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Textualism and originalism In the context of interpreting the U.S. Constitution, what is the distinction between textualism and originalism? Are the two approaches applied much outside of the U.S. in other contexts? | It is generally held that Textualism is a kind of Originalism, which is a set of theories: these theories have something in common, which sets them apart from Minimalism or Living Constitiutionalism. The problem is that it is very difficult to establish a defining canon for Originalism, whereas Textualism is a newer development prominently associated with Scalia. There are three related theories: Original Intent, Textualism, and Original Public Understanding, subsumed under the umbrella of Originalism. The textual difficulty is finding a (somewhat) contemporary advocate of Original Intent or Public Understanding who maintains that theory in the face of Textualism, so that we can see the essential principles that distinguish the theories. Smith ("Why originalism won’t die…" says that Originalism is the view, embraced by Antonin Scalia, Robert Bork, Clarence Thomas and many academic legal theorists, that the meaning of the Constitution should be settled by reference to the original understanding of those who enacted its provisions As characterized by R.G. Natelson, The original meaning (or original public meaning) is how a reasonably intelligent, involved member of the public would have interpreted a provision. Primary evidence of original meaning is how words were used in common discourse and the definitions in contemporaneous dictionaries and legal sources. Circumstantial evidence includes the drafting and ratification conventions, public debates, and so forth. The public meaning theory seems to have not gotten much traction, though it might be subsumed under an attempt within Original Intent theory to find evidence for that original intent. Scalia (the arch-Textualist) characterizes his "opponent" originalism (not textualists) saying "Originalists believe that the Constitution should be interpreted to mean exactly what it meant when it was adopted by the American people." (quote from Scalia AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 6, 2005, copied from Smith) Bork (The tempting of America) says that under the Original Intent view, "a judge is to apply the Constitution according to the principles intended by those who ratified the document" (emphasis added) A variant sub-theory is strict constructionism, and in Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, Scalia cites the case of Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 to illustrate the difference between strict construction and textualism. In this case, case where defendant was said to have used a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime when he offered it in exchange for cocaine. Scalia, opining in the minority, rejects the majority’s "strict" interpretation of the word "use", says The phrase “uses a gun” fairly [emphasis added] connoted use of a gun for what guns are normally used for, that is, as a weapon. When you ask someone “Do you use a cane?” you are not inquiring whether he has hung his grandfather’s antique cane as a decoration in the hallway. In Scalia’s theory, which is a formalist but not a mechanical theory, words are to be interpreted "fairly", rather than "strictly": A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means. Focusing on the difference between Scalia’s theory as a representative of textualism (sometimes called "original meaning" theory), and his characterization of other broadly-construed originalist theories (strict constructionism, as identified in Common-law courts…, Scalia in particular denies the relevance or even the existence of “intent” behind legislation. The first and most obvious reason this is true is that, with respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent, so that any clues provided by the legislative history are bound to be false followed by some interesting extracts from Senate floor debate that indicates how a certain bill was passed without anyone apparently reading the relevant committee report. In short, the difference between original intent and original meaning has to do with whether the words used in a statute are dispositive, or are they a guide to discerning the intention of the legislature where that intention is to be enforced. | "Tamper" implies action taken with intend to improperly change the meaning. "Alter" simply means "change". "Mutilate" simply means "damage" but in this context implies "Make unreadable". "Obliterates" here means 'make unreadable" or "remove". As a practical matter, there is not much if any difference between these words in this context, and no authority will spend any time at all considering whether some action is 'tampering" or "mutilation". The word "or" is used precisely to avoid such arguments. Any of these shades of meaning is equally forbidden. English-language laws and regulations often specify multiple synonyms or near-synonyms , connecting them with "or" so that anything within the more general scope of the concept is included. Charles Rembar, in his book The Law of the Land, asserted that this dated to the period in England shortly after the Norman Conquest, and that lawyers tended to include equivalent terms from Latin, Norman French, and English. He mentions such combinations as "Give, devise, and bequeath" and "Promise, covenant, and agree" as typical and often-used examples of this tendency. When this sort of multiple terminology is used, it is generally only useful to try to understand what is covered by the combined phrase, and of no value to try to determine which term covers which part of the concept. In the cited cases, anyone who tries to change a passport to say something that the government didn't intend, or who tries to damage or destroy a passport, or anything similar, would be guilty of the forbidden act. And similarly, anyone who tries to make an MVID read differently, or to make it unreadable, would be guilty. | Here is an example: The Author agrees to hold harmless and indemnify the Journal and The University against any legal claim or action or expense of any nature arising from any claim of infringement of copyrights or proprietary rights resulting from publication of the manuscript or claims of libel, obscenity, unlawfulness or invasion of privacy arising out of anything contained in the manuscript as furnished by the Author. Suppose Author infringes the copyright of Jones, by copying large parts of it into Author's work. Author is now in legal trouble because he illegally copied stuff into his manuscript, but Journal is also in big (bigger) legal trouble, because it made many copies of Jones' word and sold them. Jones will now sue everybody, mostly the Journal (since Journal has money, and Author doesn't). Thanks to the indemnity clause, when Journal gets sued, all of the costs (of litigation and judgment) have to be born by Author. The primary purpose is to protect Journal from suits by third parties. Nothing can keep you from getting sued, but such a clause (theoretically) means that the person whom your contracting with has to cover the cost of his wrong-doing (assuming that he is not a turnip). The term "hold harmless" is there to guarantee that Author can't decide to sue Journal for publishing a libelous or infringing article. The functions are similar, but not totally the same: this and references therein could be interesting reading, by way of more details. He argues against using both terms, and instead you should use only "indemnify". In this case, the court said "When two words are used in a contract, the rule of construction is that the words have different meanings", which caused the court to assign distinct meanings to the words (which are typically used as though they mean the same thing), which doesn't seem to have been the original intent. | 1911-1913 very shady time in USA political history. They could amend the Constitution to make a law Constitutional. There's nothing shady about that in the least. In fact, it is the point of constitutional amendments: to provide a mechanism to change the constitution when it prohibits something that an overwhelming majority of people -- well, of congress and of state legislatures -- think should be allowed. A constitutional amendment can reverse the provisions of Article I; it can reverse a constitutional ruling by a court (or at least reverse the ruling's effect); and it can certainly overcome arguments by Jefferson and Jackson, which have very little legal weight if any. Wasn't the whole point of the revolutionary war ... It doesn't matter what the point of the war was. What matters is that the constitution controls what the government can and can't do, and the constitution can change. The constitution countenanced slavery until it didn't. The constitution required senators to be chosen by state legislatures until it didn't. The constitution forbade income tax until it didn't. | See this working paper by Silvia Ferreri for an excellent write-up of this issue. The key point is that because each linguistic version of legislation is equally authentic, none can be taken as the authentic version. The court then resolves this by applying two principles: comparing the linguistic versions and giving deference to legislative intent. This is necessarily a case-by-case analysis. The paper calls attention to Case C‑445/09 arising from the Netherlands, where 9 different linguistic versions are compared and shows that the straightforward Dutch reading of the legislation in question isn't compatible with the other linguistic versions or legislative intent. In paragraph 25, the decision also contains a concise summary of the general principle of interpreting laws in multiple languages: According to settled case-law, the need for uniform application and, accordingly, for uniform interpretation of an EU measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim which the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see, inter alia, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Joined Cases C‑261/08 and C‑348/08 Zurita García and Choque Cabrera [2009] ECR I‑10143, paragraph 54; and Case C‑473/08 Eulitz [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22). | Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law There are two different meanings of the word Jurisprudence A heavy word for the study or knowledge of the law. If a judge or law lecturer were to refer to "the role of freedom of contract in our jurisprudence" for example, this is the sense intended (this is the sense @ohwilleke refers to in his answer). The second meaning - and the more usual meaning nowadays, particularly in in academic circles (I note you are studying law so this is probably the meaning you are asking about) - could be described as the philosophy of law. In Legal Philosophies (1997) J W Harris says (p.1) Jurisprudence is a ragbag. Into it are cast all kinds of general speculations about the law. What is it for? What does it achieve? Should we value it? How is it to be improved? Is it dispensable? Who makes it? Where do we find it? What is its relation to morality, to justice, to politics, to social practices, or to naked force? Should we obey it? Whom does it serve? These are the questions of which general jurisprudence is comprised. They can be ignored, but they will no go away... Jurisprudence has to entrench on [the disciplines of moral and political philosophers] at many points, as well as upon those of social and political theory. It is a scavenger, as well as a ragbag; having no perimeter to its field of enquiry, save that what is studied must have a bearing on some general speculation about law. If jurisprudence has a heartland all its own, it is legal theory Much discussion about moral claims of the law (and moral claims on the law) takes the concept of law itself for granted. Yet, answers to such questions may turn on what picture of law we have. Legal theory asks: What is the nature of law (everywhere, or just in the modern state)? In a three year English undergraduate law degree, Jurisprudence has traditionally been studied as a compulsory module in the third year which concentrates on legal theory. One thing students immediately notice is that the exact scope and definition of jurisprudence is disputed (which can be discomforting since all the other modules they have hitherto studied - Contract, Tort, Crime, etc- have clear definitions). This uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that legal theories which come under the umbrella term of legal positivism have as one of their central themes the proposition that jurisprudence should only be concerned with positive law and that legal theory need not (and should not) look outside to ideas of morality or natural law. In other words not only do different legal theories have different explanations of the phenomenon of law, but they actually disagree about the scope of what it is they are supposed to be explaining! Traditionally jurists thought of God as the ultimate law-giver whose laws were written on human hearts (conscience). This is the "natural law" which human legislators add to by creating "positive law". For example murder is contrary to natural law but you need human laws to define the different categories of homicide, the prescribed penalties, and the procedure by which accusations are tried and decided. You also need human laws to define the circumstances in which a contract comes into being etc. Note: positive in used in its old original meaning of "laid down" as distinct from natural. It is nothing to do with the modern meaning of positive as being the opposite of negative. William Blackstone, in Vol. 1, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) Page 27, wrote: This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws. Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as be is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian1 has reduced the whole doctrine of law. This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws. Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as be is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law.... Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these. There are, it is true a great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy; for, with regard to such points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, the former. To instance in the case of murder; this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the natural law; and from these prohibitions arises the true unlawfulness of this crime. Those human laws that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increase its moral guilt, or superadd any fresh obligation in foro conscientiae [in the court of conscience] to abstain from its perpetration. Nay, if any human law should allow or enjoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law, or else we must offend both the natural and the divine. But with regard to matters that are in themselves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by those superior laws; such, for instance, as exporting of wool into foreign countries; here the inferior legislature has scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make that action unlawful which before was not so... In the Province of Jurisprudece Determined (1832) John Austin wrote at length about both natural law and positive law and sought to draw a line of distinction between them: AS one of the Law-Professors at the University of London, I planned and partly delivered a systematical Course of Lectures on General or Abstract Jurisprudence. In the ten lectures delivered at the beginning of my Course, I distinguished positive law (the appropriate matter of jurisprudence) from various objects with which it is connected by resemblance, and from various other objects to which it is allied by analogy. Out of those ten discourses, I have made the treatise which I now submit to the public, and which I venture to entitle “the province of jurisprudence determined.” Determining the characters of positive laws, I determine implicitly the notion of sovereignty, with the implied or correlative notion of independent political society. For the essential difference of a positive law (or the difference that severs it from a law which is not a positive law) may be stated generally in the following manner. Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body > is sovereign or supreme. Or (changing the phrase) it is set by a monarch, or sovereign number, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author. To elucidate the nature of sovereignty, and of the independent political society that sovereignty implies, I examine various topics which I arrange under the following heads: First, the possible forms or shapes of supreme political government; second, the limits, real or imaginary, of supreme political power; thirdly, the origin or causes of political government and society. Examining those various topics, I complete my description of the limit or boundary by which positive law is severed from positive morality. For I distinguish them at certain points whereat they seemingly blend, or whereat the line which divides them is not easily perceptitible. Austin's account of positive law (essentially a command of a sovereign accompanied by a threat of sanction for non-compliance) has been criticised as being simplistic and of failing to provide an adequate explanation of law and legal systems, but to be fair to Austin he never claimed that his theory of positive law could alone explain what happens in legal systems. He recognised the influence of natural law/morality as part of an explanation. He simply wished to define the limits of Jurispudence as an academic subject, which he did narrowly. Some jurists, however, have subsequently sought to produce theories of law which seek to explain what the phenomenon of law is, and how it works, based only on positive law. Such theorists are called "positivists" and their school of thought is called legal positivism. In 1960 Hans Kelsen published Reine Rechtslehre which was translated into English in 1967 as The Pure Theory of Law. As the word pure in the title suggests Kelsen's theory is in the legal positivism school of thought - i.e. it seeks to explain law and legal systems by reference only to positive law. Kelsen himself was a moral relativist but not all legal positivists are necessarily atheists or moral relativists. Some may personally think that natural law/morality is important but nevertheless think that the discipline of law should be "self contained" and should be capable of being completely and satisfactorily explained without brining natural law/morality etc. into it. Natural lawyers critique the theories of legal positivism by saying that they are incomplete as they leave so much unexplained. Legal Positivists reply that their theories have a restricted scope precisely because everything outside the scope of the theory is not really law at all and so does not need to be explained by the theory. So you can see that the definition of Jurisprudence is rather woolly but philosophy of law with particular emphasis on competing theories of what the phenomenon of law actually is might be a short rough definition to convey the general idea of Jurisprudence as the word in generally used today. | Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged. | The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in. |
Does originalism address how to amend the Constitution for changing values? Originalism is a method for interpreting law by enforcing what the text meant to the people who originally wrote it. Following originalism rights are adjusted to the current values of people by passing laws, which seems to be reasonable in practice. However from what I've read of it the Constitution is very broad. It rarely dives into specifics but rather gives a high level statement, seemingly to be carried out by legislation and the judicial process. For example "cruel and unusual" in the 8th amendment. Justice Anthony Scalia, one of the biggest proponents of originalism, stated that the death penalty wasn't included under it because it was legal at the time the text was written. Under originalism modern society needs to amend the Constitution if it wants to include the death penalty or anything else under "cruel and unusual". Do proponents of originalism suggest the new amendment use the phrase "cruel and unusual" but with the understanding that those words now mean something different? Or that it specifically call out the death penalty and everything else? I wonder because the former would be strange and possibly confusing, and the latter greatly restricts amendments by not allowing them to paint with a broad stroke as the original text did. | The actual method of amending the Constition is spelled out in Article V – originalism would reject the position that there are other ways to amend it. We can see the result in the ratified amendments. Originalism is a theory of interpretation, not a theory of drafting, and it hold that the words of the law, be it the Constitution or a particular statute, are to be understood as would be understood by people originally. (There are numerous versions of originalism, so one can't be more precise than than until you decide whether you mean original understanding or original intent, the latter now being a minority viewpoint). It does not hold that new laws should be drafted in the language as it existed in the 18th century, as indeed they are not. Thus the 26th Amendment is written in contemporary style befitting the fact that it was drafted recently, and the 27th Amendment is written in older style befitting the fact that it was drafted in 1789. As for "changing values", each ratified amendment represents some change of values, whereby originally a right was not recognized (or was), and by the amendment, that value changes. The 18th Amendment represents on change in values, and the 21st reflects a change in that value, though not back to the status quo. | The scenario in the question says that: They [3/4ths of citizens] agree that normal processes like public testimony, initiatives, referenda, elections, and recall effort have failed to make any changes that the public wants Nobody is suggesting violence or rebellion. All processes will follow pre-abolishment laws. But if "normal processes" cannot be used to make the changes desired, then "pre-abolishment laws" are not being followed in all respects. Moreover, id the current elected officials do not agree to be replaced, then violence of some degree will be needed to remove them, or they may initiate violence in the form of attempted arrests of those leading the change process for violations of those "pre-abolishment laws". So these conditions are inconsistent, they cannot all be true. Luther v. Borden There is at least one highly relevant episode in US history, adn it was explored in the Supreme Court case of Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) In connection with he opinion the Justia Syllabus says: At the period of the American Revolution, Rhode Island did not, like the other States, adopt a new constitution, but continued the form of government established by the Charter of Charles the Second, making only such alterations, by acts of the Legislature, as were necessary to adapt it to their condition and rights as an independent State. But no mode of proceeding was pointed out by which amendments might be made. In 1841, a portion of the people held meetings and formed associations which resulted in the election of a convention to form a new constitution to be submitted to the people for their adoption or rejection. This convention framed a constitution, directed a vote to be taken upon it, declared afterwards that it had been adopted and ratified by a majority of the people of the State, and was the paramount law and constitution of Rhode Island. Under it, elections were held for Governor, members of the Legislature, and other officers, who assembled together in May, 1842, and proceeded to organize the new government. But the charter government did not acquiesce in these proceedings. On the contrary, it passed stringent laws, and finally passed an act declaring the State under martial law. In May, 1843, a new constitution, which had been framed by a convention called together by the charter government, went into operation, and has continued ever since. The question which of the two opposing governments was the legitimate one, viz., the charter government or the government established by the voluntary convention, has not heretofore been regarded as a judicial one in any of the State courts. The political department has always determined whether a proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision. The courts of Rhode Island have decided in favor of the validity of the charter government, and the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and laws of the state. The question whether or not a majority of those persons entitled to suffrage voted to adopt a constitution cannot be settled in a judicial proceeding. The Constitution of the United States has treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power of recognizing a State government in the hands of Congress. Under the existing legislation of Congress, the exercise of this power by courts would be entirely inconsistent with that legislation. The President of the United States is vested with certain power by an act of Congress, and in this case, he exercised that power by recognizing the charter government. Although no State could establish a permanent military government, yet it may use its military power to put down an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The State must determine for itself what degree of force the crisis demands. In the Court's formal opinion, Chief Justice Taney wrote: We do not understand from the argument that the constitution under which the plaintiff acted is supposed to have been in force after the constitution of May, 1843, went into operation. T he contest is confined to the year preceding. The plaintiff contends that the charter government was displaced, and ceased to have any lawful power, after the organization, in May, 1842, of the government which he supported, and although that government never was able to exercise any authority in the State nor to command obedience to its laws or to its officers, yet he insists that it was the lawful and established government upon the ground that it was ratified by a large majority of the male people of the State of the age of twenty-one and upwards, and also by a majority of those who were entitled to vote for general officers under the then existing laws of the State. The fact that it was so ratified was not admitted, and, at the trial in the Circuit Court, he offered to prove it by the production of the original ballots and the original registers of the persons voting, verified by the oaths of the several moderators and clerks of the meetings, and by the testimony of all the persons so voting, and by the said constitution, and also offered in evidence for the same purpose that part of the census of the United States for the year 1840 which applies to Rhode Island and a certificate of the secretary of state of the charter government showing the number of votes polled by the freemen of the State for the ten years then last past. The Circuit Court rejected this evidence, and instructed the jury that the charter government and laws under which the defendants acted were, at the time the trespass is alleged to have been committed, in full force and effect as the form of government and paramount law of the State, and constituted a justification of the acts of the defendants as set forth in their pleas. It is this opinion of the Circuit Court that we are now called upon to review. ... Certainly the question which the plaintiff proposed to raise by the testimony he offered has not heretofore been recognized as a judicial one in any of the State courts. In forming the constitutions of the different States after the Declaration of Independence, and in the various changes and alterations which have since been made, the political department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision. ... The point, then, raised here has been already decided by the courts of Rhode Island. The question relates altogether to the constitution and laws of that State, and the well settled rule in this court is that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and laws of the State. ... Besides, if the Circuit Court had entered upon this inquiry, by what rule could it have determined the qualification of voters upon the adoption or rejection of the proposed constitution unless there was some previous law of the State to guide it? It is the province of a court to expound the law, not to make it. And certainly it is no part of the judicial functions of any court of the United States to prescribe the qualification of voters in a State, giving the right to those to whom it is denied by the written and established constitution and laws of the State, or taking it away from those to whom it is given; nor has it the right to determine what political privileges the citizens of a State are entitled to, unless there is an established constitution or law to govern its decision. ... he fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States provides that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on the application of the legislature or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. Under this article of the Constitution, it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State. For as the United States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority. ... ... by the act of February 28, 1795, provided that, in case of an insurrection in any State against the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the legislature of such State or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or States, as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to sufficient to suppress such insurrection. ... By this act, the power of deciding whether the exigency had arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound to interfere is given to the President. He is to act upon the application of the legislature or of the executive, and consequently he must determine what body of men constitute the legislature, and who is the governor, before he can act. The fact that both parties claim the right to the government cannot alter the case, for both cannot be entitled to it. ... ... It is true that, in this case, the militia were not called out by the President. But, upon the application of the governor under the charter government, the President recognized him as the executive power of the State, and took measures to call out the militia to support his authority if it should be found necessary for the general government to interfere, and it is admitted in the argument that it was the knowledge of this decision that put an end to the armed opposition to the charter government and prevented any further efforts to establish by force the proposed constitution. The interference of the President, therefore, by announcing his determination was as effectual as if the militia had been assembled under his orders. And it should be equally authoritative. ... The court thus upheld the verdict for the defendants, and the authority o the government recognized by the President. It should be noted that this Case arose before the passage of the 14th and 15th amendments to the Federal Constitution, and particularly the Equal protection and Sue process clauses of the 14th, and the "one man, one vote" cases later decided under those clauses. If a state government in 2020 had laws similar to the Charter Government of Rhode Island in 1840, they would be struck down as against those clauses and amendments. But unless an "abolishment" as described in the question were to be recognized and the resulting government approved by the President and Congress, it would not be lawful, and federal authority and military force could be used to support the lawful government. | You're largely correct, though there's some vocabulary you're using that could go either way in terms of proper understanding. My comments on your understanding, presuming we're dealing with two Berne countries (UCC is largely irrelevant these days): My understanding of copyright is that it grants the author an exclusive right to distribute their work in whatever manner they'd like for some amount of time (determined by the copyright duration in a country). Generally correct though there can be many exceptions here (fair use, technical/temporary copying, first-sale doctrine, etc.). Can a person in Country A legally use the adapted work? I'm assuming no [...], Basically correct, whoever holds rights to the original work could theoretically still assert their rights in Country A on any portion of the derivative work that was part of the original. [...] does that mean that the author of the work created in Country B does not technically have all the rights to the work they created, since they have no control over whether their work can be distributed in Country A? This is splitting hairs, but while the derivative author has the rights given to them by copyright law, they aren't absolute. In particular in this case, regardless of which country, they still don't have any inherent exclusive rights over the original work. With respect to country B, those exclusive rights have expired so they don't bind the derivative author, but they haven't expired in country A. If that is the case, then would these rights be "granted" to the author of the adaptation when the copyright finally expires in Country A? Again splitting hairs, but its more helpful to express that no rights are actively granted by the expiration of copyright in Country A, it's just that no one holds those rights anymore (here there might be a language issue too, generally in copyright law "rights" refers to those exclusive actions that may be taken by the copyright holder, and not always to the "right" i.e. "freedom" for someone to do something). | The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation, also called the "Constitution Annotated", is the constitution of record: the only constitutional law treatise formally authorized by federal law, the Constitution Annotated functions as the official Constitution of record What version is authoritative can be meaningful. See William W. Van Alstyne, "A Constitutional Conundrum of Second Amendment Commas". And although phoog and I have provided different answers, I think we are both correct. The text as shown in the Constitution Annotated is what is universally accepted as the version to quote from in judicial submissions and reasons. But it's because it has drawn from the version in phoog's answer. Basically, the document in the archives is authoritative, but there is no need for writers and judges to go look at that when they are quoting, because the Constitution Annotated is deemed to have replicated that content faithfully. | The eighth amendment, by prohibiting excessive bail, implies that pretrial detention is constitutional in at least some circumstances: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Some may be surprised to learn that this was not at all innovative. There is a virtually identical clause in the English Bill of Rights, a century earlier: That excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted. From this it should be clear that pretrial detention was already widely accepted as necessary in some cases (in fact, it was the norm for centuries), so it is unlikely that anyone thought that the constitution or bill of rights had sought to abolish it. The assertion that pretrial detention is illegal as a means of punishment follows directly from two principles, namely: That the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. It is not appropriate to punish someone whose guilt has not been proven. That the purpose of pretrial detention, in keeping with the presumption of innocence, is not to punish. Rather, it is primarily intended to secure the presence of the accused at trial and to prevent the person from committing more crimes. Wikipedia has more information at its articles on bail and the eighth amendment's excessive bail clause. Consequently, there is unlikely to be any case in which the constitutionality of pretrial detention, generally, is at issue. Rather, you will find cases in which particular elements of an individual's pretrial detention are alleged to violate some constitutional right, which, in addition to the protections already mentioned, includes the right to a speedy trial. | The will is overridden by the new law. Suppose the owner had not died: then he would have to comply with the change in the law. When a person inherits property, they gain the right to that property which the originally had, and they do not gain any additional immunity to the usual obligation to obey the law. | Are laws written logically and rigorously? No. Laws are not consistently written to any consistent stylistic standards. Whatever legislators approve becomes the law even if the law is poorly drafted. While some legislative bodies, such as the Joint Tax Committee of the U.S. Congress and the legislative services department of many state legislatures encourage good, or at least consistent, drafting practices, these standards are routinely ignored in the course of the legislative process. This is particularly true in the United States, since it does not have a "House of Revision" akin to the House of Lords or the Canadian Senate, that is concerned primarily with the quality of legislative drafting, and also does not have law that are drafted by the secure majority of a Prime Minster in most parliamentary systems. Instead, in the U.S. there is constant haggling and negotiation on a bill by bill basis at every step of the legislative process right up through a conference committee reconciling different versions of a bill that arise between two houses of a bicameral legislature. As a result, the key drafting priority is to secure support of a majority of legislators in two houses of the bicameral legislature and then avoiding a veto of the final product, and that objective is pre-eminent over the objective of good drafting. Frequently, in the U.S., legislation is intentionally drafted ambiguously in order to secure its passage with different legislators essentially making "bets" on the courts interpreting the language which is known to be ambiguous in the manner that they prefer. Sometimes legal language that is very precise and logical is interpreted to mean something completely different than what it literally says. For example, consider the 11th Amendment to the United States which says: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. This is an amendment to Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 1 of the United States Constitution, which says: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State,—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. But, what the 11th Amendment actually means is that states retain sovereign immunity in most cases. The governing principle in interpreting legislation is not logic but legislative intent. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. summed up the situation famously when he said: The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. | Legalese The purpose of a legal document is to set out the rights and responsibilities so that: they can understand them, a third party (e.g. a judge) can rule on them in the event of a dispute. These two requirements are often in tension. We have about 1,000 years of legal precedent where certain words and phrases (sometimes in Latin rather than English) have developed very clear and precise meanings. This serves very well for the 2nd point but it can be confusing to lay people especially where: the word as used in everyday speech has a broader meaning than the way it is used in the law (e.g. shall), the word is no longer used in everyday speech (e.g. thou), or the damn thing is in Latin (e.g. certiorari). For example: "Thou shall not kill" is a legal prohibition - killing by you must not happen. However, "Killing is illegal" is merely an observation. TL;DR There is no reason why an agreement cannot be expressed in plain English. However, when put in front of a judge, that plain English must be interpreted; maybe it is better to use words that have clear and unambiguous legal definitions? An anecdote, probably untrue In the spirit of never letting the truth get in the way of a good story. The legal fraternity's love of opaque language supposedly dates from the 1600s. In those days a lawyer was paid by the folio - a large piece of paper. As a consequence lawyers used very big handwriting. Parliament, justifiably, thought that this was a rort and legislated that lawyers must be paid by the word. So now we have "in the event that" instead of "if" because 400 years ago it was worth four times as much. Parliaments do this kind of thing a lot. |
When can punching be legal? My neighbor kissed my wife. I was pissed and wanted to punch him in his face. But I was able to suppress my anger. If I did punch him, would that be okay? I saw people punch one another over this in movies. Kissing my wife is adultery right? | If I did punch him , would that be okay? No, that would be Assault and Battery. If you did him serious injury you could face a charge of Grievous Bodily Harm. If you killed him, that would be murder. If you are in the UK, Canada or Australia and you were charged with murder you could claim provocation in an attempt to have the charge reduced to Voluntary Manslaughter. If you were in the US you could attempt to argue "extreme emotional or mental distress" if you are in a state that has adopted the Model Penal Code for any of the charges; if successful your sentence would be reduced. I saw people punch one another over this in movies. And I saw aliens invading the Earth in the movies - what happens in the movies if not necessarily true. Kissing my wife is adultery right? No, extramarital sex is adultery. Notwithstanding, adultery is not illegal in common-law countries. I'm pissed and don't know what to do? I sympathise with you but this is not a legal question. Whatever is going on between you, your wife and your neighbour is a social situation; not a legal one. | I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!). | Assuming these are common law crimes (Kenya is a common law country - sort of) or statutory crimes that have codified common law crimes without substantially changing them. It is not attempted murder - this requires an intent to kill. Pulling the trigger would have that intent, pointing it doesn't. It is assault if it puts the victim in fear of immediate harm (pretty sure it would). There are probably some statutory firearms offences too. | Legally, they can kick you out for any reason that isn't illegal discrimination. They can't kick you out for being black. They also can't kick you out for being white. But they can kick you out for not liking your face. Now the question is: Who can kick you out? The store owner obviously can. Anyone who is given the authority by the store owner can. Actually, anyone with the apparent authority can kick you out. However, everyone other than the store owner has been hired to work towards making profits. If throwing you out is bad for business, then whoever did it would have to answer to the store owner. So the ex-friend can't go to court for throwing you out, but they might get into trouble with their boss about it. PS. I interpreted "kicking out" as saying "Please leave our premises. If you don't leave then you will be trespassing and I will call the police", not actually kicking the person with your foot which would be most likely assault. | A problem with the question is that it uses the loaded term "victim". If you change the question to "Are there actions that you can perform involving another person, which are crimes even if the other person consents to participating in the action", then there are very many. Selling alcohol to a minor; selling heroin to anyone; selling sex in most US jurisdictions; selling firearms to a convicted felon. Also, for a physician to assist a person in suicide, in most states. Formerly in the US, various forms of sexual intercourse were acts that consent did not make legal. Whether or not the person is a "victim" in these cases is open to debate. In the case of physician-assisted suicide in Washington, the doctor is allowed to prescribe (oral) drugs that the person ingests: only a doctor is permitted to do this, both under the DWD Act and as a consequence that only a doctor can prescribe the drugs. There seems to be a belief that it is a crime to assist a person in committing suicide, which is probably correct if the assistance is shooting the person in the head, or in general directly causing the death (thus, "I give you permission to shoot me in the head" doesn't cut it). But from what I can tell, it is not generally against the law in Washington to help a person who commits suicide (e.g. supplying the means of self-dispatching). In some countries, suicide and helping with suicide is illegal, e.g. in Kenya Penal Code 225 says Any person who (a) procures another to kill himself; or (b) counsels another to kill himself and thereby induces him to do so; or (c) aids another in killing himself, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for life. No exception is created if the person consents to being aided to kill himself. | No, it's not legal. This is the tort of assault, not to be confused with criminal assault. A tort of assault does not require actual contact, whereas some jurisdictions define criminal assault elements as those of battery; in others, it is an intended battery without the contact. The elements of common law assault are: A positive, voluntary act You can't do this accidentally or negligently That intentionally causes reasonable apprehension in the plaintiff The person must reasonably apprehend contact. However, this is a subjective standard. If the plaintiff does not apprehend contact, then this element is not satisfied. Additionally, while words alone are rarely enough to satisfy this element, words in a certain tone, or with certain actions, may be. Also, verbal threats are not required for this element. Of immediate You can't assault someone by threatening them with something that'll happen in the future, if it's distant enough. Whether this is distant enough is decided on a case-by-case basis. Unlawful contact The contact needs to be unlawful and harmful. In the situation you describe, a civil action in assault would have all requirements fulfilled. You might also succeed in pressing criminal charges, depending on the jurisdiction concerned. Police officers generally have the power to maintain the peace, and an assault is most definitely a breach of the peace. Again, depending on the jurisdiction, they may have the power to detain them, or to ask them to move along, for example. | A private venue normally has discretion over who may attend their premises, as long as it is not because of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination law. Note that the communication, as quoted, did not say that the banned person was a threat, but only that one of the performers felt uncomfortable. I do not think that the banned person has any legal recourse, unless they can plausibly assert that this is a case of unlawful discrimination, which the question does not suggest. | united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority. |
Why do some data controllers require two forms of ID and others only one? Meet Bob. Bob has submitted a number of subject access requests to various data controlling bodies, including businesses and several police forces. Some police forces simply require scan of id with photo, name, dob, while others need two forms including proof of address. However it is not clear from their requirements whether both must indicate all the required informations or if they simply must both between them indicate all of them. Are there rules on what requirements may be deemed unlawfully or excessively onerous as preconditions for complying with a SAR? And why would they require this when other perfectly analogous police forces are happy with one basic photo ID? Both aspects: why do they need your address (and what if you are a vagabond/nomad with NFA?), And why is one id not good enough? | Verifying the identity of the person making an SAR is a requirement (for fairly obvious reasons) but there's no specified way this is to be done. As the ICO puts it: If you’re not sure the requester is who they say they are, you must check this quickly. You shouldn’t ask for formal ID unless it’s necessary and proportionate. Instead, you could ask questions that only they would know, about reference numbers or appointment details for example. Or you can ask for ID that you can actually verify. There’s little point insisting on photo ID if you don’t know what the requester looks like – it should be proportionate. The key word to take account of here is "proportionate" - and this is going to hinge on not just the data the SAR is asking for but the type of data that the Data Controller/Processor is handling. A police force is likely to be storing far more sensitive data about the data subject than e.g. a retailer and you'd expect a more robust identification process. The fact that the law doesn't specify ID requirements is what will lead to different organisations having different requirements - they've ultimately had a large amount of leeway in determining what is appropriate themselves, and that leads naturally to variation. In general terms (rather than specifically for SARs) requiring two forms of ID is not uncommon, it does after all increase the security of the process. Pick-pocketing someone's wallet will often get you their driver's license but it will rarely get their wallet and their recent utility bill. Successfully intercepting a utility bill won't get you their driver's license. It's not perfect but it raises the difficulty of circumventing the check. Are there rules on what requirements may be deemed unlawfully or excessively onerous as preconditions for complying with a SAR? If Bob feels the ID requirements are too extreme they can complain to the ICO and if they agree they can "advise" the data controller to ease up on the requirements and if this fails to reach a satisfactory outcome Bob ca take legal action - but I doubt the examples given would raise any concern. Even the two-forms level is only on a par with the requirements many agencies have for renting a car. why do they need your address (and what if you are a vagabond/nomad with NFA?) In addition to the ID-aspects having your address may be necessary in terms of communicating with you regarding the SAR. If you're someone of no fixed address this requirement may provide difficulties of course - but SARs are by no means unique in this regard. Talking to the data controller and seeing if they would be willing to accept either an alternative second form of ID or waiving the requirement altogether would be the logical first step in such circumstances. | Identification rules vary from state to state, but there is no state which would require a person in Mr. Walker's position to identify themselves to law enforcement. The passenger is compelled to produce identification to law enforcement through the threat of illegal violence. | According to this article, the Malmö Administrative District Court found that the intent of the user is immaterial to whether a camera is being used for surveillance, so even if that is not why you are doing this, it counts legally as "surveillance". The law requires a permit from the länsstyrelse (county? government), according to the Kameraövervakningslag (2013:460) (article 8 states the requirement for permit, art. 16 tells you who to apply to). I believe that a tennis court would be considered a "public place", even if privately owned. Art. 17 tells you what goes into an application (there is probably a form), and art. 18 says that the kommun gets to weigh in. Presumably it would be critical to have a consent form signed before any recording happens, and you would include that in the application. | Data can only be processed if there is at least one lawful basis to do so. The lawful bases for processing data are: the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes. processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract. processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject. processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person. processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. So unless you have some very compelling reason to need to process that person's data without their consent, you can't legally do it. Therefore it is hard to see how you could produce this "template", and even if you somehow did the person receiving it might not have a lawful basis for fetching (processing) that data anyway. | It depends. Can the data controller or another person, with "means reasonably likely to be used," (see clause 26 of the preamble of the GDPR) use that data alone or in combination with other data to identify a natural person? If yes, it is personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. If no, it is not personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. Anonymous data is not subject to the GDPR. "The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes." Assigning an unique alphanumeric code to a thing does not necessarily make the code and/or the thing "personal data". But if you have a set of data that is or can be linked by the unique alphanumeric code (e.g. as a primary key in a set of tables) and you can use it to identify a person, then it is personal data. Either way, to be GDPR-compliant / to mitigate risk you should make some kind of record to reflect that process of thinking and what you decided. And if the answer is Yes, it is personal data, then you should record your "lawful basis" for processing the data and how you decided that. | The common law is permissive That is to say that, in a common law jurisdiction, the law is about what you must not do rather than about what you must do. Now, particular statutes may be phrased as requiring certain actions but, if you read them the “common law way” to coin a phrase, they are really imposing sanctions for doing the prohibited thing that falls outside those parameters. Since there is no legal prohibition on using multiple names (simultaneously or sequentially) you are free to do so. Now, there are common law prohibitions of, for example, fraud or tax evasion. So, if you use different names for the purpose of doing those prohibited things, then that is illegal but it is the specific criminality that is sanctioned, not the use of the alias in perpetrating it. The UK has a law that makes it a crime to not register the birth of a child. It also imposes some (and by most country’s standards, very few) restrictions on the name a child can be registered under. But there is no legal obligation on the child or their parents to use the registered name in any particular circumstances. There may be difficulties (amounting to impossibility in some cases) in obtaining a passport, opening a bank account, or claiming social security under a non-registered name but that is due to the necessity to identify the individual for which the name serves as a proxy. However, outside the requirements of specific statutes or administrative procedures, the common law position is that your name is what people call you and you identify as your name. The second part is important - I have been called dickhead on many occasions but I do not consider it to be my name. The UK has a patronymic tradition for surnames so, usually, on marriage, the female adopts the surname of the male and that, through the marriage certificate, becomes her registered name. However, it is extremely common for women to continue to use their original (and now not registered) name in their professional life and her new name in her private life. This can be problematic. My wife, has on server all occasions been refused permission to board a plane because the ticket (booked by others) was in her maiden name - a name for which she has no official identification. However, that’s a procedural problem - she didn’t do anything illegal. | Reporting that an SS card is lost or stolen could be useful for two reasons: obtaining a replacement, and finding and prosecuting the perpetrator. You can obtain a replacement card from SSA at any time, and they do not require a justification for a card (they do not investigate thefts). The local police can investigate, but will only investigate a theft (not a simple loss). Their interest would be in prosecuting the perpetrator (and possibly retrieving the stolen property). In the course of investigating, the police will ask (in some form) if you have a clue where it is, and if you do not admit that you know where it is, they can prosecute you, because that would violate your state's version of the false statement law (Washington example here). The physical card is not so important: loan applications etc. don't require producing a physical SS card: what they need is the number on the card. | As a native English speaker I would read this as requiring the DPO to monitor all the things listed (i.e. you are correct). Furthermore it would be ridiculous for the DPO to be personally responsible for doing all of these things. If you were supposed to perform "assignment of responsibilities" yourself that would pretty much make you the Chief Operations Officer. If you are only required to monitor job assignments for compliance then by the same logic you are only required to monitor training. Having said that, there is an established principle in the safety industry that compliance should have an independent reporting line up to the top management, and I think its the same for financial regulations too. You cannot be an effective DPO if you are just watching from the sidelines. So I would expect a DPO to have: Line responsibility for audits and routine compliance work such as privacy impact assessments, with a dedicated team of people if necessary. This ensures that there is an independent reporting line from everyday work up to the DPO. Do not accept a situation where data protection work is carried out by the project and then handed to you to file once it is complete, because it never will be. Project managers have a lot of competing priorities and they are extremely good at avoiding anything that sits between them and project completion. You MUST have your own people in the project to see what is happening and the power to stop a project if it is not compliant. If they won't give you that, turn down the job. Budget responsibility for training (with the work actually done by specialist contractors or the company in-house training department) Notification of job assignments where data protection is part of the responsibility. |
Is mooning people in the UK legal? If one pulls down one's trousers and underwear to expose one's buttocks but without intention to expose any part of one's genitals, for the purpose of conveying one's disapproval and irreverence to another, (also called "mooning"), do they commit an offence in any part of the UK? UK specified, all other jurisdictions, esp. USA welcome. | In English law there isn't a specific offence of "mooning". However: It is conceivable that under Public Order legislation someone mooning could be found guilty of causing "harassment, alarm or distress". There was a man arrested for mooning a speed camera, charged with a public order offence and subsequently acquitted. In 2010 a Kent man was issued with an anti-social behaviour order (ASBO) that banned him from mooning (among other things). ASBOs were civil orders, breach of which was a criminal offence. Had that man continued to moon, he could have been found guilty of the criminal offence of breaching the order. (ASBOs have since been replaced with a system of civil injunctions and civil behaviour orders.) It is conceivable that repeatedly mooning one or more particular people would be deemed harrassment. I am not aware of criminal cases but there was an employment tribunal case that found the person had committed sexual harrassment in the workplace because they had mooned a colleague. At common law it is an offence to outrage public decency, "an act which is lewd, obscene or of disgusting character, which outrages minimum standards of public decency as assessed by the jury." I doubt whether a brief moon would amount to that; worse behaviour might. | What you're asking about is extraterritorial jurisdiction, and it will depend on the country and crime(s) involved. As an example, under Australian law, it is a crime to engage in sexual activities with minors barring specific exemptions, which are not relevant to this example. There are countries where the age of majority is less than that in Australia. If you were to travel to this country, you are not necessarily committing a crime there. However, Australia's sex tourism laws make it a crime to do this anywhere in the world. This is enacted (I believe) under the foreign affairs power of the Commonwealth Government. It will largely depend on the legal system of your country, as to whether laws have extraterritorial effect. In general, however, laws do not have extraterritorial effect unless explicitly stated. | There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced. | Is it true that I cannot buy a puppy and smash it deliberately for my perverse amusement (regardless of whether it's in front of them or not)? If I cannot, can you point me to the relevant laws? Is it true that I cannot buy a cow or a pig and throw it into a woodchipper similarly for my perverse amusement? If I cannot, can you point me to the relevant laws? You can't do either of these things. Every state has some sort of law banning cruelty to animals. For example, in Colorado, the laws prohibiting cruelty to animals are codified at Sections 18-9-201 to 18-9-209, Colorado Revised Statutes. The core language of the statute is codified at Section 18-9-202(1)-(1.5) (as of July 1, 2014) which states (in language that is not atypical nationally) that: (1)(a) A person commits cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence ovedrives, overloads, overworks, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beats, allows to be housed in a manner that results in chronic or repeated serious physical harm, carries or confines in or upon any vehicles in a cruel or reckless manner, engages in a sexual act with an animal, or otherwise mistreats or neglects any animal, or causes or procures it to be done, or having the charge or custody or ay animal, fails to provide it with proper food, drink or protection from weather consistent with the species, breed, and type of animal involved, or abandons an animal. (1)(b) Any person who intentionally abandons a dog or cat commits the offense of cruelty to animals. (1.5)(a) A person who commits cruelty to animals if he or she recklessly or with criminal negligence tortures, needlessly mutilates, or needlessly kills an animal. (1.5)(b) A person commits aggravated cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly tortures, needlessly mutilates, or needlessly kills an animal. (1.5)(c) A person commits cruelty to a service animal if he or she violates the provisions of subsection (1) of this section with respect to a service animal . . . whether the service animal is on duty or not on duty. The rest of the statute mostly spells out sentences and other remedies and definitions applicable to these offenses. For what it is worth, the laws against cruelty to animals, and the now obsolete laws prohibiting cruelty to slaves that existed when slavery was legal in the U.S., were quite similar. So, yes, an animal (pet or otherwise, there is almost no formal legal distinction between pets and non-pets, even though in practice, people evaluate what is cruel to a pet and to a farm animal differently) is property. Yes, someone who owns an animal may intentionally kill it or maim it, or have someone acting at the owner's instructions do so. But, an owner must do so humanely under the circumstances and must do so for a good reason (such as for food, to put down a sick or injured or dangerous animal, or for experimental research). Ranking states is a bit difficult. There are some states that have felony cruelty to animals statutes and some that don't. I don't have the time to look for an exhaustive survey of the law state by state (one summary is here). There are some states that are quite specific (like Colorado) and others that are more general in language. Idaho has an express provision that killing animals that are harrying livestock is an acceptable reason. Some of the difference boils down to how the law is applied in practice, rather than to the language of the statutes on the books. The overall gist of the statutes, however, is pretty similar: don't be cruel in how you do it, and don't harm animals if you don't have a good reason for doing so. There is also a lot of conduct (for example, separating mothers and young children, amputating body parts such as claws or tails or reproductive organs without consent, or confining and leashing them) that would cause emotional harm to animals and which would be grave human rights abuses, that is not prohibited as cruelty to animals. Similarly, there are many farming practices that are accepted as not violating these laws like the process of creating veal or foie gras that could be characterized as cruel but are accepted as not violating the laws against cruelty to animals. To a great extent, these exceptions, which are rarely codified, are simply a matter of custom and practice and tradition, rather than having any well reasoned logical derivation from statutory language. | Are there any laws or regulations in place to prevent companies from using deceptive names or branding? united-kingdom Yes. The applicable legislation may be found in the Companies Act 2006. Section 1198 states that: (1) A person must not carry on business in the United Kingdom under a name that gives so misleading an indication of the nature of the activities of the business as to be likely to cause harm to the public (2) A person who uses a name in contravention of this section commits an offence. [...] Also a further provision at Section 54 states that: (1) The approval of the Secretary of State is required for a company to be registered under this Act by a name that would be likely to give the impression that the company is connected with— (a) Her (sic) Majesty's Government, any part of the Scottish administration, the Welsh Assembly Government or Her Majesty's Government in Northern Ireland, (b) a local authority, or (c) any public authority specified for the purposes of this section by regulations made by the Secretary of State. [...] The Regulations referred to above are the Company, Limited Liability Partnership and Business Names (Sensitive Words and Expressions) Regulations 2014 which lists, at Schedule 1, a host of words and expressions that are prohibited or require approval as the case may be. This list is far too long to reproduce in full, but by way of example it includes: Bank Charity Child support Police Royal Stock exchange University | Note that "pedophilia" is a psycological or social term, and not a legal term. What laws prohibit is the creation, distribution, and possession of child pronography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. This means that there is no offense if no real child is involved, and this is also true of the various other US laws on child porn. Since the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) erotica which appear to depict a minor engaging in sexual activity, but which are not depictions of any actual child are protected speech under the US First Amendment and are therefor not criminal. So called "furry cub porn" might include modified images of actual minors, in which case it would seem to be covered under US laws against child porn. But if the character is totally invented, or is based on an adult rather than a minor, then it would seem to come under the rule of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Note, the law in other countries is significantly different. In particular in the UK a realistic drawing may be considered to be a "pesudo-photograph" even if not based on an actual person, and may be punishable in the same way as an actual photo of an actual minor. Note also, the making, distribution, or posse ion of 'child porn' is a very serious criminal offense. I am not a lawyer, and one should not rely on this post to determine what acts are and are not legally safe. If there is any question, consult a lawyer. Note also that under the above statute (18 U.S.C. § 2251), something may be "child pornography" if the person involved is a minor, even if that person is old enough under local law to consent to sexual activity, and even if the person did in fact so consent, and even if there was no intent to distribute the image or video. So a person taking, say, a cell-phone video of him- or herself having sex with a 17-year-old, intended for personal watching only, in a state where the age of consent to sex is 16, can still be found guilty under this law, and such cases have occurred. | Not disclosing transgender identity is not a crime of any kind, not rape, not fraud, not anything else. There is really no qualification to this statement. There is pretty much no plausible scenario in which concealing a transgender identity leads to liability for fraud of any kind and this never constitutes rape by deception. What is a crime and is regularly prosecuted, is retaliating against the person or property of someone who they discover is transgender while having sex. Incidents like these happen with some frequency and they alway create criminal liability for the person retaliating and never for the transgender individual in the cases where the transgender individual isn't killed (dozens of time each year in the U.S. the transgender individual is killed in a situation like this one). | Racing would likely be commiting an offence under the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, Section 28 Every person who in any street, to the obstruction, annoyance, or danger of the residents or passengers, commits any of the following offences... [F23] Every person who rides or drives furiously any horse or carriage, or drives furiously any cattle |
Are the attorney ratings on the website avvo.com reliable? I am relying on the ratings on Avvo to determine who I should choose. Is it reliable? | No. Avvo.com is effectively an advertisement platform for attorneys. Avvo.com deletes detailed accounts of attorney misconduct including such an attorney themselves admits to, for e.g. in a dispute resolved in the attorney’s surrendering of their case upon the involvement of an arbitrator. This is true, including in California, where attorney misconduct is known to be greatly prevalent, left unprosecuted, and covered-up for. (See, for e.g., State Bar doesn’t police attorneys or itself closely enough, state audit finds, San Francisco Chronicle, April, 2022; see also, The State Bar of California’s Attorney Discipline Process, Auditor of State of California, April 14, 2023) In fact, even low-star ratings may be deleted when an attorney disputes users' ratings without an impartial documents-only hearing. However, where an attorney successfully accumulated enough 1 and 2-star reviews, and they are shown anything less than 5 stars should be a red flag. The lower the overall rating the greater a red flag, and the more ratings being the base of the overall rating the more well-founded any such red flag is. All in all, a 5-star avg. rating on that site should not be given any more weight than a billboard reading the “best injury attorneys in the Greater [fill in with choice of city name of metropolitan area] Area, call (888)…”; however, a low rating should raise serious concerns because of the business model and moderation practices of the site administration. (If they say you’re bad, you probably are bad bad.) | The reality is that it is almost never an acceptable tactic to use in any jurisdiction where I ever have/or currently do practice. The bar is relatively small no matter where you are; even in bigger cities. Your reputation is your most valuable asset and it would be crippled if this became your M.O., or was used in anything but the most rare and egregious situations (e.g. withholding evidence, lying to the judge, tampering with jury). Small violations (which are seemingly big in the heat of trial) happen every day and if you even suggested this it would come back on you more times than not. This is exponentially true in the criminal arena where the Judges and prosecutors interact on a daily basis and have formed collegial relationships. If you practice criminal law you often need to form good working relationships with the ADAs or AAGs since most cases get disposed of through negotiations with these very individuals. I have been in situations where my colleagues and I discussed it, opined on how it would be appropriate, but in the end have never gone that far. One time things were so bad with opposing counsel on so many levels, I considered it; however, I was a newish lawyer and my mentor at the time told me that he had never seen anyone but a federal court judge issue a sanction and aside from that, had never even seen it requested by a lawyer in the local bar. And these were horribly bad violations of the rules of procedure, conduct unbecoming, etc. So, I would suggest avoiding this practice. My rule of thumb is that unless the offending practice is so egregious that one would be technically duty bound to report the conduct to the bar, it is not appropriate to ask for sanctions. | Take option #2. Your concern in that scenario is not realistic: A lawyer who "reported" you to the counterparty of your settlement for such a consultation would be disbarred so quickly and harshly that it might actually give you faith in the Bar Associations. Consultations with lawyers are privileged, and lawyers have a duty to maintain client confidentiality in all but the most extreme situations. Furthermore, you might (ultimately) be entitled to whistleblower compensation, and unless you're an SEC rules specialist you probably wouldn't know how to get that without an advocate like a securities industry lawyer. | According to a blog post (written by a lawyer who actually has had multiple people ask about that), it depends on several things. The gist is that they're not getting away with this "brilliant plan" unless they take so many steps to make it look legitimate that it will, in fact, become a legitimate porn production enterprise — in which case, why bother with the ruse in the first place? To find you guilty of prostitution, a jury would have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that you were guilty of prostitution and not just making porn. But putting a camera in the room doesn't necessarily make it First-Amendment-protected porn; sometimes it just means you're giving them evidence of your crime. Since juries can differ, there's not really a bright line. But some things look bad to judges and juries. If the director is also doing sexual acts in the film, that looks bad. If he's also never directed or acted in porn before, that looks bad. If a person in the film is paying for the "actresses" instead of getting paid for "acting", that looks very bad; see United States v. Roeder, 526 F.2d 736, 737 (10th Cir. 1975). Having an actual script, on the other hand, may look good. Keep in mind that if the film is not just pornographic but actually obscene, obscenity laws could still apply even if you convince them it isn't prostitution. The First Amendment does not protect obscene materials. Additionally, if you claim it's porn, you will need to properly keep records of the names (and all former names/aliases) and dates of birth of your "actors" and "actresses", unless you want to be guilty of a federal felony. This includes making a copy of their photo ID. The records must also made available for inspection by the Attorney General and his inspectors for a minimum of 20 hours per week, with no advance notice given by them. Is everyone involved really going to be OK with all of this - especially since the law specifically notes that the records may be used as evidence in a federal obscenity prosecution? | Disclosures are prescribed by state law. Fair housing, which is a federal concept, pertains to issues such as using prohibited personal facts to determine whether to accept an offer. (Hazardous materials disclosures are also mandated at the federal level, but are are included in state requirements which can get pretty broad). If you are buying in Washington state, RCW 64.06.020 says what and how you must disclose. The list of disclosures is very detailed, covering title and covenants, water, sewer, structure, systems and fixtures, environment, and mobile home related. The only one of the 86 questions about smoke is whether smoke alarms are present. Thus smell of smoke is not a legally material fact that must be disclosed, in this state. The California disclosures, even longer, are here, and there is likewise no "smells bad" disclosure. It is unlikely that any state in the US mandates such a disclosure, since it is somewhere between a subjective evaluation and a self-evident fact. Some people are very sensitive to certain smells while others do not care. The burden is on the buyer to pursue matters of personal concern (in writing!), such as whether any dog has been present in the house in the past 5 years (some people care). You have to look carefully at the response. "Don't know" is usually a safe bet, unless you actually have factual knowledge. From what I can determine, Massachussetts is on the opposite end of the spectrum from California. There are some requirements imposed on real estate agents, and there is the federal lead paint disclosure, but otherwise it appears that nothing is mandated by law. This form seems to be used by the real estate association, and there is a question about "history of smoke/fire damage to structure". The reasonable interpretation of that is "has the house caught fire and suffered damage", so "no" from a cigar-smoker would not be fraudulent. If the intent of the question were to reveal if someone has smoked frequently in the house, that would he the question they'd ask. You can check whether you have this form and see what it says, but "smoke damage" would not normally be interpreted as meaning "smells a bit funny". | Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority. | Yes, there is a good chance. Ordinarily, the law as written is what is enforced. On occasion, the wording of the law is actually ambiguous, or vague, which means that the jury will need an instruction as to how to interpret the law. In fact, juries are not literally read the statute, they are given a set of decision-making instructions so that they can decide "If we find X, we must acquit; if we find Y we may convict". Your attorney will, if he is diligent, note the problem and strive for an instruction that favors the client. (The prosecution will of course object). Eventually, on appeal, a court will decide what the law "really means", and that decision might be strictly based on the letter of the law, or it might be based on a supposed spirit of the law, i.e. what the legislature "originally intended". That outcome is determined in part by the jurisprudential ideology of the prevailing justices of the appeals court. Usually, letter of the law prevails until a higher court rules that a particular "spirit" is what was originally intended. | Unless the lawyer is sitting around with nothing to do (in which case s/he has bigger problems than one yelp review) s/he would have to take time which could otherwise be spent on paying cases to file such a suit. The lawyer would still have to pay court fees to file such a suit. If such a suit were clearly meritless (say the review is not defamatory but merely an expression of opinion) then it should be dismissed early in the process, and the judge and other legal insiders who may follow such matters are likely to have a negative view of the lawyer based on such a filing. This may well hurt the lawyer. more than any Yelp review ever could. If the lawyer files a clearly meritless suit, the court may well order that s/he pay your legal fees as well. There are no guarantees, but the risk of a lawyer filing a "revenge suit" over a moderately negative Yelp review seem low. |
What is the "preamble" to a ballot measure called? Oregon ballot measures have this basic format (this particular one is an initiative for a constitutional amendment, but referendums [referenda?] are similar, as are measures for regular legislation): Whereas, ABC is good and XYZ is bad, and Whereas, the state government currently promotes XYZ rather than ABC, and Whereas, the state government should promote good things, Be it enacted by the people of the State of Oregon, Article 1, Section 1 of the Oregon Constitution is amended to read, Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. What is the "whereas" part called? | These are called recitals. See: Termly legal dictionary: recital US Legal: recital Wikipedia: recital (law) Wiktionary: recital, n. 5 (law) | If the U.S. adds a new territory, are the people currently living there able to become president? No. Or does the territory have to become a state in order for the people to be eligible to become president? Not necessarily. What does "natural-born citizen" mean? The meaning of the natural born citizen clause of the constitution is unclear in many respects, but virtually all scholars agree that a person who was a US citizen at birth, and who has remained a US citizen until present, is a natural-born citizen. There is a small minority of scholars who insist that a US citizen at birth is only a natural-born citizen if they were born in the US (for example, Ted Cruz would not be considered a natural-born citizen). There is an even smaller minority who insist that a person must have at least one US citizen parent in order to be a natural-born citizen. But for all practical purposes, these minority viewpoints are irrelevant. The only thing that matters is whether someone was a US citizen when they were born. Citizenship of people living in US territories When a US territory is created, the people living there don't automatically become US citizens, and if Congress eventually gives them US citizenship, the canon of presumption against retroactivity applies: a statute should not be read to be retroactive unless there is evidence that it was intended to apply retroactively. That means the people who get US citizenship under the statute don't become natural-born citizens; they're considered to have been automatically naturalized when the statute went into effect. But if there's a statute saying that people born in the territory are US citizens at birth, then people born in the territory after the effective date of that statute are natural-born citizens, since they are citizens at birth. I will use Hawaii as an example. Hawaii became a territory in 1898. Citizenship was granted in 1900. Statehood was not granted until 1959. 8 USC §1405 governs the citizenship of people born in Hawaii: A person born in Hawaii on or after August 12, 1898, and before April 30, 1900, is declared to be a citizen of the United States as of April 30, 1900. A person born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900, is a citizen of the United States at birth. A person who was a citizen of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898, is declared to be a citizen of the United States as of April 30, 1900. So, Hawaiians didn't become US citizens when Hawaii was annexed. They were granted US citizenship 2 years later. A person born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900 is a natural born citizen. Applying the presumption against retroactivity, we see that a person who was born in Hawaii between August 12, 1898 and April 29, 1900, or who was a citizen of independent Hawaii when it was annexed by the United States, was not a natural born citizen and could not have become President. In addition to the presumption against retroactivity, there is also another canon of construction that applies here: Congress could have used the "is a citizen of the United States at birth" language for the other two categories of Hawaiians too, but chose to omit it. Presumably, Congress acted purposefully in doing so, with the intent of granting citizenship at birth to only one of the three categories. (I can't remember whether this canon has a name.) Can Congress grant natural-born citizen status retroactively? If the US were to acquire a new territory and saw fit to bestow citizenship retroactively to birth on some natives of that territory, would those people be eligible for the presidency? No one knows the answer to that question. As an example of when Congress has granted citizenship retroactively, the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 created 8 USC §1401(h), which granted citizenship retroactively to birth to individuals who had been born outside the US to a US citizen mother and alien father prior to May 24, 1934. This act was necessary because, prior to that date, only US citizen fathers could transmit citizenship, not US citizen mothers. A person granted citizenship under this statute would be over the age of 89 now, so we're unlikely to see one run for president. It's an open question whether someone who obtained US citizenship through this statute would be considered eligible for the presidency. One could argue that "natural-born citizen" implies a person who actually was a citizen when they were born and that retroactive grants of citizenship are a mere legal fiction that cannot override the meaning of the constitution. | While "clause" has a specific definition in linguistics, that is not how it is used in laws and legal documents. These terms have no standard definition for legal writing. Documents or legal codes that use both generally use "article" to mean a larger division than "clause" does. In discussion of the US Federal Constitution, for example, the largest divisions are called "articles", each of which is divided into several "sections", and each section generally contains several "clauses". Some of these are actually grammatical clauses, being part of a sentence with a verb and a subject, while others might be called paragraphs in ordinary prose. A given document or legal code should ideally define which terms it will use for its parts, and which contain which others. This can be done in whatever way the drafters wish, but it is desirable that it be clear. In addition to the terms you have mentioned, terms often used include "subsection", "subsubsection", "title", "paragraph", "subparagraph", "chapter", "part" and "division". These are not used consistently, and I have never seen a single document or code that uses all of them. The Us law code is divided into titles, each of which contains sections. In some of these sets of related sections are grouped into chapters. Sections may have subsections or paragraphs. In my experience smaller contracts or business documents rarely use "articles" and some just use "section" for any named or numbered part of the document. Usually titles or section headers are explicitly stated to have no legal effect, and the division into sections or other parts is simply to facilitate reference, and does not have legal significance. Whether a provision is called an article, a section, or a clause will not normally change its legal effect. However, where one part of a document refers to another part, such as "as specified in section 23" then the reference will be found in and only in the designated part, and will not be looked for in some other part. | There isn't to the best of my knowledge, any single document that tells courts to follow precedant or when and how to do so. Each State, and the Federal government, has a set of court rules of procedure. These will indicate, among many other things, the form that should be used in citing previous cases, but that is about form, not content -- about how to cite a case, not about when a court should or should not cite one. Some precedents are what are called persuasive. These are from other court systems: say a different state, or even another country. These also include rulings from other courts at the same level, say from a different district, or even from lower courts. Other precedents are binding. These are from a superior court to the one where the case is cited. In a state's lower court, rulings of that state's supream court are binding. In Federal district courts, rulings of the Court of Appeals for the same Circuit, and of the US Supreme Court are binding. In Federal appeals courts, rulings of the US Supreme Court are binding. They are also binding in state courts on matters where the US constitution is involved, or where Federal law supersedes state law. Prior rulings of the same court are strongly persuasive, but not strictly binding -- a court can overrule its own precedents when it thinks the law or justice requires this, although most courts are reluctant to do so. Or more often it can distinguish a previous ruling, saying, in effect: "that previous ruling is still valid, but this is a different case in such and such a specific way, so the result is different". Students in law school spend a good deal of time learning how precedents are cited, and how they should be used, learning what sorts of things are controlled by precedents, and how to find the precedents that apply to a particular case. When they become lawyers and then judges, they taken this body of learning with them, and use it in writing decisions, and opinions that explain those decisions. New law from the legislature can reverse previous court decisions, except in the case of decisions interpreting the constitution (federal or state). Amendments can change the constitution. Judges must adapt to such changes in the law. To a significant extent our system of precedent is a matter of tradition, going back largely to the common-law courts of England, although it has been modified by specific legislation in many ways, as well as by more recent court decision and practice. It is passed on in law schools, in legal apprenticeships of various kinds, and in individual court decisions. | Each state has its own election laws, so you will get 50 different answers depending on what state you are interested in (perhaps 49, since Washington doesn't have polling places - depends on what you mean by "poll watcher"). This page is a starter list of legal resources. This page starts you on deconstructing this notion of "poll watcher". Colorado is one state that explicitly allows partisan observers, here are the rules. No person is compelled to be an observer, so I don't understand who you think might be abusing a poll watcher. Perhaps you are referring to the possibility that an election official will prevent an observer from doing their job. Or perhaps you are thinking that being a poll watcher abuses the intent of some law. Whatever you have in mind, there are laws in each state that say what is allowed and what is forbidden, so you have to address this at a local level. No state has a requirement that observers must come from or swear allegiance to the majority party of that polling jurisdiction (e.g. county, or precinct). Any attempt by election officials, or anyone else, to block observers from the minority party would be rebuffed by the courts. The courts will not attempt to divine inner motivations for sending an observer. Most states allow partisan observers. Michigan distinguishes "challengers" and "poll watchers", and there are distinct rules and powers for the two sets. A crucial difference is that a watcher cannot legally challenge a claimed right to vote or a precinct board action, but a challenger can. There are rules of conduct imposed on both kinds of observers, one of them being that you cannot challenge a voter for the purpose of annoying or delaying the voter. This is a misdemeanor (a crime) under MCL 168.727, and as a criminal prohibition, the state would have to prove intent beyond reasonable doubt. Blog posts by the observer might provide sufficient evidence, but speculation by the majority party would not. | No. This is black-letter constitutional law. From Article 1, section 9: No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. | As @cpast says in their comment, these are not equivalent punishments, the fine is for the lower end of the scale where incarceration is not warranted and the maximum gaol term is for the most egregious cases. That said, your supposition is almost certainly correct; statutes tend to be a "set and forget" thing, legislatures have a lot to do and going back to old laws to update fines in line with inflation is probably not high on their list of priorities. In order to overcome this problem all jurisdictions in Australia have adopted the Penalty Unit; fines in statutes are stated as a certain number of penalty units and the value of a penalty unit is set in various ways that usually do not require a vote in parliament. | Is that really so, though? Is there, since 2007, no single place in U.S. regulations (including e.g. the Federal Register) that says that e.g. electric current is supposed to be measured in amps? More generally, what is the current legal situation with units of electric measure (the volt, the ampere, the ohm, etc.) in the United States? These units are authorized for use by 15 USC 204, quoted in the question. The statute further authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to interpret or modify the standard, but it does not require it. In the absence of any such interpretation or modification, the provisions of the standard are authorized as they are. Also, what exactly did the lawmakers mean by 'repeal of redundant and obsolete authority' in the case of 15 U.S.C. 223 and 224? They meant that there was no need for those sections, which specifically authorized the use of certain metric-system measures, in light of the general authorization to use the entire metric system. |
Is it possible to use for commercial purposes code released with a license which allows it, even if it was patented afterwards? This software was released as open source 2 years ago: https://github.com/lululxvi/deeponet The license allows commercial use: https://github.com/lululxvi/deeponet/blob/master/LICENSE However, end of last year one of the authors decided to file a patent. As a result, in October 2021 they put a warning saying that the code cannot be used for commercial purposes: https://github.com/lululxvi/deeponet/commit/693c23d269b0017178419c42a2a48b804e0920bb#diff-b335630551682c19a781afebcf4d07bf978fb1f8ac04c6bf87428ed5106870f5 What has precedence, the code license or the patent? | The software can’t be patented Since it was published before the patent application was lodged, the patent application should be rejected since it is based on prior art. You (or anyone else) can lodge an objection to the patent application on that basis to help the patent examiner find the prior art. | If the app (and the service accessed from the app) truly doesn't have any EULA, ToS, or license agreement, to include restrictions on reverse engineering, you can probably create an alternate front end, so long as you aren't using their logos, etc. However, their data may be a different beast, depending on the nature of it. For example, extracting data from Twitter would potentially violate Twitter's license on the original text copyright held by the authors in question. Wikipedia explicitly includes redistribution in their license agreement with authors/content creators. If all you are extracting and storing is the temperature at a particular weather station, you might have less of a concern. Anything beyond merely factual runs the risk of a copyright infringement as you store the data in your own database. | The code is copyrighted. You are not given any permission to use or copy any part of it, nor to create a derivative work based on it. There is no way for you to "make the copyright null". The code was copyrighted in 2005, and the copyright will not expire until 70 years after the death of the author, under US law. The period would vary in some other countries, but in no country that I know of will it expire in the next few years. That the author is dead, or the publisher out of business, does not change this legally. Someone, probably the author's heir, or perhaps whoever bought the remains of the publisher's business, will own the copyright. However, the ideas and programming techniques shown and discussed in the book are not protected, and you may use them freely to write programs, commercial or non-commercial. You need not even acknowledge the book as a source of ideas, although to do so would be nice. Of course, since the author is dead and the publisher not active, if you were to infringe the copyright by copying code from thsi book, there is a reasonable chance that no one would notice, but if someone did notice, the current owner of the copyright could sue you for infringement, and could perhaps win sizable damages. It would be safer to write your own original code using only the general ideas from the book. In future, do not ever assume that you can just take someone else's code (or other creative work, such as a book) and reuse it without permission, unless it is in the public domain, for example because it was published before 1923. | You cannot do this through any established public license that I know of, but you could write your own. The model would be any educational use or non-commercial use license, such as CC NC licenses. The main challenge is defining the excluded classes of usage. That is why you should engage an attorney to draft this for you. I don't think there is any point in adding a $5M penalty clause. You offer a separate paid license for individuals who do not want to comply with the particular terms of your license, and set the fee to whatever you want. Saying that you're gonna fine violators is a bad idea because penalty clauses are illegal. Instead, the standard approach is a liquidated damages clause, where you state what a reasonable estimate of your damages would be. In the case of software that is available for purchase, illegal copying of the software obviously results at least in the cost of the software qua lost revenue as damages. Plus shipping and handling. | Patents are not that relevant in this case. Software patents are unenforceable in most parts of the world anyway. What matters here is copyright. Every work contract has a clause that everything an employee creates as part of their employment is copyrighted by the company. So using company-owned code to build an own project would be a copyright violation. There are also other legal tools in some jurisdiction which can be used against employees trying to misuse intellectual company property. But that's a topic for Law Stackexchange. Also, this isn't really related to a BYOD policy. Being able to bring your own device to work and then back home might make data theft more convenient, but isn't required. There are many other ways to steal sourcecode, like USB drives or uploading them to the internet. To prevent the first you would have to design your software development offices like a supermax prison facility with meter-high walls (so nobody can throw a device over it) and strip searches on everyone leaving the building. This is neither feasible nor reasonable for anything below matters of national security. To prevent the second, you would have to completely prevent internet access from developer workstations, which would greatly impede the productivity of any software developer. So most companies do not even try to physically prevent employees from stealing sourcecode. They rather rely on the legal safeguards and on maintaining a mutual trust relationship with their employees. It might seem counter-intuitive to some, but when you do not treat your employees like potential criminals they are in fact less likely to betray you. | You'll want to read the actual licenses yourself and understand what is required. If you don't understand, then you'll want to consult an attorney. But neither of these licenses are all that complex in my opinion. MIT: Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. Apache 2.0: Redistribution. You may reproduce and distribute copies of the Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or without modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that You meet the following conditions: (a) You must give any other recipients of the Work or Derivative Works a copy of this License; and (b) You must cause any modified files to carry prominent notices stating that You changed the files; and (c) You must retain, in the Source form of any Derivative Works that You distribute, all copyright, patent, trademark, and attribution notices from the Source form of the Work, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works; and (d) If the Work includes a "NOTICE" text file as part of its distribution, then any Derivative Works that You distribute must include a readable copy of the attribution notices contained within such NOTICE file, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works, in at least one of the following places: within a NOTICE text file distributed as part of the Derivative Works; within the Source form or documentation, if provided along with the Derivative Works; or, within a display generated by the Derivative Works, if and wherever such third-party notices normally appear. The contents of the NOTICE file are for informational purposes only and do not modify the License. You may add Your own attribution notices within Derivative Works that You distribute, alongside or as an addendum to the NOTICE text from the Work, provided that such additional attribution notices cannot be construed as modifying the License. Nowhere does either license require you to publish your application's source code, even if your application is directly based on the original code. | We can't really know until the ruling is made. The Supreme Court might issue a ruling that encompasses all software APIs, or may predicate its ruling on this more specific situation, e.g. that because Oracle's library is so extensive its structure can be copyrighted even if that does not necessarily mean that any individual function signature can be copyrighted. They could also decide based on something unrelated to the heart of the copyright question - skimming through the petition for a writ of certiorari, they could make a decision based on the original implied license from Sun, for example. Hopefully their decision will answer the copyright question of function declarations completely, but it isn't required to. | There is no contract between you (the licensee) and the licensor of the software. The creator of the open source software just says "here's the software, you may use it if you like, as long as you fulfil some conditions. ". No contract, no liability. I think the developer would only be liable if they intentionally created software that causes damage. (Which has happened, some open source browser plugins have recently been modified to run bitcoin mining software, or worse. I suppose the miscreants could follow all the GPL rules or whatever license is used). |
Can voting on Stack Exchange be unlicensed practice of law? Suppose I want to ask for specific legal advice, and can format it as a yes/no question. Also assume that the no-RSLA policy of Law SE is not enforced, only actual laws on unlicensed practice of law. If I post my question, and then I post two answers, one saying "yes" and the other saying "no", and the community "answers" my question by upvoting the right one and downvoting the wrong one, are voters guilty of unlicensed practice of law, assuming they would be if they had answered in the traditional way? | No. In order to practice law, one must establish an attorney-client relationship. Participation in Internet forums absolutely does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Everyone involved in law spends a disproportionate amount of time disclaiming this, so nobody inside the field will be confused on this point. I believe this is also directly stated in the Terms of Service. And as Jen notes, upvoting/downvoting is not even agreeing with the legal validity of the answer. Take the tour or read help pages for what voting means. It's perfectly conceivable for a psychic who knows how to sway people could write a better voted answer than three lawyers. | Can a moderation team in a game extend a ban that you have just because they want to TL;DR Yes and no. It's their platform and you broke the rules that you agreed to. Therefore, you forfeited your right to use the service for as long as they deem appropriate up to and including forever. In exercising this power they must act reasonably which, in the absence of anything in the contract (and I can't see anything) means that their response must be proportionate and offer you procedural fairness. It's possible that they haven't done this - it may even be likely. However, in order to have this overturned, clause 24 of the EULA requires you to take the dispute to arbitration. Clause 24.4 sets out how to initiate this. | Let's say the trustee runs into a situation where the beneficiary demands some action, and the trustee thinks this action is a really, really bad idea. Then the trustee can either say "no". Or the trustee can say "yes" and be liable (so if the action is a really bad idea then the trustee won't do this). The trustee can NOT say "yes if you sign this paper that I'm not liable for the result of this action", because the job of the trustee is to protect the beneficiary and he wouldn't be doing that. | When the required number of jurors vote "yes" (or "no", or whatever the question is), then the jury has reached a verdict. There is no provision whereby the presiding juror can re-interpret "yes" as "no". In the case you describe, if a unanimous verdict is required that despite a reasonable inference that the last juror believes the defendant to be guilty, he has voted not guilty so the jury has not reached a verdict. In case the guy in charge decides "In this case no means yes", thus falsely presents a supposed unanimous verdict, there is still an option for juror polling, in which case the not-guilty juror gets a chance to affirm his not guilty vote; though one of the parties has to request jury polling. If during polling the juror's response is not a clear "yes", then it could be more complicated. | Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details. | We cannot dispense personalized legal advice: that is what your attorney is for. However, I agree with your analysis that this is most likely covered by fair use, and indeed it is not obvious that you have taken anything that is protected. There is no creativity behind a number such as entries in the "I did N pushups" column. The arrangement of data into a web page passes the smidgen of creativity test, but "210" is not a creative number. The terms of service of a website cannot negate your right to use the website however you want in a non-infringing way. If your use is "fair use", then they can't tell you that you can't use it. In case it turns out that "fair use" fails, the matter would hinge on what exactly the TOS says. They may have granted you permission to make use of their "information". So there are three positive avenues for you to consider: not protected, fair use, and permitted. A practical difficulty is that a university lawyer is only interested in the interests of the university, and they are as likely to say "don't do that" or "get permission" as they are to say "that is fair use". You can hire a lawyer who is paid to care about your interest, though there is never a guarantee that the lawyer's advice is correct. I think it is likely that the lawyer will tell you to not say anything until legally forced to, given the apparent rebuff of your request for special permission. | I suspect that US voting records would fall under Article 2(2)(a): Article 2 Material Scope ... This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (a) in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law; I doubt it would be possible to argue successfully that a foreign election is anything other than "an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law." Even the territorial scope could be questioned. This is set forth in the next article, on "territorial scope," the second item of which says: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. It is probably arguable whether processing absentee ballots from EU residents constitutes "offering services to data subjects in the Union," but in this case it's likely to be more difficult to resolve that question than to determine whether the activity falls outside the scope of Union law. | To determine whether an attorney is licensed to practice in a specific jurisdiction, you need to look up that attorney in the bar that applies to that jurisdiction. Some attorneys do not allow their information to be posted on the online lookup, in that case you would have to call the bar to confirm that s/he is licensed. I assumed you meant more than "case" in the legal sense above. For instance, if you want a Patent, you would need someone licensed to the Pat Bar. Cases they have worked on: You can use Google Scholar and select Case Law / the Jurisdiction you are concerned with and search for their name exactly (I would also limit the time frame.) The attorneys for each side are listed at the top. Some of the large cases have multiple pages of attorneys with their name on the case. Alternatively, if you have a subscription service to WestLaw Next, Bloomberg Law, or LexisNexis you can lookup the attorney and see case information as well, as well as court documents they have submitted in various cases - this allows you to get a glimpse of their writing style. Alternatively, you can visit your local law school's law library and, if they have public access, use the public terminals (at least my law school has these.). |
Do police need to present warrant prior to seizure? In the United States, suppose a warrant was required for a seizure and the police properly obtained one. Do the law enforcement officials who execute the warrant need to present that warrant prior to seizing the evidence? Or is it okay to present the warrant after the item(s) have been seized? If it makes a difference, I'm specifically wondering in the scenario that the item is on your person. | We should start with the rule regarding presentation of search warrants. The US Court search and seizure warrant form explicitly says Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken. State will have similar rules, e.g. Washington's CrRLJ 2.3. (d) Execution and Return with Inventory. The peace officer taking property under the warrant shall give to the person from whom or from whose premises the property is taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken. This does not explicitly say "before starting the search," and the wording "shall give ... a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken" implies that the two documentary items can be presented at the same time (therefore after the search). Arkansas's rule Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.3 is slightly different (b) Prior to entering a dwelling to execute a search warrant, the executing officer shall make known the officer's presence and authority for entering the dwelling which is not a requirement to present the warrant itself, and then (c) In the course of any search or seizure pursuant to the warrant, the executing officer shall give a copy of the warrant to the person to be searched or the person in apparent control of the premises to be searched. The copy shall be furnished before undertaking the search or seizure unless the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such action would endanger the successful execution of the warrant with all practicable safety, in which case he shall, as soon as is practicable, state his authority and purpose and furnish a copy of the warrant. So there is some variation in the requirement for handing over a copy of the warrant. Body searches might be subject to different standards per jurisdiction. Washington search law has extensive limits on strip and body cavity searches, whereas searching pockets is like searching a premise (a copy of the warrant must be eventually presented, along with an inventory of items seized). It is typically stated that ideally, police will show a copy of the warrant to the person being searched or whose premise is being searched, but ideally does not mean "must always". I have not found any case where an officer reasonably could have shown the warrant prior to conducting a search (when so requested by the searchee) but unreasonably refused. | In the United States . . . Scope of Search Warrant: To what extent can they search you and your belongings? The scope of a search is limited by what is stated in the warrant. Not only must a warrant be supported by probably cause, it must also describe with particularity, "the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." See U.S. Const. Amend. 4. For example, they cannot search a house if the warrant specifies the backyard, nor can they search for weapons if the warrant specifies marijuana plants. However, that doesn't mean that officers can seize only those items listed in the warrant. If, in the course of their search, police officers come across contraband or evidence of a crime that is not listed in the warrant, they can often seize it. When it comes to containers, the police are allowed to search anything that items could be inside. So, if they're looking for stolen TV's, they can't search a jewelry box or under the floor boards. However if they looking for something small, like bomb parts, just about everything is fair game. To search you, the warrant would need to authorize the search of your person, or the police would need an independent justification to search you. For example, if they found explosives that were illegal to posses, they could conduct a search incident to arrest. Can they search your entire computer? Yes, assuming computers are within the scope of the warrant. Compelling people to produce passwords of encryption keys: If they find encrypted files can they detain you until you decrypt them? This depends on your jurisdiction as it is a developing area of law and deal with 5th amendment. This is something that would not be done through a search warrant and would involve a separate proceeding. In this situation, constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. V, may be implicated. Case where Court held producing passwords violated the 5th Amendment: The government's postindictment grand jury subpoena ordering the defendant to provide all passwords associated with his computer in order to secure evidence of child pornography allegedly contained in the computer, which spawned the three counts contained in the indictment, required the defendant to make a "testimonial communication," and thus the subpoena violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, where the government was not seeking documents or objects but instead was requiring the defendant to divulge through his mental processes his password that would be used to incriminate him, the district court in U.S. v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2010), held. The court explained, an act is "testimonial," and thus protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when the accused is forced to reveal his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the government. It is the extortion of information from the accused, the attempt to force him to disclose the contents of his own mind, that implicates the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, the court said. Case where Court held producing passwords did not violate the 5th Amendment: The district court in U.S. v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012), recognizing that production of a document may fall within the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination since it acknowledges that the document exists, that it is in the possession or control of the producer, and that it is authentic, held that the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not implicated by requiring her to produce the unencrypted contents of a computer where the government knew of the existence and location of the computer's files; a preponderance of the evidence established either that the computer belonged to the defendant or that she was its sole or primary user, such that she had the ability to access its encrypted contents; and the government had offered her immunity, precluding it from using her act of producing those unencrypted contents against her. The court determined, also, that a preponderance of the evidence, in a motion to compel production of the unencrypted contents of the computer, found during a search of the defendant's residence, showed that either the computer belonged to her or that she was its sole or primary user, such that she could access its encrypted contents, supporting the decision to compel her to produce those unencrypted contents, where the defendant acknowledged, during a telephone conversation with her ex-husband, that she owned or had such a computer, the contents of which were accessible only by entry of a password, and the computer, which was found in her bedroom, was identified with her name. This issues probably will not be decided one way or the other until the supreme court rules on it. If they find a password safe can they force you to give them a password and >then can they log into all accounts you have stored in it? When you say password safe, I am assuming you mean password management software. If so, see above. If you don't give them the password but they find it written down somewhere, can they still use it? Yes, assuming their warrant allows them to search papers or it is in plain view. Out of curiosity, do police ever actually do this? Find a password protected file on a computer and go through all the papers in the desk and try all possible passwords until they find one? I'm not sure, but it wouldn't surprise me. Even if they don't have a warrant that covers papers, police have been known to bend the rules. I think someone with police experience could have a better answer for this. | united-states In the US, the default rule is that your home is your castle. In general, nobody, not even the police, can enter your home without your permission. The main exception to this rule is that police do not need your permission if they have a search warrant to search your home. To get a warrant, the police must convince a magistrate that they have good reason (ie, "probable cause"), such as a gps track, to believe they will find evidence of a crime if they search the house. The police in your hypothetical are in a similar situation to police who are tracking the gps signal from a "bait car/bike/phone/tablet/package." (A bait car is a car/etc that has been fitted with a camera and gps tracker, and left out as bait for thieves.) As long as the car is in public view, the police do not need a warrant to search it and arrest the person driving it. However, once the bait car is out of public view, where the police can no longer see it, they need a warrant to go in and recover it, even if they can see it on the tracker. (See, for example, the instructions for bait car programs from the Eugene and Reno Police Departments.) (For phones, which may not be in "plain view" even if the thief is, the police use ring programs to make the phone ring. Hearing a phone respond to a ring program gives them probable cause under the "hearing" version of the "plain view" doctrine.) Bottom line: In the US, the police need a search warrant. Since search warrants take time and effort, police may be unwilling to get a warrant for something as low valued as a phone. If the police can't or won't help, there are various options for privately enforcing one's rights. These range from the legal -- knocking on the door and confronting the thief -- to the illegal -- left to your imagination. | Huge difference between a car and a house. For example, at least in Pennsylvania no warrant is required to search a vehicle on public roads. In other states there are so many easy pretexts that you practically have little protection from a full vehicle search (although the pretext will have to withstand strict scrutiny if evidence found in a search is used to charge you with a crime). Your house, on the other hand, still enjoys very strong fourth-amendment protections: One of my favorite U.S. Supreme Court cases on the subject is Florida v. Jardines, in which SCOTUS ruled that even approaching the front door with a drug-sniffing dog without a warrant constituted an illegal search. (The majority opinion is worth reading for its illumination of current law on this question.) | This depends entirely on STATE law, and you need to list the state(s) you are interested in in the question. Thus, the usual legal statement "it depends." POLICE ARE NOT ATTORNEYS Don't accept legal advice from the police at face value. Police frequently don't actually know the minutiae of the law, and/or often misunderstand it. Their job is not to provide legal advice nor legal judgement, their job is to enforce the law based on certain priorities. Thus the area of enforcement is usually narrowed to specific categories so they can be experts in that area. (I.e vice cops, bunko squad, homicide division, etc.) But police are not lawyers, so don't expect them to understand the law. They did not attend 3 years of law school after attaining a college degree, which lawyers DO. Police get as little as 3 months training (in some states like Arkansas they can be put on duty without ANY training for up to a year (!) before attending the academy). THAT SAID, REGARDING CALL RECORDINGS: There are single and two party states. In single party states, any single person who is part of a call or communication can record it. In "two party" states, everyone that is part of the call must be informed. There are numerous exceptions and stipulations however. GREAT EXPECTATIONS First off, is there an "expectation of privacy." Again this varies by state and case law. Generally, if there is no expectation of privacy, then there is a clear exception to record. For instance, if you are in a busy restaurant, and people around you can hear or eavesdrop, you have no expectation of privacy. Courts have also ruled that if you are in the presence of a police officer performing official duties, there is also no expectation of privacy (not for either of you). IS IT LIVE OR IS IT MEMOREX Are you being recorded? If you are in a two/all party state, and you have an expectation of privacy (a phone call made in your home) then one of the following must occur: If the police are recording you without your knowledge, they must have a court order permitting them to do so as part of an investigation. Otherwise you must be notified with a statement at the beginning of the call that the call is being recorded. (Typically your option is to hang up or continue. Continuing the call implies your consent.) In some states the notification can be in the form of a "duck" or a beep every 15 seconds (time period varies, this is also different per state). OPINION NOT ADVICE BELOW I would think that being notified that a call is being recorded ends any expectation of privacy for any involved party. Assuming the state law and related case law supports recording when there is no expectation of privacy, this circumstance would seem to permit recording legally. Doubly so if your were talking to police in official capacity (did you notice a beep every xx seconds?) CAUTION: Because this varies so much by state, and because even the various Federal District Courts are not in unanimous agreement on the minutiae, there may be other factors to consider. | There are a variety of situations like border crossings, entry into official buildings, etc. in which there is a general right for law enforcement to demand identification on a suspicionless basis, none of which seem to apply in this case. But, the most common justification for demanding ID is to make what is called a Terry stop (after the name of the U.S. Supreme Court case that upheld the legality of these stops in the face of 4th Amendment limitations on searches and seizures). Wikipedia accurately summarizes the law in this area as follows. A Terry stop is: a brief detention of a person by police on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity but short of probable cause to arrest. The name derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that police may briefly detain a person whom they reasonably suspect is involved in criminal activity; the Court also held that police may do a limited search of the suspect's outer garments for weapons if they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person detained may be "armed and dangerous". To have reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop, police must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts" that would indicate to a reasonable police officer that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity (as opposed to past conduct). Reasonable suspicion depends on the "totality of the circumstances", and can result from a combination of facts, each of which is by itself innocuous. The search of the suspect's outer garments, also known as a patdown, must be limited to what is necessary to discover weapons; however, pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine, police may seize contraband discovered in the course of a frisk, but only if the contraband's identity is immediately apparent. In some jurisdictions, persons detained under the doctrine of Terry must identify themselves to police upon request. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), the Court held that a Nevada statute requiring such identification did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, nor, in the circumstances of that case, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self incrimination. New York is one of the many states that has a stop and identify statute, that allows an officer to insist on presentation of an identification any time there is a legal basis for making a Terry stop. The New York stop and identify statute is N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §140.50. This says: 1. In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest without a warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 2. Any person who is a peace officer and who provides security services for any court of the unified court system may stop a person in or about the courthouse to which he is assigned when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 3. When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions one and two a police officer or court officer, as the case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search such person for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, he may take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person. 4. In cities with a population of one million or more, information that establishes the personal identity of an individual who has been stopped, questioned and/or frisked by a police officer or peace officer, such as the name, address or social security number of such person, shall not be recorded in a computerized or electronic database if that individual is released without further legal action; provided, however, that this subdivision shall not prohibit police officers or peace officers from including in a computerized or electronic database generic characteristics of an individual, such as race and gender, who has been stopped, questioned and/or frisked by a police officer or peace officer. In this particular case, if the law enforcement officer were more clever, he would have said that he was concerned that the crew might be using the drone to case the property in order to commit a crime there in the future. And, if he had said that, this would surely pass muster for reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and would have provided a legal justification for demanding ID. The "about to commit a crime" justification for a Terry stop makes it, in practice, much broader than probable cause for an arrest, which requires that the police believe that a crime has actually already been committed or is in progress, not just that someone is about to commit a crime (a person may be subjected to a Terry stop even if his actions which tend to show he is about to commit a crime have not yet progressed to the level of an attempted offense for which someone may be convicted and are not truly imminent). (Actually, strictly speaking, the officer is only entitled to determine the information that an ID would reveal, and not to insist that someone actually have the ID on his person, under state law, although a local ordinance or court interpretation of the law could possibly give him the authority to actually demand an ID to determine this information. For example, California courts have held that a duty to provide basic information implies a duty to provide it in a verifiable manner.) The fact that the law enforcement officer failed to articulate any legal basis for the stop, yet went on to arrest the individuals, weakens the case that the stop was valid considerably, because generally, at least in theory, a law enforcement officer is supposed to be able to articulate the reasonable suspicion for the stop at the time that the stop is made and not days later after the fact. In addition to stop and identify laws, some states (including Colorado) have held that failing to provide an ID on demand, under the "totality of the circumstances" can sometimes constitute obstructing a police officer and provide a basis for an arrest. It isn't inconceivable that a law enforcement officer in this situation could make that argument and prevail at least in showing probable cause for arrest on that basis, even if it wasn't a sufficiently solid argument to give rise to an obstructing a police officer conviction. | Here is what the Austrian law says in this case (Google translation): Bag control in the supermarket: There is no obligation to have your bag checked by supermarket staff or security guards. If there is a reasonable suspicion, the supermarket staff can ask a suspect to wait for the police to arrive. The police can then check the bag. In this Austrian newspaper article (in German) they say about this topic If a person is injured during the arrest because of a low value item or if an expensive item is damaged, the detective might be liable for it. As long as they don't start searching your bags, they are allowed to hold on to you till police arrives. I would complain to the shop owner about the detectives and their behavior via mail, this is probably the most efficient thing what one can do. | Chain of custody and testimony in this regard. Say there is a murder victim, with DNA of the suspect under the fingernails and a knife with the suspect's bloody fingerprints stuck in the chest. There would be testimony what happened to the knife. If a paramedic removed it to attempt first aid, the paramedic would testify. So would the officer who bagged it, and the forensic analyst who took the fingerprints. A pathologist would testify if the knife was consistent with the stab wound (a careful pathologist could never swear that the knife was the cause of death, just that it matches). The pathologist would also testify how DNA was collected under the fingernails, and how it was sent to the lab. The defense may claim that the suspect also tried first aid, or that a corrupt cop forced the suspect to hold the knife. The court or jury then draw their conclusions from this and other testimony. Same here. A lifelike picture found on the web proves nothing. A witness who takes the stand to testify that he or she took a certain picture would be more credible. So would a forensic officer who testifies how she or he removed the data from a surveillance camera, checked for common signs of tampering, and then signed a copy of the data with a private key. (The signing shows no third-party tampering after collection, it is not evidence of integrity before that.) Years ago, in germany, there was the case of a bank robber who claimed that a fleeing suspect had handed him a bag of money in the forest and then vanished. "Prove it wasn't so," he demanded. "You can't. So there is reasonable doubt." Well, the court found that the statement merely created unreasonable doubt, and the sentence was upheld on appeal. |
Legally working , Two remote jobs at same time I’m currently working with a software company remotely and the work load is very light. So I received a new offer from another Software company and was planned to accept it and keep my current job as well, keep in mind both companies aren’t competitors they work in two different categories. But my new contract has this section: And not sure if legally I have to leave my current job or I can keep it as long as I work for my first job outside the working hours of the second. DUTY OF LOYALTY You agree that while you are employed by the Company, (a) you have an undivided duty of loyalty and fair dealing to the Company and will work for the best interests of the Company and not take over any of the Company's business opportunities or prospective business opportunities for your personal gain and/or to the detriment of the Company; (b) you will not engage in any other employment or business activity without written permission from executive management; and (c) you will not engage in any other activities that conflict with your obligations to the Company. Also worth mentioning my current job doesn’t have in the contract Duty of loyalty or any other similar rules. | You need written permission from the second employer That’s a condition that the second employer (but not the first) has imposed on you. It’s not a complicated interpretation. | I infer from the use of the past tense "worked" that you no longer work for the company in question. Also, from the fact that you are wondering whether there might be negative consequences, I infer that you do not have permission to use the systems in question. The specific consequences will depend on where the company and its computers are located, as well as on the nature of the systems you log in to and on what you do with those systems, but it's certainly possible to receive a penalty of several years' imprisonment. The fact that you created the system in question makes no difference. | The first question would be whether you are an employee, or an independent contractor. There is more to that determination than how the company labels you, but that is a starting point. Based on the minimal autonomy that you imply that you have, you would probably be found to be an employee. Then there are limits on the number of hours that you can work in a week or day, which they are complying with. The employer is required to record the hours that you worked, and it is a crime to keep false records. It is also required that an employer pay for the time you work. Therefore the employer cannot legally refuse to pay you for your labor, and they cannot legally falsify records. The employer can limit your pay to 15 hours per week, if you work just 15 hours per week. They can also set ridiculous performance standards, whereby at the end of the week you will not have done what they wanted you to do. Their only recourse is to dismiss you. In response, you can file a complaint, but note that the concept of "wrongful dismissal" under the act is about entitlement to termination or severance pay. The arbitrator may find that the employer contravened the act, and can order them to rescind the termination. Or, before you get fired, you can complain and the arbitrator could order the employer to either modify their work requirements or else to pay you for the time worked. The difficult point (for you) in this case is that the act does not address employer performance expectations, and employers are generally allowed to set their own performance standards. If you have a written employment contract, there might be provisions regarding termination which could help you. Without a written contact, there is no statutory provision that prevents an employer for terminating you, but they may have to give you notice and pay for doing so, as long as you are not terminated for "just cause". Hoang v. Mann, 2014 ONSC 3762 is an Ontario case where an employee was terminated for just case based on insubordination, job performance, inability to get along with co-workers and so on. On the front of job performance, the courts have found that an employer must clearly communicate standards to employees, and give employees an opportunity to meet those standards. But they do not generally decide e.g. how many units per hour an assembly-line worker can reasonably be expected to complete. | It would basically be illegal, regardless of what a contract says: contracts are subordinate to the law. So the question comes down to whether the law unequivocally requires OT for shifts longer that 8 hours. These sorts of governmental fact sheets are not absolute statements of the law, they are guidelines about what is most commonly applicable, and to determine if there are any exceptions, one must consult the actual law. The fact sheet says "After working eight hours in a day an employee must be paid time-and-a-half for the next four hours worked", which is somewhat different from "in a shift". The (summarized restatement of the) law says that an "averaging agreement" is legal (if in writing), so if that allows working more than 8 hours in a shift, that could be consistent with (does not override) the law. To really know, you have to read the actual law. The section on maximum hours and overtime says 35 (1) An employer must pay an employee overtime wages in accordance with section 40 if the employer requires, or directly or indirectly allows, the employee to work more than 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply for the purposes of an employee who is working under an averaging agreement under section 37. So 3 shifts of 12 1/3 hours would be legal, and perhaps typical in a hospital. The "average hours" part of the law says an employer and employee may agree to average the employee's hours of work over a period of 1, 2, 3 or 4 weeks for the purpose of determining the employee's entitlement, if any, to overtime wages under subsections (4) and (6) of this section and wages payable under subsection (8) or (9) (b). as long as there is a clear advance agreement (as in a contract). This still limits hours worked without overtime to 40 hours/week (on average), and then there is still an upper limit of 12 hours: An employer under this section who requires, or directly or indirectly allows, an employee to work more than 12 hours a day, at any time during the period specified in the agreement, must pay the employee double the employee's regular wage for the time over 12 hours. Since the law is stated in terms of "day", we better see what a "day" is: "day" means (a) a 24 hour period ending at midnight, or (b) in relation to an employee's shift that continues over midnight, the 24 hour period beginning at the start of the employee's shift; so you can't force an employee to work 12 hours without overtime (without an averaging agreement), simply by splitting a 12 hour shift across midnight. It is thus possible for a contract to do things that superficially appear to be contrary to the "most common situation" factsheet representation, but the law itself is not overridden by such a contract. | If I did not sign promotion bonus document, my career would be over. Is this duress? No. The premise is hardly true or even logical, and what you describe falls short of duress. Not every imbalance of bargain power implies duress. First, it seems that you could have declined the bonus, thereby preempting the sanction/remedy for leaving within 12 months. Second, it seems hard to prove (and unrealistic) that your career would have been over if you refused to sign the document. The employer can easily refute that allegation by pointing out that there are many others who did not sign that employer's document and yet work elsewhere as investment bankers. You would need certain, additional context to reasonably allow for a conclusion that your career altogether depends on what happens with this single entity. Third, your mention that "the bonus mitigates the horrendous weekly hours" reinforces the idea that signing the document was your preference (namely, for the purpose of obtaining some additional, non-compulsory stimulus) rather than employer-inflicted duress. The rationale and decision for acceptance of those conditions reflects that you knowingly exercised your freedom of contract. A party is not entitled to void a contract only because he belatedly changed his mind about conditions of which he was aware beforehand. | People are laid off all the time when sales are down, the market is bad, etc: there is no legal "right to a job" except whatever is in your employment contract. There is a legal concept of promissory estoppel which boils down to promises being binding. However, there has to be a clear and definite promise, not for example a statement like "we hope to bring you back after this is over". Normally, the employer can argue that they have the right to fire you regardless of performance, and that would be the end of it. Let's say you have it in writing, and it is clear that they unconditionally promise to hire you back: you would want to (e)stop them from arguing that they have the right to fire you. The underlying idea of promissory estoppel is that such a promise keeps them from making that argument. But: it is not enough that they made the promise, you also had to rely on the promise and act / forbear from acting in some way because of that promise. It could be, for example, taking another job, or moving to another country, or simply looking for another job. The hard part, then, would be getting a clear and definite promise. | Generally, what you say you will do in a contract is what you must do - there is no "the dog ate my homework" excuse. For your examples: Employment contracts have so much government regulation that the common law contract is lost in the mists of time. It is unlikely that a court would interpret an employment contract as requiring exact timekeeping; it is also unlikely that the person would have worked exactly 38 hours on every week except the one where they worked 37.5. However, if it were proved that the employee owed 0.5 hours to the employer they could be required to provide it or refund the pay they had received, barring a law that changed this. The dog must be walked. Alice must find a substitute walker if she is unable to provide it. Falling sick is something foreseeable that Alice should have provided for either in the contract ("if I am sick I won't walk the dog") or by arranging for someone else to do it. For purely personal services, falling sick may frustrate the contract, however, dog-walking is probably not personal enough. There is a doctrine which allows termination by frustration where neither party is at fault, however, it is not clear that this would apply. The building burning down is foreseeable and could (should?) have been addressed in the contract. If the destruction of the building was without fault on the owner then the contract is frustrated. If there was some fault on the owner (smoking in bed, inoperative fire alarm etc.) and the cleaner stands willing, ready and able (that is able except for the absence of a building) to perform their obligations, the owner would probably be obliged to pay, at the least for unrecoverable costs (e.g. wages) and loss of profits - if they pay for the cleaning products the cleaner would be obliged to deliver them up. One of the main reasons for the length of contracts for non-trivial transactions is they deal with these contingencies. | Such a clause must be presented before or at the same time the offer is made. The (somewhat new) law NH RSA 275:70 says Any employer who requires an employee who has not previously been employed by the employer to execute a noncompete agreement as a condition of employment shall provide a copy of such agreement to the potential employee prior to the employee's acceptance of an offer of employment. A noncompete agreement that has not been disclosed to an employee as required by this section shall not be enforceable against the employee, but all other provisions of any employment, confidentiality, nondisclosure, trade secret, intellectual property assignment, or any other type of employment agreement or provision shall remain in full force and effect The question is whether such an agreement would mean you can't set up shop on your own and take a bunch of customers with you (it seems that such clauses are enforceable), or does it mean you can't work in that trade (competing for new customers, or as an employee of a competitor) – such an interpretation would not be enforced, in the analysis of this article. The clause must be "drafted narrowly to protect only a company's legitimate business interests, like customer goodwill and confidential information". A specific case of this interpretation is Merrimack Valley Wood Products v. Near, 152 N.H. 192, which finds that the law does not look with favor upon contracts in restraint of trade or competition...Such contracts are to be narrowly construed. Nonetheless, restrictive covenants are valid and enforceable if the restraint is reasonable, given the particular circumstances of the case In assessing reasonableness, three tests must be passed (must be answered "no"): first, whether the restriction is greater than necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer; second, whether the restriction imposes an undue hardship upon the employee; and third, whether the restriction is injurious to the public interest. As an example of a reasonable restriction: When an employee is put in a position involving client contact, it is natural that some of the goodwill emanating from the client is directed to the employee rather than to the employer. The employer has a legitimate interest in preventing its employees from appropriating this goodwill to its detriment. But restricting a person from working with any customers of the company (not just the employees work-related contacts) is unenforceable, because the company had no legitimate interest in protecting its entire client base from its former employee, because he had no advantage over any other complete stranger, possessing no special hold on the goodwill of the majority of Technical Aid's customers. See also Brian's Fitness v. Woodward for reaffirmation ("valid only to the extent that it prevents an employee from appropriating assets that legitimately belong to the employer"), and additional citations. The question arises whether there is a distinction between the former employee approaching former customers, versus those same customers approaching the former employee. I have not located any case that directly addresses that, but Technical Aid v. Allen, 134 N.H. 1 says A restrictive covenant must unreasonably limit the public's right to choose before it will be found to be injurious to the public interest. I think it is likely that the courts would find it to be an unreasonable limit on the public's right to choose, if a customer were prevented from choosing a different company to provide the desired service simply because the customer happened to have previously had a business relationship with the former employee. This "right to choose" is asymmetrical – the public has a right to choose any service provider, an employee does not have an equivalent right to pursue (seek out, woo) a customer, in light of a restrictiveness covenant. |
Is my landlord required to bring an ungrounded house electrical service up to code? We recently started renting an older house. We were installing a dryer when we noticed we were getting electric shocks when we touched the back of the dryer while it was plugged in. After some testing, I determined the house isn't properly grounded at all. I made a maintenance request to my landlord last night, but I wanted to make sure I was correct in demanding they send an electrician immediately. I found some laws stating the home must be within all applicable building codes, one saying grounding is required for all 240v plugs, and another specifically calling out laundry areas needing grounding. Am I in the right for demanding an electrician immediately? I consider the home to be unsafe, but I'm not an expert in any regard to building codes. We are located in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. | This is outside the scope of landlord-tenant law and the obligation of the landlord to make the premise habitable. Building codes are not imposed retroactively on existing housing, so while it is true that you cannot legally build a house without service grounding, you do not have to install service grounding when that becomes part of the electrical code (which was decades ago). The law is here; the state could have impose an obligation on landlords to always update plumbing, electrical etc. so that rental housing always conforms to current codes, but it did not. If the electric does not work properly, that has to be repaired, but if there is a functioning but less than ideal electric (knob and tube wiring; ungrounded; no GFI circuits in the bathroom, incorrect receptacle covers, overburdened or improperly placed service panel, too few receptacles), that's not something you can legally force a landlord to change. | There is a law requiring it (in Washington). Per RCW 29a.08.720, "current lists of registered voters are public records and must be made available for public inspection and copying under such reasonable rules and regulations as the county auditor or secretary of state may prescribe". As in all states, there is a law that requires disclosure of "public records", which is in this case limited to first and last name, age, county and zip code (there is no official party affiliation, and phone number or street address are excluded from public records). Ohio law is a bit different, so you can get a street address (in the Ohio section, it also includes putative data from other internet sources, which are often just guesses – it thinks my son lived in Texas). It does not include California, because voter lists are not mandatorily-disclosed public records in California. Under half of the states' records are available. | Most leases have a provision allowing a landlord to make entry without notice in an emergency, but the better course of action, as noted in a comment by @BlueDogRanch, is to call the police and ask them to make a "welfare check." You would ordinarily be permitted to cooperate with police by unlocking doors in furtherance of their welfare check. The police are trained to do this properly in a way that properly balances the need to aid someone who is sick or ill, the need to preserve evidence if there was a death or crime that needs to be understood legally, and to protect the legitimate privacy interests of the tenant. You are not. You could incur liability for failing to prevent death or aggravating injury, could be wrongfully implicated if physical evidence from you contaminates the scene or you destroy evidence showing the true cause, and could be sued for invading the tenant's privacy if it was found that you entry was unreasonable and that it wasn't really an emergency, which is always easier to conclude with 20/20 hindsight. As it is, your biggest potential source of liability is delaying in calling the police seeking a welfare check. They often respond quite quickly to these by the way, although it is not the very highest priority for law enforcement. | In the US, many municipalities have ordinances outlawing loud noises during some night hours. It may start as early as 10pm or as late as 11pm, and end as early as 6am or as late as 7am. Unfortunately, you have to deal with it in the way which you indicated you would rather not. The people to call to deal with this are the police. You don't have to be present when the police arrives. Nor will they tell the neighbors who called them. But if the noise ordinance is violated, it is their job to deal with it. During the day-time hours, it is generally legal to make loud noises unless they exceed some very extreme levels. But those extreme levels are probably more than anything casual teenagers can do. If the walls of the house are not visibly shaking, that's probably not it. | Clean your tub. Scratch that off the list. Typo - forget about it, there is nothing here, clerical errors are curable if not outright reasonable. In CA your landlord can enter under certain circumstances. All but emergency require notice, agreement, or your presence. But what is your remedy? A civil suit for damages or call the cops and try to get the landlord charged with criminal trespass under CAL. PEN. CODE § 602. | Your sewage provider is a “Public service company” under Maryland law: (x) (1) “Public service company” means a common carrier company, electric company, gas company, sewage disposal company, telegraph company, telephone company, water company, or any combination of public service companies. (ee) “Sewage disposal company” means a privately owned public service company that owns or maintains facilities for the disposal of sewage. The Public Services Commission sets the rates: The Commission shall have the power to set a just and reasonable rate of a public service company, as a maximum rate, minimum rate, or both. The utilities code paraphrases this in other provisions: In accordance with the provisions of this article, a public service company shall charge just and reasonable rates for the regulated services that it renders. There is no legal process involved in your situation, since it is a political matter what constitutes a just and reasonable rate. You can write letters of protest, but the commission has the power to set the rates. You can, however, investigate whether the charges were actually approved. You do, however, have to contact the utility before filing a complaint with the commission. The landlord has zero control over rates set by the government, so they cannot reasonably be expected to contractually commit to any particular rates. However, if they overtly lied to you about the terms of the lease, you might sue to get out of the lease, but the chances that you would prevail in such a suit are negligible. | Yes, but not without notice KS Stat § 58-2557 (2015) 58-2557. Landlord's right to enter; limitations. (a) The landlord shall have the right to enter the dwelling unit at reasonable hours, after reasonable notice to the tenant, in order to ... exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, ... | From what I can determine, there has not been a legal challenge to the practice that reached a high enough level to get on my radar, so it's not clearly prohibited or allowed. Turning to the relevant federal regulations, the implementation of the Fair Housing Act, the law hinges in part on an Aggrieved person includes any person who— (a) Claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (b) Believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur. In order to sue a university because they offer sex-separated halls, floors or rooms, a plaintiff would have to show that they have been harmed by being given such a choice. Reading the prohibitions in §100.50, there is no obvious "Discriminat[ion] in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities", and it does not "otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings". Cases like McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (a case putting an end to the "separate but equal" doctrine) include reference to the fact that appellant was harmed ("The restrictions imposed upon appellant impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession"). Analogously, the relatively rare black-only residences of UC Davis and Cal State LA might be targeted in a discrimination suit, if plaintiffs can make the required legal argument that there is harm. |
Would it be legal to publish a program to factor large semiprime numbers? If I somehow figured out a way to factor large semiprime numbers in a reasonable amount of time (don't worry, I haven't; this is hypothetical), would it be legal to publish the code? This could be problematic because RSA, an encryption algorithm that Internet security is pretty much based on, can be trivially cracked by an attacker with the ability to factor the large semiprime numbers used. An attacker with such ability could quite easily have read and modified the contents of this page while it was being transferred to your browser if they controlled one of the routers the page passed through over the Internet. | Sure But it’s been done. Admittedly, we don’t yet have the computer to run it for numbers bigger than 15 but the algorithm is ready to go. | I wrote a letter to the Eclipse Foundation. The consultant pointed me to section 5 in their FAQ. My case falls under the term "linking". He warned that he isn't a lawyer, but offered the following short answer: The Eclipse Foundation does not consider linking with EPL content to be a derivative work and so you are not required to disclose your source code. | If you are worried that some secret will become public, you should find and meet with an attorney, not a financial adviser or other nonlawyer. Your attorney is able to shield your secret information from disclosure in ways other professionals cannot. Raise any credit score issues you're concerned about. In general, the public has a right to access judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 US 589, 597 (1978) (noting that the right is rarely litigated and not clearly defined). That right is not absolute; some records can be sealed, which means that the public can't read them. Local rules govern when that happens. I don't think the existence of a civil lawsuit could be made secretly except in special circumstances. Likewise, the plaintiff usually must identify herself, except in special circumstances. A plaintiff should assume that everything about the lawsuit--who filed it, against whom, what evidence arises, the trial, and who wins and loses--will be public. | It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages. | In the United States, no. For something to be illegal in any meaningful way, you have to be able to point to a law that makes it illegal. If there's no law to break, it's not illegal. I would wonder if your colleague was thinking about question of whether cryptocurrencies are legal tender. For something to be "legal tender," there would need to be some kind of law or regulation requiring people to accept them as payment. There is no such requirement in the United States, so Bitcoin, for instance, is not legal tender. But that doesn't make it illegal tender; it just means that people can decide whether to accept it or not. | Wikipedia explains this well enough: Particular numbers can be trade secrets, and their reproduction and dissemination may be particularly proscribed, e.g., by the U.S. DCMA. As a coarse analogy: Your social security number is not "illegal." But if somebody entrusted with it shared it in violation of law or contract then their communication of the number in a context that allowed potential identity thieves to associate it with you would be illegal. To answer follow-up questions in the comments: Sure, "mere possession" of a number can land one in jail for all sorts of crimes, just like "mere possession" of stolen property can. For example, if you possess a bank account number, credit card number, or PIN, and you "conspire, confederate, or combine with another" person who actually commits fraud or theft using that number, then you can be convicted of the same crime. This is so common that a search for "conspiracy to commit wire fraud" or "credit card fraud" provides ample reading. | In general this is protected by the first amendment. It is not in general a problem describing how one can one can do something illegal. But there are special cases to be careful with. You might want to do some research into the limits on free speech. It would be hard to provide an answer that fully covers all your different cases and you would need to be more specific about what illegal activity you want to describe. In describing how to do something illegal, you might accidentally share information that you are not allowed to share. When you post things online, this can be considered as publishing or exporting. Therefore certain export restrictions might apply. Also, It is illegal to publish bomb making manuals, with the knowledge or intent that this information be used to commit a federal crime of violence. See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/842. There are restrictions on publishing material relating to cryptography without having an export license. Granted, this isn't necessarily related to publishing things that are illegal, but just to give an idea about how publishing/exporting knowledge can causes problems. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the_United_States ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) sets restrictions on what you can publish about arms. What you publish can't be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” See for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandenburg_v._Ohio. One might imagine that you could get into trouble if someone interprets what you do as inciting or producing a lawless action. It might sound obvious, but you want to make sure that you have the right to share the information that you have. The information that you are providing might be copyrighted in some way. | In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say. |
Why was Charles Manson convicted of murder? Charles Manson's sentence is for first-degree murder. This is defined as "any intentional murder that is willful and premeditated with malice aforethought. " How can this be the case if he did not murder and only encouraged others to kill? Isn't his crime incitement at worst? | See California Penal Code Section 31: All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission, and all persons counseling, advising, or encouraging children under the age of fourteen years, or persons who are mentally incapacitated, to commit any crime, or who, by fraud, contrivance, or force, occasion the drunkenness of another for the purpose of causing him to commit any crime, or who, by threats, menaces, command, or coercion, compel another to commit any crime, are principals in any crime so committed. | Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification. | While felony murder was an offense originally invented to single out more culpable murders from less culpable murders, with only the former punishable by death, as opposed to imposing the death penalty on everyone convicted of murder, it has evolved into a means of convicting someone of first degree murder who otherwise would not have been guilty of the crime of murder (or even conspiracy to commit murder) at all. In a typical felony murder statute, everyone who participates in a felony designated in the felony murder statute that results in a death at the hands of any participate, without regard to premeditation or involvement in the murder itself, is guilty of felony murder, rather than merely the underlying felony crime. Typically, felony murder is one way to be guilty of first degree murder and typically the punishment for first degree murder is either life in prison without possibility of parole, or the death penalty (if the state has death penalty), as determined in a second phase of the jury trial after the guilt phase is completed. At the death penalty phase, following evidentiary presentation by the prosecution and the defense of aggravating and mitigating factors, in addition to the evidence presented in the guilty or innocence phase of the trial (at which the same death qualified jury convicted the defendant), the jury (except in Nebraska where a panel of three judges makes this decision, and in Montana where a sole judge makes this decision) must determine if the aggravating factors in the case outweigh the mitigating factors, if any. The fact that the defendant (now a convicted murderer) was a knowing participant in a felony is typically an aggravating factor. The possibility, if established, that the defendant (now a convicted murderer) was not expecting that violence would occur and did not participate in the killing would be a mitigating factor. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit imposing the death penalty for felony murder. The Supreme Court has created a two-part test to determine when the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for felony murder. Under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), the death penalty may not be imposed on someone who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place. However, under Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the death penalty may be imposed on someone who was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. So, the constitutional standard for imposing the death penalty for felony murder is higher than the constitutional standard for imposing the default life without possibility of parole (LWOP) sentence for felony murder. Keep in mind also that following a jury imposition of the death penalty that this decision will be upheld if any reasonable jury could have found facts sufficient to impose the death penalty by finding some evidence to be credible and other evidence to be less credible, whether or not that was the most plausible interpretation of the facts and whether or not this was actually the reason for the jury's decision. Also keep in mind that the death qualification of the jury (i.e. striking for cause from the jury pool anyone who is categorically opposed to imposing the death penalty), means that juries in cases where the death penalty is an option are systemically biased in favor of the prosecution in the process of how the judge guilty or innocence, and also, in their evaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors in a case. | Syed was convicted of two crimes: first-degree murder and kidnapping. In many American court systems, including civilian criminal courts in the state of Maryland, convicts receive a sentence for each offense. They don't get one overall sentence to address all their crimes. Sentencing guidelines may make sentence calculation work by computing one sentence for all the offenses, but the sentence is actually imposed by specifying a certain sentence for each offense and setting them to run concurrently or consecutively to match the guidelines sentence. The judge gave Syed life on the murder charge, but he also needed a sentence for kidnapping. The judge picked the maximum of 30 years. Thus, life plus 30. The sentences can run either concurrently or consecutively; if one sentence is life, that isn't necessarily an important issue, but it could potentially have parole implications. | First, I need to correct a misconception you seem to have. The length of time you spend in jail does not normally determine if something is a felony or a misdemeanor. Whether something is a felony or a misdemeanor is based on how you're charged. And it's not like you happen to be charged with something with a maximum sentence of 365 or 366 days; if you are being charged with a felony, it's because the decision was made that your alleged crime was serious and should be treated as a felony. If you're being charged with a misdemeanor, ditto. Prosecutors charge knowing the difference between the two. The distinction was not originally "punishable by more than a year in prison" vs. "punishable by at most a year." In fact, it originated well before the idea that the default punishment for most crimes is confinement for a term, where the term is dependent on the severity of the crime. The original distinction was about forfeiture. A felony was a violation of a feudal relationship between a lord and a vassal; if a vassal violates their duty of loyalty to their lord, their relationship ends and their property is forfeit to that lord. Not all serious crimes were felonies. Murder was normally not a felony, because it didn't violate that duty of loyalty. Later on (post-Normans), murder and other serious crimes did result in forfeiture. The term broadened to include these crimes; at this point, "felony" meant "this crime results in your property being forfeit." These were also the most severe crimes. This is the point where "felony" meaning "exceptionally severe crime" really became established. However, the technical distinction based on forfeiture became muddied, because of another punishment that almost always went along with it: execution. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, complained that people are mixing these two up. The meaning generally shifted to "crimes which were punished by death," but scholars did know that the proper meaning should really be "crimes punished with forfeiture." The distinction mattered. Because felonies were so serious, the procedure involved differed in several respects. I happen to know you're in the US and my main source is also about the US, so let's hop across the Atlantic Ocean to the colonies. Here, forfeiture was pretty much unknown around the time of independence. The popular understanding of "felony" was still "capital crime;" the legal understanding tended to be "the common-law felonies plus things the legislature designated as a felony." Nearer the end of the 18th century, the number of crimes punishable by death dropped substantially in the US. The default punishment for most serious crimes shifted from execution to confinement in a prison (this is when prison became the default sentence for even very serious crimes in the US). These new prisons were very different from the older jails: they were designed to reform their inmates, and turn them into productive members of society. But not all crimes need that; with less serious crimes, you don't have to go about fixing a character flaw, you just have to show to the criminal that doing this bad thing results in this punishment. The lack of a firm definition of felony became a serious problem shortly after this change. Originally in the US, things worked basically like in England. Legislatures passed laws, which might refer to older laws by name, but there was no organizing principle. Lots of the criminal law was bound up in precedent. It was extremely difficult to find out for sure what the law even was. Instead, there was a major push to codify the law. That means you would have a code, which contained, in organized form, all the laws relating to crime. One of the earliest and most influential American penal codes was actually never adopted. It was written by Edward Livingstone for Louisiana, and was intended to wholly supplant the common law (Louisiana would be the perfect state for this, because it still has a civil law tradition). Livingston didn't use the term "felony," but did distinguish between "crimes" and "misdemeanors." The main systematic difference was not in the penal code itself (the punishments were set out on a crime-by-crime basis), but in the corrections code. Crimes were punished in a penitentiary designed to reform the prisoner; misdemeanors were punished by simple imprisonment. Crimes were all punished by more than a year, while misdemeanors could be punished by anywhere from a few days to two years. The important thing was where and how you were punished, not for how long. While this code was never adopted, it had a major influence on the New York code of 1829. The New York code was designed to rationalize the law, but not do too much in the way of substantive changes. In particular, the old idea of a "felony" was not abolished; it was preserved, with real significance (part of the point of keeping the term was that they didn't want to lose all its baggage), and so it needed a definition. They basically adopted Livingstone's definition. Felonies were always the more serious crimes; since serious crimes were now evidence of character flaws to be reformed in a penitentiary, the crimes where you got sent for reform were the felonies (plus, of course, those punished by death). All others were misdemeanors. They also decided that punishment for more than a year, in a jail that's not designed to reform you, was bad; no jail sentence could be more than a year. Since confinement continues to be the main form of punishment, this definition has managed to stick without issue. The forfeiture and capital punishment definitions became obsolete as those punishments became completely obsolete or very, very limited in use. That's pretty much how things got where they are now. It makes some amount of sense to distinguish between bad crimes and not-so-bad crimes, without needing to list out the bad crimes. This is not actually unique to English law; the French penal code also makes this distinction. The term survived the feudal context in which it originated because it was useful. As confinement became the main type of punishment, and as (at the same time) confinement for serious crimes was paired with efforts to reform and rehabilitate criminals, the old distinction shifted to distinguishing between things where you needed that reform and things where you just needed punishment. Then, it shifted in some places to being about the length of said punishment, as an alternative way of expressing the same basic idea but which could be more easily applied to varying systems. Main source: Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early American Republic, 57 Clev. St. L. Rev. 461 (2009) | Yes, a crime is committed as is a tort. The exact crime would vary from state to state. The most common description of this crime and tort would be "fraud" but the way that criminal conduct is allocated between particular offenses in states varies considerable. Theft (in jurisdictions where it is broadly defined) and shoplifting (in jurisdictions where it is a distinct offense) would be two other plausible offenses. | Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all "completely illegal" regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a "criminal conviction"). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been "decriminalised" - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority. | Judges do not decide, jurors do (however, if a judge is the fact-finder, then the judge makes such a determination). The main input that the decision-maker gets is a jury instruction. In order to unify "reasonable doubt", "reasonable price", "reasonable delay" and so on, appeal is often made a mythical being, "the reasonable man", so reasonable force would be the degree of force the reasonable man would use in a given situation. I will draw from California criminal instructions ('cuz I have them) but similar instructions can be found across jurisdictions. For example, one instructions says "A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes". Or from a negligence instruction "A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk". More detailed appeal to The Reasonable Person is found in the justified homicide instruction: Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified. When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed. The defendant’s belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true. There is no explanation of what it means to be "a reasonable person". Since nobody believes that they themselves are unreasonable, a simple and also wrong way of judging the matter is to subjectively judge whether you yourself would do the same thing, if you were in that situation. Very often, instructions do not even bother to say what "reasonable" means, so (re interpreting expert testimony) "You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence"; (re corpus delicti) "That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed"; "Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty", "when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable" The closest the law has come to articulating an objective characterization of "reasonableness" is in "reasonable doubt" instructions. One characterization is in People v. Feldman, 71 N.E. 2d 433. It is not a doubt based upon sympathy or a whim or prejudice or bias or a caprice, or a sentimentality, or upon a reluctance of a weak-kneed, timid, jellyfish of a juror who is seeking to avoid the performance of a disagreeable duty, namely, to convict another human being of the commission of a serious crime A somewhat improved characterization is the Calcrim instruction Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt There is room for improvement, but it points in the right direction. On rare occasions, a law is written that actually includes a definition. The Gas Price Spike Act HR 3784 said The term ‘reasonable profit’ means the amount determined by the Reasonable Profits Board to be a reasonable profit on the sale. It is then up to the board to subjectively determine what that profit is. (BTW this did not become law). [Addendum] It's actually very difficult to determine what reasoning judges use in those cases where they are the determiners of fact. They will likely call on their knowledge of law, asking "are these circumstances sufficiently like past circumstance A where the defendant was convicted, or more like B where the defendant was acquitted". |
what types of businesses or service providers must give concessionary pricing to those in benefits and/or disabled? In England the practice is so widespread among various types of institutions that it must be not only rooted in some degree of societal tradition but also some statutory provisions of some sort. What is the origin of this practice? | Custom is more important than the law AFAIK there is no legal requirement to provide concessional pricing for any goods or services. Custom dictates that this is more common for services than for goods but, for example, cinema’s often don’t provide concessional pricing for blockbuster movies. | Defining the value of a privately held company is hard (tax returns don't provide a very informative basis because accountants will tend to under-value things like "goodwill" in order to avoid paying tax). However that doesn't matter for this stack, because the only legal question is: If I had some means of coming up with a number and presenting it, would it be legally acceptable to define that as their company value in a license? And the answer is: absolutely yes! You are pretty much entirely free to define terms in your license as you see fit. If you want to define "company value" as meaning "the annual gross salary paid to receptionists", go for it. (You would probably need to define what a "receptionist" is in this case). | Is she committing unlawful discrimination or otherwise behaving in an unlawful manner? No. She would be — if she was saying like "customers with Celiac disease pay £14, others £10". But instead, she simply offers different products at different prices. She makes it clear which option is what. Everyone can buy the option of their choice for the same price — she is happy to sell either or both options to whoever chooses them regardless of their allergies or disabilities. | I’m guessing you have seen a sign in a business that read - “Management reserves the right to refuse service to anyone”. At least in the US, they do not need a reason as long as the reason isn’t unlawful discrimination. They can decide not to serve you. | You have to start with the pertinent ADA regulations, 28 CFR Part 36, and esp. subpart B which gets to the prohibition. Under §36.201(a), No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any private entity who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. After that under activities, it is stated that A public accommodation shall not subject an individual or class of individuals on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation. and also A public accommodation shall not afford an individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals. moreover "separate but equal" is not allowed. The sign does not articulate any denial of opportunity, so that should be the end of the discussion. OTOH I suspect that a sign saying "Please do not enter this store if you are white" would be held to be discriminatory, as an indirect denial of permission to enter based on race. §36.208 introduces two important exceptions. First, This part does not require a public accommodation to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of that public accommodation when that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. That means that (irrespective of the fact that covid is not a legal disability) it is legal to exclude direct threats to the health of others. And furthermore, In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, a public accommodation must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: The nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk. Based on reasonable medical judgment and innumerable official government proclamations, it is reasonable to believe that a person with covid symptoms pose a threat to public health. The law doesn't require you to be omniscient and actually know that customer A has covid and customer B has asthma. §36.301 then says more about possible screening requirements. It is generally expected that everybody knows the law and will follow the law: ignorance of the law is no excuse, nor is it a cause for a discrimination claim. It would not be legal to exclude a person from a public accommodation when they pose no threat to public health. The customer with asthma is expected to know this law, and is expected to not infer incorrectly that the sign implies that he is being illegally excluded. The customer with covid is also expected to know this law, and is expected to know that it refers to him – as is allowed under the law. Potentially illegal discrimination enters the picture once actual exclusion happens, getting you back to "individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment". A rule that "anybody who coughs gets thrown out" is most likely to not pass muster as a reasonable health-based criterion. Including a temperature scan is likely to put the practice within the realm of the reasonable. | First of all, the site you found is governmental, so a rather good find in the first place. It indicates: Au restaurant, la carafe d'eau ordinaire en accompagnement du repas est inclue dans le prix du repas. En outre, les établissements de restauration et débits de boisson doivent indiquer la possibilité pour les consommateurs de demander de l'eau potable gratuite. In the restaurant, the carafe of plain water to accompany the meal is included in the price of the meal. In addition, catering establishments and drinking establishments must indicate the possibility for consumers to request free drinking water. The relevant law cited in the further article is Order No. 25-268 of June 8, 1967, which was repealed in 2016, but speaks about that such a charge needs to be included in the price. However, a different order concerning the display of prices from 1987/1990 is still active. This specifies in Article 5: Les cartes et menus doivent comporter, pour chaque prestation, le prix ainsi que la mention "boisson comprise" ou "boisson non comprise" et, dans tous les cas, indiquer pour les boissons la nature et la contenance offerte. Cards and menus must include, for each service, the price as well as the mention "drink included" or "drink not included" and, in all cases, indicate for the drinks the nature and the capacity offered. Likewise, an environmental law in the shape of Article L541-15-10 demands the following: A compter du 1er janvier 2022, [...] Les établissements de restauration et débits de boisson sont tenus d'indiquer de manière visible sur leur carte ou sur un espace d'affichage la possibilité pour les consommateurs de demander de l'eau potable gratuite. Ces établissements doivent donner accès à leurs clients à une eau potable fraîche ou tempérée, correspondant à un usage de boisson. From 1 January 2022, [...] Restaurants and drinking establishments are required to indicate in a visible manner on their menu or on a display space the possibility for consumers to request free drinking water. These establishments must give their customers access to fresh or temperate drinking water, corresponding to the use of beverages. Since the latter law actually requires them to give access to free drinking water (which is tap water) on request, they are allowed to not bring it out with the meal, as long as they have the required note that tells about it. However, many restaurants will deliver a flask of it on its own, sometimes even before you order. As a side note: the serving of free water to meals is pretty much a custom in France, even if the waste reduction law of 2022 is very new still and the old law that had mandated it went away in 2016. When I last was in Paris in about 2005, I had to ask for water in one restaurant as they didn't deliver it on their own with the meal, upon which the server asked if I would prefer it chilled or warmed. In none of the about 10 different food places I visited in the week, water or table charges did show up on the bill, very much in accordance with the 1987/90 law. In one restaurant also the slices of baguette served while we choose our meals were off the bill, even though we asked for a refill of those. | Contracts are illegal if they require a signatory to break the law, so the contract here is detailing that this specific clause does not apply if following it would contradict the law. It's basically saying that no signatory may hold the other for breaking contract terms if the reason for breaking the contract terms is because the law specifically says these things are required. For example, if the contract reads "The hotel does not allow guests to have animals in the room", this creates an illegal situation if said animal is a guide dog assisting a blind person, which must be allowed under laws for Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). By changing this clause to "The hotel does not allow guests to have animals in the room, except as required by federal, state or local law." Then it is now acceptable. A able bodied guest will still be in breach of contract if a cat is brought into the room, but a blind person would not be in breach because the law says you cannot use this to bar a blind person with a guide dog, and the contract must comply with the law. The Cat Person can be thrown out for breech of contract, but the blind person cannot because this exception allows the blind person to bring the dog into the rented room. | Yes, but ... It doesn’t protect you. Let’s imagine you put such a clause in and a person in Europe used your service notwithstanding: they’ve broken the contract but you’ve broken the law. You get the fine and they get ... nothing. Because you can’t contract outside the law you never had a valid contract with them so you have no basis to sue. Further, because you are purporting to something you can’t legally do, you are probably on the wrong side of misleading and deceptive consumer protection law: which is another fine. If you can ensure that you don’t breach local law - like by not operating over the internet - then you can choose not to deal with e.g. Europeans. If you can’t guarantee that, then you’re stuffed. |
When does silence imply consent? Does the saying qui tacet consentire videtur (silence implies consent) carry any weight in civil litigation? For example, suppose that Alice emails Bob, "When I began work we agreed that the rate was $100/hour." Another email from Alice to Bob says, "I worked all weekend to fix that!" Years later these emails are admitted as evidence in civil litigation pertaining to money owed for work Alice did for Bob. Bob testifies that he did not agree with either assertion, but he can't produce any contemporaneous objection (e.g., a reply Email saying, "I disagree.") Can a trier of fact (judge or jury) consider the lack of a contemporaneous objection as evidence of contemporaneous consent? Is there any law suggesting that such an inference should or should not be made? (Interested in common law jurisdictions; U.S. in particular.) | Silence itself does not generally imply consent, but in the context of a history of transacting, silence in the face of continued actions by the other side can indicate consent. Here's a fun little example (Saint John Tug Boat Co. Ltd. v. Irving Refining Ltd., [1964] S.C.R. 614). The plaintiff was a tug boat company who was providing tug services for the defendant who operated an oil refinery. The large crude oil tankers coming into the refinery needed tug guidance and the plaintiff provided this. There was an undisputed verbal acceptance of a written offer for services from June 13, 1961 to July 13, 1961. The agreement was expressly extended twice, each for two weeks, into August 1961. No further authorization for extension was made. However, the plaintiff continued to provide tug service for the incoming tankers and continued sending monthly invoices to the defendant until February 1962. The defendant did not pay and denied liability for all charges after the middle of August 1961. The trial judge said: I find that the defendant knew that the Ocean Rockswift continued after August 1, 1961, in commission on call to assist and did assist the large tankers during the period in question, and that the plaintiff expected payment on a rental basis for its being kept in commission. The defendant had ample opportunity to notify the plaintiff that it did not accept any liability on that basis, but did not do so. The defendant acquiesced in the tug being so employed. The Supreme Court of Canada quoted from Anson on Contracts: So if A allows B to work for him under such circumstances that no reasonable man would suppose that B meant to do the work for nothing, A will be liable to pay for it. The doing of the work is the offer; the permission to do it, or the acquiescence in its being done, constitutes the acceptance. And from Williston on Contracts: Silence may be so deceptive that it may become necessary for one who receives beneficial services to speak in order to escape the inference of a promise to pay for them. But the Supreme Court of Canada clarified: ... mere failure to disown responsibility to pay compensation for services rendered is not of itself always enough to bind the person who has the benefit of those services. The circumstances must be such as to give rise to an inference that the alleged acceptor has consented to the work being done on the terms upon which it was offered before a binding contract will be implied. This answer shows how silence can play a role from a pure common law contract perspective, without considering equitable principles. sjy's answer correctly adds that silence can be relevant to various equitable doctrines. | It seems to be violating IPC §375 Having sex is only the first half of the check. The other is the enumerated list 1-7 that describes pretty much circumstances of no consent. Among them are (1) Against her will. (2) Without her consent. (3) With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. There are two prongs here: You can argue that the consent wasn't properly given because it was given out of fear of coming injury (IPC §90), or it was given but for a fear of hurt coming from the eviction. In either case, the description demanded can be fulfilled: no-consent theory Being homeless directly leads to physical harm of the body, destruction or loss of property and reputation, and as such is an injury as defined in the IPC. As such, the threat of eviction is a threat of injury. Consent isn't present if the reason for a person to comply with a demand is fear of such an injury. As such, there is no consent as required by IPC §375 (2), and so it is rape. In the alternative, it is forced against the will, and thus violates IPC §375 (1). harm theory Being made homeless is directly harming any person in body and mind. Having obtained consent from a threat of harm to the person or close person, it is violating IPC §375 (3), and as a result is rape. | If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically. | Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent? | There are basically two kinds of conduct that you identify. One is backing away from what you believe were oral promises made by the employer and lawyer regarding payment. Whatever the status of the promises made by the employer, the oral statements made by the lawyer would probably be viewed by a court or ethics board as settlement offers or proposals rather than actual binding agreements, and this is unlikely to be considered an ethical lapse. For purposes of ethics questions and fraud lawsuits, lies about what kind of deal you are willing to make with an adversary don't count as lies. This isn't a terribly logical rule, but is is a well established one. Given that: I was told (by employer), verbally and in text/email messages that I "would be paid when the deals closed." It is going to be very hard for the employer to take back those written statements and text and email messages are usually given the effect of signed writings in a court of law. This is going to be taken as a confession of the employer regarding the probably unwritten agreement of the parties regarding your right to be paid on these deals, so you would be well advised to stick to your guns on this issue. The percentages will be another point that is hard for the employer to fight if there is a course of dealings between the parties in which you receive a consistent percentage or there was a written agreement concerning your commission percentage. Also, even if the lawyer did make a promise and breached it, this would still only be a breach by the employer of a contract made on the employer's behalf by his lawyer. It is not an ethical lapse to breach a contract about future conduct, and a lawyer is not personally responsible for contracts he makes as a disclosed agent of your former employer. The second is making a false statement of fact about whom the lawyer has discussed the matter with. Lawyers do have an ethical duty to be truthful and failing to do so is an ethical lapse. But, this duty is generally interpreted to apply only to statements of fact which are material. If a lawyer lies to you about how old he is, or whether he's ever had an affair, in the context of a pre-litigation negotiation like this one, the ethical officials won't care. If a lawyer lies to you about something material to the transaction (e.g. claiming that the employer has money in the bank to pay a settlement when in fact it is overdrawn on all of its accounts and has no money coming in and the lawyer knows those facts), this is a serious ethical breach. It is hard to see how this information would be material, even though it casts doubt on his credibility. Ethically, he owes any duty of confidentiality to his client and not to you, so it isn't your complaint to make from a confidentiality point of view. Also, unless he discusses confidential advice that he provided to his client when no one else was present to you, he has not waived the attorney-client privilege, contrary to the answer by @IñakiViggers on that issue. Of course, proving that the lawyer said anything in an oral conversation at which no one else was present comes down to a credibility fight between your sworn statement and his if the lawyer testifies inaccurately about the discussion. A sworn statement from you is proof and would meet the "burden of production" to provide proof in support of your case at a trial, but wouldn't necessarily prevail easily at trial since the judge might not be convinced regarding who is accurate in their account of the discussion (I have avoided the word "lying" because there are a variety of reasons that people inaccurately recall discussions). What would be the sensible way to use this information to my advantage while trying to resolve these matters with having to bring suit and go to court? Is there anything that this lawyer should fear, if his unethical behavior was brought to light, either in court or to a bar association? The conduct you describe on the part of the lawyer will provide you with little or no leverage in your negotiations and is likely to not even be considered admissible evidence in court since it may be considered a form of settlement negotiations. Your strongest leverage will be the written statements from the employer. But, depending upon the amount in dispute, it may still make sense to compromise given the time and expense and uncertainty of going to court. Even in the clearest case, you probably only have a 90% chance of winning a contested case, and you wouldn't cross the street if you knew you had a 10% chance of being hit by a car as you crossed, even if you knew that the collision wouldn't be fatal. Unless your state has a wage claims act that covers you, you may have little or not prospect of an attorneys' fee award if you prevail, and representing yourself when the employer has a lawyer will always put you at a disadvantage in a court setting. If the amount in dispute is great (e.g. $50,000+), hiring a lawyer is probably worth it. If the amount in dispute is small (e.g. $5,000) you may want to file a suit in small claims court and only hire a lawyer for a couple hours of pre-hearing coaching. | The word argumentative can mean a number of things. However, when defined as in the passage quoted from Wikipedia, it is not the opposite of 'conciliatory.' It has nothing to do with whether the witness is cooperating with the lawyer examining them. In this context, an argumentative witness is one who gives evidence about a legal conclusion (that is, the answer to a legal 'argument'). This is not allowed, because witnesses must give evidence of fact and not opinion. Sometimes, the distinction is murky. The example given is 'was the driver negligent?' The answer could well be seen as 'conciliatory' if it is consistent with the case being advanced by the advocate. It is still an impermissible argumentative question, because it is a question of law for the court to decide, not a question of fact. Suppose the lawyer wants to prove that a driver was negligent. An eyewitness could give evidence about what he or she saw and heard. A qualified professional could give expert evidence about what can be inferred from the physical evidence or agreed facts (eg. whether anybody was speeding). In the unlikely event that the driver admitted fault but a trial was still necessary, the driver could give evidence that they were drunk or not paying attention. None of these witnesses can express an opinion as to whether or not the driver was negligent, because that is the argument that the court has to decide by drawing inferences from the witnesses' factual evidence. In this context, the opposite of argumentative could be admissible, factual, direct or non-opinion. | No, this is not an acknowledgement of guilt or liability. It offers a "discount" some sort of reduction in price. This could be an offer of settlement without admission of liability, or even just advertising for repeat business (unlikely as that may seem). Without the rest of the communication, there is no way to tell. Unless there are specific admissions, this statement alone is not likely to have much significance in such a case. Edit: There is still not enough context to tell exactly what the sender of this communication wanted to accomplish with the offer of the discount, but since the OP now says "the party does not take the responsibility" this is not an admission of guilt, whatever else it is. It sounds like some sort of backdoor form of settlement offer without admission, but that is far from clear to me. My original answer is not significantly hanged here. | This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off. |
What is the difference between categories of countries in the extradition act 2003? What is the purpose of dividing countries into different categories at all? | Category 2 countries are those that implement the European Arrest Warrant framework which allows for a simplified and uniform extradition process between such countries. Category 1 countries are those that have extradition treaties with the United Kingdom. | The official Scottish government website, under the section headed Proof of identity uses the terms "could" and "can" which, in the UK, do not impose a statutory duty or obligation unlike "must". It also confirms that: Landlords who rent properties to tenants in England and Wales must check that a tenant has a right to rent, and live, in the UK. You don't need to do this check in Scotland. (My emboldenment) So it seems there is no lawful reason to ask the question but asking, in and of itself, does not appear to be in breach of the Equality Act 2010. It is what the prospective landlord does with that information that may, or may not, make it so either by: s.13 Direct discrimination (1)A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. ... (5)If the protected characteristic is race, less favourable treatment includes segregating B from others. ... Or s.19 Indirect discrimination (1)A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's. (2)For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's if— (a)A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b)it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, (c)it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and (d)A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (3)The relevant protected characteristics are— ... race ... For completeness and clarity: s.9 Race (1)Race includes— ... (b)nationality; (c)ethnic or national origins. ... | That sounds a lot like the German Antragsdelikt (literally "crime by request"). That is a crime (defined in the criminal code), that can only be prosecuted if the victim requests it. Antragsdelikt mostly applies to less serious crimes, such as slander or petty theft, while "serious" crimes, such as robbery or assault must always be prosecuted (Offizialdelikt). Also, there are many minor crimes (relatives Antragsdelikt) which are usually only prosecuted by request, but where the prosecution can also decide to press charges if it is in the "public interest" (usually because the act is deemed a serious infraction). Similar concepts exist in Austria and Switzerland. | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | They still have the power They generally don’t because: Most activities of a criminal nature no matter how novel can be shoehorned as a new instance of an existing crime. Parliament is much more pro-active in its legislative agenda. The judicial system moves much more slowly. | Yes, this has come before the Court. Some prominent examples are - Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium (1987), the first time Article 3 was before the European Court of Human Rights, on the complex Belgian system of balancing French-speaking and Dutch-speaking electoral institutions Matthews v United Kingdom (1999), on whether people in Gibraltar should be able to vote in elections to the European Parliament Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (2005), on whether the UK could have a blanket ban on voting applicable to all prisoners Riza and others v Bulgaria (2015), on selective interference with the electoral count In all but the first of these, the Court found a violation of Article 3 of the Protocol. At other times, it has given deference to a State's particular processes, or ruled that a complaint was inadmissible because it did not pertain to the covered type of election. You may be interested to read the Court's guide to its case-law on the topic (a 34-page PDF) which includes many more citations, and an explanation of the legal reasoning involved. | India is a quasi-federation Powers are split between the state and national government as detailed in the constitution. India is a halfway point between full federations (e.g. USA, Australia) and unitary nations (e.g. France, Austria) - it still has sovereign states like a federation but the national government has much more power to intervene. Notwithstanding, citizenship is solely the province of the national government - Indian states have no power over it. | What a country claims to be the case certainly doesn't guarantee what is the case. The constitution (at least as of 2012) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (aka North Korea) says: Article 67. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and social organizations. Needless to say, North Korea is not generally considered a bastion of free speech. The People's Republic of China has a similar provision in its constitution. When we get to countries where those outside the country consider there to be some level of freedom of speech, there are still restrictions. In the UK, the Official Secrets Act makes it a crime for any person to republish leaked classified information. Germany makes it illegal to deny that the Holocaust happened. Until 2013, Canada made it illegal for a person to use telecommunications to say something that would expose people to hatred for some reason covered by antidiscrimination law. Many, many countries criminalize child pornography. Many, many countries have copyright laws. "Free speech" does not mean "you can say whatever you want and the government can't stop you." It means "as a general rule, the government can't restrict what you're saying because they don't like it." I am unaware of any country with a functional government with unfettered freedom of speech. |
Why must I consent to treatment at the eye doctor when implied consent is obvious? Whenever I get a checkup with my eye doctor, they have me sign a consent-to-treat form. I never gave it a second thought. This last visit, though, the front desk attendant was distracted when I arrived. They knew I was there waiting, but forgot to have me sign. They called me for my appointment, I finished, paid, checked out with the same attendant at the desk, and left. Now I'm wondering. Does it matter that they forgot to have me sign? Obviously I consented to being treated because I'm an adult and I willingly went with the doctor, so what's the need to have me sign? Is there some reason that an optometrist in the US would have me sign for my consent to treat at every visit when my implied consent is so obviously given? Is there some liability that they reduce by getting my physical signature? | If they do a treatment which you didn't consent to and harm you they risk being sued. As such, they get you to sign a consent form to prove you agreed to the treatment and were informed about what was going on and any material risks. They had implied verbal consent from you which is enough legally, but there's a risk that if it went wrong you could claim you didn't consent, they lied about what treatment you had, and they illegally did it. As an example, they often drip something into your eye which can sometimes cause blurry vision for a while. If you had blurry vision after and crashed your car you could theoretically sue them because you say you didn't consent to that and they have no proof you did. | Am i going to jail? I'm so scared. No, probably not. The details depend on jurisdiction, but normally the only crime you could be accused of would be that of forgery. However, forgery by definition requires an "intention to deceive". So my personal advice would be to come clean immediately: Go to your employer, and tell them you did not understand the checkout system and accidentally signed yourself, instead of having the customer sign. If you do that, what you did would not count as forgery, because (as you explain) you did not do it on purpose to trick someone. Now, your boss may still decide to discipline you in some way, maybe even fire you, but that's out of your hand. If they are reasonable, they'll hopefully understand a minor mistake on the first day. That said, it is possible your jurisdiction has special penalties for incorrectly filling out medical documents, so there may be more to it - but I doubt it. To be sure, try asking someone you know and trust who is familiar with the legal rules around medication. Or book a single consultation with a lawyer - this is not cheap (typically around $100 in the USA, or 100€ in the EU), but will give you peace of mind. You could also try asking around if there is a local initiative which offers legal help, possibly a professional organization or trade union. | Yes, since you default to no consent, ergo consent would have to be positive. It's rather unsatisfactory though as a sort of double-negative, and needs careful wording to make sure consent is informed. However, this may be a technical problem as it seems odd that you can't have an unchecked checkbox. Does the word 'checked' perhaps appear in the HTML? https://ux.mailchimp.com/patterns/forms#radio | We're missing a lot of information that we'd need to offer a full answer. Here are some of the things that will probably drive the analysis: the type of counselor we're talking about; the types of information the counselor disclosed; the reason she disclosed it; the job functions of the people to whom she disclosed it; the reason the client is bothered by the disclosure. Generally speaking, a mental-health counselor has a fiduciary duty to maintain the confidentiality of patient information, but my understanding is that in most cases, the counselor would be allowed to discuss a case with colleagues for the purposes of advancing the patient's treatment. So discussing the facts of a tough case with a supervisor is not going to be as problematic as idly gossiping about clients with custodial staff. Beyond the permitted disclosures, there are also situations in which counselors are required to disclose confidential information, including cases where the counselor suspects child or elder abuse or where the counselor believes the client poses a danger to herself or others. If the disclosure was truly not permitted, then it may be that the client has a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In Georgia, proving that case requires evidence that: That the counselor had information relating to the client that she knew or should have known was confidential; That the counselor communicated the client’s confidential information to third parties; That the client did not give informed consent to the counselor’s conduct; That the confidential information was not a matter of general knowledge; and That the disclosure harmed the client. As you noted, the client could also file a complaint with the state licensing board. I don't know of any federal laws or regulations that would come into play in the situation you've described. | What’s the problem? Most likely the situation is 100% sure that he or she wouldn’t have performed the operation without anaesthesia. Therefore anaesthesia was not something his brain needed to remember, therefore it didn’t. He gave a truthful answer. He has no memory of it. He doesn’t need a memory of it, he just needed to make sure it’s done. Do you have any reason to believe it was not done? Operating without anaesthesia would be negligent. Not remembering it is done is not. On the other hand, he would have remembered the patient screaming if he started cutting without anaesthesia. | They must comply with your restrictions, via the principle that consent can be withdrawn. One relevant Supreme Court case is Walter v. US 447 US 649, which declares that When an official search is properly authorized—whether by consent or by the issuance of a valid warrant—the scope of the search is limited by the terms of its authorization Likewise in Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, A suspect may, of course, delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents. In US v. Williams, No. 16-3547, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 21304 (3d Cir.), the court elaborated that a consensual search satisfies the mandates of the Constitution only if conducted within the boundaries of the consent given. This recognition establishes that it is the subject of a consensual search who decides the terms of the search. and furthermore, That a party may terminate a search by withdrawing his consent is a corollary of the recognition that the subject of a consensual search determines the parameters of that search. Bear in mind that you have to be crystal clear on any limits on the scope of a search. If this is more of a business call (the electrical inspector) and not a search, they don't have any special powers to enter your house. If the inspector enters your basement study without permission, that is trespassing, but you can't sue him because of that unless there was actual damage done. You can complain to his superior. | Let's be quite brutal here. Inexperienced driver doesn't mean the driver made a mistake. Lots of friends in the car doesn't mean they interferred with his driving. Loud music in the car is totally legal. "Perhaps was distracted" - "perhaps" you were distracted by looking at the passengers of this car instead of yielding? It seems that you drove without due attention. You noticed at the last moment that you had to yield. "Yielding" isn't just stopping right at the last second, you have to drive in a way that it is visible for others that you are going to yield, and you didn't. The other driver was 100% correct to assume that you wouldn't yield. Then you come up with an accusation that a police officer was biased. That's a very, very strong accusation. It's impossible for you to prove. It's the kind of accusation that will cause the judge to believe that you can't accept your own faults, and that you need the maximum possible fine to make you realise your mistakes. That's why you need a lawyer. A lawyer will either make sure that you only say things in court that actually help your case. Or will advise you not to fight this in court at all, if that is better for you. If you go to court on your own, you'll only get yourself into trouble. And if there was bias by a police officer, and a witness lying, and a driver driving without attention, then a lawyer with experience in these things might be able to prove that it court, although that would be a very tough call, but you on your own don't have a chance in hell. You say "the shop owner lied". The shop owner says "no, I didn't". So what's your next step? You don't know. Your lawyer knows. That's why you need a lawyer. | Yes in general Generally, almost all western jurisdictions (be they civil law or common law) have some way to get medical records into evidence, be that via subpoenaing, or by discovery requests or court orders. In most cases, the party that brings the suit is also the patient or their legal representative, and they give (or imply) consent to the use of the records. And in cases where the defendant's medical records are required, usually, the defense wants those in too to prove some condition. And then there are cases where the state or their representatives brings the charge. They usually can bring a warrant or court order to obtain the documents. Then there are Medical records that had been made specifically on the behest of the state. Here, the warrant is usually filed to obtain the samples or access to the body to be investigated, the record itself forms the basis for the investigators to proceed - and is not under client-doctor confidentially in the first place. It had been made specifically for the state and it is a state-owned medical record, be they made on request of the executive power (police) with a warrant signed by a judge or on behalf of the judicative after a court order to evaluate capacity (see below). However, medical records can generally only be obtained if the records are relevant to the case at hand and only to the degree necessary: You can't request the medical records about a person's fertility status in a case that discusses damages for his broken arm. As a result, the medical record available in court might be only an extract from the original, with irrelevant passages sealed or redacted. Unlike many people think, it's quite common to get some medical records into court in some way or another: As the basis of injury cases If you have a case of physical injury, the injuries themselves need to be proven in court. This is done generally by getting the medical records - thus they can be subpoenaed by a party, usually the injured party here. Then a medical expert can discuss them, be they a court-appointed one or paid by either of the parties. In this category also fall mandatory reports of certain types of wounds or situations. As such, the treating doctor has to provide a medical report with enumerated types of injuries, like bullet wounds or where child abuse might be the reason. Very necessarily in malpractice cases Malpractice is pretty much injury on steroids: the injuring party made the records and would never want to give them up to the one suing them - if they could. Alice shall remove Appendix. It goes haywire and the day after Charly needs to cut Bob open again. Now Bob sues Alice for malpractice. Bob needs medical records from both Alice, the doctor who botched it, and Charly, who was fixing Alice's error. Generally, both records are subpoena-able to the degree relevant and necessary, and indeed the opposing medical opinions on the operation and records form the very basis of the case for either side. Without the ability to subpoena the - in this case unmodified - records from the injuring doctor, proving - or defending - a case of malpractice would be impossible: the very truth of the allegation should be in the medical records. It's routine in cases around death What is the very last medical record a person can ever get? An autopsy record! That's a very sensitive medical record, but they routinely are used in homicide cases. Oftentimes, the investigators also subpoena the medical records of the victim from their doctors to corroborate the autopsy record, while the defense might subpoena them to try and disprove it. Even in civil cases, like the OJ-Simpson civil damages case, autopsy and medical records from an accompanying criminal case can and will be "pulled" (copied over) from the other trial's docket. Regularly in child protection cases Whenever child protection is on the line, be them protective orders or who a child will live with after the child protection service (whatever its name is) is in on a case, then medical records are often required to bolster one side. Those records could be medical records from quite many doctors, be they physicals or psychological evaluations... Sometimes the medical records required here are only created due to court-ordered medical or psychological evaluation by a doctor. Whenever incompetence defense is called When the lawyer claims temporary incompetence or insanity, courts generally order a psychological evaluation. These medical records are evidence, but usually don't need to be subpoenaed: they have a waiver form to be disclosed to the court almost built-in. Are they available to the public? Medical records are part of truth-finding, but they are also quite sensitive. As a result, most medical records can not be gotten from the court and enter the dockets under seal. Another option is, that they enter the docket partially or even mostly redacted, with passages blackened. |
Is this NDA valid? I have a non-disclosure agreement that I signed to not disclose confidential information of the disclosing party. “Confidential Information” shall include all information or material that has or could have commercial value or other utility in the business in which disclosing party and receiving party are engaged in; and any other projects that parties named in this agreement collaborate on, as well as other related information regarding specific projects and products. However, the disclosing party never signed the NDA. Does this mean that the NDA is not valid and any "confidential information" can then be disclosed? | Contracts don’t need to be signed Unless they are of a class that does - NDA’s aren’t. If the parties agree to a contract then it binds them. You agreed and your evidence for doing so is your signature. They agreed and their evidence for doing so is your signature on the contract they gave you. | If a contract sometimes uses the wrong name, is it still valid? Yes. It is valid as long as the contract as a whole permits identifying the parties (unequivocally) and ascertaining their role with respect to the contract. Using "Contractor" and "Consultant" interchangeably despite only the former being explicitly defined seems a bit sloppy, but it does not by itself alter or invalidate the meaning of the contract. The excerpt you reproduce is self-explanatory. Its first sentence identifies the parties, and there are only two. Thus, there is no reasonable way to dispute that the second sentence means "Contractor shall indemnify Company", since a clause of the sort "he will indemnify himself" makes no sense. Moreover, the legal definitions of Indemnitor and Indemnitee (Black's Law Dictionary) clearly make reference to "the person" (who protects or is protected, accordingly) and "the other" (that is, not to self). | The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds. | Is there any legal doctrine whereby E's agreement with A continued to apply to E in his work for company N? No, because the parties to the non-compete agreement were Employee E and company A, not the human who owned and sold A. What about B? Do they have any standing to block E's going to work for a B's customer? No. My rationale is that the decisions you describe result in a waiver of the non-compete clause. An employment relation between B and E never existed. Thus, the only vestige of B's non-compete rights binding E that could have been preserved stem from E's former employment at A. However, that vestige disappeared at the instant B --apropos of the hospital project-- waived its non-compete clause with N. Given B's waiver with regard to N, N's failure to establish a non-compete clause with E enables the latter to conduct business with (or accept employment at) the hospital. If anything, B would have standing to sue N for negligence or related torts. But neither B nor N has any viable non-compete claims against E. | Depending on the circumstances, it may be irrelevant whether or not the the terms of service contain an express clause dealing with inaccurate information. For example, in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, under section 2(1) of the Fraud Act 2006, if you dishonestly make a representation which is untrue or misleading with the intention to make a gain or cause someone a loss you will commit the offence of fraud. This could arise for example if you give a false name intending to obstruct the other party from being able to pursue you for any breach of your contractual obligations (e.g. non-payment for services). As for whether or not you would breach any clause in the contract requiring you to provide accurate information, it's very hard to say without seeing the exact wording and context of the clause. | Do I have recourse against seller? Is the seller liable or obligated to disclose this and if so what are my options? Probably not. The general rule is that you accept any condition which could be discovered with reasonable inspection. When "At the time of sale I waived inspection and did As-Is" you are greatly limiting your claims. If the seller believe that the work done fixed the problem, you probably have no remedy. It could be that the seller made a false representation in the disclosure (you'd have to look at the exact language) but even then proving it with only the kind of circumstantial evidence provided would be very challenging. In particular, as a practical matter, it isn't really economic to sue in a $10,000 non-disclosure case without open and shut clarity of fault, as opposed to some suggestive but ultimately inconclusive indicators. You could always ask and state the case in a demand letter, but if you came to me as a potential client, I wouldn't take your case because the high cost combined with the low likelihood of success would make it unlikely that an attorney could bring the case in a way that would generate net value to the client. | Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on. | In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it. |
Does absence of legal advice affect litigation of a written agreement? It is common for parties to a contract to adapt templates (in a generally misguided effort to avoid legal costs). In such cases, the Written Agreement may not reflect the parties' Actual Agreement. How do courts resolve claims by a party in litigation that a term in their Written Agreement does not reflect the Actual Agreement, in a scenario in which (at least) the party disputing the term did not obtain legal advice on the Written Agreement? For example, if neither party obtained legal advice, will a court accept evidence that a term of the Written Agreement did not reflect the Actual Agreement, and instead apply compelling evidence of the Actual Agreement? Or is the language of the Written Agreement always applied, regardless? For purposes of this question, assume: The litigation does not concern ambiguities, so this is not a question that is answered by the contra proferentem rule. Neither litigant asserts that the contract in question is an adhesion contract. I.e., the litigants had equal bargaining power upon entering into their agreement. As an example, imagine that the parties adopted a Written Agreement with a standard integration clause. The plaintiff's case depends on invalidating the integration clause. Plaintiff presents contemporaneous evidence that the parties did not intend the Written Agreement to be integrated, even though the template they used contains the integration clause. (Of course, in this case the defense succeeds if the integration clause is enforced, so the defendant will not admit that the intent was otherwise.) So far it sounds like the plaintiff can't prevail. But what if at the same time that they signed the Written Agreement in question the parties signed another agreement covering some of the same subjects? That seems like evidence that the Written Agreement was not in fact integrated. Or what if there is incontrovertible evidence that both parties subsequently and intentionally acted contrary to some term of the Written Agreement? That would suggest that the Written Agreement did not represent the Actual Agreement. Interested in common law; particularly U.S. | Courts only decide disputes If the written contract says X but the parties agree they meant Y, then the court adopts Y. However, if the written contract says X but one party asserts Y and the other Z, the court takes the written contract as definitive. The parol evidence rule would prevent any evidence being introduced if X is unambiguous. Plaintiff presents contemporaneous evidence that the parties did not intend the Written Agreement to be integrated, even though the template they used contains the integration clause. The plaintiff can’t introduce that evidence in the first place unless there is some ambiguity to be resolved. If it’s plain on the face that integration (whatever that is) was intended then we’re done here counsel, move along. But what if at the same time that they signed the Written Agreement in question the parties signed another agreement covering some of the same subjects? If the documents don’t create a practical conflict then we’re in the same place as before. If they do then the court will try to resolve that within the written documents - a later document will usually prevail over an earlier one and a more detailed document over a more general one. Extrinsic evidence is almost always excluded. Or what if there is incontrovertible evidence that both parties subsequently and intentionally acted contrary to some term of the Written Agreement? That would suggest that the Written Agreement did not represent the Actual Agreement. No, that would constitute a waiver by one or both parties - you can choose not to enforce (waive) your rights under a contract. This can be one off or, if repeated often enough, a waiver for all future breaches. Alternatively, the parties are free to change the terms of their contract; maybe that’s what happened. | No Or at least not necessarily. Contract terms are legally one of three types: Conditions, Warranties, or Intermediate. Breach of any term allows the aggrieved party to sue to recover damages - monetary compensation to restore them to the position they would have been in had the breach not occurred. Breach of a condition also (or instead) allows them to terminate a contract. Breach of a warranty does not. Intermediate terms are terms that might be a condition or might be a warranty depending on how egregious the breach was. A contract can explicitly make a term a condition, the historical and still used phrase being that X is “of the essence”. If the contract is not explicit (most aren’t), then that is the concept that the court uses to decide - is the term “of the essence”, that is, absolutely fundamental to the performance of the contract. Similarly a term can be explicitly a warranty, usually by saying party Y “warrants” something. Most incidental or procedural terms are warranties - if breached, they never give rise to a right to terminate. Most terms are intermediate, particularly most terms about time. Normally, intermediate terms are warranties but if a breach is egregious enough, then this can elevate the term to a condition. Payment terms are a classic: if you are a day or a week late in making payment, the other party can’t cancel the contract. If you are a year late, they can. Somewhere in between, your breach changes the term from a warranty to a condition. For your situation, the early delivery is clearly a breach of a warranty, not a condition. If it even is a breach - the contract may say that they are obliged to deliver by 1 December: delivery on 1 November is clearly in compliance with that term. If it is a breach, you do not have the right to terminate the contract and if you tried you would be breaching the contract yourself by repudiation. By the way, repudiating the contract is definitely breaching a condition. A huge number of contract disputes turn on who validly terminated and who repudiated the contract. If it is a breach, you can sue for damages which, since they have not charged you for November, would be what it cost you or what you lost by having their bin on your premises for a month. My guess that this would be in the order of zero. | A case for negligence or some other tort would likely never reach the stage where we could answer this question, as lawyers are generally immune from suit for their litigation conduct. I don't know of any case with facts likey you've described, but my understanding is that the litigation privilege precludes virtually any tort action based on a lawyer's statements in the course of the proceedings. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, for instance, has specifically acknowledged that claims for defamation, extortion, fraud, perjury, forgery, slander of title, injurious falsehood are unavailable: The policy reasons for the privilege have often been repeated: In fulfilling their obligations to their client[s] and to the court, it is essential that lawyers, subject only to control by the trial court and the bar, should be free to act on their own best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of later having to defend a civil action for defamation for something said or written during the litigation. Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). | But even then, to my understanding, a contract can't prohibit a party from seeking legal remedies. You are mistaken. A contract settling a bona fide dispute regarding people's legal rights can mutually (or unilaterally for that matter) release or waive their legal rights. In fact, a waiver or release of rights is routinely a part of a settlement agreement. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of such agreements are entered into every year and they are almost always enforced. Sometimes, but not always, a settlement agreement will also call for a dismissal of a case with prejudice, which (roughly) means a dismissal that prohibits refiling a case involving the same subject matter. | The precedent is very clear and was accurately applied by the judge A treaty does not create domestic law and is only applicable to the extent that it is incorporated into domestic law. She extensively quotes the relevant precedents in the judgement at [42-49]. | The validity of the NDA is not an easy question, but a related one is more clear. A lawyer in the U.S. in most states is not permitted to threaten criminal or administrative action (e.g. reporting someone to immigration or tax officials), to gain advantage in a civil case. You can unilaterally bring criminal charges or take administrative action, but it is deemed to be unethical and against public policy to refrain from bringing criminal charges or taking administration action to gain civil advantages. An NDA of the type described arguably violated the same public policy and might be invalidated as a result. Put another way, there is a privilege to make certain reports to public officials without legal consequences and such an NDA might violate that privilege. Some of these privileges found in what are called "whistle blower" statutes specifically prohibit this kind of agreement as to some specific kinds of illegal conduct, but not others. There isn't a general rule. This said, it is not black and white. For example, a private NDA can't prevent someone from testifying under subpoena, but can prevent someone from voluntarily testifying in the absence of a legal compulsion to do so such as a subpoena. Suppose a woman is sexually assaulted at work, and is given an NDA to sign. Can the company legally require her not to disclose the conduct of an illegal activity? I can imagine this example coming out different ways in different jurisdictions. For example, some states have a legal duty (rarely enforced) that requires people to report felonies, and an NDA in this case would contradict that affirmative legal duty, while others do not. Another source of gray in the analysis is that there is a difference between not reporting a sexual assault that actually happened, and, as part of a larger settlement, executing an affidavit stating under penalty of perjury and under oath that a sexual assault didn't happen. The first is potentially an NDA that is void as a matter of public policy. The other, in principle, is a settlement that the person signing the affidavit can only enter into if it is true. There is nothing, in general, wrong, about requiring someone to confirm that certain representations are true as part of a business transaction or contract and allowing the contract to go forwards only if certain facts are true. The gray gets deeper, because whether a sexual assault happened or not is not always a subjectively black and white clear issue of pure fact. (It is subjective because an affidavit or affirmation is made to the best of the declarant or affiants' knowledge and belief, not as a matter of objective fact.) For example, someone may not have perfect memory of what happened, or there could be doubt over the question of whether the perpetrators acted recklessly (the Model Penal Code intent requirement for sexual assault) or merely with criminal negligence (which would not be sexual assault under the Model Penal Code). A statement made under oath about whether a sexual assault happened to the best of your knowledge, thus, might be a mixture of factual issues (A penetrated B at a certain date and time) and legal or not perfectly factually known ones (A acted with X intent regarding consent during that act). So, in a case where there was some room to argue either way about how to characterize what happened and about what actually did happen, there might be some room for a settling party to make a non-perjured statement consistent with the settlement and then to agree not to a true NDA, but instead to not make statements which, if the affidavit is true, would be false. In a plea bargain in a criminal case, one can plead "no contest" without agreeing that the crime factually happened, but that isn't really possibly in the context of an affidavit about what really happened, with an NDA limited to not disclosing the incident since it was already agreed as a matter of sworn fact that there is nothing to disclose that rises the level of a crime. | You can use academic sources when arguing in court if you like, but be aware of the following: Academic texts are not primary sources of law in Jamaica. What is in them may be persuasive but does not bind a court in the same way as statute law or case law. Sometimes, it's appropriate to cite works of legal scholarship to flesh out an argument. If the book contains a succinctly-phrased statement that matches what you want to prove, but prior case law isn't quite as neatly applicable, then you might cite both - subject to points below. Citing the book alone is weaker. At other times, when there is authority on both sides of a point, you might find academic argument tipping the balance, but again not to be used in isolation. Whether a text is persuasive may not be obvious, especially for older works. Sometimes, perhaps often, the law has changed since the book was published. Don't assume that an old book by a famous author will automatically be revered. You can check to see if newer books say something different from the older one, and in general start your search looking backwards from now in order to identify the current state of the law. It is more common these days to see references to current editions of textbooks than comparatively ancient authorities, no matter how illustrious the name of Blackstone might be. If a point of law is not actually contested, then there is no need to argue about it. It can form part of the background material that is agreed on between the parties. Basic principles of the way contracts work don't need elaboration or authority. Judges would prefer to have you limit the number and range of authorities you bring in, because they only have so much time in their day and they don't want to struggle through a lot of unnecessary background reading. In a skeleton argument, the strong preference is for only one principal authority to be mentioned in support of each point of law. You can mention a recent decisive case rather than reciting the entire history of case-law on the topic, and you don't need to include cases where a well-understood precedent was applied without difficulty. It may be that a textbook brings you to the relevant statute or judgement but then that is what you need to cite, not the textbook itself, especially if it simply quotes or restates what is found in the primary material. For filing court documents in general, pay close attention to the Civil Procedure Rules and the Practice Directions, including PD No. 8 of 2020 on the format of the judge's bundle. If the judge is annoyed enough about non-compliance with the court's rules about submissions, then various sanctions are available to them. For example, they can refuse costs on the legal research that led to the preparation of the submission. In correspondence, which I think you allude to, you can be more free than when dealing with the judge's bundle. In a letter to the opposing party you can certainly bring in additional references that you think would be helpful to you as a matter of rhetoric and argumentation. Do note that doesn't mean it is a good idea to make correspondence too aggressive or lengthy. For one thing, a judge can end up reviewing the correspondence and will notice whether or not you are making a good-faith effort to resolve the matter, or at least identify the salient issues to bring to the court. | Finding Certainty There is only one way for certain: Do the supposedly unlawful thing Get sued (civil) or prosecuted (criminal) Go to court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose, appeal to the next appellate court in the chain In one of those courts refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal Repeat as necessary until you reach the Supreme Court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose or the Supreme Court refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal. Of course, this whole cycle will take a few years and quite a lot of money. Not certain but persuasive Consult a lawyer: their area of expertise is knowing what the law is and how it will likely apply to your circumstances. Of course, they can be wrong about this because - see above. Why is this so hard? Common law jurisdictions, of which Florida is an example, do not have a "Code of Laws" where you can look things up and see if they are legal or illegal. The Common Law in Florida is partially enacted law (by the US, Florida, County, City and finally your housing corporation) and partially unenacted law (decisions made by courts about both the enacted and unenacted law). In fact, enacted law is usually quite ambiguous until it has a body of unenacted (or case) law that surrounds it and provides guidance on how the courts will interpret it. Part of a lawyers skill is knowing (within their area of expertise) what the relevant case and statute law is with respect to the specific facts of the case, or knowing how to research them. Publish and be damned! You can always take the Duke of Wellingtons approach. In common law jurisdictions, everything is legal unless there is a law (enacted or unenacted) that makes it otherwise. If you do not believe that the action you wish to take is illegal then advise the other party that you will give them 24 hours to come back with a court injunction to prohibit it, otherwise you will proceed. You can't call a bluff harder than this! |
Can a racist business owner legally get away with saying he only wants to hire people that 'look white'? This is a belated follow up to an earlier question where I asked how one can get away with hiring actors of an appropriate race when BFOQ (Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications) exceptions do not apply to race. The answer was that you can't insist on hiring someone who is black, but you can require someone that looks black. So taking that to the logical extreme if one employer is allowed to make requirements based off of one's apparent race why can't others? If I have some organization that panders to racist folks can I say I need all my servers to look like the appropriate race so that I don't offend my clientele? I'm pretty sure (and hope!) the answer is that this isn't legal, but what I'm wondering is more what the distinction between these two cases is. How is the line drawn between the few legitimate reasons where hiring someone based off of the race they appear to be makes sense and all the numerous occasions where it would just be an end-run around refusing to hire someone based off of race? Is there an actual hard and fast line here? Has there been a court case where someone tried to hire only people that appear white as a means of discrimination and the courts gave a ruling specifying why it wasn't allowed? | No. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It is therefore generally forbidden for an employer to refuse to hire someone because they are not white/black/etc. or because they do not look white/black/etc. The law permits exceptions when the employee's religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualifiction, but not when the employee's race or color is a bona fide occupational qualification. The answer to your previous question was wrong because it adopts an "is black vs. looks black" distinction that doesn't really work. Discriminating against someone because they "look black" is the same thing as discriminating on the basis of color. Even if you were saying someone "looked black" because of their hair or facial structure or clothing, you're talking about "perceived as" discrimination, which many courts treat as equally impermissible. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lake Cty., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1278 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (“Objective appearance and employer perception are the basis for discrimination and, in the opinion of this Court, the key factors relevant to enforcing rights granted members of a protected class.”). As far as I know, the question of whether one may discriminate on the basis of race or color in casting decisions is still unresolved, but the courts that have looked at it seem to so far be in agreement that casting directors may make engage in that kind of discrimination because their constitutional rights to create their art as they see fit under the First Amendment overrides their statutory obligation to provide equal employment opportunities under the Civil Rights Act. For example, the issue arose when a black man brought civil-rights claims against ABC for excluding him from auditions for The Bachelor. ABC argued that its casting decisions are an essential component of its expression, and the court agreed: Ultimately, whatever messages The Bachelor and The Bachelorette communicate or are intended to communicate — whether explicitly, implicitly, intentionally, or otherwise — the First Amendment protects the right of the producers of these Shows to craft and control those messages, based on whatever considerations the producers wish to take into account. ... Thus, whether enforcing § 1981 here would frustrate, enhance, or be entirely consistent with the message that The Bachelor and The Bachelorette conveys, the First Amendment protects the producers' right unilaterally to control their own creative content. Claybrooks v. ABC, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 1000 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). | Your bank is not discriminating against you. Your reasons for not having the required amount of funds pass thru your account has nothing to do with your marital status. In general, it's problematic to make a chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination. For example. Your argument is analogous to the following. My boss fired me for being late to work. But I was late to work because my child woke up late and missed the school bus; so I had to drive her to school. Therefore, my boss fired me for having children. That type of chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination just doesn't hold water. It is non sequitur and a requires a leap of logic. | It's almost certainly legal and is commonplace in much of the world- especially in technology-related fields. There is a legitimate reason for a recent degree in a changing field such as Computer Science. A degree from 2019 would have covered very different topics than one from 2009, which would be unrecognisable from one from 1999. While I agree it is more likely that valid applicants will be young (under 35), there is no reason to believe this was the intention. For this to be illegal it would have to be done with the puropse of deterring older applicants. If you're still convinced it's illegal and want to spend time and money on this, lawyer up. If you're looking for advice on how to be considered anyway, I know for a fact this has been asked on Workplace before. | It is entirely legal to discriminate on arbitrary grounds. What is not legal is to discriminate on the basis of a protected category, for example race. The law say that you cannot favor or disfavor a customer because of their race. Federal law specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, but not age or gender (disability is more complicated). Moreover, the grounds are not arbitrary. The establishment is at legal risk if a customer does not wear eye-protection, and you have no right to compel them to assume that risk: it's a perfectly normal business decision. The law states that "Customers are not allowed to use a tanning device unless the customer uses protective eyewear", and verifying that you have such eyewear is the minimal way of assuring compliance with the law. | Barrister to instructing solicitor: “Am I working for the plaintiff or defendant?” Plaintiff Your honour, this excellent study and the expert testimony you have heard from the authors, clearly demonstrates that whiteboard testing is sexual discrimination by another name. The clear correlation between the gender of the interviewee and their ability to perform this task, which is unrelated to the job and is actually a test of how good the person is at handling performance anxiety, is being used to prejudicially and unlawfully screen out female applicants. Defendant Your honour, this discredited paper and the inconsistent testimony of the author clearly demonstrated that the methodology was flawed and the conclusions are unsupportable. When pressed, it turned out that the number of females encompassed by the catch-all word “all” was 6 - hardly a sample big enough to draw any meaningful conclusions from. Further, it turned out that the number of men who also improved was unknown because they didn’t test them! So we have the authors of a study with gender discrimination in its very methodology drawing asinine conclusions from it about gender discrimination! It may be that whiteboard testing is better at finding competent actors than programmers and this may make it a terrible recruitment tool. However, my client can run their businesses in whatever inefficient way they choose so long as it isn’t unlawful discrimination - and this isn’t that. | The Supreme Court has held, Regents of California v Bakke 438 U.S. 265, that a racial quota system is unconstitutional. The decision upheld the use of race as one of many factors, but ruled against setting aside positions that could only be filled by members of racial group ("forecloses consideration to persons like respondent"). To be constitutional, the practice must allow the possibility of hiring a person not in the racial group, thus they cannot require a person to be of a certain ethnicity, which is the situation you describe (but check the language of the ad since it probably states a preference, not a requirement). Preferences are found to be allowed in Grutter, Fisher, just as GPA or extramural activities can be considered. In Gratz it is emphasized that racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, thus must be narrowly tailored, and a system automatically awarding points or disqualifying applicants based on race is not narrowly tailored. The EEOC has made available this non-opinion letter addressing faculty recruitment and the "especially encouraged" clause, which more or less says this, also pointing to 29 CFR 1607, i.e. addressing the Title VII issue. 29 CFR 1607.2(C), the statutory realization of Title VII, says the use of recruiting procedures designed to attract members of a particular race, sex, or ethnic group, which were previously denied employment opportunities or which are currently underutilized, may be necessary to bring an employer into compliance with Federal law, and is frequently an essential element of any effective affirmative action program; but recruitment practices are not considered by these guidelines to be selection procedures 29 CFR 1607.3(B) requires that Where two or more selection procedures are available which serve the user's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship, and which are substantially equally valid for a given purpose, the user should use the procedure which has been demonstrated to have the lesser adverse impact which expresses the "least restrictive" concept of strict scrutiny. | The theatre is a private place. You may enter it only with the permission of the owners. They are not obliged to grant you that permission. They have the right to refuse admission on almost any grounds they choose. I say "almost" because many jurisdictions have laws about things like race or gender discrimination. I suspect in India it would be illegal to say "You can't come in because you are Hindu." The point is though, that there is a short list of reasons which they aren't allowed to use. Any other reason is legal. | One limit is that potential jurors cannot be excluded solely on the basis of their race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. ___ (2019). As summarized in Flowers: Equal justice under law requires a criminal trial free of racial discrimination in the jury selection process. Enforcing that constitutional principle, Batson ended the widespread practice in which prosecutors could (and often would) routinely strike all black prospective jurors in cases involving black defendants. By taking steps to eradicate racial discrimination from the jury selection process, Batson sought to protect the rights of defendants and jurors, and to enhance public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Batson immediately revolutionized the jury selection process that takes place every day in federal and state criminal courtrooms throughout the United States. The Batson restriction is not merely that one cannot explicitly announce race as the factor by which one is excluding a juror. This will most often not be the kind of evidence available and if that were the rule, the purpose of the rule would easily be defeated. What Batson prohibits is exclusion of a juror "on the basis of race" (whether or not a proxy was the proximate or purported means by which the prosecutor made the decision). See Flowers at p. 18 of the slip opinion: The trial judge must determine whether the prosecutor’s proffered reasons are the actual reasons, or whether the proffered reasons are pretextual and the prosecutor instead exercised peremptory strikes on the basis of race. The ultimate inquiry is whether the State was “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.” |
What is a police car? Is a police department allowed to duct tape lights and a siren to a private vehicle and start using it as a police cruiser? If the only law in question is whether one is "impersonating an officer," can any car drive around with lights and sirens blaring so long as there's a public or private police officer in it? I'm really curious about how this applies everywhere, but considering I split primary residence between California and Boston, I'm including tags for California, Massachusetts, and the US. | A "police car" doesn't necessarily have a special legal status, so a police officer can theoretically drive a beat-up pickup truck and "be legal" (but not in Washington, see below). What matters is whether others have to give special attention to the vehicle. The pertinent question is, what are the requirements for being an authorized emergency vehicle. I'll give you Washington state law, and you can apply this to other states fairly easily. RCW 46.37.190(1) mandates that Every authorized emergency vehicle shall, in addition to any other equipment and distinctive marking required by this chapter, be equipped with at least one lamp capable of displaying a red light visible from at least five hundred feet in normal sunlight and a siren capable of giving an audible signal. (3) Vehicles operated by public agencies whose law enforcement duties include the authority to stop and detain motor vehicles on the public highways of the state may be equipped with a siren and lights of a color and type designated by the state patrol for that purpose. The state patrol may prohibit the use of these sirens and lights on vehicles other than the vehicles described in this subsection. Given these restrictions, a driver knows whether they must get out of the way, and whether they have to "pull over" (stop driving and get ready for a brief traffic detention). The manner of attachment of "stuff" on the outside of the vehicle falls under general state patrol safety rules, whereby for example you can't balance a rocking chair on the roof and speed down the highway. The state patrol has reasonable discretion to deem that a particular mode of attachment is "unsafe" – this won't be like building-code minutia. Duck tape would probably be deemed to be an insecure means of attachment. There can be some statutory provisions regarding use of private vehicles, for example RCW 46.37.185 allows green lights on firefighter's private care: Firefighters, when approved by the chief of their respective service, shall be authorized to use a green light on the front of their private cars when on emergency duty only. Such green light shall be visible for a distance of two hundred feet under normal atmospheric conditions and shall be of a type and mounting approved by the Washington state patrol. The use of the green light shall only be for the purpose of identification and the operator of a vehicle so equipped shall not be entitled to any of the privileges provided in RCW 46.61.035 for the operators of authorized emergency vehicles. Flashing blue lights are prohibited by WAC 204-21-230(c)(4) "other than a law enforcement vehicle as defined in WAC 204-21-020", which is "a publicly owned or leased vehicle operated by a law enforcement agency and which is used for the law enforcement functions of the agency". That means that in Washington, the town sheriff cannot use his personal car as a law enforcement vehicle. I expect there to be some variation on that point across the US. The lights-and-sirens law is what keeps ordinary people from putting lights and sirens on their vehicles. | The police are probably exempt from liability and the evidence is probably admissible pursuant to California Penal Code § 633 which states (referencing the two party consent statutes): (a) Nothing in Section 631, 632, 632.5, 632.6, or 632.7 prohibits the Attorney General, any district attorney, or any assistant, deputy, or investigator of the Attorney General or any district attorney, any officer of the California Highway Patrol, any peace officer of the Office of Internal Affairs of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, any chief of police, assistant chief of police, or police officer of a city or city and county, any sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff regularly employed and paid in that capacity by a county, police officer of the County of Los Angeles, or any person acting pursuant to the direction of one of these law enforcement officers acting within the scope of his or her authority, from overhearing or recording any communication that they could lawfully overhear or record prior to January 1, 1968. (b) Nothing in Section 631, 632, 632.5, 632.6, or 632.7 renders inadmissible any evidence obtained by the above-named persons by means of overhearing or recording any communication that they could lawfully overhear or record prior to January 1, 1968. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 633. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 372 P.3d 811 (Cal. 2016) (Tape recordings of defendant's telephone conversations with sister of murder victim admitted at murder trial did not violate state Invasion of Privacy Act, since sister was acting pursuant to direction of police inspector acting within the scope of his authority.); Armenta v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, 61 Cal.App.3d 584 (1976) (Section 632 was not violated when sheriff's deputies recorded conversation between enrollee in methadone maintenance program and fellow enrollee who was acting as undercover informant, since prohibition under that section does not apply to police informants); People v. Collins, 182 P.2d 585 (Cal. App. 1947) (Testimony of district attorney's stenographer, who listened in and took notes over concealed microphone equipment, was properly admitted.) The year 1968 is when California adopted its statutory invasion of privacy law. Prior to that point and still today, the constitution's protection of privacy and requirement for warrants to do a wiretap is much narrower than the requirement under California's two party consent statute (but for Section 633 above). I also doubt that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy while in custody in the back of a patrol car or while otherwise arrested. There is definitely no expectation of privacy in that situation if the suspects have been given Miranda warnings. | No For the same reason that requiring a licence to drive might, in some circumstances, result in harm to a person who cannot drive because they don’t have a licence. The city (or any government) has legislative immunity for the laws they put in place even if those laws have negative consequences to some people. All laws have negative consequences to some people, for example, laws against theft are extremely prejudicial to thieves. Similarly, the executive is immune for exercising their discretion in the enforcement of the law. This is the basis of the police not having a general duty to protect. However, police have a specific duty to protect when they have taken an individual into their care and control. | In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense. | depending on the Jurisdiction, you actually were in violation of law! In germany it is a misdemeanor to drive with the high beams on in such a fashion that it blinds or dazzles other road traffic, such as traffic from the front. It is also a traffic violation to drive with front lights that don't properly illuminate the street - such as a broken one. In the worst case, improper illumination voids the validity of the safety certificate (TÜV) and thus you may not drive the car at all on public streets until you have repaired the defect. Not having a valid TÜV can mean you are also not insured! In the US: YES, a stop is most likely legal In the united-states, Terry v Ohio is the governing case. It prescribes that, to initiate contact with a car and detain it on the street curb, reasonable suspicion is enough. What could be reasonable suspicion for the police? In the case presented, 'The high beams are on constantly to hide non-functioning/sufficient normal light' would be the very first thing that comes to my mind, so there very likely is reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Ot of course 'The high beams are suitable to dazzle me for a split second, and thus the driver endangered traffic'. Endangering traffic can actually be a felony in some cases. Or just 'They shone their brights into my eyes and violated the High Beam statute' - which is actually the most likely case. As a result, while a broken headlight is not reasonable suspicion to search a car, them and high beams might qualify to make a stop reasonable, especially if at first just a verbal warning not to dazzle oncoming drivers was intended by police. Only if the local law is worded in a peculiarity, that might invalidate a stop. And you might be in violation of law here too! california High Beams can be a traffic violation within 500 feet of oncoming traffic and 300 when trailing another car, if they are not so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. florida Under Florida Law, it is also a noncriminal traffic infraction to drive with the high lights on in such a way that it blinds traffic within 500 feet of them oncoming and 300 if you are behind them. Again, the test is that the beams are only ok if they are so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. new-jersey Here comes a possible source for your quote: New Jersey has a similar high beams law, but also a recent case. The judgment from the New Jersey Surpreme Court is only valid in New Jersey. According to it a high beam violation has to be witnessed by the officer themselves to justify a "terry stop". If you dazzle a moving police cruiser they may stop you. If you dazzle the moving car in front of them, they may stop you. But if you beam your high beams at a stopped car or no car at all, then the police can't stop you. HELD:The trial court and Appellate Division properly concluded that the motor-vehicle stop violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The language of the high-beam statute, N.J.S.A.39:3-60, is unambiguous; drivers are required to dim their high beams only when approaching an oncoming vehicle. Neither a car parked on a perpendicular street nor an on-foot police officer count as an oncoming vehicle. The judgment of the Appellate Division upholding the trial court s suppression of the evidence is affirmed. Had the officer, in that case, operated the car while being on the same road, the stop would have been constitutional. But he was on foot in a crossing street. texas Wait, actually the quote stems from Texas. However, it has nothing to do with high beams but additional lights such as "Angel Eyes". Texas too has a High Beam Statute, which just like other states, bans blinding oncoming traffic: (c) A person who operates a vehicle on a roadway or shoulder shall select a distribution of light or composite beam that is aimed and emits light sufficient to reveal a person or vehicle at a safe distance ahead of the vehicle, except that: (1) an operator approaching an oncoming vehicle within 500 feet shall select: (B) a distribution aimed so that no part of the high-intensity portion of the lamp projects into the eyes of an approaching vehicle operator; and Even in Texas, blinding the police cruiser would thus be enough to stop the car, at least for a verbal warning and lecture. Common courtesy While it might not be against the law to dazzle someone everywhere, it actually does impact the other drivers: there have been crashes induced by traffic running high beams and blinding oncoming traffic, which then ran off the road or into other cars. In some countries, if they catch you for causing a crash that way, you are in for negligence. As a result, it actually is common courtesy in Europe to dim off your high beams when you notice oncoming traffic, and, if you don't run high beams yourself but notice high beams oncoming to flash them up for a brief moment so you get noticed. | In the United States, the U.S. Department of Transportation, by regulation sets uniform design and signage standards for federally funded highways, which most U.S. state and local governments incorporate, either by restating them or incorporating them by reference for non-federally funded roads. I imagine that most other countries have similar regulations. Nonetheless, this is extremely unlikely to prevail as a defense to the traffic violation of speeding which is usually a strict liability offense to which almost no affirmative defenses, excuses, or justifications may be considered. | YES in germany §23 StVO (1a) Wer ein Fahrzeug führt, darf ein elektronisches Gerät, das der Kommunikation, Information oder Organisation dient oder zu dienen bestimmt ist, nur benutzen, wenn hierfür das Gerät weder aufgenommen noch gehalten wird und [...] (1a) Whoever is driving a vehicle may only use an electrical device that is serving communication, information, or organization or destined to be used for this if... 1. they don't pick the device up or hold it and [...] That is plenty clear: holding the device is banned in any way, and implies using it under German legal precedent. | First off, you cannot booby trap your property, period. It is both illegal and tortious. But, as you noted, there are already questions/answers that deal with this issue. Sure enough, if the police get a no-knock search warrant, that in and of itself is the Court order allowing entry by any means necessary. When the officers, there by right of law, breach the outer perimeter and stop at the warnings, they will not be seeking any other court orders to have you allow them "safe entry". Their warrant gives them all the right they need, as probable cause of crime and violent intent or intent to destroy evidence was already presented to a judge. If, in real life, you actually put up signage or state explicitly that they're being forewarned that you intend to harm, trap, maim, or otherwise make it unsafe to enter; or that doing so will result in an attempt to destroy evidence, that is something they have already assumed (hence the seeking and granting of the no-knock vs. a regular search warrant). However, the signs in and of themselves are not protected speech, but rather overt threats, and that would put you in a very precarious position indeed. If the police get a "no knock" warrant (the most invasive, difficult to get warrants, whereby there is a grave risk of destruction of evidence or injury to persons), the police will ensure they have safe passage – they've come prepared for dangerous entry long before your signs, but once they see them, you could rest assured they will take them as they are intended: as a direct threat to their safety, and they will deploy a SWAT or other heavily armed entry team (who is usually there anyway for these dangerous entries). You could expect things like smoke/out canister and teargas, flash bangs, and heavily armed and well armored officers attempting to force you from your dwelling. Presumably, if you need to disarm traps to escape the situation, they can enter. Assuming you're home when they invade with chemical weapons, whether you come out or not, they will force you to disarm whatever booby trapping you may have in place that may destroy evidence, likely walking you in as their human shield in the event you're lying about any dangerous ones. That is probably your best case scenario. They may just decide to throw you through the perimeter once they get their hands on you, just to see what happens! If you don't exit and are home or if you are lucky enough to be out, the bomb squad, ATF, and SWAT will converge on your property in less than typical means. Because from your warning they can assume some incendiary or explosive device exists, bringing it into the jurisdiction of other agencies. If they cannot disarm the trap, they would send a robot in first to set it off, or cut through your roof, or knock down a wall – whatever it takes to get in without using a typical means of ingress/egress, so as not to chance your trap. Regardless, you can rest assured that they will get in, and you will pay for the trap you set for law enforcement. Further, to whatever charges you'd have been faced with from evidence flowing from the original warrant will now be added additional charges like attempted murder of a peace officer; if you have any roommates or known associates: conspiracy to do those things; attempted destruction of evidence, criminal interference with a police investigation ... all at a minimum. If anyone is actually harmed, your signage offers you no shield from criminal or tort liability, and you will be lucky to live through the experience once they get their hands on you. Police tend to not like being the targets of intentional maiming, dismemberment or death. You have to understand that, according to this hypothetical, you are intentionally trying to harm law enforcement, or destroy evidence of your dangerous criminal activity. These are not invaders, or intruders according to the law; they are the people whose job it is to enforce the laws, collect the evidence (if you weren't getting arrested pursuant to the fruits of the warrant, you certainly would be at that point). The signs themselves would make excellent exhibits in the coming case of State v. you. BTW: The only reason they have left John Joe Gray alone is that he knows the Henderson County Sheriff Ronny Brownlow, who has been told that the ATF, FBI, and State SWAT, would all be happy to enter and get or kill Mr. Gray if need be. Since the Sheriff never filed any federal charges, and has determined that he doesn't want to breach (and it's in his jurisdiction to determine this), the Sheriff, aware that Gray's entire family is holed up in the "compound", decided it's not worth going in. It's as well known as it is anomalous. When the police want in, and have the right to get in, they will get in. That Sheriff just decided it's not worthwhile. |
What do you pay for Lexis/BNA/Westlaw? How much do small firms or individual practitioners pay for access to Lexis, BNA, and Westlaw? These seem to be essential tools for effectively engaging with the judicial system, and something of a barrier to entry for anyone not practicing full-time for profit. | I checked actual cost. It is just under $400 per month for one license. Here is a cost breakdown if you want some things a la cart and others blanket license. They are a LOT of money and are cost prohibitive unless they are used as a part of your legal practice. That said, everything available on Lexis or Westlaw are available at other, free sites. If you are looking for state and federal statutes, as well as precedent setting cases, those can be found on Findlaw (and other similar sites). Each state also publishes all of their statutes online, as well as law court decisions. The same is true of statutes and legislation. Legislative history can be obtained at any law library. These places also have free access to West and Lexis on their public computers. So they charge a premium for the convenience of having everything in one spot, as well as a variety obtain of other services that wouldn't be relevant to lay persons (like Accurint). I should amend to say Lexis/West does have things that you cannot just get online such as treatises practice guy, forms, etc. What I meant when I said that you can get pretty much everything for free online was statutes, case law, regs, etc. | This is a fun one. I don't have any particular domain knowledge about this question. So this one is just a guess. My answer is strictly from a practical standpoint. If I were faced with this situation in real life, what would I do? (Technical point: I feel the vagueness of the language, "Is he allowed to" allows me to answer this way.) My assumptions: My assumptions are that: The cost of consulting an attorney on the matter or filing a law suit would likely exceed the combined total cost of the bike and the lock. Usually, the law follows what "feels right" and what makes common sense to the average person. Usually. Not always. But usually. (Legal principles: "Equity follows the law." and "Equity does not aid a party at fault." See this reference.) What I would do: So, I would do the following... (if I were in the U.S.) I would simply cut the bike lock and repossess my bike (unilaterally) if and only if all the following conditions were true in the situation: I could confirm without any doubt that the bike in question is actually my bike and not just another one that looks just like it. I could not find anyone around who looks like they might be the owner of the lock or the other bike. If I could find the owner of either the lock or the bike it is highly likely there was some mistake and the situation could be resolved directly with them. There are no law officers nearby. If so, I would engage them in helping me rectify the matter. If they said it was a "civil matter" and refused to get involved, I would proceed to the next item on this list. I had the tools handy and available to cut or break the lock. If any of the above conditions were false, I would flag down the nearest law officer or call one to the scene to help resolve the issue. Any other approach would seem impractical to me on the basis of my above assumption numbered 1. If I were anywhere outside the U.S., I would involve the local authorities without considering the unilateral repossession option. | I'm not a lawyer, but under the law as it's written, I see two problems: 17 USC 121 allows "authorized entities" to make and publish accessible copies of works. An "authorized entity" is defined as a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities. So if you, as a private citizen, decide to do this, it could conceivably be copyright infringement. You might have to set up some kind of non-profit organization to make it legal. It's also OK (I think) if you make such copies for your own personal use, so long as you don't redistribute them. So far as I can tell, nothing under 17 USC 121 requires the original publisher to provide an "authorized entity" with a copy in any particular format (PDF, paper, or otherwise) for making accessible copies. Basically, the law seems to have envisioned organizations of sighted people purchasing paper copies, transcribing them, and republishing them; not blind individuals doing electronic transcription for themselves. It might still be worth contacting Hal Leonard and asking what they can do for you, but unfortunately it doesn't look like the law requires them to do anything for you. As Nij points out in the comments, this really seems to be a question about the company's policy, rather than the law. | The lawyer referred to in that article is suing in his capacity as the recipient of spam emails under California's anti-spam law. Not every jurisdiction has a law like this. I'm from Australia. In Australia, when we make laws prohibiting something, the law usually appoints a government agency to administer the law and bring prosecutions under it, and fines are paid to the government. In contrast, America has a lot of these laws where affected individuals can sue and collect the fines personally. So under the Californian law, you can get $1,000 per email for particular kinds of spam even if you haven't actually suffered any real damage: California Business and Professions Code s 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii). How? You need to work out who sent the spam, get evidence to prove it, and file a claim in a Californian court. Apparently you can sue in small claims court, which saves you on filing fees. It helps if you have many email accounts, because then you will receive many emails and therefore can collect many fines. One of that lawyer's wins was in Balsam v Trancos (2012) in the Californian Court of Appeal. Another example of a judgment discussing the Californian anti-spam law is Bontrager v Showmark Media. | If you want to protect yourself or any property interests you may have in this circumstance you have to talk to a lawyer. You cannot get (or trust) legal advice from the internet. I will, however, make the following personal observations: I only provide a W-9 to people who are paying me money, and who request it as a condition of paying me. I don't know of a legal requirement to supply it after the fact. However, not providing it to someone who did pay you more than $600 in a tax year could certainly make it difficult for them to comply with their tax filing obligations. I do not sign any agreements, assignments, or contracts, without what I consider to be fair consideration. E.g., if on leaving a job (as has happened) I am asked by a former employer to sign something that I am not already obligated to sign due to some prior contract, then I negotiate what is commonly called a "severance package." They pay me and/or extend benefits, and I sign something that limits their liability. | when is it a good idea to get a lawyer? Only when you are not confident that you can put enough dedication to the matter & learning curve, or when you are not confident of your ability to cope with the emotional/frustrating toll of judicial proceedings. I do not mean this in an ironic way or to challenge you. It is just important to avoid a false sense of confidence. However, if you decide to represent yourself in court, you will have much more control of your case than if you delegate it to some lawyer whose attention is split with many other unrelated cases. Also, never get intimidated by pedantic or wasted phrases such as "he who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client". In the XXI century, most urban people can read and write, Canadian laws are written in your own language, and the Internet provides many informative resources for free. Furthermore, even knowledgeable attorneys happen to be clearly wrong about the law, as I pointed out here. I feel like the bulk of the work is carefully detailing what happened which feels more like the job of a news paper editor. It involves more than that. A newspaper editor does not get entangled with subtleties of a story or of the law, and subtleties are often decisive in judicial proceedings. Litigation also involves intensive legal research so as to find case law (that is, binding court decisions) and statutes that support your position. The application of these laws to a particular case are often premised on subtleties. Hence my remark in the previous paragraph. A newspaper editor hardly ever knows what questions or evidence are required or would suffice for proving a case. This knowledge only comes through (self-)education and experience. What options exist if I don't want to pay a lawyer a bunch of money and am willing to do most of the work myself, for example would pro bono be a good option? Start by searching for "pro se" and "Canada" on the Internet. Some of the results might actually provide guidance on what procedural law(s) apply in your jurisdiction, the legislation, and so forth. As for searching case law, there should be a Canadian equivalent of http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch (sorry I am not knowledgeable of the specifics of Canadian litigation/resources). Based on your other post, I presume you are or will be getting acquainted with the Tenancy Act. I recently addressed here a question about the Act, showcasing the combination of that legislation and contract law (interestingly, many tenants presume their issue with the landlord is strictly about landlord-tenant legislation when in fact it has to do with contract law). I am sure in a library will find plenty of useful books covering the basics of the legal system as well as the rules of civil procedure. Find out whether the public has access to case files in Canadian courts. If so, go to a courthouse and study those files. Get acquainted with the drafting and format of pleadings, motions, responses, briefs, and so forth (although in Small Claims court much of this would be unnecessary, for small claims proceedings are much more simple). This will show you the practice aspect of what you learn from books. When using a term that you consider essential to your case, be sure to consult its meaning in a legal dictionary (I do not know whether Black's Law Dictionary is applicable in Canadian litigation). The meaning of many words are much more specific in litigation compared to their common usage. Or would getting a real lawyer and spending only one hour of his time be better? I highly doubt it, especially if you have not gained any background in law. A lawyer will not explain things from scratch, let alone the intricacies you need to know. The most you could get from speaking with a lawyer for an hour would be notions which are too generic to be of any use at all. Moreover, I doubt that a lawyer in a phone interview will give you any legal references for you to verify on your own. In the very beginning of my litigation, I spoke with a law firm as assigned by a lawyer referral company. By then I already had some background in law and therefore I had specific questions. The guy from that law firm just kept babbling ambiguities very quickly. At the end of the phone call, I thought "nah, I will do this by myself". You might end up making that decision in your current or future matters. | Laws update, collectively, very frequently. Laws are embodied in statutes, regulations, and court rulings, statutes being the most stable of the three. In terms of what an individual lawyer would do, the most important is to focus on the relevant and ignore the irrelevant. If you mostly write wills and trusts, that defines a subset of issues that are important to you; if you are a tax attorney, that is another subset. If you ask a contract attorney about some highly speculative matter of constitutional law, the answer will most likely be "That's outside my area of specialization". The concepts of "subscribe" and "free" are mostly antithetical. If you want the really good stuff, you can subscribe to Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. If you want the really free stuff (as generally seen here), the simplest solution is to use Google which may direct you to Findlaw, Justia, Cornell, Avvo or Law SE (unabashed plug). New is not necessarily better, and frankly, new statutes are the least informative, because legislatures often say things that are less than clear on the face of it, and will need to await either administrative creation of a regulation that spells out what the law means, or a court ruling that does the same thing – maybe 10 years after the law was passed. | Normally, you call, briefly discuss what you want, and schedule a meeting for paid consultation. The charge for a one hour consultation would vary greatly but would typically be $100-$500. You may need to sign a fee agreement and provide a retainer for the fees to be paid in advance, but different lawyers have different policies. |
At what salary do I need to withhold taxes? My wife and I recently hired a full-time nanny to watch our infant daughter. She works 42.5 hours per week (the nanny, not our daughter). We're discussing what we should do when COVID finally wanes and we feel more comfortable going out for date night. We could ask our nanny if she'd like to earn a few extra bucks. However, since we're already over 40 hours for the week, we'd have to pay her time and a half. Therefore, it makes economic sense to have some teenager or the like on retainer. I imagine that we wouldn't have to withhold taxes for an infrequent babysitter the way we do for our full-time nanny. However, what is the exact legal requirement? Is there an annual dollar amount after which we'd have to start withholding? For context, we live in Virginia, USA. | A babysitter is a household employee in the IRS's parlance. This means that: [Y]ou may need to withhold and pay social security and Medicare taxes, pay federal unemployment tax, or both. To find out, read Table 1. You don't need to withhold federal income tax from your household employee's wages. But if your employee asks you to withhold it, you can. The thresholds in Table 1 (for 2021) are: If you pay more than $2,300 in a calendar year to any one household employee, you must withhold Social Security & Medicare taxes from that employee's wages, as well as pay the employer's share of these taxes. If you pay more than $1,000 in a quarter to any one household employee, you must pay federal unemployment tax. In addition, you are liable for Virginia state unemployment tax as well. As noted in the above document, you do not have to withhold income taxes from your household employees. You and your employee can agree to a withholding arrangement for income taxes, but it's not required. This doesn't mean that your employee isn't liable for income taxes on these wages, it just means that they're not your concern. Finally, note than wages paid to anyone who is under the age of 18 at any time in 2021, and whose work for you is not their primary occupation, are exempt from Social Security & Medicare taxes. Such wages are still subject to federal unemployment taxes, though. (And possibly also Virginia unemployment taxes, though I haven't checked.) See the "Wages Not Counted" subsections within the sections on "Social Security and Medicare Taxes" and "Federal Unemployment Taxes" in the above-linked publication. | A temporary guardian would qualify, however, you would have to go to the probate court and explain why you are "unable to care for the minor". It would appear from the situation you describe that you are able to care for the child. A standby guardian would also qualify if it has taken effect "upon the occurrence of a specified contingency, including, but not limited to, the mental incapacity, physical debilitation or death of the principal….” Killing yourself seems a little extreme just to avoid 2 weeks in quarantine. | I believe that under federal law, the franchise owner cannot avoid overtime in this way. A similar case was considered by the Labor Department in 2005 (FLSA2005-17NA): This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning the application of the overtime requirements of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to employees who work at two different health care facilities operated by one management company. It is our opinion that all hours worked at any of the facilities must be combined for the purpose of calculating hours worked under the FLSA. The letter explains the logic pretty clearly, with citations. When an employee is "jointly" employed by two or more employers, then the hours are all combined for overtime purposes. 29 CFR 791.2(b) explains how "jointly" is determined: Where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employers, or works for two or more employers at different times during the workweek, a joint employment relationship generally will be considered to exist in situations such as: (1) Where there is an arrangement between the employers to share the employee's services, as, for example, to interchange employees; or (2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the employee; or (3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer. Paragraph (1) applies: the two employers (the two restaurants) have an arrangement to share the employee's services (the owner is explicitly dividing their hours). Paragraph (3) also applies: both employers are under common control, since the same person owns both. They certainly are "not completely dissociated". The same logic would seem to apply even if the two locations are different restaurants, or different types of businesses. The 2005 letter explains further: Factors that are relevant in finding joint employment include, for example, whether there are common officers or directors of the companies; the nature of the common management support provided; whether employees have priority for vacancies at the other companies; whether there are any common insurance, pension or payroll systems; and whether there are any common hiring seniority, recordkeeping or billing systems. These also seem likely to apply in your hypothetical cases. | Unfortunately, it looks like the answer is yes. There was a bill passed around 2007 called the "Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007". You should track down official information as I am going by newspaper articles. If an employed, adult child isn't supporting their parents or step-parents, 60 or older, their parents or step-parents can go to a tribunal and ask for an enforcement order. The upper limit was 10000 rupees per month or a possible jail term. The Times of India has an article from December 2019 that the government plans to expand the law to include son- and daughter-in-laws as responsible besides children, step-children, and adoptive children. The new bill also includes grandparents and they do not have to be over 60. The plan is also to remove the 10000 cap. | The Commonwealth of Virginia defines a worker as an employee if his or her employer: Furnishes, tools, materials and equipment needed to do the work; Sets the hours of work; Withholds payroll federal and state income taxes and Social Security taxes Receives direction and training from the employer about how to do the work; and Is paid by the hour, week, or month instead of being paid at the completion of a job Virginia also lists the 20 IRS factors and Virginia exemptions for Employee Classification on their web site. One of the factors in determining if a worker is an employee states, "If the employer furnishes significant tools, materials and other equipment by an employer, the worker is generally an employee." Other factors include whether or not the employer can discharge a worker or if the worker can quit work at any time without incurring liability. There are many factors that will be unique to your particular situation that will determine if you were an employee or a contractor. If you were an employee and not a contractor then, in Virginia, the employer would have had to pay you at least minimum wage for your efforts. Generally speaking, an employers recourse for dealing with a non-negligent employee who performs their work incorrectly is to terminate the employment relationship. It is generally not acceptable to dun the worker for damages that occur during the normal course of business. If, on the other hand, you were an actual contractor then your contract with your client will be the guide in how you were paid and would also define the damages for which you are responsible for work not performed to contractual specifications. It is still possible to pay an employee for piece work. This is often done in construction and could make sense for the type of work you were performing. However, the Fair Labor Standards Act requires that the employer maintain records regarding hours worked so that there is an assurance that minimum wage and overtime rules are followed. There is a good article related to the construction industry that provides a good explanation of the details. Most state employment commissions, including Virginia's, provide assistance to workers to help them determine if they were properly classified. Virginia's website does this as well allowing you to call or send an email. | If your friend was a salaried W2 full time exempt employee hired by the company to, among other things, write software like this, then the fact that it was developed "off the clock" with the employee's own resources means nothing once he gives it to the company. I mean if I give you a present and it blows up and breaks your arm, I'm still liable even if we didn't have a "contract" - especially if I knew it would blow up. Your friend's position is even worse since the relationship entails the employee's having the employer's best interests in mind. If I were your friend, I'd either figure out how to fix this or take gnasher729's advice from the comments and find a country where it's easy to hide from parties public and private. Maybe buy a bunch of canned food and go live on a boat? | If you were in the office, and ready to take instructions what to do from your manager, then you were legally working and need to be paid. There's plenty of things you can do in an office without electricity unless it's too dark. If the manager didn't ask you to do anything, it's the company's problem, not yours. If you took the opportunity to leave for 90 minutes to do your weekly shopping, then you shouldn't get paid. | My question: Do I need to declare this income when filing my 2018 tax return? considering that I was actually losing money. Yes. If you would otherwise have to file income taxes if you didn't have this money losing venture, you need to report this income. If you otherwise wouldn't have to file an income tax return, you don't have to file an income tax return simply to report a loss from a money losing rental, but you would still want to do so, because reporting the loss in this year could reduce your income taxes in future years. When you lose more money than you earn from sources other than capital gains, you have what is called a "net operating loss" or "NOL" for short, that can be carried forward to future years to reduce your income for income tax purposes. An exception applies if a business or rental losses money year after year after year. In that case, the IRS considers the business or rental to be a hobby rather than something done with an intent to make money and the loss is disallowed. But, obviously, that exception does not apply to your case. If the answer is yes: How do I also declare the rent I paid to the agent, to show that I actually didn't earn anything. What tax form do I need? Usually, you would report the rents received as income on Schedule E to your primary tax form (probably a 1040NR) and list the money paid to the agent and any other expenses you incurred as expenses. This will generate a net loss and can be used to reduce your income subject to taxation from other sources. Under the tax law that takes effect in 2018, you can't deduct as many expenses related to the rental as you could in prior years. But, you can still certainly deduct the rent you paid for the property that you then leased to a third party in short term rentals. Airbnb issues W-9 form for US person, W-BECI for non-US person with TIN, and W-8BEN for non-US person without TIN. A Social Security Number (SSN) is one of several forms of Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TIN). So you would provide Airbnb with a W-BECI. Airbnb will then send a Form 1099 to you early next year, and will send another copy of that Form 1099 to the IRS. The fact that the IRS will learn about your gross rental income from short term rentals from Airbnb is one of the main practical reasons that you should file a tax return declaring that income. |
Definition of "religious belief" under the UK Crime and Disorder Act 1998 The UK's 1998 Crime and Disorder Act defines "religious group": In this section “religious group” means a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief. It does not appear to define "religious belief" anywhere. Does anyone know if this draws on other legislation or perhaps if there is any relevant case law relevant to its definition? | This is a partial answer as it doesn't address the religious aspect. Grainger plc v Nicholson may be of relevance. That case was about Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of religion or belief) and focussed on the belief element rather than the religion element. The court held that the following criteria must be met for something to be a belief under the ECHR: The belief is genuinely held. It is a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint. It relates to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. These are known as the Grainger criteria and are also of relevance in relation to Section 4 of the Equality Act 2010. | There is no such law in the US, although there many laws prohibiting specific forms of harm, for example laws against murder, theft, assault, arson. All laws are predicated on the idea that an illegal act causes harm, but I don't get to deem, for example, that you are harming society by opposing Satan. There are no laws prohibiting any belief in the US, and such a law would be unconstitutional (in violation of the First Amendment). So being a Satanist could not possibly be illegal. | In the United States, each state is free to define their own version of what is rape and what is sexual assault. Many States view rape and sexual assault to be of "equal severity", but they are punishable under different laws. For example, Kentucky defines rape as any non-consensual intercourse and includes anal sex and object penetration in the definition of intercourse. Alaska does not define rape in its criminal code but all forms of unwanted sexual penetration (by object or other) under sexual assault charges. New York defines rape as sexual intercourse without consent and all other unwanted contact under sexual assault. Source: takepart.com As you can see, the definition of rape and sexual assault is either combined or broken out into separate laws. In most States though, the punishment for either rape or sexual assault is considered the "same severity". Under Federal crimes, rape is not defined but is grouped under 18 US Code 2241-2248. Punishment for these crimes range from a fine through life imprisonment. So for the United States, your (1) and (2) either may be classified as "rape" or "sexual assault" but the severity of the offense and the punishment is usually equal under the eyes of the law. Taking New York for example... Sec. 130.00 defines terms Sec. 130.50 Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree Sec. 130.52 Forcible Touching Sec. 130.35 Rape 130.50 (Criminal Sexual Act, which (1) and (2) fall under) is a Class B Felony, so is 130.35 (Rape). They all fall under Sec 70.80 for sentencing, which says that a Class B Felony must be a term between 5 and not exceeding 25 years. You can look up the laws in other States, but many follow the same pattern, either they lump sexual assault and rape under the same law, or they break them apart into distinct "rape" and "sexual assault", but use the same sentencing guidelines. | This is incest new-south-wales Incest is defined as sexual intercourse between close family members which includes siblings and half-siblings. Sexual intercourse includes penetration of the genitalia or anus with any part of the body or any manipulated object and application of the mouth or tongue to female genitalia (among other acts). It earns you up to 8 years imprisonment. There is no specific law against pornography depicting implied or illegal acts (child pornography excepted). However, I suspect such material would be Refused Classification; the distribution of which is a crime attracting a penalty of up to 12 months. | There isn't likely to be a single universal definition; a word can be defined in different ways for different laws. It's entirely possible that these laws have no more specific definition of "food" than what you've found. In that case, a court interpreting the law would presumably follow the plain meaning rule, under which "ordinary words have their ordinary meaning". Should there be a dispute, a judge would have to determine whether the substance in question is "food" in the ordinary sense of the word (in some cases, judges have cited widely used dictionaries when looking for an "ordinary" definition). They would also try to determine whether the legislature would have intended this particular substance to be covered by the law. | Is it true? No, that is inaccurate. References to protected categories are not a requisite element of harassment. Typically harassment is defined as a pattern of conduct (thus encompassing two or more acts) consisting of unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable person to be frightened, annoyed, distressed, molested, and/or experience other unpleasant emotions. See, for instance, the definition of harassment in Michigan legislation, MCL 750.411h(1)(c). The notion of harassment can --but does not necessarily-- involve targeting or attacking of one or multiple protected categories in which the victim belongs. For instance, sexual harassment is understood as harassment with purposes of mocking the victim's sexual orientation, or procuring sexual gratification from/with that person. The adjective "sexual" merely qualifies the context of the troubling pattern of conduct, but that term in and of itself is not what imports the character of harassment. The examples in the paragraph you quote are inaccurate and/or inconclusive because they would highly depend on the context. The adjective "selfish" is not sufficiently related to Judaism, whence it would be unreasonable for a Jew to allege religious harassment merely because somebody called him "selfish". Instead, a finding of religious harassment would involve repulsive allusions to themes or elements to which Jews would be sensitive based on historical grounds (such as nazism, and antisemitism), doctrinary grounds (jokes about pigs), and so forth. Where I can find a complete list that includes all the possible words? For the reasons explained above, there is no such list. Words would have to be assessed in light of the context in which the course of conduct takes place. Furthermore, not all harassment involves words. Harassment, regardless of its type, can be in the form of drawings, gestures, physical contact (such as sexually molesting a person), voiceless phone calls, and following a person, to name just a few methods. | canada The person claiming self-defence must have the subjective belief that "a threat of force is being made against them or another person." Such belief must also be based on reasonable grounds. They must also act with the subjective purpose of protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force. This comes from the text of the defence, codified at s. 34 of the Criminal Code. It reads: 34 (1) A person is not guilty of an offence if (a) they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them or another person or that a threat of force is being made against them or another person; (b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and (c) the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances. "Unless the accused subjectively believed that force or a threat thereof was being used against their person or that of another, the defence is unavailable" (R. v. Khill, 2021 SCC 37, para. 52). The National Judicial Institute's model jury instructions slightly rephrases: [the accused] believed that force [or the threat of force] was being used against him/her [or against another person] and [accused]’s belief was based on reasonable grounds Regarding evidence in general: the court needs some evidence on which to give an "air of reality" to every element of this defence in order to place the burden on the Crown to rebut the defence beyond a reasonable doubt. This does not require the accused to testify about their subjective belief. The evidence about the subjective belief can come from elsewhere in the evidence. For example, even if an accused had no memory of the encounter, there may nonetheless be evidence about their subjective belief: video evidence of the encounter, hearsay evidence about what the accused said during the events, physical evidence revealing a defensive posture, etc. The evidence must support an inference of a subjective belief in a threat. It is not enough that the evidence shows that a subjective belief would have been reasonable. But none of that is relevant to the question of what the elements of self-defence are or whether an act taken without the subjective belief that the accused or another person is being threatened is self-defence. The question has helpfully taken the standard approach to legal hypotheticals of just asserting what the facts are in order to take questions of evidence off the table. | Generally, irrespective of charge, there is no 'shield laws' in the UK legal system. Any such provisions are a matter of discretion for the judge on the same grounds as the admissibility of evidence. Though the following case relates to a murder case rather than rape, it does provide justification for the lack of 'shield laws'. In R v Davis [2008] UKHL 36; [2008] 1 A.C. 1128 (henceforth Davies), as described in para 3, per Lord Bingham, the witnesses were subject to extensive protective measures, as 'they claimed to be in fear forth their lives if it became known that they had given evidence against the defendant'. [Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (2011 Penguin) 99]. The case addresses issues at the time of the original hearing. However, more recently, there have been statutory provisions for anonymity of witnesses, specifically section 86 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This enables witness anonymity orders to be made, however there are specific requirements that can be found in subsequent provisions of the Act, but there is no common or absolute protection of victims or witnesses. A closing note regarding the 'victim' in the rape case, it should be noted that in the UK legal system, as criminal cases are brought by the CPS on behalf of the Monarch, not the victim and as such the victim is, for all intents and purposes, a witness. |
Would Joel Tenenbaum or Jammie Thomas-Rasset be sued today? What I understand is Technically, Joel and Jammie were sued for uploading. Practically, Joel and Jammie were sued for downloading and were unfortunate victims of not turning off seeding after downloading music via torrent: Their 'uploading' was not that they were really the original uploaders of the music like there was this torrent file and then it was uploaded from an account belonging to them. Rather, they were just seeding which is automatic in torrent clients (unless you set upload speed to zero or something...so I've heard). Nowadays, it's much easier to both illegally download music and not have problems re the turn off seeding: Just download from youtube. Their trials were mid-2000s which is when YouTube just began. Over a decade later, not only is YouTube huge but also are there so many ways to download from YouTube. Copyright law has not changed (in their favour) at all since then yet I think because of the advent of technology, they are almost definitely not likely to be caught for illegally downloading - at least music...movies are another matter - because they'd be just downloading! 5.1. Btw, the relevant difference I see between music and other stuff like movies/books/games is that full songs are legally uploaded on YouTube for us to listen to for free. It's the same idea as radio. It's not like movies which may be fully legally uploaded but we still have to pay or books which afaik aren't uploaded fully at all. Question: Did I misunderstand anything? Edit 1: I'm asking not if they'd be sued if they were caught or whatever but rather if maybe in the 1st place they wouldn't even be caught. The conjecture I'm driving at here is that effectively (when I say 'effectively' here I mean in a de facto as opposed to a de jure sense) their crime isn't exactly copyright infringement but not having good enough technology to commit copyright infringement. The key difference here is YouTube downloading. YouTube wasn't as big then as it is now. And apparently it's a huge grey/gray area or whatever re downloading. YouTube is effectively radio without schedules. So you can think of downloading from YouTube as similar to home taping or whatever. But yeah ok it's wrong if the RIAA have continued to catch people regardless of the advancement of technology (how would they know if their catch rates are as effective btw?) but simply stopped SLAPP or whatever. Edit 2: Another thing I thought of based on comment of Brandin: De minimis. One user downloading something from YouTube, even if it's an infringement, is extremely small in terms of damage. (...) On the other hand, if you place something on a website or on a torrent, and let hundreds of people download that copy, the damages are much more significant So yeah the RIAA has less incentive to go after youtube downloaders, so I figure Jammie and Joel would not be sued because they would not caught with today's technology. | The RIAA changed their litigation strategy in the late 2000s and it (and its members) generally no longer sue individuals. See https://hbr.org/2008/12/why-the-riaa-stopped-suing If you're just asking for a prediction about whether Tenenbaum or Thomas-Rasset would be sued today if they were to impermissibly make copyrighted music available to the public again, my preduction would be no. But I have to say this is an odd prediction to ask us to make. And I wouldn't have much to argue against somebody who predicts the other direction. | It depends where you and your friend are and where the copyright was created. Ripping music for personal use is considered fair use/fair dealing in most jurisdictions. Having multiple copies/devices for personal use is OK too - practically, you can't watch more than one at a time unless you have a very unusual brain. If the intention is that both you and he would have and use copies then that is a violation. | Rolling Stone has a short non-technical article on a dozen famous cases. This page is a massive database on music copyright infringement cases going back to 1844, along with analysis of the cases. That analysis may well suffice for your interests: here is an except from a recent case: In fact, there is no melodic material in the section in question in the plaintiff’s work. The harmonic progression of the arpeggiated chords of both songs is utterly commonplace and not copyrightable expression. Neither are “structure, tempo, instrumentation” when, as here, these elements in both works contain no protectable authorship individually or combined. The plaintiff’s references to “iconic notes” and “feel” are meaningless. What excited the plaintiff was merely the fact that a portion of the defendant’s song sounds like his. This similarity, however, doesn’t support a claim of infringement of a musical work when, as here, the musical elements of the portions of the songs in issue underlying the recorded sounds of both works contain little or no protectable original expression Apart from providing the appellate court rulings, this also includes original complaints and petitions, certain trial court rulings, and amicus briefs which are the "technical" core of the court's finding of fact. However, you will need to read a varied sample of these cases and not just pick one at random. This will at least provide the raw material basis for discovering how these decisions are made. | Copyright almost certainly exists in the images, since presumably someone took those pictures and so they would own the copyright of those images. However, that doesn't mean you don't own the film, you just that don't own the copyright. You can have it developed to see what's there without copying the images. Just tell the developer you only want the film developed and for no prints to be made. If there's child pornography you could end up in a lot of hot water. While you'd be innocent of any crime, if the developer reports the images to the police you'll have to convince them that you had no idea what was on the film. It's extremely unlikely that there's anything untoward on the film however. I'd note however that unless the film is only a couple years old then it's likely the pictures have faded significantly. If it's ten or more years old, there might not be anything recognizable. | First I should point out that the Google question is about a different situation, the "snippet" issue where a tiny part of a web page is redistributed, where the issue of resolved in the US by appeal to the "fair use" defense. The proposed scenario as written here is broader since it would go beyond a couple of lines, and goes up to the limit of copy an entire web page. That is copyright infringement, with or without an associated link. Copyright protection is not just about attribution, it is about control. If you can limit your copying appropriately, you may survive under a fair use analysis; but you need to hire a lawyer with experience in copyright litigation to vet your notions of what is "a small amount" etc. | These images were quickly taken down to settle this problem. It doesn't settle the problem, at least under US law, because a former infringer may still owe statutory damages under 17 USC 504 (and I imagine under some analogous Canadian law). Ceasing the infringement does not extinguish the plaintiff's right to those damages, although it may limit the size of the damages. However, the opposition in question continued to try and sue for more, claiming that the information on these properties were taken from them (which is apparently incorrect and lacks proof) Information, in and of itself, is not subject to copyright protection in just about any jurisdiction in the world (see for example 17 USC 102(b)). It has been suggested in the comments of another answer that this may nevertheless be a trade secrets violation, but that would only be the case if the information had been non-public and the site appropriated the information from an unpublished source belonging to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff deliberately caused this information to be published on their own website, then trade secret law certainly does not apply to it. Nevertheless, if the site copied literal text or images from the plaintiff's website, or closely paraphrased it, that is an infringement of copyright. Copyright protects the creative elements of the text, even where the text is serving a primarily utilitarian or functional purpose. but they continue to drag this on in an assumed attempt to try and make the defendant basically spend all their money fighting this off before it gets before a judge. It is unclear what you mean by this. The normal process is for the plaintiff to send the defendant some sort of written demand, the defendant either complies or they don't, and then the plaintiff either files a lawsuit or they don't. If the plaintiff never files a lawsuit, the defendant is under no obligation to continue interacting with the plaintiff, and can simply wash their hands of the matter. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be wise, as settling is often more cost-effective than going to court. Ignoring the plaintiff increases the likelihood of a lawsuit being filed. But if there is no lawsuit, then there is nothing to "fight off" in the first place. | Copying is illegal, creating an identical work by coincidence isn't. If it is not a criminal case, then a court decides whether it is more likely that the identical work was created by copying or by coincidence. Creating an identical work through a random process isn't going to happen, claiming this would be an awful defense. On the other hand, it is quite possible that two software developers using very stylized code adhering to struct coding conventions can produce quite large bits of identical code. Your links titled "metadata" and "hash" don't actually link to a description of metadata, or the description of a hash, but to a description of torrent files, which is something totally different. Systematically distributing files whose only purpose is the illegal duplication of copyrighted works should not be done without consulting a lawyer, as has been said on other threads (whether posting links to copyrighted files is legal). The chances that a random process will generate a file identical to an existing copyrighted file of say over 100 bytes are virtually zero. If there is an illegal copy of a copyrighted file, and you claim that you created it through a random process and coincidence, you will lose, and deservedly so. | Copyright law doesn't say the art isn't copyrighted if it was made unlawfully. It seems the art can be copyrighted and the act of making it can be a criminal offence. I'm not aware of any such copyright cases that have gone to trial. A fairly well known case that settled out of court is that of Jason “Revok” Williams and H&M. Williams noticed his art in a photograph used in an H&M marketing campaign. His lawyer sent a cease-and-desist letter to H&M. In response, H&M applied for a court order stating that the product of an unlawful act could not be copyrighted. Following some bad publicity H&M relented and settled with Williams. H&M stopped using the photograph and withdrew the application for the court order. (News source) ... The debate over street artists’ copyright privileges has entered courtrooms quite a bit over the past few years, according to Philippa Loengard, deputy director of Columbia Law School’s Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts. ... The [H&M] claim wasn’t surprising, Loengard said, but it also doesn’t hold up. At its core, a copyright requires only two things: that the work is original and that it is a tangible medium of expression. [Loengard said,] “ … Copyright is not a legal or illegal sanction of the activity that was done to produce the work. Copyright is a separate entity.” Another case settled out of court is that of Joseph "Rime" Tierney and Moschino. Tierney sued Moschino for using his art on its designs. One day before the court was notified of the intention to settle, Moschino sought to have the case dismissed on the grounds that unlawfully made art could not be copyrighted. (News source) "As a matter of public policy and basic logic, it would make no sense to grant legal protection to work that is created entirely illegally." |
Incomplete/unserviceable SAR submissions and deletion timeframes Bob was party to an incident in a shop that keeps CCTV footage for 30 days. 28 days later he submits a request for this responsive footage, but neglects to include with it adequate selfidentification materials like license or proof of address. Two slightly different questions here which I think are similar enough to be asked in a single post: Suppose they have a SAR processing backlog of 3 days by which time the data will have been deleted. Do they have why duty to first preliminarily review any requests and triage them by material auto deletion date? And secondly, forgetting any processing backlog related lead times, remembering that Bob had failed to include adequate identification proof to satisfy the data controller's procedures, must they make efforts to preserve the responsive materials even if they feel that they cannot yet responsibly disclose them to Bob while his request pends due to inadequate identification? | As I understand it there is no obligation to 'triage' SARs or keep data 'just-in-case' that would otherwise be deleted as a matter of routine. Can we amend or delete data following receipt of a SAR? It is our view that a SAR relates to the data you held at the time you received the request. However, in many cases, routine use of the data may result in it being amended or even deleted while you are dealing with the request. So it is reasonable for you to supply the information you hold when you respond, even if this is different to what you held when you received the request. However, it is not acceptable to amend or delete the data if you would not otherwise have done so. Under the DPA 2018, it is an offence to make any amendment with the intention of preventing its disclosure. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/right-of-access/how-do-we-find-and-retrieve-the-relevant-information/ | If there's a reason to believe that your machine has data that would be relevant to a lawsuit, then yes, it is subject to inspection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34: A party may serve on any other party a request ... to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control: ... any designated documents or electronically stored information—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form. So if there's a lawsuit where there becomes a question about what you downloaded from the network, then it's quite plausible that your device could be demanded or subpoenaed. But that's not the same thing as "forfeiting" your device. The normal procedure in such a case would be that the agency's lawyers would notify you of the demand, and you would take your device to an ESI expert, who would make a digital image of the device's hard drive. The parties would then fight about what portions of that image they are allowed to access, but you would have your device again while that was going on. | You are processing the users IP address in order to carry out the translation to a physical location (see my comment for the technical issues with that) and an IP address is most certainly considered personal information, so yes under the GDPR you are going to need a published policy because you are both data controller and data processor. You need to inform the user of what you are doing, and you need to tell them of the legal basis for the processing (there are several under the GDPR, of which consent is only one - but in your case its going to be the easiest to justify). If you use a third party service for the location translation, you also need to inform the user of that and make available the third party services data processing policy. | When you make a request based on the GDPR, Art. 12(6) GDPR applies. Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. As you can see, this only applies when the data controller (Blizzard) has reasonable doubts about your identity. If I understand it correctly, Blizzard provides services (games) which requires you to login with a username and password. So they have no doubts about your identity when you use their (paid) services with just a username and password. So there should also be no reasonable doubts when you make other requests when you are able to login to their website. A copy of your government ID seems unnecessary. Recital 57 also confirms that identification does not require a government ID: Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. A copy of your id, includes a photograph. The photograph could show health, religious, racial or ethnic information. That kind of personal data has much stricter rules defined in Art.9 . Most governmental IDs contain a national identification number. EU Member States can limit processing of those identification numbers even further. For example in the Netherlands processing of the identification number is only allowed when a specific law exists. So Blizzard is not allowed to process a Dutch national identification number. There are also ID convers] which hide sensitive information like document numbers and photographs in case you do need a copy of an ID. Also note that identification is only possible by comparing existing personal data with the provided personal data. I assume you did not provide a copy of your ID when registering. So many things which are shown on the ID do not make sense to sent to Blizzard. It does not know your place of birth, so it cannot verify it. Art. 5 requires 'data minimisation' for personal data. So they are not allowed to process more data than required. So you also do not need to send you more data than required. You should get an answer on your request within 30 days. However, since you ask to delete your account, the answer also might be that they will deny your request. They have to explain why they will not delete your account. | From the German lawyer association ("Deutscher Anwaltverein") one can find the following (Google-translation): In the case of a purely preventive identity check, the officers are initially only allowed to determine the identity of the respondent. This means that you can ask for your name, date and place of birth, home address and nationality and have your ID shown - by the way, as a German citizen you don't have to always have your ID with you. "You don't have to answer any questions beyond that," says lawyer Robert Hotstegs from the German Lawyers' Association (DAV). Of course, police officers often try to gather more information with emphatically casual questions. "Well, where do we come from" or: "And where are we going now?" Are typical examples. The police are not allowed to insist on an answer. Anyone who, as a respondent, is voluntarily too willing to provide information can harm themselves and possibly even give rise to concrete suspicions. So they are allowed to ask such things, but you don't need to answer everything. How to handle such situations, again according to the link above: “I recommend answering the survey as briefly and politely as possible. This has a de-escalating effect and helps to end the unpleasant situation as quickly as possible, ”says Attorney Hotstegs. However, you should always answer the questions about yourself. Because if the police cannot determine the identity of a person or only with great effort, they may take further measures to determine the identity. This includes taking it to the police station and, under certain circumstances, a search. Otherwise, these measures are not permitted without a specific reason. | Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data | Yes, that might be a violation of data protection law such as the DPA 2018 / UKGDPR, but not necessarily so. It depends on the details, for example on the purpose this camera serves. Background on Fairhurst v Woodard and on legitimate interests Fairhurst v Woodard is a significant case discussing implications of use of video surveillance outside of a commercial context, but it is a complex case due to the multitude of cameras involved and due to the somewhat unrelated privacy and harassment issues. Point 135 is about the Driveway Camera, which only surveilled public property and the claimant's property, but did not view any part of the defendants property. People are free to surveil their own property, and would then be covered by the UKGDPR household exception. But for surveillance outside of their own property, defendant would have to comply with the DPA 2018 and the UKGDPR, for which defendant would have needed a legal basis. The defendant argued that they had a legitimate interest (Art 6(1)(f) UKGDPR): 134. […] The Defendant submits that all his data collection and processing was necessary for the purposes of crime prevention at his property and in the car park However, a legitimate interest always require as balancing test. The legitimate interest can be “overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject” (Art 6(1)(f) UKGDPR). It is not necessary here that these interests, rights, and freedoms are explicitly enumerated in statutory law. Here, a right is claimed without supporting legal basis: 134. […] Claimant submits that her right to privacy in and around her home overrides that purpose. However, a possible basis for this claim would be Art 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is part of UK constitutional law: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” The court balances these rights and interests very differently for the different cameras. The Ring Doorbell is mainly focused on people who would ring the defendant's doorbell, and only incidentally captures passer-bys. Here, the legitimate interest was found to be valid. On the other hand, the Driveway Camera was mostly trained on claimant's property. Here, claimant's interests, rights, and freedoms override the claimed legitimate interests. Your scenario If the camera records the people living in the Green House when they go to or from their property, then yes, it seems like their rights would be affected. But in your scenario, the context of the camera is not clear: Why was it installed? If the purpose is crime prevention, is there evidence of such crimes in the neighbourhood, or are the cameras intended to counter a speculative threat? What is its field of view? Is it mainly trained on the Yellow House's doorstep and only captures the street as a background, or does it focus on the street? Is the camera's field of view masked off as far as possible to exclude public spaces? Does the camera record continuously, or is it only activated for certain events like when a doorbell is rung or when someone enters the Yellow House property? Does the camera also record audio? All of this is important because it factors into a legitimate interest balancing test. Maybe the Yellow House camera is more like the Ring Doorbell in the above case where the incidental capture of passer-bys was found to be acceptable, maybe it is more like the Driveway Camera that served no legitimate interest. There is no absolute right to be free of all surveillance. Instead, the interests and rights of the Green and Yellow house residents must be balanced appropriately. Where there is surveillance, it must be limited to what is necessary. | According to this article, the Malmö Administrative District Court found that the intent of the user is immaterial to whether a camera is being used for surveillance, so even if that is not why you are doing this, it counts legally as "surveillance". The law requires a permit from the länsstyrelse (county? government), according to the Kameraövervakningslag (2013:460) (article 8 states the requirement for permit, art. 16 tells you who to apply to). I believe that a tennis court would be considered a "public place", even if privately owned. Art. 17 tells you what goes into an application (there is probably a form), and art. 18 says that the kommun gets to weigh in. Presumably it would be critical to have a consent form signed before any recording happens, and you would include that in the application. |
What are the boundaries of warfare in regards to targeting persons in command? None of the targeted strikes against Russian commanders on the ground in Ukraine was decried as a war crime, so i guess targeting military people near the front that 'only' give orders instead of pushing any triggers themselves is fine in the rules of war. My question is what the boundaries on that are, geographically and in the org-chart. Putin is "Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" - is he therefore considered a member of the military? Would he have to don a uniform to make him an eligible combattant, or come into some specific distance of the front? The Geneva Convention protects combattants 'hors de combat', which i always took as meaning gravely wounded, but would that also include people who never actually take part in hostilities, like command personnel stationed at home? | It is not necessary for a combatant to actually carry arms to become a legitimate target. An uniformed mechanic carrying a screwdriver at an airbase is a combatant, entitled to the protections of the conventions but also a valid target. Of course a civilian commander-in-chief does not wear insignia, but he is presumably recognizable. Civilian targets can be attacked according to the tests of military necessity and proportionality. It can be legal to attack a bridge even if it was built by and for civilians, it can be legal to attack a factory producing arms, it can be legal to attack a power plant also serving a barracks. Taking out a key command-and-control node sounds like miliary necessity to me, but surely there would be lawyers for either viewpoint. | Following the links in the article you quoted, you find that it is indeed illegal in Germany to insult a foreign head of state. For a prosecution to happen, the foreign government has to ask for prosecution, and it would be a criminal case. It's not clear to me whether a TV station could be sued as well. Where Mr. Böhmermann lives would be irrelevant, what would be relevant is whether the insult happened in Germany. | The short answer is, in absence of a treaty or convention governing travel, then the law of the country over which the plane is located governs for the time the plane is in overflight. Laws of a jurisdiction (a country, or a state) are generally taken to extend upward from their boundaries (and downward for the control of mineral rights, etc.). There are a number of jurisdictional cases where service of process (presenting a defendant with a copy of citation starting a civil suit) or an arrest has taken place on-board aircraft where the action had to take place over a given country or state to invoke jurisdiction. As mentioned in the first sentence, there is nothing to prevent countries for entering into a Treaty or agreement that would alter the basic scheme, but absent a treaty or convention, the basic scheme of boundary extension would apply. | "Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road. | Insofar as those treaties don't bind the US, the notion of "violating" such laws is moot. Hoda Muthana is, under Yemeni law, a Yemeni citizen (it is immaterial whether she has ever "accepted" or exploited it), and as such stripping her of US citizenship would not leave her stateless. In the case of Hoda Muthana, the action is based on the legal argument that she was not ever a citizen, based on the premise that her father was a foreign diplomat. Under US law, children born to foreign diplomats in the US are not birthright citizens, following US v. Wong Kim Ark. Birthright citizenship cannot be revoked. However, a person can renounce their citizenship, via certain acts, including taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having attained the age of eighteen years;or (3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons serve as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer The defense argument would presumably be that ISIS is not a foreign state (despite their own claims to the contrary) so her affiliation with ISIS does not qualify. There are grounds for denaturalization, including falsifying or concealing relevant facts pertaining to naturalization, refusing to testify before Congress, or joining a subversive organization including Al Qaeda within 5 years of naturalization. | Country A and country B must do whatever they agree in the settlement of the conflict between themselves - returning or ceding of territory being one of these. Or they can disagree about these laying the seeds for further conflict. The most recent example of this is Russia's seizure of the Crimea from Ukraine; which they legitimised by a plebiscite. AFAIK, Ukraine and the international community has not accepted this but neither are they doing anything about it - legally Crimea is still part of Ukraine, practically it is part of Russia. | Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it. | Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest. |
How do I collect on a judgement against a debtor who only deals in cash? How do I collect on a judgement against a debtor who is all cash? They have no bank account and rent everything or pay other people for things. The only options I can see are: Follow them home from work EVERY DAY with a police officer to take their pay. Enter their house and take their financed furniture. Take their worthless financed cars. Is there anything else I can do? Judgment is 10k. Garnishment doesn't work because they understate income. I have reported them for tax evasion and drug use but police don't care. | To add to user6726's answer: In general, you can only collect a judgement if there are assets or income available to be collected (i.e., owned by the debtor, and not protected from collection, such as personal items or part of the wages). If you suspect the debtor has assets you do not know about, you can formally ask the debtor to declare their assets. In Nevada (and in many other US states), this is called an Examination of Judgment Debtor (or just Debtor's examination). The basic idea is: You ask the court to order a debtor's examination. The court (after checking your judgement) orders a hearing where the debtor must appear (or they may be imprisoned for contempt of court). In the hearing, you can ask the debtor about their assets, and they must answer truthfully (usually under oath). Details vary, as usual. See for example this page from the Las Vegas Justice Court: Examination of a Judgment Debtor. As a practical note: The whole process, as usual, means additional work and possibly legal cost for the creditor - so it only makes sense if there is a realistic possibility of finding previously unknown assets. As usual, this is a decision the creditor must make. | I don't know the situation in L.A., but most courthouses I've dealt with will allow you to just pay the fine online and be done with it. Try their website or call the clerk's office to get more information. | If you had an agreement that amounts to a contract, it is binding even if it was informal. However, if your agreement was not in writing, it might be hard to prove. You can easily prove that you transferred money to the other party. But can you prove that it was a loan an not a gift? And even if it is agreed to be a loan, if no repayment time was specified, what says that the debt is due now? Was the agreement really for a loan repayable on demand? The court would have to determine what your real contract was, or what contract can be implied from the actions of the parties. Also, if you are in a common-law jurisdiction, there could be a question of what consideration there was for the loan. Without consideration, there is no valid contract in such a jurisdiction. Perhaps a promise to repay could be treated as sufficient consideration. Small-claims courts do deal with unclear verbal contracts on a regular basis, but the outcome will depend on the facts of the case, and on the details of local law. It might be wise to consult a local lawyer with small-claims experience. A single consultation should not be too expensive. In response to comment If the "written binding agreements" include a statement from the other person that this is a loan, and a promise to repay it, you are in a stronger position than I had thought from the original question. The question for the court would be, since there was no due date agreed, what is a reasonable date to impose. The court might treat it as a loan repayable on demand, or specify some particular date for repayment. | The part of the statute (which is part of an article of the Uniform Commercial Code model language applicable to the sale of goods) that you are discussing reads as follows: 1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. I have put the critical language of (1)(c) for the purpose of understanding what they are talking about when they are talking about "cash sales" in bold. You are asking: Please explain it to me and tell me what a "cash sale" has to do with voidable title. Doesn't cash sale just mean you are paying cash for something? That sounds perfectly innocent to me. Items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) involve circumstances which are examples of transactions in which a buyer of goods obtains voidable title from the seller. This means that the sale can be undone if the seller acts promptly enough, but the sale can't be undone if the buyer in turn sells the goods to a good faith purchaser for value (i.e. someone who pays a meaningful price for the goods without knowledge that the seller only has voidable title). If the goods have been sold to a good faith purchaser for value, however, then the seller who could otherwise undo the sale entirely can now only sue the buyer for damages (usually the agreed purchase price, or fair market value if no purchase price had been agreed upon yet). When it says in (1)(c) that "it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale"," what the statute is describing is a transaction where the original deal was that you will deliver goods to me with the understanding that I will pay you for the goods in full with currency or other "good funds" (like a wire transfer), roughly contemporaneously. But, what actually happens is that you deliver the goods to me and instead of promptly paying you the cash you are owed for the goods, I don't actually pay you anything. This could happen because I was trying to cheat you and get something for nothing, in which case I would have also committed fraud which also falls under (1)(d). More innocently, suppose that I run a small grocery store and you run a dairy that delivers milk for resale to my grocery store every morning at 5 a.m. before banks open, in time for the morning rush of innocent customers milk to put in their coffee on their way to work, before the banks open, and then I go to the bank when it opens every day at 9 a.m. and take out some cash and hand it over to your money collector, when your money collector stops buy my grocery store around lunch time. But, today, I was stunned to discover that all of the money in my bank account had been frozen due to a garnishment on a money judgment against me that I hadn't been aware of because the process server who was supposed to give me notice of the lawsuit against me instead threw the court papers in the sewer and lied on the return of service saying that he'd delivered the court papers to me, so that unbeknownst to me, a default judgment was entered against me. The sale would be voidable in both cases, the one where I was trying to cheat you while telling you that it would be a "cash sale" and the one where I innocently found out that I didn't have the money to pay you that I had no reasons to think that I wouldn't have available to me. And, in each situation, if my grocery store sold half the milk that was delivered to me in the morning rush, those sales would be valid and irreversible, even though I completely stiffed the dairy owner and there was a total failure of consideration in what was supposed to have been a cash sale transaction. But, the dairy owner would have a right, when he found out that he wasn't getting paid at noon and the sale turned out to have been a voidable one, to take back all the milk that hadn't been sold to my customers yet in the hope that he could sell it to someone else who was actually willing and able to pay for it instead. In general, under circumstances when a sale is voidable, if I haven't resold the goods to a good faith purchaser for value, then you can legally force me to return the goods and have the sale invalidated. But, if I have sold the goods to somebody else for a more than nominal price, and the person who bought the goods from me doesn't know that I cheated you by not paying for the goods, then you can't undo my sale of the goods that I didn't pay for to the good faith purchaser for value. Situation (1)(c) is very similar to situation (1)(b), in which you give me the goods and I give you are personal check for the purchase price, but the check is then dishonored by the bank (something that could been my intentional plan to cheat you, but which could also have been my failure to keep track of the balance in my bank account as I wrote checks). Both of these situations involve broken promises which may or may not have been made with no intent to honor those promises in the first place. Situations (1)(a) and (1)(d), in contrast, involve out and out fraud and deceit, but not "fraud in the factum". In other words, what (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) all have in common is that the goods were voluntarily delivered by you to me, even though your voluntary delivery was obtained by improper means such a deceit regarding who is buying the goods. ("Fraud in the factum", which is also void, involves situations when, for example, I ask you for you to sign what I tell you is a birthday card, when what I have actually done is have you sign a letter authorizing your delivery man to deliver lots of goods to me, and then I use that letter to have goods delivered to me.) In case (1)(a) this would often be a sale on credit or open account to someone you believe to have good credit but who is in fact someone else with bad credit. For example, you make a sale to George Shrub, thinking you will be delivering goods to George Shrub, Sr. who has good credit, but instead you are tricked into delivering the goods to George Shrub, Jr. who has multiple bankruptcies and never pays his bills on time. In case (1)(d) there are myriad possible examples. For example, I may have given you counterfeit money to get you to deliver the goods to me. Or, I may have purchased your cow in a barter exchange for beans that I told you were magic beans, but that were really just ordinary beans. But, in both (1)(a) and (1)d), as well as in (1)(b) and (1)(c), you are voluntarily delivering the good to me and then not getting what you thought you had bargained for in the deal, sometimes with evil motives and sometimes for innocent reasons, so voidable title arises. In contrast, suppose that I snuck into my stockyard one night and stole the goods from you. In that situation, you would have a right to get your goods back not only from me, but even from a good faith purchaser for value to whom I sold the stolen goods, because out and out theft that does not even involve consent procured through fraud or a broken promise, doesn't give me any title to the property, not even voidable title. Similarly, suppose that I pointed a gun at you in your shop and insisted that you deliver the goods to me or else I will kill you. Again, in that situation, you aren't giving me even voidable title to the goods, and you can sue a good faith purchaser for value from me to get the goods that I never had any colorable claim to have ever owned back. The language in the first sentence of (1) goes along with the language about voidable sales of goods in the rest of (1), because the first sentence of (1) covers situations when I may not have 100% ownership of goods that I sell to some else. For example, suppose that I have a pedigreed male dog that I have purchased the pet rights in from a breeder, while the breeder has retained the stud rights in the dog. (Yes, these transactions really happen. I've litigated them.) Under the first sentence of (1), I can sell the pet rights I have in the dog to you, but I can't sell the stud rights that I don't own to you because I don't own them. And, unless I am a pet store owner to whom the dog has been "entrusted" (and I'm not a pet shop owner), I probably can't destroy the stud rights through a sale of the dog to you when I am purporting to be selling you both the pet rights and the stud rights, even if you are a good faith purchaser for value, because I am not a merchant to whom the "entrusting" doctrine applies. So, if I sold the dog, the owner of the stud rights could still enforce those rights against the person to whom I sold the dog. Parts (2) and (3) deal with an exception to the general rule in the first sentence of (1) called "entrusting" which is quite similar to voidable title. Entrusting involves you leaving your goods with a merchant who is in the business of selling those kinds of goods. So, if I leave my nice clothes with a consignment shop or a pawn shop and the consignment shop or pawn shop sells my clothes to someone and give the buyer good title, and I can't undo that sale even if you didn't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I had entrusted to the consignment store or pawn shop (e.g. perhaps they were only allowed to sell my wedding dress for a minimum price of $100, but instead sold it to someone for $30 which they didn't have permission to do, then the buyer of my wedding dress for $30 would still have good title to the wedding dress and the sale couldn't be undone). But, on the other hand, if I leave my nice clothes with an automobile parts shop or a grocery store or a stationary store, and they don't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I left in their care, and then they sold my nice clothes to one of their customers, that sale made without my permission would be void and could be undone, even if their customer paid more than a nominal price for my nice clothes and had no knowledge that the merchant didn't have my permission to sell my nice clothes. This is because we don't believe that someone who buys, for example, my wedding dress from an automobile parts shop or grocery store or stationary store, can legitimately say that they really believed in good faith that the seller really had your permission to sell my wedding dress, because that is not an ordinary merchant-customer transaction for them. | An incomplete list: Getting the money. How did you plan to get paid? Credit card? Paypal? Integrating those into a website in compliance with their terms of service is not easy. (I wouldn't touch credit card numbers, in particular, even with a ten-foot pole. Too much liability risk for weak implementations. Too many highly skilled attackers to pounce on any mistake.) Distributing the App. Places like the Apple App Store have their own terms of service, especially regarding payment and in-app purchases. At a guess, Apple would reject your app, but if they allowed it, how does your withdrawal policy fit with the 30% cut they want from the initial transaction? Holding the money. So there are user accounts with a credit balance that can be withdrawn again. Would you be able to repay them if all users withdraw at the same time? Where do you keep the money? Currency risks. Say international customers pay in currency A, which the payment provider transforms into currency B. Then they want their money back, but exchange rates have changed. What do they get? Knowing your customer. There would be money laundering concerns. Do you have the infrastructure to identify your customers? Can customers change the (re)payment method from one account to another? Can you handle withdrawals if a user no longer has the same credit card, for instance? Scammers leaving you to hold the bag. Say a scammer tricks a victim into making a deposit, and then finds a way to redirect the withdrawal (see above). Would you be able to deal with the legal and administrative fallout? | This is a civil case, taking away your freedom is only for criminal offenses. Not paying your bills is not a criminal offense. It is up to the creditor to look for your assets, etc. A court can make you show up and answer questions about your assets and income. While you are in court the judge can make you give your gold watch to your creditor. Outside the parameters of the question there are circumstances like failure to pay child support when you do have the funds that can lead to incarceration. In some places you can be jailed for contempt of court if the court requires your presence to let the creditor have the ability to try to get access to your assets and you do not show up. | The government cannot seize property because a person residing at that property has a tax debt: the debtor has to have a legal interest in the property, which you say you don't have. The government can seize property under the practice of civil forfeiture, which is a legal dispute between law enforcement and property – the simplest way to put it is that the property itself has "done wrong" (is involved in illegal activity). That's not what tax debt is. It is possible for the state to seize property in error, so just because the state makes a mistake somehow does not mean that the state cannot file the paperwork and seize the property if the owners ignore the summons. | You will still have to pay A ticket can be ammended if the state so chooses (they can look up what color and model your car is). The car is probably on video. The officer can testify if they wrote your car info down somewhere else. And if they identified you inside the car as the violator, the car's color hardly matters. The idea that minor mistakes or omissions on tickets can get you off is a myth. From an actual lawyer |
How can data received in online subject access request form be used by ACRO? Meet Bob. Bob has requested his PNC file from ACRO Criminal Records Office under the Data Protection Act. Their online request form solicits much intrusive information. What purposes may information so supplied be used for? | From ACRO's Subject access - further guidance web page: Why do I need to supply proof of ID? We need to be confident that we provide your personal data to the correct person, which is why we ensure we have sufficient proof of identity before we disclose any information. It also helps us to ensure we make a correct match on the PNC. As for this proof of ID (personal data) provided when submitting a Subject Access Request, ACRO's Privacy policy states: We gather information about site usage to help the development and improvement of services to the public, and to protect the integrity of our systems from malicious users. At the moment this information consists of: Statistical information obtained using Google Analytics. No information collected can be used to identify individual users. For more details about how this affects your privacy please visit the Google Analytics Privacy Centre. If you don’t want to send information to Google Analytics, an Opt-out Browser Add-on is also available or you can configure your browser to let you to choose which, if any, cookies are allowed to be created. Information obtained by our content management system to examine what people are searching for, what they find and occasions where no results are returned. Information collected can’t be used to identify individual users. Information provided by users through online forms; it's held in our UK-based secure data centres and is retained in line with the Data Protection Act 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, and our retention policies. However, I have not been able to locate publicly available copies of the retention policies referred to in the emboldened text. | BAD idea It is one thing to upload the phonebook and associated pictures for use of the owner of the phonebook. It isn't a fair use of the phonebook pictures - and you might not have a license anyway, as some people associate photos with numbers that they don't have a license to associate with anyway. But what if instead of a photo of the person, the first photo someone associated with the person is a photo of something like... crack cocaine, a photo of someone in a very compromising situation, just genitals, or some other thing that is just as tasteless or possibly criminal to share? In that case, your company is possibly committing defamation, and in case sharing or possessing of the image itself is illegal, your company is now the actor and liable. Depending on the content of the picture, distribution of pornographic material (possibly even underage material of that sort) could be up that alley just as much as hate speech through symbols, usage of banned symbols (such as swastikas in Gernamy) and many many others. | Art. 15(4) GDPR says: (4) The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. If I was the controller in this situation, and I believed that this would endanger the students that have criticised the professor, I would base my argument for not complying on this. In addition, Art. 85 GDPR requires member states to: [...] reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression and information [...] So you may be able to argue that the students posting messages are engaging in "processing for journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression", depending on the laws of the particular member state. (edit: this could be difficult since you mention it is a private database). The second case seems just like the first in terms of GDPR, but may constitute defamation. Defamation (or libel) laws differ wildly in each country; he Wikipedia article on Defamation explains the situation in each member state in more detail. In the third case: if the professor submits a request based on the rights of a data subject other than himself, they don't need to comply. These requests need to come from the data subjects themselves, not just a random person assuming authority. (although I suppose it's possible for them to give power of attorney to the department head if they wanted to) Personal data and the rights that GDPR provides to data subjects always relate to a natural person, not an institution or a company. | Is X considered personal data? Can you use X to directly or indirectly identify a natural person? In the data to which you have access can X be related to an identifiable natural person? If you answer yes to either of those questions then X is personal data. Article 4(1): ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; Scenario 1: you want to count each user agent that comes to your site, that's the only data you have, then the user agent is not personal data (it cannot be used to identify someone - unless it has a name and address etc, which seems highly unlikely - and you cannot relate it to anyone). Scenario 2: you have customer records with names, addresses etc (clearly personal data) and want to record each customer's user agent then the user agent is personal data (it relates to the identifiable natural person). Scenario 3: in one dataset you record that a user agent was associated with order ID 123456 and in another dataset you record that order ID 123456 was for John Smith (plus address etc), then the user agent is personal data (it relates to the identifiable natural person). Is this considered storing personal data? If X is personal data. Do I need user's consent to record X? If you want to record X and X is personal data, then you must have an Article 6 lawful basis for recording X. Consent is one of the six lawful bases. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. | It's from a company called MarkMonitor that does trademark protection for clients - specifically around internet activities and that includes domain cybersquatting - which is illegal in the US under the ACPA, and of course that's what you were/are doing. So it could be a legitimate request as these things go. But that's not the whole story - the domain in the e-mail you posted is "walmartt.com" which is not only currently owned by Walmart Inc. but always has been, in fact the current Registrar of record is the aforementioned MarkMonitor. So either this isn't a legitimate request because you don't own "walmartt.com" and therefore this is spam or phishing (in which case feel free to delete it and move on with your life), granted that would be a pretty impressive bit of phishing since you are currently cybersquatting some Walmart-typo domains. Or you're just telling porkies all the way through your question for reasons of your own. | Per Art 12(6), they are allowed to ask for additional identify verification: where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. Additionally, Recital 64: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. A controller should not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential requests. There is no consensus regarding what this means in practice: Must the controller use all measures that they can be reasonably be required to use? Or only those measures to verify the identity to a reasonable level of certainty? I agree with you that asking for a passport is excessive, and that email verification would be sufficient. However, that is just my personal opinion. The GDPR can also be interpreted in a way that asking for a copy of your passport is OK. Where they process a copy of your passport, that is personal data as well. You also have data subject rights with regards to this processing, for example the right to be informed of the purpose of this processing and of when the data will be deleted. If it is only used for the purpose of verifying your identity, the copy of your passport should be deleted immediately afterwards. The data controller may have additional obligations because a passport or ID card is a very sensitive document. E.g. Art 87 allows member states to impose additional rules. Most sensible controllers will therefore want to avoid processing passports, unless they only operate in specific EU member states. | From the article: The FBI is investigating alleged computer intrusion and theft against an unidentified “victim corporation” involving “confidential or proprietary information,” including tests, test forms and internal emails, according to a search warrant issued in the case. The reference to "computer intrusion" is not precise, but may mean that they suspect a violation of some provision of 18 USC 1030, which makes it a federal crime to access a computer without authorization, or to exceed authorized access, under certain circumstances and for certain purposes. So it's not necessarily just a civil matter. Specifically, 18 USC 1030(a)(2) provides: Whoever [...] intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains [...] information from any protected computer [...] shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. Subsection (c) provides for fines and imprisonment for various terms, making a violation of (a)(2) a felony or misdemeanor, depending on circumstances. Subsection (e) defines "protected computer" as any computer "which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication". It seems very likely that the computer in question was used in interstate communication, and that the SAT does affect interstate commerce. The fact that they got a search warrant means that they were able to satisfy a judge that there was probable cause to believe a crime was committed and the search would yield relevant evidence. We'd have to read the warrant, or the corresponding application, to know more. | I decided to rewrite this after the clarification in the comments. You can find the old version in the history. The question is not, actually, about a browser extension. It is about a web service that can be accessed by the browser extension. The way to access the service should make little difference, it could be clay tablets, homing pigeons, or this browser extension, what matters is the service. The service has two functions: Receive PII of the victim, sent by the customer, to calculate the probable email of the victim, and return this PII to the customer. The service operator could argue that the customer is really the data controller under GDPR rules, and that the service operator is only the data processor, but that is not a plausible use case. The customer would need to get and document the consent of the victim before the probable mail is calculated, so why would the customer pay the service operator for a service like this? There is already contact with the victim. Generate a database of specific company email patterns to enable 1. This would also use PII, from random employees of the company in question, and there is no customer to shield the service provider by pretending that consent was collected. The way around the first issue might be to sell the database and have all calculations on the customer's system, but that doesn't resolve the second issue, that of creating the database. This involves looking for patterns in PII of individuals, unless the target company is obliging enough to make the pattern public. |
Can an animal file a lawsuit on its own behalf? I need to find a case regarding whether a Gray Wolf can file a lawsuit on its own behalf with regard to the Endangered Species Act. I don't have a specific jurisdiction and I have searched different terms in Westlaw with no luck. Can anyone point me to a case? | Since wolves physically cannot construct and legal petitions pro se, they can't sue in courts on their own. However, the same is true of various humans. The real legal question is whether a wolf (or other animal) has standing to sue (with the aid of a crafty attorney). The question is not entirely decided in the US, but the odds for animals having standing in court are poor. In the case of Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, a macaque in Indonesia took some selfies with an unattended camera. The camera owner published the photos and claimed copyright: PETA and others then filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against the photographer, acting on behalf of the macaque (assigned the name Naruto). The court dismissed the case, but the specific reason was that PETA failed to assert "next friend" status, especially that "the next friend has some significant relationship with, and is truly dedicated to the best interests of, the petitioner". In an earlier decision, Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, the court do not have statutory standing under the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the National Environmental Protection Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. But there is also Article III (constitutional) standing. The court notes that Article III does not compel the conclusion that a statutorily authorized suit in the name of an animal is not a "case or controversy." As commentators have observed, nothing in the text of Article III explicitly limits the ability to bring a claim in federal court to humans. ... It is obvious that an animal cannot function as a plaintiff in the same manner as a juridically competent human being. But we see no reason why Article III prevents Congress from authorizing a suit in the name of an animal, any more than it prevents suits brought in the name of artificial persons such as corporations, partnerships or trusts, and even ships, or of juridically incompetent persons such as infants, juveniles, and mental incompetents. Indeed, in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, the endangered finch palila sued, being represented by attorneys for the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, and other environmental parties. The lawsuit was successful, in part because the court reasoned that the bird ( Loxioides bailleui), a member of the Hawaiian honeycreeper family, also has legal status and wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right. The Palila (which has earned the right to be capitalized since it is a party to this proceeding) is represented by attorneys for the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, and other environmental parties who obtained an order directing the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources ("Department") to remove mouflon sheep from its critical habitat. Sports hunters, represented by the Hawaii Rifle Association, among others, had intervened to dispute the contention that the Palila was "harmed" by the presence of mouflon sheep. However, the main reason why the suit succeeded was that defendants failed to argue that the bird did not have standing. The Cetaceans court referred to the Palila case (also 9th Circuit), and dismissed that statement as "nonbinding dicta". Their discussion is then followed with numerous cases where the Palila statement is found to not be a binding holding. There have been some successes, Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co, 880 F. Supp. 1343, in dicta states that Thus, as a protected species under the ESA, the marbled murrelet has standing to sue "in its own right." Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, No. C-93-1400-FMS, slip op. at 9, n. 4 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 1, 1993) (quoting Palila, 852 F.2d at 1107.) See also Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia, Florida, 896 F.Supp. 1170. | Can I sue? (Shall I sue? Is up to you) Yes, anyone can sue anybody but that doesn't mean it will be successful. The likely candidate for making a claim seems to be under the tort of Emotional Distress, however, note that... Since the definition of offensive conduct is subjective by its very nature, the courts have set high standards to make out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional harm. To be successful, the plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct which caused severe emotional distress to another person. Source ...but according to the OP and comments, this criteria does not appear to be have been met. | I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level. | No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal. | Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed. | No, you cannot ask for proof/documentation. According to the U.S. Department of Justice: In situations where it is not obvious that the dog is a service animal, staff may ask only two specific questions: (1) is the dog a service animal required because of a disability? and (2) what work or task has the dog been trained to perform? Staff are not allowed to request any documentation for the dog, require that the dog demonstrate its task, or inquire about the nature of the person's disability. | There sort of is a law, this one. It does not absolutely forbid owning a possum, but it is required that you have a license to take or keep a wild fur-bearing animal including a possum. There is no existing "license to take and possess as a pet", but you could try under trapping licenses. However, they warn that the Fur-bearing Propagation Permit does not authorize individuals to possess live fur-bearing animals as pets.This IS NOT a “pet permit.” Ultimately, what would happen is you apply for a license, but they would deny the application because you don't plan to propagate the animal, or skin it. Although the statute does not specifically prohibit keeping a fur-bearing animal as a pet, it does authorize Parks and Wildlife to promulgate and enforce regulations. Another approach would be to seek a wild animal rehabilitation permit, pursuant to PWD regulations (here). This is also not a general pet permit, but in case your program of possum rehabilitation fails, you are not required to kill it or release it into the wild to die. There is a test required, to be sure you know how to rehabilitate wild animals, plus a requirement for letters of support from conservationists, veterinarians or rehabilitators. | A summary is here: see for example Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: 'in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel'. In the same vein, Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 held that "an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and so, likewise, may waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel". In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 it is held that this extends (via the 14th) to state courts. As to the expression "practice law", maybe the meaning of this expression is taken to be self-evident, though clearly it is not. Statutes that prohibit that act for non-lawyers generally specify things such as "for another person" or "holds himself out as entitled to practice law". |
If I use a discount card at a German museum that I do not know isn't valid at that museum, but the museum accepts it, is that a crime? I live in Belgium and in August went to Dusseldorf on a weekend trip. As an autistic adult I have a EU Disability Card, which is a new trial project by the EU, which is only valid in 8 countries, one of which is Belgium. Germany notably isn't one of those countries. Still, I showed the card at the ticket booth for a local museum, the K20 museum for contemporary art, not knowing that the card was only valid in the 8 countries the trial is active in and thus wasn't yet in use in Germany. I assumed that given that it was a European project, it would be accepted as proof of disability, and I would get the 10 EUR discount ticket for disabled people instead of the full 12 EUR ticket for adults. The cashier apparently didn't know what to do with the card and waived my ticket price entirely. The question I have: is what I did considered a crime, like fraud or theft? or should I just not worry about this? After all, the museum did have a discounted ticket for disabled people, and that card was proof of my disability, just a proof that wasn't commonplace yet in Germany. The cashier was within her rights to give me the 2 EUR discount or refuse to accept the card, but instead she waived the ticket price entirely, so | No, it doesn't seem like you did anything wrong. You can't have committed fraud because you didn't have the intent of entering the museum without paying. Fraud is defined in section 263 StGB: (1) Whoever, with the intention of obtaining an unlawful pecuniary benefit for themselves or a third party, damages the assets of another by causing or maintaining an error under false pretences or distorting or suppressing true facts […] You had no intention of obtaining an unlawful benefit. You presumably did not misrepresent your disability status. German criminal law has a related violation in Section 265a StGB, “obtaining benefits by deception”: (1) Whoever obtains the output of a machine or the services of a telecommunications network which serves public purposes or uses a means of transportation or obtains entrance to an event or facility by deception with the intention of not paying the fee […] Again, your lack of intent means that you haven't committed this crime. Interpreting what actually happened: The K20 ticket fees are reduced for severely handicapped people with 50% GdB (degree of disability indicating the person's difficulty of participating in society, in particular that person's difficulty for working a normal job, as determined by the VersMedV). You were not attested such a degree of disability via the German system, and therefore were not eligible for the discounted entrace fee of EUR 10. The museum has no obligation towards you to actually collect those fees. They can waive them whenever they want, for whatever reason they want. The museum could have given you the discounted price even without suitable evidence of your disability. Instead, they waived the fee entirely. If anyone is going to have problems here, it is the person at the ticket counter for failing to collect the appropriate fees. But that is an internal issue for the museum. You legally obtained a valid ticket to visit the museum. Translations were taken from the official page https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html | There is no systemic process by which convictions of crime in Germany (at all, let alone for misdemeanors) are reported to authorities in Canada. This said, a Canadian charged with a crime in Germany has a right to consular assistance (i.e. to call upon the Canadian embassy for help). And, if the Canadian actually does obtain assistance from the Canadian government in defense of criminal charges and is convicted anyway, obviously, a Canadian government official will know about it. I don't know if Canadian diplomats who provide consular assistance who learn of criminal convictions of Canadians abroad report those convictions to criminal record database record keepers in Canada, although I suspect that they do not. | This sounds a bit far-fetched. There are laws against circumventing copy protection measures (DRM) but not against aimbotting (to the best of my knowledge). Thus, you cannot reasonably believe that a click-assist functionality would be used to break laws. It could definitely be used to break private contracts such as an EULA, but you are not a party to that contract and are not bound by its terms. Of course, when you use such click-assist tech in an online game, you might be breaking your contract with the game vendor or server provider. But this doesn't imply that a click-assist would be forbidden outside of that context. Note that assistive technologies sometimes have exceptions from laws, e.g. a permission to circumvent DRM if necessary for accessibility. In the US, the Librarian of Congress adopts exceptions for a duration of three years. While none of the current exceptions match your specific scenario involving video-games, it can be permissible to break DRM on e-books or videos for certain accessibility enhancements. | certain kinds of payments just are tax-free There are several kinds of tax-free special payments in germany, such as certain types of additional payments (for example "Vermögenswirksame Leistungen" and "Steuerfreibeträge"), or gifts within a certain value (e.g. goods/services up to 50 € a month). In this case, they most likely fully use the "Inflationsausgleichsprämie", which is tax-free up to 3000 €. | This is likely to be a matter of policy rather than law That is, it’s not likely there is a law prohibiting it but it is highly likely that the person’s training and their employer’s policy on the matter is that they must complete a ticket once they start it. It’s a pretty universal anti-corruption measure - it prevents the situation where they are writing the ticket, the owner appears and offers them half the value of the fine in cash to stop: well, they can’t stop so they can’t be tempted by the bribe. Of course, the bribe can be offered before they start but, when fighting corruption, you minimise the opportunities rather than eliminate them. I know that police and rangers (private people can’t issue tickets) in new-south-wales are so restricted. | Art. 15(4) GDPR says: (4) The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. If I was the controller in this situation, and I believed that this would endanger the students that have criticised the professor, I would base my argument for not complying on this. In addition, Art. 85 GDPR requires member states to: [...] reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression and information [...] So you may be able to argue that the students posting messages are engaging in "processing for journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression", depending on the laws of the particular member state. (edit: this could be difficult since you mention it is a private database). The second case seems just like the first in terms of GDPR, but may constitute defamation. Defamation (or libel) laws differ wildly in each country; he Wikipedia article on Defamation explains the situation in each member state in more detail. In the third case: if the professor submits a request based on the rights of a data subject other than himself, they don't need to comply. These requests need to come from the data subjects themselves, not just a random person assuming authority. (although I suppose it's possible for them to give power of attorney to the department head if they wanted to) Personal data and the rights that GDPR provides to data subjects always relate to a natural person, not an institution or a company. | at what point can you just leave? Is it always technically illegal in the UK to leave without paying the bill? Probably depends on what you mean with just leaving. If just leaving translates I haven't paid and I won't pay (because of the hassle with the card) then that's probably Making Off Without Payment, section 3 Theft Act 1978 (Thanks @bdsl). Could the restaurant just force you to wait until close of business if necessary? What if they still hadn't fixed the payment system by then? I don't think a restaurant can physically detain you. Not even the 45 min you have been waiting. But if you leave without paying and without an agreement with them how & when to pay they can of course call the police because again that looks very much like making off without payment. According to your post, they did provide a payment system (cash) which was working all the time and that moreover has the special status of being legal tender. if you don't physically have the cash on you, you can be sued? You can be sued if you don't pay your bill (assuming the bill itself is correct) when it's due. In order to avoid endless hassle of the "I tried to pay via x, but they wouldn't accept this." type, legal tender defines ways of payment of a debt that the creditor/seller must accept. In many legislations, cash in the local currency provides such a fallback if other payment methods fail. Note that cash payment is very robust against internet failure, broken devices and power The UK (+ US) meaning of legal tender is that the restaurant must accept this means of settling the debt (at this time, the food is already eaten but not payed) - but they don't have to accept any other means of payment. (Note that e.g. for the EUR-countries there is at least a recommendation to make acceptance of legal tender mandatory also in retail, which includes simultaneous exchange food vs. payment). The 2nd important implication of this is that any argumentation along the lines that no reasonable means of payment were available would be very weak. You are not required to have sufficient cash with you to pay your bill if you can reasonably assume that some other way of payment will be acceptable to the restaurant. I see that like a spare wheel for a car: if you have a flat tire (card doesn't work) having a spare wheel (cash) allows you to deal with the issue with less hassle than if you don't: change your wheel vs. having to get your car brought to a workshop and wait until they put on a new tire (pay cash instead of waiting for the card to work again or a tedious hunt for another payment method). I'd like to point out that card doesn't work and not sufficient cash at hand (or forgotten purse) is something that happens quite often in general (rarely for any given transaction, but we have lots of transactions). I'd expect a restaurant or a gas station to be experienced in dealing with that. In any case, there are several possibilities to resolve the issue short of "just leaving": The key to all this is communication: talk to the restaurant to find a way to resolve the issue. Reassure them that you're not trying to use the opportunity to defraud them - that's what they are afraid of in this situation. "Where can I find an ATM?" Possibly offering a deposit: "And would you mind looking after my bag [phone] until I'm back?" Possibly showing them your ID card (or similar, if you have any) so they have your address: remember that so far you are an anonymous customer for them: which means that suing you for the money would be somewhere between too expensive and impossible. If you are a group, it should be sufficient if only one of you leaves in search of cash. Credit cards can be charged in a total offline way (MOTO = mail order/telephone order) where the credit card data is entered manually by the seller: the restaurant may be able to charge your credit card if fill in a paper credit card payment form. They may accept settlement via other payment systems: paypal & Co. wire the money via your online banking account (even if that doesn't give an instantaneous transfer, ask them if that's OK with them if you show/forward them the "transfer accepted message" for now) allow them to withdraw the money from your account via direct debit or something similar I'd not expect a restaurant to accept this possibility as they're probably not familiar with it and it means a lot of hassle for them with their bank to get listed to receive money that way. if you are in a region where cheques are still in regular use, that may be a solution as well. Restaurants like any other business can write invoices. They usually don't like this because their risk of having costly trouble to get the money is high. While your printout bill is technically an invoice already, it can be turned into an invoice (+ copy for them) giving your name + address and specifying how and when you'll pay. Which would keep track of how you (pl. = you + restaurant) decided to settle the bill under the peculiar circumstances. This works even in case of e.g. a power outage that prevents you from getting cash from an ATM in the neighborhood. | switzerland This answer is mostly to point out that the situation isn't so obvious, and may greatly differ between jurisdictions. OR Art 7 specifies: 2 The sending of tariffs, price lists and the like does not constitute an offer. 3 By contrast, the display of merchandise with an indication of its price does generally constitute an offer. So the seller is bound to the price tag of an item in a shelf or in a window. If the prices differ, the customer can generally request the lower price, unless the seller can clearly show that there was a significant error. There's a separate law ("Preisbekanntgabeverordnung") that specifies that (under most circumstances) a shop must put price tags on their items. What margin constitutes an error is disputable. The federal court ruled that an offer for an opal ring for 1380 Francs instead of 13800 could be considered an error. But a T-Shirt that is offered for 20 Francs in the shop window but 25 Francs on the shelf is probably not. |
Assaulted by store employee: who is liable? Meet Bob. Bob was egregiously assaulted by a stores security guard who damages his phone and vehicle. One of the other employees grabs his phone out of his hand on retribution for attempting to photograph them and throws in several metres in the air so that it crashes down on the pavement and smashes into pieces. The security guard, I imagine, is criminally liable in a personal capacity for assault. But in terms of civil liabilities, what types of damages might be claimed for these events, and whom from? Is the store corporately liable as three employees were discharging their professional duties on the store's behalf? E&W specified all countries welcome. | The store owners may well be liable for damages. See a very similar fact pattern in Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc (short title) which was an appeal concerning: : 2 [...] an employer’s vicarious liability in tort for an assault carried out by an employee. The details of which are: The Supreme Court upheld a damages claim brought by Ahmed Mohamud, an innocent customer who suffered serious head injuries in a savage, unprovoked attack in which he was repeatedly kicked and punched by Amjid Khan, a petrol kiosk attendant who was employed by Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc at a branch in Birmingham. The Court found that the supermarket giant was vicariously liable for Mr Khan's appalling behaviour. .. [T]he Court had to consider two matters. Firstly, what was the nature of the employee's job and was there sufficient connection between his field of activities and his wrongful conduct for the employer to be held liable for his actions? The Court noted that it was part of Mr Khan's job to attend to customers, to interact with them and to respond to their inquiries. His conduct was inexcusable and it could not be said that he had metaphorically taken off his uniform the moment he stepped out from behind the counter. In ordering Mr Mohamud never to return to the petrol station, Mr Khan was purporting to act in his capacity as a Morrisons' employee. His motive in launching the attack was irrelevant and it did not matter whether his actions were driven by personal racism rather than a desire to benefit his employer's business. The Court's decision opened the way for Mr Mohamud's estate and dependants to seek substantial compensation in respect of his lost earnings and the pain and suffering he endured before his death. [Source: SWlaw] | Barring any specific statute the relevant law is the tort of negligence. To succeed Alice must prove Bob: had a duty to Alice, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to Alice, and Alice was, in fact, harmed or damaged. She will probably succeed on 1, 3 and 4 where she will struggle is with 2. It seems that Bob did everything a reasonable person could do to avoid the accident. The only possible hope is that not knowing that bridges freeze first might be something a qualified NZ driver should know and that he breached his duty by not knowing if that is something the judge considers reasonable. The traffic warning is irrelevant and untested (and untestable) hearsay and should be excluded from evidence. | Claim is irrelevant. Specific to Maryland Law, Assault occurs when one makes or attempts to make physical contact with another OR intentionally frightens another. Alice saying she helped to steal the car and your definition of the theft as "accosted Carol" implies one of the three forms of Assault took place. Alice just admitted to commiting the crime she thought was wrongly charged to her. The crime she was trying to get out of is called "Assault and Battery" which is where Assault leads to actual injury or physical harm to the victim OR attempts to actually injure or harm another OR puts them in fear of such action. In Maryland Law, the Battery portion almost always is paired with assault while in other states, it might be possible to commit Battery without Assault (though in these states, normally a separate assault charge to Battery is usually added.). As a helpful tip, the two words general break down as follows: Assault: The act of threatening harm or making unwanted non-injurious contact with another person. Battery: Causing Injurious Harm to another person. In Maryland, Alice was rightly charged with assault. Upon capture, Bob will recieve an "Assault and Battery" charge for hitting Carol with the stolen card and may get an addition simple Assault charge for the threats before he drove away. | In theory, a store can ban you or anyone else for any reason except those protected by law against discrimination. As a practical matter, you potentially have various forms of recourse. The first thing to do is to write the the CEO of the chain, with a long detailed letter describing the incidents, and naming names. Most CEO's don't want to deal with this kind of bad publicity, and will at least order an investigation, and make amends, if the internal investigation is in your favor. This would apply even to the late Sam Walton, if the chain is WalMart, or whoever the current CEO is. If you are a member of a protected minority, or even have dark skin, you can sue the chain on those grounds. There will be a presumption that they barred you on grounds of race or color. Then the burden of proof will be on them to show that they didn't bar you for those causes. As a form of "entrapment," you should take a witness, basically the most influential person you can get hold of that's not a family member, to the store with you to ask them why you were barred. The mayor of your town would be ideal, more llkely it would be a boss, teacher, or clergyman, but in any event, someone who knows you well. If you can get them to accuse you of stealing in front of this third party, you have the makings of a defamation case. And even if you aren't a minority, you can sue them anyway. You can demand "discovery" of all internal documents, videos, etc. relating to your case. Your lawyer will also the right to "depose" (cross examine) all offending managers.There's a good chance that something embarrassing will turn up in the process. (Many defendants settle in connection with discovery.) You might want to hire a second (libel) lawyer to teach you how to publicize the case without running into libel laws. If all this fails, the store can probably bar you, but you want to make it prohibitively expensive for them to do so, meaning that most rational people wouldn't bar you after the above. If they do, they're not rational and you're better off not using the store. | I think you would have difficulty distorting the situation - Pokemon Go is not magic that defies existing laws, and this would be no different to a mall issuing a trespass notice (which is effectively how they would kick you out) for any other reason. I would question the ability of a store to "Arrest" you - that is a job for the police - After they trespass you (ie by giving you notice to leave), if you come back again then they can call the police to arrest you - but its not as clear-cut as someone seeing you playing a game and arresting you. I don't think Pokemon players are a "protected class" of people, so finding a valid cause of action might be tricky. About the best you could do would be to talk with your wallet (ie shop elsewhere with your friends), but for my money that would make me more likely to go to that mall ! | The officers could incur liability under 28 U.S.C. 2680 (h) with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1346 (b). This would probably be considered "loss of property" or a "wrongful act". It is very rare for cases to go forward for this because of the costs of litigation against an officer. "[I]t is well recognized that ‘officers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order to perform their duty.’" Cody v. Mello, 59 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979)). “Before any due process liability can be imposed for property damage occurring in a lawful search, it must be established that the police acted unreasonably or maliciously in bringing about the damage.” Cody, 59 F.3d at 16. That actually means that the burden of proof is on the victim to show unreasonableness / maliciousness. It would probably be easier if the thing destroyed could not possibly have contained the item looked for. For instance, if they are looking for a 65" LED TV, they can't even look in a 64" dresser (or something smaller than the object that could not physically hold the object). This issue becomes moot when dealing with drugs. | Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough). | You have accurately summed up the conundrum. There is little else to say. You need to accept that there is confusion, even within the law itself, and rely on context to establish in any given instance which meaning is meant. You will come to find that there are many instances of such confusion in the law. The historic technical distinction in the law (especially in tort law) between assault and battery has been collapsed in the everyday vernacular and this had made its way even into the way that the words are used even by law enforcement officers and legislators, who grew up speaking the vernacular language like everyone else. Where I live, in Colorado, the word "menacing" has been used be legislators to replace the historic sense of the word "assault" and the words "assault" and "battery" have become synonymous. But, in England, they are struck with a situation in which the meaning of the word "assault" has become context specific. |
I'm a victim of racism by the border police of Bulgaria I was excited to visit Bulgaria, I flew all the way to Sofia (Bulgaria), but unfortunately, I was not able to enter it for no reason. I provided everything they wanted me to provide, but no luck (everything was legal). They checked out my baggage and they put me in a very dirty prison (in the airport) under surveillance like a criminal, without food or water, even though I told them that I was very thirsty. The police in my home country didn't understand what happened because, everything was legal on my side, and they told me maybe I was a victim of racism. I contacted the consular officer of Bulgaria in my home country, and she told me that the police officer (a girl) is racist, and I'm not the first case. The consular officer protested several times, but the same thing still happening (the consular officer started crying when she heard my story). Please, I would like to speak out and put an end to this. What should I do? who should I write to? | I'm very sorry to hear about your situation. Unfortunately, this is too important to trust advice from strangers over the Internet. You should talk to an attorney familiar with Bulgarian immigration law. @jwh20 is correct; entering another country is not a human right. If they are not allowing you to return to your home country despite your following all laws, that is likely a human rights issue. This does not necessarily mean you won't be able to get into Bulgaria; if one person is preventing you from entering, an attorney may be able to get that person's decision overturned. | united-states "I know is it illegal for authorities to question a suspect when their lawyer isn’t present" This is not really true, at least in the US. The suspect must explicitly ask for a lawyer. Even saying "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" (ie Davis v. U.S. (512 U.S. 453 (1994)) isn't enough, they have to say "I want a lawyer". Until they invoke the right, an officer can question all they want (provided they were informed of these rights, except for certain situations which are relatively complicated. See Miranda Rights). So no, an officer questioning you without a lawyer is neither a crime nor illegal. Once you invoke your Miranda right though, they have to respect that. With or without your lawyer, this is called interrogation. You can filter your responses through a lawyer, or waive your right to a lawyer and answer directly. | None No law requires police to keep people apart when making statements. Doing so is good police practice. In some police organizations internal regulations or procedures may specify that officers should do so. But those are not laws. In some cases witnesses may have had a chance to confer and agree on a story before police arrive, the police cannot prevent that. The trier of fact can take into account that witnesses had a chanc to agree on a false story. | What should and shouldn't happen isn't going to do a damn thing about your passport situation. Your passport isn't being 'held', it's in processing at a place that is currently not operational due to an unprecedented virus outbreak. No one is acting like a criminal or treating you like one, you are just unlucky. If your situation is that dire, you have no choice but to get a temporary passport. I seriously doubt an Indian court is going to side with you on this one. Just because the passport office is legally allowed to operate, doesn't mean that they are actually able to. If, for example, COVID-19 hit enough of their workforce, they won't have enough people to operate properly and they'll have no choice but to close. And no, '2 or 3 people' is not enough to operate such a large scale, sensitive operation with high security requirements, even just to return passports . | Do flight attendants have an unlimited leeway of forcing the passengers to listen to their gibberish that are completely unrelated to their duties? Pretty much, I'd say. It may not be a good customer experience, but the flight attendant certainly isn't doing anything illegal. You don't have a legal right not to hear speeches that offend your IP sensibilities. I don't think it's legally any different than if they were showing an in-flight movie that you didn't like. If you try to forcibly stop him, you are likely to be found in violation of 49 USC 46504, which prohibits "assaulting or intimidating a flight crew member or flight attendant of the aircraft, interferes with the performance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessens the ability of the member or attendant to perform those duties". Even if making speeches about Mickey Mouse is not part of his duties, anything physical you did to try to stop him would likely tend to also lessen his ability to perform his actual duties. Violation of 49 USC 46504 is a felony and carries a prison term of up to 20 years. If you try to shout him down, you might be charged with disorderly conduct under state or local law, like this guy. You could probably push your call button to summon another flight attendant, and politely state that you object to the loquacious crew member's behavior, and could they please ask him to stop. Alternatively, you can put on your noise-cancelling headphones and turn up the volume on your music. Anything beyond that and you're in a bad legal position. Of course, you can certainly file a complaint with the airline after the fact. There's a fair chance you'll get an apology, maybe some extra air miles, and the flight attendant might be disciplined or fired. But that's an internal customer service or personnel matter; nothing to do with law. | "Does the needlessly obnoxious and antisocial manner in which they're behaving and clearly drugged intoxication create any kind of charge like disturbing the peace or something like that?" Probably. But you don't want to take the law into your own hands. Call the police and have them make the judgement. There is a lot of discretion involved; some police officers may simply tell the preacher to move on; others may detain him on public intoxication or being a nuisance, according to local and UK laws, as well as check for permits and licenses for street/public performances. Many people gathered around the busker to express support and appreciation for him as well as disgust toward the preachers unnecessary disrespect. That's well within rights, as long as the behavior doesn't degrade into the same type(s) that the preacher is exhibiting and possibly be a nuisance or worse (i.s., assault) as per the law. | The problem was that the arresting officer and the investigating officer were two different people. After American airlines misidentified Mr Lowe as the suspect a warrant was issued for an arrest, and it wasn't until about a year later when officers in New Mexico ran his name and found that he had a warrant that they detained him. So their actions were perfectly proper. The length of his detention was primarily because the USA functions as separate legal jurisdictions, so you can be held for some time on a warrant for another state. Possibly the investigating officer should not have relied on American Airlines identification of the suspect. However, Mr. Lowe would have to overcome the qualified immunity bar to sue the PD. The case against the airline is that of negligence: they had no duty to single out Mr. Lowe; they could just have turned over all the data, as requested. Having chosen effectively to carry out their own investigation, the claim is that they owed a common law duty of care to Mr. Lowe to do it competently. It's clear that misidentifying Mr. Lowe as the suspect was likely to do him harm, so it's a reasonable foundation for a claim. More than that, we will have to see. | First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not. |
Discriminated against by solicitations of donations for Ukraine at checkout Meet Bob. Bob deeply opposes the world order of NATO imperialism and finds the Ukrainian NATO backed regime repulsive and abhorrent due to its perceived Nazi associations in his mind. (Bob vehemently abhors Nazism.) Bob further feels disgusted by all of the propaganda with which he feels he is incessantly bombarded from all directions by society. He feels very exhausted as this incessant propaganda siege grates and wears on him and besides he feels that it is a form of morally repulsive virtue signalling by people who don't actually harbor the proclaimed virtue at all. It is to Bob arguably as though the state has officially endorsed a worldview that is dedicated to actively condemning his own so as to make him feel alone, inferior, and utterly marginalized. One day, Bob goes out to buy some stuff and after inserting his card to the payment terminal, he is asked if he would like to add a donation to the Ukrainian cause to his payment. No such offer is made for him to donate to the Russian federation's war widows/orphans, or to the Russian federation's armed forces, or to the antifascist people's republics of Donetsk and Lugansk. He now feels further marginalised and vilified by society. Now meet Alice. Alice sports Ukrainian flag badges and bumper stickers and can't stop telling everyone how much she hates Vladimir Putin. Alice visits the same shop and is offered the same option when paying for her purchase. Alice leaves with a warm, pleased smile on her face as her worldview has been affirmed. Has Bob been treated less favourably than Alice by this establishment with respect to his committed philosophical worldview of opposing fascism and all its associations and forms? Has Bob thus been unlawfully discriminated against? | Has Bob been treated less favourably than Alice by this establishment with respect to his committed philosophical worldview of opposing fascism and all its associations and forms? Has Bob thus been unlawfully discriminated against? No. There is no discrimination law engaged here by the retailer asking if its customer would like to donate to the Red Cross Crisis in Ukraine Appeal or such and not asking if the customer would like to donate to any other appeal. | It sounds to me like the parties made proposals with an intent to draw them up and formalize them but didn't intend to form binding agreements. The first agreement sounds vague. The second was committed to writing, suggesting that the written deal was to be the real agreement, and not executed. In the last case, it doesn't appear that there was an agreement because there was no meeting of the minds on the essential term, which was the price. Going to court is expensive. It is expensive whether this is litigating underlying disputes or trying to enforce an alleged oral settlement that is disputed. Also, settlement discussions that don't result in a resolution are not admissible as evidence in court. Making a deal would be nice, but Dave's concept of what constitutes a deal seems to be out of touch with reality. | united-states In the US it is not unlawful to produce and display a video arguing for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, whether the intent is to support that invasion or to document the claims of those who do support it, and argue that they are invalid. Such a video would be protected by copyright, and copying it and redistributing it with subtitles might well be an infringement of that copyright, if done without permission. On the other hand, doing so with the intent of educating others about Russian claims might constitute fair use. If so, it would not be copyright infringement under US law. Aside from the copyright issue (which would be up to the copyright holder to take action on) US law does not really care what the motivation for posting such a sub-titled video might be. Whether or not it is "beneficial for the whole human civilization" is not relevant to US law. It is protected by the First Amendment against government suppression. That would not affect YouTube, as a private actor,, determining not to host it on their site. | I think you're viewing the use of pronouns and contracts wrong. You are speaking to the Licensee, not some third person. So you would say "You agree to give us all your bases", not "The]y agree to give us all your bases". If you were to use a third person pronoun in describing what the other person is gonna do and what you'll do for them, calling the Licensee "they" is positively confusing, and more likely to cause problems. I hope they see my point. | Indeed, article 3.24 of the Arbeidsomstandighedenbesluit: Toiletten en wastafels In een bedrijf of inrichting zijn in de nabijheid van de ruimten waar de werknemers hun werkzaamheden verrichten een voldoende aantal toiletten aanwezig. In of in de onmiddellijke nabijheid van de ruimten waarin de toiletten zich bevinden zijn voldoende wastafels. De toiletten of het gebruik van de toiletten zijn naar seksen gescheiden. My translation (intentionally less idiomatic than it might be in order to parallel the Dutch word order): Toilets and lavatories In a business or facility there are in the vicinity of the areas where the workers perform their work a sufficient number of toilets present. In, or in the immediate vicinity of, the areas where the toilets are, there are sufficient lavatories. The toilets or the use of the toilets are segregated by sex. It's a very long law, so I haven't read it all, but it doesn't seem to impose a penalty on people who disregard the sex segregation of the toilets. I suspect that it imposes a responsibility on the employer to enforce the segregation, and presumably a penalty could be imposed on the employer for failing to do so. I do not know what mechanisms would be available to the employer to penalize an employee who uses the wrong toilet. I don't know anything about the catering industry, and I cannot infer why you ask about it specifically. If you're asking about toilets provided by such businesses for their customers, however, I suspect it's likely to be governed by another law. (I further suspect that sex-segregated toilets for customers are optional in at least some circumstances, since small bars and restaurants often have only one toilet.) | Does he have some kind of libel or invasion of privacy case? The description of the "art work" is somewhat inconclusive. I will assume that the red lipstick and blue eye shadow in the fictional poster are suggestive of that soldier's "makeup". If the World War Two soldier were still alive and a straight male, he might have a claim of defamation insofar as the poster portrayed him as having a sexual orientation which is inaccurate, detrimental to his reputation, and tending to dissuade others from associating with the soldier. Policies against sexual discrimination aside, no straight male likes being falsely characterized as to sexual orientation (in part because of the undeniably harmful, lasting impact something like this would have in his environment). The defendant's possible allegation that the "art work" was hyperbole would be unavailing. That is because the suggestive poster is likely to impinge on viewers a detrimental concept of the soldier even if it is obvious to those viewers that the poster was not an actual, color photograph taken of him during the World War II. In most jurisdictions in the US, the defamed soldier would need to file suit within a year from the publication of the poster (an exception is Tennessee: six months) because the statute of limitations for claims of defamation is shorter than most others. | There may be a purpose to have laws which are impossible to follow. (I'm neither a lawyer nor a politician, following points are what I like to call qualified hearsay - they come from qualified people I know personally but were given as a remark or during a chat over a cup of coffee and therefore are not easily substantiable with rigorous sources. You can treat them as a hypothetical ideas for your thought experiments.) Everybody is implicitly guilty Confident citizens and transparent law is the worst enemy of totalitarian regime. You learn to live with ingrained feeling that there surely is something you are guilty of. Merely being addressed by police makes you nervous and malleable; should you stand up against oppression, it is easy for the state apparat to detain or convict you of one or more default offenses. A good example would be the law present in many, if not all, socialist bloc countries saying that knowing of a comrade having commited an offense or merely planing to and not reporting it to authorities is an offense in itself. Whether you did or did not know would be determined by the authorities. Make your laws very strict with a hope thay they will be followed at least to a degree Not laws in themselves, but standards (technical norms) regarding nuclear power stations in the former Soviet Union were strict to the point where they were technically impossible to follow given the state of the art. For example the standards for manufacture of high pressure pipes would state very low level of material impurities that when the actual manufactured material contained twice the level of impurities the pipe will still be very safe to operate. In a centrally planned economy with ever more ambitious production projections and declared zero need for contingency this was one of several ways how to create a bit of a wiggle room. (Source: I once worked for a nuclear power research institute supporting Soviet technology and was told this by an expert on stainless steel.) So there you have a bit of an illustration what may happen if a law is intentionally impossible to follow. Since you labelled your question 'United States', I believe the follow-up question is why would anyone want to propose such a law. | @DaleM isn't wrong, but some elaboration is in order. You (almost always) gain your citizenship (or nationality) in the first instance, at birth, without the agreement or assent of you or your parents. It is thrust upon you. Usually, your country of citizenship must consent to end your citizenship (or authorize you to do so unilaterally) under that country's laws. Once you have citizenship or nationality, in practice, in most countries, you can generally only renounce your citizenship if you contemporaneously or already have a citizenship somewhere else. You are at a minimum strongly dissuaded from doing so and are not a sympathetic candidate for relief under laws related to statelessness if you willfully put yourself in this position knowing the consequences. This is a feature of the citizenship laws of most countries in order to implement international treaties designed to prevent statelessness which are widely adopted. When an adult is naturalized as a citizen of a new country, usually, their old citizenship is revoked by operation of law under the laws of their old country. In many countries, including the U.S., there are high fees and tax consequences for renouncing your citizenship. Any potential tax liabilities in the future that were not yet due under U.S. law (e.g. capital gains taxes an appreciated assets not yet sold, and estate taxes that would be due if the person renouncing their citizenship had died on that date) are owed immediately upon applying to renounce your citizenship. A stateless person is, subject to quite narrow exceptions, still subject to all of the laws of the place where they are located, including almost all of its criminal laws (except treason) and its tax laws (at least on income earned in that country). A stateless person lacks many rights. They can't travel internationally (there are exceptions under treaty in some cases, but obtaining those rights is cumbersome at a minimum). They can't vote. They typically aren't entitled to domestic welfare state benefits like national health insurance, disability payments, unemployment benefits, subsidized housing, old age or retirement benefits, etc. They can't work in a licensed or regulated profession. They may not even be able to sign a lease. They may not be allowed to own a company or serve as an officer or director of a company or as a trustee of a trust. They aren't entitled to diplomatic assistance. There are many fraudulent legal movements such as the "sovereign citizen movement" (and the Moorish Sovereign Citizens) that assert that citizenship is voluntary and that just by disavowing it in some official feeling way, they can be exempt from taxes, court jurisdiction, and/or other laws. This is false and people who act on this fraudulent misinformation often suffer serious legal consequences as a result. |
What is the threshold of suspicion for retail loss prevention to subject shoppers to various impositions Meet Bob. Bob purchased something and elects not to print/collect a receipt from the self checkout till. The security then accosts him suspecting him of not paying for it and he insists that he did, so the security asks him for his receipt. He says he doesn't have one, so security asks which till he used to check out and pay. He doesn't remember but reckons it's one of those middle three and security asks him to wait while they check those three for the transactions. Bob meanwhile is in a rush to get somewhere and would like to leave with the goods he has in fact already purchased. When does shop keeper's privilege entitle shops to makw such impositions on one's time and movement? EAW specified all jurisdictions welcome. | The security guard, acting for the (now former) owner of the property doesn't know the new ownership of the property and asks for evidence Bob now owns the property. The security guard is free to ask. Bob cannot produce a receipt for his purchase of the property. The security guard asks which checkout Bob used, so that the security guard can check its records for the transaction. Bob doesn't know specifically and says the checkout was one of three. The security guard asks Bob to remain while each of the three checkouts is checked until Bob's transaction is discovered (or not). The security guard is free to ask. Bob is legally free to leave with his property but the security guard may think he has reasonable grounds for suspicion of shoplifting and decide to try to detain Bob on suspicion of shoplifting until the ownership of the property is established. As any member of the public, the security guard may use "as much force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large." (s3 Criminal Law Act 1967) Bob is also free to leave without his property. In this case, as there could be no grounds for suspicion of shoplifting, only attempted shoplifting, it seems unlikely that any force would be reasonable. Of course, depending on retailer policy the security guard may be allowed to ban Bob from the premises if Bob doesn't cooperate. https://www.inbrief.co.uk/employees/being-a-security-guard/ | In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect. | Go to know that you live in Washington. Per RCW 49.48.210, They must give you written notice with their evidence. Per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, you can (and should) request a review of the employer findings. Since the employer gave you the money, and you nor they saw any error until now, you may be protected under estoppel (WAC 388-02-0495). In the response letter, I would write something along the lines of " [Company Name] has paid IAW my expected rate and acted correctly when I received my money. I have also spent the money in good faith. Indeed, I still cannot see that any overpayment has actually happened. Please send me exact details why you believe that I have been overpaid, and why you believe that estoppel does not apply. Until this manner has been resolved per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, I request that you continue to pay my wages at normal rate for my time. I do not accept liability for the actions or inactions of [company name] and the claimed overpayment." Get receipt that the employer received the notice. Because it is in review, they don't have the right to garnish your wages. Challenge everything at the review. If something was changed or edited, challenge that. I would open up a new thread if they did that much. Best of luck | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. | Given that Bob has no obligation to pay anything to Charles, who has no legal duty to do anything, I don't see how Charles could have liability to Bob. If Charles wants to, he can decline to pay a reward to Bob or can pay an amount smaller than Charles hoped for as a reflection of Charles' delay. | So for your first question, yelling "Stop Thief" loudly at the thief is perfectly legal (Like Yelling "Fire" in a crowded theater, it's legal if the theater is infact, on fire... the quote implied that it was a prankster who drew amusement from the reaction of the people who took him seriously). This may alert store employees, who have a specific kind of Citizens Arrest Power known as "Shopkeeper's Privilege" and is a reduced liability compared to Citizens Arrest. This is also pretty basic self defense agains people who are not engaged in any physical action against you but are starting to scare you. Suddenly shouting draws attention to you and discourages them from their behavior "I SAID DON'T TOUCH ME" being suddenly shouted in a Wal Mart is going to get notices from the immediate crowd drawn to you, and by poximate location, the person who is making you uneasy. For your second question, maybe, it depends... since the cop is clearly chasing the guy, you meet the qualification to use non-deadly force in stopping the criminal (i.e. you are witnessing a person committing a crime, in this case, resisting arrest or persuit) and it would certainly be reasonably non-deadly force if you were to trip, grab, or push the fleeing suspect. Citizens Arrest doesn't specify a minimum time to qualify, so if the officer is seconds behind, and you detain the criminal in this action until the gap is closed, it still counts. | It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter. | A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable. |
Do data protection officers typically have any actual incentive to integrity in their performance of statutory duty? Meet Bob. Bob was brutally assaulted by store security in a big corporate chain store. Bob would like to obtain evidence of the same and thus submits a gdpr subject access request to the central head office. He requests any CCTV footage from the day in which he may appear. The corporate offices designated data protection officer receives his request and carefully reviews all of the day's footage to put together his formal response to Bob's request and soon realises why he is requesting the footage. Not wishing to cause a pr disaster for his employer, he decides to omit or accidentally not accidentally damage some of the most damning footage of the incidents. What legal consequences in practice might the DPO realistically face, apart from the pleasure of his employer and future job security? What recourse does Bob have if the DPO claims that all the footage provided is all the he appears in, even if it doesn't include the incidents motivating Bob's request, or to regretfully report to Bob that there was a technological failure and the footage from that day is irreparably destroyed? E&W specified all welcome. | Spoliation of evidence, once a suit is filed The reason Bob requests the video from Alice Corp is not that he is concerned about his GDPR rights, it is because he wants to file a lawsuit. In fact, it would be super helpful if Bob had filed the lawsuit and served it together with the GDPR request, so there is a pending case... and added a paragraph that he demands the preservation of all evidence at that point. In either case, the sudden deletion of the files by their DPO Charly, after Alice Corp was put on legal notice that they have to preserve evidence, is spoliation, indeed, it would be the very definition: The intentional destruction or alteration of relevant evidence in existing or pending litigation. 1 The main remedy for spoliation is the imposition of a rebuttable presumption of fact that the lost or destroyed evidence would have been unfavourable to the party that destroyed it. This presumption can be rebutted by evidence showing that the “spoliator” did not intend to affect the litigation by destroying the evidence (McDougall v. Black & Decker Canada Inc., 2008 CarswellAlta 1686 (Alta. C.A.)). So, we have the DPO performing spoliation, and thus the lawsuit for the beating will assume that the destroyed video showed exactly what Bob alleged that Alice Corp's security team did to him. in england-and-wales DPO Charly can be further sued for destroying evidence under Section 2 (16) Criminal Justice Act 1987. Spoliation might even happen before the case begins with filing & summons According to an article by Chris Dale, discussion spoliation in england-and-wales the case of Earles v Barclays Bank Plc [2009] EWHC 2500 (Mercantile) (08 October 2009) was named as one of the best descriptions of spoliation in English law. That case indeed is illustrative, as it might be explicitly applicable to the case as described (emphasis mine): 28 [I]n this jurisdiction [Bermingham/England] as in Australia, there is no duty to preserve documents prior to the commencement of proceedings: British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v. Cowell [2002] V.S.C.A. 197, a decision approved in this country by Morritt V.C. in Douglas v. Hello [2003] EWHC 55 at [86]. However, the leading text book in this area – Documentary Evidence by Charles Hollander QC- suggests in paragraph 10-06 of the 10th edition that "there might be cases where it was appropriate to draw adverse inferences from a party's conduct before the commencement of proceedings." In my judgment there would have to be some clear evidence of deliberate spoliation in anticipation of litigation before one could legitimately draw evidential "adverse inferences" in those circumstances. There is no such evidential basis in this case. 29 After the commencement of proceedings the situation is radically different. In Woods v. Martins Bank Ltd [1959] 1 Q.B. 55 at 60, Salmon J. said "It cannot be too clearly understood that solicitors owe a duty to the court, as officers of the court to make sure, as far as possible, that no relevant documents have been omitted from their client's list". 30 In the case of documents not preserved after the commencement of proceedings then the defaulting party risk "adverse inferences" being drawn for such "spoliation": Infabricks Ltd v. Jaytex Ltd [1985] FSR 75. So, yes, we got it in a judgment from the High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division, Birmingham District Registry, Mercantile Court: if it is extremely likely, that proceedings will begin shortly, destroying the video might be spoliation in anticipation of litigation, and thus be problematic even before proceedings started. As a remedy, an adverse inference might be drawn to the content of it. 1 - RESOURCE ID W-015-7809 © 2022 THOMSON REUTERS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | Acme is bound by Bob's actions so long as they were conducted with "apparent authority" from the perspective of Client C and involved his work duties, even if he carried them out contrary to company policy - unless Client C knew for a fact that Bob was violating company policy and didn't have authority within the company to do so when he was doing these things. Acme, directly, or Acme's insurance carrier, in a subrogation suit after it has settled the claim from Client C, could probably sue Bob, especially if he willfully violated company policy for the purpose of harming client C. This is rarely done, but ultimately Bob owes duties to Acme which he violated which probably give rise to liability, although proving that and collecting the judgment would both be difficult. If Bob had authority within the organization to deviate from company policy, however, which he would have a good cause to claim that he did, this would be a full defense to such a suit, since Bob was always acting as a disclosed agent of Acme. Client C probably cannot sue Bob directly, whether or not it sues Acme. In contract matters (which this would include) a disclosed agent is not responsible for the acts he carries out on behalf of his principal. For example, an employee who signs a promissory note on behalf of a company in an official capacity as a disclosed agent of the company isn't responsible for paying the note. This is different than the rule in tort cases where the principal and anyone whose actions personally caused the tort caused the problem is liable. For example, if the employee got into a car accident that was his fault while he was driving on the job for the company, both the company and the employee would be liable to the person who was hurt. The circumstances that you describe sound more like a breach of contract than they do like a tort, so Bob would probably not have any personal liability to Client C. Could Bob or Acme (or both) face any criminal liability? Unless Bob was the CEO or other senior officer of the company, Acme wouldn't face criminal liability, because he is too far down the chain of command to cause Acme the entity to have the requisite criminal intent. Realistically, failing to "verify that equipment rental invoices match delivery records before notifying the client to approve the invoices for payment" does not amount to a crime no matter who does it. This might be careless or a breach of contract, but it is not fraud or theft because it lack the necessary criminal intent. If Bob actively photoshopped equipment rental invoices with a specific intent to defraud Client C, he would probably be criminally liable for fraud, although even that isn't an open and shut case as it still basically involves failure to perform a contract according to its terms and a mere breach of contract is generally not a crime unless you intended not to perform it in the first place, when you entered into the contract. | EU Member State Data Protection Authorities ("DPAs") have fined foreign legal entities (pursuant to Articles 58(2)(i) and 83 GDPR and further national provisions), however it is not publicly documented whether the specific situation you described has occured. Even if such situation would arise, I would think that it is unlikely that DPAs imposing administrative fines could enforce their (fine imposing) decisions outside the EU, even if the decision in question was confirmed by a court. For instance, in the Netherlands there is not a strong legal basis for the (mutual) recognition and enforcement of foreign administrative decisions. I could imagine that the same applies to other EU Member States. However, please note (possible) civil liability Your question seems to refer to enforcement of the GDPR under instruments of administrative / public law. Please note however that the GDPR can also be enforced by private individuals and organizations, e.g. through tortious liability claims. See for example Amsterdam District Court 2 september 2019, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2019:6490 for a situation (albeit purely national), in which the Court awarded damages for a GDPR breach to a data subject. Possibly, a similar case could be brought against an entity outside the EU that processes data of EU data subjects, contingent upon the outcome of certain questions of International Private Law. With regard to civil damages, there is an extensive international legal framework that covers the cross-border enforcement of rewards for civil damages. Likely, such rewards for damages could more easily be enforced outside the EU. However, I must note that such (private) cross-border enforcement of the GDPR has not happened in practice (yet) either (as far as I know). (Please note that this answer assumes (per the question) that the GDPR is applicable and only deals with the question of the territorial aspects of subsequent enforcement. See about the territorial scope of the GDPR: What is the legal mechanism by which the GDPR might apply to a business with no presence in the EU?). | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. | Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people. | In answer to your questions, always get potential clients to sign a contract which covers the GDPR personal data processing requirements at a minimum, prior to giving them a copy of a consultant resume to retain. If you were sat in a meeting with them it is much simpler to record in your logs that the client had sight of the resume but was not left a copy of it in any format, than it is to keep track of which clients have a copy of which data and chasing up to ensure it is erased/destroyed when appropriate. To ensure clients treat the resumes as confidential, make sure they are labelled in the header and footer as confidential. They could also be kept in an envelope clearly marked confidential. There could also be a footnote in small print that informs anyone with a copy, who the data controller is, and that processing is strictly subject to the terms of the 'client contract' or whatever you call it, and that it should be returned or shredded within X days of receipt for example. If you have a computer system generate these it could even specify the client's name and the specific date it should be shredded by. Your notice could include a reminder that the personal data is protected under the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016 and that (client name) as a data processor could be held liable in the event of unauthorised disclosure or processing, if they act outside or contrary to lawful instructions of the data controller. Whilst this won't enforce responsible processing at least it will ensure that your business has done its best to ensure any recipients are fully aware of their responsibilities to protect the information and it would be very difficult for a client to claim they weren't aware the information was confidential or that they had legally binding responsibilities to protect it. It's also worth noting that simply sending CV's/resumes (or other personal data) out via email (unless suitably encrypted) would not meet the requirement in GDPR recital 39 for personal data to be "processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security and confidentiality of the personal data, including for preventing unauthorised access to or use of personal data and the equipment used for the processing." Email technology whilst convenient does not offer any guarantees regarding privacy and confidentiality, therefore instead of sending resumes as email attachments it might be better to use a web-based extranet system which authenticates users before granting access to view resumes. Emails could just let clients know there is a new resume or X number of resumes waiting for them to review and give them a link/button to login. The records of processing activities are in GDPR Article 30 on page 50, and it does not specify a retention period nor that we can choose the retention period, but simply states that data controllers make the records available to the supervisory authority when requested to do so - this may imply indefinite retention of processing records even beyond the life of the processing system (e.g. discontinued products/services), however we may need to await further clarification on this issue from supervisory authorities to be sure. | These are only tangentially related to the GDPR A government entity processing data in accordance with a member state law is ipso facto in compliance with the GDPR. That’s because lawful government data processing is a legitimate reason for processing data under the GDPR. If Germany, for example, passes a law saying German police can record every phone call in Germany, then that would be a lawful basis for processing under the GDPR. There may be constitutional or other legal limitations on such a law but as far as the GDPR is concerned, they’re fine. | In principle, the data subject's right to access involves a copy of all personal data the controller holds on them. There are no time limits by default. Of course, the controller can ask a data subject to clarify their request, e.g. to focus on a particular time frame. There is an implied time limit though: personal data may only be processed/stored for as long as the data is necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was collected. Afterwards, it must be deleted. A controller with good data management will be able to limit their effort by having as short retention periods as possible for their different records. Furthermore, a lot of data is not personal data, or falls out of scope of the GDPR because it is not processed with automated means or forms part of a filing system. For example, if thousands of old invoices were archived in paper form in boxes that are only sorted by year, there might be an argument that this isn't a filing system in the sense of the GDPR and that a DSAR would not have to involve looking through all the archived invoices (compare also Art 11). In your scenario, there is a clear retention period of six years. You are asking for records about how that data might have been used further in the past. To the degree that such data is actually available, that could reasonably be personal data and should be included in a response to a DSAR. E.g. they might have information like this: “File #1234 was included in a data set that was sold to EvilCorp in 2007. The entries in File #1234 that are older than 2014 have been purged, so we do not know which entries were included in the data set. The current name on File #1234 is Dave.” This information about the sale would be personal data because it relates to you, and you are identifiable. Of course, the controller might not be set up to perform this search unless specifically asked. However, more unspecific information might not be personal data. For example: “About 70% of our files were included in a data set that was sold to EvilCorp in 2007. We no longer have records indicating whether your file was included.” Since there is no link between the sale and your personal data, I don't think it would have to be included in a DSAR response. The primary reason why you should be told about sales of personal data is that per Art 15(1)(c), you should be informed about “the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed” in a DSAR response. So when making a data subject access request, it could make sense to explicitly referencing this paragraph. So you would be interested in receiving a copy of your personal data as per Art 15 GDPR, and in particular any available information per Art 15(1)(c) GDPR about the recipients or categories of recipients to whom your personal data has been or may have been disclosed in the past. Quite likely the response will be underwhelming, e.g. by just giving a broad category such as “potential creditors who are contractually obligated to use the data only in accordance with our policies”. Whether such responses are compliant (I don't necessarily think so) will not be clear until there's a good precedent, and that would require that someone sorts this out in court. |
Why are Russian combatants in Ukraine considered soldiers rather than terrorists? The question bothers me since February 2022. Why (legally) are Russian combatants in Ukraine considered soldiers (thus POWs when captured) rather than terrorists? There is no formal declaration of war. They are members an organization (Russian military) that commits acts of terrors to civilian population in clear violation of international law of war. Moreover, they either directly or indirectly contribute to the mentioned acts of terror. Their state (Russia) explicitly claims that there is no war (thus unilaterally waiving the protection of law of war for Russian forces). Why is that particular group of armed people acting in clear violation of Ukrainian law treated as "soldiers in war" rather than state-sponsored criminals? Note, that waiving the protection of law of war does not waive the protection of Ukrainian law (right to due process etc.). | The third Geneva convention says in its second article (emphasis added): the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. The violence in Ukraine qualifies for at least two reasons: it is an armed conflict between two high contracting parties, and it is a case of partial occupation of the territory of a high contracting party. "Members of the armed forces" of Russia who have "fallen into the power of [Ukraine]" are therefore protected by the provisions of the convention as prisoners of war as defined in the convention's fourth article. It follows from this that the parenthetical commentary in the question's third bullet point is incorrect: refusing to call this "military action" a "war" does not in fact "unilaterally waive the protection of law of war for Russian forces." As to the allegation in the second point, even a prisoner of war who is suspected of committing a war crime is entitled to the convention's protections. Any punishment for the war crime is to be imposed by due process of law. The fact that war crimes may have been committed by other elements of Russia's armed forces is even less of a justification to deny the convention's protections to prisoners who are not individually suspected of war crimes. | The Geneva Conventions prohibit attacking anyone who has clearly communicated an intent to surrender. Certainly, there is a point at which if perfidy reaches a sufficient level of frequency, then the side committing it will lose the ability to "clearly communicate" an intention to surrender, but it isn't clear just where that point is. | A question like that is impossible to answer in general, but your question includes some incorrect assumptions. Many countries try to prevent visitors to become de-facto residents through repeated visits. For instance, the Schengen area limits visitors on short-stay visa to 90 days out of every 180-day rolling window, and the UK seems to give their immigration officials more discretion on every re-entry. Many countries give political asylum to people who are persecuted in their home country. A pandemic, or generally bad living conditions, do not count as persecution. Many countries give refugee status to people who have to flee war or disaster in their home country. The default case for these rules is a person who is in danger and wants to travel to a safe country. Then there are rules for force majeure when a person in the country is forced to overstay through no fault of their own. How that is handled usually depends on how cooperative the visitor was at securing a timely return or a visa extension. During the early days of the pandemic, there have been blanket extensions in some countries. As travel re-opened, these have run out. One of the differences between the last three bullet points is how long the stay is permitted. Political asylum tends to be for the long term, refugee status lasts until the end of the disaster, and a force majeure exception might just last a few days. So if this is not just a hypothetical question, contact a lawyer or the immigration authorities where you are now. Generic answers on Stackexchange cannot replace specific, professional advice. | Your question is based on an incorrect premise Heads of State can be and have been held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity. For example: Germany Japan Yugoslavia Rwanda | The answer to your question, strictly in terms of whether they have the capacity to authorize states to violate international humanitarian law is yes. However, it is highly unlikely. It takes only one permanent member to veto such a resolution. Moreover, UN Charter Article 24(2) states that: ... the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations ... and International Humanitarian Law would certainly be considered a principle of the United Nations. So, are they capable of passing a resolution in violation of International Humanitarian Law? Sure. Is it likely to happen? Almost certainly not. Having said that, if this happened, it would be a novel area of law, and while currently, international law suggests it would be binding and legal, it is possible that sanctions could be imposed if such a resolution were passed by the Security Council. | Almost certainly, there is no such right. It's illegal under 18 USC 831 to possess "nuclear material" without specific authorization. 18 USC 832 forbids the possession of a "radiological weapon". If there is intent to use the device to cause death, serious bodily injury, or damage to property or the environment, that's also a violation of 18 USC 2332i. I don't think these laws have been explicitly tested against the Second Amendment, but related cases suggest they would hold up (if the challenge wasn't simply dismissed as frivolous). The Second Amendment doesn't grant a blanket right to own weapons. Federal law, 18 USC 922 (o) makes it unlawful to own a "machinegun" (as defined in the statute), and in the case of Hollis v. Lynch, the Fifth Circuit held that this law was constitutional, because, as they said, the Second Amendment only protects weapons that are in "common use [...] for lawful purposes like self-defense." This case doesn't seem to have been appealed further, but the reasoning cited by the Fifth Circuit comes from the Supreme Court's opinion in D.C. v. Heller. If machineguns aren't in "common use", and therefore not protected, surely the same would apply to nuclear weapons. | Deadly self-defense is legal in Germany. The self-defense law (in particular Sect. 32 of the Criminal Code) makes no restrictions as far as the type of aggression and the type of defense is concerned. That means that - in principle - you can defend yourself against an attack by any means that is necessary to stop it. The principle behind that is "das Recht muss dem Unrecht nicht weichen", which translates to "the law does not have to yield to the unlawful". That particularily means that: You do not have to run. You do not have to yield. You do not have to wait for help from public authorities (notably the police). You can defend yourself (against any attack on you, be it life, limb or property), no matter if that would mean commiting a crime (even if that crime is killing a person). This is called "Trutzwehr" or "schneidiges Notwehrrecht", which can be translated to "active defense" or "aggressive defense" as opposed to passive defense. However... This regulation is not without pitfalls and limitations. There are quite a few, which means that in practice deadly force could be considered unlawful in self-defense. Books have been written about this subject alone, so it can not be exhaustively handled here. Some examples for corner cases are: Attackers that clearly can not understand the severity of their actions have to be spared from extreme effects of your self-defense. The classical book case is that you can't shoot little children stealing apples from your tree. If there is a massive discrepancy between what you want protect and the damage the attacker has to endure (called "qualitativer Notwehrexzess" - translating to "qualitatively eccessive self-defense"). If someone insults you, shooting him might go to far, since while your honour is attacked (which is protected by Sect. 185 Criminal Code), the attacker's life (protected by Sect. 212 Criminal Code) by far outweighs it. Note that, to ensure the effectiveness of the self-defense laws, the discrepancy must be extreme. And it does not mean you can't defend yourself. You just have to choose a less severe measure. So you might get away with knocking the insulter out. After the attack is over you hit the attacker once too often, which causes his death (called "quantitativer Notwehrexzess" - "quantitatively eccessive self-defense"). The attack was over at the time of the deadly blow, so your right for self-defense had ended. You might get away without punishment, if it was impossible for you to realize that the attack was over. If you only think an attack is happening, but it is not (for example someone attacking you with a rubber knife on Halloween). In this case there is no attack and so technically there is no right for self defense (called "Putativnotwehr"). Similar to the cases of excessive self-defense, it depends on your individual case (notable if you had a chance to realize the attack was false) if you are punished or not. To sum it up: You have the right to defend yourself by any means necessary, but you are held responsible if you go to far (not just a little, but really really to far). | You've asked a two part question. [Is this a violation of] the international policy that a country should never refuse entry to verified citizens of their own? In considering that question, the US example may be illuminative. The US requires US citizens to have a "passport book" when flying into the US, even though the US issues "passport cards" that serve as proof of nationality. If you can get to the border and prove your US nationality (by passport card or otherwise), they'll let you in, but airlines won't board you unless you have a passport book. If you don't have a passport book, you're supposed to get to the nearest consulate and apply for a passport before flying to the US. But note that the US obligation to admit its own citizens is principally a feature of US law. CBP does not waive 8 USC 1185 because of some international body; there is no body that enforces international "policies" of this nature. Rather, they do so because they know that the federal courts would require them to admit US citizens based on the right of free movement implicit in US law. If someone were unable to get into their country of citizenship and unable to gain legal residence elsewhere then unless they could remain on the run for the rest of their life they would eventually end up as the subject of negotiation between whatever country is trying to deport them and their country of citizenship. In other words, in the worst case, such people become a bilateral diplomatic matter between two countries. Therefore, any challenge to the restriction would have to go through the Italian or EU legal system. Is this a violation of the EU freedom of movement directive, whereby a verified EU/EFTA national cannot normally be refused entry to any EU/EFTA state? It certainly seems to be, but without a decision from an EU court, we can't be certain. From Article 5 of the freedom of movement directive (2004/38/EC): Article 5 Right of entry 1. Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border controls, Member States shall grant Union citizens leave to enter their territory with a valid identity card or passport and shall grant family members who are not nationals of a Member State leave to enter their territory with a valid passport. No entry visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on Union citizens. This doesn't say anything about allowing EU citizens to board aircraft from non-EU destinations without their EU passports. So if Italy makes a rule that EU citizens need a passport to board a flight to Italy from outside the EU and Schengen area, that doesn't seem to violate Article 5 except by implication. It would be for a court to decide whether that implication is in fact present. Because Article 5 doesn't say anything about where the passenger has flown from, we can also consider the case of a dual citizen of an EU member state and a "third country," who might fly to Italy using the third-country passport, and then present a national ID card at the immigration counter. If such a traveler were denied entry, that would appear to violate Article 5. If that traveler's other nationality were one that required a visa in the non-EU passport, the traveler might have a stronger case that Italy's rule infringes on the right of free movement. EU or EFTA citizens could also challenge the restriction more generally as an infringement on the right of free movement that is established in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), even if the directive itself does not prohibit the restriction. For example, one might argue that free movement is restricted because there are countries to which EU citizens can travel with only an ID card, but from which they cannot return to Italy with only that card. In addition, non-Italian EU or EFTA citizens could challenge the more restrictive regime applied to them on the argument that it violates the principle of non-discrimination articulated in Article 9 of the TEU: Article 9 In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.... Furthermore, non-Italians residing in Italy could challenge the more restrictive regime on the basis of Article 24 of the directive: Article 24 Equal treatment 1. Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty. The benefit of this right shall be extended to family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who have the right of residence or permanent residence. |
Does typed up notes of an oral conversation make the oral discussion more legally binding? Does typing up and sending oral conversation make the discussed more legally binding? I think the oral words discussed without someone taking notes cannot make a strong case to be legally binding or used as prosecution material because no one will remember them and people distrust recall. | An oral contract is (usually) entirely legally binding (exceptions include things like land sales). Written notes do not change that. The important thing about nearly contemporaneous notes is that if the contract runs into difficulty and you need to litigate, they are likely to be accepted by a court as good evidence of what was agreed. They will be much more difficult for the other party to challenge later (they can be challenged now of course - which is part of why they are considered good evidence of what was agreed). | Podcasts and recorded talks are protected by copyright, because they have already been put in fixed form. An extemporaneous radio text (e.g. from a dial-in talk show) does not have fixed form, until someone makes it permanent (audio-records it or writes the text down). A transcript of a podcast is a derivative work, and only the copyright owner can authorize creating a derivative work. So yes, permission is necessary. | To add to Nij's answer: You write I have not signed any paper document. You seem to assume that a binding contract can only be entered into in writing. This is wrong. In most countries (certainly in Germany), a binding contract generally does not require a written document. A contract can be entered into orally, or even silently ("Schlüssiges Handeln", "Implied-in-fact contract"). All that is required for a contract is that one party made a proposal, and the other party indicated their agreement, implicitly or explicitly ("Willenserklärung"). Clicking "yes" on a website can mean entering into a contract if you could reasonably be expected to understand that you were accepting certain obligations (such as that of paying a fee). So in your case, you probably entered into a valid contract, and will have to fulfill your obligation under it, which means paying. From a practical point of view: If you choose not to pay, the organizers will probably either drop the claim (if you are lucky), or they will pursue it. In that case, they can send you a "Mahnbescheid" for their claim. At that point you either pay within 14 days, or respond that you reject the claim, then there will be a trial, which you will probably lose, and pay a lot more than 40€. If you do not respond to the Mahnbescheid, you will receive a "Vollstreckungsbescheid", and then a visit by a Gerichtsvollzieher (officer of the court). My advice would be to pay and learn to properly cancel registrations. | must all interaction be through a lawyer after receiving the first letter? Consistent with others' answer, no, you don't need a lawyer. But your question in and of itself is indicative of the steep learning curve you would need to undergo in order to avoid "shooting yourself in the foot", as the saying goes. By this I am not encouraging you to get a lawyer (in fact, here on stackexchange and elsewhere I promote litigation in pro per). Instead, I encourage people to learn about the applicable statutes, procedural laws, how to conduct legal research, and to draft/present their arguments in court. Here are some suggestions regarding your response letter: Avoid sarcastic admissions such as "Right, for sure I am at fault for the employer's [fill_in_the_blanks]". If you ask for a clarification, clearly state that you expect reasonably sufficient detail as well as any and all records that substantiate the alleged damages. Although that won't strictly limit the allegations the employer can make in court proceedings, the attorney's reply might help evidencing the employer's vexatious approach later on. Avoid wording that may be misinterpreted as consciousness of guilt. Be assertive and truthful. Keep in mind the lawyer is gauging (1) how easily he can intimidate you, and (2) whether he can make additional claims to harass you via court proceedings. From now on, all your interactions with the attorney and the employer should be in writing (preferably email, given its reproducibility). When unethical individuals are aware that their position is devoid of merit, they are very tempted to indulge in false accusations (of threat, for example). Thus, communications in writing constitute objectively verifiable proof of who is acting unlawfully. Even if the attorney premises on your contract (or employment agreement/manual, or company's guidelines) the alleged damages, the clauses at issue might be illegal and therefore void. For instance, from 2007-2012 my former employer (an Indian IT intermediary) prohibited me --via contract-- to disclose my salary. The contract contained the typical lawyered babbling, but that doesn't mean that all of it was legal. In 2013 I realized that the prohibition violated Michigan law, and he had no option but to strike the entire clause. That being said, I didn't sue him for that, but for other more important matters which are currently pending review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Absent any further context in your inquiry, it is hard to make additional suggestions on how to proceed. | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. | This is a good question, although it discusses crimes. This answer generalizes the question by giving a response for civil violations. In the united-states, where federal civil-procedure is followed and provided the tape isn't solely for impeachment purposes (i.e. it also documents other elements), there are certain disclosures required at the beginning of discovery governed by Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). If a party withholds one of these disclosures, under Rule 37(c)(1), the court is able to take a number of actions, including throwing the evidence out. This could, of course, result in the withholder's conviction. Yet, if the court does not go to that extreme, it may impose the sanctions in Rule 37(b). So the withholder's attorney might try to make a case that the evidence is, indeed, solely for impeachment purposes. | A police officer can lie, and lying does not render a statement inadmissible. But there is a separate area of law regarding self-incrimination and the right to a lawyer. The basic principle is that a person can always assert their 5th Amendment rights, whether or not they are under arrest. When a person is under arrest and has asserted their right to an attorney, questioning must stop and anything that results from further questions is inadmissible. There is no single factor that distinguishes ordering asking questions from custodial interrogation. For example if you have been dragged by officers to the police station and held in a locked room for hours in the middle of night, one would reasonably believe that you were taken into custody, and interrogation must stop once you request a lawyer. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, police contacted the defendant whom they suspected was involved in a burglary and they invite him to chat at the station. They lie and say they found his fingerprints at the scene (they did not). He then confesses, they read him his rights, and he confesses again. The confession is admissible, because this was not a custodial interrogation. The relevant question is whether "a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave". | Actually, the concept "right" means that it can be waived: you may exercise the right, but do not have to. If it is an obligation, you can't "waive" the obligation; but the right to free speech does not mean that you must speak, and the right to bear arms does not mean that you must bear arms. You may decline to exercise, or waive, a right. Sternlight 16 Ohio St. J. On Disp. Resol. 669 (2001) in "Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial" partially addresses this (the focus though is on binding arbitration). One thing to note is that the Seventh Amendment does not appear to apply to issues in state court (it is a separate and fascinating question to wonder what parts of The Constitution are incorporated against states, and why). All is not lost for the constitutional question, we just need a different constitution. By the agreement terms, "This Agreement is governed by the laws of the State of New York". Therefore, New York's Constitution (Article 1 Sect 2) is also applicable: Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law. Thus, the right may be waived. Waiver of a right to jury trial is not the same as waiver of the right to trial: what the agreement says is that litigants would have a civil bench trial, where the judge determines whether there was a breach. In New York, NY CPLR § 4102 allows parties to waive civil trial by jury (and unlike California), such waiver terms have been upheld, but the courts have recognized that there is a problem, so it's not always obvious whether such waivers in contracts are legal. |
What is a mercantile court? Another answer cites the Birmingham mercantile court. I've never heard of a mercantile court before despite having researched the English court system before. What is this court and where does it fit into the overall system? | From the Circuit Commercial (Mercantile) Court Guide: The Circuit Commercial Courts (formerly the Mercantile Courts) operate in eight regional centres throughout England and Wales as part of the Queens [King's] Bench Division of the High Court. They decide business disputes of all kinds apart from those which, because of their size, value or complexity, will be dealt with by the Commercial Court. As well as large cases, the Circuit Commercial Courts decide smaller disputes and recognise the importance of these, particularly to small and medium sized businesses. They form part of the Business and Property Courts of England and Wales. More info: Circuit Commercial Courts FAQ The Birmingham Circuit Commercial Court | Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country. | The part of the statute (which is part of an article of the Uniform Commercial Code model language applicable to the sale of goods) that you are discussing reads as follows: 1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. I have put the critical language of (1)(c) for the purpose of understanding what they are talking about when they are talking about "cash sales" in bold. You are asking: Please explain it to me and tell me what a "cash sale" has to do with voidable title. Doesn't cash sale just mean you are paying cash for something? That sounds perfectly innocent to me. Items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) involve circumstances which are examples of transactions in which a buyer of goods obtains voidable title from the seller. This means that the sale can be undone if the seller acts promptly enough, but the sale can't be undone if the buyer in turn sells the goods to a good faith purchaser for value (i.e. someone who pays a meaningful price for the goods without knowledge that the seller only has voidable title). If the goods have been sold to a good faith purchaser for value, however, then the seller who could otherwise undo the sale entirely can now only sue the buyer for damages (usually the agreed purchase price, or fair market value if no purchase price had been agreed upon yet). When it says in (1)(c) that "it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale"," what the statute is describing is a transaction where the original deal was that you will deliver goods to me with the understanding that I will pay you for the goods in full with currency or other "good funds" (like a wire transfer), roughly contemporaneously. But, what actually happens is that you deliver the goods to me and instead of promptly paying you the cash you are owed for the goods, I don't actually pay you anything. This could happen because I was trying to cheat you and get something for nothing, in which case I would have also committed fraud which also falls under (1)(d). More innocently, suppose that I run a small grocery store and you run a dairy that delivers milk for resale to my grocery store every morning at 5 a.m. before banks open, in time for the morning rush of innocent customers milk to put in their coffee on their way to work, before the banks open, and then I go to the bank when it opens every day at 9 a.m. and take out some cash and hand it over to your money collector, when your money collector stops buy my grocery store around lunch time. But, today, I was stunned to discover that all of the money in my bank account had been frozen due to a garnishment on a money judgment against me that I hadn't been aware of because the process server who was supposed to give me notice of the lawsuit against me instead threw the court papers in the sewer and lied on the return of service saying that he'd delivered the court papers to me, so that unbeknownst to me, a default judgment was entered against me. The sale would be voidable in both cases, the one where I was trying to cheat you while telling you that it would be a "cash sale" and the one where I innocently found out that I didn't have the money to pay you that I had no reasons to think that I wouldn't have available to me. And, in each situation, if my grocery store sold half the milk that was delivered to me in the morning rush, those sales would be valid and irreversible, even though I completely stiffed the dairy owner and there was a total failure of consideration in what was supposed to have been a cash sale transaction. But, the dairy owner would have a right, when he found out that he wasn't getting paid at noon and the sale turned out to have been a voidable one, to take back all the milk that hadn't been sold to my customers yet in the hope that he could sell it to someone else who was actually willing and able to pay for it instead. In general, under circumstances when a sale is voidable, if I haven't resold the goods to a good faith purchaser for value, then you can legally force me to return the goods and have the sale invalidated. But, if I have sold the goods to somebody else for a more than nominal price, and the person who bought the goods from me doesn't know that I cheated you by not paying for the goods, then you can't undo my sale of the goods that I didn't pay for to the good faith purchaser for value. Situation (1)(c) is very similar to situation (1)(b), in which you give me the goods and I give you are personal check for the purchase price, but the check is then dishonored by the bank (something that could been my intentional plan to cheat you, but which could also have been my failure to keep track of the balance in my bank account as I wrote checks). Both of these situations involve broken promises which may or may not have been made with no intent to honor those promises in the first place. Situations (1)(a) and (1)(d), in contrast, involve out and out fraud and deceit, but not "fraud in the factum". In other words, what (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) all have in common is that the goods were voluntarily delivered by you to me, even though your voluntary delivery was obtained by improper means such a deceit regarding who is buying the goods. ("Fraud in the factum", which is also void, involves situations when, for example, I ask you for you to sign what I tell you is a birthday card, when what I have actually done is have you sign a letter authorizing your delivery man to deliver lots of goods to me, and then I use that letter to have goods delivered to me.) In case (1)(a) this would often be a sale on credit or open account to someone you believe to have good credit but who is in fact someone else with bad credit. For example, you make a sale to George Shrub, thinking you will be delivering goods to George Shrub, Sr. who has good credit, but instead you are tricked into delivering the goods to George Shrub, Jr. who has multiple bankruptcies and never pays his bills on time. In case (1)(d) there are myriad possible examples. For example, I may have given you counterfeit money to get you to deliver the goods to me. Or, I may have purchased your cow in a barter exchange for beans that I told you were magic beans, but that were really just ordinary beans. But, in both (1)(a) and (1)d), as well as in (1)(b) and (1)(c), you are voluntarily delivering the good to me and then not getting what you thought you had bargained for in the deal, sometimes with evil motives and sometimes for innocent reasons, so voidable title arises. In contrast, suppose that I snuck into my stockyard one night and stole the goods from you. In that situation, you would have a right to get your goods back not only from me, but even from a good faith purchaser for value to whom I sold the stolen goods, because out and out theft that does not even involve consent procured through fraud or a broken promise, doesn't give me any title to the property, not even voidable title. Similarly, suppose that I pointed a gun at you in your shop and insisted that you deliver the goods to me or else I will kill you. Again, in that situation, you aren't giving me even voidable title to the goods, and you can sue a good faith purchaser for value from me to get the goods that I never had any colorable claim to have ever owned back. The language in the first sentence of (1) goes along with the language about voidable sales of goods in the rest of (1), because the first sentence of (1) covers situations when I may not have 100% ownership of goods that I sell to some else. For example, suppose that I have a pedigreed male dog that I have purchased the pet rights in from a breeder, while the breeder has retained the stud rights in the dog. (Yes, these transactions really happen. I've litigated them.) Under the first sentence of (1), I can sell the pet rights I have in the dog to you, but I can't sell the stud rights that I don't own to you because I don't own them. And, unless I am a pet store owner to whom the dog has been "entrusted" (and I'm not a pet shop owner), I probably can't destroy the stud rights through a sale of the dog to you when I am purporting to be selling you both the pet rights and the stud rights, even if you are a good faith purchaser for value, because I am not a merchant to whom the "entrusting" doctrine applies. So, if I sold the dog, the owner of the stud rights could still enforce those rights against the person to whom I sold the dog. Parts (2) and (3) deal with an exception to the general rule in the first sentence of (1) called "entrusting" which is quite similar to voidable title. Entrusting involves you leaving your goods with a merchant who is in the business of selling those kinds of goods. So, if I leave my nice clothes with a consignment shop or a pawn shop and the consignment shop or pawn shop sells my clothes to someone and give the buyer good title, and I can't undo that sale even if you didn't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I had entrusted to the consignment store or pawn shop (e.g. perhaps they were only allowed to sell my wedding dress for a minimum price of $100, but instead sold it to someone for $30 which they didn't have permission to do, then the buyer of my wedding dress for $30 would still have good title to the wedding dress and the sale couldn't be undone). But, on the other hand, if I leave my nice clothes with an automobile parts shop or a grocery store or a stationary store, and they don't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I left in their care, and then they sold my nice clothes to one of their customers, that sale made without my permission would be void and could be undone, even if their customer paid more than a nominal price for my nice clothes and had no knowledge that the merchant didn't have my permission to sell my nice clothes. This is because we don't believe that someone who buys, for example, my wedding dress from an automobile parts shop or grocery store or stationary store, can legitimately say that they really believed in good faith that the seller really had your permission to sell my wedding dress, because that is not an ordinary merchant-customer transaction for them. | renting a single room with three other guys each renting their own rooms means exactly what it says. What you are paying for is that room, plus shared access to the common areas. Without knowing exactly what your lease says, especially with respect to the common areas, it's difficult to give a proper answer. I suspect that the lease for your room says nothing about who can live in the other rooms. Unless the lease says otherwise, the landlord has full control of the common areas. (Compare with a large apartment building, with hallways, stairwells, lobbies, etc., which must be maintained by the landlord.) This isn't an unusual arrangement, but I've never understood why anyone, landlord or tenant, would want it. There's far too much potential for conflict. You, yourself, could be a totally obnoxious person that the other three guys can't stand, but they'd have to put up with you. Their only alternatives are to move out or to ask the landlord to evict you. Moving out would be a lot of trouble for everyone. But, depending upon jurisdiction, as long as you're paying the rent on time and not causing damage to the property, eviction could be a very difficult and long process. And eviction is hardly in the landlord's interest. It costs a lot of money and time, and might not be granted even if she did apply. Why might a landlord spend so much time at the house they're renting? I'd be concerned about the implications of a woman going out of her way to do yoga in an area rented to four men. That is the part that sounds most strange in this situation. How do I resolve this? I'd start looking for a room somewhere else. | As your question is concerned on English law, a clear answer is yes but is specific for English law. Barristers from the same chamber may represent opposing sides in a case. This is normal and common practice. Barristers are independent practitioners in the British and many other common law systems who represent clients in court but are not in charge of the case as a whole. As a result, they may be instructed to represent clients whose interests diverge, and each barrister is responsible for deciding whether or not to accept a particular case. While each barrister acts independently and is free to take on any case they choose, chambers are groups of barristers who share resources and facilities. Even if they are representing opposing sides in the same case or different cases, barristers are typically required to adhere to the professional code of ethics and maintain client confidence. It is important to note that ethical rules prohibit lawyers from representing opposing sides in the same case, and the concept of barristers and chambers does not exist in some jurisdictions, such as the United States. | My general belief is that in the United States entering structures like the ones you've pictured would be considered trespassing regardless of if there is a sign in place or not. This is based on the fact that I'm almost certain that if you become injured while on the premises you could sue the land owner. I believe the trespassing signs are just there to give legal cover to the land owner in case someone does try to sue them. Here are two sources that essentially support my beliefs: General definition: Trespass is defined by the act of knowingly entering another person’s property without permission. More detailed legal definition: § 11.411 Criminal trespass. (a) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he or she is not licensed or privileged to do so, he or she enters or surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure. An offense under this subsection is a misdemeanor if it is committed in a dwelling at night. Otherwise it is a petty misdemeanor. As you can see these buildings are clearly owned by someone, and you clearly haven't gotten permission to enter the building. Ergo, you're trespassing. Now if you were talking about ancient Mayan ruins, or an Old West ghost town then this would be more of a gray area, I believe, since those structures have been abandoned for 150+ years. The same goes for structures in National Parks, since a National Park is public land you could make a case that you thought you were allowed to go since you weren't specifically told you can't go (assuming you didn't cross a fence line/no trespassing sign). You should definitely contact a real lawyer though. Now if you do enter then I think the probability that you will be caught and prosecuted would be fairly low. It is your decision if that risk is worth the reward of entering/exploring the structure. | There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer. | The modern jury trial in common law countries (i.e. those with legal systems based upon those of English law) derives from 12th century English practice as it evolved over time in England, and is frozen in time to some extent in U.S. practice, by the nature of the jury trial as an institution at the time that it became a constitutional right in the United States in 1789. The English jury system emerged in the 12th century in the wake of the Norman conquest of 1066 CE, and codified Norman customary law, particularly among its soldiers in courts-martial and had some resemblance to modern courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the United States military such as the notion that you could be judge's only by your peers in rank or your superiors, although it subsequently evolved in English civil practice. (England also developed in parallel non-jury courts of equity as a division of the tax collection department in England, a set of courts that were merged with courts of law in most places in the U.S. in the 19th century, the remains a distinctive source of U.S. jurisprudence in matters which are decided solely by judges. This short summary also ignores features like the coroners' juries and grand juries of English derived practice.) The civil jury is now almost extinct in England itself, and in most common law countries other than the U.S., except for a handful of kinds of cases (e.g. defamation, civil fraud, false imprisonment, and eminent domain cases), and in serious criminal cases. Other cases in England are now handled in the first instance by a single judge at the trial court level in most cases. Outside the common law countries, first instance trials in serious cases are usually conducted by a panel of three or five judges, with a lead judge presiding over the conduct of the matter. Most jury-like systems outside of common law countries are limited to serious criminal matters, and often involve a hybrid of judges and specially selected citizens with exceptional ("blue ribbon") qualifications who deliberate together with the judges. These systems were mostly adopted after World War II in imitation of U.S. and English practice, but some as early as the 15th century in Europe. The Continental European practices described in an answer by @Geremia, and likewise Greek direct democracy based trial and Sumerian trials come from a tradition that was abandoned no later than the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe as civil codes on the model of the French and German civil codes were adopted, and often much earlier. These practices are not ancestral to the current practice of jury trials in modern legal systems. Juries were not described as a means of adjudication in the Bible. In the ancient democratic Greek city-states, some city-states had direct democracy of landed males citizens and those citizens met collectively in town meeting style to address both legislative and judicial matters. The governance practice of Caribbean pirates, or some isolated bands and tribes, of small early New England Puritan communities, and of small revolutionary military units, have some similarities to this kind of practice, all of which were small communities organized on a principle of direct democracy and which arose more or less independently of each other. Mostly, in the Roman Empire, judges or regulated private arbitrators resolved the matters that were vested in civil and criminal juries today in places that still have them. Some serious matters at times in Rome were decided by quasi-juries in a Greek town meeting like format with hundreds of jurors in a stadium or amphitheater. But this was never a routine means by which justice was metted out. Inquisitorial trials were a subset of canon law, and canon law is generally carried out by deputized clergy, in a process that was more written than oral, and in that involved active investigation by the judges rather than passive consideration of adversary presented evidence (giving rise to the modern inquisitorial judicial systems common in Continental Europe, Latin America, and much of Asia (where Maoist or Islamic legal systems are not primarily influences). In Medieval Times, the predominant practice was for decisions to be made by the ranking local feudal lord, or his delegate, and the role of the delegate of a feudal lord is directly ancestral to that of the common law legal system's judges, which is one of the reasons that common law judges have powers such as contempt of court, and immunities from liability not available to judges elsewhere. Select institutions in the Holy Roman Empire and what is now Germany in the 15th to 19th centuries appear to have been devised in imitation of the English jury system. |
How can I report an animal breeder who sold me mistreated animals? I bought two German Shepherd puppies from a breeder in North Carolina. I live in South Carolina. The one puppy has a hole in her heart and both puppies have worms. The worms come from drinking standing water with animal feces in it. The conditions of this breeder were horrible. I contacted her as my vet told me to and I asked for my money back, and to meet us halfway since she is very far from us (over four hours one way). She refused. Where can I file a complaint again her for conditions of puppies? She has several litters now that are almost ready to go again. She is selling very sick puppies. | The North Carolina Department of Justice runs an animal welfare hotline at 1-855-290-6915. The link implies that this is a toll-free number within North Carolina only, so it may not work from where you are. If it doesn't work, the page above also mentions ways to file a complaint online or by mail. They also suggest contacting local animal control agencies directly to file a complaint, and provide a list of county agencies responsible for animal control. When you file a complaint with this hotline, it will be investigated and forwarded to the appropriate authorities. It appears that it is typically the local authorities who will take action on such matters. Our office will review your complaint to determine if the allegations involve animal cruelty. If our office determines that it is animal cruelty, then we will refer the complaint to the appropriate county authority in which the animal is located. Depending on the details of the complaint, your local animal control office, local Sheriff, or the NC Department of Agriculture may have the authority to take action. ... Complaints are referred to the proper county authority for investigation. Please direct follow-up questions to the county animal control or law enforcement agency. Note that under North Carolina law, cruelty to animals is defined as when someone intentionally overdrive[s], overload[s], wound[s], injure[s], torment[s], kill[s], or deprive[s] of necessary sustenance ... any animal ... As used in this section, the words "torture", "torment", and "cruelly" include or refer to any act, omission, or neglect causing or permitting unjustifiable pain, suffering, or death. It is not 100% clear to me that a breeder selling sick puppies would fall under this law, though if the worms were indeed caused by drinking tainted water that could be construed as "deprivation of necessary sustenance." In any event, it would be worth reporting this breeder to the NC hotline; they can probably make a determination better than most random folks on the internet (such as me.) | The contract between you and the company is for the supply of the goods. How they get them to you is irrelevant; they may have them in stock, or they may order them and ship them on, or they may send an order to the factory to ship them directly to you. There is nothing saying that they have to be in stock anywhere. The law you refer to says that they must ship within 30 days unless they provide a specific date. In effect "shipped within 30 days" is an implicit term in the contract. If after 30 days they have not shipped the goods then you are entitled to rescind the contract (i.e. get your money back). Where things get interesting is if they took your money knowing that they would not be able to ship within 30 days, or at least being reckless (i.e. not caring) about it. It does rather sound like this may be the case. If so then it may rise to the level of fraud, and the FTC or state authorities may take action. Try writing to the FTC. A single event won't get any action, but if they get lots of complaints then they might. | NJ Rev Stat §9:6-1 may be the source of the rumor (since it was in the news), but that law prohibits "the habitual use by the parent or by a person having the custody and control of a child, in the hearing of such child, of profane, indecent or obscene language". The NJ Supreme Court recently declined a First Amendment argument for overturning the law. Otherwise, a candidate is disorderly contact, NJ Rev Stat § 2C:33-2(b), A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense if, in a public place, and with purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in reckless disregard of the probability of so doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive language, given the circumstances of the person present and the setting of the utterance, to any person present. N.J. v. Burkett somewhat tests this law, though the specific acts (which were found to be puerile yet legal) are not adequately described to test the limit on this ban on profanity (as a subcase of coarse language). The statute still stands, but seems not to have been otherwise prosecuted. | Is the question just whether a company can contact its customers to ensure that they're happy with the company's services? If so, the answer is generally yes. I can think of no reason why this would change based on the fact that someone saw her using the services of a competitor. Your mother seems to be treating the phone call as an accusation, but it appears to be standard customer-relationship maintenance. If she chooses to approach it differently, she can use it to improve her bargaining power with Gym 1. | I find that Petri Mäntysaari: The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law: Volume II, p. 115-140 can pretty much explain the reasoning for this. It is in chapter 5.3 on Terms non-binding as intended. The contract might not contain all legal requirements for some reason, or a clause might become invalid due to law changes. Sometimes the contract becomes unenforceable for some reason or another in part or full. The salvatorian clause is there to fix the defective clause to become the closest estimate to the written form that is legal and not deficient instead of being just dropped from the contract. This can save a contract from becoming unenforceable or making it void in whole. Especially look at Page 140: If a contract term is invalid because of a mandatory provision of law, it will be replaced by legal background rules(§306(2) BGB). One of the standard ways to address the situation is to use a so-called salvatorian clause. [...] This [reinterpretation/fixing of deficiencies] would not happen without a specific contract term. (See §139 BGB. On the other hand see also §140 BGB. Compare DCFR II.-7:302 and II.-7:303) A caveat though: if the alteration to the clause needed is too big and substantial, the contract as a whole can become void and null, no matter what the salvatorian clause said. It cannot overcome some burdens and there are regularly courts (I know this for Germany) voiding contracts due to such serious deficiencies. Notes BGB is the German "Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch", an english translation exists §139 says "If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part." Example: a sale lacking any payment is not a sale (which starts a legally required warranty) $140 says "If a void legal transaction fulfils the requirements of another legal transaction, then the latter is deemed to have been entered into, if it may be assumed that its validity would be intended if there were knowledge of the invalidity." Example: a sale lacking any payment can be interpreted as a gift if the intent was to do so (and does not grant warranty) DCFR is the EU Draft Common Frame of Reference, so the above rules are to be found in the document as follows II.–7:302: Contracts infringing mandatory rules - p. 565. Paraphrased: "if a clause in a contract violates a law, substitute the law for it, courts shall decide if that alters or voids the contract. They may fix contracts to cure them." II.–7:303: Effects of nullity or avoidance - p. 574. Paraphrased: "void contract (parts) can constitute unjustified enrichment, transfer of items might not have happened, courts may fix contracts to cure." From the DCFR document one can read what happens in absence of a Salvatorian clause, especially for UK law. II.–7:302: I. Contracts contrary to law 1 All European systems deal with contracts which contravene some rule of law, as opposed to contracts which are contrary to fundamental principles of morality or public policy. 5 In ENGLISH, IRISH and SCOTTISH law the standard texts all include chapter headings such as “Illegality”, or “Statutory Invalidity”. See further Enonchong, McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 19.28-19.36, and, for the confused development of Scottish law, Macgregor in Reid & Zimmermann vol. II, chap. 5. II. Effects of infringement 8 The general starting point in most European legal systems is that contracts violating legal rules are void. There is often, however, considerable flexibility in the law. 14 In ENGLISH and SCOTTISH law, while an illegal contract may be void, it is more often presented as “unenforceable”, in that neither specific performance nor damages are available to the parties. Thus a party may withdraw from an illegal contract with impunity. Courts will take notice of illegality of their own motion and dismiss actions accordingly (Chitty on Contracts I27, no. 16-199; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland, § 7.15; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.17-19.27).). Again, however, there is flexibility in the law on contracts infringing statutory provisions. There are several cases in which the courts have considered whether giving effect to the statute requires the nullity of the contract as a supporting sanction (see e.g. St John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 267; Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. v. S Spangletts Ltd. [1961] 2 QB 374, CA). English law is currently under review by the Law Commission: see its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions. The Commission’s provisional proposals were to the effect that courts should have the discretion to decide whether or not illegality should act as a defence to a claim for contractual enforcement. But the discretion should be structured by requiring the court to take account of specific factors: (1) the seriousness of the illegality involved; (2) the knowledge and intention of the party seeking enforcement; (3) whether denying relief will act as a deterrent; (4) whether denial of relief will further the purpose of the rule rendering the contract illegal; and (5) whether denying relief is proportionate to the illegality involved. II.–7:303: Notes 5 In ENGLISH law the general rule is against restitution but it is possible in exceptional cases where the claimant is not in pari delicto with the recipient, or the transaction has not been completely executed, or if the claim can be formulated without reference to the prohibited contract (Treitel, The Law of Contract9 , 490-504). IRISH law is similar (Clark 314-19), and so is SCOTTISH law (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol. 15, paras. 764-765), although in one Scottish case where, by statute, contracts using old Scottish measures were void, restitutionary recovery was allowed in respect of a sale of potatoes by the Scottish acre, on the ground that there was no moral turpitude in such a transaction (Cuthbertson v. Lowes (1870) 8 M 1073; see further Macgregor, (2000) 4 ELR 19-45; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.22-19.26). The English Law Commission in its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions suggested that a court should have discretion to decide whether or not illegality should be recognised as a defence to a claim for restitution, various factors being taken into account. In addition the court should have a discretion to allow a party to withdraw from an illegal contract and to have restitution where this will reduce the likelihood of the completion of an illegal act or purpose, although it must be satisfied that the contract could not be enforced against the claimant, that there is genuine repentance of the illegality, and that it is not too serious. | The simple way is to post a picture of you and the widget to a site like Flickr. A more expensive way (but with rather more weight) is to get a Notary to certify they saw you and the widget on January 9th. Both the above provide evidence you had access to the widget before January 10th, but neither prove you owned it. For that, you would need a dated (possibly even notarized) bill of sale or similar - but if you acquired the widget via a gift, that won't work. A signed witness statement from the giver would probably serve (and the statement could legitimately be created when you are prosecuted). None of the above are unforgeable - but you don't need that. Depending on how the law is written, you will only need to show ownership on the balance of probabilities, or you might only need to show reasonable doubt that you didn't own it on 9th January. | I very much suspect she is in right to 1) no receive promotion emails anymore, 2) Have them close the account again and 3) have them delete her pictures. No, she does not have those rights. She agreed to a legally binding contract when she signed up for the service when she clicked "OK" to open the account. That contract outlines her "rights," as you call them, and they can be very different from what you assume to be ethical and moral bounds to a business relationship. What you imagine to be fair business practices could be generally regarded as fair and normal consumer relations; but that's not necessarily what may be in the contract. What she agreed to in the Terms of Service (TOS) could be some form of long term licensing of her photos to the service, and that could be why they won't delete the photos and why she can't delete them in bulk. The TOS states the terms of the promo emails she agreed to receive. Read the TOS; everything will be outlined. The company is in no way obligated to make life easy for her or change the contract to appeal to her; she agreed to everything, including downloading all her photos. If she didn't read the TOS and feels they copied all her photos "without her knowing", that's her fault. It's possible that the company is breaking consumer protection laws with some of their practices, but you'll need to read Canada consumer laws and see if they require ease of use, permanent op-out of emails, etc. I doubt the company would be flagrantly violating consumer law. | No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false. |
Projectors, White Boards & Electronic devices in judicial courts Are projectors, white boards and other electronic devices viz monitor screens, laptops,scanners, recording and playback devices etc. available or allowed in courts? As a example, the lawyer of either the plaintiff or defendant would like to present using a projector and display screen clipings, transcripts, laptop etc. as part of evidences, proofs. Is this allowed in the high courts and Supreme Courts? | These questions are typically left to the discretion of the judge in whose courtroom the presentation is happening. It is very common to see these types of devices in trial courts, but they are much less common in appellate courts, and I doubt you'd ever see one in the United States Supreme Court, where the arguments are essentially limited to oral presentations. | tl;dr there is at least one instance of a disorderly conduct charge for watching pornography in a public library. I bring you the story of STATE OF WISCONSIN v DAVID J. REIDINGER. From the most recent (January 2016) appeals court decision: David Reidinger was found to have violated WIS. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 18.11(2), which prohibits disorderly conduct in University of Wisconsin System buildings or on university lands. The evidence at trial established that others witnessed Reidinger viewing pornography in a public library on the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire (UWEC) campus. On appeal, Reidinger argues he has a First Amendment right to view legal adult pornographic material at a public library. Reidinger also vaguely alludes to a conspiracy between numerous public officers and employees to harass him. We reject these arguments and affirm. Background Following a bench trial, Reidinger was found to have violated WIS. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 18.11(2) and was fined $295. Shannon Riley, a student supervisor at the McIntyre Library on the UWEC campus, testified she received a complaint from a student at 10:40 p.m. on December 14, 2014. The complaining student testified that she and her roommate were working on homework at the library when they noticed Reidinger watching pornographic material on the computer next to them. Two university police officers, Edward Lancour and Amanda Henry, responded to the complaint. Lancour and Henry met with the complaining students, who showed the officers a picture they had taken of Reidinger’s computer screen that showed open pornographic images. Lancour then personally observed Reidinger watching pornographic material on the computer for approximately thirty seconds before asking him to close the browser and move with him to a library stairwell to discuss the matter. Lancour testified he told Reidinger his watching pornography was causing a disturbance, to which Reidinger responded that he had a constitutional right to view pornographic material at a public library. Lancour then told him they had received several complaints, and witnesses had stated that Reidinger viewing pornography at that location made them feel uncomfortable. Reidinger was issued a citation for disorderly conduct under WIS. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 18.11(2) the following day. I am actually mildly surprised by this decision, because United States v. American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) seems to indicate that the ability of adult users of a public library to disable Internet filters in order to view lawful content is constitutionally critical to the question of whether such filters are allowed, as stated in a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy: If, on the request of an adult user, a librarian will unblock filtered material or disable the Internet software filter without significant delay, there is little to this case. Specifically, as stated in the dissenting opinion on Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg'l Library Dist., 2010: "Even accepting for the moment that these libraries are not a limited public forum, eight justices found the ability of a patron to disable the filter constitutionally critical." Thus there are many reports of libraries refusing to stop adult patrons from viewing pornography on these grounds: Seattle libraries: No sleeping or eating allowed, but porn-watching OK Is Web Surfing For Porn At The Public Library Legal? City libraries say ‘checking out’ porn protected by First Amendment Public library okays porn viewing despite parent complaint However, a Washington State Supreme Court decision (Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg'l Library Dist., 2010) found that public libraries do not have to disable Internet filters by request of an adult user. (Note: I also posted this answer on Academia.SE) | Question 1: Some of the more recent questions from December 2016 on this on Avvo.com replying to a question on Los Angeles Small Claims courts: "[T]he likelihood of any small claims judge in LA awarding them to you is slim." And another answer: "Yes you can if the claim is $10K or less." Another California lawyer on Avvo in 2013 replying to a San Francisco, CA question: "I have seen cases where punitive damages have been awarded in small claims court. You can always request and try to offer evidence that you feel warrants such a finding" (one additional lawyer agrees) And another licensed in California to the same question: "Punitive damages are available in Small Claims [but] if you do not ask for it, it cannot be awarded." Another one from 2010 to another question: "You can, up to a maximum claim of $7,500. Punitive damages are based on the net wealth of the defendant, so normally litigants don't request any amount, since the amount depends on the defendant's financial disclosures." Question 2: In Indiana: "If punitive damages are awarded, the TOTAL of all monetary damages CANNOT exceed the Small Claims Court's jurisdictional MAXIMUM award" According to another attorney in California from March, 2019: "You can sue for up to $10,000.00 in small claims, and pray for punitive damages up to that amount." So, attorneys in California seem to agree that punitive damages may be awarded in Small Claims court in California if: You ask for punitive damages, and ask for them timely up to no more than the jurisdictional limit, and probably without stating an exact amount; Serve the claim as required for the court on the other party; If you can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct was despicable, fraudulent, oppressive malicious or outrageous; If you can prove the net worth of the defendant which could warrant the award. | A "night court" is simply a court that operates outside the ordinary business hours for the convenience of people who have work during those hours. They aren't common and are mostly found in medium sized and large cities. A "night court" can do whatever judges in the jurisdiction decide should be offered at that time based upon the needs of people who deal with the court system. Small claims civil cases and protection order cases, for example, are also often handled in a night court format, and a variety of criminal law matters not requiring a jury trial could be handled in that format. Most cities have a judge or magistrate assigned to take arraignments, not always at night (often the position is rotated among judges in the jurisdiction every now and then), which, as the question notes, "should serve to read the charges, set bail and potentially record a plea, but defer the rest of the process (discovery, pre-trials, depos, trial, and eventual sentencing) to later appearances." An arraignment court would often accept guilty pleas, and sentence people when they plead guilty to infractions, petty offenses, and misdemeanors. It would also often dismiss charges when the prosecutor decides that the case has no merit and decides not to pursue it. It would rarely enter not guilty pleas on the merits, but the court in the television show might not be a pure arraignment court. But, as my knowledge of television comedies is less expansive than my knowledge of the law, I can't tell you if this is "an accurate portrayal of a Night Court, or purely a device for fictional purposes." I'm sure that the TV version has wittier dialog, more interesting lawyers and court personnel, and less boringly repetitive cases than real life, but I'd have to defer to someone who has ever watched more than the trailers of the show to comment further. | One wouldn't be able to make a claim about a driving record without it being testimony. Testimony will be challenged during cross examination. The prosecutor won't be able to bring up prior bad acts (such as previous speeding tickets) but will most certainly be allowed to rebut any claim of no prior bad acts made by a defendant. When the defendant claims a spotless driving record the defendant is introducing character or a character trait into the trial. Once introduced by the defendant the prosecutor will be allowed to challenge the credibility of that statement and, therefore, the credibility of the witness. Imagine the following interaction: Defendant: I have a spotless driving record. Prosecutor: Are you saying you've never been issued a traffic ticket? Defendant: Um, Uh, well... When a defendant goes to court they are facing a specific charge. The prosecutor will present evidence that supports that charge and it is up to the defendant and his attorneys to sow reasonable doubt within the jury, or at least one juror. By presenting character, the defendant may appear to be saying either, "Hey, it was my first time let me off," or, "I've never done it before so I couldn't have done it this time." Either way, it probably won't create reasonable doubt in the juror's mind about the specific charge they're weighing and it has the potential to open a can of worms that would be unfavorable to the defendant. | In brief: In common law systems, are there specific laws? Yes. Are they written down? Yes, here are the laws of Australia and New Zealand. Or are there only previous court rulings? No. Elaboration: Broadly (and rather vaguely) speaking there are 3 sources of law in a common law jurisdiction: Statute law which consists of the Acts passed by the legislature Administrative law which consists of the rules and regulations made by the administrative arm of government under the powers granted them by the constitution or delegated by the legislature Case law which consists of the decisions made by the courts; this can be decisions based on Long-standing precedents whose origins are lost in the mists of time Interpretations of statute and administrative law It is important to remember that the courts only get involved to resolve conflicts (civil or criminal) - they do not unilaterally make decisions on the law. Judges (if they are wise) never give opinions on the law - that is the role of solicitors and barristers who are the paid advocates of the parties. The role of a judge is to decide how the law fits the circumstances of the particular case before them. To do this they interpret the statutes, administrative rules and decisions made by other judges on similar cases. The decision of a superior court is binding on a subordinate court, persuasive on an equivalent court or a court in a parallel jurisdiction and subject to review by a superior court. The overwhelming majority of cases do not make new case law - most of the arguments in court are about why (or why not) the established law applies to the current facts; they are not about what the law is. Occasionally a decision will be made that modifies the previous interpretation or even more rarely represents a paradigm shift - those are the cases that matter! | Judges don't have timesheet entries (and are often expressly excluded from FOIA obligations). They get paid salaries and are expected to work hard enough to clear their dockets in reasonable periods of time, however long that takes. If you wanted a more direct evidentiary estimate, you could estimate that a judge and his clerk together probably work 90-120 hours a week, figure out how many trials and hearings of what length were conducted and deduct that time spent on that from the total, and then divide the remaining hours by the number of opinions one can estimate that the judge wrote (or better yet, a reasonable estimate of the number of pages of opinions that one can estimate that the judge wrote). Typically, a lot of the legal research grunt work and more boilerplate parts of an opinion are written by the law clerk under some general instructions from the judge, with the judge writing the more substantive sections personally and heavily (or lightly, depending upon the quality of the law clerk) revising the draft opinion as a whole. The longer the opinion, the more likely it is that a substantial portion of it was written by the law clerk. For similar kinds of legal writing (e.g. appellate briefs and motions for summary judgment and proposed orders or written closing arguments) one to six hours per page from all professionals working on the document would be in the right ballpark. Judicial opinions come with some efficiencies, because once a judge decides a point of law or reaches a factual conclusion it doesn't have to be belabored in the same way that a litigant who isn't sure if their reasoning will be persuasive or not must. But, judicial opinions also typically have to spell out a greater proportion of legal and factual foundation for the end analysis that isn't hotly contested, will summarize all of the material points from the evidence presented in the case, and will frequently also recap in some detail the arguments made by the advocates for both sides of the case before actually engaging with those arguments in an analysis section. On balance, those factors probably pretty much balance out. If the judicial opinion is shorter, elegantly written, contains pithy turns of phrase, and/or contains lots of legal citations or factual analysis not raised by either party, it is probably closer to five or six hours per page or more. If the opinion is longer, has a rote and mechanical feel to it, and has very little factual analysis or references to law not mentioned by the parties, it is probably closer to one hour per page or even less. When some of these factors go one way, and other of these factors go the other way, it is probably in between in terms of hours per page. This said, sometimes it takes a judge a long time to write an opinion, but the end product is very short and elegant. In these situations, often what happened is that the judge and the judge's clerk spent lots and lots of hours writing a long and detailed first draft, then got an insight that provided a much more efficient and succinct way to reach a resolution to the case. In those circumstances, there would be dozens or scores of hours of work that went into the discarded first draft, only to be superseded by a half a dozen or dozen hours devoted to a much shorter final draft. In those cases, the final draft of the opinion might be ten or twenty hours per page or more once you include the time spent on the discarded draft. Of course, another factor is that some judges are just more efficient legal writers than others, and some judges have more familiarity with some areas of law than others. A opinion that might take one judge twenty hours to write might take another judge presiding over the very same case and producing an opinion of the same length and quality a hundred hours to write. The opinion in Meads v. Meads was 176 pages. If I had to make a best guess, I'd estimate that it probably took about 600 hours to write, probably about two-thirds of which was law clerk hours and probably about one-third of which was judge time. | In general, court hearings are held in public; and anyone is free to make a fair and balanced report of the proceedings. It is important that justice is seen to be done. However, in some circumstances that is not true—the obvious example is if a child is involved. It is not sufficient though merely that "[the claimant] wants to keep his/her identity confidential". Have a look at the Civil Procedure Rules (part 39): 39.2 General rule – hearing to be in public The general rule is that a hearing [including a trial] is to be in public. ... A hearing, or any part of it, may be in private if – (a) publicity would defeat the object of the hearing; (b) it involves matters relating to national security; (c) it involves confidential information (including information relating to personal financial matters) and publicity would damage that confidentiality; (d) a private hearing is necessary to protect the interests of any child or protected party; (e) it is a hearing of an application made without notice and it would be unjust to any respondent for there to be a public hearing; (f) it involves uncontentious matters arising in the administration of trusts or in the administration of a deceased person’s estate; or (g) the court considers this to be necessary, in the interests of justice. The court may order that the identity of any party or witness must not be disclosed if it considers non-disclosure necessary in order to protect the interests of that party or witness. https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part39#39.2 If you can satisfy the court that one of (a) to (g) apply, the court may make an order anonymizing proceedings (for instance, you would only be referred to as "AB" in reports and judgements) or it might hold the hearing in camera (in private). However the other party may well wish to oppose your application. Indeed, even a newspaper hearing of your case but unable to report it is entitled to object: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/1.html (In re Guardian News) Conclusion In these circumstances, when carrying out the ultimate test of balancing all the factors relating to both M's article 8 rights and the article 10 rights of the press, we have come to the conclusion that there is indeed a powerful general, public interest in identifying M in any report of these important proceedings which justifies curtailment, to that extent, of his, and his family's, article 8 Convention rights to respect for their private and family life. For all these reasons, we would set aside the anonymity order in respect of M. ... Therefore, A, K, M and HAY will be named here and in the judgments on the substantive appeals, as Mr Mohammed Jabar Ahmed, Mr Mohammed Azmir Khan, Mr Michael Marteen (formerly known as Mohammed Tunveer Ahmed) and Mr Hani El Sayed Sabaei Youssef (or Hani al-Seba'i), respectively. |
Is there a contract, or was this offer not accepted? Mr E orders a cake for his wife's birthday at a bakery on his street. On the bakery's window, a sign is up that says, 'Today's special offer! Any customised cake for £50!' Mr E orders a customised cake for £50 at 1 p.m., and he is told by the baker that he will complete his order by around 3:30 p.m., and that he should pay the cost when he returns. Mr E is given a ticket with the approximate time and his order, and he is instructed to bring this ticket with him when he returns to collect his order; Mr E takes the ticket back home with him. After Mr E leaves with his ticket, the baker begins making Mr E's order. At 3:20 p.m. on that same day, Mr E's friend contacts him and shows him a picture of a cake for £45. He thinks it is vastly superior to his order. So, at 3:30 p.m., Mr E calls up the baker, and the baker has prepared his order and is now waiting for him to come and collect it. But Mr E, over the phone, says he will not pay and that he doesn’t want the cake anymore. The baker claims that Mr E verbally entered into the contract at the bakery earlier that day, after Mr E made his order and received the ticket, which was before the baker began making his order. Mr E disagrees. Is Mr E in breach of contract? | The contract was made the moment Mr. E asked for the cake, the baker agreed to make it, and (while or shortly before) the baker created a receipt ("ticket") at around 1 PM. The receipt is the evidence of what was agreed upon and likely contained the descriptor and the estimated finish time of the cake as well as the price1. This means that the contract is not just oral, it is evidenced in writing, though not a written contract. The contract stipulated: Mr. E will, at 3:30 PM, pay £50 to the baker as specified on the receipt. The Baker will, at 3:30 PM, give a custom cake to Mr. E as described on the receipt. The contract is enforceable, so even if Mr. E does no longer want the cake, it is his (to dispose of in any way he wants) and he owes the baker £50. So if Mr. E does not pay, he is in breach of contract. 1 - The contract was formed by the meeting of the minds the moment both agreed on the price and service. This can be during or while putting it in writing on the ticket, which merely is the evidence of it, or shortly after said formation as JBentley does note. It is not material that neither party did sign: Mr. E got a copy of the ticket and the baker got a copy (so they know what to make) | I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly. | I did the Googling: Prior to the case described in this article, a notice was to be deemed served if the sender can sufficiently prove that the letter was properly addressed, pre-paid and posted. Law - Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 The case made it clear that the same law also sets a condition, where if the letter was not received at said mailbox, or too late received, the notice is to be deemed not served. The receiver is not required to prove that the letter has not arrived in the mailbox. Also, if your mail has been tampered with, you should contact Royal Mail - they will perform an investigation and put your mailbox in order. I work with tenants and landlords, thus lots of official notices. In this practice, it's often a recommended action to follow up on a notice and make sure the receiver has indeed received and acknowledged the notice. I don't know if it's a legal requirement, but often in disputes (which go to arbitration by a 3rd party), if one party states they did not receive the notice and the other party can't sufficiently prove that they did everything in their power to contact and confirm the delivery of the notice, the notice is regarded as not served. I believe you cannot deny post. If it's in your mailbox, it's your responsibility to check and read it. | Written Contract If there was a written contract, the fact that it wasn't signed is not relevant. While a signature is evidence of agreement with the terms there are other ways that acceptance can be indicated: like you paying them $600. Wrong Information Where the error is fundamental to the performance - e.g. you needed shipment to Alaska and they were offering shipment to Alabama, the contract would be void ab initio. That is, it never happened and everyone needs to be returned to their original positions as far as possible. However, in general, an error by one or the other party in their understanding of what was agreed does not invalidate the contract. For example, if you told them it was a "small" dog because it was small for a Great Dane but under an objective classification, it is, in fact, a "large" dog the contract must be completed and either you or they wear the additional cost of doing so. Whether they are entitled to ask for additional payment "due to some wrong information" depends on who took the risk under the contract for its correctness? Barring a specific term, the risk usually lies with the party that provided the "wrong information" but some contract will assign the risk for one party's errors to the other party - subject to a requirement to act in good faith. If they are not entitled to additional payment, they have to perform the contract for the original fee. If they are entitled, then you have to pay a reasonable price increase - you are not generally entitled to cancel. All of this turns on the specific terms of the contract and the exact nature of the "wrong information". Consumer Protection Law CPL in your state or their state or both will almost certainly have something to say about this beyond common law rules of contract. | Depends on where you are, and likely also on what they knew when. It is entirely normal to order some goods (like perishable food, or custom-fitted furniture) before it is produced. The contract may or may not include advance payment. Most jurisdictions require some sort of intent for fraud, so the non-fulfillment would not be fraud if circumstances beyond the control of the supplier prevent delivery. The question of civil damages and repayment is distinct from criminal fraud charges. | Is there any sort of implied expiration date for a contractor's completion for medium size contractor jobs (< $10k)? Absent a provable deadline, the question would be whether the delay is reasonable (or habitual) under the circumstances. The contractor's presumption that he can do whatever he wants regarding unspecified aspects of a contract is inaccurate. Those matters can still be decided on the basis of contract law and/or under principles of equity. See also the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which is frequently cited by U.S. courts, at §235(2) and §243 regarding non-performance of a contract. Will my verbal complete-by date hold up in lieu of any written complete-by date? It depends on each party's credibility. Proving that he essentially ignored your follow-up requests will make it harder for him to credibly refute your assertion about the verbal deadline. In case none of your follow-up efforts (or none of his responses) are in writing or if he denies that you repeatedly called him, you might want to subpoena his phone service provider --if the matter goes to court-- and file as evidence the resulting production of records. | As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine. | In General Generally speaking, applying common law principles, no. In the case of a relative or friend or neighbor or someone like that, doing a favor for a business does not create a legally enforceable right against a business or business owner. Contract Claims The question assumes that there is not true express contract, or even really a contract to pay compensation in some amount or by reference to some schedule of rates, that was implied in fact. Unjust Enrichment Claims One can still recover for service or benefit rendered under a claim of "unjust enrichment" in the absence of a contract. But, in contexts applicable here (also called "quantum meruit") there must be an expectation of payment communicated in a way clear to an objective observer of the situation to recover, as opposed to a gratuitous provision of service. One classic case of unjust enrichment is when someone paints your house by accident, when they are actually under contract to paint your next door neighbor's house, and you know that they made the mistake but allow them to go forward expecting to be paid anyway. Another classic case is one where services must be provided by a doctor or repairman or lawyer on an emergency basis and everyone knows that they were hired with an intent that you pay them, but the price could not be agreed upon because it was urgent to do the work immediately before working out the details of a contract to provide services. In these circumstances, the service provider is entitled to payment of the fair value of the services provided despite the lack of an express agreement regarding the amount. In this example, however, there is not a clear expectation of payment that an objective outside observer would have been able to discern at that time the services were provided, so by default, the help provided was gratuitous, and not enforceable legally. Special Considerations For Spouses This general analysis also applies to a spouse, but not quite so strictly. While the spouse couldn't sue for compensation or having a legally enforceable right to compensation, the extent of the help provided would be one factor among many that could be considered in determining an equitable division of property (in states that are not community property states) and an appropriate and equitable amount of alimony in states that do not have a fixed formula for determining this amount. De minimis assistance would "come with the territory" and be part of a spouse's general right to an equitable division of property under a partnership theory of marriage. But, more extreme labors not compensated in money during the marriage, such as personally building a barn on a farm, or working full time in a spouse's business for a prolonged time period without express money compensation, might have a value assigned to it that is considered in balancing each side's share in an equitable division, if one spouse is reaping the benefit of the other spouse's unpaid labor by receiving, for example, a working farm or business. Similarly, in a fraudulent transfer case, it is possible that a payment to a spouse for extreme labors in the past of this kind would have a status similar to a payment for a pre-existing and not substantially contemporaneous debt. A spouse would be an insider. But, the transfer for no contemporaneous consideration might be considered safe from a fraudulent transfer attack after one year rather than the usual four year statute of limitations on fraudulent transfers. Concluding Observation: Questions Of Proof. Of course, all of this would be based when litigated on oral discussions and context limited by people's memories. This might make proof of a claim like this on the merits hard to win on at trial. But, it also makes disproving a claim prior to trial, when what happened is disputed, difficult. Caveat For Intellectual Property Claims I do not address the issue raised by a comment of designing a logo which raises legal issues specific to who owns intellectual property. Sometimes the person who comes up with an idea is the default owner of the intellectual property rights associated with that idea, unless there is a written agreement to the contrary. This default rule usually applies even if the intellectual property was created with the intent that it be used by someone else. |
Does indecent exposure require intentionality? Meet Bob. Bob went out on the town wearing boxer shorts which in itself is entirely legal. A security guard pointed out to Bob that his shorts were unbuttoned so Bob buttoned them up. They later accused Bob of having his genitals hanging visibly out the front at one point which, even if truthful, he certainly was not aware of and did not intend. If this was true, then what offences might Bob have been committing, and would they have required his self exposure to be intentional? England and Wales specified, other jurisdictions always welcome. | Yes, and also there needs to be intent to cause alarm or distress. See section 66 Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1)A person commits an offence if— (a)he intentionally exposes his genitals, and (b)he intends that someone will see them and be caused alarm or distress. (2)A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable— (a)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both; (b)on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years. For clarity, although the above legislation uses the masculine subject pronoun "he", this offence may be committed by a female also. See section 6(a) Interpretation Act 1978: [...] (a)words importing the masculine gender include the feminine; [...] | An example of where this is not allowed is Seattle, WA. Municipal code SMC 12A.06.025 states It is unlawful for any person to intentionally fight with another person in a public place and thereby create a substantial risk of: Injury to a person who is not actively participating in the fight; or Damage to the property of a person who is not actively participating in the fight. B. In any prosecution under subsection A of this Section 12A.06.025, it is an affirmative defense that: The fight was duly licensed or authorized by law; or The person was acting in self-defense. You can see from adjacent sections that "mutual combat" is not legal. I recognize that there is this meme about Seattle, but this is a distortion of an incident when the police turned a blind eye to a fight. We have police issues, no doubt: there is nothing legal about such fights. Of course, for a licensed event, you can "fight". Of course the potential legality depends on how mutual combat is defined. Illinois v. Austin 133 Ill.2d 118 and citations therein, subsequently Illinois v. Thompson, 821 NE 2d 664 define it thus: Mutual combat is a fight or struggle which both parties enter willingly or where two persons, upon a sudden quarrel and in hot blood, mutually fight upon equal terms and where death results from the combat. Similar death-definitions are found in Donaldson v. State, 289 SE 2d 242, Iowa v. Spates, 779 NW 2d 770. The law looks askance of such behavior. For the sake of clarity, a term other than "mutual combat" would be preferable. | An assault is carried out by a threat of bodily harm coupled with an apparent, present ability to cause the harm. There is no need for physical contact in an assault, all that is needed is the threat and the apparent, present ability. The drill sergeant was behaving in a threatening manner and had an apparent, present ability to cause harm; he was guilty of assault. Consensually engaging in a legal contact sport lacks the threat of bodily harm; that is to say that the bodily harm is a risk of the sport but it is not the object of it. Of course, an illegal sport where death or maiming is an inherent part would leave the participants open to assault (and battery) charges - you cannot agree to do illegal things. What is necessary to constitute the threat and the apparent means depends on the whole of the circumstances. A person throwing water when they had threatened the victim with acid is most certainly assault. Pointing a replica pistol at someone who doesn't know it is a replica constituted the threat and apparent means in one action. | General Question Having an intention is never enough for punishments (both Strafe and Bußgeld) of the German state. But having an intention and be right at the start of doing the offense (details are complicated) is sometimes punished as an attempt of the offense (Versuch). This is defined in § 13 Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (Act on Regulatory Offences). § 13 OWiG (= §§ 22-24 Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code)) (1) Whoever, in accordance with his understanding of the act, takes a direct step towards the realisation of the factual elements of the offence, shall be deemed to have attempted a regulatory offence. (2) The attempt may be sanctioned only if expressly provided by law. (3) If the perpetrator voluntarily renounces further execution of the act or prevents its completion, he shall not be sanctioned for attempt. If the act will not be completed without the contribution of the abandoning party, his voluntary and earnest efforts to prevent its completion shall be sufficient. (4) If more than one person participates in the act, the one who voluntarily prevents its completion shall not be sanctioned for an attempt. However, his voluntary and earnest efforts to prevent the completion of the act shall suffice if the act is not completed without his contribution or is committed independently of his earlier participation. If you started the offense but stopped, so you don't fulfill offense, you don't get sanctioned, if you stopped voluntarily (freiwillig), § 13 III OWiG. (The details are more complicated.) This may be the case in your example, but beeing seen by a police officer is no reason for Freiwilligkeit. So you may have attempted the offence. But an attempted offence gets only sanctioned if this is expressly provided by law, § 13 II OWiG. This is provided for no traffic violation. (But for some of the Straftaten in context of traffic, e.g. § 315b StGB Dangerous disruption of road traffic.) So the answer to your question is a clear: No Specific aspects of your case I have searched the norms for your case, a red light offence for cyclist: § 37 II Nr. 1, Nr. 2, Nr. 6 Straßenverkehrsordnung: the rules for traffic light § 49 III Nr. 2 StVO: declaring violations of § 37 StVO as regulatory offences (legal basis: § 24 I Straßenverkehrsgesetz) Nr. 132a Anlage 1 Bußgeldkatalog-Verordnung: sets 60 € fine for red ligth violations of cyclists (legal basis: § 1 I BKatV) Nr. 132a Anlage 1 BKatV: sets 100 € fine for red ligth violations of cyclists after at least one second Nr. 3.2.19 Anlage 13 Fahrerlaubnis-Verordnung: sets fine of one point in Fahreignungsregister (driving ability register) for these offences (legal basis: § 40 FeV) In none of these laws a sanction for attempt is defined. I'm not sure what you did after getting of your bike, you migth have violated the red ligth walking. For this you can get a 5 € fine (Nr. 130 Anlage 1 BKatV), strictly speaking not a Bußgeld (fine), but only a Verwarnungsgeld (warning fine). But the competent authority can but doesn't have to sanction the offence, § 47 I OWiG. So the officer just didn't gave you the warning and thought it is OK. | There are various tangential ways in which this could be illegal, for example if your subjects are celebrities, you take a picture of them and commercially exploit it without permission in a product endorsement. Leaving aside such fringe cases, in the US, the legal right to privacy comes about, at the first cut, by premise trespass law. If the proprietor tells you to go away, you have to go away; if the proprietor tells you that you cannot take pictures, you cannot take pictures (your right to enter is conditional). Neither of those circumstances holds in your case. There are other tort-law bases for a right to privacy: numerous privacy laws regarding privacy and financial transactions (not relevant here), the aforementioned right of publicity (commercial exploitation of likeness), false light (like defamation, about creating a false impression – I don't see what false information is conveyed by a photo). There is also public disclosure of private fact, but that cat is out of the bag because the subject has self-disclosed the supposedly offensive fact revealed by the picture by eating in public. Intrusion of solitude and seclusion does not exist in the circumstance, since the subject is eating in public where everybody can see: there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. This page sums us Virginia law. The main take-away from that is that there is no common law action for privacy in Virginia, and only an action for unauthorized used of likeness or name. | Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing. | No, but... It is not an offense to photograph people, especially if they are just caught at the edge or out of the center of the photography. However you do not have a right to photograph people either. In fact, under German law, you have to gain the consent of people that are the centerpiece of a photo for publication, or make the photo for a number of enumerated reasons. Among such is news reporting or documenting an ongoing crime - such material is made in the public interest. If you make a photo without consent or qualified reason, possession of the photo in general is no problem but you have no right to publish the photo. To prevent such publication, the photographed person may demand deletion or destruction of the photo - however, following the demand is not explicitly required. Such a demand however is equivalent to an explicit demand to not publish the picture. As such, it gets really tricky for the photographer. Publication without a release (or a no-release statement) or one of the few excusing reasons is a punishable offense, which can land you in prison for up to one year. This stems from Art. 2 GG, §22, §23 and §33 Kunsturhebergesetz. Hindering rescue services with your camera and creating photos of injured and vulnerable people is illegal under the same reasoning. Getting into the way of the police can constitute obstruction of emergency helpers atop of that. More on that specific part of German law can be learned in this question. Do note that such photography can also be a crime under §201a StGB, especially if your photography shows someone as vulnerable. Another possibility for the approaching police might have been, that the policeman was interested to find out if you might have photographed or filmed the incident that led to the arrest. In that case, he might have requested a copy for evidentiary reasons. | There are no small sexual assaults Indecent assault/sexual assault/sexual touching Different jurisdictions have different definitions but, wherever you are, the behavior you describe is a criminal offense and the appropriate course of action is to report it to both your employer and the police. The fact that the perpetrator is under the professional care of the victim does not change this although, if the positions were reversed, this would be an aggravating factor. That is, assuming you are willing to make a statement to the police and, ultimately, testify before a court. It may not come to that - the police may not press charges. You can also civilly sue for the damage you have suffered. Work Health and Safety Your employer has an obligation to provide a reasonably safe workplace. If this is a not uncommon occurrence then they should have analyzed the risk and determined appropriate mitigation strategies and trained you in these. Have they? |
I am 16. Can my parents legally transfer my money I have earned from my own job to their account and take it? I am a 16 year old, who got their first job at 14ish, and ever since have had my own debit card with my own name on it, and all the money I have earned from work, gifts, etc. have been on there. I have direct deposit pay checks, and I save most of it for a car I want in the future. I feel I am reasonable with my money and I understand the importance of saving it. I have had no issues whatsoever with it. My parents decided both to take my debit card away and to transfer all my 5k into their account and not give it back to me. I have fought this, but there isn't much I can do. I am looking into this on the legal side of things, and I'm wondering if this is legal or not in the United States, for a parent to simply take away all the money their child has earned by their own work. | You must confirm with your banking institution that the account you have with them is solely in your name. There is a very good chance that it is not, which would mean that the account is joint-owned until you reach 18 years old. Ownership of an account implies that one can deposit and withdraw money at will, with no need to justify or rationalize the action. There could be other implications to be had around them just taking the money and not giving it back, but it starts with confirming that the bank account is, as you state, yours and yours alone. | At the federal level, gift cards seem to be treated as a special case of electronic fund transfer. 15 U.S. Code § 1693l–1 and the corresponding regulations presently regulate disclosure of fees and expiration, and do not directly say anything about sale of such a card. There might be relevant state laws, though Washington state laws mostly mirror the federal law (also allowing issuing a card with an expiration date if given for no value to a charitable organization). You can actually get your last $5 back in cash in Washington per RCW 19.240.020. A gift card / certificate isn't a "thing" in the way that an apple, hammer or table is, it's a contractual relationship. If you own a thing, you can freely re-sell it to whoever you want (assuming there isn't an express statutory prohibition against the sale of the thing). You cannot universally sell (assign) a contract right – there is a default preference that you should be able to, but Amazon has in this case said "No, you can't". | Both of your question are creatures of contract. Their disclosures when you set up the account (or potentially amended disclosures or terms they've mailed to you subsequently) control both of these questions. They don't have to share the results of their internal investigation against you (they do have to give you proof that the deposit/transfer was fraudulent), but that does not give you access to their internal investigative process or its findings. They cannot shut down your account based on protected reasons (race, class, gender, religion, etc.), but the can certainly close an account pursuant to their operating procedures, their rules, terms and conditions or disclosures - all of which you agreed to (implicitly or explicitly) when opening the account. There is likely nothing you can do about either of these issues, unless the contract you formed with them by opening the account gives you that right, which would appear in their terms of service, disclosures, etc., and these almost always protect their right to do most anything when it comes to protecting the overall best interest of the corporate entity. | While it is true that cash is legal tender, this can still be overridden by mutual agreement (i.e. in a contract). So the legal tender status only matters if payment methods were not agreed upon before entering into an agreement. In other words: If a restaurant lets you eat without telling you they do not accept cash, they will have to accept cash. However, if they explicitly tell you they only accept card payments, they can insist on this later. This applies in both the United States, in Germany, and in Canada (see e.g. It may be legal tender, but more businesses are snubbing cash). So to address your points: As I understand the legality would work something like this: 1) I accept the the contract where I agree to pay with card in exchange for food Yes - however, in accepting the contract you also accept that the restaurant is "cashless" (assuming the restaurant clearly tells you so, e.g. by putting up a sign or by saying it in person). I attempt to fulfill the contract to the best of my ability, but am prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond my control Yes. Since you attempted to fulfill the contract, you did not commit the crime of theft (which requires intention not to pay). However, you still owe what you promised when entering into the agreement, which is to pay with a card. At this point I owe the restaurant the money, but since the original transaction failed, this is a debt, which I offer to settle with legal tender No. As explained above, if the agreement stipulates a specific payment method, this generally overrides the "legal tender" aspect. In short: You agreed to pay with a card, so you are required to pay with a card. If you cannot pay with a card, you have not fulfilled your part of the agreement. It is is arguable that it is not your fault, but this does not change your obligation. Now you must either negotiate a suitable alternative (cash, cheque, golden watch...), or come back to pay later with a card. Also, the business may be able to charge you additional costs, such as extra accounting work or interest because of your non-standard payment - that would depend on the details. | In general As Dale M explained, if you give the money to someone who is not obviously authorized by the business to accept money and sell stuff in exchange, you have not entered into a valid sales contract. That means you are taking things without permission. Therefore the shop could sue you for any damage this causes (maybe you took something the shop did not want to sell, or the person at the information desk was not an employee and ran away with the money). However, whether this constitutes a crime such as theft will depend on jurisdictions. Germany In Germany, for example, it would probably not, because by definition a theft requires "intention to take posession in violation of the law" (StGB §242). You could argue that you did not intend to violate the law, because you paid the required amount, and only gave the money to the wrong person by mistake. Of course, I cannot guarantee that will convince the judge... England and Wales Similarly, the law in England and Wales defines "theft" in section 1 of the Theft Act 1968: A person is guilty of theft, if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; [...] Furthermore, section 2 says: A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— [...] (b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or [...] So, similar to the situation in Germany, you could argue in court that you intended to buy the item legally, and believed that the shop would be okay with that. | Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice. | Abandonment is not the legal concept to be concerned with (though the situation might fall within the ambit of a law that uses the word "abandon"), instead the question should be about the legal obligations of a parent. California Family Code is what you want to look at. Though a look at the criminal act of "child abandonment" can be informative: section 271 and following indicate that there are some penalties for abandonment-like actions for children between 14 and 18, but the acts would have to be "willful" and "without lawful excuse" (which probably includes "inability to perform"). In the Family Code, section 7822 states when proceedings can be brought. For example, if (2) The child has been left by both parents or the sole parent in the care and custody of another person for a period of six months without any provision for the child's support, or without communication from the parent or parents, with the intent on the part of the parent or parents to abandon the child. Section 3900-3901 says that the father and mother of a minor child have an equal responsibility to support their child in the manner suitable to the child's circumstances. The duty of support imposed by Section 3900 continues as to an unmarried child who has attained the age of 18 years, is a full-time high school student, and who is not self-supporting, until the time the child completes the 12th grade or attains the age of 19 years, whichever occurs first. Nothing in this section limits a parent's ability to agree to provide additional support or the court's power to inquire whether an agreement to provide additional support has been made. There seems to be a formula for computing expectations of support: but the law won't require a person to pay money that they do not have. The law also will not compel a third party to take in an guest, nor will it compel the mother to become homeless (i.e. order the third party to take in the child or eject the mother). The courts could easily require the mother to take financial responsibility for the child. | Does this mean that anyone who is born in the US is automatically a US citizen, whether they want it or not? Yes (subject to a couple of exceptions, namely the children of diplomats with full immunity and the children of a hostile foreign occupier). Or does this amendment just offer the possibility of requesting citizenship? In other words: is there an action to be made in order to become a US citizen when born in the US (and therefore one is not before this action is performed)? No. For someone who falls under the 14th amendment's citizenship clause, the only way to avoid being a US citizen is to relinquish or renounce it, which generally means that one is stuck with the US citizenship for at least 18 years. Most countries' citizenship laws, or at least all of those with which I am familiar, operate this way—automatically—for "normal" cases of acquisition of citizenship by virtue of the circumstances of birth. This is true whether the citizenship derives from the place of birth or from the parents' citizenship. |
Why is there usually a six month time limit for bringing disability discrimination actions to court? Kester Disability Rights note in a blog post of 25 Jun (page 6) that There is usually a six month time limit to get your case to court. What provision might they be referring to and where can I read more about it? | This is probably refering to the time limit at Section 118 of the Equality Act 2010. Subject to some exceptions, proceedings on a claim within section 114 may not be brought after the end of... the period of 6 months starting with the date of the act to which the claim relates ... Sonia Birdee (barrister) has shared some slides on the topic: Limitation in Equality Act 2010 claims (non-employment). She describes the general limitation period and also presents some ways of potentially getting more time. | Yes, the statute of limitations in New York can toll if a person is out of state for a long period of time. See CVP § 207. Defendant's absence from state or residence under false name: If, when a cause of action accrues against a person, he is without the state, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from the time he comes into or returns to the state. If, after a cause of action has accrued against a person, that person departs from the state and remains continuously absent therefrom for four months or more, or that person resides within the state under a false name which is unknown to the person entitled to commence the action, the time of his absence or residence within the state under such a false name is not a part of the time within which the action must be commenced. If an action is commenced against a person described above, the time within which service must be made on such person in accordance with subdivisions (a) and (b) of section three hundred six-b of this chapter shall be computed in accordance with this section. This section does not apply: 1. while there is in force a designation, voluntary or involuntary, made pursuant to law, of a person to whom a summons may be delivered within the state with the same effect as if served personally within the state; or 2. while a foreign corporation has one or more officers or other persons in the state on whom a summons against such corporation may be served; or 3. while jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be obtained without personal delivery of the summons to the defendant within the state. | There is no clear answer, though multiple sources feel that the answer is clearly "yes" and "no", and there is a reasonable probability that given the circumstances described, a court ruling would be favorable to plaintiff. This informal letter from the EEOC tends to conclude that sleep apnea is not a disability in the legal sense, but this letter (2003) was rescinded – still, it reveals one line of thinking and relevant case law. In Michaels v. McPherson Kansas, the appellate court refers to and upholds a lower court ruling that plaintiff suffered employment discrimination under the ADA (among other things). The appeal does not discuss the core issue in ADA law, whether the condition significantly limits a person's life, which strongly suggests that defendant accepted the conclusion that sleep apena can be a disability. On the other hand, in Taylor v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, a discrimination case involving sleep apnea was dismissed – but crucial to the dismissal was that he was successfully treated (also relevant was the lack of notice given the the employer). Finally, in Keyes v. Catholic Charities, federal court found that plaintiff's condition was not a disability under the meaning of the term in ADA. This does not mean that sleep apnea is "not a disability under the law", it means that "defendant is not disabled under the law", that is, the conclusion is based on the particulars of the individual condition, which is why the answer is "maybe yes, maybe no". There is a two-prong inquiry into the condition. First is a determination whether the person is “substantially limited in any major life activity other than working, such as walking, seeing, or hearing”, compared to the general population. If not, then an inquiry into work-related substantial limitations. A six month delay in seeking treatment undermined Keyes' argument that his condition was a substantial limitation, furthermore he had a CPAP machine, so essentially his condition was fixed – circumstances not application to the case you describe. See also Peter v. Lincoln Technical Institute, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 417 for various citations and the overall conclusion that no court in this circuit appears to have decided whether sleep apnea is, on its own, enough to qualify as a disability, probably because "a particular diagnosis, no matter how severe, ..., standing alone, is not sufficient to establish `disability'" | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. | In principle, the data subject's right to access involves a copy of all personal data the controller holds on them. There are no time limits by default. Of course, the controller can ask a data subject to clarify their request, e.g. to focus on a particular time frame. There is an implied time limit though: personal data may only be processed/stored for as long as the data is necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was collected. Afterwards, it must be deleted. A controller with good data management will be able to limit their effort by having as short retention periods as possible for their different records. Furthermore, a lot of data is not personal data, or falls out of scope of the GDPR because it is not processed with automated means or forms part of a filing system. For example, if thousands of old invoices were archived in paper form in boxes that are only sorted by year, there might be an argument that this isn't a filing system in the sense of the GDPR and that a DSAR would not have to involve looking through all the archived invoices (compare also Art 11). In your scenario, there is a clear retention period of six years. You are asking for records about how that data might have been used further in the past. To the degree that such data is actually available, that could reasonably be personal data and should be included in a response to a DSAR. E.g. they might have information like this: “File #1234 was included in a data set that was sold to EvilCorp in 2007. The entries in File #1234 that are older than 2014 have been purged, so we do not know which entries were included in the data set. The current name on File #1234 is Dave.” This information about the sale would be personal data because it relates to you, and you are identifiable. Of course, the controller might not be set up to perform this search unless specifically asked. However, more unspecific information might not be personal data. For example: “About 70% of our files were included in a data set that was sold to EvilCorp in 2007. We no longer have records indicating whether your file was included.” Since there is no link between the sale and your personal data, I don't think it would have to be included in a DSAR response. The primary reason why you should be told about sales of personal data is that per Art 15(1)(c), you should be informed about “the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed” in a DSAR response. So when making a data subject access request, it could make sense to explicitly referencing this paragraph. So you would be interested in receiving a copy of your personal data as per Art 15 GDPR, and in particular any available information per Art 15(1)(c) GDPR about the recipients or categories of recipients to whom your personal data has been or may have been disclosed in the past. Quite likely the response will be underwhelming, e.g. by just giving a broad category such as “potential creditors who are contractually obligated to use the data only in accordance with our policies”. Whether such responses are compliant (I don't necessarily think so) will not be clear until there's a good precedent, and that would require that someone sorts this out in court. | Would a U.S court honor his request, based on his prior commitment? You are not specifying the purpose of the court hearing, or whether Adam is pro se litigant (which sounds unlikely if this plaintiff is a movie star). If plaintiff Adam is represented by an attorney, Adam's presence is unnecessary in most or all court hearings. In fact, typically neither parties nor their lawyers have to show up in court, whence their absence does not constitute contempt of court. Absence merely implies that they miss the opportunity to [orally] argue their position before the court, and thus would depend on whether the judge bothers to actually read their brief. If you mean a hearing in which Adam needs to be present, his request to reschedule the hearing is most likely to be granted. His contract is strong evidence that his request is not a vexatious attempt to delay proceedings. Since the hearing would be in month 4, the particularity that his contract goes up to month 4 implies that rescheduling would not significantly delay proceedings. Regarding your comment, rescheduling can (and does) happen multiple times even in criminal cases. This post includes an excerpt of the Register of Actions of criminal case 16-870-FH in Michigan state court (Washtenaw county), highlighting several instances of rescheduling as requested by the defense counsel and despite prosecutor's objection. I believe the case got rescheduled a few more times beyond what the snapshots reflect. | Let's say that the mediation doesn't succeed to achieve voluntary compliance satisfactory to both sides. What happens next? Under Sec 706(e) it appears that the complainant has to litigate himself in a civil court, and potentially be exempt from any fees and have an appointed attorney. Not really. The EEOC at that point (within a certain time period) either decides to litigate the case itself, or if it chooses not to litigate itself, authorizes the employee to litigate the case at his or her own expense, and if the employee prevails, the remedy awarded by the Court includes what the court determines to be the employees reasonable attorneys' fees. The details of the process and the relevant deadlines are available at the EEOC's website. Basically, if the case isn't resolved in mediation, the employer makes a position statement, the employee responds, the EEOC investigates (using its subpoena power, if necessary) on average for ten months, and the EEOC either prosecutes the case itself, or it issues a "Notice-Of-Right-To-Sue" which allows the private employee to hire a lawyer and sue the employer. How often does it actually happen? The EEOC handles about 90,000 charges per year and wins about $525 million a year in judgments and settlement awards (parallel agencies at the state level handle additional cases in a similar manner). The vast majority of the cases are settled or result in a Notice of Right To Sue letter, with only 100 to 400 lawsuits per year actually filed by the agency resulting in $22 million to $168 million a year of awards in court cases. About 25% of these cases go to trial. The rest settle before trial or are resolved in motion practice before trial (including default judgments, when the employer simply doesn't respond to the lawsuit). Once the EEOC brings a lawsuit, settlement is the most common resolution. So, there are a lot of cases, although there is only about one EEOC claim per 1,000 employees in the workforce subject to EEOC jurisdiction per year. Whether this is a lot of complaints or not many, is really a matter of opinion. Only about one in twenty-five people will ever file an EEOC claim in his or her entire life, although this will vary considerably based upon a person's race, national origin, religion and sex. A non-Hispanic white Christian male of European descent is much less likely to file an EEOC claim during his lifetime than someone who does not fit that description. Realistically, a majority of cases that aren't abandoned by the employee in the administrative process (which is a significant share of the total) or found to have no factual basis (a small but significant percentage) are settled for fairly modest dollar amounts (an average of about $10,000 to $20,000 per claim). The bigger dollar cases for a single employee usually end up being brought in a private lawsuit rather than by the EEOC itself. About 14,000 of those charges each year result in a Notice of Right to Sue letter followed by a civil lawsuit filed by a lawyer for the employee. It isn't terribly easy to determine from official statistics what proportion of cases resulting in a Notice of Right to Sue letter rather than an EEOC lawsuit ultimately do not result in a lawsuit being filed by the employee. About 250 of these cases (not quite 2%) go to trial each year. The rest settled or are resolved in motion practice before trial (including default judgments, when the employer simply doesn't respond to the lawsuit). Once an employee brings a lawsuit, settlement is the most common resolution. Folk wisdom in the employment litigation field is that the average settlement of a case of ordinary strength on the merits that is settled fairly early on in the process is about six months of wages. An estimate that the employees in private lawsuits secured more than $200 million a year in settlements and money judgments is probably a gross underestimate. It could easily be $500 million to $1 billion per year. But, there are no good statistics available since settlement amounts are overwhelmingly confidential. The EEOC sues on behalf of the employee in cases it chooses to litigate itself on a weekly basis, and likewise declines to prosecute and certifies the case to allow the individual to prosecute the case with a private attorney all the time. Is there any relevant case law? Yes. Pretty much every relevant detail of the process has been litigated in case law that has produced reported decisions because there have been many thousands of employment discrimination cases litigated under the Act. There are probably at least two dozen to four dozen new published appellate decisions in the federal circuit courts each year on these kinds of cases, if not more, and those decisions have come at a pretty steady rate for the past half century. There are hundreds of published decisions interpreting these statutes in almost every one of the federal circuits. On quite a few issues, there are splits of authority between different circuits regarding how to interpret the law that will ultimately be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, or by Congress, or that may remain unresolved forever. How will the civil court try the case? Will the judge reference the Civil Rights Directly? It is a little unclear what you are asking here, but I will do my best. Regardless of whether the EEOC or the individual employee brings the case, it is filed as a Complaint in federal court like any other federal lawsuit, litigated according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and resolved in the vast majority of cases either by a judge in a pre-trial motion, by a settlement between the parties, or by a jury trial presided over by a judge. In a jury trial, the judge tells the jury what the applicable law says and the jury decides if the employee has proved a case against the employer when applying that law after hearing the evidence presented at trial and then decides what damages award to make, on a very short jury verdict form. In a bench trial (i.e before a judge without a jury), the judge makes those determinations in a lengthy written ruling setting forth the factual and legal basis for the judge's determination on the merits. Jury trials are much more common than bench trials in these kinds of cases, partially because plaintiffs want juries to make a damages determination, and partially out of a perception (not entirely inaccurate) that judges tend to be pro-employer on average. What is a likely punishment? Punishment is mostly the wrong term. It is a lawsuit for money damages to compensate the employee for harm actually suffered. The jury (or the judge if the case can be decided before trial in a motion for summary judgment or if a jury trial has been waived) determines the amount of compensation, if any, which should be awarded for lost wages, non-economic compensatory damages, etc. and the judge then awards attorneys' fees and court costs based upon the submissions of the parties after the trial is over based upon a determination of what is allowed by law and what is reasonable. To some extent, an employer's obligation to pay attorneys' fees and costs acts as a proportionate punishment for not immediately settling a case where the employer is found to be in the wrong. To some extent, non-economic damages can constitute a punishment. But, when an employer is found to have discriminated intentionally, which is most of the time, punitive damages can also be awarded, although they must be proportionate to the amount of actual compensatory damages awarded, typical one or two times the compensatory damage award unless that award is very small. Statutory liquidated damages are sometimes awarded in lieu of certain kinds of punitive and compensatory damages awards in age and sex discrimination cases under the Equal Pay Act. There are also dollar limits on awards based upon the size of the employer. Why is the process convoluted by adding an extra step in form of the commission? Mediation is allowed as a compromise to encourage negotiated resolutions that avoid litigation costs before everyone has spent a lot of money on lawyers. In practice, a surprisingly large number of cases result in pre-trial mediation resolutions, often in cases where an outcome if the case had gone forward to a trial would have been uncertain. The involvement of the Commission is a compromise between having a system where all cases are prosecuted at state expenses and one in which all cases are brought privately with an opportunity to win attorneys' fees if one prevails. The EEOC has usually used its authority to bring cases that are clearly cases of improper employer conduct where due to the small dollar amounts involved or the number of employees affected, an individual lawsuit would not provide an adequate remedy since private lawsuits would not be brought otherwise. It is very hard for a private attorney to justify bringing an employment discrimination lawsuit over a case where the damages are likely to be in the $5,000 to $25,000 range because the employee doesn't make much money unless liability is 100% clear (e.g. there is an admission on videotape from the employer), despite the fact that a prevailing party can get non-economic damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs. So, it is particularly hard to bring employment discrimination cases on behalf of employees who don't earn much even when they aren't discriminated against. The availability of EEOC enforcement prevents employers of low wage workers and workers in temporary employment whose damages are small from ignoring the Civil Rights laws with impunity. A private lawyer does something on the order of $30,000 to $150,000 of billable work to bring an employment discrimination case involving a single employee-client to trial, and a lawyer defending such a case for an employer will typically incur more legal fees for their employer client than the employee's lawyers do, while the employer's lawyer defends the case all of the way through a trial, even before considering any amounts actually awarded to a prevailing employee in a case where the employee wins. Each side's legal fees, individually, will usually exceed the amount of compensatory and punitive damages awarded combined in a fairly small dollar case for an employee who wasn't paid very much, or at least didn't lose a huge amount of money economically due to illegal discrimination (for example, because the employee wasn't promoted while a less qualified candidate was promoted). This is an important reason why lots of cases settle and why the EEOC is necessary. The EEOC process also provides a means by which arbitration agreements with individual employees can be circumvented because the EEOC is not a party to those agreements and is not bound by them. Why isn't discrimination simply prosecuted by the state's attorney? After all racial discrimination very much fits the definition of a public wrong. Government agency resources aren't unlimited, so the government can't prosecute every credible complaint, so the EEOC has to pick and choose how to get the most bang for its available resources. In practice, the EEOC can only afford to pursue about one in ten of the employment discrimination cases subject to its jurisdiction that go to trial with its own lawyers. The cases it can't afford to bring, it delegates to the private sector rather than simply leaving those cases unprosecuted as would happen in the criminal justice system. This also provides a way for an employee who has a lazy or unenthusiastic government lawyer assigned to their case at the EEOC who doesn't take what the employee sees as a strong case seriously a way to get relief for employment discrimination despite the fact that the EEOC isn't willing to back them up. Private lawsuits are a check and balance against bad EEOC decisions about how strong cases are as well as a way for the EEOC to avoid financing the legal fees of people who can afford to sue on their own. Is the enforcement any good? Lots of employees over the years have gotten lots of money, although probably not 100% of the amount of the economic harm they suffered (and, of course, employee and employer attorneys have gotten paid a lot of money in the process as well, which is good if you are a lawyer, but is dead weight loss from an economist's point of view). But, more importantly, the behavior of employers has changed greatly as a result. In practice, most lawsuits, and almost all lawsuits not brought by the EEOC itself, involve either wrongful termination or failure to promote someone, rather than discriminatory hiring, since it is hard to show an individual right to be hired for which an individual is entitled to compensation. Even in EEOC cases, most are brought for discriminatory advertising or openly admitted discrimination in hiring, rather than covert discrimination by an employer in hiring on a non-permitted basis. The EEOC brings a handful of cases alleging covert discrimination in hiring against medium or large employers each year, in part, just to provide a credible threat to anyone considering doing so, often with a combination of tips from insiders (particularly those from hiring officials who are fired in retaliation for not following a discriminatory hiring policy) and with undercover "test applicants" who submit functionally identical resumes for the same job when many job openings are available. But, this is usually a tiny share of the total volume of employment litigation brought under the Civil Rights Acts. There is a certain irony in this, because employers who are willing to hire someone who belongs to a "protected class" in the first place, who hence, are probably not the most discriminatory employers in the market, are more exposed to a realistic risk of a discrimination lawsuit, than employers who refuse to hire anyone in a "protected class" in the first place, so long as the employer keeps its mouth shut about this practice and is willing to lie and come up with false pretexts for its actions. Dishonest gross racists and clear misogynists are under punished, while less culpable employers who are more honest but still a little bit discriminatory in the cases of a few well paid employees are over punished relative to more culpable employers. Also, employment discrimination laws provide the most monetary compensation to the most competent and well paid employees who probably have the greatest capacity to mitigate their damages by seeking other employment from less discriminatory employers, while providing the least compensation to the marginal employees for whom discrimination in employment most impacts their quality of life. Indeed, often the most marginal employees aren't even willing to risk filing a complaint with the EEOC for fear of being blacklisted in the future in a manner that is impossible to prove. Still, at a minimum, by making it illegal to publicly state a discriminatory reason or to state a discriminatory reason to someone who could testify against you in court, the laws in question have changed the internal normative standards that managers of medium and large sized business apply on a day to day business such that at least lip service and public commitment is given to the requirements of the civil rights laws. This change in corporate culture has probably had more of a real world effect than actual suits for damages have in regard to discrimination in hiring. The benefits of the voluntarily discontinuation of discrimination in employment as employers internalized the norms established by the civil rights laws for the most part has provided far more benefit to employees who were previously discriminated against than litigation and settlements resulting from the EEOC process. For example, when Sandra Day O'Connor (future Supreme Court justice) was a young lawyer, fewer than 5% of attorneys were women and she was often mistaken for a secretary or receptionist by clients. Now, about half of all young associate lawyers (even at very large firms who graduated from very prestigious law schools) are women. Almost all of this change was due to a change in professional norms that were a direct result of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (women had legally been allowed to be lawyers since the 1920s almost everywhere and earlier in some places), rather than through case by case litigation. The Civil Right Act opened up a huge new lucrative profession to women and minorities, and the experience of the legal profession was the norm and not the exception. Before the act, women were pretty much limited to school teaching, being librarians, nursing, secretary work, food service, day care, piece work sewing and laundry work. After the Civil Rights Act, their employment opportunities dramatically increased. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is likewise, more or less single handedly, responsible for today's black middle class which would have been an order of magnitude smaller otherwise. There are economic arguments that discrimination laws do or do not do much good, but those arguments rarely consider the fact that the law, when it was first enacted, dramatically changed corporate culture and the moral viewpoints and norms of the middle and upper middle class who act as employers making hiring decisions across the nation. Until the Civil Rights Act was enacted, tradition and prejudice kept a huge share of the population out of most of the marketplace in a manner completely contrary to what a naive Economics 101 analysis would predict. | Note that while a person can request a specific accommodation, an employer or potential employer is not required to grant the specific accommodation requested. Some other accommodation which (the employer claims) will meet the expressed need can be offered instead. Also no accommodation need be offered if it would impose an "undue burden" on the employer. The normal expectation is that there will be a back-and forth until the employee (or applicant) and the employer agree on an appropriate accommodation. Where there is agreement but the agreement is then violated, the normal first response is to make such adjustments as will restore the agreed accommodation. Only if that fails will a legal complaint be heard. There is no automatic penalty for violation of an accommodation agreement, it will depend on the facts ass assessed by the Commission and perhaps later by a court. Possible penalties can include an order to employ or reinstate a complainant, back pay, costs and legal fees, and money damages, which can be up to $75,000 per violation, as the court deems just. The relevant law is 42 U.S. Code § 12112. This provides (in relevant part): No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. The section goes on to define “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” as including any of several acts, including: (b) (5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; ... (7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are the factors that the test purports to measure). 42 U.S. Code § 12111 defines "Reasonable accommodation" and undue hardship” as follows: (9) Reasonable accommodation The term “reasonable accommodation” may include— (9) (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (9) (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. (10) Undue hardship (10) (A) In general The term “undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B). (10) (B) Factors to be considered In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include— (10) (B) (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; (10) (B) (ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (10) (B) (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (10) (B) (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity. Under 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–5 and subsequent sections informal measures are normally first attempted to remedy any violation. If those fail, remadies can include injunctions against continued discrimination, awards of back pay (not relevant when the person was never an employee) orders to employ a person, awards of costs and legal fees, and other damages. No specific remedy is automatic, there is wide discretion. |
Are Wagner militants considered combatants under the IHL? Are Wagner militants fighting in Ukraine considered combatants under the international humanitarian law? Here's what the OSCE has to say Members of private military and security companies such as the “Wagner group” only fall under the very restrictive definition of mercenaries if they are both not Russian nationals and are not part of the Russian armed forces. If participating in the IAC against Ukraine, they may even be considered as members of an armed group under a command responsible to Russia and they are therefore POWs if they fall into the power of Ukraine. Otherwise they would be protected civilians (who may as such be punished for any direct participation in hostilities). So a Russian passport automatically makes a Wagner militants a combatant, doesn't it? Even if they are not incorporated into the Russian armed forces? Why? And what do they mean by the following they may even be considered as members of an armed group under a command responsible to Russia Regular Ukrainian servicemen can't prove or disprove their reported link to Russia's General Staff on the spot. How are they supposed to treat Wagner militants? | The relevant conventions tried to discourage the traditional mercenary business model, but they also try to avoid loopholes in their rules. Under command by and authorized by Russia? Yes. Wearing clothing/insignia recognizable at a distance? I don't know, but a big Z would be enough. Carrying arms openly? I presume so. There is no requirement that armed forces use only their own nationals (see the French Foreign Legion). While Russia tries to deny being "at war," under international law it is, and residents of the unoccupied part of Russia may rally around the flag. We don't know what will happen after the war. There is the precedent of the SS, which was declared a criminal organization at Nuremberg (that is, membership was considered evidence of complicity in their crimes). | The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in effect since 1976 and currently signed by about 179 countries, has in Article 12 Paragraph 4: No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. It's not absolute, as it would allow for a person to be deprived of that right if it weren't "arbitrary". But it's the strongest statement I've found so far. | You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey. | I can't speak for Latvian law, but it's not unusual for someone to be expelled from or denied entry to a political party in the UK for supporting a rival party at the same time. As one example, Alasdair Campbell was expelled from the Labour Party after he admitted voting for a rival party in elections. From that link, Labour Party rules say that someone "who joins and/or supports a political organisation other than an official Labour group or other unit of the Party" will "automatically be ineligible to be or remain a Party member". So it's not about voting, which is secret, but about supporting a rival party. Similarly, at least one member has been expelled from Labour for supporting the Scottish National Party on social media. Such decisions may have an element of the political (using it as a pretext to getting rid of someone you don't like). But there is no suggestion that such an action is illegal, if it is in the party rules. Political parties have a lot of discretion as to who is allowed to be a member, and who they expel. It's not like buying a gym membership where you are entitled to gym services or your money back; legally you sign an agreement to follow the rules when you join, and joining doesn't entitle you to much. | If you are charged under the laws of Estonia (or Australia or Thailand or the UK) then the laws of the USA have no relevance whatsoever. It makes no difference if you are a US citizen, if the alleged crime happened in the USA or was perpetrated against the USA. If nation X has jurisdiction then you are tried under the laws of nation X. That is what sovereignty means. As to your specific example, Facebook does business in Estonia, therefore they are subject to Estonian law, as a US corporation they are also subject to US law and the law of every other jurisdiction they operate in (see why they need big legal departments?). If a legitimate Estonian warrant was served on them to disclose metadata or anything else then they are legally obliged to do so or be in contempt of court. Oh, and by the way, the first amendment right to free speech does not give you a right to anonymous free speech. | There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law. | As with all international law, it depends on "who says so": I will draw on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War as most relevant. Article 3 distinguishes combatants from non-combatants, saying that Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. They then specifically prohibit murder: Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture but this only applies to non-combatants. There simply is no prohibition against killing combatants (unsurprisingly). Liberia acceded to that treaty, so for instance if one of their soldiers murdered a non-combatant, in principle they should try that soldier for the crime of murder under Liberian law. If some random dude (not a soldier) murders anybody in Liberia, in principle they should try him for the crime. Soldier may kill enemy soldier, even when the killed soldier is sleeping and poses no immediate threat to the soldier who kills him. That's the nature of war. In the case of Massaquoi, he might have been prosecuted by Sierra Leone, but negotiated immunity in Sierra Leone in exchange for information on his RUF colleagues. There was no such tribunal or arrangement w.r.t. his involvement in Liberia, and Finland opted to conduct an extraterritorial trial based on war crimes (not the killing of combatants). His acquittal was based on the lack of evidence that it was him that did the reported deeds (I don't know if there is a publicly available judgment, but it is 850 pages and in Finnish, so toivotan onnea projektille. | Usually these words refer to whether something (e.g. a law or government action) is or is not in accordance with the Constitution, including its amendments, as currently interpreted by US courts including the Supreme Court. So in view of Chaplinsky, the Constitution (as interpreted) does not protect "fighting words", and therefore a law that forbids "fighting words" is constitutional. As phoog points out in the comments, the word can also be used to refer to whether something is in accordance with the Constitution, as the speaker thinks it ought to be interpreted. So somebody might say that a certain law or action is (un)constitutional, even if a court has not considered it, if their own personal interpretation of the Constitution is (or isn't) consistent with it. Or, if a court has struck it down (or upheld it) but the speaker thinks they erred in doing so. |
Can you sue for emotional distress in FL over an erroneous eviction notice? Lets say Jane is late on paying her rent by a few days (Due on the 1st, Grace period til the 4th, Paid on the 7th). Several days after paying, she receives a physical notice on the door demanding payment in 3 days or to turn in the house. The date of the notice says the system printed it on the 7th and the day they put it on the door, the 11th. This causes Jane to go into an anxiety attack which she is already going to therapy for and caused her great emotional distress. Can Jane sue for emotional distress? How likely is she to succeed? | Can Jane sue for emotional distress? Anyone who pays the filing fee and delivers a complaint in the proper form to a court clerk can sue for anything. How likely is she to succeed? Not very likely at all. The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress is not available in this context since there is no relevant physical injury to which it is related (neither her own or someone else's). The only U.S. state where this theory might succeed under this circumstances is Hawaii and even there, this case would be a stretch because the extreme degree of the emotional distress caused in this case is arguably not foreseeable even if some emotional distress can be expected from all manner of wrongful actions. So, she is limited to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (also called the tort of "outrageous conduct"), which is a calculated and intentional act specifically engineered to cause her in particular emotional harm, rather than incident to some other purpose (lawful or not) (i.e. basically a mean prank). It is exceedingly unlikely that this is why this happened (and the title to the question implies that it was merely an error on the landlord or the landlord's agent's part). Even if this was a calculated and intentional effort to inflict emotional distress upon her, proving that this is why it happened would be exceedingly hard in most cases (absent some sort of whistleblowing informant). If she had a lease with a two-sided attorney fees clause and had to hire a lawyer to establish that she paid the rent and can't be evicted, however, she might be able to recover nominal damages of $1 and her attorney fees fighting the acts taken towards a wrongful eviction as a breach of contract. But emotional distress damages are not available in connection with breaches of contract with only rare and narrow exceptions not applicable here (e.g. bad faith breaches of insurance contracts, contracts to dispose of a deceased person's remains, and perhaps surrogacy contracts). | Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that? | Your lawyer will advise you whether to worry, but it is not a crime to not pay the rent. The action that the landlord can take is (a) evicting you and (b) suing you for the unpaid rent. Whether a written lease is necessary depends on which province / territory you are in, since that is the level at which landlord-tenant law is determined. As far as I know, no province allows a person to avoid their rent obligation on the grounds that there was no signed lease. It doesn't matter if you have been living elsewhere most of the time or all of the time. | What you have heard is not exactly correct (and also depends, in part, on the Chapter under which the bankruptcy is filed). I will address the simplest case, a Chapter 7 liquidation of an individual, which is simpler, because a Chapter 7 liquidation is determined as of a point of time, while Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 reorganizations are conceptually more complex and don't just transfer rights to a trustee at a single point in time. When you file a Chapter 7, all of your property, including you rights to sue people that had accrued as of that date, are transferred to the bankruptcy trustee as an asset of the bankruptcy estate, and the right of anyone to sue you is stayed automatically until the bankruptcy court either authorizes the lawsuit, or discharges the debt associated with the lawsuit (there are actually a few cases where the automatic stay expires on its own after a certain amount of time). Rights to bring lawsuits that arise after the bankruptcy is filed, or can be brought at any time, like a divorce/custody suit, are not barred, although property and enforcement of economic rights in those cases may be stayed until the bankruptcy court takes action. Custody issues other than child support, and termination of marital status are not affected. For example, if you file for bankruptcy on Monday and are hit by a bus on Friday, your personal injury suit claim is probably yours and not the bankruptcy estate's and can be brought by you. But, if you are hit by a bus on Monday and then file for bankruptcy on Friday, your personal injury suit claim is probably property of the bankruptcy estate. (It is a bit more complicated than this, because your right to sue for a personal injury might be exempt property, at least in part, but this example conveys the gist of the concept.) There is a further complication in the analysis which is that domestic relations actions and probate court actions are normally considered to be outside of the jurisdiction of the federal courts (bankruptcy court is a federal court), even when there is diversity of citizenship, which doesn't change the basic conclusions above. | When screening potential tenants, what is the proper way to turn them down, and the legal implications if the tenant asks for more details? The "proper" way to turn someone down depends on why you decided to turn him or her down. As long as you did not decline to rent to a tenant because of information you learned in a credit report or commercially available criminal background check, you are not required to notify them. However, it is a good business practice to notify them in writing as Nij's post suggests. However, it would be a good idea to keep a copy of the letter for you records and possibly write down some notes. Such as, "other applicants had higher income," or "could not verify rental history." These kinds notes one the letters you mail out will be you friend should you ever be accused of improper discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, etc.. Declining to Rent Based Upon a Credit Check or Commercially Available Background Check: The federal law that governs credit checks and commercially available background checks is the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). The FCRA regulates "consumer reports," which includes credit reports and criminal background checks that are assembled by companies. (The FCRA does not apply if you, yourself, are going to the state police or courthouse to get background check records). Under the FCRA, requires that people who make decisions against someone based on information in a credit or background check, notify that person. The FCRA calls this decision against someone an "adverse action" and requires that you provide the affected party the following information: The name, address and telephone number of the company that supplied the consumer report, including a toll-free telephone number for companies that maintain files nationwide; A statement that the company that supplied the report did not make the decision to take the adverse action and cannot give the specific reasons for it; and A notice of the individual's right to dispute the accuracy or completeness of any information the company furnished, and the consumer's right to a free report from the company upon request within 60 days. The FCRA calls this notice an "Adverse Action Notice." See 15 U.S.C. 1681m. An adverse action notice can be oral, written, or electronic. Obviously, written or electronic would be the best since you can prove that it was sent. Also, be aware that the FCRA has civil penalties if it is violated. The Federal Trade Commission has a helpful guide that lists some of the basics of when you do and do not need to provide adverse action notice. Website: Using Consumer Reports: What Landlords Need to Know Brochure: FTC Facts for Business However, it does not cover criminal background checks, which have many of the same rules as the credit checks under the FCRA. | I have read that Assured Shorthold Tenancies of less than 6 months are allowed, but you are not allowed to evict a tenant before 6 months. That applies only to section 21 ("no fault") evictions. Specifically, according to section 21 of the Housing Act 1988, a notice can't be served in the first 4 months of a tenancy (section 21(4B)), and can't take effect in the first 6 months (section 21(5)). Section 8 evictions, which require one or more of the reasons listed in Schedule 2 of the Act, do not have this restriction - though only some of them can be used during the fixed term part of the tenancy, and they must be listed in the tenancy agreement in order to be used in that way. Will I have to wait until he has actually left before I can arrange an AST with new tenants? Yes, but that's always true. It's very unwise for a new tenancy agreement to be signed until the previous tenants have moved out, because if they don't leave before the new agreement takes effect, the landlord is now committed to finding accommodation for the new tenants. This is why tenancy agreements are often only signed on the first day of the tenancy. | It is legally significant because you have certain protections from eviction is you reside in a place. If you are just a weekend guest (or an uninvited intruder), you don't enjoy tenant privileges and could be arrested by the police for trespassing. Whereas if you have been living in a house for some months, then removing you from your residences is typically a more involved legal procedure. Receiving mail at an address over a period of time is evidence that you reside there. | Short Answer Typically, about four weeks in an uncontested case and six weeks in a contested case, although this depends to some extent upon how business the relevant courts are at the time. Long Answer The time limits break down as follows into different parts of the process: Minimum time from formally demanding possession to being legally allowed to bring suit in this situation. This is almost certainly set by statute. In Georgia, there is no waiting period for this part of the process when rent is not paid as agreed. A lawsuit can be filed the same day that a demand for possession is made by the landlord. OCGA § 44-7-50. The time from serving a lawsuit on the tenant to the time that the tenant is required to respond in court. This is almost certainly set by statute or court rule. In Georgia this is seven days from service of process. OCGA § 44-7-51. Georgia, like most states, allows "nail and mail" service by posting a notice on the premises and mailing a notice to the last known address of the tenant, after some reasonable effort has been made to personally service the tenant or any other adult resident, so this step will typically take about seven to ten days. The time from an appearance in court or court filing by the tenant objecting to the eviction to the time that a hearing is scheduled, in the event that the tenant raises an objection (which is easily done, even if there isn't ultimately a legally valid defense to raise). There may be a legal deadline for this in the statute or court rules, although it can usually be waived. This can also vary based on how many cases are pending relative to the number of available judges, something that usually varies seasonally. Georgia does not have a fixed time period for this step, but "Every effort should be made by the trial court to expedite a trial of the issues." OCGA § 44-7-53. The time from an order of eviction as the conclusion of an eviction hearing until the sheriff or marshall actually carries out the eviction that has been ordered by the court. This is almost never a matter of public record or a legal mandate, and it would typically vary seasonally and over the course of a month as the staff available to carry out evictions is pretty constant, but the demand for evictions has monthly peaks that flow from month end leases and rental payment due dates, and seasonally with the end of school years and the end of calendar years being particularly busy times when delays are greater. Sheriffs have also been known to intentionally stall in holiday seasons. This part of the process in Fulton County is set forth here. The total time is the sum of these four times. Most evictions lawyers in the area would know what is typical for (3) and (4) and would also have a good grasp of how likely it is for a tenant to assert a defense (if the tenant does not, part (3) is skipped and a default judgment for eviction is entered on the appearance date). In my area (in Colorado), (1) is three days, (3) is usually about two weeks and (4) is usually about one to three weeks, but as noted above, your experience in Atlanta, Georgia could easily vary based upon how busy the courts and the marshall are at that time. According to this website, in Georgia, it is customary to allow 3-10 days for step 1 even though it is not legally required, step 3 is typically one to two weeks, and step 4 is typically about two weeks. It is also possible to extent step 2 by one week from one week to two weeks with a procedural tool that most lawyers are aware of in Georgia. So, you are typically looking at about four weeks in an uncontested case and about six in a contested case from notice to actually having people removed. |
Applicability of Data Protection Laws When Talking to a Lawyer According to my knowledge I am not allowed to share other people's full name nor phone number nor email address without their permission. Can I tell such details legally to my lawyer when referring to individuals related to a case without the data owner's approval? I live in the European Union. | According to my knowledge I am not allowed to share other people's full name nor phone number nor email address without their permission. That is not correct. According to GDPR Article 2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data ... ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; GDPR Recital 18 states in relevant part: (2) Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. Personal data that is not processed by "automated means", for example data which is transmitted verbally, by hand writing, or by manually sent email, is not covered by the GDPR. Data which is used by a natural person for "personal activities" is also not covered. Consulting one's personal lawyer might well be a personal activity unless it is a business matter. Even if such a transfer of data were in scope for the GDPR, consent of the data subject (DS) is not the only available lawful basis. GDPR article 6 permits any of several possible lawful bases to be used, particularly paragraph 1 point (f) which reads: (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Also possibly relevant is point (c) which reads: processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; In short, providing one's personal lawyer with the names and addresses of relevant people in connection with a legal issue is not at all likely to be prohibited by the GDPR, nor to require the consent of the people whose names and contact info are provided. However, a comment by user PMF reads: The Data Protection laws are mostly for companies, not for individuals. This is an overstatement. The laws do apply to natural persons as DCs, although enforcement is largely targeted at businesses, particularly large, for-profit businesses. | That is private. Who you work for is not information that is disclosed publicly by any state actor in Germany, just like your taxes. In fact, that or who you are employed at is often regarded as personal and private information. Nigh impossible through agencies Public agencies like the Fiskus (tax), Agentur für Arbeit, and immigration are not allowed to give any information about a person to anyone but that person or another agency that has the right to that information. Yes, (generally speaking) the tax office may not even say that a person exists (or doesn't) and what their tax number is to anyone but the person in question. | The GDPR is about "processing" not "storing", so your actions definitely fall under the GDPR. Also you have stored the email address and the email you sent in your "Sent" folder. You need to reply with all the information you have associated with that email address. This will at least be the email you already sent. If you scraped the email address from GitHub then you have it in a table with (presumably) other information such as the repository where you found it, in which case send that row of the table with the associated column headers. If you really just have a list of email addresses then say so. If you merely saw the email address and then typed a fresh email then say so. | The European Convention on Human Rights has an article about privacy (article 8). Note that this is from the Council of Europe, which is not the same as the European Union: non-EU member states such as Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan are also part of the Council of Europe and therefore the ECHR. I'm not sure if you first have to go to a lower court, but the European Court of Human Rights is the authority on this (commonly mistaken for the European Court of Justice, but they are distinct entities). According to this ruling of the ECtHR, it is not illegal to monitor your employees' communications per se. However, the monitoring has to be: for legitimate purposes ("the employer had only accessed the account in the sincere belief that it contained only messages of a professional, not personal, nature"), proportionate ("it was the only possible way available"), and communicated to the employee (or, if the monitoring is not announced, at least the restriction on personal use should be communicated, for example through company policy). In the European Union, there is also the GDPR, but this does not change much. It applies to your employer the same as any other organisation and basically says that they have to be reasonable about it: collect only what they need, for a legitimate purpose, and tell you about it. I think you should be able to request a copy of any data they collected about you, ask a human to review an automated decision, and your other usual rights. They don't need your consent to start collecting data, as Esa Jokinen already commented: "GDPR doesn't even require consent to handle PII data, but the consent is just the last option when there's no other legitimate reason to process the data." In fact, your employer probably cannot ask you for consent: because of the employer–employee imbalance of power, the consent would probably not be considered to be freely given (where this article mentions "The GDPR states", I think they are referring to recital 43). | There is nothing extraterritorial about these laws. If a company sells a good or provides a service to individuals based in the EU, then this good or service has to comply with EU laws. This concept is self-evident for physical goods that are produced anywhere in the world and then sold in the EU and the GDPR just applies this concept to services provided over the internet. The same legal concept also holds in all other major jurisdictions. The only thing that makes this more complicated for the GDPR is the actual enforcability of these laws but that is a technical issue not a legal one. | The evidence will almost certainly be inadmissible And, of course, you will be disbarred and never work as a lawyer again, you might also go to jail for attempting to pervert the course of justice. Whether the person is convicted or not will depend on the strength of the other evidence the state has. In the notorious case of Lawyer X, Nicola Gobbo was acting as a barrister for a number of Melbourne underworld figures while simultaneously acting as a police informer. A number of those convicted have successfully appealed their convictions on the basis that they didn’t get a fair trial. In their judgement on AB (a pseudonym) v. CD (a pseudonym); EF (a pseudonym) v. CD (a pseudonym) [2018] HCA 58 the High Court said: But where, as here, the agency of police informer has been so abused as to corrupt the criminal justice system, there arises a greater public interest in disclosure to which the public interest in informer anonymity must yield. EF's actions in purporting to act as counsel for the Convicted Persons while covertly informing against them were fundamental and appalling breaches of EF's obligations as counsel to her clients and of EF's duties to the court. Likewise, Victoria Police were guilty of reprehensible conduct in knowingly encouraging EF to do as she did and were involved in sanctioning atrocious breaches of the sworn duty of every police officer to discharge all duties imposed on them faithfully and according to law without favour or affection, malice or ill-will. As a result, the prosecution of each Convicted Person was corrupted in a manner which debased fundamental premises of the criminal justice system. | Does this prove that the unlicensed attorney is practicing law outside their jurisdiction and is providing legal advice by representing the "client" in legal negotiations? No. Your quote of the email does not prove that the receiver engaged in unlicensed practice of law. Nor does it prove that the receiver/non-attorney is representing, or advising, the attorney's client or the adversary. It is quite possible and valid for the unlicensed lawyer (example: paralegals) to assist an attorney who actually represents the party. | It may be legal or it may not For example, if any of the users are in the European Union, then the GDPR applies and the person storing the information is a data controller and has legal obligations. These include, having a legitimate reason for storing them, storing them only for as long as necessary for that reason, notifying the individuals that the data is being stored and why, deleting it upon a users request etc. |
What is a vested interest? We hear this phrase used a lot in political ranting, to describe various purportedly corrupt forces that are determined to do or maintain something due to an identifiable incentive. But it's just occurred to me that this is probably originally a legal term. What does it mean for an interested to be vested or unvested? | A vested interest is a type of property interest. Black's Law Dictionary provides this definition: Accrued; fixed; settled; absolute ; having the character or giving the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. In other words, a holder's interest in property is vested when he does not need to satisfy any further conditions before claiming his property. This is in contrast to a contingent interest which does not become vested until some condition is satisfied. In the United States, the most familiar example may be in the retirement context. An employer may offer to match your contributions to your 401(k) plan, with the match vesting after one year. In that case, your employer should deposit matching funds into an account in your name as soon as you begin work, but for the first 12 months, you do not actually have the right to access or use those funds. Once a year has passed, though, you are not required to do anything else to take control of the matching funds, so you are said to have a vested interest in those funds -- you may withdraw them if you please, and the employer no longer has any claim to them. The colloquial sense of vested interest is therefore inconsistent with the legal definition. For instance, in reporting on San Francisco District Attorney Chesa Boudin's reelection campaign, Fox News described writer Shaun King as having "a vested interest in the controversial DA," based on their mutual involvement in a nonprofit organization. But absent the repeal of the Thirteenth Amendment, it is not possible to have a vested interest in another person. Likewise, reports that a politician has a vested interest in some policy, that an international organization has a vested interest in global economic development or that a coach has a vested interest in his players' health make no sense when applying the legal definition. None of these things are property to begin with, let alone property that these people could actually be said to hold an interest in with no preconditions. It is likely that in the vast majority of cases, references to a "vested interest" should simply say "interest." | It is actually because "this is important". Under US law, disclaimers must be "conspicuous" (UCC 2-316). So you can talk regularly when you're just stating the terms, but if you're disclaiming liability, YOU MUST BE CONSPICUOUS ("to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous"). There are many ways to make text conspicuous, so bold or larger type would do, but all-caps is pretty bullet-proof from a technological perspective. Thanks to ohwilleke for salient citations: invalidation of a plain-type buried indemnification clause, all-caps clause held to be sufficient, law review article on the conspicuousness requirement. | "Why" someone did something is potentially off-topic, but in regards to your hierarchical image - it lacks provenance so cannot be tested, however according to the official judiciary website: The Master of the Rolls is second in judicial importance to the Lord Chief Justice. | In general it is illegal to gamble on life. However, you might not even need to go to a bookmaker: A contract that pays money upon the death of a specific person is known commercially as "life insurance." In order to avoid the moral hazard (or reality) of creating a contract killing market, it has long been illegal to trade life insurance with any person or entity who does not have an "insurable interest" in the insured. (See also: The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance, by Peter Swisher, who also has a good review of laws and regulations surrounding exceptions to the rule like viaticals and STOLI. Further reading on the subject here.) I don't know if it has been tested, but I think anyone could argue that they would face a significant financial loss if the U.S. President were killed or died in office: the stock markets plunged on JFK's assassination. Therefore, it could be both legal and possible for anyone to buy life insurance on the U.S. President. (Note that, in the U.S., the disputes about third-party life insurance have revolved for generations around the tax benefits associated with insurance premiums and benefits. See corporate-owned life insurance (COLI), a.k.a. "janitor's insurance.") | Let's say the trustee runs into a situation where the beneficiary demands some action, and the trustee thinks this action is a really, really bad idea. Then the trustee can either say "no". Or the trustee can say "yes" and be liable (so if the action is a really bad idea then the trustee won't do this). The trustee can NOT say "yes if you sign this paper that I'm not liable for the result of this action", because the job of the trustee is to protect the beneficiary and he wouldn't be doing that. | If I can summarise: Jane gave money to Joe on the understanding that he would give it to Bob, Joe kept the money. This is matter between Jane and Joe, Bob is not involved. Edit The OP has stated that Joe did give the money to Bob. In that case, Joe was acting as Jane's agent and he discharged his agency. This is a matter between Jane and Bob, Joe is involved only so far as he was a witness to what happened. | You've basically described two of the ends of the pole in theories of jurisprudence (there are dozens of ends). There is no theory of law that relies purely on "spirit" (also no theory that actually relies on the letters uses=d in writing law), instead, everybody interprets the text (the words enacted by the government) and some people supplement their interpretation with consideration of "other factors", such as assumed legislative purpose. Certain scholars and judges are inclined to put most weight on the actual wording of the law, while others are inclined to let purposive considerations dictate the interpretation of a law. Interpreting law by W.N. Eskridge is an informative guide to supplementing a reading of the statute with anciliary considerations. Antonin Scalia is the best-known proponent of the textualist approach. | My understanding is that the syndicate would be committing an act of extortion. Under the RICO Act, IF the politician conspired with the syndicate OR IF the politician had something like an 'understanding' with the syndicate, then they (any, and all involved) could be charged with the crime (extortion), racketeering and conspiracy. Additional crimes/laws to consider: Campaign finance violations Money laundering Compelled speech (1st Amendment) |
What sentences could be imposed on a terrorist (caught alive)? If a terrorist is caught alive, what sentence would the United States Supreme Court impose? What about the highest court in the Russian Federation? Is it death by hanging, life imprisonment, or execution with a revolver? | In the united-states, the Supreme Court would not impose a sentence; it would only consider whether the trial court imposed the correct sentence, which could include a death sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court has permitted death sentences for terrorists who have been captured alive. Most recently, the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty for the Boston Marathon bomber in in United States v. Tsarnaev, 142 S. Ct. 1024 (2022). I don't believe any state or the federal government uses hanging or revolvers to carry out death sentences at this point. Far more common are the electric chair, gas chambers, and lethal injections. Firing squads and hangings are technically legal in some states, but I don't know that any states actually use them. In russia, capital punishment is unconstitutional. When it was in practice, it was reportedly carried out by a single executioner with a handgun. There is talk of reinstating the death penalty, and of course, there is reason to believe Russia continues to carry out capital punishment extrajudicially. | Doing nothing is legally safer than doing something, but you're not without hope if you pull the lever. Although you'll likely have committed murder or at least manslaughter, case law is littered with lenience in exigent circumstances, even where convictions have been affirmed. Because this is a philosophical problem, there are plenty of opinions from that perspective, but not so many from a legal standpoint. Let's assume that you're an innocent bystander, (not an employee of the railway company or the train company, etc) and have no duty to act. If you do nothing, then it is unlikely that you would be charged with a crime - you had no duty to fulfill, and therefore not negligent. There's little doubt that not pulling the lever is the safer option. More interesting is when you choose to pull the lever - then it's probable that you would have charges of murder, or at least manslaughter, brought against you by the state. What defenses does the law offer? Let's assume that you are aware that pulling the lever will kill a person. The primary defence is a legal principle of necessity: where your criminal actions are not protected or excluded by some other statute or principle, the fact that you were obliged to take this action in order to prevent some greater harm may safeguard you from penalties. There are certain elements of necessity: That you did not create the danger that caused you to commit the crime; That you ceased the criminal activity as soon as practicably possible; That you had no reasonable alternative; and The harm that you prevented was greater than the harm that you caused. I see such a defense only possibly falling over on (4), where the prevented and caused harm, in the case of human lives, are inherently very subjective. Unfortunately, each state has different rulings regarding the threshold for evidence of this defense. One of the most famous cases where necessity was attempted as a defense to murder, with remarkable parallels to this hypothetical, is that of R v Dudley and Stephens: A crew of four found themselves on a lifeboat at sea with no food and no water, and with no prospect of rescue. One of them was a child (Parker) and was nearing death and unconscious. Two of them (Dudley and Stephens), after some discussion over drawing lots, decided that the child would be killed before his natural death, in order that his blood be better preserved for drinking. The last crew member, Brooks, was silent on the matter. After killing Parker, Dudley, Stephens and Brooks fed on Parker's body. During the trial, the matter of necessity as a defense to murder was considered. The judges found that there was no common law defence of necessity to murder, and Dudley and Stephens were sentenced to death with a recommendation for mercy. The Home Secretary commuted their sentences to six months' imprisonment. This case concerns essentially the choice you're making in the trolley problem: either the four crew members were going to die, or one of them would definitely die and the others might live. It's easy to say that they should have just waited, but they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. It's also a great example of a situation where although the law says one thing, it doesn't align with our morals and ethics, and while it's a UK case, I would wager that almost every lawyer in common law countries would have heard about it. | What Is Treason? Treason is the only crime defined in the U.S. Constitution, at Article III, Section 3 which says: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted. Now let's apply that to your examples. Options For Dealing With The Secretary Secretary X refuses to perform his duty, he can be fired. But does that count as treason? When would his refusal count as treason, if ever. I am assuming that Secretary X is a civilian and not an active duty member of the military forces. The law requires this but there is a process by which a waiver of that limitation can be obtained. But, it is useful in any case to point out the differences between a senior civilian governmental official and a member of the military (different issues still would apply to civilian civil servants who are not political employees and are members of a civil servant's union as well). It would be hard to imagine a fact pattern in which mere failure to perform his duties would constitute treason, although I wouldn't necessarily say that it is categorically impossible that such fact pattern might exist. The President could fire the Secretary for failure to perform his duty, or for that matter, for no reason whatsoever, and appoint someone else to be acting Secretary. If the Secretary also committed some crime by doing more than simply failing to act in some respect (e.g. engaging in espionage), the process would be the same as any other federal criminal prosecution. But, you could fire someone and deny them all authority immediately and without due process or cause, while you would need probable cause to bring criminal charges. Options For Dealing With General A General A is suspected of plotting treason either by conspiring with a foreign power or plotting a coup. The President can investigate the claims and find if there is probable cause to believe that General A is engaged in this conduct, and if so, can order the General's arrest. The General could be tried in a Court Martial for conduct in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but, treason is not a crime covered by the UCMJ. The applicable offense for a coup participant under the UCMJ would be Article 94: ART. 94. MUTINY OR SEDITION (a) Any person subject to this chapter who-- (1) with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, refuses, in concert with any other person, to obey orders or otherwise do his duty or creates any violence or disturbance is guilty of mutiny; (2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority, creates, in concert with any other person, revolt, violence, or disturbance against that authority is guilty of sedition; (3) fails to do his utmost to prevent and suppress a mutiny or sedition being committed in his presence, or fails to take all reasonable means to inform his superior commissioned officer or commanding officer of a mutiny or sedition which he knows or has reason to believe is taking place, is guilty of a failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition. (b) A person who is found guilty of attempted mutiny, mutiny, sedition, or failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court- martial may direct. The President, however, also has the power to order any member of the military to do just about anything, with or without cause. For example, the President would be entirely within his rights to order General A to report to the Barracks at Fort Levenworth (a military prison) or to a maintenance detail in a South Korean Army base, as active duty personnel individual assigned to that duty (i.e. not detained as a prisoner) and to await further orders. If General A disobeyed this order, then General A would have committed an offense under the UCMJ and could be detained and tried for violating a valid military order. Thus, the President could assign suspected coup participants to duties where they would not be helpful in carrying out a coup without due process even though he couldn't have them arrested on a mere suspicion, even under the UCMJ. The President can't just reduce the General's rank outright, as the General has a property interest in that rank earned over the course of a career. It would take a Courts-Martial to do that. But, the General could be assigned to a new post with the same rank at any time without due process. Suspension of Habeas Corpus Is the belief that a coup is underway enough evidence to suspend Posse Comitatus or Habeas Corpus. I'll address the first part of this question under this heading and the second part under the next heading. The suspension of Habeas Corpus is discussed at Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution (pertaining to the legislative branch) and states: The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. By implication, the fact that the provision is located in Article I pertaining to Congress and not Article II pertaining to the Presidency or Article III pertaining to the judicial branch, suggests that only Congress main suspend the writ of habeas corpus. A Civil War case addressed this separation of powers issue and held that the President may not suspend the Writ of Habeas corpus without the approval of Congress, but its status as valid precedent is contested: Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487), is a well-known and controversial U.S. federal court case which arose out of the American Civil War. It was a test of the authority of the President to suspend "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" under the Constitution's Suspension Clause, when Congress was in recess and therefore unavailable to do so itself. U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney ruled that the authority to suspend habeas corpus lay exclusively with Congress. The Executive Branch, including the Army, failed to comply with Taney's Merryman opinion, and John Merryman remained inaccessible to the judiciary (and the civilian legal authorities generally) while Congress remained in recess. Taney filed his Merryman decision with the United States Circuit Court for the District of Maryland, but it is unclear if Taney's decision was a circuit court decision. One view, based in part on Taney's handwritten copy of his decision in Merryman, is that Taney heard the habeas action under special authority granted to federal judges by Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. According to this view, Merryman was an in-chambers decision. Due to its vague jurisdictional locus and hastened disposition, the nature of the Merryman decision remains contested to this day. The separation of powers issue regarding the power of the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus was not addressed squarely in the later and more famous Ex Parte Milligan, 72 U.S. 2 (1866) (which undisputedly remains good law) which held that neither the President nor Congress could suspend the writ of habeas corpus to allow the trial of civilians within the United States by a military tribunal outside a war zone. As Wikipedia explains: The president's ability to suspend the writ of habeas corpus without congressional approval was not addressed in this case, most likely because it was a moot issue with respect to the case at hand. (President Lincoln suspended the writ nationwide on September 24, 1862, and Congress ratified this action on March 3, 1863, with the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act. Milligan was detained in October 1864, more than a year after Congress formally suspended the writ.) The intertwined political and legal history of habeas corpus suspension in the United States is addressed here. A coup is generally not an invasion, although it could be if coordinated with a foreign power. Instead, a coup would probably be a form of a rebellion, which could justify the suspension of habeas corpus. So, Congress could probably suspend the writ of habeas corpus if it felt that a particular coup was a rebellion. A Congressional determination that a particular coup was a rebellion for purposes of suspension of the writ of habeas corpus would probably be a political question beyond court review. But, Congress could do this only once the rebellion was actually in progress and not merely contemplated. This is because, as Milligan makes clear, suspending habeas corpus in advance of an active rebellion that prevents the courts from functioning is unconstitutional anyway. Honestly though, suspension of habeas corpus would probably be pretty irrelevant in a coup. Typically, a coup lasts for a matter of hours or days, maybe a couple of weeks tops. Courts in which one could seek redress from allegedly unlawful detention using a writ of habeas corpus simply don't act that fast, and Congress would be hard pressed to act that fast as well. The coup will have prevailed (in which case the constitution is basically irrelevant) or will have failed (in which case habeas corpus will provide little relief to coup participants) by the time that the courts can get involved. Also, since a coup generally involves members of the military, whose habeas corpus rights arise only once they have exhausted their avenues for relief under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the writ of habeas corpus wouldn't be a remedy available to them anyway. The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus would only be relevant to civilians involved in the coup, who are tried after Congress has suspended the writ, and who have been detained long enough for judicial relief from military detention to be relevant. Also, the post-9-11 experience has been that, contrary to common belief, civilian courts are actually a faster way of resolving cases of non-uniformed persons who commit violent, war-like acts than military tribunals and impose penalties that are just as harsh as those imposed by military tribunals. Convicting these people turns out to be easy. Indeed, in practice, many rebels and terrorists openly admit their crimes without even receiving plea bargains in exchange. So, there would be little benefit to be gained from suspending the writ of habeas corpus in order to allow the use of military tribunals rather than civilian courts to punish civilian participants in a coup. Why Would The President Want To Suspend Posse Comitatus? It makes no sense, however, to talk about suspending the Posse Comitatus Act during a coup, which is exactly the opposite of what you would want the military to do in that situation, if you are the legitimate President. You would want to suspend the Posse Comitatus Act and related laws when there was a grass roots insurgency or an invasion that had not penetrated the military, not during a coup. A coup d'etat is the recognition of the authority of someone other than the legitimate political leaders of a country as the leader of a country in a manner that denies the legitimate political leaders of a country authority by its own military or some subset of that military. The Posse Comitatus Act passed in 1878, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, is a criminal law passed by Congress that makes it a crime to use the military to enforce domestic law, especially criminal law, within the territory of the United States outside military bases (although the term Posse Comitatus is sometimes used more colloquially to refer to a group of laws and regulations with the same effect including but not limited to the true Posse Comitatus Act, such as the Insurrection Act of 1807, 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335). In a coup, by definition, the military is following illegitimate leaders and the whole point is to prevent martial law from being imposed by the military in that situation, which Posse Comitatus is supposed to prevent them from doing. Coup participants could be prosecuted for violating the Posse Comitatus Act by imposing martial law while they are members of the U.S. military on active duty. It would make no sense for the President to suspend it. | Murder is one of the few cases where the intention and not just the act is relevant. The act – killing a person – is the same for Mord and Totschlag, whereas fahrlässige Tötung covers acts that have caused the death of a person. The language of the Stgb labels the perpetrator who killed someone as a murderer or manslaughterer depending on their intention. That a person and not an act is punished is often criticized, but it has no practical consequence. Clearly, the intention isn't that the second one is free. Courts are able to interpret the law reasonably. However, the distinction between two kinds of killings seems to have no basis in reality and robs courts from flexibility to find a just sentence. There are occasional attempts at reform, but none will be successful while CDU/CSU is part of the government. | First, I need to correct a misconception you seem to have. The length of time you spend in jail does not normally determine if something is a felony or a misdemeanor. Whether something is a felony or a misdemeanor is based on how you're charged. And it's not like you happen to be charged with something with a maximum sentence of 365 or 366 days; if you are being charged with a felony, it's because the decision was made that your alleged crime was serious and should be treated as a felony. If you're being charged with a misdemeanor, ditto. Prosecutors charge knowing the difference between the two. The distinction was not originally "punishable by more than a year in prison" vs. "punishable by at most a year." In fact, it originated well before the idea that the default punishment for most crimes is confinement for a term, where the term is dependent on the severity of the crime. The original distinction was about forfeiture. A felony was a violation of a feudal relationship between a lord and a vassal; if a vassal violates their duty of loyalty to their lord, their relationship ends and their property is forfeit to that lord. Not all serious crimes were felonies. Murder was normally not a felony, because it didn't violate that duty of loyalty. Later on (post-Normans), murder and other serious crimes did result in forfeiture. The term broadened to include these crimes; at this point, "felony" meant "this crime results in your property being forfeit." These were also the most severe crimes. This is the point where "felony" meaning "exceptionally severe crime" really became established. However, the technical distinction based on forfeiture became muddied, because of another punishment that almost always went along with it: execution. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, complained that people are mixing these two up. The meaning generally shifted to "crimes which were punished by death," but scholars did know that the proper meaning should really be "crimes punished with forfeiture." The distinction mattered. Because felonies were so serious, the procedure involved differed in several respects. I happen to know you're in the US and my main source is also about the US, so let's hop across the Atlantic Ocean to the colonies. Here, forfeiture was pretty much unknown around the time of independence. The popular understanding of "felony" was still "capital crime;" the legal understanding tended to be "the common-law felonies plus things the legislature designated as a felony." Nearer the end of the 18th century, the number of crimes punishable by death dropped substantially in the US. The default punishment for most serious crimes shifted from execution to confinement in a prison (this is when prison became the default sentence for even very serious crimes in the US). These new prisons were very different from the older jails: they were designed to reform their inmates, and turn them into productive members of society. But not all crimes need that; with less serious crimes, you don't have to go about fixing a character flaw, you just have to show to the criminal that doing this bad thing results in this punishment. The lack of a firm definition of felony became a serious problem shortly after this change. Originally in the US, things worked basically like in England. Legislatures passed laws, which might refer to older laws by name, but there was no organizing principle. Lots of the criminal law was bound up in precedent. It was extremely difficult to find out for sure what the law even was. Instead, there was a major push to codify the law. That means you would have a code, which contained, in organized form, all the laws relating to crime. One of the earliest and most influential American penal codes was actually never adopted. It was written by Edward Livingstone for Louisiana, and was intended to wholly supplant the common law (Louisiana would be the perfect state for this, because it still has a civil law tradition). Livingston didn't use the term "felony," but did distinguish between "crimes" and "misdemeanors." The main systematic difference was not in the penal code itself (the punishments were set out on a crime-by-crime basis), but in the corrections code. Crimes were punished in a penitentiary designed to reform the prisoner; misdemeanors were punished by simple imprisonment. Crimes were all punished by more than a year, while misdemeanors could be punished by anywhere from a few days to two years. The important thing was where and how you were punished, not for how long. While this code was never adopted, it had a major influence on the New York code of 1829. The New York code was designed to rationalize the law, but not do too much in the way of substantive changes. In particular, the old idea of a "felony" was not abolished; it was preserved, with real significance (part of the point of keeping the term was that they didn't want to lose all its baggage), and so it needed a definition. They basically adopted Livingstone's definition. Felonies were always the more serious crimes; since serious crimes were now evidence of character flaws to be reformed in a penitentiary, the crimes where you got sent for reform were the felonies (plus, of course, those punished by death). All others were misdemeanors. They also decided that punishment for more than a year, in a jail that's not designed to reform you, was bad; no jail sentence could be more than a year. Since confinement continues to be the main form of punishment, this definition has managed to stick without issue. The forfeiture and capital punishment definitions became obsolete as those punishments became completely obsolete or very, very limited in use. That's pretty much how things got where they are now. It makes some amount of sense to distinguish between bad crimes and not-so-bad crimes, without needing to list out the bad crimes. This is not actually unique to English law; the French penal code also makes this distinction. The term survived the feudal context in which it originated because it was useful. As confinement became the main type of punishment, and as (at the same time) confinement for serious crimes was paired with efforts to reform and rehabilitate criminals, the old distinction shifted to distinguishing between things where you needed that reform and things where you just needed punishment. Then, it shifted in some places to being about the length of said punishment, as an alternative way of expressing the same basic idea but which could be more easily applied to varying systems. Main source: Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early American Republic, 57 Clev. St. L. Rev. 461 (2009) | Murder carries certain penalties, and attempted murder is distinguished from murder only with respect to penalty. Without the circumstances allowing execution, the punishments are life without parole, life with possible parole after 20 years, or a definite term of 50 years with possible parole after 20. There are separate "enhancements" for crimes against elders or use of a deadly weapon, and if these circumstances exist, they are applicable to both murder and attempted murder. In all cases of enhancements, the enhancement cannot exceed the penalty for the crime (also, it runs consecutively). The punishment for attempted murder is not the same as the punishment for murder: since murder is a class A felony, attempted murder is defined as a class B felony, which has a penalty between 2 and 20 years. Compare that to actual murder which carries a minimum sentence of 50 years. In no case can a person committing actual murder serve less time than a person attempting murder, even with "enhancements". | It’s complicated. Most crimes in DC that would be state crimes elsewhere are punished under the DC Code, which was at one point written by Congress but which the DC Council now has the power to amend (subject to Congress’s right to change it at any time). Crimes under the DC Code are tried in the DC Superior Court, which is generally considered a local court. Its judges are appointed by the President (subject to Senate confirmation) for 15-year terms, but the President must pick from a list made by a commission with both federal and local membership. Appeals from Superior Court go to the DC Court of Appeals, which is not the same as the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit. From the DC Court of Appeals, appeals go to SCOTUS just like appeals from state supreme courts. Prosecution can be done by the city Attorney General (normally handles misdemeanors) or the federal US Attorney for the DC District (normally handles felonies). Jails are handled by a city department, prison terms are handled by the federal BOP. DC is in the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States, so many generic federal crimes apply there. However, in practice they are not charged in US District Court as violations of the US Code but in DC Superior Court as violations of the DC Code. For double jeopardy and many other constitutional purposes, the DC Code has to comply with restrictions on federal power. This is part of the reason Heller was brought in DC: gun rights groups wanted to set a precedent under the 2nd Amendment before they had to argue that it applied to the states under the 14th. | So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification. |
Can you sue yourself under the TX anti-abortion law? The text of Sec. 171.208. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OR AIDING OR ABETTING VIOLATION. reads (emph. mine) (a) Any person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any person who Does this mean that you can sue yourself for intending to have an abortion, admit to the planned abortion, pay the statutory damages to yourself in 1000 terms of $10 (or in one go if that doesn't cause other issues), and then file those thousand receipts as proof that the statutory damages have been paid in full. After which any future action brought by anyone else for that specific abortion will have to be dismissed because: (c) Notwithstanding Subsection (b), a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed or induced in violation of this subchapter, or for the particular conduct that aided or abetted an abortion performed or induced in violation of this subchapter. Would this be a viable defense against this law? Can those damages be forced to be payed to anyone other than the plaintiff? Are there any other gotchas with this perceived loophole? | You'd be confessing to committing a crime. I'm not a lawyer, but I wouldn't recommend trying it. Sure, if this trick worked, you might be able to clear yourself of civil remedies, but there's a much bigger problem with this: with the repeal of Roe vs Wade, Texas once more criminalised abortion, and so this tactic would, by necessity, require confessing to a crime in a court of law. While that law expressly prohibited the levying of penalties against the pregnant woman, the law allowing for lawsuits against people who "aid and abet" abortions didn't seem to apply to them either. As such, you'd be opening yourself up to fines of tens of thousands of dollars and a maximum prison sentence of life in jail. | Keep in mind that there are two kinds of legal consequences. One is criminal liability for violating a criminal statute, in a prosecution that must usually be brought by a government official. Merely causing emotional distress, in and of itself, is not generally a crime. For that matter, inducing someone to have sex with you through lies about anything other than the identity of the person having sex is usually not a crime. But inducing someone to disclose secrets or take actions that they otherwise would not have taken based upon a statement like this could be wire fraud, theft, extortion, or a variety of other crimes, depending upon what the person A was induced to do by the messages. Knowing what was sent, in isolation, doesn't tell you everything you need to know. While practicing medicine or other healing arts without a license is a crime or at least a civil offense, this wouldn't necessarily qualify, because person B is pretending to create someone treating person B, not pretending to practice medicine on person A. No one who wasn't in on the prank had medicine purportedly practiced upon them. But if the text were use to cause someone to act in reliance on a medical opinion (e.g., to get an employer to grant family leave to person A) then it might be illegal practice of medicine. The second is civil liability, in the form of a lawsuit for committing a civil wrong, called a "tort" or breaching a contract, or for other private individual initiated requests for remedies. The conduct in the question, conceivably gives rise to civil liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, or civil fraud. But to know that it isn't enough to know what was said. One also has to know what happened on the other end of the communication. Did person A believe the text? Did person A suffer extreme emotional distress? Did person A part with money or information that couldn't have been obtained without a false statement of fact? Was person A's reputation harmed somehow? | Your personal liability depends on your state law regarding the family car doctrine, so the answer there is "maybe" (Texas is not a state with that doctrine, so simple ownership of the car does not confer liability). You would be liable if your supervision of the child was negligent, which means approximately that you knew or should have known that she was a bad driver and would cause damage. Still, the insurance company is suppose to indemnify you (plural) against such loses, as long as they are legally required to do so. That would include many considerations, such as whether the driver was covered under the policy, whether the car was being used contrary to the terms of the policy (being used commercially), and so on. The insurance company is entitled to make a reasonable determination of whether they are responsible for the loss (and if so, to what extent). If they actually decline to cover the loss, you would need to sue them to make them comply with the terms of the policy (and your lawyer would give you a detailed explanation of why they are not liable, in case they aren't). The plaintiff works with his insurance company to recover his insured losses, and with his lawyer to recover any uninsured losses. His insurance company works with your insurance company, up to a point, and then the lawyers get involved. Your daughter does not work with his insurance company, and your insurance company probably has said something along the line "only talk to us". The insurance that a driver typically has may cover some of their own medical costs, but does not provide a payment for "pain and suffering": that is an uninsured loss. It is not generally required that drivers carry insurance to cover their own medical expenses – it is required that they insure against damages, in general, suffered by other parties (if the defendant is at fault). So there is probably nothing for the plaintiff to work out with his insurance company. In Texas, if the defendant is entirely at fault, defendant will be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 90% at fault, defendant will be liable for 90% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 49% at fault, defendant is not liable. Defendant can, in any event, also sue for damages, so if defendant is 49% at fault, defendant can recover 49% of her damages. The insurance companies might be able to talk it out and reach a clear resolution of the matter, but it could be more in their interest to throw the dice and work it out in court. One can always sue at the very start, and drop the suit if it becomes advantageous. | Short Answer No. The immigration applicant is generally not entitled to his or her attorney fees in this situation, even though the government is violating one of its own laws. Long Answer The Black Letter Law Question The Right To Fees Depends On The Legal Theory Advanced A consistent answer doesn't exist at the level of generality of the title question. Some of the statutes that relate to a violation of the law by a government official include an attorney fees remedy to a prevailing plaintiff, while others do not. Violations of constitutional rights enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 entitle a prevailing plaintiff to an attorney fees award. But the immigration law is a statutory requirement not a constitutional one and there is no generalized constitutional right to have the U.S. government comply with every provision of every enacted statute. Indeed, the general rule is that enforcement of statutory rights against private individuals is discretionary and non-justiciable. A writ of mandamus filed to compel the federal government to take action as it is required to do under the immigration laws would usually arise under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which does not generally entitle the prevailing plaintiff to attorneys' fees, and that would probably be the case in an All Writs Act petition for a writ of mandamus filed in relation to the timely processing of an immigration application. But the All Writs Act is basically a statutory touchstone through which the door is opened to the entire pre-Revolutionary War English common law of writ practice as modified in a common law manner through case law by the American federal courts, and there are probably some exceptions in fact patterns beyond the scope of the question. This said, I am not an expert in immigration law and it is possible that there are administrative law remedies under either the federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA) or the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) which might provide a different solution to the same problem. Article III Court Litigation Is The Rare Exception In Immigration Cases Keep in mind that most immigration law matters are in the exclusive original jurisdiction of the immigration courts, which are not Article III courts, and are instead staffed by administrative law judges operating according to immigration court procedures, which must then be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and only after those remedies are exhausted may most immigration cases be brought before an Article III court which in that case is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the case arose within the immigration court system. And, appellate review of BIA decisions is quite limited. Perhaps someone more familiar with the federal APA and INA would know if there is any right to attorneys' fees under those acts, although I suspect that the answer is that there is not. Indeed, the fact that Article III litigation is such a rare exception to the general rule is one of the reasons that this problem has not been viewed as a crisis that is critical to fix. It is easier to find alternative funding to litigate cases that come up only dozens of times a year than it is to do so for issues in cases that are routine and pervasive. Exceptions Apply Where There Is Wrongful Government Litigation Conduct Also, while attorney fees are not recoverable as a matter of course in actions arising under the All Writs Act where there is not a common law right to attorney fees in a particular fact pattern, attorney fee awards may still be entered in an action under the All Writs Act, or under any other cause of action in federal court, as a sanction for wrongful litigation conduct. There are three kinds of sanctions for wrongful litigation conduct that commonly arise: Rule 11 If a party files a legal document in a federal court case which is frivolous (i.e. lacks any colorable legal basis), groundless (i.e. lacks any factual basis), or vexatious (i.e. is made for the purposes of harassing a party or delaying the case for no legitimate purpose even if it is not otherwise frivolous or groundless), then an attorney fees award may be made as a sanction proportionate to the fees incurred as a result of the wrongful litigation conduct under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Discovery Sanctions If a party fails to obey the rules governing pre-trial disclosure of information in "discovery" forcing the other party to enforce those obligations in motion practice prior to trial, one of the remedies that the court may (and often does) provide for this wrongful conduct is to award attorney fees to the party that requested the information and did not receive the response that party was entitled to under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Contempt of Court If a party or someone else with knowledge of the court order and some relationship to a party fails to obey a court order, or if someone who is present in the courtroom engages in conduct disrespectful to the court in the court's actual presence, party who engaged in this misconduct may be held in contempt of court. Contempt of court may be criminal, simply punishing the wrongdoer for misconduct in the same way that one might for a misdemeanor violation, or civil, imposing incarceration or fines or other remedies until the wrongdoer complies with a court order. When someone is held in contempt of court, the sanction for doing so frequently involves an award of attorneys fees incurred as a result of the wrongful action by a party to the case against the wrongdoer. Of these three options, the third, contempt of court, has the most bite as a practical matter. If a judge orders the immigration agency to meet a deadline by a certain time and it fails to do so, which isn't an uncommon result when it has already failed to do so despite receiving formal complaints about the delays, it is very likely that the sanction for failing to meet the court ordered deadline to comply will result in an attorney fees sanction against the government. Does This Rule Encourage Misbehavior? what would prevent the government from always abusing its power? It may decide to process applications as slow as possible, and only process an application in a timely manner if a lawsuit is filed against the government (at the expense of the applicant); but without any further financial consequences to the government. Sometimes Government Officials Do The Right Thing Because It's Their Job In any political and legal system, we have to count on some of the key actors to follow the law not because there are consequences for not following the law, but because their job is to uphold the law. For example, we trust judges and juries to try and rule in accordance with the facts presented to them and the relevant law in the cases they decide in court, even though both judges and juries have absolute immunity from liability for their official judicial acts. The President, and every single other federal government official, federal judge and federal administrative law judge, is likewise sworn to uphold the constitution of the United States, and the President and everyone else in the executive branch acting with authority delegated to them from the President's Executive Branch power has a duty to "faithfully execute the laws" of the United States. Presidential elections represent (theoretically anyway) the judgment of the American people concerning who is most able to do that job properly and to make good choices about how to exercise discretion in doing so. Also, as a practical matter, many snarls in the immigration process are handled by members of Congress in their constituent service role or through the passage of private laws, rather than by attorneys for the applicants in the Article III court, in part precisely because individual litigants can rarely afford to pay lawyers to do that. Almost every Senator and members of the House of Representatives (539 in all including non-voting delegates who still get staff), where I worked as an intern for a while, has a staff member who devotes perhaps 1/4 to 1/2 FTE to resolving cases like this one. Sometimes Delays Are Unavoidable And Not Due To Official Misconduct The wrongfulness of the delay is also mitigated by the fact that often delays are not due to any bad faith conduct on behalf of the federal government officials involved. It is not infrequently the case that it is impossible for federal government officials to do the job that Congress have given them a mandate to carry out, by the deadlines that Congress has set forth, with the funds that Congress has appropriated to them to get the job done. This is true not just in the immigration law context, but in all sorts of circumstances. The Political System's Design Naturally Disfavors Immigrants Of course, politicians and government officials often don't do everything that they are supposed to do for reasons that aren't noble or blameless. The administration in place for the last four years as of the time that this answer is written specifically campaigned on a platform of radically reducing legal immigration and largely succeeded in doing so, even though it lost many particular legal battles on that front. This wouldn't be the first time that this has happened. Immigrants, by definition, are made up of a class of people who can't vote in Presidential or Congressional elections and, as the median voter theorem would predict, their interests as non-voters fall to the bottom of the political priorities. The U.S. Legal System Is Applying Rules Designed For Different Contexts The other reason that this happens is that it evolved that way. There are a lot of good policy reasons (beyond the scope of this answer) for the American Rule that each side bears their own attorney fees in lawsuits between private parties. In a nutshell, it encourages people not to litigate minor disputes and encourages settlements that reduce the deadweight loss of transaction costs associated with litigation in lawsuits where there are substantial amounts in controversy. There are good arguments for the opposite rule as well, which is why there are many exceptions to it and why the English legal system, post-1789, ultimately ended up changing its default fee shifting rule. But when that rule was put in place, "public law" (i.e. lawsuits between the government and private individuals and between governments) was largely outside the jurisdiction of the common law courts that are the ancestors of the modern U.S. court system. The general rule was that you couldn't sue the government or government officials at all, and there were few exceptions and the scope of government regulation in people's lives was much smaller, although that was starting to change. Other Countries Adopt The Rule You Propose In contrast, in French law, under the First Republic, sovereign immunity from its citizens (that survived in England) was abolished, and the Republic established a separate legal system for handling public law disputes, under the supervision of the French Council of State, that has endured through the present. In the French system, copied in principle (although not every administrative detail) by essentially all other countries with a civil law legal system, once you file a public law complaint (on a form you can purchase at your neighborhood convenience store), the Council of State assigns one public law lawyer (basically a senior civil servant and not a member of the same legal professions as private law lawyers and notaries and prosecutors and judges) to represent the government in your case, and assigns another one from the same pool of government lawyers to represent its citizens in the case, in a manner similar to how barristers are assigned to serious criminal cases on a case by case basis in the British criminal justice system. There is a lot to be said for the civil law approach. Historically, it has led to government bureaucracies that are better run and treat citizens more fairly and with less corruption, relative to U.S. style systems, which is an important reason why state owned enterprises are much more popular in countries with civil law systems than in countries without them. But that simply isn't the path that U.S. law has taken, even though there are good arguments that the U.S. system is more vulnerable to being unfair. Various Workarounds And Limitations Prevent Worst Case Scenarios Still, because government officials do try to follow the law as best they can most of the time (especially career civil servants who implement the political appointee's policies), and because really outrageous litigation conduct by government lawyers who take unreasonable positions in public law litigation can result in judicial sanctions, the system still does provide some means for relief when the government violates the law. Finally, the fact that attorney fees aren't shifted in these cases doesn't mean that these cases aren't litigated. In some cases, the individual or their sponsor can afford to litigate the issue. In some cases, immigration attorneys litigate the issue pro bono (i.e. without charge to the client) because the issue has importance to their ability to deliver results to all their other clients or as a form of charitable giving and, in some cases, local governments fund this litigation on behalf of their non-citizen residents or non-profit advocacy groups fund this kind of litigation from private donations. For example, the City of Denver is among those local governments that has established a fund to help pay lawyers to litigate immigration issues on behalf of its residents to address the financial barriers those residents face to enforcing their legal rights under federal immigration laws. So, in an example of the Coase Theorem of economics, even when the formal legal arrangements and rules of a system are non-optimal, a free market economy tends to find workarounds that reallocate unfair burdens in a way that is sufficient to make the system as a whole function better. | Defamation that is actionable in court in the United States consists of a false statement about a presently existing fact that damages your reputation and is not a matter of opinion. While not strictly required in a case involving private parties that is not a matter of public concern, most defamation cases require proof that the false statement was made knowing it was false or with reckless disregard for the truth (which basically means with no factual basis and no ability to know if it is true or false). Hyperbole is excluded. Statements made to you personally cannot be defamatory, since you know the truth. For example, claims that you were falsely called mentally ill might be considered statement of opinion or hyperbole. Similarly, if the person who said you weren't being hacked actually believed this was true (e.g. the pastor's assistant might believe this based upon what the pastor who was knowledgeable about computers might have told the assistant), then that might also not be actionable. Most states have quite short statutes of limitations for defamation. For example, in Colorado, the statute of limitations is one year from the date that you learn that a statement was made to another person. Some kinds of defamatory statements (slander per se) do not require proof that you suffered actual damage to your reputation. Other kinds of defamatory statements do require hard proof of your economic damages. Harassment does not neatly fit into one legal category. There could be claims for intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress, for breach of fiduciary duty owed by a pastor to a parishioner, for sexual harassment if factually appropriate, or for retaliation for certain kinds of lawful conduct. None of these are particularly easy to prove and again, the statute of limitations is not terribly long, typically two or three years from an incident. Both defamation and harassment claims would be subject to first amendment immunities to the extent that they involved a religious official who could be legitimately characterized as carrying out a religious function in making the statements. Given the events you describe, this is probably a weak defense, but it would certainly pose one more hurdle to a lawsuit. Another remedy for harassment and stalking, in addition to or instead of money damages in a lawsuit, might be to seek a restraining order against the people who are the source of the problem if you could really prove it with evidence that is admissible in a court of law that a judge would be likely to find to be more credible than the lies that they try to tell to defend themselves in court. Finally, many forms of hacking violate state and federal laws and one of the federal laws, at least, contains a right to bring a private lawsuit against the hacker to enforce it. The first amendment religion and free speech clauses would not generally protect any hacking activity either. But, proving that someone is guilty of hacking, even in the face of strong circumstantial evidence, is often very difficult. For example, even if you can prove that the hacking originated at an IP address belonging to the pastor, proving that the pastor was actually the person at the keyboard and not a friend of his or another family member of his, might be quite difficult to prove. Also, as in the cases of defamation and harassment, quantifying your money damages could be difficult. Stalking and hacking are also both usually criminal offenses so you could file a complaint with a law enforcement agency, although many law enforcement agencies lack the ability and competence to understand and investigate hacking cases and the inclination to deal firmly with allegations of stalking. There are practical steps that can be taken to prevent hacking from a technological angle, although I am not competent to tell you what they are, and your post doesn't provide sufficient detail to know in any case. Obviously, this isn't a legal solution. You can also be mindful in your daily life to act in a manner that mitigates your exposure to stalking although there are limits to how effective this non-legal solution can be as well. You can combat character assassination with non-legal PR and counter-gossip approaches as well as with lawsuits. Ultimately, you need to decide what to do and may need to confer with a lawyer and give that lawyer detailed factual information to evaluate your claims, and you may or may not decide that the legal system is a good solution. Proving incidents in a he said, she said situation, especially when one of the people involved is an outwardly respected pastor who has no qualms about lying and gas lighting, can be very difficult - so in the absence of proof, you may need to figure out how to develop proof before it is sensible to sue and you may not have much time to do that. You are unfortunately in a situation with no easy solution, just a variety of second best options, and you have to decide which ones to pursue. You also need to focus not on what remedies the law allows, or what wrongs have been done by the perpetrators. Instead, you need to focus on what will maximize your personal well being. Some people find that litigation can bring closure and relief, but ultimately, you can't control what the criminal justice system does and you have only partial control over what happens in a civil lawsuit. The litigation process prevents you from letting go of the matter if you later decide that is what will serve you best, can be costly, can be unjust, and can be aggravating. In terms of time, treasure and its impact on you emotionally, it can be a very expensive solution and can force you into a position where you are not in control. If the court finds that your evidence isn't solid enough, you could end up worse off, rather than better off, as a result of a civil lawsuit. And, usually, you can not get your attorneys' fees as part of your damages in a civil lawsuit for defamation or some kinds of harassment (such as intentional infliction of emotional distress) even if you prevail. Ultimately, a court in a civil action for wrongful conduct can award you money, but can't vindicate you morally or remove that person from his position in the organization. Also, if you win a money judgment, you still have to identify assets or income from which you can collect it and many of these claims would not be covered by any insurance policy. And, ultimately, a restraining order, while potentially a helpful tool in helping to get the wrong doers to back off, is just a piece of paper stating your rights and describing conduct that would be wrongful and punished if proven, not a magical shield that prevents someone from violating that restraining order just as they have violated your dignity and reasonable expectations of civil treatment and probably your legal rights already. You have to decide what your personal objectives are and how best to achieve them without getting unduly focused on the limited and imperfect options that the legal system provides. | As a lawsuit, it doesn't make sense in U.S. law unless you have suffered significant injuries. Your damages are likely to be, at most, nominal ($1) if you discovered it before you were hurt, so you'd only lose the money spent replacing the jar of peanut butter with a non-defective one and the nominal $1 damages. You would not generally have a right to any of your attorneys' fees and personal time spent on a lawsuit like that which would likely cost tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars on an hourly basis (no attorney would take a case like that on a contingency basis), and would take hundreds of hours of your own personal time. | There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake. | Is there a cause of action for "Outrageous conduct" that does not depend on the vulnerability to the emotional distress of an individual but might be properly applied to a public official (acting in official capacity) due to the effects on society as a whole? No. There is no such cause of action. A public official acting in the official's official capacity is immune from civil liability in tort for intentional acts that do not violate a clearly established constitutional right. There are some narrow exceptions to this general rule. For example, certain employment discrimination lawsuits are allowed. Similarly, for example, embezzlement of private funds held in a fiduciary capacity by a public official in charge of conducting foreclosures would be actionable in many states. But there are no exceptions that are in any way a fit to the fact pattern described. Furthermore, at least in federal courts, there can't be such a cause of action. An action that has an effect on society as a whole is, by definition, an act which no one has standing to sue regarding. Standing to sue, which is a subject matter jurisdictional requirement in federal court, requires a particularized injury to a legally protected interest of an individual that is distinct from the injury caused to the general public, or taxpayers generally, or citizens generally. State law, in principle, can give standing to someone who does not have standing under this federal constitutional law standard in state court, but most states make only the most narrow exceptions to the principle. For example, some states give someone standing to sue for violation of state constitutional budget and tax rules that apply to legislation generally. Often standing exceptions and exceptions from the federal court case and controversy requirement (which is also a matter of subject matter jurisdiction in federal court) are waived at the same time. |
Does revocation of U.S. passport imply revocation of U.S. citizenship? When a U.S. passport is explicitly revoked (in contrast to it, say, simply expiring), does that also imply revocation of the holder's U.S. citizenship? For example, when the U.S. revoked Ed Snowden's U.S. passport, did he yet remain a U.S. citizen, as he seems to assume himself and as Wikipiedia (which now lists both his U.S. and Russian citizenship as current) seems to also assume? I, too, would assume so, i.e., that revocation of passport does not imply revocation citizenship. That would also be consistent with the Wikipedia article about U.S. Passports, which explicitly states (emphasis mine) The lack of a valid passport (for whatever reason, including revocation) does not render the U.S. citizen either unable to leave the United States, or inadmissible into the United States. which would be a rather useless statement if all holders of a revoked passport were no longer citizens. Nonetheless, news media seem to often conflate these two things and I didn't yet find a clear direct statement that they are distinct. | People often use "passport" as a metonym of "citizenship," but that should not lead one to mistake the two. Notably, many US citizens live their entire lives without having a passport. A fairly brief search didn't turn up an explicit statement from an official government source that passport revocation does not affect US citizenship, but that is quite clearly the case if one reads between the lines of the fairly sizeable statutory and regulatory provisions governing both. Nationality law is codified at 8 USC 1401 and following, with the sections governing loss of nationality beginning at 8 USC 1481. The regulations concerning nationality generally are found at 8 CFR 301 and following, but there are not many regulations concerning loss of nationality. Passport law is found in an entirely different title of the US Code, and titles are the highest level of division in the code. It is in 22 USC 411 and following. There are provisions that restrict eligibility for a passport scattered around in there without any section applying specifically to passport revocation. That is found in the related regulations. Passport regulations are codified at 22 CFR Part 51, with revocation being the subject of Subpart E, which is 51.60 and following. There may be an explicit statement in the regulations that passport revocation does not affect citizenship. I did not look very thoroughly. But a bit of logical reasoning shows why it must be so: The conditions for loss of US nationality are very well defined. They are also fairly tightly circumscribed by several decisions of the US supreme court in the decades following the second world war. The conditions for revocation of a passport are much less strict; as an example, a passport may be revoked under 22 CFR 51.62 and 51.60 if the bearer "is the subject of an outstanding Federal warrant of arrest for a felony, including a warrant issued under the Federal Fugitive Felon Act (18 U.S.C. 1073)." US nationality is required to hold a US passport, but US nationals do not need to have a US passport. Therefore, a US passport may be revoked for a reason that cannot lead to loss of US nationality, and, when that happens, US nationality is retained. The condition mentioned in point 2 is clearly insufficient for depriving someone of US nationality, not least because the subject of an arrest warrant is only suspected of having committed a crime. Depriving a suspect of their liberty is acceptable to the extent necessary to bring that person to trial, but further deprivations beyond that end would violate the constitution's guarantee of due process. A word on "nationality" and "citizenship" in US law is in order, lest the use of the two terms seem inconsistent or arbitrary. US nationality is broader than US citizenship. All US citizens are US nationals, so loss of US nationality implies loss of US citizenship. However, there are some people who are US nationals without being US citizens, so it is more precise to speak of "loss of nationality" than "loss of citizenship," and indeed that is the term used in US nationality law. | No A government performing the functions of government (like issuing a visa) is not in a contractural relationship with the person they are doing it for so there is no basis in contract law for such a suit. It might be arguable that they were negligent, however, first they would have to agree to be sued as they have sovereign immunity, secondly you would need to prove that they owed you a duty of care which I am far from sure they do and thirdly you would need to prove that they breached it which I don't think they did. | In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order. | There is no possibility of legally holding a country "to account" for an action. An individual could be legally tried for a crime (murder), and a country could via a political process be made to suffer the consequences if a leader performs some act (it need not be illegal). Germany, Iran and Russia have historically suffered certain consequences of actions held to be "officially sanctioned", and individuals such as Adolf Eichmann have been specifically punished; Fahad Shabib Albalawi and 4 others were sentanced to death for involvement in Khashoggi's murder. Punitive recourse against a country is always via political / military action. Khashoggi, specifically, was apparently a lawful permanent resident of the US, which is probably sufficient connection to the US for a suit based in the Alien Tort Statute. There have been various suits filed against individuals under this act, some of which succeeded, for example Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876. An individual could be sued under the Alien Tort Statute, but a foreign government enjoys sovereign immunity (the US government has limited its liability on that grounds, but Saudi Arabia has not). His fiance might then sue some individual, but Saudi Arabia itself could not be "held to account". | Yes. A domestic passport is sufficient photo ID for any purpose (other than driving or establishing state residency) and is expressly authorized as sufficient ID for employment on a form I-9 and for banking "know your customer" rules. Indeed, for some purposes, even an expired passport is sufficient ID as it establishes citizenship. | You've asked a two part question. [Is this a violation of] the international policy that a country should never refuse entry to verified citizens of their own? In considering that question, the US example may be illuminative. The US requires US citizens to have a "passport book" when flying into the US, even though the US issues "passport cards" that serve as proof of nationality. If you can get to the border and prove your US nationality (by passport card or otherwise), they'll let you in, but airlines won't board you unless you have a passport book. If you don't have a passport book, you're supposed to get to the nearest consulate and apply for a passport before flying to the US. But note that the US obligation to admit its own citizens is principally a feature of US law. CBP does not waive 8 USC 1185 because of some international body; there is no body that enforces international "policies" of this nature. Rather, they do so because they know that the federal courts would require them to admit US citizens based on the right of free movement implicit in US law. If someone were unable to get into their country of citizenship and unable to gain legal residence elsewhere then unless they could remain on the run for the rest of their life they would eventually end up as the subject of negotiation between whatever country is trying to deport them and their country of citizenship. In other words, in the worst case, such people become a bilateral diplomatic matter between two countries. Therefore, any challenge to the restriction would have to go through the Italian or EU legal system. Is this a violation of the EU freedom of movement directive, whereby a verified EU/EFTA national cannot normally be refused entry to any EU/EFTA state? It certainly seems to be, but without a decision from an EU court, we can't be certain. From Article 5 of the freedom of movement directive (2004/38/EC): Article 5 Right of entry 1. Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border controls, Member States shall grant Union citizens leave to enter their territory with a valid identity card or passport and shall grant family members who are not nationals of a Member State leave to enter their territory with a valid passport. No entry visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on Union citizens. This doesn't say anything about allowing EU citizens to board aircraft from non-EU destinations without their EU passports. So if Italy makes a rule that EU citizens need a passport to board a flight to Italy from outside the EU and Schengen area, that doesn't seem to violate Article 5 except by implication. It would be for a court to decide whether that implication is in fact present. Because Article 5 doesn't say anything about where the passenger has flown from, we can also consider the case of a dual citizen of an EU member state and a "third country," who might fly to Italy using the third-country passport, and then present a national ID card at the immigration counter. If such a traveler were denied entry, that would appear to violate Article 5. If that traveler's other nationality were one that required a visa in the non-EU passport, the traveler might have a stronger case that Italy's rule infringes on the right of free movement. EU or EFTA citizens could also challenge the restriction more generally as an infringement on the right of free movement that is established in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), even if the directive itself does not prohibit the restriction. For example, one might argue that free movement is restricted because there are countries to which EU citizens can travel with only an ID card, but from which they cannot return to Italy with only that card. In addition, non-Italian EU or EFTA citizens could challenge the more restrictive regime applied to them on the argument that it violates the principle of non-discrimination articulated in Article 9 of the TEU: Article 9 In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.... Furthermore, non-Italians residing in Italy could challenge the more restrictive regime on the basis of Article 24 of the directive: Article 24 Equal treatment 1. Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty. The benefit of this right shall be extended to family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who have the right of residence or permanent residence. | No. Refusing to tell the address alone is not a reason to detain somebody. But there are situations where the authorities can demand that a person identifies himself or herself, including such details as the address (or lack of a permanent residency). In such a situation, failure to identify yourself can get you locked up. Also, the tone of your posting seems to question the legitimacy of the UK government and legal system as a whole. That is a box you're putting yourself into, and the company you find there is not very pleasant. | Yes. The meaning of "citizen" in "citizen's arrest" has nothing to do with citizenship. It just means "ordinary person" or "member of the public" — as opposed to "a law enforcement officer". |
How do USA nationals pay taxes on illegal income without self incriminating themselves? I am not an American but this has always baffled me. From what I understand, American government is not allowed to compel someone to self incriminate themselves. However, IRS wants people to report their income even if it is illegally obtained. So to me it sounds like the government is forcing citizens to self incriminate themselves by showing "or else" stick dangling over their heads. Always wondered how this conundrum is handled within the legal framework. | You would report illegal income via Schedule 1, line 8. At the bottom, after naming many specific legal sources of income there is a line 8z "Other income. List type and amount" with very little space. The instructions refer you to Miscellaneous Income in Pub 525. They do list "Stolen Property" as a category, saying If you steal property, you must report its FMV in your income in the year you steal it unless in the same year, you return it to its rightful owner. However, there is no requirement to report the illegal nature of your income, and it is not difficult to describe such income in non-incriminating terms, such as "miscellaneous income". If they are not satisfied, you may inform them of your 5th amendment right to not incriminate yourself. Invoking your right to silence does not constitute probable cause for a search warrant. | You don’t need to hire an attorney If you like, you can represent yourself. Just like you can build your own house, repair your own car or amputate your own limb. You only need to be a lawyer if you are representing someone else. However, there is a saying that goes: A person representing themselves has a fool for a client. Your lawyer is a professional, you aren’t. They know what to do when the other side says “Objection, facts not in evidence” or how to correctly fill out, file and serve a pleading; do you? | There are several reasons people wish to get a marriage annulled. I'll try to list them in order of frequency -- though I'm unaware of any statistics that confirm that my ordering is correct. Money. As per Nij's comment, when people are divorced, their property is subdivided 50-50. If one person can get away with an annulment, and keep the property which he earned, then it will be in his interests to do so. Religious reasons. As per SJuan76's comments, several churches, including Catholic, Mormon, and Russian Baptist, do not allow a person to marry if his previous spouse is still alive. An annulment is a way around that. Fraud marriages. This is rare, but under Trump it happens more often then you might think. People (usually women) come to the US illegally, marry someone (generally significantly older), and after the wedding day they are never again seen by their spouse. They use their marriage certificate to ensure permission to stay in the US -- but, they were never interested in marrying that person in the first place. When found, often such people are living with another illegal alien "as a boyfriend", with kids born before the fraud marriage even took place. It is in such cases, that their new spouse often tries to attain an annulment of the marriage -- to make sure that the illegal alien doesn't get rewarded for cheating them. Personal reasons. For some people, having never been married means it's easier to get a spouse who also has never been married -- and being able to check the "Single -- Never married" box on a form is always a plus in such cases. Now, don't ask me why people prefer to marry someone who's never been married, over someone who's been divorced. :) Incest. Under the US law, if you marry someone who's your close relative, then you are guilty of a felony -- even if you didn't know they're your close relative at the time of marriage. However, if you annul the marriage, then you can avoid prosecution. | Being outside of IR35 means one is considered a (self-employed) contractor, not an employee, and as such will not have income tax and national insurance contributions deducted under PAYE. HMRC require the NINO and Ltd Co details to cross-reference the payments declared in the public sector's accounts with the Ltd Co's accounts to ensure (a) they match, (b) the correct tax and NIC is paid by the relevant entities, and (c) to confirm the identity and/or status in the Ltd Co of the recipient of the payments. | They aren't "imposing tax laws at the state level", and the states are still perfectly free to award whatever credits they like. There's a more complete explanation here. Before 2017, if you paid, say, $30,000 in state taxes, you could take a $30,000 deduction from your federal taxable income, thus reducing your federal income taxes by some fraction of $30,000 (depending on your tax bracket). The 2017 tax bill placed a $10,000 limit on this deduction. Some states responded by creating a provision where you could donate $30,000 to the state and receive a $30,000 credit against your state taxes owed - so you end up paying the same amount to the state, but now you characterize it as a charitable donation, which is still deductible from your federal taxable income. The new IRS regulation says that such a "donation" will no longer be deductible from your federal taxable income; that's all. Your state can still issue you a tax credit for such a donation if they want - the federal government has no control over that - but any such credit will reduce the amount you are allowed to deduct on your federal return, making the whole exercise pointless. The federal government certainly has the power to determine how you should compute your income for the purposes of your federal income taxes, including what you may or may not deduct. That's the power they're using here. | You have not committed a crime or a violation of non-criminal law when you swear something under oath believing in good faith that what you are saying is true, and you are mistaken. The law does not expect omniscience. Also, making a false statement under oath is only sanctionable if you make a false statement of a "material fact." Whether or not you have a Social Security number is not a "material fact" in the context of a passport application where the material facts are that you are the same person as the person described in your birth certificate, that the parents there are to the best of your knowledge your parents, that the birth certificate is authentic, and that you have not renounced U.S. citizenship. The question about a Social Security number is there for administrative convenience, not to make any determination about your right to a passport. You should apply for a Social Security number. If you already have one, your actions consistent with not having one will only corroborate the fact that you were ignorant of that fact when you applied for a passport, and you will have your existing Social Security number provided to you. As a practical matter it is unlikely that you have one. There are no forms that your non-U.S. parents would have to be filled out that would have required one, and you know that you haven't applied for one in the past. Before Social Security numbers of dependents were required on U.S. tax forms, most people didn't get Social Security numbers until they got their first job. | The Constitutional proviso of Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 states that "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed". This does not preclude a legal finding against the interest of an individual (e.g. a law can be passed whereby a person is punished for committing a certain act). It is important to understand that this clause means that Congress cannot pass a law declaring an individual to be guilty – this limits the legislative branch, not the executive or judicial branches. Congress can pass a general law and then the executive and judicial branches can enforce that law against an individual. Sanctions against an individual are routinely imposed by the executive branch (the IRS can fine you, Securities Exchange Commission can fine you, HUD can fine you, Homeland Security can sanction you in various ways...). Actions against an individual always start with the executive branch. You can contest an executive action on various grounds, such as "exceeds authority" or "unconstitutionality of underlying law", which then brings in the judicial branch. A "bill of attainder" would be a law passed by Congress that declares Katerina and Maria Vladimirovna to be guilty, end of story, and no such law was enacted. | This is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1401 which details who qualifies for "birthright citizenship". Including of course the condition mandated by the 14th ammendment, Congress is otherwise free to bestow such citizenship essentially as it pleases by duly enacted legislation. One of the cases that receives birthright citizenship is a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States. So the presumption for young children found in the US is that they are citizens by birth. The law in particular requires positive proof that the individual in question was definitely not born in the United States. Lacking this, or it failing to be found prior to reaching the age of 21 years, they are citizens. For other cases, this will likely end up falling to the courts, who will decide the matter on the preponderance of the evidence. In this case it becomes the burden of the individual claiming citizenship to establish that they are a citizen*. Birth certificates can be filed after birth, and can be submitted as evidence. The laws controlling the validity of birth certificates is locally determined. If there are other birth certificates from other countries, or conflicting witness testimony, then it will fall to the court to decide which case is more likely based on the evidence available. *More accurately the burden generally falls on the entity making the claim about someone's citizenship (their own or someone else's). In a deportation hearing, for example, it falls to the government to establish the individual is not a US citizen. Deporation only applies to aliens, so the defendant must be established as such. |
Can I provide multiple legal bases for GDPR purposes? I used Termly's privacy policy generator, and in the policy that they generated there are four Article 6 legal bases: Consent Legitimate Interests Legal Obligations Vital Interests I took a screenshot of the section that lists the legal bases. Now, my question is, does Termly's approach work at all? Does it have any legal value? I thought that you can only choose one legal basis at a time. This is what the ICO has to say about changing the legal basis You must determine your lawful basis before starting to process personal data. It’s important to get this right first time. If you find at a later date that your chosen basis was actually inappropriate, it will be difficult to simply swap to a different one. Even if a different basis could have applied from the start, retrospectively switching lawful basis is likely to be inherently unfair to the individual and lead to breaches of accountability and transparency requirements. | There are two related aspects to this question: can multiple legal bases cover the same processing purpose, and how must this information be presented in the privacy notice? In the following, this answer will address the following sub-questions, listed here alongside a short summary. Do you need a clear mapping between processing purposes and corresponding legal bases? Yes, such a mapping is effectively necessary to satisfy your GDPR obligation to be able to demonstrate that all your processing activities are covered by a legal basis. If one legal basis doesn't work out, can you fall back to a different one? No. This is nonsensical considering how the individual legal bases work. However, it is possible that similar processing activities serve different purposes under different legal bases, and it can be worth evaluating different legal bases when trying to determine which one you should rely on. How should legal bases be presented in a privacy notice? While a Termly-style generic list of potential legal bases is common, there are good reasons to believe that this fails to achieve the GDPR's transparency goals. It is better to clearly associate each processing purpose with its legal basis. Appendix: positive examples of structuring a privacy notice Do you need a clear mapping between processing purposes and corresponding legal bases? Yes, the data controller must always have a clear understanding regarding which processing activity is conducted under which legal basis. Under Art 5 GDPR, personal data shall only be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes” and processed “lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner”. “The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with [these obligations]”. To be able to demonstrate that each processing activity is covered by a legal basis, it is necessary in practice to have a document that spells out the specific legal basis relied upon for each processing purpose. Some data controllers are formally required to maintain such Art 30 Records of Processing Activities (ROPAs), but keeping track of core information makes sense for all data controllers. The ICO writes in their guide on lawful basis for processing: You need therefore to keep a record of which basis you are relying on for each processing purpose, and a justification for why you believe it applies. There is no standard form for this, as long as you ensure that what you record is sufficient to demonstrate that a lawful basis applies. This will help you comply with accountability obligations, and will also help you when writing your privacy notices. It is your responsibility to ensure that you can demonstrate which lawful basis applies to the particular processing purpose. If one legal basis doesn't work out, can you fall back to a different one? Probably not. Processing for different purposes. In some cases, it will happen that data is processed for one purpose initially, and for another purpose under a different legal basis subsequently. For example, a web shop might collect payment information in order to execute a contract to buy goods. But once that contract is fulfilled, it is likely that the webshop will have to archive some of that information for multiple years due to legal obligations around financial recordkeeping. While in both cases the processing activity is similar (storage of the information), the purpose is different and so the legal basis can differ. In this context, it is useful to consider Art 6(4), which discusses when data that collected for one purpose can be reused for another purpose. This is possible whenever those purposes are “compatible”. Multiple legal bases for the same purpose. Some data controllers try to apply multiple legal bases to the same processing purpose, in the hope that some will stick. For example: We're showing personalized ads based on your consent. But if you decline consent we will show you personalized ads because we have a legitimate interest in making money. And if you object to the legitimate interest then showing you personalized ads is necessary for performance of a contract we have with you, namely in section 7(23)(f)(ii)(ξ) of our terms of service where “Service shall make reasonable effort to ensure that Content shown is relevant to User”. This doesn't work. Specifically in the case of consent, consent can only ever serve as a legal basis if the data subject has an actual choice. If the data controller just falls back to a different legal basis in case consent is declined or withdrawn, that choice is hollow. Similarly, having a fallback for legitimate interests makes no sense. The core aspect of a legitimate interest is that there must be a balancing test between the legitimate interests and the data subject's rights and interests. A legitimate interest can only serve as a legal basis if it outweighs the data subject's interests. A core factor here is whether the data subject can reasonably expect their data to be processed for the given purpose. Data subjects can object to the legitimate interests, which may make it necessary to re-run the balancing test taking into account the objecting data subject's individual circumstances. But it is quite possible that the legitimate interest still overrides the data subject's interests, so that processing can continue. On the other hand if the objection prevails, it is difficult to conceive a scenario where there could exist some fallback legal basis to continue despite the successful objection. Specifically for the issue of using Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract instead of other legal bases, the EDPB has published guidelines 2/2019. They explain that whether processing is indeed “necessary” must be considered from the perspective of the data subject, so that many purposes like “service improvement” or advertising cannot be covered by this legal basis. Something does not become truly necessary for a contract just because it was unilaterally inserted into a terms of service document. Determining an appropriate legal basis. However, thinking in terms of fallbacks can be quite useful for determining an appropriate legal basis. In general, legal obligations or necessity for performance of a contract should be considered first, falling back to a legitimate balancing test otherwise. Consent is a choice of last resort when no other legal basis would apply, since consent can authorize nearly any processing activity, no matter how risky or disadvantageous to the data subject, if the consent was obtained in a valid manner. How should legal bases be presented in a privacy notice? The GDPR is slightly ambiguous here. Per Art 13(1)(c), your privacy notice must provide the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing It is possible to interpret this in two ways: you list the purposes of processing, and separately any legal bases that you may rely on for any purposes; or you list the purposes of processing, and for each purpose you also list which legal bases you rely on for that specific purpose. Providing an abstract list of legal bases. You very commonly see the first approach, that essentially just summarizes Art 6(1) GDPR for the convenience of the reader. This boilerplate approach is of course attractive for privacy policy generators that do not understand the context your specific processing purposes. While the relevant EDPB guidelines on transparency don't take a clear stand on this matter, I have doubts that this first approach is fully GDPR compliant. This fails to provide required transparency. The Art 13 and Art 14 information obligations are an expression of the Art 5 GDPR principles like “lawfulness, fairness and transparency”. Merely listing any potentially applicable legal bases does not make it transparent to the data subject what data is being processed under which rules. But knowing the legal basis covering a particular processing activity has direct impact on the data subject's rights such as the right to revoke consent, to object to legitimate interests, or to erasure. This fails to specify the actual legal basis. Such a generic listing might also fail to fully satisfy the conditions for certain legal bases. Where the legal basis is a “legal obligation”, it is not sufficient to generically refer to legal obligations in abstract. Rather, Art 6(3) says that The basis for the processing referred to in point (c) and (e) of paragraph 1 shall be laid down by: (a) Union law; or (b) Member State law to which the controller is subject. Thus, I would expect a fully compliant privacy notice to actually reference those laws, at least in a general sense (e.g. compliance with court orders, or for financial recordkeeping). Specifically in the case where legitimate interests are used as the legal basis, Art 13(1)(d) says that those legitimate interests shall be provided. Guidance from the EDPB WhatsApp decision. While the Transparency Guidelines linked above are not excessively helpful here, there is a body of regulatory interpretation for example in the form of the EDPB binding decision 1/2021 regarding WhatsApp. In section 5.1, it is discussed whether the WhatsApp privacy notice at the time satisfied Art 13(1)(d). Here, the EDPB quite unambiguously argues that only the second approach – per-purpose information – can be compliant. From para 56 and 59 in the decision: The EDPB is of the view, […] that providing full information on each and every processing operation respectively is the only approach that will ensure that the data subjects can: (a) exercise choice as to whether or not they might wish to exercise any of their data subject rights and, if so, which one(s); (b) assess whether or not they satisfy any conditionality associated with the entitlement to exercise a particular right; (c) assess whether or not theyare entitled to have a particular right enforced by the data controller concerned; and (d) assess whether or not they have a ground of complaint such as to be able to meaningfully assess whether or not they wish to exercise their right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority. […] The EDPB considers that in the Legal Basis Notice WhatsApp IE has not specified the provided information with regard to the corresponding processing operation such as information about what categories of personal data are being processed for which processing pursued under basis of each legitimate interest respectively. Practical impact. Termly's templates fall short of this standard, but their fine print also makes it clear that their service does not provide legal advice and that they aren't responsible for anything. It may also be worth considering that your privacy notices will likely face less scrutiny than WhatsApp, as in the decision cited above. That a very strict standard was applied to WhatsApp also has to do with Facebook's/Meta's/WhatsApp's history of playing games around appropriate legal bases and its extremely large user base, also involving children, making it very important to provide clear and comprehensive notices. Appendix: positive examples of structuring a privacy notice My suggestion would be to think about these transparency obligations in a tabular manner where you have an Excel sheet with columns for purpose, data involved, retention periods, and legal basis: purpose data retention legal basis personalized ads cookie identifiers, interest profile 6 months Art 6(1)(a) consent server security logs IP address 3 months Art(6)(1)(f) necessary for legitimate interest showing comments to other users username, comment until you delete the comment Art 6(1)(b) necessary for performing service ... ... ... Many data controllers will have exactly such information anyway when they keep Art 30 Records of Processing. Based on these records, it is then possible to write an accurate and understandable privacy notice that clearly relates processing purposes with other required information. I have seen privacy notices that use exactly such a tabular approach, though it's more common to provide a sub-section per purpose. For example: Purposes for which we process your personal data: Personalized ads. If you give consent (Art 6(1)(a) GDPR), we will show you personalized ads. For this we will set a cookie identifier (→ about cookies), and collect a profile of your interests based on the content that you interact with. The profile will be deleted 6 months after you last interact with our site. ... Showing comments to other users. When you post public comments, we will show them to other users. Providing this service is necessary to perform our contract with you (Art 6(1)(b) GPDR). The comment will publicly display your username, the date when you posted the comment, and the contents of the comment. The comment will be shown indefinitely, but you can delete it at any time (→ help center). Such an approach also fits well with a “layered approach” to transparency, where you split the information of the privacy notice across multiple pages, so that data subjects only have to read about those processing activities that are relevant to them. For example, an online marketplace company might have different notices covering browsing the listings on their site, buying a product, seller-side activities, and their employee recruiting processes. Another reasonably good approach I've seen is to have a section per aspect required by the GPDR, and to then provide a list that goes through each processing purpose. This is essentially a flattened version of the above table: Processing purposes: personalized ads server security logs showing comments to other users Legal basis for processing purposes: for personalized ads: your consent pursuant to Art 6(1)(a) GDPR for server security logs: our Art 6(1)(f) GDPR legitimate interest in ensuring the security of our services against hacks, DDoS attacks, or other criminal acts for showing comments to other users: Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performing our contract with you: showing comments is a core feature of our website, as covered by our terms of service (→ link). Which data is processed: for personalized ads: cookie identifiers, interest profile based on the content you interact with for server security logs: your IP address, a timestamp, and which pages you visit on our site for showing comments to other users: your username, date when you posted the comment, and the contents of the comment How long your data is kept: ... | Is it GDPR compliant that I can't access the account that I created and the personal data that I shared because "I haven't completed their internal pre-qualification process"? Article 15 defines a “Right of access to the data subject” but it's difficult to see how this could be construed as a right to log into a specific website. Common sense suggests this would be a very bad idea. If they are willing to provide the data through another means (say a report or data dump of some sort), the obligation would seem to be met. In fact, article 15(3) even states that data controllers should merely provide the information in a “commonly used electronic form” (i.e. not necessarily through access to their systems or whatever form they are using internally for the processing). Have you asked for that and would you be satisfied by that resolution? Is it GDPR compliant that their answer to my deletion request is "We will delete the data..." The text of article 17 (right to erasure) explicitly specifies that such a request must be honored without “undue delay”. Article 12, which defines some of the modalities for the rights to access, rectification or erasure by the data subject, also provides that controllers shall “provide information on action taken on a request […] without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request”. You haven't provided any time frame and I don't think there is anything wrong with acknowledging the request by promising they “will” do it but in light of article 12, it seems you would indeed be entitled to know once they have actually taken further action. However, you implied you might want to access the data first and it's not clear to me whether you explicitly invoked the GDPR in earlier communications. So I would clarify and reiterate my request (access or erasure) and ask them for explicit confirmation once it has been satisfied. | european-union (germany, spain, uk) The cookie consent law is the ePrivacy directive, which was implemented as national laws by all EU member states (including, at the time, the UK). Later, GDPR changed the applicable definition of consent so that implicit consent is no longer allowed. A notice in fine print as in the given example is not sufficient to meet this definition of consent, so any non-necessary cookies set in that context would be a violation. But it would be the national ePrivacy implementation that would be violated, not the GDPR. Thus, the GDPR's famous 4%/EUR 20M fines are not relevant here. Instead, each country can set its own fines. In Germany, this would probably be up to EUR 50k (§16 TMG) though German law doesn't implement this aspect of ePrivacy correctly. In the UK, PECR penalties are determined by more general data protection penalty legislation. Notable instances of cookie consent enforcement include the Planet 49 (ECJ judgement, German BGH verdict) case which basically affirmed that yes, the GDPR's definition of consent applies. Thus, any case law regarding GDPR consent is also applicable to the issue of cookies. Furthermore, the Spanish AEPD has issued an interesting fine due to insufficient cookie consent, but due to much more subtle violations than the outright disregard in the given example. E.g. in the Vueling action (decision (Spanish, PDF), summary, listing on enforcementtracker), the Vueling airline's website had a consent banner but ultimately told the user to reject cookies via their browser settings. This violates the requirement that consent must be specific/granular, since the browser settings are all-or-nothing if they're available at all. The airline was fined EUR 30k, the maximum possible under applicable Spanish data protection law. But what kind of risks would some blog run into that just sets cookies without appropriate consent? If the service is outside of the EU, enforcement is difficult. I am not aware of cookie consent enforcement against non-EU services. National data protection authorities can investigate the violation and issue fines, subject to their respective national data protection laws. They generally only do this when there are lots of complaints. Some authorities like the UK ICO have indicated that cookie consent enforcement isn't a priority for them. Independently, individuals can generally sue the service for damages. Some lawyers might send out cease and desist letters to non-compliant websites in the hopes of collecting fees. So aside from the last point, the risk is likely somewhat low, especially for a smaller site. At this point, it is worth reminding that ePrivacy/GDPR doesn't require consent for all cookies, and is not just limited to cookies. It is more generally about access to and storage of information on a user's device, unless that access is strictly necessary to provide the service explicitly requested by the user. Thus, functional cookies can be set without consent. However, consent does become necessary when cookies or similar mechanisms are used for analytics, tracking, or ads. Even though GDPR is involved, the cookie consent requirements apply regardless of whether the cookies involve any personal data. | Not legal advice - you should consult an attorney who knows your local jurisdiction. That's a general statement, but especially true here because the GDPR does not include personal liability for directors (or others) in the event of a data breach, but domestic laws may indeed do just that. The UK is one example where certain circumstances can lead to criminal liability for directors of a firm in the event of a breach. That said, your company should care. The fines for knowingly allowing a breach or not reporting it properly in a timely manner have been made more significant than the prior Directive. There are things you could do to potentially mitigate consequences in the event of a breach and a fine being levied on the company, such as aligning with best practices and getting certifications. In sum, the actual punishments for noncompliance will vary by jurisdiction, but any business that handles data in the EU should undoubtedly be ensuring it is aware of what, if any, obligations it has and taking steps to comply before May's deadline. | It may be legal or it may not For example, if any of the users are in the European Union, then the GDPR applies and the person storing the information is a data controller and has legal obligations. These include, having a legitimate reason for storing them, storing them only for as long as necessary for that reason, notifying the individuals that the data is being stored and why, deleting it upon a users request etc. | GDPR does not require consent. It requires a legal basis. Consent is only one legal basis among many. Some other legal bases are: legitimate interest (implying an opt out solution) necessity for performance of a contract If your customers pay you to deliver email updates, that contract is the legal basis for sending email updates. The only wrinkle is that as you describe your service, the emails aren't an essential part of the service. Alternatively, you might assert that there's a legitimate interest to deliver updates via email so that updates aren't missed. In that case you must allow the users to object, e.g. via ab unsubscribe link in the email and via their account settings. Because a prior business relationship exists, there's a strong case for legitimate interest – even if this were marketing emails (!). Legitimate interest requires you to balance the legitimate interest with the data subject's rights and freedoms though. Your updates are most likely not marketing, so any advice you might read relating to marketing emailings is irrelevant. GDPR applies because you are established in the EU. The regulation applies in relation to all your users, not just EU users. If and when Brexit happens you will still be covered by the Data Protection Act, which transcribes the GDPR's requirements into UK law. However, processing data from EU users will then count as an international transfer which requires extra compliance work, at least until the EU issues an adequacy decision for the UK. | GDPR seems quite clear that if you are recording calls, video and/or audio, you must get consent. Wrong. The GDPR requires that your have a legal basis for processing personal data. Consent is a legal basis but there are others. With respect to note taking, the GDPR only applies to “personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.” So, if they notes are not about an individual (and many B2B phone calls will not be) or are neither automated nor filed, the GDPR does not apply. If they are captured by the GDPR, you need to have a legal basis for the notes. Again, consent is one but it is not the only one. | The territorial scope of the GDPR is defined in Article 3. It covers "personal data of data subjects who are in the Union", whether they are EU citizens or not. So to answer your questions: 1) are EU users, but moved to USA a few years ago, and signed-up on my website? They are not in the EU, so are not covered. You don't need to know if someone is an EU citizen, just if they are currently in the EU. 2) went for holidays in USA, signed-up on my website, and then came back to EU? (note - potentially skipped any Consent questions at sign-up, because IP was from USA) If someone moves into the EU while using your service then they fall under the GDPR for the time they are in the EU. If their home address is in the EU then that is covered, and monitoring of their behaviour while in the EU is also covered. Your other two questions are about VPNs. If a VPN is used to evade IP address geolocation and you have no other clue about where someone is then you can't be blamed for not knowing where they are (although I'm not aware of any actual case law on this topic). But if someone with a USA IP address gives a home address in the EU then you should probably treat them as being in the EU to be on the safe side. Basically, if you don’t know if they are in the EU or not, you should treat them as if they were. |
When do Section 33D notices actually get used? Section 8 of the Housing Act 1988 describes the effect of such a notice being issued upon landlords by the Home Office, and the content of such notices makes obvious when it can be sent and might be sent, but what operational guidance procedures specify when the Home Office actually uses this provision? What can trigger the Home Office's operational procedures to actually send such a notice, or has the provision entirely fallen out of use? | When do 33D(2) notices actually get used? When, in accordance with section 33D(1), Immigration Act 2014 the conditions at s.32D(2) have been met: The condition is that the Secretary of State has given one or more notices in writing to the landlord which, taken together,— (a)identify the occupier of the premises or (if there is more than one occupier) all of them, and (b)state that the occupier or occupiers are disqualified as a result of their immigration status from occupying premises under a residential tenancy agreement. What operational guidance procedures specify when the home office actually uses this provision? There are no, that I can find, open-source "operational guidance procedures" available. Those that may exist within the Home Office will in all likelihood follow the requirements and conditions stipulated in section 33D of the 2014 Act, section 8 Housing Act 1988, and at the Rules 83.9(5A) and 83.13(2) at Part 83 Civil Procedure Rules and Practice Directions. What can trigger the Home Office's operational procedures to actually send such a notice? When there is sufficient evidence, and it is proportionate and necessary to do so after taking in to account, for example, all the available information about the landlord, the occupiers' immigration status, and the public interest in terminating the agreement. Has the provision entirely fallen out of use? I have not been able to find any publicly available data on this topic, so one option would be to submit a Freedom of Information request for an answer. Also, from a comment: It is almost surely specified/codified in some operational guidance document somewhere, and even if such is non statutory guidance, courts are still semi-bound to lend it some weight in legal contexts. Whether or not to issue of a 33D notice is an operational case-by-case decision based on particular circumstances, so if a court (more likely an Immigration Tribunal) needs to consider the Home Office's internal mechanics, authorisation requirements, quality assurance and other such processes (which, hopefully, should be recorded in detail) then the normal production of evidence / disclosure / discovery rules would apply (with any non-relevant parts properly redacted to prevent unnecessary disclosure). | (I am not your lawyer. I am not here to help you. If you are reading this because someone has died, please stop and instead read the Scottish Courts and Tribunals guide to dealing with a deceased's estate in Scotland, or contact a solicitor.) Yes, in general. Section 1 of the Wills Act 1963, which is in force in Scotland, specifies that "[a] will shall be treated as properly executed if its execution conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed." Furthermore, Section 4 states that "[t]he construction of a will shall not be altered by reason of any change in the testator’s domicile after the execution of the will." "Construction" here refers to interpreting the language and effect of the will. So if the will was validly executed in England, it should also be in force in Scotland, and a Scottish court will give it the same meaning it would have had under English law. Furthermore, the same rule of validity seems to apply in both England and Scotland: Wills Act 1837 section 9. There may be other Scottish laws affecting the disposition of the estate that differ from English law. Relevant statutes include Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, section 21A, which seems consistent with Wills Act 1963. (I am trained in U.S. rather than English or Scottish law; I'm trusting the accuracy of the UK's excellent online legislation archive for the proposition that the statutes cited are in force in Scotland. I haven't checked the case law for contrary interpretations.) | The Citizens Advice Bureau states in Rights of tenants to sublet their home Rights of secure and flexible tenants to sublet Most local authority tenants are secure tenants. You are also likely to be a secure tenant if your landlord is a housing association and your tenancy started before 15 January 1989. Most secure tenancies don’t have an end date. If your tenancy has an end date and you rent from the local authority, your tenancy is a ‘flexible tenancy’. Flexible tenancies are a type of secure tenancy. What rights do secure and flexible tenants have to sublet? You can sublet part of your home with your landlord's written permission. If you sublet part of your home without permission, you are in breach of your tenancy agreement. Your landlord can't unreasonably withhold their consent to a request to sublet part of your home. Also, your landlord can't attach conditions if they allow you to sublet. If your landlord refuses your request to sublet part of your home, they must give you their reasons why. And then, crucially You can't lawfully sublet all of your home. If you do, you lose your status as a secure tenant and your landlord can evict you. For more detail about types of tenancy, please see that page. | In RI it appears that two days notice and a reasonable purpose is enough. There are states that list the reasons a landlord can access a unit; RI is not one of those states. http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/title34/34-18/34-18-26.HTM | Usually how long does it take for the police to acquire IP details from the ISP now they no longer need a warrant to serve them under the snoopers charter. The Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data Code of Practice published by the UK Home Office in March 2015 encourages service providers to furnish a disclosure notice within a fortnight: 3.50. Ordinarily the CSP should disclose, in writing or electronically, the communications data to which a notice relates not later than the end of the period of ten working days from the date the notice is served upon the CSP. In practice, it is impossible to tell what "usually" looks like because historical data is not available. Would they usually then come and search your house for devices if it was cyber related? It depends on what grounds an offence is believed to have taken place. In any case, unless you are arrested a search warrant would be required, and a constable (authorised by an inspector) must apply to a court. Lord Widgery CJ in Williams v. Summerfield [1972] 2 QB 512 described a search warrant as: ... a very serious interference with the liberty of the subject, and a step which would only be taken after the most mature careful consideration of all the facts of the case. Warrants that are governed by legislation for specific offences (The Theft Act 1968, section 26; The Firearms Act 1968, section 46; The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, section 23(3); Obscene Publications Act 1959, section 3; and Protection of Children Act 1978, section 4) require specific information as to the suspected offence. For example: If it is made to appear by information on oath before a justice of the peace that there is reasonable cause to believe that any person has in his custody or possession or on his premises any stolen goods, the justice may grant a warrant to search for and seize the same… (Theft Act 1968) More general search warrants are issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and the would first need to persuade a justice that there are reasonable grounds for believing: that an indictable offence has been committed there is material on the specified premises which is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation of the offence it is likely to be relevant evidence and it does not consist of or include items subject to "legal privilege", "excluded material" or "special procedure The justice would normally want to ensure there are reasonable grounds to believe that you would prevent access to that evidence (e.g. by refusing entry or by destroying it first), which make a warrant necessary. If you are arrested because a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that you have committed an offence, and the offence is indictable, PACE also grants a power to search premises following arrest: 32(2)(b) if the offence for which he has been arrested is an indictable offence, to enter and search any premises in which he was when arrested or immediately before he was arrested for evidence relating to the offence | If you were given a non compliant notice, you haven’t been given notice You can stay as long as you like or for 4 months after they give you the correct notice. The landlord’s legal obligation was to give you 4 months notice: not his agent, or the Queen, or some guy he was chatting with at the pub. Whether that causes other people with other contracts problems is a matter for them to work out, it’s none of your business. However, … The management agency is the landlord’s agent. That means, as far as you are concerned there is no legal difference between what they do and what the landlord does. If either of them had given you a valid notice, it is as though the landlord had done so. However, if the landlord says something to the agent, from your point of view, the landlord is talking to themselves. If the landlord has sold the property, it comes with any existing leases. If the landlord has promised vacant possession and can’t deliver it, then they have broken the contract with the buyer and the buyers can sue your landlord for damages or possibly terminate the contract or both. If that happens, and it was a result of the agent’s negligence, the landlord can sue the agent. | The wording of the original lease and the renewal form are vital here. The Texas Property code, Title 8, chapter 92 is the relevant state law for residential tenancies. It neither forbids nor guarantees a right of renewal. That is left up to the lease agreement. However, it does require a landlord to provide a tenant with a copy of any signed lease promptly. Specifically Sec. 92.024. LANDLORD'S DUTY TO PROVIDE COPY OF LEASE provides that: (a) Not later than the third business day after the date the lease is signed by each party to the lease, a landlord shall provide at least one complete copy of the lease to at least one tenant who is a party to the lease. ... c) A landlord's failure to provide a complete copy of the lease as described by Subsection (a) or (b) does not invalidate the lease or, subject to Subsection (d), prevent the landlord from prosecuting or defending a legal action or proceeding to enforce the lease. (d) A landlord may not continue to prosecute and a court shall abate an action to enforce the lease, other than an action for nonpayment of rent, only until the landlord provides to a tenant a complete copy of the lease if the tenant submits to the court evidence in a plea in abatement or otherwise that the landlord failed to comply with Subsection (a) or (b). (e) A landlord may comply with this section by providing to a tenant a complete copy of the lease: (1) in a paper format; (2) in an electronic format if requested by the tenant; or (3) by e-mail if the parties have communicated by e-mail regarding the lease. Sec. 92.003 provides that: (a) In a lawsuit by a tenant under either a written or oral lease for a dwelling or in a suit to enforce a legal obligation of the owner as landlord of the dwelling, the owner's agent for service of process is determined according to this section. (b) If written notice of the name and business street address of the company that manages the dwelling has been given to the tenant, the management company is the owner's sole agent for service of process. (c) If Subsection (b) does not apply, the owner's management company, on-premise manager, or rent collector serving the dwelling is the owner's authorized agent for service of process unless the owner's name and business street address have been furnished in writing to the tenant. Dallas municipal law prohibits retaliating against a tenant who complains about improper conditions or requests maintenance, but says nothing about lease renewals. Under ordinary contract law, an offer and acceptance makes a contract, unless the parties have previously agreed otherwise. Moreover, demonstrable practice can make or confirm a contract. If the tenant has paid rent for either March or April in reliance on the renewal agreement, and at the specified renewal rate, and that rent has been accepted, that may well constitute ratification (and thus execution) of the renewed lease. This is if the new lease would hav started before the April rent was due. So the tenant may well have the right to enforce the terms specified in the February renewal form. However, this will depend on what those terms are, and also what renewal provisions, if any, were in the original lease. It might be a good idea to send a letter to the landlord and manager, saying that the renewal form that you signed constitutes an acceptance of their offer, and thus a binding contract, and asking for a signed copy as per section 92.024, mentioning the section number. If it were me, I would send such a letter by both email and USPS certified mail, to both the manager and the landlord, if I had both addresses. I would keep a copy of any communications, and make them all in writing from now on (email is writing, legally). In any case the tenant would be wise to continue to pay rent on time in the amount specified on the renewal form, by some traceable means such as a check, money order, or credit card. I would be sure to use a method the original lease listed as acceptable, or that had been used in the past, except for cash. If I used a check, I would write "payment in full for rent of {address} for {month}" on the back The tenant would be wise to consult a local lawyer who specializes in tenant's cases, there seem to be quite a few. There is a local housing crisis center. It offers regular (twice a month) legal clinics with volunteer lawyers, and can be reached at 214-828-4244 or [email protected]. Such a center might be able to recommend local lawyers. Often an initial consultation with a lawyer on such a matter is free or at a low charge. It would probably be a good idea for the tenant to take some action fairly promptly. 15 U.S. Code Chapter 96 (the federal e-sign act) (section 7001) provides that: (a) In general -- Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law (other than this subchapter and subchapter II), with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce— (1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and (2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation. Also the UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999), which has been adopted by Texas, allows but does not require the use of electronic signatures. Thus the tenant;s email response ought to be a vald means of forming a contract. | Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that? |
Can an attorney give legal advice on a federal issue to an out-of-state client? Can a lawyer in one state give advice to a client in another state if only federal law is relevant? | It's a more complicated question to answer than you would think. The relevant rule of professional conduct is Rule 5.5 (which has the same numbering in every U.S. jurisdiction, but not identical substantive language). Generally, one can represent a client based in the state (even if it has offices in many states including one where the lawyer's office is) where a lawyer practices anywhere the lawyer can competently do so. Tribunal admission in tax and patent practice is national, but in Article III federal courts have admission to practice on a court by court basis. Part of the issue is that no fact pattern that I client is in is ever 100% federal or 100% state with some rare exceptions like immigration court or federal tax court or patent cases. Most client situations have both state and federal dimensions that a competent lawyer is aware of and counsels on, even if the client perceives it as a federal law issue and even if the federal law issue may be the most important one. The rule and the official comments in Colorado are as follows: Rule 5.5. Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law (quoted in pertinent part which also contains provisions related to employing disbarred lawyers and paralegals): Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct Law Firms and Associations As amended through Rule Change 2018(6), effective April 12, 2018 (a) A lawyer shall not: (1) practice law in this jurisdiction without a license to practice law issued by the Colorado Supreme Court unless specifically authorized by C.R.C.P. 204 or C.R.C.P. 205 or federal or tribal law; (2) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulations of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; . . . COMMENT [1] The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. In order to protect the public, persons not admitted to practice law in Colorado cannot hold themselves out as lawyers in Colorado or as authorized to practice law in Colorado. Rule 5.5(a)(1) recognizes that C.R.C.P. 204 and C.R.C.P. 205 permit lawyers to practice law in accordance with their terms in Colorado without a license from the Colorado Supreme Court. Lawyers may also be permitted to practice law within the physical boundaries of the State, without such a license, where they do so pursuant to Federal or tribal law. Such practice does not constitute a violation of the general proscription of Rule 5.5(a)(1). . . C.R.C.P. 204 and 205 pertain to the practice of law by law students in clinical courses with suitable sponsors and lawyer supervision. The American Bar Association Model Rule contains an additional subsection not adopted in Colorado (which is adopted in a majority of jurisdictions) which states: (c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that: (1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter; (2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized; (3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or (4) are not within paragraphs (c) (2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. | This depends very much on the nature of the agreement, and whether it affects the client's rights and obligations. It may also depend on which US state this is in. If the agreement is "We will hold the negotiating meetings at your office instead of mine." the client's rights are not affected and the client probably has no veto. If the agreement is "Yes we will plead guilty to manslaughter." it isn't valid without the client's consent. If the client is giving up any rights or making any significant concessions, then the client's consent is probably required, but I can give no better answer without an indication of the subject of the agreement. | The language that you're referring to, where it states that if they do not provide responses to legitimately served discovery requests in a timely manner, that they would be responsible for attorney fees, this does not refer to your attorneys fees that you incurred in defending the suit. It refers to attorneys fees that would (actually could) arise out of a hearing on a motion to compel, in the event they never answered. If that occurred, the law allows you to ask the court to award you reasonable attorney's fees as well as sanctions, but only those having to do with getting the court to make them answer. Importantly, despite the rule that states this is a potential repercussion for continually failing to answer, they rarely get awarded. This usually only occurs when the court has already warned them, after you (i.e., your attorney) has willingly given them extensions, the court has given them further extensions, and they still failed to produce/respond. Typically an attorney will allow the other side substantial extensions of time, and this is something you may not even know about. When you say they completely ignored the deadline, I'm assuming you mean the deadline on the discovery notice that gets served with the papers. Interrogatories and Requests for production of documents rarely get done anywhere near the deadline in the rules, which is a mere 3 weeks. Many times, it takes much more than this to track down everything that was requested. This is why extensions happen all the time and unless you're asking, this isn't something your lawyer will even discuss with you. When you say they "didn't offer a remotely reasonable settlement until after the deadline and didn't finally dismiss the case until months after the deadline," I'm assuming you mean they didn't make a reasonable demand (it sounds like you were the defendant). This is actually very common, and in fact, it is very early on to make (or reduce the original) demand low enough that the Defendant will accept it prior to the discovery deadline and all the depositions have passed. (When I say deadline, I don't mean the one you're talking about, I mean the actual discovery deadline, which is set forth in the scheduling order; this can easily be 9 months from the time an Answer to the Complaint is filed.) If you're referring to the token deadline put in the first set of interrogatories served, this not a "real" deadline anyone of the attorneys expects to be adhered to. Further, this a very quick settlement and you should be happy your attorney disposed of your case so quickly. As you pointed out, you are paying a lot of money every day the case lives on. In fact, the money you saved by settling early is substantial. If your attorney had gotten the documents and responses and had to wade through all of them, organize them, send follow up requests, take depositions, etc., you would be out easily another $10,000. Your lawyer did you a favor, because a less honest attorney would tell you to wait, to see if there is a defense, just so they could pad their bill. Many times when it is clear that the case is going to settle, the lawyers will serve pro forma discovery, and will say to each other not to bother answering while they attempt to settle. They are timely served if you cannot settle, but it's clear that settlement is the ultimate goal. This is very typical when the defendant almost certainly has exposure, but when the plaintiff's case also has some holes. Because of issues on both sides, they agree a modest settlement to dispose of the matter, quickly, is the best course. When you say the settlement explicitly involved each party paying their own attorney's fees, all settlements contain this clause. I have never seen a settlement agreement where a party agreed to pay the other's attorneys fees. It's just not done. In the rare case it is, it's part of the structure of the settlement and it flows to the Plaintiff, not the Defendant. This may occur in a civil rights case where there are no real damages, but the statute allows for attorneys fees to be awarded if even one-dollar is awarded. So, in a case like this, sometimes the plaintiff will accept their attorney's fees being satisfied as the settlement, (usually along with some sort of consent decree), so as to curtail the abhorrent behavior. If you want to discuss these issues with your attorney, they are not billable: they are administrative pertaining to your bill; hence, you can do so without fear of being charged. If you're nervous, tell him ahead of time you'd like to discuss your bill. He won't try to bill you for this, as he can't, and furthermore your case is settled so your file is closed. To answer your question explicitly: No - your fees are not recoverable. This is not only because you've already settled, but you were never entitled to them anyway. To answer your question about the point of sending discovery at all if you are not going to expect answers and the goal is to settle, (1) is to preserve the right during the discovery period, in the event settlement negotiations break down; (2) to give the other side a picture of how sharp your attorney is, and that he/she will be asking the right questions and they will be invasive; and (3) this is just how it is done. What you've described is how almost all low level cases proceed. Lastly, just to address what you said about it taking a few months from reaching a verbal or "handshake" agreement and having the settlement actually be recorded by the judge and a dismissal issuing, this is just something that takes a little while. Depending on the type of case it is, the court may need to approve the settlement. Even when it's not necessary for the court to approve the settlement, it takes a while to go back and forth on the language, draft the stipulations of dismissal and so on. A few months is right on target. It sounds to me like you had a pretty effective and honest lawyer who could've dragged this out for much longer. Advice for the future, in case you ever find yourself needing the services of an attorney again: If you have these types of questions, you should ask them as they come up. Again, it's not something that you can be billed for, and your lawyer should be happy to answer. Some lawyers are better than others in remembering to explain what the technical stuff means, and what the game plan is. However, the client has a responsibility too, which is to ask if you don't understand. | If you are worried that some secret will become public, you should find and meet with an attorney, not a financial adviser or other nonlawyer. Your attorney is able to shield your secret information from disclosure in ways other professionals cannot. Raise any credit score issues you're concerned about. In general, the public has a right to access judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 US 589, 597 (1978) (noting that the right is rarely litigated and not clearly defined). That right is not absolute; some records can be sealed, which means that the public can't read them. Local rules govern when that happens. I don't think the existence of a civil lawsuit could be made secretly except in special circumstances. Likewise, the plaintiff usually must identify herself, except in special circumstances. A plaintiff should assume that everything about the lawsuit--who filed it, against whom, what evidence arises, the trial, and who wins and loses--will be public. | The law regarding proof of service allows service of summons by publication in case a defendant "is not a resident of the state, but has property therein and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action". Plaintiff must file an affidavit saying that he believes that you are not a resident, and he either mailed the summons to you or states that your residence is unknown. Knowing how to contact a person is not exactly the same as knowing their residence, so the statement in the affidavit might be true. There is a one year limit on your right to defend and reopen if not served personally. The statute of limitations tolls after the cause of action has accrued (which I suppose would be defective service of the summons, viz. perjury in the affadavit). For recovery of real property, the time would be ten years. The court rules allow that "At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued". (This is clearly a matter that your attorney needs to address). | Since Mr X has a lawyer, the lawyer should advise what form this letter should take to be most helpful to Mr X's interests. In the absence of such advice, I would suggest soemthing like My lawyer, Y, now represents me in connection with {matter} and has done so since {date}. Plus any additional content that the company wants to see. | To determine whether an attorney is licensed to practice in a specific jurisdiction, you need to look up that attorney in the bar that applies to that jurisdiction. Some attorneys do not allow their information to be posted on the online lookup, in that case you would have to call the bar to confirm that s/he is licensed. I assumed you meant more than "case" in the legal sense above. For instance, if you want a Patent, you would need someone licensed to the Pat Bar. Cases they have worked on: You can use Google Scholar and select Case Law / the Jurisdiction you are concerned with and search for their name exactly (I would also limit the time frame.) The attorneys for each side are listed at the top. Some of the large cases have multiple pages of attorneys with their name on the case. Alternatively, if you have a subscription service to WestLaw Next, Bloomberg Law, or LexisNexis you can lookup the attorney and see case information as well, as well as court documents they have submitted in various cases - this allows you to get a glimpse of their writing style. Alternatively, you can visit your local law school's law library and, if they have public access, use the public terminals (at least my law school has these.). | Disclaimer: I am not familiar with US law, so this answer is from a general perspective. It should apply in most jurisdictions, though. Are there any laws or regulations which I can use to convince a hospital's billing department to talk to me, despite the fact that they have a clear policy otherwise? No, I don't think so. A company or organization is generally free to decide for themselves who will or will not communicate with you - I don't think there is any law giving you a right to choose. How would this even work? What if the people you ask to talk to are overworked, on vacation or just not qualified? However - you do have another, more important right: To be considered valid, a bill must provide credible evidence that the charges are justified. You cannot just ask someone to give you money, you must actually provide a reason why you are owed money. In this case, this means the hospital must send you a bill that you can understand and verify. To get this: First, stop bugging them over the phone. Once a point is reached where legal action seems likely (like in your case), any information you get is only really useful to you when in writing. So do everything in writing. It's fine to talk to them if it helps solve the problem - but insist on getting things in writing afterwards. The first thing you need to write is a formal letter that you refuse to accept the bill, because you cannot verify it. Outline in details what parts you cannot understand/verify, and ask for the information you need (such as what the codes mean). Once you have received a satisfatory explanation of the bill (which may take multiple letters), you go through it with a fine comb, and dispute any items that you think are unjustified. You may need the help of a lawyer to exercise these steps, but in principle you can probably do it on your own, too. Whether you get a lawyer is ultimately a trade-off (making a mistake may cost you money, but hiring a lawyer costs money, too). A first consultation with a lawyer is probably not too costly (ask first!), and may help you to decide whether you need more assistance. |
What is the definition of a troll in the legal context? Most commonly one hears the term in the context of the phrase "copyright troll," but what is the essence of a legal "troll"? | Another term sometimes used in place of "copyright troll" or "patent troll" in order to be less pejorative is "non-practising entity"1 (moreso in the patent context). These terms refer to a family of characteristics, not always present in every particular instance. These are not well-defined legal concepts but are used colloquially (mostly in academia and journalism) to describe a kind of behaviour in the legal system. Some legal opinions have used the term "troll".2 And some statutes even aim to assist defendants subject to claims from trolls.3 Some features: they do not licence or produce the material themself they adopt aggressive, vexatious, and frivolous litigation tactics to attempt to get high value settlements they initiate claims or demands beyond the scope of their rights or despite fair use defences litigation awards and settlements are a significant part of their revenue Because these terms (copyright troll, patent troll, troll, non-practising entity) do not have a precise meaning, good academic work that uses such a term will provide a definition of how they are using the term within their work.4 1. This is also somewhat imprecise, but by non-practising entity, this refers to entities that do not "practise the patent." This is an odd phrase, but to practise a patent means to actually use, make, or sell the patented invention or products incorporating the patented invention (as opposed to merely excluding others from doing so). 2. I haven't done my own independent research for this and am not providing a list of cases, but see footnote 17 of Brad Greenberg, "Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses", 2014. It lists a few judicial opinions from the United States using the term, often in quotation marks. The opinions relate trollness to "costly and expansive discovery to need to oppose a fair use defence", that one party was not a troll because it "actually produced the [works] and did not merely acquire the copyright therein to enforce against infringers", that "copyright trolling" uses litigation "not to make the copyright owner whole but to provide a new revenue stream". There are likely many more examples. 3. See for example Washington State's Patent Troll Prevention Act. They use the term only in the short title because of its popular connotation. The term does not appear in the text of the statute. Instead, it prohibits what is considered "bad faith" assertions of patent infringement and includes a description in a preamble of what the legislature considers the nuisance to be. 4. Greenberg's operational definition is: "a copyright owner who: (1) acquires a copyright—either through purchase or act of authorship—for the primary purpose of pursuing past, present, or future infringement actions; (2) compensates authors or creates works with an eye to the litigation value of a work, not the commercial value; (3) lacks a good faith licensing program; and (4) uses the prospect of statutory damages and litigation expenses to extract quick settlements of often weak claims." | Court filings are, in general, matters of public record. This does not automatically put them into the public domain. This will mean that, absent a special order of the court, anyone will be able to read this filing as pert of the court records. Many courts now make all or parts of their records available on the web. But the copyright holders will possibly retain their rights to authorize the making of further copies, and surely retain the right to authorize the making of derivative works, and their other rights that are part of the copyright bundle, such as the rights of public performance. These rights would not be retained if the work had been placed in the public domain. | The fact that something is illegal does not imply that it is illegal to post pictures of it happening. In general, under U.S. law, free speech protects almost all forms of communications subject to a handful of narrow exceptions and this is not one of them. There are many legitimate reasons one might want to post video of a fight (e.g. to identify crime perpetrators for purposes of prosecuting them), but no legitimate purpose is legally necessary. Surely as a platform Reddit cant hide against it being a platform of free speech in this case? They most definitely can. Reddit is also not responsible for user posted content under Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act, even if it were illegal for the person posting it to post the content | I did a lot of digging through case law and statutes, but I don't see a definition for "biological sex" anywhere in federal law, though after looking through those cases, it seems pretty clear that courts think of "biological sex" as a definition of "sex," and that they take it to mean the sex listed on your birth certificate. Even if we could find a straightforward statutory definition, it probably wouldn't do much to inform the interpretation of this memorandum, as it would only apply to the specific section of law in which the definition was included. | LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision. | Newspapers often say things that are not technically true by the standards of legal usage, especially in headlines which must be brief. "Legalize" is a popular or political concept, not a legal one. Instead, the legal concept underlying such court actions is that (1) an existing prohibition is unconstitutional, and thus such a law cannot exist, and (2) anything is legal unless it is specifically made illegal. "Legalize" is a reasonable term that describes what happens in such cases: to make something be legal (per (2) that means "remove a restriction"). | The audio book would probably be an infringing derivative work because the client could redistribute it once the client received it. It sounds very much like a product that is regularly sold by merchants relying on copyrights. Conceivably, simply reading a book aloud to a client in some sort of streaming context that could't be shared with others or replayed would merely be fair use, much like hiring a baby sitter to read a book aloud to your children would be clearly fair use. If there were an automatic text to sound converter as opposed to an individualized performance, it might not be considered infringing. There are people with programs that do this who haven't been sued, but the boundaries haven't been explored very thoroughly. Honestly, there isn't a lot of guidance in this area from statutory language, and the questions would often not be guided by much case law involving similar facts. Your intuition living in the modern world is probably almost as good as a lawyer's in this situation. | Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP. |
Can a crime victim sue the prosecutor that prosecuted the crime? This is an unusual situation, probably not what you are expecting. A few years ago, my addicted son would demand money from his mother (my wife) while I was at work. She would say no, but he wouldn't take no for an answer. He always had a excuse for needing the money, such as a car repair or whatever. After saying no twenty times, she would finally give in and just give him money just to get rid of him, often $50 to $100 per day! This went on for months. Finally, one day my wife decided to stand firm and refuse to hand over the money. But he needed it so badly that he just took it from her, pushing her around a bit but not causing any serious injury. So she decided to call the police and file a report. We heard nothing about it for several months, and my son got into treatment and was making progress in the meantime. Then one day we got a letter informing us that that our son was going to be charged with a FELONY! We told the DA that we wanted him to learn a lesson, but we absolutely did not want him charged with a felony. They didn't care what we wanted -- even though we were the victims! We hired a private lawyer, but he didn't do much, claiming that taking it to trial would be very risky. Our son ended up spending 45 days in jail and now has a felony. He has a chance to have it expunged, but he relapsed and does not appear to be on track to do that. I am amazed that the DA insisted on charging our son with a felony when we, the victims, did not want that. As far as I am concerned the DA did more harm to us than our son did to start with. With a felony on his record, he will have a much harder time finding employment and is much more likely to be dependent on us for the rest of his life. Is it possible for us to sue the DA in Santa Clara County California for charging our son with a felony against our wishes when we were the victims? | In the United States, a crime is not prosecuted on behalf of the victim. Crimes are offenses against a sovereign, and are prosecuted on behalf of that sovereign. Prosecutions in California are brought on behalf of "the People of the State of California:" you have violated their laws, and you are being punished for that. The state constitution gives crime victims the right "[t]o reasonable notice of and to reasonably confer with the prosecuting agency, upon request, regarding, the arrest of the defendant if known by the prosecutor, the charges filed, the determination whether to extradite the defendant, and, upon request, to be notified of and informed before any pretrial disposition of the case." What it does not give is the right to decide on any of those issues. That decision is made by public prosecutors on behalf of the state and the public writ large. | No, there is no recourse. An yes, the potential "costs", both personal, financial, social, can be high and are not compensable under an investigatory hold scenario; however, it doesn't usually happen like that. There is no investigatory hold that long without arrest. If the police want to talk to you but don't have enough to arrest you, you can leave any time. If you call your lawyer, he/she will come to the police station and tell the cops to release or arrest you. If the police really want you to stay, likely there is probable cause and they can keep you anyway. The police can arrest you and keep you, without a warrant so long as there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed (by you). Once arrested without a warrant, this is what is usually referred to as an investigatory hold, where the law says you must be arraigned within 72 hours (some states it must be 48 hours, 1 day less than supreme court says is reasonable). During this time they can investigate their case against you and decide what, if any, charges they will bring. There is no recourse for this, (in the event they bring no charges) unless you can establish that you were held for no reason (including not being falsely identified) and that it was only to intentionally deprive you of your right to liberty. This is nearly impossible to prove, unless you really did nothing and the cop was just messing with you (for instance in a personal vendetta) and you can show that. | Yes, this is illegal. If by "across the state" you mean some distance away but in the same state then the exact law will depend on which state you are in, but as a rule any "conversion" of property to the use of another counts as theft. In this case your aunt has "converted" the property to the use of your Nan (funny legal phrase). The fact that the people doing this are your relatives makes no difference. (When asking about the law here you should always say which state you are in.) Although theft is a crime, you could also start a civil case to get your property back without involving the police. The details depend on where you are, but try googling "(your state) small claims court". Many states have a process for collecting low-value debts or other property without needing lawyers. You need to have a firm conversation with your aunt about this. Tell her that you want your property back, and don't back down. Also call your Nan and explain this to her as well; she may not have realised that she is in possession of stolen property, which is usually a separate crime. If you want more advice on how to get your property back without starting a family row then you might ask on the Interpersonal Skills SE, but it might be better to start with "When are you planning to return my property?" and leave "You are a thief" as a last resort. Edit: As Eric Nolan points out in the comments, you may be a minor. If you are under 18 then your aunt has authority over you that she wouldn't have if you were older. For instance, if she is concerned about your use of video games impacting school-work then confiscating your console and putting it out of your reach would be perfectly legal. | Generally speaking, you have to disclose that the defendant is a minor in the complaint and their deadline to respond is tolled until the court has appointed a guardian ad litem for them. So, while it is possible, it is arduous. Also, since someone below the age of eighteen can claim minority as a defense to an executory contract (as opposed to a contemporaneous exchange of goods or services for cash), and in some cases, to other contracts, you have a better shot at suing for malperformance and nonperformance of work. Finally, even if you can sue, collecting a judgment from a minor, who is likely to lack both employment and any significant assets, is very challenging. A minor's legal guardians or parents would not be responsible for a judgment entered against a minor in these circumstances. there was no written contract for the job and the only information I have of them is their phone numbers. The lack of a written contract isn't a serious problem in a short job that was performed by both sides. You will need to be able to locate them to physically serve them with process to sue them. If you have their names, approximate ages, and the general vicinity of where they live or work, this isn't an insurmountable burden, but it is a bit of extra work that could turn out to be easy or could turn out to be a major obstacle. | Direct civil suits are not the only way to obtain remedies for property violations. Other options: Ask. You can send them a simple letter describing the violation and asking them to compensate you appropriately. Complain to authorities. If they engaged in any behavior that constitutes a crime (e.g., criminal fraud) then the state (via district or state attorneys) is responsible for any criminal prosecution. If the state prosecutes and you are considered a victim, the state generally takes that into account if they are able to prevail against the defender. Even if they didn't commit a crime, but they have a sufficiently outrageous pattern of abusing individuals' civil rights, state attorneys may decide to threaten or take legal action. Seek a "litigation investor." If the size of damages likely to be recovered via lawsuit is high enough, then law firms will sometimes take cases "on contingency," which typically means the plaintiff does not front any money, but gives up a significant share of any winnings. There are also independent litigation investment companies that perform the same function based on a similar calculus, but often for even larger cuts of any winnings. | You misunderstand the significance of the phrase "innocent until proven guilty." This is in part because you are not considering the entire phrase. The full phrase is that an accused party is "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This does not mean that the accused is innocent, only that criminal procedure must take as its starting point that the accused did not commit the crime. The major implication of the presumption, and indeed its original purpose, is that it places the burden of proof on the prosecution. This means that if a prosecutor asserts that you stole something, you do not have to prove that you did not. Rather, the prosecutor must prove that you did. The only reason to present evidence of your own is to rebut the prosecutor's evidence. Another practical implication is that a decision to detain someone awaiting a criminal trial may not be based on the assumption that the accused committed the crime. On the other hand, that decision is not based on the assumption that the accused did not commit the crime. There is a presumption of innocence, but no assumption of innocence, and the government is not obliged before the person is convicted to treat the person as if there is no accusation or charge. Wikipedia has a decent discussion. If we modify your question accordingly, it becomes How can two people be presumed innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? Now the answer should be clear. The prosecutor must develop evidence that shows which one of the people has committed the crime. If the prosecutor cannot do that, neither person may be punished. | If you sue a person for a tort X, one of the things you have to prove is that the defendant did do X. A baseless belief that it must have been so-and-so will do you no good. You do not have to have iron-clad evidence of your allegations, for a civil suit, but you have to show with a preponderance of evidence that the claim is true. A combination of "hates me" and "provably did this a number of times in the past" could well suffice. As for damages, it depends on what harm you actually suffered. If you get fired and you show that it was because of a false allegation, you would probably have to take this to the big court, since small claims court handles amounts in the $5,000 range (jurisdiction-specific). | However, can I ask the person provide me money in exchange that I am not going to call police? First of all, the conduct you describe is a tort, in addition to possibly being a crime, and so you could ask them to provide you with money in exchange for a release from tort liability (i.e. not suing them). This is done all of the time and is perfectly legal, although if one is afraid of extortion claims, the safer course would be to file the lawsuit first (and possibly also report the crime to the police first) and then to seek money damages. Once a criminal complaint has been filed and an accusation made publicly, there is no "extortion" element. A lawyer would not be permitted as a matter of professional ethics from proposing a settlement in exchange for not contacting the police, but could obtain money with a threat of civil liability. This is not obviously within the definition of extortion, because reporting them for committing an actual crime would not necessarily be "wrongful" conduct in every situation, and wrongful use of "fear" is one of the elements of the California crime for extortion. But, it is clearly within the definition of "fear" which is defined to mean: Fear, such as will constitute extortion, may be induced by a threat of any of the following: To do an unlawful injury to the person or property of the individual threatened or of a third person. To accuse the individual threatened, or a relative of his or her, or a member of his or her family, of a crime. To expose, or to impute to him, her, or them a deformity, disgrace, or crime. To expose a secret affecting him, her, or them. To report his, her, or their immigration status or suspected immigration status. This definition makes no reference to the validity of the accusation. It might be possible to determine with more case law research when threatening to report a crime that they have committed is "wrongful use" of "fear". My expectation is that this is something of a gray area and may be quite fact specific (it is not a point upon which there is great uniformity between U.S. states). This excerpt from a California Supreme Court decision helps clarify the line between a legitimate threat and an extortionate one (case law citations and references omitted), and tends to suggest that insisting on money, hinging on a threat that the a criminal complaint will be made otherwise, does constitute extortion in the State of California, even when made by the victim in the case of a crime that was actually committed: Extortion “Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent ... induced by a wrongful use of force or fear....” (Pen.Code, § 518.) Fear, for purposes of extortion “may be induced by a threat, either: [¶] ... [¶] 2. To accuse the individual threatened ... of any crime; or, [¶] 3. To expose, or impute to him ... any deformity, disgrace or crime[.]” (Pen.Code, § 519.) “Every person who, with intent to extort any money or other property from another, sends or delivers to any person any letter or other writing, whether subscribed or not, expressing or implying, or adapted to imply, any threat such as is specified in Section 519, is punishable in the same manner as if such money or property were actually obtained by means of such threat.” (Pen.Code, § 523.) Extortion has been characterized as a paradoxical crime in that it criminalizes the making of threats that, in and of themselves, may not be illegal. “[I]n many blackmail cases the threat is to do something in itself perfectly legal, but that threat nevertheless becomes illegal when coupled with a demand for money.” The extortion statutes “all adopted at the same time and relating to the same subject matter, clearly indicate that the legislature in denouncing the wrongful use of fear as a means of obtaining property from another had in mind threats to do the acts specified in section 519, the making of which for the purpose stated is declared to be a wrongful use of fear induced thereby.” “It is the means employed [to obtain the property of another] which the law denounces, and though the purpose may be to collect a just indebtedness arising from and created by the criminal act for which the threat is to prosecute the wrongdoer, it is nevertheless within the statutory inhibition. The law does not contemplate the use of criminal process as a means of collecting a debt.” In Beggs “we explained that because of the strong public policy militating against self-help by force or fear, courts will not recognize a good faith defense to the satisfaction of a debt when accomplished by the use of force or fear”; For purposes of extortion “[i]t is immaterial that the money which petitioner sought to obtain through threats may have been justly due him”; “The law of California was established in 1918 that belief that the victim owes a debt is not a defense to the crime of extortion”. Moreover, threats to do the acts that constitute extortion under Penal Code section 519 are extortionate whether or not the victim committed the crime or indiscretion upon which the threat is based and whether or not the person making the threat could have reported the victim to the authorities or arrested the victim. Furthermore, the crime with which the extortionist threatens his or her victim need not be a specific crime. “[T]he accusations need only be such as to put the intended victim of the extortion in fear of being accused of some crime. The more vague and general the terms of the accusation the better it would subserve the purpose of the accuser in magnifying the fears of his victim, and the better also it would serve to protect him in the event of the failure to accomplish his extortion and of a prosecution for his attempted crime.” Attorneys are not exempt from these principles in their professional conduct. Indeed, the Rules of Professional Conduct specifically prohibit attorneys from “threaten[ing] to present criminal, administration, or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute.” (Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 5–100(A).) In Libarian v. State Bar we upheld disciplinary action against Librarian who, after losing at trial, sent a letter to opposing counsel, accusing his opponent's client of perjury and threatening to use the perjury charge as the basis of a new trial motion and a criminal complaint unless opposing counsel's client paid Librarian's client. “Although no action was taken either by Librarian or Siegel to prosecute Nadel, the record clearly shows conduct which is in violation of Librarian's oath and duties as an attorney. The threats contained in the letter indicate an attempt to commit extortion. The sending of a threatening letter with intent to extort money is ‘punishable in the same manner as if such money ... were actually obtained’ (Pen.Code, § 523) and the crime of extortion involves moral turpitude.” The conduct of an attorney who threatened an oil company with reporting adulteration of its gasoline to the prosecutor unless it paid his clients was not only grounds for disbarment but “constituted an attempt to extort money as said crime is defined in sections 518, 519 and 524 of the Penal Code”; attorney's suggestion in letter demanding $175,000 settlement in divorce case that he might advise his client to report husband to Internal Revenue Service and United States Custom Service constituted “veiled threats [that] exceeded the limits of respondent's representation of his client in the divorce action” and supported attorney's extortion conviction]. As these cases illustrate, a threat that constitutes criminal extortion is not cleansed of its illegality merely because it is laundered by transmission through the offices of an attorney. Bearing these principles in mind, we turn to the instant case. Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 15–21 (Cal. 2006). |
Striking infrastructure sites, what would be considered as a war crime? During the Russo-Ukrainian war I saw that strikes on Ukrainian power stations were labeled as war crimes. Is that so? After all, electricity is a blood of industry, by disabling it you may cripple weapon production/repair. Same goes to fuel depots, cellular communication, roads and bridges to name a few. Clearly there are facilities that should not be damaged under any circumstances, like water supplies or medical installations. So there are two questions. Is a power plant a legitimate target to strike? Is there a definition of what exactly could be considered as a legitimate target during the war? | Attacking a nuclear power plants without consideration of its consequences on the civilian population and/or the environment may qualify as a war crime. Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (whose definition of war crimes reflects jus cogens, or preemptory norms of international law, even if not all nations are parties to the ICC), war crimes include Article 8, paragraph 2 (b) (iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; As to the definition of legitimate military objectives, the International Committee of the Red Cross has an overview on this subject. One succinct definition offered by the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention is In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. The same Protocol (article 54) prohibits attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (e.g. water supplies or agricultural land and livestocks for civilian purposes). While electricity power plants do not necessarily qualify as indispensable to survival (they may be e.g. if required for adequate heating during winter) and can in any case be a legitimate objective, an attack on a nuclear power plant may violate Protocol I's requirement to limit the scope of destruction. Article 51 prohibits indiscriminate attacks which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. | Governments have a significant interest in controlling pathogens and preventing outbreaks: they are dangerous to dense & unimmunized populations. Can a government legally prevent me from intentionally infecting myself with a virus? Yes, governments have the broad authority to enact laws. The US prohibits and regulates pathogen experimentation (self-infection). There are also rules regarding shipping and export (ITAR). Furthermore, in the US, there are (FL, NY state) laws that prevent patients from being tested unless the order is given by an authorized health care professional. Hopefully, you do live in a state that does not have this regulation (AZ). While I do believe in one's right to do as one sees fit with one's own body, there is the counter-argument: there must be limits when it comes to unnecessarily exposing the community to pathogen risk. I hope that this question is theoretical and that nobody actually believes the immunity supposition without a credible peer-reviewed scientific publication. Unfortunately we live in an age where misinformation is propagated at novel speed and scale. I wish the OP well. That being said, I have concerns regarding the underlying assumptions of the question. While I am comfortable with the OP question, the underlying assumptions give me great pause. UPDATE IMHO: I hope that no reader will seriously consider amateur experimentation in self-infection in the hope of conferring immunity. Giving a pathogen uncontrolled safe-haven to propagate and possibly infect others seems irresponsible. I doubt that the government cares if any individual manages to puts themselves in an early grave, however, it does care if amateurs create an unnecessary pandemic risk. I would think that any government would view pathogen experimentation much like nuclear device experimentation, because of the mass casualty risk. I hope that readers understand the implications of an amateur uncontrolled experiment. | Technically, yes: Whoever willfully or maliciously injures, tears down or destroys any letter box or other receptacle intended or used for the receipt or delivery of mail on any mail route, or breaks open the same or willfully or maliciously injures, defaces or destroys any mail deposited therein, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. That said, just because it's technically a felony punishable by up to 3 years in federal prison, doesn't mean you'll actually be punished that way. The Department of Justice's Criminal Resource Manual has a section on misdemeanor offenses that apply to postal crime: Among the misdemeanor dispositions available are: 18 U.S.C. § 1701 (obstruction of mails generally); 18 U.S.C. § 1703(b) (opening,destroying, or detaining mail without authority); 18 U.S.C. § 1707 (theft of property used by postal service); and 18 U.S.C. § 1711 (misappropriation of postal funds). When the charge might best lie under 18 U.S.C. § 1705 (destruction of letter boxes or mail) or 18 U.S.C. § 1706 (injury to mail bags) and in other appropriate circumstances, an applicable misdemeanor may be found in 18 U.S.C. § 641 (theft of government property); or 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (destruction of government property). That suggests (at least to me) that federal prosecutors are supposed to at least consider misdemeanor instead of felony charges for minor cases of mailbox destruction. Under normal circumstances, destruction of federal property only becomes a felony if the damage (or attempted damage) is more than $1,000. This is a pretty good example of how US laws are written with prosecutorial discretion in mind. In other systems, the law about destruction of mail or mailboxes would lay out when it's a serious crime and when it's minor. In the US, it's always considered a serious crime because the assumption is that prosecutors won't charge it in minor cases (in fact, official guidance to prosecutors lays out ways they can charge it without charging the felony). It's also possible to be prosecuted at the state level for this, and if you're actually a juvenile that's much more likely than federal prosecution. The feds don't really like handling juvenile cases; they normally leave those up to the states unless there's some good reason not to. Even if you're an adult, the feds may well leave the issue up to the state for prosecution. At the state level, the threshold for felony vs. misdemeanor vandalism would depend on the state. Whether you're prosecuted at the state or federal levels, there's a decent chance you wind up with at least a misdemeanor on your record. Vandalism is illegal, after all. | The general rule is that using force in self-defense is justified if the person using the force reasonably believes it immediately is necessary to prevent the unlawful use of force against themselves or a third party. Deadly force is not generally justified except in response to a reasonable fear of deadly force, or to prevent certain violent crimes (like rape, kidnapping, robbery, etc.) Force is not justified in retaliation. In some states, if you're not at home (or maybe even then), you also have a duty to retreat before you can use deadly force in self-defense. So, for your specific questions: If they hit you once but aren't continuing to hit you, it's illegal to hit them back. You can only use force to defend yourself, not to get even. If someone gets in your face without touching you, you might be allowed to use force, but it depends on the circumstances. You don't have to wait for someone to hit you, but you can't sucker-punch someone because you want more space in a mosh pit. Your use of force needs to be something you reasonably believe to be necessary to stop/prevent their unlawful use of force. It also needs to be proportional to the force you're defending against; you can meet deadly force with deadly force, but shooting someone to stop them from slapping you is murder. Likewise, no one's going to believe that you really thought you had to beat the crap out of someone in order to stop them from slapping you, or that it's in any way proportionate to what they did. Deadly force is not allowed in defense of a person unless you reasonably think deadly force is needed to prevent the unlawful use of deadly force, or to prevent one of a few crimes being committed against them. Depending on the state, it might be presumptively justified if the person is trying to forcibly break into your occupied house, car, or place of business, but that's state-dependent. | The fact that an explosive device is improvised is irrelevant to any law of war with which I am familiar. "Legal in war" is more a matter of deciding which treaty, convention, or custom you care to respect. | I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!). | In the US, only crimes that involve death or crimes against the state can be punished with death, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (this was a child rape case and execution was held to be unconstitutional). There is a consideration of "proportionality" whereby execution is not an option for all crimes involving death. The court doesn't include or exclude non-death cases, they explicitly kick the can down the road ("We do not address, for example, crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity, which are offenses against the State"). Therefore, there is no ruling that bars execution for treason, but there is for rape and burning someone's stack of hundreds. This is a list of 2008 pre-Kennedy non-murder "surviving" state capital offenses (most of the cases listed in the article are for rape, which was ruled unconstitutional): Treason (Arkansas, Calif., Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Washington) Aggravated kidnapping (Co., Idaho, Il., Missouri, Mont.) Drug trafficking (Fl., Missouri) Aircraft hijacking (Ga., Mo.) Placing a bomb near a bus terminal (Mo.) Espionage (New Mexico) Aggravated assault by incarcerated, persistent felons, or murderers (Mont.) However, in Washington the death penalty is now unconstititional. The Missouri penalty for treason has been since reduced to a maximum of life imprisonment. On the other hand, Florida still has a "capital drug trafficking" penalty if you import 300+ kg of cocaine, knowing that "the probable result of such importation would be the death of any person" (death does not have to actually result). Here is a list of federal crimes that allow execution, which includes only large-scale drug trafficking, espionage and treason in the non-death crimes. | It's possibe to cover auto-starting apps and cookies under the definition. I'm not convinced and could argue against that but I don't think it matters. The tiny extract you linked isn't a law. It is a definition. It does not say "these things are illegal". For that, we have to zoom out a little. Section 43 includes the offense in question (emphasis mine): If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network... introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus... So back to the question. Could Steam be considered a virus? Maybe. Is it illegal? No. On the other hand, if I were to gain access to your computer and download Steam, yes that could be an example of breaking that law. |
Can a judge consider recent events in an older case? Bob likes fast cars. Two months ago, he was unfortunately caught for excessive speeding. Both his car and his driving license were confiscated immediately. By law (SVG Art 16c, Abs 2 a_bis and Art 90) he now expects a jail sentence of at least one year. But since this was the first incident of this kind, he will probably get away with a suspended sentence. Today is his trial. To get to court, Bob does something very stupid: He steals a car and drives to court, again at excessive speeds and again, he is caught. Can the judge, based on the second incident, change his sentence because he now knows that the suspended sentence probably won't hold Bob from speeding? The judge of course knows that there will likely be a second trial involving Bob (for speeding again, but also for stealing a car and driving without a license). Answers for different jurisdictions are welcome. Also, I'm interested basically in "can the judge use evidence from a new case", rather than the exact sentencing in this example. Question based on a true story. | canada Evidence of offences other than the one for which the accused is being sentenced is admissable at a sentencing hearing, even evidence of untried offences. R. v. Edwards, 2001 CanLII 24105 (Ont. C.A.): [39] There are statutory provisions that do permit the use of evidence about the offender, even though that evidence also discloses the commission of other crimes. First, s. 718(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code set out as two of the objectives of sentencing: (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; [40] Neither of these objectives can be fairly achieved through sentencing without knowing something, and perhaps quite a bit, about the background and character of the offender. The Crown, in this case, in effect put its case for admission of this evidence on the need to separate this respondent from society. The sentencing judge can consider such evidence of untried offences. (R. v. Jordan, 1991 CanLII 203 (B.C.C.A.)) When there is a dispute about any fact that might aggravate the sentence, the Crown (prosecution) must establish that fact by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Criminal Code, s. 724(3)(e). See also R. v. Roopchand, 2016 MBCA 105: The first ground [of appeal] is whether the sentencing judge erred by taking into account the accused’s pending charge for an untried offence when imposing sentence. The use to be made of evidence will be informed by the purpose for which it is to be admitted. With respect to what use can be made of evidence of untried offences at a sentencing hearing, the case law is clear: while such evidence cannot be used for the purpose of punishing the accused, it is admissible when its purpose is limited to shedding light upon some aspect of the accused’s character and background which is relevant to the objectives of sentencing being considered by the judge R. v. Angelillo, 2006 SCC 55: The fact that Mr. Angelillo had been charged with two new counts of fraud, both of which were allegedly committed while he was waiting to be sentenced, was obviously relevant to the assessment of the danger his release would represent for the community. In Angelillo, the judge could even have "postponed the sentencing hearing to a date after the interim release hearing regarding the new charges in order to be better informed of the risk resulting from the subsequent act." | canada Or would I still be charged with his murder since it’s a different criminal instance? Yes, this is the correct intuition. Different instance/wrong; different basis for the charge; not precluded by double-jeopardy. In Canada, the term of art is autrefois convict. Section 609 of the Criminal Code lays out the standard for what it means for the count to be the same: the matter on which the accused was given in charge on the former trial is the same in whole or in part as that on which it is proposed to give him in charge The later charge for murdering Bob would be a wholly different circumstance or "wrong" or "delict" than the first conviction was based on. The later charge would not be precluded. | An affirmative defense is a way of avoiding conviction by acknowledging you did the act claimed, but that such act was among the exceptions provided by the law which makes such acts otherwise an offence. That is, you affirm (acknowledge, admit) your action of using the device, but you are claiming that your use of the device (handsfree as a GPS guide) is okay, and therefore you should not be convicted. For all intents and purposes in this situation, your "2" and "3" are the same thing. The device is supported by something other than you holding it, and you are able to keep both hands on the wheel while using it in this way. Finally, a plain language reading of the definition for "hands-free accessory" suggests that using an object in the car to support the device where it can be seen, or using a feature of the device that speaks directions which you can hear, neither of which requires moving your hands off the wheel, will be considered such an accessory. It is also worth pointing out that such usage of a device (placed in a cradle or on the dashboard or turned up so it is heard) will be well-known to the legislators, and there is a reasonable interpretation of the law that would allow such usage. If this ever went to court, and somebody used this defence for this situation, they would probably be okay. | If you were moving "with the flow of traffic" but over the limit, you were still breaking the law, and the cop can choose which car or cars to stop on any basis or none (except ones forbidden, such as racial in the US). This is almost surely not a valid defense, not in any jurisdiction that I know of at least. If you can show that to slow to the speed limit would have actually been unsafe, you might have a defense, but that is going to be hard to get a court to accept. | The life sentences were based on counts 2 and 4, distribution of narcotics by means of the internet and continuing criminal enterprise. In reviewing the sentencing hearing, all of the evidence indicates that the sentence was based on the nature of his acts, and not anything he did after his arrest. There is no way to know if prosecutors would have been amenable to a plea bargain. | In the US, obscenities, insults, racial slurs and so on are legal, owing to the First Amendment. An actual, believable threat to maim you would not be legal, under Cal. Penal 422, but "I oughta punch you" would not be a criminal threat. Some forms of aggressive driving constitute reckless driving, if they are driving "in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property". It is also against the law to follow too close (you must follow reasonably and prudently). Exceeding the speed limit is a violation of Veh. Code 22352, even if it's to pass a guy on a bike. Of course, we can't tell if you are obeying the law, but even if you were doing something illegal in your biking such as blowing away a stop sign, "the other guy was bad" is not a defense against a citation for illegal driving. | Texas and California are actually what are called Presumed Speeding states, unlike most others which are Absolute Speeding states. (There is a little known third category called Basic, but this is uncommon). In a presumed speeding state, a speed-limit violation offers someone in your shoes far more flexibility in building your defense than the more common absolute state. In states that use this presumed system, such as California and Texas, it is not illegal to drive over the posted limit as long as you are driving safely and this can be established. For example, if you are driving 50 mph in a 40-mph zone, you are "presumed" to be speeding, yes. However, despite this prima facie evidence (meaning "on its face") of speed in excess of the posted limit, if you can show you were driving safely you may be able to mount a pretty decent defense. Just because you got a ticket is not prima facie evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that you were speeding. You are presumed innocent. If they prove you were speeding this is all they need to make their case, unless you rebut it. But there is a lot of room to rebut this presumption – and that is if they prove it. They must (as with all criminal cases) prove you did what you are accused of beyond a reasonable doubt – the highest standard of proof in the U.S. So, if everyone was going 80 MPH in a 70MPH zone, you would argue that the road was (I'm assuming) dry, unmarred, you were traveling in heavy enough traffic that to slow your speed to the posted limit would actually be less safe than traveling with the flow of traffic. You can talk about the state of your vehicle (repair, handling, etc.), how you stayed in one lane, and you can describe your skill at driving – especially if you have no other tickets and you have been driving for a long time. If you were weaving in and out of traffic, riding someone's bumper, if it was pouring rain, the road was bumpy or under construction, or if you admitted speeding (if you did this you can still rebut with a showing of safe driving, but ignore all info regarding challenging radar or other means of determining speed), or if any other evidence exists that the officer would testify to that shows you were not driving safely, this will not be successful. A successful example of a speeding defense in Texas: on a clear, dry morning with no other cars on a wide, straight road, a man is pulled over for being clocked going 50 mph in a 40 MPH zone. He had a perfect record and had been driving 22 years. He was driving a 2-year-old car. He convinced a judge that this was driving safely given those conditions and was acquitted. That's because facts presented were sufficient to "rebut the presumption" that by going over the posted limit he was driving at an unsafe speed. NOTE: Never bring up your driving record unless it is spotless. Unless you are a habitual offender it cannot be used against you or be brought into evidence at all, unless you open the door. You can also mount a defense based on the radar detection device, if one was used. You can seek records as to when the calibration fork was last checked, when the last time it was professionally calibrated (rather than self calibrated). You can ask, in a leading way (only if you know) how close the car behind and in front of you were (you don't want to be too close to the car in front of you, however if the cars were tightly grouped it is more likely the radar detector could have read another vehicle): e.g., "Isn't it true that the car behind me was only 1.5 car lengths behind me?" Only do this if you know, but if you can get the officer to admit that the car behind you was close, that can be used to rebut the radar detection and goes to the argument that driving slower would have been dangerous and you were driving safely with the flow of traffic. You should be prepared to put on an entire trial if you fight the ticket. In Texas, I believe speeding is considered a Class C criminal offense (rather than a civil offense as in most absolute states); hence, they have to build the prima facie case against you and prove it beyond reasonable doubt. If you can afford one, get a good traffic violation attorney. Always choose a jury in this type of case. Everyone speeds a little and you are far more likely to be acquitted by a jury than a judge. You should also ask to have the case assigned to the county seat; request this in writing ASAP. If you are trying the case, be prepared to go after the officer. Note any distinguishing marks on your car (if any), recall what you wore, what time of day, the lighting, all that. Even go back to the scene at the same day and time and take video showing the flow of traffic, (hopefully) the straightness of the road, etc. Cross-examine him on all facts with confidence and in a leading manner. Always ask for the calibration reports and you will get all evidence against you in discovery. This thing about 10mph being the minimum they can give a ticket for: ignore that, it's rubbish! It's meant to get you to admit to him that "you were only going 8 or 9 over." Also, that whole percentile argument is not relevant and will not work at all. You must show that you were driving safely given all the facts and circumstances to rebut the presumption that you were driving unsafely by speeding. It is worth fighting as you will also incur surcharges, increased insurance rates, and points on your license that are cumulative and stay for 3 years – a certain amount of which gets you suspended if you get (or have) more violations. | There may be two questions sort of embedded in here: How long does the government have before it violates Speedy Trial; and How long does the government have to turn over its evidence? Unfortunately, they're probably both impossible to answer at this point. Question 1 Under the Speedy Trial Act (18 USC 3161): In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. If a defendant consents in writing to be tried before a magistrate judge on a complaint, the trial shall commence within seventy days from the date of such consent. IRA was indicted on February 16, 2018, so 70 days later would be April 27, 2018, which has obviously already come and gone. But their initial appearance wasn't until May 9, 2018, which pushes the time back to July 18, 2018. That would be the default latest date for a trial to begin, but the Act also allows delays for a variety of factors. Among them are delays "resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant," which includes time the court spends considering the defendants' motions. So if IRA moves to dismiss the case, all the time spent fighting over that motion would "toll" speedy-trial time, meaning that it would stop the clock until the motion was decided. Another provision of potential relevance is 18 USC 3161(h)(8): Any period of delay, not to exceed one year ... [if] an official request .. has been made for evidence of any such offense and that it reasonably appears, or reasonably appeared at the time the request was made, that such evidence is, or was, in such foreign country. So if there's evidence somewhere in Russia linking these guys to the crimes they're accused of, that might push speedy trial back by a year just to deal with that issue alone. So the short answer to Question 1 is that Speedy Trial requires the trial to begin on July 18, but that practically speaking, that probably won't happen. Question 2 The timing of discovery, the process of each side turning over its evidence to the other side, varies based on the kind of evidence involved, so there are usually multiple disclosures of evidence between the time of indictment and the actual trial. Under current DOJ guidelines, prosecutors are encouraged to provide "broad and early discovery." More specifically: Exculpatory evidence available under Brady v. Maryland should be turned over "reasonably promptly"; Impeachment evidence available under Giglio v. United States should be turned over "at a reasonable time before trial to allow the trial to proceed efficiently"; and Material available under Rule 16 should be disclosed "as soon as is reasonably practical." As you can see, these aren't really hard deadlines. The defense will ask for the documents, the government will turn over documents, and then they'll probably both fight about turning over some other documents, and then they'll wait for the court to decide what to do. So when does Mueller have to turn over his evidence? Probably the best answer we have right now is: "When a judge tells him to." |
Is it legal to force users to accept new terms of service by threatening financial loss? Why isn't it illegal, (extortion or duress), to force users to accept new Terms of Service by threatening financial loss, (like denying access to purchased content, or inhibiting or prohibiting the ability to earn an income)? Users often heavily invest financially in those products for many years, (monthly fees, digital content like Amazon Kindle books, or cash transactions in games). And, they can lose all of their investments to sudden changes, (changes that severely limit rights they used to have). For example: What if games that allowed real money economies suddenly denied users the ability to earn incomes? Or, what if Amazon were to stop people from lending books, or giving them to others, (if they allowed it in the past)? Or, what if games were to disallow people from streaming them, or suddenly restrict speech, or disallowing players to transfer items with each other? Or, what if Microsoft Windows was to suddenly change its license to mandate reporting how the software is used, by removing previously installed software support for optional reporting. etc… Now, you may not transfer, exchange, sell, market, promote or solicit any of this platform's items or services you provide using this platform outside of this platform and must instead use this platform and currency for these. Now, you may not engage in harmful, abusive, or hurtful criticism towards this platform or developers including communication via other platforms. | Why isn't forcing users to accept new Terms of Service by threatening financial loss, (like denying access to purchased content, or inhibiting or prohibiting the ability to earn an income), considered extortion and therefore illegal? Usually this is not illegal, and even if it is, it usually doesn't constitute extortion (or extortion's civil counterpart, which is called "duress", which is an affirmative defense to contract enforcement). Generally speaking, exercising a legal right someone already has, for a purpose that is not improper, does not constitute extortion. A TOS Rarely Creates A Reasonable Expectation That It Won't Change Most importantly, in the case of terms of service governed information technology services, the firm that creates the terms of service reserves, at the outset, the right to change them at any time. So, the user has no reasonable expectation that the terms of service won't change in a manner that they dislike. There is no implied promise to never change anything material about the service. Terms of service are usually specifically drafted from the outset to avoid creating something that looks like a property interest on the part of the user in having the service continue to work in a particular manner. TOS Terms May Not Be Unconscionable Both the original terms of service and any subsequent amendment of them, is not permitted to be "unconscionable" (e.g. it can't make the life of your first born child a liquidated damages provision that applies if the terms of service are breached). But, there isn't much of a legally protected reliance interest in not having the terms of service changed in this situation (although almost every general rule could conceivably have some exception to it, probably far more factually extreme than the fact patterns identified in the question). If a term is unconscionable, it may not be enforced as contrary to public policy, without regard to what prior versions of the same agreement may have stated. TOS Changes Are Usually Prospective Only On the other hand, a terms of service amendment is generally only effective prospectively and does not generally change rights that have fully accrued and vested prior to their amendment, at least until the user takes some act to affirmatively continue to use the service going forward. When there are vested rights under old versions, the remedy is not to characterize the change as extortion, however. It is to not apply the amendment to the terms of service retroactively to the already vested rights. For example, if the old terms of service did not contain an arbitration clause, and litigation was in progress under the old terms based upon old transactions, and then a new terms of service were adopted that mandated arbitration, this amendment would not generally be applied to require the pending lawsuit in court to be stayed and transferred to an arbitration forum. The right to litigated vested when the lawsuit was filed. | The European laws have specific sections regarding digital goods. The following two passages are relevant to you: From Returning unwanted goods: Warning! Please note that you may not use goods that you have received before deciding to withdraw from the purchase. The right to withdraw exists to allow you to examine the product in the same way as you would in a shop, not to give you 14 days free use. Be aware also that more specific rules apply to digital content (e.g. downloading or streaming music or video). From Shopping online: Digital content Specific information requirements apply when you buy digital content online, e.g. when downloading or streaming music or video. Before you make the purchase, you must also be informed how the content operates with relevant hardware/software (interoperability) and about its functionality, including whether any geographical restrictions apply to the use of the content and if private copies are allowed. You also enjoy the right of withdrawal within 14 days from concluding the contract for online digital content. However, once you start downloading or streaming the content you may no longer withdraw from the purchase, provided that the trader has complied with his obligations. Specifically, the trader must first obtain your explicit agreement to the immediate download or streaming, and you must explicitly acknowledge that you lose your right to withdraw once the performance has started. So yes, the law specifically allows you to waive that right when purchasing digital goods. So long as Steam has correctly advertised the product's system requirements and other key details, you lose your right to withdraw from the purchase the moment you start downloading it to your system. | No AFAIK there is no such legal requirement. Why this company told you there was I can’t speculate. But I will. There may be under contract with MicroSoft to put their OS on every box they sell - that would be a legal requirement. Or the just don’t sell boxes without this and they employee told you it was a legal obligation to get out of the conversation. | Of course you have to follow the license. You seem to have a license that doesn't allow distribution and want to know if giving copies to the Dutch or Chinese branch of your company is distribution. First, you should not make that decision. Your company's lawyers should do that. Second, such distribution is with some licenses perfectly legal if you distribute the software with source code. That's a business decision which you or your manager or his/her manager... can make. Such questions (whether giving a copy to your Dutch branch is distribution) often don't have an answer that is yes or no but maybe - if you went to court, would a judge say that it is distribution? The answer is quite clearly "maybe". So unless you can find a safe way, there is a risk. Again, your lawyers will assess the risk. | Monopoly is a trademark of Parker Brothers. You would need to get permission to use that trademark. The artwork of the game is copyrighted and cannot be duplicated without violating that copyright. In general, the labels meaning phrases like "Go to Jail" and "New York Avenue" are probably copyrighted and some court decisions have decided that labels are a copyrightable element. However, there is some gray area. The game mechanics are not copyrightable and can be duplicated. What this means is that if you clone the game and use new labels (like new property names and card titles) then you are probably fine. You would have to make a novel board design. If you clone the game, but use the game's labels, then you could potentially lose in court. Of course, remember that corporations will sometimes sue just to intimidate people, even if they have a losing case. Just because your clone is non-infringing doesn't mean they won't sue you. It costs them money to sue people, so if your clone is obscure or not used by many people it could fly under the radar and be ignored by the company. If your clone was a success and became widely used, that would significantly increase the chance you could get sued. In most cases a company will threaten infringers before they sue them, because it is a lot cheaper to threaten somebody than sue them. Therefore, you could make your clone and just plan on discontinuing it if they threaten you. Of course, there is a small risk they would sue you anyway. If you made no money then you are probably safe because it would be a lot harder for them to argue that you commercially damaged them if you made no money. | The relevant legislation is found in sections 5361-5367 of the United States Code. The key prohibition is in section 5363. To fall within the scope of this prohibition, a person must: (1) be "in the business of betting or wagering" and (2) accept a payment in connection with the participation of another person in "unlawful Internet gambling". So you need to look at (1) what is betting or wagering and (2) what is unlawful Internet gambling. Both terms are defined in section 5362 and discussed on Wikipedia. Assuming that you are running a video game that is not a thin veneer over a casino, and the users are gambling in-game items that are not purchased with actual money, then you are unlikely to be found to be engaged in the business of betting or wagering, especially given the exclusion in section 5362(1)(E)(viii) for "participation in any game or contest in which participants do not stake or risk anything of value." | Is this illegal? No, subject to some possible narrow exceptions discussed below. Do the social media companies have a duty under the First Amendment to not censor users? No. Indeed, usually, there is greater liability exposure for failing to censor content, for example, by failing to honor a "take down notice" under Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act based upon an alleged copyright violation, or for failure to censor content related to potential sex trafficking. The First Amendment to the United State Constitution (which applies to state and local government via the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution) is a limitation on the power of governmental actors only. This said, some state constitutions, such as California's, provide free speech protections not just from government action, but also in spaces that are privately owned, but are open to the public and constitute de facto public forums. The authority of California to expand its state constitutional protections to these private settings was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). It is conceivable that these doctrines could be expanded to public Internet forums in the case of California based social media companies (e.g., Facebook has its headquarters in Menlo Park, California; so does its sister platform Instagram; LinkedIn is based in Sunnyvale, California; and Google is based in Mountain View, California). There are also laws that limit how employers can regulate employee speech in a labor relations context, although most of them don't have constitutional dimensions. It is conceivable that these doctrines could limit social media platform's authority to limit some kinds of speech by their own employees, or in situations where the social media platform looked like it was acting as a mere agent of some other employer controlled by that employer for all practical purposes. There has also been litigation related to free speech on social media regarding the rights of governmental account holders to exercise the same kinds of account management that is available to other users, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government. The social media platform operator is not itself the primary target in these cases, but if it simply implements its terms of service neutrally with respect to all account holders, it could be facilitating a constitutional violation by its governmental account holders and could conceivably be held liable for aiding and abetting that violation of the law by a governmental account holder (in the context of a lawsuit for money damages this is a special subtype of something called a civil conspiracy). | IANAL, but a EULA is a Contract of Adhesion https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/adhesion_contract_contract_of_adhesion and restrictions against publishing benchmarking data about products is fairly common https://www.eff.org/wp/dangerous-terms-users-guide-eulas A contract is a contract, even a click-through, and is legally binding; there is plenty supporting case law. You sign when you click: http://smallbusiness.findlaw.com/business-operations/contracts-and-electronic-signatures.html Basically, VMware has lots more money than you do. If they are annoyed at your posting of benchmarks that don't make their products look as good as they feel they should, they can at very least send a DMCA to the site that posts the benchmarks. Whether that works could depend on where the website is hosted. At most, they could take you to civil court, if you are in their jurisdiction. What happens, if you refuse to take your unapproved benchmark down? Can they sue you? Yes. (In civil, not criminal court). How much leg does a clause like this stand on the courts? In the United States? A contract is a contract. And VMware and you (I assume) are in the US, so the contract is enforceable. In the rest of the world? Outside of the US, enforceability is variable; that is searchable in law databases for each country and agreements between countries. Consider your motives for posting benchmarks against VMware's EULA. Do you have good points to make? Or are you simply complaining about the product? Who has more money to spend defending or fighting the EULA? You or them? If you're seriously concerned about this, talk to a lawyer and don't take legal advice from the general public. |
Are opening and closing statements part of the record? Lawyers are permitted to say things (e.g., "rhetorical flourishes" and "excusable hyperbole") during opening statements and closing arguments that would not be permitted during the evidentiary phase of a trial. I have seen judges prohibit jurors from taking written notes during opening statements or closing arguments. But I believe I see court reporters recording the opening and closing statements. So are those part of the record? And if so does that mean that a judge can cite them in a ruling or decision on the case? | Yes. Opening statements and closing arguments are part of the record, but they are not evidence on the merits of the case. Courts often cite them in their rulings on various issues, especially because they are strong indicators of a party's theory of the case and what the jury was being encouraged to consider when rendering a verdict. | My understanding is that "the record" only refers to the official record of the proceeding, e.g. the transcripts that would be kept on file and used as the basis for formal decisions. Such records are usually prepared after the fact by a court reporter based on their shorthand notes or audio recordings, so this indicates that the reporter should simply leave out the statement in question when creating those records, perhaps replacing it with a marking saying "(stricken)" or something of the sort. "Stricken from the record" doesn't indicate that the statement is to be kept secret or scrubbed from all history in some Orwellian fashion, merely that it should not be considered in any legal decision-making process (e.g. a judge's ruling). The decision should be made as if the statement had never been uttered. Anyone else in the courtroom -- lawyers, journalists, members of the public -- is free to remember it, write it down, publish it, shout it from the rooftops, or etch it into stone tablets, if they wish. No penalties exist for doing so. I also don't think there is any requirement to delete it from the court reporter's preliminary notes or audio recordings; again, only from the final official transcript. (There could be other situations where it is forbidden to record or divulge what was said: secret grand jury proceedings, material under seal, gag orders, etc. But those would all require some sort of regulation or order outside the usual meaning of the phrase "strike from the record".) | Discovery Basically, you ask. If your opponent thinks your request is out of bounds they object, give their reasons to the judge, you give yours and the judge orders them to produce the evidence or not. A lot of people think court cases have big “ah-ha” movements when a witness reveals something unknown on the stand. This rarely happens because there are no secrets in litigation - both sides have to clearly explain their case before, usually well before, they go to trial. | Yes, One Can In the United States, one may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify or otherwise give information that might tend to implicate the speaker in a crime. This is true in any court proceeding, civil or criminal, whether the person asserting the privilege is an accused, a witness, or a party to a civil case. It may be asserted in a Grand Jury or trial proceeding. One may also assert the privilege under police interrogation, or in an administrative proceeding. One may also assert it when testifying before Congress, a state legislature, or any local legislative body. One may also assert it when testifying before a government agency, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission. Asserting the privilege is often informally called "pleading the Fifth", although strictly speaking "pleading" is something that only an accused does (as in "I plead not guilty"). The availability of the privilege in civil cases has been true at least since the Saline Bank case of 1828 (see below). The privilege is not available when no criminal prosecution is legally possible, such as when the statute of limitations has expired, or when the law invoked has been held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, and no other valid law applies. Thus, if an authorized government official (usually a prosecutor) offers a grant of immunity, the privilege is no longer available on matters covered by the grant, and the person asserting it must then testify on such matters. The privilege may be asserted when the person doing so is actually guilty, or when the person is not guilty, but has a reasonable belief that the statements asked for might be used against the speaker in some current or future criminal proceeding. A person who has been tried for a crime nut had the case end in a mistrial, or a dismissal without prejudice, could still be re-tried for that accusation, and so may assert the privilege. Any assertion must be clear, but need not use a specific form of worfs. The standard form advised by many lawyers is I decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me. but less formal wording such as 'I take the Fifth" will also serve to assert the privilege. When the privilege is asserted in a court case, the Judge may question the person asserting it in private, off the record, to determine whether the fear of incrimination is reasonable. Case Law Saline Bank (1828) In the case of United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. 100 (1828) Chief Justice Marshall wrote: It is apparent that, in every step of the suit, the facts required to be discovered in support of this suit would expose the parties to danger. The rule clearly is that a party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to penalties, and this case falls within it. [This case was cited in Murphy, below] Saline Bank was a civil suit by the US treasury in Federal curt against an apparently unincorporated bank, but a Virginia state law of the time made it a crime to operate or participate in a bank without a proper charter. Thus the Marshall Court held that a witness in a civil suit could assert the privilege against the future possibility of a state criminal proceeding. Kastigar (1972) In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) the US Supreme Court wrote (footnotes omitted): It [the privilege against self-incrimination] can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has been zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the privilege [Citing the Miranda case in a footnote]. (Kastigar was a case in which people subpoenaed before a Grand Jury asserted the privilege, were granted immunity, and still refused to testify, alleging that the grant of immunity was not enough to revoke the privialge. They were held in contempt, appealed, and the Court held that the immunity was sufficient to allow the witnesses to be compelled to testify. In the court of its opinion, the Kastigar Court reviewed the history of the privilege and of immunity statutes in some detail.) Murphy (1964) In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) the US Supreme Court wrote: We have held today that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be deemed fully applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. ... Petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor concerning a work stoppage at the Hoboken, New Jersey, piers. After refusing to respond to certain questions about the stoppage on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminated them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey and New York. [Footnote 2] Notwithstanding this grant of immunity, they still refused to respond to the questions on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law, to which the grant of immunity did not purport to extend. [This case was cited in Kastigar above.] McCarthy v. Arndstein (1924) In McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (footnotes omitted, boldface added) The US Supreme Court wrote: The case is now before us on rehearing, granted in order to permit argument of the proposition, not presented by counsel before, that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to an examination of the bankrupt made for the purpose of obtaining possession of property belonging to his estate. ... The contention now is that the privilege against self-incrimination ought to have been disallowed because, under the Constitution, it does not extend to the examination of a bankrupt in a bankruptcy proceeding. The government insists broadly that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in any civil proceeding. The contrary must be accepted as settled. The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. The privilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also a party defendant. It protects likewise the owner of goods which may be forfeited in a penal proceeding. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 142 U. S. 563-564. The government urges more strongly a narrower contention. It claims that the constitutional privilege does not relieve a bankrupt from the duty to give information which is sought for the purpose of discovering his estate. It asserts that, in England, such an exception to the common law privilege prevails, and that the exception had been established there prior to the Declaration of Independence. Whatever may be the rule in England, it is clear that, in America, the constitutional prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination has not been so limited. | The standard of proof required to survive a motion to dismiss is very low. The factual (not legal) assertions of the plaintiff are assumed to be true, and the case is dismissed if the defense shows that even when the plaintiff is given that benefit, the assumed facts don't establish the case. This standard is somtimes referred to as "sufficiency of the claims". | Yes. The jurisdiction I am familiar with is England and Wales. Conviction requires evidence (witness testimony is evidence) which proves the case "beyond reasonable doubt". It is open to the jury to find the witness so convincing that they find that they are sure the defendant committed the crime. In general of course, prosecutors prefer to have some supporting evidence (either additional witnesses, or circumstantial evidence - like DNA.) | Anywhere in the world, do parties to court hearings have no absolute right to access those transcripts (or recordings)? I have not checked every common law jurisdiction but I suspect that as all (?) such courts have their own inherent powers to make directions the answer is probably: NO. That said, a close-but-no-cigar example may be found at Rule 79.30 of the Civil Procedure Rules concerning terrorist financing proceedings in england-and-wales: Unless the court directs otherwise, rule 5.4 (Register of Claims), rule 5.4B (Supply of documents from court records – a party) and rule 5.4C (Supply of documents from court records –a non-party) do not apply to any proceedings to which Section 2 or 3 of this Part applies or to any document relating to such proceedings. "Sections 2 and 3 of this Part" refers to applications to set aside financial restrictions and appeals against being designated as being linked to terrorism. The relevant cited Rules are: 5.4 (1) A court or court office may keep a publicly accessible register of claims which have been issued out of that court or court office. (2) Any person who pays the prescribed fee may, during office hours, search any available register of claims. And 5.4B (1) A party to proceedings may, unless the court orders otherwise, obtain from the records of the court a copy of any document listed in paragraph 4.2A of Practice Direction 5A. (2) A party to proceedings may, if the court gives permission, obtain from the records of the court a copy of any other document filed by a party or communication between the court and a party or another person. | In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge. |
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act equivalent for citizens What equivalent do ordinary US citizens have in terms of digital protectionss, as the US government and its financial interests have as defined in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act? | The US CFAA is by no means limited to "the US government and its financial interests ". It currently applies to any computer which is "protected". 18 USC § 1030(e)(2) defines a "protected computer" as (in part): a computer ... (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States This covers any computer connected to the internet. 18 USC § 1030 (a)(2) (C) applies to anyone who obtains without authorization : information from any protected computer; Of course, nothing requires federal prosecutors to bring charges for all acts which technically violate this sub-section. If someone hacks another person's holiday card address list, I doubt if a CFAA prosecution would be brought, but it could be if the US Attorney thought fit. | Greendrake's answer says that a country can declare any jurisdiction it likes. This is true, but in practice it is the convention that a country should claim jurisdiction only over its territory and its citizens. The point about "citizens" is normally not pushed, as when you go to a foreign country you are normally subject to its laws rather than those of your home, but for instance there are laws against child sex tourism where the perpetrators can be prosecuted at home for offences committed abroad. However this basic principle gets more murky with long-distance communication such as the Internet. Someone in country X can, for example, provide a service to someone in country Y which is illegal in country Y. At this point the laws of country Y have been broken by someone sitting in country X. Y is not claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction; the crime occurred inside its own territory, but the criminal is currently resident in X. From a legal point of view this is the same as if both had been inside Y when the crime was committed, but then the perpetrator fled to X before they could be arrested. So in the Kim Dotcom case, Dotcom is alleged to have committed criminal copyright violations by supplying movie files to people in the US. In the Meng Wanzhou case, Meng is alleged to have made fraudulent statements to American banks to the effect that Huawei was complying with US sanctions law (otherwise those banks would not have been able to do business with Huawei). The accounts I've read don't say whether Meng was in the US for those meetings, but the fact that they were made to American banks in order to do business in America makes the precise location of the meeting irrelevant. | You are granted the free trial as part of a trial, not to permanently use the program. When the user downloaded the trial version of the program, he probably had to accept T&C granting a one-time only say 3‑month trial period. It is a mere breach of contract if you’re circumventing this, but you might still be liable to damages. Circumventing technological protection measures is forbidden, § 95a UrhG. However, these protection measures must be considered effective. Now, lawyers are usually no computer gurus, so they might arrive at completely different conclusions, but I guess/hope editing a plain text file, substituting a plaintext ISO 8601 date, will not be deemed “effective”. (I presume the same effect could be achieved by resetting the computer’s RTC.) Having said that, since you intend to “publish a guide […] detailing how to use this exploit” I suspect it might not be that trivial and thus, from a lawyer’s POV, be considered an “effective” technological protection measure. If it is considered an effective technological protection measure, you might be punishable via § 108b UrhG, but I’m not sure about that. The wording is terribly complex. | Obviously you may end up voiding warranties, losing on-going support from the manufacturer, or there may be a contract you agreed to stating that you won't do it, but assuming none of that is relevant (e.g. a salvaged Tesla doesn't get support/warranty anyway) is there any law preventing you from modifying your property to remove the limits placed on it? This assumes away one of the biggest issues, which is doing this is almost certainly a breach of contract unless the contract term is void as against public policy (which it probably isn't). So, the manufacturer can sue you for money damages probably equal to the difference in value between the limited and unlimited hardware in the marketplace. The manufacturer might also be able to obtain an injunction against this practice, which could result in the incarceration of someone who knowingly violated this court order for contempt of court, once an injunction is secured from a court to enforce the contract. There is also an anti-hacking statute in the United States, whose plain language appears to prohibit taking actions that override a digital system's security features. Unlocking these hardware features would appear to violate this statute. This is part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and is codified at United States Code Title 17, Section 1201. As Wikipedia explains: 17 U.S.C. 1201 is often known as the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions. These provisions changed the remedies for the circumvention of copy-prevention systems (also called "technical protection measures") and required that all analog video recorders have support for a specific form of copy prevention created by Macrovision (now Rovi Corporation) built in, giving Macrovision an effective monopoly on the analog video-recording copy-prevention market. The section contains a number of specific limitations and exemptions, for such things as government research and reverse engineering in specified situations. Although, section 1201(c) of the title stated that the section does not change the underlying substantive copyright infringement rights, remedies, or defenses, it did not make those defenses available in circumvention actions. The section does not include a fair use exemption from criminality nor a scienter requirement, so criminal liability could attach to even unintended circumvention for legitimate purposes. The statute is quite lengthy and full of technical definitions and narrow exceptions and exceptions to exceptions to the general rule. These legal issues have mostly gained media attention in the context of farmers who seek to hack into the built in software of their farm machinery in order to repair it where the manufacturing companies have not cooperated. There have been legislative fixes proposed that would make these prohibition void as against public policy for some specific purposes like doing repairs. There have also been efforts to characterize this kind of business practice as an anti-trust violation. But, none of that legislation has passed in the United States, to the best of my knowledge and belief. But, I am not aware of any high profile legal precedent that has addressed this point but I wouldn't rule out the possibility that there is one. The closest case I could find on point (from the High Court in Australia) is Stevens v. Sony, which holds "that a device allowing PlayStations to play games with a different region code did not violate the anti-circumvention laws, because the mechanism in the PlayStation did not directly prevent the infringement of copyright." I am not personally familiar with non-U.S. law on this topic. Wikipedia reviews some of the applicable law in the E.U. and Australia. According to this Wikipedia entry, pursuant to European Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of May 22, 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, E.U. member nations must adopt domestic anti-circumvention statutes that meet certain minimum E.U. standards set forth in the directive. Also according to the same Wikipedia entry: "Australia prohibits circumvention of "access control technical protection measures" in Section 116 of the Copyright Act." In Australia, "Penalties for violation of the anti-circumvention laws include an injunction, monetary damages, and destruction of enabling devices." | She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove. | If it’s your pizza, yes The civil equivalent of theft is the tort of conversion, “consisting of "taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession". In England & Wales, it is a tort of strict liability.” | Your code is considered free speech (Bernstein v. United States) and you have allowed the use of the code via the MIT license. Since the application of your code is very generic and is not specifically targeting anyone. You probably are not criminally liable. This is simply writing a "Proof of Concept" for security testing purposes. That same way Metasploit, Nessus, and Nmap have actual exploit code but are considered tools of the trade. Now if you go around using your spyware on non consenting victims. You might get a visit from some people with guns and badges that have 3 letters on them. | HIPAA applies to covered entities Which, broadly speaking are entities that provide health care in the USA regardless of where they might be based. The nationality of the patient is irrelevant. |
Can a judge put me under oath for closing statements? For a municipal traffic ticket trial in USA, can a judge put me under oath as I am about to give a closing statement? I declined to testify and accepted to give a closing statement instead. The judge said, “all right. You know what? I’m going to put you under oath anyway. Raise your right hand...” I raised my right hand and acknowledged penalty of perjury. He said, “I’ll accept that as being under oath.” | This wouldn't be customary and is probably improper, but the judge may have been trying to do you a favor. In the absence of being under oath, the judge could not consider anything said in your closing statement as evidence. If you are under oath, the judge can weigh something you say in your closing statement against the other evidence when making a ruling. | united-states I am answering this in the case of a criminal jury trial (given the context of the previous question). It is my understanding that the judge must accept (almost?) all evidence admitted into court. So, this leaves me with three questions: What happens if an official shows evidence that the judge hadn't agreed to feature in the trial? . . . What happens if the evidence happens to be inadmissible? A trial in a criminal case takes place in a courtroom at a predetermined date and time, with the prosecutor physically sitting at one table in front of a judge and the defendant and the defendant's lawyer physically sitting at another table in front of the judge, and a jury physically sitting in a seating area to the side of the judge, and a witness (usually) physically sitting in a chair on the other side of the judge (in rare circumstances, for minor witnesses, testimony is provided by telephone with the phone put on speaker in the courtroom for all to hear), and a court reporter or tape recorder keeping track of what happens verbatim. In a trial, essentially all evidence comes in through witnesses sitting on a special the chair in front of the judge designated for witnesses (called the witness stand) at the request of either the prosecuting attorney, or the defense attorney. This is the only way the evidence is introduced (other than by stipulations of both side's lawyers). Prosecutors and defense attorneys don't testify or provide evidence themselves. The judge is usually not told what evidence will be offered at trial in advance, although sometimes a pre-trial hearing is held to consider a particularly important piece of evidence's admissibility prior to trial, in a hearing on what is called a "motion in limine" or a "motion to suppress". If that happens, the judge's decision made in advance will be honored by the judge when anyone tries to introduce the evidence at trial. But those are the exception and not the rule. Usually, any witnesses can be asked any questions at trial and the judge does not consider the admissibility of the answer to the question until it is asked and objected to by the other side's lawyer at trial. A defendant can choose to be, but is not required to be, a witness in his or her own case. In a trial, when it is their turn, the prosecution and defense, respectively, ask witnesses to sit at the witness stand one by one and ask them questions, which the witness answers under oath, absent an evidence objection from the other side's attorney. While a witness is on the stand, exhibits such as documents or physical objects can also be introduced into evidence in connection with the authenticating testimony of the witness (except in cases where both sides stipulate to the admission of the documents or other non-testimonial evidence). As the lawyers try to introduce evidence by asking a question to a witness on the stand, or by asking the judge for permission to introduce non-testimonial evidence, the other side's attorney can say, "I object". If that happens, the witness on the stand is not allowed to answer the question and the non-testimonial evidence (e.g. documents, or a knife allegedly used in a crime) is not made available to the jury until the judge rules on whether it is admissible or not in accordance with the rules of evidence. Usually, the judge rules on the evidence objection immediately in the moment, although in rare cases, the judge will let the jury have a break for a few minutes while hearing arguments from the lawyers for both sides on about the relevant evidence rules and/or researching the legal issue, before ruling on the evidence issue. Once the judge rules on the evidence issue, the trial continues immediately. If the judge "sustains" the objection to the evidence, then the question doesn't get asked and/or the jury doesn't get to see the non-testimonial evidence. The lawyer whose question or offer to introduce evidence was successfully objected to moves on to their next question (if any) for the witness instead. If the judge "overrules" the objection to the evidence, then the witness answer the question and/or the jury gets to see the non-testimonial evidence which is "received" into evidence by the judge. This process continues continuously, for as many business days as it takes, until all witness testimony and all non-testimonial evidence has been presented to the court and both sides have told the court that they have presented all of their evidence. Then each side makes closing arguments to the jury, the judge reads the jury instructions of law on how to resolve the case, and the jury is sent to closed room to discuss the case and decide whether to say "guilty" or "not guilty" with respect to each charge brought by the prosecution in the trial. This decision is called a "verdict" and when the jury has made up its mind on all charges present to it, the jury lets the judge know that it has made up its mind, and the judge calls everyone back to the courtroom, and the jury tells the judge what they decided in open court. If the verdict is "not guilty" on all criminal charges in the case, then the case is over, with no post-trial motions and no appeals. If the verdict is "guilty" the defendant is convicted, subject to post-trial motions to declare a mistrial and appeals by the convicted defendant. If the convicted defendant appeals the case, and the judge abused his discretion in overruling an objection to the evidence that is made by the lawyer for the defendant (or the defendant personally if the defendant is not represented by a lawyer), because no reasonable judge could have found that the evidence was admissible under the circumstances, then the appellate court rules that the judge has made an "error". The appellate court will not find that the judge's ruling is an "error" if the judge made the correct decision for the wrong reason. If it is reasonably possible that "error" possibly in combination with other errors made by the trial court judge could have caused a convicted criminal defendant to have been acquitted by the jury if the errors weren't made by the judge, then the defendant gets a new trial. The new trial usually before the same judge with a new jury. But the new trial is before a different judge and a new jury if the judge is no longer a judge on the court for any reason, or if the judge has been so defiant of the appellate court (typically ignoring its instructions in a retrial after a first appeal) that the appellate court decides it must remove the judge from the case. A criminal defendant is only acquitted by an appellate court if the appellate court finds that it would be impossible under any circumstances for the defendant to be convicted in a new trial, possibly with different evidence presented by the prosecution. What happens if a private citizen does the above? This doesn't make sense. Private citizens don't rule on the admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial, and can't introduce evidence in a criminal trial except at the request of a prosecuting attorney or defendant's attorney by being called as a witness and asking the questions that the lawyers (and sometimes the judge as well) asks the witness. Witnesses are not allowed to volunteer testimony or provide documents to a jury unless asked to do so by a lawyer in the case. What happens if someone provides evidence in court without the knowledge of the judge? As the process described above should make clear, this is basically impossible absent some extremely irregular event on the same level of irregularity as someone bribing a jury or threatening a jury with harm if he votes the wrong way. | A witness who disobeys a court order has automatically broken the law. Indeed, this is the most fundamental of laws; you can't decide "If I turn up to the hearing I may be punished for my crime; but not attending isn't against the law, so goodbye." A witness who goes out of the jurisdiction cannot, of course, be punished while there (though when he returns he may have to explain why he chose to leave having been warned that he must attend or face penalties- that is the meaning of sub poena). But your assumption that anybody who fails to attend probably had a good reason betrays a fundamental, though common, misunderstanding. A court has determined that your evidence is necessary for justice to be done. There is therefore no good reason not to attend. It may well be that a doctor would prefer that you did not go to court that day, and if you apply to the court it may be possible to find some arrangement. But you are not allowed to decide 'my convenience is more important than discovering whether the defendant should go to jail or not". Civilised countries have people who are empowered to make that decision; they are called judges, and the decision has been made. | Perjury is a crime in every state, and being a resident of a state is not a requirement for criminality. You can't lie in court just because you don't live in a state of the court. Compelling testimony of an out of state resident will require a court from the person's state. | united-states Generally, a witness cannot object to a question on the grounds that it fails to conform to a rule of evidence (e.g. hearsay). A witness can refuse to testify on a matter either due to the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or on the grounds that some other privilege (e.g. attorney-client, clergy confession, spousal) applies. A witness can also say that they don't understand the question as phrased (either because it is complicated or because it contains terminology or concepts that the witness doesn't understand), or that the witness didn't hear the question, or that the witness forgot what the question was while the lawyers and judges were discussing whether it could be asked. This often results in the question being restated or rephrased. A witness may also answer a question by stating that there is no answer to the question as it is based upon a false premise (e.g. "on which day of the week did you beat your wife?"). And, if true, a witness can properly answer that they don't know the answer, either because they never knew or because they don't currently recall the answer. | The IRS requires taxpayers to swear under "penalties of perjury" to their statements and figures given concerning their income. Since obviously this constitutes a potential incrimination The privilege against self-incrimination applies to giving testimony that reveals that you have committed a crime, not to doing something prospectively in a way that does not violate criminal laws. The solution is that you may truthfully report the amount of income that you have on your tax return. Ordinarily, the information that you had a certain amount of income, without a specific description of its source, would not in and of itself be incriminating. So, it is not "obvious that this constitutes potential incrimination[.]", at least in the general case. There might be some circumstance in which merely filling out the information on a tax return required by law and signing it under penalty of perjury would be incriminating, although this is far more narrow that your question suggests. In those circumstances, the solution would be to file an unsigned tax return accompanied by a disclaimer stating that you are not signing it under penalty of perjury as it would be potentially incriminating for you to do so would on a signed and attached explanation that explicitly claims the 5th Amendment privilege. There is actually an IRS form for doing that or similar things on: IRS Form 8275. This would result in serious civil tax penalties, but would probably protect you from a criminal tax law violation (at least for the failure to file offense, not necessarily from the failure to pay offense). | Normally, the prosecution case will not rely upon the testimony of the defendant. Instead, the prosecution will call all of its witnesses until its evidentiary case is complete. Then, the defense case opens and it may call witnesses. The defense is not obligated to call all of the witnesses that it stated that it anticipated that it would call prior to trial and the jury doesn't know which witnesses the parties said that they anticipated that they were going to call and didn't call. Until the defense case is closed, the defendant can call himself or herself as a witness if he or she wishes to do so, but is not obligated to do so. Once a defendant starts testifying (generally in his or her own case) he or she has generally waived the Fifth Amendment right not to testify. So, the prosecution may cross-examine the defendant in this situation. But since the prosecution's case is usually already closed at this point, the prosecution's cross-examination is limited to the scope of the defendant's testimony under questions from his or her own lawyer (there are some nuances of how this is done when the defendant is self-represented and has no lawyer). The prosecution cannot expand the scope of questioning of the defendant to new topic areas. I can imagine deviations from this pattern in odd circumstances, but they would be very rare. | Discovery Basically, you ask. If your opponent thinks your request is out of bounds they object, give their reasons to the judge, you give yours and the judge orders them to produce the evidence or not. A lot of people think court cases have big “ah-ha” movements when a witness reveals something unknown on the stand. This rarely happens because there are no secrets in litigation - both sides have to clearly explain their case before, usually well before, they go to trial. |
Is anyone who develops websites or webapps for clients legally responsible for what they are creating and all the gdpr obligations? Suppose the case of a european (italian) web developer who, at the request of a client, creates a web platform for him from scratch (also with database, saving user’s data, ecc.). When putting the platform online, what are the developer's legal responsibilities? Is the person who develops websites or webapps for clients legally responsible for what he is creating and for all the obligations of the gdpr or anything else imaginable? Thank you. | The GDPR as such puts obligations on the Data Controller (DC), that is the person or firm or other entity who determines the purposes for which data is processed. The entity that hires the developer and operates the web site is responsible for compliance with the GDPR and other laws and regulations, such as the e-privacy directive and its implementing laws. However, it is highly likely that in commissioning a web site the DC would specify that it be designed to aid compliance with the GDPR and other relevant laws, and if the developer did not do that it might be a breach of contract. Indeed, even if GDPR-friendliness was not explicitly required by the contract between the developer and the DC, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purpose would probably apply. A designer who, knowing the site is to be hosted and operated within the EU, failed to design it to facilitate GDPR compliance might well be in violation of those warranties. But that would depend on the specifics of Italian law. But note that GDPR compliance is not a matter of web site design, but of the ongoing practices of the operation of the site. There are various ways to comply with the GDPR, no specific technology or design need be used. The DC must so operate the site as to comply. If the DC fails to do that, penalties could be imposed on the DC, not on the developer. | You premise is correct. The processor is someone that processes data on your behalf, and since the GDPR definition of processing is extremely broad, that is about every third party subcontractor that you use for data processing, including various cloud providers. I'm afraid it will soon become a huge mess with a gazillion contracts to sign. I disagree. Yes, the GDPR says that a contract between the controller and processor must exist, but Article 28 of the GDPR does not say anything about how the controller shall document these instructions. Basically, in cases like the one you describe where John Doe relies on a web agency for having a contact form on the web, there will be a standardized (by the web agency) service agreement between the John Doe (controller) and the web agency (processor). There is nothing stopping the parties from agreeing that this service agreement that John Doe accepted as part of the onboarding procedure is also the DPA as required by the GDPR. Putting something like the following in the service agreement would do it: The parties agree that this Service Agreement between You (controller) and Us (processor) set out Your complete and final instructions to Us in relation to the processing of Personal Data and that processing outside the scope of these instructions (if any) shall require prior written agreement between You and Us. You also agree that We may engage Sub-processors to process Personal Data on Your behalf. The Sub-processors currently engaged by Us and authorized by You are listed in Annex A. I think we will se a lot of amendments in service contracts as the GDPR gets better understood, but I don't really see a flood of DPAs in addition to these amended service contracts. | GDPR recital 64 says: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. A controller should not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential requests. The GDPR does not specify exactly what methods of verification are "reasonable". GDPR Article 11 paragraph 2 provides: Where, in cases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the controller is able to demonstrate that it is not in a position to identify the data subject, the controller shall inform the data subject accordingly, if possible. In such cases, Articles 15 to 20 shall not apply except where the data subject, for the purpose of exercising his or her rights under those articles, provides additional information enabling his or her identification. This is amplified by Recital 57 which says: If the personal data processed by a controller do not permit the controller to identify a natural person, the data controller should not be obliged to acquire additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with any provision of this Regulation. However, the controller should not refuse to take additional information provided by the data subject in order to support the exercise of his or her rights. Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. GDPR Article 12 paragraph 6 provides: Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. All of the above seems to indicate that the Data Controller must follow reasonable practices, but is not required to guarantee a positive response to a Data Subject who cannot supply reasonable evidence of identity. Moreover the Controller is required to reliably ascertain the identity of the Subject before providing information or acting on a request. Incidentally, good security practice is that the site does not retain the actual password. instead it hashes the password with a good cryptographically secure hash function, and stores the hash. This means that the site cannot reliably determine if a password is unique among all passwords saved by the site, and searches among passwords are not normally done, and would not be reasonable. A site using an email address as the User Identifier would normally enforce at the time an account is created that the email is unique among all emails registered on the site. A user who cannot provide the email would typically be rejected as not able to be identified, unless the site retains additional ID info not listed in the question. I think such a practice would be considered to be reasonable in the current state of technology. | Yes, you could do this be means of the EULA, provided you are not in the EU yourself. You only have to comply with the GDPR if you are offering a product or service to people that are in the EU. If you are making it clear that whatever you offer is not available to Europeans, you make your site exempt from the GDPR. | You should probably get a lawyer, but my reading is this: The company whose SDK you use owns their SDK, owns their code, and is free to take any of your ideas how to improve their code without paying you. But they say that ideas are ten a penny, so this is mostly there to prevent pointless lawsuits. On the other hand, it says that everything you do with your product is yours. I might be completely wrong, that's why you should get a lawyer. | Well actually... I think you'll just need to wait a little more. I monitor the situation quite closely and I can tell you that it's just a matter of time. Microsoft was one of the first (if not the first) to communicate openly about the GDPR and the changes that follow. From the blog post: If your organization collects, hosts or analyzes personal data of EU residents, GDPR provisions require you to use third-party data processors who guarantee their ability to implement the technical and organizational requirements of the GDPR. To further earn your trust, we are making contractual commitments available to you that provide key GDPR-related assurances about our services. Our contractual commitments guarantee that you can: Respond to requests to correct, amend or delete personal data. Detect and report personal data breaches. Demonstrate your compliance with the GDPR. Microsoft is the first global cloud services provider to publicly offer you these contractual commitments. We believe privacy is a fundamental right. The GDPR is an important step forward to further clarify and enable individual privacy rights and look forward to sharing additional updates how we can help you comply with this new regulation and, in the process, advance personal privacy protections. Microsoft has set up an informational site on GDPR here. If your eyes are on any other provider, I think the only way to learn more is getting in touch and inquiring about their progress and process. Hope this helps. | While German law indeed requires providing correct contact information it does not require the recipient to answer queries. It is there so that you can submit legal notifications. In your case I wouldn't be so sure that the information is not correct. However, even if the contact information is incorrect, there is not much you can do about it. This is reserved to the following groups by § 8 Abs. 3 UWG: every competitor; associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51); Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. Unless you are a competitor you are out of luck. The hoster or other providers can't do anything and don't need to, as they are not required to check legality of their user's websites. It doesn't really matter where you are by the way for these laws. | From a German perspective, it would be absolutely normal and expected that you're providing identity & contact information publicly. Per §5 TMG (Impressumspflicht / Anbieterkennzeichnung) this is required for German tele-media offerings, such as websites or email providers, even if non-commercial. Whereas for you as an upstanding and diligent email provider an abuse@... address should be enough, the German context expects a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit… There absolutely are privacy and free speech issues with this compelled self-doxxing. But by running an email service, you're not just acting as a private person. Your privacy interests and the transparency and security interests of other people have to be balanced. Now since you are not in Germany, the TMG does not apply to you. You have no legal obligation to provide this information. However, the ISP also has no legal obligation to to deliver your email. The ISP does have an obligation to apply appropriate organizational and technical safety measures. It seems that one organizational measure they have found appropriate is that they will only deliver emails from providers that provide public contact information, as would be the norm in Germany. I am not entirely sure how the GDPR applies here. The GDPR doesn't really allow or prohibit disclosures of personal data, it just requires that every purpose of processing for personal data has a legal bases per GDPR Art 6. One such legal basis is a legitimate interest, which boils down to a balancing test between your rights and freedoms and other people's interests. I'm also not sure if the contact information should be classified as personal data in this context, because the contact info primarily relates to your role as an email provider. I'm also not sure if the ISP is processing your personal data in the sense of the GDPR when they merely require you to publish it on your own site. They would be processing it as soon as they scrape, store, or otherwise use this info. |
How to "withdraw consent" without implying consent was ever given? Privacy policy often states that one can "withdraw consent" to the collection, use and disclosure of personal data. Unfortunately, it is often the case that consent was given to the collection, use and disclosure of personal data for a particular use case, but somehow the data was used for other unstated use cases. How can I "withdraw consent" without implying consent was ever given, so that I reserve the right to take further action in the future? | You could say something like "I do not consent to [XYZ], and I revoke any consent I may have given in the past." That makes it clear that you intend to revoke consent, without acknowledging that you ever did consent. | GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls. | It is generally legal for a business to ask, but it is not legal for a business to insist that you provide it as a condition of providing goods and services unless a law requires that the SIN be provided. As explained by the relevant Canadian government website: While there is no law barring businesses from asking for the SIN where there is no legal requirement to do so, they do need to make people aware that collection of a SIN is optional and not a condition of service. The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) sets out ground rules for how private sector organizations may handle personal information — including the SIN — in the course of commercial activities. Under the law, organizations cannot require you to consent to the collection, use or disclosure of your personal information unless it is required for a specific and legitimate purpose. This means that, unless an organization can show that your SIN is required by law, you cannot be denied a product or service on the grounds of your refusal to provide your SIN. Of course, the rub is, that an employer is legally required to have your updated SIN for tax purposes, so the employer is allowed to demand, rather than merely request that you provide it. In particular: 7.3 In addition to the circumstances set out in section 7, for the purpose of clause 4.3 of Schedule 1, and despite the note that accompanies that clause, a federal work, undertaking or business may collect, use and disclose personal information without the consent of the individual if (a) the collection, use or disclosure is necessary to establish, manage or terminate an employment relationship between the federal work, undertaking or business and the individual; and (b) the federal work, undertaking or business has informed the individual that the personal information will be or may be collected, used or disclosed for those purposes. A business is required to do this consistent with Schedule 1 to the Act which provides in the most pertinent part: 4.7 Principle 7 — Safeguards Personal information shall be protected by security safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the information. 4.7.1 The security safeguards shall protect personal information against loss or theft, as well as unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use, or modification. Organizations shall protect personal information regardless of the format in which it is held. 4.7.2 The nature of the safeguards will vary depending on the sensitivity of the information that has been collected, the amount, distribution, and format of the information, and the method of storage. More sensitive information should be safeguarded by a higher level of protection. The concept of sensitivity is discussed in Clause 4.3.4. 4.7.3 The methods of protection should include (a) physical measures, for example, locked filing cabinets and restricted access to offices; (b) organizational measures, for example, security clearances and limiting access on a “need-to-know” basis; and (c) technological measures, for example, the use of passwords and encryption. 4.7.4 Organizations shall make their employees aware of the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of personal information. 4.7.5 Care shall be used in the disposal or destruction of personal information, to prevent unauthorized parties from gaining access to the information (see Clause 4.5.3). There is really no specific provision allowing you to refuse to provide information via email, but the Safeguards provision does state that appropriate care does need to be taken to avoid disclosure, and you are disputing that their email collection is adequate. Also, while employers are required to collect SIN data from employees, there is nothing that expressly requires them to collect it via email. If you wanted to compromise, one option would be to save the SIN in a password protected word processing document (usually available in the save as window in an obscure little corner), and then you could attach the password protected document to the email and communicate the password itself to the recipient orally via telephone with you calling their number to prevent any phishing scam. It's a bit clunky, but it gets the job done. Also, please recognize that while a SIN number is important to keep confidential to the extent possible, it is hardly the most sensitive personal information in existence. Lots of people have a need to know it for legitimate purposes and it probably wouldn't be hard at all for someone to get it illegitimately by making a request for your credit record or a tax return transcript under false pretenses. | I think that one cannot answer a question such as "Will the personal use exception in the GDPR apply to personal blogs?", because it is unclear if you refer to: personal information published on the blog pages personal information collected from the Website, by way of forms, cookies, server logs, strictly collected and processed for the purpose of operating the Website for your own personal purposes as a blogger (by yourself of through a subcontractor in the sense of GDPR) and not personal information collected from the Website's operation, transferred or provided to third parties for their own purposes (this would include cookies used to identify and track users across multiple domains) Regarding 1., a personal blog wanting to benefit from the exemption should not publish third party's personal information without their consent or another legal basis, and C-101/01 certainly applies here. About 2., if the information is strictly collected and used for the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog, I would tend to agree that it should benefit from the exemption. I feel that C-212/13 would not necessarily be an indication that because the blog is publicly accessible it is then "directed outwards from the private setting" in the sense of this ruling, and should not be considered as "purely ‘personal or household’ activity". C-212/13 case was relating to a camera installed by an individual on his family home for its own security purposes which was also monitoring a public space. The persons filmed on this public space had absolutely no direct connexion with the person collecting their images. In case of a blog, the visitors of the blog interact with the blog for fulfilling the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog of the publisher of the blog. Another argument is given by the Recital 18 which you quote: a personal blog can be viewed as a type of social networking or related online activity. Finally, about 3., there is no doubt for me that, in this case, the publisher of the blog is engaged in an activity which is not personal, since it willingly provides personal information to third parties which they use for their own purposes (and not as subcontractors in the sense of GDPR). There may be other approaches apart from these 3, but that's a start for your considerations. | No. From here: Organisations must not send marketing texts to individuals without their specific, valid and prior explicit consent. This consent must be recorded and kept as proof of consent. There is a limited exception for previous customers, which is known as the soft opt-in. A soft-opt in only applies if the organisation have obtained the contact details in the course of a sale (or negotiations for a sales) of a product or service to the customer; they are only marketing their own similar products or services; and they gave the customer an opportunity to opt-out of the marketing, both when first collecting the details and in every message thereafter. | The cookie consent requirement comes from the ePrivacy Directive, not from the GDPR. While the GDPR defines consent, cookie consent is required regardless of whether the cookie actually contains personal data. Instead, it says we can access information stored on an end users device under the following circumstances. Technical access to the information is used for the sole purpose of performing a transmission over a network, e.g. using a browser cache. Accessing the information is strictly necessary for providing a service explicitly requested by the user, e.g. session cookies or a consent-declined cookie. The user has given consent to the access, where consent is defined by the GDPR (freely given, informed, specific, …). The first scenario likely doesn't apply because your cookies aren't likely to be “technical storage or access” in the sense of ePrivacy, and because the tracking cookies wouldn't be used for the sole purpose of carrying out a transmission. The second scenario doesn't apply because tracking cookies are not strictly necessary to interact with the webshop, as evidenced by the possibility to opt out. The service explicitly requested by the user is the webshop or website, not the A/B testing. This only leaves consent as possible grounds for storing or accessing information on the user's device. It is already the storing or access that is covered by ePrivacy, not only later use as a persistent identifier. Your suggestion – to first set the cookie and then delete it if it shouldn't have been set – is more compliant than many set-ups I've seen, but is still technically non-compliant. It is also likely to fail in practice under non-ideal network conditions: if the request to see whether GDPR applies times out, or if the user closes the browser tab before the cookie will be deleted, the tracking cookie will remain without consent. I would instead suggest to consider the following points. It seems that by itself, Optimizely Web cannot be used in a compliant manner since it doesn't provide sufficient control over how cookies are managed. Thus, you should avoid loading such tracking scripts unless consent has been given, or unless this processing falls outside of EU/UK law. Currently, you defer loading of tracking scripts until you know if you have to ask for consent. This can be avoided if you always ask for consent :) This can also be avoided if you load the tracking scripts from a server that can independently determine whether the requests comes from the EU. For non-EU requests and for users with opt-in, the server can return the original tracking scripts. Otherwise, the server returns a dummy script. This server can be independent from your website's hosting. By combining the jurisdiction decision with the loading of the script, one roundtrip is saved and latency is reduced. Finally, no one is forcing you to use Shopify, and ePrivacy/GDPR is not required to accommodate their limitations. You do have different choices: use Shopify, at the cost of slow pages and limited A/B tests use a different A/B test provider that can be used without setting cookies use edge computing to do stuff in between of the browser and the original server use a different webshop platform ignore EU laws Well, one of them is clearly unethical. But you do have choices, and which choice you take is a business decision. Slow pageloads and consent banners are likely costing you conversions, but Shopify might be providing massive value that outweighs all that. | In england-and-wales this would fall within the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and depends on whether he lacks the mental not physical, capacity to make the decision for himself. Can he: Understand the information relevant to the decision Retain that information Use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision Communicate that decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means). If the answer to any of these is"no" then he cannot lawfully give true consent. Although the Act allows for others, such as a power of attorney, to make decisions on behalf of someone lacking the mental capacity, s.27 specifically excludes the decision to marry. | You don't know. You can't know. And you can't force the officer to tell you. Detention Status As a practical matter, you have no way of knowing if you are compelled to follow an officer's order because you are being detained unless the officer volunteers that information (your detention status) which they are not compelled to disclose and have every incentive not to disclose. Consider the situation when the officer does not have reasonable suspicion do detain you. If the officer instantly informs you that you are "free to go" then you are likely to leave and end the encounter immediately. However, if the officer says nothing, then you might stay and inadvertently say or do something that would give the officer reasonable suspicion to detain you from that point forward. Your behavior during that detention could lead to probable cause, arrest, etc. Every officer knows they have nothing to gain by being quick to tell you you are free to go. Deceptive Conduct To compound the issue, police encounters are particularly problematic because police officers have a lawful right to engage in deceptive conduct during an investigation including but not limited to lying. You, on the other hand, can be prosecuted for lying to the police conducting an investigation. (See this article for more information.) Hobson's Choice Therefore, all things considered, police encounters present a Hobson's Choice. Either comply with every order in an effort to end the encounter quickly. Or try to press the officer to determine whether you are "being detained" or "free to go." The former course of action voluntarily cedes some of your rights. The latter risks "provoking" the officer into making your encounter more difficult, painful or costly than it otherwise might be. Never Consent to Searches That said, you are never under any obligation to consent to a warrantless search of your home or vehicle. Typically, saying, "I do not consent to searches." is usually sufficient if asked. Evidence obtained from warrantless searches is barred from being used at trial unless you waive this right by consenting to the search. See this question (and answers) if you are concerned about the officer falsely claiming you gave consent if you didn't. Never Talk to the Police As a legal matter, talking to the police can never help your case in court. Anything you say to the police that might help your case (i.e., exculpatory) is not admissible as evidence because it's hearsay. On the other hand, anything you say to the police can and will be used against you. In fact, even if you are completely innocent of all crimes AND you are completely 100% truthful to the police, you can still give the police all they legally need to convict you of a crime simply by talking to them. Whereas, without your statement, they would not have had sufficient evidence to convict. See this Youtube video for more details and examples of how this can and does happen every day. Practical Matters The above analysis presents the reader with some practical concerns. You don’t want to risk being harmed by an officer in fear for his safety. You don’t want to be handcuffed and taken to the police station if you can avoid it. You must obey all unconditional commands of a peace officer. It does no harm to inform the officer that you are willing to comply with all unconditional legal commands and ask him or her if a given command is, in fact, unconditional. Some attorneys go in the opposite direction from the "never talk to the police" rule and advise that, say in the case of a domestic violence dispute, the best course of action is to answer police questions matter-of-factly, never lie and never admit guilt. That course of behavior can avoid a potential trip to the police station in handcuffs in the back of a police car even if you are never ultimately arrested. TL;DR: Police encounters are tricky. It's difficult to know what to do. The best course of action is to educate yourself about your rights and the law and apply judgment and common sense to guide your behavior to achieve the best outcome. I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. This answer is not legal advice. Please consult an attorney to obtain proper legal advice. |
Are individuals who identify as non-human animals members of a protected class? This question is inspired by the following question over on Academia.SE: Should students' nonhuman identity be taken seriously in classroom settings? The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission notes: In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, No. 17-1618 (S. Ct. June 15, 2020),[1] the Supreme Court held that firing individuals because of their sexual orientation or transgender status violates Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination because of sex. Individuals who identify as non-human animals report sexual aspects of their identity to academic researchers (Brooks et al 2022. PMID 35576143): evidence was found that most furries did, indeed, report being sexually attracted to various facets of their furry interest (e.g., furry-themed media) and were sexually motivated to engage in various furry-themed behaviors (e.g., interacting with other furries) Thus, my question is if individuals who identify as non-human animals are members of a protected class with respect to employment discrimination. Could such an individual assert this protection through the sexual orientation class? The question focuses on the United States, but I would also be interested in prospectives from around the world. | In the US, no. This is because "protected class" is defined statutorily for a particular purpose, for example "civil rights", "employment", "housing". There can be variation in federal vs. state or municipal protected classes and what classes have which rights (e.g. "race" is included in all protected classes but pregnancy-discrimination is not federally protected w.r.t. housing), but so far nobody has defined "self-identifies as non-human" as a protected class. If Congress were to pass a blanket law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of species, then (1) it would be illegal to not consider my dog as a job candidate and (2) it would be illegal to take into consideration whether a job candidate is a human versus a dog or a fern. But there is no such law. "Non-binary" is not, per se, a protected class. The rationale of Bostock v. Clayton County is that one cannot legally discriminate based on whether a person is male or female, therefore one cannot legally discriminate based on whether one is a male who has sex with a female versus whether one is a male who has sex with a male, or whether one is a male who abjures sex, because they all reduce to discrimination based on whether one is male (or female). It's not legal to discriminate against furries based on whether they are male or are female, but being a furry is itself a protected class. | IQ level is not a protected class and so using it to discriminate between job applicants is not illegal per se. However - in the U.S., studies have shown that self-identified blacks score around 15 points lower than self-identified whites, on average. If your use of IQ to discriminate between applicants reflected this disparity - and did not represent a bona fide occupational qualification (unlikely) - then your use of IQ for this purpose could easily be construed as illegal discrimination based on race. | The grain of truth is what you've read is that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149 § 19 says No person shall, by intimidation or force, prevent or seek to prevent a person from entering into or continuing in the employment of any person This is referenced in a compendium of state laws loosely subsumed under the notion of "blacklisting". In Arkansas, this would be writing, printing, publishing, or circulating false statements in order to get someone fired or prevent someone from obtaining employment; in Indiana it is using any means to prevent a discharged employee from obtaining employment. The Massachusetts law only prevents use of intimidation or force to prevent a person from getting employed. In other words, "blacklisting" is not the same thing in all jurisdictions. | Almost certainly not. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendez v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 680 F.Supp.2d 357, 375 (D.P.R. 2010) "This incident, however, is not sufficient to constitute direct evidence of discriminatory animus...[Defendant's agent]'s anecdote could be interpreted as emphasizing the importance of a positive attitude, rather than plaintiff's interpretation that it expressed a preference for younger male employees...This benign interpretation seems more plausible...In light of these facts, there does not appear to be any evidence on the record that gives a 'high degree of assurance' that discriminatory animus was behind the decision to terminate plaintiff" (emphasis added). NOTE: OP's original question was simply whether listing 'positive attitude' on a job description was illegal. OP has now changed the question to whether making employment decisions based on a depressed individual's lack of a positive attitude is illegal. Although I have great sympathy for those with mental illness and personally wish the law were different, my answer is still that this is almost certainly legal. Another example of a court finding attitude to be a legitimate reason upon which to base employment decisions is: Martin v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 809 (M.D. Pa 2000). In this case, the court accepted as a legitimate reason for promoting one individual over another that the promoted individual "demonstrated good interpersonal skills." Id. at 817. A third example is Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, the Seventh Circuit explicitly noted that "[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and we will not second-guess that decision." Id. at 601. It then went on to affirm dismissal of the plaintiff's ADA claim because the employer "said that lead drivers must have knowledge of the mechanics of the trucks and be able to manage the other drivers on the truck through a positive attitude and ability to get along well with others. But the supervisors in charge of hiring lead drivers testified without contradiction that [the plaintiff] had a negative attitude that drew complaints from other drivers." Id. at 601-602 (emphasis added). After a relatively exhaustive search, I've found no case to counter these pretty clear statements that basing employment decisions on 'attitude' is legal. FURTHER NOTE: OP has now modified the question again to add the qualification that the lack of a positive attitude "doesn't prevent the employee from doing their job." IF this were actually true, then the answer likely becomes that illegal discrimination has occurred because then the employee would be 'otherwise qualified' (a key phrase in employment law litigation). BUT, there is an inherent contradiction in premises in OP's question now because if X is a requirement of a job, and Y employee cannot do X because of Z, then Z is preventing Y employee from doing that job. In other words, if a job requires a positive attitude, then one can't do that job without a positive attitude. Ultimately, what OP's question is really trying to get at is 'what if the employer makes 'positive attitude' a job requirement, but I don't think it should be a job requirement?' Unfortunately, there's almost certainly no legal recourse for this as long as it's a legal job requirement because, to reiterate the 7th Circuit, "[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and [a court] will not second-guess that decision." Id. at 601. | There are many analogous cases throughout the world, but like the petition you cite, they are not legal, they are political, e.g. the Kautokeino rebellion, the Basque conflict, Turkish-only laws in Turkey, Bantu minorities in Somalia, Jim Crow laws in the US. A legal case would be when parties file a lawsuit in some higher court, to force a government to cease a policy of ethnically-based discrimination. There were a number of cases arising in the US, which centered around the policy of "separate but equal" which was found unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education. On the political front, there has been a long standing debate over curricular matters, where not everybody's culture is given equal treatment in public school curricula. In order to successfully sue over the practice, there has to be an underlying legal basis, for example a law mandating that such-and-such be taught in the schools. Washington state law mandates teaching US history, and does not mandate teaching Chinese history, so a lawsuit over not teaching US history would succeed and one over not teaching Chinese history would fail. The courts would find that it is up to the legislature, or the local school board, to establish the rules regarding what is to be taught. It may be that there are cases where a school district is sued because they aren't following the rules set by higher authorities. It is an absolute fact that schools do not teach the history and culture of all of the students in their classes. | Context is important. There is no law against taking a picture of a child who is entirely naked or exposing certain body parts. The laws in question such as 18 USC 2251 refer to the fact that the minor "engage[s] in, any sexually explicit conduct". Sexually explicit conduct is defined in 18 USC 2256, and would include "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" (which does not include nipples of anyone). Federal law does not define "lascivious", but the ordinary meaning of the word does not include the situation that you describe. The Justice Department, which goes after child pornographers, provides this guide to federal child porn laws. Georgia's child porn law is only marginally different, referring to "Lewd exhibition" rather than "Lascivious exhibition" , and including the "Condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise physically restrained on the part of a person who is nude" (so a picture of a person holding a naked baby would technically qualify, but is highly unlikely to be prosecuted as production of child porn). These laws pertain to any form of child porn, including "private use only". Dissemination would be an added charge. | This is known as the "ministerial exception", which protects the rights guaranteed under the First Amendment, which include the right of religious groups to determine who is and is not a member of their clergy, and emerges from the case-law of the US Supreme Court. The most recent leading case on this is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171 (2012); as Chief Justice Roberts put it in that case: the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own | Leonard's law says that the school can restrict speech if it is against the religious tenets of the organization. Now I don't think school uniforms fall are part of the tenets of Catholicism, so why can private schools enforce dress codes? I see there's a misunderstanding of the Leonard's law. But I fault the California legislators (not you) for that confusion, since the statutory language is ambiguous and leads to the reasonable interpretation your inquiry reflects. The statute reads: (c) This section does not apply to a private postsecondary educational institution that is controlled by a religious organization, to the extent that the application of this section would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the organization. It is not that a religious school is allowed to restrict speech if it contravenes the tenets of that religion, but that the statute altogether is inapplicable to religious schools because it is considered an infringement of fundamental liberties to which religious institutions are entitled in the US. The [religious] school would prevail on the basis of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. See Dermody v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 530 S.W.3d 467, 474 (2017): The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine prohibits courts from deciding cases "dependent on the question of doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical law, rule, or custom, or church government[.]". (Please note that I strongly disagree with the application of that doctrine in the Dermody case and I consider it impermissibly outdated for the controversy litigated therein, but that is a separate issue). A religious school could convincingly argue that the judicial review of its uniforms policy infringes matters of ecclesiastical discipline/rule/custom, aspects which ultimately "involve an internal church dispute over religious authority or dogma" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 220 (2005). Infringements of ecclesiastical abstention and akin doctrines would be outweighed only in "compelling" [cases] because "the duty to prosecute persons who commit serious crimes is part and parcel of the government's `paramount responsibility for the general safety and welfare of all its citizens'" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct. at 225 (brackets added in this answer). A free speech controversy such as the school's uniform policy simply does not meet that threshold. |
What does "Russian person" mean in EU legislations? The primary document of the EU sanctions against Russia (COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 833/2014) uses the term "Russian person". The recent directive COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2022/1909 has phrase "Russian persons and residents". However, the term "Russian person" is not defined. Does it simply mean Russian citizens? Are Russian citizens with temporary or permanent EU member state or EU residences exempt from this? | The expression "Russian person" appears in Article 11 of the original, which says No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by: (a) entities referred to in points (b) or (c) of Article 5, or listed in Annex III; (b) any other Russian person, entity or body; (c) any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a) or (b) of this paragraph The "Whereas" clause first introduces the word "person" saying Those measures comprise the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain natural and legal persons, entities and bodies and restrictions on certain investments, as a response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol Article 2 then gives various prohibitions, which are broader that the March prohibitions against certain transactions "to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia". Since the regulation applies to things that are not human and cannot be citizens, it does not mean "citizen". It does include "a human", as well as artificial persons such as corporations, or government bodies. A Russian citizen who lives and works entirely in e.g. Germany is not in the prohibited set if they are not shipping prohibited goods to Russia. The Syrian Commander-in-Chief of the PLA (who is not a resident of Russia) is, however, prohibited from obtaining "dual use goods" to be taken to and used in Russia. Article 11 is different in wording from other articles stating various prohibitions, which repeat that long expression with "in Russia or for use in Russia". Art. 11 says that under certain circumstances, contract claims shall not be satisfied if the claims are made by (a) entities referred to in points (b) or (c) of Article 5, or listed in Annex III; (b) any other Russian person, entity or body; Apart from the explicit list in Annex III, (b-c) or Art. 5 is (b) a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union whose proprietary rights are owned for more than 50 %by an entity listed in Annex III; or (c) a legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of an entity referred to in point (b) of this paragraph or listed in Annex III. Therefore, the expression "any other Russian person, entity or body" refers to something much more expansive. On the face of it, it has to mean that no "Russian person" in any sense can sue for non-performance arising from this regulation. | GDPR & EPD require user consent before storing a users personal information. Wrong. User consent is one of the ways that justify storing personal information, but there are others. You may check art.6 to see the several reasons that allow to store personal information. In this case, it seems reasonable to justify it under the paragraph f (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of course, that means that the data has to be used for this purpose. Avoiding spammers and other banned users would be such a purpose, but you should ensure that you do not send those e-mail address commercial information or even a Christmas greeting. In any case, be careful with anything you store. If along with the e-mail you stored more info, this could be interpreted as excessive and beyond the scope of paragraph f. For example, imagine storing "User wrote nazi statements" explaining why the e-mail is banned; EU laws are very restrictive about storing information about political or religious beliefs. | It may "seem[] normative" that "a law cannot enumerate any specific persons or companies to be included or excluded from its provisions." But in fact it is not generally the case. There are various kinds of laws that traditionally have named specific people or entities to define their scope. These include: In nineteenth-century England, a divorce could only be granted by a specific law passed by Parliament, naming the persons to be divorced. I am not sure when the practice stopped. In the US during the nineteenth century (and I think the early twentieth century also) a corporation was normally formed by a specific law granting a charter of incorporation to the named company. In the US during the period 1866-1870 there were a number of laws passed permitting former Confederate officers and officials who were presented by the 14th amendment from holding office under the US or any state to hold office again, as the amendment provides for. Eventually Congress passed a more general amnesty. It was once common for the English Parliament to pass bills of attainder. These were legislative declarations that a particular person was guilty of a particular crime, generally without any trial or other process. Sometimes the specific sentence was also imposed by such a bill. This was sufficiently resented that the US Constitution specifically forbids Congress or any state from passing such a bill. It was once common for actual laws to grant payments to specific people for specific purposes. This is no longer common, but there is no legal bar to it in either the UK or the US that I know of. The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 contains a provision enabling Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children to continue to receive royalties for performances and adaptations, publications and broadcast of "Peter Pan" whose author, J. M. Barrie, had given his copyright to the hospital in 1929, later confirmed in his will. This right is to persist even after the expiration of ordinary copyright for the play, but is not a full grant of copyright. Laws or ordinances invoking eminent domain to take the property of particular individuals for particular purposes are common, mostly at the local level. In the US, the Equal Protection Clause generally forbids laws which treat people, or groups of people, differently unless there is some rational basis for the distinction. But in some cases a plausible basis is asserted and such laws are passed. | Isn’t this discrimination since nationals do not have to apply? Yes it is discrimination. But that does not make it illegal. In fact discrimination is in general legal unless it is based on some characteristic which is specifically forbidden as a basis for discrimination (e.g. race). And in general, all of the countries in the world allow and enforce discrimination based on nationality; for example non-nationals will not be able to run for Head of State (and additional restrictions may apply). The EU members allowing similar rights to the citizens of other EU countries is the exception, not the rule, and once the UK stops being bound by EU treaties it can impose its own legal system on non-nationals. And while EU treaties give lots of rights to EU member-countries citizens, they still allow for discrimination based on nationality (for example you cannot run for Prime Minister or MP of Spain as a foreign EU resident). Isn’t the UK Government breaking the law? This could go against EU treaties, but the point is that the UK will no longer need to comply with them. is the UK Government responsible for the harm and distress caused to the individual health and mental wellbeing? No, the UK Government is not responsible if you do not like its laws to the point that it affects your health. Is there any ground for challenging this scheme legality in court? Unlikely. In any case it will not be because you are frightened by it, any challenge would be in the grounds that the government actions act against some other UK law. For example, if the decision to make such a list was made by the Executive but it contradicts some law approved by the Parliament. If this list does not contradict any law, then there are no grounds for challenging it. Would there a breach of my human rights if I was not to apply for settle status and then subsequentially got deported (taken away from my children, home, business, etc.)? How about if I was refused, re-entry or access to public services (NHS for example)? If you do not apply you will not have any evidence that you were settled, and the government could legitimately believe that you are irregularly in the country and try to expel you; you probably would have an opportunity to prove that you were settled even if you were not in the list but that could be way slower, more expensive, riskier and stressful than just registering now. Get this clear: that settled person list is to help you to show that you were a UK resident before Brexit and to give you the protections that are being negotiated between the UK and the EU for expatriates. Probably you could choose not to enlist, but it would work against you. | The order itself is here. It applies to "any United States person", which includes citizens, LPRs, entities with a US basis, and any other person in the US including tourists. It applies to transactions, and not static possession. There is no exception to the effect that "you can trade as long as it's not on the NYSE", and it says Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited The order is not just directed at brokers, or the NYSE, it applies to everybody / everything everywhere, if you are a US person. Apparently there was some unclarity on the OTC question, which was clarified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, to the effect that it includes OTC trading. | You've asked a two part question. [Is this a violation of] the international policy that a country should never refuse entry to verified citizens of their own? In considering that question, the US example may be illuminative. The US requires US citizens to have a "passport book" when flying into the US, even though the US issues "passport cards" that serve as proof of nationality. If you can get to the border and prove your US nationality (by passport card or otherwise), they'll let you in, but airlines won't board you unless you have a passport book. If you don't have a passport book, you're supposed to get to the nearest consulate and apply for a passport before flying to the US. But note that the US obligation to admit its own citizens is principally a feature of US law. CBP does not waive 8 USC 1185 because of some international body; there is no body that enforces international "policies" of this nature. Rather, they do so because they know that the federal courts would require them to admit US citizens based on the right of free movement implicit in US law. If someone were unable to get into their country of citizenship and unable to gain legal residence elsewhere then unless they could remain on the run for the rest of their life they would eventually end up as the subject of negotiation between whatever country is trying to deport them and their country of citizenship. In other words, in the worst case, such people become a bilateral diplomatic matter between two countries. Therefore, any challenge to the restriction would have to go through the Italian or EU legal system. Is this a violation of the EU freedom of movement directive, whereby a verified EU/EFTA national cannot normally be refused entry to any EU/EFTA state? It certainly seems to be, but without a decision from an EU court, we can't be certain. From Article 5 of the freedom of movement directive (2004/38/EC): Article 5 Right of entry 1. Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border controls, Member States shall grant Union citizens leave to enter their territory with a valid identity card or passport and shall grant family members who are not nationals of a Member State leave to enter their territory with a valid passport. No entry visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on Union citizens. This doesn't say anything about allowing EU citizens to board aircraft from non-EU destinations without their EU passports. So if Italy makes a rule that EU citizens need a passport to board a flight to Italy from outside the EU and Schengen area, that doesn't seem to violate Article 5 except by implication. It would be for a court to decide whether that implication is in fact present. Because Article 5 doesn't say anything about where the passenger has flown from, we can also consider the case of a dual citizen of an EU member state and a "third country," who might fly to Italy using the third-country passport, and then present a national ID card at the immigration counter. If such a traveler were denied entry, that would appear to violate Article 5. If that traveler's other nationality were one that required a visa in the non-EU passport, the traveler might have a stronger case that Italy's rule infringes on the right of free movement. EU or EFTA citizens could also challenge the restriction more generally as an infringement on the right of free movement that is established in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), even if the directive itself does not prohibit the restriction. For example, one might argue that free movement is restricted because there are countries to which EU citizens can travel with only an ID card, but from which they cannot return to Italy with only that card. In addition, non-Italian EU or EFTA citizens could challenge the more restrictive regime applied to them on the argument that it violates the principle of non-discrimination articulated in Article 9 of the TEU: Article 9 In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.... Furthermore, non-Italians residing in Italy could challenge the more restrictive regime on the basis of Article 24 of the directive: Article 24 Equal treatment 1. Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty. The benefit of this right shall be extended to family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who have the right of residence or permanent residence. | First of all, in a GDPR contest, the process described is not strong anonymization. It may be hard for an outsider to go from the stored record to any PII, it is much easier for an outsider to "single out" an individual. This means that given a known individual, one can determine whether that person is among those listed in the records, or can determine this to a significant degree of probability. For this only the algorithm and the rotating salts are needed, one need not break the hash. Note also that the GDPR specifies that if a person can be singled out with the assistance of the site operator the data is not considered anonymized. Thus this data needs a lawful basis under the GDPR, and the various other GDPR requirement all apply. However, even if the data were totally anonymized, and say just added to a count of users with this or that User Agent, the process of reading local data (including but not limited to cookies) itself requires informed consent, and so a cookie banner or other interaction with similar info under the e-Privacy directive (EPD). The EPD, being a directive and not a regulation, must be implemented by national laws, and the exact provisions in those laws may differ somewhat from country to country. But I believe that all of them require consent before any local data is read. | Nicknames, usernames, or gamer tags are definitely personal data under the GDPR. You are operating under a very narrow definition of “identifying”, which is understandable since the definition of personal data in the GDPR isn't overly enlightening at first glance: […] an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; — GDPR Art 4(1) However, this definition does show that “identifiable” should be interpreted rather broadly. For example, indirectly identifying data is still identifying data – there doesn't even have to be a strong identifier like a name, passport number, or street address. It is also not necessary that identification enables you to determine the real world identity – identification is anything that allows you to single out a person, or to combine data into a profile of that person (compare Recitals 26 and 30). In any case, an online username or user ID is clearly an identifier and will fall under one of “a name, an identification number, […] an online identifier”. If in doubt, ask your data protection authority for guidance. You've correctly understood that you will need a legal basis to process this data, and that legitimate interest could be that legal basis. This doesn't have to be your own interest, so a community interest would be OK. You need to balance the user's rights against this interest. You have performed this balancing and have found that the interest outweighs these rights. You've noted that such leaderboards are a cultural norm and are generally expected, which strongly weighs in your favour. However, legitimate interest is not a free pass but just means an opt-out solution (right to object per Art 21). You should also inform users that the leaderboard is accessible publicly when they join your server (transparency principle per Art 5(1)(a) as detailed by the information obligations in Art 13). In particular, you should use a “message of the day” or welcome message functionality to link to your privacy policy. You should also be aware that other rights such as the right to access, erasure, and data portability apply. As an alternative to legitimate interest (opt-out) you could also consider consent (opt-in), though this results in slightly different data subject rights and is more difficult to do correctly. But I'd agree that legitimate interest is more appropriate here. |
Judges barring defendants from using social media A New York Times article recently mentioned that a US immigration judge has prohibited a non-US-citizen from speaking on social media, apparently as a condition of release from detention. But the federal immigration judge Charles R. Conroy ruled this week that Ms. Sorokin was no longer such a threat — provided she wears an ankle bracelet. She will also be barred from using social media, including the accounts she already has. How is this ability to ban people from publishing in a particular place or kind of place to be squared with free speech rights? Is it: US law does not actually recognize or protect a right to free speech by non-citizens, so while this would be illegal to do to a citizen it is not illegal here. US law does not prevent the government from cutting deals with people where they "voluntarily" restrict their speech and it "voluntarily" stops locking them up when it might otherwise be allowed to. Or from then locking them up again if they go back on the deal. There's something in the judge's ruling that justifies this particular restriction on free speech in this particular case, such as it being reasonably necessary to protect against the person committing a crime. (This would make a lot more sense in, say, a libel case than an immigration case.) Or is it something else? | The NYT article implies that she has used social media in the past to get her victims to believe her fake back story. She is being released from detention, and the restriction on her using social media is not tied to her expressing a particular viewpoint. Courts have repeatedly held that the Government can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest ( U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 US 367 - Supreme Court 1968). One such compelling interest is the effective administration of criminal justice (U.S. v. Spilotro, 786 F. 2d 808 - Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit 1986). For instance, speech restrictions can be tied to the purpose of preventing a defendant from committing further crimes while released. | If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed. | In the US, a person is "within their rights" to invoke the Fifth Amendment, i.e. refuse to self-incriminate. However, the government can give a person immunity from prosecution for offenses having to do with the testimony, in which case he can be compelled to testify. A person is not required to guess about whether they could actually be convicted based on their testimony. It is the privilege of the court (judge) to determine whether a witness has "a reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer" (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17). | In the US, they would not be automatically prosecuted. The prosecutor would have to find out about the testimony, decide to prosecute, and go through all the normal processes they otherwise would, but they have an additional piece of evidence. Per the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution, a witness cannot be forced to answer a question that would incriminate them. If the question was objected to on this ground and the objection overruled, the witness' answer would not be admissible against that witness at trial, and the prosecutor would have to prove the case using other evidence. | The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit people with no affiliation with the government from trying to convert people to their religion in a way not endorsed by a government official or agency. It could be that there is some content neutral prohibition on strangers accosting young school children if that person is so persistent that it amounts to content neutral harassment, or that the person might actually be a sex offender prohibited from contacting children. But, the facts of the question don't seem to compel this conclusion. Even if it violates any law to do this, it is not a violation of the U.S. Constitution. | It is like an affidavit of sort, sworn out without the jurat and not before a notary. The swearing out of a complaint or rebutting evidence in all Federal civil matters (some states allow for the same) must contain an affidavit or an "unsworn declaration" that swears out the facts to be true and accurate, even though not notarized, and is based on fact and not supposition. It is subject to the same penalties of perjury if one lies as if you swear on a bible and testify in court or on a "sworn" affidavit. Affidavits need not be sworn before God, or on a bible. You have a right to just "affirm" that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth....and not "so help me God". Many courts don't use a bible at all anymore. 28 U.S.C. 1746 relates to these "Unsworn Declarations Under Penalty Of Perjury" It is not b/c you don't believe in God that you'd use this...you always have the option of swearing out even a declared affidavit or testifying without swearing on a bible if you're an atheist. They just leave out the "before God" part. Affidavits are the norm, however, in Federal Courts that have an expedited docket this is typically used when it could take a while to get a notary and the evidence is due. (In some states lawyers are automatically notaries but in others they aren't). The ability to swear out a complaint or contest a deposition without having to wait on a notary can be the difference between making your deadline or not. It's commonly used when records custodians are called to certify the authenticity of documents produced pursuant to subpoena or other formal request. Under F.R.Civ.P 56 declarations usually are not within the type of evidentiary categories that can be used at the summary judgment phase. If it's a small misstatement you would probably be faced with a fine. If it's a total lie, outright, you'd be looking at jail time (say a records custodian removed evidence and swore out it was the complete business record in a fraud case). 18 U.S. Code § 1621 discusses perjury generally (in federal actions). | The first amendment to the US constitution says: Congress shall make no law [...] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; [...] This constitutional hurdle is a very high obstacle to preventing the media from publicly saying something that is detrimental to the interests of the US government. Giving people the freedom to say "our government is wrong" without being afraid of repercussions is the reason why this amendment exists. And yes, freedom of speech includes the freedom to be wrong. When someone makes false claims in public to sway public opinion, then it's the responsibility of their peers to point out those falsehoods and let people decide by themselves who to believe. The government can of course also engage in counter-speech, for example by holding a press conference where they address claims made about them and present their side of the debate. But it is not the job of the government to use force to suppress falsehoods, because the government can not be expected to be impartial in this matter. The government not suppressing public discourse is one thing which separates libertarian states like the United States from authoritarian states where uncomfortable speech is suppressed. There are a couple exceptions. But as long as Carlson doesn't make any statements which are defamatory, obscene, fraudulent, violate copyrights or explicitly incite physical violence, the government's hands are tied. | The essence of the order's argument is that in editing user generated content outside of the provisions in one section of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), the platform necessarily excludes itself from the protections afforded by another section of the CDA. The EFF says: ... Even though neither the statute nor court opinions that interpret it mush these two Section 230 provisions together, the order asks the Federal Communications Commission to start a rulemaking and consider linking the two provision's liability shields. The order asks the FCC to consider whether a finding that a platform failed to act in "good faith" under subsection (c)(2) also disqualifies the platform from claiming immunity under section (c)(1). In short, the order tasks government agencies with defining “good faith” and eventually deciding whether any platform’s decision to edit, remove, or otherwise moderate user-generated content meets it, upon pain of losing access to all of Section 230's protections. ... The order also argues that the very popular social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are the functional equivalent of the public square, not merely private providers protected by the First Amendment, and therefore should not be able to edit user generated content. The EFF article quotes from a Supreme Court judgment that says "merely hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public function and does not alone transform private entities into state actors subject to First Amendment constraints." Recommend the full article: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/trump-executive-order-misreads-key-law-promoting-free-expression-online-and See also Techdirt's article, The Two Things To Understand About Trump's Executive Order On Social Media: (1) It's A Distraction (2) It's Legally Meaningless. [edit] Eugene Volokh wrote a good explainer with background. Regarding the social-media-platforms-become-state-actors argument, see this recent D.C. Circuit judgment on appeal (Freedom Watch v Google etc): Freedom Watch's First Amendment claim fails because it does not adequately allege that the Platforms can violate the First Amendment. In general, the First Amendment 'prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech.' Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019). Freedom Watch contends that, because the Platforms provide an important forum for speech, they are engaged in state action. But, under Halleck, 'a private entity who provides a forum for speech is not transformed by that fact alone into a state actor.' ... This was a group that alleged Google, Facebook, Twitter and Apple "conspired to suppress conservative political views ... its audience and revenues and succeeded in reducing each". Very similar to Trump's complaints. And "this idea that Section 230 requires sites to moderate in a neutral fashion has become very popular even though it has no basis in reality or law" - Ken White (aka Popehat) in another good explainer and podcast about this. |
Self-incriminating statements carry weight of proof If someone is recorded confessing to a crime, can the recording serve as evidence solely because it contains the self-incriminating statement? Putting as an example: Carlos had his wallet stolen. In a meeting between colleagues, he records the conversation without the others knowing and one of the colleagues confesses that he stole Carlos' wallet. Can Carlos use recorded confession (self-incriminating statements) as evidence? In other words, do self-incriminating statements carry weight of proof? | england-and-wales Yes, generally speaking, a confession may be given in evidence - including the one recorded by Carlos - under section 76 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): (1)In any proceedings a confession made by an accused person may be given in evidence against him in so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the court in pursuance of this section. The defence may apply for it to be ruled inadmissible if it satisfies one of the conditions s.76(2): If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by an accused person, it is represented to the court that the confession was or may have been obtained— (a)by oppression of the person who made it; or (b)in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in consequence thereof, the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as aforesaid. NB PACE makes no distinction between confessions made to members of the public or to the police under caution (what some refer to as being read his rights). The next step is to establish whether the recording meets the rules of evidence concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence at section 114 Criminal Justice Act 2003 - s.114(1)(d) and 2(a) (emboldened) seem to me to be the most relevant to this scenario: (1)In criminal proceedings a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings is admissible as evidence of any matter stated if, but only if— (a)any provision of this Chapter or any other statutory provision makes it admissible, (b)any rule of law preserved by section 118 makes it admissible, (c)all parties to the proceedings agree to it being admissible, or (d)the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for it to be admissible. (2)In deciding whether a statement not made in oral evidence should be admitted under subsection (1)(d), the court must have regard to the following factors (and to any others it considers relevant)— (a)how much probative value the statement has (assuming it to be true) in relation to a matter in issue in the proceedings, or how valuable it is for the understanding of other evidence in the case; (b)what other evidence has been, or can be, given on the matter or evidence mentioned in paragraph (a); (c)how important the matter or evidence mentioned in paragraph (a) is in the context of the case as a whole; (d)the circumstances in which the statement was made; (e)how reliable the maker of the statement appears to be; (f)how reliable the evidence of the making of the statement appears to be; (g)whether oral evidence of the matter stated can be given and, if not, why it cannot; (h)the amount of difficulty involved in challenging the statement; (i)the extent to which that difficulty would be likely to prejudice the party facing it. (3)Nothing in this Chapter affects the exclusion of evidence of a statement on grounds other than the fact that it is a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings. But... A confession, on its own and without supporting and/or corroborative evidence, is not normally sufficient to bring a prosecution and is fraught with potential risks - Operation Midland being a similar example of when it can go horribly wrong if just one bit of evidence is taken at face value without it being properly verified or tested. | Can a statement of one's beliefs constitute defamation if those beliefs can't be proven true? You might think that it is impossible to prove what's going on in your mind. But this is done all the time. Thoughts can be inferred from words and actions. For example, theft requires an intent to permanently deprive someone of property. If someone hides merchandise under their shirt and proceeds to the exit, there's generally not a reasonable doubt about whether they intended in their mind to steal it. Defamation laws vary by state. However, the First Amendment sets a baseline that all states must follow. Defamation requires a false fact. Pure opinion is not defamation. However, it is possible to defame via a statement which is an opinion, if that opinion implies undisclosed facts which are false. If you say that you "believe" the companies are deceptive, this clearly implies you know something that makes you believe that. You can get around this by disclosing the entire factual basis for your opinion. If you say that the New York Giants are deceptive because their stadium is actually located in New Jersey, that's not defamation, because people can judge for themselves whether that's actually deceptive. But if the team was actually located in New York, you could be liable. Would we still have some potential burden of proof The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, but it's only preponderance of the evidence in most cases, meaning the jury just needs to find it 50.001% likely that you are liable. But if the plaintiff in a defamation case is considered a "public figure" the standard of proof is raised, and they must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that you acted with "actual malice" (which more or less means that you didn't actually believe what you were saying.) According to this paper it's an open question as to whether a corporation can be a public figure (although I don't know if their analysis is still valid since it's from 2001); the answer might depend on which circuit you are in, and even if you know how your circuit has decided the matter, the Supreme Court might rule the other way. And if your case goes all the way to the Supreme Court, you're going to be paying a lot of legal fees over the course of many years. You should also know that even if it's not defamation, you might not be off the hook. There's something called "tortious interference of business". If you're going to literally have people stand in front of businesses to try to drive their customers away from them and to you, I would highly suggest you get a lawyer from your area to determine whether and how you can legally do this. | How much would I be expected to reveal if not directly connected to the case? For example, if I was asked, "What were you doing in the alley at night?," would you be required to reveal the information if it is potentially humiliating (e.g. you were having an affair) or illegal (e.g. you were getting illegal drugs)? The latter case seems to violate the protection against self-incrimination. Or what happens if you just lie about something inconsequential? You have to answer any permissible questions (i.e. consistent with the rules of evidence) asked. If you were doing something illegal you can claim the fifth and not testify unless you are given "transaction immunity" that your testimony will not be used against you in a criminal case against you. Usually perjury prosecutions require that the lie be about a material fact. Suppose you receive a death threat (either verbal or in writing) from the person charged with and who committed the crime. Something along the lines of: if you testify against me, then my friends will kill you after the trial. What legal options do you have? Tell the prosecutor on the case and ask the prosecutor to provide protection to you and to go after the people making the threat. The witness protection program was created for these cases. | “Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all. | They are both “documents” under most rules of evidence Basically, there are only two sorts of evidence: Testimony. What a witness says to the court. Although, in practice a lot of testimony is said out of court and given in writing but it’s still testimony. Documentary. Everything else. | By producing sufficient evidence at trial. In this case, the most likely sources of evidence would either be eye witnesses (if someone witnessed the forgery) or expert testimony (i.e., handwriting experts). Any experts would have done an analysis and would testify about the results of their analysis. Any eye witnesses would testify to what they personally observed. Judges are not handwriting experts. They don't evaluate signatures. Judges are law experts. They evaluate evidence. Sworn testimony (subject to cross-examination) by a qualified handwriting expert stating so would be evidence of a forged signature. The handwriting expert would conduct all the necessary analysis, then provide a conclusion and their testimony in exchange for a fee. Also, patterns of deceptive conduct (that can be found during discovery) could be introduced as evidence to impeach the credibility of the testimony of any witness (including your counterparty). I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. Please do not do anything based on anything I have written because I really don't know what I am talking about. I'm just stumbling around in the dark like everybody else. If you need help with a case, please hire a real attorney and even offer to pay them for their time and expertise. | Although there have long been requirements to disclose certain types of defenses -- alibi, insanity, etc. -- common law jurisdictions have more recently moved in the direction of greater disclosure obligations for the criminal defendant. Virtually every jurisdiction now requires the defendant to disclose his witnesses and his evidence to the prosecution at some point before the trial, at least if the defendant has made discovery demands of the prosecution. For more information on common-law discovery rules, see here. | If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ("Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.") If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) ("If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.") The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves. |
Is it legal to *prohibit* recording a conversation in Pennsylvania? I went to a walk-in patient care facility earlier this evening, and asked the provider upon his entrance if I could record the interview. (I realize this feels adversarial, but I had a valid reason.) He replied that no, it was hospital policy that encounters could not recorded, and even after explaining the reason, he refused, so I did not. But I do wonder if this is legal. When I got home, I looked it up. According to this digital media law site, it is not illegal to record a conversation if you are one of the parties: Federal law permits recording telephone calls and in-person conversations with the consent of at least one of the parties. This is called a "one-party consent" law. Under a one-party consent law, you can record a phone call or conversation so long as you are a party to the conversation. I also saw that Pennsylvania's wiretapping law is a "two-party consent" law. I tried to read the wiretapping law but gave up pretty quickly. So I'm left to wonder. Is it legal to prohibit recording a conversation in Pennsylvania? I have never been threatened with a lawsuit, so I'm a bit less leery of patients suing me than some of my colleagues. Granted it doesn't happen often, but I've always given consent when asked if I could be audio recorded (I'm a physician.) My reasoning: - It may be helpful to a caregiver who was unable to attend the visit. - It is no different than bringing in a friend or relative into the room (It's actually a lot more objective and I only have to answer one person's questions.) - Due to anxiety over illness, etc., patients only hear/remember about 25% of what a doctor says. An audio recording is a valuable resource for the patient if they want to review instructions or explanations they might have missed. - It empowers a patient to a small extent, evening out the huge imbalance of power between physician and patient. Anything I can do to increase confidence in me in particular, and in the medical profession in general, is a plus. - The patient has as much a right to an audio copy of our interaction as a paper copy of the chart. - I have nothing to hide if I'm doing my best and meeting (hopefully exceeding) the standard of care. - It protects me as well if a claim is made (I imagine alteration of audio recordings can be detected if necessary. My previous malpractice carrier encouraged transparency in all things, and had no problems with this. But I never even thought to run this by the legal department of the hospital where I'm now employed, and if it's discouraged, I missed the memo. | You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't. | As a short answer, guidance from the Department of Health and Human Services has clarified that HIPAA does not require hospitals to provide separate rooms. As a longer answer, HIPAA is very deeply misunderstood. It does not prohibit "leaking" patient information; it prohibits unreasonable and unpermitted disclosures of protected health information (PHI). Among the PHI disclosures that are permitted are uses that are for the purpose of delivering medical treatment. Of course, the covered entity (in this case, the hospital) is required to take reasonable measures to safeguard that information. One of the areas that trips people up is figuring out exactly what it is we're safeguarding that information from. A lot people assume that the HIPAA imposes an absolute rule against disclosure of PHI, but it's more accurate to say that HIPAA requires reasonable safeguards against the unauthorized use of PHI. With that standard in mind, it becomes easier to see why you don't need to universally separate patients. In all likelihood, neither you nor your roommate is likely to use the other's PHI in any way not allowed under HIPAA. We can look at your question as proof: You've disclosed a person's health condition and medical history, but you were a reasonable person and omitted the man's name, birth date, record number, and anything else that might allow us to link that information to an individual. Hospitals -- and the law -- recognize that most people have no interest in a random strangers' medical information, let alone plans to do something nefarious with it. Because there isn't much of a threat there, the hospital isn't required to take exhaustive measures to protect the information. But when you put all that information for every patient for every doctor for every department for every hospital into a single database, the information starts getting a lot more valuable. That's why there are much tighter regulations surrounding protection of electronic records. Of course, the roommate situation might be different if the hospital had a patient that they somehow knew had a history of identity theft or even a history of disclosing PHI. I've never heard of this happening, but I'd imagine that that knowledge would require the hospital to either segregate that patient or otherwise take extra care to avoid disclosing any information about a roommate. | Following you around with the intent of harassing you is stalking. I don't know whether there's going to be a law actually requiring social distancing in Florida. In other states, I've seen laws set up to make it a crime to violate an order of the Director of Public Health or something like that. I don't know whether Florida actually has an order requiring social distancing by the general public. | You can request in advance that you get only a half-dose: there is certainly no law prohibiting making a request. They may refuse or they may agree. If they refuse, you can go elsewhere, but you cannot compel them to do what you ask for, given current law. You can also yell anything you want, or flail about however you want, at your peril. You could seriously hurt yourself by jumping around, and you would not be able to sue them for your stupid actions. Nor could you sue them for assault, since to get the ball rolling, you have to consent to getting the shot. Although consent can be withdrawn, there is the practical matter that you almost certainly cannot effectively communicate withdrawal of consent in the time needed to finish administering the job. If it took 5 minutes to administer the shot, you might be able to say "I changed my mind", and they would be required to end the treatment, against medical advice. | NJ Rev Stat §9:6-1 may be the source of the rumor (since it was in the news), but that law prohibits "the habitual use by the parent or by a person having the custody and control of a child, in the hearing of such child, of profane, indecent or obscene language". The NJ Supreme Court recently declined a First Amendment argument for overturning the law. Otherwise, a candidate is disorderly contact, NJ Rev Stat § 2C:33-2(b), A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense if, in a public place, and with purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in reckless disregard of the probability of so doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive language, given the circumstances of the person present and the setting of the utterance, to any person present. N.J. v. Burkett somewhat tests this law, though the specific acts (which were found to be puerile yet legal) are not adequately described to test the limit on this ban on profanity (as a subcase of coarse language). The statute still stands, but seems not to have been otherwise prosecuted. | It is not "perfectly legal" to transcribe music for personal use. It is pretty likely that you can get away with it. The first thing to understand is that the act of transcribing is the creation of a derivative work (see the definitions part of Title 17). The core protection is section 106, which states that the owner of copyright has the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. So it is not permitted to prepare derivative works, e.g. transcriptions, without permission from the copyright owner. There is a big however: section 107 provides a possible loophole, "fair use". If you were to be sued for violation of copyright in making an unauthorized derivative work, your attorney might well advise you to set forth a fair use defense. This question and answer summarizes the basics of the fair use defense. Probably the most important factor would be the 4th factor, the effect on market -- in the circumstance that you describe, the effect is likely to be low. If you do this as a paid service for others and not just for personal amusement, then a fair use defense becomes a stretch. | Every State in the union has some form of involuntary mental health hold. Regardless of whether or not the patient claims it was an accident, it is incumbent upon the hospital or facility where the individual is held (which is typically at least 72 hours) to do an in-depth analysis of whether the person is a danger to themselves or others. While in this scenario it may've been an inadvertent overdose, the empirical evidence suggests it could have been intentional as the practitioner cannot see into the thoughts and motivations behind the patient's actions. Even taking the patient at face-value, addiction to the extent of overdose is also a mental health issue, which may cause a person to be a danger to themselves. From a clinical perspective, it is much more likely than not that one of the two scenarios occurred, versus a truly mistaken overdose. One would need to mistake their actions numerous times in a day to take so much as to overdose. If you look at it from the inverse perspective, if the facility failed to keep a person who'd just overdosed, or the first responder failed to initiate a hold and the person later died, minimally they would be liable if sued by the family in an action for wrongful death. The unfortunate facts are that if a person was set on committing suicide, it unlikely they would be forthcoming with that fact, for this very reason (the mandatory hold), so a person's word cannot be the determining factor. Even if someone was not intentionally trying to take their life, having taken enough Xanax to cause medical overdose would suggest the potential that even if not suicidal, the individual was at a minimum abusing the medication by taking much more than prescribed (or in a way that is contraindicated - such as with alcohol or other depressants) and potentially suffering from benzodiazepine addiction. Either way, if the hold was not initiated or cut short - and then someone ended up dying from an overdoes - the responsibility and potential liability is the same. A person who is suicidal can reassess what may be a snap decision, or have a chemical imbalance stabilized, or a severe addiction identified in that amount of time. For the person who ctually takes so much medication as to mistakenly cause overdose, this is certainly inconvenient; however, 72 hours is a short time in the grand scheme of things to potentially save a life. The law will nearly always err on the side of safety and prevention. | You don't specify what country's law you're interested in, but as you mention precedent, I'll assume you're interested in common-law jurisdictions such as the United States. The short answer is: you won't find any successful lawsuits such as you describe, at least not without some significant additional facts. In order to be subject to liability, a person needs to commit a breach of some duty. In a civil suit, this needs to be a duty to the plaintiff. In order for it to be actionable for the doctor to not answer the phone, the doctor would have to have somehow assumed a duty to answer the phone at that particular time. Giving someone your phone number is not, in and of itself, a promise that you will never take a shower, or go to a movie, or let your battery run down, or for any other reason be unwilling or unable to answer your phone at a moment's notice. In addition, the patient would have to demonstrate that the doctor, by failing to answer the phone, caused some sort of harm. If the patient is having a medical emergency of some sort, the doctor's advice will almost certainly be: "Hang up and dial 911." This is something the patient can do without the doctor's help. Without some more significant and compelling facts, no court is going to impose a duty on a doctor to sit by the phone waiting for a patient's call. |
Is downloading YouTube videos legal? I've always been under the assumption that doing such was illegal. I don't see any difference between downloading music from YouTube and downloading music from The Pirate Bay. Apparently, there is this Software Recs SE question that talks precisely about downloading from YouTube. Related: Piracy/File sharing - Why aren't songs, movies or ebooks given for free (+ads) like TV? | It's not a crime per se, but you're breaching contract if you're accessing it by normal means, that is, through a Web browser or through the API. Youtube Terms of Use 5B, emphasis added: Content is provided to you AS IS. You may access Content for your information and personal use solely as intended through the provided functionality of the Service and as permitted under these Terms of Service. You shall not download any Content unless you see a “download” or similar link displayed by YouTube on the Service for that Content. You shall not copy, reproduce, make available online or electronically transmit, publish, adapt, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, or otherwise exploit any Content for any other purposes without the prior written consent of YouTube or the respective licensors of the Content. YouTube and its licensors reserve all rights not expressly granted in and to the Service and the Content. It is a breach of the Terms, which you agree to and are contractually bound by, to download Content unless Youtube allows it. Because Users license, the Content to Youtube, Youtube is entitled to recover loss of income from your breach of contract, including loss of advertising revenue, and possibly even punitive damages. Legally, whether you can download it depends on the jurisdiction. It is generally acceptable to make a copy of media you purchase, however these rights do not generally extend to media purchased online, where you become bound by the terms of the service provider - in this case, Youtube. The owner of the Content retains ownership rights and licenses derivation, reproduction and distribution rights to Youtube. That is, if the content owner made it available on some other website for viewing, then you would have the rights to download it for the purposes of viewing it. However, you would still not have distribution, adaptation or modification rights unless they were assigned to you by the content owner. You may have a a Fair Use/Dealing defense for the content, depending on the purpose and nature of your usage. 17 U.S.C. § 107 outlines the considerations in a US Fair Use defense, which essentially boils down to: Nature and purpose of the use Nature of the copyrighted work Amount of the copyrighted work used The effect of the use on the value of the copyrighted work In the absence of case law to the contrary¹, the Terms of Use, copyright law, and fair use law are only legal principles we can rely upon in determining the legality of downloading content from Youtube. 1. It's possible that there is case law, but I've just spent a bit of time searching and haven't found any cases where end users were sued for downloading content. | Maybe. It might fall under "fair use", which overrides the general requirement to get permission. The way to find out is to do it, get sued, then try to defend your action by using the fair use defense. If they win in the lawsuit, you can't, if you win, you can. There are four "factors" that have to be "balanced", plus a fifth. The factors are "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes", "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole", "the nature of the copyrighted work" and "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work". The fifth consideration is "transformativeness". W.r.t. purpose of the use, your use would likely be found to be "fair", except for the Youtube monetization problem. The "nature of the copyright work" question is primarily about "artistic works" versus "factual works", so it would depend on what you are taking from. One second might not be substantial, unless that one second is the only reason people pay to watch the copyrighted work. That interacts with the substantiality desideratum: could people get the crucial amusement content of the paid work for free by watching your video? You can read some case law in the links here, and you basically have to get an attorney to analyze your plans to tell you what your risks are. | Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz. | You're talking about sites like Youtube, so I'll focus on that. That quote, which you bolded, was over-simplified. The actual law is 17 USC 512 (c) Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction of Users. (1) In general. A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider (A) -- (I) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing; -- (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or -- (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; (B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and (C says and complies with a DMCA takedown notice). What you're talking about is membership fees (e.g. Youtube Premium)... or general advertisements that would be placed on any video without awareness of it being infringing. That does not violate Safe Harbor per se. At least not on a legitimate site which is dominated by legitimate content and makes an honest, credible effort to keep it that way. The important clause in (B) is "In a case..." Under (B), they lack the ability to control each activity (upload or view). Youtube's inability is due to receiving 500 hours (30,000 minutes) of uploaded video every minute, obviously requiring 30,000++ staff seats working 24x7 to curate. That would amount to about 200,000 staff - all of Google is around 50,000 right now. Even if a small site were able to moderate all content, they might still have a Safe Harbor defense if they could credibly say that they did not know the material was infringing. If someone created a "Juan Brown" username and uploaded blancolirio's videos from YouTube, they could say "we did not know that was not the real person". But if the video started with an HBO splash screen and tones, then heck no. But non-moderation is not an airtight defense. When sites are neglectful toward removal, they can soon develop a reputation as a haven for such infringing content - which the sites tend to embrace, since it brings many customers! This was the undoing of several music sharing sites in the 00's, since this awareness of their reputation, plus a lack of diligent removal, failed them on all three arms of 1(A) above. Remember that a competently run website that relies on user submissions is well aware of the DMCA and its case law, and has tailored its rules and enforcement to make it easy to defend a copyright claim. For instance, in the case of music, Youtube uses some human intervention but largely automated means to either take it down and give the uploader a copyright "strike" leading to a ban (which alienates their biggest contributors, especially when a popular Youtuber like blancolirio winds up with a distant car stereo in background noise, remember the detection is by "bot" and no human ever sanity-checks it). de-monetize the suspect video (uploader gets nothing, but, neither does YouTube). monetize it, but give the revenue stream to the rights holder due to an agreement with them. The last one is Youtube's preference with regards to music. As this was vastly easier, more practical and better for the community all-around, allowing whole classes of content to be created that would be prima-facie illegal otherwise. And it's content people are already creating and Youtube can't stop them, so it solves a big policing problem too. | "Personal use only" does not excuse copyright infringement under US law. The uploader does not hold copyright, and neither gives nor denies permission to copy his creation. The law does not require a copyright holder to deny permission, it requires the user to actually obtain permission. So no matter how you slice it (even as fair use) it is infringement for you to copy that video. | The platform will get in trouble for copyright infringement. The disclaimer that you are not liable does not work, legally, since the person suing you hasn't agreed to the TOS on your webpage. You can be sued for "secondary infringement", meaning that not only the uploader but also you the service provider are liable. The solution to this quandry is the "DMCA safe harbor", a set of rules which, if you follow them, you won't be held liable. The specific piece of law is here. The essence of the rules is that you have to have a "designated agent" who receives takedown notices: if a copyright owner finds their stuff on your page, they officially notify you, then you take the material down – expeditiously (no dawdling). You notify the uploader, they either accept the takedown or file a counterclaim, you notify the rights-holder, there's a waiting period, then the rights holder can file a lawsuit, or not. If the rights-holder doesn't file suit, you can put the material back up. You cannot rely solely on the intricate DMCA notice / counter-notice dance, because under para (c)(1)(A)(ii) of §512, you also must not be "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent". | It would be copyright infringement. You had the copyright holders permission to make one copy of the song by downloading it. At that time, if you gave me a copy of that song, it could be argued that very, very little damage was caused because I just had downloaded that song myself with practically the same effect. Today, that argument is not valid anymore. So this is definitely copyright infringement. That's your question answered. I doubt that anyone would take action if you gave a copy to someone and it was found out. Making it available to the world for free download is another matter. That could easily get you into trouble; in the USA there could be a fine up to $150,000 without any proof of actual damages needed. | There's existing copyright infringement and future copyright infringement. Let's say you sold a million records with infringing contents. That's copyright infringement. It has happened, you can't undo it. Now you get sued. If you think you will lose, it would be a good idea to change the music to be not infringing, so the next million records are not infringing and add to the damages. It doesn't fix the infringement that has already been done, but makes sure there is no further infringement. And infringement after you were told about it and asked to stop might be punished more harshly. |
lawyer's corruption If a corrupted lawyer during a court case intentionally doesn't provide enough given information by his client to the judge, i.e. intentionally doesn't represent given information and loses the case, does such a lawyer commit a crime? If yes, what is the name of such a crime and how to deal with such a situation? | It's hard to say, given how little we know about the case and the information, also what you mean by "corrupted" and what your evidence is. Here are two hypothetical cases that illustrate different possibilities. 1: The accused instructs the lawyer to tell the judge "My client has an alibi against the robbery charge: at the time, he was murdering his brother". Lawyer deems this to be a bad argument because murder is punished more severely than robbery. The lawyer is doing his job, protecting the interest of the client. No crime or civil wrong. 2: The accused instructs the lawyer to tell the judge "My client has an alibi against the robbery charge: at the time, he was in church". The lawyer doesn't understand that this is exculpatory evidence, thinking "they never asked about church, there's no point in me raising this issue". The client can probably sue for incompetence. There are possible criminal charges possible, for example if the lawyer is working for The Mob he might be involved in an actual criminal conspiracy. | You misunderstand the significance of the phrase "innocent until proven guilty." This is in part because you are not considering the entire phrase. The full phrase is that an accused party is "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This does not mean that the accused is innocent, only that criminal procedure must take as its starting point that the accused did not commit the crime. The major implication of the presumption, and indeed its original purpose, is that it places the burden of proof on the prosecution. This means that if a prosecutor asserts that you stole something, you do not have to prove that you did not. Rather, the prosecutor must prove that you did. The only reason to present evidence of your own is to rebut the prosecutor's evidence. Another practical implication is that a decision to detain someone awaiting a criminal trial may not be based on the assumption that the accused committed the crime. On the other hand, that decision is not based on the assumption that the accused did not commit the crime. There is a presumption of innocence, but no assumption of innocence, and the government is not obliged before the person is convicted to treat the person as if there is no accusation or charge. Wikipedia has a decent discussion. If we modify your question accordingly, it becomes How can two people be presumed innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? Now the answer should be clear. The prosecutor must develop evidence that shows which one of the people has committed the crime. If the prosecutor cannot do that, neither person may be punished. | Such an action by the lawyer is certainly unethical, but there is no automatic or routine mechanism to detect it and give better advice to Rob, at least not in the US. Rob could get a second opinion, but criminal defendants do not often do this, and there is no requirement to do so. If the situation is extreme, it might be reported, after the fact, and the lawyer sanctioned. But no one is ever required to do a plea bargain, and there is always a chance, even if only a very small one, that a jury will acquit. Whether to try for a trial is a judgement call. That makes it hard to deal with the unethical intention, which the lawyer presumably did not tell anyone about. Rob's only practical protection is to pick a lawyer with a good reputation for not doing that sort of thing, and reputations can be misleading. If Rob does not have money he may not be able to choose at all, but then the lawyer will not be tempted to go to trial to "suck money out of" Rob, because there will be none to suck. In that case the lawyer may, indeed, be tempted not to go to trial when (rarely) that would be in Rob's best interest. Rob would have little protection against that. | In California civil court cases: Will court extend filing deadlines for me if I can prove that my attorney was unresponsive? Generally only in cases of "gross negligence" on the part of the attorney, or other "excusable neglect" (e.g. the attorney died). Not always even then. The typical "gross neglect" fact pattern is that an attorney just wakes up one day, steals all of the client funds in his trust account, and travels to another country, or sinks into a deep clinical depression and ignores all of his cases for a long period of time, often weeks or months. Are attorneys liable for the consequences of missing court deadlines? If missing the deadline failed to live up to the standard of care for a reasonable attorney (usually it will be a breach of a standard of care but in very complex cases it might not), and if one can prove that the missed court deadline caused economic harm, then usually an attorney can be sued for malpractice for missing a court deadline. As a practical matter, there are lots and lots of court deadlines and it is the exception rather than the rule that you can show that missing a particular court deadline caused you harm. But, it certainly happens. | Are police required to contact a real lawyer if you ask? give opinions from a number of lawyers and police in different jurisdictions. The basic consensus is that in most jurisdictions, such behavior will get the case thrown out of court and often get the police officer who tried this fired. HOWEVER there was a case where this was tried and while the case was thrown out on appeal, it was not as simple as the postings in the above article may have made it appear. This story shows a case where the Tennessee police actually did this. While the lower court allowed it because the defendant was "gullible", the appeals court rejected this argument. [T]he conduct of the law enforcement officers in this case, and in particular Detective Henry, is so egregious that it simply cannot go unchecked. That Detective Henry would illegally pose as an attorney and arrange the circumstances of the defendant’s case to make it appear as though he had successfully undertaken legal representation of the defendant is abhorrent. That the detective would specifically instruct the defendant not to communicate the relationship to his appointed counsel, in what we can only assume was an effort to enlarge the time for the detective to gain incriminating information from the defendant, renders completely reprehensible the state action in this case. Given the unconscionable behavior of the state actors in this case and the fact that the defendant was essentially prevented from proving prejudice through no fault of his own, we have no trouble concluding that the only appropriate remedy in this case is the dismissal of all the indictments. | The appropriate course of action would be to demand an evidentiary hearing, present evidence, and appeal the judge's ruling if it is contrary to the evidence in the record. Abandoning your attorney because the judge is sounding ominous would be foolish indeed. You can't do anything about the judge or about DSS. | Should one be unconditionally honest with their lawyer whenever one is being charged with a crime ? Yes. Otherwise, the defendant risks doing one or more of the following: (1) hinder the litigation strategy his lawyer devised; (2) increase the likelihood of inconsistencies that can only hurt the defendant's credibility on factors relevant to the sentencing guidelines; and/or (3) prompt the lawyer to withdraw once the truth is unveiled (whether the withdrawal is on grounds of wasted effort or on moral grounds), which further complicates the defendant's position. | A contract can’t legalise illegality Let’s assume that absent the “simulation” disclosure in the ToS, this would be fraud. The question then becomes, does making the disclosure make it not fraud? Fraud requires dishonesty and deception. These are measured by what a reasonable person would determine from the overall conduct so a small piece of truth in amongst a web of half-truths and outright lies is still dishonest and deceptive. From the perspective of US law, is Bob doing this regarded a scam? No, but only because “scam” isn’t a legal term - it’s slang for fraud and this is fraud Is this a criminal case, or a civil case? Both What evidence can Tom provide to support the lawsuit? Whatever he has. However, in practice, these types of fraudsters are rarely ever caught and it’s even more rare for the victim to recover their money. They are usually off-shore in countries with either poor rule of law or which will not extradite their nationals. |
Which license can protect a project's owner and give him ownership over volunteer contributions? I am the owner of a private GitHub repo for a game project. We are a team of 5, I wrote 98% of the code and made several commits, other users have also added their own code to the project and its been merged into the main branch. Parts of the project might be released commercially at a later date (not sure yet), maybe on Steam. There is no license, which means it's under All Rights Reserved (according to Github). Does that mean that everyone still "owns" their own code? Since I am the owner of the repo, what rights do I have over the contributions of code of others? Or is all the code others wrote still theirs under "All Rights Reserved"? That's in case of code, what about when a team member contributes models, audio files, etc? I dont want to get sued by someone because I used their proprietary code. So I think I need a license that gives me ownership over the contributions of others. In this case all team members are inexperienced and have agreed to work as volunteers, with full accreditation if the project is ever published. So what would be the de facto best license for me to use here? Appreciate any help. I looked all over Stack/Quora and forums, but couldn't find any conclusive answer. | Yes, a work with no license is All Rights Reserved, reserved meaning the creator of the work. Who is the creator of the work ? Everyone who contributed it, unanimously. Yes. If people contributed any copyrightable part of your work, in theory you cannot add any license or grant any right to use/reproduce/whatever the work without their unanimous agreement. That's very cumbersome, and almost nobody really does that, but it's what the law is. Big serious companies and repos require contributors to waive their rights on the code they contribute, by agreeing to a contributor's agreement. For example, python/cpython requires you to give your contribs a license allowing the python org to do essentially what they want with it, even though you retain copyright over them. If your project is not so serious, I suggest it should be enough to make the license clear, and that by contributing people are agreeing to place their contribution's code under the license. If it's a free license, that's all you need. | While the Commons Clause is not an Open Source license, the BSD license allows you to do this. To be clear, you cannot change the license of other people's code. You can however add your own code and license it under whatever terms you want. The resulting code then consists of your modifications, under whatever license you want parts of the original code, under BSD-3-clause Since you are a license-taker for the BSD-3-clause material, you must still comply with its license such as providing any recipients with the copyright + license notice. When people receive the software with your modifications, they must comply with both your chosen license terms for your modifications, and with the BSD-3-clause license for the other parts. For example, you can use the Commons Clause to prevent certain competing uses of the software as a whole. But since you will presumably provide the source code of the software, other people are free to use the BSD-3-clause code under the terms of that license, ignoring your restrictions. If you provide binaries then the resulting binary would not be covered by the BSD-3-clause license, but you would still have to provide the copyright and license notice for the original code as a kind of attribution. | The Organization Does Not Own the Copyright As you were clearly not an employee of the organization, and did not have a specific contract with them, this was not a "work-made-for-hire" (WFH). Therefore, the copyright initially belonged to the author, in this case the programmer, that is you. That being so, it would require a written document to transfer the copyright to another during your lifetime. In future there should be a written agreement in such a case, spelling out just what rights are to be retained by whom. It can save lots of trouble. The organization would have an implied license to use the software. The terms of this would be defined by the conduct of the parties, and might be a matter of dispute. Probably there would be a non-exclusive license without any fee or ending date. Probably there would be no license to distribute to others unless you explicitly grant one. Specific US Laws 17 USC 101 defines a WFH: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. (emphasis added) 17 USC 201 provides that: (a) Initial Ownership. — Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work. (b) Works Made for Hire. — In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. ... (d) Transfer of Ownership.— (d) (1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession. (d) (2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title. 17 USC 204 provides that: (a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent. | A document can be distributed under more than one license. Just because it has been made available under a CC license for free, doesn't mean that IEEE can't negotiate a different license with different terms that allow them to sell the content. (This is similar to the way that a software library can be available for free under a license that permits non-commercial use, but also be made available for a fee for commercial use.) If you want to know whether IEEE is legally selling Aaron Swartz's manuscript, you can contact Morgan & Claypool, the publisher that owns the copyright, and ask them whether this use by IEEE has been authorized by them. For the other documents you mention, contact MIT Press. Etc. | Generally, as the copyright holder, you can grant anyone a license to any or all of the copyright rights you have over your work (copying, distribution, derivative works, etc.). If you want to articulate unambiguously exactly what rights you are licensing, and optionally require attribution, you could use one of the Creative Commons licenses, which are designed for creative works. Some that would likely be a good fit for you are: Creative Commons Attribution license (CC BY) - Grants full rights to any recipient to use, modify, and distribute. Requires that all reuse mentions you somewhere in the work's credits. Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike license (CC BY-SA) - Grants the same full rights as the CC BY license except that any new derivative work made by a recipient must also be licensed under the CC BY-SA license. With the CC BY license, another person's modifications could be under a different license; under CC BY-SA, all modifications must be licensed under CC BY-SA when distributed, so the work and all its future transformations must be shared under the CC BY-SA license, forever (until your copyright expires, of course). This falls under the broad umbrella of copyleft licenses. CC0 - Functionally places your work in the public domain where it can be used by anyone with no restrictions (other than moral rights). CC0 allows you to renounce all claim to copyright on your work (to whatever extent possible in your jurisdiction), and/or freely license all the rights you hold in your work to the maximum extent possible (for jurisdictions where renouncing your copyright is not possible). There are also Creative Commons licenses that disallow commercial use and disallow the creation of derivative works, but you are probably not interested in those, since you want to grant full rights. One other factor to consider is whether you want to license the musical work itself or only the sound recording. By default, you might only be licensing the recording, which means other people cannot record a new cover of your music. (See Does a Creative Commons license allow me to record a cover of a song recording?) If you want to allow that, simply make a separate declaration when you license the work, saying something like, "In addition to the sound recording(s), I also license the underlying musical work under identical terms, to allow recipients to record their own covers based on this song." | Unless you have a legally valid IP right related to the specification that statement is meaningless. When a software license is granted it is based on the copyright of the code. The copyright of the spec. just stops people from copying the spec - it does not protect the information in it. You can restrict copying of the spec. under copyright, you can make up a name for the spec (like USB or Bluetooth) and get a trademark and only allow the trademark use in limited cases(doesn’t stop implementation of the spec), or get a patent that would be necessarily infringed if something complying with the spec was created and used, sold, made, etc. or you can keep it secret and only show it to people who contractually agreed with your terms. | You'll want to read the actual licenses yourself and understand what is required. If you don't understand, then you'll want to consult an attorney. But neither of these licenses are all that complex in my opinion. MIT: Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. Apache 2.0: Redistribution. You may reproduce and distribute copies of the Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or without modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that You meet the following conditions: (a) You must give any other recipients of the Work or Derivative Works a copy of this License; and (b) You must cause any modified files to carry prominent notices stating that You changed the files; and (c) You must retain, in the Source form of any Derivative Works that You distribute, all copyright, patent, trademark, and attribution notices from the Source form of the Work, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works; and (d) If the Work includes a "NOTICE" text file as part of its distribution, then any Derivative Works that You distribute must include a readable copy of the attribution notices contained within such NOTICE file, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works, in at least one of the following places: within a NOTICE text file distributed as part of the Derivative Works; within the Source form or documentation, if provided along with the Derivative Works; or, within a display generated by the Derivative Works, if and wherever such third-party notices normally appear. The contents of the NOTICE file are for informational purposes only and do not modify the License. You may add Your own attribution notices within Derivative Works that You distribute, alongside or as an addendum to the NOTICE text from the Work, provided that such additional attribution notices cannot be construed as modifying the License. Nowhere does either license require you to publish your application's source code, even if your application is directly based on the original code. | Written down computer code is subject to copyright. If you do not have the permission of the owner to copy it you are breaching their copyright unless your use constitutes fair use/dealing. |
The status of Urdu in Pakistan versus the status of Hindi in India This is a critical question because it caused the 1952 language movement in Pakistan. The Internet says that Urdu is the national language of Pakistan, but that Hindi is not the national language of India. However, practically, both of them are the lingua franca in their respective countries. How are they dissimilar according to the constitutions of their respective countries? . Note: I am comparing Pakistan and India. I am comparing Urdu in Pakistan with Hindi in India. I am not comparing Urdu and Hindi in India. I am not comparing Urdu and Hindi in Pakistan. . Note2: I am seeking an explanation of an article of the constitution. That is what Supreme Courts do. Therefore, it should be a legal question. | The difference is mainly terminological. Article 251 of the Constitution of Pakistan says 1.The National language of Pakistan is Urdu, and arrangements shall be made for its being used for official and other purposes within fifteen years from the commencing day. Subject to clause (1), the English language may be used for official purposes until arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu. Without prejudice to the status of the National language, a Provincial Assembly may by law prescribe measures for the teaching, promotion and use of a Provincial language in addition to the National language. Article 343 says (1) The official language of the Union shall be Hindi in Devanagari script The form of numerals to be used for the official purposes of the Union shall be the international form of Indian numerals (2) Notwithstanding anything in clause ( 1 ), for a period of fifteen years from the commencement of this Constitution, the English language shall continue to be used for all the official purposes of the Union for which it was being used immediately before such commencement: Provided that the president may, during the said period, by order authorise the use of the Hindi language in addition to the English language and of the Devanagari form of numerals in addition to the international form of Indian numerals for any of the official purposes of the Union (3) Notwithstanding anything in this article, Parliament may by law provide for the use, after the said period of fifteen years, of (a) the English language, or (b) the Devanagari form of numerals, for such purposes as may be specified in the law In other words, in one case the term employed is "national language" and in the other case it is "official language". In either case, national government business is to be carried out in the official / national language, and not in a regional language. | This sucks. It is also legal. It's a private school, they can admit who they like (provided they don't discriminate on the grounds of protected characteristics like "religion" or "caste"). | So generally, when a region of a nation tries to break away and form a new nation or join a nation, it's acceptance as a nation is generally based on the Diplomatic Recognition of other Nations. This can either be de facto or de jure, with the former acting in a manner of having some acknowledgement of a government of a territory, while a de jure recognition typically is stronger with embassies, consulates, and treaties between the two nations. For example, the United States has de jure recognition of France and vice versa, while they merely have de facto recognition with Iran (They recognize there is a government of the territorial area known as Iran, but they feel that the current government is illegitimate and refuse to engage with it in diplomatic relationships. Iran similarly knows there is a United States, but refuses to recognize it for political reasons as well.). When two nations do not have de jure recognition they will often appoint another nation "Protecting Power" who will act as a representative of the appointing nation in the nation they do not recognize. Currently, the Swiss Embassy in Iran has an office dedicated to U.S. affairs as it is the Protecting Power of the United States in Iran. Iran has asked Pakistan to have the same duties. And before you ask, yes, it is the geopolitical equivalent of two people in the same room not speaking to one another, but telling a third person to give the other person a message (U.S.: Switzerland tell Iran that they will give us back our citizens who are being held in their jail cells or we will drop bombs on them. Switzerland: rolls eyes Iran, the U.S. says they want their guys back or they will bomb you. Iran: Oh yeah? Tell U.S. 'Death to America!' Switzerland: eye roll They said... U.S.: Already routing the bombers!) If a region is claimed by more than one government, than it becomes disputed territory. Presently China has a lot of disputed territory with its neighbors and Maritime neighbors. Ongoing disputes include territories also claimed by India, Bhutan, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and The Philippines. Interestingly, the dispute with Taiwan is over who is the real government of China... Taiwan claims much of the other disputed territory China does... plus some territories which China has resolved disputes over. The Russia-Ukraine situation will likely leave the territory in question (The Donbas and Crimea Regions) listed as disputed. Generally, disputed territory doesn't mean nations cannot be friendly, as the United States has a number of territorial disputes with Canada, despite being very strong diplomatic allies (with the single largest land boarder between two nations in the world, disputed territory was bound to happen). Perhaps the most interesting is the now resolved dispute of the San Juan Island in Washington State. Oversimplified History has a good video about it on his YouTube channel, specifically the "Pig War" confrontations and does a pretty good job of highlighting just how dramatic the change to the modern border would have been. | No, all text of the Canadian constitution is of equal force. The 1993 Supreme Court case New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly) makes this clear: It is a basic rule, not disputed in this case, that one part of the Constitution cannot be abrogated or diminished by another part of the Constitution: Reference re Bill 30, An Act to amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148. So if the privilege to expel strangers from the legislative assembly is constitutional, it cannot be abrogated by the Charter, even if the Charter otherwise applies to the body making the ruling. This raises the critical question: is the privilege of the legislative assembly to exclude strangers from its chamber a constitutional power? The opinion went on to determine that the privilege of the legislative assembly to exclude strangers was an unwritten constitutional principle which could not be abrogated by the written constitutional Charter (though they did not specifically call it an unwritten constitutional principle at the time, this is retroactively so through Reference Re Secession of Quebec para. 52). Edit: Following Toronto (City) v. Ontario (AG) 2021 SCC 34, it's not entirely clear New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. is still good law as the majority relegated unwritten principles to interpretive aids and filling structural gaps of the written Constitution, without referencing this case. The rule that the (written) Constitution cannot contradict itself seems logical though, and the cited Reference re Bill 30 does indeed state at para. 62 that the written Charter cannot override other parts of the Constitution (presumably we should read that as specifically written parts, since that's what was at issue in the reference). | As I understand it one of Scotus jobs is to mediate inter-state litigation. Did this happen with equal regularity over the years or was this something that happened mainly when the union was new? You are right the Supreme Court of the United States is the venue for state vs. state disputes. Though I would be careful to differentiate "inter-state" litigation from "stave vs. state" litigation. These disputes did happen regularly over the years yes, but with differing success as the strength of the Federal Government and Supreme Court increased*. In general state v. state cases are not too common, and generally deal with issues such as land and border disputes or questions. *(See as a partial reference this video where when NJ sued NY over a land dispute, NY effectively ignored the Court/ the Court didn't hear the case in 1832. Whereas in the 1990s NY did not ignore it https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgZ1f4ACZBQ) For background the relevant provisions of the Constitution and statute are as follow: U.S. Const. Article III: Sec 2: In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleiii 28 USC Sec. 1251 (a)The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States. (b)The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: (1)All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, > consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties; (2)All controversies between the United States and a State; (3)All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State or against aliens. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1251 For a recent/ current state v. state case see Mississippi v. Tennessee: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22o143.html concerning territorial matters/ water rights. Is it therefore at least in theory possible for two states to have contrary laws and scotus be forced to make a value judgment contrary to state law to resolve some dispute? Generally no, unless the state law is impermissible under the United States Constitution or otherwise preempted by federal law for example. But the Supreme Court wouldn't really rule on "contrary" state laws, most cases are concerning federal laws or land matters. Also, unless there is a matter of Federal Law ("federal question") or the state v state controversy under Article III the Supreme Court doesn't have jurisdiction to rule on state matters (again unless a "federal question" is involved). Can scotus decide not to hear inter-state litigation in the same way it often does with constitutional matters or are they forced to mediate because there is no other way to settle such matters? Yes, they can choose not to hear state vs. state cases. Rule 17 of the Supreme Court Rules regards "Procedure in Original Action" https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/supct/rule_17 in which the Court "Court thereafter may grant or deny the motion, set it for oral argument, direct that additional documents be filed, or require that other proceedings be conducted." Though, and I will note for completeness in answering your question, some current Justices believe it is not discretionary. See below: 155, ORIG. TEXAS V. PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL. The State of Texas’s motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied for lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Texas has not demonstrated a judicially cognizable interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections. All other pending motions are dismissed as moot. Statement of Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins: In my view, we do not have discretion to deny the filing of a bill of complaint in a case that falls within our original jurisdiction. See Arizona v. California, 589 U. S. ___ (Feb. 24, 2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting). I would therefore grant the motion to file the bill of complaint but would not grant other relief, and I express no view on any other issue. https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/121120zr_p860.pdf | When traveling abroad, how does a nation state know that a couple is married? Usually by accepting the couple's verbal statement. Some countries include a remark in a married person's passport with the name of the person's spouse, which is obviously more likely to be accepted in case of doubt, but not all countries do this. The usual formal proof of a foreign marriage is a certified copy of the foreign marriage certificate with an apostille or similar legalization whereby the foreign ministry of the country where the document was issued (or, in some federal contexts, of a constituent entity) attests to the legitimacy of the official who certified the copy and to the authenticity of the certification. This is a fairly burdensome process that is normally associated with proving family relationships in connection with establishing residence in a foreign country. Nobody is going to expect visitors to have such documents. For a casual or temporary purpose such as hospital visitation rights, the certified copy might be helpful even if it is not legalized. On the other hand, in a country where homosexuality is criminalized, the certificate could be used as evidence against the couple. What laws are in place regarding hospitalization and next of kin? This will be governed by national law. Human rights treaties probably have something to say about it, at least indirectly, but if your spouse is in the hospital that's not going to be of much use. Local law and the hospital's policy will control. What happens to a same-sex couple traveling to a nation that is not amicable to same-sex unions, say India? This is rather too broad, especially as it will depend on the sympathy of the people involved as well as on local law. The outcome could be anywhere from according full spousal visitation rights to the arrest of both spouses followed by conviction, imprisonment or possibly worse, deportation, and a ban on reentering the country. | You don’t have to swear Witnesses are given the option to swear (technically take an oath) or to affirm, which has no religious connotations. You also don’t actually swear on a Bible if you do swear. For example california. The US is a very religious state france is a secular state - it prohibits religious clothing (hijabs, crucifixes etc.) in schools. The united-kingdom (specifically England) has an official state religion (Anglican) but religion is far less prevalent in politics or society than it is in the US. For example, outside of a place of worship, who your mother is sleeping with is a far more acceptable topic of conversation than what her religious beliefs are. Which is not to say it actually is an acceptable topic of conversation, just that it’s more acceptable than religion. australia elected its first openly atheist Prime Minister in 1983. The US was not founded on the idea that there shouldn’t be established religion, just that there shouldn’t be a state religion - that is, a church backed by the power of the government. Many of the early settlers were fleeing religious prosecution from state religions. Nevertheless, it was never the intention to exclude religion from politics. Indeed, religion in the US influences politics to a much greater degree than it does in most European or Anglophone countries. | Because the 1860 law that criminalised “unnatural” sex is unconstitutional In essence, Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India decided that criminalising sex between consenting adults violated the Constitutional right to equality. You have a Law in the Constitution that says people have to be treated equally. You have another law that says people in same-sex relationships are to be treated differently. The law in the Constitution wins. According to the BBC: Thursday's decision was delivered by a five-judge bench headed by India's outgoing chief justice Dipak Misra and was unanimous. Reading out the judgement, he said: "Criminalising carnal intercourse is irrational, arbitrary and manifestly unconstitutional." Another judge, Indu Malhotra, said she believed "history owes an apology" to LGBT people for ostracising them. Justice DY Chandrachud said the state had no right to control the private lives of LGBT community members and that the denial of the right to sexual orientation was the same as denying the right to privacy. The courts in India, like they are in most common law/civil law jurisdictions are interested it questions of law. Questions of sin and morality they are happy to leave to religion. |
Can I change attorney ad litem? I’m in a custody battle in Arkansas. We still have 10 months until the final date of court. Our attorney ad litem appointed for our 2 year old daughter is extremely biased against me. I can feel it and don’t trust her. Can I request the court to change AAL? | This person is appointed by the court to look after the child's interests recognizing that the child's interests may be different from those of the parents. As @phoog notes in the comments: the attorney ad litem is not your lawyer. The question suggests that you might not understand this (you mention "our" attorney ad litem). The job of the attorney ad litem is to represent your daughter's interests, which might not align with yours. This is why you need your own lawyer. The attorney ad litem might be skeptical of you and your submissions to the court; that's her job. It doesn't necessarily mean that she is biased against you. If her skepticism is well founded, an attempt to have her replaced may work against you. (FYI, most jurisdictions call this person a "guardian ad litem" or GAL, but Arkansas uses atypical terminology.) Our attorney ad litem appointed for our 2 year old daughter is extremely biased against me. This is not a reason to remove the person appointed. It is their job to distrust parents and provide an independent opinion to the court. There could be grounds for removing a guardian ad litem (e.g. a personal relationship with one of the parties prior to the litigation), but nothing in this question suggests that any relevant facts are present. You would be much better served trying to figure out what causes the guardian ad litem to distrust you and to find a way to show that person that their distrust of you is ill-founded. | Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? This is a hard question to answer that doesn't have a neat resolution. Very little pertaining to the authority of a parent over a child is codified in statutory law and there is not a clear cut age at which a child has "freedom of conscience" vis-a-vis a parent. Most of the law related to children concerns allocation of parenting time and parental decision making between divorced, separated or unmarried parents; abuse and neglect; and juvenile delinquency. There is also usually a snippet of criminal law stating that certain kinds of uses of force to discipline children do not constitute crimes. But, part of why it doesn't come up very much is that older children are usually socialized in a manner that causes them to show a certain amount of respect for the wishes of their parents. It also doesn't come up much for children who aren't in their late teens, because the complete economic dependence of children on their parents or guardians gives the parents considerable power of their children that doesn't require the exercise of physical force. Also, it is quite dependent upon how the issue presents itself. No law enforcement agency is going to aid a parent in forcibly dragging a kid to church against their will. But, no social services agency is going to remove a kid from a home because his birthday party will be cancelled if he doesn't go to the church of his parents' choice the Sunday before his birthday. There are also some subtle but important distinctions between states on the issue of emancipation. In Colorado, emancipation is a statement about the empirical reality. If a child is self-supporting and lives apart from parents or guardians then the child is an emancipated minor. It is not a status granted by a court, it is a status acknowledged by courts when evaluating other issues. In California, a child is not emancipated unless a court grants a child that status and a child who is de facto emancipated without the leave of a court is guilty of a "status offense" (the New York State term for someone in this state is PINS for "person in need of supervision"). Basically, if a parent can force a child to go to church by means that don't constitute abuse or neglect and don't exceed the level of force authorize for child discipline in the criminal code, then they can do it, and if they can't manage that, then they can't do it. Many states have a "status offense" that allows government intervention with the cooperation of a parent or guardian in cases where an "uncontrollable" child is defiant and simply will not give any heed to the parent or guardian's instructions. In practice, the older a child is, the less likely someone viewing a parent's conduct forcing a child to do something is to be viewed as acceptable or legally justified. The legal rights of children in a school setting are also age dependent under the case law, although not always in a really well defined way. Controls on student expression that would be uncontroversial for elementary school students may be looked upon by the law with disfavor for high school students and clearly prohibited for adults. Perhaps one useful way to conceptualize it is that trying to make a child attend a particular kind of religious service is not considered an improper purposes for a parent of any minor to utilize the resources available to the parent to do so, but the range of resources available to a parent with regard to an adult child is much narrower. | This is not possible, simply as a matter of definitions and legal terminology. Someone who is "represented by one or more attorneys" is by definition not pro se which means representing yourself without an attorney. There are very rare instances in criminal trials involving serious consequences in which a pro se defendant is allowed to have an attorney advisor who does not represent them in court in an agency capacity, but, first, people who do that almost always lose and are almost always mentally ill (although not necessarily eligible for an insanity defense), and second, because courts generally don't allow this in any other circumstance (at least in court). The concept of getting advice from an attorney without having full fledged representation is called a "limited representation" and the law regarding limited representations more generally varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even between different courts in the same place. For example, Colorado's state courts and Colorado's federal courts have different rules for limited representations. | Once you withdrew the complaint without prejudice, any statute of limitations benefit you obtained from filing the lawsuit evaporated. From a legal perspective, it is as if you never filed at all, except that the lawsuit that was filed proves that you had notice of the claim at the time you filed, so you cannot take advantage of any "discovery rule" that allows a statute of limitations to start running from the date that you knew or should have known of your right to file a lawsuit. In all likelihood, the statute of limitations has now run, although that would depend upon the jurisdiction in which it was filed. Some jurisdictions toll the statute of limitations during a period of minority, but that tolling might very well be insufficient to allow the claim to be filed 20 years later. | Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter. | Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed. | Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked & answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false & misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness. | The first question would be whether those papers are indeed "legit", and we don't do product reviews. Assuming the company didn't mess up and she was legally served, the next question would be whether she responded (in the legal sense) or not. If she failed to respond at all within 21 days (add 9 days if she is out of state), then your next step would be to file default divorce paperwork (presumably that's covered in the service you paid for). If she agreed to the divorce and the courts knows that, then you file some more paperwork and she doesn't have to show up to anything. If she disagreed, there will be an "answer" and possibly a counterpetition. There is an exchange of paperwork w.r.t. assets, a mandatory mediation stage, more paperwork, disclosures etc. and a pre-trial conference, followed by a trial. If you are at this stage, attendance is mandatory. As long as you have proof of service, nobody requested a postponement, and there is some evidence to support your claim, a default judgment can be issued. It's not clear what "divorce proceeding" you are referring to that involves her attendance. However, you can file divorce paperwork yourself or using an online service, and using an online service does not render the paperwork illegitimate. It's not guaranteed that the service did what would be necessary for you to get the outcome you desire, but that's beyond the scope of what we can tell you. |
Is "constiption" a recognized legal concept? Quite a few questions have been asked about "constiption" on Law SE and other SE sites. Is "constiption" a real legal concept? | No This term appears to have originated from an anonymous user of this site. Constiption is not a recognized legal concept, nor is it an English word in any other context. All DuckDuckGo hits are either SE questions or misspellings of "constipation". | Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all "completely illegal" regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a "criminal conviction"). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been "decriminalised" - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority. | There is no "different legal procedure" for challenging the constitutionality of a law. The only way to do so is through the process that this question contemplates: to argue that the law is unconstitutional in a civil or criminal trial. Whether the law bears directly on the matter at trial or only on ancillary matters such as discovery, the court has the power to find the law unconstitutional and to issue orders accordingly. The extent to which such a ruling binds other courts depends on which court issues the ruling. | A statement cannot be libel unless it actually identifies the plaintiff to defame him. The identification need not be by name, but it must be specific enough that the public would be able to determine who the statement referred to. You can read more about this concept at Prof. Eugene Volokh on Libel Law Therefore, if nobody other than the plaintiff or defendant learned about the connection before the filing of the case or the publication of discovered emails, the original work of fiction was not a libel. And by telling everyone that the connection existed, yes, the plaintiff was impliedly consenting to any further alleged libel and it would be a defense from liability for the plaintiff. Furthermore, there wouldn't be libel unless whatever the fictional character did was untrue (something the real plaintiff didn't do) and the public would think that whatever the character did was actually an assertion that the real plaintiff did it. I could write a satire about a President Brock O'Bama who is actually a lizardman in disguise, and that's my First Amendment right, not a slander of the President. Disclaimer: only describing the common law and majority rules. State laws may differ. | Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability. | You sue the legal person One of the things that distinguishes legal personhood from other structures is the ability to sue and be sued. You can't sue a business name or a trust for example but you can sue a company. I have in fact been required to make adjudication decisions that I know will be unenforceable in court because the applicant named a trust rather than the trustee. | It's saying if part of the contract is found to be void or unenforceable, that the rest of it is still a contract. It's called severability. | Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz. |
Early Termination of Non Residential Florida Lease: Security Deposit A tenant enters into a 24 month non residential office lease, pays for months 1 though 5 and unilaterally indicates to move out in early month 7. The tenants move out at approximately 7.5 months. Assume: there is no provision in the lease for early termination the landlord does not agree to early termination there is no material breach of the contract other than tenant non payment the tenant has prepaid the last month's rent the tenant has a prepaid security deposit in the amount of 2 months rent the tenant returns the rental in perfect condition The tenant has effectively prepaid for 3 months of rent. In the absence of a provision for termination in the lease: Why should the landlord have cause to collect (keep the deposit): for month 6 and 7? for any months subsequent to month 7? if yes to subsequent, how many months? Months 8, 9, ... until new tenant is found? By moving out early without landlord agreement, did the tenant abandon month 24 and its corresponding payment? | The landlord is entitled to damages Damages under a contract are to restore the innocent party to the position they would have been in had the breach not occurred. This means the landlord is entitled to rental payments of a monthly basis for the balance of the lease. However, the landlord is also obliged to reasonably mitigate the damage, typically by finding a new tenant as soon as possible. Let’s make the example concrete. Let’s assume the rent is $1,000 per month and that there is no pro-rata clause in the contract (as is typical). That means whether the tenant uses 1 day or 31 days of a month, they owe a full month’s rent. When the tenant moves out, they owe $3,000 (plus interest). They also have an ongoing obligation to pay rent each subsequent month. This gives unmitigated damages of $17,000. The landlord spends $500 to clean and get the property ready to rent. $1,000 commission to the agent and $500 on advertising. After 2 months they find a tenant at $800 per month. Damages would be $3,000 for the unpaid rent, $2,000 for the out of pocket, $2,000 for the unoccupied months and 14 x $200 = $2,800 for the lower rent. So, $9,800. Typically, a security deposit can be put against unpaid rent but might not be allowed to be deducted for economic loss from a breach. | What the landlord is doing is forcing you to abide by the terms of your lease agreement. You most likely agreed to a 1 year lease on a signed document, which means you're pretty much screwed because if he wanted to, he could force you to fulfill the lease and pay him anyway. However, his remarks about when you can notify to terminate are wrong. See end of answer. About Terminating Your Lease Early However, there are a few loopholes you can exploit. The easiest one is to get him to increase your rent. Ask about it, tell him that you're considering staying but tell him you want to know if he's going to increase the rent by much. If he declares that he is going to increase the rent, perfect. Get him to send it to you in writing (which he is legally required to do). Just in case though, have him on speaker phone and record every conversation you have from now on without telling him. This is legal (see this answer) and is a powerful form of evidence, so exploit the hell out of it. If you can get him to tell you that he's going to increase your rent, then you can legally submit a notice to terminate tenancy on the grounds that you do not wish to pay the increase. In this case, the amount of notice that you have to give is capped to the day that the rent increase is to take place. If you try this, do everything you can to get it in writing. Don't feel proud of snaring him and immediately announce that you're leaving because of this as soon as he says it on the phone, because you're screwing yourself out of going through the proper channels to make sure you not only win, but you've made your case air tight. Also, feel free to let you landlord know that he owes you money. Landlords in Ontario have to repay you a capped interest rate on your last months' deposit every 12 months. This rate is decided annually and for 2015 is capped at 1.6%. If your landlord wants to be anal about the rules and stick the letter of the law to you, do it back. Becoming a pain your landlords ass is a great way to get them to either become more flexible, or make a mistake that will give you an out. Notice that if he does increase the rent, he can demand that you increase your last months deposit and force you to pay it. You could "accidently" make him aware of this right in a conversation where you are concerned about a rent increase immediately after letting him know that he owes you money for the interest. "I'm concerned about the rent increase because I have to increase my deposit by law too." This way, he'll hopefully have the thought "I can avoid having to give him any money by increasing his rent by the same interest rate, so he'll owe me what I owe him, therefore I owe nothing. I'm so smart!" Then he cheerfully gives you a notice to increase rent, at which time you invoke your right to terminate tenancy on short notice due to an increase in rent. Your Landlord Is Wrong All that aside, your landlord committed an illegal act when they refused your notice to terminate, because he's denying you your rights under the RTA. From the Residential Tenancies Act: A tenant may terminate a tenancy at the end of a period of the tenancy or at the end of the term of a tenancy for a fixed term by giving notice of termination to the landlord in accordance with section 44. 2006, c. 17, s. 47 The details adjust a little bit depending on your circumstances, but the conditions in section 44 are basically to ensure the following: You are giving 60 days notice. You are not giving 60 days notice where the termination date you provide is less than the previously agreed term, except in special cases like the one I mention about increased rent. There is nothing in section 44 that can be confused to mean that you must wait until you have passed the end of your term before you can decide to leave. I suspect your landlord is deliberately interpreting the use of wording like "may terminate at the end of" to imply you have to wait to give your notice. A notice of termination is not a termination. It is a notice that in the future, you are going to terminate. Let's remove the confusion by replacing the word "terminate" with "vacating the premises and not paying another cent". That should remove any ambiguity that could be abused. So frankly you can simply go straight to the board, file the appropriate form with them and just pack up and leave when you've reached the date specified in the notice to terminate. Your final month is covered by your deposit. File the form immediately, let them know about the conversation you had with your landlord, then go to your bank and cancel the cheques you've already written (except for your deposit cheque) and simply ignore the landlord, carrying on with your moving plans. You should ask the Board if this illegal act has any ramifications. Perhaps because he has done this, this gives you an immediate out or something else. Call the Board and tell them what happened and ask them. They have an obligation to inform you correctly. Sources: Landlord Tenant Board of Ontario FAQ Final Note The Board is there to serve you, free of charge. They have a duty, as it is their explicit directive, to assist you in all matters regarding being a tenant. Phone them, talk to them at length, demand assistance. They are to inform you of your rights and guide you on the appropriate action, forms and procedure to assist you in resolving any issues you have. Note that I wrote the whole bit about getting out of your lease early legally before I refreshed my memory on the fact that you can/should give your 60 days notice before the end of your lease period. That makes the case much simpler as a I note in my answer. I left the information I already wrote however because it could be applicable or at least be of some help to others. Also note that if you're saying that the landlord came to get more cheques on the basis of his lie that he used to refuse your attempt to legally leave, then you'll need to cancel those cheques. That costs money. That alone is enough of a case to take him before the Tribunal and force him to repay the cost of those cancelled cheques. You may even successfully claim further damages or the Tribunal may voluntarily award you money for the actions your landlord is deliberately taking to deprive you of your rights. Talk to the Board. | The usual default rule is that a purchaser is bound to honor a lease on the same terms as the previous owner, and that purchase agreements are subject to existing valid leases. However, the Ontario Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 (S.o. 2006, chapter 17) section 49 (2) says: If a landlord who is an owner as defined in clause (a) or (b) of the definition of “owner” in subsection 1 (1) of the Condominium Act, 1998 owns a unit, as defined in subsection 1 (1) of that Act, that is a rental unit and has entered into an agreement of purchase and sale of the unit, the landlord may, on behalf of the purchaser, give the tenant of the unit a notice terminating the tenancy, if the purchaser in good faith requires possession of the unit for the purpose of residential occupation by, (a) the purchaser; (b) the purchaser’s spouse; (c) a child or parent of the purchaser or the purchaser’s spouse; or (d) a person who provides or will provide care services to the purchaser, the purchaser’s spouse, or a child or parent of the purchaser or the purchaser’s spouse, if the person receiving the care services resides or will reside in the building, related group of buildings, mobile home park or land lease community in which the rental unit is located. 2006, c. 17, s. 49 (2). I take that to mean that IF the purchaser intends to reside in the unit (or have one of the people in (2)(a)-(d) reside there), then and only then, you can be given notice to leave. Acceding to par (3) of the same section the notice must be at least 60 days, and must be to the end of a rental period (probably a month), and that 60 days may not start until after the landlord has actually signed a sales agreement for the unit. And the landlord can only do this if the new owner has specifically indicated a requirement for possession of the unit as a residence, not to rent to someone else. You may want to seek out a tenants assistance organization, or possibly a lawyer, since it sounds as if the landlord is going beyond what the law permits. EDIT: As to showing the unit, section 26(3) of the same act provides that: Entry to show rental unit to prospective tenants (3) A landlord may enter the rental unit without written notice to show the unit to prospective tenants if, (a) the landlord and tenant have agreed that the tenancy will be terminated or one of them has given notice of termination to the other; (b) the landlord enters the unit between the hours of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.; and (c) before entering, the landlord informs or makes a reasonable effort to inform the tenant of the intention to do so. 2006, c. 17, s. 26 (3). and section 27 (2) and 27 (3) further provide that: (2) A landlord or, with the written authorization of a landlord, a broker or salesperson registered under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, may enter a rental unit in accordance with written notice given to the tenant at least 24 hours before the time of entry to allow a potential purchaser to view the rental unit. 2006, c. 17, s. 27 (2). (3) The written notice under subsection (1) or (2) shall specify the reason for entry, the day of entry and a time of entry between the hours of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. 2006, c. 17, s. 27 (3). So it seems that the landlord may show the unit to prospective purchasers during reasonable hours. However another provision says that the landlord may not interfere with your "quiet enjoyment" of the premises, so the frequency of showing probably must be reasonable. | No The tenant is liable if they break a contract: there is no contract here. One of the tests for a contract is that there is an offer that if accepted will create a clear, unambiguous contract. Looking at the enumerated facts: Alan advertises a room to rent in a joint tenancy property in which they are lead tenant - not an offer, this is an invitation to treat Zoe views the room and verbally expresses an interest in renting it - not an offer, this is the opening of negotiations Alan passes on Zoe's contact details to the estate agent - not an offer, this is communication between one party and their agent The estate agent contacts Zoe by email, providing a draft contract and asking for further information in order to complete her details - not an offer, the contract is a "draft" Zoe provides the requested details, again by email - not an offer, just a transfer of information The contract is drawn up and the estate agents inform both Alan and Zoe that it is ready to be signed - this is an offer A week later (having not yet signed), Zoe informs the estate agent that she no longer wants to take the room - ... that was not accepted Further, the tenant is liable if they are promissory estopped - they have withdrawn a promise made to a second party if the latter has reasonably relied on that promise. Zoe has made no promises other than one to negotiate - she has negotiated. | renting a single room with three other guys each renting their own rooms means exactly what it says. What you are paying for is that room, plus shared access to the common areas. Without knowing exactly what your lease says, especially with respect to the common areas, it's difficult to give a proper answer. I suspect that the lease for your room says nothing about who can live in the other rooms. Unless the lease says otherwise, the landlord has full control of the common areas. (Compare with a large apartment building, with hallways, stairwells, lobbies, etc., which must be maintained by the landlord.) This isn't an unusual arrangement, but I've never understood why anyone, landlord or tenant, would want it. There's far too much potential for conflict. You, yourself, could be a totally obnoxious person that the other three guys can't stand, but they'd have to put up with you. Their only alternatives are to move out or to ask the landlord to evict you. Moving out would be a lot of trouble for everyone. But, depending upon jurisdiction, as long as you're paying the rent on time and not causing damage to the property, eviction could be a very difficult and long process. And eviction is hardly in the landlord's interest. It costs a lot of money and time, and might not be granted even if she did apply. Why might a landlord spend so much time at the house they're renting? I'd be concerned about the implications of a woman going out of her way to do yoga in an area rented to four men. That is the part that sounds most strange in this situation. How do I resolve this? I'd start looking for a room somewhere else. | The terms of the lease are subject to Ohio's law. The only option for a tenant terminating a rental agreement is ORC 5321.07(B)(3), in response to failure to fulfill obligations under 5321.04. Those obligations relate to safety and health, keeping things in good working order, not abusing access and privacy rights. There is no obligation to make the tenant happy. As a general rule, when you sell real estate, rental agreements transfer from seller to buyer. If they did not, tenants could be evicted as trespassers or rents could be raised massively within the period of the lease. The tenant's obligation remains the same, and it has simply been transferred to another person. | Short Answer Typically, about four weeks in an uncontested case and six weeks in a contested case, although this depends to some extent upon how business the relevant courts are at the time. Long Answer The time limits break down as follows into different parts of the process: Minimum time from formally demanding possession to being legally allowed to bring suit in this situation. This is almost certainly set by statute. In Georgia, there is no waiting period for this part of the process when rent is not paid as agreed. A lawsuit can be filed the same day that a demand for possession is made by the landlord. OCGA § 44-7-50. The time from serving a lawsuit on the tenant to the time that the tenant is required to respond in court. This is almost certainly set by statute or court rule. In Georgia this is seven days from service of process. OCGA § 44-7-51. Georgia, like most states, allows "nail and mail" service by posting a notice on the premises and mailing a notice to the last known address of the tenant, after some reasonable effort has been made to personally service the tenant or any other adult resident, so this step will typically take about seven to ten days. The time from an appearance in court or court filing by the tenant objecting to the eviction to the time that a hearing is scheduled, in the event that the tenant raises an objection (which is easily done, even if there isn't ultimately a legally valid defense to raise). There may be a legal deadline for this in the statute or court rules, although it can usually be waived. This can also vary based on how many cases are pending relative to the number of available judges, something that usually varies seasonally. Georgia does not have a fixed time period for this step, but "Every effort should be made by the trial court to expedite a trial of the issues." OCGA § 44-7-53. The time from an order of eviction as the conclusion of an eviction hearing until the sheriff or marshall actually carries out the eviction that has been ordered by the court. This is almost never a matter of public record or a legal mandate, and it would typically vary seasonally and over the course of a month as the staff available to carry out evictions is pretty constant, but the demand for evictions has monthly peaks that flow from month end leases and rental payment due dates, and seasonally with the end of school years and the end of calendar years being particularly busy times when delays are greater. Sheriffs have also been known to intentionally stall in holiday seasons. This part of the process in Fulton County is set forth here. The total time is the sum of these four times. Most evictions lawyers in the area would know what is typical for (3) and (4) and would also have a good grasp of how likely it is for a tenant to assert a defense (if the tenant does not, part (3) is skipped and a default judgment for eviction is entered on the appearance date). In my area (in Colorado), (1) is three days, (3) is usually about two weeks and (4) is usually about one to three weeks, but as noted above, your experience in Atlanta, Georgia could easily vary based upon how busy the courts and the marshall are at that time. According to this website, in Georgia, it is customary to allow 3-10 days for step 1 even though it is not legally required, step 3 is typically one to two weeks, and step 4 is typically about two weeks. It is also possible to extent step 2 by one week from one week to two weeks with a procedural tool that most lawyers are aware of in Georgia. So, you are typically looking at about four weeks in an uncontested case and about six in a contested case from notice to actually having people removed. | There is nothing in that contract that says anything about 3 months notice period. The 3 months is the legal default for contracts that do not expire on their own, unlike yours, that has all properties of a limited time contract. I would personally see the detailed description of how you can end this contract as overriding any legal default. But as always, with this specific contract in the original language, you need to see a lawyer to know for sure. Your contract clearly states: you can leave your appartment whenever you want, even before the agreed upon time. If you leave between the 15th and the end of a month, you have to pay for that month in full. If you leave between the 1st and the 14th of the month, you have to pay the fair share of the rent for the days you where there. So for example, on a 30 day month if you lived there for 10 days, you still have to pay a third of the rent and the landlord will return the rest if you paid for the month in advance. If you live there for 16 days, you have to pay for the full month and nothing will be returned if you paid for the month in advance. Please note that you need to "hand over" the vacated rental object during normal business hours. So don't go in there on the evening of the 14th at 16:59. And don't try to "hand it over" when you haven't moved your stuff out yet. At the hand over, you give the keys to the landlord and that is it, it is the last thing you do. Very likely your landlord will want to have a look at the rental object while you are there, so they can make sure it is all in order, you did not damage it or did not leave any of your stuff. Generally speaking, there is nothing your landlord could do to you if you decide to leave early. They cannot make you leave even earlier or any other retaliatory shenanigans you may have heard of in other countries. In Germany, such contracts are not adversarial. You don't need to keep it a secret to the last second. If you know you want to leave on a certain date, inform your land lord, make an appointment for the "hand over" well in advance and save yourself (and them) all the stress from doing things last minute. |
When should a point of order be raised for an error by the chair in calling a vote? Under Robert's Rules of Order, if the chair does not follow proper procedure in calling a vote, but the error does not influence the outcome (e.g. it passes with such an overwhelming majority that it it clear that it would have still passed under proper procedure), should a point of order be raised as soon as the mistake happens or after the vote is over? | To be valid, a point of order generally needs to be made at the time of the possible Rules violation Exceptions are where the Rules violation violates the law, where it conflicts with a previously adopted motion (other than a motion to rescind that earlier motion), or where it violates a fundamental principle. Assuming your example doesn’t do any of those things, then the point of order is moot once the vote has been taken. | It doesn't really matter exactly what the judge says as long as it's clear whether the judge is sustaining or overruling the objection. With that said, in movies you'll rarely see the person asking the question get to respond to the objection, but you'll notice in the trial that happens in most cases. For example, if one party objects that a question calls for hearsay, the examiner may defend their question by pointing out that the statement is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, or that it falls into one of the hearsay exceptions. At that point the judge is responding to both parties and someone else or possibly multiple people have spoken since the objection was originally raised, so she might specify that she's "overruling the objection" as opposed to just saying overruled, so it just makes it clearer on the record what she's ruling about. It's worth noting as well that she might need to specify which objection she's sustaining if more than one objection is raised. In this trial both hearsay and relevance objections have been raised at the same time, and the judge might specify that she's sustaining e.g. only relevance. This can tell the examiner whether they are free to keep going down the same line of questioning with different questions, if the objection sustained was hearsay, or to move to another line of questioning, if the objection sustained was relevance. | The core principle of stare decisis is that the law should not depend on what judge you got; two cases with the same facts should have the same outcome. In the common-law tradition, there weren't really written statutes; there was only "what's been done in the past," and so the only reference you'd have to what the law should be in some situation is past court decisions. If judges didn't have some constraints to rule similarly to before, there really wouldn't be any legal standards (because there was no written law to go back to; in civil-law countries, there always has been a written law, so precedent isn't so important). Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent. However, judges are expected to obey precedent, and for the most part do what they're supposed to do. If they don't, the case will likely be reversed on appeal. Binding precedent only applies within the area a court serves; a court doesn't have to listen to precedent from a different court that has nothing to do with the case. The rule is that precedent from any court up the appeals chain is binding; federal district courts are bound by their circuit court and SCOTUS, state courts are bound by higher state courts and SCOTUS (but not other federal courts, as the case can't be appealed to them). A court can sometimes overrule its own precedent, but the cases where it can do that are rare (and so applying a higher court's precedent can also be viewed as "if you appeal to them they'll say X, so we're saying X.") | It is true that a shareholder who controls a majority of the votes can be quite powerful indeed. This is a somewhat murky area of the law, but in many cases, a majority shareholder has a fiduciary duty to do what is best for the corporation as a whole (not just the majority shareholder, but all shareholders), an obligation that logically parallels the obligation of the board of directors (which controls a corporation with much the same effect as a majority shareholder). In Delaware, where most large corporations are incorporated, a major shareholder or group of shareholders can have less than 50% of the vote can still be considered de facto majority shareholder if they have influence over the rest of the shareholders. Majority shareholders, either de jure or de facto, are required to act only with "entire fairness" to all the shareholders, and courts may invalidate or otherwise grant relief on transactions made by majority shareholders that are not fair to all shareholders. If a majority shareholder takes actions directly, it has the burden of proof in court to show that any actions taken accord with the "entire fairness" standard. A more in-depth discussion of these issues can be found in this article out of the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. | No, the result of an exam is not actionable. The court could only make a decision whether legal proceedings were met. However, the grader’s decision whether a particular answer (and thus the overall exam’s result) was correct or incorrect is not legal in nature. There is no German law saying “1 + 1 = 2”. Therefore, the court could not make a ruling on that, nor is it really their task to do so. Similarly, it is not the court’s (or the legal system’s) responsibility to ensure a certain share of students pass the exam. […] 93% not passing is just absurd. Welcome to Germany. Such exams did and do exist. I refer you to the local student’s body (specifically the Fachschaft). They will advocate for (future) students, especially if there are “design flaws” with the class to be found. Unfortunately, if it’s the “examiner’s fault”, there are no other options than finding an amicable solution. Sometimes, students change universities just to pass a certain module. | As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury. | The last part, about equal suffrage in the Senate, does not expire. The question is whether it can be itself amended out of existence. There has been no test of that possibility. This article argues that this may not be subject to amendment. There is only one way to find out for sure. The idea is that the original intent was that this is supposed to be an absolute clause, but of course that only speaks to original intention (and the original intention is not clear, as the article discusses). | As @DavidSupportsMonica says, you can't go back in time to fix the problem. As a rule regulators are more interested in obtaining compliance than throwing the book. There are no sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences, but most convictions lead to a fine. However HSE Policy is that enforcement should be proportionate to the degree of non-compliance and the level of risk created. 5.2 In our dealings with duty holders, we will ensure that our enforcement action is proportionate to the health and safety risks and to the seriousness of any breach of the law. This includes any actual or potential harm arising from any breach, and the economic impact of the action taken. 5.4 Applying the principle of proportionality means that our inspectors should take particular account of how far duty holders have fallen short of what the law requires and the extent of the risks created An annual inspection that was overdue by one day is a very minor failing, and the principle of proportionality means that you are most likely to get verbal advice not to let it happen again. You say "if anything happens", presumably meaning if there is an actual incident or serious risk, such as a fire or CO poisoning. Its true that in such a case they will certainly want to look at your records, but the proportionality rule still applies. They would need to be able to make a causal link between your failing and the actual incident to make any more of it, which wouldn't be the case here. |
Failing to return hired goods: criminal offence or civil matter? Meet Bob. Bob hired a TfL/Santander bicycle for £1.65/30minutes and lost it. Bob has presumably committed a breach of contract, but has he committed a criminal offence? Now meet Alice. Alice hired a car for £30/day from enterprise. She also loses it and fails to return it. Has she committed any criminal offence or are these situations purely civil wrongs? Does the answer change if it is a DVD from Blockbuster rather than a car or bicycle? | I cannot see any criminal offence with Bob losing a bike. It is, as far as I can see, purely contractual. According to TfL Santander Cycles Lost, stolen or faulty page: If your cycle is lost or stolen, call the Contact Centre on 0343 222 6666 (call charges may apply). We're open every day of the year. And: Charges for missing/damaged cycles You may be charged if the bike is not returned or is damaged by you or an additional user. Not returned: up to a maximum charge of £300 Damage: up to a maximum charge of £300 Similarly, purely losing a hire car is not a criminal offence. It would be a matter for the insurance provider to deal with. If Bob was complicit in theft, then that would require a different (and off-topic) answer. | I'm not a lawyer, but I am an NHS employee, and can more concretely answer your questions. Has any crime been committed, and if so, is there any point in pursuing this with the police? If so, how do I go about it? Yes, in-fact, several crimes have been committed. Firstly, NHS employees are prohibited from viewing patient's personal information that they are not specifically treating. In opening your letter from the NHS, the nurse in question violated this practice. It's a breach of both privacy and trust. This is taught at the NHS and the nurse would be aware of this. Secondly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse has committed workplace fraud. They have impersonated a patient, and in doing so, cost the NHS money and time it won't get back by cancelling your appointment. Again, this is also taught within the NHS, and the nurse would be aware of this too. Thirdly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse may have put a life in danger in doing so, which is effectively gross negligence at a minimum. Although this can be reported to the police, it'll be more effective to report it to the appropriate NHS bodies. Even if a crime has not been committed, I would think that at the very least, opening someone's mail and then impersonating them and cancelling the surgery would at least be viewed as unprofessional, especially for someone employed in the NHS. Is there a procedure for making a complaint against an NHS worker? There are several different approaches, given the various breaches of trust. As BlueDogRanch mentioned, you can file a compliant to NHS England, which includes via email. Be sure to get appropriate information like the nurse's name, address, and if possible any details (like appointment reference numbers) to aid the investigation. Secondly, because of the cost incurred via the malicious cancellation of an appointment, costing time and money (and running the risk of opening the NHS to litigation), you can also report the fraudulent aspects to the NHS Counter Fraud Authority. | Fraud may be a crime, or a tort (civil wrong): only criminal fraud can be a "felony". The Washington criminal laws about fraud are here, and they are all fairly specific, such as selling or destroying encumbered property (which is a misdemeanor anyhow), or conducting a mock auction. Most frauds are misdemeanors, though forgeries are in the felony category. It also includes identity thefts, again the emphasis being on false documents. Based on your description, this is not a crime, it is a civil wrong, meaning that she will have to sue the guy to get her money back. The Attorney General's office will not get involved unless there is a widespread state interest (for example, very many Washington residents being victimized), and then the involvement would be suing on behalf of the victims. That said, if the swindle was carried out by phone, then that is potentially a violation of a federal felony law, 18 USC 1343. It would not matter if the parties are in the same state, because phone service counts as "interstate commerce". So the details of phone involvement matter. Saying that you "have to" charge for processing a refund is not per se fraudulent and texting someone that "I'll have to charge an extra $2,000" doesn't make this wire fraud. But there is some potential for a federal wire fraud angle. | It is likely that the law applying will be both that of the USA and your country. If you went to court this would be one of the things you argued over. For example, Australian Consumer Law applies to any goods or services sold to a customer in Australia irrespective of where the vendor is located. Your jurisdiction may have similar laws. At first blush you must comply with the term of the contract preventing reverse engineering. They would be within their rights to terminate the licence if you don't. However, they probably have an obligation under your equivalent to the ACL to supply a product that: is merchantable is fit for purpose does what it says it will do If it doesn't then you have a right to terminate and get your money back, sue for damages and your country's government may prosecute. | Yes, but that doesn't make the theft not theft At the time of the crime, Joe committed theft. The state can prosecute Joe for that theft. Alice's subsequent gift does not change this although it would prevent her from suing for recovery. As a practical matter, if Alice was willing to lie and say that the gift preceded the theft or she had given permission for the item to be taken, this would almost surely create reasonable doubt in any prosecution. However, on a pure "these are the facts" basis, the theft is a theft. | The person getting the item by fraud didn't get any ownership. Therefore when you bought it, you didn't get ownership either. It's still the company's property, and they can do with it what they like (within reason, they wouldn't be allowed to make it blow up in your face). If you sent back the item, good on you, because the item is now with its rightful owner. If you don't like it, you can sue the person who sold the item to you. | You've already found an answer to the question about theft in the linked answer, that since they do not take the goods, nor even intend to take them away permanently there can be no consideration for theft here. There may be a case of criminal damage though, reading up on CPS website brings up some interesting points, notably: Damage is not defined by the Act and what constitutes damage is a matter of fact and degree. The courts have construed the term liberally and included damage that is not permanent such as smearing mud on the walls of a police cell. The damage need not be visible or tangible if it affects the value or performance of the property. It could be argued that by rearranging merchandise in a shop, with clear intent to disrupt its operation you are affecting the performance of the store, and that just may fall under criminal damage. Especially when done regularly, or in an organized way; something that demonstrably affects the business. Though in practice I doubt that anyone, besides the people "hiding" the papers, will care. Shelves in most newspaper stores are inspected and restocked multiple times a day, and as a part of normal customers routine stuff gets moved around and later corrected by staff. | This smells strongly of "bait and switch" fraud: offer a product at an attractive price, then "discover" that the product is not really available at that price. By that time the customer has sunk costs and is therefore willing to accept an alternative product with a lower quality or higher price than was originally promised. Looking at the homepage for ".club" it seems that they do indeed offer different prices for different names. I see "examples.club" listed at $101 while "model.club" is listed at $19,000. From your post it sounds like your hosting company have cancelled your purchase and will not actually charge you the higher fee. This is, as you say, a very dodgy practice. You might want to move to another company which is more up-front about unknown costs for such domains. If you have already paid the £7.99 then you are entitled to that money back. You do not have to accept a different name: that would be a classic bait-and-switch scam. They are NOT entitled to charge you a higher price unless you agree to it. If they won't return your money or try to charge you more then you should drop them like a hot brick and report them for fraud. Edit in response to question edit The situation is not clear-cut, and will probably depend on the exact wording in the company's terms and conditions to determine exactly when the contract was formed. An article about a similar case in The Telegraph had this to say: The legally binding contract is complete when a retailer accepts an order. However, acceptance does not necessarily happen at the point of order. Even the confirmation email may not be an acceptance. Some retailers reserve the right to cancel an order up to the point of delivery. It is therefore important to carefully check the retailer’s terms and conditions (which must be available on their website) and emails – if a retailer simply acknowledges an order, there may be no contract at that point. Lots of companies have T&Cs saying that there isn't a contract until they actually deliver the item, so if they don't deliver then they are not in breach of contract. The company may also be able to argue that its offered price was so grossly disproportionate that it was an obvious mistake and therefore they should not be held to it. UK contract law is based on the concept of a "meeting of minds" where two people have the same view of the contract and agree to it, but this is rather problematic when one of the minds was represented by a buggy computer. You might be able to counter this by showing that they are still doing it, and hence this is an ongoing business practice rather than an honest mistake. Ultimately your only options, assuming they decline to honour the purchase, are to either accept the refund or take them to court requesting an order of specific performance. |
Sitting in first class with a standard class ticket Sitting in first class with a standard class ticket Meet Bob. Bob purchased a ticket from Bristol to Exeter on a standard class seat. However, upon boarding the train he conveniently finds that the whole first class cabin is empty and helps himself to one of the plusher seats. What legal offence (s) has Bob committed, and why should he be forced to go back to the standard cabins? Is there any criminal offence? If the criminal offence is reliant on a civil wrong like breach of contract or such, must that in itself come with proof of actual damage or loss resulting from the breach? And if it is rooted in a civil contract term, then could those terms not be seen to be unfair and unenforceable as unduly benefiting the merchant with no discernible benefit at all to the consumer? Another line of thinking is that if Bob possesses some protected characteristic, the most obvious one being disability, less straightforward possibilities perhaps including race or others that are "disproportionately correlated" with having less money then perhaps the facts can be crammed into a frame in which the operator must prove that enforcing the wastage of these seats is a proportional means of achieving a reasonable aim (which cannot simply be limited to profit making). | This would be an offence under section 5(3)(a) of the Regulation of Railways Act 1889: (3) If any person— (a) Travels or attempts to travel on a railway without having previously paid his fare, and with intent to avoid payment thereof; ... he shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine ... The Crown Prosecution Service has a summary of transport offences, which says of the above offence: "Intent to avoid payment" does not require a dishonest intent, just an intent to avoid payment of the sum actually due: Browning v Floyd [1946] 2 All E.R. 367: where a man used the return portion of a non-transferable ticket given to him by his wife who had not used it, he was guilty of the offence and she was guilty of aiding and abetting him. In the case of travelling in first class on a standard ticket, you would be avoiding payment of the "sum actually due", since a first class ticket is more expensive. | All of this is illegal. You do not give a jurisdiction so I will use NSW, Australia as an example but many countries' laws have similar effect. Australian Consumer Law prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct: It is illegal for a business to engage in conduct that misleads or deceives or is likely to mislead or deceive consumers or other businesses. It doesn't matter that what you have said is strictly speaking factual - the way it has been said is likely to mislead or deceive. However, what you are proposing goes further and IMO crosses the line into fraud (s192E of the Crimes Act): 192E Fraud (1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly: (b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage, is guilty of the offence of fraud. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person’s obtaining of property belonging to another may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay for the property. In addition to the illegality, stealing other people's money is morally wrong by any reasonable standards of morality. | Not legal advice - you should consult an attorney who knows your local jurisdiction. That's a general statement, but especially true here because the GDPR does not include personal liability for directors (or others) in the event of a data breach, but domestic laws may indeed do just that. The UK is one example where certain circumstances can lead to criminal liability for directors of a firm in the event of a breach. That said, your company should care. The fines for knowingly allowing a breach or not reporting it properly in a timely manner have been made more significant than the prior Directive. There are things you could do to potentially mitigate consequences in the event of a breach and a fine being levied on the company, such as aligning with best practices and getting certifications. In sum, the actual punishments for noncompliance will vary by jurisdiction, but any business that handles data in the EU should undoubtedly be ensuring it is aware of what, if any, obligations it has and taking steps to comply before May's deadline. | UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence. | Neither The contract is completed when each party has totally fulfilled its obligations under the contract. In this case, it is when the purchaser has consumed or otherwise dealt with the banana to their satisfaction. The vendor has ongoing obligations under the contract until this happens. For example, obligations that the banana is of merchantable quality and fit for purpose. If the purchaser peels the banana and discovers that it is "off" or eats the banana and develops food poisoning then the vendor still has obligations and can be sued under the contract. Yes, I realize that no one is going to sue anyone over a rotten banana but let's assume that "banana" is code for 54km of motorway construction and £1 is actually £1 billion. When is the contract formed? This is not a trivial determination and there are literally hundreds of thousands if not millions of lawsuits that have turned on this exact question. Once the contract is formed its binding on both parties; until then, either can walk away (subject to estoppel) The traditional analysis involves offer and acceptance. In your banana scenario, the shop displaying "Banana's: 50p/each" (it's a fruit shop - they always have unnecessary apostrophes) is not an offer - it is an invitation to treat. An offer is made by Ben placing the banana on the counter and proffering the £1, it is accepted by Sam taking the £1. At this point, the sale is binding on both parties. Ben has fulfilled all his obligations under the contract, Sam still has some. In addition to those discussed above, he owes Ben 50p. Strictly speaking, this is not an obligation under the contract but a debt due and payable. Consumer protection law The proceeding is a strict contract law interpretation - many jurisdictions have consumer protection legislation (and food safety laws for bananas) that impose additional protections and may change the contract law position. | Do the police have to pay to fix your front door? If they took a year to analyse a mobile phone, can you claim due to the excessive amount of time it took? What if the device is returned broken, or wiped? What court costs can you recover? Can you recover loss of income? You've asked a few questions; I'll attempt to deal with them all, and I'll refer to each item as I do so. Damage to property This could apply to damage to property (items 1 and 3, which are more or less the same thing). The answer? The police may pay damages. Here's a recent example from 2008: Police in Britain paid out more than half a million pounds last year to repair doors, ceilings and even mantelpiece ornaments smashed in raids that were based on wrong information. ... The Home Office said that compensation policy was decided at force level but most police authorities draw tight legal lines round repayments. A spokesman for the Gwent force said: "The critical factor is simply whether forced entry is legal, proportionate and reasonable given the circumstances." Items seized as evidence In general, you are not entitled to compensation for an item that is seized for an extended duration of time (2). The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) ("PACE") states: (1) Subject to subsection (4) below, anything which has been seized by a constable or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20 above may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances. (4) Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose. If it's just the data on your phone they want, then they would be required by PACE to copy it and then return the device. Legal costs A successful defendant (4) is entitled to compensation in some cases, including costs incurred for expert witnesses. Schedule 7, para. 3 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 inserts additional provisions to the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985: (3)Condition A is that the accused is an individual and the order is made under— (a)section 16(1), (b)section 16(3), or (c)section 16(4)(a)(ii) or (iii) or (d). (4)Condition B is that the accused is an individual and the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in a court below which were— (a)proceedings in a magistrates’ court, or (b)proceedings on an appeal to the Crown Court under section 108 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (right of appeal against conviction or sentence). (5)Condition C is that the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in the Supreme Court. (10)In this section— “legal costs” means fees, charges, disbursements and other amounts payable in respect of advocacy services or litigation services including, in particular, expert witness costs; “advocacy services” means any services which it would be reasonable to expect a person who is exercising, or contemplating exercising, a right of audience in relation to any proceedings, or contemplated proceedings, to provide; “expert witness costs” means amounts payable in respect of the services of an expert witness, including amounts payable in connection with attendance by the witness at court or elsewhere; “litigation services” means any services which it would be reasonable to expect a person who is exercising, or contemplating exercising, a right to conduct litigation in relation to proceedings, or contemplated proceedings, to provide.” Basically, you can include the legal costs noted above: where the accused is an individual and the order is made under section 16(1), 16(3), or section 16(4)(a)(ii) or (iii) or (d) of the POA; where the accused is an individual and the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in a court below, which were either proceedings in a Magistrates Court, or proceedings on appeal to the Crown Court under Section 108 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 (right of appeal against conviction or sentence); or where the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in the Supreme Court; where the accused is an individual and the legal costs were incurred in relevant Crown court proceedings, as defined in POA s6A(11), and the Director of Legal Aid Casework has made a determination of financial ineligibility in relation to the accused and those proceedings (POA s16A(5A)). Compensation for loss of employment Loss of a job in and of itself is not generally grounds for compensation. What if you were arrested for some highly sought-after skill - say, computer vulnerability testing - and were acquitted by means of an affirmative defense? You might end up with a job that pays more. You are not entitled to any statutory relief. But, let's say it's something unflattering, and the police continued to broadcast your arrest and charges even though they were aware it was false. There's precedent for aggravated damages, as per Patel v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 645. In this case, the Claimant was stopped and searched upon entry to the UK. After being denied entry, the Claimant appealed the decision... the primary judge found that the immigration officers had falsified information pertaining to the Claimant's suitability to enter. Although this was appealed, I haven't been able to find the subsequent ruling; it's possible it was settled outside of court. However, this shows that judgement can - and has - been made against a defendant who causes pecuniary loss through malicious and contumelious conduct. I think I've covered everything, but it's hard to be sure. Consider your question into several separate questions in future :) | Does a situation like this constitute breach of contract and/or a violation of advertising laws? No. There is not enough information that would lead to a finding of either. It is unclear how customers would be allegedly affected (if at all) by the release of a product at a different store, let alone where the goods or services at issue are digital and require no physical presence at a venue or premise. Except for very specific factual circumstances, a change of sales venue would hardly be cognizable as deceptive or unfair practice. Also, prior to purchasing or reserving a game, there is no contract between the public and the developer/supplier. Potential customers typically are not entitled to a specific performance by the developer. Even if [Phoenix Point] supporters' decision were provably based on the prospect of release at Steam, your description nowhere reflects that there was a mutually conscious exchange (or promise of an exchange) of considerations involving the parties' support of a game and the counterparty's release of the game at a specific venue. Absent that meeting of the minds, either party's reliance or expectation on the other is irrelevant. Generally speaking, the sole cruciality of either party's motives does not create legal obligations. | The judgement actually gives reasons: The criminal law insists that every person driving a car must attain an objective standard measured by a skilled, experienced and careful driver. That is shown by McCrone v Riding ... the standard is an objective standard, impersonal and universal, fixed in relation to the safety of other users of the highway. It is in no way related to the degree of proficiency or degree of experience attained by the driver. And the judgement goes on to quote R v Evans [1962] 3 All ER 1088: if a man in fact adopts a manner of driving which the jury think was dangerous to other road users in all the circumstances, then on the issue of guilt it matters not whether he was deliberately reckless, careless, momentarily inattentive or even doing his incompetent best. [Such considerations are] highly relevant if it ever comes to sentence. Primarily, it is to protect other road users. It is only on the matter of guilt that skill and experience are irrelevant. When it comes to sentencing, it may be a factor. And, if I might add my own interpretation, part of the reason that the skill of the driver is irrelevant is that the other users of the road cannot know whether a driver is skilled and experienced - they must therefore be able to expect this, and the law reflects this expectation. As much as we complain about other road users, we only complain because we expect them to meet a certain standard - we most likely would not complain if we truly expected them to be incompetent. |
How do email delivery services store users' email addresses in a GDPR compliant way? Mailchimp, Twilio, Hubspot and other services provide apis to save lists of email-addresses and send them emails (marketing, technical, etc.). Even if a user asked to unsubscribe, those services will keep his email address in an "Unsubscribed Users" list. Anonymous users can also visit all kind of marketing websites, and fill other people's email addresses. In this case the "Unsubscribed Users" list is important, because if the email-address had been deleted completely, entering the victim's email-address again would re-add it to the marketing lists. How are these services compliant with GDPR and other regulations? They do keep email addresses of users that requested to unsubscribe, and those lists can even belong the EU citizens and maintained in remote locations (outside the EU). What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Thanks! | GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls. | This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy. | If you can’t stand the heat, get out of the kitchen The thrust of this question, as well as many others you have posted, seems to be looking for a way of avoiding your obligations under the GDPR because they are difficult, onerous and/or expensive. Too bad! You don’t have the option of which laws you comply with and which ones you don’t. If I had my choice, I’d comply with the GDPR and not with tax law, but I don’t so I can’t. You have 3 simple choices: Do your best and insure the rest. This means learning what’s required and implementing it to the best of your ability and taking out appropriate insurance cover to deal with any mistakes you make. Ignore the law and hope you don’t get caught. Don’t release apps. | The status of any PII (Personally Identifiable Information) is the same in GDPR regardless of location, or who enters it. Its goals are (among others) to stop any actor (company / government or other) from hiding responsibility about their use and practices around people's data. GDPR does even apply to anything offline and on paper. Basically it means you have to validate any entry field is free of PII before processing it. Or make it clear in your privacy statement how you handle this use-case. | I believe in this case, your company (OrgX) is a data processor and your customer's organization (OrgY) is the data controller. OrgY is responsible for establishing a lawful basis for sending you (OrgX) the personal data for their employees. Note that consent is just one of six lawful bases outlined in article 6(1). I'm no expert, but I believe OrgY's admin can claim they have a legitimate interest in sending their employee's personal data for training sake. In either case, the data processor is not responsible for establishing the lawful basis for processing. Of course, data processors aren't completely off the hook. GDPR outlines specific requirements for data processors (see chapter 4, particularly article 28). | The GDPR does indeed require that the password be stored "securely". It does not specify the technology which must be used for that purpose. Hashing the PW is a common method, and should be sufficient if properly implemented (strong hash function, use of salt, etc). But other methods of securing the password might be sufficient. Encrypting the PW rather than hashing it, so that an authorized person could decrypt it temporarily might be OK. Or perhaps a security app can separately retrieve only the specified characters of the PW through some sort of encryption. Or perhaps the ISP is not using proper security. In the case of Knuddles in the linked news story, an actual breach occurred which led to the poor security being reported. You could send a report to the appropriate national Data Protection Authority. | The CEO wants to "fool" users You are essentially admitting that the company you are working for is about to deceit its customers and asking whether that is legal. The relevant set of laws is rather sparse and does not give direct answers in regards to oAuth tokens or other details of that level (which is probably making your CEO think he can "handle" the arising questions). Probably the most relevant bit of legislation that applies here is The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to online privacy and data security policies. I am pretty sure that, in practice, if the users take your company to court, it will be held liable because: users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? While the users are still allowing you to read their data it is completely up to the Terms/EULA what you can do with it. However, once you have made the users think that they have withdrawn your access (e.g. they "deleted" oAuth tokens), you are no longer authorized to read the current data (although the Terms may still allow you to use the old data you obtained when you had access). Silently continuing to access their data without their knowledge/approval is definitely a deceit. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database There would be nothing wrong with that if it was in the Terms. But if it is not, that would be a blatant (and easily punishable) breach of privacy. Note that you may also be held personally liable for this wrongdoing (if/when proved so). "Just doing your job" claim will not work. | Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people. |
If I quit, can my employer claim back pay that was agreed to but not included in our written contract? About a year ago I started a job, my contract for it says: Pay and Expenses The Employee will be paid £9/hr in arrears. Salary may be increased at the direction of The Employer subject to The Employee taking on additional responsibility which is agreed upon by both parties. Overpayments If the Employer makes an overpayment to the Employee to which she is not entitled, or which is more than that to which she is entitled, the Employer has the right to recover the overpayment by deductions from the Employee's salary or from other payments due to them. Any deductions will normally be made over the same period that the overpayment was made. Notice of termination The Employee is obliged to give the Employer 4 weeks notice to terminate their contract of employment. A couple of months into the job my employer thought I was planning to quit and as they didn't want me to I was able to negotiate a pay increase to £11/hr, and my employer asked that if he gave me a new contract with this pay increase would I agree to work there for 2 years. At the time I said yes however no written contract containing our agreement was produced, so the only documents I have are my original contract, my pay however did go up. Now however due to a change in circumstances I would like to quit and I'm wondering if my employer could reclaim all the additional pay they have given me over the months if I do. | I see that most (all up to this point) answers and comments are made around if a verbal contract is binding enough for the employer to "pursue back" the extra payment that you received... but as far as I can see, they don't even need to consider the verbal agreement. Your employer thought (and apparently was right) that you were going to resign, so they offered you a payment raise in exchange for you to stay for two more years. You verbally agreed but this agreement was never written down nor signed by any of the parts, yet your employer respected it and for X amount of time you received more money that what your initial, written, signed contract says. Now you want to quit; as mentioned above, you only have your original contract, a contract that says two things that are key for this "dilemma": The Employee will be paid £9/hr in arrears. Salary may be increased at the direction of The Employer subject to The Employee taking on additional responsibility which is agreed upon by both parties. If the Employer makes an overpayment to the Employee to which she is not entitled, or which is more than that to which she is entitled, the Employer has the right to recover the overpayment by deductions from the Employee's salary or from other payments due to them. You received payments for £11/hr, which is more that that to which you're entitled according to this (one and only) contract; so, your employer has the right to claim back those £2/hr that, officially, you were not entitled to. IF you want to argue that, as the 1st point says, both parties agreed to increase your salary for "additional responsibilities", YOU would also have to admit that you agreed to stay for two more years, agreement that you are not complying to; so, once again, it's a point in favour for your employer. All in all, it all boils down to how your employeer "feels" when you present your resign letter; maybe they will just agree and let you go without further issues, but if they want to claim back that payment raise, IMO they have both the right AND the arguments to do so. | No employer has ever the right to withhold your pay check for work you have done. It is strictly illegal. Even if they had 100% evidence that you caused damage and were responsible for that damage, they still can't withhold your pay. They have to pay you, and then they can try to take you to court. The reason for this law is exactly cases like yours, where people try to avoid payment. If the "powerful attorney" tells you that you are not getting paid, then that "powerful attorney" is making a big mistake, because any lawyer would love to take your case to court and see the judge cutting the "powerful attorney" down to size. If you don't want a lawyer now, then you can write a letter by registered mail telling them that you worked for them, how much the payment due is, that they are legally required to make that payment, and that you will take them to court if they are not paying. If there is a conflict between law and a "powerful attorney", the law wins, and the law is on your side. | Does it matter whether employer is company or individual? No. Must certain amount of notice be given? Yes - the notice period maybe specified in the contract but even if it isn't there are statutory notice periods that apply depending on length of employment etc. So if the following criteria are met they are legally classed as an employee they have worked for the employer for at least a month Then certain minimums apply: If they have worked for the employer for: 1 month to 2 years – statutory notice is 1 week 2 to 12 years – statutory notice is 1 week for each full year they have worked 12 years or more – statutory notice is 12 weeks A notice period in the contract (i.e. "contractual notice") can exceed the statutory minimums but it can't reduce them. What other requirements are there that must be followed? This is pretty broad and I don't really want to reproduce everything here but the ACAS page on dismissals covers the basics. Can notice be dispensed if the task is of an urgent nature and employee must be replaced as a matter of urgency? Dismissal without notice is possible in cases of Gross Misconduct but that is about what the employee has done - nothing to do with the urgency of replacing them. However, if both parties agree a notice period can end early: The employee can ask if they can leave before their notice period ends. They should get agreement from their employer in writing. If the employee does not get agreement to leave early they could be in breach of contract. If the employee leaves early, the employer only has to pay them for the time that they’ve worked. If an employer wants them gone immediately they can do that if it's either in the contract but they still have to pay them for the notice period. They can also offer payment in lieu of notice if it's not in the contract but it's then up to the employee if they agree. | They have exactly zero legal grounds to withhold your last paycheck. From Code of Virginia 40.1: All employers operating a business shall establish regular pay periods and rates of pay for employees except executive personnel. All such employers shall pay salaried employees at least once each month and employees paid on an hourly rate at least once every two weeks or twice in each month, except that (i) a student who is currently enrolled in a work-study program or its equivalent administered by any secondary school, institution of higher education or trade school, and (ii) employees whose weekly wages total more than 150 percent of the average weekly wage of the Commonwealth as defined in § 65.2-500, upon agreement by each affected employee, may be paid once each month if the institution or employer so chooses. Upon termination of employment an employee shall be paid all wages or salaries due him for work performed prior thereto; such payment shall be made on or before the date on which he would have been paid for such work had his employment not been terminated. The Virginia Department of Labor and Industry unfortunately does not take claims if there is a written contract and recommends you pursue the matter in court. You may want to consult with a local labor attorney to get an idea of where to go from here, even if you plan to file in small claims court. Virginia extortion law doesn't appear to apply to withholding stolen property, but their claim that release of the last paycheck is consideration for signing the NDA may be some other civil wrong, like conversion. I do not know whether you could recover damages above the wage owed for that. | It is not uncommon for an employer to ask a former employee to assist with something as a courtesy, and sometimes the former employee will choose to do so. If it requires more than a small amount of time, this may be done under a short-term consulting contract for pay. But unless there was a contract of employment requiring such post-employment advice, there is no legal obligation for the former employee to provide such assistance. The most the former employer could do is give a poor reference if asked by potential future employers, and most large corporate employers now only give job title, salary range, and dates of employment to avoid claims of incorrect or defamatory statements in such references. | How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management. | Yes, it also applies. However, an employment implies they agree to having employment related data stored and processed (e.g., to be paid). When there are performance related bonuses in the contract, this will likely (but IANAL) imply they agree to performance data being collected and stored appropriately. Furthermore I would assume most of such data processing (such as knowing who is responsible for a certain change, who created a file, modified it etc.) falls into "legitimate interests" of the employer, as this information may be necessary for operations. I'd assume (still IANAL) that much of the consequence wrt. GDPR is the right to have your data erased. So a company should be prepared to remove such data when an employee leaves the company, e.g., by clearing the responsible person fields upon request. At least for data where there is no legal requirement to have such data provenance. But: consult your lawyer for a proper legal opinion! | Can my accountant bill me for previous work he agreed to perform for free? No. The difficult part will be for you to prove that he agreed to do the job for free. Hence the importance of having this kind of "gentlemen's" agreements in writing. You have the burden of outweighing --even by means of circumstantial evidence-- the common presumption that professional work is done for compensation, not for free. However, just like it might be hard for you to prove the aforementioned "gentlemen's agreement", it would also be hard for him to prove that you agreed to (or knew, or should have known, you would have to) pay the amount he is billing now. In the event that you are unable to prove he agreed to work for free, you might want to dispute the reasonableness of the amounts he is pursuing so belatedly. It is noteworthy that the work at issue being "really simple" would not be the only factor for assessing how much he may recover. Other factors such as the accountant's qualifications or the market rate for similar services would be weighed in awarding recovery (if any). Can I legally ignore these invoices? It does not make any sense that he sends me invoices for work done 4 years ago. You may ignore the invoices regarding older work, that is, those for which the period of limitations has elapsed. For most cases, section 4 of the Ontario Limitations Act provides a two-year period to bring a claim. Since the accountant himself did the job, and most likely he was --or should have been-- aware of the payments due for his services, he would be unable to prove that his "discovery" of claims (see section 5 of Limitations Act) regarding older tax filings meets the period of limitations. Equivalently, see here the paragraph starting with "For example, if the courts determine that [...]". |
Why doesn't law take into account probability? My question is based on my layman understanding, I'm not in law When I think of "[damages]"* I think of "what is the expected liability from an interaction," as opposed to "what is the real damage of an interaction." For example, let's say you get into a car crash (that was not your fault) but do not sustain injuries. Why can't you sue for potential injuries that might have occurred based on probability, despite the fact that you did not sustain injuries? Another example, let's say you almost get run over by a car, but don't. There was a very real probability that you may have been runover in that scenario, but you didn't. Why isn't there some civil repercussions for that? Maybe there is, but my understanding is that most law does not incorporate probability. * The original question included the word "[s]tanding" here which was not the proper term. | [L]et's say you almost get run over by a car[; t]here was a very real probability that you may have been runover […], but you didn't. Why isn't there some civil repercussions for that? Construing the first question broadly, and in line with the one reading "[w]hy isn't there some civil repercussions for [a missed although very real probability of a car run-over]?", the question is, admittedly, based on a few incorrect premises. There are "repercussion" some of them being of criminal nature (reckless driving, vehicular assault etc.), and others may become of civil nature as follows: Common law tort of negligence — Mere threat of harm can be harm for purposes of damages "“When there is a breach of duty, "a person who is in the path of negligent conduct and reasonably fears for his or her own safety may recover for resulting emotional distress." In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, Cal., 973 F.2d 1490, 1493 (9th Cir. 1992). ” […] See Potter, 863 P.2d at 833 (George, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing hypothetical pedestrian narrowly avoiding speeding car and indicating that threat of injury is the relevant issue); Wooden v. Raveling, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891, 897-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Potter hypothetical and holding plaintiff was not precluded from relief simply because car did not actually hit her) (Taylor v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 599 F. App'x 664, 2) (bold type added) Accordingly, broadly construing the question so as to effect the greatest scope of the spotting of damages, one may sue, although not for injuries per se, but instead damages under an emotional distress legal theory and its particular categories like anxiety, depression, recurring nightmares, sleeplessness, anger, angst etc. depending on the actual facts of the case, and typically supported by expert testimony when possible. Strictly construing the question, the mere possibility or even probability of injuries do not merit a cause of action for damages in and of themselves, as such damages never occurred. It may be possible that in certain scenarios the mere possibility is so outrageous that it exceeds all bounds of a civilized society, that nominal damages, say, of $1 are awarded and punitive damages are awarded so as to deter such conduct, but even in that case such a hypothetical case the cause of action will not be the damages under a personal injury tort, but one for nominal damages and for punitive damages even if the factual underpinnings are the same. Standing Standing is one's positive relation to at least one event that is the basis of a legal proceeding in a court, that is, one being the presumptive subject of some sort of wrongdoing that merits their recognition as a party to a legal proceeding. The term there would have been "damages" instead of standing. Why doesn't law take into account probability? It does. Rarely enumerated probabilities other than in case of the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof where the quality of the evidence must weigh in favor of the one who has the burden of proof, in other words the fact finders job is to decide whether something is greater or smaller than 50 percent probability. Although it is rather the exception than the rule, probabilities other than the greater-than-50-percent standard also appear here an there in the judicial process, for example, in asylum cases “"[t]o effect a well-founded fear [from persecution so as will constitute protected for purposes of U.S. asylee or refugee status], a threat need not be statistically more than fifty-percent likely [to have been made; however,] the [U.S.] Supreme Court has suggested that even a one-tenth possibility of persecution might effect a well-founded fear." Lim,224 F.3d at 934-935 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421, 430, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). Kaiser v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2004) (see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, [“ "Let us ... presume that it is known that in the applicant's country of origin every tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some remote labor camp.... In such a case it would be only too apparent that anyone who has managed to escape from the country in question will have 'well-founded fear of being persecuted' upon his eventual return”]) In less enumerated forms many other aspects of the judicial process rely on probabilities. | In the US it's very simple: How does the party that makes the lawsuit get the money in this scenario? They don't. Winning a lawsuit against a person is a legal confirmation that they really do owe you the money. It also gives you the ability to do certain things to try to collect: you could seize their assets or garnish their wages. If they don't have any assets or any income then you are out of luck. You can't take what doesn't exist. As the saying goes, "you can't squeeze blood from a turnip". A bit of legal jargon sometimes used here is to say that such a defendant is judgment proof. Even if you win a lawsuit against them, it won't do you any good, because they just don't have any money. If the person cannot pay it off, does it transfer over to their relatives? No. People are not responsible for the debts of their relatives. | united-states You may be confusing the right to an attorney if you cannot afford one that is applicable only in CRIMINAL cases, not civil cases like you are discussing. You may be able to get an attorney to take your case on a contingency basis but there are two things to keep in mind: The attorney has to have some expectation that the case is winnable. The amount to be recovered must be worth the risk of taking on this case. In other words, for the attorney it's more of a business question that a legal one. Many attorneys will give you a free 30 minute, more or less, consultation. Perhaps you might give that a try. | Doing nothing is legally safer than doing something, but you're not without hope if you pull the lever. Although you'll likely have committed murder or at least manslaughter, case law is littered with lenience in exigent circumstances, even where convictions have been affirmed. Because this is a philosophical problem, there are plenty of opinions from that perspective, but not so many from a legal standpoint. Let's assume that you're an innocent bystander, (not an employee of the railway company or the train company, etc) and have no duty to act. If you do nothing, then it is unlikely that you would be charged with a crime - you had no duty to fulfill, and therefore not negligent. There's little doubt that not pulling the lever is the safer option. More interesting is when you choose to pull the lever - then it's probable that you would have charges of murder, or at least manslaughter, brought against you by the state. What defenses does the law offer? Let's assume that you are aware that pulling the lever will kill a person. The primary defence is a legal principle of necessity: where your criminal actions are not protected or excluded by some other statute or principle, the fact that you were obliged to take this action in order to prevent some greater harm may safeguard you from penalties. There are certain elements of necessity: That you did not create the danger that caused you to commit the crime; That you ceased the criminal activity as soon as practicably possible; That you had no reasonable alternative; and The harm that you prevented was greater than the harm that you caused. I see such a defense only possibly falling over on (4), where the prevented and caused harm, in the case of human lives, are inherently very subjective. Unfortunately, each state has different rulings regarding the threshold for evidence of this defense. One of the most famous cases where necessity was attempted as a defense to murder, with remarkable parallels to this hypothetical, is that of R v Dudley and Stephens: A crew of four found themselves on a lifeboat at sea with no food and no water, and with no prospect of rescue. One of them was a child (Parker) and was nearing death and unconscious. Two of them (Dudley and Stephens), after some discussion over drawing lots, decided that the child would be killed before his natural death, in order that his blood be better preserved for drinking. The last crew member, Brooks, was silent on the matter. After killing Parker, Dudley, Stephens and Brooks fed on Parker's body. During the trial, the matter of necessity as a defense to murder was considered. The judges found that there was no common law defence of necessity to murder, and Dudley and Stephens were sentenced to death with a recommendation for mercy. The Home Secretary commuted their sentences to six months' imprisonment. This case concerns essentially the choice you're making in the trolley problem: either the four crew members were going to die, or one of them would definitely die and the others might live. It's easy to say that they should have just waited, but they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. It's also a great example of a situation where although the law says one thing, it doesn't align with our morals and ethics, and while it's a UK case, I would wager that almost every lawyer in common law countries would have heard about it. | You always run some legal risk when you drive. As long as you are insured (you have a card in your hand) and you have permission to drive the car, it does not matter who owns the car. There is a difference between the legal minimum insurance coverage and actually adequate coverage, and since you are not getting separate insurance where control the insurance levels, you theoretically run some liability risk if you have an accident and the coverage is less than the damages (insurance doesn't mean that the other guy can't take you to court for the rest of the amount). There is also a risk that the housemate will do something crazy like cancel the insurance coverage for you, or report the car stolen, so you have to decide how worried you are about that possibility. | What you are talking about here is the tort of negligent misstatement, a subset of the tort of negligence. First, there is no presumption in any jurisdiction that I am aware of that anyone is or is not a lawyer (or doctor, or engineer etc.). If people knew that you were, however, then it is reasonable that they would give your statements more weight then if they did not know. It may also be reasonable if they suspected you were. The practical purpose of such a disclaimer is to ensure that they know you aren't. For the specific facts you give, you would certainly be in a better position if you said: "But I'm not a lawyer, so you should seek professional advice"; not so much because you told them you weren't a lawyer but rather because this changes your advice to "seek professional advice". It's impossible to be wrong with that advice! The standard form in Australia is: "this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice". If the statement is limited to "I'm not a lawyer" or if your neighbour knew you were, for instance, a dog catcher with no professional qualifications, then you could still potentially be liable. Your neighbour would need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; by giving advice you potentially do, however, a for negligent misstatement there must be a 'special relationship' [Hawkins V Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539, MLC Assurance V Evatt]. You breached that duty; the advice given was "unreasonable". There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your advice there would have been no loss. There was a legal (proximate) cause; damage to the neighbour as a result of the advice must be foreseeable. Harm; the neighbour must suffer real loss. The main point of the disclaimers is on the 2nd point: what is "unreasonable" for a professional is different than for a "lay person". Oh, and by the way: this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice. | The mechanic could be held liable, indeed this attorney explains what you have to prove in exactly this case (not necessarily involving a million dollar car). The mechanic was negligent in diagnosing and repairing the brakes. You then have to prove that you mad the mechanic service the brakes (receipts / invoices). You need an attorney to figure out exactly why the brakes failed – maybe he messed up reassembling the brakes, maybe the brakes were defective (product liability) and he was negligent in detecting the defect – then the manufacturer is also liable, and it becomes an issue of what percentage of blame goes to each person. This doesn't mean that you are off the hook, because you still might have taken action to avoid the collision (emergency brake? steer to the right? how fast were you driving, how close were you following?). | Civil claims have statutes of limitations too Usually shorter than 10 years. Therefore, Bob cannot sue anyone for recovery and therefore does not practically own the bike. In some jurisdictions, limitations acts make it explicit that Bob loses title to the goods meaning he doesn’t own the bike de jure as well as de facto. It’s not possible to say what a “typical” limitation period is but periods above 10 years typically only apply to actions on real property (land) not personal property (bike). However, that just begs the question. The criminal limitation is irrelevant to the civil action They are completely independent so whether a criminal action has happened, is in progress or can’t happen doesn’t affect the civil action. Bob doesn’t need the information The person who has the bike may or may not be the one who converted it: Bob doesn’t care because they are presently the one detaining it. So Bob sues for detinue: you have it, it’s mine, give it back, or, give me monetary compensation. Whether the person who has it acquired it lawfully or not is a matter of complete indifference to Bob. If they did acquire it lawfully then they have a breach of contract cause of action against the person who sold them goods without good title. But that’s their problem, not Bob’s. |
If I ask my doctor to order a blood test, can they refuse? In New York, USA, If I go to my doctor's office and request that they order a specific blood test for me, can they refuse? Is there anything in HIPAA (or other laws) that compels a medical professional to order a test that has been requested by their patient? | There is no such legal requirement coming from federal or NY state law. Doctors can refuse treatment when the patient is abusive or the matter is outside the scope of their practice, and that can include a test which requires skills, equipment or a contractual relationship that they don't have. Also if a procedure conflicts with their professional duties (that is a large loophole), they do not have to perform a requested service: an example is prescribing antibiotics for a viral infection. There is also a federal regulation known as the conscience rule which is conceivably applicable. If the test is medically unnecessary (e.g. a covid antibody test "just for the heck of it") it would be illegal for the physician to perform the test and bill the insurance, though not illegal to do the test and have the patient pay, unless their agreement with the insurance company precludes any and all unnecessary treatments (regardless of whether the patient pays). That is, you cannot compel the doctor to breach his contract with the insurance company. If they do perform the test, then according to HIPAA, they have to tell you the results. | When you refer to customs, that necessarily denotes travel to a foreign county, such that each county will have their own laws, rules, and regulations that govern these issues. It is more than likely that if you refuse to answer the questions of customs officials in ANY country, you will be denied admittance. The same is true if you refuse or balk at being searched (personally or your possessions), and keep in mind that this is without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The best thing to do is to answer the questions honestly and accurately, but also as narrowly as possible to completely answer. Trying to argue with them will only send up red flags and you will be there longer. Remember it is a privilege, not a right, to enter a sovereign nation of which you are not a citizen. For example, in the U.S., customs reserves the right to detain for questioning, search you, your car, your children, your bags, packages, purse/wallet, or any other travel item with full legal authority to do sol they can even examine your electronics (content and hardware). You place your stuff on the exam station and open it. (After the exam is completed, you will be asked to repack and close the baggage.) If you are unhappy with the way you are being treated, you do have the right to ask to speak to a CBP supervisor, but I cannot see anything good coming of it, unless they were super rude without provocation or broke something of value. The authority to delay and speak with travelers derives from the United States Code (section citations below) enables CBP to prevent the entry of persons who are inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and to prevent the smuggling of merchandise, including narcotics and other contraband items, into the United States. Speaking with travelers and examining merchandise coming into or leaving the United States is just one of the mechanisms used to identify illegal or prohibited items, and to determine whether or not someone is trying to enter the U.S. for unlawful or fraudulent purposes. Unless exempt by diplomatic status, all travelers entering the United States, including U.S. citizens, are subjected to routine Customs examinations. At times, people make the mistake of thinking their civil rights are being violated by being asked questions about their trip, personal background and history, etc. That is not the case. Supreme Court decisions have upheld the doctrine that CBP's search authority is unique and does not violate the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Customs website has a detailed Q&A section. Most modern countries do as well. | Without the patient's permission, the doctor cannot legally share the patient's health information with the patient's employer. Your Rights Under HIPAA: [...] without your authorization, your provider generally cannot [...] give your information to your employer Remedies for confidentiality violations include civil actions, administrative fines, and criminal charges. (Remedies for Violation of HIPAA Privacy Rights and Medical Confidentiality, HIPAA Violations and Enforcement, What is the Penalty for a HIPAA Violation) Individual states also have confidentiality laws that are violated by the hypothetical in the question. | You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives. | The rule applies to "A covered entity or business associate", who may not "use or disclose protected health information" except as permitted. The set of covered entities and business associates is pretty large, and certainly covers nurses, also secretaries working for the hospital or insurance company. It is not restricted to the doctor-patient relationship. However, the restriction is not absolute: a patient can consent to the disclosure of such information: but, the consent must be written. This raises an interpretive challenge, in case patient A reveals a medical fact to a friend B who happens to be a medical professional. Person B probably is a "covered entity", since they are undoubtedly A health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter. The information also is "protected": Protected health information means individually identifiable health information: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, that is: (i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii) Maintained in electronic media; or (iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium. (2) Protected health information excludes individually identifiable health information: (i) In education records covered by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii) In records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); (iii) In employment records held by a covered entity in its role as employer; and (iv) Regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50 years. Para 5 on prohibited uses and disclosures explicitly lists the prohibited disclosures (genetic information for insurance underwriting, sale of PHI), so idle gossip is not explicitly prohibited. It is also not explicitly allowed. But again, the regulation says: may not use or disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by this subpart Nothing in the rules limits the obligation of a "covered entity", in terms of how they came to be in possession of PHI. Given the definition of "covered entity", the fact of being a covered entity is a property does not depend on obtaining information electronically. So without written consent, B who is a covered entity cannot gossip about A's medical status. | united-states Speed limits can be enforced by any means (except photo-radar) in most U.S. jurisdictions without notice that it is being used. Those laws are close to being uniform in the U.S. due to federal coordination on federally funded roads, even though state and local laws are what governs them directly. Some U.S. jurisdictions prohibit the issuance of photo-radar speeding tickets without notice before entering the photo-radar picture taking zone. I'd have to research further to see if New York City does. The purpose of the language on the sign is to make drivers more fearful of being caught in circumstances where they don't see someone trying to enforce the law, not to have greater legal effect. | There are no legal requirements for official certification of BSL-1 and BSL-2 laboratories in the US. There are legal requirements for higher-level labs that deal with Select Agents. The CDC has a page on certification laws and regulations, which is "about" samples derived from the human body. Organizations (such as universities) have offices that perform inspections and approve (or not) a particular laboratory, by reference to standard professional guidelines. This is, of course, different from the situation in Europe. There may be state-level legal requirements. | It's probably not unlawful to ask, but an answer cannot be required immediately. Per the Department of Labor, Susan has 60 days to elect COBRA coverage (the qualifying event here being the termination of Susan's employment): Your plan must give you at least 60 days to choose whether or not to elect COBRA coverage, beginning from the date the election notice is provided or the date you would otherwise lose coverage under your group health plan due to the qualifying event, whichever is later. It would be unlikely for an employer to discourage an employee from electing COBRA coverage due to costs to the employer, as you suggest: Susan is still employed and thus could be treated differently in her last two weeks depending on how she responds because the company is struggling financially and is looking for every opportunity to save money. Susan electing to use COBRA coverage is unlikely to cost the company money, because the employer is permitted to charge her the entire cost of the coverage, plus 2 percent to cover the cost of administering it (additional DoL source). As far as privacy goes, I don't think anything illegal has occurred here. The most prevalent law regarding privacy of health information, HIPAA, generally does not apply to employers. Susan could, of course, request a private discussion, and any response from Emily could not rise to the level of illegal harassment or create a hostile work environment. |
With copyrighted material, as long as Bob blog a snippet of it and provide their offical website link and comply with the (DMCA) law, safe enough? Bob would like to start a blog where Bos shares some how-to tutorials. Bob would like to show some credibility and educational suggestion, so Bob would quote some instructions from the manual and provide link to the product official website where the manuals hosts. Sure, Bob will share the Disclaimer page where Bobs will comply with the (DMCA) law and don't own the manual itself. Is the safe enough for Bob and the website? The goal is the avoid any legal issues. The goal is not to avoid DMCA takedown requests. Bob will comply with the (DMCA) takedown request. PS Define "safe enough": The goal is the avoid any legal issues after complying with the (DMCA) takedown request. | Short Answer As a practical matter, the strategy you suggest is widely used, and the vast majority of the time, it does not result in copyright disputes. It isn't 100% risk free, however. Long Answer All of the questions in this answer are governed entirely by federal law. Both basic copyright law, found in Title 17 of the United States Code, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (which amended Title 17 of the United States Code in part, and also added 28 U.S.C. § 4001 related to movie licensing) are federal statutes that do not have parallel state law counterparts. Copyright cases are in the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts when they arise in the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) ("[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to ... copyrights .... Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in ... copyright cases."). This isn't a DMCA case This strategy doesn't really utilize Section 230 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), however, which protects online hosts of sites from liability for user generated content, if the host honors DMCA takedown notices (subject to an exception for human trafficking content). DMCA takedown notices aren't strictly speaking applicable in this fact pattern. When Bob is the website's author, his content isn't user generated content from which he is protected from liability by Section 230. His Internet Service Provider is protected from liability for his content, but Bob isn't protected from liability for his content, because he isn't a third-party user of his own website. The Basic Copyright Law Analysis Once you understand that nuance that this isn't a DMCA question, the question collapses into a simple copyright infringement issue. The bottom line in this copyright analysis is that if you take a snipper of material from a copyrighted source and link to the source copyrighted material, are you not likely to face copyright liability. Links Are Basically Liability Risk Free The link itself, pretty much categorically, and without lots of additional relevant facts (basically some sort of conspiracy behind the scenes that can't be discerned from looking at the work itself), will never give rise to copyright infringement liability. Snippets Are Copyright Infringements That Fair Use Usually Excuses So, the remaining issue is whether a snippet of a copyrighted work flagged for educational purposes, creates risk of copyright infringement liability. There is always some risk any time you publish a copy, no matter how small, of copyrighted material without the permission of the copyright owner. The snippet is undeniably a publication of a copy of copyrighted work (by virtue of the premise of the question). This is a prima facie case of copyright infringement and your inclusion of a link to the source makes it fairly likely that your publication of this copy will be discovered by the copyright owner. So, this is a copyright infringement that gives rise to copyright liability unless this liability for copyright infringement can be overcome or excused by the affirmative defense to copyright liability of fair use. The risk that the snippet will not be considered fair use, and therefore will be found to be a copyright infringement giving rise to copyright liability is relatively higher if the snippet is a photograph or a sound recording than it is if it is merely quoted words from the source. But, usually, a reasonably small snippet of a copyrighted work published for educational purposes will come within the fair use defense, even though that really needs to be evaluated on a case by case basis. Practical Context And Analysis The fact that this mode of expression, with a snipped and a link on a blog for educational purposes is pervasive on the Internet, as a practical matter, means that generally speaking, this will be considered fair use. Usually, this strategy will prevent someone who uses it from facing litigation for copyright infringement, even though, in theory, the determination is highly fact and context specific. It isn't a guarantee of no liability, but it is low risk. Most marginal cases where someone arguably slightly exceeds fair use are resolved with a cease and desist letter (with which Bob should comply even if he thinks his use is fair use), rather than litigation. | Under US copyright law, all works are protected by copyright except for US Government works. The concept of "public domain" is not legally well-defined, and is used colloquially to refer to government works, works whose protection has expired, works available to all, and works not copyrightable (such as scientific laws or old software). Under older copyright law, releasing a work without the copyright symbol effectively put the work in the public domain. One can simply say "I dedicate this work to the public domain", and that is typically taken to be enough. CC0 purports to do this (using more words). However, as far as I can tell, author rights under European law are so strong that it is simply impossible. Releasing works into the public law has to be consistent with other aspects of the law. If you grant an perpetual exclusive right to copy and distribute to a publisher, their right does not go away on your death (a right which they would not have with a real public domain work). A problem is that an author who makes such a dedication (a bare license) could revoke the license and reassert their copyright. They could be estopped from making that argument. As property, your heirs would inherit the copyright and could (try to) revoke the license. Presumably the courts would not allow them to pursue ostensive infringers. Nevertheless, your plan is neither trivial nor bullet-proof. | It is not critical, however, it can help and it can't hurt. You own the copyright and if you were to take legal action you would need to prove this - the notice is evidence you can use to do so. Note that some jurisdictions (including the US) require registration of copyright before commencing legal action and that damages only accrue from the date of registration. A more significant issue is: what rights does the website owner have? They may believe that their contract with you involved a transfer of the copyright to them: did it or didn't it or doesn't it say? | Yes. The introduction to the license says "You may adapt — ... build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially". (My emphasis). Note that there is an attribution requirement so you need to find a way to attribute each image to its individual author. For the fine details, you certainly need to read the actual license (rather than the introduction) and you probably need to consult your own, paid-for, IP lawyer - but if you are just scoping the project out at the moment, you should be fine. For contrast, here is a Creative Commons licence that does prohibit commercial use. | 20th Century Fox have a trademark on "Simpsons." They have trademarks on "Bart Simpson", on "D'oh", on "Duff Beer". I would assume that they take their trademarks seriously. What you can't do is to use someone else's trademark to make people believe your commercial product is related to theirs. It's quite reasonable to assume that someone seeing your book in a store would think it is written by the makers of The Simpsons show and therefore buy it. Even if you say that isn't your intention, it is what would happen. I'd try coming up with some different titles, maybe "How to write animated TV shows" with "Example: The Simpsons" (well, you are the writer so you should come up with something better), and take them to a lawyer. And then contact the makers of the show (again asking the lawyer for advice how to do this) because even if your lawyer says the title is fine, that doesn't mean you can't be sued. | The first thing that has to be done (in court, or via lawyer-to-lawyer communication) is that The Company has to prove that they own the copyright. If they accomplish that, you can defend yourself by providing proof of a license to download and redistribute. From what I can tell, you cannot directly prove that, since the rights-holder did not give you the license. The issue is that a third party cannot impose a license on a work simply by putting it out there with a file that claims to be a license from the artist. So this brings in the Free Music Archive: they presumably have some evidence that the rights holder did indeed grant the alleged license, and may be able to provide proof. Your argument may be credible, in the sense that you had a good-faith belief that the item was so licensed, and the website would provide a basis for concluding that that belief is reasonable. If the work was licensed, then the some rights holder would know that, but not necessarily the current one. Assume the artist made a recording, transferred the rights to Company A, who later sold the rights to Company B who is now coming after you. Artist may have licensed it when it was his, and forgot to tell A. A may have licensed it when they sold the license to B. Artist may have improperly licensed it after he sold the work to A (under the "I wrote it, I have the right to do whatever I want" non-legal theory). A might have improperly licensed the work after selling the right to B (maybe by mistakenly including it in a package deal, i.e. via bookkeeping error, rather than ignorance of the law). Or, they may simply have forgotten. If this is a DMCA takedown notice, the notice-giver could just be abusing the system. But we don't know how you were contacted, so I'll leave DMCA out of this for now. | None of the methods suggested protect Bob from a copyright or trademark infringement claim. These methods may protect Bob from a claim that Bob is an intentional infringing party, as opposed to being an "innocent infringer". But, an innocent infringer is not immune to liability for copyright and trademark infringement. Instead, an innocent infringer is simply subject to less potent penalties and remedies than an intentional infringer of the copyright or trademark owner's rights. Also, innocent infringer status ceases when Bob receives a cease and desist letter if Bob continues the infringing conduct. This said, in the first case, if Bob independently writes the blog post without copying anyone else's work, Bob has not infringed any copyright. This is true even if someone else had already written exactly the same thing. Copyright infringement, unlike patent infringement and trademark infringement, requires that the infringing work actually be derived from the work claimed to be infringed and independent invention of a work is a full defense to copyright infringement. | It's complicated You still own your own posts First off, you own everything that you originally created. Posting it on Stack Exchange doesn't affect your rights to your own content. Incorporating suggestions If you copy any of the text from posts that were created by others, you must comply with the CC BY-SA license. The exact version will depend on when the content was posted, and can be viewed by clicking the "Share" link or viewing the post's timeline via the clock icon on the left. Currently, new posts are licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0, which requires you to (basically) provide attribution with the creator's name, a link back to the content, and an indication of whether changes were made. A more detailed description of the exact requirements is here. You would also be required to license the work that you incorporated it into under the same license. However, game mechanics aren't copyrightable. If you merely used mechanics suggested in the posts without actually using the actual creative expression (for instance, names or description text) from the posts, you would not be required to provide any attribution or use any particular license, because you didn't use any copyrightable material from the post. A thank-you would still be nice All that said, it's still a nice thing to do to provide some sort of informal thanks to those who provided valuable assistance, even when you're not legally required to do so. |
Did Spirit Airlines break the law when they sold me Wi-Fi that they do not offer on any of their planes? On the 29th of September I flew from PDX to Las Vegas and bought the Wi-Fi service that was offered online to utilize during the flight. I further learned the Spirit Airlines has no Wi-Fi anywhere on any flight. I've been trying for the last 5 days to get a hold of somebody to issue me a refund and I get is the answer no | Given the facts as stated in the question, it appears that Spirit owes a refund. If the portal or site through which the service was sold also handles other flights that do provide wi-fi, there may not have been an intention to sell an unavailable service, and so this may not have been fraud. It is not proper to knowingly sell a service that is not available, but if it is an error, it is not strictly illegal, but the contract has not been fulfilled. One could, in such a case, attempt to place a charge-back with the credit card through which payment was made, if a card was used. Failing that, one could take the matter to small claims court. Before opening a court case, I would send a physical letter by certified mail to the airline's customer service address, with a copy to its HQ address, explaining what happened and requesting a refund by a specified date. If there is a customer service email, a copy to that as well. | Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out. | Answering my own question after some more research (which I should have done in the first place). Yes, it's illegal both in the US and in the EU Many airlines do it anyway because they are desperate for cash and hoping that no government agency will enforce it. A trade group is actually lobbying to change the laws Airlines will do what they can to make you accept a voucher. Some create an incentive, some make it just extremely difficult to get refund or they will simply deny it. If you accept a voucher, you waive the right for a refund. Only realistic option is a charge back through the credit card but I haven't found any successful examples yet. Good overview articles: https://onemileatatime.com/flight-cancelled-refund/ https://viewfromthewing.com/airlines-are-breaking-the-law-by-refusing-refunds-for-cancelled-flights/ | You can absolutely sue the entity that operates EZpass because it is a private company and you have a monetary dispute with it (unless the agreement you entered into with EZpass to allow it to charge your credit card contains an arbitration clause). But, this would make no sense. Everybody agrees that you owe EZpass money for tolls that you admit that you incurred, and if you don't pay that you are clearly in the wrong. The fact that they weren't able to charge your credit card for some reason (who knows, maybe there's a typo in your records or the phone line had static at a critical moment when they tried to process the charge, it doesn't really matter why), doesn't mean that you don't owe them money for the tolls that you incurred and if the sue you at a time when you still owe money for that toll you will definitely lose. The only dispute is over the late fee. And, the dispute is that you have to pay something that you haven't actually paid. So, in the status quo, in which you haven't paid a late fee which you believe you don't owe, and you are winning for now. Generally speaking, one brings a lawsuit to change the status quo. EZpass is the party that claims you owe money and hasn't been paid, so ordinarily EZpass would sue you and not the other way around, because it wants to change the status quo. Now, realistically, bringing a lawsuit for a single late fee is insane. The filing fee alone is more than the late fee, you couldn't afford to hire a lawyer for twelve minutes without paying more than the cost of the late fee, and the contract with EZpass very likely doesn't allow you to get your attorneys' fees if you prevail. The bigger question, which might make a lawsuit worthwhile, is that if you don't pay your late fee, EZpass could ban you from using toll roads entirely and impose big fines that are authorized by your agreement with you if you do. In short, if you can't work it out with customer service reps and their managers at EZpass over the phone, you would be a complete fool to sue rather than to pay the late fee that you think was wrongly imposed. Not every battle, even when you are in the right, is worth fighting. | I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify. | Is UPS allowed to take my money and business without intention to fulfill its side of the transaction? No. The company's belated change of mind constitutes breach of contract, and its subsequent refusal to give you a refund completes the prima facie elements of fraud and/or unjust enrichment. The company's acceptance of your package & money and its subsequent act of sending your package to NC strike the applicability of its clause on Refusal of Service (see the link provided in the other answer). The blanket term of "among other reasons" is hardly enforceable at that point. In particular, the existence of a lawsuit between the recipient and the company further weakens any merits of the company's belated change of mind. That is because, by virtue of that lawsuit, the company currently has to deliver to that same recipient other packages anyway. Thus, the company cannot allege that delivering your package "is unsafe or economically or operationally impracticable". Also, since you are the one who paid for the service, the company cannot withdraw on grounds of "the person or entity responsible for payment is not in good standing". | My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here. | Yes they can You are approaching this from the wrong direction. Their right to enforce what you can and can't do doesn't come from radio-spectrum law; it comes from property and contract law. You are on their property subject to a license that they give you to be there. One of the terms of that license is that you won't set up or operate a wireless network. No doubt there are other things you are not permitted to do; for example, you may not be able to sell goods and services. If you breach the terms of the license then you are trespassing and they are within their rights to have you removed. In addition, if you are a student (or staff), this is probably one of the terms of your contract with the university. If you breach it, they can terminate your candidature (employment). Contracts can impose obligations on you that goes beyond what the law obliges you to do. Indeed, there is no contract if it only requires what is already required. |
Is it illegal for my employer to force me to lie/mislead a customer over the phone as to what type of Nurse I am and/or what my capabilities are? My employer (a major health insurance company) wants me to routinely lie to members as to what type of RN I am. I was hired to be a telehealth "Advice Line Nurse" providing assessments, triage and basic educational services to members over the phone. Once I quit my previous job to take the new job, I was told that I would be expected to occasionally support other Nursing departments (ie. Case Management) in a support role when they were busy. I now spend a considerable amount of my day in this "support role" and I am supposed to mislead the customer into thinking that I am a Case Management RN. I have no desire to be a Case Management RN and have no training or experience as a Case Management RN. I am often put in a position of failure because the member wants or legitimately needs Case Management services that I cannot provide but I will get in trouble if I let them know that I am not a Case Management Nurse. My employer even has the phone systems set up in a way that the contact phone# info left for the customer to try and reach Case Management doesn't even go to the Case Management department... its simply a generic phone# that usually connects them to my Nursing department (Advice Line). Is this legal and can I be fired for not complying? My stress levels are through the roof because I feel that I am misrepresenting my Nursing license that I worked so hard for. If I need a Plumber, I am going to be pissed if an Electrician shows up pretending to be the Plumber. What are my options? | You must follow the lawful and reasonable directions of your employer As an RN you have obligations under the law that are independent of your employment. Almost certainly, one of these is not to practice in an area which you are not skilled or qualified to do so (unless you are under adequate instruction and supervision). Remember, as an RN you, personally, are legally responsible if your advice leads to harm and you were not acting reasonably. There are plenty of nurses who have gone to jail for delivering a lethal dose of medicine that was wrongly prescribed by a doctor. Even if your advice is unlikely to lead to this, you can still be deregistered - seems a waste of a lot of education just to become an Uber driver. Further, most jurisdictions make it illegal to mislead or deceive in trade or commerce. This one won’t send you to jail. So, it appears that the instructions are unlawful and it is not misconduct if you were to, politely, refuse them. This would not give your employer grounds to fire you. However, you should document your concerns and reach out to your union and possibly consult a lawyer. | They can ask, but there is nothing in law - that I can find - which obligates an answer. (There may be some exceptions that require a previous employer to provide a reference which might include this detail, but that does not appear relevant here.) As an aside, there is an ongoing #EndSalaryHistory campaign by the Fawcett Society which is focused on equal pay and sexual equality in the workplace, and they are calling on employers to: stop asking salary history questions... | The criteria used by the IRS suggest that for federal tax purposes, the cashier would be properly classified as a contractor. Behavioral Control: A worker is an employee when the business has the right to direct and control the work performed by the worker, even if that right is not exercised. There is probably some training involved here, but it seems negligible. Has the company actually retained the right to direct and control the cashier? Is he obligated to use their register, as they tell him to use it? Is his work evaluated for compliance with those instructions? I'd guess that in most cases, the company doesn't actually care about any of this. As long as the company got all the money it was owed, would it really care if the cashier just stuck the money in his pockets until the end of the day? I'd also argue that it isn't really the employer controlling the when and where of the contractor's work, but rather the circumstances. Classifying him as an employee because he has to be at the event doesn't really make any more sense than saying your plumber is an employee because he has to come to your house to do the job. Financial Control: Does the business have a right to direct or control the financial and business aspects of the worker's job? The investment in the cash register seems relatively nominal. The company probably does not reimburse the cashier for expenses incurred in getting the job done. The cashier is presumably free to offer his services to others. The cashier is presumably being paid a one-time, flat fee. As you noted, though, the fact that there isn't much profit-loss opportunity is one factor pointing in the other direction. Relationship: The type of relationship depends upon how the worker and business perceive their interaction with one another. The fact that this is a single, hours-long job is probably the strongest evidence that the cashier is a contractor. Further, the cashier's job is not a key part of the business, as it is only a minor portion of an event that the company has never performed before and has no apparent intention of repeating. I assume that the company is not providing health benefits, sick time, etc., and that any contract with the cashier includes no language suggestive of an employer-employee relationship. Conclusion: The employee-contractor distinction is pretty fact-intensive, but based on what you've provided, there seems to be a much stronger argument that the cashier would be a contractor. | the company does have the right to "verify the eligibility of the person and terminate the service to the ineligible at any time" is pretty unambiguous. They have assessed your eligibility, determined you don't have one and have terminated the service. They are completely within their rights to do this. If you feel that they have assessed your eligibility wrongly then you can dispute their assessment - either through whatever dispute resolution is detailed in the contract or by going to court if the contract is silent. The fact that they previously assessed you as eligible (or didn't actually make an assessment) is irrelevant. | This is not legal advice, It is not even primarily a legal opinion. It is a legal position. The lawyer, acting on behalf of the agency from which you requested information, is giving the reasons why that agency is declining your request. The lawyer is presumably either an employee of the agency, or has the agency as a client. In any case, this is notice of the position that the agency would be likely to adopt if you took further legal action, such as a suit to compel disclosure. Lawyers provide such position statements ion behalf of clients or employers all the time. Such statements indicate why certain action is taken, what basis the client or employer has for taking or not taking certain action, and often indicate the nature of the defenses or theories that will be used should a lawsuit follow, although the client or employer is free to change the theory at the pleading stage. Not only is it not unethical for the lawyer to respond in this way, the agency is, I am fairly sure, required by the law to provide a valid reason when a request is declined. That is what they have done, provide a reason that they claim is valid, with some legal reasoning about why it is valid. Note that I express no view on whether the reason given is in fact valid, or would be sustained in a suit. That would be a different question. | I would recommend talking to an adult person in HR. I'm quite sure they will notice that what your manager wants to do is more than dodgy, and doing something dodgy may be in the interest of your manager, but not in the interest of the company. The best thing is to go to HR, acting as if a mistake has been made, and point out to them what your start date was, and that the new contract has the incorrect starting date, and they need to fix this mistake or you can't sign the contract. If they insist you sign it, then you DON'T sign it. If they say you will be fired if you don't sign it, then you tell them that in that case you would get legal advice. BTW. You definitely don't sign this as it is. PS. This answer was posted on workplace.stackexchange, not law.stackexchange, so please don't complain if there is no legal content. | We're missing a lot of information that we'd need to offer a full answer. Here are some of the things that will probably drive the analysis: the type of counselor we're talking about; the types of information the counselor disclosed; the reason she disclosed it; the job functions of the people to whom she disclosed it; the reason the client is bothered by the disclosure. Generally speaking, a mental-health counselor has a fiduciary duty to maintain the confidentiality of patient information, but my understanding is that in most cases, the counselor would be allowed to discuss a case with colleagues for the purposes of advancing the patient's treatment. So discussing the facts of a tough case with a supervisor is not going to be as problematic as idly gossiping about clients with custodial staff. Beyond the permitted disclosures, there are also situations in which counselors are required to disclose confidential information, including cases where the counselor suspects child or elder abuse or where the counselor believes the client poses a danger to herself or others. If the disclosure was truly not permitted, then it may be that the client has a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In Georgia, proving that case requires evidence that: That the counselor had information relating to the client that she knew or should have known was confidential; That the counselor communicated the client’s confidential information to third parties; That the client did not give informed consent to the counselor’s conduct; That the confidential information was not a matter of general knowledge; and That the disclosure harmed the client. As you noted, the client could also file a complaint with the state licensing board. I don't know of any federal laws or regulations that would come into play in the situation you've described. | No While you can be bound to terms you had the opportunity to read and didn’t, you cannot be bound to terms that you did not have the opportunity to read. That doesn’t mean that you don’t have a contract but it will be on different conditions to those in the undisclosed terms. For a contract to be valid, the parties must agree on the essential terms, for a phone contract, what service the phone company is giving and how much the consumer pays. Incidental terms can be left undefined and they will, if needed, be filled in by a court with reasonable terms. However, this only happens to the extent necessary to give effect to the primary purpose of the contract. For example, late fees or termination fees are not strictly necessary (common law principles of damages for breach of contract work just fine) so, if the undisclosed terms include them, they will be unenforceable. Notwithstanding, it’s quite likely that refusing to disclose in the advance violates state or Federal consumer protection laws against misleading or deceptive conduct. |
Is it against law to expel from political party if one has voted against it in the national general elections? Eastern Europe (EU) case This is about Eastern European country that is the member of EU. Political parties of this country are eligible to receive monetary support from the country budget (taxpayer money) based on the performance on the national elections and the party under consideration has received those funds for past several years. Now this party performed very poorly at the latest general elections, there were reputation risks and badly prepared election platform etc. Many party members voted against their party, it was against their conscience to vote for it. Party was expelled from the parliament completely. Now some other group of the party members are trying to organize the Congress or executive body to expel the members from the party, if those members have publicly declared that they have voted against their party. My question is - considering that political parties have special place in the democracies and that they are receiving government funds and can not be private clubs - is it lawful to exper party members from the party if they have voted against their party or have declared publicly that they have voted against their party? Can such decision by the party Congress or the executive body of the party be challenged in the national courts of law and overturned by them? OK, this country is Republic of Latvia. | I can't speak for Latvian law, but it's not unusual for someone to be expelled from or denied entry to a political party in the UK for supporting a rival party at the same time. As one example, Alasdair Campbell was expelled from the Labour Party after he admitted voting for a rival party in elections. From that link, Labour Party rules say that someone "who joins and/or supports a political organisation other than an official Labour group or other unit of the Party" will "automatically be ineligible to be or remain a Party member". So it's not about voting, which is secret, but about supporting a rival party. Similarly, at least one member has been expelled from Labour for supporting the Scottish National Party on social media. Such decisions may have an element of the political (using it as a pretext to getting rid of someone you don't like). But there is no suggestion that such an action is illegal, if it is in the party rules. Political parties have a lot of discretion as to who is allowed to be a member, and who they expel. It's not like buying a gym membership where you are entitled to gym services or your money back; legally you sign an agreement to follow the rules when you join, and joining doesn't entitle you to much. | A law which punishes a specific person – a "bill of attainder" – is unconstitutional. Private laws, which benefit an individual, are legal. An example is Private Law 112-1, which says Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.), Sopuruchi Chukwueke shall be deemed to have been lawfully admitted to, and remained in, the United States, and shall be eligible for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1255) upon filing an application for such adjustment of status. Nothing prevents such a bill from being made law, where the benefit is a grant of citizenship. Of course, it has to be signed by the president, or else congress must override his veto. | Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged. | A statutory instrument that exceeds the limits of the enabling Act is void. For example, an Act that enables the executive to make regulations about companies would not support a regulation that purported to affect companies and partnerships. There are two controls in place: regulations must be tabled in Parliament and any MP can call for the regulation to be debated and voted down. anyone affected by the regulation can go to court to oppose it - there are lots of things they can argue including that the regulation overreaches its enabling Act. | The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal. | Note that the answer to most of your questions has nothing to do with the GDPR specifically, but has to do with the legal force that an EU Regulation has. Here's a related answer on EU Regulations vs. Directives. That said, here are my answers to your specific questions: So member states can define a different age, even though the GDPR says that it should be 16. But is this an exception? Yes. Are there any other exceptions? Yes. Scanning the Regulation for instances of "Member State" is a good way to find them. In my opinion, the biggest area of the GDPR where Member States have influence is Article 6, "Lawfulness of Processing". In some circumstances, it allows Member States to specify what could be considered a lawful basis for processing. Must these exceptions be explicitly stated in the GDPR? Yes. As a Regulation, exceptions must be explicitly stated in order to be permissible because Member States have no authority to overrule EU law*. I'd like to understand to what extent the GDPR must be followed by member states, and to what extent it could be amended in national laws. "Amended" is a fuzzy term. It can mean adding, changing, or removing from the law. Unless otherwise specified, Member States could not change or remove provisions, but there could very well be additions consistent with the GDPR. *Some Member States dispute this statement when it comes to constitutional issues. | See https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/who-can-and-cant-contribute/, the section on "Foreign Nationals". The Commission stated, in AO 1998-14, that the use of any surname on a contribution check (or similar instrument) would not, by itself, give any reason to inquire as to the person’s nationality. Nonetheless, the Commission advised the committee to take the following minimally intrusive steps to ensure that the contributions it received did not come from foreign nationals: Ensure that public political ads and solicitations directed to audiences outside the U.S. contain a summary of the foreign national prohibition of 52 U.S.C. § 30121. Make further inquiry into the nationality of the contributor if the committee receives a contribution postmarked from any non U.S. territory. Make further inquiry into the nationality of the contributor if the committee receives a contribution indicating that either the bank or the account owner has a foreign address. In all of the these instances, if the contribution is submitted along with credible evidence (for example, a copy of a valid U.S. passport) that the contributor is a U.S. citizen, a U.S. national or a permanent resident alien, no further inquiry need be made. However, if the committee has actual knowledge that the contributor is in fact a foreign national, it may not rely on these documents as a defense. So, if the donor has been informed of the rules and gives a US address, the campaign can assume that they are eligible to donate, unless the campaign has actual knowledge that they aren't. If they give a non-US address, the campaign is supposed to get some other proof of nationality. By the way, that page also explains that the first part of your question is slightly wrong. It isn't only US citizens who are allowed to donate - US nationals (a rather rare category consisting mostly of people from certain US territories) and permanent residents are also eligible. | "Law" is actually a very broad term, which encompasses statutes, rules, regulations, precedent and I'm sure some other things that I'm forgetting. The popular understanding of "law" is the statute, which involves Congress (at the federal level) or the legislature (and the state level). That is the kind of law that we say is "passed". At the federal level, some number of representatives or senators will introduce a bill into the House or Senate, and it is discussed in a relevant committee; if it is approved, it moves to debate by the whole House / Senate and if it passes it moves to the other house. Once it has passed both the House and Senate, it goes to the President where it may be signed, rejected, or ignored. If signed, it becomes "a law", if rejected (vetoed) it can become law anyhow if it gains a 2/3 majority vote in both houses. If the President ignores it ("pocket veto"), it becomes law in 10 days (Sunday is not a day), unless Congress is not in session. Oh, and, that's just the tip of the iceberg. At the state level, there is a similar process, with the further option of referenda and initiatives. In the former case, a particular law will have been passed by the legislature and then it is put to a popular vote for affirmation / overturning, and in the latter case a new law is proposed by the people (generally through a petitioning process) and then voted on by the populace. There is a fair amount of variation on how this works and what can be done, by state. A law can be repealed (withdrawn) by passing a law that repeals a given part of the existing law, and it can be re-written. The Supreme Court of the jurisdiction can also withdraw a (part of a) law if it is found to be unconstitutional. No foreign body can override US law, although if the US is bound by treaty (which necessarily involves another country) then we might have to do whatever that treaty says, because we approved the treaty. One limit on what we can be forced into by treaties is that a treaty cannot violate the constitution. The largest source of law in the US is actually not statutory, it is regulatory law, where a regulatory agency writes rules with the force of law (so really, it is law). In that case, there has to be a statutory basis, where at the federal level a law is passed empowering an agency to write rules, where the scope of the regulation is supposed to be related to the empowering statute in some manner. In that case, there is a vetting process, but basically no voting, just an announcement, some discussion, and eventually the rules are set. Analogous processes exist at the state level. We also have various county and city governmental bodies, where e.g. the city council can vote to create a law; or, they can empower an agency to write regulations. Yet another source of law is the Executive Order, where the president can decree that such and such will be the case (as long as it has something to do with what the executive branch does). These are somewhat limited in scope, but every president seems to like to test what that limit is. Governors get to do it too! And lastly, courts have an indirect power to make law, by ruling on how an existing law is to be interpreted (as well as ruling that a law or part of a law is unconstitutional). |
Does San Francisco and California law have jurisdiction in the Presidio of San Francisco? The Presidio is rumoured to be federal land, and I'm wondering how that affects what law is applicable there. Does California law have any effect there? | Only a partial answer as I (and maybe others) attempt further research... The Presidio of San Francisco falls within the care of the National Park Service (NPS) that... ... carries out its responsibilities in parks and programs under the authority of Federal laws, regulations, and Executive Orders, and in accord with policies established by the Director of the National Park Service and the Secretary of the Interior. (Source: NPS) And As a general principle, state or local governments may not directly enforce their laws against the National Park Service with respect to federal lands and activities within units of the National Park System. This principle originates in the U.S. Constitution. Article IV of the U.S. Constitution outlines the relationship between the states and the Federal Government, and each state and the others. Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, known as the Property Clause, grants Congress: Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States…. This delegation of authority to Congress over federal lands, and the re-delegation of that authority to the various land management agencies, prevents states from enforcing their laws and regulations that pertain to lands, such as zoning, building permits, and land use regulations. (Source: NPS Applicability of State and Local Laws to NPS Activities pdf) | Questions about "why a law is ..." are political questions not legal questions and you may get better traction on politics. However, I will address the legal issues and offer some speculation on the politics. The states named in the preamble to the Constitution (an Act of British Parliament) as original states were New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Western Australia was not named at the time of the passing of the Act or Royal Assent because the people of that colony had not vet made their mind up. Legal Issues WA decided to join in a vote held on 31 December 1900 and Australia came into being on 1 January 1901. Therefore, even though not named as such, WA was an "original state". Since all 6 states in the Federation are "original states" the clauses have no practical effect at present. However, there have been a number of proposals to add new states, either by subdividing existing states or by granting statehood to the territories of Northern Territory and/or the Australian Capital Territory. If such were to come to pass, the clauses would have practical effect. In 1998, Norther Territorials rejected an offer of statehood that would have given them 3 senators as a state and 2 representatives based on population (currently they have 2 senators and 2 representatives). Clearly, they were not being given the same privileges as an "original state". In 2015 all Australian governments agreed in principle that the NT should become a state by 2018, however, as it is now 2017 and no action has been taken this seems unlikely. Political Issues Politics is complicated: just as much in the late 19th century as it is in the early 21st. Negotiations between the colonies were fraught and federation was by no means a certain outcome. New Zealand and Fiji dropped out early and each forged its own path to nationhood. However, by the late 1890s it was clear that the 5 eastern colonies would federate with or without Western Australia. It seems likely that this provision served multiple purposes including: putting pressure on WA to join at the outset - the deal they got as a "Johnny come lately" may not have been as good. protecting "white" Australia - the drafters of the Constitution were men of their times, that is to say: racist, misogynist bigots. Any non-original states were likely to be former British colonies in the Pacific or South-East Asia, this clause would allow the nation to reduce the influence these non-white states might have. | The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court. | Any court from a municipal traffic court on up can declare a law unconstitutional and the U.S. Supreme Court is almost never the court that does so in the first instance. Also, while the jurisdiction stripping law that you suggest might be unconstitutional, it is not obviously unconstitutional. The relevant language is in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution (this has been modified by the 11th Amendment in ways that are not pertinent to the issue at hand): The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-- to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. The key language being the language in bold, who scope and limitations are the subject of hot debate in legal scholarship. For example, both military tribunal law for non-soldiers and the collateral review of death sentences implicate this provision. An issue related to U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction over military court-martial court composition will be heard this year in oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court. There is also debate over whether the jurisdiction of every single federal court can be removed from a matter within the judicial power of the United States. In that regard, keep in mind that the United States federal court system did not have direct appeals of criminal convictions at all until the 1890s, although you could challenge, for example, the jurisdiction of a criminal court over your case with a writ of habeas corpus which is a collateral attack on a conviction in a separate civil lawsuit formally directed at your prison warden. That being said, as far as I know, a law is considered in effect until declared unconstitutional. It is illegal to break an unconstitutional law, until declared so. You are wrong. A law that is unconstitutional on its face is, in terms of legal theory, unconstitutional immediately upon enactment and a court simply acknowledges that fact. It is not illegal to break an unconstitutional law even if no court has yet declared it to be unconstitutional (in U.S. jurisprudence). A law that is unconstitutional as applied is unconstitutional in application at the moment it is applied unconstitutionally, and again, a court merely acknowledges that fact. | It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power. | Apparently an obscure business forced the California government to collect tax from amazon. No, this is not true. Mr. Grosz filed a lawsuit asking the court to force California to collect tax revenues. The lawsuit is still pending before the court without a decision on the merits. As the saying goes, anyone can sue for anything; their success is another matter. The apparent legal basis for standing is section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows taxpayers to sue against wasteful or illegal government spending: 526a (a) An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a local agency, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax that funds the defendant local agency ... The Plaintiff has claimed that, allegedly, there is a mandatory duty to collect taxes and that failure to do so constitutes a waste. The court will decide if it will accept this argument and compel the collection. | I don't know of any cases where a court has done this, but the law would permit it in an appropriate circumstance. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) federal courts in the united-states may grant relief beyond what the complaint demands: Final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings. The same is true in new-york under N.Y. C.P.L.R. Law § 3017: The court may grant any type of relief within its jurisdiction appropriate to the proof whether or not demanded. | Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..." |
Oregon property disclosure law: buyer discovers cracking foundation that seller did not disclose - 20 months after closing I purchased a 110 year old house 18 months ago and am living in it. At the time of sale I waived inspection and did As-Is based on two factors: a 3rd party inspection was provided to me from buyer and I used the "Property Disclosure Statement" filed and signed by seller. seller occupied house for nearly 30 years. I discovered front porch (which is load bearing for the house - not a deck) - has been settling for many years resulting in a cracked foundation (in several spots) and a sinking supporting corner. I can see where the previous homeowner shimmed the foundation several times and even replaced a supporting beam with pressure treated wood (this wood wasn't manufactured until 1990's and even has tags on it - but no conclusive dates) the foundation is still settling and will cost me $10k to fix. since it is clear (the use of the newer wood is the only proof I have) that the previous homeowner had been dealing with this major problem and working on it but did not disclose it: is that a violation of the "disclosure statement"? Do I have recourse against seller? Is the seller liable or obligated to disclose this and if so what are my options? Thanks for any information. | Do I have recourse against seller? Is the seller liable or obligated to disclose this and if so what are my options? Probably not. The general rule is that you accept any condition which could be discovered with reasonable inspection. When "At the time of sale I waived inspection and did As-Is" you are greatly limiting your claims. If the seller believe that the work done fixed the problem, you probably have no remedy. It could be that the seller made a false representation in the disclosure (you'd have to look at the exact language) but even then proving it with only the kind of circumstantial evidence provided would be very challenging. In particular, as a practical matter, it isn't really economic to sue in a $10,000 non-disclosure case without open and shut clarity of fault, as opposed to some suggestive but ultimately inconclusive indicators. You could always ask and state the case in a demand letter, but if you came to me as a potential client, I wouldn't take your case because the high cost combined with the low likelihood of success would make it unlikely that an attorney could bring the case in a way that would generate net value to the client. | The Australian government has put out a document entitled RG 96 Debt Collection Guideline. It makes it clear that they consider it forbidden to disclose that you are collecting a debt. They even forbid disclosures that would allow a third party to infer that you are collecting a debt. Part 2, Section 1(b): If you consider it necessary to divulge your identity as a debt collector before being sure that you are dealing with the debtor (for example, if requested by the person you are dealing with), then you may do so if that would not have the effect of divulging that the debtor has a debt. Particular care should be taken when speaking to a person at a debtor’s workplace or when using a medium that may be shared with others (e.g. social media, landline telephones etc). Section 8: Telling any third party the reason for trying to find the debtor will also disclose personal information about the debtor. Caution should be exercised when leaving messages for the debtor that may be seen or accessed by third parties, for example: Business cards or other documentation should not be left for the debtor in any open manner that would allow a third party to infer the nature of your interest in contacting the debtor. Voicemail messages should be phrased so as to avoid a third party inferring the nature of your interest in contacting the debtor. At no stage should contact be made with a debtor’s social media account that would compromise the debtor’s privacy, for example, placing a message for the debtor in a way that would allow anyone other than the debtor to view it. So to your questions: So if I attempt to call a debtors old work place can I disclose that I am searching for him because I am collecting a debt without further information No, you cannot not say that. or should I say that I am prohibited by disclosing my reason for making contact with the individual by the Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 section 45(j) You should not say that either, as it would allow the former employer to infer the nature of your interest in contacting the debtor. | Normally, a recorded deed is taken at face value. If Bob acquires a house and conveys the house to Bob and Clark, his cousin, a joint tenants with right of survivorship, or pays for 99% of the price of a house and directs that it will be deeded to Bob and Clark as joint tenants with right of survivorship, the normal interpretation of that transaction is that Bob made a gift of an undivided one half interest in the property with right of survivorship to Clark. It sounds like the fact pattern is that Bob dies before Clark, giving Clark 100% title of record to the house subject to the mortgage, and Bob's heirs are not cool about that fact and would like to escape that consequence. This is a tall order for Bob's heirs. Normally, at least two important rules of evidence will preclude admission of testimony to the contrary. One is the parole evidence rule. This excludes as a matter of law evidence of discussions entered into prior to execution of an unambiguous written instrument that is not on its face incomplete, even if other evidence, called "extrinsic evidence" is available. The other is the dead man's statute, which is quite tricky in its technical application, but is basically designed to prevent an interested party from offering self-serving testimony that economically benefits them about what a deceased person said. The classic examples would be "I'll sell you these gold bars for $10", or "I'm giving you this painting", or "I agree to let you live in my house after I die rent free for 11 months." A statement regarding an intended ownership interest in joint tenancy with right of survivorship real estate asserting that it is not 50-50 when nothing on the face of the deed suggests that this is case might be barred by the dead man's statute since these are statements of a dead man that favor the person offering the evidence. But, as I say, the application of the rule is quite technical. Also, to the extent that any third-party like a lender or a judgment creditor of the surviving joint tenant gets a lien or other property right in the property that is recorded, and that person had no knowledge of the claims of ownership outside real property records of the relative rights of the joint tenants, that evidence couldn't be used to impair or reduce the third-party's rights in the property by virtue of the recording statutes. If a dispute arose while the co-owners were alive at a time when there were no disputed claims of third-parties to the property, the joint tenancy would be easy to severed into a tenancy-in-common, and the actual relative contributions and right of the parties could be litigated in court with the testimony of those parties. But, usually, the four unities are in practice, a consequence of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship deed being prepared and recorded, rather than primarily being a condition precedent to it. If a single deed is executed that says that grantee are two or more people who are described as joint tenants with right of survivorship, then the legal consequence of that deed is that the co-owners become equal owners with a right of survivorship and unlimited right to possession of the whole. Also, even though it isn't standard, it isn't impossible for property to be in a tenancy-in-common which a side agreement to make a transfer upon death to the remaining tenant-in-common, even if it isn't a true joint tenancy with right of survivorship. So, if one proved by some competent and admissible evidence that a 50-50 ownership was not intended and that it wasn't a true canonical joint tenancy, this wouldn't necessarily invalidate the survivorship provisions on the face of the deed. A judge would be more likely to treat the deed as a non-standard non-probate transfer at death than to treat it as a tenancy-in-common without a right of survivorship, despite language of survivorship on the face of the recorded deed. Now, something other than equal co-ownership might be admissible for some purposes, like tax consequences, but that wouldn't go to who gets the property when a co-owner of the property dies. From an evidentiary standpoint, the case would [be based upon] . . . non-will ledgers, third party banking transactions, and letters of evidence that show the decedent undertook full responsibility for expenses related to the acquisition and maintenance of the property. The joint tenant was involved in the deed and mortgage issuance by the decedent for the sole purpose of mortgage qualification (i.e. credit requirements) This doesn't sound very convincing. First, there is nothing inconsistent with a joint tenancy with right of survivorship with one co-owner being the person who provides the funds for purchasing the home and handling all of the maintenance and expenses. This is more common than not in the case of a married couple or pair of unmarried domestic partners that own the real property as joint tenants with right of survivorship and it used to be even more common. Second, a lender would almost always require that all people obligated on the mortgage be owners of the property, and that all owners of the property be obligated on the mortgage. (Strictly speaking, in California, it would probably be a deed of trust rather than a mortgage, but that is functionally equivalent.) But, it wouldn't be very common as a commercial requirement to insist on joint tenancy with right of survivorship as opposed to tenancy-in-common ownership. Also since providing credit to a transaction is something of value, getting an ownership interest in the property in exchange isn't beyond the realm on possibility and plausibility in a deal that isn't entirely arms length but isn't entire a gift either. Providing credit is probably sufficient consideration to support the deal as a binding contractual agreement. Now, the best strategy might be a letter or exchange of letters that amount to an agreement. This wouldn't bind the mortgage company, but might have some relevant. Still, if the letters predate the execution of the joint tenancy deed, the parole evidence rule might keep the letters out of evidence. Some sort of express trust theory, treating the letters as a trust agreement, might if the language was right, be a stronger legal argument. I'm trying to wrap my head around how a court would interpret documentation vs. intent with regard to the joint tenancy ownership of real property. The key point being that the decedent didn't 'generally' pay for the property, but always paid for it. This is almost completely irrelevant. It is consistent with the alternative characterization of the transaction, but it is also consistent with the deed terms. In particular, if the decedent described the remaining joint tenant as a 'renter' during an interval of co-habitation, and no financial transactions between the two took place subsequent to that. I could imagine bringing a legal action to reform the deed, but the threshold of proof to win that action is pretty high. Absent some sort on undue influence or abuse of a confidential relationship, I have a hard time seeing a deed like this being reformed by a court to reflect a different kind of transaction, even if that was the original intent of the parties, but it isn't impossible if the right facts and evidence were available (which the dead man's statute, again, heavily constrains). If Bob was defrauded by Clark, I could also imagine some sort of legal remedy being available. But it is hard to think that Bob who was the primary mover in the deal would have been defrauded by Clark in this fact pattern. In California, the relevant case law seems to be Kershman v Kershman, Milian v DeLeon, and Cosler v Norwood Kershman v. Kershman is not on point. It is a divorce case dealing with the issues of marital v. separate property under California's community property regime which is an entirely different body of law that doesn't apply to unmarried co-owners of property. Milian v. De Leon is more on point, involving unmarried people with unequal contributions to the property who take title by a deed that says joint tenancy. it found that, “once the court in a partition action has determined that a true joint tenancy exists, it may not order reimbursement or contribution on account of differences in the amounts the parties have paid toward the initial acquisition of the property.” Milian v. De Leon (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1195. (Source) This holding is the standard common law rule. It isn't isn't really relevant here, however, because that case applies in the context of a partition action while the co-owners are alive, and not after death when the survivorship feature causes the surviving co-owner to be sole owner by operation of law. Cosler v. Norwood is a much older case, from 1950, and seems to stand for the proposition that the language of the deed regarding equal ownership that flows from calling the co-owners joint tenants can be overcome by extrinsic evidence in the context of a partition action, although it is arguably implicitly repealed by Milian v. De Leon. But it isn't on point for the same reason that Milian v. DeLeon in not on point - it considers the rights of two living parties in a partition action dispute (i.e. a lawsuit to untangle co-ownership of property), not concerning the validity of a survivorship provision in the deed in the presence of unequal contributions to the acquisition price. Changes to the survivorship rights do not obviously at all flow from the existence of unequal contributions. | "an agreement by email for the cost of rent and damage deposit etc." may well constitute a lease. If it doesn't specify a term or ending method, it is probably a month to month lease. If nothing is specified about notice to leave, you probably should gt 30 days notice. The law in BC is the Residential Tenancy Act. However, many localities have laws that modify or supplement the provincial law. You probably need legal assitance beyond the scope of this forum. a Tenant Resource Advisory Center (Trac) might be able to help. Their web sitre also provides links to various other resources, including legal referrals. The Tennant Survival Guide offers pointers to legal aid. This site offers additional resources. So does the BC Law institute Note, even if you have certain legal rights in theory, the person from whom you are renting may not respect these. Consult legal or community sources to determine your best approach. This question is really beyond the scope of this forum. | Since the contingency is in the contract and has not been removed, if the purchase falls through due to not selling the existing property, they will get their earnest money back. That was the whole point of putting the contingency in the contract in the first place. | We have no way of knowing when this happened, but it is probably a fact, recorded some time in the past. Utility companies very frequently obtain a right-of-way (easement) which gives them certain rights to your property. Typically, this happened a long time ago when a previous owner agreed. As for gas pipelines, that typically includes "don't plant trees" restrictions. The easement is usually recorded in the county office where deeds are filed. The legal basis is generally "because you agreed, or some previous owner agreed". You can get a copy of the easement to see if "no trees" is actually part of the agreement. If yes, no point in arguing, if not, you could hire a lawyer if they are demanding that they are threatening you. They are allowed to be concerned and to ask you to cut trees regardless, but if it's not required by the terms of the easement, you can say "No, I'd rather keep my tree". | Once you withdrew the complaint without prejudice, any statute of limitations benefit you obtained from filing the lawsuit evaporated. From a legal perspective, it is as if you never filed at all, except that the lawsuit that was filed proves that you had notice of the claim at the time you filed, so you cannot take advantage of any "discovery rule" that allows a statute of limitations to start running from the date that you knew or should have known of your right to file a lawsuit. In all likelihood, the statute of limitations has now run, although that would depend upon the jurisdiction in which it was filed. Some jurisdictions toll the statute of limitations during a period of minority, but that tolling might very well be insufficient to allow the claim to be filed 20 years later. | If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected. |
GDPR - Consent to the use of personal data on mobile app - stored per device or signed up user? For my mobile app, I need to get users' consent to process their personal data (and separately to use anonymized data for Google Analytics). I am unsure, however, how exactly I have to implement this. I could ask for consent when a user is signing up and that consent is then linked to this specific user. I ask for consent when an app is first opened and save this consent option on the device (and log this choice whenever an account is logged in on this device). Option 1 would be preferred since it is easier to implement technically, but I am not sure whether it is valid GDPR-wise. Someone could have created an account on device X and then download the app on device Y and login with the account created on device X. In this case, no consent would have been given on device Y. My question is 1. whether option 1 still would be valid according to the GDPR, and if not, whether option 2. is a viable alternative. If not, any advice on how it should be ideally handled is appreciated. | Either approach can be GDPR-compliant. An issue to consider is that you as a data controller relying on consent “shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to processing of his or her personal data” (Art 7(1)). This might be simpler if a record of the consent is linked to a user account. On the other hand, the GDPR's data minimization principle would suggest that decentral, offline approaches are preferable. So you do have some flexibility here, as long as you feel comfortable demonstrating that your approach is compliant when investigated by a supervisory authority. In many cases, consent is not an appropriate legal basis to start with. It is one of several options in Art 6(1) GDPR. If a data processing activity is necessary for fulfilling a contract with the data subject, then Art 6(1)(b) is more appropriate. If the processing is necessary for a legitimate interest, then Art 6(1)(f) would work – after conducting a balancing test. Art 6(1)(a) consent is appropriate when the processing activity is not necessary, or when a legitimate interest balancing test doesn't go in your favor, or in some cases when required by law. For example, consent is required when processing special categories of data (such as biometrics), or when accessing or storing information on the end user's device, beyond what is necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user (the “cookie law”, but much more general than cookies). Consent also has heightened compliance requirements compared to other legal bases. The data subject must be able to make a free decision, without any coercion. You must not use dark patterns. You must leave the data subject a real choice. You must not make access to your app conditional on giving unrelated consent (like providing access to a game only when the user gives consent for personalized ads). The data subject must be able to easily withdraw consent later, without suffering detriment for this. The EDPB has issued relevant guidelines that might be helpful here: EDPB guidelines 05/2020 on consent EDPB guidelines 2/2019 on Article 6(1)(b) in the context of online services (also relevant for apps) TL;DR: what is “necessary” for performance of a contract is an objective question, and should generally be considered from the data subject's perspective. It is not possible to circumvent consent requirements by putting unrelated processing purposes like “analytics” into a services' terms of service. The main purpose of this document is to serve as a rebuttal of Facebook's GDPR compliance strategy. But it's perfectly fine to avoid asking for consent for those processing purposes that are actually necessary for the user. I've noticed that you mentioned various Google services like Analytics and Firebase. To the degree that your use of these services implies an international transfer of personal data into the US, it might be impossible to be GDPR-compliant. Be wary of claims that you're only transferring “anonymous” data, as the GDPR has a fairly broad concept of identifiability. | You are missing something. The fact that you have a tick box and its state is saved in the database is enough. The burden of proof is only "on a balance of probabilities", so someone arguing that they didn't consent would have to demonstrate that you falsified the database entry somehow. In terms of GDPR requirements in general you don't need a greater level of proof than this, the key thing is that you have a robust system in place to obtain proof (such as not allowing data into the database without a tick in the box). | I'd say it's definitely illegal. Here's what the cookie notice says on Facebook at the time of writing this answer: By clicking on or navigating the site, you agree to allow us to collect information on and off Facebook through cookies. And here's what the GDPR define consent: ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; Also consider this, by the way: When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. Facebook's notice is a small blue bar at the top of its blue header, and you might not even notice it (at least on a desktop computer where I'm seeing it). I see no way to easily deny consent, for example there is no button saying "I don't accept". All you can do is click on the link to their cookie policy, and still that policy does not present a clear and easy way to deny consent in all different cases, it looks pretty complicated (among other things, it depends on whether you have a Facebook account or not). So denying consent looks pretty difficult, if at all possible. On the other hand, to give consent, you'd only have to click on any link. I tried this. I opened my browser in private/incognito mode, so it should not use any previous cookies. On Google, I searched for "facebook John Doe". Clicked on a result bringing me to a Facebook page with a list of profiles of people named John Doe. The cookie bar appears at the top, but let's pretend I did not notice it. Then I click on a profile, supposing I'm interested in a certain John Doe, and... I land on John Doe's profile on Facebook, now without the cookie notice! What happened is I gave consent by clicking on any link, that is, clicking on John Doe. I can't see any way this "consent" could ever be considered "freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes". Why is Facebook not compliant? Well, they probably couldn't be compliant even if they wanted to, unless they wanted to go out of business. Lately I've been wondering what the purpose of Google Analytics would be if users were always given the option to freely refuse consent. Virtually every user would always be clicking on "I don't accept", every time everywhere, so lots of business models would be totally disrupted. By the way, as of now, the cookie bar of this community (stackexchange) does not comply with GDPR either. To tell you the truth, I'm afraid very few websites have a GDPR compliant cookie notice. | Under European rules (GDPR, ePrivacy), you only need consent here if you both access or store information on the user's device (such as cookies), and this access/storage is not strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user. A session cookie is strictly necessary for providing a log-in functionality, so such cookies are unlikely to require consent. In contrast, cookies for measuring ad impressions are not strictly necessary for showing the website content. Necessity must always be thought from the user's perspective, not from the provider's economic needs. If you use one cookie for multiple purposes, you should analyze each purpose separately. Maybe setting a cookie does not require consent under one purpose, but accessing the same information for a different purpose could require consent. If you have to ask for consent, this consent must be in line with the GDPR's requirements in Art 7. Consent must be freely given, i.e. there must actually be a way to decline the consent without suffering detriment. Consent must be informed, i.e. the user must be told directly for what consent is being sought, without having to click through to a long privacy policy. Consent must be specific, so it must be possible to consent for one purpose while declining consent for another. An "I agree to the terms of service and privacy policy" checkbox cannot constitute valid GDPR consent because it fails all these criteria: I cannot use the service without agreeing, I'm not told essential information up front (you cannot expect users to actually read long privacy policies), and this is an all-or-nothing bundle that does not allow specific choices. If you do not have to ask for consent, you should still be transparent about your use of cookies, for example by providing a paragraph on this topic in your privacy notice. I think showing a cookie banner would be a bad idea in that scenario, since it could be confused with an invalid consent banner (no way to decline the cookies). | I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy. | Yes. Article 4 GDPR Definitions (1) ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; Recital 26 Not applicable to anonymous data The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. | This is clearly personal information (PI) , and indeed personally identifiable information (PII). and so is Personal Data under the GDPR. Under Article 6 of the GDPR any processing must have a lawful basis. There are 6 possible bases. The most likely ones here would be (a) consent, or (f) legitimate interst, but the private association may claim some other basis as well. They should tell you what basis or bases justify their processing of this information, which includes storing it and publishing it. Under Article 13, Paragraph 1(c) the association should have informed you of the purposes for which information was collected when it was first collected. Under Article 15 paragraph 1 you are entitled to request and obtain from the association (or any other Data Controller) a statement of what PI about you they hold. along with this they must supply various other information including; (a) the purposes of the processing; (b)the categories of personal data concerned; (c) the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed, in particular recipients in third countries or international organisations; (d) where possible, the envisaged period for which the personal data will be stored, or, if not possible, the criteria used to determine that period; (e) the existence of the right to request from the controller rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing of personal data concerning the data subject or to object to such processing; (f) the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority; and other specified information. Article 17 paragraph 1 provides that: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay ... if one the the specified conditions applies, particularly: 1(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing; 1(c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2) Article 21 paragraph 1 provides that: The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to his or her particular situation, at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or her which is based on point (e) or (f) of Article 6(1), including profiling based on those provisions. The controller shall no longer process the personal data unless the controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. Thus I would suggest that you send a written communication to the association, stating that you: Request access to all PI which they have about you, as permitted by GDPR article 15 paragraph 1; Request that they delete any such information from the public website and any other publications, as permitted by GDPR article 17 paragraph 1; State that you object to further processing of this information under GDPR article 21 paragraph 1; Request information on the name and contact info of the relevant supervisory authority under GDPR article 15 paragraph 1; State that you expect these requests to be complied with promptly, in no event later than 30 days. Mention your prior request for the public info to be deleted, and that several months have already elapsed. Give the exact date of the prior request. I would suggest sending these requests, together in a single email, specifically mentioning the relevant GDPR provisions. I would suggest sending a copy of this by registered mail, and retaining a copy, along with the identifying number of the registered letter. In the letter, mention the email. If the association does not promptly respond in a way you consider satisfactory, you may wish to file a complaint with the relevant data protection supervisory authority. You may also wish to consult a lawyer with experience in this area to determine if you have any legal recourse if the association does not comply. | The point of privacy laws is to set basic standards that apply to everyone, whether or not they have a privacy policy. A privacy policy that is inconsistent with privacy laws cannot be enforced. Breaches of privacy law can be punished even if the conduct is permitted by a privacy policy. Article 7 of the GDPR illustrates this by making special provision for the nature of "consent" to the processing of personal data. Consent must be freely given, and a "written declaration" as to consent, like the acceptance of a privacy policy, "shall not be binding" to the extent that it infringes the GDPR. The $5 billion penalty obtained by the FTC in United States v. Facebook, Inc (19-cv-2184) demonstrates that privacy laws can have a practical impact when a service provider "subvert[s] users’ privacy choices to serve its own business interests." Facebook was penalised even though its users agreed to Facebook sharing "information about the App User and the App User’s Facebook Friends" with third-party developers. Whether a service provider has breached privacy law is a complex, fact-specific question, but if the service is "pretty much part of people's lives," that will generally affect both the application of privacy law and the likelihood of an investigation by the regulators. |
What (kind of body) is TV Licensing, and how do they select people to send their scary mailings to? Is the body a governmental department? Is it established or commissioned by any legislation in particular? What is its mandated function and mode of function? How does it select what addresses to send its lovely nonsense to, what addresses to skip over? | I worked for TV Licensing for 9 years. They have two databases: The Post Office Address File (PAF, which they subscribe to for a fee) and their own database of licenced (UK spelling) addresses. They run a periodic compare, and write to the ones that are on the PAF but not the TVL. At the time, there were 27 million households on the PAF, and 24 million on the TVL. Data from elsewhere showed that 97% of UK households had TVs, so there was a gap to be closed (around 3 million) which represented extra revenue for the BBC, and they got some of that kicked back as an incentive. The IT infrastructure was ancient (they still had a DEC VAX) and there were anomalies, e.g. letters were sent to places like "Water Tank" and "Railway Signal Box", plus houses were demolished, new ones built, etc. Also, TV dealers were obliged by law to notify TVL of the names and addresses of people buying or renting TVs, VCRs, etc, but no legal obligation on the buyer to provide their correct address, or any at all. It is no more illegal to send letters to addresses asking if a TV licence is needed, than it is to send them asking if a credit card is wanted, or begging for a donation to a charity. The letters were carefully worded to avoid any accusation of wrongdoing. It may be useful to remember that the funding model for the BBC was established nearly 100 years ago, in 1923, when a 'Radio Licence' was required to operate a broadcast radio receiver. These were expensive items, and usually bought from retailers, who could be obliged to notify the licensing authority of purchasers' names and addresses. By the time that licence was abolished, in 1971, radio sets were so cheap and ubiquitous that the scheme was unworkable. The same thing is happening with TVs. Where I live, not a rich suburb, people routinely give away 5 to 7 year old smart or non-smart TVs for nothing, or put them out for trash collection. I can get a USB TV tuner stick for around the equivalent of $15 that would turn my tablet, PC, or Raspberry Pi into a fully functioning TV. The UK parliament is examining a number of alternative funding models, some of which involve transferring the burden to general taxation. HOUSE OF LORDS Communications and Digital Committee 1st Report of Session 2022–23 Licence to change: BBC future funding Note for international readers: in the UK, 'licence' is the noun, and 'license' the verb. | I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely. | No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false. | What legal problems might you run into? Well, you'd be violating 47 USC 301, which requires a license for anyone broadcasting in the United States. Penalties for that are given in 47 USC 501 (a fine of up to $10,000 and up to a year in prison), 47 USC 502 (an additional fine of $500 per day of violation), 47 USC 501(b)(2)(D) (forfeiture of up to $10,000 per day, with a maximum of $75,000), and 47 USC 510 (forfeiture of your equipment). "Just outside the FM band" on the low end (below 88 MHz) is television channel 6, while on the high end (above 108 MHz) are frequencies used for airplane navigation. If your transmission interferes with a licensed user of channel 6, you're also in violation of 47 USC 333, which carries much the same penalties as violating section 301, but without the forfeiture of equipment. If your transmission interferes with air navigation, you're in violation of 49 USC 46308, which carries a penalty of up to five years in prison and a fine of up to $5,000. Honestly, you'd be better off broadcasting inside the FM band: there, you can broadcast without a license under 47 CFR 15, which limits you to a broadcast power of 250 microvolts per meter at 3 meters (basically, you can broadcast to anyone in your house or maybe the next house over). | Disclosures are prescribed by state law. Fair housing, which is a federal concept, pertains to issues such as using prohibited personal facts to determine whether to accept an offer. (Hazardous materials disclosures are also mandated at the federal level, but are are included in state requirements which can get pretty broad). If you are buying in Washington state, RCW 64.06.020 says what and how you must disclose. The list of disclosures is very detailed, covering title and covenants, water, sewer, structure, systems and fixtures, environment, and mobile home related. The only one of the 86 questions about smoke is whether smoke alarms are present. Thus smell of smoke is not a legally material fact that must be disclosed, in this state. The California disclosures, even longer, are here, and there is likewise no "smells bad" disclosure. It is unlikely that any state in the US mandates such a disclosure, since it is somewhere between a subjective evaluation and a self-evident fact. Some people are very sensitive to certain smells while others do not care. The burden is on the buyer to pursue matters of personal concern (in writing!), such as whether any dog has been present in the house in the past 5 years (some people care). You have to look carefully at the response. "Don't know" is usually a safe bet, unless you actually have factual knowledge. From what I can determine, Massachussetts is on the opposite end of the spectrum from California. There are some requirements imposed on real estate agents, and there is the federal lead paint disclosure, but otherwise it appears that nothing is mandated by law. This form seems to be used by the real estate association, and there is a question about "history of smoke/fire damage to structure". The reasonable interpretation of that is "has the house caught fire and suffered damage", so "no" from a cigar-smoker would not be fraudulent. If the intent of the question were to reveal if someone has smoked frequently in the house, that would he the question they'd ask. You can check whether you have this form and see what it says, but "smoke damage" would not normally be interpreted as meaning "smells a bit funny". | The question that you need to answer is whether, when you embed, you "copy, reproduce, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, or otherwise exploit any Content". It seems that you have done that, i.e. you didn't just "watch". The next question is whether you have "prior written consent of YouTube". Youtube requires a license from contributors granting users the right to "access your Content through the Service, and to use, reproduce, distribute, display and perform such Content as permitted through the functionality of the Service and under these Terms of Service". To fill the gap, you have to determine whether your act of embedding is permitted by the Youtube TOS. Their TOS states §2A that "The Service" includes the YouTube "Embeddable Player". It also says §4 YouTube hereby grants you permission to access and use the Service as set forth in these Terms of Service, provided that: (A) You agree not to distribute in any medium any part of the Service or the Content without YouTube's prior written authorization, unless YouTube makes available the means for such distribution through functionality offered by the Service (such as the Embeddable Player). On the face of it and as long as you do the stuff that follows in B-I, you have complied with that requirement and therefore you have written permission from Youtube. | In ABC v Aereo 573 U. S. ____ (2014), the US Supreme Court held that activity almost identical to what you describe is copyright infringement. Respondent Aereo, Inc., sells a service that allows its subscribers to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air. When a subscriber wants to watch a show that is currently airing, he selects the show from a menu on Aereo’s website. Aereo’s system, which consists of thousands of small antennas and other equipment housed in a centralized warehouse, responds roughly as follows: A server tunes an antenna, which is dedicated to the use of one subscriber alone, to the broadcast carrying the selected show. A transcoder translates the signals received by the antenna into data that can be transmitted over the Internet. A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive and begins streaming the show to the subscriber’s screen once several seconds of programming have been saved. The streaming continues, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast, until the subscriber has received the entire show. We must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes [copyright] by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service that allows them to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air. We conclude that it does. A nicer summary, oral argument transcript and audio are available from the Oyez Project. In my opinion, your example is more clearly an infringement of copyright than Aereo's. Aereo dedicated separate antennae to receive a signals for each subscriber at the subscriber's direction, and rebroadcast the signal over the internet in near real-time. This let them argue two things: 1) that they were not performing the work, only letting other people perform it, and 2) that the performance was not "to the public". In your example, the server is receiving and saving the broadcast, and then later, that single copy is being reproduced and transmitted to whomever requests it. That would certainly be considered both reproduction and performance to the public. | There is a federal law, 18 USC 2252, which criminalized distribution and receiving of child porn. One part of the law addresses a person who (1) knowingly transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; The next part addresses one who (2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; The word "knowingly" is crucial here: it may mean that if you don't know, it's not a crime. The wording is not completely clear, in that maybe the law only says that you have to know that you received and don't have to know anything about the item that you received. So it is up the the Supreme Court to say exactly what that means. In US v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, they did. The court held that "knowingly" does not just mean that you know you are receiving or distributing, because that would yield absurd results such as that a retail druggist who returned a roll of film unprocessed would be guilty of distributing child porn, just in case the film contains child porn. As the court says, "We do not assume that Congress, in passing laws, intended such results". There is a general constitutional presumption that any crime has a scienter requirement (Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600): "the standard presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct". The court rejects the narrow interpretation that "knowingly" just applies to the verb, and "This interpretation is supported by the canon that a statute is to be construed where fairly possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions". There are also state laws which are untouched by X-Citement, which may make possession of child porn a strict liability offense. Washington state law is written so that you have to know or intend ("Knowingly develops, duplicates, publishes, prints, disseminates, exchanges, finances, attempts to finance, or sells a visual or printed matter that depicts a minor engaged in an act of sexually explicit conduct as defined in RCW 9.68A.011(4) (a) through (e)" or "Possesses with intent to develop, duplicate, publish, print, disseminate, exchange, or sell any visual or printed matter that depicts a minor engaged in an act of sexually explicit conduct as defined in RCW 9.68A.011(4) (a) through (e)".) The statutory rape law on the other hand has no requirement pertaining to knowledge or intent (1) A person is guilty of rape of a child in the third degree when the person has sexual intercourse with another who is at least fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old and not married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least forty-eight months older than the victim. I don't know whether some state's statute was written without a "knowingly" requirement. |
USPTO search says that a practitioner, Bob has status "agent", but his employer advertises him as a "patent attorney" Bob is a patent practitioner, and works for a firm. The firm’s website lists him as a Senionr Attorney holding a J.D. However, according to a https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/practitionerSearchEntry search, Bob’s status as practitioner is of "agent". What explains the inconsistency? | Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority. | See Attorney at law, is there any other kind? As expatiated on English Stack Exchange, Attorney-At-Law can be distinguished from Attorney-In-Fact. I quote from the University of New Mexico's Judicial Education Center Attorney-at-Law – A licensed advocate or counsel authorized by the courts to prepare, manage and try cases in court, to prepare legal documents, or otherwise represent the interests of citizens. Attorney-in-Fact - A private person (who is not necessarily a lawyer) authorized by another to act in his/her place, either for some particular purpose, as to do a specified act; or for the transaction of business in general, not of legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a letter of attorney, or more commonly a power of attorney. Grammarphobia dated August 23 2012 answers your question. Q: Why is a lawyer called an “attorney at law” and not an “attorney of law”? Doesn’t “at” refer to a place? An MD is a “doctor of medicine” not a “doctor at medicine.” A: In American English, the terms “lawyer,” “attorney,” and “attorney at law” are pretty much interchangeable, according to Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage (3rd ed.). All three refer to “a licensed lawyer.” The legal dictionary, written by Bryan A. Garner, says “lawyer” and “attorney,” the most common of these terms in the US, “are not generally distinguished even by members of the profession.” However, these three terms have had different meanings in different places and times. In England, for example, an attorney used to practice in common-law courts and a solicitor in equity courts. But the term “attorney” developed “an unpleasant smell about it,” Garner writes, and “in the nineteenth century it was supplanted in England by solicitor.” (As the Oxford English Dictionary explains, the word “attorney” was often used reproachfully to mean something like “knave or swindler.”) In the US, on the other hand, the term “attorney” has become a somewhat tony (or, as Garner puts it, more formal and less disparaging) version of “lawyer,” while “solicitor” has taken on an offensive whiff, as in signs like “No Peddlers or Solicitors.” Why, you ask, is an attorney “at” law rather than “of” or “in” law? Doesn’t “at” refer to a place? Well, all three prepositions were used in the past, according to published references in the OED, but they referred to the place where the attorney practiced, not to the practice of law itself. The Oxford editors say “attorney-at-law” (they hyphenate the term) originally referred to a “professional and properly-qualified legal agent practising in the courts of Common Law (as a solicitor practised in the courts of Equity).” Interestingly, the earliest OED citation for “attorney at law,” from William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1768), refers to lawyers at admiralty and ecclesiastical courts, not courts of common law: “An attorney at law answers to the procurator, or proctor, of the civilians and canonists.” (A procurator, or proctor, used to be a legal representative in English admiralty or ecclesiastical courts.) Why, you might wonder, has the term “attorney at law” survived when “attorney” and “lawyer” can do the job just as well with two fewer words? Well, we could be cynical and say that the kind of lawyer who feels it’s classy to be called an “attorney” would probably feel it’s even classier to be called an “attorney at law.” But there’s a more respectable reason for the survival of the longer term. It distinguishes an “attorney at law” (a licensed lawyer) from an “attorney in fact” (someone with a power of attorney to act for another). In fact, when the word “attorney” entered English in the 1300s (borrowed from Old French), it referred to someone “appointed or ordained to act for another; an agent, deputy, commissioner,” according to the OED. Here’s an example from Shakespeare’s The Comedy of Errors (circa 1594): I will attend my husband, be his nurse, Diet his sickness, for it is my office, And will have no attorney but myself; And therefore let me have him home with me. By the 1400s, the word “attorney” was being used to mean a lawyer practicing in the common-law courts in England. But around the same time it took on its negative sense. Here’s a later example from Alexander Pope’s essay Of the Use of Riches (1733): “Vile Attornies, now an useless race.” And here’s one from The Life of Samuel Johnson (1791), by James Boswell: “Johnson observed, that ‘he did not care to speak ill of any man behind his back, but he believed the gentleman was an attorney.’ ” The word “lawyer,” which entered English around the same time as “attorney,” has roots in the Old English word for law, lagu. From the beginning, according to the OED, it meant what it does now: “One versed in the law; a member of the legal profession.” We’ll end with this proverb from The Arte of Rhetorique (1553), by Thomas Wilson: “The lawyer never dieth a begger. The lawyer can never want a livyng till the yearth want men.” | Basically: what Flup said in his last paragraph (and so upvoted accordingly). Every one of the practitioners you named has an undergraduate degree from the UK, and an undergraduate degree from Canada. This, presumably, is because you're not permitted to practise law in most jurisdictions unless you have some kind of qualification in the law of that particular jurisdiction. The laws of each country, and moreover, the way in which cases are decided and in which each country's legal system works, varies so tremendously that you need to study the particulars for each jurisdiction before you can practice there. Regarding Canada: from this site: You must complete a Bachelor of Laws (L.L.B.) program or Juris Doctor (J.D.) program in order to qualify for bar membership in any Canadian province or territory. This generally takes three years to complete. In England and Wales, you can now take a law conversion course in place of an undergraduate law degree as a first stage towards being qualified. I suspect, however, looking at the dates of the judges you list, that the law conversion course wasn't an option at the time they got their qualifications, so their only option was a full undergraduate course. So the answer is: they each have two undergraduate qualifications, one from each jurisdiction, so that they could qualify to practise law in both jurisdictions. | A self-represented person, as a practical matter, has no choice but to engage with the court when an oral argument is conducted. A person present in a courtroom likewise has an obligation to acknowledge a judge addressing them. Usually it wouldn't be contemptuous to fail to appear at oral arguments of a fully briefed matter (e.g. a motion for summary judgment, or an appeal), but it would generally be viewed negatively. One could respond to a question from the court with "I don't really have anything more to say, my brief speaks for itself." And, sometimes a court would leave it at that, but if the court insists there is really no other option than to clarify and explain yourself. Most often, this helps more than hurts a pro se party, although I've certainly seen cases with ghost written pleadings (which are authorized if disclosed in many jurisdictions) where this isn't the case. A fairly common tactic in civil litigation is the take a deposition of a party, or to call a party to the witness stand, and to ask them if they really want the relief that their filed legal documents says that they do, as a way to narrow the scope of the claims brought against the questioning lawyer's client. But, this is less of an issue with a pro se party when the person who drafted the legal documents and the person engaging in oral arguments are the same person. This can't be done in criminal litigation, but I could see a prosecutor trying to do something similar in oral argument, although usually in that context, the judge and not the prosecutor, is asking the questions. | A company had me sign two conflicting documents about two years apart. Which one would apply? Possibly both because actually there is no conflict. What you describe does not reflect that these documents are incompatible or inconsistent. There is no indication that the second document impliedly or explicitly replaces the first one. The second document seems just redundant so far. Employees could likewise be required to sign a third document that only says "no drugs or alcohol on the job site on Wednesdays", and that does not mean that any previous documents they signed expire. | Does this prove that the unlicensed attorney is practicing law outside their jurisdiction and is providing legal advice by representing the "client" in legal negotiations? No. Your quote of the email does not prove that the receiver engaged in unlicensed practice of law. Nor does it prove that the receiver/non-attorney is representing, or advising, the attorney's client or the adversary. It is quite possible and valid for the unlicensed lawyer (example: paralegals) to assist an attorney who actually represents the party. | Different courts have different practices, but I believe the general practice is for plaintiffs to use exhibit numbers, and for defendants to use exhibit letters. As with most procedural questions, the final decision belongs to the judge. The repetition in letters comes in when you get to the end of the alphabet. After you've used A-Z, you go to AA, BB, CC ... ZZ, then AAA, BBB, CCC, and so on. | My lawyer answers my question, thinking he is giving legal advice to a non-client when he is actually answering a client's question. But if you read the FAQ, posts at law.stachexchange are not legal advice. In fact, questions that are so specific as to risk becoming a request for legal advice are routinely closed. But let's go further: The issue at hand is not the one your lawyer is hired to help you with. He is not your lawyer for that issue. Even if we considered the relationship through law.stackexchange legal representation, the conversation would not be privileged. You are posting in a public forum, and expecting reply in the same way. You are free to waive the privilege of communication with your lawyer, and you are doing that by using this way of communicating with him. At this point, the only thing your lawyer would have done would be voluntarily giving for free some info that he could have billed you for. What exactly would be the issue here? It is exactly what pro bono is for. The only way to breach confidentiality would be if your lawyer were to convey things that you said to him confidentially to the public, but here it would not be relevant if the OPs author were already his customer or not. |
Understanding electronic mail marketing under the UK's Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations (PECR) From ICO's guide for electronic mail marketing under PECR: ... you must not send electronic mail marketing to individuals, unless: they have specifically consented to electronic mail from you; or they are an existing customer who bought (or negotiated to buy) a similar product or service from you in the past, and you gave them a simple way to opt out both when you first collected their details and in every message you have sent. Doesn't this clip entrepreneurs' wings? It looks like the effect of this regulation is to prohibit entrepreneurs from marketing their service or product via cold emailing (or any other types of electronic messages, for that matter). I find this greatly confusing. How can a new business (especially a tech business) find its first few customers if not by cold texting in some way or another? Does PECR force new businesses to market themselves strictly in the public domain, e.g. on social media? | How can a new business (especially a tech business) find its first few customers if not by cold texting in some way or another? Don’t know, don’t care. This is Law SE, not Marketing SE. Does PECR force new businesses to market themselves strictly in the public domain, e.g. on social media? Not at all. It prevents spam and is in line with similar laws in most of the World. You can call or SMS people (unless they are in a do not call list), use conventional marketing like radio, TV, direct post but you cannot send spam email. | The second paragraph is an invitation for people who don't want to follow the terms of the GPL (e.g. who want to incorporate it into a larger closed-source work, or make closed-source modifications) to contact XXX for a less onerous (but more expensive) license. That would require that XXX have full rights to the software, that they did not for instance incorporate others' GPLed code. It would be a stretch to read the second paragraph as attempting to limit the first paragraph, particularly given the "please". | Does Amazon prohibit a family of adults from sharing a single Amazon account? No, or at least it seems unlikely. As outlined in my answer & comments on Law Meta, a domestic or family-oriented character is palpable in the clause. That weakens the notion that Amazon's intent is to preclude scenarios which are of a personal-domestic nature and short of commercial/sublicensed use. The language "You are responsible for [...] restricting access to your account" seems more permissive than something akin to "only you are allowed to access your account". The former language is consistent with the term "non-exclusive", which otherwise seems to have no relevance or purpose in the clause. Users' ability (if any) to enter multiple payment methods with different names (i.e., card holder name) could be an additional indication that the scenario you have in mind is acceptable to Amazon. It is easy for a company to implement a validation for the purpose of identifying significant discrepancies of holder names and/or to have the user confirm that all payment methods refer to one same owner. The latter approach is more conclusive for scenarios where a woman has changed names as a result of getting married or divorced. The fact (?) that Amazon declined to include that simple validation weakens the notion that the company is genuinely interested in sticking to a rule of one-person per account. | If the website containing the GDPR-wall processes any personal data of users who hit the GDPR-wall, the GDPR applies to that website. This can be as simple as writing a logfile of all visits to the website. In this case it will be illegal if the website owner does not comply with the GDPR. However a supervisory authority would probably not spent any time on such a minor violation. As long as the the website with the GDPR-wall does not process any personal data, the GDPR does not apply, so nothing in the GDPR can forbid the GDPR-wall. Some related remarks: The GDPR does not require a "privacy policy" on the website if the website does not process any personal data. If personal data is processed based on consent, that consent must be freely given. Also it may not be disruptive. So a cookie wall asking for consent would be illegal. But the GDPR does not care about any other disruptive popups, as long as they are not related to asking for consent. Using GeoIP is a perfect way to implement such a GDPR-Wall, because it would block everyone from within the EU, but nobody else. So it blocks exactly those for who the GDPR would apply. In such a case it would not be reasonable to expect anything more from a website owner. A user which uses a proxy, can not expect to be protected by the GDPR, because it bypasses a restriction set by the owner of the website. A webserver does use the IP-address of all incoming requests, to send the reply back. That could be considered a processing of personal data, but everybody seems to agree it is not. I am not sure why. But I do agree that it would be very impractical if that is considered processing of personal data. I added an example from the Washington Post So you have to pay $9/month for a GDPR compliant subscription. Because the price you have to pay is not unacceptable high, I think it would be valid to offer the premium version this way. This does not force you to choose one of the other subscriptions. In december 2018, the Austrian DPA (DSB) has confirmed that a similar offer is lawful. On derstandard.at you get a choice between free access with tracking and advertising, or pay 6 Euro/Month for tracking free access. Because 6 Euro/Month is cheaper than subscribing to the printed edition, the DSB accepted that as a valid choice. More information can be found on noyb.eu or, (with more details but in German), on wbs-law.de. | In the general case, it seems unlikely, based on the wording (which is convoluted). In certain cases, if the president of Russia posts "My name is Vladimir Putin", that post is personal data. On the other hand, you might, based on my writing, conclude that I am from the US, and you might even conclude that I'm in Washington state, but that doesn't distinguish me from 7.5 million others, so on those grounds that is not personal data. Eventually, though, you might identify me specifically from other things that I may have said on SE. The definition depends on two parts. First, personal data is "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". Any "information" provided by a natural person is "related to" that person (as is any "information" that is about such a person). The second part defines "identifiable natural person", that is, who is an "identifiable person"? Every person can, in principle, be identified by reference to some label or description of fact about them, so every person is an identifiable person, under this definition. This means that every piece of text that refers to an individual (not even text which can identify the person) is "personal data". Obviously, any individual can be uniquely identified by some collection of identifiers; the problem is that the wording of the law does not explicitly say "using that supposed personal data". If I mention that I have a relative named Knudt, that would technically be personal data: I've given information that relates to a person, though you have no idea (and could not possibly figure out) who that person is. Another term that the regulation defines and uses in a few places is "pseudonymization", which is defined as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person The point of interest here is that this says that "personal data" which cannot be attributed to an individual is, nevertheless, still personal data. I think the most important part of the regulation is art. 6, which defines lawfulness of processing, especially para 4., which allows consideration to be given to safeguards such as pseudonymization. | There is nothing illegal with doing this (absent specific contractual terms or industry regulations to the contrary in particular cases, e.g. in the case of export controlled high technology products). This is called operating a wholesale business or operating as a broker. Lots of legitimate legal businesses have this business model. | What Big Tech is doing is spending a lot of money on lawyers and appeals – doesn't matter if it costs millions if you can make money in the meanwhile. Facebook stores a lot of user data in the US. Initially, this was allowed because the US was recognized as offering an adequate level of data protection under the Safe Harbor and later the Privacy Shield Framework. Then Schrems I and Schrems II happened and the adequacy recognition was ruled to be invalid. Does Facebook pull back their user data? No. The GDPR offers alternative reasons why you might process data in foreign countries, such as “standard contractual clauses” (SCCs) or “binding corporate rules” (BCRs). Now, Facebook claims that they are using SCCs. Is this valid? Almost certainly not due to the issues of US law analyzed in the Schrems II case, but it can take years for the next round of court cases to work its way through the system. And when Facebook's use of SCCs is ruled invalid they will probably try BCRs next, and once that is over a decade will have passed and the US might actually have achieved an adequate privacy level by then. You do not have Facebook-style money to spend on lawyers and endless rounds of appeals, so you should avoid legally risky things such as outsourcing data processing activities to companies in the US (this doesn't mean you can't be compliant if you are a US entity). I mentioned adequacy decision previously. There is a list of countries that the EU considers to be sufficiently safe. Currently, the more notable countries involve Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, in addition to EU/EEA countries of course. If you want to process data in a location that is OK for both the UK and the US, then looking at companies in one of these countries is a good idea. For example, if most of your users are in the US but you would like your servers to be in a country with an EU adequacy decision, then looking at Canada could make sense. Even outside of this list, you can process data if you implement additional safeguards via SCCs. However, this requires a case by case analysis of the legal environment in that country. One problem with the US is that it has national security laws that impose requirements on companies in a manner that is incompatible with SCCs. A company bound by these US laws cannot enter into such a contract where it guarantees the privacy of your user's data. Countries other than the EU have much more tedious data residency laws. The GDPR does not impose any data residency requirements in the sense that data must not leave a particular country – you just have to ensure that the data is properly protected. In contrast, Russia and China have real data residency requirements that are fundamentally incompatible with the GDPR. | Building off @DigitalFire's answer, I looked into the TOS related requirements that Google Analytics puts out and I found this on Google Analytic's TOS: You will have and abide by an appropriate privacy policy and will comply with all applicable laws relating to the collection of information from visitors to Your websites. You must post a privacy policy and that policy must provide notice of your use of a cookie that collects anonymous traffic data. Apparently, Google themselves also requires you to notify users when you are using their service to track people (That's pretty good of Google). Here is a simple example of what a privacy policy would look like. There doesn't appear to be any issues with laws in other countries either. For my purposes, I'll just implement an agreement that pops up during installation that users will have to accept. |
How to know if a patent law firm is credible or any good at all? I am researching this company https://boldip.com/ How do I verify that It's even a real law firm It's credible It's great at its practice | As to #1, the US Patent and Trademark Office has a patent practitioner search where you can verify if someone is a registered patent practitioner. If so, it means they passed a [registration process] that evaluates their "legal, scientific, and technical qualifications, as well as good moral character and reputation", as well as a multiple-choice exam. I looked up a few of the attorneys listed on the firm's About Us page and they show up as registered. So this seems like a good indication that they are a "real law firm". This does not address whether they are "credible" (I'm not sure what that means), or how to evaluate the firm's quality, and I will leave it to someone else to answer that. | I've been wondering if it is possible to hire / create a company with someone who would open a restaurant in my place and manage it according to my guidelines. Yes, of course. You can do it just like you described: Create a company, hire employees, (let them) open the restaurant. You, as the owner of the company, could set up whatever guidelines you have in mind, and your employees would be bound by them (limited only by general laws, such as on health and safety). Some caveats, however: You will need money to set this up - for buying / renting space for the restaurant, for paying your employees, obtaining supplies, initial marketing etc. It may take a while until the restaurant earns money (if ever), and you'll need money in the mean time. Someone will need to manage, that is make decisions. You can do that yourself, but then you will work for the restaurant (which you write you do not want to do). Or you can hire someone to do it for you, but that will cost more (in salary), plus you will have to find someone you can trust. That's a tradeoff for you to make. I guess it'd be like an intellectual property. That depends, but usually there will be little in terms of intellectual property. If you have a unique idea for the restaurant, you could patent it, but there are many restrictions on what you can protect, and ways around it, plus this also costs money (a lot if you need a lawyer's advice). Apart from that, you can register a trademark for the restaurant, but that only protects the name / logo, not any ideas. Finally, some of your ideas might be considered trade secrets, but again the protection is limited. In general, there is no blanket "idea protection". If you have a good idea for a restaurant, in most cases other restaurants will be able to copy them, possibly with slight changes - take that into account. | Unless there is something special in Pakistani case law on this topic, it would pass the originality requirement. In my opinion, it is actually very well laid out, and it is clearly not just slapping a few tags on plain text. This article does not indicate any particularly high standards for originality in Pakistan. | In the abstract, two businesses that cooperate in violating a third party's copyright could both face liability. Applying that information to the facts you gave would amount to legal counsel. If you don't want to tell the client 'no,' you should speak to a lawyer about your potential liability. Beyond the legalities, do you really want your portfolio to advertise that you design sites by ripping other sites off? | It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial. | Does this prove that the unlicensed attorney is practicing law outside their jurisdiction and is providing legal advice by representing the "client" in legal negotiations? No. Your quote of the email does not prove that the receiver engaged in unlicensed practice of law. Nor does it prove that the receiver/non-attorney is representing, or advising, the attorney's client or the adversary. It is quite possible and valid for the unlicensed lawyer (example: paralegals) to assist an attorney who actually represents the party. | You are describing a liability suit. My sense is that based on the facts you describe you will face two serious challenges to making a successful case. Damages and liability. In order to win a liability case, you must first establish that you have been damaged in some way. According to your facts, your damages are at best, the replacement value of a used controller. I'm guessing that's what, $20 or so? That doesn't cover the cost of an attorney's time to even begin to hear your version of the facts, much less give you advice or pursue a case for you. After you establish damages, you must prove the company is responsible or has some share of liability for causing your damages. Again, I think this is going to be an obstacle for you. Not placing a warning that the game will affect you by causing you to throw your controller and be mean to your mom would be unprecedented if you were to prevail. AFAIK. | I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? You have probably waived your claim if you proceed with the deal knowing about the Realtor's conduct. What would your damages be? Could you have mitigated them by not agreeing to the deal? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this? Lawyers aren't that specialized. I would not recognize a "personal" attorney as something necessarily different from a "Real estate attorney" and the questions involved are not so complex that a general practice attorney couldn't handle them. Familiarity with real estate issues would be desirable (e.g. you wouldn't want to hire someone whose practice was exclusively as a criminal defense attorney or a personal injury lawyer, or a patent lawyer, for this task), but a great many lawyers who describe their practices differently would have the relevant experience and knowledge. |
idea behind crime punishment What is the idea behind putting people who commited a crime into prison? What such a state does is an act, that if a person does to a different person, it is called limiting someone's freedom, which is a crime. So the country basically applies a principle "eye for an eye" by sending people to prison. The idea "eye for an eye" is basically a revenge. Isn't there a better principle to apply? Thank you. | canada Principles of sentencing I question your premise that the country applies an "eye for an eye" principle to sentencing. In Canada, for example, the declared purposes of sentencing do not include revenge. The purposes of sentencing is listed at s. 718 of the Criminal Code: 718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. This is described in more detail in this Parliamentary research paper. It discusses the purposes of sentencing including non-custodial (out-of-prison) sentences. Prison abolition / decarceral options Regardless, many people are imagining and working towards a legal system with less imprisonment. This activism and research is characterized as "decarceral" or "abolitionist." Here is some material about this ("Intro to Abolition", noprisons.ca and their Syllabus: "Abolition in So-Called Canada"). | Generally not. A judge in sentencing has a number of options subject to the statute or common law. A fine may be one option, imprisonment another. Others include community service, a suspended sentence or death. What they choose is (subject to appeal or commutation) what you do. You can't substitute one for the other. | What they teach in self-defense courses is legally irrelevant, though has a practical basis. Under the law, options 1 and 2 are "preferred" because those actions cannot be considered criminal. Shooting a person is potentially a crime (assault or homicide): but it can be legally excused under those circumstances deemed to be "self defense". If shooting a person is justified in self defense, it isn't assault or murder. It is legally "better" to main than to kill, because maiming is less force than killing, and the general rule is that one should use the least force necessary to defend yourself. That is because on the one hand you should not use force against another person, but on the other hand you have a right to live and if a person attempts to deprive you of your life, you are justified to use force to stop them. The degree of force allowed is related to the threat posed. Every legal system encourages putting "shoot to kill" in last place – no jurisdiction favors using maximum possible force in self defense. I think what is confusing you is that as a practical matter, shooting to maim is riskier, and the consequences of erring in favor of less force may be your death. It has nothing to do with killing witnesses (which is illegal), even if that is what they taught you in your self defense class. Brandishing a weapon is also illegal but involves even less force, and is even less effective as a means of self defense. | In the US, if a person enters a guilty plea, a judge may proceed to convict and sentence the accused without any form of trial. In the case of minor offenses with possible penalties of less than six months in jail, there is no US constitutional right to a jury trial. and the accused may be convicted and sentenced after a bench trial with no jury. In the case of infractions that are not criminal, such as many traffic offenses, a judge or magistrate may make a judgment and impose a penalty after a brief and often informal hearing. In some non-US jurisdictions, there is no right to a jury trial even in serious cases. In most such jurisdictions some form of due process and some hearing or trial is required for conviction. However, in various authoritarian regimes, people may be "convicted" of "crimes" without anything like a trial before an independent tribunal. In short, this depends on the nature of the case, and the laws of the jurisdiction involved. | Any country is free to decide what actions are considered to be crimes, and what crimes are prosecuted depending on whether you perform the action in the country, outside the country, and depending on whether you are a citizen, a resident, both, or neither. They can also decide what are accepted defences in court and which are not. Any other country is free to decide under which circumstances they will ever extradite someone to that first country. Now you have to check the laws of the individual countries. | As far as I understand, no one can jail anyone as a result of a civil matter. I can't just say, hey! You did this! I'm taking you to jail. You simply don't have the reason and authority to do so - and I doubt the jails would want random people coming in for random reasons. Courts also don't send people to jail for this. As far as I understand, you can only be jailed by a judge for a criminal matter. However, you can go to jail as a result of a civil matter. When this happens, you need to found guilty of a criminal offence, most notably Contempt of Court. You can be found guilty of that offence if you don't respond/comply to the court's instructions - such as failing to repay debts. In order to be found in contempt, the court needs to find that you also intended to refuse the court's instruction (this is known as mens rea). If you were found liable, the court would not send you to jail. They would instead tell you to repay the damages that you owed the creditor (the person who filed suit). Inability to do this does not result in contempt of court, however, you should generally let the court know of this. In terms of this, the court can allow the creditor to garnish wages, have scheduled payments... etc of the debtor. To answer the main question, the only time that the court will jail a person will be upon conviction of a criminal offence (such as contempt of court), and not a civil matter (such as liability). | Extradition is done for specific charges. A principle found in virtually all extradition treaties called the "rule of specialty" says that the country requesting extradition may not prosecute the defendant for any crimes except the ones for which extradition was granted without the permission of the extraditing country, except for crimes committed after the defendant is extradited. This protection expires once the defendant has been released from jail and had a fair chance to leave the country. The rule of specialty doesn't necessarily mean the other charge needs to be dropped, but the defendant can't be tried for it as long as the rule applies. If they're later in the country for another reason (or don't leave when they have the chance), they can potentially be rearrested for the other crime. But as long as they're only in the country because they were extradited, they can't be tried for any other past crimes without the extraditing country's permission. | You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey. |
What laws govern, empower, or limit indiscriminate accusatory TV Licensing mailings? Anyone who has lived in the UK knows about postal TV license fee spam. These gaslighting, accusatory and threatening letters seem to verge on extortion, and are regularly received by households who do not watch any TV. What is the worst that can happen due to ignoring these seemingly empty threats, who sends them out, what powers do they have, and is it not illegal for them to send these threatening letters groundlessly? | The law doesn't work like that. You don't need a law to allow you to send someone a letter, just as you don't need a law to allow you to do anything at all. You are free to do anything you like unless there is a law which says you can't do that thing. There is no law which specifically says that TV licensing cannot write to unlicensed properties. More generally, there is Section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which provides at sub-section 1: A person must not pursue a course of conduct — (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. Sub-section 3 provides that the above rule is not breached if "in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable." Section 7 provides that "course of conduct" means there must be at least two occasions of that conduct, and that harassment includes alarm and distress. It is a fast and straightforward matter to notify TV licensing that you don't need a TV Licence. You are free to do that at any point before or after you receive a letter. If you do so, they will stop writing to you for two years. It seems unlikely therefore that a court would make a finding of harassment. It is reasonable conduct for TV Licensing to write to properties which its records show are unlicensed given that they will stop doing so if you ask them to. "What is the worst that can happen due to ignoring these seemingly empty threats?" If you do not do any of the following: Install or use a television receiver. Have in your possession or control a television receiver which you intend to install or use or which you know or believe someone else intends to install or use, then you can safely ignore the letters free of consequence. If you do any of the above then you will commit an offence under Section 363 of the Communications Act 2003 and you can be prosecuted. | Say I build myself a faraday cage/wave screen around my house, potentially resulting in poor nework coverage for my neighbours. Questions about land property and constructing permits apart, can I be sued for that? By the network operator? by the neighbours? In most countries, the use of the radio spectrum is regulated (who may send what on which frequency, at which power, etc.). As part of these regulations it is usually forbidden to interfere with the reception of radio waves. So if what you do causes your neighbours to have reception problems, then yes, that will most likely be illegal. In France, the government agency responsible for these problems is ARCEP (Autorité de Régulation des Communications Électroniques et des Postes). If someone notices reception problems, they can complain to ARCEP, as explained for example on the page Le traitement des plaintes en brouillage ("Handling of complaints about jamming"). While you will probably not go to prision for jamming reception, you could have to pay a significant fine. This article on cell phone jamming mentions a penalty of "up to six months in prison or a 30,000 € fine" for "selling or installing" a cell phone jammer. In addition to that, anyone harmed by the reception problems could sue you in civil court and try to collect financial damages (how much that would be will be up to a judge to decide). That said, note that a faraday cage around your house should not hinder reception outside your house. A faraday cage only influences reception inside the cage, not outside. However, that is off-topic here :-). | Point three should include "to the best of my knowledge and belief", or be modified to state that none of those "house or the adjacent shop" have informed the affiant of any such delivery, or delivered any such package to the affiant. It might add that the affiant had questioned such persons and they denied receiving such a delivery. The point here, of course, is to prove that the package was never properly delivered, no doubt in support of a claim on the delivery service. The ordinary assumption is that if a person in the "house or the adjacent shop" had accepted a package, it would normally have been given to the addressee at an early opportunity. | Short Answer Based on the facts you supplied, it seems the author's request for removal might be unenforceable. Explanation Section 2.a.1. of the license declares the license is irrevocable. [Emphasis added]: Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to: A. reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and B. produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material. Irrevocable means: "Unable to cancel or recall; that which is unalterable or irreversible." Disclaimer: I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. So don't rely on my answer for anything. Hire a real attorney if you need help with a legal matter. Never take legal advice from strangers on the internet. Treat all answers on this site the same way you would as if they came from a bunch of strangers at a party who got all their legal information by watching episodes of Boston Legal, The Practice and Ally McBeal. But have lots of opinions they are willing to share on legal questions nevertheless. | Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz. | Can he name a particalur one, like Linkin Park? Or that would be considered non-allowed type of advertising? Generally speaking, that does not constitute unlawful advertising. Public figures are allowed to broadcast their preferences on issues that are more sensitive than topics of music. There might be few, rare exceptions where something like this would be outlawed, but most likely that has to do with a regime's censorship of specific bands or music styles rather than with a general prohibition. | Nobody so far has discussed Electoral law e.g. Representation of the People Act 1983 There are various clauses that may be relevant, one of which is: A voter shall be guilty of bribery if before or during an election he directly or indirectly by himself or by any other person on his behalf receives, agrees, or contracts for any money, gift, loan or valuable consideration, office, place or employment for himself or for any other person for voting or agreeing to vote or for refraining or agreeing to refrain from voting. Subsection 2 similarly makes it an offence to offer employment to induce any voter to vote or refrain from voting but somewhat less concisely. I believe this would make such a contract unenforceable. | The funding of public-service broadcasting in Germany was changed effective 2013-01-01. Under the current rules (Rundfunkbeitragsstaatsvertrag, in German), a monthly fee is to be paid for every single unit of housing (flat or single-family house), unless it is uninhabitated. It is otherwise immaterial how many people live there or whether any of them owns a receiver¹ or not. Certain people are exempt from the broadcasting fee or eligible to a reduced fee; however, in a multi-person housing unit, this only applies if each inhabitant satisfies the criteria for exemption or reduction. The “ARD ZDF Deutschlandradio Beitragsservice”, or Beitragsservice² for short, is the entity tasked with collecting the broadcasting fees. According to section 2(1) of the Rundfunkbeitragsstaatsvertrag, if a housing unit has multiple inhabitants, they are jointly and severally liable for the broadcasting fee. This means that the Beitragsservice gets to choose which inhabitant they claim the money from; and apparently, in your case, they have chosen you. You, in turn, can claim a proportionate amount of the fee from your flatmates or former flatmates, according to general principles of civil law. This may be difficult in practice, though, if your former flatmates aren’t willing to pay or are hard to reach; enforcing your claim may be time-consuming and costly. Regarding the announced visit, I can only speculate. One possibility is that the Beitragsservice might want to check whether your flat is really just a single unit of housing; if one of your flatmates, e.g., has a separate entrance, their room might be another unit for which they would have to pay their own broadcasting fee. (Note that Beitragsservice representatives have no special rights; you are never required to invite them in.) A second, more unpleasant possibility is that the matter has already progressed and a bailiff will appear in order to carry out a distraint. (They do have special rights, and it is not a good idea to try and lock them out.) If the letter is indeed from the city administration, that unfortunately hints at the second possibility. In that case, you should definitely see a lawyer, as soon as possible. ¹ Note that under the rules valid until 2012, where it did matter, a computer with Internet access was also considered a radio, termed a “neuartiges Rundfunkgerät” (“novel radio receiver”). ² It used to be known as Gebühreneinzugszentrale, GEZ, an acronym that is still often used informally. |
GDPR storing vs processing / computing data (failover scenarios) I'm having a hard time understanding what exactly is meant by 'data processing' in GDPR. There's one specific scenario which I'll explain later, but I will first try to simplify my question. Let's say I have 2 servers: one running a database and one is a HTTP web server. The database is located in the EU and stores privacy sensitive data. The HTTP web server is located outside the EU but doesn't store any data. Would it violate GDPR if a consumer would enter privacy sensitive data which is sent to the HTTP web server and then stored on the database server when no trace of the data is left on the HTTP web server? This might sound like an odd question, so let me elaborate. In a real-world scenario, there would be (at-least) 4 servers: 2 databases 2 HTTP web servers For each server type, one is located in the EU, and the other is not. The database in the EU stores all EU data. The database outside will never contain any EU privacy sensitive data. Now, we define a single entry point for the 2 HTTP web servers. You could do this using Azure Traffic Manager which utilizes the DNS protocol to balance the load between the 2 servers. Usually, the entry point will route all EU traffic through the HTTP server in the EU. Unless the server in the EU goes down. The entry point will then direct traffic from the EU to the HTTP server outside the EU. Based on the authentication information provided the non-EU web server still knows the request is GDPR bound, so it will use the EU database to handle the request. Would this violate GDPR? | You're probably making an “international transfer” here, but that doesn't mean it is illegal. The GDPR has a very broad concept of “personal data” and of “processing”. Per Art 4(2), ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction Which I would summarize as: pretty much anything you do with the personal data counts as “processing”. So yes, your non-EU servers would be processing the personal data in HTTP requests, even when those servers aren't directly storing the personal data. Chapter V of the GDPR applies to Any transfer of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer to a third country […] Per this definition, the question whether an international transfer occurred is inextricably linked with the question whether the data is being processed in the destination country. The generally accepted interpretation here is that mere transfer through a country does not constitute processing. For example, if your requests happen to take a network route through other countries, that wasn't an international transfer. But your HTTP server is definitely doing processing, even if it doesn't store the data persistently. If the HTTP server is in a non-EU country, then you have to consider how this transfer of data is protected. You're supposed to uphold the high GDPR data protection standards regardless of where the processing occurs. Some countries have been granted an EU adequacy decision, meaning that their data protection laws are sufficiently similar to EU laws and no extra bureaucracy is needed for that transfer. The transfer still needs to be noted in your privacy notice (compare Art 13(1)(f)). In other cases, you may be able to rely on “standard contractual clauses” (SCCs), which are pre-formulated contracts provided by the EU that translate relevant GDPR aspects into a private contract between the data exporter and data importer. However, you as a data controller must make sure that the data importer is legally able to enter into that contract. For example, the terms of these SCCs are incompatible with US national security laws, meaning that US companies might not be able to enter into the SCCs. There are a couple of other ways to authorize international transfers, but they are mostly relevant for multinational groups of companies, or in exceptional situations. In any case, other GPDR requirements like the need to have a suitable contract with your data processors remain unaffected. Also unaffected is the obligation to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the compliance and security of your processing activities (e.g. see Art 24 and Art 32 of the GDPR). For example, this may imply the need to implement suitable encryption. In the wake of the Schrems II ruling that struck down the EU–US “Privacy Shield” adequacy decision, the EDPB published recommendations on extra compliance measures that could allow SCCs to remain valid for EU–US data transfers. But it's not easy to defend data processing activities when potential adversaries include literally the NSA, and measures such as end-to-end encryption (E2EE) are incompatible with cloud services that are more interesting than backup storage. Practically speaking, I would reconsider an architecture that would allow failover of EU data processing operations to non-EU locations, unless those target countries are covered by an adequacy decision. If you need a high availability setup for EU activities, it may be more appropriate to maintain multiple deployments within the EU. | The status of any PII (Personally Identifiable Information) is the same in GDPR regardless of location, or who enters it. Its goals are (among others) to stop any actor (company / government or other) from hiding responsibility about their use and practices around people's data. GDPR does even apply to anything offline and on paper. Basically it means you have to validate any entry field is free of PII before processing it. Or make it clear in your privacy statement how you handle this use-case. | I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data? | Please note that Google Analytics do not anonymize the data you collect on its behalf unless you configure it to do IP-anonymization. If you use Google Analytics and do not use this feature, you need to have a DPA (Data Processing Addendum) in place with Google in order to comply with the GDPR. This is a real hassle, so unless you absolutely need fine-grained demographic data, it is strongly recommended that you use IP-anonymization. According to our data protection supervisory authority, this is sufficient to comply with the GDPR vis-a-vis Google Analytics. Does data that is anonymized need to be collect in the event of a GDPR Subject Access Request? No. But as the controller, you need to make sure that is is anonymized. | The GDPR does indeed require that the password be stored "securely". It does not specify the technology which must be used for that purpose. Hashing the PW is a common method, and should be sufficient if properly implemented (strong hash function, use of salt, etc). But other methods of securing the password might be sufficient. Encrypting the PW rather than hashing it, so that an authorized person could decrypt it temporarily might be OK. Or perhaps a security app can separately retrieve only the specified characters of the PW through some sort of encryption. Or perhaps the ISP is not using proper security. In the case of Knuddles in the linked news story, an actual breach occurred which led to the poor security being reported. You could send a report to the appropriate national Data Protection Authority. | Alice's business sells database management software. Organisations buy or licence the software, deploy it on hardware they control and use the software to help store and, process and analyse 'personal data' within the meaning of GDPR. Alice's business has no access whatsoever to the personal data being stored and processed by those organisations. In respect of that personal data, GDPR is not engaged by Alice's business. The business is neither a 'controller' nor 'processor' of that personal data. Who does the data protection law apply to? - European Commission Who does the UK GDPR apply to? - Information Commissioner's Office | Yes, GDPR applies: you are a data controller established/living in the UK or are offering services to people in the UK you fall under the material scope of the GDPR. The Art 2(2)(c) exemption for “purely personal or household activity” does not apply since you're offering the service to the public. You must consider GDPR compliance here. This is especially important as you are showing personal data to the public. Don't do that unless you have a very good reason, appropriate safeguards, and are clear to users how their information will be shown. On a high level, GDPR compliance involves working on the following questions: For what purpose are you processing personal data? Context: purpose limitation principle per GDPR Art 5(1)(b) What is the legal basis for processing? GDPR Art 6(1) lists the available legal bases. Here, consent, necessity for performance of a contract, or a legitimate interest could be a legal basis. They may have further obligations attached. A legitimate interest requires a balancing test that considers the data subject's rights and freedoms. Consent must fulfil the conditions per Art 7 in order to be valid. What is the minimal data necessary to achieve the purpose? Per the Art 5(1)(c) data minimisation principle, it is illegal to process personal data beyond what is necessary and adequate. You must provide data protection by design and by default per Art 25. Special categories of data per Art 9 such as health data are illegal to process outside of narrow exemptions. You must delete data once it is no longer necessary. What appropriate safeguards and security measures should you apply? Per Art 24 and 25, you are responsible for determining and implementing appropriate measures. This depends a lot on your specific context, so there's no checklist you can apply. Per Art 25(1) you must pseudonymize the processed information if that is compatible with the processing purpose. What further compliance measures do you have to consider? There are additional GDPR and non-GDPR compliance measures. From the GDPR side: Use the answers to these questions to write a privacy policy, including the information that you must provide to data subjects per Art 13. Consider whether you have to maintain a Records of Processing document per Art 30, or if you have to make a Data Protection Impact Assessment per Art 35. If you use third party services, figure out whether they are a joint controller or data processor and apply appropriate safeguards. If you have data processors, ensure that you have a contract in place that covers the items from Art 28(3). If you share data with other controllers (not processors) you need a legal basis for doing so. If you transfer data into a non-EU/EEA country (after 2020: non-UK country) you need a legal basis per Art 44 and have to cover additional items in your privacy policy. Ideally, the target country is covered by an EC adequacy decision per Art 45. For US-based companies, this is the case only when they have self-certified under the Privacy Shield framework. Non-GDPR compliance steps could include cookie consent banners, or showing a VAT ID. How can you prepare for data subject requests? Data subjects have various rights per Arts 15–23, subject to the modalities in Art 12. For example, a data subject could request that their information is erased from your website. The exact rights also depend on the legal basis you selected. You should figure out in advance how to deal with such requests. | GDPR gives you a lot of flexibility here to choose either DPA. From Art 77: Without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, every data subject shall have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of his or her habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement if the data subject considers that the processing of personal data relating to him or her infringes this Regulation. However, the DPA from the company's country would be designated the lead supervisory authority for this investigation. If multiple DPAs are involved, they would coordinate with each other. There is no EU body that you could contact directly. But if the different DPAs have a dispute regarding this investigation, the EDPB would provide a consistency mechanism. This mechanism has been used in the past e.g. to force the Irish DPA to correctly apply the GDPR against companies from the Meta group, like WhatsApp and Instagram. Though it might slow things down, it could be advantageous to have multiple DPAs involved, precisely so that the investigation is double-checked. If the lead supervisory authority declines the case, this would also enable the other DPA to do its own investigation. So, it would be a good idea to lodge a complaint with the DPA of your home country, and let it forward the issue to other DPAs as needed. However, contacting the DPA in the company's country would also be fine, especially if you are fluent in the relevant official language, and/or if you live in Ireland. |
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