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Is it legal to pretend to be the British monarch? Is it legal for John Doe, in the UK, to claim to be king of the UK and insist on being called His Majesty King John II? I'm not asking about impersonating the actual monarch (e.g. claiming to be King Charles III), but keeping one's real name but calling oneself King or Queen. | It depends where one does this. In the UK, I believe it is a crime to falsely claim to be the monarch. Lady Jane Grey was beheaded for doing so. The charge was treason. In any other places it is probably not a crime, but might be viewed as evidence of insanity. A comment mentioned Emperor Norton who lived from 1818 to 1880, largely in the US city of San Francisco. He proclaimed himself "Emperor of the United States". He was treated as a piece of "local color", not as a criminal. According to the Wikipedia article on him (linked above): Norton had no formal political power; nevertheless, he was treated deferentially in San Francisco, and currency issued in his name was honored in the establishments that he frequented. Some considered him insane or eccentric, but citizens of San Francisco celebrated his imperial presence and his proclamations, such as his order that the United States Congress be dissolved by force and his numerous decrees calling for the construction of a bridge and tunnel crossing San Francisco Bay to connect San Francisco with Oakland. Though Norton received many favors from the city, merchants also capitalized on his notoriety by selling souvenirs bearing his name. | Napoleon was never a prisoner of war, since he surrendered, as you say, after the conclusion of hostilities. If a label is necessary, he was probably a prisoner of State; but the important point was that in Rochefort he surrendered not, as in 1814, to the Allied Powers but to the British Government specifically: he dictated a letter on 13 July 1815 to George III including the lines "I come, like Themistocles, to throw myself on the hospitality of the British people. I put myself under the protection of their laws". (Since the French government had declared several of Napoleon's followers traitors and written to one of his staff "The interests of the State and the safety of his person make it absolutely necessary [for Napoleon to leave France as soon as possible]" and the Prussian and Russian governments would cheerfully have hanged him [no citation, but the behaviour of the occupying armies leaves little doubt], it is probable that this was less a grand gesture and more a necessity.) It is clear from his correspondence that Napoleon was envisaging some sort of genteel retirement like that of his brother Lucien, who was living in a country house under the supervision of a single police inspector; but this was never realistic, and the captain of the Bellerophon wrote specifically "I have no authority to agree to any such arrangement...I cannot enter into any promise as to the reception he may meet with" [from the British Government]; Napoleon decided to surrender nevertheless. It is interesting that Lord Liverpool (the Prime Minister) decided not merely not to imprison Bonaparte in the Tower as the newspapers were suggesting, but not to allow him to set foot in England: whether this was to avoid legal complications or to prevent a possible rescue attempt will never be known. But is is clear that after 15 July 1815 Napoleon had placed himself entirely in the power of the British Government, to be imprisoned or dealt with as they pleased. [Quotations as in Cordingly's Billy Ruffian, since it is to hand; but the best treatment of those days is Gilbert Martineau's Napoleon Surrenders.] | You didn't bother to state who this appeal is with or even where you are but I'm almost certain I know the answer. Just once. If the appeal is denied, you may be able to appeal to a higher body such as a higher court or an ombudsman. However, any group or court allowing the same appeal ad infinitum until you get what you want would be farcical. | The UDHR does not create enforceable rights. It is aspirational and not self-executing. This said, calling a legally recognized relationship a "civil union" rather than a "marriage" does not inherently violate the UDHR any more than using the Mandarin or Swahili word for marriage instead of the English one would. A marriage is just a bundle of rights and responsibilities, the UDHR does not tightly constrain what must be included in that bundle, and it is surely the substance rather than the mere terminology that matters for determining if rights have been violated. Something fairly described as marriage must be available to all, but a rose by any other name would be just as sweet. Civil law countries already distinguish between legal marriage, which basically is a "civil union" and religious marriage, which is deinstitutionalized. | To paraphrase the Princess Bride: "I don't think those words mean what you think they do". The "truther-activist", "sovereign citizen", and "Citizen vs. Human Being" concepts will only hurt you. It has never succeeded, to my knowledge; It has failed multiple times. Let me tell you a little about myself to illustrate what I mean: I am a software developer (and it seems from your profile, you are at least somewhat computer inclined, so this will hopeful make sense to you). The business side of the company I work for think that myself and my team write "magic code", and having the system do whatever they ask for is just a matter of pressing enough buttons in the correct order. It totally insane, and it completely analogous to what you are propose. The court is a carefully designed system, and you don't have the power to make arbitrary changes to it. Certainly not through the "arbitrary button presses" of "legal fiction". Some things to note Legal fictions are never summoned. People are. Organizations are. See initial paraphrase with regards to "legal fiction". Your legal fiction has not been summoned, you have. You will be appearing as yourself, not a straw man. I'm sorry to break it to you, but whomever you have heard this from is wrong, and in the most best case scenario, they are confusing what they want to be true for reality. If they have received any money from you in relation to this opinion, then they are almost certainly a scammer and a liar. If you insist on going further with this nonsense, then you WILL lose, regardless of what actual facts you have. My condolences. Now, to answer the question you asked: Yes, you can file a monition for discovery before first appearance (but not before pleading). You can file by mail, and in some jurisdictions, online. Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/goingtocourt/caseBasics.shtml. | By changing the name, the filmmakers are signaling that the character in the movie is not acting the way the real-life person acted. It is not uncommon for historical fiction--which is basically what the "Moneyball" film is--to combine historical characters for narrative purposes, or to invent new characters to drive the plot. If you see a movie where Henry V stops to talk to Joe Welshman, a common soldier, before a battle, you assume that Henry V was at that battle, but you don't assume that the soldier is a historical person whose words with the king happened to be recorded on a nearby tape recorder. So, if you watch a movie where some characters have real people's names, like Billy Beane, and others have invented names, like Peter Brand, you don't necessarily assume that Brand represents a one-to-one correspondence with one real person. More likely, his part represents things that were done by multiple people, or were done in a different way that is not as narratively convenient. As you say, if you read the book, you will recognize the character--but you will also recognize the changes, and understand why the name was changed. | Presumably you mean "and make untrue accusations of wrong-doing". In the US, defamation involves statements about a legal person, and a place, government or government body, or industry is not a legal personal (a specific business can be, however). In the course of "defaming" a city, you might end up defaming a supposedly fictitious individual who bears a striking resemblance to a real person, for example a made-up New York real estate tycoon named Ronald Rump who runs for president. Or you could defame the "police department of Bug Tussle" which in fact is composed of only one person -- that is, you refer to a group but the group is so small that it actually refers to an identifiable individual. See this answer regarding defaming people in fiction. Okay, it's not actually true that a government can't be a legal person. The fact that in the US a government can't sue for defamation would be rooted in the First Amendment, and is surely embodied in case law that is lurking. In Canada, governments have had more power to pursue critic via defamation suits. In Ontario, Halton Hills (Town) v. Kerouac 80 O.R. (3d) 577 (2006) says that "a government may not sue in defamation". I expect that there is some such ruling in the history of US law. | I emailed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in the USA asking this and received the reply: "There is nothing to prevent you from marketing antiques in the UK while present in the US." I also contacted a relevant US attorney and received: "There’s nothing in your question which would implicate Colorado or US law. If you're a UK citizen, and the sale is happening in the UK while you're in the US, then the US has anything to do with it. So as long as the UK doesn’t have any problem with it, the US will not." So I would conclude this question fairly answered. |
Selling a house providing the financing yourself for the buyer Is it possible if I own outright my flat to sell it to the buyer where I provide the financing for the buyer to buy it off me? The flat is difficult to otherwise get a mortgage on. I presume this will require regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) but is it even possible to do this once without a company that does this as a general product? | Jurisdiction: england-and-walesnorthern-ireland The relevant legislation here is the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 together with subordinate legislation passed under that Act. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000: Section 19: (1) No person may carry on a regulated activity in the United Kingdom, or purport to do so, unless he is - (a) an authorised person; or (b) an exempt person. Section 22: (1) An activity is a regulated activity for the purposes of this Act if it is an activity of a specified kind which is carried on by way of business and - (a) relates to an investment of a specified kind; or (b) in the case of an activity of a kind which is also specified for the purposes of this paragraph, is carried on in relation to property of any kind. (5) “Specified” means specified in an order made by the Treasury. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001: Article 4: The following provisions of this Part specify kinds of activity for the purposes of section 22(1) of the Act (and accordingly any activity of one of those kinds, which is carried on by way of business, and relates to an investment of a kind specified by any provision of Part III and applicable to that activity, is a regulated activity for the purposes of the Act. Article 61: (1) Entering into a regulated mortgage contract as lender is a specified kind of activity. (3) In this Chapter — (a) subject to paragraph (5), a contract is a “regulated mortgage contract” if, at the time it is entered into, the following conditions are met — (i) the contract is one under which a person (“the lender”) provides credit to an individual or to trustees (“the borrower”); (ii) the contract provides for the obligation of the borrower to repay to be secured by a mortgage on land; (iii) at least 40% of that land is used, or is intended to be used — (aa) in the case of credit provided to an individual, as or in connection with a dwelling; or (bb) in the case of credit provided to a trustee which is not an individual, as or in connection with a dwelling by an individual who is a beneficiary of the trust, or by a related person; but such a contract is not a regulated mortgage contract if it falls within article 61A(1) or (2). Article 73: The following kinds of investment are specified for the purposes of section 22 of the Act. Article 88: Rights under a regulated mortgage contract. So, if you are providing the mortgage to someone who will live at the property and are doing so by way of business (likely unless this is an arrangement with a friend or relative) then you will need to be FCA authorised unless there is an applicable exemption. See Chapter XV of Part II of the Regulated Activities Order and Section 38 FSMA and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Exemption) Order 2001 for examples of exemptions. A full analysis of financial services regulation would be too dense to fit into a Stack Exchange post and you should seek specialised legal advice before considering entering into any kind of mortgage as a lender. "is it even possible to do this once without a company that does this as a general product?" It doesn't matter whether you are a company or whether you do it once or regularly. However, due to the costs and practicalities of obtaining FCA authorisation (where applicable) and ensuring that contracts and land registry charges are correctly drawn up (given the high stakes), you are unlikely to see many one-off or "amateur" mortgages in the real world. | A lease of land is not the same as a residential lease, the latter being strongly regulated by special laws. So caveat emptor is the default rule for land leases (see this article). You have to look at the laws of your state, but let's take Washington as an example. This is not a residential tenancy which is subject to different laws, it's just leasing land, similar to leasing a chainsaw or a car. Your implied warranty would be that the land is fit for the ordinary purposes for which land is used, and that is all. It might be worth wondering about whether building a cabin on the land changes your property tax liability. | Colorado statute 42-6-206 imposes disclosure requirements on the sale of vehicles with salvage titles. That you didn't know it was a salvage does not seem to be of concern to this particular statute. This means that you are potentially entitled to redress against the people who sold you the car as well, provided the sale occurred in Colorado and they failed to disclose it to you (i.e., you didn't just forget about it in the intervening years). Given the presence of a law specifically covering your circumstances, it may be worth consulting with a local attorney to see what your obligations are. There may be mitigating circumstances, but they are not currently obvious to me if they're there. (conventional wisdom in the industry is that all private sales are "as-is" with no implied warranty of merchantibility and no recourse for a buyer who doesn't do due diligence -- I was shocked to find a statute specifically protecting buyers of salvage vehicles) | It's important to be absolutely clear on what is being sold. Using English translations may affect the outcome. Assuming "SoleTraderCompA" is an Einzelunternehmen, the sale would be an asset sale. The company isn't sold, because the company is legally identical to person A! Instead, person A makes an extensive list of all assets he's selling (goods, real estate, intellectual property, etcetera). "SoleTraderCompA" might be a trade mark, in which case the trade mark can be sold. Person B can also be an Einzelunternehmen, and as part of its business operations buys aforementioned assets from person A. But in general, any legal entity can buy the assets of person A, including a GmbH or AG. | He may be entitled to (part) of the deposit or he may owe you more money When you and he agreed you both entered a legally binding contract - you are obliged to sell the vehicle to him, he is obliged to buy the vehicle from you. The deposit is merely the first instalment of the payment for the vehicle with the balance being due on delivery. They are not refundable by default. He now wants to repudiate the contract and you have several options: you can refuse his repudiation and require him to complete the contract within a reasonable time. He probably won’t do this so when he doesn’t we move on to one of the other options. In essence, this is simply a warning shot that if he doesn’t complete the contract you will move on to item 2. you can accept the repudiation and sue for damages, these would include your lost rent, pro-rata of registration, insurance etc. from the time you would have sold to the time you do sell, any additional advertising, any difference in the price you ultimately get if it is lower than his offer etc. you can accept the repudiation in return for keeping the deposit in lieu of the actual damages. This in makes the deposit a liquidated damages amount and it must follow all the same rules, basically it must be a genuine pre-estimate of the damage you would suffer and not be so high that it amounts to a penalty. You can accept the repudiation and, as a gesture of goodwill, return some or all of the deposit. | user662852 has a good point -- whoever own the property has the right to make the rules. Is the property, land+construction in fact your's or does it belong to the HOA who just grant you access as a lease holder? Different states has different rules, but in my state it is illegal to maroon a property and there must be a access to public streets even when this necessitate passing over somebody else land. However that is irrelevant if the HOA owns the land your house is build on. I think you will have to look at your HOA agreement and see what it says. | Since the contingency is in the contract and has not been removed, if the purchase falls through due to not selling the existing property, they will get their earnest money back. That was the whole point of putting the contingency in the contract in the first place. | united-states Meet the word "clawback". The general rule is that anything you do simply for asset protection can be undone by the government or courts. See the excellent book by Adkisson and Riser titled Asset Protection. First, the creditor is going to ask about all your assets including transfers. You have to answer truthfully, or else you open a whole other can of worms. The creditor and court will look at the character of these transactions. Suppose you sell a Ferrari worth $200,000 appraised value, to your brother for $155,000. However, it was an open eBay auction. Plaintiffs review it, hoping to find it was a "vest pocket" sale rigged to be unappealing to anyone but family. Wrong: it was a competent and earnest listing, which did attract 12 stranger bidders, and 3 bidders took up your offer to let them inspect the car. And according to Ferrari brokers that price was realistic given the soft market. Your brother simply outbid them, for nostalgia reasons. You did get the money and did use it to settle with creditors. That sale will be considered legitimate, because there's extensive provenance held in reliable third party hands (eBay). You sell the Ferrari for $100 to your brother. The court will presume that you intend to buy the car back for $100 after your legal troubles have cleared. This sale will be declared invalid, the Ferrari clawed back, and the creditor will be able to target that asset. The same thing can happen if you are insolvent, expect to enter bankruptcy, and pay a creditor "out of turn". E.G. you settle your debt with the country club (so you can keep attending) before you pay your tax bill. The creditors, IRS or court can "claw back" that payment. That happened to my family's business once. Meet the word "Penalties". OK, so what does a dumb crook do? They lie about their assets. They testify "I crashed the Ferrari on the property, it was a basket case. I parted it out and chopped up the rest, threw it in the weekly trash week by week". And they can produce no documentation of any part sales. Meanwhile, plaintiff had already pulled DMV records and found it's currently registered... to the brother, with a DMV sale price of $100. They sent over a detective, who has pictures of it sitting in the brother's garage. And plaintiff gleefully maneuvered the dumb crook into a lie under oath. And now they face judicial punishment - including harsh fines, and jail for contempt of court or refusal to disclose. This bypasses the Fourth Amendment, so there is no trial for proof of guilt. But it's a government agency, not a private party All the moreso, then. Government has the right to bypass some of the rules for private parties - such as being able to do asset search, subpoena, or attach assets without filing a lawsuit. The IRS is probably the most experienced at pursuing asset hiders. They have "their own" Tax Court which does exclusively tax cases. |
I bought a premium domain and now the registrar says that domain wasn't really available for purchase I purchased a domain name from a popular domain registrar, I immediately got the confirmation email and receipt for the purchased domain but the domain wasn't added to my account so I contacted the GoDaddy support, they said as I won the domain in auction so it may take up to 7 days to transfer the domain to may account. I waited for 7 days and contacted the GoDaddy support again, they said please wait for some more time and If problem still persists after 14 days you can email at [email protected] to resolve the issue. As my issue wasn't solved even after 14 days, I contacted the support via that email address and I got the following response. Unfortunately, due to an unexpected issue this domain was recently made available for purchase in error. This domain should not have been available for registration, auction, or capture via backorder. We have refunded your full purchase amount and we are taking proactive steps to prevent this error from happening again in the future. Please accept our sincere apologies for any confusion this issue may have caused. Thank you for your understanding and for choosing Go Daddy. I was assured that I got that domain and did some commitments with that domain. is there any legal action can be taken against registrar for such kind of act? | No You agreed to this: If the change of ownership from Seller to Buyer is not able to be completed (i) due to either party’s fraudulent activity or (ii) for any other reason, Buyer and Seller acknowledge and agree that GoDaddy shall have no liability or responsibility regarding the same. You got your refund - that’s all they owe you. | To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law. | It would be terribly risky for you to simply link another company's terms of service. What if they take their server down? What if they change their terms? You would not even know when exactly the changes were made. Copying their terms means you might run into copyright issues on the text. Either pay a lawyer to write your ToS for you, or see if you can find something in the public domain. | does the email chain above set out a legally binding contract, would it stand up to the test in a court Generally speaking, yes, unless you signed a "more formal" contract thereafter. The more formal contract would supersede the email chain. Furthermore, the subsequent conduct by both parties evidences the existence of a contract. The fact that you have been provided with the service and that you have been charged for these ~12 months evidences the formation and existence of a contract. is the breach of contract sufficient to give us grounds to terminate the contract? Yes. To substantiate a claim of breach of contract, you will need to provide evidence that the "24/7/365 support line" is missing or unacceptably subpar in that it has caused you losses (such as downtime and consequent impact on your operations), or that such pattern of service disruptions would subject your company to imminent risk of losses if you were forced to stay in the contract for the remaining ~24 months (obviously, you will need to establish that this item or feature is not just incidental to the contract). | This will depend partly on what you use the e-commerce website for. If it is simply a point-of-sales and your accounting records are kept elsewhere, then it may be possible to delete their account including associated orders and payments, though you should check that the software doesn't simply update the record by setting the value for a column named deleted or del for short to 1 instead of 0 to identify deleted records, but instead actually deletes the record from the database. You should consider how you will refund a customer if required after doing so!! (i.e. perhaps you acknowledge the request but keep the information for at least as long as the customer is eligible for a refund, and then delete it). If the system is also used for accounting records, then if a customer/user wishes to assert their right to be forgotten, it is likely you'll need to disable the account and apply some kind of pseudonymisation (essentially replacing personal identifiers such as name, email address, date-of-birth, with dummy/null data), in order to preserve the integrity of your financial records. For example, in the UK, there is a statutory obligation on companies to retain financial records for at 7 years. In cases where data cannot be immediately erased due to other legitimate reasons for which it must be kept, once those retention periods expire the data must be erased. You'll need to keep a record of anyone that requests to be forgotten, and remember to follow-up to complete erasure at the appropriate dates if it can't be done immediately, and when the data is destroyed the user needs to be informed. | I have already contacted a lawyer and paid all the money I had and they didn't help me resolve anything, the guy just talked to me for a little bit. He essentially just took my $600 and no action was made. He said the best thing to do would be to wait it out because the contracts were never fulfilled by them and they can't claim my inventions etc if I am an independent contractor. To me it just sounded like a bunch of BS and not a real solution to this. You paid $600 for expert advice which told you to do nothing. You think the advice is bullshit and intend to go full steam ahead against the advice given. I'd say it is very likely that the lawyer is a better expert than you, so you should follow his advice. You are in a hole, you were told to stop digging, and you intend to continue digging. Don't. There are times where doing nothing is the best advice. In this case, you intend to accuse someone of breach of contract. That has a good chance of landing you in court. A company cannot afford to ignore such a statement. You claim the contract is void and you want to cancel it - but you can't cancel a void contract. It's void. Listen to your lawyer. | Does this prove that the unlicensed attorney is practicing law outside their jurisdiction and is providing legal advice by representing the "client" in legal negotiations? No. Your quote of the email does not prove that the receiver engaged in unlicensed practice of law. Nor does it prove that the receiver/non-attorney is representing, or advising, the attorney's client or the adversary. It is quite possible and valid for the unlicensed lawyer (example: paralegals) to assist an attorney who actually represents the party. | Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer. |
Can schools require that students use school-provided computers? I am a parent of a four year old. She will be starting Kindergarten in August 2023 and my school system provides Chromebooks to all students. I do not want my kid to have their own computer when they are five. Can the school system legally require my daughter to have a computer? | If the school is a private school, then definitely yes: the school can also mandate clothing and grooming standards, and so forth – attending private school is optional, and they can even require the parents to provide the computer. (Mandatory) public schools have less power, but they still have the right to require students to do things that the parents do not like. For example, a parent might not like the particular history curriculum, or the might not like the fact that the child has to study music, but that is a power granted to public school districts. If the requirement were "unreasonable" in some sense, parental prerogative might win out over the school's rational of educational necessity. But it is no more unreasonable to require a student to learn how to use a computer that it is to require them to learn how to read a book. You might argue that reading is "more necessary" than developing computer skills, but the school district's curricular judgment is placed above that of a parent, so you would have to establish that giving a child access to a computer is objectively unreasonable. | Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? This is a hard question to answer that doesn't have a neat resolution. Very little pertaining to the authority of a parent over a child is codified in statutory law and there is not a clear cut age at which a child has "freedom of conscience" vis-a-vis a parent. Most of the law related to children concerns allocation of parenting time and parental decision making between divorced, separated or unmarried parents; abuse and neglect; and juvenile delinquency. There is also usually a snippet of criminal law stating that certain kinds of uses of force to discipline children do not constitute crimes. But, part of why it doesn't come up very much is that older children are usually socialized in a manner that causes them to show a certain amount of respect for the wishes of their parents. It also doesn't come up much for children who aren't in their late teens, because the complete economic dependence of children on their parents or guardians gives the parents considerable power of their children that doesn't require the exercise of physical force. Also, it is quite dependent upon how the issue presents itself. No law enforcement agency is going to aid a parent in forcibly dragging a kid to church against their will. But, no social services agency is going to remove a kid from a home because his birthday party will be cancelled if he doesn't go to the church of his parents' choice the Sunday before his birthday. There are also some subtle but important distinctions between states on the issue of emancipation. In Colorado, emancipation is a statement about the empirical reality. If a child is self-supporting and lives apart from parents or guardians then the child is an emancipated minor. It is not a status granted by a court, it is a status acknowledged by courts when evaluating other issues. In California, a child is not emancipated unless a court grants a child that status and a child who is de facto emancipated without the leave of a court is guilty of a "status offense" (the New York State term for someone in this state is PINS for "person in need of supervision"). Basically, if a parent can force a child to go to church by means that don't constitute abuse or neglect and don't exceed the level of force authorize for child discipline in the criminal code, then they can do it, and if they can't manage that, then they can't do it. Many states have a "status offense" that allows government intervention with the cooperation of a parent or guardian in cases where an "uncontrollable" child is defiant and simply will not give any heed to the parent or guardian's instructions. In practice, the older a child is, the less likely someone viewing a parent's conduct forcing a child to do something is to be viewed as acceptable or legally justified. The legal rights of children in a school setting are also age dependent under the case law, although not always in a really well defined way. Controls on student expression that would be uncontroversial for elementary school students may be looked upon by the law with disfavor for high school students and clearly prohibited for adults. Perhaps one useful way to conceptualize it is that trying to make a child attend a particular kind of religious service is not considered an improper purposes for a parent of any minor to utilize the resources available to the parent to do so, but the range of resources available to a parent with regard to an adult child is much narrower. | In general, permission is not granted to enter the premises of another by climbing a fence unless it is explicitly granted. That the fence is on your property, but adjacent to the school's property, is a complication. The school, observing that there is a boundary fence, might reasonably rely on that to exclude people from entering other than at desired entry points. So it might be that your entry over the fence would be unauthorized and thus technically trespassing. If you were to put a gate in your own fence, the school's reliance is probably less reasonable. Or if you were to formally notify the school that you intend to enter the school grounds over your own fence. However, in practice, you are not trespassing until you are notified by the owner or owner's agent or someone with proper authority. If there is no sign, there can be no claim that you were notified by one. So until a school official or employee notices you using the fence and orders you to stop, there is no issue. | It depends upon how the service works. A "scrivner" is permitted, but "legal services" are not. If, for example, it asks you the questions on a state approved form and asks you to fill in answers and the compiles the answers into a complaint with the proper typesetting, this would be permissible. It could also have "educational materials" which you could read that could discuss small claims court. But, if it provides individualized assistance on a case by case basis on how to answer the questions, for example, prodding you to say something about each element of a cause of action if you fail to do so, this might very well constitute the practice of law and be illegal. | This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs. | We don't have a lot of details, but if you're in the United States, the answer is probably yes. There are rarely any meaningful rules of evidence in student misconduct cases, so pretty much anything can come in. There may be some small difference in the answer depending n whether you're dealing with a public university or private, but in either case, I can't think of any reason why they would not be able to introduce the evidence if they had it. If there's a question about its authenticity, I imagine that would just be up to the misconduct board to decide. If Person X says "Person Y sent this to me," and Person X seems credible, that's probably going to be enough. | Yes The child owns what they own - it would be illegal for the parent to take the item and dispose of it or otherwise permanently keep if from the child (once they became an adult). However, parents are their children’s legal guardians and are responsible for the raising of their children including matters of discipline. It is both legal and appropriate for a parent to limit access of a child to their possessions. | Is it lawful to offer smaller portions only to children below a certain age..? Yes Part 3 of the Equality Act 2010 covers "Services and Public Functions" and at section 29 states: Provision of services, etc. (1)A person (a “service-provider”) concerned with the provision of a service to the public or a section of the public (for payment or not) must not discriminate against a person requiring the service by not providing the person with the service. This is the only definition of "service-provider" in the Act, but the Equality and Human Rights Commission confirms a restaurant falls with the scope of Part 3: Equality law applies to any business that provides goods, facilities or services to members of the public. This includes a wide range of different businesses and services. These include: [...] restaurants [...] However all that is moot (but posted here for context) as Part 3 of the Act opens with caveats at section 28 which establishes that: (1)This Part does not apply to the protected characteristic of— (a)age, so far as relating to persons who have not attained the age of 18; [...] |
I am a US citizen but have never lived in the US. Who is my Congress member? This seemed like the most appropriate SE site to ask this question. If you can think of anywhere better please feel free to migrate it there. I was born outside the United States to American parents, and am therefore a US citizen (social security number and all). However, apart from short visits, I've never actually lived in the US (nor voted in US elections etc.) I have a relatively urgent (passport related) issue with the local US embassy. A friend told me it may be beneficial if I could contact my Congressional representative, but as I've never lived in the US I don't know who that would be. The whole "letter-to-your-congressperson" dynamic is also new to me. Should I just pick one? Would they know I'm not actually their constituent? | You would check with the authorities in the state where your parents last lived. Actually, you can write to any congressperson, and they can pay attention to you or ignore you as they like. (This also applies to people who live in the US; if you think a representative other than your own will be more likely to follow your request, you can write to them instead.) The reason it's most common to write to your own representative is that they have a political motivation to consider your request (you are more likely to vote for them if they do what you ask). If you were to vote for a congressperson, that would be in the district where your parents lived (but that is governed by state law). | At the time of annexation of country X someone would have to decide the status of the countries citizens: If all citizens of X are now citizens of the USA, and whether they are legally citizens from the date of annexation or since they were citizens of X, and if they are considered residents in the USA since the day they became residents of X, and if they are retrospectively "born in the USA" if they were born in X. And other things, like whether non-citizen legal residents of X are now non-citizen legal residents of the USA. That has to be decided for many reasons, and the answer to your question follows naturally from this. Maybe you could check on a history site if anyone knows how this worked with Hawaii. | Short answer: You find a country who is willing to recognize you as stateless, and issue you travel papers. At that point you can enter the U.S. by applying for a visa. The USA really does not want to create stateless people. They are laboring diplomatically to eradicate statelessness. As such, the State Department will want to see that you are secure in another country's citizenship before they will repudiate your US citizenship. Otherwise, they are very reluctant. The State Department will insist you do the repudiation in a foreign country at a US embassy. If you want to become stateless with your feet in the United States, you'll likely have a legal fight on your hands. Regardless, it will cost you $2300 in filing fees (plus, all your back taxes) :) At that point, you become the problem of the foreign country. You aren't anyone to the USA, and you have to apply for a visa just like anyone else. When a stated person enters the US, immigration's pivotal concern is whether you'll leave the US consistent with the terms of your visa, i.e. return to your country of citizenship. Being stateless increases this risk, and being a USA expat increases that risk further, since you are so familiar and comfortable in the US. If you found yourself in the kind of piccadillo that would qualify a foreigner for refugee or asylum status, the US would consider it just the same as others, since those statuses include right of residency. Some countries manufacture stateless people, e.g. Syria will not grant citizenship to a non-Muslim born there. | Yes, you can register in Connecticut. Connecticut previously limited voting eligibility to "permanent" residents, but it later changed that to limit it to people with at least year's worth of residency, and then six months' of residency. Under current law, though, a voter need only be a "bona fide" resident of "some town" in Connecticut. This means you need only to have legitimately moved into the city with some actual intent to stay, even if not forever. The deadline is tomorrow, so register now. | Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide). | The Secret Service is primarily concerned with protecting the people and information they oversee, not enforcing laws. They have the power to arrest someone for any unlawful conduct, but unless a drug user is presenting as a threat to a protectee, they are unlikely to be arrested by the Secret Service. More likely the Service would simply escort the person off the premises and refer the matter to the DC Metro Police to handle. Edit: Such a case would not be turned over to the US Capitol Police (as originally written) It would most likely be referred to the DC Metropolitan Police Department.Corrected my answer above. | Although the constitution doesn't explicitly require your vote to be equal in strength, surely the founders intended with the word 'vote' that you at least get to choose who you vote for. Quite the contrary. The founders specifically intended that smaller states should have disproportionate strength - they knew exactly what they were doing. This was one of the major design goals of the Constitution and is reflected in several other areas (e.g. the structure of the Senate); the smaller states wouldn't have agreed to join the Union if such concessions hadn't been made. There's a general principle in law that "the specific overrides the general". You're not going to get anywhere by trying to read into the word "vote" when there is explicit text saying something different. If the founders intended the word "vote" to imply "equal power for everyone", then why would they have specified, in great detail, a system which does exactly the opposite? For that matter, the founders didn't particularly intend that the people be able to vote for president at all! Article II, Section 1 says only that "each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors..." There is no requirement that the state should hold an election to determine the appointment of the electors. According to Wikipedia, five states initially had the electors chosen by the state legislature, without having the people vote at all, and South Carolina continued to use this system until 1860. The 14th Amendment, section 2, appears to require that all eligible voters (male and 21 at the time, since modified by the 19th and 26th Amendments) be allowed to vote for their electors, but even there the wording is "any election" which appears to leave open the possibility of having no election at all. (It hasn't been tested as far as I know.) I think that your proposed lawsuit would be quickly dismissed, possibly as "frivolous". | The newly elected Congress does all of the work in electing a new President. Under the 20th Amendment, the newly elected Congress takes office on January 3. Then three days later, on January 6, 3 USC § 15: Counting electoral votes in Congress, requires the new Congress to meet in Joint Session to count the electoral votes. If this session does not produce a President or Vice President, there is what is called a contingent election. In a contingent election the House begins immediately to choose a President from among the top three electoral college vote getters, while the Senate chooses a Vice President from among the top two electoral college vote getters. Both Houses use majority rule. The House votes by state, so a majority is 26, while the Senators vote individually, so a majority is 51. If the House does not pick a President by Inauguration Day, January 20th, the Vice President serves until a President is picked. If neither a President nor a VP has been picked by the 20th, the Presidential Succession Act applies, and the Speaker of the House, President pro tempore or a cabinet officer serves as Acting President. It wasn't always done this way: The 20th Amendment was passed in 1933 to take control over elections away from the lame duck Congress. Before the 20th A was adopted, the terms for P, VP and Congress all ended on Inauguration day, March 4. That meant the lame duck Congress had to deal with electoral matters. By giving Congress and the P/VP different expiration dates, the Amendment meant new Congress could deal with the election. Setting the election counting date after the new Congress was seated (on January 6), meant only the new Congress could. |
How deterministic are modern legal systems? I am a software engineer trying to understand how judges make decisions in lawsuits. In computer and other sciences there is a concept of deterministic system: In mathematics and physics, a deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system. A deterministic model will thus always produce the same output from a given starting condition or initial state. In lay terms this simply means that if the system is being fed the same input again and again it will generate exactly the same output each time. If applied to legal system: Each judge would be a sub-system that builds the whole US legal system Evidence provided to the judge under lawsuit would be one kind of the input Ruling made by the judge would be the the output of the lawsuit Lawsuit would be a test to see how legal system reacts on particular input Here are my questions (if you feel comfortable answering only some of these questions I would still appreciate it): How deterministic is the US legal system? Can you provide examples of popular lawsuit instances that were almost the same but resulted in very different outcome? And If you are familiar with the steps that lawsuit has to go through in the US legal system, then what are these steps (e.g. assigning a random judge to a lawsuit; same judge unpredictably deciding what is and what isn't convincing evidence to him; same judge deciding how much of punishment to give for each violation under same circumstances ...). How much unpredictability does each step introduce and what is the typical source of that unpredictability? And What are efforts to make the legal system more deterministic (e.g., let computers to contribute to ruling, precedent-court ...)? Are persons involved in the judicial system concerned about this problem, and does it have a term in the legal world? Also, I understand that this question is quite general and does not specify some of the variables that could affect answers (e.g. country or state, type of lawsuit). You can chose how to answer it. | How deterministic is the legal system? It depends. And less than we might wish. It depends on the case. How complex is the fact pattern? How strong is the evidence? How clear is the law? How compelling are the legal precedents? Questions of that nature. The only generalization I might make would be that "lower level" cases seem more deterministic than "higher level" cases. By higher level, I mean those heard by a supreme court making constitutional decisions. Here is a web site that has created a prediction market out of supreme court cases. Many have written on this topic. Read this answer. It is an excellent treatise on the subjectivity of the legal system. Written by a real attorney. Read this answer too. My advice: If you seek a deterministic system, don't look to the legal one. | The concept of "ignorance" of laws isn't about the individual. It's about administratibility of the system. The argument is that a system with a wide-ranging ignorance defense would struggle to produce results—just or otherwise. So the American system presumes knowledge of the law and then carves out narrower exceptions, such as mistake of law. For example, the law wasn't published, or it had been overruled. Alas, the question about why there isn't a hotline belongs on another site. | It is purely ceremonial. The tendency in modern jurisprudence is towards the practical and away from legalisms and technicalities. Even if a judge used a gavel in some way inappropriately, it would be unlikely to have any legal significance for anyone but the judge. An argument based on gavel misuse would fall into the "fringe-on-the-flag" category of legal arguments (yes, there are people who think that the court's powers are determined entirely by the fringe on the courhouse flag). The gavel is a traditional trapping of a common law courtroom, but has no legal significance. | While this isn't a simple and direct answer, it should point you in the right direction. There are countries which like the United States have parallel national and subnational court system, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, and Switzerland. Different rules of procedure for different courts within a larger overall court system for a federal jurisdiction are not that unusual even in nominally unitary court systems. But, the division between them is on something of a continuum with fine shades of differences between them. Only a few are as close to the extreme of power sharing and a "federalist" approach as the United States, however. Also even unitary court systems (in a geographic and federalism sense) often have parallel court systems on subject matter grounds. For example, France has both ordinary civil courts and labor courts whose rulings could overlap, and England historically had courts of law and courts of equity with a complex relationship to each other (and also ecclesiastical courts with jurisdiction of matters now vested in the civil courts of law like inheritance of tangible personal property). Similarly, Northern Ireland has or has had what amount to different parallel legal systems for terrorism and non-terrorism criminal offense. Most countries also have parallel criminal and quasi-criminal legal systems for civilians and soldiers respectively. I've seen this tension between the two systems as a plot point in contemporary English police procedural dramas, for example. On the other hand, systems with a more unitary legal system rarely are so fierce in their defense of protections against double jeopardy as the United States, and the dual sovereignty doctrine in U.S. double jeopardy law can be seen as a safety valve in practice and as applied in cases where the double jeopardy rule as interpreted under the U.S. Constitution is too strong a bar to legitimate second prosecutions. A comparative analysis of double jeopardy concepts can be found here. It is tricky to reduce the subtly differences between the rules in different countries to a clear yes or no kind of answer. A square answer to your question requires detailed examination of a dozen or more court systems that someone felt the need to write a book about to explain. If I can find a more specific answer I will update this one. | So my understanding is that the phrase "common law" can refer to either the concept of laws established by court precedent or it can refer to a specific body of laws that have been established that way. Yes. Should I just be inferring that from context? Yes. Is there a single body of "common law"? No. Are there distinct bodies of "U.K. common law" and "U.S. common law" for example? Yes, furthermore there is different common law in England/Wales, Northern Ireland & Scotland and each state of the US. Further, Scotland and Louisiana are not straightforward common law jurisdictions but rather a blend of common and civil law. If so, how are they related? They are related in that they all: have a common source, middle English common law evolve in the same way - judges interpreting the current common law and the statutes of the legislature follow an appeals system through higher levels of courts. They do not all go in the same direction though. Do judges in common law countries cite court decisions in other common law countries? Sometimes; it depends on the "distance" of the other jurisdiction. A judge in New South Wales is quite likely to consider how judges in Queensland and Victoria have considered similar laws, less likely to look at the UK and Canada and extremely unlikely to look at the USA. This has a lot to do with how far back it is since the "last common ancestor" of the law; the longer the corpus of law has been separated the more likely that the principles have diverged, partly this is cultural drift but mostly this is differences in statutes that actively modify the common law. Usually, jurisdictions within the same country are quite close to each other; partly due to common culture but often because of a genuine effort to "harmonise" laws across borders. There are occasions, however, where legislatures "steal" laws from other jurisdictions, in which case they often look to each other for early development of common law on those laws. For example, the Alberta (Canada) Builder's Lien Act 2000 and the NSW (Australia) Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 both address the same "wrong" and both had a common and parallel genesis pre-enactment; early cases in each jurisdiction were watched by the other. | The phrase "reasonable doubt" was formed hundreds of years ago, and does not hold any mathematical or probabilistic meaning. It is for each individual juror to decide for themselves what constitutes "reasonable doubt", and whether the evidence presented to them has crossed that threshold. EDIT for extra clarity: As stated above, the definition of "reasonable doubt" is intentionally vague*, and left to be decided by each juror for themselves on a case by case basis; as such there is no single rule that can be applied to jurors (also note barring accepting a bribe, a juror cannot be legally sanctioned for their conduct as a juror, nor their vote, regardless of the evidence before them). So one juror might judge by P(A|B), another might judge by the defendant's appearance, another might judge by the majority of their peers (so that they can go to a ball game that evening, such as in the film 12 Angry Men), another might disagree with the law (see: jury nullification) and so vote not guilty on that basis, and another might bow to social pressure and convict despite overwhelming evidence that the defendant is not guilty (for example, at the end of To Kill A Mockingbird). A prosecutor cares about convincing the entire jury that the defendant is guilty(outside of Oregon and Louisiana, where only 10/12 vote is needed to convict, so the prosecutor only cares convincing 10 jurors). The defense only cares about convincing a single juror (or three in LA or OR), although more can be useful to prevent a mistrial. The defense (in theory) should not care whether or not the defendant is guilty. *The origin of reasonable doubt was in Britain, where certain jurors would refuse to convict, despite any evidence, due to religious prohibitions of "Judge not, less ye be judged". | The legal system advances practitioners on a number of criteria, not all of which relate to their legal education. It's essentially the same for all professions - your schooling/education may or may not determine your success in the field. Also relevant would be the social circles you navigate, your achievements post-education, and so on. | U.S. answer only. Are there a few database-like resources that would allow me to easily search for such cases? It is balkanized. It also isn't entirely clear what information about the cases interests you. Almost all federal court filings (but not administrative law decisions) are in a database called PACER. Each state has its own system. Some are almost completely unified, and in others, there are many databases. In Colorado, for example, the Colorado E-Filing system has all filings in state courts, but courts outside the state court system, mostly the Denver County Court and municipal courts, as well as some major private arbitration firms, are on their own and most subcontract the job to a division of LexisNexis, a private firm. In both cases, access to these filings is not free except to parties, and has lots of data with access restricted to parties and the court. Published appellate court decisions are also available at an Internet based source. None of these covers administrative law decisions in Colorado, however. Administrative law decisions are usually kept by the agency and also often by a commercial firm that compiles them. Some of them do not give the public access to the decisions in the absence of a FOIA or open records act request. Commercial firms like Westlaw and LexisNexis and several less well known firms (including a free one run by Cornell University), keep databases of published decisions of appellate courts plus a somewhat random assortment of unpublished decisions, with federal court trial court decisions getting much more heavy coverage than state court trial decisions and unpublished state appellate court decisions. But, these are only key court orders, not all filings in the case, and are not the true source documents. There is also a non-profit consortium that maintains a database of court records from the 75 most populous counties in the United States, and there is a private firm that keeps selective track of jury verdicts to the fullest extent that it can obtain them. Some credit reporting agencies (both consumer credit and business credit agencies) maintain databases of judgments and liens. |
How does the Spanish legal system determine cases of vicarious abuse? According to this article in Spanish, the Spanish legal system recognizes instances of vicarious violence (violencia vicaria) in cases in which a person abuses or even kills their child in order to emotionally abuse their partner (or possibly only in cases in which a male partner abuses their child in order to harm their female partner). As noted in the article, there have been a number of convictions for vicarious abuse. Of course, there are other reasons why some people might hurt their children, such as part of a pattern of abuse toward the children unrelated to spousal abuse, for the purpose of collecting life insurance money, as part of sexual abuse, and so forth, so presumably there exist certain criteria in the Spanish legal system to distinguish these cases. What are the legal standards in Spain for classifying abuse or violent crimes against children as vicarious violence? | The article seems to state the legal standard which I repeat here in a Google Translate version: The former Government delegate for Gender Violence, Miguel Lorente , defines vicarious violence as "violence that, when it seeks to hurt and harm women, instead of doing it directly, seeks to harm people who have special meaning for them." Harming a child or other person with special meaning to the true target of the violence is, of course, already a serious crime in Spanish law. A finding that the crime was a form of vicarious violence is a sentencing enhancing finding of fact by the court that makes a convicted defendant eligible for what U.S. lawyers would call "life in prison with possibility for parole" even though Google Translate provides a more literal translation from the Spanish of the words used to describe the enhanced sentence for which someone becomes eligible if this is established. Of course, there are other reasons why some people might hurt their children, such as part of a pattern of abuse toward the children unrelated to spousal abuse, for the purpose of collecting life insurance money, as part of sexual abuse, and so forth, so presumably there exist certain criteria in the Spanish legal system to distinguish these cases. Other than the legal definition set forth above, there does not appear to be any further legal guidance for the courts in determining if this sentence enhancing fact has been established. It is merely a question of fact for the judges on the court to determine based upon the evidence presented at trial by the prosecution and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Lawyers for the defendant can argue that this sentence enhancer should not apply because one of the different motives in the quoted material from the question was the actual or predominant motive, and the prosecution can argue that it was indeed vicarious violence, and then the judges have to decide whether they think that the prosecution has met its burden of proof to establish this motive and impose the enhanced sentence (which is authorized, but not required, even if it is established). This isn't going to be the easiest point to make in a typical case for the defendant. Usually, the defense is primarily going to be trying to cast doubt upon whether the prosecution has met its burden of showing that the defendant is guilty of the underlying crime at all, and, for example, having the defendant testify that he did it because he was a pedophile, rather than to hurt his wife is not going to help him all that much. Instead, I would expect that the usual approach of the defendant's lawyer would be to argue that the prosecution's evidence, if believed, supports a prosecution theory of the case that, for example, this murder was about insurance money and not about intimidating the defendant's wife. Another way the the defense could fight this sentencing enhancing claim at trial would be to argue that the specific evidence of the prosecution offer to show the defendant's alleged vicarious violence motive isn't credible in all of the ways the one generally casts doubt on the credibility of evidence in a court case. For example, the defense might offer evidence from a different witness than one offered by the prosecution that cast's doubt on the credibility of the prosecution's witness. Or, the defense might ask (or have the judges in the case ask) questions of the witness who is the key witness on the vicarious violence motive issue, that casts doubt on that witnesses' own testimony (perhaps by pointing out contradictions in the testimony or that the witnesses couldn't have been where the witness claimed to be in earlier testimony). Also, it doesn't appear that vicarious violence has to be an either/or question. Nothing in the definition of vicarious violence suggests, for example, that a defendant can't both have a motive to collect insurance money, and a motive to intimidate the child's mother, at the same time, "killing two birds with one stone" so to speak. | It isn't that uncommon to do something similar to this, which is called a "test case". One of the more familiar examples of this kind of litigation conduct is the case of Plessy v. Ferguson. There have been test cases, for example, that involved important questions of E.U. jurisdiction in civil law countries as well. | Intent matters here, but yes. Alice could be considered guilty of either Second-Degree Murder or Manslaughter, though the latter is far more likely. Texas has no laws condoning assisted suicide that could absolve Alice. Second-degree murder requires the following: The defendant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of another person The defendant intended to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act that was clearly dangerous to human life and this act caused the death of an individual This is tenuous, but it could be argued this way if Alice intended to cause Bob's death. It certainly meets the second criteria: shooting oneself constitutes serious harm and giving a firearm to someone who has stated an intent to kill themself is reckless. It's more likely that Alice would be charged with manslaughter. The only definition is: A person commits an offense if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. As discussed above, giving someone who has announced an intent to kill themself a loaded gun is reckless. Alice's actions resulted in Bob's death. | In 50/50 custody you have the right to stand your ground to ensure the safety and well being of your children. You do not need to involve police unless it is an emergency. "911 Operator, what is the emergency". Only call them when you feel your children are in grave danger. For example, you know for sure that the other parent is drunk and driving, or the other parent is drunk and on the ground unable to move and the child is in danger, etc. If you involve the police over your partner excessive drinking than, and they find that she was not excessively drinking, you will face false accusation charges and her lawyer will try to make you look like the bad guy trying to take away her children. how drunk does my ex have to be for me to deny a drop-off? Is it entirely based upon outward signs or blood-alcohol level? You should not search for drugs or alcohol, or administer tests, as to avoid the accusation of an illegal search. You can, however, based on your judgment of common sense assess the situation and see how drunk (s)he is and make your decision based on that circumstances. Make a 1-page log to document the date, time, situation description (3-5 sentences of what you see and why you make that decision.) It would be wise to have a witness around, so write down the person name as well for reference, (NOT MANY PEOPLE LIKE TO BE WITNESSES, But you can write down the people names that you know were around that incident.) Don't tell your partner that you are making the log. Suprise them in the court when you have a full page of incidents due to drinking. Am I correct in assuming that in order to protect myself from being accused of denying visitation, that (in the future) I need to involve the police if I suspect her of being intoxicated? *Always protect yourself! Be Your Own Advocate. * Don't involve the police unless its am emergency, read the first comment above. If I involve the police, do I need to be sure that she is extremely intoxicated in order to avoid a "false alarm"? (Obviously, this scares me as I'd prefer she didn't drink at all) This drinking incident is alarming itself. However, you should consult with your family law attorney. I would say that document five issues if it exceeds 5 in one month than filing a motion with the court to adjust the drinking problem, and that you request the child to be with you 60/40 custody. You must be able to demonstrate that you have the time, commitment and resources to take over the 60/40 custody. What options do I have, if any, if she drinks around him in her own home? Is she within her legal right as long as she doesn't get in a car, doesn't pass out or does something blatantly abusive? File a motion to adjust the custody, speak with your family law attorney. | First off: if someone in DHS is telling you this, your first, best, and really only option is to get advice from an attorney specializing in family law. Regardless of what we tell you here, without representation you will have a hard time with officials who believe otherwise. That said: I don't find anything exactly matching what you describe. The Uniform Adoption Code (AR Code § 9-9-200 (2014)) does not specifically address sibling groups at all. Adoptive parents do have rights to streamlined adoption of a sibling of a child they already adopted, under the Streamlined Adoption act (AR Code § 9-9-701 (2014)). In the section related to Placement of Minors (AR Code § 9-28-108 (2014)), however, is likely what the case worker was describing. Subsection (b) (2) reads, in part: (2) When it is in the best interest of each of the juveniles, the department shall attempt to place: (A) A sibling group together while they are in foster care and adoptive placement This is discussing foster care and adoptive placement, of course. I think the key wording is When it is in the best interest of each of the juveniles; that would be your argument (that it is not in their best interest). I see a 2011 case, for example, discussing a sibling group of four children not entirely different from yours; while there are not children with special needs, there is a child with major behavioral issues, and one of the (three) foster parents is considering adopting one of the children and "would be open" to considering others, but clearly isn't expecting to be required to do so. Note: I am not a lawyer, and particularly not one specialized in family law This is based on my reading of the 2014 Arkansas code. That is almost 2 years old. That said, I don't see any news articles or similar discussing limitations in sibling group placement in Arkansas recently, which is the sort of thing that usually would get attention. That said, this has also been something that HHS has been trying to encourage states to push for – more sibling group placement and awareness of sibling group issues – so it's entirely possible something could have changed. | The general rule is that the ability to have a valid divorce has nothing to do with where the marriage was entered into, or the citizenship of the parties. Usually, any jurisdiction with sufficient contacts with either member of the couple has jurisdiction to enter a divorce. Hence, generally, people get divorced in the place that they live. The problem in this scenario is step 5. I think that it is highly likely that the U.S. Embassy is simply wrong, unless there is some serious irregularity in step 4. An annulment after four years of marriage, as opposed to a divorce, is highly irregular and would not be allowed in the vast majority of jurisdictions. But, maybe there are facts and circumstances that make it otherwise. This fact pattern, while it on one hand sounds like a "for a friend" question based on real facts, also sounds like some important details that may be outcome determinative have been omitted. | Usually, but not always. In California, this is governed primarily by the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1713-1724. The general rule is that the judgment of a foreign court in a country with a legitimate legal system (like New Zealand), that had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter, is enforceable through a summary process that does not reconsider the merits of the foreign money judgment, if the person seeking to enforce the judgment can establish those facts. See § 1716(a)-(b). But there are many exceptions to the general rule. See §§ 1715(b) (taxes, fines, penalties, some domestic relations judgments), 1716(c) (seven grounds for procedural irregularities, a ground for public policy exceptions, and certain defamation judgments). Section 1717 of the Act provides for certain exceptions to the exceptions. There are also federal law exceptions in addition to those in the act, including one applicable to foreign defamation case judgments. But these laws rarely have much practical effects beyond the California statute in cases involving purely money judgments that are governed by the California statute. Injunctive and other non-monetary relief granted by a foreign court is less frequently enforceable, and when it is, is not governed by a simple, summary statutory process from this statute. Special rules apply, in particular, to foreign child custody judgments. The summary process, when there is no other pending case in California between the parties is as follows: "If recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought as an original matter, the issue of recognition shall be raised by filing an action seeking recognition of the foreign-country judgment." § 1718(a). It is legally possible to file and prosecute a case like this one pro se in California, and it is unlikely that an in person hearing would be required in a case like this one. Usually, one could prevail in motion practice or with a remotely conducted hearing (especially in the COVID era). Whether an in person evidentiary hearing was required in a case like this would depend a great deal on the nature of the defense to recognition of the foreign judgment asserted. But, the better practice would be to hire a California lawyer to handle it for you. Typically, the cost of doing so would be the filing fee, the cost of serving the judgment debtor with process, and something on the order of $1000-$3000 in legal fees. So, it would be much less expensive than a full fledged new lawsuit, but would be too expensive to be practical in the case of a small claims sized judgment in most cases. | Habitual offender laws are written such that they represent distinct crimes. In your given example, the trier of fact will be asked to judge two distinct crimes: Did the defendant rob the bank Did the defendant break the habitual offender act An example from California, Penal Code Section 193.7 defines habitual offenders for traffic offenses: A person convicted of a violation of subdivision (b) of Section 191.5 that occurred within seven years of two or more separate violations of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, of, or Section 23152 or 23153 of, the Vehicle Code, or any combination thereof, that resulted in convictions, shall be designated as an habitual traffic offender subject to paragraph (3) of subdivision (e) of Section 14601.3 of the Vehicle Code, for a period of three years, subsequent to the conviction. The person shall be advised of this designation pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 13350 of the Vehicle Code. The conviction of being an habitual traffic offender is applied an underlying statute's sentencing guidelines. In the case of California's Vehicle Code 14601.3(e)(3): Any habitual traffic offender designated under Section 193.7 of the Penal Code or under subdivision (b) of Section 23546, subdivision (b) of Section 23550, subdivision (b) of Section 23550.5, or subdivision (d) of Section 23566 who is convicted of a violation of Section 14601.2 shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for 180 days and by a fine of two thousand dollars ($2,000). The penalty in this paragraph shall be consecutive to that imposed for the violation of any other law. In this case, there is enhanced sentencing if one is convicted of the crime of driving under a suspended or revoked license if the person is also convicted of being an habitual traffic offender. The jury instruction template used when determining if an enhanced sentence is warranted requires that the defendant be found guilty of the underlying crime as well as the additional allegation of the sentencing factor: If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] _________________[,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]][ or thelesser crimes[s] of ], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that <insert description of enhancement, sentencing factor, or factual issue>. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime. To prove this allegation, the People must prove that: <Insert elements required.> The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved. The person in your example is not being punished again for the first crime; they are being sentenced to a year for robbing the bank the second time and receiving a sentencing enhancement of a year for breaking the habitual offender statute. |
Is a digital signature done by a third party valid? Alice sends Bob a document to sign with DocuSign or a similar service. Bob does not have a device DocuSign works on, or does not know how to open the document. Bob forwards the email to Joe. Joe calls Bob on the phone and reads the document to Bob. Bob tells Joe to sign it. Joe signs Bob's name. Is the signature binding on Bob? | Possibly. Under UCC 3-402, a representative can sign for a party. There are some conditions though. One is that the signature should show unambiguously that the signature is made on behalf of the person identified in the instrument. If the signature is not clear that the signature is made in a representative capacity, the representative is liable. The only thing that a digital signature adds is the possibility that it is impossible to unambiguously show this because of the software. It seems from the internet that Docusign allows this. | If a website's TOS has restrictions against unauthorized copying and use of anything in the site, that applies to the TOS, too. Chances are, no one will do a Google search on the exact text of their TOS to find if someone has copied it; but who knows? If they paid a legal service to draft a very specific and original TOS, they may be concerned with others copying it illegally. Beyond that, their TOS is a legal document. Your TOS is a legal document. Your users sign a contract when they click and accept. If you copy and paste a TOS, and don't understand exactly what is in it, and you and your users are bound by that TOS, what kind of legal risks do you open yourself up to? A simple Google search yields https://formswift.com/terms-of-service among others. Or try one of the many services like LegalZoom. | If someone gave a gift than requested it back is it legal? The request itself is legal, but that does not mean that you have to comply with it. I never promised anything that tied to the tablet. So I'm not sure if it counts as a conditional gift. It does not. An unconditional gift (which initially you did not even want) fails to meet the elements of a cognizable doctrine such as contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, or unjust enrichment. he says he will report the tablet as stolen if I don't return it He might get in trouble if he does that, since he knows or should know that the tablet was never stolen. He gave it away despite your initial refusal(s). As such, he might incur false reporting of a crime. | The contract is enforceable No one is in any doubt that the parties to the contract are you and Smith Homes and everyone knows that Smith Homes means Smith Homes LLC. The written document is only evidence of the contract, the contract is the entire commercial relationship. Contracts are not invalid because they have typos or minor irregularities- otherwise virtually no written one would be. The law can be very pragmatic sometimes. | Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability. | It is Latin - "through". It means that someone is signing on behalf of the company, and is not generally required but can be printed explicitly as evidence that the person signing purports to be authorised to do so. | There are several forms of notarized documents, the most common of which are affidavits (which are written statements of a person made and signed under oath) and acknowledgements (which is a notarized statement that a document was signed before a notary, usually used for documents related to real property). There would be no legitimate reason I can think of to notarize an offer letter, and the fact that you want to do that probably means that you are confused about some other aspect of the law that would make you think that you would want to or need to do something like that. A more common thing to do, for example, in anticipation of a lawsuit, would be to prepare and execute an affidavit which states that the letter, attached as an exhibit, was signed by you, and anyone else that you have personal knowledge signed it, for your signature before a notary. A notary is not allowed to execute an affidavit (or a very similar document called a verification which is a very short document saying that the facts stated in a single document asserting a claim in a court case are true and correct in a form substantially similar to an affidavit) if it is signed outside the notary's physical presence (in theory because the notary administers an oath before you sign it). An acknowledgement can be executed by a notary if the person who signed the document comes before the notary in person and acknowledges that it was signed by him or her, even if the notary was not there when it was actually signed. The notary would state the date that you acknowledged it in person to the notary in the acknowledgement and would not make any statement regarding when it was actually signed. There is special formalized legal language that must accompany each kind of notarization, which is called the "jurat". Then the notary signs and dates the jurat in the appropriate place and applies a notary seal near the jurat in the indicated location (if any) mark "L.S." for "location of seal" in latin. | No "In writing" does not at all imply "written by hand". A typed or printed document is equally "in writing" and indeed is often preferred. These days an email or other electronic document is also considered to be "in writing", unless a contract specifies that notice must be made by postal mail, or some such requirement. If a document must be in writing and "signed" there are various ways of executing an electronic signature which are legally fully equivalent to a manual written signature. What thye requirement of notice in writing really means is that the notice cannot be spoken in person or by telephone, nor in any other way that does not involve some form of writing. Electronic signatures See "Overview of electronic signature law and its legality in Canada". Also, this Wikipedia article says: Canadian law distinguishes between the generic "electronic signature" and the "secure electronic signature". Federal secure electronic signature regulations make it clear that a secure electronic signature is a digital signature created and verified in a specific manner. Canada's Evidence Act contains evidentiary presumptions about both the integrity and validity of electronic documents with attached secure electronic signatures, and of the authenticity of the secure electronic signatures themselves. |
What percentage of jury trials are unclear verdicts at start, vs cases where defended really should have plead for lesser charges? My, limited, understanding of the US legal system is that pretty much everyone will be offered a plea bargain before going to trial. That would imply to me that the only people that end up in trial are either people who's case is truly ambiguous and it's not clear which way the the jury will vote, or people who probably should have accepted a plea bargain and stubbornly refused to. So I'm wondering from those who have experience of jury trials how many fall into the former category and how many into the latter? How likely is it that you have a good idea which way the jury will vote before the trial even starts? | Without being omniscient, it is impossible to pin down an exact percentage, and there are a lot of context specific reasons why some kinds of "easy" cases are more likely to go to trial than others. But, there have been quite a few serious efforts to answer this question with data (putting aside the normative issue of whether you should go to trial when you are likely to lose). One of the best statistical estimates comes from an analysis of criminal jury trials in Sarasota, Florida and the race of the jurors on the jury pool. Based upon that study, it is possible to infer statistically that an average juror of either race would reach the same aquittal or conviction decision in about 55% of cases involving black defendants and about 68% of cases involving white defendants. But, there are many other cases that are close enough on the merits given the likely available that the outcome depends upon the race of the jury, which basically means that the evidence can be reasonably viewed in different lights to reach different conclusions based upon your predispositions before seeing it. For the sample as a whole, about 68% of cases where convictions results and a minimum of 14% of cases that produce acquittals, are sufficiently clear than the racial composition of the jury doesn't matter. Given that something like 90% of cases produce plea bargains generally, and that plea bargains are usually made before a jury pool is drawn, the random impact of the racial makeup of the jury pool that is selected for a case in Sarasota, Florida only directly matters in about 2% of all criminal prosecutions. My criminal procedure professor from law school made one of the most comprehensive surveys of data pertinent to estimating wrongful conviction rate ever prepared. He concludes that wrongful conviction rates for murders and rapes are on the order of 2.3%-5%, and that wrongful conviction rates for other serious felonies are probably somewhat lower (since weak cases are less often pursued) but that it is harder to determine precisely what error rate is involved since the legal process and civic activism rarely takes the time and resources necessary to consider wrongful juvenile convictions or wrongful convictions for less serious crimes. Other sources have suggested that wrongful conviction cases, and studies comparing jury outcomes with conclusions of the presiding judges in the cases regarding where the jury does and does not agree with the judge regarding the correct outcome generally speaking point to a similar level of uncertainty in decision making accuracy. suggest that as many as 10-20% of jury determinations are erroneous, although this is to some extent a product of samples biased for cases with a high risk of wrongful convictions. For example, analysis of a special set of state court cases in 2000-01 from four jurisdictions in a study by the National Center for State Courts (Hannaford-Agor et al 2003) suggested that approximately 17% of jury verdicts were inaccurate, 7% of the all jury verdicts were wrongful convictions and 10% of all jury verdicts were wrongful acquittals, with corresponding rates of 10% wrongful convictions and 1% wrongful acquittals for the judges' verdicts (Spencer 2007). Similarly, an abstract of one study stated that: "I examine . . . how the criminal system in the United States handled the cases of people who were subsequently found innocent through post-conviction DNA testing. . . . The leading types of evidence supporting their wrongful convictions were erroneous eyewitness identifications, faulty forensic evidence, informant testimony, and false confessions. . . . . few innocent appellants brought claims regarding those facts, nor did many bring claims alleging their innocence. For those who did, hardly any claims were granted by appellate courts. . . . courts often denied relief by finding error to be harmless on account of the appellant's guilt. Criminal appeals brought before they proved their innocence using DNA yielded apparently high numbers of reversals—a fourteen percent reversal rate. However, . . . the reversal rate is indistinguishable from the background rate in appeals of comparable rape and murder convictions[.]" Another way to judge the ratio of easy to hard cases is to look at conviction or verdict rates in cases that go to trial. While the vast majority of criminal charges brought result in conviction of something and the vast majority of civil cases brought result in a judgment for the Plaintiff, in an hypothetical ideal world where the lawyers and parties on both sides of cases are rational actors with the best available information and there is no bias in the availability of information, you would expect pre-trial settlements to resolve, on average, all of the cases with an objective lean one way or the other, leaving only the cases that are, on average, coin flips left to go to trial, with 50-50 outcomes, regardless of the mix of cases originally filed. And, that model isn't horrible. Less than 2% of civil cases and less than 10% of criminal cases go to trial. Civil case outcomes vary by type of case, but the overall result in those the go to trial is close to 50-50. But, in criminal cases, convictions greatly outnumber acquittals, because "easy cases" where a conviction is likely often still go to trial, because neither side is paying for their lawyers from their own funds in most cases, because there is little incentive to offer favorable settlements in close cases, and because, as discussed below, there is a significant irreducible risk of an inaccurate outcome. In federal criminal cases that actually go to trial, the Pew Research Center’s data shows that defendants who pursue a trial experience different outcomes based on whether they choose a bench or jury trial. The acquittal rate in bench trials is 38% (a very small and unrepresentative sample), whereas it’s 14% for juried trials (the vast majority of cases). This would suggest that about 72% of federal jury trials are "easy" cases, while about 28% are "hard" cases, in line with the Sarasota study in order of magnitude. Note that this is different from "conviction rates" which compare the percentage of cases charged that produce guilty verdicts or plea bargains, rather than conviction rates in the subset of cases that go to trial. The percentage of people charged with some federal crime who end up being convicted of something is very, very high, compared to state court, but that is almost entirely due to the ability of federal prosecutors to cherry pick strong cases with high mandatory minimum penalties and to secure plea bargains as a result, rather than from different rates of criminal jury trial outcomes. Still, in "2018, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that among defendants charged with a felony, 68% were convicted (59% of a felony and the remainder of a misdemeanor)" and the conviction rate at trial is lower than the conviction rate of all people charged criminally with felonies, since plea bargains are more common than unilateral government dismissals of all charges. But, in almost every court system, more than 50% of criminal trials result in convictions. So, the percentage of "easy" criminal cases going to trial in state courts is still significantly lower than in federal courts. Maybe the percentage of state criminal cases going to trial that are "easy cases" in the range of 5%-20% in this kind of analysis (which is quite a bit lower than the more rigorously designed Sarasota study). The challenging thing, of course, is knowing in advance which cases judges or juries will get wrong. I typically conceptualize the issue as a certain irreducible uncertainty of outcome any time you actually roll the dice on going to trial on the order of 10%-20% whether you are in front of a judge or a jury, and an additional uncertainty in cases where there is some specific reason to think that the outcome is a close call, or that special risk factors for inaccurate verdicts (like heavy reliance on cross-racial eye witness identification of suspects) is present. From the perspective a client, even in a seemingly secure case, this impacts how plea bargains and settlement offers are evaluated. If your client is actually in the wrong and facing very severe punishment and there are no offers to settle that don't also involve very severe punishment, going to trial and hoping to benefit from the irreducible inaccuracy of trial determinations can be rational even in a quite weak case. Likewise, in either a civil or a criminal case, if getting some win is much more important for the person bringing the case, than getting a "home run" maximal win, making a lenient deal even in a fairly solid case can make sense to avoid the risk of rolling the dice and the irreducible risk of error any time there is a trial. Also, of course, lots and lots of parties to both criminal and civil cases are not rational actors and make bad decisions. These characteristics of parties to legal cases frequently play a large part in the fact that these parties ended up having to deal with the legal system in the first place. One of the difficult systemic and institutional issues, however, is that the behavior of people who are irrational because they are dumb or crazy, and the behavior of people in the system who are innocent and have excessive but not necessarily unreasonable trust in the accuracy of the judicial process, can look very similar. People who are factually innocent systemically insist on going to trial even in the face of lenient plea bargains at rates much higher than people who are factually guilty, even in cases that seem to have identical strength before a neutral third-party, and are, as a result, over represented in the ranks of people who actually go to trial. | Legally and safely? Have a good and true reason for being excused, and hope the judge accepts it. If being on a jury would somehow cause you legitimate hardship, you may be excused. If you're a felon, and haven't had your rights restored, many courts won't even let you sit on a jury. Don't "pretend" anything, though. If you intentionally deceive the court in order to avoid jury duty -- or, where it's possible, even to get onto a particular jury -- that is illegal in probably every court that has a concept of jury duty. | Could DA Bragg have only charged Trump with 34 misdemeanor counts, without elevating the charges to felonies? Yes. if Trump's defense team argues that the law that elevates the misdemeanor charges to felony charges does not apply in this case, because the elevation option does not include federal laws, then since this is a matter of law and not a matter of fact, Judge Mercan (rather than the jury) will decide whether or not to dismiss the felony charges? Yes. Does Judge Mercan have the option of dismissing the felony enhancement but allowing the misdemeanor charges to proceed, or would Mercan have to dismiss all charges against Trump? Judge Mercan could probably choose either option if he found that the original charges were not supported by the law. There is law regarding how this decision is made but I personally don't know that area of law well. One of the reason that I am unfamiliar with it is that it is exceedingly rare for a judge to conclude that the prosecutor's charges are not supported by the law. I would be very surprised if that judge reached that conclusion in this case, in particular, because both federal election law violations and state and federal tax law violations are implicated by the indictment. The DA no doubt legally researched this issue exhaustively before presenting the charges to the grand jury and has made out a prima facie case for a felony under the applicable New York State law. If Trump is brought to trial, then would it be possible for a jury to return a verdict that Trump was guilty of the misdemeanor offenses of falsifying business records but innocent of doing so with an intent to commit another crime? If so, then could Trump still be found guilty of the misdemeanors, or would he be fully acquitted, since the jury ruled that he was not guilty of the exact charges that DA Bragg filed? Whether a jury is presented with a lesser included offense charge at the request of the defense, is partially a matter of the prosecution's election to make that option available or not, and partially a matter of the judge's decision on how to handle it. The body of law involved in how this decision is handled on a case by case basis is quite involved. Most of the case law involves homicide cases, assault cases, and property crime cases where there are charges with are identical except for aggravating factors for the most serious charges. But, lesser charges generally aren't presented if based upon the evidence presented at trial, either the more serious charge is established or no charge is proven. For example, if the defendant presents an alibi defense, and a witness whose credibility is disputed places the defendant at the scene intentionally committing a crime, a lesser included offense charge would not be appropriate. But, if the defendant admits hitting a pedestrian and causing the pedestrian's death, but claims that the pedestrian was at fault in the accident for jay walking, while the prosecution alleges that the pedestrian was intentionally struck as part of a mafia hit, multiple lesser included offenses would probably be charged involving different levels of intent of premeditated intent/aggravated circumstances killing (first degree murder), to a knowing killing (second degree murder), to a reckless killing (manslaughter), to a criminally negligent homicide or vehicular homicide charge. Typically, the decision on this point would not be made until all evidence was received and the judge in a hearing away from the jury but in the presence of the prosecutors and defense counsel crafted jury instructions based upon the evidence presented at trial and the arguments raised by counsel at trial. | If 'literally 300' attorneys declined your case on the basis of a phone call, without looking into the details, I can see three options: You are unable to communicate the nature of your case clearly. In this posting, you mentioned complaints against a company, a municipality, and a landlord, plus being evicted. Focus on explaining one case. If you think you 'know for a fact' that you have several big payouts coming, there is the first problem. Nobody knows what a jury will decide. An attorney might hesitate to work for a client who does not understand this. Litigation is always a risk. All your cases actually lack merit, a lawyer sees this and you do not. Not knowing the cases, I cannot tell. (And no, you should not explain them in detail on the web. If they do have merit, posting your strategy hurts the cases.) Your state has a vexatious litigant list and you are on it. That would not prevent an attorney from taking your case, but it might make them hesitate. | The jury never finds there was “no crime” They either find that the state has proven that this particular defendant committed this particular crime (guilty) or they have not proven it (not guilty). Another jury at another time may find the opposite - this does sometimes happen where a guilty verdict is appealed and the appeals court orders a retrial. For another defendant charged with a different crime (e.g. accessory to the first crime) before another jury, the result of another trial is both irrelevant and inadmissible. | A series of answers were proposed to similar questions in the world building forum. https://worldbuilding.stackexchange.com/questions/29880/how-could-a-legal-system-whose-punishments-were-based-off-of-level-of-certainty https://worldbuilding.stackexchange.com/questions/29941/how-to-handle-plea-bargains-in-a-court-where-punishment-is-based-off-confidence The relationship to plea bargaining is as follows: When the prosecution has a strong case with a high probability of winning, it insists on going to trial and will make only slight concessions relative to the result that could be obtained at trial. When the prosecution has a case of typical strength with an intermediate chance of winning, it will normally make a significant concession in the severity of the offense charged or other agreements that impact the length of the sentence, relative to the result that would be obtained if the prosecution fully prevails at trial, rather than "roll the dice" and usually the defense will agree in exchange for a more lenient sentence. When the prosecution has a case that is weak (but being ethical, believes that there is probable cause to support), it will normally make very deep concessions such as agreeing to a much less severe charge or for example to probation or a deferred judgment, to at least impose some punishment, in order to avoid going to trial, even when the potential punishment if the prosecution full prevails is very high. Plea bargaining rates in the federal system are in the mid- to high 90%s, while plea bargaining rates in state systems are often in the 70% to 90% range (federal prosecutors can leave weaker cases to state prosecutors if they want to and have a stiff hammer due to high mandatory minimum sentences for many offenses and the sentencing guidelines, but state and local prosecutors have to take what their less elite law enforcement officers come up with). At trial, prosecutors typically win convictions well over 50% of the time (although not too much more, because the more clear cases are either dismissed by prosecutors as unproveable prior to trial or are plea bargained). The net effect of the current system is that the severity of the sentence imposed in the vast majority of cases is proportional to the probability of the prosecution prevailing at trial times the likely sentence if it does prevail, as evaluated mutually by the prosecution and the defense. When there is not a sufficient consensus on the fair sentence in light of those factors the rare trial happens (and more often than not the defense rather than the prosecution overestimates its chances). Unfortunately, this also means that the biggest penalties for going to trial are in the weakest cases in which the prosecution just barely manages to convince the jury and there is a strong probability that the defendant is actually innocent, as opposed to the cases where it is fairly clear that the defendant is guilty. And, people who are actually innocent of everything are most likely to roll the dice and go to trial, since people who are guilty of something know that in any fair resolution that are going to face the significant downsides of having any criminal conviction on their record, while people who are actually innocent may reasonably (although sometimes inaccurately) believe that the system will protect them and allow them to escape all consequences except the costs of defending themselves in court (if they can afford it). Another option that prosecutors have in a case where proof beyond a reasonable doubt may be difficult or impossible, is to bring a civil lawsuit or to seek an administrative penalty, which may result in loss of a licenses or payment of a fine or compensation, rather than bringing criminal charges. In these cases, the prosecution only has to prove a case by a preponderance of the evidence in most cases, and usually, the defendant has no right to an attorney at public expense even if the defendant is indigent. These fines (or civil forfeitures) can also help fund the criminal justice system that pays prosecutors and other participants in the process. Below that standard, prosecutors can seek search warrants, wire taps and arrest warrants in cases where there is merely probable cause to believe that a person committed a crime, which in addition to setting up future prosecutions can also be used as a form of punishment/harassment of someone prosecutors believe to be guilty of a crime even though they may not even have the evidence necessary to prove a civil suit, but the amount of impact that a search warrant, wire tap, or arrest can have on a suspect is much less than a full blowed prosecution. | No. Indonesia Law uses Civil Law structures which use an Inquisitorial Trial. The chief difference is that in the United States (which has a Common Law Structure) the judge usually does not decide the case, but interprets the law (Trier of Law) and with a few exceptions, will determine the sentence once guilt is found. The Jury decides the case (Trier of Fact) and pronounces guilt (It is the right of the defense to request a Bench Trial, which gives the Judge both roles. The prosecution cannot object to this request). In a Civil Court, the big difference is that their is no Jury and the Judge has both roles (Trier of Law, and Trier of Fact). As the name suggests, rather than two sides fighting each other (adversarial), the two sides are answering questions posed to them by the Judge or usually a panel of Judges are used and the Judge may initiate further investigation in the evidence. The United States does use Inquisitional Trials from time to time, but they are often seen in misdemeanors, traffic courts, and small claims courts. The latter is a popular daytime TV genre (think Judge Judy) while misdemeanors and traffic court decisions are often time funny and make great Youtube videos. There are not many great Adversarial media as many throw out rules for time sake (real U.S. trials have many long boring periods during testimony) and story/drama sake. I would recommend "My Cousin Vinny" which was written by two lawyers who were fed up with Hollywood messing up how court room drama works and is hilarious to boot. When viewing either, take them with a grain of salt. | "If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining. |
Is it legal to offer a scholarship only for female applicants? Suppose an organisation offers training courses on a subject of general significance that could not in any stretch be said specific to either or the other gender. And it offers free spaces on it under a "scholarship" that is only available for female applicants. Is this lawful? | Maybe s158 of the Equality Act 2010 allows proportionate action to redress disadvantage, different needs or disproportionately low participation by people with a protected characteristic. For example, woman make up 16.5% of the UK’s engineers. Given they make up more than 50% of the population one could reasonably come to the conclusion that this is disproportionately low. If this was an engineering scholarship, this would fall within the exemption. In contrast, woman are 52% of UK lawyers - not a disproportionate number for either gender and not engaging the exemption. However, female judges are only 39%, arguably disproportionate, so if the course is a post-graduate one preparing people to enter the judiciary, that’s probably ok. Women are 75.5% of teachers, so a scholarship for male students in that profession is ok too. | There are two senses in which this action might be "against the law". One is that it violates some specific (statutory) law, the other is that it violates some common-law principle especially pertaining to contracts. We can quickly dispose of the possibility that you have violated a statutory law: there is nowhere in the US where you are compelled by law to do anything about foreign language classes (take, avoid, pass, whatever). Your university has the right to establish and enforce whatever requirements it deems proper for awarding degrees and credits, and has the legal power to act broadly in providing an education. Let's say that they have stated a requirement that everybody must take 2 quarters of some foreign language, then if you don't do that, they are entitled to withhold the degree from you. Whereas, if you had satisfied all of the requirements for the degree, then they could not arbitrarily withhold the degree -- it is now a thing that you have a property right to. Just as the university has the right to impose requirements (with appropriate advance notice), they also have the right to suspend requirements, generally or according to circumstances (as long as it is not arbitrary). A typical actual example is "that class hasn't been taught for 3 years". In this case, the requirement was not suspended, but an agent of the university acting within the scope of their appointment judged that the requirement had already been satisfied in your case. The university administration might not actually approve of the professor's choice and might change their rules or sanction the professor (at my university this was common practice, albeit never officially sanctioned), but it is the sort of thing that is within the scope of the professor's job (to judge that you have satisfied the "bottom-line" requirements of the course). Since there was no wrong-doing on your part and you acted in a good faith belief that the professor's actions were "allowed", then the university would be buying itself a pile of legal trouble if it were to rescind your degree. | This is probably refering to the time limit at Section 118 of the Equality Act 2010. Subject to some exceptions, proceedings on a claim within section 114 may not be brought after the end of... the period of 6 months starting with the date of the act to which the claim relates ... Sonia Birdee (barrister) has shared some slides on the topic: Limitation in Equality Act 2010 claims (non-employment). She describes the general limitation period and also presents some ways of potentially getting more time. | Most Likely Yes to both. It really depends on the nature of your agreement, oral agreements are as legally binding as written ones, but as a matter of evidence in court written contracts are of course better. So looking at your agreement: did you agree to pay the full amount, in return for a place to study? Or did you specifically agree to pay on a rolling basis, where you pay for however long you actually study? I would believe that you had agreed to the first type of agreement, since that is what most study contracts are. And if that's the case: You pay to be allowed to attend, whether you actually attend or not isn't important. And even if you pay on a rolling basis, I would think in a lawsuit the court would find that - judging on previous payments - you'd have agreed to pay on a per semester basis, meaning that the incomplete semester would round up and you would still have to pay for it. I would lean yes to the 2nd question (but im not sure so anyone with more info please chime in). This answer can be more useful if you be specific about the terms and conditions of your study | It sounds like you've read about two party consent and public spaces. But while anyone can sue, it's winning a case that's relevant. "My client respects the applicant's beliefs, but choosing to express beliefs in such a way during a job interview indicated sufficiently questionable judgement that my client was unable to consider the applicant further for the advertised position." "It has also become apparent that the plaintiff was not acting in good faith in making an application for employment." Court finds for the defendant and orders the plaintiff to pay costs. | The UK does have free lawyers for those who cannot afford an attorney. In fact, it is even more liberal than the US, including representation in civil cases for the most part as well (there are a few exceptions, like libel, and from what I've read, even that is changing). Rather than the main source of free representation being called public defenders, they are referred to as Legal Aid, which is a government funded agency much like public defenders are in the United States. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that legal aid will be made available to those who lack sufficient resources, in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. In the event legal aid is too busy to accept a new client, the court will appoint a solicitor from a list of private firms/practitioners that will act in the same capacity. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees the right to a fair trial in both civil and criminal proceedings. This has been interpreted as providing for a general requirement of some measure of “equality of arms” between the state and the individual or between the parties in the case, and the overall structure of the article, as well as the case law of the Court, stresses the vital connection between the right to legal assistance and the general interest in guaranteeing the right to a fair trial. When faced with a criminal charge, the right to legal assistance is explicitly set out in Article 6 (3) (c). An entitlement to free legal aid in civil cases is available in cases where the absence of legal support would make any equality of arms impossible and would effectively deprive an applicant of access to the proceedings as such, for example, when a case can be filed to a court only if assisted by a lawyer in circumstances when an applicant cannot clearly afford one. My guess is, if your friend was denied counsel under legal aid, she has too much income or to many assets to qualify, or she is involved in a case that does not qualify. That said, the right to counsel in in the UK is a right for the indigent in most types of cases (even civil) and is becoming more and more fundamental as imposed by findings of the European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence. Here is a link where you can at least begin to get some information. https://www.gov.uk/legal-aid/overview | Too old to be a lawyer? Legally: No. See Part 4 of the Age Discrimination Act 2004 which... ...makes it unlawful to discriminate against someone on the ground of age in respect of the following: (a) employment and related matters; (b) education; https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2020C00283 | The official judgements do not reveal the funding for these lawyers; so where can I find this information? Nowhere. The commercial arrangements between lawyers and their clients are private and confidential like any other business transactions. You have no more right to know this then you do to know how your neighbour pays their mortgage. how could she have funded litigation in the EWHC and then EWCA before the UKSC? She may have rich parents or another benefactor who has in interest in her or the outcome of the case. She may have won the lottery. She may be the heiress of a dead rich uncle. By the way, "having" student loans does not mean you "need" student loans. Interest rates on student loans are cheap - if I need to pay $10,000 for a course and have $10,000 earning 5%, I would be nuts to use that if I could take out a loan at 3%. |
Is a request to dismiss a motion the same as requesting denial of the motion? Given the statement: Defendant respectfully move this Honorable Court to deny and dismiss Plaintiffs motion dated 1/1/20. If the goal is to ask the ajudicating authority to not perform opposing counsel's request, is there any difference if the word deny is removed? Defendant respectfully move this Honorable Court to dismiss Plaintiffs motion dated 1/1/20 IANAL and trying to get a sense of the nuance of the pleading language. | A court would "dismiss" an action, a claim, or a defendant, but I don't know of any American court that would "dismiss" a motion. Instead, a motion would be "denied," or perhaps "overruled." If I saw this language in a motion, I would assume it was just a lawyer doing the stereotypical redundance thing. | Admission of copying proves one of the elements that the plaintiffs would normally need to prove in an infringement suit, making a law suit less risky from their perspective. This may very well invite lawsuits that would otherwise not be filed. But, this is pure speculation. Your legal rights are the same, independent of how much you choose to reveal in advance of a lawsuit. If your copying doesn't amount to a substantial taking, then it isn't infringement, whether you admit to copying or not. | Not in this case First, we are having an appeals court case that is filed against the dismissal of the real case - there had been no trial. It's a research into if there was a clear error of the court, not who would have won. The Appeals court decided to send it back to the district court with pretty much a direct order to have a trial and solve the issiue, as the very last paragraph of the file shows: We conclude that Schwake stated a Title IX claim against the University because he plausibly alleged gender bias. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the district court’s order and judgment dismissing the claim with prejudice, and remand for further proceedings. Now, back to your quote. As this is an appeal case, the standard is different than in the district court. In this case, it tries to see if there might have been a case, which was dismissed erroneously. Page 15 and 16, where you cite, states (emphasis mine): Schwake’s allegations of a pattern of gender-based decisionmaking against male respondents in sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings make that inference plausible. He alleged that “[m]ale respondents in student disciplinary proceedings involving alleged sexual harassment and misconduct cases at [the University]” “are invariably found guilty, regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” Schwake further alleged that he was “aware of recent [University] disciplinary cases against male respondents in alleged sexual misconduct cases who were all found guilty regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” The district court was not free to ignore this non-conclusory and relevant factual allegation. [your quote] The absence of this level of detail from Schwake’s complaint does not render Schwake’s allegation conclusory or insufficient. There is no heightened pleading standard for Title IX claims. See Austin, 925 F.3d at 1137 n.4. That point is particularly apt here. It may be difficult for a plaintiff to know the full extent of alleged discrimination in decisionmaking before discovery allows a plaintiff to unearth information controlled by the defendant. This sheds much more light upon the situation of the case: Schwacke sued and alleged something. The University alleges the contrary in their reply brief and asks the court to dismiss the claim. The court dismissed in March 2018. This was before any discovery has taken place: nobody was subpoenaed, nobody had to testify in court, nobody had to turn over any documents. We have only statements from either side. As the next step, Schwacke appealed the dismissal, and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, as it found clear error in the handling in dismissal, as one can see in the last paragraphs from each claim's section: Here, we are satisfied that Schwake’s allegations of contemporaneous pressure and gender-based decisionmaking establish background indicia of sex discrimination relevant to his Title IX claim. Considering the combination of Schwake’s allegations of background indicia of sex discrimination along with the allegations concerning his particular disciplinary case, we conclude that sex discrimination is a plausible explanation for the University’s handling of the sexual misconduct disciplinary case against Schwake. This is sufficient for Schwake’s Title IX claim to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage. Now it is up to Schwacke to get into discovery, subpoena the information from the university and go into the courtroom trial... Unless the parties settles. Sidenote By the way, the quote of the university refers to a different case from the 6th Circuit (where Ohio is), which they try to pull up as a model standard. This case is not binding for the 9th Circuit (where Arizona is) but could have been used as a model. Doe v. Miami University, 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) is somewhat similar to Schwacke, as it had been previously dismissed. However, the Title IX was restored by the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit and it was sent back to the lower court to have a trial. Here too, the standard was reasonable expectation or plausibility: Plaintiff “allege[d] facts showing a potential pattern of gender-based decision-making that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal’ circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination.” | Either is possible Let's look at a very recent example: Dominion sued Guliani and Powell separately. But Smartmatics sued both plus Fox at once. Their allegations are even very similar. The benefit of Smartmatics' approach is, they only need to file documents once, and only meet one time the filing fee. Parties may try to get their case split off, then they become a separate case and it becomes the Dominion strategy. The benefit of Dominion's approach is, that the separate cases are harder to dismiss for each party on their own and they have no standing to weigh in on the other case. If the court consolidates the cases, it becomes the Smartmatics strategy. Also note, that the court can act on its own against a joint lawsuit: parties might get dismissed from it that were improperly joined. Those dismissals are without prejudice and can be fixed by just re-filing the lawsuit against the dismissed defendant alone. | "Cancellation" is generally a result of some statement or action a person made becoming public or having been made in public. Tortious interference requires that the defendant's actions are independently wrongful, such as defamation or criminal acts against the plaintiff. Truthful speech and opinions which do not allege facts are protected by the First Amendment (as well as state constitutions) and thus cannot be wrongful conduct. To apply that here, anyone can react to public knowledge about a person and call for that person to be fired, that is protected speech. As far as I know in this particular petition's case, RMS does not dispute that he made the statements they are attributing to him and using as evidence for their call to remove him from the board. | Here's the thing: if the plaintiff/appellant/claimant are the same legal entity as the defendant/respondent, it's plain to see that one of them must lose. For instance, consider a case where two trains operated by the same corporation collide. Assuming that the drivers both performed their duties, the company is vicariously liable – such a case is frivolous and is likely to be thrown out for that reason. It's just a waste of time and money. Or your second example: If the woman was driving the city vehicle and crashed it in the course of her duties, it is the city that will be the defendant in the proceedings, not the woman. So essentially: while it's difficult to prove that something has never happened, these are good reasons to expect it would not happen. | The simplest solution is to hire an attorney to do this for you. If you want to do it the hard way, you need to try to figure out why your motions were denied. For example, did you file proper motions, or did you just write on a piece of paper "I need all of Walmart's records"? Why do you think that a court will / should supply you with an Open Record (of what)? A real lawsuit is not like Judge Judy where you tell your story and hope the judge has sympathy on your plight. Did the judge say / write anything about why he is denying your requests? | Your assumptions are incorrect. Courts allow oral arguments (when they do allow them) so that attorneys have a chance to better address a judge's concerns. The idea is that it lets an attorney not only present the core of his case, but it also lets him address any problems with his reasoning that the judge may have or help the judge explore a complicated question. Without that all you have is the back-and-forth in writing with opposing counsel, which is useful, but may not actually address the issues that are important to the judge. There is some difference in how you present arguments on paper as opposed to in oral argument, but the distinction is largely one of style rather than substance. An argument that is great on paper is still great when presented out loud, you just present it differently because you are presenting it in a different medium. For example, you have to present oral argument with the assumption that the judge may interrupt you at any time to ask a question they are interested in, derailing your entire pre-planned argument into a tangential point the judge considers important. This is great because it lets you address what the judge is concerned about, but it requires a different preparation and some changes to the format of your argument. For example, while you will front-load both oral and written arguments with a roadmap, both your roadmap and your first sentence are much more important in oral argument. |
What can I do about an ex-landlord “trash talking” me on Facebook? I had lived in a shared rental house with 4 other tenants. Problems arose when the landlord wanted me to move out early despite what the lease said. He got the other tenants to bug me until I agreed, but I insisted he paid for the cost of moving. Clearly he holds ill feelings about me, and I just found out he’s been “trash talking” me on Facebook and posted a link to my account. What actions should I take? I intend to block him and report it to Facebook as bullying. Is there anything else I should do, like take screen shots in case things go further? I was willing to forget the situation after I got my damage deposit back but things like this keep coming up and I haven’t fully excluded the possibility their may be some arbitration/court with him in the future. In terms of what he’s actually posting about me on Facebook is just stupid crap, mainly name calling and saying “I’m the worst person in the world” and how I left rotting food and came back and threw garbage on their lawn. There is no element of truth to any of these claims. | Actually, he has been libelling you which is defamation in writing - slander is verbal defamation. Notwithstanding, if what he has done has or is likely to cause damage to your reputation and is a statement of fact that is not true then it is actionable. Neither name calling nor his opinion that you "are the worst person in the world" are statements of fact. Saying you left rotting food and that you threw garbage on the lawn are. You could sue for damages or seek an injunction requiring him to withdraw his statements and apologise, however, a better (and cheaper) first step would be to send a cease and desist letter. You can find templates online or pay a lawyer to send one. The latter is likely to scare the s@&t out of him and may be worth the money just for the satisfaction. | I did the Googling: Prior to the case described in this article, a notice was to be deemed served if the sender can sufficiently prove that the letter was properly addressed, pre-paid and posted. Law - Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 The case made it clear that the same law also sets a condition, where if the letter was not received at said mailbox, or too late received, the notice is to be deemed not served. The receiver is not required to prove that the letter has not arrived in the mailbox. Also, if your mail has been tampered with, you should contact Royal Mail - they will perform an investigation and put your mailbox in order. I work with tenants and landlords, thus lots of official notices. In this practice, it's often a recommended action to follow up on a notice and make sure the receiver has indeed received and acknowledged the notice. I don't know if it's a legal requirement, but often in disputes (which go to arbitration by a 3rd party), if one party states they did not receive the notice and the other party can't sufficiently prove that they did everything in their power to contact and confirm the delivery of the notice, the notice is regarded as not served. I believe you cannot deny post. If it's in your mailbox, it's your responsibility to check and read it. | Generally, you would have to bring an eviction action just as you would for an ordinary landlord-tenant relationship. This means given written notice served as required by MA law of a deadline to leave, and then if the child did not leave, filing an eviction lawsuit and serving the papers on the child, and then attending an eviction hearing, and then, if you prevailed in that hearing as you probably would (probably with horrible TV and newspaper publicity that might go viral in social media), and then, arrangements would be made to remove him and his stuff from the house on an appointed day with law enforcement and movers and you would change the locks. It would probably take a few weeks start to finish. It is not something that a non-lawyer should try to do themselves. A lawyer would probably charge you a few thousand dollars for this proceeding. The main exception would be that generally a parent has a duty to support an adult disabled child who cannot provide for himself. You probably do not have the legal right to simply kick out your child without an eviction action, although few adult children would choose to push their legal rights not to be removed in that manner if they were. The fact that a child would likely end up homeless in some circumstances if you did this is something that most parents would not be at peace with and would regret later even if they felt good about the decision at the time, but that is a parenting decision and not a legal one. | As a legal matter, you need to call or visit your local police station, report that you found some lost money, answer their questions honestly and dispassionately (they don't care about your hate etc. unless it's causing an active situation they have to deal with, and even then they don't much want to hear you go on about it), and then let them deal with it. You can tell your neighbor, if he inquires, that you have handed the matter to the local police and he can inquire with them about claiming it; feel free to ask the police to affirm that's the suitable course of action. You can expect to be given legal possession of it if they are unable to determine the true owner in accordance with local law. You can ask the police for details on that, though they'll probably just tell you as a matter of procedure without prompting. | Your question seems to be about abandoned property and whether Missouri’s statute on disposing of property after a tenant abandons his/her property applies. See Mo. Rev. State. Ann. § 441.065 (“Abandonment of premises, disposition of remaining property.”) Assuming there was no agreement (in writing or orally) for the 19 year-old to pay rent, he was most likely a guest and not a tenant. As a guest, landlord-tenant laws, would not apply to the property that that was left at the nice family’s house. The definitions section of Missouri’s landlord-tenant statutes (and common sense) support this analysis. See Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 441.005. Therefore, the issue them becomes did the 19 year abandon his property? To that question, I think the answer is yes. Missouri Courts have defined the test for “abandoned property” in Herron v. Whiteside, 782 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo. App. W. Dist. 1989), stating: Abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment of ownership so that the property ceases to be the property of any person and becomes the subject of appropriation by the first taker. Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Mo.App.1974). Abandonment of property requires intent plus an act. Id. A sufficient act is one that manifests a conscious purpose and intention of the owner of personal property neither to use nor to retake the property into his possession. Id. Intention to abandon may be inferred from strong and convincing evidence and may be shown by conduct clearly inconsistent with any intention to retain and continue the use or ownership of the property. Herron, 782 S.W.2d at 416. So to synthesize that passage from Herron, the court is saying that there is a 2 part test for determining if property is abandoned. Did the person intend to abandon the property? Did they commit some act to show this intention? If the answer is yes, to both, they the “first taker” or person that gets possession after the property is abandoned is the new owner. Here, it seems that the 19 year-old intended to abandon the property. He left without explaining why and stated that he would not unload the property if the nice family tried to return it (implying he would not accept the property back). Looking at the second part, him moving without giving notice, and telling the nice family that he won’t accept delivery of the property are both acts showing his intent to abandon the property. | The key here is the provision "through no fault of his own". A landlord who relies on this provision would need to be able to demonstrate what the cause of the delay was, and that s/he had not been reasonably able to avoid it. Nor could a landlord simply fail to take steps to repair the problem, whatever it might be. If the problem will clearly take more than 30 days to fix (Isay the building burned down), the prospective tenant would have the right to cancel the lease at once. True, in such a case the tenant would be put to the trouble and expense of finding another place at short notice, but then the landlord would have lost his income from the property. The provision allocates the losses between the parties in such a case. If the property is not available at the specified time for the lease to start, but could be available a few days later, the quoted provision would not allow the landlord to just ignore the situation and end the lease. The landlord is allowed only a "reasonable time" to fix the problem, and taking significantly longer than is needed would not be "reasonable". | As soon as possible. Liability There is no contract here so you would be relying on the tort of negligence and/or trespass. If you have suffered damage from somebody else's negligence then they are liable for your loss. Part of the problem that you face is you need to determine exactly who was potentially negligent. It probably isn't your neighbour! It is quite likely that your neighbour was using a contractor; a contractor is not an agent and so your neighbour has not been negligent, the contractor has. If you were to sue your neighbour in those circumstances you would lose. You need to take steps now to find out exactly who the person was who caused the damage - that's the person you would need to sue. To win a negligence claim, you need to prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. If the facts are as you say: They probably have a duty, They probably failed in that duty, See below, You have clearly suffered harm or damage. Types of loss or damage The treatment of loss or damage under the law depends on what type of loss it is: Direct loss includes the repair and rehabilitation of the property - this would generally be recoverable, i.e. legally it is a cause of harm. Consequential loss includes the loss of rental income during the period that the property is unavailable. Alternatively, a court may consider that the loss is the cost of you providing alternative accommodation to the tenant if this was an obligation on you; this could be more or less than the rent. It would also include relocation costs etc. This is also generally recoverable. Pure economic loss would include loss of earnings if the tenant terminated the lease and you were unable to find a replacement or were forced to lower the rent as well as any advertising or agent's costs. While it is possible to recover this, it is quite likely that this would be considered unforeseeable and therefore not a legal cause of harm. The legal reasoning is that the loss (tenant terminating the lease) is too far removed from the proximate cause (damage to the unit) to hold the defendant responsible for it. You have already indicated that the tenant is trying to use the circumstances to their advantage; this is not something that could have been foreseen. Duty to mitigate loss You have a duty to mitigate the loss caused by the negligence. This would normally include ensuring that repairs were carried out in the most time and cost-efficient way possible. The defendant is only liable for reasonable costs; not actual costs. Insurance If a third party is liable for the loss, then they are liable for the loss irrespective of if it is covered by your insurance. Your insurance company can sue in your name to recover whatever they have lost; while they can, they will only if they believe it is commercially worthwhile. You need to talk to your insurer to determine what they will cover and what they won't and if they are going to seek to recover and what they will do if you seek to recover - they may choose to take the lead and tack your stuff on the back. | he is jointly liable for the remaining 3 months, even though he never signed anything. Is this true? That seems unlikely. The lease is between Adam and the landlord. Although the lease might have language making all tenants jointly and severally liable, it would affect Bob only if it can be proved that he was aware of those terms when he moved in. Your description does not elaborate on any agreement(s) between Adam and Bob. But Adam is not allowed to impose on Bob any obligations merely because relations between them broke down. Absent a contract between Adam and Bob, the question of whether Adam is entitled to any recovery from Bob could only be assessed on equitable grounds. |
Is overseas cybercrime is rarely prosecuted Hypothetical question: Let take a cybercrime is happend with minor overseas. But it is too lightly.consider it is chatting between two people-adult and minor and no photos are sent. Does it prosecutes from one country two another? | That depends on several things: Do the authorities have solid evidence of what happened? Authorities in which country? A screenshot is not evidence, that would be easily faked. It takes access to the metadata. Does the country where the perpetrator lives consider it a serious crime? Note that when two people exchange such messages, who is the criminal and who is the victim can depend on the ages of both, and the exact rules of who is guilty of what may differ from country to country. There are countries which prosecute child abuse by their citizens or residents abroad once they come back. So it may be that nothing happens, or it may be prosecuted. | I'm answering your title question and assuming that you meant to present a circumstance that would actually trigger criminal liability, but based on the ages you've actually used in your hypothetical, you may not have done so. I'll ignore that complication and just present what the law is. Yes, there are some U.S. laws that people can be found to violate while in another country. The Department of Justice has a "citizen's guide" explaining extraterritorial sexual exploitation of children. The main offences are: 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a): Transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity 18 U.S.C. § 2423(d): Travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c): Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places For § 2423(a), there must be the intent to engage in "any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense." For § 2423(b) and (c), "illicit sexual conduct" means, among a few other things: "a sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Chapter 109A includes § 2243(a): Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any Federal department or agency, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who (a) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and (b) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. | When a country makes criminal laws, these laws usually apply to anyone present in the country, and acting in the country. But the country is free to declare that some law might apply to its own citizens in a foreign country, or even foreign citizens in a foreign country. Assuming the laws about using marijuana say nothing about the country, that most likely means it only applies to using marjuana in the country itself. But if the US government decided that taking marijuana in Canada is illegal for US citizens, then nobody can stop them. In this case, Canada would not extradite you (unless Canadian law says that it is criminal for Canadians to use marijuana in another country), and Canadian police would likely not collect evidence. So even if illegal, it would be hard to convict you. PS. The "polygamy" case would be interesting, I think you would have to read the exact wording of the laws in every country. Some countries will say that you can't get married twice, and the attempt to get married a second time while already married is bigamy. In that kind of country you wouldn't have committed a crime within that country. Also, you would only be married to the first wife. | The most important rule for an extradition from Germany is this: If the role of the countries were reversed, would the person be convicted in Germany according to German law? You say the link claims that he couldn't be convicted now, because he would have been convicted twice for the same crime. So he wouldn't be convicted in Germany if the roles of the countries were reversed, therefore no extradition. (The next important rule is this: There must be enough evidence that the person would be prosecuted in Germany, not necessarily convicted. You also need to convince the court that the accused will get a fair trial when extradited, that there will be no cruel or unusual punishment, including death sentence, and lastly there is no extradition for small crimes when the extradition plus having to appear in a foreign court can be considered worse punishment than the actual punishment for the crime. All these irrelevant in this case, I think). "Auslieferung unstatthaft" just means "extradition inadmissible" or "extradition illegal". PS. Ludl asked "shouldn't there be some law that if someone cannot be extradited from Germany because of extradition law, they can still be prosecuted in Germany". That would be completely unnecessary. Let's say one US citizen murders another one in Germany, the USA asks for extradition (they wouldn't, because it is a German matter, but they could ask of course), and Germany rightfully refuses. Then since it is a murder on German ground, it will be prosecuted in Germany. It would be absurd to think that a failed extradition request could protect a murderer. | The victim's country might seek the suspect's extradition from the country of residence. Extradition is a formal law enforcement process whereby the authorities in each country cooperate to hand over the suspect to the victim's country. Whether extradition can take place depends on factors such as: whether it's permitted by the constitution of the country of residence - some constitutions do not permit the extradition of their citizens whether there is an extradition treaty between the two countries (e.g. the US-Canada extradition treaty) or as part of the laws within a supranational body of which the countries are members (e.g. the EU) the outcome of an extradition hearing, if there is one - the suspect might be allowed to appeal against the extradition (and against an adverse decision) whether the government of the country of residence approves or blocks the extradition A case pertinent to your hypothetical is that of Gary McKinnon, a Briton resident in the UK who was accused by the US government of hacking into many military and NASA computers. He was indicted by a federal grand jury and the US sought his extradition from the UK. After a few years of litigation, including appeals to the-then superior court of the UK the House of Lords and the European Court of Human Rights, which on the whole went against him, his extradition was blocked by the-then Home Secretary Theresa May on human rights grounds. A process outside the legal system of the victim's country is extraordinary rendition - although sometimes the government of the suspect's country secretly cooperates. This is state-sponsored kidnapping or abduction - agents of the 'victim' country grab the suspect and move him to that country or some other place. So far as I'm aware, however, it has not been used on hackers - only people suspected of terrorism. There is at least one known case where the person was abducted by mistake. Alternatively the two countries might come to an agreement whereby the person is tried in the country of residence and punished there if convicted. | I'll preface this by saying I live in Australia where the lowest jurisdiction that can make an act a criminal offence is the state; local governments simply do not have that power here, Question 1: If I understand this right you have a law that you do not enforce that carries moderate sanctions and you are asking that a law that you do not enforce with greater sanctions will be a greater deterrent? Well ... no (see here). If you want to stop the behavior you have to enforce the sanctions that you have in a fair and impartial way. I would suggest that you make it very clear that starting in early September the laws will be enforced - that gives people fair warning. Then, each weekend in September you bring in enough police (State Troopers?) to enforce the law. Its not going to take many $250 fines to make people stop. Question 2: No comment. Question 3: No comment. Question 4: Sounds like a good way of getting the city sued for negligence; just because people are breaking the law does not make it legal to hurt them. If you are serious then fencing the entire area may be worthwhile but the area would still need to be policed. | The law in every country where your service is available prevails. That means that if your servers are in Estonia, your file storage is in Lithuania, your company is in Switzerland, you are in France, you hold Thai citizenship, your users are in the USA and the signal transits through the U.K., Belgium, Germany, Canada and Poland then you are subject to the laws of each and every one of them. In addition, if China has reason to believe that the stored files contain matters relating to their citizens then they can take an interest. And so on and so forth ... A country has jurisdiction wherever it wants to have jurisdiction subject to the limits of and its ability to actually enforce its laws. What you are proposing is certainly illegal in many countries and you need to seek professional legal advice - not rely on strangers on the internet. | In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say. |
What happens when someone changes their license on an image (or other file) and you are actively using it on your website? Say I find a CC0 (public domain) or other Creative Commons Share Alike (permissive license) image on Flickr or the web. Or any asset/file really, that is under a permissive "you can use this royalty-free/copyright-free/etc. for commercial purposes/etc." license. Say I use that image on my website, or that audio file, or video, or document. All is fine and well because the license was permissive. But then say the original content creator changes their license to be more restrictive, that is, you can't use it for commercial purposes, or other restrictive limitations are placed on the image/file. But I am already using it, given the old license. What am I to do now? There's not really an easy way to be notified of file permission changes on the web. You'd have to wait for the author to manually tell you they did that. Even if they did tell you they changed it, what is to be made of the fact that you used it when it had a permissive license? One example of this is on Flickr. I am not sure everyone is aware of how licensing works who uploads photos to Flickr. So say they had a permissive license at first, then they see someone using their images for commercial purposes, and then they go and change the license of those images to be more restrictive (disable commercial use, for example). The person using the author's images used them when the license was permissive, but now the license is restrictive. What happens in this situation? For any file type, or if that's too complex then I'm mainly interested in image/audio/video, or just images. Can the one using the author's file say "I started using it when the license was permissive, so I am free to use it now even though you changed the license"? Or what happens exactly in this situation, from a legal (and potentially practical) perspective? Must you take down the image after that? If you are required to take down the image after you used it when it had a permissive license, that seems like pandora's box, and you can't trust any image, because what if someday they decide to make all their images restricted but you are using thousands of them from when the license was permissive? Then there is the problem of proving the license was permissive at first, before it was changed. Flickr doesn't have license change logs, so maybe you would have to add the URL of the image to the wayback machine on archive.org to "prove" it was permissive? I don't get what you would have to do to make sure that, if you used an originally permissively licensed image/file, and then the license changed to more restrictive, that you won't get into trouble. | The creative commons licenses explicitly include a paragraph that they cannot be revoked once granted. That is an important concept of all free licenses (CC, but also MIT, Apache etc) Now it's a fact that Flickr (and maybe other sites) do allow changing the license to something less permissive. If you use one of their images, it's really best to keep a proof that it once was available under the CC license you originally got it with. This can be e.g., a screenshot or a link to the wayback machine. Wikimedia commons is often affected by this problem, as people regularly upload files from Flickr (which is absolutely ok, if they have a CC-by-sa or similar license at the time of the upload). Commons has installed a review process for such uploads. Trusted users check that the uploaded files really have the license on Flickr that the uploader declared. If later the license on Flickr is changed by the original owner, the history on Commons is considered to be enough evidence that the license was, in fact, permissive earlier. More about this can be read here. | In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost. | Online file converters are legal: there is no law that prohibits a person from making a program available and executing online, including creating output in the form of a file. It is possible that some person may illegally copy copyright-protected material then use a website to modify that material, in which case the question of vicarious liability for copyright infringement could arise, so we appeal to the DMCA safe harbor provisions to see what the website must do. First, the owner of copyright must submit a properly constructed takedown notice to the website. Crucially, the notice must contain sufficient information that the website operator can find and take down the item(s) in question. Assuming that the complainant can supply the "where is it" information, then there is a notice and counter-notice routine where the uploader is informed and can deny the accusation – the website operator doesn't evaluate the merits of the claim, he only sees that the formalities were observed. If the operator follows the rules, he cannot be held vicariously liable. If the link does not expire and if it is somehow promulgated, the technical potential for being a contributor to copyright infringement becomes very real, but it puts the operator in no worse a legal position than Youtube. So the question is not just related to OCILLA, it is entirely covered by that law. Questions of how users or website owners are "supposed to" act don't figure into this. If the website owner does not comply with those provisions, they have no access to the safe harbor provisions, and they can be sued. However, the website itself remains legally "permitted" (there never was a prohibition of such a website). | I assume these are digital photos that were electronically transferred (not prints physically delivered). If they were prints physically delivered, he owns those prints, since you used to own them but you unconditionally transferred ownership to him by giving them. No backsies under the law. The photos are protected by copyright law, which means that the person who took the pictures has the exclusive right to make copies, disseminate them, and authorize making copies. In order for anyone to make a copy, they need permission – a license – from you. In the world of pre-planned business deals, the copyright holder writes up a document granting B some right to use the protected material, which typically means "you can install it on your various devices but may not give copies to others". In this case, however, you didn't create an explicit written license. So if this ends up in court, the question is what implicit license you granted. The courts will not decide that you granted him the license to unrestrictedly sell or give away copies of the protected material. The most likely outcome would be that he can only keep his copy, i.e. he will not be forced to erase the copy that you sent him. What the courts would do is try to discern what license you most likely intended to grant to him. There is a provision in copyright law that allows a licensee to make backup copies of a computer program (17 USC 117), but a digital photo is not a computer program. So the lifespan of the copy that you sent would be the lifespan of the phone (I assume) that you sent it to. Since actually using a digital photo technically requires making a copy (from disk storage to computational memory), there is a legal direction (dead-end) that you could go where the photo could exist on the phone, but never be opened again. Again, the courts would have to discern what license you probably intended w.r.t. ever opening the photo – obviously you intended that the file could be opened / viewed any number of times. You could argue that the license which you granted was conditional, i.e. "you can have and use these pictures as long as we are a thing", but establishing that this was part of the license would be tricky. Free digital content often has some "as long as" condition attached to it, i.e. "you can use this program as long as you are affiliated with University of Whatever". I don't consider a conditional license to be a ridiculous interpretation, on the other hand the particular court (judge) might decide that people who sext should be forced to live with the unpleasant consequences of their decisions. If we exclude such a line of thinking, I don't see a compelling counter-argument that your ex-partner inequitably loses a right by construing the license as conditional. I don't know if there is any case law that addresses this: at any rate, copyright law would severely limit what he could do with the pictures (the tort "invasion of privacy" also limits dissemination). | If your app is published under US law, then the DMCA would apply, just as if it was a web site. The DMCA doesn't say anything about what particular technology the distributor is using. TO be protected by by the DMCA's "safe harbor" provision, you will need to include a notice in your app that you accept takedowns, and provide an address or method by which they can be sent, and an agent who will receive them. (You can be your own agent if you choose.) When and if you recieve a take down notice, you must check if it is valid in form. According to this Wikipedia article, a takedown notice must include: (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site. (iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (See the actual text of the relevant section of the law.) If you receive (through your designated agent) a valid takedown notice, you must promptly remove the content and notify the poster (or you can instruct to poster to remove it, but you must do so yourself if the poster does not). If the poster then files a valid counter notice (see the linked sources above) with your agent, you must notify the sender of the original notice, and if the sender does not notify you of a copyright suit filed within 10-14 days, you must restore the content. Provided that these rules are complied with, the host gets a 'safe harbor" and cannot be sued for copyright infringement, nor for the act of taking down the content. I believe that the agent must be registered with the US copyright office. The courts have not ruled on just how quickly an ISP or other host must react to the takedown notice. It must be "expeditious". Moreover, Under the DMCA (i) 1) (a) The host must have, post, and enforce a policy denying access to repeat infringers, or lose safe harbor protection. The text of the provision is: (i) Conditions for Eligibility. -(1)Accommodation of technology. —The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider— --(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers; | The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details. | Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing. | When you license your IP (like a song) you can specify the terms and conditions of its use by the licensee, including revenue shares from any derived work. However, if, as your comment suggests, you grant an "informal" license, and later decide that you want to "firm things up" with a license having different terms, that's a matter you would have to either negotiate or litigate with your counterparty. If you want a common reference point for negotiation of this sort of license, you might have a look at compulsory license terms. |
A tourist can request political asylum? Some countries like Uruguay accept political asylum request ONLY if the person enters the country illegally, for those with tourist visa they have a way more complex mechanism. But generally speaking, since each country is a micro universe in laws, is it possible for a tourist to request political asylum? Or there are other ways for a tourist to permanently migrate to the visiting country? | The answer is "it depends," of course. An asylum application may be considered less credible if the applicant entered as a tourist. The applicant would have to explain what changed between the time of entry and the time of the asylum application. (Perhaps a change of government at home? The start of a civil war?) Many countries expect applications for a work permit to be made from outside. Such an application may take much longer to process than a tourist visa, which makes the stay as a tourist problematic. On the other hand, there are countries which allow some tourists to file immigration applications. For instance, Canadian citizens and some others can apply for a German residence permit while they are in Germany. | No. The repeal of pro-LGBT legislation is not sufficient. To be a refugee you must have a real and imminent fear of persecution which is generally defined to include matters like bodily harm or arbitrary detention or seizure of property on account of your status. The generalized protections existing under the law from private violence and civil rights violations in the U.S., while imperfect, is not going to suffice as a general matter to establish refugee status, particularly because many of those protections arise under federal law. A generalized fear of a "civil war" someday, and a general dissatisfaction with the amount of corruption present in the government and the bad policies of the government, in the United States, is not sufficient. Also, the United States is a free immigration zone, which means that people can freely travel and relocate to other parts of the United States, and while some places in the United States might be quite unfriendly to LGBT individuals, there are other places in the United States that are much more welcoming both in theory, based upon enacted laws, and in practice. For example, in Colorado, there are state anti-discrimination laws, one of the leading candidates for Governor is a gay man who is currently one of our Congressmen, we have had lesbian speakers of the state house, a high official in Denver's school district is a gay man who was a former state legislator, and a DA in a fairly conservative suburb of Denver vigorously prosecuted and obtained a conviction against a man who murdered a transwoman on account of her trans-status including a hate crime count, and a transman serves in the U.S. military in one of the state's federal military bases. When I walk the halls of my children's high school in Denver, the walls are full of official administration proclamations of support for LGBT students that is backed up by action and reflected in how my children's many LGBT friends were treated in their school. Denver's clerk's office proudly proclaims that it marries hundreds, if not thousands, of same sex couples every year. This doesn't mean life is perfect in Colorado, but it isn't official persecution of the kind that would rise to refugee status either. And, since anyone in the U.S. can move to Colorado or other relatively LGBT friendly states, there would not be any ground to claim refugee status. Canada, for example, would not admit someone as a refugee based upon persecution for LGBT status if that person did not demonstrate that they could not escape persecution by moving to metropolitan Denver or San Francisco or New York City. The U.S. is not necessarily the very best place in the world to be LGBT, but it is certainly near the top, despite the fact that the struggle for LGBT rights is ongoing and will be indefinitely and it isn't perfect. | What should and shouldn't happen isn't going to do a damn thing about your passport situation. Your passport isn't being 'held', it's in processing at a place that is currently not operational due to an unprecedented virus outbreak. No one is acting like a criminal or treating you like one, you are just unlucky. If your situation is that dire, you have no choice but to get a temporary passport. I seriously doubt an Indian court is going to side with you on this one. Just because the passport office is legally allowed to operate, doesn't mean that they are actually able to. If, for example, COVID-19 hit enough of their workforce, they won't have enough people to operate properly and they'll have no choice but to close. And no, '2 or 3 people' is not enough to operate such a large scale, sensitive operation with high security requirements, even just to return passports . | Generally a person can leave money to any person or organization that the testator pleases. In some US states, a minimum portion must be left to family (spouse and/or children). Aside from that, there is no requirement and no exclusions. US law prohibits gifts (and other support) to a few specific organizations which the government has officially listed as terrorist, and I suspect the Taliban is one of these. Gifts by will would be covered by this law just as gifts from a living person. But if a living person in the US can lawfully make a gift to an organization, a similar gift may be left by will. Even if a particular bequest was unlawful, that would not make the will as a whole invalid. Edit: It seems that the Afghan Taliban is not on the list of terrorist organizations maintained by the US, and so there would be no bar to a US citizen leaving money to that group. There would be to groups actually on the list. The general principle above holds. | People can take their personal cars through the Channel Tunnel from Great Britain to France. They don't actually drive their cars through the tunnel, but going by car is a perfectly normal way to travel between those two countries. That's probably the most well-known place where drivers will switch from driving on one side of the road to the other, but there are many more . If driving with a car with the wheel on the "wrong" side were forbidden, these options would not exist, because at least one direction of travel would not work. Now, of course, that doesn't mean a country like Belgium, which does not have to direct way to Britain, couldn't forbid cars with the steering wheel on the right. But at least for EU states, that seems to be forbidden, as Poland and Lithuania learned when they tried to require cars that were to be registered there to have the steering wheel repositioned to the left Consequently, the Court holds that the position of the driver’s seat, an integral part of the steering equipment of a vehicle, comes within the harmonisation established by Directives 2007/46 and 70/311, so that, in the context of the registration of a new vehicle in their territory, the Member States may not require, for reasons of safety, that the driver’s seat of that vehicle be moved to the side opposite the direction of the traffic. It notes in that regard that the legislation at issue provides for exceptions with regard to the use of vehicles equipped with a steering-wheel on the right by people who reside in other Member States, and travel to Poland and Lithuania for a limited period (for example, tourists). That fact shows, according to the Court, that the contested legislation tolerates the risk involved in such use. So even those countries that tried to ensure that registered cars had the steering wheel on the "right" side made provisions for cars that were just traveling through. And the EU does not consider it a valid law to require wheels to be repositioned. | In general, obtaining a Visa is a thing that is done according to the discretion of the state offering it. As a result, it is entirely up to the Austrian regulations. To establish the necessary information, sometimes additional information is required then the basic ones. Austrias Visa page lists: Nachweis über ausreichende Mittel zur Bestreitung des Lebensunterhalts für die Dauer des geplanten Aufenthalts und die Rückreise in den Herkunfts- oder Wohnsitzstaat Sonstige von der jeweiligen Behörde geforderten Nachweise (Hotelreservierungen, Einladungsschreiben, Buchungsbelege, Rückflugticket, Nachweis einer aufrechten Beschäftigung, usw.) – da diese den örtlichen Standards angepasst und mit den anderen Schengenvertretungen koordiniert sind, können die Nachweise lokal differieren The first is "proof that you are financially not dependant on Austria for the time you want to be there" and "Any other documentation required by the office". That means, yes, they can ask for any documents that are reasonable to establish that you can pay for your travel to Austria and intend to return home after your visit. They do so according to Article 14 of the Visa-ordonance: Article 14 Supporting documents When applying for a uniform visa, the applicant shall present: (a) documents indicating the purpose of the journey; (b) documents in relation to accommodation, or proof of sufficient means to cover his accommodation; (c) documents indicating that the applicant possesses sufficient means of subsistence both for the duration of the intended stay and for the return to his country of origin or residence, or for the transit to a third country into which he is certain to be admitted, or that he is in a position to acquire such means lawfully, in accordance with Article 5(1)(c) and (3) of the Schengen Borders Code; (d) information enabling an assessment of the applicant’s intention to leave the territory of the Member States before the expiry of the visa applied for. Any other information is under 14.1.d, and that can take the shape of bank statements. | No, it can't unilaterally scrap such schemes Immigration is a shared competence between the Union and Member States under Article 4(2)(j) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This means that the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts. However, it is predicated on a triad: the Commission (proposer of legislation), Parliament (co-decision maker), and the Council of the European Union (co-decision maker). The Parliament would not be able to propose and enact legislation scrapping the schemes by itself. The matter of proposing legislation would fall to the European Commission under the ordinary legislative procedure. Such a proposal would go before the Parliament and the Council of the European Union for a "co-decision". Either side may amend, accept, or reject the proposal. While the Parliament may accept any proposed legislation from the Commission, the Council is unlikely to agree. This is because the Council is comprised of government ministers from each Member State. In the matter of immigration, it is likely that the Home Affairs minister of each Member State would meet as the Council to consider the proposed legislation. Given the obvious conflict of interest for each "golden visa" scheme, it seems unlikely that the Council would agree to curtail or scrap the system given the advantages it provides that Member State, and the need to be "competitive" with other Member States (even though such competition should not really exist, to ensure the harmony of the Union). Therefore, the Council would likely reject the proposed legislation and assuming the subsequent conciliation committee cannot get both the Parliament and the Council to agree on the matter, the proposal will be abandoned. | Can I just go to the United States and marry him anyway, and still live in Canada? Basically, yes. But, if you tell the border patrol that you are engaged or headed to your wedding when crossing the border to attend your wedding, you may be denied entry, because you no longer qualify for a tourist visa or student visa, and now need a fiancee visa to enter the U.S. This can prevent you from crossing the border for a long time while a financee visa is processed. (I've seen this happen in real life more than once when I lived in Ann Arbor, Michigan which is near the Canadian border.) Once you are married, it is perfectly legal to live in Canada, although this may lead to tough questions from U.S. or Canadian immigration officials about whether you had a bona fide marriage if you later seek to gain U.S. citizenship, or he seeks to gain Canadian citizenship based upon being married, since not living together is circumstantial evidence that you have a sham marriage. This said, immigration officials tend to be more suspicious of sham marriages when one spouse from a poor country seeks citizenship in a rich country than they are in U.S.-Canadian marriages in either direction. Immigration officials are more suspicious if you do not have children together and are less suspicious if you have children together. Do I have to report this to anyone? You need a marriage license from the state or local government as applicable where the marriage takes place and it must be returned with signatures from the officiant and a couple of witnesses within the time set forth in the license. If you change your name upon marriage, you need to change it for purposes of all of your identification documents including your passport, usually by submitting your marriage license to the appropriate officials. If you are asked by a border crossing official if you are married or engaged to be married you are required to answer truthfully, but you do not have to volunteer the information. If either of you applies for a permanent residence visa or citizenship in the other country the immigration officials of that country must be informed on the application for the visa or citizenship. |
Are push tokens considered PII under the GDPR or the CCPA? I'm building a server for an app and I'm trying to get my privacy protections right. The app allows users to opt in to push notifications. If the user opts in, then I save a push notification token to later send notifications to that user on my server. Are such push notification tokens considered to be personally identifiable information under the GDPR or the CCPA? It seems to be it could be yes because the token can be used to push messages to a user (like a phone number or email address), or no because it only identifies a device and not a human being. | Yes, but it doesn't matter. This answer discusses gdpr implications. Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable person. The GDPR has an extremely broad concept of identifiability, also covering indirect identification using additional information and with the help of third parties. Even just being able to single out one data subject, i.e. being able to distinguish different users from another, counts as identification. If you already have a concept of user accounts, any information that is linked with the user accounts and somehow relates to those users would also be personal data. Since you have distinct push tokens per user, it seems like this criterion would be met. Additionally, those unique tokens might be directly identifying by themselves. The GDPR does not allow for semantic games like “it only identifies the device, not the user”. The key here is that the definition of identifiability does not hinge on your intentions, but on objective capabilities: if you or someone else who can come into possession of this data were to attempt to identify the user (such as singling out users from another), would they be reasonably likely able to do that? Since most devices are single-user, being able to identify a device would imply that you're reasonably likely to also identify users. Just because something is personal data doesn't mean you're forbidden from using that data. It means that you'd have to comply with GDPR rules, if you're otherwise within scope of that regulation (e.g. if you're EU/UK-based, or are targeting your services to people who are in UK/EU). For example, basic GDPR compliance steps include having a clear legal basis for your processing of personal data (such as necessity for performing a contract to which the data subject is party, or necessity for a legitimate interest, or consent), providing a privacy notice, and taking appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to ensure the compliance and security of processing. For example, TOMs regarding these push tokens could involve encryption, access controls, and a plan for installing security patches in order to prevent data breaches. Using push tokens is already a good measure in this context, since they are effectively pseudonymous and prevent linking additional information via that token (two sites/apps pushing notifications to the same person will have entirely different tokens). However, the push notification provider (e.g. Google, Apple, Mozilla) can resolve the pseudonymous tokens and link them to a person, indicating that these tokens are ultimately identifying (even if you can't perform that linking yourself). Note that if GDPR applies, then other EU/UK rules might apply as well. For example, sending electronic messages (such as emails) is subject to anti-spam rules (EU: ePrivacy, UK: PECR). These rules apply regardless of whether personal data is involved. Since the rules are not technology-specific, it is likely that regulators would consider user-visible push notifications to be equivalent to more well understood technologies like email and SMS. | Most likely yes if you are subject to UK or EU laws: The EU ePrivacy directive and implementing laws such as PECR in the UK require that you obtain consent before accessing information on a user's device, unless that access is strictly necessary to perform a service requested by the user. Cookies and similar technologies such as LocalStorage are stored on the user's device. Analytics are not strictly necessary to display a website. Thus, you need to obtain valid consent before setting any analytics cookies. GDPR and ePrivacy/PECR have some interactions: Even though the cookies might technically be set by GoSquared, you as the website operator are responsible for compliance. You are the data controller, the third party analytics are usually a data processor who only process data on your behalf. You must ensure that the data processor is compliant. Even if they were a joint controller you'd be responsible for what happens on the website (relevant precedent is the Fashion ID case). While ePrivacy originally had a fairly weak concept of consent (e.g. “by continuing to use this site, you consent …”). However, the GDPR updated the definition of consent, so that valid consent must be freely given, informed, actively given, and specific. If you set cookies for different purposes in addition to analytics, users should be able to give or withhold consent for analytics independently from other purposes. Since consent must be actively given, consent is never the default, e.g. pre-ticked checkboxes are not compliant (relevant precedent is the Planet49 case). Like Google, GoSquared stores data in the US. You are causing personal data to be transferred into the US, which is an international transfer. Before it was invalidated earlier in 2020, such transfers were easy to do under the Privacy Shield adequacy decision. Now, such transfers are only legal if you sign SCCs with your data processor, and your risk assessment indicates that your user's data is sufficiently safe there, despite your processors potentially being legally unable to comply with the SCCs. Fortunately for you the UK's ICO has taken a more industry-friendly stance on this matter than other countrie's data protection agencies. Why do so many websites use Google Analytics (GA) without requesting proper consent? A variety of potential reasons: They are actually non-compliant. After all, GA is not GDPR-compliant in default settings, and Google doesn't do a good job of providing essential information. Many data protection agencies have indicated that cookie consent enforcement is not their focus. GA can be used without using cookies/LocalStorage/…, and thus without requiring consent under ePrivacy or PECR. The websites might not be subject to EU or UK laws such as ePrivacy. | I don't think you would be responsible for whether your software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner. For GDPR compliance, it is important who the data controller is. The data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of a personal data processing activity, i.e. the why and how. The data controller alone is responsible for their GDPR compliance. When a data controller wants to run some software, it's the data controller's responsibility to ensure that this software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner (or possibly not at all). Determining purposes and means of processing When someone other than the developer runs a software, the question is who might be a controller: you as the developer, they as the operator, or neither, or both? The operator is clearly a controller: they determine a purpose for data processing (e.g. to manage staff) and have determined means to perform that processing (e.g. to use the software). The developer may or may not be a controller. Clearly, the developer has made choices about how the processing of personal data will be performed, i.e. has determined some means of processing. E.g. the developer has developed a particular architecture, chosen a way to store personal data, and has implemented some security measures. But determining some means is not sufficient to be a data controller, see discussion below. Has the developer participated in determining the purposes of processing? I think this will depend on the specific functionality provided by the software in question. If the software just does what it says and processes the data for the operator's purposes, everything should be fine. If the software also processes data for the developer's purposes, that developer might be a controller. For example, if analytics or crash reports are collected by the developer, that would be a clear indication that the developer would be a (joint) controller. So depending on specific factors, the operator might be the sole controller, or the operator and developer might be joint controllers. Essential vs non-essential means What about the developer determining some means? When does this make the developer a joint controller? The EDPB has created a theory of essential vs non-essential means: 40. As regards the determination of means, a distinction can be made between essential and non-essential means. “Essential means” are traditionally and inherently reserved to the controller. While non-essential means can also be determined by the processor, essential means are to be determined by the controller. “Essential means” are means that are closely linked to the purpose and the scope of the processing, such as the type of personal data which are processed (“which data shall be processed?”), the duration of the processing (“for how long shall they be processed?”), the categories of recipients (“who shall have access to them?”) and the categories of data subjects (“whose personal data are being processed?”). Together with the purpose of processing, the essential means are also closely linked to the question of whether the processing is lawful, necessary and proportionate. “Non-essential means” concern more practical aspects of implementation, such as the choice for a particular type of hard- or software or the detailed security measures which may be left to the processor to decide on. – EDPB guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, added formatting for legibility Looking through that list of essential means, some might be determined by a software's developer, but I wouldn't expect this to be the case for this kind of open source software. types of personal data: the software certainly sets a framework for processing specific kinds of personal data, e.g. by providing database fields for names, contact details, and schedules. But ultimately, the developer does not control which data is actually collected and filled into those fields – the developer does not cause specific kinds of personal data to be processed with the system. duration of processing: unless the software is programmed with a fixed retention schedule, it should be impossible to argue that the developer has determined the duration of processing. Even then, it would also be the operator who has determined this duration to be appropriate, rather than editing the open-source software to change the duration. But typically, no such retention schedule is enforced, and retention would depend solely on the operator (who can use an admin interface or a database console to erase old records). categories of recipients: typically, the developer does not determine to whom the data in the system will be given. But if the system sends data to third parties by itself, this might change. For example, if the system is pre-configured to store data in an existing cloud database instance, or to a specific analytics server, the developer might be acting as a controller. Here, good software engineering and legal risk minimization coincide. Best practices for web apps state that account credentials and connection strings shouldn't be hardcoded or committed to a repository, and should instead be provided externally (e.g. via environment variables). categories of data subjects: this depends solely on how the software is used. The developer has no way to determine whose data the operator will enter into the system. If the developer isn't a controller, might they be a data processor instead? In a GDPR context, a data processor is whoever processes personal data on behalf of a controller. The developer is clearly not a processor in this scenario because both the “processing” and “on behalf” criteria fail. The developer has no access to the data in the operator's instance, so cannot process the personal data. There is no direct relationship between the developer and the operator. The operator has not delegated authority to the developer so that the developer would be acting “on behalf” of the operator. There is a legal relationship between the two roles (the developer has licensed the software to the operator) but that is entirely irrelevant in a data protection context. The GDPR isn't directly about cookies While the GDPR does cover how personal data can be processed with cookies, the famous “cookie law” is actually separate: those cookie consent requirements stem from EU member state's implementations of the ePrivacy directive. Instead of talking about “controllers”, ePrivacy has concepts such as the “provider of an information society service”. While this role fits perfectly to an operator/provider who runs a web app in a publicly accessible manner, it does not fit a developer who merely makes some source code available. Is the developer even subject to the GDPR? The GDPR can only apply to data controllers and processor who process personal data. As discussed above, the developer is probably not processing personal data at all. Even if the developer were processing personal data, it is questionable if GDPR would apply assuming the developer has no “establishment” in the EU (e.g. an office). Then, the question would be whether those processing activities are either related to offering goods or services to data subjects in Europe, or whether the processing activities involve monitoring the behavior of people who are physically in Europe. Unless the developer is actively targeting European businesses with marketing for this software, the answer is very likely “no”. Could the operator sue the developer for providing software that isn't GDPR-compliant? The operator can sue anyone for any reason, but is probably not going to win. As discussed, the operator is a data controller. They are responsible for ensuring that their purposes and means are GDPR-compliant. That involves selecting suitable software. The data controller would be neglecting their own responsibilities if they just download some random software and start feeding personal data into it. Things might be different if the operator specifically advertises GDPR compliance features but you're not going to do that. It's also worth noting that common open source licenses like the Apache License 2.0 include a warranty and liability disclaimer. To which degree they protect the developer ultimately depends on national laws, but they make it difficult for the operator to make a legal argument that they're entitled to a GDPR-compliant product. See also the related question: Do warranty disclaimers in software licenses carry any legal weight? What can you do? First, don't worry too much. Given how much bad software there is on the internet, surprisingly few developer get into legal trouble for writing source code that's buggy or missing some features. Second, consider choosing a license for your project that includes a reasonable warranty/liability disclaimer. Third, make the state of your project clear in your README file. If someone knows that this is alpha-quality software and that no compliance features were implemented, it's their own fault if they actually use that software. | Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data | You are processing the users IP address in order to carry out the translation to a physical location (see my comment for the technical issues with that) and an IP address is most certainly considered personal information, so yes under the GDPR you are going to need a published policy because you are both data controller and data processor. You need to inform the user of what you are doing, and you need to tell them of the legal basis for the processing (there are several under the GDPR, of which consent is only one - but in your case its going to be the easiest to justify). If you use a third party service for the location translation, you also need to inform the user of that and make available the third party services data processing policy. | There is nothing in the GDPR requiring you to collect individual personally identifiable information. If the website has no need, and the website owner no desire, to collect such information, there is no requirement to do so. The GDPR requires that if such information is collected, that there is a lawful basis, and that it be handled appropriately and stored securely, and deleted when there is no longer a need to retain it, or on a proper request. If no such information is collected in the first place, all the rules about how to handle it do not apply. It is possible that some law of an individual country in the EU might mandate collection of some particular information, but I have not heard of any such requirement. | The ePrivacy Directive Cookies are governed in the EU by the ePrivacy Directive which was first passed in 2002, and revised in 2009. However, if a site places a cookie, and later reads the cookie and stores an indication of the cookie content, this may be personal information and thus also subject to GDPR rules. (Other privacy laws, such as the CCPA, may also impose requirements on cookie use, when they apply.) Note that the so-called "EU cookie law" is a directive and not a regulation. This means that it is up to the various EU countries to implement it in their national legislation, and different countries may implement it in different ways. It would be the actual laws in individual EU countries that would be binding on website operators, and I am not going to try to find and analyze all the various laws on the topic. Paragraph 25 of the directive (linked above) reads: However, such devices, for instance so-called "cookies", can be a legitimate and useful tool, for example, in analysing the effectiveness of website design and advertising, and in verifying the identity of users engaged in on-line transactions. Where such devices, for instance cookies, are intended for a legitimate purpose, such as to facilitate the provision of information society services, their use should be allowed on condition that users are provided with clear and precise information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC about the purposes of cookies or similar devices so as to ensure that users are made aware of information being placed on the terminal equipment they are using. Users should have the opportunity to refuse to have a cookie or similar device stored on their terminal equipment. This is particularly important where users other than the original user have access to the terminal equipment and thereby to any data containing privacy-sensitive information stored on such equipment. Information and the right to refuse may be offered once for the use of various devices to be installed on the user's terminal equipment during the same connection and also covering any further use that may be made of those devices during subsequent connections. The methods for giving information, offering a right to refuse or requesting consent should be made as user-friendly as possible. Access to specific website content may still be made conditional on the well-informed acceptance of a cookie or similar device, if it is used for a legitimate purpose. This should mean, if implemented straightforwardly, that cookies, beyond those absolutely essential to the operation of a site, can only be placed if a user is notified of the intention to place them, and freely consents. This can be done once per user, on an initial session. Users are supposed to be provided with provided with "clear and precise information". I do not think a simple statement that the site uses cookies fulfills this. At the very least the purposes for which cookies will be used should be provided. The directive does not make clear what level of detail about individual cookies such a notice must provide. The notice described in the question neither describes the purpose of cookie placement, nor does it offer any meaningful choice to accept or reject them. As such, I do not think it would be compliant with the directive. If cookies are read back (which is after all pretty much the point of having them) and can be potentially identified with an individual, then under the GDPR (article 6) there must be a lawful basis for processing them, and the interaction above would not be enough to establish consent as a lawful basis. There might be some other basis that does not require consent, however. Interpretations from others This page from cookiebot explains some of the history of the directive, and how it contrasts with the GDPR (which is a regulation, and so is directly applicable without the action of national legislatures). This page from The Verge discusses recent changes in the directive and the guidelines for applying it, and criticizes how it has been complied with, and ignored, by many sites. Cookies and the GDPR This page, "GDPR, and the ePrivacy Directive", from GDPR.EU says: ... cookies, insofar as they are used to identify users, qualify as personal data and are therefore subject to the GDPR. Companies do have a right to process their users’ data as long as they receive consent or if they have a legitimate interest. Passed in the 2002 and amended in 2009, the ePrivacy Directive (EPD) has become known as the “cookie law” since its most notable effect was the proliferation of cookie consent pop-ups after it was passed. It supplements (and in some cases, overrides) the GDPR, addressing crucial aspects about the confidentiality of electronic communications and the tracking of Internet users more broadly. To comply with the regulations governing cookies under the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive you must: Receive users’ consent before you use any cookies except strictly necessary cookies. Provide accurate and specific information about the data each cookie tracks and its purpose in plain language before consent is received. Document and store consent received from users. Allow users to access your service even if they refuse to allow the use of certain cookies Make it as easy for users to withdraw their consent as it was for them to give their consent in the first place. That page also describes the proposed ePrivacy Regulation which, if passed, will replace the current directive, and links to drafts of it. Conclusion The site described in the question probably does not comply with legislation implementing the ePrivacy directive. Depending on where it is hosted and targeted, and what it does with cookies that it sets, it may fail to comply with the GDPR as well. There has been very little enforcement of the directive so far. This may change in the future, particularly if it is replaced by a regulation, as has been proposed. | Alice's business sells database management software. Organisations buy or licence the software, deploy it on hardware they control and use the software to help store and, process and analyse 'personal data' within the meaning of GDPR. Alice's business has no access whatsoever to the personal data being stored and processed by those organisations. In respect of that personal data, GDPR is not engaged by Alice's business. The business is neither a 'controller' nor 'processor' of that personal data. Who does the data protection law apply to? - European Commission Who does the UK GDPR apply to? - Information Commissioner's Office |
Does the Geneva Convention apply to the party denying that the war is going on? Suppose a country R invades another country U without declaring war and insists that the invasion is not a war, but a "special operation", aimed at liberating U's citizens from U's government, or some BS like that. U's position, on the other hand, is that R's invasion of U is an act of war. The first question: can captured soldiers from R's army claim protection under Geneva Convention? The second question: is R required to respect Geneva Convention rights of the captured U soldiers? Furthermore, R hired mercenaries from yet another country, S. Those mercenaries, even though acting at R's behest and under R's instructions, are not a part of R's or S's armies. The third question: does the Geneva Convention apply to them too? Finally, volunteers from other countries are volunteering to help U's resistance, despite not being citizens of U and despite the volunteers' nations refusing to take any part in the conflict. Are those volunteers protected too? | International Humanitarian Law applies to all armed conflicts The Geneva Conventions are a part of the overarching body of this law. It applies to all armed conflicts, not just declared wars. An armed invasion by R of U is a conflict to which IHL applies irrespective of if it is a declared war or not. BTW, declared wars outside Africa and South America are virtually unknown since WWII | Yes, for most of them. Article 42.7 TEU If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. The "specific character" for "certain Member States" refers to states with a traditional military neutrality, notably Austria, Ireland, and Sweden. Those EU states which are also NATO members would not have that excuse since they agreed, in principle, to use military force to protect others, so they cannot say they are constitutionally incapable of doing so in the EU case. This is why the EU does not, generally, admit members with open territorial conflicts. Probably no, for the rest of NATO Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. This is in a way weaker than the EU clause, "such action as it deems necessary" might allow individual countries to do less than going to war if that is unnecessary. Also, NATO-but-not-EU countries might claim that a Russian attack on EU forces in an EU-but-not-NATO country does not constitute an attack in the treaty area: Article 6 For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, [...] How to interpret a Russian counter-counter-attack on NATO countries after those counter-attack Russia in accordance with collective defense after a Russian attack on a non-NATO country would become a political issue. As pointed out in the comments, the practical application of either TEU 42.7 or NATO Article 5 would be intensely political, not just in the "indirect" case but also where it seems to be clear-cut. Nations might rally to the flag or drag their feet, depending on the details. Or even depending on totally unrelated issues where they want to get concessions. Or they might alert their forces and deploy them on different flanks than the one under attack, because that flank feels exposed. | NO (mostly). Servitude means that the employer, or owner of the indenture, or whatever, can use physical force to make the indentee carry out the work given. If the indentee runs away they can be arrested and forcibly returned. This is distinct from the law of contracts. If Alice agrees to provide labour for Bob and subsequently fails to fulfil the contract then Alice may have to pay damages, but that is all. Even in cases of crminial fraud where Alice never meant to provide the labour in the first place, the penalty is defined by law, and would not be the provision of the contracted labour. As the OP notes, military service is generally an indenture-style contract; desertion is a crime. However the other party in that case is the government acting under law rather than a third party acting in their own self-interest. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits all forms of servitude. | There are circumstances in which countries that are generally recognized to follow the rule of law will extradite in the absence of a treaty. For example, the U.S. generally will not extradite absent a treaty, and there are many countries with which the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty. Regardless, 18 U.S. Code §§ 3181 and 3184 leave the executive with the authority to extradite without regard to the existence of a treaty, persons (other than citizens, nationals or permanent residents of the United States), who have committed crimes of violence against nationals of the United States in foreign countries. U.S. Department of Justice Manual, 9-15.100 - General Principles Related to Obtaining Fugitives from Abroad | What a country claims to be the case certainly doesn't guarantee what is the case. The constitution (at least as of 2012) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (aka North Korea) says: Article 67. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and social organizations. Needless to say, North Korea is not generally considered a bastion of free speech. The People's Republic of China has a similar provision in its constitution. When we get to countries where those outside the country consider there to be some level of freedom of speech, there are still restrictions. In the UK, the Official Secrets Act makes it a crime for any person to republish leaked classified information. Germany makes it illegal to deny that the Holocaust happened. Until 2013, Canada made it illegal for a person to use telecommunications to say something that would expose people to hatred for some reason covered by antidiscrimination law. Many, many countries criminalize child pornography. Many, many countries have copyright laws. "Free speech" does not mean "you can say whatever you want and the government can't stop you." It means "as a general rule, the government can't restrict what you're saying because they don't like it." I am unaware of any country with a functional government with unfettered freedom of speech. | The US Constitution has no bearing on the Nuremberg Tribunals The tribunals were not conducted under US law, they were conducted under an international treaty going by the snappy title of No. 251 Agreement by the Government of the United Kindom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Union of Societ Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis. This was signed for the United States on 8 August 1945 by Robert H. Jackson who later served as chief prosecutor on the tribunal. The laws of the United States allow three mechanisms for the US to join international treaties: treaties, congressional-executive agreements and executive agreements. I do not know what mechanism was used but AFAIK, no contemporary challenge was made that the US lacked the power to or hadn't properly acceded to the treaty. This is the extent to which US domestic law would be applicable. The US recognises that there are other laws and other courts than merely US ones and that their citizens may be subject to those laws and serve on those courts. Indeed, there are circumstances where US courts will apply foreign law to a case; when that happens US law applies to the procedure but the substantive law of the other jurisdiction is applied to the facts. There is no doubt that the legal basis of the Nuremberg Tribunal was suspect and controversial and this was recognised at the time as this April 1946 The Atlantic article demonstrates. However, there was never any doubt that US law (or UK, or USSR, or French law) was totally irrelevant. I suggest you ask a new question focusing on the role of "Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law" under international law. | As with all international law, it depends on "who says so": I will draw on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War as most relevant. Article 3 distinguishes combatants from non-combatants, saying that Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. They then specifically prohibit murder: Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture but this only applies to non-combatants. There simply is no prohibition against killing combatants (unsurprisingly). Liberia acceded to that treaty, so for instance if one of their soldiers murdered a non-combatant, in principle they should try that soldier for the crime of murder under Liberian law. If some random dude (not a soldier) murders anybody in Liberia, in principle they should try him for the crime. Soldier may kill enemy soldier, even when the killed soldier is sleeping and poses no immediate threat to the soldier who kills him. That's the nature of war. In the case of Massaquoi, he might have been prosecuted by Sierra Leone, but negotiated immunity in Sierra Leone in exchange for information on his RUF colleagues. There was no such tribunal or arrangement w.r.t. his involvement in Liberia, and Finland opted to conduct an extraterritorial trial based on war crimes (not the killing of combatants). His acquittal was based on the lack of evidence that it was him that did the reported deeds (I don't know if there is a publicly available judgment, but it is 850 pages and in Finnish, so toivotan onnea projektille. | The 2nd Amendment does not grant a right not to bear arms. This is its text: A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. Read D.C. v Heller for the reasons the 2nd Amendment stands for an individual's right to bear arms. Most relevant to this question is what the phrase "keep and bear arms" means (internal citations removed): We turn to the phrases “keep arms” and “bear arms.” Johnson defined “keep” as, most relevantly, “[t]o retain; not to lose,” and “[t]o have in custody.” Webster defined it as “[t]o hold; to retain in one’s power or possession.” No party has apprised us of an idiomatic meaning of “keep Arms.” Thus, the most natural reading of “keep Arms” in the Second Amendment is to “have weapons.” ... “Keep arms” was simply a common way of referring to possessing arms, for militiamen and everyone else. ... At the time of the founding, as now, to “bear” meant to “carry.” When used with “arms,” however, the term has a meaning that refers to carrying for a particular purpose—confrontation. In Muscarello v. United States, in the course of analyzing the meaning of “carries a firearm” in a federal criminal statute, Justice Ginsburg wrote that “[s]urely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second Amendment … indicate[s]: ‘wear, bear, or carry … upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose … of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.’” If there is a constitutional argument against mandatory gun ownership laws, it does not stem from the 2nd Amendment. |
Citizens United applicability to 100% foreign owned US corporations? Citizens United said that US corporations can spend unlimited "independent expenditures for political campaigns". However, foreign natural persons and foreign corporations are not allowed to spend any independent expenditures for US political campaigns. Even buying merchandise from a presidential candidate's campaign website would be illegal for a foreign natural person or a foreign corporation. However, for a US corporation that is 100% owned by foreign natural persons, does Citizens United apply? What about 99%, 98%, 97%, .... ? | From https://www.fec.gov/updates/foreign-nationals/ A domestic subsidiary of a foreign corporation (or a domestic corporation owned by foreign nationals) may make donations and disbursements in connection with state or local elections (if permissible under state and local law) provided that: These activities are not financed in any part by the foreign parent or owner; and Individual foreign nationals are not involved in any way in the making of donations to nonfederal candidates and committees. | Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide). | In most US states, anyone can buy such lists, covering either the whole state or a specific municipality or election district. Political campaigns routinely buy such lists and use them to organize door-to-door campaigning, as well as postal appeals. Some years ago I was a (losing) candidate for local office in NJ. I bought such a list covering the township I was running in. It showed each voter's name, address, age, party of registration, if any, and which of the last several elections the person had voted in. I think the lists were available from the board of elections, and local lists from municipal clerks. Exact procedures no doubt differ from state to state, as will costs. At that time lists were available in electronic and paper formats. Purchasers had to sign an agreement not to use the information for commercial marketing, as I recall. Updated lists including data from the latest election are not usually available at once, but are available long before the next general election. | It is legal. 18 USC Chapter 17 contains laws regarding what you can/cannot do with US legal tender. It doesn't mention anything about buying, or selling US tender at or above the face value. And there are several businesses in the USA that do this (coin exchanges which purchase coins at less then face value and give you dollar bills in return, etc...). However I would be concerned that your action might look like money laundering to the customs official on your way back home. Or on the way going to the foreign country for that matter. Which could be very bad for you. I would talk to a lawyer about this. | Embezzlement is criminally prohibited by 18 USC 666, and this DoJ manual page on what is embezzlement cites the answer in Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268 that Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom such property has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has lawfully come. It differs from larceny in that the original taking was lawful, or with the consent of the owner, while in larceny the felonious intent must have existed at the time of the taking Following other case law, the elements of the crime are there was a trust or fiduciary relationship between the defendant and the private organization or State or local government agency; the property came into the possession or care of the defendant by virtue of his/her employment; the defendant's dealings with the property constituted a fraudulent conversion or appropriation of it to his/her own use; and the defendant acted with the intent to deprive the owner of the use of this property. This page lists over 32,000 disbursements; filtering just for rent give over 2,400 disbursements, a number of which are recent and made to some business with Trump in the name (Trump Tower LLC etc). The conversion would have to be fraudulent to be embezzlement. There actually is not any evidence provided that a transfer violated FEC regulations (we have dates, amounts, and recipient), so we would have to speculate about what else is true. There are processed disbursement images up to 10/21/2020 such as this receipt for 3 charges for food and lodging paid to Trump Hotel Collection. In fact this payment was made by Donald J Trump for President, Inc. although the search term was the aforementioned PAC: I will overlook that anomaly. This is the FEC page on that committee (you have to follow the committee number because the name was also used in the 2016 campaign but was terminated). There vast numbers of filings linked there, but nothing that I saw indicates that Trump is in any sense an employee of the organization, so there is no actual evidence that there were any "Trump actions". First, it would have to be shown that there were Trump actions. Second, it would have to be show that the action was fraudulent. Technical misappropriation is not fraudulent. This FEC page describes the safe harbor provisions for misappropriation. This page specifically addresses embezzlement. Although they use the word "embezzlement", they do not purport that misappropriation constituted embezzlement as defined above, to point out that civil penalties may result from violation, see 11 CFR Part 104. Ultimately, the legal propriety of the disbursements depends on its purpose: here is what the FEC say about illegal conversion for personal use (food for daily consumption, mortgage or rent for personal residence, tuition...). The available evidence does not even suggest embezzlement. | It's not illegal to say things in your profile. SE requires you to license your content to them on a non-exclusive basis pursuant to CC BY-SA 4.0. "Non-exclusive" means that you can also license the material to others on some other basis, e.g. CC0. In that case, a person who uses your material can rely on the other license that you granted. If SE wanted to, it could prohibit putting licenses in a user profile, in which case you would have to promulgate your more generous license elsewhere. | Non-Profits Need Not Have Owners But Must Have A Lawful Purpose Any non-profit company, for example, a 501(c)(3), is ownerless and can be run by a self-perpetuating board if desired, rather than having delegates that provide an outside source for new board members. In that case you have to set forth a purpose of the company or trust, to which its assets and profits must be used, and it must be managed in accordance with that purpose. You can also have a "private foundation" that is effectively ownerless, again with a designated charitable purpose. Generally speaking, the law limits how much compensation can be paid to officers and employees of such a company and restricts self-dealing transactions by such a company. You probably cannot create a valid trust or business with no beneficiaries and no designated charitable purpose which is supposed to merely accumulate its profits and assets. Ownerless Cooperatives Are An Oxymoron Your reference in this and other posts to an "ownerless cooperative" is basically an oxymoron. A cooperative is an entity owned by a class of people who have a contractual relationship with the entity (usually consumers or producers) who are the owners of the company with voting control and who are entitled to an adjustment of their transaction prices with the cooperative via a rebate or surplus check proportionate to the dollar volume of their dealings with the cooperative (Northwest Mutual, must rural electric companies, and most credit unions would be examples of consumer cooperatives, Ocean Spray is a good example of a producers cooperative). An ownerless entity is pretty much by definition not a cooperative. An excellent overview of forms of entity organization other than investor owned stock corporations can be found in The Ownership of Enterprise by Henry Hansmann. The Life Of The Law Is Not Math Or Logic Honestly, it sounds like, in your several posts on the subject, that you are attempting the hide the ball of an ulterior purposes which is material to the legality and organization of an entity. The law is not like science or mathematics. You can't prove a bunch of isolated propositions and then string them together logically. The law operates on an entire comprehensive "fact pattern" and even if every step of your chain of reasoning to an ultimately result is supported by legal authority, this does not mean that this will be the result you get when you put all of the pieces together. That kind of logical reasoning doesn't work in a legal context. The heading of this section is a paraphrase of a famous statement about the law by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience... The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. from "The Common Law" (1881) at page 1. Blockchains Are Not The Legal Innovation That They Claim To Be Using blockchain technology to manage "tokens" of voting control in an entity is ultimately completely irrelevant. Blockchain technology is just another alternative to certificated shares, shares kept on an ownership ledger, or shares kept through secondary shareholding intermediaries or brokers. The technology used to keep track of voting control or economic ownership is irrelevant, and some common entities (e.g. homeowner's associations) have ownership that is basically determined via a crude public blockchain called the county clerk and recorder's records. People who think that blockchains provide any significant legal innovation into anything (e.g. here) are fundamentally misguided and typically are not people familiar with the law who have misconceptions about how the law works. Also, contrary to the hype, blockchains are not fraud-proof and indeed, involve serious systemic risks of instability because an error in an old transaction can disrupt lots of current claims. Claims such as those made here that blockchain transactions are irrefutable are naive and basically false. A block chain is a bit like a real property record system without an adverse possession rule to make ancient glitches irrelevant. Moreover, blockchains are a solution to a non-problem. Authenticating ownership and voting rights, economic entitlements, and corporate actions is something that has never posed a very significant economic problem ever since writing was invented. These are economic problems that were already effectively solved in the days of the Minoans, and widespread ownership of well authenticated entities by numerous ever shifting groups of owners was a problem well in hand by the days of the British East India Company. Anonymous Ownership Or Contribution Records Are Illegal Truly anonymous ownership, however, is legally prohibited, even though ownership need not be made a matter of public record. In the case of for profit entities, by securities regulation which requires disclosure for purposes of exercising voting rights and for disclosing large blocks of ownership as required by law, and for purposes of tax law. In the case of non-profit entities, it is prohibited by virtue of laws regulating private foundations that impose tax requirements when certain concentrations of contributions come from a small, related group of people. In the case of political organizations, campaign finance laws require disclosure. | The Cayman Islands are well known as a tax haven. They have a corporate tax of 0%, and that includes income from abroad. So by moving your company officially to the Cayman Islands, you can avoid to pay a lot of taxes. Now of course most other countries will still send you a tax bill for any income you make with business activities within their borders. But there are accounting tricks to get around that. For example, many countries only tax profits, not revenue. So you can reduce your annual profits of your national subsidiaries to zero by having them pay money to your company on the caymans. For example, you can transfer your trademark to your subsidiary on the Cayman Islands and then have your subisdiaries in all other countries pay the Cayman company an annual license fee for using that brand name. And the license fee happens to be just so expensive that your national taxable profits become zero. And no, that's not just a Chinese thing. Corporations all around the world use that method to avoid taxes. |
Is it legal to create a website acting as middleman for transactions between game items and real life cash? Knowing the ToS and EULA of the game prohibit one of selling his game items for real life money transactions, my question is, is it legal to create a website to act as the middleman for these transactions? From my view there is two options the website could work: Serve as a fully middleman: user posts an item; service bot receives the item; whenever a user buys the item the service bot gives the item to that user. Serve as a transaction website: user posts an item; waits for someone that wishes to buy it; service takes care of all the money transactions and confirms the item was given by both users; My thoughts are the first one is illegal as a service because of the bot doing actions against the ToS and EULA but the second one I'm not that sure because the risk is on both accounts. For research purposes the game in question is Rocket League. There are also real examples of this for Counter-Strike: Global Offensive such as Bitskins and DMarket which are still running, if this is not legal could someone explain why these examples are still up knowing they are in the same situation as the game I mentioned? | Tortuous interference with contract Both websites would be able to be successfully sued under the tort of interference with contractural relations. The requisite elements of tortious interference with contract claim are: (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract between plaintiff and another; (2) defendant’s awareness of the contractual relationship; (3) defendant’s intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of the contract; (4) a subsequent breach by the other caused by defendant’s wrongful conduct; and (5) damages. The damages would be caused by the reduction of the play experience by allowing these things to be bought instead of earned. | Is it ok to copy the game concept and even with mostly similar content like "fighting", "building houses" etc ? Yes, but ... I should also mention that pretty much my whole User Interface is based on the User Interface from "Parallel Kingdoms" Is copyright violation. Ideas are not protected by IP law. The tangible representation of those ideas (art, words, layout, format etc.) is protected. | Your issue is trademark, not copyright. If these other guys use their mark (product name) in commerce but did not register it, they have an unregistered trademark which you could be infringing. Between two users of the same trademark, the first to use in commerce wins. (There is a territorial component but with the Internet, meh.) If the trademark is registered that gives them a presumption of validity. Trademark infringement is concerned with consumer confusion. If someone uses someone else's trademark in a way that confuses consumers as to the origin of the goods, that's a problem. What this means is that if I make tires with the name Sportie and someone else makes soap also with that name Sportie there is not a high likelihood of confusion. Likewise a hotel in Washington called Runner's Cove probably doesn't infringe a shoe store in Florida with the same name. Fantasy games and fantasy books sold over the Internet? Sounds like a potential problem that you might want to clear up before the second book. | This would be infringement. It generally doesn't matter that you're giving things away for free. Keep in mind that the point of these laws is not only to prevent third parties from making money off the creator's ideas, but also to protect the creator's ability to make money. If you're providing free knock-off Winnie the Pooh products, that cuts into the market for the creator's legitimate products. | It is legal, though not if the grounds are illegal discrimination (race, religion, etc), which by their (empirically supported – they raised the price) representation is not the case. As a marketing strategy (pick a low number, hope for a bidding frenzy that drives the price up) it is legal, though carries a non-trivial risk. It does not constitute "bait and switch" under any definition of the term, and it is not illegal to engage in a business practice that causes someone to frown, or otherwise disapprove. | It might possibly be illegal. For criminal law, usually you need to obey the laws of three countries: The country you are a national of (by personality principle) The country from where you make the sale (by territoriality principle) The country that hosts the attacked interest (by territoriality principle) Then it depends on the jurisdiction (and other factors) whether the sale is legal or not. I'll use the example of my country, Czech Republic. There is a crime called "Unauthorized access to a computer system or data storage device". For example, you commit this crime by exploiting a vulnerability in a web application and copying the web owner's data on your computer. It is also codified that whoever wilfully facilitates the committing of a crime by providing the criminal with resources (such as the exploit) is considered to have also committed the crime. For this to apply, you must have known or expected that the exploit will be used to commit a crime. The courts would decide this. | An additional important fact is that the EULA at the time did not assign Blizzard the rights to custom maps.1 And since 2010, Blizzard and Valve have jointly registered DotA-related copyright. See e.g. U.S. Copyright Registration Nos. TX0008153084 and TX0008149056. The theory of ownership is as follows. Because the EULA did not assign Blizzard the copyright in the customization, the modders gained copyright in those, despite the restriction that they not be used commercially. It was then free to them to transfer those rights to Valve. A court has considered in passing whether this assignment to Valve was valid. See Blizzard Entm't, Inc. v. Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., No. 3:15-cv-04084-CRB (N.D. Cal. May. 16, 2017). The judge recognized that the EULA explicitly prevented Eul and Icefrog (the modders who assigned their rights to valve) from using their creations for commercial purposes. However, because uCool "twice failed to argue that the ban prevented Eul and Icefrog from validly assigning their rights to Valve," the judge understood uCool to have waived that argument. Thus, the status of the copyrights is still in flux. However, commentators speculate that Blizzard and Valve have an agreement/protocol for dealing with these copyright issues. It would take a third-party to argue that copyright in one or more of the DotA variants is in the public domain or actually owned by some other creator and force a court to assess the copyright and validity of the assignment.2 1. Today, the language has been updated to "assign to Blizzard all of your rights, title, and interest in and to all Custom Games." 2. For one person's theory of how this could be the case, see David Nathaniel Tan, "Owning the World's Biggest eSport: Intellectual Property and DotA" (2018) 31:2 Harv. J.L. & Tech 965 at 984 (analogizing to Sherlock Holmes). I am not suggesting that a third party with no ownership interest in the copyrights would have standing to enforce Blizzard's former ToS, ELUA, or other agreements, or its copyrights. I am proposing that the third party might raise these as an arguments in defence of their own use (as uCool did). | Copyright protection is about certain acts, and not about relationships between products. Copyright law says that the creator of an original work hold the exclusive right to copy and to authorize creation of derivative works. Copyright law does not say that anybody can freely create derivative works as long as they are different to a certain extent. So if you take an original Mario and modify it a teeny bit, that is a violation of copyright; if you take an original Mario and modify it hugely, that is a violation of copyright. Degree of similarity is relevant on some cases when the factual question arises whether the allegedly-infringing work is based on some protected original. This is most obvious in music cases, where all baroque music has some similarity to all other baroque music, all death metal has some similarity to all other death metal, and so on. There is not a legal quasi-statutory standard for measuring substantial similarity in music. The scientific underpinning of such a standard would be based on (weighted) combinatorics and the idea that there are only so many tunes possible (that would be a huge number, until you get to the "within a genre" condition). It seems obvious (by your "admission") that the derived works are based on protected works, so Nintendo's permission is required to legally create such works. However, you do or would hold copyright in your unauthorized derived work. Without a trail of evidence such as a SE question pointing to the connection, the derived images might be hard to connect to the originals. In addition, you may be able to avail yourself of a "fair use" defense, in case you get sued by the original creator. Factors favoring such a defense are the insubstantiality of the copying (a small portion) and the "transformativeness" of your creation. |
When should you register copyright for countries you don't live in? From what advice I've read, it's a very good idea to register a copyright for the country where you live. However, when should you also register a copyright with other countries? | That depends very much on the particular countries involved. Some countries do not have a system of copyright registration at all. Of those that do, the benefits vary. In the united-states, one cannot sue for infringement at all unless the copyright is first registered. One cannot obtain statutory damages, or legal fees as damages, unless the work is registered before the infringement starts, or no later than three months after publication. So if one thinks it is plausible that one will sue for infringement in a US court, it is a good idea to register early. In other countries, the benefits may be different and the value of registration not so clear. Note that a plaintiff (usually the copyright owner or claimant) can normally choose what jurisdiction to file an infringement suit in. Suit can usually be brought in any country where the work has been published or distributed. So one can limit registration to countries where one is likely to bring a suit. | In the USA, you are covered by the DMCA act, which you should most definitely read. I can't sue you and your website for copyright infringement unless I first send you a DMCA takedown notice. (Of course I can sue, but I will lose). In the DMCA notice I have to tell you who I am so that you can contact me, I have to tell you under perjury that I am the copyright holder or an agent of the copyright holder of some work, and that I believe your website is infringing on that copyright. You then have the choice to remove the material, which means I cannot sue you for copyright infringement because you acted on my DMCA notice, or you can refuse to remove it and I can include you in a copyright infringement lawsuit. By not acting on a DMCA notice you take full responsibility. If you remove the material, you should inform the person who uploaded it. That person can decide to be Ok with the removal (and hope they won't get sued for copyright infringement, and they usually will be fine), or they can send you a counter notice. That counter notice would tell you that the uploader believes he or she isn't infringing any copyright. After receiving a counter notice, you may reinstate the material, and you tell the sender of the DMCA notice. Again, you are now legally protected. The uploader can now be quite sure to be sued, unless the DMCA notice was sent in error. | A copyright notice like that could mean the authors are claiming copyright in different portions of the work, or claiming a joint copyright. With the former, standard copyright law applies with respect to each part, so I'm going to examine the joint copyright aspect. Broadly speaking, joint works tend to be an unclear and internationally inconsistent area of copyright law and you haven't specified jurisdiction. Since this is an English language site and the US and UK are polar opposites on most of these issues, those will be the jurisdictions I examine. US Definition: To qualify as a joint work, each author's individual contribution must be inseparable or interdependent, and the authors must intend to be joint authors (17 U.S.C. s 101, Childress v. Taylor, Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc.). Rights of use: Joint authors can independently exploit and license a work without consent of other co-authors, but have a duty to account profits to co-authors (House Report No. 94-1476 (1976), Goodman v. Lee, Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, etc.). UK Definition: To qualify as a joint work, each author's individual contribution must not be distinct, they must work towards a common design, but no specific intention of joint authorship is required (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Art. 10(1), an 11-factor test was articulated in Martin v. Kogan para. 53 by the E&W Court of Appeal). Rights of use: Joint authors must seek consent of the co-authors in order to exploit and licence a work (Cescinsky v. George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., Hodgens v. Beckingham). For further information, see this excellent paper by Elena Cooper comparing how US and UK law diverged on this point. | I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server. | No, CC does not replace copyright. A creative commons license is one way to use the copyright that you already have the moment you make an original creative work. Without a copyright, a creative commons license does nothing. You don't need to do anything to get a copyright. However if you plan to exploit a work commercially, or want to be sure that it is well protected, you can gain additional protection in the US and some other countries by registering the copyright. US registration can be done online at this page. The benefits of US registration are described on this page. Nor do you need to "file for" a Creative Commons license. by publishing or distributing a work with an indication that it is subject to a creative commons license, you have released it under that license and anyone may thereafter use it subject to the terms of that license. This is done with a statement such as "Released under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA 4.0 license." Such a statement is often placed near the (optional but strongly recommended) copyright notice, but that is not required. if you wish to specify the form of attribution (for example to a specified pseudonym) or a URL to use in providing attribution, that should ideally be placed near the license statement. If the work carries a list of credits, those may be placed nearby as well, but need not be. | I'm pretty sure in France you have moral rights and copyrights. I am writing from New Zealand, but we have some similar intellectual property laws due to being member countries of the World Intellectual Property Organisation. We are also both member countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO has the TRIPS agreement which relates to IP). So my answer may or may not be right – check what it says in France's copyright acts: you should be able to search for terms like first owner, and moral rights, films/videos, etc. The school isn't your employer, and so the basic rule is that you as the author are automatically the first owner. Since you're not really at school to create anything or research for the school, I don't think the court would enforce a blanket term that you had to agree to that the school owns intellectual property in what you create. You probably own the copyright. You also have moral rights in what you have created, which means even if the school does own the copyright in your work, you can request they attribute it to you if they show it in public (online). Not all works have moral rights. However, in NZ if you create a film/video you do have moral rights in it. | There's no "common law copyright" in the US. There's common law trademark, but copyrights and trademarks are different things. All copyright is based on federal copyright statutes, and an unregistered copyright is just called an unregistered copyright. What an unregistered copyright gives you is almost the same thing as a registered copyright: the exclusive right to exercise various rights (reproduction, distribution, public performance/display, etc.) Registration is required before you can actually file an infringement lawsuit, but it's OK if you only registered it after learning about the infringement. The main reason to register the work early is that you might be able to collect higher damages if it was registered before the infringement. If the work was unregistered when the infringement happened, you can only collect actual damages. If it was already registered, you can instead opt to collect statutory damages. Statutory damages don't require you to show actual loss; instead, the court awards between $750 and $30,000 per work based on what it considers fair. The lower limit can go down to $200 if the infringer had no reason to think they were infringing, and the upper limit can go up to $150,000 if the infringement was willful. You can also collect attorney's fees if it was already registered. In the comments, the question was raised of whether someone else might be able to register the copyright for your work before you and what would happen then. When I say "registration is required before filing a lawsuit," the requirement is that you submit the registration paperwork properly, pay the fee, and wait for the Copyright Office to act on the application. If they accept the registration, you're all set. Even if they refuse, though, you can still file an infringement claim -- you just have to also serve the head of the Copyright Office, who has the option of jumping into the case to argue about whether the work could legally be registered. You can also sue the Copyright Office to get judicial review of a denial under the Administrative Procedure Act (refusal still lets you file infringement lawsuits, but you can't get statutory damages or attorney's fees against an infringer unless the Copyright Office actually accepted the registration). | Copyright notice is not relevant to having a Copyright. 1 Copyright starts to exist the moment a work is created. When the pen touches the paper the first time or the hammer strikes the block to become a statue, the work is started to be created. At that moment 2, copyright is gained as it becomes a work, usually defined in the national laws. Publication for sure grants all the rights according to the Berne Convention rules - which are the absolute minimum standards. In the united-states the Berne Convention's agreement is for example codified as 17 USC §102 and uses the moment of creation to start rights: Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Similarly, the German Urheberrechtsgesetz does list what can be copyrighted and that the copyright is with the author, and presumes the act of creation creates the copyright for nationals, and publication for non-nationals: Section 1: The authors of works in the literary, scientific and artistic domain enjoy protection for their works in accordance with this Act. Section 2: (1) Protected works in the literary, scientific and artistic domain include, in particular: [List of items] Section 120: (1) German nationals shall enjoy copyright protection with respect to all of their works, whether or not they have been published and regardless of the place of publication. In the case of a work created by joint authors (Article 8), it shall be sufficient if one of the joint authors is a German national. Section 121: (1) Foreign nationals shall enjoy copyright protection with respect to their works published in the territory to which this Law applies, unless the work or a translation of the work has been published outside that territory more than 30 days prior to its publication within that territory. Subject to the same limitation, foreign nationals shall enjoy protection with respect to their works published in the territory to which this Law applies in translation only. There is no registration needed to have a copyright. However in the US you need to register a copyright to seek specific damages in the courts. 1 - Currently. In the past it had been very relevant, but laws have changed since then. 2 - Technically shortly after the moment that the first touch is done and the work gains some originality, but there already can be an artistic expression in a single brushstroke of a minimalistic piece or a single stroke calligraphy - and the absolute minimum originality needed is rather low: while putting ARD in a line in a specific font is not protectable under copyright (it's a trademark), a 6-tune jingle is enough to be deemed a protected work in itself! Under German law, this is the Kleine Münze |
Can a person make a subject access request for police body cam footage? A British Transport Police officer accused a subject of wasting police time after the subject waited patiently for police attendance to resolve a situation with a counterpart who had called police. The subject responded by challenging the accusation of wasting police time by having the police called on them. The officer changed his story by denying the he had said it. The subject calls this out by proposing to consult the body cam footage by Subject Access Request (under the Data Protection Act). The officer objects that one cannot make a Subject Access Request directly but rather could only do it through "a solicitor". Is there any truth to this whatsoever, and if so, on what basis could one not be entitled to make a request that one's representative can apparently make on one's behalf? | There is nothing preventing the OP's "subject" from making a Subject Access Request in these circumstances From the British Transport Police's Privacy Notice page, under the heading "How we use personal data": This privacy notice explains: ... the rights individuals have when we process their personal data. ... Right of Access: You can request access to the personal data we hold about you free of charge. You can request access to the personal data we hold about you using the contact details in this privacy notice. ... We collect personal data from a variety of sources, including: ... sound and visual images (e.g. from body worn cameras, CCTV, or facial recognition software); ... our own CCTV systems and body worn cameras. There's more detail in the link, which I have not replicated here to save space and avoid unnecessary "noise", but the above should cover the relevant points raised by the OP | Indirectly, no the wording of the caution is "You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence." It is illegal to question someone if they have asked for legal advice. so if you ask for a solicitor they are not allowed to question you, and you cannot (by definition) fail to answer their questions if they're not allowed to ask them. Reference from https://www.gov.uk/arrested-your-rights/legal-advice-at-the-police-station "Once you’ve asked for legal advice, the police can’t question you until you’ve got it - with some exceptions." | Special regimes For some kinds of questions there are special presumptions or forms of evidence that are specified by statute. For example, in Canada and the United States, registering a copyright creates presumptive proof that the copyright exists and is owned by the registrant. In Canada, breathalyzer results are conclusive proof of the blood alcohol concentration if certain conditions are met. Some of these regimes are not subject to challenge: they are legal facts even if they are not objectively true (e.g. the breathalyser results). Others create presumptions that can be overcome by contrary evidence (e.g. copyright ownership). The default: present relevant evidence, including testimonial evidence But outside of special regimes, you prove a fact by introducing evidence. The default is that all relevant evidence that bears on a material fact is admissible. Evidence is relevant when, if is were to be accepted, it would make the fact in issue more or less likely to be true. Evidence comes in many forms: testimony of the parties or witnesses, documentary evidence, physical evidence, expert opinion evidence. If you are wondering, "How do I prove X?" Ask yourself, why do you believe X? Or, how do you know X? Or, how has the event X left its mark on the world? Whatever has led you to believe X probably is the evidence that you would want to introduce to the court to help prove X. Perhaps you saw X: you can tell the court you saw X. Perhaps you took a photo of X: you can present that photo in court. Perhaps you have a receipt for X: you can show that receipt in court. Perhaps X is a proposition about your own actions: you can tell the court about those. Obtaining the evidence Evidence can be obtained from the other party during the discovery process, or from third-parties using subpoenas, subject to objections relating to relevance or privilege. Not all (potentially) relevant evidence is admissible However, some evidence will be inadmissible despite it being potentially relevant. I will only present a few categories, some very general and some more specific: hearsay (unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay exclusion), privileged material (unless it is a case-by-case privilege or a discretionary privilege and the person seeking to admit the evidence demonstrates to the judge that it should be admitted), sexual history evidence of a sexual assault complainant when it will be used to support an inference that the complainant is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge or is less worthy of belief (this is because it has been recognized as not relevant for this purpose), material that was obtained in contravention of the Charter and where the court has decided that the remedy for the Charter violation is exclusion of the evidence (in the United States, there is stricter, exclusionary rule), there are many more. There are also some meta-rules about the evidence that may be used to impugn a witness's credibility, themselves at trial to provide evidence, but for now I am leaving those out of this fairly summary answer. Weighing the evidence The trier of fact (the judge or a jury) then is to weigh all the admissible evidence, including by weighing the witness and party testimony according to its credibility and reliability after testing through cross-examination, to come to a conclusion on the ultimate question(s) at issue. | Footage of an arrest is clearly evidence: tampering with it is a crime. Notwithstanding, destroying someone's personal possessions without authorisation is a crime. Accessing a computer (which all modern image and audio recorders are) without authorisation is also a crime. | In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe). | An Art 15 Subject Access Request (SAR) “shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” It would be a grave violation of privacy for an email provider to search its users' account contents. It is therefore likely that the email provider would refuse to fulfil that subject request, unless required to perform a search via a court order. Instead, the SAR could be directed to the account holder (Alice or Dave), if they are subject to the GDPR. Depending on the exact legal framework, emails might be protected under confidentiality of communications rules, making such searches similarly illegal to wiretapping. At least in germany, I am fairly certain that an email provider would be criminally liable if they were to disclose emails from their users' email accounts to a third party. | It's not an interrogation Nothing makes Mr. Hansen a police investigator. He is a private person talking with another private person. His testimony or the recording of the interview might or might not be admissible in trial, that's for the court to decide. But Miranda warnings are only needed when you are under arrest or when you are in a custodial interrogation. Hansen, agent of the police? There's arguments that Hansen might or might not have acted as an agent of the police, and in one case he was deputized. However, that does not change that for Miranda you need an arrest or custodial interrogation (e.g. where one is not free to leave). As far as I am aware, none of the people interviewed was in such a situation and technically free to go at any time - making Miranda not required. | You give no jurisdiction but in general: First, police have no obligation to be honest. So, yes they can collect this without consent by e.g. taking hair from your hairbrush (with a warrant) or giving you a glass of water while interviewing you and getting it from your fingerprint oils (which may not actually be technically possible but never mind that). No, they can't take it by "force" by sticking a swab in your mouth. Yes, it will almost certainly go into a database. Of course, there are some jurisdictions where police are entitled to decide you are guilty based on the fact that you didn't pay them a bribe. |
What is the status of laws that refer to the Queen now we have a King? For example, the Treason Felony Act 1848 refers specifically to harm to the Queen: If any person whatsoever shall, within the United Kingdom or without, compass, imagine, invent, devise, or intend to deprive or depose our Most Gracious Lady the Queen, from the style, honour, or royal name of the imperial crown of the United Kingdom, or of any other of her Majesty’s dominions and countries... Currently we do not have a "Gracious Lady Queen" with "the imperial crown", but a King. What is the status of this law? Is it now impossible to break it, or does "Queen" get interpreted as "King" when the head is state is male? I may be worth noting that the law was written when we had a previous "Gracious Lady Queen", and it appears the text has not changed since 1891, so this may not be a new issue as we had a King from 1901 to 1952. | What is the status of laws that refer to the Queen now we have a King? As mentioned in Treason Felony Act 1848 - Wikipedia: Section 10 of the Interpretation Act 1978 says that references to the Sovereign reigning at the time of the passing of the Treason Felony Act are to be construed as references to the Sovereign for the time being. since 1978 a general solution exists which applies to all acts. Between 1901 to 1978, Section 30 of the Interpretation Act 1889 used a similar wording. Sources: Treason Felony Act 1848 - Wikipedia Interpretation Act 1978 - Section 10 References to the Sovereign. In any Act a reference to the Sovereign reigning at the time of the passing of the Act is to be construed, unless the contrary intention appears, as a reference to the Sovereign for the time being. Interpretation Act 1889 - Wikipedia Interpretation Act 1889 | No Governments have sovereign power. Subject to constitutional and legislative constraints, governments can change laws as they wish. That includes legislative changes and administrative policies. Most governments tend not to use this power arbitrarily because it tends to make investors wary - economists call this sovereign risk. Like any other risk, the higher it is, the greater return an investor expects - countries with high sovereign risk get less foreign investment and pay more for it. Further, most governments don’t make laws that are retrospective but unless there is a constitutional prohibition (like there is in the United States, for example), they can. So Ireland could not only change the rules going forward, they could change the rules that applied in the past (assuming the Irish constitution doesn’t prohibit this, which I don’t know enough about). If Ireland were to change this law, it’s likely there would be plenty of forward notice. The arrangement you spell out between mother and son is not enforceable unless it’s a contract and the presumption is that such familial agreements are not contracts. Such a presumption can be overcome by an explicit declaration by the mother and the son that they intend for it to be legally binding, preferably in writing. Now, governments can and do enter contracts which are enforceable by the courts but that is a one-on-one relationship between a government and a contractor; not a decree that must be followed by everyone. Unless, of course, they are the sort of government that doesn’t follow their own laws - I’m sure you can think of some - but they are huge sovereign risk. | Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies. | The question is definitely specific to a jurisdiction. I think this is legal in the jurisdiction you specify. Wikipedia shows incest in New York defined as: Persons known to be related to him or her, whether through marriage or not, as an ancestor, descendant, brother or sister of either the whole or the half blood, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece. I don't think "our children have married" means the couple is related "as brother and sister through marriage". In England and Wales, this would definitely be legal. Wikipedia lists the relationships that cannot marry, and co-parents-in-law are not on the list. (The table is probably out of date, in that the "for men" and "for women" column should almost certainly be merged.) | The law does have examples They are called “judgements” Every case decided by a court is an example, in common law jurisdictions at least. When those cases are decided by an superior court they become precedents - binding “examples” on courts in their hierarchy and persuasive “examples” on other courts. When you go to a lawyer for advice, she doesn’t just parrot back the statute, she looks at the precedents and decides whether the case decided by the House of Lords in 1848 or the High Court of Australia in 1912 more closely matches your situation. Also, statute law often has examples written into them Statues exist in hierarchies, Constitution, Acts, Regulations, Departmental Policies etc. and the lower you go the more specific the law is and the more likely it is to have examples. For example, this answer I wrote for another question quotes examples from the new-south-wales Evidence Act. | Article 75 says that It devolves upon the Storting: (a) to enact and repeal laws; to impose taxes, dues, customs and other public charges, which shall not, however, remain operative beyond 31 December of the succeeding year, unless they are expressly renewed by a new Storting Article 97 says that "No law must be given retroactive effect" . The combined effect of these provisions is that any changes in the law effected this year could apply to tax years after 2020 but not including 2019. So the law as written supports your understanding. Skatteetatten seems to agree since the rules are listed as covering 2019. | This is not a quote, per se, rather, it is a meme. It is attributed to Gilbert Gray, and according to The Independent Saturday 7 March 1998 was originally: "I take it, Mr Gray, that your client is familiar with the maxim: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" "Indeed my lord, responded the QC drily. "In Barnsley they speak of little else." However, according to the Fortune Newsletter two years later, it was attributed to a different barrister, Charles Gray, who is reported to have recounted a story about a barrister in Reading who was asked by the judge whether his client was aware of the principle of Res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself), to which the barrister replied: "In the Irish village from which my client comes, M'Lud, they speak of little else". It is also attributed in 2005 to some unnamed judge referring to sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. As Tim Lymington notes, the Irish res ipsa loquitur version is attributed to Marshal Hall apparently was on the air in the BBC production The Trials of Marshall Hall originally from 1996, and is cited in a recent book review. The book review and Wiki versions of that statement differ slightly in the wording of the text, to wit Wiki: "Is your client not familiar with the maxim res ipsa loquitur?” replied, "My lord, on the remote hillside in County Donegal where my client hails from they talk of little else." vs. book review Judge: “Mr Marshall Hall, is your client familiar with the doctrine res ipsa loquitur? Marshall: “My Lord, in the remote hills of County Donegal from where my client hails they speak of little else.” Without a copy of the book, I can't say whether the reviewer mis-copied the quote, but at least we can believe that the linked quote represents the review author's wording. There is a much earlier work on the life of Marshall Hall, Marjoribanks, Edward For the Defence. The Life of Sir Edward Marshall Hall K.C. (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1929), which might contain the quote in question. At this point, I am inclined to take the Hall res ipsa loquitur quote as being original and the others as being derivative works. | Are UK Tier 4 rules law? Yes. The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (All Tiers) (England) Regulations 2020 (SI 2020/1374) has been amended by SI 2020/1611. Unfortunately, the amendment is only available as pdf at the moment and I can't copy-and-paste it on my phone for you. SI 2020/1374 and all subsequent amendments may be found here... https://www.legislation.gov.uk/primary+secondary?title=Coronavirus%20all%20tiers ETA: The Introductory Text to SI 2020/1374 states: The Secretary of State makes the following Regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 45C(1), (3)(c), (4)(b), (4)(d), 45F(2) and 45P of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/22/contents |
Can Prince Harry wear the uniforms of his former units? It's been in the news recently that Prince Harry has been banned from wearing a military uniform at the events surrounding the late Queen's funeral, since he was stripped of his honorary military titles when he stopped being a working royal. However, he is a veteran who served ten years in the British military and was deployed to Afghanistan. Why can't he wear the uniform of his former rank and unit in his capacity as a retired officer, rather than wearing the uniform of his (now removed) honorary titles in his capacity as a member of the Royal Family? | By Army regulations, no, he's not allowed to wear that uniform. Prince Harry technically isn't a "retired officer". Rather, he resigned his commission in the Army, effective 19 June 2015. See the London Gazette for 11 August 2015, Supplement 61319, page 14838, under "Captain H. C. A. D. WALES 564673". According to the Army Dress Regulations 02.45a (page 101 of the PDF), "It is to be noted that those who resigned their commissions are not authorised to wear uniform under any circumstances." Moreover, under the Uniforms Act 1894: (1)It shall not be lawful for any person not serving in Her [sic, now His] Majesty’s Military Forces to wear without Her Majesty’s permission the uniform of any of those forces, or any dress having the appearance or bearing any of the regimental or other distinctive marks of any such uniform: Provided that this enactment shall not prevent . . . . . . F1 any persons from wearing any uniform or dress in the course of a stage play performed in a place duly licensed or authorised for the public performance of stage plays, or in the course of a music hall or circus performance, or in the course of any bona fide military representation. (2)If any person contravenes this section he shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding [F2level 3 on the standard scale]. Clearly Prince Harry is not currently serving in His Majesty's Military Forces, and "His Majesty's permission" would by default be granted only through the Army Dress Regulations promulgated in his name. If Prince Harry were to wear the uniform anyway, then in principle he would be in breach of the regulations and thus the law, and liable for the prescribed fine. Of course, if he had worn the uniform, it would presumably have been because his father the King had in fact granted him permission to do so (on which point His Majesty would presumably have solicited the advice of his ministers). But as a matter of politics and optics, that was probably not likely to be given. Throughout the prince's active military service, there was a concerted effort to make it appear (accurately or not) that he was serving under the same conditions as any other officer of the same rank, without receiving preferential treatment. So it would fit with that practice for him to comply strictly with the Army regulations, even though they could certainly be waived for his benefit. | Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records. | Short answer Maybe Long answer s.61(1) empowers a "proper officer" to enter premises without a warrant for the health protection functions and purposes described in subsections a-to-d in order to search, take samples and measurements, inspect records and any other actions authorised by s.62(1A). A Proper officer is not a constable, but defined at s.74(b) as being a person appointed for a particular purpose (ie function or role) by the relevant authority. s.62(1) allows the proper officer to take with him anyone necessary, which can include a constable who may be required to facilitate a forced entry, prevent a breach of the peace, make a pre-planned arrest or perform any number of police-specific functions. However... s.61(2A) states that this power of entry does not extend to a private dwelling; which may or may not be the house referred to by the OP. Entry in to a private dwelling requires a warrant under s.61(3). | That means that a person cannot put a new cover or binding on a book, and then resell it or lend it, unless permission is obtained from the publisher. This has the effect of prohibiting libraries, which need to rebind most books, from carrying the book without the publisher's permission. This condition did not apply in the US, because under the US Law's First Sale Doctrine, the seller cannot impose such conditions on the buyer. The very standardize wording was, I think, once part of the Net book Agreement (NBA) used by Penguin and other UK-based publishers on sales in the UK and the Commonwealth. You will find it on many used books from such publishers. I believe the main aim was to prohibit discount resellers of used books, and to prohibit sale of "stripped books" (reported to the publisher as "unsold and destroyed"). I believe that this is no longer in effect, but I am not sure. The NBA was dissolved in 1995. | As per this question & answer, in the US there is no expectation of privacy in public places (not to be confused with private places where public is allowed e.g. supermarkets). Photos taken in public belong to the photo taker and he/she is free to use them in whatever way. No privacy is violated here. The fact that the person whose photo was taken was a celebrity does not change anything. It would have been completely their fault to expect privacy in a public place and behave rashly. | What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation. | It is illegal to take or publish a picture of someone without his consent in France. There are five exceptions : people related to news events of public interest, public information purposes (when right to inform the public is bigger than right to privacy), people present in a public location when focus is not on them, public figures during their public functions and activities, people shown in a large group without distinction of one or several individuals. If you respect one of the 5 conditions, you do not require consent. Policemen do not have extended or extra protection regarding these rights: they are treated as any individual. This is described in a report from the CNDS (Commission National de Déontologie de la Sécurité): "[Les forces de l'ordre] doivent considérer comme normale l’attention que des citoyens ou des groupes de citoyens peuvent porter à leur mode d’action. Le fait d’être photographiés ou filmés durant leurs interventions ne peut constituer aucune gêne pour des policiers soucieux du respect des règles déontologiques." which translates approx. to: "Policemen must consider as normal the attention that citizens or citizen groups can pay to their mode of action. Being photographed or filmed during their interventions cannot be seen as as an embarrassment to the officers concerned to comply with ethical rules." See also this Wikimedia Commons internal policy that summarise the French law and (fr) the exceptions on droit-image.fr | What can I do to prevent someone from leaving me something in their will? Nothing. Allowing other people to legally change someone's will defeats the purpose of a will: To express the writer's last wishes. (That is why the full title is a "Last Will & Testament"). Do I have to take responsibility for things left to me in a will or are there other options? No! You do not have to accept an inheritance. The legal process for rejecting an inheritance is called "disclaiming." It happens often enough that there are plenty of nice summaries of the process on-line. Your next step should probably be to read one of them. |
Would it be legal for a bystander to use force to prevent an abortion in Texas? Would it be legal for a bystander to use deadly force to prevent a doctor from committing an abortion in Texas? | No. Under Texas Penal Code Title 2 Subchapter A, one of three three conditions must be true to use the defense-of-others defense, that the person against whom force is used unlawfully and with force entered the person's residence, vehicle of business (not applicable), or attempted to forcibly remove the person from same (idem), or attempted aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Abortion is not statutorily murder in Texas, even if it is illegal. | §Sec. 54-212 of the ordinance states (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, sell, offer or display for sale, give, lend, transfer ownership of, acquire, carry or possess any assault weapon or large capacity magazine in Cook County So if the gun is an assault weapon, it is not legal to sell. That ends the legal inquiry. Beyond that, we can only conjecture as to possibilities, for example (1) you may be mistaken in your assessment of some particular firearm, (2) the authorities don't know yet so haven't taken action or (3) they do know and they have taken action. Your link did not lead to any obvious things that count as an assault weapon, perhaps you could be more specific. | Not much. Consider the following: The father can not force the mother to abort the pregnancy. Ex post facto agreements of non-payment are, in all likelihood, unenforceable. The father will be obligated to pay child support under the laws of the state with jurisdiction over the paternity. The abortion angle won’t work. Setting aside commentary regarding the politics or ethics of abortion. I think we can agree it is a highly charged and emotional topic for some people. I point to the fact it always seems to be an issue during Supreme Court nominations and presidential elections. Given the explosive nature of the issue of whether abortions should be legal or not (in the case where the mother does not want to carry full term) could you imagine how much more dynamite it would add to the debate if the question were whether or not to allow the father to force the mother to terminate the pregnancy against the mother's wishes! One can only imagine how much more bombastic the abortion debate might then become. You can’t escape child support (most likely). To give you a sense of how difficult it is to escape the obligations of child support. Consider the following... A Kansas man was ordered to pay child support when he thought he was being a sperm donor only and signed numerous agreements with the lesbian couple he thought he was helping. In that case, the court justified its ruling on the grounds that a doctor was not involved in the insemination process. But nothing prevents future courts from making the same ruling in cases where a doctor is involved in the insemination process. Especially if that state either withdraws from the The Uniform Parentage Act, amends it, repeals it, or never adopts it in the first place. Sperm Donors and Child Support: Even in cases in which the donor is known, but holds himself out as unknown, some courts have held the donor legally obligated to pay child support. Read more here. Ex post facto agreements are problematic. Now that you've edited the question, the above link is even more useful for providing a possible avenue to try (albeit unlikely to work): a non-payment agreement. The discussion in that link describes that even if you could somehow convince the mother to go along with it, it is unlikely (though not impossible) to be enforced by the courts. It depends on the facts (e.g., intercourse vs. in vitro), circumstances (e.g., relationship vs. no relationship between the parties), timing (e.g., before vs. after the agreement), etc. of the impregnation itself. Notwithstanding all the above, if you still have questions, you might consider floating an idea of an approach you think you might try (in a separate question) and get reactions to that specific proposal. | You may legally ask someone to shoot you, or do all sorts of other things to you. There are no laws against asking or various kinds of speech: laws restrict the doing. If you ask a person to shoot you and they do it, that person will probably be arrested for assault (or murder, depending on how it works out) – shooting a person is assault. A possible defense against an assault charge is consent, but that defense isn't freely available whenever a person says "I give my consent for you to assault me". You cannot consent to foreseeable serious bodily injury (more accurately, the law does not recognize such consent as valid consent). You can agree to be struck (in a boxing match) because such force is not serious bodily harm; and if unforeseeably serious bodily harm results, the consent defense is available. But if you ask a person to shoot you in the liver, they will be prosecuted for assault, because the resulting serious bodily harm is foreseeable. | I would just like to clarify, in addition to the other answers and what Dale M alluded to, one important detail: Unless you are carrying out the death penalty, no one under any circumstances is allowed to kill anyone else. What you are sometimes authorized to do, is to use deadly force. There is an important distinction between the two. When using deadly force, you are using extreme force to stop someone doing something, which may result in getting that person killed, but killing isn't the point, stopping whatever he is doing is. If instead of a knife you had a gun on the train, you shot the guy in the face, his crime spree came to and end, yet he was still alive but unconscious, and you decided to "finish the job" and shoot him some more, you'd be going to prison. The language is important. Even if in self defense situations, if you say that you were shooting to kill, you're going to be in serious trouble, but if you say you were shooting to stop, you're in the clear. | Murder Which is the unlawful taking of a life with intent to do so. However, the doctrine of self-defence can make killing lawful: A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. if the prosecutor is of the opinion that the force used "is reasonable in the circumstances" they may not lay charges. If they do lay charges the judge may decide that there is no case to answer before going to trial if self-defence applies. If there is a trial this will probably be the strategy the defence employs and they may or may not be successful. If convicted the penalty is life imprisonment. Also, there is no UK law: there is the law of England and Wales, the law of Scotland and the law of Northern Ireland. | Is there any state where someone doing this would potentially face manslaughter or murder charges, due to some variant of a 'life starts at conception' anti abortion law? Not really. Those laws are currently unconstitutional. A state could certainly prescribe some criminal punishment in a case like this one, but punishing under existing manslaughter or murder laws would almost surely not be upheld under existing law (subject to change without advanced notice by the U.S. Supreme Court). If someone knowingly and intentionally destroyed an embryo conceived via IVF but not implanted yet what kind of consequences do they face? Is the potential life treated differently or is this just destruction of property? This is a tough question that probably doesn't have a uniform answer under the law of all U.S. states. For one thing, it isn't clear who, if anyone, has property rights in the embryo. It is certainly conceivable that a state might instead conclude that the donor receiving the IVF treatment has only contract rights in it (and breach of a contract is not a crime). It might be viewed as a property destruction case. There might be a specific statute on point. There might be a civil lawsuit remedy. In most states, this would be an issue of first impression and a court would look a competing ways that cases had been handled in other jurisdictions to decide what to do in its case. | Your understanding of the bill is correct. Legislation takes effect 90 days after sine die adjournment unless there is an emergency or enactment clause. If a relevant provision of the law is struck down as unconstitutional, any suit dependent on the provision would be dismissed. Residency is not relevant, what is relevant is being subject to Arkansas jurisdiction, meaning "being in Arkansas". A non-resident traveling to Arkansas could not have a forbidden procedure in Arkansas, and an Arkansas resident can have a procedure allowed elsewhere if they are elsewhere. A spouse would not be able to get an injunction if, for instance, the wife traveled to Washington state for the procedure, because Arkansas courts have no jurisdiction over Washington state. The law imposes a restriction on what physicians in Arkansas can do, and the woman receiving the abortion is not subject to liability. |
Could the U.S. squeak out a compelling argument that it is not bound by the Equal Protection Clause or that it be treated differently than states? Points of law “The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Amdt. 14, § 1.” Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. 54, 76 (2016) It does, indeed: "No State shall […] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (U.S. Const. Amdt. 14, § 1.) Research and axiomatic foundations Many of the particular rules and federal decisional laws deriving from the Equal Protection Clause follow this principle; however, I have not been able to locate a formulation of it such that would declare it as a matter of law binding the federal government, and not just one state or another. For this reason, I believed this might have been one of ""those settled usages and modes of proceeding" found in the common law[; (Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856)) … or ancient rules" (Wooden v. United States (Mar. 7, 2022, No. 20-5279) [pp. 33-34]) conserved and provided under the Fifth Amendment in the meaning of the Due Process of Law. For this reason, I looked at parallel legal systems into which the same ancient European ancestor divided into in hope to find an ancient latin sobriquet that would be used so and potentially carry similar meaning under U.S. jurisprudence. The continental (and now British) jurisprudential principle of the "equality of arms" provides that the integruos or decent process of law requires that "the prosecution and the defence have equal opportunity and opportunity to express their views and positions on questions of fact and law in criminal proceedings [… under] Article 6(3) of the [European Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR")] […] and "ECtHR considers all non-criminal proceedings as civil proceedings for the purposes of Article 6, [(incl. of 'fair trial' in Article 6(1))] it should be borne in mind that the category established by the ECtHR includes administrative proceedings in addition to civil proceedings in the constitutional sense, where the requirement of equality of arms must also be satisfied." (Erzsébet A. Gácsi, The principle of equality of arms the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 2007, DeepL translation) Question I found no Latin cognate of the "equality of arms", and I failed to find it explicitly named under U.S. jurisprudence; hence, my own research ended there, and my question began here: Can an argument be made that the federal government is not also bound by the same principle expressed here, in other words, can an argument be made that: The Federal government may deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, could an argument be made that the federal government is not subject to the provisions or any subsequent decisional-law formulation of the U.S. Constitution requiring that "all persons similarly circumstanced … be treated alike" (Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)) including by the United States? Or even better, was there ever any binding argument made to such effect? | No. While the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment doesn’t apply to the federal government, the Supreme Court has read the same requirements into the 5th Amendment. This is generally considered to have started with Bolling v. Sharpe 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (in this case, "the Court began in earnest to fold an "equal protection" guarantee into the concept of "due process."” United States v. Madero, No. 20-303, at *9 (Apr. 21, 2022)), and as Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92 (1976) put it, Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment. | Current Place of Magna Carta in US law Magna Carta is not now a current statute in any part of the US. I don't think it ever was (not since the US became independent of the UK), but I am not sure of that. Its words influenced the drafters of the US Federal Constitution. In some cases it may thus be helpful in understanding the original intention of the framers, but probably The Federalist and the records of the debates of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention are far more persuasive and more helpful. The major decisions of the Marshall Court are also very relevant. The US Supreme Court can and does change its interpretation of laws passed by Congress and of the Constitution. The words of Magna Carta are not more binding than Supreme Court decisions. In fact they are not binding at all, on any court or official in the US in any way. They are part of our legal history, but they are mnot current law, no more than the Code of Justinian or the Laws of Hammurabi are. The detailed procedural rules of Magna Carta are certainly not in fore in the US in 2022, nor in the UK either. The Ninth Amendment, which protects unenumerated rights of the states and the People does not protect,such procedural details, At least it has never been held to do so, to the best of my knowledge. I don't even know of a case where such a contention was seriously argued. The question states that: The meaning of “Due Process of Law” of the Fifth Amendment is, primarily, chapter 28 of Magna Carta and everything that built on it by judicial decisions. There is a sense in which this is true, but a very weak one. The concept of “Due Process of Law” was to some extent spelled out in Magna Carta, and later court decisions and legal and political philosophers (such as Locke) built on it. But most of the specifics of what constitute "due process" at the time of Magna Carta have since been dropped, and most of the current requirements were added much later. The idea of a hearing before an impartial tribunal, where the accused can present evidence, goes back to MC. Other requirements of due process, such as a right to a lawyer, rights against self-incrimination, rights against double jeopardy, the right of an accused to testify under oath, the right of an accused to issue subpoenas to witnesses, the right to an impartial jury, The right to be free of search, seizure or arrest unless probable cause has been shown under oath, and many others were added long after MC, some not until the 20th century. Such one-time aspects of due process as the right to be tried by members of one's own social class, a vital aspect of MC, are long gone, and never really existed in the US. Two-Witness Rule There was an early debate in a Supreme Court case, a perjury case if I recall correctly, on the need for two witnesses for conviction, but later statues have altered that rule. I don't know of any such rule ever applying to arrests in the US. It surely does not apply now. Coke and Magna Carta Early in the 1600s Lord Justice Edward Coke used the text of Magna Carta (among other things) to argue that Equity courts should not be able to use injunctions to stop cases pending in common-law courts. To do this he gave to Magna Carta a semi-sacred status it did not have when it was originally issued. (Indeed J.C. Holt, in his classic study Magna Carta, arguses that the charter was a victory for King John, and a defeat for the Barons, because the Barons allowed themselves to be bought off by promises that John never intended to keep, and that were not, in fact, kept. He further argues that it was the re-issues over the period 50-100 years later that gave MC what contemporary force it had, but that it was Coke's invocation of it that gave it the modern reputation as a foundation of freedom. I agree.) Coke claimed things for Magna Carta it could not have meant at the time it was issued, as the equity courts did not exist as an institution at that time, and would not for several generations. Charles Rembar, in his excellent non-technical history of Anglo-american law, The Law of the Land: The Evolution of Our Legal System (ISBN: 978-1-5040-1566-0; 1980) wrote (pp. 57-8): Early in the 1600s, Lord Justice Coke declared that neither king nor Parliament could transgress fundamental principles of common law. In time the proposition was true enough for king (also, academic: he himself could make no law, fundamental or trivial), but it has never held for Parliament; no one in office followed Coke along this line, not even Coke himself. Removed from the bench, he entered the House of Commons, and fought the Stuarts there. In the last stage of his long career, Coke asserted the utter supremacy of Parliament, an assertion which by the century’s end had become the constitutional law of England. The equation of "Due Process of Law" with "Law of the land" was part of this argument on Coke's part; it was, in effect, a piece of spin, which not all later scholars have noticed. "Due process" was, at beat, a part of the "law of the land", and it was always subject to modification by Act of Parliament (earlier, by acts of King-in-Council). It is true tht the US Supreme court has taken "Due process" in a procedural sense, to imply in most cases the right to a hearing, before an impartial tribunal, including a right to present witnesses and evidence, and that several of these principles are mentioned in Magna Carta, and come down to us from MC through much legal history. Magna Carta in the Case of Murray's Lessee In the case of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856) The US Supreme Court looked back throigh legal history to consider what is and is not permitted by the US Fifth Amendment, and its "Due process" clause. This is the kind of extensive excursion into legal history that was more common in Court opinions from the fist half of the Nineteenth Century that it is now. (Rembar remarked, on p 170 of The Law of the Land, "the Supreme Court, ... is fond of legal history and often gets it wrong.) But it is important to note how that opinion from the Taney Court (not the previous Marshall Court) used Magna Carta. The court wrote: [59 U. S. 277] We must examine the Constitution itself to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. We apprehend there has been no period since the establishment of the English monarchy when there has not been, by the law of the land, a summary method for the recovery of debts due to the crown, and especially those due from receivers of the revenues. It is difficult, at this day, to trace with precision all the proceedings had for these purposes in the earliest ages of the common law. In short that court is interested in Magna Carta only as it has influenced US state and Federal statutes. It in no way states or implies that the exact procedure of Magna Carta must be that of the current US, or is assumed to be such in the absence of a statute changing that procedure. Rather it looks at how US States adopted procedures derived from MC as a guide to the meaning of the Due process clause. After discussing at 59 U. S. 278 what the procedure for retrieving money from tax officials who had allegedly retained it improperly under the statutes of the Tudors (already long after Magna Carta, although well before Coke) the Court wrote: [59 U. S. 278] This brief sketch of the modes of proceeding to ascertain and enforce payment of balances due from receivers of the revenue in England is sufficient to show that the methods of ascertaining the existence and amount of such debts and compelling their payment have varied widely from the usual course of the common law on other subjects, and that, as respects such debts due from such officers, "the law of the land" authorized the employment of auditors, and an inquisition without notice, and a species of execution bearing a very close resemblance to what is termed a warrant of distress in the act of 1820, now in question. It is certain that this diversity in "the law of the land" between public defaulters and ordinary debtors was understood in this country, and entered into the legislation of the colonies and provinces, and more especially of the States, after the declaration of independence and before the formation of the Constitution of the United States. ... [59 U. S. 279-280] Provisions not distinguishable from these in principle may be found in the acts of Connecticut (Revision of 1784, p. 198), of Pennsylvania, 1782 (2 Laws of Penn. 13); of South Carolina, 1788 (5 Stats. of S.C. 55); New York, 1788 (1 Jones & Varick's Laws, 34); see also 1 Henning's Stats. of Virginia, 319, 343; 12 ibid. 562; Laws of Vermont (1797, 1800), 340. Since the formation of the Constitution of the United States, other States have passed similar laws. This legislative construction of the Constitution, commencing so early in the government when the first occasion for this manner of proceeding arose, continued throughout its existence, and repeatedly acted on by the judiciary and the executive, is entitled to no inconsiderable weight upon the question whether the proceeding adopted by it was "due process of law." *Prigg v. Pennsylvania-, 16 Pet. 621; United States v. Nourse, 9 Pet. 8; Randolph's Case, 2 Brock. 447; Nourse's Case, 4 Cranch C.C.R. 151. Tested by the common and statute law of England prior to the emigration of our ancestors, and by the laws of many of the States at the time of the adoption of this amendment, the proceedings authorized by the act of 1820 cannot be denied to be due process of law when applied to the ascertainment and recovery of balances due to the government from a collector of customs It is to support this last conclusion on what is and is not Due Process under the Fifth Amendment that the Court examined history, including Magna Carta. All the rest of this discussion of history was Obiter Dictum not binding precedent. And of course, not Supreme Court precedent is binding on future Supreme Court rulings. The court can and does overturn its own decisions, and change its interpretations of the Constitution. Wooden v. United States and its citation of Murray's Lessee In Wooden v. United States (Mar. 7, 2022, No. 20-5279), Justice GORSUCH in his opinion concurring in the result, but dissenting from the majority opinion's reasoning, wrote, starting on page 6 of his separate opinion: Consider lenity’s relationship to due process. Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, neither the federal government nor the States may deprive individuals of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" Amdts. 5, 14. Generally, that guarantee requires governments seeking to take a person’s freedom or possessions to adhere to “those settled usages and modes of proceeding” found in the common law. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856); N. Chapman & M. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L. J. 1672, 1774–1775 (2012). And among those “settled usages” is the ancient rule that the law must afford ordinary people fair notice of its demands. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. ___, – (2018) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3– 5). Lenity works to enforce the fair notice requirement by ensuring that an individual’s liberty always prevails over ambiguous law. Early cases confirm the message. In United States v. Wiltberger, a sailor had killed an individual on a river in China. 5 Wheat. 76, 77 (1820). But the federal statute under which he was charged criminalized manslaughter only on the “‘high seas.’” Id., at 93 (quoting Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 12, 1 Stat. 115). Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that other parts of the law might have suggested Congress intended to capture the sailor’s conduct. 5 Wheat., at 105. But he insisted that “penal laws are to be construed strictly” because of “the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals”—and, more specifically, the right of every person to suffer only those punishments dictated by “the plain meaning of words.” ... United States v. Mann tells a similar story. 26 F. Cas. 1153 (No. 15,718) (CC NH 1812). ... As the framers understood, “subjecting . . . men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law . . . ha[s] been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instrumen[t] of tyranny.” The Federalist No. 84, pp. 511–512 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); see also McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931) Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law . . . fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand The first thing to note is that this is not a majority opinion, and so not binding law. Indeed another opinion in this case specifically responds to Justice Gorsuch's views, taking issue with them. The next thing to note is that while the opinion does cite Murray’s Lessee, it never so much as mentions Magna Carta, nor does it quote any of the mentions of Magna Carta in Murray’s Lessee. Justice Gorsuch cites Murray’s Lessee to support two principles. One is the "rule of lenity" whch says theist when there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, it shall be read so as to favor the accused. The other is the "rule of fair notice" which says that a person shall not be convicted of crime unless some law clearly makes the actions charged criminal. Justice Gorsuch derives both of these from the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. To establish this, he cites, not Magna Carta, nor cases from Tudor times, nor US cases from before the Constitution, but US Supreme Court cases written by Justices Marshall and Story (both members of the Marshall Court), and one of the numbers of The Federalist (often considered a good guide to the intentions of the framers). Nothing in this citation implies that the detailed procedures of Magna Carta are now in force, nor that they ever were in the US. It applies only a general rule of law, not a detailed procedure, and that on the basis of US Supreme Court precedent, not because Magna Carta says so. The Great Charter may have been one of the earliest statements of these rules, but it is the reconfirmation of them, in case after US case, that makes them part of US law today. | The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings. | Here's some of the law in the area of prosecutorial discretion: In the ordinary case, “so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S. Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). Of course, a prosecutor's discretion is “subject to constitutional constraints.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 2204–2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). One of these constraints, imposed by the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500, 74 S. Ct. 693, 694–695, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954), is that the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on “an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,” Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S. Ct. 501, 506, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962). A defendant may demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is “directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons ... with a mind so unequal and oppressive” that the system of prosecution amounts to “a practical denial” of equal protection of the law. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1073, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). In order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal protection, a criminal defendant must present “clear evidence to the contrary.” Chemical Foundation, supra, at 14–15, 47 S. Ct., at 6. We explained in Wayte why courts are “properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.” 470 U.S., at 608, 105 S. Ct., at 1531. Judicial deference to the decisions of these executive officers rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors and courts. “Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” Id., at 607, 105 S. Ct., at 1530. It also stems from a concern not to unnecessarily impair the performance of a core executive constitutional function. “Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy.” Ibid. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996). | Clearly, British laws against e.g. murder, theft, fraud, and most other crimes were received into state law because those matters are under the jurisdiction of the states. States (and also to some extent federal criminal statutes) received British common law definitions of various crimes and defenses, but not British penal statutes (which often didn't define those crimes in the late 18th century). The statutory law of Britain did not apply as U.S. law at either the state or federal level upon the U.S. Declaration of Independence, except in isolated cases where a state, or the federal government expressly adopted it by reference in their own statute. The existence of British law, both statutory and through case law, informs how the U.S. common law was understood (something that was predominantly a matter of state law) and how concept in the U.S. Constitution, U.S. federal statutes, and state constitutions and statutes were understood (especially when terms from British statutes are used in a similar matter in U.S. state and federal statutes and constitutions). But, British statutes did not have direct force and effect in the U.S. after independence. As much as anything else, this simply reflect how the nature of statutes v. common law was understood in the late 18th and early 19th century. Nobody expected that British statutes would be directly applicable, so they weren't. There may have been instances where common law rules actually had their roots in British statutes that were mostly forgotten in long layers of British common law case law, and many statutes expressly adopting British case law also expressly incorporate selected relevant British statutes of generally applicability. But, no British statutes were applicable "automatically" in the U.S. For example, before Congress enacted the Naturalization Act of 1790, would a person born outside the US to a US citizen father have been a US citizen by dint of the US "inheriting" the British Nationality Act 1772 mutatis mutandis? No. Basic ways of thinking about what nationality or citizenship even was or meant would have been received, but not by receiving the British Nationality Act 1772 as U.S. law. And before Congress enacted the Crimes Act of 1790, would an American who levied war against the US, gave aid and comfort to its enemies, or counterfeited US currency have been convicted and sentenced under the Treason Act 1351? Not really. From the adoption of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 until the adoption of the Articles of Confederation on June 11, 1777, as a practical matter, the revolutionary forced had very little actual control of the courts in an enforceable way, there was an insurgency against the British underway, and it was an ad hoc effort from day to day and month to month that was muddled through without a formal structure or guidance at a colony by colony level, or even more granularly within a colony. In the period from June 11, 1777 until the new U.S. Constitution was implemented in 1789-1790, under the Articles of Confederation, the situation was fluid and irregular. State governments made most statutory and common law, adopting their colonial era colonial statutes but not necessarily British statutes that their local legislature didn't adopt. Central government laws usually acted on the states, not directly on individuals, much like treaties today. There was little or no directly applicable central government legislation. Many topics, like citizenship, were simply ignored in this era. The U.S. Constitution adopted in 1789, and the initial acts of the First Congress to implement it, were a response to the realization that after the war and its immediate aftermath had settled down, that the newly formed country needed to regularize, institutionalize, and deal with a lot of governance issues and legal questions that nobody had had the time or resources or authority to deal with while a war had been going on. For much of this time period the Revolutionary War was in progress and it wasn't always obvious who even controlled the courts or had practice authority to enforce court judgments. The Revolutionary War was not concluded until 1783. It was an improvisation at first, and not necessarily a uniform one, since the Articles of Confederation conceived of the U.S. as many countries in an alliance with each other rather than an actual single nation that had to address legal issues uniformly. Prior to the establishment of the federal court system under the U.S. Constitution of 1789 that remains in force, the only institution of the central government was Congress and its committees, which functioned as a legislative body, a body selecting people with executive authority, and as a court of last resort from state court judgments. Everything was carried out at the state level except for courts-martial. Structurally, the Articles of Confederation were a fused system, akin to the U.K. Parliament which had its highest court of appeals and its prime ministership fused with the legislative authority of parliament, layered on top of 13 separate sovereign state governments. | Almost no constitutional right, for the most part, applies or gives rise to an all-encompassing right at all times. Schools can determine that certain times are off limits as activity during those times may interrupt the environment most conducive to learning, or for other articulable reasons; this is fine so long as it is applied evenly. Schools may say you may not hand out literature at certain times, only before or after classes, weekends, or put limits on the place or manner of distribution. There are examples of this premise that exist, pertaining to nearly every right, otherwise considered absolute. This is no different than the principle that while Americans enjoy the right to free speech, not all speech is protected at all times, or that the right to bear arms does not apply to all people, places, or environs. | tl;dr My assumption: the U.S. government is considering whether to accept refugees and immigrants (given your Syria comment). The background section talks about State attempts to restrict entry. The answer is nuanced since there are different standards for an entrance decision than there are for someone who is already in the U.S. This is because foreign nationals in their home nations aren't "persons within the jurisdiction of the United States," and so laws like the Civil Rights Act only apply in spirit. What does that mean? We wouldn't expect to see the federal government discriminate based on religion, but we might expect to see decisions made about groups that incidentally share an common religion. This is because the federal government has wide latitude when it comes to alienage---which is just a formal name for policies related to non-citizens. While religion is afforded a high degree of protection, the federal government's alienage policies are governed by the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. This implies a practical challenge: things like religion and national origin can be very difficult to disentangle from questions that pertain to the alienage category. For example, a policy might restrict some group's entry "because of" a particular alienage reason and "in spite of" the fact that most of the affected people happen to share a common religion. Background The Equal Protection Clause U.S. Const. Am. XIV § 1 prohibits States from denying any person within its jurisdiction "equal protection of the laws." The Clause is often applied to the federal government as well, via the Due Process Clause U.S. Const. Am. V. See, e.g. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In relation to the clause, laws are reviewed for their constitutionality using either strict, intermediate, or rational basis scrutiny. Strict scrutiny would mean that in order to distinguish based on a particular trait, the government has to have a compelling, narrowly tailored interest, and no less restrictive alternative available. Rational basis just means the government's interest is subject to a lower level of scrutiny (e.g. benefits exceed costs, or don't let in felons). Things like, race, religion, national origin, and some forms of alienage are suspect classes that merit strict scrutiny. This bit about alienage is important. As we'd expect from the above, when States enact alienage statutes, they're subject to strict scrutiny, and when those statues cross the line, the courts have found that State attempts to restrict resident or non-resident aliens encroach upon the federal government's exclusive control over entrance of aliens. Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). In other words, the federal government, not the States, decides whether various "aliens" are admitted. Note: State scrutiny levels when dealing with undocumented immigrants may be context specific. See, e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (children and education). The federal government's authority over immigration is further solidified by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Const. Article VI. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1967). As such, the courts have applied rational basis scrutiny to the federal government's immigration policy. One reason alienage is interesting is that it tends to encompass things like national origin and religion. This doesn't imply the federal government makes its decisions on the basis of religion. In fact, it'd be hard to make an argument that they do. However, since the categories can be so closely entwined, many scholars have argued for a change in standard. Edit In hindsight, this topic seems quite forward looking. A couple weeks after the OP's question a U.S. presidential candidate (Donald Trump) came out in favor of a ban on entry into the U.S. by Muslims. That led to a flurry of activity, and to this insightful blog post by Professor E. Posner. | States have a general police power, meaning that they can pass laws about whatever they want unless there's a specific reason they can't. A state does not have to give special justification for why something is in the realm of stuff they can regulate; someone challenging it has to say what specific section of the Constitution it violates. For a time, the Due Process clause of the US Constitution was considered to imply freedom of contract. This time ended in the 1930s. The doctrine of a constitutionally protected freedom of contract is pretty much completely dead. A state can't abridge the freedom of contract for no reason, but that's because just about any law needs some reason to be allowed. The level of review is that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest; this is not a very demanding level of review. Source State bar associations are given power by laws making it illegal to practice law without being a member of the bar and requiring licensed lawyers to comply with bar rules. State bars that control admission to practice are generally government agencies (specifically, agencies of the court system). When the state bar is not a government agency, attorney discipline and licensing is handled by a government agency (lawyers might have to join the bar, but the bar has to accept licensed lawyers as members; the bar's power in these cases is limited to recommendations to the courts). |
Can a company charge two different prices for the same product at the same time? Let’s say the company is called X. I have found out that there are two different links on X’s website which leads to the same product, one that has a price of $1000 and the other $800. The link for the lower price is very hard to find even though it is on the same website. I called the company today and told them about the problem and they said that they are going to fix it. However, I have found out that this has been going on for months. So this just means that X has been overcharging thousands of costumers for more than 3 months. What should I do? | A company can charge each of its customers a different price if it wishes. Providing this discrimination is not on the basis of a prohibited reason (race, sex etc.) this is not illegal. | A "similar brand", even a "knock off", does not infringe trademark protection (which is the issue here, not copyright) as long as reasonable consumers or purchasers will not be confused or mislead into thinking that the product is the same as the original product, or is made by, affiliated with, sponsored by, or authorized by the makers of the original product, or that the knockoff in some way shares the reputation of the original product. Obviously that is a fact-based judgement, but a name that alludes to another product but is obviously different is generally not considered an infringement. (I recall reading of a case in which the well-known "North Face" clothing brand tried to sue a new brad called "South butt". I believe that North Face lost. Apparently I was wrong and the case was settled.) | According to this site in the UK apparently there are laws against calling something free if it was part of the entire package before or if was added later and the price went up Example of the latter: LG sold a TV. They then added a sound bar, increased the price and listed the TV as TV for $XXX + free sound bar. They ran afoul of the regulations Also adding something and calling the addition free is okay if the price didn't go up but you can only advertize it as free for 6 months. After 6 months the law considers it included by default and therefore no longer free. | They're not actually billing people different amounts because they have insurance or not. Doctors can pretty much bill a patient whatever they want for their service, similar to how a grocery store can charge whatever they want for their fresh deli cheese. Generally, they charge every single person the same amount. It just gets discounted depending on the insurance you have and how much they're willing to pay. One of the huge benefits of having medical insurance (outside of them paying for your medical expenses) is that they build contracts with service providers, known as their network. Those contracts specify prices (both preset and algorithmic) for certain services that you receive through those providers - the insurance provider will only pay that much and the doctor cannot charge the patient more than what is paid. If a claim was processed through a different insurance provider, the price will likely be different since each provider will have a separately negotiated contract with different price points for different services. It's not a system of "this is the insured price and this is the uninsured price" but rather a system of "this is the contract you established saying you'd accept this much from us for this service." For an uninsured person, though, you have no insurance provider and more importantly no provider contract backing you up. So you'd have to face the full force of the non-discounted price of those services. You'll face the same problem even with insurance if you go out-of-network, where the provider does not have contracts and therefore will only cover up to a certain amount that they would normally pay out for a similar service, requiring you to cover the rest of the amount of whatever the doctor decided to bill for that particular service. Without that insurance contract preventing the doctor from billing you the remainder of what they'd normally charge, you'll likely be slapped with a bill for that remainder. Directing back at your original question: there is no reason that a medical provider would ever legitimately bill someone a different amount because they are insured or not, thus there are no laws preventing it. It's that they already agreed to accept this certain amount from patients covered under this specific insurance. Again, they bill every patient the same amount - the insurance company is just saying "we're giving you this much and the rest of this, yeah that needs to go away." If you've ever looked at an EOB (Explanation of Benefits) from your insurance company, you'll see that the actual billed amount from the doctor is almost always much, much higher than what is actually paid out by you or the insurance, often known as the insurance discount. Maybe you'd rather think of it as a coupon? | It is not a bait and switch, nor false advertising. It might be a violation of contract, depending on the exact wording of the TOS or other agreement with the site. Probably not. "Bait and switch" refers to the tactic of advertising a specific product at a good price to draw one into a store (or to a site) and then claiming to be out of the advertised item, and attempting to sell the buyer a different item, usually one that is not as good a bargain. Even then, this is only illegal in most places if the seller did not have enough stock to meet reasonably anticipated demand. A notice such as "quantities limited" or "while supplies last" generally makes this legal. If no attempt is made to "switch" the customer to a different product, there is also usually no illegality. Whether this is false advertising depends on exactly how it was advertised. If the TOS or ads contained wording such as "no purchase is final until confirmed with airline" then there is probably no false advertising, but the exact definition depends on the specifics of local law, and the details of the facts will matter a good bit. | Forget whether or not it's legal; it's mathematically stupid. The store owner gets no advantage by taxing you on each individual item vs. just taxing the bill as a whole because of the distributive property of multiplication. A(x) + B(x) + C(x) is exactly the same as (A + B + C)x You can try this on a calculator and you'll get the exact same answer each time. The only possible benefit to the pizza place by doing it that way would be the cumulative effect of rounding. But even if they were being that shady, it only amounts to a few pennies per customer. Not exactly a profitable criminal enterprise. More than likely what happened is the waitress didn't quite know how to ring you up so she made corrections to the ticket trying to fix something. | It may be illegal under product labelling regulations that apply to that kind of product (or under a general deceptive trade practices act), but even then, only if you are interpreting the numbers, whose meaning is not clearly spelled out, correctly. But, to be actionable as fraud it must, among other things, be a misrepresentation as to a material fact (which if the goods, such as cordless drills, are not perishable it probably isn't) and the recipient of the misrepresentation must have justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation (which is necessary not true in the case of a representation that it was made in December 2018 on a product sold no later than July of 2018). It is also not entirely clear that this is a "made on" date. It could refer, for example, to the the twelfth batch or lot or shipment of products made in 2018, and not to the month of December, or it could refer to a product made in 2018 at factory number 12. @NateEldredge in the comments also makes the plausible observation that it could be a week number which is a common system in manufacturing which would put it in a more reasonable March 2018 time frame. You probably shouldn't do anything, because you haven't been harmed by this cryptic string of numbers embossed on the product, and even if you were, your damages would not be worth the time or money involved to pursue it as anything other than part of a class action lawsuit. | This would appear to be a simple application of contract law - the exchange of money for a promise (to sell at a fixed price in the future). Option contracts are only regulated if they relate to options over securities (like company shares) - not if they are over personal property (like baseball cards). |
How does copyright apply to rules, eg ISO standards? As I understand it, copyright applies to creative expression and not for examples rules of games. Does this also apply to the ISO standards (example, costs CHF 158)? For example, could one re-write the standards in one's own words and sell them in competition with ISO? Or is there something that would prevent this, perhaps something like Copyright in compilation? | Expression vs Idea As I understand it, copyright applies to creative expression and not for examples rules of games. That is not correct as stated. Game rule, or more exactly the fixed expression of a set of game rule (what one finds in the package of a commercial game, or in a book such as Hoyle's Rules of Games, can be and usually are protected by copyright. What is not protected is the ideas expressed in a set of rules. These are sometimes called "game mechanics". For example it is a rule of bridge that 13 cards are dealt to each of 4 players. That is a fact, and so is not protected by copyright. But the exact wording of the official Laws of Duplicate Bridge is protected. "creativity" vs "originality" Many things that might not be considered very creative are protected. US Copyright law calls not for creativity, but for an original work. The concepts of "creativity" and "originality" have a significant overlap, but are not at all the same. For example, a person might watch a baseball game and write down play-by-play account of it. That might not be very creative, but it would still be protected by copyright. But the event of the game are facts, and not protected. Someone else might describe the same game in different words, covering the same facts, and that would not be copyright infringement. Another example. A person writes a scientific paper describing in detail a series of chemical experiments and the results obtained. That is not very creative (although the design of the experiments might be). It would, however, be protected by copyright. But the facts and ideas would not be protected. Another person could desacribe the same experiments in different words, and that would not be an infringement of copyright. Merger Doctrine In extreme cases, such as a basic recipe, there is no expression temperate from the facts. In such a case the "merger doctrine" applies, and there is no copyright protection at all. Standards Standards, such as ISO standards, are normally protected by copyright. But the ideas expressed in them are not. And since standards are highly factual, the protection afforded to them is particularly narrow. But when one is testing compliance with a standard, the exact words of the standard may be important. A compliance officer is not likely to accept a paraphrase as a valid substitute. Standards in Laws The actual text of laws (and regulations), however (Federal, state, or local) is never protected by copyright. All are in the public domain. So when a law incorporated and reprints a standard, as is often done with fire and building codes, anyone may freely reproduce the codes as set down as part of law, even through the code has been copyrighted and indeed registered, as long as the source is the text of an enacted law or regulation. | The answer to this depends very much in which country you are in, and how you go about implementing it. First of all, this might seem obvious, but copyright only applies if you copy something that is covered under copyright. If you copy an idea - that having a library that solves problem X is useful - and that is the only aspect you copy, then under U.K. Copyright law, there is no copyright infringement, as ideas are not copyrighted. However, if you copy aspects of the library interface, or the object model of the original library, then it's a derived work, and the copyright of the new work is only partly yours. If you translate the source into a new language, then the copyright is largely still with the original author. Every country implements copyright law in their own way. One of the principle differences are in the available "fair use" clauses. You may find that you are entitled to a fair use clause for creating a "compatible" library, or you may be allowed to quote small aspects of the original in your new work. You need to check up on your countries laws. | The commentators are just making stuff up when they say that you can freely infringe on copyright as long as it is for personal use. It is true that "personal infringers" are less likely to suffer the legal consequences of any infringement (partly because it's easier to avoid detection and partly because the hassle to award ratio involved in suing a personal infringer is too high). It's a misunderstanding of "fair use", based on the legally erroneous assumption that anything is okay until you make a business out of it. | The copyright on the book of quotations protects the collection. That is, it protects the author's choice of which quotations to include, and of what order to list them in. It also covers any division of them into groups or categories, and any added text (intros, comments, and so on) written by the author. It does not protect the quotations themselves. As those are not the original work of the author, s/he can have no copyright in them. Any quotes that are in the public domain (through expiration of copyright, or otherwise) may be used freely. Any others are protected by copyright. However the use of a short quotation is often fair use under US law, or is subject to another exception to copyright elsewhere. But that depends very much on the details of the factual situation. So quotes with expired copyrights are safe to use. Others may well be safe if they are relatively short, and proper attribution is given. | Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation. | Copyright and patents are two very very different things. Copyrighting a standard means the wording of the standard can not be copied without the copyright holders permission. It does not protect the ideas expressed in the document, just the way those ideas are expressed. IEEE standards, for example, are copyrighted by the IEEE and therefore you can't make a copy of the Ethernet specification, you need to buy it from them. That has nothing to do with implementing an Ethernet device. To implement something described in a technical specification might or might not require one or more patent licenses. The authors of the standard may not even be aware that something they require for the standard has already been invented and patented by someone else. Many standard bodies do impose a requirement on participants in the standard's creation that they offer licenses to any patents they own that are needed to implement the standard on a fair and equal basis to all. It is called FRAND - the acronym for fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing. | It would seem that your song is a derived work. You took the original work and found words that sound the same. If the original work had used different words, your work would have ended up differently. So you have a derived work. Same as making a translation; if the original was different, then the translation would be different, so the translation is a derived work. I was asked "How is this not straight up infringement". But it is. Not only copying is an exclusive right of the copyright holder, but also the creation of derivative works. | In general, a gameplay video would be either a partial copy or a derivative work, and in either case an infringement if created without permission. Such a video might be covered under fair use in US copyright law, particularly if made for the purpose of commentary on a game or instruction in how to play or design a game. In general, a fair use defense is more likely to succeed if only the minimum amount of the work required for the purpose is used, and sound tracks might not be required for such a purpose. Thus a maker of such a video might choose to omit the sound to improve the fair-use case. Moreover, when the sound track contains licensed popular music it would be subject to a separate copyright, and many music publishers are notoriously litigious, so prudence would advise omitting the sound. All that said, fair-use is a case-by-case determination, and if the makers of such videos have not been sued, they (and we) can only guess how a case would turn out. As to why game makers refrain from having such videos taken down (if they in fact do refrain) one can only speculate. Game publishers may consider the videos good advertising. Questions based on the absence of legal proceedings are inherently speculative, unless a copyright holder has announced a policy of not taking action and the reasons for it. |
What is the point of a Royal Assent? Some say that a monarch cannot withhold Royal Assent to a bill passed by the parliament. Really? What happens if they refuse to grant assent to any law passed by the parliament unless they are personally satisfied with the law — effectively trying to coerce the parliament into making such laws as the monarch wishes? In such a case, would the parliament depose the monarch? Would it replace them by a more obedient one? But if the parliament can just do that, what is the point of seeking Royal Assent in the first place? What's the point of not effecting a passed bill straight away instead? | Because rituals are important You might well ask what is the point of the ceremony of the Black Rod: Black Rod is best known for their part in the ceremonies surrounding the State Opening of Parliament and the Speech from the throne. They summon the Commons to attend the speech and lead them to the Lords. As part of the ritual, the doors to the chamber of the House of Commons are slammed in the approaching Black Rod's face. This is to symbolise the Commons' independence of the Sovereign. Black Rod then strikes the door three times with the staff, and is then admitted and issues the summons of the monarch to attend. Societies are not run by laws - they are run by convention and custom. Take the universe and grind it down to the finest powder and sieve it through the finest sieve and then show me one atom of justice, one molecule of mercy. and yet... and yet you act as if there is some ideal order in the world, as if there is some... some rightness in the universe by which it may be judged. Terry Pratchett, Hogfather The purpose of Royal Assent is to preserve the convention and custom that the United Kingdom is ruled by a King to avoid dealing with the reality that it's ruled by the people just like you and me which is and should be a truly terrifying thought. This is not a dig at politicians, judges, and civil servants: it applies equally to your doctor, the engineer who designed your house and the plumber who fitted your toilet. What would happen if it was refused? Well, a constitutional crisis would happen. The UK and most other Commonwealth countries have had a few; they seem to find a solution. However, it's a crisis primarily because no one knows how it will be resolved in advance. This particular crisis is unlikely to arise: the last time it happened was in 1708 by Queen Anne who was acting on the advice of her ministers (who were answerable to Parliament for their actions). the last time it happened against the wishes of the government was in 1696 by William III. the last time a monarch considered it was in 1914 by George V who decided it should not be done without "convincing evidence that it would avert a national disaster, or at least have a tranquillising effect on the distracting conditions of the time". | There is no higher court which can overturn a SCOTUS decision, so in theory (or, imaginarily) they can rule any way they please. The ruling could then be overturned by a later court, as happened in these cases. However, justices of the Supreme Court can be impeached (impeachment is not subject to judicial review), so the individuals responsible for such a ruling could be impeached. Or, if the sitting president is favorable and the enabling legislation has been passed, additional members of the Supreme could be added, as was unsuccessfully attempted during the Roosevelt administration. The court could not write specific enforceable statutes defining the crime and imposing a penalty. They could rule that there is such-and-such right which is protected by the Cconstitution, and that that right must be protected by the states (for instance, a state may not pass a law that prohibits practicing the Pastafarian religion). It would be unprecedented, though, for SCOTUS to order a legislature to pass particular legislation. That would not mean that a ruling could not be written which mandated that, but it would be a huge break from tradition and a clear breach of the separation of powers. Legislatures could respond "they have made their decision; now let them enforce it". Decades ago, existing state death penalty laws were declared unconstitutional as defective with respect to the 8th Amendment, meaning that there was no death penalty in many states for some time. Homicide statutes could likewise be struck down en masse, perhaps as an Equal Rights violation, which would means that either homicide is now legal, or the Equal Rights violation in those statutes must be eliminated. All that SCOTUS would have to do is rule that a fetus is a person. Recall Roe v. Wade: If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. A model for how this might take place is McCleary v.Washington, where the Washington Supreme Court ordered the legislature to act to fund public education, on constitutional grounds that the legislature has an obligation to do certain things. The leverage imposed by the court was a large daily contempt fine that went up to over $100 million. However this was symbolic (lifted when the legislation was passed), and it took 3 years to implement the order. | To become law, a bill must be passed, in identical form, by both chambers of Congress, during the same Congress that is during the two-year period between congressional elections. At the end of a congress (also called a term), any bill that did not become law (passed by both chambers and signed by the President or any veto overridden) is dead. It may be taken up in a later congress, but it starts again from the beginning of the process. See Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3 of the United States Constitution The comments correctly point out that the constitutional provision cited and linked to above does not specify the rule that a bill must pass both chambers during the same Congress (sometimes called the same term of Congress). I am confident that the rule stated above is correct. I have read news stories about bills that did not pass both chambers "dying" at the end of a Congress, although I have no citations to hand at the moment. I have spent several hours over the last two days searching the House and Senate websites, reading the House rules, the Senate rules, and Jefferson's Manual. Jefferson's Manual began as notes on parliamentary procedure, made for his own use by Thomas Jefferson during his tenure as Vice-President (1797-1801), based on the then-current procedure of the English Parliament. It is the original basis for the Senate rules. I understand that it is still considered an authority on the procedures of Parliament as they existed in the period 1750-1801. Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice section li (a session) (sec 588, page 316), reads: Parliament have three modes of separation, to wit: by adjournment, by prorogation or dissolution by the King, or by the efflux of the term for which they were elected. Prorogation or dissolution constitutes there what is called a session; provided some act was passed. In this case all matters depending before them are discontinued, and at their next meeting are to be taken up de novo, if taken up at all. 1 Blackst., 186. ... [Sec 590, page 317] Congress separate in two ways only, to wit, by adjournment, or dissolution by the efflux of their time. What, then, constitutes a session with them? A dissolution certainly closes one session, and the meeting of the new Congress begins another. The Constitution authorizes the President, "on extraordinary occasions to convene both Houses, or either of them." I. 3. If convened by the President's proclamation, this must begin a new session, and of course determine the preceding one to have been a session. So if it meets under the clause of the Constitution which says, "the Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day." I. 4. This must begin a new session; for even if the last adjournment was to this day the act of adjournment is merged in the higher authority of the Constitution, and the meeting will be under that, and not under their adjournment. So far we have fixed landmarks for determining sessions. ... [Sec 592, page 318] When it was said above that all matters depending before Parliament were discontinued by the determination of the session, it was not meant for judiciary cases depending before the House of Lords, such as impeachments, appeals, and writs of error. These stand continued, of course, to the next session. Raym., 120, 381; Ruffh. Fac., L. D., Parliament. The practice of the English Parliament as set down by Mr. Jefferson seems to be the basis of the current US practice, but I can find no law, nor any provision of the current house or senate rules, explicitly adopting or codifying it, or setting it as a rule for the US. The official page How Our Laws Are Made has an extensive discussion of the progress of a bill from proposal to law, but nowhere mentions what happens to a bill not agreed to by both chambers. | The constitution does not actually forbid "abusing a position for financial gain", and thus it is left to the political process to address any such actions (voting for a different candidate), or the legislative process (defining certain acts as forbidden) – or, the impeachment process. The court system in the US does not have the power to decide on their own what politicians can and can't do, if there is no underlying law. It is within congressional power to define limits on the act of any politician, for example Congress could pass a law requiring the President and Vice-President to have no business interests or stocks during their term of office; they could require that of cabinet members or members of Congress. Such a law would, of course, either require presidential approval or else sufficient support in the houses of congress to override a veto. There are various limits on what government folks can do. 18 USC 202(c) is an example of a limit on the limits: Except as otherwise provided in such sections, the terms “officer” and “employee” in sections 203, 205, 207 through 209, and 218 of this title shall not include the President, the Vice President, a Member of Congress, or a Federal judge It is possible that a president could engage in a criminal act such as theft, and that is not permitted and would be grounds for impeachment. The president does not, however, have the power to e.g. unilaterally send all government hotel business to a certain hotel company, nor can he declare that 10% of all government expenditures must be deposited in his personal bank account, so the mechanisms whereby corrupt rules of certain other nations can get away with that is that those executives have vastly more power in their countries than POTUS does. With congressional support, though, such acts could come about. If it did, it would not be too surprising if SCOTUS ruled based on common law and considerations of justice that such a law / act was illegal, but it would not be a textualist argument. | tl;dr: Statutory preambles are typically non-binding, and some states have laws to this effect (e.g. Florida, Illinois, Iowa, etc.). The most consistent interpretation I've found is that when the body text isn't clear, the preamble might be helpful in determining context and legislative intent. For example, in Shea v. Clinton, 850 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D.C. 2012), the district court said that where statutory text is ambiguous, courts may look to the preamble and legislative history for clarification. This extends beyond the realm of statutes. In Catalina Marketing v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the court found that considering limitations in the preamble of a patent should be context-specific. | There is no "theft" without a law that defines what "property" is and what "theft" is. Laws derive from the state that has the power to enforce them. A state may issue the laws and decrees and stablish who owns the lands. It can later make changes to that ownership. When the Normans invaded England, Willian I became the legal authority and with that he could award, confiscate and keep lands as he saw fit, without that being considered "theft" in any legal sense of the word. The English government (and all others) still have the authority to take away, redistribute and otherwise change the ownership of lands as they see fit, and nothing of it would be theft. Internally most of them have chosen to stablish some procedures to ensure that this is only done when needed by meeting some tests (eminent domain), but even if they didn't have those (again, self-imposed) restrictions they still would be able to change ownership as they saw fit. That does not mean that a government using that power to punish political opponents or ethnic minorities would not face internal and external protests. | Congress has the power to propose amendments, but not to enact them. Amendments are only enacted once they're ratified by 3/4ths of the state legislatures. And yes, there's no reason to think it would be unconstitutional for 2/3rds of each house of Congress plus 3/4ths of the state legislatures to make fundamental changes to the Constitution like eliminating other branches of government. The only limit on amendments that's still in effect is that states can't be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate without their consent. | The dichotomy between solicitors and barristers in the UK isn't one based on verbal definitions in the English language. In other words, the fact that barristers argue and solicitors don't isn't something that's inherent to the words, it's just how British law decided to divide it. Since those countries with solicitor generals don't have this dichotomy, they generally don't have anything actually called a barrister, and there's no reason why the solicitor general couldn't be called that, since solicitor doesn't require that he not argue in court. |
Could a British monarch "go full dictator" if they wish to do so? Queen Elizabeth II was generally nice and didn't abuse her power. But could her successor do otherwise and "go full dictator", in theory? Would he have enough legal powers to do so? Admittedly, dictators are not known for playing by the book, but they often start out in a lawful or a "semi-lawful" fashion. To what extent, if I put it another way, does the British democracy rely on solid legal checks and balances, not on the monarch's goodwill? Considering the UK's uncodified constitution, which is not really there, one may start to have some doubts about it. | Parliamentary Supremacy was established by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in which James II & VII was deposed by Parliament, and the line of succession was changed by Act of Parliament to favor William and Mary. Key laws passed during the aftermath of the Revolution included the Declaration of Right (which forbade keeping a standing army without Parliamentary consent, and put control of the military in Parliament), and the Coronation Oath Act 1688 which established in law obligations of the monarch. Since 1688 it has remained the governing principle of English (later British and UK) law that ultimate authority lies in Parliament, not with the monarch, and that Parliament can at any time depose a monarch for failing to act properly, and can settle the line of succession to the crown. A British King or Queen who tried to exercise dictatorial power, or even to use remaining Royal Prerogative powers to assume personal rule, could and quite likely would be deposed. | In england-and-wales this would fall within the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and depends on whether he lacks the mental not physical, capacity to make the decision for himself. Can he: Understand the information relevant to the decision Retain that information Use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision Communicate that decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means). If the answer to any of these is"no" then he cannot lawfully give true consent. Although the Act allows for others, such as a power of attorney, to make decisions on behalf of someone lacking the mental capacity, s.27 specifically excludes the decision to marry. | Most of the implications here are political, not legal. For that, you'd have to ask Politics.SE. The law, however, is quite clear: If the President is alive, and "a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide" do not invoke the 25th amendment, the President would remain President and just not do their job in this case. Congress could presumably provide for a different set of people to validate the President's disability status, but in your hypothetical, this wouldn't happen due to a lack of consent from the Senate. The 25th amendment was created to solve this problem: it is the only solution to it. If it is not used, then there is no other means to remove a disabled-but-alive President. Most (all?) executive agencies can run themselves perfectly well day-to-day without the President's help, so nothing would be likely to fall apart immediately. There wouldn't be anyone to appoint new judges or other presidentially appointed officers, which would probably eventually become a problem. | Because the courts or the legislature decide they have them There is no doubt that both the courts and the legislature in common law countries have the ability to find, create, or extend rights and this has been done in the past. This is, in fact, where legal rights were created. The US Bill of Rights was created by the people in 1791. If the people in 2191 want to grant rights to AIs then they can do this. This is legally possible. Whether it's a good idea is a matter of philosophy and politics. | No, abuse of power is not necessarily criminal Imagine a judge that is “heightist” - they always rule in favor of defendants who are taller than 175cm and always rule against those who are shorter irrespective of the merits of the case. This is clearly an abuse of power. It’s not illegal because “height” is not a category protected from discrimination (AFAIK). However, it is a failure to correctly discharge their legal obligations. | We can only guess at what argument he has in mind, but one possible argument is that the standard is unconstitutionally vague, similar to the argument by McDonnell in the recent McDonnell v US (admittedly about a different statute). The vagueness argument was developed in several of the briefs: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/ The unconstitutional vagueness argument has also been made specifically about 18 USC 793 (e). US v Hitselberger 1:12-cr-00231-RC D.D.C. (2014). The defendant made a motion to dismiss based on constitutional vagueness, but this motion was denied. Private Manning raised the same defence, also unsuccessfully: http://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/051012-vague.pdf | The governing law would be the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961). The relevant part is Article 29. Diplomats must not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. Diplomats are also immune from civil and criminal prosecution. Technically, it wasn't a US diplomat but a family member, but by Article 37 they have the same protection. The linked article suggests that her diplomatic immunity ended, but that's a bit of a non-issue. The host nation (the UK in this case) can declare anyone, diplomats or family to be persona non grata which indeed ends diplomatic immunity, but only after the person is allowed to leave the host nation. And when the act happened, the immunity was in place. Immunity cannot retroactively be withdrawn by the host nation. | I think we're talking about In re Hennen, which dealt with the removal of the clerk of the district court in Louisiana: It all these departments power is given to the secretary, to appoint all necessary clerks; 1 Story, 48; and although no power to remove is expressly given, yet there can be no doubt, that these clerks hold their office at the will and discretion of the head of the department. It would be a most extraordinary construction of the law, that all these offices were to be held during life, which must inevitably follow, unless the incumbent was removable at the discretion of the head of the department: the President has certainly no power to remove. These clerks fall under that class of inferior officers, the appointment of which the Constitution authorizes Congress to vest in the head of the department. The same rule, as to the power of removal, must be applied to offices where the appointment is vested in the President alone. The nature of the power, and the control over the officer appointed, does not at all depend on the source from which it emanates. The execution of the power depends upon the authority of law, and not upon the agent who is to administer it. And the Constitution has authorized Congress, in certain cases, to vest this power in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of departments; and all inferior officers appointed under each, by authority of law, must hold their office at the discretion of the appointing power. Such is the settled usage and practical construction of the Constitution and laws, under which these offices are held. In re Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 259–60, 10 L. Ed. 138 (1839) (emphasis added). |
Having multiple residences Let's suppose I'm a citizen of Italy, France and Belgium and let's suppose I own 3 houses in Bologna, Italy; Paris, France; and Brussels, Belgium. As far as my supposed countries of citizenship are concerned, can I be considered, by each one of them, one of their own residents? (Meaning, can I be considered a French residing in Paris and having it on French ID, an Italian living in Bologna and having it on Italian ID and a Belgian living in Brussels and having it on ID?) | Yes, depending on the local registration laws of the country in question, when you have a residence in that country. You can also be a resident of multiple countries under the same conditions. You can also be considered a non- resident citizen of your own country. In the European Union, Residence Laws are national laws only for periods up to 3 months are there generel EU Laws So to answer the question under what conditions is someone from Belgium, France or Italy considered a resident, you must look at the countries residence laws (if they have one at all). Note: This has nothing to do with residence permits. A resident permit only allows a foreigner to stay in a country. A foreigner must still fulfill the local Residence Laws, where they exist, as a citizen of that country must also do. Belgium: Moving to Belgium | Belgium.be Belgians who are returning home If you were registered at an embassy or consulate, and are now definitively returning to Belgium, it is in your interests to notify them before you leave. In principle, you should report to your new municipality within eight working days of your arrival in Belgium. After confirming your main place of residence you are recorded in the national register. Your new municipality will notify the municipality where you had your main residence before you moved abroad. If this municipality still holds your administrative records, they will forward them to your new municipality. As soon as you have been registered the procedure starts for issuing a new identity card. Foreign nationals The free movement of persons applies within the European Union, making the residence rules for EU citizens much more flexible than those for the citizens of other countries. "Free movement" also applies to countries in the European Economic Area (EEA): in addition to the EU states, these are Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. However, there are transitional rules for certain new EU Member States. Registering with the municipal authorities If as a foreign national you wish to stay in Belgium for longer than three months, you must report to the municipality in which you are staying within eight days of your arrival. You must be registered on the National Register; and for that you must have an actual place of residence in this municipality. both Belgians and Foreigners share the common procedure of registering with the municipal authorities France: France residence Wikipedia France utilizes a national identity card (carte nationale d’identité sécurisée or CNIS), an official non-compulsory identity document. The address information on the card is merely derived from other documents like electricity bills. There is no requirement to notify change of address, which leads to the situation that the current address is often verified by showing bills relating to the current home.[citation needed] Registering your residence abroad - France If you are an EU citizen, you don't need to register after 3 months in France. All EU citizens have the right to live and settle in France However, you can get a residence permit if you wish. Registration at their place of residence is voluntary (3rd Country) Foriegners Arrival in France | France-Visas.gouv.fr What you need to do in France Long-stay visa with the obligation to apply for a residence permit If the visa issued to you is a long-stay visa indicating an obligation to apply for a residence permit, you must complete this process within two months of arrival and contact the prefecture of your place of residence. Registration at their place of residence is mandatory Italy: The Immigration Portal (Translated to English) EU citizens who intend to settle in Italy, or in another European Union state, no longer have the obligation to request a residence card but, after three months of entry, it is necessary to register in the registry office of the municipality of residence ; no formalities are required for stays of less than three months. Italy - Residence of individuals An individual who moves to Italy must apply for registration with the Record of the Italian Resident Population in the municipality (comune) where they intend to reside. At the end of the stay in Italy, the individual is required to apply for the cancellation of their name from the Record of the Resident Population. While registered, you are considered to be a tax resident. An Italian citizen who transfers to a foreign country has to cancel oneself with the Records of the Italian Resident Population and has to register with the Records of the Italian resident abroad, the Anagrafe Italiani Residenti Estero (AIRE). Note: The first paragraph is for all persons, where as the second is specific to Italian citizens Italian citizens who fail to register with AIRE while abroad, often face huge tax bills when returning. Conclusions: The conditions can differ radically between countries, depending on the local resident laws (where they exist). In Belgium you are considerd a resident while registered in National Register In France you are considerd a resident when registered at the local prefecture, which is only mandatory for 3rd Country Foriegners In Italy you are considerd a resident while registered at the local Record of the Italian Resident Population in the municipality (comune) Assumptions should never be made, since the non compliance of local residence laws can have consequences. Resident registration - Wikipedia Africa Americas Europe Belgium France Germany Italy Russian Federation United Kingdom Asia and Oceania | For a definite answer, Bob should ask his tax advisor. German freelance status ("Freiberufler") is a bit difficult to navigate, because legally speaking, this status can only be applied to contract work that requires a university degree, everything else is a regular business ("Gewerbe") that is taxed differently and requires you to join the chamber of commerce. This has become a bit murky as there are freelance software developers without a degree (who should be careful about using the word "engineer") and the tax office seems to accept that, but I'm not entirely sure they are as lenient towards entertainers (which YT would fall under). The way I understand the Blue Card FAQ, freelancing is not allowed for Blue Card holders, I'd consider that the bigger problem (but that's an immigration issue, not a tax issue). | The phrase in question is clarifying that if the wall (excluding the support) is on one person's property, and the support crosses into another person's property, then it is not a party fence wall. Why make this clarification, given that if a wall doesn't stand "on lands of different owners", it can't be a party wall anyway? Architect's Legal Handbook: The Law for Architects suggests that this is because there is a different rule for walls which separate buildings, hence the need to highlight the difference (emphasis mine): ...rights of adjoining owners do not arise where only the foundations project on the to the adjoining land if the wall concerned is a boundary wall, not being part of a building, but they do arise if such a wall separates buildings belonging to different owners. | Under Fed. R. Civ. P. One can be served according to the state law or: (2) doing any of the following: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized None of those would apply to your facts. Thus you would have to find some jurisdiction that would allow service of process under your fact. I dare say that none will and that due process would come into play. In NJ, due process applies and service may be made (1) Upon a competent individual of the age of 14 or over, by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at the individual's dwelling place or usual place of abode with a competent member of the household of the age of 14 or over then residing therein, or by delivering a copy thereof to a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on the individual's behalf; It has to be the current place of abode. | A list of potentially expatriating acts may be found at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/Advice-about-Possible-Loss-of-US-Nationality-Dual-Nationality.html As the page explains, one will lose one's citizenship when performing one of these acts with the intention of losing one's US citizenship. In most cases, the presumption is that such intention does not exist. One obvious exception is an explicit renunciation of citizenship before a consular officer. The others are accepting a "policy-level position" in a foreign government, serving in a foreign military engaged in hostilities with the US, and committing treason. | In germany inheritance tax (Erbschaftsteuer) taxes someone receiving an inheritance (or a gift - they are treated the same). If the heir is (inheritance tax) resident in Germany, German inheritance tax is due in principle on the whole received property, regardless of where that property is. Paid foreign inheritance tax on particular types of property and in accordance with tax treaties can be deducted. (Details: see §21 ErbStG and §121 BewG) Wrt the scenario in the question: if that foreign country collects low/no inheritance tax, the heir gets accordingly low or no deduction from the due German inheritance tax. Whether the "more mobile" property in the question counts as foreign property or not depends on whether the deceased was German resident in the sense of inheritance tax law or not (e.g. moved their residence to the foreign country > 5a before their death), but again, that wouldn't lower the total amount of taxes due, it only shifts who gets them. In order to actually avoid German inheritance tax on the mobile property of the question, the heir would need to move their tax residency away from Germany. | As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there. | Exact wording might matter here, so I looked up the law. It says "a permanent resident complies with the residency obligation with respect to a five-year period if, on each of a total of at least 730 days in that five-year period, they are physically present in Canada". Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 28(2)(a). If you visit the Canadian side of the park, you're "physically present in Canada". It would therefore appear that this would meet the requirement. I am by no means an expert in Canadian immigration law, though. |
Can fictional abilities of a character be protected by copyright? Some examples of abilities from games: In Dota 2, the hero Queen of Pain has a ability/skill called Scream of Pain. It is essentially a kind of "magical" scream that damages nearby enemies. In the Warcraft universe the so called "night elves" have an ability called shadowmeld that makes them invisible, leaving only the shadows. Are abilities like these protected by copyright? Also, there are any court cases regarding this? | Your example powers are tropes and their basis in public domain The Queen of Pain's scream is modeled after the Banshee, which had a scream that would kill... and there are LOTS of variants of Banshee. In fact, "Our Banshees Are Louder" is a trope. Hiding in a shadow or walking through it is for example a typical feature of Ninja stories since the Edo Period, and a common Trope as "Shadow walker". That makes those two powers older than You can not have a copyright on concepts, facts, or ideas. Facts are not copyrightable, which was decided LONG ago over Feist v Rural. Neither can you copyright concepts or ideas. You won't get a claim on the concept of a damaging scream or turning into shadow. See also Copyright.gov (emphasis mine): How do I protect my idea? Copyright does not protect ideas, concepts, systems, or methods of doing something. You may express your ideas in writing or drawings and claim copyright in your description, but be aware that copyright will not protect the idea itself as revealed in your written or artistic work. | In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any. | We cannot and will not try to answer "what should i do?" questions here. Nothing in the linked page makes me think that the views expressed in the previous question here are any less correct. They certainly have not changed the law on copyright. The linked page is an open forum. Many of the posts o9n that thread express ill-informed and incorrect views of how copyright works, and what it protects. Several google searchs find no trace of the suit described in the thread. Note that in US law no copyright claim may be heard in a small claims court, except for the federal copyright office's small claims tribunal. I am not sure if the same is true in Canada, but it might be that the suit was simply dismissed on such a basis. In any case small claims cases do not establish legal precedents in Canada or the US. Of course it is true that anyone can sue over almost anything, even when there is no valid legal basis for the suit. If the suit had been won by the claimant, or even settled that would be larger grounds for worry. A person seriously worried over publishing a book such as that described in the question might do well to consult a lawyer with relevant expertise. A single consultation plus an opinion letter might not cost very much. But 17 USC 102 (b) is very clear that copyright never protects facts, as are the copyright laws of other countries. Note that reports of the events of sports matches are not protected by copyright, although expressive language and analysis may be. 17 USC 102 (b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Article 2 paragraph (8) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (8) The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. There seems little room for copyright protection of the moves of chess games. | You should probably look up the Open Gaming Liscense (OGL) and what you can or cannot do with respect to it. Generally, classic fantasy monsters (Dragons, Manticores, Sasquatch, Vampires). Are fair use. OGL also allows for creatures that are similar to D&D exclusive monsters to exist so long as the name is changed sufficently. Most "monsters" are in what's called Public Domain and are free to use and modify. Additionally "powers" of a monster (or superhero) aren't generally copyrighted but the totatllity of their use in a work can be (does your superhero fly? Is super-strong? Is invulerable? Can be fine. Is he named Clark Kent? That's a problem). Fair Use also allows for some parody but again, it's a defense to copyright infringment and not a liscenses to take someone elses work wholesale. It also doesn't stop them from suing you, as you have to claim fair use as your defense if and when each suit arises. I'd recomend looking at National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc. for an example of an intellectual property dispute that is close to yours. Note that Fawcett won at trial but lost on appeal and rather than take the matter before SCOTUS decided to settle out of court. | To my understanding, the answer is in theory no, in practice yes. Ordinarily, non-infringing derivatives gain copyright on the creative elements contributed by that derivative's author (17 USC 103(b)). However, as I cover here, the United States has a specific statutory provision in 17 U.S.C 103(a) which bars infringing derivatives from gaining copyright (internationally, most statutes are silent on this specific scenario). So in theory, Disney does not own copyright on the derivative because no one does - no copyright was assigned to the derivative author due to its infringing nature and the elements original to that derivative are technically in the public domain (unless they are far enough removed from the original, per the wording of s. 103(a)). However, in practice Disney effectively owns the copyright. By definition of being a derivative, it contains original elements of another author's work. Disney is the rightsholder of that author's work and as such can effectively exercise the rights granted to it by copyright law on the derivative by virtue of holding the underlying original's copyright. | Per a decision of the US Copyright Office last month, AI generated images are not subject to copyright. That means you can use the generated images for any purpose you want1, but so can anyone else. However, the specific usage of a given image might be protected - so if you put a caption on the image and arrange it in the form of a comic (as the artist in that example did), that specific text and arrangement can be protected, but the underlying image can't be. Laws may differ elsewhere in the world, but that's the current stance in the US. 1 Subject to any appropriate laws, including any copyright laws which the new image itself may violate. Just because the image isn't protected itself doesn't mean that it can't infringe on someone else's copyrights. See the other answer for more details. | Of course. Copyright law prevents you from making copies, and prevents others from making copies. It doesn’t oblige you to take extreme precautions against vague possibilities that others might break the law. And reading is not considered “copying”. So you don’t have to prevent others from reading your books at all. | Copyright never protects ideas as such, whether in movies, novels or text books or any other kind of work. However, if an aspect of work, such as a character, place or fictional society are sufficiently distinctive, and if another work uses that aspect, with detailed similarity to the previous work, it might be found to be a derivative work of the original. A derivative work requires permission from the copyright holder of the original work. For example, in Ursula K. LeGuin's famous SF novel The Left Hand of Darkness a fictional race or species, the Gethenians, is portrayed which is neither male nor female most of the time, but becomes sexually active and gendered a few days a month, and an individual may be male one month and female the next. This is an original and distinctive idea. Another author could create a different group of people with a similar nature without infringing copyright, but if the detailed description of how the process worked, or how it felt to the individuals involved was similar, that might make it a derivative work, and LeGuin's estate might be able to sue and win. This is something that gets decided on a case-by-case basis, and such decisions are highly fact-based. But if the new work has a society or species which is clearly different from any previously invented one, even though it shares some aspect, and if there is no detailed, point-by-point similarity, an infringement suit seems unlikely. Several SF authors have said "Its not the idea, it's what you do with it that matters." Filmmakers, because of the money involved, tend to be more cautious than book authors. For example, Paramount bought rights to the "flat cats" from Robert A. Heinlein before filming the Star Trek episode "The Trouble with the Tribbles", although the similarity was quite probably not enough for a successful infringement suit (but no one will ever know for sure, since they bought permission). This is described in some detail in David Gerrold's book about the making of that episode. Gerrold wrote that his conscious model was the importation of rabbits into Australia, not RAH's flat cats, but there are some similarities, and DG had read The Rolling Stone (where the flat cats appear) years before. In any specific case. consulting a lawyer with expertise in the area would be a good idea, as the details will matter. |
Is it considered harassment if a neighbor threatens with legal actions on whatever I do on my property I hope this question is appropriate here. I moved into a house in a nice neighborhood a few months ago. I get along with most neighbors very well, but there is the one troublemaker like in every community. I'm currently replacing my old and rotten wooden handrail next to some stairs which are used by all neighbors. They were not really usable as such in fear of splinters and if one would rely on them when he stumbles they would probably fall apart. The new ones are made of sturdy aluminum with LEDs for the night to see the steps better. So an improvement in every way. This certain neighbor immediately contacted the authorities and harassed the contractors as he considers them unsafe as they are just handrails without paling, so a small child could walk under it and fall into a small ditch where a funicular runs in parallel. In this specific case he mentions his grandchild who actually lives there, he only owns the house and rents it to his daughters family. I order some netting on the area where the fall to this ditch is above 1m, but for optics and the price I decided against it where the fall is only 50-60cm. I am aware if someone falls and gets injured, my insurance has to pay. But I don't see how he could force me to build a fence instead of just a handrail. Talking with other neighbors, everyone dislikes that guy and against few of them he already took legal action. One had to cut down a tree a previous owner planted a bit too close to his property. I am planning to a larger remodeling of my land and even though my property only touches his at a corner I fear he will again try to take legal action for whatever reason he feels fancy. How can I prevent this or is there even a legal action I can take against him if it turns out as I fear? | You must comply with the law even on your own property Things like handrails and fencing of potential falls are almost always subject to local building codes. "[S]ome netting" is unlikely to be compliant except as a temporary measure. In addition, materially changing the functionality so that it becomes less safe, even if it complies, may expose you to liability if someone gets injured. Such as if the new handrail is replacing one which had measures to prevent someone from slipping under them. Harassment I'm unfamiliar with Swiss harassment laws but they usually require unwanted behaviour that offends, humiliates, intimidates, or creates a hostile environment and must usually be directed at a protected characteristic. Offending someone because you don't like them is fine; offending them because they are a woman is not. A neighbour raising concerns with you, your contractors, or the authorities is not harassment. Nor is exercising his legal right to bring a lawsuit. If it persists beyond what is reasonable it may cross over into stalking, but that's not harassment either. | Is the contractor liable? It depends. Trespass and conversion would be the applicable torts. In some jurisdictions, those are strict liability torts, in others they are intentional torts. The contractor lacks intent, but did participate in the act. I haven't yet had a chance to check out California in particular. California appears to come close to a strict liability regime based upon the relevant jury instruction and related commentary. In a suit, would PersonB sue contractor for damages, who would then sue PersonA, or would PersonB sue PersonA directly for damages? Person B would sue both. The contractor for participating in the act, and Person A as the principal upon whose behalf the contractor is working as an agent, on a respondeat superior theory. Person A could have liability even if the contractor didn't, in this fact pattern. Would actions by PersonA be criminal? Probably, as a form of criminal trespass, criminal vandalism and possibly even burglary (sometimes defined as trespass with an intent to commit a further crime). I'd need to check California's criminal statute definitions to be sure of precisely what. But, in reality, PersonA would usually have a bona fide good faith belief that he had a legal right to do so, and in that case, it would not be a crime. Would actions by contractor be criminal? No. For criminal law purposes, the contractor lacked the requisite intent. The intent elements of the criminal trespass statute in California are here. | She has no legal right to your stuff, and every legal right to the apartment. The only way adjudicate such a conflict of rights is with a restraining order. A temporary order would expire in 3 weeks. Item 14 in the petition requests exclusive use, possession, and control of the property. However, that path of restraints is tailored to domestic violence, so item 27 has you describe the alleged abuse: Abuse means to intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to you; or to place you or another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or to harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, keep you under surveillance, impersonate (on the Internet, electronically or otherwise), batter, telephone, or contact you; or to disturb your peace; or to destroy your personal property. Note that the description refers to destroying your personal property, not pawing through it. It's really impossible to know if the judge will exercise his discretion to include "reasonable fear of destruction (or theft) of personal property", since the ex-roommate has no further interest in the apartment. There is an alternative path of a harassment restraining order, which does not require a defined domestic relationship (such as ex-roommate), where "harassment" is violence or threats of violence against you, or a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed you and caused you substantial emotional distress. A course of conduct is more than one act and that seems even less likely. | You did not specify a country or the specific contracts that might rule your condominium. At least in some jurisdictions indeed the repair cost of private portions cannot be shared. Moreover, you may not be required to pay some costs for common portions if you refuse to do so and won't make use of them. Do I have to sue them to fix this issue? A lengthy law-suit is too costly for me. If I refuse to pay $2k and only pay 1.2k, will I be facing any legal troubles? You will probably manage to continue paying just 1.2k, and have them have to sue you if they want to collect that supposedly owned money from you. However, there might be some requirements about providing notification of your refusal in a certain way or before some time elapses. I would recommend you to consult a local lawyer, it will be well-spent money. Plus, that refusal is actually sent by your lawyer (rather than just telling you how/what to say), should make your "law-understanding neighbor" think twice about going forward with their attempt of having you pay for it. | This is a context where you need to lawyer up. There are two issues, his share of the costs, and his permission to construct in part on his property. You mother has the same rights, so she likewise can refuse to sign off on his scheme (the lawyers negotiate a resolution). Assuming both parties are insured and (to make it more complex) have different insurance companies, the companies limit how much they will contribute for their part of the damage. Normally, you find a contractor who will do it for a given price, let's say $10,000, and the parties split the cost. Both parties have an interest in the choice of contractor because of cost issues, and quality of product and service (though the insurance company cares about the cost). If one of the parties is a contractor, they too can legitimately submit a bid, and then the parties can decide which is the best bid. It is not fraud if a contractor, who is an insured, submits a bid and makes a profit on the job. It would be fraud if that party withheld material facts from an insurance company. In the context of massive disaster insurance claims, the insurance companies may not perform a rigorous investigation (e.g. may not ask for multiple bids). It would then be a material fact that one of the insureds stood to profit from this arrangement, so the insurance companies would likely wish to see evidence that the costs were not unreasonably inflated. If the neighbors bid is in line with industry standard (and the insurance companies know who the contractor is), there is nothing fishy about the arrangement. This assumes that both parties are being cooperative with each other. When that is not the case, lawyers are good at getting cooperation (not letting the other party push their client around). | This depends on the law of the specific jurisdiction, but there is non-trivial similarity in those rules across the US. The general rule is that the person who owns the property must maintain the property. There are often local ordinances that explicitly say that, for example this which is the legal mechanism behind this guidance on tree-trimming. A municipality can do the trimming, or they can send official letters to property owners telling them to trim the bushes. It does not matter whether the sign is on your property via an easement, what matters is where the tree is. You are not responsible for trimming your neighbor's tree if the stop sign is on your property. | "If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining. | The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to. |
Is assassination of presumed civilian informants considered a war crime and/or crime against humanity? In Myanmar for the past several months revolutionary forces have been regularly threatening, targeting, and assassinating civilians who are believed to be reporting anti-government activity to the government (the civilian reporting results in arrest and/or death of revolutionaries and/or sympathizers). Would the assassinations be considered a violation of Geneva Convention and/or other international laws due to targeting non-combatant civilians, or are assassinations in that context considered a normal/expected part of a civil war? What factors go into determining whether or not killing targeted non-combatants is considered a war crime? | What factors go into determining whether or not killing targeted non-combatants is considered a war crime? The cynical answer is "it depends on who wins and who judges". There are various definitions of what constitutes a civilian, all of which are "negative definitions" (i.e. Not a member of an armed force(e.g. an army, navy, etc; actually wielding arms is not required) or "involved in hostilities", meaning not a partisan, insurgent, or other form of "belligerent"). Civilians should not be targeted by military actions under international law. On the other hand, spies, especially those who's activities cause death, are explicitly not soldiers entitled to Prisoner-of-War status, and can be executed. There are some protections provided for spies, but those generally seem to be geared towards soldiers captured during "non spy" activities with regards to past actions as spies, as opposed to "in the field" spies...and it is unclear to me what that means for an "informant" who presumably gathers intelligence in their day-to-day activities. To what extent an informant is a "spy" is unclear. Espionage consists of the access, generally on behalf of a state (or belligerent party), to information that is held by another and considered as confidential or strategic, in the military, security, or economic field. Identities of personnel is very much confidential and strategic information, so passing that information to the government seems to qualify as espionage. Whether or not this equates to being "involved in hostilities" is unclear. The case could certainly be made that an informant, especially one who does not go out of their way to gather intelligence or receive compensation is a civilian. Likewise, the case could certainly be made that they are a de facto belligerent, being no different in their effective activities than a formal intelligence operative or artillery coordinates finder. Wars are messy; civil wars especially so. | Probably murder. Because "victim 2 was then shot by this man in self defense" hasn't been determined by a neutral third party investigation or jury - it is just his own rationale for shooting. He may not be charged, or he may be tried and acquitted on the basis of self defense, but he isn't in a position of authority to simply make a "rightful death" call on his own, (is there such a thing?) and dispose of all the evidence. Obstruction of justice would probably be the minimum charge for covering up evidence of the murder of Victim #1. There is really no valid reason for covering up a double homicide, and his actions could easily result in a double murder charge. | The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate. | They could be prosecuted in any state where there was evidence that part of the crime was committed. Realistically, either State A or State B could prosecute for conspiracy to murder as an additional charge, because the conspiracy clearly spanned more than one state, even if they can't prove where the crime was committed, although physical evidence (e.g. traces of camp sites, footprints, testimony about landmarks, evidence of poop with human DNA from the victim in it), would usually make it possible to show that some part of the crime was committed in the state. There is probably also a federal crime that could be implicated such as "murder involving flight across a state line" (hypothetical, but I'm sure that there is something similar on the books). I'm not going to address the further hypothetical as it is too bizzare and law is ultimately very context specific. Find a more plausible fact pattern, perhaps with a different crime, and ask a separate question if you want to really address the issue. | In England and Wales, under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by section 59 and Schedule 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) it's a criminal offence to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting someone to commit suicide. I think that applies to Scotland too, and there is similar law in Northern Ireland. Encouraging suicide is also a criminal offence in some other common law jurisdictions, e.g. in Australia. While in other common law jurisdictions, if there isn't such a law, the person might instead be prosecuted for manslaughter - or not at all. The minimum, maximum and recommended penalties may well differ between jurisdictions. I don't know what you mean by "vengeance rampage" but I'm not aware of any jurisdictions where it is lawful for a person to cause harm to someone for revenge. States tend to reserve for themselves a monopoly on the use of force. | A problem with the question is that it uses the loaded term "victim". If you change the question to "Are there actions that you can perform involving another person, which are crimes even if the other person consents to participating in the action", then there are very many. Selling alcohol to a minor; selling heroin to anyone; selling sex in most US jurisdictions; selling firearms to a convicted felon. Also, for a physician to assist a person in suicide, in most states. Formerly in the US, various forms of sexual intercourse were acts that consent did not make legal. Whether or not the person is a "victim" in these cases is open to debate. In the case of physician-assisted suicide in Washington, the doctor is allowed to prescribe (oral) drugs that the person ingests: only a doctor is permitted to do this, both under the DWD Act and as a consequence that only a doctor can prescribe the drugs. There seems to be a belief that it is a crime to assist a person in committing suicide, which is probably correct if the assistance is shooting the person in the head, or in general directly causing the death (thus, "I give you permission to shoot me in the head" doesn't cut it). But from what I can tell, it is not generally against the law in Washington to help a person who commits suicide (e.g. supplying the means of self-dispatching). In some countries, suicide and helping with suicide is illegal, e.g. in Kenya Penal Code 225 says Any person who (a) procures another to kill himself; or (b) counsels another to kill himself and thereby induces him to do so; or (c) aids another in killing himself, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for life. No exception is created if the person consents to being aided to kill himself. | Insofar as those treaties don't bind the US, the notion of "violating" such laws is moot. Hoda Muthana is, under Yemeni law, a Yemeni citizen (it is immaterial whether she has ever "accepted" or exploited it), and as such stripping her of US citizenship would not leave her stateless. In the case of Hoda Muthana, the action is based on the legal argument that she was not ever a citizen, based on the premise that her father was a foreign diplomat. Under US law, children born to foreign diplomats in the US are not birthright citizens, following US v. Wong Kim Ark. Birthright citizenship cannot be revoked. However, a person can renounce their citizenship, via certain acts, including taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having attained the age of eighteen years;or (3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons serve as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer The defense argument would presumably be that ISIS is not a foreign state (despite their own claims to the contrary) so her affiliation with ISIS does not qualify. There are grounds for denaturalization, including falsifying or concealing relevant facts pertaining to naturalization, refusing to testify before Congress, or joining a subversive organization including Al Qaeda within 5 years of naturalization. | What they teach in self-defense courses is legally irrelevant, though has a practical basis. Under the law, options 1 and 2 are "preferred" because those actions cannot be considered criminal. Shooting a person is potentially a crime (assault or homicide): but it can be legally excused under those circumstances deemed to be "self defense". If shooting a person is justified in self defense, it isn't assault or murder. It is legally "better" to main than to kill, because maiming is less force than killing, and the general rule is that one should use the least force necessary to defend yourself. That is because on the one hand you should not use force against another person, but on the other hand you have a right to live and if a person attempts to deprive you of your life, you are justified to use force to stop them. The degree of force allowed is related to the threat posed. Every legal system encourages putting "shoot to kill" in last place – no jurisdiction favors using maximum possible force in self defense. I think what is confusing you is that as a practical matter, shooting to maim is riskier, and the consequences of erring in favor of less force may be your death. It has nothing to do with killing witnesses (which is illegal), even if that is what they taught you in your self defense class. Brandishing a weapon is also illegal but involves even less force, and is even less effective as a means of self defense. |
Minimize police interaction on road trip with bicycle mounted on back of the car, obscuring the license plate Here is my bicycle mounted on my car, license plate is obscured I am driving like these occasionally here in Orlando, no problems with the cops at all. Now I am planning to do a road trip through multiple states and I am worried that I will attract the attention from police. Another complication is that there is no license plate in the front because in Florida they only give you one license that goes on the back. My question is: what should I do to minimize chances of being stopped by police? Should I put the license plate in the front? Maybe hang it somehow on the bicycle? here is the list of states on the road trip: Florida South Carolina North Carolina Georgia Tennessee | One specific Florida statute, 316.605 covers this matter directly: ...and all letters, numerals, printing, writing, the registration decal, and the alphanumeric designation shall be clear and distinct and free from defacement, mutilation, grease, and other obscuring matter, so that they will be plainly visible and legible at all times 100 feet from the rear or front. Italics mine. A Jacksonville, FL lawyer's blog references a drug case in which the driver was pulled over because the frame around the plate partially obscured the legends at the top and bottom of the plate, typically a state slogan and/or county or other "insignificant" information. Irrespective to this question, the traffic stop was rejected, as the officer was able to read that information as well as the identification information contained in the tag number. The linked article goes on to suggest that one might get away with it if only the legends are obscured, but it appears that the lawyer's opinion also depends on the judge. In the case of the supplied photo above, it's quite obscured and would create a citing offense if an officer arose from the wrong side of the sleeping furniture. Other states might be determined by searching [state name] obscured license plate. User65535 (a rather large binary-1 number) has presented an answer that I see as an omission on my part. Your primary question is how to get around the obscuration of the tag. You have a number of disadvantages. No trailer hitch means the bike rack is less than solidly mounted, and would not provide a suitable attachment point for a remote tag mount. No trailer hitch means no trailer wiring, which would have been used for a tag light and possibly remote brake lights and turn signal lights, although it's debatable if yours are truly obscured. Aiming at only relocating the tag, you'd still have to have the ability to illuminate the plate, which mean you'll tap into that wiring lead in some manner. The answer may be magnets. Magnets with a light and bracket to hold the tag. You'd want to pull the tag and lock it in the trunk when you are away from the vehicle, as creating a convenient magnet mount means convenience for someone to walk by and snap it free of the mount. I'd bet that the lower part of the car is plastic, but the lower right corner of the trunk lid may support magnets. Additionally, one could consider a strap-through mount. The plate frame (with lights) would be mounted on sturdy fabric straps with parachute clips that lock inside the trunk and wrap around the appropriate portions of the trunk, placing the tag in a visible location, again perhaps the lower right corner. | Threatening to report the uninsured driver to avoid payment would be blackmail and illegal / criminal. As a result, they are not going to do this. Reporting the uninsured driver on the other hand is their civic duty. So they can get your friend into trouble, but they can't get around paying. Is your friend insured now? If not, tell him to get insured IMMEDIATELY. And if they are very lucky, the other company doesn't figure out your friend was uninsured, and they get away with it when they make a claim. Alternatively, tell them to figure out how much the damage is, how much the repair will cost, and whether it is worth taking the risk. | An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all? | Obviously the police isn't checking all the time that all the speed limit signs are still where they should be, so in practice you would get a speeding ticket, which the police officer would give you with a good conscience. And you might very well think that you missed the sign, and pay the fine without complaining. If you are sure there was no sign, you could say to that officer "I didn't see any speed limit sign, where was it? " and hopefully he or she would tell you where that sign was supposed to be. Then you might go back, find the sign on the ground, take a photo, take it to the police officer who would then take action to get the sign back up, and would most likely make that speeding ticket invalid. There are exceptions: A speed limit sign can actually allow you to go faster than you would be allowed without the sign. For example in a town the normal speed limit without any signs might be 30mph, and the sign said 40mph. If the police officer stops you going 45, you have no excuse because without the sign the limit would have been 30. Or you have one sign 30, followed by a sign 40. Same situation if the "40" is taken down. Or the police should have put up repeating signs every two miles, but put them every mile. If one sign is down, they could still be within the legal limits. And last, assuming the police didn't put the sign up just for fun, there is probably something making it unsafe to go 60mph if there was a sign 40mph. If that is something you should have seen, and doing 60mph was dangerous for reasons you should have seen, then you might get a ticket for driving at an unreasonable speed. Even if there never was a speed sign. You are never allowed to drive at a dangerous speed. | I would inform the authorities about that loss as soon as possible (consider that your lost license could be found by a criminal who then conveniently "loses" it during a bank robbery), and ask them how to get a replacement license as soon as possible. See here: http://www.dmv.org/ok-oklahoma/replace-cdl.php That website actually recommends having a copy of your CDL with you at all times, or your company should have a copy on their files they can fax to you, so it would seem legal to drive with a copy. There is a difference between "driving license" in the sense "the permission given to you by the state to drive a car on public roads" and "driving license" in the sense "a piece of paper or plastic giving evidence that you have permission to drive". In most countries, driving without license is a serious offence, while driving without the piece of plastic is a minor offence. | Interesting question! I believe all of the examples can be addressed by the following rules: A vehicle on a roadway has the right-of-way over a vehicle not on a roadway. Therefore, the vehicle leaving a parking lot always yields to a vehicle in a parallel road. Absent another rule, the vehicle on the right always has the right-of-way. So if two vehicles are leaving adjacent parking lots, the left one waits for the right one to go if there is any potential conflict. Of course, not enough people know these rules, so in practice if you can't get the vehicle with the legal right-of-way to take it I teach drivers to be as decisive and cautious as possible: I.e., take the right-of-way, but not so fast that you can't avoid the other vehicle if it decides to go after all, because legally you will be at fault in a collision. (Though it's anyone's guess how police and insurers would settle the tricky scenarios you illustrate.) | When the LEO violently assaulted the citizen on the easement is he out of his jurisdiction? No. Federal law enforcement officers' jurisdiction generally* includes the entire US. Federal and state jurisdiction are said to be concurrent with one another. If the federal law enforcement officer has a lawful basis to effect an arrest, the arrest can be effected on a state† highway easement. Is there any immediate or long term consequence for an officer committing crimes or doing so egregiously (with or without qualified immunity) out of his jurisdiction as opposed to doing so in his jurisdiction? If the officer were outside his jurisdiction (which isn't the case here) then the officer is generally treated as any other private individual. In this case, "outside his jurisdiction" means "in another country," which brings up all sorts of additional complications that aren't really in scope here, largely because the laws and legal systems of other countries are different from those in the US. Are there any nuances to jurisdiction and law enforcement by LEOs that a first amendment auditor should be aware of? There are plenty, but perhaps the most prominent one, if the internet is any guide, is that an officer is not required to articulate the basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause at the time of a Terry stop or an arrest. The time for this is much later, after a judge is involved. Arguing with an officer on this score is just going to make things worse. Instead, one should cooperate while stating one's objections clearly and calmly, especially making it clear that cooperation does not imply consent. * Some categories of officers do have more limited jurisdiction: thanks to cpast for the example of park rangers, whose jurisdiction is essentially restricted to national parks. The officers in this case are CBP field officers. There is a wide misconception that CBP officers' jurisdiction is limited to within 100 miles of the border, but that 100-mile limit only applies to their power to board and search vessels and vehicles without a warrant in order to prevent illegal entry into the US. Their power to make warrantless arrests "for any offence against the United States" committed in their presence is not geographically restricted. † The original video was filmed in South Portland, Maine, and the roadway is a municipal street, Gannett Drive, to be precise. The point remains, however, that it is a public right-of-way, and federal officers are not "out of their jurisdiction" simply because they've left a federal facility and entered a public place. | "I don't know" is a better answer than most, but you should only say that if it's the truth. The three most important rules to follow when being questioned by a police officer are as follows: Do not lie. Do not incriminate yourself. Be cooperative (to the extent that you're not lying or incriminating yourself). "Do you know why I pulled you over?" or "Why do you think I stopped you?" are perfect opening questions for law enforcement to ask because there is no good answer. Any answer you give puts you at a disadvantage for the rest of the stop because you've tacitly accepted the officer's assumption that you did something wrong. The best response would be to simply reply back with their own question. "Why did you pull me over, officer?" If you say it right, it's rational, polite, and cooperative without actually answering anything. Your position from the very beginning should be that you did nothing wrong (even if you know that you did). It's the officer's job to make the case. It's not your job to help them. |
What can I do to stop a 15% to 40% apartment rent increase? For the past 5 years a friend of mine has been living at an apartment complex in Maryland. They are approaching their 1-year lease. They were surprised to receive a letter of rent increase uploaded here. The letter says that the rent is going up 15% for a 1-year lease. And the ‘Voluntary Rent Guideline’ recommends an increase of .4%. The month-to-month lease increased 40%. The letter goes on to say, if you feel this is an excessive increase, you can contact the Maryland Department of Housing and Community Affairs. I went to the DHCA website and searched for - rent increase. It said, Montgomery County does not exercise rent control for rented residences. Landlords only must notify tenants of a rent increase greater than 0.4%. What choices does my friend have, will contacting Maryland Department of Housing and Community Affairs change anything? Maryland Department of Housing and Community Affairs https://www3.montgomerycountymd.gov/311/Solutions.aspx?SolutionId=1-TYH51 Voluntary Rent Guideline https://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/DHCA/housing/landlordtenant/voluntary_rent_guideline.html | Under Montgomery County Bill 30-21 A landlord must not increase a tenant’s rent to an amount that exceeds the voluntary rent guidelines under Section 29-53... but with the further provision that the increase would take effect "during the emergency". "The emergency" refers to "the catastrophic health emergency declared by the Governor of Maryland on March 5, 2020" and renewed and amended at various times. But as you can see here, the state of emergency no longer exists, therefore this law is no longer in force, and the question of exceeding those guidelines is moot. | We have made a complaint about this decision to the local administrative and highest courts of Finland. Both of these courts rejected our complaint (the highest court rejected our right to even file a complaint!) without even looking into the details of the matter at hand. Did you hire a lawyer? If the court rejected your complaint without even considering it, it may have been procedurally improper. Generally speaking, once your complaint is rejected by a court with proper jurisdiction, the matter is resolved and you lost. End of story, too bad. You have no recourse but to accept the action of the local government as lawful even though you believe that your case was wrongfully decided. In any case, I doubt that the local government's action in your context is illegal. This is an issue of "condemnation" and not zoning. Generally speaking, the government has a power of eminent domain to seize property for a public use so long as a process is in place for the owner to obtain compensation for the seizure. A government owned recreation center would generally be considered a public use. Certainly, nothing you have described would violate the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02, Article 17. As you note: No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. This is a case where the deprivation is in the public interest, in which the Finnish courts have decided that the conditions provided by law for doing so have been met, and in which you acknowledge that you have a right to compensation. Since it appears that the compensation has not yet been determined, it is premature to say that the compensation you receive will not be fair or paid in good time, and you need to participate actively and vigorously in the compensation process to make sure that you do make the best case you can for fair compensation. Also, as you note, this has happened many times in Finland. This strongly support the conclusion that this action is legal under Finnish law, even if you would prefer to interpret its laws in another manner. Of course the compulsory purchase will not be paid with a fair market price but with a much lower price, which is technically a legalized robbery as it has many times occurred in similar cases in Finland. My next step is to file a complaint to the European Union Fundamental Rights commission in hopes that they can help me. An appeal to the European Union sounds futile to me, as everything you have said suggests that your rights under the E.U. Charter have not been violated. Call it robbery if you will from a moral perspective, but as you note, it is legalized robbery in much the same way that taxes are "legalized theft." Your efforts would be better sent hiring a lawyer to help you negotiate with the local government over the price. If you make a strong evidentiary case that the land is worth more than you have been offered, you have a decent chance of getting more than you have been offered, even if it is less than what you believe it is worth. You also have a better case of winning on appeal on the issue of an unfair price in a second instance court in Finland, than you would on the issue of whether the condemnation was legal, on which the settled law in Finland and under international law is that it generally is legal in your circumstances. | Residents agree that the receipt of mail by any individual not listed as a Resident or Occupant in this Agreement at the Leased Premises shall be proof of occupancy of that individual and a violation of this Agreement. I assume that the lease states that only the listed individuals can reside in the unit. Maybe they think that this says that receipt of mail by an unlisted person is a further violation of the lease, I don't think that is clearly enough stated that the courts would agree that receiving mail is itself a violation of the lease. Instead, it seems to be intended to say something about an existing clause – you can't have other people living there. The courts would look at the requirements of the lease, and ask "did you comply"? The question of whether you did a certain thing is a question of fact that has to be resolved in court. However, the revised lease language does not state that all mail must be addressed to Johnny Johnson – it only addresses receipt by a person not on the lease. You are (apparently) on the lease, so you may receive mail there. Nothing in the lease controls how such mail can be addressed. If you receive mail addressed to Tommy Thompson, your defense is that you received the mail, and you are on the lease, so you will not have violated the new clause. | Michigan law say nothing about landlord entry, so whatever it says in the lease is what is allowed. Various sources like this comment on the lack of such statutory regulations. There does not appear to be any relevant case law for Michigan which impose restrictions on a landlord's right to access a rental. Since there is no statutory or case law restriction on landlord's right to access his property, landlord's agent would have the same right to access. That would mean that if the listing agent were authorized by the landlord to enter, then the agent could enter, and it would not be necessary for the landlord to accompany this agent whenever entry was needed. That does not mean that a "listing agent" that happens to work with a landlord has an independent right to enter the landlord's property. The same would go for repairmen. It is actually not clear to me whether there could be blanket permission for any and all with access to the lock box to enter, since pretty much any realtor can enter a house for sale, subject to whatever the stated limitations are, and they don't call the owner for each entry. I suspect that one would not have legal grounds for imposing a particular additional restriction on a landlord's right to access and permit access to the property, since there's no overriding statute, and restrictions on landlord access mainly derive from statutes. | This hinges on what you mean by "spy". Generally, a landlord cannot enter a leased or rented property* without the tenant's consent, nor can their agents. (They can arrive and ask to enter, as can your neighbors whether or not you own your home, but you are not required to acquiesce in either case). A landlord can view the publicly viewable portions of the property at their leisure, as can their agents, or any member of the public for that matter. A landlord could possibly be notified of a tenant's actions in a number of ways: such as viewing the public portions of the property, being notified (or billed) by utilities or public agencies, or receiving complaints from the neighbors. A neighbor has no more, and no less, legal ability to spy on you if you owned your home vs if you rent your home. So, they would have no more right to, say, spy at your house with a telescope than if you owned the property yourself, but no less right to complain if you have a loud (or audible) party or a large number of guests; the only difference being they can complain to someone who could potentially do much more than they could if you owned the property yourself. Thus, the answer to your question depends on what is meant by "spying". *This assumes that this is a separate property; a landlord who rents out a room in their own home often has far greater rights. | You need absolute written buy in from the landlord. His agreement is with you, not this new person. If the new person stops paying for whatever reason, then landlord is coming after you. | Often, evictions are bifurcated. An initial hearing determines all evidence necessary to determine if there is a default existing sufficient to justify an eviction, and if so, the eviction goes forward immediately despite the fact that not all issues in the case have been resolved. A later hearing resolved the precise dollar amount of any damages claim. If the grounds for eviction is non-payment of rent, and the amount of payments or the amount of obligations of the landlord that can be setoff against the rent due exceeds the amount of rent found to have not be paid, then it is a defense to an eviction in the initial possession phase. If the counterclaim is smaller than the amount of rent owed (or cannot for some reason be set off against the amount owed) then it is only at most, a setoff against a damages award in favor of the landlord. I'm have not researched, in particular, how this is handled in New Jersey, but I am providing this answer on the theory that some insight is better than nothing. For the purpose of this question assume the landlord does not dispute the tenants underlying claim. His only argument is that the tenant should counter sue and that it should not be raised as a defense for non payment / stop the eviction. If this is true, it is both an affirmative defense to the eviction claim and a basis for a counterclaim in most cases. The better practice would be to raise it both ways in the same lawsuit. But, if the counterclaim is not sufficient to overcome the claim that rent is owed and not paid in full, or triggers some other different alternative ground for an eviction (e.g., maybe the lease provides that application of a security deposit against rent owed is itself an event of default), then that wouldn't prevent an eviction. | A financial institution (including a pawnbroker) cannot unilaterally change the terms of an agreement and obeying the law. This section in particular limits the interest rate to 2% per month. It would be illegal and a misdemeanor to raise the interest rate above the statutory limit. They also cannot change (shorten or lengthen) the maturity date of the loan, nor can they obligate you to wait until the maturity date to pay off the loan. They are in a bit of a bind if they lost their FFL. There is nothing illegal about transferring inventory to another store. They cannot compel you to redeem the item immediately, and you cannot compel them to violate the law and keep the item without the required license. In case what happened is that you went past the original maturity date because there is no viable public transportation to the new location and you've gone over the 30 day "grace" period (hence the extra charges), you might successfully argue in (small claims) court that the shop is responsible for your tardiness. The fact that the item is located 40 miles away is not per se an unconscionable burden on you, but if it is impossible or very expensive for you to get there because of the new location, they could have some responsibility to mitigate the situation (e.g. give you a ride to and from). |
Picking fruit that overhangs public property Today I was eating plums from a tree growing on private property, which I picked from branches overhanging the public highway. A passing cyclist said "That is scrumping" and I replied "Not on a public highway". I looked it up. The Royal Horticultural Society advice is a contradiction: Can I cut off overhanging branches? Yes, provided it is done without trespassing onto the other person’s property. Do I have to get permission from my neighbour or give them notice to cut off the overhanging branches? No. But it also says Can I pick and keep the fruit from overhanging branches? No, not without permission from the owner. Can I collect windfalls from a neighbour’s tree that overhangs my garden? No, not without their permission. Windfall fruit still belongs to the owner. So if I cut off the whole branch, that would be legal? BBC's Newsnight explored the topic, and consulted some 'experts'. Urban foraging - ethical? . . . They were unanimous: picking fruit that overhangs a public right of way is not scrumping, it is decidedly ethical and almost certainly legal. yet after further investigations, they conclude from the British Trust for Conservation Volunteers that is is not legal: I was shocked to find that the law on picking fruit from overhanging branches could not be clearer: “A neighbour has no legal right to any fruit on overhanging branches.” But I am not a neighbour: I was a passer-by on public property. One comment under the BBC's story says Clearly the law has changed since medieval common law: the phrase "by hook or by crook" refers to a pilgrim's right to graze food that overhangs their route. If it was within said reach of the path, it could be gathered. So was it once a right to take such fruit, and when did the law change? Edit The plum tree is part of the hedgerow bordering the property (in a semi-rural location), rather than in a garden or orchard. I don't know if that classifies it as wild, but it is not a cultivated variety, as the fruits are quite small. | This is covered by Sections 1 to 6 of the Theft Act 1968. A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it. Each relevant word is then dealt with. Dishonestly does not apply in the circumstance where you have in law the right to deprive the other of it. Here, you have no right: the fruit's owner has every right to the fruit he owns. You have no right just to come along and take it. A right to deprive the other of something would be relevant where he had misappropriated it from you. Appropriation is any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner. Here, you are assuming the rights of the owner by taking the fruit. Property is fairly self-explanatory. Everything except land is property. Belonging to another: "Property shall be regarded as belonging to any person having possession or control of it, or having in it any proprietary right or interest." Here, the owner of the tree has possession and control and a proprietary right and interest. Permanently depriving means that you treat the thing [fruit in this case] as your own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights. All of these apply in your case of taking fruit from a tree owned and grown by someone else. There is an exception, which may be relevant to the "by hook or by crook" quote: A person who picks mushrooms growing wild on any land, or who picks flowers, fruit or foliage from a plant growing wild on any land, does not (although not in possession of the land) steal what he picks, unless he does it for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose. But this doesn't apply where the tree is not growing wild. It is generally held that you can cut off foliage or whatever which is overhanging your land — I can't find a reference specifically, but I expect it's to do with nuisance and free enjoyment of your own land — but the severed parts and any fruit on them are still the property of their owner, and you can't deprive him of them permanently. Public land isn't yours, so you can't cut off branches overhanging it: the public authority can. Even there, they must give them back to the owner. The 1968 Act repeals a number of prior Acts (all the way back to the First Statute of Westminster in 1265), but I can't see anything relevant to the restriction of common law. If what you quote as common law still applied in 1968, it was that Act which restricted it to wild fruit (as opposed to fruit overhanging public land). It's quite likely that the common law was simply codified and made unambiguous than it was deliberately restricted. | To answer the question in your title: Yes, local authorities require planning permission. However, the question in your question is different. Removing a bus shelter or a lay-by probably wouldn't require planning permission if it was done by Tesco's in their car park - so the local authority doesn't require it either. There may be a requirement for consultation on such changes, but when Douglas Adams referred to It was on display in the bottom of a locked filing cabinet stuck in a disused lavatory with a sign on the door saying ‘Beware of the Leopard'. he was only half joking. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the bus shelter and lay-by are "roads", so if you don't live in a unitary authority would be handled by the County Council (or equivalent), whereas Planning is the responsibility of the District/Town/City Council. | There is no general rule about ownership: one parking lot I know is owned by the city, another is owned by the company that operates the mall, and in a third case it is owned by a third party who doesn't operate the mall. Either way, the owner of the parking lot has the property right to limit how it is used, and their agents (security guards, for example) can request that you refrain from skateboarding. They can evict you; they may not have the legal authority to physically toss you off the property, but they can probably perform a citizen's arrest for trespassing. None of this depends on how many cars are in the parking lot. It is more likely that a governmentally-owned parking lot will have a corresponding law restricting its use (whereas in the case of a private parking lot, restrictions center around general property law and the law of trespass). | It depends on whether "person" means "owner" If Bob is liable, it's not under the Impounding Act of 1955. In that Act, the occupier of land is allowed, but not required to impound trespassing animals. This is made clear in s 21 of the Act, which says "the occupier...may seize and impound any stock trespassing on the land." A quick search finds no sections of the Act requiring an occupier to impound trespassing cattle. So it seems Bob is free to send the cattle on their way, at least under the Impounding Act. However, liability for cattle and cars is also covered by the "Animals Law Reform Act of 1989." The two subsections of "Section 5" of that Act appear to broaden the class of people who could be held liable for damage “caused by an animal straying onto a highway.” Neither subsection explicitly mentions the owner. Instead, both talk about the "person" who is liable. The first, s 5(1) says the part of the common law that “excludes or restricts” “the duty that a person might owe to others to take reasonable care” to prevent damage no longer applies in New Zealand. The second, s 5(2), says a court must determine "whether a person is liable...for damage caused by an animal straying onto a particular highway..." Given that Impounding Act explicitly says "owner" not "person," common sense suggests the use of the word "person" rather than "owner" in the Animals Law Act of 1989 means that Act allows others besides the owner to be held liable for damages. Whether New Zealand courts agree, and whether they have interpreted the “Animal Laws Act” in a way that would include Bob is a matter of fact that can only be answered by someone who knows New Zealand law. Added: Something fun to read Law professor Robert Ellickson studied how people actually resolve disputes over wandering cattle in Shasta county in northern California. There's a readable summary of what he found here. (The title of his book, "Order without law," sums up his main finding -- there are rules that are enforced, but those rules have little to do with the formal law or law enforcement.) | In the U.S., the common way to address this would be called a servitude among academics and legal scholars, although it would typically be titled either an "easement", or more likely a "covenant" (which is the customary name at common law for a promise that runs with the land). It would typically be reduced to writing and executed by both parties and recorded with the same formalities as a deed (i.e. it would typically be signed and acknowledged before a notary public, would contain a legal description, and would be coded with both parties in the grantee-grantor index). In New Zealand, I suspect that the process would be similar. One complication in New Zealand that might make the formalities different is that, New Zealand has a title certificate based system of real property recording called a Torrens Title system which it adopted in 1870, rather than the less formally structured race-notice recording system that, in principle, allows almost anything to be recorded without requiring that it fit in a particular box of types of documents that are permitted. Since 2017, in New Zealand, valid legal interests in law do not arise unless they are recorded. Since 2017, the New Zealand system's official copies are also now entirely electronic. Covenants are governed by Sections 240-250 of the Land Transfer Title Act of 2017 and seem to correspond to the kind of contract described in the question. | The fire department is entirely within its rights, which are the same as any other property owner. The fact that property is owned by a governmental body does not mean that members of the public can't be excluded that property. Some governmental property is public, but lots of it is private, and this would usually include most parts of fire department property. As long as you have not been denied any access to a public road by this fence, there is nothing improper about it. Anyone can walk through their parking lot, park their car there, meet friends, whatever, This is almost surely inaccurate. The fire department does not have to allow members of the public to have any access to their property and probably would demand that most of the uses you describe stop if they interfered in any way with the performance of its duties. | 40km/h There is no ambiguity. The speed limit on the through road is clear and the speed limit on the side road is irrelevant. The fact that Bob may be legitimately unaware that this is the speed limit doesn’t matter either. If you want to ask if Bob has a defence if issued with an infringement notice, please feel free to post a new question. | Much of "the woods" is owned by the US government, where your chances of any degree of success are highly variable. It is extremely unlikely that you can get away with it at all on a military base or in a national park. You may be able to get away with it for longer on Forest Service land (legally speaking, you're supposed to move along after 14 days), but if you're looking for a permanent legal claim to the land, that will not happen without an act of Congress. If public domain land has valuable minerals which you exploit, you may be able to chop down trees and build a cabin, but until Congress lifts the moratorium on mining claims patents, you cannot gain title to the land. (Public domain land is land not set aside for a specific purpose, such as a national park or wilderness area). Another possibility is to seize the land through adverse possession, as long as you satisfy the requirements for such an action in the state in question. Chopping down trees and building a cabin probably satisfy the requirements of actual possession, openness and notoriety. You would have to continuously live there for 5-30 years, depending on state, and have to have exclusive use of the land. If you get found and the owner tells you to leave (whether or not they get a court order), or if they say "I'll let you stay for a while", or they do a bit of landscaping, then you can't take the land (or, the clock restarts). There are a number of state-specific quirks such as whether you have to believe that the land is actually yours. Also, you can't dispossess a government. At some point, you will have to deal with the county, since you built the cabin without a permit. |
How would the first constitution of India interpret hijab in the classrooms? Recently, a court in Kerala, India, banned the hijab in classrooms, saying that the hijab is not an integral part of the religion of Islam. Therefore, theoretically, Muslims in any part of India cannot wear a hijab if challenged in a court of law. There were many Muslims who opposed the Two-Nation Theory and the partition of India on religious grounds. Some of them must have had first-hand experience in the design of the 1950's constitution of India. I am interested in knowing their views about the hijab. Therefore, I think, consulting the 1950's constitution would be a great idea. How would the first constitution of India interpret the wearing of hijab in the classrooms? | The 1949 constitution is here. The wording has not changes in any material fashion that impinges on religion, and there is no specific mention of hijab or other items of apparel. However, it is not trivial to mention the provision in Art. 25(2)(b), which is still valid, that "The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion". There is a legal principle to the effect that if you say one thing and don't say another, you can infer that it was not intended to include the other. Given an opportunity to also explicitly constitutionally include the hijab as a "profession of the Muslim religion", and the fact that it was not so included, the courts would concludes that there is a stark difference between the kirpan and the hijab. There have been various tweaks to the wording of provisions related to religion since the original version, but none that would affect how the courts would interpret this case. The Karnataka ruling discusses the concept of "religion" versus "culture" (proffering the decidedly Hindu-centric view that "religion" is "dharma"), and they posit w.r.t. the hijab that "At the most the practice of wearing this apparel may have something to do with culture but certainly not with religion". In other words, the words of the constitution don't tell you what status the hijab has. | Is there default caste of child born out of inter-caste marriage? Short answer The child normally takes the father's caste, but it may be contested if it can be shown that the child is brought up by the mother. Long answer The case law has been evolving in recent years, the latest findings by the Supreme Court of India can be found at Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika vs State Of Gujarat & Ors on 18 January, 2012 [T]he legal position that seems to emerge is that in an inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal the determination of the caste of the offspring is essentially a question of fact to be decided on the basis of the facts adduced in each case. The determination of caste of a person born of an inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal cannot be determined in complete disregard of attending facts of the case. In an inter- caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal there may be a presumption that the child has the caste of the father. This presumption may be stronger in the case where in the inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal the husband belongs to a forward caste. But by no means the presumption is conclusive or irrebuttable and it is open to the child of such marriage to lead evidence to show that he/she was brought up by the mother who belonged to the scheduled caste/scheduled tribe. | The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed. | The protection lies in the fact that these sorts of restrictions are expressed in state laws, and states are Constitutionally forbidden from denying to any citizen the equal protection of the law, or from interfering with religion. The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids states from making any law impeding free exercise of religion, or having the effect of establishing a state religion. This means that any law that forbids people of any religious denomination (including atheists) from holding any office (elected or not) under any level of government is unconstitutional. See Torcaso v. Watkins. Moreover, Title VII's protected classes are also (with the exception of sex) suspect classes under the Equal Protection Clause. A state or local government may not pass a law discriminating against a suspect class unless it is a narrowly tailored law which is the least intrusive way to achieve a compelling state interest. In practice, that means a state can't pass a law discriminating on the grounds of national origin, race, or religion. Sex is a quasi-suspect class; government discrimination on the grounds of sex must further an important state interest in a way reasonably related to that interest; again, in practice this will tend to rule out laws saying "no women can be elected to this post." The Americans with Disabilities Act actually does not exclude elected officials. It defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." The Equal Pay Act doesn't apply to elected officials, but again, sex is a quasi-suspect class. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act also excludes elected officials, and this is the one case where a state really could discriminate -- the applicable test is whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, which is not an especially high bar. | No, absent a state law to the contrary (and I am aware of no such law in this case) it is not illegal. Universities, as institutions, are permitted to express opinions on political issues, especially political issues that are pertinent to their operations. Indeed, they often do so. (Political candidates are arguably a different matter and certainly involve a more complex analysis to determine if the Johnson Amendment applies to a public university, but that isn't at issue in this case.) Governmental entities may not take religious positions, but may take political ones. Generally, even public colleges like Rutgers have this autonomy. Indeed, lobbying is frequently necessary for the survival of a public university - it has no choice but to lobby and a free hand regarding the issues upon which it does lobby. | No, all text of the Canadian constitution is of equal force. The 1993 Supreme Court case New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly) makes this clear: It is a basic rule, not disputed in this case, that one part of the Constitution cannot be abrogated or diminished by another part of the Constitution: Reference re Bill 30, An Act to amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148. So if the privilege to expel strangers from the legislative assembly is constitutional, it cannot be abrogated by the Charter, even if the Charter otherwise applies to the body making the ruling. This raises the critical question: is the privilege of the legislative assembly to exclude strangers from its chamber a constitutional power? The opinion went on to determine that the privilege of the legislative assembly to exclude strangers was an unwritten constitutional principle which could not be abrogated by the written constitutional Charter (though they did not specifically call it an unwritten constitutional principle at the time, this is retroactively so through Reference Re Secession of Quebec para. 52). Edit: Following Toronto (City) v. Ontario (AG) 2021 SCC 34, it's not entirely clear New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. is still good law as the majority relegated unwritten principles to interpretive aids and filling structural gaps of the written Constitution, without referencing this case. The rule that the (written) Constitution cannot contradict itself seems logical though, and the cited Reference re Bill 30 does indeed state at para. 62 that the written Charter cannot override other parts of the Constitution (presumably we should read that as specifically written parts, since that's what was at issue in the reference). | Under 42 USC 2000a(a): All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. So a business may be generally prohibited from discriminating against you on the basis of your religion, but I don't know of any law that requires stores to accommodate whatever aversion or hostility you may feel toward gay people or their allies. On the contrary, such businesses have a First Amendment right to display such decor. So legislation that required them to stop speaking out in support of nice gay people would be struck down as unconstitutional. | To pick up on your comment 'Does this mean if I wish to build a chair for personal use, then since trade of chairs exists between states, Congress has the authority to outlaw possession or manufacturing of chairs?': Yes. For example, the US Congress can legislate to prohibit a farmer from growing wheat for use on his own farm, on the basis that there is interstate trade in wheat and therefore the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the growing of wheat: Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. If you grow marijuana, or build a chair, or whatever, you conceivably affect the number of marijuanas, chairs, etc that are traded between states. Therefore you affect interstate commerce. Therefore the US Congress can regulate you. The fact that your marijuana or your chair or your what is trivial in the scheme of the national economy is irrelevant if the aggregation of all regulated marijuana, chairs or wheat is significant: 317 US 111, 127-128. If the law didn't prohibit possession of marijuana absolutely but instead prohibited, say, the carrying of marijuana in schools, then the US Congress might have trouble relying on the Commerce Clause: see United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549 and replace 'marijuana' with 'handguns' (OK the marijuana/handgun analogy is bad but hopefully this illustrates that there are at least some limits on Congress' power -- it's not just 'any physical object that relates whatsoever to interstate trade therefore unfettered federal legislative power'). |
How did private individual litigants at the SCC and UKSC find lawyer(s) to represent them, when their quantum was ≤ $900? My Aunt is trying to instruct a lawyer (NOT a paralegal) to know her prospects of success, particularly to avoid adverse costs, before suing a large corporation for damages of $6000 CAD. Aunt shall not file a claim, if her prospects fall way under the balance of probabilities. Aunt emailed and phoned at least 30 law firms in Vancouver, in vain! Here are responses from 5 different firms. The others just never replied! Even as a junior associate, my hourly rate shall eat into your claim. I cannot provide value for a $6000 claim. Unfortunately, we do not accept new retainers just for Small Claims. We would act in Small Claims Court merely for existing clients. Our firm has a retainer policy of $5000. Retaining us does not appear cost efficient to you. Technically, I can help you out. But my retainer is $3000, and I am not comfortable with you spending this money on me. Even though you are in Vancouver, we understand why you reached out. You are right that our hourly rates are lower, as our firm is located in the countryside. We do advise clients merely by telephone and Zoom. But we do not act for matters that happened in Vancouver. We are not interested in taking this matter on. But then how did the private individuals in these apex court cases find lawyer(s) to represent them, when their quantum was ≤ $900 CAD adjusted for inflation? What is my Aunt doing wrong? In The Queen v. Savage [1983] 2 SCR 428, 1983 CanLII 32 (SCC), the quantum was $300 CAD. But Savage was represented by Alan Schwartz, for the respondent. In Attorney General (Ontario) v. Fatehi, 1984 CanLII 85 (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 536, the quantum was $300 CAD. But Fatehi (Defendant) (Respondent) was represented by Brian H. Wheatley, Q.C., and Peter A. Daley, for the respondent. In ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, the quantum was £50. But Beavis was represented by 3 English barristers and a solicitor firm — John de Waal QC, David Lewis, Ryan Hocking, instructed by Harcus Sinclair. | Most cases of these type involve a strategic interest of a party, e.g., in a situation that is likely to recur in many future cases for that party making the precedent valuable to a litigant, or in future cases in which a lawyer is likely to find the precedent useful because the lawyer frequently represents clients who would benefit from the precedent that a clean case could make, even if it doesn't make economic sense in the particular case. For example, ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, addressed the pervasive issue of when penalty clauses in consumer contacts were void as contrary to public policy. The precedent is important for certainty in drafting almost every consumer consumer contract, which matters a lot for any decedent sized business. In the case of ParkingEye, for example, their whole business model is built around the ability to charge penalties is someone parks beyond the time that they are authorized to do so, or without authorization at all. A bad result for ParkingEye, even at the trial court level, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, would mean that the contract term in question would be invalid without a need to litigate the merits of the legal issue of the validity of that contract term in all future cases brought against ParkingEye. This effect on future cases against the same litigant often encourages a party to appeal a case and litigate it at a level far in excess of the amount in controversy in that particular case. Similarly, both The Queen v. Savage [1983] 2 SCR 428, 1983 CanLII 32 (SCC), and Attorney General (Ontario) v. Fatehi, 1984 CanLII 85 (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 536, addressed the important and routinely recurring question of whether a driver involved in a traffic accident is obligated to pay clean up costs incurred by a governmental body as a result of that accident. Also, government litigants aren't as cost conscious and are repeat litigants in a great many area, and when a private litigant is sued in a case dealing with that issue, the litigation costs are generally paid by car insurance companies that are involved in litigating almost every car accident, even though the nominal party to the case is an ordinary person driving a car. One of the main things that you buy when you buy car insurance is a free lawyer in every single case where you are sued to defend you if you are sued for negligence arising from your use of a car. Both sides have a strong long term strategic interest in how the legal issue is resolved in future cases. | can you hire a witness as your lawyer to exclude their testimony? That is pure fiction and misleading. Unfortunately scenes like that contribute to keep people ignorant about the law, which then makes it easier for courts to dissimulate their recurrent miscarriage of justice. But Purdue University v. Wartell, 5 N.E.3d 797 (2014) is an example where the Indiana courts did the right thing, and is pertinent to your question. There, Purdue University first assigned an investigator in regard to plaintiff's grievance, and thereafter the University tried to withhold information under pretext that the investigator was also its lawyer and thus that the information was protected by the privilege. Because that person hitherto had been portrayed only as an independent investigator, the Indiana courts concluded that Purdue University was estopped from invoking the attorney-client privilege (as well as the work-product doctrine). Thus, the guy in the film or series who said to be "screwed on Kardashian" reflects pure cluelessness about how the law supposedly operates. I have not seen the plot of that film or series, but the information that the friend-lawyer obtained prior to becoming O.J.'s attorney would not be protected by the privilege because it was not obtained in preparation for O.J.'s defense. If there were one star witness on the opposing side and they happened to be a lawyer, could you simply pay them off by hiring them as your lawyer? This question is somewhat unclear to me, but I will mention that lawyers have a duty to disclose to their potential or actual client any conflict of interests. The rules of so-called "professional conduct" discourage lawyers to ignore conflict of interests in that this conflict may impair their "services". And, as I explained previously, any information that a lawyer obtains as witness rather than as attorney in the matter is not protected by the privilege. Thus, as for If you committed a crime at a law-firm and everyone who witnessed it was a lawyer, is there any rule preventing you from just hiring all of them? the answer is: Nothing prevents the criminal from hiring all of them, but that information is not protected. | I will assume B.C. as your specific jurisdiction: there could be provincial differences. As phoog says, you certainly may mention this problem to management, who have an interest in keeping you happy. No law against that. As for the "legality" of sexual harassment, the CBA BC branch says that "Sexual harassment, which is discrimination based on sex, is illegal under the BC Human Rights Code". It is interesting to see what the code actually says. Section 8 Discrimination in accommodation, service and facility says (1) A person must not, without a bona fide and reasonable justification, (a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public, or (b) discriminate against a person or class of persons regarding any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or class of persons. The question is whether using the term "babe" constitutes discrimination against a person regarding service because of sex. This article on the Law Society of BC web site specifically identifies "verbal harassment" as an instance: Verbal harassment – This comes from anyone within the firm and or other workplace or a person who does business with the firm or company. Some examples are: referring to an adult as a babe, honey, girl or stud; whistling at someone; turning work discussion to sexual topics; asking personal questions of a sexual nature; making sexual comments about a person’s clothing, anatomy or looks; or asking someone repeatedly for dates and refusing to take no for an answer. (emphasis added). In case you're thinking that maybe there's a difference in what the code says regarding services and what it says regarding employment, section 13 Discrimination in Employment says: (1) A person must not (a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ a person, or (b) discriminate against a person regarding employment or any term or condition of employment because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or because that person has been convicted of a criminal or summary conviction offence that is unrelated to the employment or to the intended employment of that person. In other words, it is defined simply in terms of "discrimination", which means "making a distinction". It is known that unwanted sexual advances constitute illegal discrimination, see Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. [1989] 1 SCR 1252. The court found that Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Sexual harassment in the workplace is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job‑related consequences for the victims of the harassment. They did not, however, find that this is the only form of sexual discrimination (obviously, since it isn't). I can't point to case law indicating whether gender-biased expression are actionable, but that would be consistent with the letter of the law and "babe" is indeed an example cited in the Law Society article. | Can my accountant bill me for previous work he agreed to perform for free? No. The difficult part will be for you to prove that he agreed to do the job for free. Hence the importance of having this kind of "gentlemen's" agreements in writing. You have the burden of outweighing --even by means of circumstantial evidence-- the common presumption that professional work is done for compensation, not for free. However, just like it might be hard for you to prove the aforementioned "gentlemen's agreement", it would also be hard for him to prove that you agreed to (or knew, or should have known, you would have to) pay the amount he is billing now. In the event that you are unable to prove he agreed to work for free, you might want to dispute the reasonableness of the amounts he is pursuing so belatedly. It is noteworthy that the work at issue being "really simple" would not be the only factor for assessing how much he may recover. Other factors such as the accountant's qualifications or the market rate for similar services would be weighed in awarding recovery (if any). Can I legally ignore these invoices? It does not make any sense that he sends me invoices for work done 4 years ago. You may ignore the invoices regarding older work, that is, those for which the period of limitations has elapsed. For most cases, section 4 of the Ontario Limitations Act provides a two-year period to bring a claim. Since the accountant himself did the job, and most likely he was --or should have been-- aware of the payments due for his services, he would be unable to prove that his "discovery" of claims (see section 5 of Limitations Act) regarding older tax filings meets the period of limitations. Equivalently, see here the paragraph starting with "For example, if the courts determine that [...]". | This is not possible, simply as a matter of definitions and legal terminology. Someone who is "represented by one or more attorneys" is by definition not pro se which means representing yourself without an attorney. There are very rare instances in criminal trials involving serious consequences in which a pro se defendant is allowed to have an attorney advisor who does not represent them in court in an agency capacity, but, first, people who do that almost always lose and are almost always mentally ill (although not necessarily eligible for an insanity defense), and second, because courts generally don't allow this in any other circumstance (at least in court). The concept of getting advice from an attorney without having full fledged representation is called a "limited representation" and the law regarding limited representations more generally varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even between different courts in the same place. For example, Colorado's state courts and Colorado's federal courts have different rules for limited representations. | As a lawsuit, it doesn't make sense in U.S. law unless you have suffered significant injuries. Your damages are likely to be, at most, nominal ($1) if you discovered it before you were hurt, so you'd only lose the money spent replacing the jar of peanut butter with a non-defective one and the nominal $1 damages. You would not generally have a right to any of your attorneys' fees and personal time spent on a lawsuit like that which would likely cost tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars on an hourly basis (no attorney would take a case like that on a contingency basis), and would take hundreds of hours of your own personal time. | What remedies are therein the United States? I would imagine that the witness could be prosecuted for perjury. My guess is that the plaintiff could prosecute the witness for the lost damages. Are there any other remedies like reopening the original trial or declaring a mistrial so that the plaintiff could sue the (deep-pocketed) defendant, or would this be double jeopardy? Perjury prosecutions are like unicorns. They are rumored to exist but are almost never seen. A prosecutor would be exceedingly unlikely to bring charges in such a case, but it might not hurt to ask. Even if the criminal prosecution prevailed, however, the defeated plaintiff would be no better off, or might get out of pocket court costs as restitution at most. You could request that the witness be sanctioned for contempt. But, this leaves the loser in the original case no better off unless the judge made the highly unusual decision to award compensatory damages as a contempt sanction. Similarly, if you have reason to believe that the attorney knew that the testimony offered was false, that would be grounds to grieve the lawyer which could result in the lawyer's suspension or disbarment, but that is very difficult to prove and again would not advance the unjustly defeated plaintiff's cause. Assuming that the time to move for a retrial (usually two weeks) expired when the new evidence was discovered, you could move to set aside the verdict (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 or the equivalent state rule). The deadline for such motions based upon fraud by an adverse party is usually six months. Sometimes an independent action to set aside the verdict for fraud on the court could also be brought (sometimes within two or three years), which is an uphill battle, but probably the best option if all other deadlines have expired. The witness probably has absolute immunity from civil liability outside that court case for the testimony offered, so a civil action suing the witness for lost damages would be dismissed. The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply, but a similar doctrine called "res judicata" (a.k.a. "claim preclusion") prohibits retrying a case that was tried on the merits between the same parties, if it has become a final order. So, filing a new case is ruled out assuming that no appeals were filed within the deadline for doing so. And, even if the deadline for filing an appeal has not lapsed, it probably wouldn't prevail because the key new evidence wouldn't be in the record. It would be better to file to set aside the judgment in a motion and to appeal if that motion was denied. | This practice is probably not illegal, but I think it is at best ethically dubious. The invoice specifies ""Advising in relation to employment agreement with X", but according to the question no advice about X was given or even asked for, and while advice about Y was discussed, no such advice was given. That suggests that the asker owes the solicitor nothing. However the asker was informed of the hourly charge and then continued to discuss the issue. it could be argued that the constitutes an implicit contract to pay that rate for those discussions. It seems that the asker never said "does that rate apply to this telephone call", nor did the solicitor say "that hourly clock starts now if you want to continue". This leaves the situation less clear than it could have been. The second email, as described, seems to imply that the work of giving advice had not yet commenced, and thus no fee was due for services to date. A person in this situation could reply with a letter (sent by email or postal mail or better both) saying that no advice was given, no useful service was performed, and there was no agreement to pay for any service, so no fee is due. If the solicitor takes this to a court case, the asker may well want to consider consulting a different legal professional. This is a case where the exact facts may well matter, so no more precise answer can, I think, be given here. |
Unreasonably refused carriage by TfL Suppose Bob takes his bike every day on the London Overground which he is entitled to do under the rules if it is not peak time. One day he goes to ride the train and his chain has broken and it is raining heavily out and he happens to be quite far from home. He is told by the tfl tube attendant that because his bike is not folding model it isn't allowed and because it is electrically assisted it must have a combustible battery so it wouldn't be allowed anyway. Bob retrieves the official rules on his phone to show the station supervisor but the supervisor is not interested instead exhibiting a big sadistic grin while taking delight in the fact that he has the power to waste the time of another human being. He isn't interested in how he's mistaken about the official rules but calls the police. Bob having been in this situation once before at another station eagerly awaited the police arrival as on that occasion the btp were reasonable and explained to the station manager how he had been mistaken on the rules so that Bob was allowed to ride. On this occasion they were much more unreasonable and awful, and Bob was forced to wait for an hour after he had already touched in to the station but was being obstructed from entering with the big disabled turnstile being switched off to prevent his entry. The entire time this bully station manager stood smugly grinning. The London Overground employee came up from downstairs at one point and actually looked up the rules because he gathered that Bob had actually known what he was talking about and reasoned to the station supervisor that as Bob's bicycle was neither a scooter nor a unicycle, it should therefore be allowed on the train but the supervisor wouldn't hear any of it. Further when asked for his name the man began putting his hands over his name badge before eventually deliberately turning it to face himself so that it could not be read. When BTP arrive they explain that because TfL is a private entity they can change the rules arbitrarily and refuse to allow you on at their own discretion. Yet this is hard to believe given the public funding and surely attached mandate which it receives from the government to provide a public service for all. What is the actual legality here, and what requirement do TfL have to apply the rules evenly and uniformly? What remedies does Bob have available for his wasted time, his refusal of carriage, the supervisor's concealment of his identity, general rude treatment, and the BTP's shockingly insulting accusation of his "wasting police time" by simply trying to explain the situation to reason with them upon their arrival, either against TfL, or against BTP? | If we cut through all the entertaining colour commentary around Bob's experience then all that happened is TfL refused him permission to carry a specific item and according to the TfL Conditions of Carriage: 9.2 Staff can refuse permission for you to take any item onto our services. For example, you may be prevented from taking a bicycle on DLR services during the London Marathon. So the rules around the times when non-folding bikes are permitted on the Overground not withstanding there's a catch-all rule which allows them to refuse specific items on specific occasions for whatever reason they want. What remedies does Bob have available for his wasted time, his refusal of carriage, the supervisor's concealment of his identity, general rude treatment, Realistically - none. The refusal may be harsh - but there's plenty of room in the conditions of carriage to allow it. A supervisor concealing his identity may be annoying but it's not illegal, nor is being rude. the BTP's shockingly insulting accusation of his "wasting police time" by simply trying to explain the situation to reason with them upon their arrival, either against TfL, or against BTP? Probably nothing doing here either - the BTP aren't for what Bob's trying to use them for. I doubt they'd actually pursue Bob for wasting police time unless he makes a habit of doing it, but they've got a point. They're not the complaints department for TfL! It's like calling the police because McDonalds won't serve you at the drive through. | Let me give you a simple, even if rather silly example: You take me to a civil court. You tell the judge "gnasher regularly parks his blue car in front of my home, and the color blue violates my sense of beauty. Judge, make him stop it. " A question of fact would be: Is my car actually blue? Not green, or red? And do I actually park my car in front of your home, and do so regularly? A question of law would be: Am I allowed by law to park my car in front of your home, even when my car has a color that you don't like? If this goes to a civil court, the judge would look at it and probably say: "Even if all the facts that 'Gimme the 401' claimed are true, as a matter of law there would be no case for gnasher to answer, since these actions would be permitted by law". If the judge decided that it is illegal to park cars in offensive colours in front of someone else's home as a matter of law, the court would then have to decide the facts: Whether what you claimed is actually the truth. (And while this example is silly, there have been people claiming that the neighbour's use of WiFi interfered with their health. And by law it is illegal to interfere with someone's health, so the facts would have to be examined). | Both the police and the courts are likely to look at the situation as a whole, rather than adopting any policy specifically in relation to drivers or owners. For example, it's unusual for people to rent cars to their friends for months on end. That might suggest there is something untoward about the arrangement. Is there evidence of the commercial arrangement, or is the owner pretending to have rented the car out for months, when in reality they had stashed the drugs then let a friend borrow the car for a day? It would also be unlikely for a drug dealer to stash a large amount of drugs in a car then lend the car out on a long-term basis, so if the car is out of the owner's hands, that would tend to suggest the drugs belong to the person in possession of the car (and not the owner). But if the amount of drugs were small, typical of personal use, then it becomes more credible to imagine they could be forgotten by the car owner before lending the car to a friend. Police intelligence might also have a bearing. Does one party or the other have known links to the drugs trade? Also, is the lifestyle of one or the other, in particular, inconsistent with known sources of legitimate income? My point with all these questions is to highlight how sensitive the issue is to the fine details of the circumstances, and that it's impossible to give a strictly general answer. | 2201.4 Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated at all or such times as shall be indicated by official traffic control devices. I'm failing to see the "... except when pulling over for the police" subclause. Equally there is no "... unless you think you should" subclause. If you choose to have a hearing the evidence will show unambiguously that you drove the wrong way in a one way street and you will testify as to your reasons for doing so. For you to avoid the violation you would need to convince the examiner that a) you are telling the truth and b) that your mindset is in any way relevant. Unless the officer clearly directed you to pull into that spot, the decision to do so appears to be yours. I'd pay the fine if it was me. | There are multiple questions on different areas of law, but I will answer purely on any criminal liability arising by the drivers concerned and leave the question(s) on civil liability to others. The general rule to avoid creating unsafe situations appears to be in the Royal Decree of 1 December 1975, at Article 7, which states (via English translation): 7.2 Users must behave on public roads in such a way that they do not cause any inconvenience or danger to other users, including the staff working for the maintenance of the road and the equipment bordering it, the surveillance services and priority vehicles. Here are some specific regulations/offences relating to the railway crossing incident: Under Article 4 of the 30 September 2005 Decree: It is forbidden to stop or park a vehicle on level crossings. Carol may have committed an offence under Chapter 2, Article 2 of the 1975 Decree: It is forbidden to stop a vehicle or park it in any place where it is obviously likely to constitute a danger for other road users or to obstruct them unnecessarily... Dave may have committed an offence under Article 20 of the 1975 Decree: 20.2. The user approaching a level crossing must be extra careful to avoid any accident: when the level crossing is not equipped with barriers or traffic light signals or when these signals do not work, the user can only enter it after making sure that no vehicle on rails is approaching. ... 20.4. The driver cannot enter a level crossing if the traffic congestion is such that he would in all likelihood be immobilized on this crossing. | What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation. | You have the right to notify the owner of the car of their vehicular trespass and the consequences of that. You do not have the right to damage the car in giving said notice. You have the right to offer to clean the gum off whatever part of the car you stuck the notice to. If you succeed in cleaning it,the other party will not have a legal cause of action, in all likelihood, since there is no damage (though with a bit of imagination they might come up with some 'missed business opportunity' loss). The court would probably find your choice of sticker to be negligent (put the notice under the wipers? use painter's tape -get some if you don't have any). The rationale 'we had no other choice' holds no water: there are alternatives. 'Criminal Damages' is a concept in UK law, but it relates to willful damage such as vandalism, not accidents. It would be an issue if you had planned to cause damage, but that seems not to be the case here. | For starters, you can't "use the antitheft law" because you are not a criminal prosecutor. I'm not sure that the criminal statute would support a civil action for replevin, at least until you've paid all the fees that the towing company is explicitly authorized to charge and they still refuse to release the vehicle. And if that was the case, you wouldn't need the criminal statute — the title to your vehicle should be sufficient. See Baltimore County Code (2003) §18-2-203 for the police department's authority to remove and store cars with expired registration "by contract." See also §§ 21-16-111.1 et seq. and §§21-16-123 et seq. regarding police initiated towing and licensing of towing companies. The latter set of statutes and the fee schedule fixed by the county are available here. |
Legal obligations towards monarchs We are seeing cases of people being arrested in UK for holding #NotMyKing signs or something along these lines. My question here is not about the legality of those police actions. My question is: as a UK citizen opposed to monarchy, do I have any legal obligation of differential treatment towards the king/queen if I stumble upon them on the pavement or can I treat them exactly like any other ordinary citizen? In a purposefully exaggerated way for the sake of clarification, a law that states something like "you must address the king as 'your highness' or you will be arrested", or "thou shalt vacate thy seat if the king enters the bus". | Lèse majesté is not prosecuted in the UK While it is still technically illegal to advocate the abolition of the monarchy under the Treason Felony Act of 1848, more recent freedom of speech laws means that it is not possible to bring a successful prosecution. The only reason it hasn’t been abolished is that Parliament has better things to do and, since the government doesn’t bring charges under it, the courts can’t quash it. So, the Monarch has the same legal protections as anyone else. | I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly. | Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character. | The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing | Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence. | While it is from a different jurisdiction, the following goes to the heart of the matter: Arrest, when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension of a person or the deprivation of a person's liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether the person has been deprived of personal liberty of movement. Directorate of Enforcement v Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440 at ¶46 (SC of India) In your example, the police officer has been deprived of "personal liberty of movement"; if they can still speak there would be no legal impediment to them placing the person who arrested them also under arrest. It would then be incumbent on both parties to deliver each other into lawful custody. The citizen would need to seek out a law enforcement officer to do this; the police officer has already done so, being their own law enforcement officer. After this, comes the paperwork. | The bouncer is employed (or (sub)contracted) by the owner/lessee of premises - someone with the right to evict persons from their private property per the common law rights to exclusive use of one's property. When the bouncer evicts you, they are exercising this right on behalf of and as the agent for the owner, who could do it, but instead has assigned limited agency to the bouncer to do that for them. Entrance to (and remaining on) a property may be authorised and revoked at any time - at the time that consent is not given or is withdrawn, you become a trespasser and the police may be called upon to forcibly remove you from the premises. For example, I can have a party at my house, but if I don't like someone, I'm entitled to ask them to leave. I could also ask a friend to ask that person to leave, if I didn't want to do it myself. Note that bouncers aren't empowered to physically evict anyone except for the general right to use reasonable and proportionate force. For instance, someone that was just standing around in the nightclub probably couldn't be physically thrown out, but someone who was causing harm to themselves or others could be restrained or repelled as appropriate (and if restrained, you'd need to be very careful to do so in the course of effecting a citizen's arrest, otherwise you'd probably be committing false imprisonment). There may be statutory provisions that bestow additional rights and responsibilities upon bouncers, but this is the basic premise. I'm fairly certain that this would apply in all Australian jurisdictions; probably in all common law jurisdictions. | england-and-wales - present day... Would the contents of the envelope be considered privileged? No Although it is possible to argue that the letter is a communication to the lawyer (albeit by mistake) its purpose is not in relation to seeking or receiving legal advice, so it fails to meet the definition of legal privilege: There are two forms of legal professional privilege: Legal advice privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers and their clients for the purposes of giving or obtaining legal advice. Litigation privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers, clients and third parties made for the purposes of litigation, either actual or contemplated. Would the lawyer be required to divulge it if asked by the police or in a court? Yes, No, Maybe If the lawyer is a suspect/defendant then there is no requirement to answer any questions whatsoever. Similarly, there is no obligation on a witness to answer questions unless a statutory provision has been triggered, such as the lawyer being given a Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 Disclosure Notice. Would he be required to report the matter to the police on his own? Yes Although there is no general requirement to report a crime (of this nature) to the police, the lawyer's profession is in the "regulated sector" which requires Suspicious Activity Reports to be submitted to the authorities: ... in respect of information that comes to them in the course of their business if they know, or suspect or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that a person is engaged in, or attempting, money laundering... What difference, if any does it make that the client apparently did not intend to send these contents to the lawyer? None that I can see ETA The status of legal privilege in 1925 seems to have been the same as now, and this Wikipedia article, under the heading History offers this in support: The common law principle of legal professional privilege is of extremely long standing. The earliest recorded instance of the principle in English case-law dates from 1577 in the case of Berd v Lovelace ([1576] EngR 10 (& Ors)) |
How many days do you have to live somewhere in Texas before you have residency in a home? A woman has to move in with her parents because she fears becoming homeless while her husband is on probation for a felony DWI. Over 4 years of probation while living there the parents become extremely toxic and abusive to the woman (their daughter). Then the father passes away and the mother freaks out because she has no income anymore. Daughter offers mother money for rent (has been living there without paying any rent for years) but instead mother tries to force daughter into homelessness in order to move in another person (other daughter) and kick out daughter #1. Daughter and husband and kids move out for three weeks because mother threw a temper tantrum and left the house and daughter wants mom to be able to come back. In that amount of time, daughter gets kicked out of new place due to conduct of husband and mother in law. Daughter comes back to parents' house with a fake permission from mother in law who claims that she talked to the mom. During this time mother has not returned to the home but she has changed the locks despite telling daughter to come back and get the rest of her things out & clean up. Mother is now physically but not mentally incapacitated in a hospital and won't speak to daughter. Once daughter returns to the house if nobody tries to stop her from staying there is that consent to her coming back? How many days are needed to establish residency? State is Texas country is U.S. Is she trespassing? Does someone have to evict her to get her out or can they pop in at any time and say she is trespassing and have her arrested? | Residency under Texas law is determined by various individual laws for different purposes: probate (in case you die), divorce, in-state tuition, voting, fishing licenses. Your question is in the realm of landlord-tenant law, which does apply to one or more rooms uses as a permanent residence, but there is no requirement that the tenant be a "resident" in any legal sense. So that law is applicable no matter when you arrived in Texas. | In some states there is a law know as Caylee's Law, for example Connecticut General Statutes 53-21a(d) which requires reporting a child's disappearance: Any parent, guardian or person having custody or control, or providing supervision, of any child under the age of twelve years who knowingly fails to report the disappearance of such child to an appropriate law enforcement agency shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. For the purposes of this subsection, “disappearance of such child” means that the parent, guardian or person does not know the location of the child and has not had contact with the child for a twenty-four-hour period. Assume that they have done as the law requires, i.e. reporting the disappearance. It could be a crime for the parents to fake the kid's death, depending on what you did to "fake" the death. They might legally do things that could lead a person to think the child died; but telling the police, in the course of an investigation, that the child died in an accident, would be a crime. The parents would not have to convince the school district of anything, though someone at the school might alert the authorities that the child was gone (but they would know that anyway). They might well have to convince the police of something (i.e. that they didn't kill the child). It would certainly be a felony to lie to the IRS (i.e. claim the child as a dependent). It would also be a crime to continue to receive welfare payments or other benefits based on the fact of having a child. | The situation is that Executive Order 2020-33 is no more, and a new order, 2020-68 exists. The old orders to stay home are now copied under this order, but it may be necessary for her to re-issue (a subset of) the orders so that they are pursuant to #68 and not #33 (live by the technicality, die by the technicality). If she does not do that quickly, I expect there to be legal challenges. The law (30-403) doesn't say that orders issued pursuant to a declaration of a state of disaster expire when the authorizing declaration expires, but one can reasonably infer that that is what the legislature had in mind when this law was passed. But that is a matter for the courts to decide. Deference to the executive, which is the usual way that courts operate, would favor an interpretation where saying "All previous orders that rested on Executive Order 2020-33 now rest on this order" counts as re-issuing the same orders with a new number in the text. The law does not say that the circumstances authorizing an emergency order have to be completely different. Perhaps the legislature will revise the law in the future, but it is what it is right now. | The general rule is that the ability to have a valid divorce has nothing to do with where the marriage was entered into, or the citizenship of the parties. Usually, any jurisdiction with sufficient contacts with either member of the couple has jurisdiction to enter a divorce. Hence, generally, people get divorced in the place that they live. The problem in this scenario is step 5. I think that it is highly likely that the U.S. Embassy is simply wrong, unless there is some serious irregularity in step 4. An annulment after four years of marriage, as opposed to a divorce, is highly irregular and would not be allowed in the vast majority of jurisdictions. But, maybe there are facts and circumstances that make it otherwise. This fact pattern, while it on one hand sounds like a "for a friend" question based on real facts, also sounds like some important details that may be outcome determinative have been omitted. | If I remember the case correctly, he didn't make his home look uninhabited (that is nobody is living there) but as if the inhabitants had left (gone shopping etc.) to make it look attractive to burglars. He then waited inside, armed with a gun, with the intent of shooting any burglars that might arrive. He shot the first burglar in the legs, and then proceeded to kill the unarmed and now defenseless burglar, who was lying injured on the ground and was in no position anymore to hurt him. He then did the same with a second burglar, shooting her in the legs, then shooting her multiple times, and when he found she was still alive, he shot her point blank in the face while she was lying on the ground. You are asking the wrong questions. You are asking "is it illegal to remove a truck". It's not. What is illegal is to intentionally create a situation where you shoot people and try to claim "self defence". It can very well be argued that by luring burglars into your home with the intent to kill them, they are not actually illegal in that home, because you wanted them to be there. You can do many things that are each completely innocent but add up to a crime. Actually, for everyone interested, I posted a question maybe last week or the week before whether you can be convicted for both first degree murder and second degree murder for killing a person, and it was exactly this case that inspired the question. What should he have done? If he hadn't lured the burglars in, I believe the case would have still been a double murder, since he killed both unarmed teenagers when they were absolutely no threat. It might not have been first degree murder since it would not have been premeditated. But he intentionally lured them in, making it premeditated (first degree) murder. If he had only injured them, the fact that he lured them in could very likely have made this an assault. You asked: "Now that the burglars are in his house, what should he have done? " Well, he got himself into a dangerous situation. Remember, he was convicted for premeditated murder. So just before he shot the girl in the head, he should have instead put the gun away and called police and an ambulance. It would have been one murder instead of two. Just before he shot the boy, he should have put the gun away and called police and an ambulance. It would have been just attempted murder. When he heard the first person entering, he should have called the police and waited. When the burglar came in sight, he should not have shot and injured him. It's a similar question to "if I try a bank robbery and there is an armed guard, what should I do". The only legal thing to do is to drop your weapon and wait to be arrested. If an armed burglar had appeared instead of two unarmed teens, well, he would have put himself into a dangerous situation. Just as the burglar would have no right to shoot even if a home owner points a weapon at him, he had no right to shoot, no right to self defense, since he had intentionally created the situation. Tough shit. That's what you may get if you plan a murder. Responding to some comments: @J.Chang Are you being serious? You are not allowed to make your house inviting to burglars, while waiting inside with the intent of killing them. Self defense only applies when a reasonable person would believe they are in danger. Reasonable persons don't think that a burglar comes in with the intent of blowing themselves up and taking the home owner with them. And no, you don't get to "assume the worst". Not when the worst is something no reasonable person would expect. Thanks to Dale for pointing out that even for soldiers in a war situation, where different rules apply, deliberately killing a helpless enemy combatant is murder. | Your daughter says of your son: "He hit me." She has made an allegation. Assume that the evidence shows that there is a red mark on her arm, tears and she and her brother were the only two people in the room at the time. This evidence is enough to establish a prima facie case. However, this evidence has not yet been tested. Now, for obvious reasons, we are going to assume that your family operates on an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial model of justice of so it is you who will be doing the testing. You might ask for a statement of the fact from your son. This will almost certainly contradict the evidence of your daughter because ... siblings. Assume that your son says they were arguing over a controller and that your daughter threw it at his head, he ducked and it bounced off the wall and struck her in the arm. So now you might cross-examine both the plaintiff and defendant to try to find any inconsistencies or other reasons to doubt their testimony. Or you might examine the controller for evidence of it being smashed into a thousand very expensive pieces. At the end of this process, you may prefer your daughter's version over your son's: if so, your daughter has met her burden of proof and is entitled to whatever remedy your Solomonic wisdom decrees. However, if you prefer your son's or find them equally plausible then she hasn't and justice requires a remedy in the other direction. This is because it was your daughter who had the burden of proof throughout. However, assume instead you son said: "I hit her but she hit me first". Well now he has admitted to the alleged facts and your daughter's burden is met but he is raising an affirmative defense ("I did it, but ...") rather than a negating defense ("I never did!"). The onus has now shifted to him to demonstrate the required elements of self-defense. Of course, unlike in the public legal system, self-defense is generally not a total defense withing a familial legal system and the best he can hope to do is mitigate the punishment and, vitally important in the interests of justice for children, ensure his sister gets punished too; because vengeance is more important than mercy. | Either party can petition the appropriate court for an adjudication of paternity (if this has not already been established in connection with the issuance of the birth certificate), and for a parental responsibility and child support order, at any time, if no such order is in place (assuming that Pennsylvania is the "home state" of the child and venue is proper). Child custody and visitation rights are determined based upon the "best interests of the child" with very little other formal guidance from the statute or even case law which also affords a judge very broad, although not unlimited discretion in resolving the issue if the parents don't reach an agreement. Any parent who is not adjudicated to be "unfit" (whose parental rights would then be terminated), is entitled to some reasonable visitation under the circumstances at a minimum. In practice, courts tend to prefer to enter an order that preserves the pre-litigation status quo is one was established for any reasonable length of time. Once a custody and visitation schedule are established (logically, this is actually done contemporaneously), a child support award is also entered based upon the number of nights per year that the child spends with each parent, the income of each parent, and the extraordinary expenses, if any of the child, pursuant to guidelines that exist under state law but are federally mandated. Generally speaking, child support payments are quite small relative to the incomes of the parties. If a parent is willfully refusing to work or underemployed so as to reduce child support, in some circumstances, income that could have been earned is imputed to that parent for purposes of determining the appropriate amount of child support. There is a small body of civil procedure that goes to the nitty gritty of how this is handled after a petition is filed, but that really goes beyond the scope of the question. In the simplest case, only the two parents are involved in the litigation. But, there are circumstances in which there can be other parties. For example, if the child has been supported by welfare, a representative of the state is a party to make sure that child support is paid reducing the need for welfare payments or repaying welfare payments already made by the state. Guardians of an un-empancipated minor or disabled parent might participate. Grandparents can sometimes have standing to participate. A non-parent who has physical custody of the child would usually have standing to participate. This all gets a little technical, and since the question doesn't suggest any facts that would call for additional parties, I will leave it at that. In the event of a substantial change of circumstances after a statutory period after the last order was entered, a court may start over, more or less from scratch, and establish a modified child custody, visitation and child support order that reflects the changed circumstances. As a practical matter, for parents who are separated from shortly after the birth of a child and can't work things out between themselves, there will probably be several to half a dozen modification proceedings until the child is an adult. | There's a lot of variables here, as many leases are built in different ways within the leeway allowed by law. You will want to contact a local lawyer to see how you can mitigate the damage to yourself, and contact your landlord and see if you can re-negotiate the lease. If the landlord doesn't want to re-negotiate, you're probably facing eviction if you can't come up with the full rent by yourself; many leases don't allow non-related adults to live on the premises if they're not on the lease (this can also result in eviction). However, your roommate will also get an eviction record and be responsible for any damages if the lease survives long enough to cause an eviction. Actually having a random person move in from Craigslist might also cause your roommate to suffer additional liability if they're not allowed to sublet their lease agreement, which many leases do not allow (landlords like knowing who's living on their properties). Having them move in might cause both you and your roommate to be evicted. You probably don't have any rights to sue your roommate until actual damages occur (in other words, after you've already been evicted). You should speak with your landlord as soon as possible to get a new lease. An eviction record will cause problems for your roommate as well, so you might urge them to consider staying long enough to get things sorted out legally. When you ask your landlord, simply ask something like, "My roommate wants to move out. What are my options?" They will tell you what they are willing to accept. |
In what manner "prescribed by law" can a soldier be permitted to stay in a privately owned home without violating the Third Amendment? The Third Amendment states No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. This oft-overlooked amendment states that soldiers cannot be housed in a privately-owned building without the owner's consent in peacetime. During times of war, this amendment may be overruled in a manner "prescribed by law." What law is being referenced? During a war can American soldiers commandeer my house? | Meaning of the Third Amendment The US Third amendment means that if the US ever wants to quarter soldiers in private houses (or other dwellings), without the consent of the owners, it can only do so in time of war, and only in accordance with some law that Congress passes, authorizing such action and providing procedures for it. To the best of my knowledge, Congress has never passed any such law, and so no such "quartering" would be permissible, even during wartime. Note that the text of the amendment says "house". This provision might be extended to other dwellings, such as apartment buildings, but probably not to any "privately-owned building" that is not a residence (that is, was not previously a dwelling). Such non-residences are not protected by the Third Amendment , although the takings clause of the Fifth might apply, as might the Due Process clause, depending on the circumstances. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) would be relevant in such a case. Engblom v. Carey The amendment was invoked and interpreted in Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982). This is said by Wikipedia to be the first decision at the circuit court level interpreting the amendment or depending on its provisions. It has never been the basis for a US Supreme Court decision In 1979 there was a state-wide strike of NY corrections officers (prison employees). NY National Guard troops were deployed by the state. Staff had been rented apartments as part of their employment agreement. Guard troops were first housed in administrative buildings and school buildings at or near the prison. But after five days striking officer were evicted by the state, and Guard troops were housed in dorms so vacated. Two of the officers sued. The second circuit court held that: the National Guard troops are in fact soldiers under the Third Amendment; the Third Amendment applies to state as well as federal authorities, i.e., is incorporated against the states; and the protection of the Third Amendment extends beyond homeowners, but covers anyone who, within their residence, has a legal expectation of privacy and a legal right to exclude others from entering into the premises. That is, tenants and other lawful residents are protected. Issues Mentioned in the Question What law is being referenced? No such law currently exists. Congress could pass one in the future. During a war can American soldiers commandeer my house? Only if Congress passes such a law, and then only if whatever procedures that are "prescribed" by the law Congress passes are followed." | Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform. | TL; DNR: No. Charging the Councilwoman under §2383 for making a speech would violate the First Amendment, and "levying war" in the §2381 means actually fighting, not conspiring to fight. 18 USC §2383 Since §2383 is a statute, it must conform to the Constitution. To charge Sawant for what she said in a speech would violate the 1st Amendment, which says, "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech..." Even without the First Amendment problems, §2383 would not apply. The words "rebellion and insurrection" in §2383 are usually read to mean real violence, not vague words that may or may not involve violence. Not even Cliven Bundy, the Nevada rancher who has had several armed standoffs with the government, was charged under §2383. 18 USC §2381 Since §2381 is based on Art. 3, §3, the Treason Clause of the Constitution, the First Amendment does not apply to it. Following the Treason Clause, §2381 has two prongs. To be guilty of treason, one must either: a) Levy war against the United States; or b) Adhere to its enemies. "Enemies" has been interpreted to mean enemies in a real war, so the second prong does not apply. Since Sawant is not actually levying war against the United States, §2381 can only apply to her if it covers a conspiracy to levy war against the United States. The Supreme Court decided it did not in 1807, in Ex Parte Bollman. Bollman was charged with conspiring with Aaron Burr to carve a new country out of the US. The Court ordered Bollman released. In his opinion, John Marshall explained why: However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war, and actually to levy war, are distinct offenses. Marshall’s narrow reading of the Treason Clause was consistent with the views of the Founders. In Federalist 43, James Madison explained that in the past, “violent factions” had often used “new-fangled and artificial" definitions of treason to “wreck their alternate malignity on each other…” To keep from repeating this sorry history, the Constitution “opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger,” by defining what constituted treason and specifying how it was to be proved. | He has this phrased like it's the ability to decide which laws you follow, and that it's an ability being withheld from the general public (although I seriously doubt that at least the former is the case). This is yet another false claim made by "freemen" or those who claim "common law defences". Notice of Understanding has no legal meaning unless the context demands that it evidences a meeting of the minds for the purposes of contract formation. It is a well-settled principle of common law that in order to be bound by a contract, there must be an agreement. Put simply, I cannot bind someone simply by sending them a Notice unless it is a right conferred on me by some earlier statute or legislation, or legally binding agreement. I tried searching for a solid definition, but all I could find was people/organization's Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights. The reason you've found nothing official about the terms Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights is that there is nothing official or legal about those terms. They are ordinary terms with ordinary meaning being bastardised by deluded people who believe they can fine the government and refuse to be bound by the law of the land. Of course, none of this holds up. What is the purpose of declaring your Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights? It might make you feel better, even though it has no legal, practical or other effect. | There are no cases interpreting the Second Amendment to have that meaning at this time. Even when regulations on corporate gun dealers are held unconstitutional, this holding, thus far, has always been because the regulations burden the rights of natural persons who own guns to bear arms. But, while corporations do not have the right themselves, they do have standing to bring suit regarding regulations of their corporations that burden the Second Amendment rights of their customers in a way that allegedly violated the right. | Generally, "yes", but it isn't a constitutional or federal right. It is a right that flows from the right of the owner of real property to determine who is allowed on real property, and the fact that generally speaking, a concealed weapon carrier isn't a protected class that cannot be discriminated against. Thus, while this is the default rule in the U.S. and the predominant rule in the U.S., a state has the authority to prohibit businesses that are otherwise "public accommodations" from discriminating against concealed weapon holders if a state wishes to do so. I wouldn't be surprised if there were some exceptions, either for all concealed weapon holders, or for some subclass of them (e.g. undercover police officers). For example, a law review note, a.k.a. student written law review article, cited in the comments notes that some states require a business owner to post a sign prohibiting concealed carry in order to have the right to remove someone from the premises of their business for this reason. | The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate. | First, the practical answer is no: even if they ordered the President to go to war, the President can just refuse. The military is generally in the habit of listening to orders from the President, particularly if the question is "do we or do we not go to war;" the courts do not have the power to command the armed forces. They could try issuing an injunction instructing the military to go to war, but the injunction would be ignored. They could try holding people in contempt, but the President is in charge of almost all federal law enforcement (and can pardon criminal contempt), so that's not going to work. And even if the President could be punished for contempt, if he thinks intervening will result in the annihilation of the human race in a thermonuclear war, he will not issue the orders. But that's assuming the courts would even try to intervene. They wouldn't. Courts don't generally want to issue orders that they know will be ignored. In this case, the relief being sought (i.e. an order to do something) is a kind of relief that is up to the discretion of the court. So even if a court would be legally justified in issuing that order, they have an easy out. (For damages claims, Congress can just refuse to appropriate any money to satisfy them; no federal money can be spent unless Congress appropriates it). There's an even earlier out, though. Courts are not political branches of government; one of the basic rules of jurisprudence is that courts should not get involved in deciding something that's really up to the elected branches. Baker v. Carr had a list of factors to consider: a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Foreign relations in general is very often grounds for deference, as is military strategy. Courts are utterly unqualified to determine proper diplomatic or military actions to take, or to evaluate whether the President's actions were enough to meet the requirement of "do what's necessary to restore security;" foreign policy is a case where a country needs a unified face (because other countries aren't particularly willing to deal with US internal politics), and where the courts could easily screw up what the government is doing; and whether to send Americans to war is a question that is clearly a matter for those accountable to the people. So, federal courts cannot analyze this question to decide whether or not the government has done anything wrong; it's for the other two branches to decide. |
Can a person go to the court if she signed a contract not to go to court? Suppose a couple signed a prenuptial contract that said they couldn't go to court regarding their divorce and custody of children. Everything must be resolved through mutual consensus and consultation of their respective families. After some time, the wife wants a divorce and full custody of the children, but the husband won't agree with her about the custody. He won't let children go no matter what. Can she go to court? | What kind of contract would that be? One about... arbitration? One about "I hereby relinquish my claim for payment of X?" --- children cannot be taken away from their father, no matter what. - OP That contract is void in germany because this contract not only violates public policy, it tries to modify something that is regulated by law into a way that does offer less than the law demands as a minimum. That's not allowed in Germany. Further, a clause that gives custody to the father by default is also Sittenwidrig in Germany, and thus void under §138 BGB. So would be a clause that gives it to the mother by default by the way. In a case of controversy, only a court order can assign guardianship. And only the court can take guardianship away. When the kid is born its guardianship gets assigned to the parents as guardians by §1626 BGB. While it is possible to give your partner guardianship if you're not married under 1626a BGB it is explicitly impossible to assign guardianship for any compensation to either party (e.g. the mother or the new guardian may not receive anything other than the guardianship in the specific paper) under 1626b BGB. Thus a contract that does anything else in addition to guardianship, like a prenup, voids at least the guardianship clauses. And you have to tell the court about that assignment of guardianship under ($1626d BGB). Now comes the kicker: §1628 BGB forces the parents to apply to the court to solve any problems of huge impact, such as guardianship: So technically, mediation results are fully non-binding and you can not mandate it. Also, since all marriages are through the state, it needs a formal instrument of the state to be dissolved. The only three ways that the state ever allowed this to be done after WW2 were a) annulment through a court, which only was possible till 1998, or b) divorce through a court, c) death of one of the marriage partners. Yes, it takes a judge to divorce a marriage under $1313 BGB or one of the two married to die. Because you can't divorce without a filing in court, a clause that demands to divorce in some way that is not including §1313 BGB, that clause would be void. It might be legal to have a clause that demands to try to solve issues in arbitration before filing for divorce or sorting the belongings in such a way, but it can't supplant the court requirement. | Usually and ideally, a GAL would take an active role in parenting questions, while taking a secondary role in property division and maintenance with the primary concern being that the economic arrangements are sustainable and don't subject the child to hardship when with the other parent (e.g. many divorcing parents fail to realize that maintaining two households will result in more child related expenses than one). I will assume that you are asking from the perspective of a party to the divorce and not from the perspective of a mediator, although the phrasing is not entirely clear. Some basics: Have a good command of the facts about your finances, your ex's finances, and the children's schedules and needs (assuming that there are children). For example, it would be good to have school calendars as far forward as they are available, to know the children's medical providers, and to have a firm command of their extracurricular activities, their friends and the requirements of any childcare providers. Often child support worksheets will be mandatory for a settlement to be approved, so get those worksheets and fill in the facts you know already. Bring a calculator so you can consider new assumptions and evaluate financial proposals accurately. If you think you have received inaccurate disclosures, be prepared to explain in detail what you think is inaccurate and why you think that this is the case. If domestic violence has been an issue, there are restraining orders that are or have been in place, there are abuse or neglect allegations present (including emotional abuse of a spouse or children), or the co-parents have had trouble coordinating and reaching decisions without outside assistance, be prepared to explain these situations in factual detail so you can avoid summarizing the situation in a vague way. Bring anything you might need to refresh your recollection about relevant facts with you to mediation. If you haven't received full disclosure of your spouse's finances, insist on receiving that, ideally before going to mediation and absolutely before reaching a deal. Spend time considering possible resolutions of property, maintenance and parenting matters in advance. Very early on in mediation each of you will be asked what you want and mediation shouldn't be the first time that you have thoughtfully considered the question. Spend time thinking about what you need on a non-negotiable basis to survive - to be able to meet basic needs for food, shelter, clothing, health care, etc. for you and your children, and also about what your ex needs and how your ex can achieve it. Proposing ways to achieve objectives that your ex hasn't considered that are viable is a good way to get a resolution. Ideally, attend a parenting class (mandatory in many jurisdictions before getting a divorce that involves children) before attending mediation. Keep in mind that children are not prizes or bargaining chips and that you need to consider their needs as well as your own. Your kids love both of you even though you can no longer manage to live with each other. Do not utilize the children as sounding boards for mediation stances and do not try to use them as decision makers or conduits for communication between the co-parents. Recognize that in most states, marital fault is irrelevant, and that starting a new relationship is natural and routine, even if it makes your skin crawl that your ex is starting a new relationship. Take an attitude of focusing on what the deal does for you rather than what the deal does for your ex. This is about you getting what you need, not about making your ex worse off. Be prepared to walk away from mediation without a deal if necessary, because your ex won't accept a reasonable deal. Maybe half of mediations end without a settlement. Recognize that it may be possible to reach partial resolution (e.g. splitting up tangible personal property; figuring out how holidays will be handled with the children; agreeing on schools that children will attend; figuring out who, if anyone, will continue to live in a marital residence; stipulating to the value of particular assets; stipulating regarding each party's income; stipulating regarding what is and isn't separate property where you can agree; agreements to disclose information), without resolving all issues. Partial resolutions reduce uncertainty and make it easier to prepare for and conduct a permanent orders hearing on the remaining issues. Even if you can't afford to hire a lawyer to represent you in the entire case, pay for an hour or two of a lawyer's time to evaluate what kind of property division, maintenance award and parenting arrangements are within the range of the possible and likely if you go forward to a permanent orders hearing. Be prepared to put the terms of anything that is agreed to at mediation in writing. Mediators will usually tell you if they need forms signed, payments made, or a "mediation statement" in advance. Do everything required on time. A "mediation statement" is a summary of the key facts and your position on a fair resolution and could be a couple to a dozen pages depending upon the complexity of the case. Be clear in a mediation statement about what is O.K. to share with the other side and what is for the mediator's information only. When a mediator asks for a mediation statement the main reason for doing so is to save time that the mediator is charging you per hour for 50-50. A mediation statement can make getting the mediator up to speed on the facts more efficient and less likely to omit important facts and the mediator needs to learn the key facts to be effective. | Not much. Consider the following: The father can not force the mother to abort the pregnancy. Ex post facto agreements of non-payment are, in all likelihood, unenforceable. The father will be obligated to pay child support under the laws of the state with jurisdiction over the paternity. The abortion angle won’t work. Setting aside commentary regarding the politics or ethics of abortion. I think we can agree it is a highly charged and emotional topic for some people. I point to the fact it always seems to be an issue during Supreme Court nominations and presidential elections. Given the explosive nature of the issue of whether abortions should be legal or not (in the case where the mother does not want to carry full term) could you imagine how much more dynamite it would add to the debate if the question were whether or not to allow the father to force the mother to terminate the pregnancy against the mother's wishes! One can only imagine how much more bombastic the abortion debate might then become. You can’t escape child support (most likely). To give you a sense of how difficult it is to escape the obligations of child support. Consider the following... A Kansas man was ordered to pay child support when he thought he was being a sperm donor only and signed numerous agreements with the lesbian couple he thought he was helping. In that case, the court justified its ruling on the grounds that a doctor was not involved in the insemination process. But nothing prevents future courts from making the same ruling in cases where a doctor is involved in the insemination process. Especially if that state either withdraws from the The Uniform Parentage Act, amends it, repeals it, or never adopts it in the first place. Sperm Donors and Child Support: Even in cases in which the donor is known, but holds himself out as unknown, some courts have held the donor legally obligated to pay child support. Read more here. Ex post facto agreements are problematic. Now that you've edited the question, the above link is even more useful for providing a possible avenue to try (albeit unlikely to work): a non-payment agreement. The discussion in that link describes that even if you could somehow convince the mother to go along with it, it is unlikely (though not impossible) to be enforced by the courts. It depends on the facts (e.g., intercourse vs. in vitro), circumstances (e.g., relationship vs. no relationship between the parties), timing (e.g., before vs. after the agreement), etc. of the impregnation itself. Notwithstanding all the above, if you still have questions, you might consider floating an idea of an approach you think you might try (in a separate question) and get reactions to that specific proposal. | Can you always ask for an independent genetic testing when you are asked by the court to support your wife's or your partners children? No. Only sometimes. (Literally, you can always ask, but sometimes the answer will be clearly "no", as a matter of law.) Some presumptions of paternity are conclusive (either immediately or after a statute of limitations to contest paternity expires) and can't be overcome by contrary genetic evidence. Other presumptions of paternity are rebuttable. The specifics vary in important details from state to state. The theory behind the conclusive presumption is primarily that the presumed parent in those circumstances becomes the psychological parent, and it is not in the best interests of the child to dislodge a psychological parent, even if that parent is not a biological parents. Put another way, a conclusive presumption is really part of the definition of what a father is under the law. Several other answers at Law.SE have addressed this in the context of specific U.S. states. An answer here considers California law and another answers the question under New York law. | No contract can limit a court's jurisdiction An NDA is a contract: it cannot prevent the application of the judicial process. Should your dispute reach a courtroom, the NDA and the documents it seeks to protect are all admissible and you should subpoena them from the defendant and submit those copies to the court (that way you are not breaking the terms of the NDA). What is not admissible is bona fide "without prejudice" documents: that is documents that contain admissions and offers made in a genuine attempt to settle a dispute. This privilege is established by the context of the document, not by if it does or does not have the words "without prejudice" on it (except, of course, that their presence/absence is part of the context). | This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best. | Possibly If the texts are sufficiently precise that they constitute offer and acceptance then they would create a contract notwithstanding that “some documents” were never provided. First, your offer must have been sufficiently clear that it was open to acceptance by a simple “yes” or “ok”. Given that you had a lease, a simple offer to have another one would be enough as “on the same terms” is implied. Second, she must have accepted your offer unconditionally. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign” is an unconditional acceptance even if the documents never appear. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign first” or “Yes, I’ll put together some documents with the terms” aren’t. The first is a conditional acceptance and the condition wasn’t met. The second is a rejection with an intention to make a counter-offer that never eventuated. Third, real estate is heavily regulated. There may be specific requirements (such as a particular form of contract, or that it be witnessed) that mean there is no binding lease even though there would be a contract at common law. | How to Best Help I suggest you ask around at the courthouse. You might need to get advanced permission from the judge. Every courthouse is setup a bit differently so it's hard to say exactly whom you will need to ask. But ultimately that will probably require the judge's advanced approval. Order of Child Support You used the term violation so I will assume the mother has in her possession a copy of the Order of Child Support (OCS) resulting from the divorce or paternity case that determined the amount and timing of support payments she is entitled to. Correct? Aside: If the mother doesn't already have an OCS it's pretty simple to get one. Most states just have a standard set of forms and a formula to apply. There is very little subjectivity involved. Unless one or more of the parties has unreported or variable income. And she can also collect back child support too. Back Child Support AFAIK you are not barred by statute for seeking back support as far back as when dad's obligation began. Which AFAIK is when mom became the primary caregiver. In practical terms, this would be the first day mom had the kids living with her and dad didn't live with them. Interest on Unpaid Child Support Most states allow mom to collect interest on (ordered but) unpaid child support at a rate set by statute. In some states the interest rate is in the 9 to 12% range. You need to compute it using a spreadsheet. You go back to each ordered monthly obligation, calculate the number of months from then until the current date, then multiply that number times the obligation amount times 1/12 of the interest rate. Then add all those months together to get the total. Like I said, a spreadsheet is the easiest way to do this calculation. Motion for Contempt of Court Assuming you have acquired an OCS, enforcement is also pretty straightforward. In some states, the mechanism to force the father to pay is called a Motion for Contempt of Court for violating the OCS. Again, it's so common, unfortunately, most courthouses support pro se litigants by having all the necessary forms on hand and volunteers to help people fill them out! When mom files the contempt motion with the court she will schedule a date for a Show Cause Hearing, at which time dad will need to appear and explain why he should not either pay up or be found in contempt of court. Courts enforce child support VERY strictly. So the paperwork alone should be enough for her to win her case. Unlicensed Practice of Law As for you "helping her" in court. Be very careful. That sounds dangerously like practicing law without a law license. There is a thing called a "bar" in the courtroom that only attorneys or clients are allowed to cross (by practice and tradition). That's where the term bar exam originated. Anyway, if you want to try that, be very careful and you might want to run that by the judge or clerk and get prior approval first because the unlicensed practice of law has the potential to be a sticky wicket. Use of an Interpreter I would be shocked if the court did not make allowances for non-native English speakers to use the services of an interpreter in the courtroom. That's something you definitely need to ask around at the courthouse for all the details. And whether the interpreter needs to be licensed, registered or otherwise approved by the court in advance. Process Service One last point. Make sure to properly process serve dad with the motion and paperwork. Process service is what will bind him to appear at the show cause hearing. You should be able to find forms, instructions and a professional process server by asking around down at the courthouse. Dad will have a chance to respond in writing to the motion prior to the hearing. And mom will have a chance to respond to his response. Ask around at the courthouse how all this works. Especially the deadlines involved. These are also strictly enforced. State Registry Enforcement Assistance One last, last point. In the future, it might help if the OCS made a provision for the father to pay directly to the state registry for child support enforcement. The will keep track of all the payments and can provide enforcement assistance like levying bank accounts and garnishing wages, etc. So that could help with future enforcement. Disclaimer I am not a lawyer. I am not your lawyer and you nor the mom are my client. This is not legal advice. So please don't do anything based on what I write here; if you do, please be aware you do so at your own risk. So seek the advice of a real lawyer if you are going to actually do anything that might create an issue. |
Is consensual sex between adult siblings (and pornographic material thereof) legal? I was reading an article about a scandal involving a politician (allegedly) trying to set up a meeting with a porn actress, and it mentioned that the actress is mainly known for having a twin sister who is also a porn actress, and for performing with her. This made me wonder whether consensual sex between adult siblings is legal, and whether pornography made of such activity is legal. Because the incest taboo is historically based on genetic defects in the offspring resulting from incestuous sex, I also wonder whether the siblings being male and/or female makes any difference. Jurisdiction: the people mentioned in the article are EU citizens, but I'd also be interested in answers about other jurisdictions where extra-marital sex, homosexuality and pornography are legal in general. | This is incest new-south-wales Incest is defined as sexual intercourse between close family members which includes siblings and half-siblings. Sexual intercourse includes penetration of the genitalia or anus with any part of the body or any manipulated object and application of the mouth or tongue to female genitalia (among other acts). It earns you up to 8 years imprisonment. There is no specific law against pornography depicting implied or illegal acts (child pornography excepted). However, I suspect such material would be Refused Classification; the distribution of which is a crime attracting a penalty of up to 12 months. | One relevant US law is Title 18 Chapter 110. Using real children in porn is against the law, as is most anything connected to it (permitting children to do it, distributing, buying...). Under the definitions (18 USC 2256(1)) “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years. The possible hook for cartoons is via the definition of “child pornography” which is any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where— ... (B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. My guess is that hentai doesn't satisfy this definition, since I hear that the characters in a cartoon don't actually look like real people. However: there are also general laws against obscenity in some jurisdictions, and in US v. Whorley, it was held that you can still be convicted of receiving obscene material (Japanese child porn cartoons) – SCOTUS refused to hear an appeal. Most cases that are prosecuted also involve real child porn, or plea bargaining. In light of Whorley, it hasn't been definitively determined that hentai is against the law, but the first step has been taken. | Actual sex with a minor is an offence. Under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, doing something "which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence" is attempting to commit the offense, and is itself an offence. They have attempted the offence of having sex with a minor, although they didn't succeed because unbeknownst to them the other party was not a minor. There is some variability in whether it matters that there is no actual minor involved. In that specific instance the offence he was charged with was arranging the commission of a child sex offence (Sexual Offences Act 2003 §14), where one "intentionally arranges or facilitates something that he intends to do". Since he pleaded guilty, we won't find out how an appellate court would interpret 14(1)(b) ("doing it will involve the commission of an offence"). | Is it true that men are forced to pay child support for children they didn't consent to having? Yes. This is true in every U.S. jurisdiction, in the U.K., and in every jurisdiction of which I am aware in the E.U., and it is the rule in many other jurisdictions. The duty to pay child support in these jurisdictions flows from the relationship between the father and the child, and is not a contractual concept based upon consent. The primary exceptions to this general rule are cases where a parental relationship is legally terminated (e.g., in connection with the adoption of a child born out of wedlock), and cases in which someone becomes a sperm donor in a statutorily authorized arrangement that generally does not involve sexual intercourse. Historically, roughly speaking in the early 19th century, and earlier in English common law, and most other European and European-colonist jurisdictions, a man only had a duty to support the children of his wife or the children of his deceased former wife if he was a widower. Even further back, in the Roman empire from which the foundations of Roman civil law were derived, a father had a right in his sole and absolute discretion to commit infanticide, killing his infant children, a right which was a major political issue in the Roman empire from sometime in the 100s CE until it collapsed. Some jurisdictions, such as Japan, only established a legal duty to pay child support to a custodial parent in any circumstances in the late 20th century, although those jurisdictions still recognized the legal duty of a father to support a child in his custody. It is also worth noting that women in every country of which I am aware have a duty to support the children to which they give birth, whether or not they consented to impregnation (e.g. even if they were raped), or to giving birth (e.g. even if they wanted an abortion but were denied access to abortion by law or otherwise). This support obligation persists in almost every case, even if the woman's child is in the custody of another parent or guardian, and a woman is much more likely to face criminal prosecution for failure to support her child than an uninvolved father (although criminal prosecutions of men for non-support do happen). So, the claim that this constitutes sex discrimination is ill-founded. | First of all, Sally can't charge Bob, or anyone else. She can file a complaint with the police, or with the District Attorney. It may or may not be investigated, and if it is, charges may or may not be brought, and she has no control over any of that, although she may be able to use persuasion or political pressure to influence the decision. In New York, persuading a child to make pornography is a class C felony. Possessing child pornography is a class E felony. Promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child is a class D felony. Disseminating obscene material to a minor is a class E felony, unless the defendant solicits the child to engage in sexual activity, in which case it's a class D felony. All of these have 5-year statutes of limitation. (N.Y. Pen. Law § § 70.00, 80.00, 235.21, 235.22, 263.05, 263.10, 263.11, 263.16.) I can't find any NY law that makes it a crime to ask for a naked image of a child and be refused, although there may well be one. Note that it is not a crime in NY to posses sexual or nude pictures of a person 16 or older, although it is a crime to create them. There are also federal laws against child pornography, but federal policy is not to bring federal cases where the accused are under 18 and a state case could be brought. In fact, the federal authorities generally do not bring cases except against major producers when a state case can be brought instead. But that is a matter of policy, not law. NY has a pre-trial diversion program for teen-ages involved in "sexting". They can agree to take special classes, and avoid a criminal conviction or any jail time. The court must approve candidates individually for this program, but it is widely used. In the given scenario, the statute of limitations would not have expired (if the law I couldn't find makes this a felony, misdemeanor SoL is 2 years). In theory bob could be charged and tried for his solicitation. If charges were levied, the prosecution would need to prove at trial that Bob had made the request, and that it was serious, not a joke. It would also need to persuade a jury to convict when no sexual image had ever been transmitted. In practice I doubt that a case would be pursued after several years. That would depend entirely on the DA, or the relevant assistant DA who handled the case. Nothing would legally prevent such a case that I know of. | If I did punch him , would that be okay? No, that would be Assault and Battery. If you did him serious injury you could face a charge of Grievous Bodily Harm. If you killed him, that would be murder. If you are in the UK, Canada or Australia and you were charged with murder you could claim provocation in an attempt to have the charge reduced to Voluntary Manslaughter. If you were in the US you could attempt to argue "extreme emotional or mental distress" if you are in a state that has adopted the Model Penal Code for any of the charges; if successful your sentence would be reduced. I saw people punch one another over this in movies. And I saw aliens invading the Earth in the movies - what happens in the movies if not necessarily true. Kissing my wife is adultery right? No, extramarital sex is adultery. Notwithstanding, adultery is not illegal in common-law countries. I'm pissed and don't know what to do? I sympathise with you but this is not a legal question. Whatever is going on between you, your wife and your neighbour is a social situation; not a legal one. | Not disclosing transgender identity is not a crime of any kind, not rape, not fraud, not anything else. There is really no qualification to this statement. There is pretty much no plausible scenario in which concealing a transgender identity leads to liability for fraud of any kind and this never constitutes rape by deception. What is a crime and is regularly prosecuted, is retaliating against the person or property of someone who they discover is transgender while having sex. Incidents like these happen with some frequency and they alway create criminal liability for the person retaliating and never for the transgender individual in the cases where the transgender individual isn't killed (dozens of time each year in the U.S. the transgender individual is killed in a situation like this one). | The law does not criminalize "having more than 1 legal spouse", it criminalizes specific behavior. The polygamy statute is here. It says Every one who (a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter into (i) any form of polygamy, or (ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage, or (b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony, contract or consent that purports to sanction a relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. That is, if you behave like you're married to multiple women, you've committed a crime. |
What protections are there for constituent to MP communications? Various types of communication are considered protected under UK law: Doctor/Patient Client/Lawyer Confessor/Priest It seems logical to me that constituents should be free to communicate with their MPs without fear of that communication becoming public or being handed to any third party, such as the police (with the exception of abusive communications). Does such a provision exist in law, or is the confidentiality of MPs communications simply rely upon convention? I'd also be interested to know if the law is different for MPs, MSPs and SMs. | What protections are there for constituent to MP communications? Not much... MPs are protected by privilege only when they are engaged in proceedings in Parliament, and have no special protection for anything they do outside those proceedings. It’s important to remember that not everything that happens in Parliament is a proceeding. This means that the protections of privilege don’t apply to some things you might expect to be covered. For example, they don’t apply to correspondence with constituents or ministers ... [Source UK Parliament] Unless, I assume, the correspondence is directly related to Parliamentary proceedings. | What a statute means can be difficult to determine. There are several approaches to statutory interpretation that could be helpful: Textual: The plain meaning doesn't confine "use" to a few particular types of uses. The plain text provides an expansive prohibition on any use of an electronic communication device. Legislative history/legislative intent: The previous version of the subsection did limit prohibited uses to only composing, sending, or reading electronic messages. Given the amendment, it seems that the legislature no longer desired that limitation. When the bill was introduced, Rep. D'Amico stated the purpose of the bill was to "[expand] the prohibition on driving while using an electronic communication device to include uses beyond composing, sending, or reading an electronic message." During debate, when asked what a person should do that doesn't have Bluetooth, Rep. D'Amico suggested "You put it on speaker phone". When asked, "Where would you place the phone?", Rep D'Amico replied, "Wherever you feel like; just not next to your ear." During the same debate, D'Amico described the bill: "What House Bill 1247 does is ban handheld cell phones while driving a vehicle." In my opinion, the declaration of the bill's sponsor, and the debate surrounding the bill treated it as expanding the prohibition from including only texting and email to also include voice conversations. As far as I can tell, the full scope of "using" under this statute hasn't been tested in court, but I could see this going either way. The plain text provides an expansive prohibition on any use of an electronic communication device. However, a court might also be convinced by the legislative intent that only aims to add handheld voice communications to the previous list of prohibited activities (or it least it could be argued that this is the case). Further, under a purposive construction, a court could even look beyond the explicit legislative intent and find that the core purpose was to prevent distraction, in which case "using" could include any activity on your electronic device that distracts you as if you were texting, or making a phone call (eg. selecting the next song to play in your music app). | In normal commercial situations there is the principle of freedom of contract where parties are free to contract with whom they choose. As a result of this principle, they are also free to not choose to contract with whom they choose (i.e. refuse to serve someone). There are limits, such as if it could be argued that by doing so contravenes other laws, such as those against discrimination on the basis of race, age or gender for example. When a public entity is involved, it is a branch of government and is governed by the rules that define the relationship between the individual and the state - the constitution, so principles of constitutional law apply. Decisions made by public bodies can therefore be subject to judicial review, where an affected party or someone with sufficient standing can take the matter to court to be reviewed by a judge. | In the UK, no offence is committed, however many public locations cite the Data Protection Act 1998 as a reason to stop people taking pictures. DPA does not mention this topic at all, and is a red herring (however informing the location of this is unlikely to help, I have discovered) In fact, in the UK, the only laws that appear to exist cover either specific locations and properties (eg military installations) or using photography to take pictures of individuals in areas where they have an expectation of privacy. The Photographer's Rights Guide published by digitalcameraworld in 2012 is still current as far as I can see. It has this specific guidance: Photographers Rights: Taking Pictures of People in Public Are you breaking any law when you’re taking pictures of people in public? Probably not, but the position under UK law is uncertain. There are currently no general privacy laws under UK law, but the UK courts must take into account the European Convention on Human Rights, which gives everyone the right to respect for their private and family life. As this is an area of law that has been developing rapidly over the last few years, it is hard to be certain what will constitute an infringement. The key issue is whether the place the image is taken is one where a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, it has been suggested that the right of privacy of a child could be infringed by publishing a photo of them with their parents in a public street. It is therefore advisable to be careful when taking photos intended for publication, even where the subject matter is in a public place. Failure to obtain a model release for the use of an image will certainly make it harder to sell the picture to stock libraries. Photographing children The same laws apply to adult and child subjects, but a child does not have the legal capacity to consent and a parent or guardian must therefore do so on their behalf. Be aware that schools, leisure centres and places where children and adults gather usually have their own photography restrictions. Although decent photos of children (see our tips for better pictures of babies, children and teenagers) taken in a public place may be fine for non-commercial use, seek permission from the child’s parents or guardians and don’t shoot covertly with a long lens. For commercial images, you’ll need to get a model release signed by the parents. Also read the section on the powers of police and security guards. | Yes, you can ask permission from the court. From this page (by a firm of solicitors): Recording a conversation in secret is not a criminal offence and is not prohibited. As long as the recording is for personal use you don’t need to obtain consent or let the other person know. [...] A private recording can be submitted as evidence, but with some conditions: A recording may be relied on in evidence if the court gives permission An application for permission should be made on form C2 The recording should be made available to other parties before any hearing to consider its admissibility. So yes you can probably use it, but you can't play Perry Mason and suddenly produce it in the middle of the court hearing. Talk to your solicitor. | This question and many related ones are analysed in detail by Eugene Volokh, in a long paper that is worth reading in its entirety if you are interested in the topic. The [Supreme] Court has offered “speech integral to [illegal] conduct” as one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” excluded from First Amendment protection. But if this exception is indeed to be well defined and narrowly limited, courts need to explain and cabin its scope. This Article — the first, to my knowledge, to consider the exception in depth — aims to help with that task. On threats, he says: Companies are generally barred from firing employees for voting for a union, and unions are generally barred from retaliating against employees for their speech. The Court therefore concluded that speech that threatens unlawful retaliation is itself unlawful. On blackmail, he says: [...] telling black citizens “stop shopping at white-owned stores or we’ll publicize your behavior to your neighbors and fellow church members” is similarly constitutionally protected. On the other hand, “vote for this civil rights bill or I’ll disclose that you cheated on your wife” is likely unprotected. In general the line where the First Amendment protections end and criminal speech begins is surprisingly vague. General advice to avoid self-incrimination by not answering questions from the police is clearly protected. Threatening a witness with violence is clearly not. In between are shades of grey. | There is no way to know for absolute sure. The statutes do not address the question, so one would look at the case law. There appear to be about a dozen wiretapping cases that made it to the court of appeals in Maryland, and none of them involve implied consent (e.g. where it is announced prior to recording that the call may or will be recorded – prior is mandatory). The probability is high that implied consent suffices, since the legislature did not specific require express consent and consent is not generally taken to mean express consent. One can and should hire an attorney who will give you a professional and considered (but not infallible) opinion, if it really matters. | Regulations - Yes, Acts of Parliament - very rarely In in the united-kingdom diagrams are found in regulations, for example legislation dealing with roadside symbols. There are two kinds of legislation in the UK: Acts of Parliament and Statutory Instruments (normally called Regulations). The procedure by which an Act of Parliament is passed is that it has to be approved by both Houses of the legislature and then receive Royal Assent (Royal Assent is a formality). The procedure in each House is that the main debates occur at the Committee Stage when amendments are proposed and voted on. At the next stage (Third Reading) the House votes again on whether to approve the Bill in its amended form. Statutory Instruments (Regulations) are issued by the government (executive) and are known as delegated legislation because the government only has power to issue a regulation if an Act (called the parent Act) gives it power to do so. As you would expect there are safeguards. First of all the courts can declare invalid (ultra vires) any regulation whose terms go outside the limits of the power delegated by the Parent Act. Sometime the parent Act will provide that Regulations issued by the government under delegated powers become law without further involvement of Parliament but sometimes an Act will provide for some limited further Parliamentary scrutiny. This can be either by the Positive Resolution (the regulation will not become law until Parliament approve it) or by the Negative Resolution procedure (the regulation will become law unless Parliament passes a resolution annulling it). A key point, in the context of the question, is that neither the Positive nor the Negative Resolution procedure allows Parliament to amend the regulation - Parliament only has a binary choice to approve or disapprove. Of course if they disapprove then the government can issue a new amended regulation which then goes through the same process but the Positive/Negative resolution procedure does not allow Parliament itself to amend any regulation. I think this explains why diagrams which are sometimes found in regulations are rarely found in Acts. Constitutional proprieties require any Bill to be amendable and any member of the legislature can propose a amendment. If the Bill included diagrams then there would be huge practical problems because any member who wanted to amend a diagram would have to produce his own amended diagram which he might not be able to do/might not have time to do before parliamentary deadlines. So constitutional proprieties would normally mean that in practice Bills must be solely words. Regulations however cannot be amended by Parliament (see above) so such considerations do not prevent regulations from containing diagrams. Having said that normally Bills will only contain words, there is this example of an Act which includes a diagram of a symbol. That symbol, however, is defined in an international convention so in practice no parliamentarian would want to amend it. I know of no examples in the UK where a Bill (as distinct from regulations) contains an image which a member of the legislature might want to propose an amendment to. |
Can I scrape social media websites and advertise personal user information? I have recently built a scraper that could collect user information from a variety of social media platforms, these include: Instagram, Twitter and Nextdoor. The information provided to me are the following: Profile/Persons name Location Posts Other people in association with the user What are my legal rights in advertising this information for marketing uses such as statistics on users? Otherwise, what consequences may I face if I do so? | As Rick mentioned in comments this would most definitely be considered processing of personally identifiable information (PII) under the UK GDPR. You mention "advertising" and "marketing purposes" so it's pretty clearly not for your own personal household/family use and that means you would have to comply with the GDPR. That means you're going to need what's called a "Lawful Basis" for processing this data. There's six different ones: (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) You haven't provided enough information for to hazard a guess at what your basis would be but the ICO has an on-line tool which would give you a starting point. It's a very good idea to make sure you have all your i's dotted and all your t's crossed before you start processing any PII - and that includes documenting the process. Otherwise, what consequences may I face if I do so? In some ways the consequences of non-compliance are "what have you done?" coupled with "how much have you got?", the maximum penalty is £17.5m or 4% of your annual turnover (whichever is greater) and fines issued under the UK GDPR to date have ranged from mere pocket change to almost enough to buy a tank of petrol. Widen it to the EU and small property owners association got a €500 slap on the wrist and Amazon managed to net themselves a €746m fine. | No, it's not legal. The General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) apply given that you are in the UK (regardless of where the Data Processor is based). The UK GDPR is slightly modified due to Brexit, but the same principles apply. The only plausible legal basis for this actions would be that you consent to it, and you're entitled to withdraw that consent at any time. Some may claim that Article 6.1(b) applies, i.e. that it's necessary to send marketing email in order to fulfil the contract, but GDPR is clear that bundling such consent into a contract for service simply to permit the data processor additional actions isn't allowed, as I'll demonstrate. UK GDPR requires that consent to use your personal information (in this case, your email address) for the stated purpose be freely given. Consent to use your information for direct marketing is not freely given if it's inseparable from the consent to use it for some other service, as per para 43: Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. And Article 7.4 backs this up with When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. The intent of Article 6.1(b) is that only the processing required for the service you have bought is allowed (e.g. if you supply your address for delivery of stuff you've bought, the data processor can use that address to send you the stuff, but is not allowed to add a contract term that allows them to send you unwanted stuff). Examples of emails that Article 6.1(b) would allow (in my assessment) include things such as notification of upcoming downtime, or a reminder that subscriptions are due, but not unsolicited advertisements for other products. There's a grey area that's open to interpretation, where adverts are piggybacked onto actual service messages. | Yes, this violates the GDPR if the user is in Europe. Data which is tied to a personal device can be tied to the person who owns it. From "What Is Personal Data" by the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (emphasis added): Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. What identifies an individual could be as simple as a name or a number or could include other identifiers such as an IP address or a cookie identifier, or other factors. If it is possible to identify an individual directly from the information you are processing, then that information may be personal data. If you cannot directly identify an individual from that information, then you need to consider whether the individual is still identifiable. You should take into account the information you are processing together with all the means reasonably likely to be used by either you or any other person to identify that individual. The bit about "all means reasonably likely" in the last bullet includes the kind of de-anonymisation tactics described in the NYT article. There are 6 lawful bases for data processing in the GDPR, and all processing must fall under at least one of them. (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) Selling data isn't covered by any of the others, so consent must be obtained. Permission must be clear and positive, and you cannot predicate delivery of a service on the processing of data that isn't necessary for that service. So for instance you cannot say "You can use this service as long as we are allowed to collect and sell your data" because selling the data isn't necessary to the provision of the service. From "Consent" by the ICO: Consent requires a positive opt-in. Don’t use pre-ticked boxes or any other method of default consent. Explicit consent requires a very clear and specific statement of consent. Keep your consent requests separate from other terms and conditions. Be specific and ‘granular’ so that you get separate consent for separate things. Vague or blanket consent is not enough. [...] Avoid making consent to processing a precondition of a service. This applies to any processing of data about individuals within the EU, so just being an American company doesn't get you a free pass to ignore the GDPR if your app gets used by Europeans. The "Legitimate interests" basis is more problematic, in that the company collecting the data has to conduct a vague "balancing test" to determine if this basis applies. For direct marketing the ICO has written this, which says that direct marketing may be a legitimate interest, especially if you can show that the user has expressed interest in such adverts. For instance a location service which promises to tell you about nearby special offers would fall into this category. Against this, the impact on the user's privacy has to be considered, and location data is "special category data" because it can reveal medical information (e.g. hospital attendance) or religious affiliation (e.g. which church you go to). So unless the relationship between the recorded location data and the service is very direct its not going to pass the balancing test. The company would also need to distinguish between knowing the current location and keeping a record of historical locations; the two need separate justification. And of course nothing about this covers the sale of the data; this is considering a company which sells advertising space in it's app, not one that sells the data itself. | You must get opt-in affirmative consent to process personal data, including tracking people's use of your site or providing targeted advertising. The banner on StackExchange is likely in violation of the GDPR. Do not copy it. It does not have an explicit opt-in, only an opt out which is onerous (leave the site, then manually go in and delete any cookies they set, which may be hard to identify if they are from 3rd parties). The sites you mention that have a gateway are a more correct implementation. Consent must be acquired before processing of data begins, and it must be explicit. | A web site that is serious on protecting some content behind a paywall will put the protected content, or a version of the page with both protected and unprotected content, on separate page or pages, so arranged that a user will not be able to follow the link until that user has signed in and been accepted as an authorized user. A site that merely uses CSS to hide "protected" content is not really protecting it. CSS is designed to be modified by the ultimate user -- that is part of its function. If the site chooses to send you content, you are entitled to read it. Even if some of the content has a CSS tag attached which suppresses or obscures the display of that content, they know perfectly well that any user can supersede this with local CSS, and so I don't see how they have any legal claim, nor any way of knowing if you have accessed the "hidden" content or not. If you attempt to bypass or hack a login screen, that might be circumvention under the US DMCA, or "Unauthorized computer access" under any of several laws. | It's hard to say, under the Twitter TOS. They do not claim that copyright is transferred to them: "You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. What’s yours is yours — you own your Content (and your photos and videos are part of the Content)". But you do license the content: By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. You agree that this license includes the right for Twitter to provide, promote, and improve the Services and to make Content submitted to or through the Services available to other companies, organizations or individuals for the syndication, broadcast, distribution, promotion or publication of such Content on other media and services, subject to our terms and conditions for such Content use. Such additional uses by Twitter, or other companies, organizations or individuals, may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services. The totality of conditions, including the Twitter Rules, is ever-evolving and not apparently contained in a single link. From what I can tell, there is no condition that prohibits a user from copying tweets into a book. There are numerous statements about "respecting copyright" which refer to taking material that is not licensed to Twitter and redistributing: nothing about redistributing licensed material.A plain reading of the first bold sentence says that you can make your content available to the world, not restricted to "retweeting". | The Facebook Pixel analytics solution does not seem to support access or erasure for data subjects. While there are some GDPR compliance features, these focus on collecting consent prior to collecting data. The relationship between the pixel user and Facebook is also murky. For certain kinds of data, Facebook acts as the data processor only, and the user has all the responsibility as the data controller. For other kinds of data, Facebook and the Pixel user are joint controllers, and therefore jointly responsible. This lack of features doesn't necessarily mean that Facebook Pixel is in violation of the GDPR, since the GDPR Right to Erasure only applies under certain circumstances. However, it is really difficult to argue that a website or app that integrates Facebook Pixel would be compliant. It is also rather dubious that Facebook could be compliant themselves, since their pixels will also collect data about persons who are not Facebook members. While these problems are most apparent with the Facebook Pixel since it's explicitly intended for tracking, this problem also applies to any other embeds provided by Facebook, such as like buttons. This was the subject of the Fashion ID case, in which the ECJ determined (in 2019) that the site operator is a joint controller with regards to data collection on the website by the Facebook embed. This effectively means that third party embeds can only be loaded after the website visitor has given consent for sharing data with Facebook. The tracking of non-users by Facebook was seen as especially problematic in Belgium, where Facebook had been banned from collecting such data already in 2015 (which was upheld in 2018). Since this was pre-GDPR, FB is currently litigating whether Belgium can continue enforcing their ban. I expect that Belgium will prevail with their ban. While this has no immediate consequences for Pixel users, this would make it more likely that Pixel users could be sued or fined successfully. From an advertiser perspective, Facebook does have valuable data that make the integration of Facebook Pixel an attractive proposition. However, other analytics solutions are much easier to bring into compliance. This is ultimately a business decision: will the better understanding of your ad spend on Facebook outweigh the risk and effort of integrating the Pixel? | The length of a literary work doesn't determine if its use is fair use. Copyright does not cover names, titles of works, catchwords/catchphrases/advertising slogans etc. or lists of ingredients (like in a recipe or chemical instructions), however, the procedure can be copyright. The work must also be original. If the tweet copies something that already exists then there is no copyright in the tweet - if the thing that is copied has copyright protection then the tweet itself may be a violation. That said, assuming that the Tweet enjoys copyright protection, the owner will be the author: presumably the owner of the Twitter account. For anyone else to legally use it, the use must be either: Licensed by the copyright owner Fair use (USA) or Fair Dealing (most everywhere else in the English speaking world) For Item 1, the Twitter terms of service say: You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). In case you don't know what that means, Twitter gives you this plain English summary: Tip: This license is you authorizing us to make your Tweets on the Twitter Services available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. So, you can get permission from the copyright holder or from Twitter. Well, Twitter has given permission: Except as permitted through the Twitter Services, these Terms, or the terms provided on dev.twitter.com, you have to use the Twitter API if you want to reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the Twitter Services or Content on the Twitter Services. Providing you use their API, you can "reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the ... Content ..." Therefore, fair use/dealing considerations are irrelevant. |
Can an American living in the UK become a British citizen without losing American citizenship? If an American citizen living in the United Kingdom (England if it matters) meets all of the UK's requirements for naturalization, can he become a British citizen without losing his American citizenship? | Yes From the American perspective: U.S. law does not mention dual nationality1 or require a person to choose one nationality or another. A U.S. citizen may naturalize in a foreign state without any risk to his or her U.S. citizenship. Source: U.S. Department of State — Bureau of Consular Affairs And from the British: Dual citizenship (also known as dual nationality) is allowed in the UK. This means you can be a British citizen and also a citizen of other countries. Source: Gov.Uk 1Section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states that “the term ‘national of the United States’ means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” Therefore, U.S. citizens are also U.S. nationals. Non-citizen nationality status refers only individuals who were born either in American Samoa or on Swains Island to parents who are not citizens of the United States [Source: Dept of State, as above] | To quote Wikipedia: In theory anyone who is at least 16 and resident in the United Kingdom can call themselves whatever they wish. In practice, however, some form of documentary evidence is required when changing your name on bank accounts, passport, etc: Documentary evidence of a change of name can be in a number of forms, such as a marriage certificate, decree absolute, civil partnership certificate, statutory declaration or deed of change of name. While it seems likely that a certified translation of your marriage certificate would probably be sufficient, it may be quicker (and cheaper) to use a deed of change of name. (See also the government advice on the subject.) | I just put in for a transfer to another location my company has there and will transfer back to my original location when we move back. I don't believe I should have to go and change my state of residency, drivers license, car registration/plates, insurance etc) since I consider where I am now my permanent home. It's just a temporary relocation. While this arguably works for the common law concept of domicile, as a practical matter, if you live someplace for the majority of a year, and often more than 30 days, you are considered to reside there. You should change your driver's license, car registration/plates, insurance, voter's registration, etc., unless there is an extremely compelling reason to do otherwise, and not just different tax rates and more bureaucratic inconvenience. A planned three year stay doesn't cut it, especially, if you don't own a home or have a residential lease on a residence in the state you want to claim as your residence. The main exceptions would be someone who is in an institutional setting, such as attending college residentially for nine months a year while supported by their parents, in a prison, or in military service, where different conventions sometimes apply. Legally, could I leave everything as is since the apartment "technically?" isn't mine (I'd just be staying there with her? No. Residency and who owns or leases the place where you are living are two entirely different things. The many people who don't have a lease or own a home are still residents of the places where they live. For that matter, even if you are not a citizen of the U.S., you can still be a resident of a particular state or locality. I'd be filing my taxes as someone that commutes out of state to work and residing in their current home state etc. Nope. For state income tax purposes, you reside in the state where you sleep a majority of the nights in a year. There are sometimes more complicated rules that apply to apportion income between states, but that is the strong general rule. Is there anything I'm missing/not aware of that would make this a bad idea? Or is this a normal thing people do commonly and I'm overthinking it. This is a bad idea and not a normal thing that people do commonly. At a minimum, it will leave you with bureaucratic tangles and at risk of serious state tax audits (which, reading between the lines, seems like the most plausible reason you are thinking about this approach). At worst, you could be exposed to liability for having improper tax payments and car insurance in place, and potential criminal liability for misrepresenting your residence. It might not end up coming to a head and being a problem, but the probability that it will is significant. | Would the American client refuse to have to potentially deal with non-American courts, in the possibility of a conflict? Some might, but probably not all. Most wouldn't bother to read it; others who do won't understand what the jurisdiction provision means. Should the contractor pick just one court (English OR Welsh)? No. England and Wales is a unified legal jurisdiction. The two countries share a single court system. Could the contract stipulates that is enforceable under exclusive jurisdiction of American, English and Welsh courts, but that the Welsh one takes precedence? If US courts have jurisdiction and English-and-Welsh courts have jurisdiction, then there is no exclusive jurisdiction. | I have heard that you have to spend at least six months in a year in US to remain eligible for naturalization. Is that really true? No, that is not true. There is no requirement regarding amount of time you have to spend in the US in a year. The only requirements are the continuous residence requirement and the physical presence requirement. You are presumed to break continuous residence if you have an absence of more than 6 months (though it is possible to overcome the presumption with strong evidence for absences of between 6 months and 1 year). Since your trips are less than 6 months, they should be okay. It is possible that if you returned for just a day, and then leave again, the officer might consider the absences are really just one big absence, which would then potentially jeopardize continuous residence. I don't think that should be an issue in your case. The physical presence requirement is just physical presence for half of the required period (30 months if you are applying under the 5-year rule). So you would not meet it if you were gone for more than half the year every year. But being gone more than half the year for just one or two years, with the other years being here the whole time, should not be a problem for the physical presence requirement. | As of 23:00 GMT on 31 January 2020, the UK is no longer a member of the European Union. But there is a 'transition period' or 'implementation period' until 31 December 2020. During this period the UK is 'in' the EU single market and customs union. For practical purposes it is 'in' the EEA until 31 December 2020. By the way, Switzerland is not a member of the EEA but it is in the EU single market. | A person should register to vote in their state of residence. Aka the state where they claim to be a resident. Unfortunately, residency is defined by the individual states and the definitions aren't consistent. Even more unfortunate is that the state where a person is registered to vote is often used as a criteria in determining a person's state of residency. So, chicken and egg. Unfortunate on top of that is that residency requirements are different according to purpose. For example you may fit a definition of resident for the purpose of vehicle registration but not for income tax purposes. The important thing is to be consistent. If a student claims to be a resident of her home state so she doesn't have to change her vehicle registration, she should not claim the school state in order to get out of income tax (or any such things). After consistency, be reasonable. Based on your facts, I think FL is the best bet. She lives there and intends to live there. That's also a good place to pay taxes! But there's the rub. If she tries to claim FL as her residency for income tax purposes someone might take issue with the fact that she hasn't moved her drivers license. TLDR; plan to register where you'll live when the election happens. If anything is glaringly wrong with that plan, seek alternatives. There is nothing glaringly wrong with registering to vote in FL. Oops, forgot to add, this document purports to summarize state laws regarding registration: http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/Federal%20Voter%20Registration_6-25-14_ENG.pdf | There's no hard deadline for you to return to the US. There are some consequences, however, beginning at 180 days, at which point you are to be processed at the border as an "applicant for admission," which will usually have little practical impact on the process. After a year, your green card is no longer valid for admission to the US. This doesn't mean that you lose your LPR status, and the green card remains valid for other purposes. It just means that you should get a returning resident visa (unless you have a re-entry permit, which you would have to have acquired before leaving the US, so I assume you don't have one). There are ways to get into the US without a returning resident visa -- in particular, an airline isn't going to refuse to fly you to the US, because they won't know that you've been away for more than a year. Your LPR status remains until there is a formal finding that you have abandoned your residence in the US. This can be a result of your voluntarily relinquishing it or of an administrative or judicial action. In general, it's probably safe to say, the longer you're away, the more likely the immigration officer is to look into the possibility of abandonment. If you are absent for more than six months, you may also delay your eligibility to naturalize because this absence would disrupt "continuity of residence." A good starting point is the USCIS page International Travel as a Permanent Resident, which has more information about these matters as well as links to more detailed descriptions of some of them. Since this is https://law.stackexchange.com/, I suppose I should add some citations. The 180-day threshold is found in 8 USC 1101(a)(13)(c). The one-year threshold is at 8 CFR 211.1(a)(2). Residence requirements for naturalization are regulated at 8 CFR 316.5. It should be stressed that failing to meet these requirements does not by itself put your LPR status at risk; it only affects your ability to qualify for naturalization. |
If I move to Indonesia as a British citizen but continue to work for a British company how will my tax work? The UK and Indonesia have a "Double Taxation agreement". I'm also assuming that the digital nomad visa for Indonesia will go ahead. The visa allows you to stay in the country without paying tax. [emphasis mine] The plan is now to launch an Indonesia 5 year digital nomad visa that will facilitate long-term stays, and allow the holder to live in the country without paying tax in Indonesia. As far as I understand it a double taxation treaty means that you don't pay tax in both countries (whether that's not paying tax in one country from the start, or claiming it back afterwards). If I'm not paying tax in Indonesia then would the double tax treaty even apply? So would I have to pay tax in the UK or would I pay no tax at all? Would my company just keep paying me to my UK bank account as normal? | The usual method is that every country charges you income tax for income that you make while your body is in the country. Big exception is the USA which wants a chunk of every income, and some countries like Germany calculate your tax rate based on world wide income, but charge that tax rate on your income in Germany. "Double taxation agreements" usually have the purpose that if two countries think you should pay tax on the same money, then somehow you only pay once. If you were a US citizen, then being tax-free in Indonesia wouldn't help you at all, because the USA would want full US tax minus zero Indonesian tax. In the UK, you need to check what money you have to pay tax on as a UK citizen, especially in the first and last year when you are still in the UK. For the use of a bank account in which country, ask a lawyer. Especially as making a stupid mistake could be very costly. It may be easier to set up a company in Indonesia and your company pays the company, because it is very unlikely that your UK company wants to learn about Indonesian tax law and risk getting it wrong. | If the Attorney General has officially determined that you renounced US citizenship for the purpose of avoiding taxation, you have a lifetime ban under INA 212(a)(10)(E), and there is no immigrant waiver for this ban. See 9 FAM 302.12-6. I am not sure if the Attorney General has ever made such a determination about anyone. Otherwise, I don't see anything that would prevent you from immigrating to the US like any other foreigner. | too long, didn't read: You would be liable for a claim for breach of contract. The self-isolation guidance is voluntary in this scenario and in any event the relevant legislation allows you to leave to "fulfil a legal obligation" such as completing a contract. Therefore, the court would probably give judgment for the claimant on the facts you've given us. Your requirement to self-isolate The Government guidance for self-isolating on suspicion of, or a positive test for, coronavirus is entirely voluntary. You are only subject to legal obligations to self-isolate, and the associated risk of a £1,000 fine, if you enter England from a non-exempt country under Clause 4 of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) Regulations 2020. Therefore, in the given situation, you would not be legally obliged to remain within the property for the entirely of the quarantine period. You would be able to seek alternative accommodation. Indeed, even if you were subject to Clause 4, subclause 9(c) explicitly states: (9) During the period of their self-isolation, P may not leave, or be outside of, the place where P is self-isolating except— (c) to fulfil a legal obligation, including attending court or satisfying bail conditions, or to participate in legal proceedings, Fulfilling the terms of the contract of sale would count as needing to "fulfil a legal obligation" so you would not be fined under the legislation and it would not be a defence to any lawsuit. The court's view Given that the self-isolation guidance is voluntary and, in any event, the relevant legislation has the "legal obligation" escape hatch, the court would likely treat this as a standard breach of contract and find that you had no exceptional circumstances that caused you to breach the contract by failing to vacate the property on the day of completion. Conclusion You would be open to a claim for breach of contract. Your defence would be unlikely to succeed on the merits and the court would likely side with the claimant. | This is more a political question than a legal one, so the answer is more political than legal. Countries are sovereign, and thus can decide which treaties affect them. The UK does not need to agree to any treaty with the EU. It can just refuse to sign the agreement, and just go on its own. Of course, this works both ways. In the same way the EU cannot impose a treaty on the UK about movement of people or the North Ireland borders, the UK cannot impose a treaty on the EU allowing it trade without tariffs. If the UK does not want the deal, the path is straightforward: the Parliament1 rejects the treaty proposal. Of course, then probably the EU will be way less amenable to a free trade pact. Someone being free to do something does not exempt that someone from the consequences of doing that something. If the treaty is put into effect, then at any moment the UK (either from action by the Executive1 or the Parliament1, that is to be internally decided by the UK) can just decide that EU trade is not worth following EU regulations and just withdraw from the treaty. Happens all the time. That the UK cannot unilaterally withdraw from the treaty means is that, should the UK unilaterally decide to leave the "backstop", the UK will be in breach of the treaty and so the EU can ask in international courts for compensation3. In contrast, in many treaties there are explicit clauses explaining the conditions (e.g. notification in advance to the other parties) that allow for a signatory to "lawfully" withdraw from the treaty. But certainly the EU cannot impose its laws on the UK against the decision of the Parliament (again, this is pretty much what "the UK is a sovereign country" means). 1 Elected by British citizens2. So much for "political discrimination". 2Actually it is something more complicated but not because of the EU but of the Empire, as there are some rules allowing citizens of British Overseas Territories or Commonwealth to vote. But that is a question completely internal to the UK. 3And of course, cancel the tariff-free part of the treaty and the agreements for after the backstop ends. | Can a shopowner in Thailand ban someone from entering their shop on the grounds of their citizenship? The first tweet, explains the context properly: I’m at my local hospital this afternoon to get a medical certificate. My work permit expires soon and so I need to run around getting all the documents in order. At the hospital they wanted to check my passport before letting me in to see if I had been abroad recently. Thailand has been very popular with visitors for decades and if laws existed that discriminated against foreigners this would be commonly known. So in this case the 'discrimination' probably not because of citizenship, but more about a faulty assumption that the virus is spread by foreigners. This will have nothing to do with Thai law. The (tweet) OP quotes only another persons claim. The OP states in the first tweet that they checked his passport only to see if he was abroad recently. So he didn't share the same experience of the American. Based on that, this second hand source (that can't be verified) is probably unreliable. Due to the present (global) uncertainties, caused by the Coronavirus, one should look at the whole picture. 2020-02-04: Coronavirus: Chinese targeted as Italians panic - BBC News In Italy and elsewhere, panic is spreading much faster than the coronavirus itself. Chinese businesses are empty, shopkeepers are shutting down and Chinese nationals are being targeted. At a bar beside the Trevi fountain, a notice was put up banning customers from China. So the the situation described by the original (tweet) OP is understandable, but the quoted (but not varified) second hand source as well as the events in Italy are not. The incidents have prompted condemnation from the Italian authorities. Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte reprimanded the regional governors, telling them that they were not competent to make such a call and that nothing justified such fear. Discrimination, solely due to citizenship, would be against Human Rights prevention of discrimination. Special cases may exist for prices that are subsidized and thus only for residents. Dual pricing was common in the Czech Republic until 1999, when it was ruled illegal (but still persisted). Then a foreign resident had to supply proof of residency to avoid paying the higher price. 2007: Illegal practice of dual pricing persists in Czech Republic At the time we assumed that this was legal (it was certainly understandable), but it seems that was not the case. Are the "Human Rights prevention of discrimination" written down somewhere? Also, who enforce them? Universal Declaration of Human | United Nations Human Rights Enforcement Mechanisms of the United Nations | ESCR-Net European Convention on Human Rights - Wikipedia European Court of Human Rights How these international laws/conventions are implemented into national laws will differ from country to country. For Germany they are anchored into the constitution: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany Article 25 Primacy of international law The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory. and are enforced by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and can be passed on to the European Court of Justice (or European Court of Human Rights) should the need arise. Thailand: Part of Section 30 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2007: Unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of the difference in origin, race, language, sex, age, disability, physical or health condition, personal status, economic or social standing, religious belief, education or constitutionally political view, shall not be permitted. | I [Bob] have been in the work force for 35+ years and filed / paid taxes many times. Thus, I have not violated relevant tax law and will not agree to pay any penalty. This is not a conclusory statement. It is an irrelevant statement. Example 1: "Bob was not required to file a 2021 tax return. Therefore no offence has been committed.". This is conclusory because it offers a conclusion without explaining how it was reached (why was Bob not required to file a 2021 tax return?). Example 2: "Bob filed his 2020 tax return. Therefore no offence has been committed". This is irrelevant because the alleged offence relates to 2021, not 2020. You can work out the difference by imagining what would happen if Bob substantiated his claims. If Bob submits evidence to show that he has been "in the work force for 35+ years and filed / paid taxes many times", it will make no difference to his case because it is irrelevant (unless he can also show that he filed and paid in relation to 2021 specifically). A conclusory statement on the other hand is capable of being effective if it is backed up by supporting evidence and arguments. In example 1 above, if Bob submits evidence to show that he was not required to file in 2021, then his conclusion will be effective. Note: the phrase "conclusory statement" does not appear to be a commonly used one, returning only 171,000 results on Google. I've personally not come across it (england-and-wales), but perhaps it is more common elsewhere. | germany German Länder do not provide any citizenship-like benefits. You are a resident and that determines your administrative duties like where you register your car, which public school you can go to, where and which taxes you have to pay etc. Some places in Germany differentiate their services between "locals" and "others", for example beach access in tourist cities is sometimes locked behind a fee to non-locals (aka tourists). But that never depends on federal state, but on way smaller units. Residents of one beach town might be "tourists" 20km down the road at the next city's beach. It is more of a "the people whose taxes allow us to maintain this, go for free" approach. Outside of badly translated internet forms originally made for the US, I have never been asked for my Bundesland. The Bundesland is not printed on our national ID cards. Although anybody with a little knowledge of geography (or access to Google) can find out your Bundesland by just looking up the actual address that is printed on the ID card, the information of which Bundesland this is is really not important outside of government bureaucracy. | Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG. |
Is there a commonly agreed on definition of "third party" or does a contractual agreement have to define the term? Does a contract have to define "third party" or does it have a standard meaning of "any entity not a party to this agreement"? If third party is not explicitly defined in an agreement between Party A and Party B, is Party B free to regard its agent, or any company it contracts with to perform services (even a company that is a competitor of Party A) to be not a third party? Does the answer to these questions vary by jurisdiction? I have seen the following explicit definition in a company's Privacy statement: Third Party: any entity that is not Acme Widgets, an Acme Widgets employee, contractor, or agent. | Third-party has a general meaning but one that can be changed by the contract Third-party means someone who is not a party to the contract nor an agent of one of the parties (such as an employee of one of them). The term came about because most contracts only have two parties and they were historically identified as the first party and the second party although that usage is now uncommon: that makes everyone else a third party, even where the contract has more than 2 parties. The definition you cite expands the definition to include contractors of one of the parties: independent contractors are third parties unless their contract amounts to an agency agreement. | GDPR defines the responsibility of Companies to ensure that Personal Data in their possession is maintained Secure ensuring Confidentiality and Privacy towards the Data Subjects to whom it pertains. Prior to the Articles themselves, there are notes and over (49) one may read that companies must have in place (where applicable) mechanisms like CERT and any other SECURITY assuring tools/ processes. (83) again is all about ensuring Security. (94) reads that if the Controller (company) find it cannot ensure Security it must stop processing activities and report to the Supervisory Authority for guidance and support. Then we have Article 3 (f) establishing that it is the company responsibility to "... ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorized or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organizational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’)..." Bottom line... T&C Companies must ensure that Personal Data is processed by them (and that includes communications) are Secure while ensuring Confidentiality and Pricavy towards the Data Subjects. The wording "...commercially reasonable efforts..." is wrong, because it is not something that may be a legal requirement or not depending on "cost"; it is a Legal Obligation. Then "... the Internet is not an inherently secure environment and so we cannot guarantee the security of your Personal Information..."; this is just "poor legal advice" for GDPR does expect companies to make the Internet safe, it expects companies to maintain their IT Landscape safe... an analogy can be made about going through a group of sharks in the ocean while just swimming or on board of a big boat... the ocean is dangerous due to the sharks, yet if you are in a big boat, you won't even notice them. Then the "cherry on top"; "... e assume no liability for any disclosure of data due to errors in transmission, unauthorized third-party access or other acts of third parties, or acts or omissions beyond our reasonable control..."; now i really do not know which lawyer has written this, but it basically reads something like: "the law obliges me to ensure you are safe... however I am not able to". Now, I have seen similar "statements", but I must confess it was like 2 or 3 years ago... most companies have corrected them over time and since they become aware that penalties were for real. Just a final disclaimer It is a fact that while in transit (over the Internet) a message being delivered through a T&C Company Services will travel through 3rd party infrastructure contexts, rendering it at risk ... however, if it is properly encrypted (as it should) the transition time will not be sufficient for a successful breach attempt. So, yes they are capable of ensuring all they have stated they can not. | Q1. Is there a requirement under GDPR for data processors to disclose sub-processing arrangements and the names of the organisations involved in this? "The processor shall not engage another processor without prior specific or general written authorisation of the controller. In the case of general written authorisation, the processor shall inform the controller of any intended changes concerning the addition or replacement of other processors, thereby giving the controller the opportunity to object to such changes." -- EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 28 Paragraph 2 This clearly states that the processor would need to make clear that they are subcontracting the services and get permission for this as part of the contract, but doesn't specify whether the subcontractors must be named and identified. Perhaps there is other prior existing subcontracting legislation that requires them to be named? Some procurement contracts as supplied by controllers may specify a list of nominated (allowed) sub-contractors or require the full identification of sub-contractors though I've not found anything in law that requires they be named other than as part of a specific contractual obligation. Q2. Is there a requirement under GDPR for data processors to disclose the country or countries where data is stored and processed? "Processing by a processor shall be governed by a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law, that is binding on the processor with regard to the controller and that sets out the subject-matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects and the obligations and rights of the controller. That contract or other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor: ... (h) makes available to the controller all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article and allow for and contribute to audits, including inspections, conducted by the controller or another auditor mandated by the controller. ..." -- EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 28 Paragraph 3(h) This clearly states the data processor must make available to the data controller all details required to demonstrate compliance. It's quite likely larger organisations may choose to make this simple for data controllers by supplying this information in the form of a completed Data Privacy Impact Analysis document. "Each controller and, where applicable, the controller's representative, shall maintain a record of processing activities under its responsibility. That record shall contain all of the following information: ... (e) where applicable, transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation, including the identification of that third country or international organisation and, in the case of transfers referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 49(1), the documentation of suitable safeguards; ..." -- EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 30 Paragraph 1(e) This clearly states the data controller must maintain a record of the country or countries involved if any of these are outside the EU, and so this information must be made available to the controller as stated above. | Does an agreement in a chat count as a valid contract? In most jurisdictions (and for most transactions): yes. Usually the only thing that matters for a valid contract is that there is a mutual agreement – whether that is in writing, orally, via chat or via sign language does not matter. Of course, having things in writing makes it easier to prove in court if there is a problem, so it's still advisable. What steps could I take if they don't send the money? You can: remind them to pay if they still don't pay, you can sue them. Some juridictions have accelerated court proceedings for simple cases like this (e.g. Gerichtliches Mahnverfahren in Germany), otherwise you will have to sue in a regular court that deals with contract disputes. But I have no names and I am unsure what they can or have to do after they received the package. This is going to be the main problem. It's no good to enter into a contract if you do not know who the other party is :-). You definitely need to find out who exactly entered into an agreement with you. If the sale is to a private person, find out their name and address. If the sale is to a business (seems to be the case here), find the official name and legal type of the business, and make sure whoever you deal with is authorized to enter into contracts. Otherwise the contract will be hard to enforce in court if things go wrong. | Yes Unless your business is a sole proprietorship it operates as a legal entity seperate from its owners. It owns its assets an acrues its own liabilities. It can be sued and it can sue others. It can also agree to its own contracts. Typically the only thing a legal entity that is not a natural person cannot do is sign a marriage contract. Depending on the industry there may be no need to sue. There exist many mandatory workplace insurance to cover accidents in the workplace. You may have to share details of the injury with them but they may be uninterested in whos at fault. | "This policy" is referring to the Mozilla Community Participation Guidelines as amended (basically a Terms of Service (TOS) agreement). If so, does it mean adherence to Guidlines is fixed to version current at the moment of commencement of employment? Not really. It means that Mozilla Community Participation Guidelines are primarily guidelines for members of the general public who are not employees, and that different unstated policies delivered to employees are what govern employees instead. There are consequences for Mozilla employees failing to honor the current version of the Mozilla Community Participation Guidelines, but those consequences are set forth in an employment contract with the employees rather than being limited to the consequences and procedures set forth in the Mozilla Community Participation Guidelines for members of the general public who aren't employees. | There is ample reason to conclude that "non-commercial" would include a church, as well as advocating a political cause or candidate. The hard part of "personal". In the context of (Canadian) bankruptcy law, it can mean "non-business use"; in the context of "personal use property", it can be "A type of property that an individual does not use for business purposes or hold as an investment. In other words, property that an individual owns for personal enjoyment". US tax law takes "personal purposes" to refer to non-business purposes. But in the context of copyright (especially music downloading / copying), it is taken to refer to the use of or by an individual. Distributing free copies of a protected work does not get legally sanctioned due to the copying being non-commercial. The alternative term "private" is much clearer, in identifying "just you", but is probably avoided in this kind of context so as to avoid the wrong inference that you can only play Pokemon in the privacy of your own home. So the slightly less clear term "personal" is used instead of "private" especially in copyright-related contexts. "Personal" and "private" are not exactly the same, but when it's about use, I don't see any difference, and I think there is no question that use to attract to a church or political candidate is not "private", it is public. Since the license does not define "your own personal purposes" and there is not an existing crystal-clear definition of "personal purposes", the phrase could be given its "ordinary (plain) meaning". Of course, plain meaning has to give way to contractual intent, so we have to figure out what the parties intended. Except, you don't have a contract with Niantic, but still, plain meaning surely has some place in the law of licenses. At this point, in a lawsuit, both sides would hire an expert witness like a linguist or English teacher to make the case that a church or other non-commercial non-private use is / is not included in the meaning of "personal purpose". A silly argument could be made to the effect that if you personally have an interest in doing something then it is a personal purpose (if specifically commercial, it would be precluded by the term "noncommercial"). What makes this silly is that everybody does things for personal purposes (even acting in a way that benefits others, since you do so for the personal reason that you should do so), and thus "personal" would not mean anything. That is, "personal purposes" does not mean "whatever motivation or interest you personally have". You can also gain a certain understanding of what "personal purposes" means by looking at similar licenses. In the context of academic publishing, authors are typically granted license to copy "for personal, professional, or teaching purposes". Professional purposes and teaching purposes are things that the person has an interest in, so by mentioning these things separately, we must conclude that "teaching" is not a "personal purpose". And so: I would conclude that a court could find that using a product to support a political campaign, philosophy, or religion, is a "public" purpose, not a "personal" purpose. At the same time, at least as I understand it, a lure module is a thing that others besides yourself personally can see (I admit, I don't go), which implies that the purpose of the thing is not entirely private. In addition, there is a fair amount of buzz out there about how a lure could be good for business, which is (1) clearly in contradiction of the license terms and (2) clearly a golden opportunity for Niantic, perhaps in a few weeks after everybody gets hooked and then they will offer non-personal licenses. Their license terms also say that you will not "use the Services or Content, or any portion thereof, for any commercial purpose or for the benefit of any third party or in a manner not permitted by these Terms". I would say that that definitively says "No don't do it", and it also means that you can't be nice to a neighbor. So what they literally say and what they really intend are probably completely different things. | The internal organizational documents and practices of the company would determine this in terms of actual authority and would vary from company to company even within the same jurisdiction of organization and entity type. For example, one company might give that authority to the general counsel, another to the corporate secretary, a third to the Vice President for Information Technology, and a fourth to their Chief Innovation Officer, yet another might allow any officer of the company to do so, or might allow any employee of the company to do so. Usually, the more often a company does something and the more routine it is to do that, the lower down in the organization the authority is allocated. Anyone who appeared to have the authority to do so to a reasonably third-party, however, could bind the company even if they didn't actually have the authority to do so. |
Is it a myth that a single owner LLC protect the owner's personal assets? I own 100% ownership of an LLC. I started this LLC because everyone gave me advice that if the company is sued, the banks won't go after my car, my house or etc. As I dig deeper into the legal framework I realized that in many cases the directors are always being personally implicated in tort law suits. Some have to pay the lawsuits for the rest of their lives. Some have their assets confiscated. A company always acts on the direction of it's directors and a tort lawsuit can be filed on the directors. It becomes more incumbent if there is only one director of the company. | If the company makes a contract, and as a result of that contract it owes more money than it has, then the company goes bankrupt and the owners and directors can walk away from it. This covers the owners/directors in cases of ordinary business contracts. However if an employee (including an owner or director) does something sufficiently harmful then under the law of torts they can be personally liable as well as the company. Examples are negligence and fraud; if you build someone's new roof while acting as an employee and the roof leaks then its likely to be the company on the hook for damages. However if you misrepresented your qualifications or acted negligently then you might well be personally liable. This is all very general. Details are going to be specific to your jurisdiction. So the answer is that having a company is certainly better than making every contract in your own name, but its not complete cover. You can probably get insurance if this is a concern, but its likely to be expensive. | It is true that a shareholder who controls a majority of the votes can be quite powerful indeed. This is a somewhat murky area of the law, but in many cases, a majority shareholder has a fiduciary duty to do what is best for the corporation as a whole (not just the majority shareholder, but all shareholders), an obligation that logically parallels the obligation of the board of directors (which controls a corporation with much the same effect as a majority shareholder). In Delaware, where most large corporations are incorporated, a major shareholder or group of shareholders can have less than 50% of the vote can still be considered de facto majority shareholder if they have influence over the rest of the shareholders. Majority shareholders, either de jure or de facto, are required to act only with "entire fairness" to all the shareholders, and courts may invalidate or otherwise grant relief on transactions made by majority shareholders that are not fair to all shareholders. If a majority shareholder takes actions directly, it has the burden of proof in court to show that any actions taken accord with the "entire fairness" standard. A more in-depth discussion of these issues can be found in this article out of the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. | Yes, an HOA has a duty to treat all members equally You have my condolences. Dealing with an HOA board and/or fellow residents can be frustrating and exasperating. Unfortunately, as a practical matter, the high cost of legal advice often mean boards can ignore the law. In Pennsylvania, as everywhere, the Board of an HOA has a fiduciary relation to the owners. Because they are a fiduciary the Board has a legal duty to run the HOA for the benefit of the owners, not themselves or their friends. As the PA statutes puts it, the Board "shall perform their duties...in good faith...in the best interests of the association..." The duty to act "in good faith" is usually interpreted as including a duty to "treat all community members equally..." (For more on "fiduciary," "good faith" and "equal treatment" see here, here and here.) Whether you are being treated equally depends on the particular facts of your situation, and on how exactly PA courts have interpreted PA law. While you might be able to find a good answer on line, chances are you'll need to talk to a PA attorney with experience in condo law. You should also check your condo's governing documents. They may contain specific provisions about how decisions about additions such as lighting are to be handled. | Not legal advice - you should consult an attorney who knows your local jurisdiction. That's a general statement, but especially true here because the GDPR does not include personal liability for directors (or others) in the event of a data breach, but domestic laws may indeed do just that. The UK is one example where certain circumstances can lead to criminal liability for directors of a firm in the event of a breach. That said, your company should care. The fines for knowingly allowing a breach or not reporting it properly in a timely manner have been made more significant than the prior Directive. There are things you could do to potentially mitigate consequences in the event of a breach and a fine being levied on the company, such as aligning with best practices and getting certifications. In sum, the actual punishments for noncompliance will vary by jurisdiction, but any business that handles data in the EU should undoubtedly be ensuring it is aware of what, if any, obligations it has and taking steps to comply before May's deadline. | Your personal liability depends on your state law regarding the family car doctrine, so the answer there is "maybe" (Texas is not a state with that doctrine, so simple ownership of the car does not confer liability). You would be liable if your supervision of the child was negligent, which means approximately that you knew or should have known that she was a bad driver and would cause damage. Still, the insurance company is suppose to indemnify you (plural) against such loses, as long as they are legally required to do so. That would include many considerations, such as whether the driver was covered under the policy, whether the car was being used contrary to the terms of the policy (being used commercially), and so on. The insurance company is entitled to make a reasonable determination of whether they are responsible for the loss (and if so, to what extent). If they actually decline to cover the loss, you would need to sue them to make them comply with the terms of the policy (and your lawyer would give you a detailed explanation of why they are not liable, in case they aren't). The plaintiff works with his insurance company to recover his insured losses, and with his lawyer to recover any uninsured losses. His insurance company works with your insurance company, up to a point, and then the lawyers get involved. Your daughter does not work with his insurance company, and your insurance company probably has said something along the line "only talk to us". The insurance that a driver typically has may cover some of their own medical costs, but does not provide a payment for "pain and suffering": that is an uninsured loss. It is not generally required that drivers carry insurance to cover their own medical expenses – it is required that they insure against damages, in general, suffered by other parties (if the defendant is at fault). So there is probably nothing for the plaintiff to work out with his insurance company. In Texas, if the defendant is entirely at fault, defendant will be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 90% at fault, defendant will be liable for 90% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 49% at fault, defendant is not liable. Defendant can, in any event, also sue for damages, so if defendant is 49% at fault, defendant can recover 49% of her damages. The insurance companies might be able to talk it out and reach a clear resolution of the matter, but it could be more in their interest to throw the dice and work it out in court. One can always sue at the very start, and drop the suit if it becomes advantageous. | A SAFE is basically what used to be called a "subscription agreement", i.e. an agreement to invest money in the future that will ultimately give rise to an equity investment if made. From a practical perspective, while the contract is legally enforceable, pursuing a lawsuit to enforce it is almost always a death knell level bad move. Firms who sue investors early in the game don't get future investors. The amount of time it takes to enforce such an agreement in a lawsuit is also too long (perhaps a year or two before you have money in hand if it runs its course and still many months if it settles), and the cost of doing so is too great (probably more than $40,000 that you won't get back to bring in $400,000), for it to make sense to do so at the delicate early stage of a start up. Instead, what you need to do is get on the phone with the investor, or quite possibly meet in person, at their offices or in a more casual deal making environment over drinks, for example, to figure out what is troubling them or slowing things up and how to make them happy. This is more of a function of continuing to sell the fact that you are good investment and an opportunity that they are missing out on, than it is about telling them about your legal rights. If this fails, it is probably wiser to seek financing from someone else than to force them to perform. | They fail as a business and the debt passes to another bank. There is a massive banking catastrophe and most banks fail. Companies do not cease to exist because they are in bankruptcy. Typically a caretaker management is set in place (elected either by the borrowers or the judge overseeing the bankruptcy) to avoid the loss of value during those proceedings. Usually a company in bankruptcy has to reduce its operations because it will find it difficult to get resources to continue its usual operations. But it could continue those operations that are still expected to provide a profit. It would not be unusual for the caretaker manager to ask more funds from the borrowers in order to ensure that they do not lose even more of the value of the company. I would say that debt collection is profitable enough to keep it running, at very least to cover the minimal legal requirements so that the debt does not expire. And at the very least, the debt can be sold to a debt collection agency or another bank, outside of the bankruptcy proceedings (then the net value of this sell is what will be passed on to the borrowers). It will give a small profit for the original company, but at almost no cost or risk for them. Also, the debt holder would have no incentive to collect if it was in bankruptcy proceedings and didnt own anything. You are confusing managers with owners. The people deciding what to do are the managers, and even in bankruptcy managers still owe fiduciary duty to their business. In fact, in general there is no need for the manager of the company to "own anything" of the company they manage, yet they have to work to improve its situation. If a manager negligently caused the company to cause value, he could be sued for it. Even if he is not sued, it would look very bad for him when looking for a new job. In any case, this is not different than the shop across the street going out of business. Have you seen any of them putting a sign telling "We no longer own anything, so come here and help yourself whatever you want for free"? No? A credit card company would not do that, either. | You are talking about "joint tenancy." I am familiar with bank accounts having multiple owners characterized as "Joint tenants with rights of survivorship" (JTWROS). This keeps the account out of probate: a death certificate simply removes the name of any owner who dies. But a probate court afraid that a deceased may not have enough assets to satisfy debts can still freeze the account for the duration of probate. These really are not tools for estate planning. For example, you can't use them to avoid gift or estate taxes. Also a JTWROS account is fully exposed to the liability/creditors of every owner. So no, a JTWROS does not shield assets from creditors. Finally, encumbrance of or distribution from a JTWROS account requires the consent of every owner. Any unresolved disputes are probably headed to court. |
If I own the patent to A+B+C, and later A+B is granted a patent, can I still manufacture A+B+C If I manufacture A+B+C, then I would be infringing upon A+B, no? | What the discussion has missed is that how elements are interconnected and interrelated is itself an element. If A and B are things, some C must define their interrelationships. Image a 4-wheel car exists and what everyone knows is that to be stable a car needs 4 wheels in a rectangular arrangement. Someone invents a 3-wheel car by realizing stabilization can be achieved by only one rear wheel if it’s located between the front two. The four wheel car had three wheels but it isn’t a 3-wheeled car. The claim for the 3 wheeled invention needs to not say a car having 3-wheels. That already exists. But a car balanced as a working 3-wheeled car could be claimed. So A + B + C + D existed but someone figured out how to make a workable A + B + C and has a patentable invention. The seeming contradiction is solved by noting that the first case was really A,B,C,D and X where X defines the relationship between the first four elements. The new invention has A,B,C and Y. It is novel and not a subset of the prior art. | A patent grants the holder exclusive rights to make, use and sell the patented item. As such, you can look at the patented object, you can document it, you can study it, you can draw up plans for it. A patent cannot be granted unless the applicant discloses what exactly is being patented. So you can get all the details of a patent from the USPTO (US Patent and Trademark Office). You cannot, however, make one without infringement unless you have permission, usually a license, from the patent holder. Now I am not in any way recommending this but as a practical matter, if you, as an individual, were to make such a piece of furniture incorporating a patented feature for your use, how would they know? There are no "patent police" going from door-to-door looking for infringers. On the other hand if you were to begin selling copies of this piece at your small shop, that might come to the patent holder's attention and they might take action against you. | You can't You agreed: by submitting Materials in any form to the Company, in addition to other provisions of the Terms, you automatically grant Company a royalty-free, world-wide, irrevocable, non-exclusive, and assignable right and license to use, copy, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, edit, translate, create derivative works from, transmit, distribute, publicly display and publicly perform such Materials for the purpose of displaying and promoting the Materials on any website operated by, and in any related marketing materials produced by, the Company and its affiliates. They can keep and use your data forever and give it to whoever they want. The clause you quote doesn't alter that. All it says is that once a year, if you ask, they will tell you what information they shared and with whom. If they feel like it they will tell you how to get the information deleted. | The licence does not allow you to do this However, copyright law may. You work is (probably) an adaptation within the terms of the licence and these are not allowed. So, put the licence aside and consider if your use is fair use or fair dealing; if it is, you are allowed to do it notwithstanding the licence. | If Alice, Bob, and Cassandra are working on the program and releasing it as a joint work, the copyright statement should reflect it: Copyright (c) 2017 Alice, Bob, Cassandra If, on the other hand, Bob and Cassandra are taking advantage of the "modify" clause of the MIT license to create derivative works, the copyright statements are required by the license to be separate: Copyright (c) 2017 Alice Copyright (c) 2017 Bob Copyright (c) 2017 Cassandra | I don't know the specifics of this invention, but it's important to remember that the novelty and non-obviousness of an invention is made as of the date of the patent application (or earlier priority date, not applicable here). In this case, that would be September 5, 1979. So you'd have to look specifically at what art existed as of that date (actually, one year prior to that date) and show that the invention was obvious and not novel in light of that prior art. It would take more than a general claim that it's obvious, for example. The practices followed by the PTO in determining novelty and obviousness in accordance with the law is set out in the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure, chapter 700 ("Examination of patents"). You might find that an interesting read. The current release (Ninth Edition, Revision 07.2015) is here; the edition in effect in 1979 would have been the Fourth Edition, here. As an aside, the term of the patent is not 20 years from publication. The term under today's law is 20 years from initial filing date, not from publication. Had that law been in effect for this patent, it would have expired in September 5, 1999 (which it actually did, as noted below). Prior to June 8, 1995, US patent term was based on the date of issue plus 17 years; in this case to January 5, 1999. But under terms of the 1995 law, any patent applied for prior to June 8, 1995 got the greater of those two terms; so we're back to September 5, 1999 again. (And just for completeness, there is also the matter of periodic maintenance fees that today need to be paid to keep a patent in force; but that didn't start until December 1980, and wouldn't have applied to this patent, which was filed prior to the institution of maintenance fees.) | Does this mean that if the employee leaves the company, and then creates or gain an intellectual property right, does the company own that right ? No. The reference to "the future" pertains only to the IPRs of inventions that ensued in the course of his employment. Even if the employer alleged that the clause also encompasses post-employment creations and/or post-employment acquisitions of IPR, such extension would be unconscionable (and therefore null and void). | Adding to what Martin Bonner said: If you are a startup, and your grand plan is to be bought by a big company for a lot of money, and that big company thinks your use of React makes it risky to buy you, then you will lose out. It doesn't matter whether there is a risk, what matters is whether a potential buyer believes there is a risk. And if that is your plan, then you need to re-read Martin's answer from the point of view of a bigger company. You may not have any valuable patents, but that bigger company might. If I have an LLC with no money, then I can say "I don't care if Facebook sues me for 100 millions, I'll just let the LLC go bankrupt and start another one". If the company is worth millions or more, then the risk is much higher. |
Do these NY old dumb laws actually exist? I read some articles about old dumb laws in NY that few people know about. Apparently, these are violations that no one would be fined for in practice because they are so archaic that not even law-enforcers are aware of them. However, I was unable to find any primary source that confirms that any of those laws are actually in place. A fine of $25 can be levied for flirting. A license must be purchased before hanging clothes on a clothesline. Carmel: A man can't go outside while wearing a jacket and pants that do not match. Citizens may not greet each other by "putting one's thumb to the nose and wiggling the fingers". Donkeys are not allowed to sleep in bathtubs in Brooklyn, N.Y. During a concert, it is illegal to eat peanuts and walk backwards on the sidewalks. In New York, you can teach your pet parrot to speak, but not to squawk. In New York City it's illegal to shake a dust mop out a window. It is against the law to throw a ball at someone's head for fun. Jaywalking is legal, as long as it's not diagonal. That is, you can cross the street out of the crosswalk, but you can't cross a street diagonally. Slippers are not to be worn after 10:00 P.M. Staten Island: You may only water your lawn if the hose is held in your hand. While riding in an elevator, one must talk to no one, and fold his hands while looking toward the door. (This list was taken from https://forestgrove.pgusd.org/documents/Computer-Lab/Strange-State-Laws.pdf) Can anyone confirm if any of these are real laws in NY? | This is a mixed bag of so-called "laws", often interpreted in an unfavorable or satirical light. Because of this, you might say that none (save one) of these laws are literally laws, but they are the effects of laws that do exist. I'll do my best to sort this out. A fine of $25 can be levied for flirting. Almost certainly an anti-prostitution law taken to the extreme. I only found one example of a bill, but it failed, and was only tangentially related. It's not hard to imagine that at some point, flirting was technically illegal. A license must be purchased before hanging clothes on a clothesline. This is most likely a satire of the actual law, which probably states that you cannot hang anything out your window or in your yard without a permit. Many cities and states have rules about what you can, and can't, put on your property. These are usually related to health and/or aesthetics. Carmel: A man can't go outside while wearing a jacket and pants that do not match. It's too hard to track this one down right now, but that sounds like a satire of something like a specific situation where a person must be wearing specific clothing. For example, I would imagine a firefighter or school crossing guard having these requirements for safety reasons. Citizens may not greet each other by "putting one's thumb to the nose and wiggling the fingers". Edited for clarity While we do have the First Amendment right to Free Speech, it is sometimes recognized in jurisdictions that certain actions and phrases may pass the "imminent lawless action" exception. It is likely some kind of ordinance that prohibits being unnecessarily rude to the point where the offender may end up being assaulted or worse as a result of the gesture. This gesture was known as early as Shakespeare, with the "I thumb my nose at thee" line, also known as the "cock-a-snook" gesture in some regions. Of course, the actual law is probably much more nuanced than that, and this is just a funny way of reducing this law down to the most absurd example that someone could think of. Thanks to some comments, I just realized that this is very likely § 240.20 Disorderly conduct. A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: ... In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or ... Several states have some sort of statute like this that are technically First Amendment Free Speech violations, yet generally recognized by those jurisdictions as having legal force, since the purpose is to discourage violence that can be caused by "fighting words." Donkeys are not allowed to sleep in bathtubs in Brooklyn, N.Y. This is likely a structural integrity joke that doesn't hold up well (sorry, couldn't resist). Floors only have limited strength. If you look up the weight of a cast-iron bathtub and the maximum weight of a full-grown donkey, you'll find it weighs just less than a ton (about 1,800 pounds, assuming a heavy tub and large donkey). Someone probably saw a law about the maximum weight you can put on a floor, then looked up how much things weigh, and the joke practically writes itself. During a concert, it is illegal to eat peanuts and walk backwards on the sidewalks. Again, this is probably taken out of context, but I presume that someone was doing something stupid and got hurt or killed, so a law was written about not walking on the sidewalk without paying attention to where you were walking. For example, if a sidewalk had a open manhole cover or something, and a person fell in. This is just a hyperbole example of the actual law, whatever it may be. In New York, you can teach your pet parrot to speak, but not to squawk. Easy. Noise ordinance law somewhere. A parrot's squawk can exceed 105 dB, and is generally disruptive to living next door to you in a thin-walled apartment. This person just found something really loud, and translated this law to match that law's prohibition. It's unlikely you'll find a law this specific, but noise ordinance laws exist in many areas. My area is 75 dB during the day, 70 dB at night. In New York City it's illegal to shake a dust mop out a window. That's definitely still on the books. It's part of the littering law. Littering, sweeping, throwing, or casting any material such as ashes, garbage, paper, dust, or other garbage or rubbish into or upon any street or public place, vacant lot, air shaft, areaway, backyard, court, or alley is illegal. Throwing garbage out of windows (for example, from buildings or vehicles) is also a violation. In addition, no person may allow anyone under his/her control (agent or employee) to commit a littering, sweep- out, or throw-out violation. Merchants must put all sweepings into suitable garbage receptacles for pickup by a private carter. Residential units must put sweepings into suitable garbage receptacles for pick up by DSNY. Sanitation litter baskets may not be used for this purpose. It is against the law to throw a ball at someone's head for fun. As far as I can tell, this has a serious history. Carnival workers ("carnies") often had setups that involved heavy solid balls. The kind that could literally cause concussions if they were hit in the head. Dunk tanks, knock-stuff-over games, and so on. Presumably, people thought it would be funny to assault the carnies, so laws were written. Of course, assault is already illegal, but it was probably put there was a way to let people know it was a serious situation. Jaywalking is legal, as long as it's not diagonal. That is, you can cross the street out of the crosswalk, but you can't cross a street diagonally. This is really just saying that there's no law prohibiting jaywalking specifically, but there are laws about when you're allowed to cross an intersection diagonally. Again, making it sound weird or strange. It's just a loophole in the lawbooks. Presumably, if people started getting hit while crossing mid-street, they'd add a new law to address that. Slippers are not to be worn after 10:00 P.M. This is likely another oversimplification. It's probably something more like "you have to wear solid-soled shoes at night to protect your feet from broken debris and rats" or something like that. Staten Island: You may only water your lawn if the hose is held in your hand. This is likely a water conservation law. Automated sprinklers and lawn sprinklers waste water. In an effort to combat that problem, requiring hand-holding your hose makes you more likely to not overwater your lawn. While riding in an elevator, one must talk to no one, and fold his hands while looking toward the door. Of this list, this one is presumably a satire law that makes a statement about societal customs in some places of New York. It's highly unlikely this would be real law, but rather an expectation of how to behave in an elevator if you didn't want to have a bad experience. So, overall, I'd say that virtually none of the laws actually read like they do on this list, but some variant of the law in a more generalized form probably does exist. | I can't prove a negative, but it seems quite clear from my research that providing name and badge number is policy, not law. i.e. Many departments have a policy that their officers will provide name and badge number on request, but the punishment for failure to do so would be at the employment level not the legal level. This site has a fairly good selection of various police department policies I will note that Massachusetts appears to be an exception as mentioned by jimsug in his comment to another answer, they do require police to carry and show ID upon legal request (I did not look up what a "legal request" is) | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home. | Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have "or else" provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say "anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just". Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section. | It appears that Plummer v. State is still valid, but only in a very limited fact pattern. It is often quoted on the internet to justify the idea that a person may resist any unlawful arrest with force. That may have been true when Plummer was decided, and it was the clear holding of Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900) But Bad Elk is bad law today -- the wide adoption of the Model Penal Code starting in 1962 removed the right to resist a merely unlawful arrest. The right to use self-defense against excessive force by an officer remains, but is narrowly limited, and courts rarely find such resistance justified. In State v. Mulvihill 57 N.J. 151 (1970) The Supreme Court of New Jersey held: If, in effectuating the arrest or the temporary detention, the officer employs excessive and unnecessary force, the citizen may respond or counter with the use of reasonable force to protect himself, and if in so doing the officer is injured no criminal offense has been committed. However, the Mulvihill court cautioned: State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 1965) held that "a private citizen may not use force to resist arrest by one he knows or has good reason to believe is an authorized police officer engaged in the performance of his duties, whether or not the arrest is illegal under the circumstances obtaining." (89 N.J. Super. at 184.) The opinion put to rest the notion that the common law rule existing in some jurisdictions, which permits a citizen to resist, even with reasonable force, an unlawful arrest by a police officer, was applicable in New Jersey. ... Accordingly, in our State when an officer makes an arrest, legal or illegal, it is the duty of the citizen to submit and, in the event the seizure is illegal, to seek recourse in the courts for the invasion of his right of freedom. The Mulvihill court explained the difference in the two csase by saying: Despite his duty to submit quietly without physical resistance to an arrest made by an officer acting in the course of his duty, even though the arrest is illegal, his right to freedom from unreasonable seizure and confinement can be protected, restored and vindicated through legal processes. However, the rule permitting reasonable resistance to excessive force of the officer, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, is designed to protect a person's bodily integrity and health and so permits resort to self-defense. Simply stated, the law recognizes that liberty can be restored through legal processes but life or limb cannot be repaired in a courtroom. And so it holds that the reason for outlawing resistance to an unlawful arrest and requiring disputes over its legality to be resolved in the courts has no controlling application on the right to resist an officer's excessive force. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 719. The Mulvihill court further warned that: [A citizen] cannot use greater force in protecting himself against the officer's unlawful force than reasonably appears to be necessary. If he employs such greater force, then he becomes the aggressor and forfeits the right to claim self-defense ... Furthermore, if he knows that if he desists from his physically defensive measures and submits to arrest the officer's unlawfully excessive force would cease, the arrestee must desist or lose his privilege of self-defense. The court said that the duty to desist and submit if that would stop the excessive force is analogous to the duty to retreat rather than use force in self defense when this is feasible. The Nolo Press page "Resisting Arrest When Police Use Excessive Force" says: It’s rare that someone being placed under arrest has the right to forcefully resist. But in most states, if the arresting officer uses excessive force that could cause “great bodily harm,” the arrestee has the right to defend him or herself. That’s because most states hold that an officer’s use of excessive force amounts to assault or battery, which a victim has a right to defend against. ... An officer’s use of force is “excessive” if it is likely to result in unjustifiable great bodily harm (serious injury). Most states consider whether a “reasonable person” under the circumstances would have believed that the officer’s use of force was likely to cause great physical harm (including death). If the answer is “yes”—if a reasonable person would have felt it necessary to resist in self-defense, and if that person used a reasonable degree of force when resisting, then the resistance is typically justified. But this is a very high standard to meet, such that courts hardly ever find that an arrestee’s forceful resistance was defensible. This article from policeone.com citing California law, says that forceful resistance to an arrest is almost never justified. It does agree that resistance to excessive force can be used; Section 693 requires that even if the officer were committing a public offense (crime), only that "self-defense" force that is sufficient to prevent the offense may be used. In other words, the subject may only use force to simply stop the assault/battery under color of authority and never any more than that. and says that: It is a rare circumstance when this assault/battery under color of authority actually occurs and an officer is charged, not because of some great law enforcement driven conspiracy but because it rarely happens. In short, Plummer is still valid, but limited to the fact pattern when the person being arrested is actually being subjected to excessive force likely to cause great bodily harm, or death, and only justifies sufficient force to prevent such harm. The lawfulness of the arrest does not matter, it the the danger caused by the excess force that justifies possible resistance. As a practical matter, if resistance is likely to escalate rather than prevent harm, it is highly unwise. When Plummer is cited, often with Bad Elk, to justify resistance to an unlawful arrest because of its unlawfulness, that is no longer valid law and has not been for decades. Note that is a person who is not a law enforcement officer (LEO) but who is pretending to be one, tries to make an "arrest" this would not be an arrest at all, but an assault or an attempted abduction, and the victim would be justified in using reasonable force in self-defense, although not excessive force. This is not the Plummer rule, but the normal law of self-defense. However any arrestee should be careful. Claiming that the arresters are impersonators when they are in fact plainclothes LEOs will not go well. If a reasonable person should have known that they were LEOs, there is no right to resist unless excessive force is used. Note further that if non-LEOs attempt to make a "citizen's arrest", not impersonating officers, the right to self-defence only applies if excessive force is used, or there is a reasonable fear of excessive force likely to cause great bodily harm or death. Basically the Plummer rule still applies. Also, all of this is a matter of state law, and while Plummer should be good law in most if not all states, the exact rule may vary by state. In 2012 a few US states retained the common-law rule that any unlawful arrest justified resistance, according to the Nolo page linked above. That may have changed, or may change when a case arises. The question does not specify a state, and a precise answer depends on the specific state. | depending on the Jurisdiction, you actually were in violation of law! In germany it is a misdemeanor to drive with the high beams on in such a fashion that it blinds or dazzles other road traffic, such as traffic from the front. It is also a traffic violation to drive with front lights that don't properly illuminate the street - such as a broken one. In the worst case, improper illumination voids the validity of the safety certificate (TÜV) and thus you may not drive the car at all on public streets until you have repaired the defect. Not having a valid TÜV can mean you are also not insured! In the US: YES, a stop is most likely legal In the united-states, Terry v Ohio is the governing case. It prescribes that, to initiate contact with a car and detain it on the street curb, reasonable suspicion is enough. What could be reasonable suspicion for the police? In the case presented, 'The high beams are on constantly to hide non-functioning/sufficient normal light' would be the very first thing that comes to my mind, so there very likely is reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Ot of course 'The high beams are suitable to dazzle me for a split second, and thus the driver endangered traffic'. Endangering traffic can actually be a felony in some cases. Or just 'They shone their brights into my eyes and violated the High Beam statute' - which is actually the most likely case. As a result, while a broken headlight is not reasonable suspicion to search a car, them and high beams might qualify to make a stop reasonable, especially if at first just a verbal warning not to dazzle oncoming drivers was intended by police. Only if the local law is worded in a peculiarity, that might invalidate a stop. And you might be in violation of law here too! california High Beams can be a traffic violation within 500 feet of oncoming traffic and 300 when trailing another car, if they are not so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. florida Under Florida Law, it is also a noncriminal traffic infraction to drive with the high lights on in such a way that it blinds traffic within 500 feet of them oncoming and 300 if you are behind them. Again, the test is that the beams are only ok if they are so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. new-jersey Here comes a possible source for your quote: New Jersey has a similar high beams law, but also a recent case. The judgment from the New Jersey Surpreme Court is only valid in New Jersey. According to it a high beam violation has to be witnessed by the officer themselves to justify a "terry stop". If you dazzle a moving police cruiser they may stop you. If you dazzle the moving car in front of them, they may stop you. But if you beam your high beams at a stopped car or no car at all, then the police can't stop you. HELD:The trial court and Appellate Division properly concluded that the motor-vehicle stop violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The language of the high-beam statute, N.J.S.A.39:3-60, is unambiguous; drivers are required to dim their high beams only when approaching an oncoming vehicle. Neither a car parked on a perpendicular street nor an on-foot police officer count as an oncoming vehicle. The judgment of the Appellate Division upholding the trial court s suppression of the evidence is affirmed. Had the officer, in that case, operated the car while being on the same road, the stop would have been constitutional. But he was on foot in a crossing street. texas Wait, actually the quote stems from Texas. However, it has nothing to do with high beams but additional lights such as "Angel Eyes". Texas too has a High Beam Statute, which just like other states, bans blinding oncoming traffic: (c) A person who operates a vehicle on a roadway or shoulder shall select a distribution of light or composite beam that is aimed and emits light sufficient to reveal a person or vehicle at a safe distance ahead of the vehicle, except that: (1) an operator approaching an oncoming vehicle within 500 feet shall select: (B) a distribution aimed so that no part of the high-intensity portion of the lamp projects into the eyes of an approaching vehicle operator; and Even in Texas, blinding the police cruiser would thus be enough to stop the car, at least for a verbal warning and lecture. Common courtesy While it might not be against the law to dazzle someone everywhere, it actually does impact the other drivers: there have been crashes induced by traffic running high beams and blinding oncoming traffic, which then ran off the road or into other cars. In some countries, if they catch you for causing a crash that way, you are in for negligence. As a result, it actually is common courtesy in Europe to dim off your high beams when you notice oncoming traffic, and, if you don't run high beams yourself but notice high beams oncoming to flash them up for a brief moment so you get noticed. | I am sympathetic to your problem but there is probably not a legal solution: at least not an easy or cheap one. To help you clarify a whole mish-mash of issues I will address each of your points. frequently calls false noise complaints on neighbors resulting in police action. If the person genuinely believes that these complaints are valid, even if they do not end up being substantiated, he is within his rights to make such complaints. If you can document an ongoing pattern of unproven complaints this might amount to harassment and you could then seek a court order that he stop the harassing behaviour. However, if even a few of these complaints are proven this would become much harder. stands in front of the building in a menacing way as people enter/exit. He is entitled to stand wherever he likes in whatever "way" he likes. This is only an issue if the person entering/exiting has a reasonable fear that he will he will visit actual harm upon them, o, of course, if he actually does visit physical harm upon them. If so, then this is assault and can be reported to the police or be the basis of a civil action. hates black people. So, he's a bigot - this is not actually illegal. Discriminating against someone on the basis that they are black is illegal, hating them on that basis isn't. hates Middle Eastern people and Muslims. Ditto. constantly pounds on the floor/walls/ceilings. It can't be "constantly" - it might be often or even frequently, if you intent to take legal action hyperbolic language is not going to aid your case. To make a real complaint about this you would need to diarise each occurrence. Notwithstanding, unless he is damaging someone else's property or is violating a noise ordinance this is not illegal. screams curses at children. Clearly reprehensible behaviour: not clearly illegal. Unless this is assault (see above) or qualifies as offensive behavior under the criminal code wherever you are (unlikely) then he can scream whatever he wants at whoever he likes. Again, a pattern of such behavior may constitute harassment. Continues to park in handicap parking despite not being handicap, and receiving very expensive parking tickets. This is illegal and he is being punished for it. Unfortunately the expression Don't do the crime, if you can't do the time. has a corollary: if you are willing and able to take the punishment then you do as much crime as you want. And to add to the list, I suspect he's been putting nails in my car tire, always on the same tire, on the inside wall of the tire; I just replaced my 5th tire in 3 months. This is a crime. If you can get evidence to prove it then you can report him to the police and/or sue him for the damage. You have stated in your comments that you will be asking another question specifically about filming him, so I won't address this here. Is there some sort of legal incentive I've not clearly communicated to management to evict him? That depends on if any of his actions are actually grounds for terminating his lease and, if they are, the landlord wants to do so. A remote landlord who is getting his rent on time and not having their property damaged has no incentive to evict a tenant: no matter how annoying they are to others. It is possible, that you have a case for breaking your lease and/or suing your landlord for damages as you are not getting "quiet enjoyment" of the property. A suit along those lines may resolve the matter because either you or he will be evicted. Consult a lawyer. If he actually is insane, what sort of liability for his actions does he have? The same as anybody else. Liability for civil wrongs is an objective test of what a reasonable person would be liable for: it is not based on the specific characteristics of the person. |
As a citizen, we have the right to a speedy and fair trial by jury of our PEERS. How does a group of one's peers present their attendance to a judge? A defendant has the right to be tried by his peers. A group of the defendant's peers want to attend the trial as these peers. How do we confront the judge with our rights to be those peers? Peers are not court appointed jury. | A defendant has the right to be tried by his peers. In the U.S., this is an incorrect belief. A defendant does not has the right to be tried by his peers in the U.S. The "jury of his peers" language is a legacy of English law in the days when aristocrats were entitled to a jury of aristocrats rather than commoners, while commoners were entitled to a jury of commoners. The sole legacy of that in U.S. law is in court-martials in which officers are entitled to have their cases heard by a panel of fellow officers, rather than by a panel of active duty military personnel generally. Outside of court-martials in the U.S., the "jury of his peers" concept was eliminated not later than the time when the current U.S. constitution was adopted (in 1789) which eliminated hereditary titles of nobility, or when 6th Amendment to the Bill of Rights was adopted (as applicable in federal criminal cases) which was adopted in 1791. Instead, the Courts have interpreted the 6th Amendment right to trial by jury, which has now been applied to state and local governments as well, to require that the jury be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community (regardless of what an individual jury actually ends up as) and to have people who are conflicted or biased removed from the jury. | united-states The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant in a criminal case the right to “confront one’s accuser”, and the Supreme Court has taken a notably originalist view of this right, holding that this means face-to-face cross examination under virtually all circumstances. While there are some small exceptions related to minors and to witnesses who became unavoidably absent after giving a sworn statement (none of which could apply to Alice), and while the Supreme Court hasn’t explicitly ruled out cross examination over videoconference, the idea of anonymous testimony in a criminal case is unthinkable. Part of an effective cross examination is arguing why the witness’s testimony might be unreliable, and a defendant who didn’t know whose testimony it was would be hamstrung at that. | Canada's local court systems and procedural rules vary, especially at the lowest level, by province. So, I'm just stating some general principals. General speaking legal arguments are limited to closing arguments of the parties after all of the evidence has been presented by both sides (because this limits legal arguments to those with evidentiary support rather than merely hypothetical arguments). Opening arguments are usually supposed to be limited to a recitation of what the facts in the case will show. Presentation of evidence and examination of witnesses is also not a time for this to be done. Some courts in some jurisdictions allow a defendant to make a "half-time motion" at the close of the prosecution's case, arguing that the prosecution has failed to meet their burden of proof to establish grounds for a conviction before the defense presents the defense's evidence. But, such formalities are often dispensed with in traffic court. Some courts allow post-trial motions to be made after a verdict within a certain number of days set by court rule asking the court to reconsider its decision or overturn a jury verdict, although these aren't always available in a traffic court case. Sometimes these issues are also raised in a pre-trial trial brief or in motion practice prior to trial. The amount of time allowed for closing, and discretion to consider arguments at times other than time usually allowed are in the discretion of the trial judge. Usually, courts are more lenient regarding formalities when a non-attorney is arguing a case. Usually, there is less opportunity to raise legal arguments following a trial if the traffic court is not a court of record and appeal is by trial de novo in a higher court, and there is more opportunity to do so if the trial is in a "court of record" in which a transcript is maintained and if the trial is a jury trial (although in a jury trial, the legal arguments are made out of the presence of the jury in a hearing over jury instructions, rather than before the jury). In a traffic case in a court of record, in front of a judge, five or ten minutes, at most, would be typical and trial briefs would rarely be considered, but the judge might listen longer or take the case under advisement and ask for further briefing, if the judge thinks that there is merit to a legal argument and wants to do further research (which would be extremely unusual in a traffic case). | A witness who disobeys a court order has automatically broken the law. Indeed, this is the most fundamental of laws; you can't decide "If I turn up to the hearing I may be punished for my crime; but not attending isn't against the law, so goodbye." A witness who goes out of the jurisdiction cannot, of course, be punished while there (though when he returns he may have to explain why he chose to leave having been warned that he must attend or face penalties- that is the meaning of sub poena). But your assumption that anybody who fails to attend probably had a good reason betrays a fundamental, though common, misunderstanding. A court has determined that your evidence is necessary for justice to be done. There is therefore no good reason not to attend. It may well be that a doctor would prefer that you did not go to court that day, and if you apply to the court it may be possible to find some arrangement. But you are not allowed to decide 'my convenience is more important than discovering whether the defendant should go to jail or not". Civilised countries have people who are empowered to make that decision; they are called judges, and the decision has been made. | If a sitting juror, or a prospective juror during voir dire, cannot see or hear something clearly, what is the protocol for the juror to alert the court of this? Say something immediately? Raise your hand or number card? Write a note? Saying something immediately or raising your hand or number card are appropriate. Ideally, you get the attention of the bailiff whose job it is to supervise the jury (often also the judge's clerk of court), but if you get the attention of the judge, a lawyer, or the court clerk, they will normally interrupt to fix things as well. | Why should they? If a person is accused of a crime, say murder, why should more evidence be needed to convict them if they are a high ranking government official than if they are just an ordinary person? Why should their trial be conducted differently? If convicted, why should their punishment be different? Yes, you can run societies that way and people have and do but it isn’t very fair is it? Equality before the law does not imply any other sort of equality People high up in the government have more power and authority than others but if they are alleged to have broken the law they are treated the same as anybody else. | An appeal to ignorance asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false. That is not in any way the situation here. The defendant knows if he/she has or has not so the only available answers under oath are "yes" or "no" - the jury knows this too so any other answer will be seen as disingenuous. However, this information (affirmative or negative) is off limits to the jury as it could prejudice their decision, hence the mistrial. A quick judge could instruct the defendant not to answer and instruct the jury to disregard the question but if a conviction results the defence team could use the fact that it was asked as grounds for appeal. A judge must decide if the interests of justice are better served by a retrial or a tainted conviction. | In general they are not told. In fact, I am not aware of any jurisdiction where they are told by the judge officially. In fact judges will normally charge a jury that they must accept the law as stated by the judge, and ignore any other source of the law, whether they like it or not. But the Judge has no way to enforce such a charge. According to the Wikipedia article The 1895 decision in Sparf v. United States, written by Justice John Marshall Harlan held that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. It was a 5–4 decision. This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by United States judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present legal argument to jurors and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been presented to them. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from the panel during voir dire if they will not agree to accept as correct the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge. A 1969 Fourth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Moylan, affirmed the power of jury nullification, but also upheld the power of the court to refuse to permit an instruction to the jury to this effect. We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge, and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused, is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision. Nevertheless, in upholding the refusal to permit the jury to be so instructed, the Court held that: …by clearly stating to the jury that they may disregard the law, telling them that they may decide according to their prejudices or consciences (for there is no check to ensure that the judgment is based upon conscience rather than prejudice), we would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of lawlessness. This should not be allowed. It is not so much that jury nullification is a right of the jury, as that there is very little right for the prosecutor or judge to inquire into why the jury acted however it did. If there is a suspicion that the jury was bribed, or influenced by prohibited communications, that can be looked into. But otherwise a jury is like an oracle, its actions have no specified reason or justification, they are whatever they are. The judge (or an appeals court) can set aside a jury verdict on the grounds that no rational jury could find in a particular way -- this is mostly used to overturn convictions based on insufficient evidence. But a jury has almost total freedom to believe of disbelieve any witnesses, so if it disbelieves, it could acquit, regardless of whether it rejects the law under which charges are brought. So there is no way to tell if a particular verdict was based on nullification, or on disbelief of the witnesses, or some other possible ground. In any case, there is no provision -- that I k now of -- to set aside a jury verdict on the grounds that it was an instance of nullification, so inquiring into whether it was would be of little point. This attitude toward jury verdicts goes back to the very early origins of trial by jury, when it was a replacement for Trial by Ordeal. The Ordeal had been considered a way of asking God to decide the issue, and there was no way to ask God to clarify the decision. When it was replaced by jury trial, no way to ask for clarification was considered possible there either -- the jury was said to voice the decision of the community at large: the formal term for jury trial was "to be tried by the country". See C. Rembar's The Law of the Land and H.C. Lea's The Duel and the oath for more on this history. This article reports on recent cases where juries have refused to convict in Marijuana cases. |
Ontario Labour laws pertaining to late breaks Ontario Labour laws state: An employee must not work for more than five hours in a row without getting a 30-minute eating period (meal break) free from work. However, if the employer and employee agree, the eating period can be split into two eating periods within every five consecutive hours. Together these must total at least 30 minutes. This agreement can be oral or in writing. https://www.ontario.ca/document/your-guide-employment-standards-act-0/hours-work Does this say that a employer may not force the employee to take a late lunch if that lunch starts after they have worked for 5 hours? That is to say, must breaks be scheduled in a way that workers are not working more than 5 hours uninterrupted? | The page you link is a good summary. It describes the employer obligations under the Ontario Employment Standards Act. Eating periods are described at section 20: 20 (1) An employer shall give an employee an eating period of at least 30 minutes at intervals that will result in the employee working no more than five consecutive hours without an eating period. Exception (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the employer and the employee agree, whether or not in writing, that the employee is to be given two eating periods that together total at least 30 minutes in each consecutive five-hour period. This section has been applied several times by the Ontario Labour Relations Board and appears to have been given its plain meaning. There are two ways that the Act lets an employer provide those breaks: Provide full 30-minute eating period(s) so that the employee works no more than five consecutive hours without an eating period. By agreement, provide two eating periods that total 30 minutes, "in each consecutive five-hour period" If proceeding by option two, the 30 minutes of eating period have to occur "in each consecutive five-hour period." The Ontario Labour Relations Board has described these two options and has said that option two requires the breaks to be "within" each consecutive five-hour period. See Rusty's at Blue Inc. / M & S Accounting v Erica Solmes, 2022 CanLII 56373 (paragraph 125, emphasis in original): Section 20 requires an employer to give an employee an eating period of 30 minutes after no more than five consecutive hours of work, or (with the agreement of the employee) two eating periods totalling 30 minutes within each consecutive five-hour period. Whether an employee is entitled to a single 30-minute eating period or to two eating periods totalling 30 minutes, the eating periods must be uninterrupted. The other answer and the page you link also describes an "exceptional circumstances" exception, but that is describing section 19 of the Act. Those exceptional circumstances can only let an employer get around the requirements of sections 17 and 18. Those are not relevant to the eating-period requirements. An employer may require an employee to work more than the maximum number of hours permitted under section 17 or to work during a period that is required to be free from performing work under section 18 only as follows | is it legally acceptable to state that 7.5 hours is the standard amount No. Because you are a contractor not employee, there is no "standard" to refer to. You are only entitled to what your contract provides for, that is £N per day no matter how much time you worked. That said, if there is no word "overtime" in the contract, you cannot use one to justify how much you charge. You can, though, charge for weekend days (unless the contract explicitly prohibits working on weekends). what should be done about going into the future with this work and asking for a revised contract? 1) Learn the lesson; 2) Make up your mind about what you want to be paid for: hours, days or output; 3) Discuss/negotiate contract terms with your clients. | No, they are not obliged to take you back early As you say in your TL;DR you arranged 4 months leave and your employer no doubt made arrangements to deal with your absence. Now, you want to return early; they are not obliged to allow you to do so just as you would not be obliged to do so if they wanted you to cut your leave short. No doubt the current pandemic has changed the situation and in its absence, they might have been more willing to have you back early. But then, you wouldn't want to be coming back early. Your employment status is that you are employed and on leave. Subject to the details of your employment contract; there is nothing stopping you taking another job - there is a huge demand for logistics workers particularly in the health sector at the moment; much of it unskilled work. dIf you want to be unemployed, you can always resign. | Who entered the contract with the restaurant? In order for the restaurant to collect from a person, that person must have entered into a contract for the meal. That is, from the restaurant's point of view, they must have indicated that they would like some food and, since everyone knows how restaurants work, they know that the food will have to be paid for. Whether a given person entered a contract will depend on the specific facts. If they opened their mouth and said to the waiter something like “I’ll have the chicken”, they almost certainly entered a contract and they are obliged to pay. This is even if they had an expectation that someone else would pay for them - the restaurant is not involved in any other contracts or arrangements you might have with third-parties. You ordered, you’re on the hook. In a situation where you didn’t order, the answer is still probably yes, you have to pay. Again, because you know how restaurants work, by eating the meal that was placed in front of you rather than saying, “Just so you know, your contract for this meal is with that guy over there, is that okay?”, you probably entered a contract by your action of eating the meal. More broadly, when a group collectively enters a contract with the restaurant, they are probably agreeing with the restaurant that they will be jointly and severally bound. That is, each is responsible for all and the restaurant can pursue any or all of the people they have a contract with. A minor dining with their parents is probably not entering a contract with the restaurant. Not because minors can’t enter contracts (they absolutely can) but because of the normal expectation that the parent is entering the contract. This is because of a principle that contract terms may be implied by custom. That is, if there is a general understanding that this is the way things are done, then that will be something the law will enforce. This is a simple expedient adopted in order to make the world work - if every term of every contract had to be explicitly detailed in advance this would be a) unworkable and b) impossible. Even if there is no contract, the restaurant has equitable remedies like unjust enrichment. The diner has had the benefit of the meal and it would be unjust if the restaurant was left out of pocket. Equitable remedies can be even more complicated than contract law so we’ll just leave it at that. As for whether the restaurant will accept a promise from one diner that another will pay, that’s up to them. | You are perfectly within your rights not to tip. Unless you start your dining experience with "I'm not going to be tipping you tonight, just to let you know." you will get the same service as anyone else. Most businesses are within their rights to ask you to leave for any reason except those explicitly prohibited by law. So conceivably if you started off with the preceding sentence, the manager could ask you to leave. Not tipping wait staff at most restaurants is still an awful thing to do. No customers like tipping. Unfortunately, tipped staff can and usually are paid well below the conventional minimum wage. That they can be, is codified into law and would take a substantial amount of effort to change. Business owners are able to push the cost of paying their employees a livable wage onto their customers, and we are forced to accept it. It's a hideously flawed system that is ever so slowly changing, but it doesn't change the fact that if everyone decided not to tip, the wait staff in 95% of restaurants wouldn't be able to survive on their 'wages'. So you are within your rights not to tip, you probably won't suffer anything negative unless you are aggressively up front about the fact that you aren't going to tip, and you will be punishing the person with the least power in the equation for the fact that you don't like how the system works over here. Tipping a bartender is different and usually less necessary, and more likely to be drink is four bucks and a bit, here's a fiver keep the change. Tipping less or more than that may change the speed at which you get refills or attention. | Indeed, article 3.24 of the Arbeidsomstandighedenbesluit: Toiletten en wastafels In een bedrijf of inrichting zijn in de nabijheid van de ruimten waar de werknemers hun werkzaamheden verrichten een voldoende aantal toiletten aanwezig. In of in de onmiddellijke nabijheid van de ruimten waarin de toiletten zich bevinden zijn voldoende wastafels. De toiletten of het gebruik van de toiletten zijn naar seksen gescheiden. My translation (intentionally less idiomatic than it might be in order to parallel the Dutch word order): Toilets and lavatories In a business or facility there are in the vicinity of the areas where the workers perform their work a sufficient number of toilets present. In, or in the immediate vicinity of, the areas where the toilets are, there are sufficient lavatories. The toilets or the use of the toilets are segregated by sex. It's a very long law, so I haven't read it all, but it doesn't seem to impose a penalty on people who disregard the sex segregation of the toilets. I suspect that it imposes a responsibility on the employer to enforce the segregation, and presumably a penalty could be imposed on the employer for failing to do so. I do not know what mechanisms would be available to the employer to penalize an employee who uses the wrong toilet. I don't know anything about the catering industry, and I cannot infer why you ask about it specifically. If you're asking about toilets provided by such businesses for their customers, however, I suspect it's likely to be governed by another law. (I further suspect that sex-segregated toilets for customers are optional in at least some circumstances, since small bars and restaurants often have only one toilet.) | The legal reasons for dismissal in the UK are described here: it includes such things as being unable to do your job, redundancy, violence on the job, being sent to prison, the factory burning down. It does not include quitting. "Unfair dismissal" is described here, and it says Situations when your dismissal is likely to be unfair include if you...resigned and gave the correct notice period This page then describes recourse for unfair dismissal. §108(1) of the Employment Rights Act says that Section 94 does not apply to the dismissal of an employee unless he has been continuously employed for a period of not less than two years ending with the effective date of termination. §94(1) then says that "An employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer". §108(2) also lists numerous cases where the two-year tenure condition does not apply. Most of those reasons clearly don't apply to the act of giving notice (it includes e,g, pregnancy, whistle-blowing etc), which means that any firing because an employee is pregnant (etc.) is automatically unfair, regardless of duration of employment. §104 which is within the set of conditions that are "automatically unfair" is "Assertion of statutory right", (1)An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee— (a)brought proceedings against the employer to enforce a right of his which is a relevant statutory right, or (b)alleged that the employer had infringed a right of his which is a relevant statutory right. However, the reason for being fired in this case has nothing to do with bringing proceedings against the employer, or alleging infringement of a statutory right. As far as I can determine, being fired because you quit is not deemed automatically unfair in the sense of short-circuiting the two year employment requirement; and for an employee with less than two years of service, no justification is necessary. | According to the EEOC, in general: An employee cannot be forced to participate (or not participate) in a religious activity as a condition of employment. But how religious is this party? Simply calling it a "Christmas party" (or "holiday party") doesn't really make it a "religious activity". Many nonreligious people celebrate Christmas as a general holiday. If the party is nonreligious, then your religion is mostly irrelevant, whether or not it celebrates a winter holiday. The law requires an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would cause more than a minimal burden on the operations of the employer's business. This means an employer may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion. So, they'd likely have to serve something you could eat if they're serving food, as that would be a reasonable accommodation. (But you'd have to inform them of your needs beforehand; asking them to go out and buy something during the party would probably not be "reasonable".) |
Does using Yoda in my brand name violate copyright law of United States? I have registered a website yodaguru.com. I intend to use it as a domain name for a product I am building. Does it violate the copyright law of the United States? This character first appeared in the movie The Empire Strikes Back (1980). George Lucas, the screenwriter of the movie is still alive. It is speculated that that name may be from the Sanskrit word "Yoddha" which means warrior, or the Hebrew name "Yodea" meaning "One who knows." The copyright law of the United States says that exclusive rights generally expire 70 years after the author's death or 95 years after publication. Law talks about the derived word, does it also applies to the character name? | Copyright is irrelevant, because names are not protected by copyright. Trademark is relevant: a name can be protected by a trademark. "Yoda" is a registered trademark owned by Lucasfilms, a subsidiary of Disney. There is a list of goods and services where the property right is asserted, so for example you could get sued for peddling art books under this name. It just depends on what your business does. For instance, a plumbing business isn't competing with Lucasfilms w.r.t. that class of goods and services. | It is probably a word that can be used, but not definitively. Many words of general applicability coined by authors enter into the general lexicon. The process is similar, but not precisely identical, to the dilution of a trademarked term to become a generic descriptive term for anything in the category of items so trademarked. Early examples of originally trademarked words that entered the general lexicon are "elevator" and "escalator". For example, the word "grok" coined by Robert Heinlein, is now part of the general lexicon, as is the word "quark" coined by James Joyce (although its current meaning has shifted). The word "robot" from K. Čapek's play R.U.R. ‘Rossum's Universal Robots’ (1920), would be another example of a word coined in fiction that has entered general use. The scene a faire doctrine also authorized public domain use of tropes and terms that have achieved wide use in a genre. As a rule of thumb, if three different authors have used a term to mean the same thing, or an author who is no longer in copyright has done so, it can be used freely. For example, regardless of who originally used it, the term "mecha" would not be protected by the doctrine due to its used by multiple authors and commentators in a particular science fiction sub-genre. "Mentat" is a close case, because it is overwhelmingly used in a specific series of books written by Frank Herbert and his son with licensing from his estate, and because the series has produced so many published properties, not only in books, but in TV and movies, it has been close to maximally protected from an IP perspective by the Herbert Estate, his publishers, and his audio-visual licensees. There is at least a colorable argument that use of the term in a fictional setting would be a derivative work, intended to evoke and be derived from the extended series of creative properties. The best counterargument that the term has entered the general lexicon, or in any case is not a protected derivative work, would comes from use of the term in a non-fiction sense which is not negligible, even though it isn't terribly common. Wikipedia notes two (probably unlicensed) commercial uses, one as a trademark and the other as an IT company name, in addition to two minor fictional uses, one with a similar meaning and one with a somewhat shifted meaning. Further, to the extent that the non-fiction use was great enough to show that it entered the general lexicon, at that point, fictional use would no longer be a derivative work because the work could be derived from many sources in which the Herbert estate does not have copyrights. A Google N-gram search could be used to evaluate that argument empirically. The use of the word in the early 19th century (before Herbert was born) is particularly promising, although the senses in which it was used pre-Herbert would have to be evaluated, and the context in which it was used post-Dune would also have to be evaluated (if all the uses are in his licensed books, it hurts the cause). A quick scan suggests that in the early 19th century that it was often used as a Latin or French word used untranslated for foreign flavor in English language works, so there is an argument that it is really a loan word not specific to Herbert. Much of the modern use is in fair use commentary expressly referencing Herbert's works and in obvious misspellings of the word "mental". Particularly encouraging in the N-gram search are the uses of the word in independent science fiction novels including "The Search for Snout" (2014) by Bruce Coville, "Dorsai!" (2013) by Gordon R. Dickson, "Eye of the Storm" (2009) by John Ringo, and "The Ghost Brigades" (2007) by John Scalzi. Also, particularly notable is the use of the word in an independent non-Dune novel in "Clockwork Lives" (2015) by Kevin J. Anderson and Neil Peart, since Kevin J. Anderson was a co-author of some of the Dune novels and would have contractual obligations to the Herbert Estate as well as copyright obligations; signifying a concession of non-ownership of the term by the estate. This use in five independent fictional cases in the same genre in works published long enough ago for the statute of limitations for infringement to have lapsed (with late filed suits used to muddy the waters). This strongly advances the scene a faire doctrine validation of the word. The term is also used in a scientific journal article in 2008 in the Indian Journal of Experimental Biology, but in a related but not identical sense of the word. Another litmus test regarding whether a word is part of the general lexicon is whether it appears in more complete dictionaries, such as the OED, or Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary, or in a notable published thesaurus, None of the dictionaries and no thesaurus that I have in hard copy have that word, but this could be because mine are dated. An updated dictionary and thesaurus search would be probative evidence of this question. A thesaurus search for "genius" or "prodigy" that came up with "mentat" listed would be a good thing to look for. A third issue for general lexicon v. derivative work analysis would be whether the word can be derived by obvious use of affixes and suffixes and retroflex letters from words that are in dictionaries. For example, a word plus -ology (for the study of), or -itis (for medical conditions) would not generally be beyond the scope of legally permissible public domain use. This again is a close call in the case of "mentat". Single words are also harder (but not impossible) to protect as derivative works, if not trademarked as well, than extended passages either verbatim or paraphrased or translated, which would weaken the derivative work claim, although it wouldn't be entirely without merit just because it was a single word. | The code is copyrighted. You are not given any permission to use or copy any part of it, nor to create a derivative work based on it. There is no way for you to "make the copyright null". The code was copyrighted in 2005, and the copyright will not expire until 70 years after the death of the author, under US law. The period would vary in some other countries, but in no country that I know of will it expire in the next few years. That the author is dead, or the publisher out of business, does not change this legally. Someone, probably the author's heir, or perhaps whoever bought the remains of the publisher's business, will own the copyright. However, the ideas and programming techniques shown and discussed in the book are not protected, and you may use them freely to write programs, commercial or non-commercial. You need not even acknowledge the book as a source of ideas, although to do so would be nice. Of course, since the author is dead and the publisher not active, if you were to infringe the copyright by copying code from thsi book, there is a reasonable chance that no one would notice, but if someone did notice, the current owner of the copyright could sue you for infringement, and could perhaps win sizable damages. It would be safer to write your own original code using only the general ideas from the book. In future, do not ever assume that you can just take someone else's code (or other creative work, such as a book) and reuse it without permission, unless it is in the public domain, for example because it was published before 1923. | Under Swedish copyright law, a work such as a movie is protected for 70 years after the death of the "creator". It is unclear who the copyright holder is, but it has not been 70 years since the film was made. Unless it was explicitly "released into the public domain", it is still protected, so you can get sued. | "LearnIT" and "Learn it" are both descriptive, and thus are generally weak trademarks. It is not unlikely that a challenge would result in cancellation of any trademark on either, or in allowing a similar trademark in an unrelated category of business. For the matter of that, you don't seem to have determined whether the other company is making any trademark claims. In some countries there is no trademark protection unless a mark is registered. In others, including the US, use without registration can create some protection for a mark. It will also be relevant where the other company is doing business, and where you plan to. Trademark protection is always specific to a particular country, and generally requires proof of use in commerce in each such country (or of a plan to start such use in the near future). Domain registration is a different thing, and is not necessarily tied to a trademark (although registering a domain that infringes an existing trademark will often be disallowed). It appears that "learnit.net" is listed as available. That does not mean that a dispute filed by the other company would not be successful. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) states in section 2 that: By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to maintain or renew a domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that (a) the statements that you made in your Registration Agreement are complete and accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the registration of the domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not registering the domain name for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not knowingly use the domain name in violation of any applicable laws or regulations. It is your responsibility to determine whether your domain name registration infringes or violates someone else's rights. If you register a domain name, and another person or firm complains that the name is "confusingly similar" to an existing name or to a valid trademark, you might be required to participate in an arbitration proceeding under the UDRP, or else forfeit the registration. Note that nothing happens if no one complains. Section 4(s) of the policy reads: You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts ... that (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. In the administrative proceeding, the complainant must prove that each of these three elements are present. "Bad faith" can be shown by evidence that you obtained the domain for purposes of selling or renting it, not for use; that you intended to prevent a valid trademark owner from obtaining the name, and have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; that your purpose was to disrupt the business of the other; that you intended to attract users who were looking for the other site. The page "What Are 'Look-Alike' Domain Names?" states: An essential element of any domain name dispute is whether the domain name bears some important resemblance to a relevant trademark. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) refers to this as the “identical or confusingly similar” test. In many cases, a disputed domain name actually contains the trademark, and in other cases it may contain a typographical variation of the trademark (such as by omitting a single letter; transposing two letters; or substituting one letter for another, often adjacent to it on a keyboard). Yet in other cases, a disputed domain name may simply look like the trademark at issue, even if the domain name doesn’t contain the trademark or fall into any of the popular cybersquatting tricks described above. I refer to these simply as “look-alike domain names.” You may wish to determine if the operator of the learnit.com site has in fact obtained a trademark on "learn it". Most national trademark systems provide a means to search the trademark registers. This will not be conclusive, but may give a reasonable idea. One option is to consult a lawyer skilled in trademark law. Another might be to reach out to the exposition firm and ask if they would have any objection to your proposed blog. If they don't object, the will be no problem. Another option is to choose a domain that is not as similar to that of the existing site. One technique that can help avoid an accusation of bad faith is to provide an notice where someone first opening the blog site will see it, something like: This is XY.net. You may have been looking for XX.com,which is about {short description} If co, click here. with a link to the other site. Such a notice might help establish that you were not using the domain to improperly attract traffic looking for the other site. | This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be. | While the 12th century original is in the public domain, that translation was, if I am correct, published in 1996 and is protected by copyright. You will not be able to use extensive quotations without permission from the copyright holders. If you are in the US, you could probably use limited quotations under Fair Use. Exactly how much could be used depends on the specific facts -- there is no general rule. If your use would be likely to harm the market for the translation or to replace it, that would weigh against a finding of Fair Use, but there are four factors and they must all be considered. Note that fair use is a very specifically US concept, and will not apply elsewhere. | You would be in poorly-tested waters under US law. The invented name "Cthulhu" as appearing in a novel is not protected by copyright. A collection of invented names and other words assembled into a dictionary (e.g. of Klingon) might be found to constitute a copyright-protected creative work. In Paramount Pictures v. Axanar Productions (complaint), plaintiffs partially base their claim on infringement of language; defendants sought to dismiss the suit on various grounds ("questions of law" rather than questions of fact), but the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, defendants settled the case. Constructed languages are highly creative expressive works whose elements are deliberately selected for an artistic purpose, and they are not naturally-occurring facts. The copyright office has no position on copyright protection of a constructed language, and any such position would have to come from so-far non-existent (definitive) case law. The dismissal in Paramount v. Axanar doesn't clearly indicate that a constructed language is protected. The primary legal question would be whether the database that you copy into your system is protected. There is a colorable legal argument that a collection of language-like objects. The statutory language in 17 USC 102 does not specifically preclude protection of a wholely-creative database, and the copyright office does not say whether a conlang can be protected because the courts have not ruled one way or the other. The situation in Feist is very different from the case of a work which invents a language from nothing. |
Are countries owned? I'm trying to understand something. Businesses in the United States have one or more owners, correct? That said a business is an entity. A corporation is a person owned by many persons called Shareholders. Is a country an institution or an entity? And who owns it, if it's an entity? | Is a country an institution or an entity? Neither. It's a sovereign state (a "political entity", not an entity in the sense of a legal persona). | No, but ... The CEO is an officer of the company (as are the directors and any others with the ability to substantially exercise control over the company) and as such, owes fiduciary duties to the company - not to the shareholders or any subset of them. For example, if it is in the best interests of the company to enter a trading halt but not in the best interests of the current shareholders then the duty on an officer is to do what’s best for the company. As another example, for a crime many limited by guarantee rather than by shares it’s rarely in the owner’s interest to have that guarantee called but it might be in the company’s interest. | australia Companies can have different classes of shares with different rights: rights to dividends, voting, distribution of assets on winding up etc. Basically, it’s pretty much completely customisable. | When an entity goes bankrupt, its affairs are subject to detailed court supervision and creditors rights with respect to the bankrupt entity are severely limited by an "automatic stay" that funnels all disputes between creditors and the entity to bankruptcy court. This process, in the case of a medium to large sized business, is very expensive. If lots of creditors of the consolidated group are creditors of an entity that doesn't have any assets, it may not be worth the trouble to go through that process, since those creditors will get nothing, or there may be other reasons that it needs to function as a non-bankrupt entity. The creditors of the non-bankrupt LLC could force an involuntary bankruptcy, if they suspect that some creditors are being unduly favored or if they want more transparency, but they might prefer a non-bankrupt company if it allowed them to pursue their creditor's rights outside of bankruptcy and it had some assets. There are some very tricky collective action problems involved in cases like these, that must be made with imperfect information. It could be that the parent company is looking for a quick reorganization that is insulated from the day to day affairs of the company and involves a restructuring of only long term debt and a subsidiary bankruptcy would complicate a simple, pre-packaged plan. Still, it is hard to know with limited information. | You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey. | I'll be referencing the "Minutes of proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907" throughout (600+ pg. PDF). The page numbers refer to the ones printed on the page instead of any software page number. It seems that @owjburnham's comment is essentially correct, it is mainly a shift in terminology. It came from a desire to further distinguish self-governing from non-self-governing colonies (or "Crown Colonies" as the official term seems to have been). As such, "Dominion" came to be (re)defined as "self-governing colony." During the 1907 Colonial Conference, Prime Minister Sir Joseph Ward of New Zealand opined the following [pg. 30-31]: I think the term "Colony," so far as our countries are concerned, ought to cease, and that that term ought to apply to the Crown Colonies purely, and that those of us who are not at present known as Dominions or Commonwealths, should be known as States of the Empire, or some other expressive word, so as to make a distinction as between the Crown Colonies and the self-governing Dependencies. He also stated the following [pg. 48]: I assume that in this resolution New Zealand, now known by the term "Colony," will be included in the expression "Dominion," which I think it ought to be. Awkwardly, this was right at the end of the day and no one reacted to this statement as the conference adjourned. As the participants were deciding upon the structure and participants of subsequent conferences, there is a lengthy discussion of the exact term to be used to refer to the self-governing colonies [pg. 78-90]. Near its conclusion, the chairman states the following [pg. 89]: We agreed [...] that instead of the word "Colonies" we should use the word "Dominions;" but is it sufficiently defined if we use the word "Dominions" alone throughout? [...] I would suggest that we might take what is really the official term "the Dominions beyond the seas" in the first place where it occurs [...] and any other reference to it in the course of the Resolution might very well be "Dominions." That would make it absolutely clear what we mean by the expression in the first place. Thus, the conference opted for an implicit rather than explicit definition of "Dominion". The designation of Newfoundland as a Dominion in 1907 is just a reconciliation of the fact it was a self-governing colony and the new understanding that the word "Dominion" was to mean roughly that. There was no effective change of status. An explicit definition of "Dominion" would not come until the Balfour Declaration of 1926. Ironically, Newfoundland played no role in deciding the term to be used for itself as its Prime Minister only arrived on Day 4 of the conference [pg. 87]. | Your assumption about charities, "that legally you cannot use any of the money raised/created for anything but charitable purposes" is incorrect. For example, a charitable organization can have an office, and can pay rent for that office; it can pay a janitor to clean up, a secretary to do correspondence, and a CEO to run the operation. The basic generalization for a 501(c)(3) organization is To be tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, an organization must be organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes set forth in section 501(c)(3), and none of its earnings may inure to any private shareholder or individual. Specifically, A section 501(c)(3) organization must not be organized or operated for the benefit of private interests, such as the creator or the creator's family, shareholders of the organization, other designated individuals, or persons controlled directly or indirectly by such private interests. No part of the net earnings of a section 501(c)(3) organization may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. A private shareholder or individual is a person having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization. Accordingly, the organization cannot be created with the purpose of benefiting John Smith, or the board of directors of the organization, or shareholders. This does not preclude spending money to operate the charity. | Very few terms have a single "legal" definition or meaning that applies to all laws, and can be looked up as if in a dictionary. Rather, when a specific meaning is needed in connection with a particular law, that law will include a definition. But that definition will often not apply to the use of the same term in other laws or other contexts. Here I suspect that the OP has found the definition section of a US Federal law regulating commercial transport in interstate commerce. Obviously in such a law, those terms would be defined in the context of commercial transport. That does not mean that the same meanings will be applied in other laws. Driver's licenses and other traffic and motor vehicle regulations are largely matters of state law in the US. Definitions from a federal law, or indeed any law but that state's Motor Vehicle Code (or whatever a given state calls such a body of law) will simply not be relevant. The argument sketched in the question simply does not follow. |
Are traffic signs on private property legally enforceable in Upstate NY? Upstate NY here. You see them everywhere: private property parking lots (mall parking lots, Lowes/Target/Walmart parking lots, etc.) that have stop signs, handicap parking spaces, double yellow lines...all the same signs/markers you see out on the open/public road. So my question is: are these signs legally enforceable, seeing that they are on private property? For instance, if I fail to come to a stop at a stop sign located in a Walmart parking lot, can I get a ticket for that? If so, then how?? I couldn't put a stop sign in the middle of my back yard and then have police officers hand out tickets if someone drove across my lawn and didn't obey it. And if they're not enforceable, then what's the point of them?!? | This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied. | In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it. | In most states, the answer would be less clear, as First Amendment protections begin falling away quickly when you enter private property. In California, though, there is some strong precedent indicating that this behavior would be protected. In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 902 (1979), the California Supreme Court held that "the soliciting at a shopping center of signatures for a petition to the government is an activity protected by the California Constitution." That case adopted the reasoning of a dissent in a previous case where the court had rejected such an argument: It bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under consideration the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment. As a result of advertising and the lure of a congenial environment, 25,000 persons are induced to congregate daily to take advantage of the numerous amenities offered by the [shopping center there]. A handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in connection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations ... would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights. I'd bet there is case law addressing religious leafleting, as well, but I don't know California law well enough to cite to it. Even if there isn't, though, the First Amendment's requirements of content-neutrality in government decisionmaking would probably require that the same protections be extended to religious speech. Of course, the answer to these kinds of questions always depends on the specific facts, requiring you to engage a lawyer to get a reliable answer. For a lower cost, you could also just ask the local police if they would enforce a request from the property owner to have you removed. | There is no law against lying in these circumstances. In fact, for a very modest sum, security companies sell dummy CCTV cameras to make this lie more convincing. However, trespass only happens if people have been warned so this works for literate people who speak English and see the sign. That leaves a very large group of people who would not be trespassing even with the sign. A further problem with a sign on the house is that people have no idea how far away they have to get in order to stop trespassing. In addition, legitimate visitors (uninvited or not) are not trespassers. It seems that people are coming onto your property because they are thirsty. A better way to deal with this is go to your local hardware store and replace the tap with a vandal proof tap that has a removable head. Keep that inside and put a sign next to the tap saying "Refrigerated Water $2 - knock on front door". | It depends on the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, speed limits are implemented via Chapter 46.61 RCW, the very first section of which states: The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways except: (1) Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section. (2) The provisions of RCW 46.52.010 through 46.52.090, 46.61.500 through 46.61.525, and 46.61.5249 shall apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state We then turn to the question of what a "vehicle" is (this is the discussion of a number of legal treatises). Title 46 is about motor vehicles, but still you should look at the definition, if any, of "vehicle". We have two definitions of vehicle in RCW 46.04.670. Definition 1 says that "Vehicle" includes every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including bicycles Definition 2 omits the italicized bicycle inclusion, and explicitly excludes A bicycle, for the purposes of chapter 46.12, 46.16A, or 46.70 RCW, or for RCW 82.12.045((.)) This is a bit of a mess arising from legislative screwup, which should be resolved by appeal to RCW 1.12.025. The explicit-exclusion sections are about registration, dealers and taxes, and not speed limits. The latter version was recently reaffirmed effective July 23, 2023. The courts could therefore be somewhat inclined to not apply speed limits to bicycles, because bicycles were recently removed from the set of explicit vehicles. But as notes in the Eskridge's extensive discussion of a hypothetical ban on vehicles in Lafayette Park, there are multiple principles for interpreting laws, and "legislative intent to assure safety" would be one prominent consideration, in case the wording of the law is not crystal clear – as it is not, in this case. | Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure. | Washington state dedicated a section of their code to explicitly make this illegal (to install it, not just use it). RCW 46.37.685(1)(b) says It is unlawful for a person to have an installed license plate flipping device on a vehicle, use technology to flip a license plate on a vehicle, or use technology to change the appearance of a license plate on a vehicle. and it is illegal to sell them. Georgia does not seem to have a specific law on the topic, but the same effect holds under GA Code §40-2-41, which says: Unless otherwise permitted under this chapter, every vehicle required to be registered under this chapter, which is in use upon the highways, shall at all times display the license plate issued to the owner for such vehicle, and the plate shall be fastened to the rear of the vehicle in a position so as not to swing and shall be at all times plainly visible... It shall be the duty of the operator of any vehicle to keep the license plate legible at all times. No license plate shall be covered with any material unless the material is colorless and transparent. No apparatus that obstructs or hinders the clear display and legibility of a license plate shall be attached to the rear of any motor vehicle required to be registered in the state. We can start with the question of whether the vehicle must be registered: yes, it does. Then we can ask if "which is in use upon the highways" is true. This is not obvious, because that clause could be interpreted as meaning "which is at some time or other in use upon the highway", or else as "at those times when it is in use upon the highway". I strongly suspect that the courts would find in favor of the first interpretation, not the second, especially since the law also says that you must "keep the license plate legible at all times" (not "at all times when you are on the highway"). Finally, a plate flipper clearly "hinders the clear display and legibility of a license plate", and the law prohibits the attachment of such device, not just its use. So obscuring your license plate is just not legal. | Can a restrictive covenant deny a land owner the right to use a road on their own property? Yes. A restrictive covenant could impose such a limitation, although usually a court would disfavor that interpretation of a covenant unless no other reasonable interpretation is possible from the language of the covenant. This is basically because it would be lawful (at common law anyway) to convey the land in its entirety to the covenant beneficiary, so it is lawful to convey a lesser interest to that person. It isn't inherently unconscionable unless it makes the property subject to the covenant landlocked with no access to a public road, in which case some mandatory doctrines regarding a right of access would probably apply. Often this would be done to create a private drive across the "front lot" (which has direct access to a public road by other means) when the "back lot" of a parcel was conveyed by the owner of the combined lot to the new owner of the back lot. A covenant might be chosen instead of an outright conveyance of the dogleg of road because it retains mineral rights in the servient estate owner, because it clearly allocates property tax payment duties to the underlying owner as part of a larger economic deal, and/or because it could make a transaction possible that would otherwise be prohibited by subdivision requirements applicable in that locality. The restriction might also reduce the servient estate owner's liability for accidents arising from use of the covenant access easement, since it would ordinarily vest all maintenance and use regulation in the dominant estate owner. Some other common easements that deny the servient estate owner all use of land for a period of time are easements to allow staging of road construction activities, and easements incident to mineral rights in states where destruction of the surface is allowed if it is later restored when the minerals are extracted (such as Wyoming). |
Is it legal to take photos on private property? My friends and I were out to dinner last night, the restaurant is on this sort of alleyway/private road that’s off of a main road. There are a few other stores and restaurants on this alleyway, and people commonly walk their dogs through it as well (the entrance to an apt building in there too). Is it legal for me, as someone who has every right to walk through the alleyway (ie I have not been trespassed), to go up to a family eating dinner on the patio seating and snap a photo of them? This is me, standing on private property (that Im allowed to be on until someone tells me to leave), taking a photo of someone on that same property. | There are various tangential ways in which this could be illegal, for example if your subjects are celebrities, you take a picture of them and commercially exploit it without permission in a product endorsement. Leaving aside such fringe cases, in the US, the legal right to privacy comes about, at the first cut, by premise trespass law. If the proprietor tells you to go away, you have to go away; if the proprietor tells you that you cannot take pictures, you cannot take pictures (your right to enter is conditional). Neither of those circumstances holds in your case. There are other tort-law bases for a right to privacy: numerous privacy laws regarding privacy and financial transactions (not relevant here), the aforementioned right of publicity (commercial exploitation of likeness), false light (like defamation, about creating a false impression – I don't see what false information is conveyed by a photo). There is also public disclosure of private fact, but that cat is out of the bag because the subject has self-disclosed the supposedly offensive fact revealed by the picture by eating in public. Intrusion of solitude and seclusion does not exist in the circumstance, since the subject is eating in public where everybody can see: there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. This page sums us Virginia law. The main take-away from that is that there is no common law action for privacy in Virginia, and only an action for unauthorized used of likeness or name. | Your lawyer friend is misguided Casual conversation and writing are not subject to any maxims of interpretation - the words mean what the speaker/writer says and what the listener/reader understands and these may be different things. In a conversation about restaurants, there is no implication that the places not mentioned are not restaurants or don't exist. Even if I were to write a published magazine article called "The 10 best restaurants in the world", there is no implication that no other restaurant can possibly be better than those 10. This applies even in business settings. For example, this is the Petbarn logo: It has images of dogs, fish, cats, and birds. By your friend's argument, it would be unlawful for them to sell products for the care of pet snakes or lizards since they aren't on the sign? Or, for that matter, to operate from a building that is not a "barn"? Finally, your friend is wrong even in legal interpretation. There are many ways of contract and legislative interpretation that are or have been in use in every jurisdiction. "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius" is one maxim of interpretation but it may be in conflict with others. For example, if a regulation on aircraft listed various types of aircraft but didn't mention helicopters but nevertheless had an entire section devoted to rotor maintenance the "Rule against surplusage" would require that helicopters be included. In any event, modern courts tend to take a more holistic view to interpretation and the use of individual maxims is optional. | A receipt is just a written proof that money was taken. It is hard to imagine a place on Earth where the legality of giving such a proof would be questionable at all so that you would need to talk about an "authority to issue receipts". Only if you find a place where money itself is illegal. Now, the real question here is whether such receipts (issued by private persons not registered as businesses) can be used for accounting purposes, e.g. to claim that your business, which transacted with those persons, incurred expenses. The mere fact that sole traders need to be registered to do business does not outlaw the use of receipts issued by non-registered persons. For example, your business could be buying old stuff from the public (used cars, electronics etc.) and refurbishing it. Provided that this activity itself is not illegal, receiving receipts from those one-off private sellers, and using them in your bookkeeping would be perfectly legal too. | It is illegal in Scotland. There is currently no law specifically against it in the rest of the UK. If you find this is unbelievable, yes it is. There are attempts now to change the laws. PS. There are no photos taken "of the act". Taking the photo is the act. The pervs use a selfy stick or just get down on the floor to take photos, or take photos on stairs. PPS. News on Jan 16th 2019: "A new law will now be introduced in the next couple of months. It could mean that perpetrators might face up to two years in prison and are added to the sex offenders register." | A private venue normally has discretion over who may attend their premises, as long as it is not because of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination law. Note that the communication, as quoted, did not say that the banned person was a threat, but only that one of the performers felt uncomfortable. I do not think that the banned person has any legal recourse, unless they can plausibly assert that this is a case of unlawful discrimination, which the question does not suggest. | Google maps (Street View, Google Earth) are all legal, although perhaps they are illegal in North Korea (along with many other things). Permission would be required for them to enter your house and take pictures, but if it can be seen publically, it is legal unless there is a specific law forbidding taking pictures. It is possible that there are legal restrictions on the Street View method of driving around with a camera in some countries, but Earth view shots are obtained by satellite, which is out of the jurisdiction of the objecting country. The Street View gap for Belarus may be due to a legal restriction, or it could just be Google-strategic (there seems to be no public explanation). There have been numerous "legal encounters" involving Street View and the authorities, in the realm of privacy concerns: there is no general rule. Google has the right to make and distribute these photos because there is no (enforceable) law against doing so, unless there is. | I have a really good pizza place near my home but the bastards won't deliver when I go interstate! Now, that's discrimination! Yes, it's discrimination. However, it's not unlawful discrimination. Discrimination is not unlawful unless it is on the basis of a protected class. Geography isn't a protected class of itself. It can be if it's used as a proxy for a protected class, such as excluding certain neighbourhoods which correspond with racial or religious groups, but that's not the case here. | I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed. |
Is it legal to print the Nintendo logo (and trade marks) on retro spare parts? For old consoles like Game Boy Classic/Pocket/Advance there are no official spare parts available anymore. But there are a lot of unofficial spare parts. Some of them have the Nintendo logo and Nintendo trade marks (like "Game Boy") printed on them. For example you can find GBA lenses on eBay. Most of them are wearing the official "Game Boy Advance" logo. I wonder if this is legal. The logo graphic is copyrighted by Nintendo and also "Game Boy" is a registered trade mark. When I asked a shop about the legality I was told there is "right to restore". But I didn't find anything on the internet about it. Some manufacturers print the logos and other's don't. So I'm not sure. I asked on meta and they told me to ask here. | Marks are to denominate the origin of goods. Nintendo built Gameboys for decades. Some GameBoys have aftermarket parts like the NAKI Action Light, a peripheral never made by Nintendo but was nothing but a light and a 1.5 magnification lens. It was advertised as "Fitting a Game Boy TM" and didn't use Nintendo marks. That is nominative use and allowed. Then, Nintendo actually had stocks of spare parts that ended on the open market by now. those are genuine Nintendo parts, made for Nintendo, with the marks on it. Those are proper marks. Some people bought up tons of old Game Boys and took them apart for spares. Those are still genuine parts, even if used, and the mark is proper. Nintendo didn't make all the parts for Gameboy themselves. They had contracted OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) that created parts for construction of the toys. These were in part branded and marked in the OEM factory still, the OEMs had a license to make and mark parts. Parts produced till the lapse of the license would be most likely proper as for most intents and purposes Nintendo did endorse the manufacturing in this fashion. However after the licensee lapsed or if it doesn't contain a "put the markings on it" clause, marking would not be allowed (anymore). Finally, there are spare parts that were just made to Nintendo specs, that are not originating with Nintendo, and are marked with Nintendo marks. Such copy parts infringe on the Trademark of Nintendo. There is legal space in the aftermarket spare part market: Parts that are to specs but not marked with the marks denominating the origin. Those can be advertised akin to the NAKI Action Light "fitting a Game Boy TM" without infringing on marks. | Yes, the SFC doesn't allow the usage of the term "git" for third-party products unless they have their permisison. From the Git Trademark Policy, 2.3 Prohibited usages of the Marks: In addition, you may not use any of the Marks as a syllable in a new word or as part of a portmanteau (e.g., "Gitalicious", "Gitpedia") used as a mark for a third-party product or service without Conservancy's written permission. For the avoidance of doubt, this provision applies even to third-party marks that use the Marks as a syllable or as part of a portmanteau to refer to a product or service's use of Git code. | united-states I am going to answer based on US law. But many of the principles would be similar in many other countries. In particular the law in the EU is similar. There are two separate issues here, trademark rights and copyright. Trademark Rights Trademark law provides protection against the use of the mark "in commerce". This means using the mark to identify or advertise goods or services. It does not provide any protection against use not in commerce. Specifically 15 USC 1114 (part of the Lanham Act, the main US Federal trademark law) provides, in relevant part: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (1) (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (1) (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. If the plane was being used commercially, using someone else's trademark would be infringement and could lead to a successful infringement suit. But if it is not being used to provide or advertise a service or goodsm there is no trademark issue. Copyright 17 USC 106 specifies the exclusive rights that a copyright owner has. One is to make copies, another is to make derivative works. Unless fair use (or fair dealing in the UK) applies, one needs permission from the copyright owner. Without such permission, copying is infringement, and can lead to an award of damages. However, according to the question, the image has been released under a CC-BY-NC license. That grants permission, under certain conditions. One condition is that the image (or text) not be used for commercial purposes. If the plane is purely private, not rente out, these conditions seem to be complied with, so there is no copyright issue either. Conclusion Based on the statements in the question, there seems to br no IP issue here. Be sure that there is no commercial purpose, and that the CC license was issued by the actual copyright owner. A brief consultatuion with a lawyer might be wise. | That would be pretty much a classical case of copyright infringement. Drawing a thing from memory is copying just as much as drawing a thing with the original before you or xeroxing a thing. The degree of match between the original and your copy may vary depending on how good your memory is, but that doesn't matter, because copyright protection is not about "making exact replicas", it is about copying in any form. | Since the person who posted the game component under the CC-BY license has no right to do so, no one who used it in reliance on that license had any rights either, and all such uses were at least technically infringement (unless they came under a copyright exception, which seems unlikely). The holder of the copyright on the component could sue in any country where a game using it was published. The details of the law, including the rules on damages and other remidies, will vary from country to country. In the united-states those rules are contained in Chapter 5 of title 17 USC particularly sections 502-505. Section 504 provides for possible money damages. Section 502 provides for a possible injunction (court order to stop infringing). Section 503 provides for for infringing works to be seized. Section 505 provides for possible awards of costs and legal fees to a successful plaintiff (copyright holder). Section 502 allows injunctions to "prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright" on "reasonable" terms. But when the infringement has already been stopped, no such injunction is needed and a court is not likely to impose one. Section 503 allows the court to order the impoundment of infringing copies and "plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced". This is largely obsolete for digital content. Section 504 is the key. It offers the plaintiff a choice between actual damages plus profits and statutory damages. The rule for the first is: The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. This means money made by use of the unauthorized content, plus any loss of sales or other losses suffered by the owner. Money mad by the infringing work but not made by use of the infringing content is not included, if this can be proven. Income obtained after the infringing content was removed would probably not be included in the infringer's profits. Statutory damages can be any amount between $750 and $30,000 that the count thinks is just, but id the infringement is proved to be "innocent" the lower limit is $200. The exact provision reads: In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. An award of costs and fees under section 505 is entirely up to the discretion of the court. If the maximum possible award of infringer's profits is $10,000, and a defense of innocent infringement is plausible, a plaintiff might well find such a suit unprofitable, given the legal expenses involved in preparing an carrying through such a suit. But that is entirely up to the copyright owner. An owner may choose to file even an unprofitable suit in an effort to deter others. A person who has discovered that s/he has innocently infringed a copyright and made some money in the process would be wise to document the prompt removal of the infringing content form any publication, and efforts to notify the copyright owner. Ther is no way to be sure what actions the owner will take, if any, within those that the law allows. Often a owner in such a case will not bring suit if the infringement was apparently innocent, resulting profits were small, the infringement has been halted, and future infringement by that infringer seems unlikely. But different owners have different policies on such matters. An owner can delay in deciding whether to file suit or not. | Does the registrant still have common law rights over the mark? Maybe. According to Yospin Law, Just because a mark is listed as “dead” at the USPTO, does not mean it is available to use without registration, or to register. It’s possible that the registrant of the trademark abandoned the federal trademark registration, but is still using the mark – and so still has common law trademark rights. Does this mean the registrant can never register this mark again? No. It does not mean the trademark can never be registered again. However, a new application for registration of the mark must be made. This registration is completely separate from the previous one - it's effectively registering a new mark that happens to be identical to an old one, without the problems that would normally cause. Can another entity register this mark for the same purpose? Possibly. If it remains in use under common law rights, you would face an uphill battle to successfully register it for yourself. If it is truly abandoned, you can apply for registration, but as Beth Hutchens discussed, this is not a simple matter of filling out the form and celebrating your new acquisition. Here is a handy brief summary, but for any actual case, your first step should be to consult a patent and trademark attorney, particularly one experienced in the jurisdiction you intend to use the mark in. | This a bit dubious. You write "I know you can make a digital copy of a book or CD you own." but that is true only under limited circumstances. Making such a copy for one's own personal use would likely be fair use (in the US). Selling copies would pretty clearly be copyright infringement. Giving away free copies to significant numbers of people would also be infringement. Temporarily lending copies ro a small number of people might be considered fair use or might not. For the board game, you could allow others to play with the copy you own in person. But COVID makes that unsafe. Assuming the game art is under copyright protection (some older games might have protection expired) selling such images or making them widely available would clearly be infringement. Making them available only during the course of play to a limited group, with technical measures to prevent or discourage copying and no fee charged might pass as fair use, and the game company might well not want to pursue the matter in any case. If you create new art which can be used for the same game, it would be somewhat less likely to be considered infringing/ Even then selling access would probably be trademark infringement, and perhaps infringe the copyright on the rules of the game. There would be legal risk in doing this sort of thing. | Yes, it is legal to do that More exactly, it is not copyright infringement. Reverse engineering has been found to be a fair use under US copyright law in: Sega Enterprises v. Accolade 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer Entertainment v. Connectix 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).; and Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In general pure reverse engineering is fair use when the reuser has not agreed to a contract limiting reverse engineering and has not obtained a copy through deception. But a file format is considered to be an idea or a method of operation, and so is not protected by copyright at all, and nothing that is done with it could ever be copyright infringement. See https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/windows/en-US/3269d4f3-8b39-4a2c-8205-1a55e0c6774d/are-file-types-copyrighted?forum=Vsexpressvcs and "Does copyright protect data file formats?" from Lexology, the latter citing EU law and the case of SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Thus there is no copyright infringement in reverse engineering a file format, or in then writing and distributing code to read, write, or, modify files in such a format. If a valid patent applies, that may prevent creating or using such software without a license from the patent holder. But my understanding is that in most cases a file format will not be subject to a patent. |
reasonable accommodations for housing for people with disabilities I recently applied for an apartment and I passed the background check, income requirements, and rental history, however I did not pass the credit check. I do NOT have any evictions OR repossessions on my credit score. I just have bad credit due to my disability preventing me from driving so ride-sharing adds up and then bills and other things happen (life). my credit score is a 509. I contacted the apartments of which I was denied and told them I would like to make a reasonable accommodation. the apartments response was: reasonable accommodations are only reviewed and granted to residents. Since you did not meet our minimum requirements set forth by our criteria you were not approved based on that information and for no other reason I thought the law provides that a reasonable accommodation can alter rules in order for a person with a disability to participate. I didn't know you have to be a tenant in order for reasonable accommodations to be granted. Does the apartment complex have the rulings correct on this matter? I am in California. thank you for reading | What "reasonable accommodation" were you requesting? That they lower the bar of determining your ability to pay your bills on time? I don't think that will qualify. A business setting a minimum bar for financial viability isn't a burden tied to a handicap. It's one thing to request a ramp, contracts in braille, etc., but it's another thing to request that they accept a highly-probable financial risk. What would you expect of them the next time "life" got in the way and you couldn't pay your rent? Another accommodation? I think what they were saying is that since you didn't pass the financial background check, and as such were not accepted as a resident, you aren't in a position to make an accommodation request. | "Reasonableness" is a deliberately vague and flexible term. It does not -- and is not meant to -- have any precise definition. Instead, it is meant to be highly case specific. A "reasonable" time to repair will therefore be longer or shorter, depending on the circumstances. If you want a scratch in your countertop repaired, a "reasonable" time is probably a lot longer than if you want the plumbing repaired. And a reasonable time to repair the plumbing may itself vary with the availability of vendors, supplies, etc. Likewise with the air conditioning. It's probably a lot more reasonable to wait three months to fix the AC if it breaks down in December than in if it breaks down in the summer, which it sounds like is what's happened to you. Based on the timing, I'd feel very comfortable arguing that the leasing company has breached the agreement. The "reasonableness" standard is meant to give the landlord adequate time to respond and get the job done properly, but it can't be stretched indefinitely as seems to be happening here, to the point where you have essentially lost the entire benefit of air conditioning by sitting in a hot apartment for the entirety of the summer. New York City has pretty strong tenant-protection laws, so I suspect that you would have the option of hiring someone to handle the repairs yourself and then deducting your costs from the rent you owe. | As someone who acts for both landlords and tenants I would say that I have never seen exclusions for personal injury or death in a commercial lease. I would recommend that you have the whole lease reviewed by a solicitor dealing in commercial property, particularly as, as has been stated in another reply, exclusion of liability for personal injury or death is prohibited by UCTA. This would suggest there may be other provisions which, if not prohibited, are unreasonable and you should be aware of the commitments you are taking on prior to signing This pure speculation, but the fact that those clauses would not be in a standard lease precedent does make me wonder if the landlord has done a DIY job and produced a lease from the internet suitable for another jurisdiction. | The ADA continues to apply, and an employer cannot simply withdraw an accommodation on a whim. You have established a medical need for an accommodation, and your employer must offer an accommodation if a rewasonable one is available. The EEOC page giving guidelines on COVID says (in section K.1) The federal EEO laws do not prevent an employer from requiring all employees physically entering the workplace to be vaccinated for COVID-19, subject to the reasonable accommodation provisions of Title VII and the ADA and other EEO considerations discussed below. These principles apply if an employee gets the vaccine in the community or from the employer. In some circumstances, Title VII and the ADA require an employer to provide reasonable accommodations for employees who, because of a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance, do not get vaccinated for COVID-19, unless providing an accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business. Section k.6 further says: An employee with a disability who does not get vaccinated for COVID-19 because of a disability must let the employer know that he or she needs an exemption from the requirement or a change at work, known as a reasonable accommodation. To request an accommodation, an individual does not need to mention the ADA or use the phrase “reasonable accommodation.” ... Employers and employees typically engage in a flexible, interactive process to identify workplace accommodation options that do not impose an undue hardship (significant difficulty or expense) on the employer. This process may include determining whether it is necessary to obtain supporting medical documentation about the employee’s disability. ... The ADA requires that employers offer an available accommodation if one exists that does not pose an undue hardship, meaning a significant difficulty or expense. See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(p). Employers are advised to consider all the options before denying an accommodation request. It is hard to see how having an employee get frequent COVID tests imposes an "undue hardship" on the employer, as it should impose little or no difficulty or expense on the employer. It seems unlikely that an employer who has accepted such testing as a reasonable accommodation would change its position and seek to deny that accommodation. Even if it did, any such employer still has a legal obligation to consider what would constitute a reasonable accommodation, and to inform the employee what it would accept as a reasonable accommodation before undertaking to terminate employment. If the employer insists that a vaccination is absolutely essential and no alternative will be tolerated (highly unlikely, even hospitals are not taking that position) it must offer the employee a chance to comply or to challenge the decision. Until the employer indicates that the accommodation of regular testing will no longer be accepted, there should be no reason to take significant medical risks to meet an issue that has not in fact arisen. | Generally, you would have to bring an eviction action just as you would for an ordinary landlord-tenant relationship. This means given written notice served as required by MA law of a deadline to leave, and then if the child did not leave, filing an eviction lawsuit and serving the papers on the child, and then attending an eviction hearing, and then, if you prevailed in that hearing as you probably would (probably with horrible TV and newspaper publicity that might go viral in social media), and then, arrangements would be made to remove him and his stuff from the house on an appointed day with law enforcement and movers and you would change the locks. It would probably take a few weeks start to finish. It is not something that a non-lawyer should try to do themselves. A lawyer would probably charge you a few thousand dollars for this proceeding. The main exception would be that generally a parent has a duty to support an adult disabled child who cannot provide for himself. You probably do not have the legal right to simply kick out your child without an eviction action, although few adult children would choose to push their legal rights not to be removed in that manner if they were. The fact that a child would likely end up homeless in some circumstances if you did this is something that most parents would not be at peace with and would regret later even if they felt good about the decision at the time, but that is a parenting decision and not a legal one. | Is this even legal? Yes, it is lawful. The Ontario Tenancy Act does not seem to outlaw that type of clauses. But the clause (or lease) will be binding only if you agree to it. Also note that the clause refers to reasonable costs, which implies that those costs must be for a reasonable cause. In other words, the landlord would be barred from recovery of legal expenses if you persuade the Board that the landlord's complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Notwithstanding that the clause is lawful, I would personally discourage you from agreeing to pay the adversary's attorney fees. Note that the clause may apply in the event that neither party fully prevails, whence it is in your best interest to preclude the risk of having to reimburse the landlord in that scenario. | The relevant part of Texas law is in the property code, §§92.101-92.109 §92.104 allows them to "deduct from the deposit damages and charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the lease or as a result of breaching the lease", and then they must "give to the tenant the balance of the security deposit, if any, together with a written description and itemized list of all deductions" (except when there is uncontroversial rent owed). §92.109 states what the landlord's liability is, namely a landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of this subchapter is liable for an amount equal to the sum of $100, three times the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld, and the tenant's reasonable attorney's fees in a suit to recover the deposit. This requires bad faith, not just being wrong. If you dispute the deductions, you can sue the landlord to recover the deposit. The law also provides that "In an action brought by a tenant under this subchapter, the landlord has the burden of proving that the retention of any portion of the security deposit was reasonable". In order to extract more money from you for putative damages, the landlord will have to sue you and establish that there was an additional $2,000 damages. If the court finds that you did actually did damage the apartment, you may be ordered to compensate the landlord. Until you get such an order, you don't owe them anything; you may be able to recover the damage deposit if the "damage" was insignificant. This sketches the process of suing in Justice Court to get your deposit back, highlighting details like the demand letter that you might not have known you have to write. As far as your credit history is concerned, this is not entirely clear. The Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates the industry of credit reporting, and crucially you can dispute false claims of debts. This does not prevent a person from making such a claim. I do not have an account with the Big 3 reporting services, so I don't know what their standards are for recording a putative debt. However, you can insert a suitable statement in your record disputing the validity of the claim. It is most likely that the landlord would sell the putative debt to a collection agency. That industry is regulated by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and there is a procedure about disputing an alleged debt. | In Virginia there is a distinction between a tenant and an authorized occupant. An authorized occupant is a person entitled to occupy a dwelling unit with the consent of the landlord, but who has not signed the rental agreement and therefore does not have the financial obligations as a tenant under the rental agreement. A tenant is a person entitled only under the terms of a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others and shall include roomer. There is a third category, guest or invitee which means a person, other than the tenant or person authorized by the landlord to occupy the premises, who has the permission of the tenant to visit but not to occupy the premises. Such people who live there would not be invitees. Clearly, you can have others living with you who are not on the lease, if the landlord agrees. The landlord's main concern regarding credit rating is probably financial responsibility, and if you qualify, having people live with you who have low or no credit rating is unlikely to make any difference. There may be other concerns, such as background checks or increases utility costs). Virginia law does not specifically allow "unauthorized occupants", i.e. occupants not approved by the landlord, nor does it specifically disallow such occupants. Leases often include a provision that addresses this matter, prohibiting unauthorized occupants. Supposing that the lease is silent on the matter (not likely) and the landlord wanted to compel the other occupants to leave, the procedure would be to tell the tenant that the unauthorized occupants must leave. Then if you do not comply (do not get them to move out), the landlord could start the procedure of evicting the lot of you, and the question would be whether the court would find that you have a right to let unauthorized other people live with you. I can't find any applicable case law, but it is unlikely that the court would find such a right. Tenants have special statutory rights, as do authorized occupants under the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. A court would not find that the rights of an authorized occupant extend to an unauthorized occupant, which means that the landlord's rights as property owner are dispositive of the matter. |
Is there a way to know if a 50's immigrant became an USA citizen? My grandfather and father (both deceased many decades ago) immigrated to USA from Cuba in the 50's, returning to Cuba in 1959 to try to sell all their properties but they never could return back to USA. All I have is a scan of my father's immigrant card. Is there a way to find out if he became US citizens? So if he did, I could be an US citizen by direct descendance? Does this document provides me any special shortcut in terms of migrating to the USA? | There is a form here which you submit to USCIS – immigrated not before 1906, not for a living person. However, to apply for citizenship, one must have been a permanent resident for 5 years, so given the date on the card (and assuming your father did not marry a US citizen), he could not have been naturalized before departure in 1959. | Being automaticly citizens of the US and Uruguay, causes no problem with your German citizenship. For Uruguay, you are appling for recognition of your citizenship at birth as a grandchild of a Uruguayan citizen. Only when you, as an adult, apply for nationisation (i.e. that country considers you to be a foreigner at the time of the application) would you lose your German citizenship automaticly when this application has been granted, unless you apply for an exception beforhand. Such an exception would only be granted when you can prove that you still have strong ties to Germany. | You ask if your deceased brother's green card may be legally used by another person. The answer is: no. | tl;dr My assumption: the U.S. government is considering whether to accept refugees and immigrants (given your Syria comment). The background section talks about State attempts to restrict entry. The answer is nuanced since there are different standards for an entrance decision than there are for someone who is already in the U.S. This is because foreign nationals in their home nations aren't "persons within the jurisdiction of the United States," and so laws like the Civil Rights Act only apply in spirit. What does that mean? We wouldn't expect to see the federal government discriminate based on religion, but we might expect to see decisions made about groups that incidentally share an common religion. This is because the federal government has wide latitude when it comes to alienage---which is just a formal name for policies related to non-citizens. While religion is afforded a high degree of protection, the federal government's alienage policies are governed by the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. This implies a practical challenge: things like religion and national origin can be very difficult to disentangle from questions that pertain to the alienage category. For example, a policy might restrict some group's entry "because of" a particular alienage reason and "in spite of" the fact that most of the affected people happen to share a common religion. Background The Equal Protection Clause U.S. Const. Am. XIV § 1 prohibits States from denying any person within its jurisdiction "equal protection of the laws." The Clause is often applied to the federal government as well, via the Due Process Clause U.S. Const. Am. V. See, e.g. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In relation to the clause, laws are reviewed for their constitutionality using either strict, intermediate, or rational basis scrutiny. Strict scrutiny would mean that in order to distinguish based on a particular trait, the government has to have a compelling, narrowly tailored interest, and no less restrictive alternative available. Rational basis just means the government's interest is subject to a lower level of scrutiny (e.g. benefits exceed costs, or don't let in felons). Things like, race, religion, national origin, and some forms of alienage are suspect classes that merit strict scrutiny. This bit about alienage is important. As we'd expect from the above, when States enact alienage statutes, they're subject to strict scrutiny, and when those statues cross the line, the courts have found that State attempts to restrict resident or non-resident aliens encroach upon the federal government's exclusive control over entrance of aliens. Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). In other words, the federal government, not the States, decides whether various "aliens" are admitted. Note: State scrutiny levels when dealing with undocumented immigrants may be context specific. See, e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (children and education). The federal government's authority over immigration is further solidified by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Const. Article VI. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1967). As such, the courts have applied rational basis scrutiny to the federal government's immigration policy. One reason alienage is interesting is that it tends to encompass things like national origin and religion. This doesn't imply the federal government makes its decisions on the basis of religion. In fact, it'd be hard to make an argument that they do. However, since the categories can be so closely entwined, many scholars have argued for a change in standard. Edit In hindsight, this topic seems quite forward looking. A couple weeks after the OP's question a U.S. presidential candidate (Donald Trump) came out in favor of a ban on entry into the U.S. by Muslims. That led to a flurry of activity, and to this insightful blog post by Professor E. Posner. | Your question (when read with your follow-up comments) is somewhat complex, so I am going to make a few assumptions and break it down into several sub parts. Assumptions The conviction occurred in a state where the expungement statute allows you to tell employers that you were never arrested and convicted. When you say “public records websites” you’re asking about sites like atlaspublicrecords.com. That atlaspublicrecords.com is a US based company. They don’t list an address and the website used a private registration services, so can’t easily determine that they are US-based. Your questions and follow-up Considerations After I get it expunged, will it be removed from public records websites . . . . No. Websites like atlaspublicrecords.com do not link to actual public records. I searched a couple of common names and feel safe in assuming that it only collects and publishes the information—it does not actually link to court records. Nevertheless, it would not be available from the actual government agencies that keep those records. By getting your records expunged the convictions and arrest would no longer be available as public records that someone could request from the courthouse, police department, or whatever state agency does criminal history in your jurisdiction. do I have to show them proof of the expungement . . . . Yes, if you believe what the website claims. I can’t find a physical address for the website and don’t know if they are real or a scam, so understand that when you give them information about your expungement—or pay their silly fee, they might collect the money and do nothing. My opinion is that the company is shady and seems to operate in a gray area of the law that I will explain below. Options if they don’t remove the post: You could try to sue them for some type of secondary dignitary tort like defamation or false light. But these would have some significant legal hurdles. See G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300 (N.J. 2011), where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that commenting on an expunged criminal records was not defamation or invasion of privacy because it was the truth. You could try to argue that they are a consumer reporting agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). If they're governed by the FCRA, you have some additional legal remedies (like civil penalties/fines) if they don't remove/clarify an expunged record. The Fair Credit Reporting Act applies to credit reporting agencies, like Experian & Equifax but also covers companies that compile and sell information for background checks. This includes criminal records. See the Federal Trade Commission’s Advisory Opinion to LeBlanc (06-09-98). But . . . this website is operating in a gray area that appears to comply with the law. The FCRA only applies to consumer reporting agencies, which are defined as: Any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) Because they’re not charging money or a fee to access the reports and they’re not a nonprofit cooperative, they probably do not meet the definition of a CRA. Bottom-line is that you're best option is to give them the expungement documents once you obtain them. | No, it means the following are eligible: Natural born citizens Citizens of the United States, at the time of the adoption of the constitution The second part was to allow people that were citizens of the US in 1788 (but were obviously not "natural born citizens", since the US didn't exist when they were born) to be eligible for the Presidency. Check out Alexander Hamilton's draft of this clause: No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United States. | A US passport does not list height or make claims about ethnicity: what you have is a birth date and state, and photograph. A passport is taken to be strong proof of identity. You may apply for a new passport (turning in the old one), with a new photo. It may be necessary to provide "documentary evidence of identity" by appearing with an identifying witness (citizen or permanent resident) who has known you for 2 years and fills in an affidavit (both of you would need to bring some ID as well, so let's assume you also have a valid driver's license). It would be at the discretion of the accepting agent whether to believe that you and the "old" you are the same person. In the fictitious scenario, the person could videotape themselves undergoing the transformation, but ultimately, if one is sufficiently off the grid, then proving identity could be very difficult. | I don't know what you mean by "own a person's DNA", but analogous to owning a car or picture, you can't own a person, which is what would be required to have complete ownership of all of a person's DNA. You can legally own a sample of a person's DNA, for example by buying or bartering tissue, or if you are given tissue. If you grab a handful of hair from a person and pull it out, it is not legally yours, and you can be required to return it. If you lose, misplace or abandon tissue (or a knife), then the finder could end up owning it, depending on the circumstances. Tissue in the trash is more complicated since there may be municipal laws preventing dumpster-diving. Setting aside any such municipal codes, if you abandon your property, someone else can claim it. Hair on the floor of a barbershop, or in the trash, is a good example abandonment: it could also be an example of trespassing, in case the barber objects to you gathering samples from his floor. The 4th Amendment cannot be used to secure your DNA: it could be used to prevent securing DNA, if the intended application is compelled blood drawing. The ruling in Maryland v. King did not say that "your DNA can be taken and entered into a national database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason", since that was an objection to the majority ruling given in the dissent, not part of the actual ruling. Maybe that will end up being true, but that hasn't been determined to be the law yet. With a warrant, the police can take a tissue sample, and not wait for you to throw a tissue sample in the trash. They can also take a cheek swab from an arrestee just like they can take a photo or fingerprints (that's what Maryland v. King says). Once we've settled the matter of obtaining a DNA sample, the concept of ownership might be relevant if a party could restrict others from using that DNA pattern. But DNA is not subject to patent or copyright, so once I know your DNA pattern, you cannot legally prevent me from using that information. However, you might, if I gave you a sample as part of a contract, and there is a clause in that contract that prevents the other party from ever using that information. |
Why can courts refuse evidence? The question Layman here. This question was inspired by this question and random things I've heard/read over the years. I'm quite confused by a concept that comes up again and again and which people seem to hold for self-evident. And that concept is that there is some evidence which a court will refuse to admit. And that confuses be because... well, there's evidence. It leads to the truth. Why aren't you taking it?! It's very easy to come up with realistic examples where: There is a piece of evidence which is clearly and irrefutably shows that a person did something very bad (say, murder) This evidence is for whatever reason "not admissible" (say, it was obtained illegally) And there is no other piece of evidence that would incriminate this person. Does that mean that the perpetrator gets to go free? How can the court refuse to admit evidence, especially if it's the only useful evidence existing? And if yes, then why is this so and where is this practice useful? Some examples from the top of my head The example question above deals with unlawful searches. Imagine that a police officer decided to search a car (or an apartment) and forcefully did so against the protests of the owner (or maybe the owner wasn't even present). They thought they might find drugs or something, but instead they are surprised to discover a dead body, clearly murdered. So... now what? According to the above question, since the search was illegal, this is inadmissible evidence in the court. Does that mean that the owner of the car/apartment gets to go away scott-free? Do they launch a new investigation and try to find other evidence except the fact that it was inside the property of this guy here (and failing to do that, release them)? If the owner of the car/apartment says "I don't know what you're talking about, I last saw Jimmy here alive and well at the pub last night; I never seen his corpse before." - can they call him out on the obvious lie? Or, another example. I don't know about USA, but here in Europe it's illegal to record someone's phone calls without a warrant (or something like that; it's serious). Any recordings obtained unlawfully will be inadmissible as evidence. Let's now imagine that I've gone the full extra mile and have secretly bugged everything in my neighbour's house because I suspect (but have no evidence) that they murdered my child last month. I've got hidden cameras, microphones everywhere, etc. So one day I catch him talking to his spouse on the phone and mentioning the murder, admitting to doing it, and even telling where he buried the body. Now I have evidence... or do I? I give the recording to the police, they search the indicated place and they do find the body, but since they cannot accept my recording as evidence... does that mean that my neighbour now has no consequences? Let's also suppose that no other evidence is found that would indicate his guilt (the guy was thorough). Obviously I'd get some grief for bugging my neighbour's house, but do I now also become the prime suspect in the murder of my own child? After all - the recording of my neighbour's confession "officially doesn't exist", and I'm the one who told the police where to dig, so... | Different exclusionary rules have different reasons. Hearsay is frequently inadmissible because it's less reliable for the court to hear Alice saying "Bob told me that Carol hit him" than to hear Bob saying "Carol hit me." Another even more critical problem with hearsay testimony is that the defense cannot cross examine the person who made the statement in court. If Bob is there, the defense can ask questions such as "where did Carol hit you" and "did Carol use her right or left hand" to clarify the testimony or call its veracity into question. Alice, not having been a direct witness to the act, will not be able to respond to many of these questions. united-states Evidence obtained in violation of a constitutional right is inadmissible because admitting it amounts to allowing police or prosecutors to violate people's constitutional rights in order to obtain convictions. Not only does an unconstitutional search itself violate the rights of the person being searched, but so does the use of evidence acquired in such a search. See Fruit of the poisonous tree at Wikipedia and the cases linked therein, especially Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States and Nardone v. United States. | The wording is a little confusing, but I interpret it as saying the following: Normally, discovery in a court case allows either party to demand documents from the other, to be used as evidence. However, our courts have exceptions; certain documents might be 'privileged against discovery', meaning they couldn't be demanded in that way. If one of those exceptions would apply to a document under court rules, then you can't request it under Freedom of Access either. To know what those privileges are, and how broadly they apply, you'll have to consult the rules of court procedure for your state. | Yes Deciding a case on a basis the parties have not raised is a denial of natural justice (or procedural fairness) and invalid. The reason is very simple, the parties have not had the opportunity to produce evidence or make submissions about C or D that might have changed the judge’s mind about them. Notwithstanding, to successfully appeal, the aggrieved party must show there were arguments that could have been raised which could reasonably have altered the outcome. That said, it’s the judge’s courtroom and they can say “That’s interesting but what about C and D?” and then the parties can make submissions about them. They do have to be circumspect and make sure that they do not become one party’s advocate - one party might be well aware of C and D and don’t want them brought up because they damage their case and they are hoping the other party misses that - and then the bloody judge come charging in with his bloody duty to wider interests of justice. Non-judicial decision makers like arbitrators, adjudicators and other tribunals need to be even more circumspect because they generally don’t have a duty to anyone but the parties. Unlike in civil law systems, the role of the judge is to decide the dispute between the parties as a referee, not to determine some objective”truth” as an investigator. To keep things simple: if the plaintiff contends that the light was red and the defendant contends the light was green then, assuming there is no evidence opening the possibility, it is not open to the judge to find that the light was amber. Similarly, if the parties agree that red means go and green means stop, it is not the judge's role to tell the parties they are wrong (I'm sure questions would be asked but if the parties are adamant ...): since there is no dispute over this issue the judge would be wrong to agitate one. Now, a judge is free to apply the law that was argued as a whole - if arguments centred on Section 14 of the Relevant Act 1875 but Section 15 is applicable and germane the judge is not wrong for applying Section 15. However, they are on shakier ground if the bring in Other Slightly Relevant Act 1956. | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. | An appeal to ignorance asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false. That is not in any way the situation here. The defendant knows if he/she has or has not so the only available answers under oath are "yes" or "no" - the jury knows this too so any other answer will be seen as disingenuous. However, this information (affirmative or negative) is off limits to the jury as it could prejudice their decision, hence the mistrial. A quick judge could instruct the defendant not to answer and instruct the jury to disregard the question but if a conviction results the defence team could use the fact that it was asked as grounds for appeal. A judge must decide if the interests of justice are better served by a retrial or a tainted conviction. | So far as I am aware, all jurisdictions provide some kind of defence to the offence of possessing child pornography (or, for that matter, other illegal items like drugs and weapons) for legal purposes. This is necessary at least for police and others involved in the criminal justice system – if not, it would be difficult to seize the material and admit it in evidence if the defendant pleads not guilty. In the United Kingdom, it is a defence to prove that you possessed the material for a ‘legitimate reason,’ which is not defined. Note that this is a legal burden, meaning that the defendant must affirmatively prove the existence of a legitimate reason on the balance of probabilities, rather than merely raising reasonable doubt. See the Crown Prosecution Service’s guidance on Indecent and Prohibited Images of Children, under the ‘Statutory Defences’ section: The defence is made out if the defendant proves that he had a legitimate reason for the conduct in question. This is a legal rather than an evidential burden (R v Collier [2005] 1 Cr. App. R. 9). “Legitimate reason” is not defined in either Act. In Atkins v DPP; Goodland v DPP [2000] 2 Cr. App. R. 248 it was held that it is a pure question of fact in each case. In cases where it was maintained that the conduct was part of legitimate research, the central question will be whether the defendant was essentially a person with an unhealthy interest in indecent images acting under the pretence of undertaking research or, on the other hand, was a genuine researcher who had no alternative but to have such unpleasant material in his possession. The judgment continued to say that the courts “are plainly entitled to bring a measure of scepticism to bear upon such an enquiry; they should not too readily accept that the defence is made out.” Relevant statutory provisions The ‘legitimate reason’ defence is set out in s 1(4)(a) of the Protection of Children Act 1978 and s 160(2)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The relevant provision depends on which Act the offence was charged under; the CPS guidance has a section on ‘Which Offence Should be Charged’ for more on this. In response to the comment below, s 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 creates a separate offence of possession of extreme pornographic images. Like the child pornography offences, there is a ‘legitimate reason’ defence – see s 65(2)(a) of the Act. Commentary is available in the CPS guidance on Possession of Extreme Pornographic Images. | In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense. | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. |
Is all sex offender registry information public domain in the USA? In 1994, Congress mandated that all states develop sex offender registries. Two years later, Megan's Law provided that sex offender information must be made public. National Institute of Justice, "Tracking Sex Offenders" November 13, 2020, nij.ojp.gov Every state in the US has a public registry of sex offenders and limited details as to their identity, home address, work address, etc. Is this information in the public domain? Or does it vary state to state? | "Public domain" refers informally to copyright status, usually works whose protected status has expired. A list of names, addresses and criminal offenses is "factual", not a creative expression, and is not subject to copyright protection. You may be thinking of "public record", which is closer to an relevant expression. Typically, as instantiated in Washington state under RCW 9a.44.130 ff, a person convicted of certain offenses is required to register with the county sheriff, and that registration is thus a "public record". Under a separate law, RCW 4.24.550 disclosure is allowed "when the agency determines that disclosure of the information is relevant and necessary to protect the public and counteract the danger created by the particular offender" – in other jurisdictions disclosure may be mandatory. The specific information to be disclosed is "name, relevant criminal convictions, address by hundred block, physical description, and photograph. The website shall provide mapping capabilities that display the sex offender's address by hundred block on a map". The Public Records Act does not exclude disclosure and copying of that information, so it is a public record in the sense that it must be disclosed on request. Every state has its own laws implementing this desideratum: all states have such laws, they vary somewhat in details. | In the United States, the U.S. Department of Transportation, by regulation sets uniform design and signage standards for federally funded highways, which most U.S. state and local governments incorporate, either by restating them or incorporating them by reference for non-federally funded roads. I imagine that most other countries have similar regulations. Nonetheless, this is extremely unlikely to prevail as a defense to the traffic violation of speeding which is usually a strict liability offense to which almost no affirmative defenses, excuses, or justifications may be considered. | From my open-source research it seems that law enforcement did not use any coercive powers, such as a subpoena or warrant, in the following case but "covertly" uploaded a suspect's DNA profile in order to identify familial matches for further investigation. So it does show that (in California at least) evidence may be recovered from privately run genealogical databases without the suspect's knowledge or consent depending on which site is used. Joseph James DeAngelo, Jr. Known as The Golden State Killer, Original Night Stalker (amongst others) Thirty-two years after the ending of his killing spree, and 45 years after the beginning of his crimes, DeAngelo was finally arrested on April 25, 2018 ... DeAngelo had been identified four months earlier as the main suspect, when DNA from an ONS [Original Night Stalker] rape case was uploaded to the personal genomics website GEDmatch. With help from a genealogist, Paul Holes (a sheriff investigator who worked on the EAR-ONS cold cases) and an FBI lawyer constructed a family tree based on GEDmatch's results and eventually narrowed the list to DeAngelo. After a DNA sample was surreptitiously collected from the door handle of DeAngelo's car, it was matched with samples related to the Golden State Killer's crimes. Source However, according to the UK's Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group (BFEG): This process of uploading DNA from a crime scene in the ‘Golden State killer’ case to GEDmatch violated the terms and conditions of use. These terms stated that the person submitting the DNA had to declare that; it was their own DNA; or they were the legal guardian of the DNA donor; or they were otherwise authorised. But I cannot see if this was ever challenged by DeAngelo's defence. The BFEG goes on to say that different sites and different jurisdictions have different requirements: 23andMe, AncestryDNA and MyHeritage do not allow law enforcement use of their databases without a warrant. FamilyTreeDNA offers an ‘opt-out from law enforcement matching’ possibility, and all European users are automatically opted out in line with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Contributors to GEDmatch, which allows law enforcement use of ‘public’ profiles with permission in serious cases, must actively opt in to law enforcement matching. | To be very straightforward, yes, a police department would very likely have records of their past interactions with you in the form of police reports. They cannot just throw them away because it's been scrubbed from your public record. They detail the interactions the police officer had with you. That being said, those records would not show up in a general inquiry into your record, because those records are meant to protect the officer and the department as a reference point they can go back to in case some dispute arose in the future. If a police officer really wanted to find them, they'd have to do a bit of digging for them. The difficulty in finding them would depend on what system the particular police department uses to store those records. Smaller departments may just file them in a cabinet somewhere, whereas larger ones may actually have their own searchable database. But a traffic cop out on the street is only gonna see what you're seeing at the DMV - nothing. There is also a formal NCIC database, but traffic violations would never end up in there. That is a national database that basically stores red flag persons of interest (think stolen vehicles, sex offenders, and gang members). Sometimes multiple departments within a state will share their information with each other, but a department's database is usually kept to that department only. Also keep in mind court records. The court case that had a violation removed under such and such conditions is still gonna be a public record. Those records would generally be available to a judge overseeing your case so if you repeatedly end up in court for the same thing, they're gonna know and they're gonna stop scrubbing it from your record or offerring certain options because you're clearly not learning your lesson. Many laws allow you to have one offense stricken per year and similar stuff like that, but that kind of stuff doesn't just permanently disappear. They have to keep record of it in order to know you've already had your once per year etc. Also a note about parking violations: not all of those are actually issued by police. If it was issued by a private firm then that is not something that would ever show up on your record. It would just be in a database somewhere with whatever private firm issued the fine. Those kind of tickets get sent to collections and hurt your credit score if you don't pay them, rather than affecting your driving record. | No. According to the Section 18 of the U.S. Code, § 2251: (a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct,shall be punished as provided under subsection (e) [...] and a minor is defined (Section 18 of the U.S. Code, § 2256) as "any person under the age of eighteen years". As such, you cannot be considered a pedophile. However, if you have sexual intercourses with animals, depending on the State laws on the matter, you might be charged with bestiality or similar offences. | Yes The US constitution is in the public domain. Anyone may publish a version of it, including an altered version. No US law forbidding publication of an altered version would itself be constitutional -- the First Amendment would prevent such a law. However, if an altered version were sold under such conditions that a customer might reasonably believe it to be an unaltered version, that might be false advertising, or perhaps fraud, because the seller would be deceiving the customer as to what the product is. | 34 CFR Subpart D covers this topic ("Under what conditions is prior consent not required to disclose information?"). This includes The disclosure is to other school officials, including teachers, within the agency or institution whom the agency or institution has determined to have legitimate educational interests so that raises the question of whether there is a legitimate educational interest. Additionally, the question is raised as to the status of an SRO (they are not teachers). Disclosure is allowed to A contractor, consultant, volunteer, or other party to whom an agency or institution has outsourced institutional services or functions may be considered a school official under this paragraph provided... the conditions being that the person Performs an institutional service or function for which the agency or institution would otherwise use employees; Is under the direct control of the agency or institution with respect to the use and maintenance of education records; and Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a) governing the use and redisclosure of personally identifiable information from education records I would take this model memorandum as the most likely agreement, though your district may have a totally different memo where SROs are purely security guards. An SRO is to advance the program objective which include "Education of children regarding the role of laws, courts, and Police in society", which is the hook into "legitimate educational interest". This nothwitstanding the part that says that they "are police officers and not school teachers, school administrators, nor school counselors. The officers will assist teachers with classroom presentations on relative topics when requested and able" (there is no principle that only teachers, administrators, or counselors can have a legitimate educational interest). This model memo does not say anything that indicates that the conditions "Is under the direct control" and "Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a)" are true, but those conditions could be satisfied external to the MOU. There are some additional exceptions of the "if required by law" type, such as a state law "adopted before November 19, 1974, if the allowed reporting or disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve the student whose records are released"; or, after that date, is "subject to the requirements of §99.38" which refers you to §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). If that is confusing, here are the two self-referring sections: §99.38(a) If reporting or disclosure allowed by State statute concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve, prior to adjudication, the student whose records are released, an educational agency or institution may disclose education records under §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). The disclosure is to State and local officials or authorities to whom this information is specifically...Allowed to be reported or disclosed pursuant to State statute adopted after November 19, 1974, subject to the requirements of §99.38. So state law is one possibility; "legitimate educational interest" is a remote possiblity. Massachussetts law does include governmental third party disclosures: 603 CMR 23.07(4)(c) A school may release information regarding a student upon receipt of a request from the Department of Social Services, a probation officer, a justice of any court, or the Department of Youth Services under the provisions of M.G.L. c. 119, sections 51B, 57, 69 and 69A respectively. That does not directly apply to local police, but it is possible that a police officer is operating as a probation officer or an agent of the Department of Youth Services. Under paragraph (e), A school may disclose information regarding a student to appropriate parties in connection with a health or safety emergency if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals. This includes, but is not limited to, disclosures to the local police department Mass. law allows the possibility of treating a police officer as "authorized school personnel" if they are "providing services to the student under an agreement between the school committee and a service provider, and who are working directly with the student in an administrative, teaching counseling, and/or diagnostic capacity" – which is not completely out of the question but is a bit of a stretch (especially in the context of a blanket statement "we share records", not "we may share yours, if you get special counseling"). Tne law also says "Any such personnel who are not employed directly by the school committee shall have access only to the student record information that is required for them to perform their duties", so sharing of all records would not be allowed. | The relevant law is not so specific. It prohibits child abuse and child neglect which are defined only as general standards and not as specific rules. This doesn't appear to be child neglect, indeed, the opposite to the extent that there is such a thing. So, would it be child abuse? This would be up to the finder of fact to determine, and might depend upon the manner in which this is done (for example, what is said to a child about it) and the reason that it is done (e.g. a history of self-harm) and more generally in light of the total context of the situation. But it is not obviously child abuse, unless, for example, recorded video was used for child pornography purposes, which there is nothing in the question to indicate. A comment suggests that the criminal offense of voyeurism (F.S. § 810.140) or video voyeurism (F.S. § 810.145) might be implicated, but both of those statutes apply to "secretly" observing someone or "secretly" setting up cameras, while in this case, the cameras and viewing are anything but secret. So, even if it were child pornography, it would not be voyeurism or video voyeurism under state law in Florida. As a general rule, a child is not entitled to privacy from a parent except in certain specifically defined circumstances (e.g. certain privileged communications). |
Admitting to a misdemeanor crime on an "official" police application When someone wants to apply to become a police officer, one question on the form is whether or not they have committed a crime or were present when a crime was committed. If they say yes and detail the crime committed, and the statute of limitations has not passed, is it possible the individual would be arrested and convicted of the crime? Could the form be taken as an "official government document," allowing the answer to considered tantamount to a confession even for a misdemeanor? | It is possible. If you say e.g. "On March 12 2021 I stole a steak from the grocery store at the corner of Smith St. and Wesson Ave.", that is a confession. It is voluntary and not coerced (you're not required to apply for the job), so it is admissible. It is extremely unlikely that there is any insulating provision in the job-application process ("information obtained via applying for this job will never be used against you in a court of law"). Whether or not you would actually be arrested and tried depends on the circumstances (basically, is it "worth it" to them to prosecute you). Also, what you say in the "explanation" box matters, so I gave you a clear confession to criminal culpability. Something like "I was at the store when some dude shot a lady" isn't a confession to committing a crime, it more satisfies the full-disclosure requirement. | To be very straightforward, yes, a police department would very likely have records of their past interactions with you in the form of police reports. They cannot just throw them away because it's been scrubbed from your public record. They detail the interactions the police officer had with you. That being said, those records would not show up in a general inquiry into your record, because those records are meant to protect the officer and the department as a reference point they can go back to in case some dispute arose in the future. If a police officer really wanted to find them, they'd have to do a bit of digging for them. The difficulty in finding them would depend on what system the particular police department uses to store those records. Smaller departments may just file them in a cabinet somewhere, whereas larger ones may actually have their own searchable database. But a traffic cop out on the street is only gonna see what you're seeing at the DMV - nothing. There is also a formal NCIC database, but traffic violations would never end up in there. That is a national database that basically stores red flag persons of interest (think stolen vehicles, sex offenders, and gang members). Sometimes multiple departments within a state will share their information with each other, but a department's database is usually kept to that department only. Also keep in mind court records. The court case that had a violation removed under such and such conditions is still gonna be a public record. Those records would generally be available to a judge overseeing your case so if you repeatedly end up in court for the same thing, they're gonna know and they're gonna stop scrubbing it from your record or offerring certain options because you're clearly not learning your lesson. Many laws allow you to have one offense stricken per year and similar stuff like that, but that kind of stuff doesn't just permanently disappear. They have to keep record of it in order to know you've already had your once per year etc. Also a note about parking violations: not all of those are actually issued by police. If it was issued by a private firm then that is not something that would ever show up on your record. It would just be in a database somewhere with whatever private firm issued the fine. Those kind of tickets get sent to collections and hurt your credit score if you don't pay them, rather than affecting your driving record. | Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible. | A person cannot be arrested for a misdemeanor by a police officer without a warrant unless the officer has probable cause that a person committed a misdemeanor in their presence. "Probable cause" is when the facts objectively support a belief that the person has committed a crime. If there is a total lack of evidence, then there is no probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, so an arrest (for anything) when there is absolutely no evidence that the person committed a crime would be illegal. If, for example, an officer decides he hates your face and arrests you for littering without any reason whatsoever, that would be illegal and a cause for a lawsuit. An officer might arrest a person for smoking marijuana in public based on a person exuding the smell of marijuana and seeing the person smoking a hand-rolled cigarette, but they could also be factually mistaken as to whether the person had actually been smoking marijuana at the time: perhaps they were wearing marijuana-smelling perfume and were smoking a regular tobacco cigarette. The evidence for the crime would not be completely non-existent, but would be insufficient for a conviction. If the officer failed to take the cigarette as evidence, that would be a problem, because the remaining evidence (visual and olfactory) would not support a conviction. | Based on the question, this was not perjury; if the officer did not review the footage, the fact that his testimony was in error indicates a mistake, nothing more. To even consider a perjury charge, the prosecuting authorities would need evidence that the officer knew the testimony was wrong when he gave it. You do not indicate the jurisdiction, so nobody can say whether an appeal would lie (since new evidence has come to light), whether the conviction could be quashed for procedural failure (if multiple requests for evidence were really not received) or whether a complaint could be made against the prosecutor, the defence lawyer, or even the judge. But no case has ever been strengthened by brandishing about words like 'perjury' without being able to substantiate them. | also, what is "cannot be punished on account thereof because they lacked criminal responsibility due to the intoxication or if this cannot be ruled out"? I can not understand This means that if a person, while drunk, does soemthign that would otherwise be a crime, but the person cannot be charged because s/he was too drunk to know that s/he was committing a crime, such a person can insted be charged with having become intoxicated, and given up to the same punishment that would have been given for conviction for doign the unlawful act. For example, if a person damaged property while under the influence of alcohol (drunk), it might be impossible under German law to prosecute for the crime of intentionally damaging property, because one could not prove that the person knew what s/he was doing, and knew that it was criminal. In such a case the person could be charged with having intentionally or carelessly become drunk, but the penalty can't be more than the penalty for having damaged property would have been, nor can it be more than five years. As a practical matter, I think it very unlikely that the police would seek to impose a fine if they didn't issue any ticket or other paperwork at the scene, nor mention any such intention. However, they might be legally able to do so. | In the US, people are not put in jail because they are "known for" committing a crime. Several things must happen, and at each stage there are ways for the process to be halted. Law enforcement must gather evidence that a crime has been committed by a particular person. There ids no duty to investigate every possible crime, so this will depend on the policy of the particular LE organization, and what evidence any investigation finds. If no investigation is made, no evidence will be found. A prosecutor (state or Federal) must decide to bring charges. There is no duty for a prosecutor to bring charges in every case where evidence is brought forward by law enforcement. A prosecutor is supposed to devote the limited resources of his or her office where it seems likely to do the most public good. Cases which probably cannot be won should not be brought. Moreover, most prosecutors are reluctant to bring cases which seem likely to do them political harm. The Prosecutor must formally bring the defendant(s) before a court to hear and respond to the charges (arraignment). At this stage the judge can dismiss the charges, but that almost never happens. The prosecutor must establish that there is probable cause to bring a case to trial. This can be done via a grand jury proceeding resulting in an indictment, an "information", a probable cause hearing, or a preliminary hearing, depending on the jurisdiction and the type of crime. For minor crimes, the prosecutor's sworn statement may be enough. There must be a trial, before a judge or a jury. If the defendant is found guilty, s/he will be sentenced under the appropriate law, which may include jail or prison time. There are various other stages to the process, but those are the major go/no-go steps in a US criminal proceeding. So it is possible in any given case that law enforcement has not tried to find evidence, or has tried but failed, or that a prosecutor has chosen not to bring charges. As to why any of that might have happened, it depends on the particular situation and its circumstances. There are always costs of time, effort, and money to pursue any particular case. If cops are looking for evidence of a celebrity's drug use, they are not looking for evidence in an embezzlement or murder case. If an assistant prosecutor is tying such a case, s/he is not trying some other case. Officials have wide discretion in how to allocate resources in such matters. | You have not committed a crime or a violation of non-criminal law when you swear something under oath believing in good faith that what you are saying is true, and you are mistaken. The law does not expect omniscience. Also, making a false statement under oath is only sanctionable if you make a false statement of a "material fact." Whether or not you have a Social Security number is not a "material fact" in the context of a passport application where the material facts are that you are the same person as the person described in your birth certificate, that the parents there are to the best of your knowledge your parents, that the birth certificate is authentic, and that you have not renounced U.S. citizenship. The question about a Social Security number is there for administrative convenience, not to make any determination about your right to a passport. You should apply for a Social Security number. If you already have one, your actions consistent with not having one will only corroborate the fact that you were ignorant of that fact when you applied for a passport, and you will have your existing Social Security number provided to you. As a practical matter it is unlikely that you have one. There are no forms that your non-U.S. parents would have to be filled out that would have required one, and you know that you haven't applied for one in the past. Before Social Security numbers of dependents were required on U.S. tax forms, most people didn't get Social Security numbers until they got their first job. |
Legal implications of printing something remotely to tell the owner their printer is vulnerable? Commonly, wireless printers in homes and corporate settings can be configured incorrectly, exposing them to the internet. This can be a major security vulnerability, and can allow anyone to not only print stuff remotely on it, but sometimes even get full access to the network it's connected to. If somebody happens to find a vulnerable printer online, and no contact information associated with it, would it be legal to print a message on it to let the owners know that it's vulnerable, and possibly even how to fix it? Edit: Usually, these printers are configured not to have any sort of password, or anything really, preventing access from anyone on the internet. The printer also has to be manually set up to allow access from the internet, so could that technically be considered permission to access the device? | This could be a violation of 18 USC 1030 (and a crime). A number of things go into requirements for conviction under this law. First, it has to be a computer, which is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device Any printer that I have encountered in the past 40 years counts as "a computer". Second, (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—...(C) information from any protected computer; It is highly likely that the person printing has to receive some information from the printer, and respond accordingly so you have your "obtains information" element. Maybe not useful information, but information nevertheless. It also has to be a protected computer, (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States Well, a computer connected to the internet is a protected computer, see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918. Also, the access must be "without authorization or exceeds authorized access". The law doesn't explain with "without authorization" means, but the latter is defined as to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter If the law were stated in terms of "prohibited access", meaning "express denial of permission", and if the computer owner had set the computer to "prohibited access" by default (password protected), there would be no issue -- accessing the computer is prohibited. "Unauthorized" can also mean "has not been explicitly authorized", i.e. lacking any indication one way or the other. Every computer access is initially unauthorized, until authorization is granted; and re-trying a login after mis-typing a user name (and being denied access) is not a violation of this law. There does not appear to be case law that addresses the status of computers just left open to the public, and whether using a computer that is so exposed constitutes "unauthorized access". Also, it is not clear that the defendant in this case has "obtained information", since with printing, information flows into the computer. There is also a clause about recklessly causing damage, but I don't see what damage would result ("damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information"), and how printing would be "reckless". It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be deemed to be a crime, though if you experiment, you could be on the cutting edge of new case law. | There are some problems with this kind of vandalism, one of them clearly that the internet is international and vandalism can be performed from everywhere on servers everywhere in the world. And so it may be (both technically and legally) difficult to get hold of the vandal. Therefore, most wikis primarily focus on blocking offending accounts or their IPs and hope that this helps at least for a while. Only if it doesn't and the vandalism continues for extended time periods, legal measures are considered. Legally speaking though, vandalism is prohibited by many jurisdictions and of course by the terms of use of the wiki operators. For instance, the Swiss criminal code Art 147 explicitly puts "abusing of data processing equipment" under penalty and hence gives website operators a legal backup for setting up rules for the use of their services. Computer fraud Art. 147 1 Any person who with a view to his own or another's unlawful gain, by the incorrect, incomplete or unauthorised use of data, or in a similar way, influences the electronic or similar processing or transmission of data and as a result causes the transfer of financial assets, thus occasioning loss to another, or immediately thereafter conceals such a transfer shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. 2 If the offender acts for commercial gain, he shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding ten years or to a monetary penalty of not less than 90 daily penalty units. Technically, the law even requires prosecution ex officio, even though without a hint from the operator, the police won't start an investigation. I'm sure the US has a similar law. The problem is, as with all internet crimes, it's practical application, particularly because often website operator and offender are not living in the same country. Edit After reading the exact text again (it was unavailable yesterday) Art 147 is mostly about fraud performed by computers (classical "hacking") but it shouldn't be difficult to argue that fighting and reverting vandalism requires significant (technical and personal) effort and hence the operator looses money. Additionally, there's Art 144bis which matches even better for the scenario here: Damage to data Art. 144bis Any person who without authority alters, deletes or renders unusable data that is stored or transmitted electronically or in some other similar way shall be liable on complaint to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender has caused major damage, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed. The offence is prosecuted ex officio. Any person who manufactures, imports, markets, advertises, offers or otherwise makes accessible programs that he knows or must assume will be used for the purposes described in paragraph 1 above, or provides instructions on the manufacture of such programs shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender acts for commercial gain, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed. | What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation. | Written down computer code is subject to copyright. If you do not have the permission of the owner to copy it you are breaching their copyright unless your use constitutes fair use/dealing. | You wrote: As far as I believe, it is permitted under GDPR to record and store non-anonymized web server access logs, as these can be useful for security reasons. True, Recital 49 GDPR: The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, by public authorities, by computer emergency response teams (CERTs), computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems. You asked: My question is whether this anonymization process counts as processing personally identifiable data under GDPR? IP addresses are personal data in some cases, so yes, you're processing personal data. Then, these anonymized logs will be fed into an analytics tool to provide stats on unique visitors, page hits, etc. These are purposes considered compatible with initial purposes according to Article 5.1.(b): Personal data shall be (...) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for (...) statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’); As a matter of fact, you might be required to anonymize the data for those purposes, see Article 89.1: Processing for (...) statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner. If I were to anonymize the logs and continue to use them exclusively for security reasons, would that change anything? No, you would be processing data in a manner compatible with initial purposes (ensuring network and information security). Or does it not matter what I do with them once they are anonymized? Yes, it does. If you're not using them for "archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes" then you're using them for purposes incompatible with initial purposes. You would need to find new legal basis for processing. does this extra anonymization process on top then take it over the line meaning that consent and a privacy notice would be required? It depends on what you want to do with anonymized data. In your case, for security purposes or security and statistical purposes, you don't need the consent and there is no requirement for the privacy notice (but sure, it would be nice to publish one). For other purposes it might be different. | Yes, it's illegal. 18 USC 1030 (a) (5) (A) [Whoever] knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer [shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section]. "Damage" is defined at (e)(8) to mean "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information". Your proposed attack would certainly cause impairment to the availability of the Stack Exchange system and the data and information which it hosts. Whatever else you may think about the Stack Exchange terms of service, they certainly do not authorize any user or moderator to "destroy the site" in any sense such as you describe. It's not necessary for the TOS to explicitly say "you may not do X"; it's enough that they don't say that you may do it. To use a firewall analogy, it's "default deny". "Protected computer" is defined in (e)(2) to mean, essentially, any computer that is used in or affects interstate commerce. Which means practically every computer that has ever accessed the Internet, and certainly includes Stack Exchange servers. So your proposed attack would include all the elements of a violation of this section. Such a violation is punishable by up to five years' imprisonment if it causes a loss of more than $5000 (see (4)(A)(i)(I)), which if such an attack were successful, it certainly would. Greater penalties are possible in certain circumstances. Even if the loss does not exceed $5000, or if the attack is merely attempted but without success, it is still punishable by one year imprisonment or a fine ((4)(G)(i)). There is nothing in the terms of service saying you will go to federal jail for destroying stack exchange. Irrelevant. It is not up to Stack Exchange Inc. or its TOS to determine who does or doesn't go to federal prison. Rather, it is up to Congress to determine what conduct deserves such punishment (as they did in 1984 by enacting this law), up to federal law enforcement and prosecutors to investigate and make a case against an alleged violator, and up to the federal courts to determine if the accused is guilty and how they should be punished. | How to send a document restricting its spread? In theory you could have the company sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) prior to sharing the details of your project. However, your chances of enforcing the NDA seem negligible except maybe for George White's suggestion about a patent application. It is otherwise in your best interest to think of another way of showcasing your skills set. Assuming that the company signs your NDA, you have no realistic way to prevent the company from misappropriating (i.e., stealing) your idea(s). You will have no access to the company's systems to ensure that it has deleted all copies and records that could result in unauthorized disclosure. Even if you find out that the company misappropriated your information, it could be too late because the statute of limitations expired, and/or too costly --not just in terms of money-- to bring court proceedings for misappropriation. | I presume you are addressing the various wiretapping laws. In all of those channels, one would have a reasonable expectation of privacy, in contrast to using CB radio or a megaphone. However the context of using the instrument affects that expectation, for example if your phone is on speaker you do not have a reasonable expectation that those around you cannot hear your conversation, when there are others around you. Also, there is no expectation of privacy surrounding employers monitoring employee emails for valid business purposes – but the federal government can't intercept your emails (without a warrant) just because you are using business email. The expectation of privacy is really about the surrounding circumstance, not the instrument you use. |
What elements are considered when deciding order of trials and sentences for a multi-region, multi-year, multi-severity criminal? A citizen of the USA has a number of individuals, cities, counties, states and the federal government after them for a wide variety of crimes with a wide variety of themes over a period of several years and with a wide variety in severity. What are the considerations when deciding the particulars of trial-order and sentence-order, and how are they weighed? I'm guessing timing of charges being filed probably has a lot of weight, the location of defendant residence might be a factor in trial order/priority, and age/infirmity is probably a consideration for some defendants in even bringing some charges to trial, but what else? | england-and-wales The timing of charges being laid is a factor to take in to account, as is whether a charge is appropriate after taking in to account the suspect's circumstances described in the OP, but setting those aside - more often than not it's a negotiation between the various prosecuting agencies and the investigation teams' supervisors resulting with the more serious offences taking precedence. The lesser offences are either dealt with at a later trial or left to "lie on file", meaning there is enough evidence for a case to be made, but that it is not in the public interest for prosecution to proceed, usually because the defendant has acknowledged other, often more serious, charges. No admission to the charge is made by the defendant, and no verdict is recorded against them. Wikipedia | canada Or would I still be charged with his murder since it’s a different criminal instance? Yes, this is the correct intuition. Different instance/wrong; different basis for the charge; not precluded by double-jeopardy. In Canada, the term of art is autrefois convict. Section 609 of the Criminal Code lays out the standard for what it means for the count to be the same: the matter on which the accused was given in charge on the former trial is the same in whole or in part as that on which it is proposed to give him in charge The later charge for murdering Bob would be a wholly different circumstance or "wrong" or "delict" than the first conviction was based on. The later charge would not be precluded. | You are quoting standards that are applicable during an appeal. So in this case, the defendant was brought to trial, was found guilty by a jury, and is now appealing that conviction. During that initial trial, the evidence was supposed to have been weighed neutrally. In an appeal, the appellate court is not attempting to re-litigate the entirety of the case. That would be costly and slow in addition to burdensome on witnesses that might have to be called again to testify. Instead, it defers to the trial court for things like the determination of facts. The standards you quote show that an appellate court is only going to overturn a lower court's verdict as insufficient if the lower court's ruling is manifestly unjust. The prosecution and the defense presented evidence on a particular element of the crime at trial. The jury determined that the prosecution met its burden, and proved the element beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeals court is not going to substitute its judgement for that of the jury particularly when the jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of different witnesses that may not be possible from a simple text-based transcript. If the trial court convicted and the appeals court determines that the conviction was reasonable if the evidence was viewed from the standpoint most favorable to the prosecution, then the sufficiency standard would be met and the appeal would be denied. The appeals court would only overturn the verdict as insufficient if no reasonable juror could possibly have concluded that the state met its burden of proof given the evidence presented. | A party can ask a judge to recuse at the outset of a case for bias or other reasons (e.g. a family connection to a party). Generally, a judge rules on that motion personally and it is an interlocutory motion not subject to appeal except by extraordinary writ (or the equivalent) to the state supreme court. It is not generally proper to do so during a trial. Moreover, one jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial (which happens when the jury is sworn) if the trial ends prior to a jury verdict for reasons other than those attributable to the defendant, the defendant cannot be tried again on those charges and is functionally acquitted. There are probably some arguable exceptions to this rule in extraordinary circumstances that are not the fault of either party (e.g. if a meteor hits courthouse and kills the judge and some jurors mid-trial, or if it is revealed that the judge committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried). But the threshold for exceptions to the general rule is very high. | The U.S. has no such website, at least at either the federal or the state level. It is possible that some local courts allow their records to be searched on that basis although I am not aware of any that do so. Probably the closest database to that in the U.S. accessible to the public is the non-governmental non-profit organization operated Transactional Record Access Clearinghouse for federal criminal justice records (and other federal government records). It has lots of data on federal government matters from a variety of sources but isn't quite as comprehensive or as easy to use as the website described in the question. The problem with that is that the federal courts handle only a small percentage of the criminal cases in the United States, and it is a highly skewed mix of cases (e.g. with lots of immigration cases but few ordinary "blue collar crime" cases outside Indian Reservations and federal parks). The information necessary to build such a website is largely a matter of public record, but no one has taken on the task of making such a website. In part, this is because the task is so daunting. While the federal courts have a comprehensive electronic database called PACER, each state has at least one separate court case data base system, and many states have trial court case databases only at the county level and not at the state level, or have different databases for different kinds of courts. Even in states that do have statewide databases, there are often some courts that aren't included. For example, Colorado's state courts are part of a single statewide database, but its municipal courts each have their own separate court by court databases. Some rural areas in the U.S. still keep trial court records in paper form only. The data has been gathered from time to time of important subsets of this kind of data, but it isn't publicly available. For example, a media consortia in Florida gathered information to examine the consistency of sentencing and the extent of racial discrimination in sentencing in Florida, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the United States gathers such information selectively to make sentencing decisions. Neither of those compilations, however, including making the raw data available to the public. Similarly, there is a separate private academic database that tracks case level state general jurisdiction trial court data in 75 of the largest urban counties in the United States (including state law felony cases). But, that database is only available to members of the academic consortium that maintains it (basically, professors at affiliated universities and other professors granted privileges to use it from consortium member professors). The Westlaw division of its parent company, and Lexis-Nexus collect some trial court level data on U.S. courts, state and federal, on a non-comprehensive, basically opportunistic basis, but don't have complete data from any jurisdiction (although Westlaw's federal data basis has a pretty significant share of reasoned federal trial court orders). Both of these services require paid subscriptions. In contrast, comprehensive databases of precedent making appellate court decisions at the state and federal level are widely available on both a commercial basis (with better search tools, headnote analysis, and correlations of the data like records of cases citing other cases and statutes), and on a non-commercial basis (with just the bare bones text of the cases). This is because this information is necessary to almost every lawyer and judge to practice law on a day to day basis. | Likely an extremely hard or impossible question to answer, and may very well be one that may, barely anyone would go to appeals for a sub-1 day sentence, and it searching superior court decisions is far from well-digitized, and there are over 3,000 counties in the U.S.. Since they generally have no binding effect on future cases there is no incentive in digitizing older cases at all. I would not be surprised if during the history of the U.S., certain courts would have lost their past records for example in fires, earthquakes or other acts of God, including of such cases that no one remembered at the time, and no other record existed of any more. If you're lucky, some historian may have somehow answered this question, and is somewhere as a trivia. Also, I have never heard a sentence to be expressed in hours, minutes or seconds, so likely the answer will be a single day which plausibly could have happened where other remedies were not appropriate (defendant not having money and incapacitated from being able to do community service or engage in labor or service in servitude per a sentencing). UPDATED — There is record, in fact, of a 1906 case where a judge sentenced a man for 1 minute in jail for "being drunk and disorderly" "what was probably the lightest sentence ever given a prisoner, that of one minute in the county jail[;]" (The One Minute Jail Sentence) but of course, even less than a 150 years in the existence of the Union, they could not assert that with certainty. | In the U.S., one trial can be held for multiple co-defendants, though prosecutors and defense attorneys will have reasons for seeking separate trials (If only to avoid having a scene similar to the on in Dark Knight where Harvey Dent has about 50 mobsters caught in one RICO violation plus their lawyers and the judge's simple question of "How do you plea?" is met with a din of responses.). The Defense's reason for this is that an individual may not have been a part of every step of the collective guilt and thus some charges might not be appropriate if it's an individual's guilt compared to a groups guilt. For example, the six police officers involved in the 2015 death of Freddie Gray at trial were all tried separately. The first trial was declared a mistrial over the hung jury, and two subsequent trial's resulted in findings of not guilty by a judge during a bench trial. The remaining individuals had charges dropped (The three officers who had yet to have trials plus the one officer whose trial resulted in a mistrial). One of the findings a running theme of the officers as individuals did nothing wrong, though had they been tried collectively, the results may have been different, since the individual trials meant certain facts couldn't be brought up as they didn't apply to the individual but did if they were tried as a group. From a prosecutor's standpoint, separate trials mean that you can use one suspect against the other and make a deal for lighter charges in exchange for testimony against a partner in crime. The U.S. legal system does allow for plea deals between the defense and prosecution (and while it's not the only nation that allows this, it's one of the few where plea bargaining is not viewed as a "dirty" tactic and is openly embraced (U.S. attorneys tend to hate going to trial and will try to avoid it.). Prosecutors are not above offering immunity or granting lighter sentences in exchange for help in other cases, often in the form of testimony against the big fish. For a criminal who believes "snitches get stitches", an offer of flipping on your co-defendant for a sentence of 10 years, with parole in 5 is nothing to sneeze at when you're looking at 25 to life without parole for what you did. It's not immunity for testimony (typically, witnesses in plea bargains are not allowed to take the 5th with respect to questions on the stand because they will typically plea before the trial, and thus can't be prosecuted for the same crime.). | This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources. |
Members present and voting? I'm working on bylaws for an organization and I'm having a hard time parsing out the details of the term "members present and voting" as described in various sections of Roberts Rules of Order, Newly Revised. I do understand the general purpose in that it prevents abstentions from counting as negative votes. I wonder, though, if it could have unintended consequences. Given a bylaws article which states: all issues to be voted on shall be decided by a simple majority of qualified members present and voting at the meeting in which the vote takes place, provided a quorum is present. In an extreme hypothetical situation: at a meeting where there is a quorum present, there are 50 members qualified to vote in attendance. An issue comes up for a vote, and 45 people abstain, 3 vote yes, 2 vote no. Would this pass 3 to 2, or is there some overriding part of "majority present and voting" that I am just not understanding? | In an extreme hypothetical situation: at a meeting where there is a quorum present, there are 50 members qualified to vote in attendance. An issue comes up for a vote, and 45 people abstain, 3 vote yes, 2 vote no. Would this pass 3 to 2, or is there some overriding part of "majority present and voting" that I am just not understanding? The measure would pass 3-2. The words mean what they say. Quorum requirements prevent the small number of people voting from being unfair. | Law does not have an all-encompassing syntax and structure that, if not followed, makes it null and void. If a reasonable person could determine that (in the example of the sign you have) you are required to get written permission from any or all of the Paulding County Commissioners, then the sign is enforceable. I honestly don't see anything wrong with the sign you are displaying, it is reasonably clear. If, for example the notice contains an ambiguity or unclear phrase, the "spirit" of the law or sign is upheld. If the sign had said something to the effect of "No trespassing without permission". It doesn't say who you need permission from, but you can reasonably ascertain that you must have permission from somebody in control of the land. There is no line in the sand here. Often when a dispute in a contract comes up where it could be interpreted more than one way, it is often interpreted in favor of the person who did not write the contract. "Offer ends October 30 or while supplies last" Isn't really "ill-phrased" either. I assure you that those statements are vetted by highly paid lawyers from many jurisdictions. I'm not sure what "nonsense" you would be referring to in there. If the vendor runs out of promotional materials the promotion ends... If they had said "free hats to the first 100 customers on December 31st", you can't show up as the 101st customer and demand a hat, nor could you show up on January 1st (even if there were not 100 customers the previous day) and demand one either. | No state can amend the US Constitution by itself. Technically, an amendment to the Constitution can be proposed a constitutional convention that is called for by two-thirds of the State legislatures (though this is has never happened; all 27 amendments have been proposed by the Federal Congress, which is the alternative path). This can be done without any kind of Federal approval what so ever. After proposal, an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures. EDIT: Regarding how to "get a convention started": This hasn't been tested, since a non-Congressional amendment has not, to my knowledge, been attempted, but I would imagine a Convention would be called if 2/3rds of the states submitted requests to Congress (which would probably either be a law or a joint-resolution, which is like a law without executive approval, but the form would probably be governed by each state's respective Constitution). Alternatively, it may be sufficient for state legislatures to designate delegates who meet up somewhere (as that is essentially what happened with the Constitutional Congress, i.e. the delegates who met and drafted the US Federal Constitution). A point has been raised in another answer that there may be an issue; however, I'm not convinced of this being a bar to a Convention. The delegates at the Constitutional Congress were original chosen to discuss changes to the Articles of Confederation, but wound up throwing the whole thing out and starting from scratch instead. Therefore, I do not see calls for a convention with differing but related objectives to be a problem; the whole point of a Convention in the Constitutional Amendment process is to discuss and compromise; otherwise, why require it before skipping to the 3/4ths of states ratifying, if the 2/3rds of states already have to agree on exactly what is being proposed before sending delegates. | This was asked and answered by KPD on the Politics stackexchange. This issue came up in a decision from an appeals court, with a judge dying before the opinion was released, leading to the following SCOTUS opinion. The short of the answer: that Judge's vote is voided. If the result of negating the deceased Justice's vote is a 4-4 tie, then the usual procedure for a 4-4 tie is invoked, which is addressed in the Q&A you link. Of course this assumes that SCOTUS will apply this to themselves, but the issue appears to be non-controversial, as it was a fairly recent decision with no dissents noted. So this assumption seems safe. | Typically, nobody has to force it. Somebody in the SWIFT organization, calls and holds a meeting of the board of directors, everyone on the board of directors votes as they are supposed to vote, and it happens, with implementation by the SWIFT organization's officers. It is very unusual for a country with a say in the process to deviate from a direction to do so. Ultimately, if necessary, a lawsuit to compel action could be brought in an appropriate court, possibly a Belgian court, possibly an E.U. court, or possibly a court in the country of a recalcitrant delegate. But it is rare that this is necessary. | The first legal issue relates to the step where "Those state legislatures refuse to allow any Electoral College slate to be certified until the 'national security' investigation is complete". The "electoral voting" law regarding voting of presidential electors is ARS 16-212. First, On the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, 1956, and quadrennially thereafter, there shall be elected a number of presidential electors equal to the number of United States senators and representatives in Congress from this state. Second, After the secretary of state issues the statewide canvass containing the results of a presidential election, the presidential electors of this state shall cast their electoral college votes for the candidate for president and the candidate for vice president who jointly received the highest number of votes in this state as prescribed in the canvass. Finally, A presidential elector who knowingly refuses to cast that elector's electoral college vote as prescribed in subsection B of this section is no longer eligible to hold the office of presidential elector and that office is deemed and declared vacant by operation of law. The chairperson of the state committee of the political party represented by that elector shall appoint a person who is otherwise qualified to be a presidential elector. The replacement presidential elector shall cast the elector's electoral college vote as prescribed by this section. Notwithstanding section 16-344 and any other statute, the nomination paper and affidavit of qualification of the replacement presidential elector may be completed and filed with the secretary of state as soon as is practicable after the presidential elector's appointment. There is no provision for legislative "certification" and no authority to override the procedure set down in law. The appointment statute (344) gives sole discretion to the state party chairmen to appoint that party's electors: The chairman of the state committee of a political party that is qualified for representation on an official party ballot at the primary election and accorded a column on the general election ballot shall appoint candidates for the office of presidential elector equal to the number of United States senators and representatives in Congress from this state and shall file for each candidate with the secretary of state, not more than ten days after the primary election, by 5:00 p.m. on the last day for filing: Name, residence and postal address and an affadavit of residence in the state are needed. Again, there is no provision for "certification" by the state legislature. The certification that takes place is that the electors sign the presidential elector ballot certificate of vote, e.g. Arizona 2016, which simply notes that the electors have been "duly elected". In general, Arizona law does not require "certification" of any election. Pennsylvania law on the election of electors (25 PS 2878) similarly does not give the legislature any veto power over the electoral process. The law on the voting of the electors also does not provide for any legislative intervention. This does not mean that the legislatures cannot pass an act ceremonially "de-certifying" or invalidating the 2020 election in general, or the nominations of one or both parties. Or, they could pass an act amending the election process to require legislative certification in the case of presidential electors. There is no realistic chance that such an act would be found legally sound, and is outside the scope of the existing Newsweek fantasy. | The direct answer is simple -- the US Constitution (Article II, Section 1, Clause 2) provides that electors are appointed in the manner that state legislatures direct -- so the answer is the state legislature decides. But state legislatures don't exist in a vacuum, and the reality is not so simple. State legislatures direct the manner of choosing electors by passing state laws, which, in the case the state decides to choose electors by holding some sort of popular election, include laws for how and when ballots can be cast or received, and how recounts are to work, etc. Normally, state laws are interpreted by state courts, and state courts can strike down or modify state laws if they find that the state laws violate the state constitution. And more fundamentally, state legislatures derive their authority from state constitutions, so in principle, state legislatures should not be able to perform any act that does not conform to the state constitution (which is interpreted by the state courts). However, the Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore (2000) overturned the Florida state supreme court ruling on how to conduct recounts in the Florida election for presidential electors. Normally, federal courts do not get involved in state law issues, but the decision was mostly made on equal protection grounds, and the equal protection clause is part of the federal Constitution. So federal courts can get involved if there is an issue that relates to federal law or Constitution. In the Bush v. Gore case, there was an interesting concurring opinion that said the Florida supreme court had acted contrary to the Florida legislature, but this opinion was only joined by 3 justices, so it is not binding. Recently, the issue came up again when the US Supreme Court declined to stay a decision by the Pennsylvania state supreme court that said the Pennsylvania constitution required mail ballots postmarked by Election Day but received up to 3 days after Election Day to be counted, even though the state law said they must be received by Election Day. Notably, although the US Supreme Court declined the stay, the order listed that 4 conservative justices dissented and said that they would have granted the stay. This was before Justice Barrett was confirmed, so, now that she is confirmed, depending on her legal position on this issue, there might now be a majority of 5 justices that would intervene against the state court if such an issue were to come up again. The order did not list the legal reasoning for each of the dissenting justices, so it is unclear what legal justification they had in mind in agreeing to overrule the state court. | In a Bar exam hypothetical you are expected to discuss the merits of each party's cases. There are potentially many breaches here, you need to discuss them all. |
Retailer is constantly emailing me with receipts for transactions that aren't related to me So I've got a bit of a weird situation. I've been receiving e-mail receipts from a reasonably well-known high street retailer in the UK for transactions that have nothing to do with me. These seem to be till transactions (e.g. someone pays in-store and is asked if they want their receipt emailed to them), so I'm not sure if someone is incorrectly providing my email address for multiple transactions a day or if their system is defaulting to my email address for some reason. Either way it's extremely annoying. It's 5-6 emails a month and I'm not a customer of this particular retailer and never will be, so as far as I'm concerned they are emailing me and likely storing my email address against my wishes. I know I could do the easy thing and just block emails from their email address, but I don't feel like a retailer of this size should be bombarding me with multiple emails a month when the emails have nothing to do with me (and it ultimately doesn't solve the issue). I've contacted the retailer multiple times and each time they tell me they've taken steps to stop emails being sent to me, but nothing seems to change and I'm still getting emails from them. This has been going on consistently for maybe just under a year or so at this point but I've had random emails of this nature since 2018. I'm wondering what action I can/should take at this point? I feel I've been reasonable in notifying the retailer that they are emailing me in error, but their lack of action makes me feel that they are being negligent with my email address (and therefore my data) at this point. I was thinking of raising a Subject Access Request with them for any records with my email address associated, with the hope that prompting them to follow a legal process might cause someone to investigate, but is there any other legal paths I can/should follow? | Legal framework Per Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the UK GDPR, your email address is most likely personal data (and certainly is once you notify the data controller that it belongs to you), and the storage and use of that data constitutes processing. In order to process your personal data, the data controller must establish at least one of the six lawful bases set out in Articles 6(1)(a) to 6(1)(f). It's quite clear that none of those lawful bases apply in this situation. Hence, the processing is unlawful. Next steps Start by making a request to the data controller under Articles 14(1) and 15(1) for the following: A copy of all personal data (including the email address) which they hold in relation to you. The purpose of them holding the data. The legal basis on which they hold the data. That they erase all personal data which they hold in relation to you, pursuant to Article 17(1)(d) (unlawful processing of data). Per Article 12(3), the data controller is required to respond "without undue delay", with an upper time limit of 1 month (or 2 months if they notify you of the time extension within 1 month). Sadly, most data controllers in my experience seem to interpret this to mean that 1 month is the standard time limit, even though technically this is incorrect and the standard limit is "without undue delay". Pursuant to Article 12(6) the data controller can pause the clock by asking you for additional information if they have "reasonable doubts concerning [your] identity". If you send your request from the email address in question then they can't really have "reasonable" doubts, but be aware of this possibility in any case and respond promptly to any requests to confirm your identity so that the clock resumes. Most likely they will be unable to (correctly) provide an answer to points 2 and 3 above, since they do not have a genuine purpose or legal basis. If, after the maximum deadline has expired, they have still not responded and/or erased the data, you have two options: Complain to the ICO under Article 77(1). The ICO has the power under Article 83(5) to fine the data controller up to the higher of 4% of their turnover or £17,500,000. Complaining to the ICO is free and easy and is usually recommended over option 2. Issue a claim in the County Court for a compliance order pursuant to Article 79(1) and Section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. You also have the right to claim compensation for "material and non-material damage" (including distress) pursuant to Article 82(1) and Section 168, but this may be unrealistic in the case of a few unwanted emails. Option 2 is not free: you will need to pay a court fee and, unless you represent yourself, legal fees. There may also be additional cost risks if you lose the case. Mentioning the above two points in your request could be an effective way to persuade them to comply in the first place. | The fact that the terms and conditions do not mention the word "disable" is significant, but not in the way you seem to think. You state: "...the merchant's T&C which does not explicitly allow the merchant to charge a fee for a disabled account". However, this doesn't mean that the merchant needs to explicitly state that they may. What it actually means is that the merchant does not recognize the term "disable" in the context of terminating the service contract. (Did they use stop, terminate, delete, eliminate, fall into disuse, log off, etc. or any other similar expressions?) You haven't defined what "disable" means, but perhaps it is more like a "pause" in service for which payment is still required? (Like having the post office hold your mail vs terminating all deliveries.) What you need to do is to read the section of the T&Cs that deals with terminating service and payment, understand what is required, and execute the procedures they describe. Whatever words they use, do that. If you have done all the steps and can prove it then you have a case against them, otherwise you are arguing semantics and interpretation... As to the title question, it does not appear that any "law" has been broken, this is just a contractual misunderstanding. P.S. This is the reason why I always set up payments through my bank to "push" money to vendors rather than authorizing them to "pull" money from me. When I am done I notify them and stop paying. I don't need to ask them to please stop taking it from me. | There are three main aspects to this: Its their website, and their terms of service. They can enforce those terms, or change them (in some appropriate manner). You have no recourse if they remove you, block you, or delete your account, for example. That's the measure that you would probably have, virtually every time. To claim damages, or litigate beyond just website access control, requires a legal claim. But there's a catch there. To claim damages, they need to show actual damage, which they wish to be compensated for. If you misused their website but no actual harm can be shown, the total damage claimable is zero, whether or not you followed their rules. Merely entering dishonest information isn't by itself harm. So they would have to show they suffered damage/harm because of that, which is directly attributable to your behaviour, was foreseeably harmful etc, or similar. They also need to consider legal costs, and ability to enforce, especially if you are in a different country. If for some reason the computer use was also illegal, then a criminal act could be committed and they could notify law enforcement. For example suppose you did this in the little known country of Honestania, where the law says that to prevent trolling and online abuse, anything posted on social media under any but your own legal name is a crime. Or suppose you'd been banned from the system and ignoring/evading such a ban was criminal computer use or criminal trespass due to the forbidden/unauthorised access (which can happen in several places). But this is purely for completeness; I guess you'd know if you were taking it further, into criminal computer use. | This is less of a compliance question, and more of an infosec question. On one hand, you want to be able to restore access to an account to users who have lost their access. On the other hand, you must prevent unauthorized access e.g. from hackers. These factors must be balanced. Whether you'll fulfil a data subject access request will generally follow the same criteria as deciding whether you'll reset someone's access credentials, so I'll mostly discuss identity verification in general. Trying to validate names is generally pointless from a security perspective, since the name on the account might not be real, or because validation documents like scans from a passport can be easily forged. When a service has identity validation measures like requesting a copy of photo ID, or requesting a photo of you holding up a validation code written on paper, that doesn't actually help validating that the person requesting access is the account owner, but that the person requesting access appears to be a natural person, and now documents about their identity are on file. A lot of information like names, birthdates, or addresses is also not at all secret and could be easily guessed by a malicious actor. Most websites work by equating access with control over an email account. If you can receive a password reset code over email, you have access. In effect, this delegates the responsibility of account recovery to the email or OAuth provider. So the issue is what happens when someone loses their email account, which is not entirely uncommon for accounts that are multiple years old. One reasonable (and likely GDPR-compliant solution) is to deny access when someone loses their account. Quite a lot of services operate this way. A milder form of this is to email the old address that someone is trying to take over the account, and turn over the account only if you have other evidence of ownership and there has been no reply over multiple weeks. Since this is part of an identity verification measure, I don't think the GDPR's normal 1 month deadline would apply. However, this approach is very risky: an attack can succeed through the mere inaction of the true account holder, and it would arguably be a data breach if you give access to the wrong person – safer for erasure requests only. Also, emails like “click here or we'll delete your account” look a lot like spam (I get a lot of those about alleged problems with my Paypal account). A potentially more reasonable approach is to use questions about the account to verify ownership. When did they create the account? When did they last use it? Can they answer questions about non-public content of the account? (But don't let an attacker choose the questions!) You see some older sites that ask the user to select a “security question” for recovery purposes. But this isn't a best practice – they are frequently the weakest link in an authentication system. If the user answers truthfully, the answer may be easy to guess or discover for an attacker. E.g. the infamous “what is your mother's maiden name” question is horrendously insecure in the age of Facebook. If the user provides a more secure answer, that is essentially just another password that's even easier to lose than an email account. High-value accounts typically offer a secondary authentication method as a fallback. E.g. my bank can send me new access codes via physical mail. GitHub can optionally link a Facebook account for recovery purposes. But these measures would be overkill for most cases. Especially collecting a physical address for the sole purpose of offering account recovery would likely violate the GDPR's data minimization principle, though it may be fine when the user opts in with freely given consent. To summarize: what you're trying to do is extremely difficult, because you've need to balance different security aspects: keeping malicious actors out, and letting legitimate account owners in. Whereas I'd resolve that by denying any account recovery or subject access requests, other approaches exists with other risk profiles. The GDPR requires you to perform reasonable identity verification measures, but what is reasonable depends on the business context and is ultimately an infosec question. | Yes, it's absolutely legal. It turns out that UK retailers offer replacement out of their own politeness and are not required to do so by law. If they gave you refund then that's all they need to do. | Your main and probably sole legal recourse is a lawsuit. The basis for suing the store would be breach of contract. You pay them some money, they provide some goods. They failed to provide those goods – so far. The contract might say something about when the goods would be delivered, but otherwise the requirement would be "in reasonable time" (they can't wait 10 years to deliver). Especially for custom orders, two months is not unreasonable time. They might have run afoul of the FTC's Mail or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule, §435.2, so read that section to see whether any of those circumstances apply to you. | Is It Legally Binding? While their customer service sucks, your oral authorization of the charge is legally binding (I take payments that way almost every day in my own business, it isn't an unusual business practice in small professional businesses). You authorize oral authorization of payments over the phone in the credit card agreement that your credit card company sends you every year that you don't read and throw away. The provider has to collect more information for a credit card payment over the phone than they do for an in person swipe in a credit card machine (e.g. your credit card billing address) and they are fully responsible for wrongful charges if they deal with an imposter. By regularly checking your credit card statements, you can confirm that no incorrect charges are present. Tax Issues If you want to take a tax deduction for non-reimbursed medical expenses, you simply need to tote up the amounts your are entitled to from your own records, and put it in the appropriate box on your tax forms. You don't have to attach documentation to your return. If the IRS disputes your payment, you can offer up your credit card statements and your photograph of the receipts, and if necessary, medical records to show that you received the services, to show that the payment really happened and are deductible. Your credit card company's records, reflected in your monthly credit card statements, are considered very reliable for tax purposes. You have the burden of proving that the expense was incurred and is of a type that qualifies for a deduction by a preponderance of the evidence in the event that there is a dispute that is litigated, which means that you must show that it is more likely than not that you incurred a deductible expense of that kind in that amount in that tax year. Privacy Issues While there are financial information privacy issues associated with this transaction, HIPAA, which covers medical records, normally wouldn't apply to a credit card payment that indicates the person paid, the person paying, the account, the amount and the date, but not a description of the medical services provided or to whom they were provided, which is what is normally on a credit card receipt. The financial privacy issues are also partially addressed by the provider's merchant agreement with the credit card company which contains terms requiring them to maintain certain kinds of security with respect to your financial information (which is not to say that the provider actually follows all of the requirements of their merchant agreement scrupulously, which is why data breaches happen all the time in businesses both large and small). | If you were to seek legal recourse for breach of contract (their Terms and Conditions), the best outcome you could hope for would be "making whole", and since they have already offered this a court could award you what the retailer already offered, but make legal costs on both sides the plaintiff's liability (ie. you), since you could have taken the offer and avoided court. The Terms and Conditions associated with the discount code mean that you won't be able to return the gift cards for cash. It will be argued that by using the code, you agreed to those terms and conditions. The second paragraph of their reply looks like an attempt to scare you, but it has legal merit. By using the unauthorised code you could be considered to have made false representation when you entered into the contract. This could render the contract void, and if they could demonstrate it had been done deliberately to gain money it could meet the threshold for fraud (which is what the police would possibly investigate : if it can be shown that you were aware the discount code didn't apply to you it would constitute making "a false representation ... to make a gain for himself" [sub-paragraphs 1-5, paragraph 2 of the Fraud Act 2006]). You may be able to argue that the voucher websites misled you (though it sounds like you, I and the retailer already know that's not true), but since the retailer has offered to repay what you paid there are unlikely to be any damages - and, unless the voucher site took commission from your transaction, a contract between you and the voucher sites would be difficult (possibly impossible) to establish. In the circumstances, returning what you originally paid is a good offer. |
Can a company adopt a child? With apologies for the (only somewhat) click-bait title, in an answer to another question (see this answer) the statement Typically the only thing a legal entity that is not a natural person cannot do is sign a marriage contract. was made. Some commenters disputed this, asking, e.g., Can a business become a (natural) child's legal guardian, can a business have power of attorney over a (natural) person, etc.? This got me curious: Can any legal entity adopt a child? Or does one, perhaps, need two corporations to do this? Of course, the answer to the above may be a simple "no" for trivial reasons, but my question is really closer to asking the looser question: What is the most ridiculous thing a legal entity can do that one would only expect a natural person to be able to do? I'm happy with any interpretation of "ridiculous", here. As pertains to jurisdiction, I've put the tag united-states for starters, but I am interested in other jurisdictions too, e.g., the UK (one commenter mentioned that corporations frequently vote in elections in the City of London). | In the US, adoptions follow state law. Here is the law for Washington state. RCW 26.33.140 says that "Any person who is legally competent and who is eighteen years of age or older may be an adoptive parent". The word "person" does not have a statutory meaning under this title, thus it has its ordinary meaning. There are discussions in case law regarding the "person" status of corporations, but those extensions of the meaning "person" involve extending a constitutional right which refers to a "person" to corporations. A corporation can hold property, enter contracts, and sue and be sued just like a person, and from the earliest days esp. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, the US courts have recognized that corporations as having the same rights as natural persons to contract and to enforce contracts. But corporations can't vote or get married. So, in Washington you have to be a person-person. And, presumably in all states. | You don't explicitly say (this being an internationally visited and populated site), but based on your question, I will assume that you are in the US. For the question you asked: Is the company the government? If not, then NO, you cannot successfully sue a company (or person for that matter) for violating the freedom of speech granted by the First Amendment to the US Constitution in any circumstances whatsoever. (Sorry, this is a pet peeve of mine). The US Constitution does not bind or restrict any private* individual or company, in any way. (Here "private" means "non-governmental; a "public(ly traded) company" is still considered a "private" entity in this context). The US Constitution exclusively deals with four things: How the US Federal Government operates, powers of the government, and restrictions of the government, and the definition of treason (which arguably is itself a restriction on the power of the government, by denying them the ability to define treason themselves). The First Amendment itself is explicit about this restriction: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech (emphasis mine). Note that, while the First Amendment does not mention acts of the President, this is because the President's Constitutional powers are quite weak and limited; What powers the President does have and usually uses are granted to the office by laws passed by Congress, and so the restriction comes with them, as Congress cannot delegate to the President powers that Congress themselves do not possess). As such, no company can be sued for violating the First Amendment (or any portion of the Constitution, really) because it does not apply to them. Now, there may be laws passed by relevant legislatures, but these are dependent on your jurisdiction (e.g. state). However, as a general rule of thumb this would be legal. Turning down a candidate based on what they say in an interview is the point of having an interview; Turning down an candidate for saying something in an interview that could potentially leave the company liable for a lawsuit under the theory of vicarious liability is only good common sense. | Can a person sign a contract committing to never taking an ex-spouse to Family Court? Basically no. There are important circumstances where waiving a right to sue is not allowed as a matter of law, which often apply. This cannot be done: (1) if the existence or validity of the marriage is disputed, (2) in cases where there are (or could be) minor children, (3) in cases where there are adult children in connection with whom there is child support owed, that is not approved by the court with the child or a guardian for a child approving it, (4) in the case of alimony provisions that are "unconscionable" as that standard is defined for family law purposes, and (5) in cases where there was a defect (such as lack of adequate financial disclosure) in connection with entering into the agreement in question. But, otherwise, it is possible to agree to property divisions in a divorce, attorney fee divisions in a completed divorce, and to alimony awards, that cannot be challenged in court except on the grounds shown above. Often a family court will retain jurisdiction to resolve disputes that arise to interpret property division and alimony awards that were properly entered into when the alimony award was not unconscionable at the time it comes into being, and to enforce breaches of the agreement. But this doesn't have to be done. When jurisdiction is not retained, questions of interpretation and enforcement can be brought in a new court. I've seen divorces where ambiguities in property division language in agreements are interpreted by courts decades later to figure out who owns what property. In one such case there were two courts that might have had jurisdiction to interpret the agreement of the parties, neither of which thought that it had jurisdiction over the case, so to parallel consolidated appeals had to be brought to decide which court had the authority to resolve an ambiguity in the original agreement before either court could get to the merits of the dispute between the parties. Of course, at some point, all the kids will be grown, there will be no outstanding child support amounts owed, all property will be divided, and in some cases, all alimony awards (if any) will be fully performed. Once that point in time is reached and the statute of limitations for defects in entering into the agreement has run, then no further family court litigation is allowed. For example, as part of a divorce agreement, my (soon to be) ex-spouse wants me to put money aside in escrow that my ex can use in the event that I open up a case in Family Court. The ex is paranoid that I will continue litigation, as is agreeing to certain concessions if I agree to this stipulation. When my youngest child turns 21, the escrowed money will go to me. But if I open a case before then, he wants to be able to use the escrowed money for his lawyers. Is this escrow arrangement legally enforceable? This is probably legally enforceable if it is mutually agreed to, although I've never seen a case in New York specifically addressing that issue. This is a very different question than the title question. | Your right to have your horse not be killed is not a consumer right. "Consumer rights" are rights that you only have because you are a consumer. The issue described in the question is not about consumer rights. The sign tells you that there are risks connected to using the car park (obviously because there are lots of cars driving around, there might even be car thieves), and you accepted these risks. It doesn't give the shop permission to do anything they like. Instead of a horse, imagine a shop worker walking around with a hammer and smashing windscreens of cars; that sign isn't going to protect them. But a shop worker collecting trolleys might accidentally bump into your car, and the sign might protect them in such a case. I'd say spraying chemicals strong enough to kill a horse shouldn't happen at all (I suppose these chemicals could also kill a human), and definitely not when there is actually a horse present. To me, it's closer to the employee with a hammer than to the employee with shopping trolleys, so a court should find the shop liable. | If a line in your will bequeaths something that you don't have the power to give (e.g. you bequeath something that you don't own at the time of your death), that line has no legal effect. If I died and left you the house at 10 Downing Street in London, for example, you wouldn't actually be getting it. If your will contains enough of those lines and/or they seem excessively unreasonable, it may cause the validity of the will to be challenged on the basis that you weren't competent to prepare and sign it. If the people reading it think it's reasonable, it may have a social effect based on what it conveys to them, which could lead to voluntary compliance with your wish (especially if the main obstacle to that being realized is a mistaken understanding of and desire to respect your wishes). That could help make peace, for example, if a surviving parent's remarriage would otherwise be opposed by children (or the surviving partner) or others based solely on a mistaken understanding of the wishes of the deceased. It could also make for a really awkward moment, depending on the views of and relationships between survivors. Addressing user662852's comment on the question: You can also use a will to name a guardian for anyone you have guardianship over, which is usually more important for children (e.g. see "Why Every Parent Needs a Will."). | A contract that tells one party or another to do an illegal thing is void ab initio: courts will not recognize it or give force to it. A contract which doesnt explicitly tell either party to do something illegal but if during the course of fulfilling either party's end of the bargain they commit an illegal act it is up to the courts discretion what happens, whether to find the contract void or to maintain the contract (its a matter of public policy whether they allow the contract to continue existing, or if the contract was such that illegal acts were expected to be commited then the court will likely remder it void) Either way, you cannot indemnify someone for committing an illegal act. | In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source. | First off: if someone in DHS is telling you this, your first, best, and really only option is to get advice from an attorney specializing in family law. Regardless of what we tell you here, without representation you will have a hard time with officials who believe otherwise. That said: I don't find anything exactly matching what you describe. The Uniform Adoption Code (AR Code § 9-9-200 (2014)) does not specifically address sibling groups at all. Adoptive parents do have rights to streamlined adoption of a sibling of a child they already adopted, under the Streamlined Adoption act (AR Code § 9-9-701 (2014)). In the section related to Placement of Minors (AR Code § 9-28-108 (2014)), however, is likely what the case worker was describing. Subsection (b) (2) reads, in part: (2) When it is in the best interest of each of the juveniles, the department shall attempt to place: (A) A sibling group together while they are in foster care and adoptive placement This is discussing foster care and adoptive placement, of course. I think the key wording is When it is in the best interest of each of the juveniles; that would be your argument (that it is not in their best interest). I see a 2011 case, for example, discussing a sibling group of four children not entirely different from yours; while there are not children with special needs, there is a child with major behavioral issues, and one of the (three) foster parents is considering adopting one of the children and "would be open" to considering others, but clearly isn't expecting to be required to do so. Note: I am not a lawyer, and particularly not one specialized in family law This is based on my reading of the 2014 Arkansas code. That is almost 2 years old. That said, I don't see any news articles or similar discussing limitations in sibling group placement in Arkansas recently, which is the sort of thing that usually would get attention. That said, this has also been something that HHS has been trying to encourage states to push for – more sibling group placement and awareness of sibling group issues – so it's entirely possible something could have changed. |
Does the arrivecan app go against the Canadian charter? I was looking through the Canadian charter, and Section 6 piqued my interest. It states, in subsection 2, that Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident of Canada has the right to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province. Doesn't the arrivecan app (and subsequent forceful quarantine, and/or fine) infringe upon this right? Directly after the above subsection, it goes on to say, in subsection 3: The rights specified in subsection (2) are subject to any laws or practices of general application in force in a province other than those that discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of province of present or previous residence This to me seems to say that only provincial laws can override the aformentioned freedom. Since the arrivecan app is federally run, doesn't this mean that it is not legal? It seems that the government only chooses to follow Section 6 subsection 1 of the charter Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada. by allowing the citizen to still enter if they refuse to use the arrivecan app; however, from what I understand, they breech it by forcing a quarantine and/or fine for not using it. | It is generally understood that governments do have the right to quarantine citizens in case of epidemic outbreaks. In nations with a rule of law, the extent of quarantine regulations may be challenged in court. A challenge against the app has been filed, and trying to second-guess the court by reading sections of the constitution seems to be pointless. | The Supreme Court rules in US v. Wong Kim Ark ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment, which states All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside It is not disputed that said areas are "in the United States". The court found that "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" is intended to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the national government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases,—children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state neither of which are the case in your scenario. Technically, the child is not "eligible" for citizenship, the child has US citizenship, it is just a matter of getting a government official to recognize it (e.g. in issuing a passport). | health care checks. Hotel check in. Employment? maybe. Background Checks? doesn't matter. It actually does matter, because there is sometimes a law governing the documents that may be shown for a given purpose. For example, the I-9 form, for verifying someone's eligibility to accept employment in the US, has a well defined lists of documents that an employer must accept, and the passport card is one of those documents. A similar situation exists for Transportation Security Administration screening of air passengers. On the other hand, laws concerning proof of age for buying various products will vary from state to state, and retailers may or may not be required to accept any particular document. In the case of alcohol sales in North Carolina, for example, there is a brochure that lists "acceptable forms of identification" on page 17 and explicitly says that "passports may be in the booklet or card form." But that does not seem to create a legal requirement for the retailer to accept passport cards, because page 19 outlines the retailer's right to refuse, saying among other things that "there is no legal recourse by a customer who you have refused a sale." US passport law (22 USC Chapter 4 and 22 CFR parts 51 and 53) doesn't have anything to say about the passport's or passport card's role as an identification document; it speaks only of the more specific role as a travel document. So the general answer to your question, appears to be no. There is no law generally requiring people to accept a passport card if they also accept passports or driver's licenses. But in most specific instances, there may be a general requirement such as "government-issued identification" that includes passport cards in addition to passports and driver's licenses, or there may be a list that explicitly includes passport cards along with driver's licenses and passports. | An individual obtains due process rights upon entering into the United States. For a recent write-up on this question, see this piece at Reason. The people Trump is talking about generally aren't being denied admission at an established, legal border crossing; they're coming across wherever they can get through, and only being discovered by federal agents thereafter. Because they're already in the United States, they have due process rights. As for cross-border interactions with ICE or CBP, the extent of due process protections is still an open question. SCOTUS took it up last year, but it kicked the case back to a lower court rather than deciding it. | In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split" | Statelessness is a very serious condition. It is quite likely that a person such as you describe may be required to board an aeroplane to that country but will not be permitted to pass through immigration on arrival - Mehran Karimi Nasseri lived in Charles de Gaulle airport for 18 years in this condition. There are many people in the world who are stateless and this may or may not affect their lives. Citizenship is generally only an issue when crossing international borders or in employment situations, the latter is significant in advanced countries but less of an issue in countries with less-developed economies. | Isn’t this discrimination since nationals do not have to apply? Yes it is discrimination. But that does not make it illegal. In fact discrimination is in general legal unless it is based on some characteristic which is specifically forbidden as a basis for discrimination (e.g. race). And in general, all of the countries in the world allow and enforce discrimination based on nationality; for example non-nationals will not be able to run for Head of State (and additional restrictions may apply). The EU members allowing similar rights to the citizens of other EU countries is the exception, not the rule, and once the UK stops being bound by EU treaties it can impose its own legal system on non-nationals. And while EU treaties give lots of rights to EU member-countries citizens, they still allow for discrimination based on nationality (for example you cannot run for Prime Minister or MP of Spain as a foreign EU resident). Isn’t the UK Government breaking the law? This could go against EU treaties, but the point is that the UK will no longer need to comply with them. is the UK Government responsible for the harm and distress caused to the individual health and mental wellbeing? No, the UK Government is not responsible if you do not like its laws to the point that it affects your health. Is there any ground for challenging this scheme legality in court? Unlikely. In any case it will not be because you are frightened by it, any challenge would be in the grounds that the government actions act against some other UK law. For example, if the decision to make such a list was made by the Executive but it contradicts some law approved by the Parliament. If this list does not contradict any law, then there are no grounds for challenging it. Would there a breach of my human rights if I was not to apply for settle status and then subsequentially got deported (taken away from my children, home, business, etc.)? How about if I was refused, re-entry or access to public services (NHS for example)? If you do not apply you will not have any evidence that you were settled, and the government could legitimately believe that you are irregularly in the country and try to expel you; you probably would have an opportunity to prove that you were settled even if you were not in the list but that could be way slower, more expensive, riskier and stressful than just registering now. Get this clear: that settled person list is to help you to show that you were a UK resident before Brexit and to give you the protections that are being negotiated between the UK and the EU for expatriates. Probably you could choose not to enlist, but it would work against you. | I think that is not a "reasonable" interpretation of the order, but that's separate from the question of what will be enforced. Focusing on the word of the order, No entity in Texas can compel receipt of a COVID-19 vaccine by any individual, including an employee or a consumer What does it mean to "compel" a person to do something? A court can compel a person to stay in jail for some period of time, and can order the police to use force to enforce that requirement – that's the classical example of compulsion. Nobody except the police can compel a consumer to do anything. All of the words of the order have to be given meaning, and it is not reasonable to say that "compel" is limited to "actions backed up by police action". The government does not separately compel "consumers" and "employees" to do things. In order to sensibly interpret "compel" and "consumer", this has to interpreted as including things other than "pointing a gun at a person". The only sensible interpretation is one that includes denying service to those who do not comply. In addition, the series of "Whereas's" clearly indicate a ban on "no shots, no service" conditions. It remains to be seen in court whether this is found to be enforceable (via the "failure to comply" clause, exactly analogous to other emergency powers allowing restrictions on gatherings etc. previously). |
Are any terms of BCI combinator calculus eligible for copyright? In logic, a combinatory calculus is a system for expressing proofs whose conclusions are combinations of their premises. Such proofs are called combinators. Premises can be proofs, and a combinator can apply one of its premises to another. Today, I'm curious about the BCI combinator calculus. This calculus has three axioms, called B, C, and I: B: (y → z) → (x → y) → (x → z) C: (x → (y → z)) → (y → (x → z)) I: x → x The reader may recognize these; B is modus ponens, C swaps two premises, and I is a tautology. Now, it is well-known folklore in computer science that BCI is a complete basis for simple linear logic (e.g. see nLab). In more familiar language, this means that for any proof which only uses each premise exactly once ("linear logic"), there is a term which only uses B, C, and I as its ingredients and faithfully represents that proof. For a demonstration, consider Algorithm B at this interactive Web page; if the input only uses each letter once, then the output will only use B, C, and I. Which terms, if any, are eligible for copyright? In particular, is there a smallest copyrightable term of BCI? I know that this is a jurisdiction-dependent question. If this question seems silly, note that for the BI calculus (just containing B and I) the answer is hopefully "none" and for the SK calculus (which is equivalent to typical programming languages in expressive power) the answer is hopefully "some"; I figure that asking about a non-trivial intermediate calculus is interesting. | Short Answer No meaningful intellectual property protection is available for BCI calculus, BI calculus, or SK calculus. Long Answer Copyright Protection There are several categories of things that can’t be copyrighted. A common thread to most of them is that they lack the necessary creativity to be eligible for copyright. Ideas This includes procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries. Plans, methods, and devices, are also not protectable. However the particular manner in which they are expressed or described in a writing can be copyrighted. (Source) Copyright can protect a particular expression of an idea (e.g. the layout and exact language of a page in a textbook about BCI calculus that is not the only possible way to present it), but not a concept or system like BCI calculus. The same reasoning means that it is probably not possible to copyright BI calculus or SK calculus, even though a particular textbook expressing them in a particular way might be possible to protect with copyright. Also, since BCI calculus is derived from publications in mathematics journals made in 1924 and 1930 by its two lead creators, anything derived from the original publications would probably be in the public domain by now. In the United States: every book and tale published before 1927 is in the public domain; American copyrights last for 95 years for books originally published between 1927 and 1978 if the copyright was properly registered and maintained. It is likely that the copyright for the 1930 journal article in question was not registered and maintained, as it was not routine practice for mathematical journals to do so at the time. Even if it was, the copyright for the 1930 paper would be almost spent and would expire in the year 2025. The Alternative Of Patent Protection Patents can protect ideas of ways to implement something, but also has limitations that probably exclude BCI calculus as something that could be patented: Certain things can never be patented, regardless of how well they meet these four standards. They include the elements, theoretical plans, laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. So patenting fire or the wheel is out, though some people have tried. (Source) Any patent received for BCI calculus prior to the year 2002 would also have expired bringing the subject matter of the patent into the public domain. Also, since BCI calculus is something that has already been disclosed to the public, it is barred from patentability as a form of existing prior art. The existence of prior art would also prevent BI calculus and SK calculus from being patented. Trade Secret Protection Considered It also probably isn't possible to protect BCI calculus (or BI calculus or SK calculus) as a trade secret, because it has been disclosed to the public and hence isn't secret. (Source) Trade Mark Protection Considered It might be possible to protect the name "BCI calculus" as a trademark under which services teaching people to use it are marketed, but that wouldn't protect the underlying system or concepts. But there is a strong argument that this would not even qualify as a trademark because it is merely descriptive and does not have a "secondary meaning" particular to a particular user of the label for the system. | Copyright protection is about certain acts, and not about relationships between products. Copyright law says that the creator of an original work hold the exclusive right to copy and to authorize creation of derivative works. Copyright law does not say that anybody can freely create derivative works as long as they are different to a certain extent. So if you take an original Mario and modify it a teeny bit, that is a violation of copyright; if you take an original Mario and modify it hugely, that is a violation of copyright. Degree of similarity is relevant on some cases when the factual question arises whether the allegedly-infringing work is based on some protected original. This is most obvious in music cases, where all baroque music has some similarity to all other baroque music, all death metal has some similarity to all other death metal, and so on. There is not a legal quasi-statutory standard for measuring substantial similarity in music. The scientific underpinning of such a standard would be based on (weighted) combinatorics and the idea that there are only so many tunes possible (that would be a huge number, until you get to the "within a genre" condition). It seems obvious (by your "admission") that the derived works are based on protected works, so Nintendo's permission is required to legally create such works. However, you do or would hold copyright in your unauthorized derived work. Without a trail of evidence such as a SE question pointing to the connection, the derived images might be hard to connect to the originals. In addition, you may be able to avail yourself of a "fair use" defense, in case you get sued by the original creator. Factors favoring such a defense are the insubstantiality of the copying (a small portion) and the "transformativeness" of your creation. | The lack of a copyright notice is irrelevant, what matters is whether permission is granted. The material cannot be copied, except if the copyright holder grants you permission to copy. However, you might be able to create something legal and satisfactory on your own, because the underlying ideas are not protected. By way of analogy, you cannot copy the Turbo Pascal Numeric Methods library without permission, but you can study the logic of a module and write your own FFT routine. The status of something as "declaring code" is entirely irrelevant to the court's decision in Google v. Oracle. What is relevant to the court's finding of fair use is that the content constituted 0.4 percent of the entire API, and the fact that the copied lines of code are inextricably bound to other lines of code that are accessed by programmers, allowing programmers to bring their skills to a new environment. The court found that he amount of copying was tethered to a valid, and transformative, purpose. | This question has been addressed directly, with very similar facts, by the federal courts, and the answer, based on those decisions, is: Maybe. The most famous case in this area is Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). In that case, the defendant had bought a copy of plaintiff's art book, cut out the pages, and affixed them to ceramic tiles, which it sold. The defendant relied on the first sale doctrine, codified in 17 U.S.C. 109. The first sale doctrine says that if you own a copy of a copyrighted work, you can resell it without the copyright holder's permission. The plaintiff argued that, by altering the original artwork, the defendant had created a new derivative work. The first sale doctrine gives you the right to sell the book to someone else, but not the right to create derivative works, whether by writing and publishing an unauthorized sequel or, they argued, cutting and pasting and tiling and kilning the physical pages. The Mirage Editions court agreed with the plaintiff that the tiles were a derivative work outside the scope of the first sale doctrine, and therefore the defendants had infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights. However, other courts faced with similar facts have disagreed, and to date I'm not aware of any Supreme Court decision resolving the issue. The bottom line is: you are allowed to sell what you bought; you aren't allowed to transform it into something new and sell that. Where the line gets drawn is muddy and likely to remain so at least until the Supreme Court addresses the issue. | A fundamental principle of copyright law is that protection is only afforded to the concrete expression, and not the abstract idea. Therefore, if you write a sort program, what is protected is "that specific program", and not the general idea of a sort program. There are many kinds of sort algorithms: if you write a bubble sort program, you don't "own" all bubble sort programs, you only own the one that you wrote. If you sell your right to a particular bubble sort program, you don't thereby prevent yourself from writing another bubble sort program. But, technically, you do prevent yourself from copying that program, changing some variable names or maybe manually recoding a couple of lines, and re-licensing the code (assuming that you fully transferred copyright, or gave the customer exclusive rights to the code). The basic question that the courts will ask is "did you copy that program", which they answer by looking at the similarity between the two programs. All bubble sorts have a necessary similarity. To prove infringement, the plaintiff would (ultimately) have to prove that the similarity had to have come from copying rather than independent coincidental re-creation. Functional considerations and general programmer practice would tend to weigh against an allegation of infringement in certain cases, where "counter" is a common name for a counter variable, and bubble sort is a well known algorithm with limited practical differences in lines of code. The hard part is establishing that it would be natural for such similarities to exist even when independently coded by a single person. It may be common practice to take a program that you've sold and tweak it in some fashion, but that is copyright infringement, whereas "applying the lessons that you learned in writing X to a new program" is not infringement, it is using the same ideas, and the ideas are not what is protected. | The GPL does require you to keep any existing copyright notices: You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Program's source code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you [...] keep intact all the notices that refer to this License and to the absence of any warranty [...] The GPL also recommends adding a notice to each file: Copyright (C) yyyy name of author - This program is free software[...] From my reading of the GPL, if the software you modify contains such notices, which is likely, you must preserve them. This effectively attributes the original author. However, as far as I can see, there is no requirement to have a list of acknowledgements (as is customary in scientific papers), which lists all the software you used. How to attribute parts that are integrated in source form? (Where licence information is given in the file header) If you keep the original file header (and possibly add to it), that should be enough. How to attribute parts that are integrated in binary form? As far as I can see, there is no additional attribution required for distribution in binary form. The GPL requires you to supply the source code along with the binary form, so the attribution in the source code will be available. | Before the AIA in 2012 both companies could apply for a patent and if one of the applicants thought they were both trying to patent the same thing they could initiate an interference proceeding. In that proceeding before the board, they each present their evidence as to date of conception and diligent effort from that point to the date of the first filing. The board decided which application went forward. Now the U.S. is with the rest of the world in first-to-file. It doesn’t matter who conceived first unless one actually stole the idea from the other. There is a new derivation procedure to try to prove that. I don’t think it has ever yet happened. One of the "simultaneous" inventors could publish the invention, putting into the public domain. If published before the other's filing date, it would theoretically prevent the other from getting a patent. In any case a patent owner can stop the other from making their product or charge a royalty. There is a narrow case under the AIA where one company has been using a process that another later patents and can retain a limited right to keep using that process but can’t move or expand operations. This is called Prior User Rights. | The trivial answer is yes, at least under certain circumstances, as the example you give shows. First, the concept of substrings is not particularly useful in trademark law. IF that were the case, then we wouldn't be able to have a company called "Gaudiest Clothing Brand" because it contains the substring audi. But, you might say, what about looking at words instead of characters, as with the example of "Linux" and "The Linux Foundation." In that case, I offer the example of "Target," which is a word found in literally thousands of US trademarks. You'll notice that the first item on this list where word mark is simply target, rather than a phrase containing that word, doesn't even belong to the well known chain of stores. This brings us to another important aspect of trademark protection, which is that the mark's purpose is to identify a producer of goods, a provider of services, or particular goods or services themselves. You could probably start a bookstore called McDonald's, unless you're near Redmond, Washington, but you certainly would not be able to use that name for a chain of hamburger-based fast food restaurants. Back to the subject of Linux, one possible explanation here is therefore that Linux is a trademark for an operating system, while The Linux Foundation is a trademark for a non-profit foundation that is concerned with the operating system. The trademarks don't represent competing entities. Consider, for example, the disclaimer on volkswagenownersclub.com: VolkswagenOwnersClub.com is an independent media publication. VolkswagenOwnersClub.com and its owners are not affiliated with or endorsed by Volkswagen AG or Volkswagen of America, Inc. Volkswagen is a registered trademark of Volkswagen AG. All rights reserved. All information Copyright 2006-2010 (Also consider, for example, the case of Apple Corps, Ltd. and Apple Computer, Inc..) As far as I can tell, however, "Volkswagen Owners' Club" is not directly relevant to this question, because it is not a registered trademark, and the question concerns two registered trademarks. I am not sure whether two such trademarks could coexist if there were an adversarial relationship between their owners. In this case, hwoever, the trademarks are used together because the owners have a collegial relationship. They work for a common goal, the promotion of the product identified by one of the trademarks. The foundation's use of the trademark is therefore undoubtedly with permission. In fact, the Linux foundation is Linus Torvalds' employer, and one of the foundation's purposes is to manage the Linux trademark that Torvalds owns. Now the question of derivative trademarks, such as My Linux is clouded by the fact that Linux is an open source operating system. In principle, you can't modify a product and then sell it using its original trademark unless you have permission. For example, I don't suppose I could rebottle Coca-Cola with some added salt and pepper and sell it as *Phoog's Coca-Cola" unless I had permission from the owner of the trademark. With Linux being an open-source project, however, the terms of the open source license probably explicitly permit people to use the trademark under certain restrictions if they offer, for example, a customized distribution of Linux |
Is it possible to change your name while applying for a Green Card in the US? Is it possible to get a Green Card with a different name of your current name? Or change it as soon as getting the Green Card? I am on F-1 student visa in the US and want to apply for an EB-2/NIW/Green Card, but I'd like to also pick a new name and family name for myself. | Changing your name won't affect your immigration status. It may be more or less of a hassle if you do it before or after getting your green card. My guess is that the cost and hassle of replacing the green card would argue in favor of changing your name now, before you apply for the green card. You'll normally change your name through a state court where you reside, though, and then submit the court order with your subsequent submissions to USCIS, rather than effecting the change of name through the green card application itself. You'll probably also want to check whether this has legal effect in your country of citizenship. Detailed questions on practical aspects of the change belong on Expatriates, however. As far as this site is concerned, the answer is yes, it's fine. | Under US law, names do not matter, what matters is the citizenship of the parents. As a US citizen, your children are automatically also US citizens. Whether or not the child also gains citizenship in the father's country depends on the laws of that country. Under Kosovan citizenship law art. 6, if one parent is born outside of R. of Kosova and both parents agree in writing that the child shall acquire Kosovan citizenship (which does not preclude US citizenship). The child does not gain German citizenship (unless the other parent is a German citizen). | A few possible reasons it could be illegal (on an issue spotting basis, not a careful analysis of each possible reason): The EO is intended to discriminate on the basis of religion and in fact does so in violation of the 1st Amendment to the United States Constitution. The EO is intended to unlawfully discriminate based upon race or ethnicity in violation of U.S. statutes or the 14th Amendment. The EO was adopted without observing the notice and hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. The EO took effect prematurely because it was not duly published in the Federal Register for the time period required by law, or was otherwise insufficiently promulgated. The EO repeals other regulations currently in force in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. The EO improperly disturbs the vested, albeit limited, rights of existing visa holders (or visa applicants) without due process of law, and/or in violation of unenumerated 10th Amendment rights. Refugee visa applicants under an already adopted regulation are entitled to an individualized consideration of their application as a matter of due process and the EO amounts to an ex post facto law as applied to people already in the application process under that regulation. The EO improperly deprives people who purchased non-refundable plane tickets in reasonable reliance of their visa rights which were not revocable under any law in place at the time those tickets were purchased of a property right in those plane tickets without compensation or due process of law under the 5th Amendment. The EO is void for vagueness as the ambiguities in its drafting makes it impossible to determine who is and is not affected by the EO and in what manner. There is a conflict in the immigration statutes between statutory provisions and treaty obligations related to refugees, and the regulation implementing a particular section of the immigration law's grant of regulatory authority, and the refugee protections must prevail. A person claiming to be a refugee has a due process right to individualized consideration of their circumstances, either by statute, by treaty, or under the constitution, which the EO does not respect. The treatment of dual citizens under the EO either is contrary to statutory immigration law or to a treaty or to the U.S. Constitution and customary international law. The EO violates one or more treaties between affected countries and the United States regarding immigration. The scope and terms of the EO exceed the authority granted to the President by the section of the immigration statutes relied upon for authority to pass the EO. The administration failed to articulate a rational basis for distinguishing between nations included in the ban and nations not included in support of the EO as required by the Administrative Procedures Act. There is no rational basis for distinguishing between nations included in the ban and nations not included as required by the U.S. Constitution (a much weaker test since it allows for post hoc rationalizations). Authority to implement the relevant section of the immigration law is vested in one or more officials at the United States Department of State, rather than the President directly, and none of those officials approved the EO. The military interpreters and their families may have a contract with the U.S. government as part of their employment that gives them a right to a visa, in which case the EO would be a law impairing contracts in violation of the U.S. Constitution, as applied to them. Some of the immigrants may need to accompany U.S. citizen children in order for the children to exercise the childrens' rights to enter the country and as applied the EO may violate the U.S. citizen childrens' rights. The CBP may be incorrectly interpreting the EO (which even the administration is not clear about) and therefore violating the law as applied because the EO does not actually authorize their action or because the way that they interpreted the EO was an abuse of their discretion. The manner in which the EO was implemented (e.g. long periods of time in handcuffs for civilians not accused of any crime and with no ability to foresee that they would be denied entry, separating young children from parents, etc.) may have been an unreasonable seizure as applied, even if detention per se was authorized. The 4th Amendment requires that searches and seizures be reasonable in the manner that they are carried out even if the search or seizure is itself authorized by law. UPDATE February 2, 2017: A federal judge in California has found that at least some of these reasons have merit and has stayed the EO and set an expedited hearing and briefing schedule on whether the injunction against the EO should remain in force. UPDATE AND EPILOGUE June 28, 2018: The final version of the ban was ultimately upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Trump v. Hawaii on June 26, 2018 in a 5-4 decision. Litigation of the version of the ban in the OP was dismissed as moot when it was withdrawn and replaced with a similar but newer version of the EO. The four justices in the dissent rely on the first reason given, as did lower courts in the case and in parallel litigation. A core distinction between the majority and the dissent is the weight given by statements made by President Trump about the policy, and how much deference to give to the government's reasons for the policy offered up in court. Justice Neil Gorsuch, who cast a deciding vote in the case, took office April 10, 2017, after this answer and the first update to this answer were written. | There are a couple of flaws in your hypothetical. Nobody, certainly not the state, represents the birth records as inerrant or complete. Birth records frequently have to be corrected. In fact the point of many paternity suits is to correct the official birth record. Sometimes the father, or even the mother will be listed as "unknown" on the birth record, so the absence of a birth record naming a person as a father is not dispositive. No government official would ever issue a legal document declaring that the man is not any child's legal father because the records don't establish that. At best they could issue a document stating that the man was not the father of record for any child in the state. Anyway, the exercise would be pointless. The only birth record the court would be interested in would be that for the child before them. None of the other birth records would be relevant to the case at hand. The court in a paternity case would ask for evidence, such as birth certificates, or statements acknowledging paternity. If the two parties continued to dispute paternity, the court would order a paternity test. Older blood typing tests sometimes left paternity ambiguous, but modern DNA paternity testing is can achieve 99.99% certainty, baring fraud or laboratory error. | The way "with intent to lose citizenship" works in US law is extremely demanding; it is very hard to establish it by doing anything short of appearing before a consular officer and formally renouncing citizenship. Other ways include serving in the military of a country at war with the US, being convicted of treason for committing one of the specified potentially expatriating acts (serving in an army at war with the US is sort of a trial-less special case of that, because engaging in a war against the US is treason), or serving in a "policy-level position" in a foreign government. The State Department says as much in the link. Obtaining citizenship is listed as a case where the administrative premise applies; so is swearing allegiance to a foreign state, serving in the military of a state at peace with the US, and serving in lower-level government posts of a foreign state. In those cases, the person retains US citizenship but at some point in the future may be asked by the State Department if they wanted to renounce it. Intent to renounce citizenship is established only by explicit declaration if you've only obtained citizenship in another country. With "policy-level posts" the premise doesn't apply, but then the State Department just decides on a case-by-case basis. You may well lose US citizenship (although the King of Thailand was born in the US, and I'm not sure if he's considered to have lost citizenship), but it's not automatic. Your senior ministers may lose citizenship, but it is likewise not automatic. But the normal citizens? The link explicitly says that the administrative premise covers that. | The case that you mentioned isn't an example of what you're talking about. One thing that immediately comes to mind is the Shamima Begum case. She fled her London home to join the Islamic state but now she wants to come back to the UK (after realizing), but UK's Home Office revoked her citizenship, claiming that she could claim Bangladesh citizenship by descent even though she isn't a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. No, they are claiming that Shamima Begum is a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. According to section 5 of Bangladesh's Citizenship Act 1951, a child born abroad to a Bangladeshi citizen father is automatically ("shall be") a Bangladeshi citizen by descent at birth. (Mothers were allowed to pass on citizenship after 2009, but that was after Begum was born.) Note that registration at a Bangladeshi consulate within 1 year of birth is only necessary in the case where the father is a Bangladeshi citizen by descent. I believe Begum's father was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise by descent, in which case no registration or other action is necessary for her to be a Bangladeshi citizen at birth. It doesn't matter that she has never been to Bangladesh nor does it matter that she never claimed to be a Bangladeshi citizen. There were two men of Bangladeshi descent in a separate case who successfully fought their revocation of British citizenship, but the difference between their cases and Begum's case was that they were over 21, which she was under 21 at the time of revocation. Section 14 of Bangladeshi's Citizenship Act provides that someone with dual citizenship automatically loses Bangladeshi citizenship if they don't renounce their other citizenship, but this provision doesn't apply to those under 21. So these two men had Bangladeshi citizenship too, while they were under 21, but they lost it when they turned 21, before their supposed revocation of British citizenship, whereas for Begum, she hadn't lost Bangladeshi citizenship at the time of the revocation of her British citizenship, because she hadn't turned 21. (Perhaps you got the idea of "claiming" of citizenship from some report that one can "claim" Bangladeshi citizenship by descent while under 21, and these men failed to claim it, but Begum can still "claim" it. But if you read the text of the law, that is clearly not the case. For a child born to a father who was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise than by descent, there is no "claim" of citizenship -- it is automatic and involuntary at birth.) As to your question, there are no universal restrictions to how a country can grant or take away citizenship. There is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which countries may voluntarily join, but only a minority of countries of the world are party to the convention. Article 8 of the Convention does prohibit countries that are party to the Convention from depriving someone's citizenship if it would "render him stateless", though there are several exceptions including if the citizenship was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The language seems to require that the person already have another citizenship, not just have the ability to acquire one, though I am not sure how much leeway countries have to interpret this. In the case of the UK, it is a party to the Convention, and it has largely implemented the provisions of the Convention in its domestic law. With respect to deprivation of citizenship, section 40 subsection (4) of the British Nationality Act 1981 prohibits a deprivation order if the Secretary "is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless." (Subsection (4A) has a looser restriction where British citizens by naturalization can be deprived of citizenship if the Secretary believes that the person is able to become the national of another country. I am not sure whether this is compatible with the Convention. In any case, this is not relevant to Begum's case as she was not a British citizen by naturalization.) So if the UK were to try to deprive citizenship of a British citizen otherwise than by naturalization like Begum, not on the basis that the person already has another citizenship but on the basis that they are "eligible" to "claim" one (which as I described above I do not believe is the case for Begum; I am talking hypothetically if such a case were to arise), that can already be challenged as a violation of British law, in British courts, without considering the UK's obligations under the Convention. If it's another country that's a party to the Convention, but their law expressly allows deprivation of citizenship for being "eligible" to acquire another citizenship even though the person doesn't have one (including, perhaps, British citizens by naturalization deprived citizenship under section 40(4A)), and a person in that situation is deprived of citizenship, they don't really have any recourse. A private party cannot "sue" a country over any violations of the Convention in an international court. | Your options are generally limited by where you have (or can establish) residency, along with where your communal property is held. There are (decreasing numbers of) jurisdictions known as "divorce mills" that have notoriously lenient rules for establishing residency and completing divorces. | You are already a British citizen. This will not impact your German nationality (I don't know anything about Spanish Nationality Law): (1) Prior to 2000, EC nationals were considered 'settled' when exercising Treaty rights in the UK. They did not have to apply for indefinite leave to remain to be considered settled. As you were born in the UK to at least one parent who was exercising Treaty rights in the UK and hence 'settled' for the purposes of the British Nationality Act 1981, you acquired British citizenship automatically at birth. You do not need to, and should not, apply for naturalisation or registration, but instead for confirmation of British citizenship OR a passport (or alternatively, a certificate of entitlement to the right of abode). NOTE: of course, the situation of EU/EEA nationals in the UK is now different under the 2006 Regulations, implementing Directive 2004/38/EC, which introduced the concept of "permanent residence". There was no equivalent to this at the time of your birth, in 1988, when all EC nationals exercising Treaty rights were 'settled'. (2) You will not lose your German nationality. First, you are already British anyway, as set out above. Second, the previous answers are all wrong as a point of law. The German 'option model' requires persons born in Germany to non-German parents to decide which citizenship they wish to keep once they come of age. This never applies where one of the parents is German. It is not true, therefore, that Germany never accepts dual nationality. Equally importantly, a German national who acquires the citizenship of another EU/EEA country will not lose their German citizenship (although, as set out under (1) above, this does not affect you anyway since you are already British, even if you may currently lack a document to prove your status as such). |
What are the detention without charge time limits? In researching detention without charge, I find this accusation asserted at many countries as if each example is uniquely bad. However, surprisingly I can find no research paper or even informed opinion discussing what are the norms. Are there international agreements or conventions which address detention without charge? Specifically, after how long must either charges be filed or the imprisoned released? In the absence of such conventions, what are common detention without charge limits, and does it vary by state, geographic region, or political framework? | The time between arrest and being presented to a judge depends on the country you are in: japan You can be in jail for 23 days before you even see a judge and are charged, and that clock resets whenever they officially start to investigate you for a different possible charge. You are not charged, you are just accused of this related and greater crime. This tactic even has a special name: Hitojichi shihō. Someone they want to investigate for murder can be first imprisoned to investigate the deposit of the corpse, then for the actual murder, for a total of 46 days maximum - and if the DA isn't creative to get some other lesser included charges in. Against some Yakuza, some DAs allegedly managed to chain up much more. However, those 23 days (per investigation) are all the pre-trial investigative confinement that the state gets before a trial - the moment the formal charge is entered, the trial has to begin soon after... However, the state also often has the arrestee's confession at that point - partially because a creative DA might manage to keep you nigh permanently and in part because you don't have the right to have your attorney at your side during questioning in Japan. This is partially the reason why Japanese courts have such a crazy high conviction rate: more than 99% of the cases brought by DAs are convictions, in most cases using the confession obtained in the pre-charge detention as a piece of key evidence. england-and-wales If you are a suspect of terrorism, you can be kept for up to 14 days before you need to be either charged or released, as Rick explains much better. Generally, 24 hours or 96 hours for serious crimes, starting at the arrest hours, apply. european-union The EU has the European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 5 III): Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. However, what is Promptly is dependant on what the countries implementing say it is. As an example, let's take a (closer) look at Germany. germany While you can be in investigative confinement (Untersuchungshaft / U-Haft) for months or up to a year typically, you need to be already officially charged and a judge has to affirm you are in U-Haft. This decision that you need to be in confinement needs to be repeated regularily in case of long investigative confinements. This Investigative Confinement, "Untersuchungshaft", is defined in STPO §112 (~process regulations for criminal trials), and usually is limited to about 6 months before the suspect is to be released or be at trial, but in extremely difficult cases it can be extended by special motion in the layer of Oberlandesgericht, which is about the highest state court. Still, while an extension to 9 or 12 months is possible, there can be cases where this may be extended even further, even if that might not be entirely correct on other grounds - there had been appeals to the European court for human rights about such. On the other hand, once a trial starts and the court sees a flight risk or that you might pose a potential danger, you stay in (or are taken into) Untersuchungshaft for the duration of the trial. That is different from pre-trial Untersuchungshaft, in that you can't appeal on that your trial didn't start yet. In either case of Untersuchungshaft, any and all confinement is counted as time served, like the case of Fritz Teufel. In his case, his trial was seriously delayed and he was in Untersuchungshaft for 5 years before they convicted him to 5 years. In the end, he had already served all the due time due to the investigatory confinement, so he was released almost on the spot - just a little bit of paperwork and he was out.. Now, that is all court-ordered confinement. How far can we get without the court? What does Germany count as prompt? So, unless you have been put into investigative confinement by court order, you have to be released at the end of the day after you were arrested. End of the day is defined as midnight by the general rules. So if you were arrested Monday, 1st of January at 00:01, you are to be released on Tuesday, 2nd of January, 24:00. So, the absolute maximum confinement outside of the daylight-saving change day is 47 hours 59 minutes and 59 seconds until you need to have been seen by a judge, but because it is nigh impossible to get to see a judge between 16:00 and 24:00, the typical confinement till you are formally charged and possibly transferred to Untersuchungshaft is usually less. On a mere technicality, there is one day a year where you might be confined twice from 2 AM to 3 AM, but that is also always a Sunday. | What is the status of songs that glorify illegal activity in different countries? germany Depends on the crime and the lyrics. For historical reasons, glorifying genocide is banned. Calling for crimes to be committed against individuals is banned. More generic 'gangster rap' pretending to a criminal lifestyle is allowed. The exact dividing line between the two comes out in court precedents, which weigh the freedom of expression against the freedom from insults and criminal threats. Are there any countries where my question would be illegal to write? Sure. Consider North Korea, where those lyrics would be evidence of decadent Western speech patterns and get punished by two years to life (or more, if the police has a quota to fill). | It depends on the jurisdiction. Some states don't require a signature. In California refusing to sign is grounds for arrest: CA Codes (veh:40300-40313) 40302) Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this code, not declared to be a felony, the arrested person shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of the offense and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where the arrest is made in any of the following cases: (a) When the person arrested fails to present his driver's license or other satisfactory evidence of his identity for examination. (b) When the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to appear in court. (c) When the person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate. (d) When the person arrested is charged with violating Section 23152. | The default is that countries are not required to repatriate alleged criminals It is one of the cardinal provisions of sovereignty that one country cannot "reach into" another country's territory for any reason. However, countries can voluntarily repatriate an alleged criminal subject to their own legal systems allowing this. This can be ad-hoc or through a longer-term extradition treaty. Even where extradition is allowed, there are common things that will prevent it: Dual criminality - generally, the alleged crime must be a crime in both jurisdictions, Political crimes are usually not subject to extradition Possibility of certain types of punishment - nations without the death penalty will generally not extradite for alleged capital crimes. This can be overcome with appropriate guarantees that such a penalty will not be sought. Jurisdictional issues Own citizens - some countries will not extradite their own citizens notably Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Russia, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Syria. Fair trial standards - extradition will usually be refused when a fair trial cannot be expected. | The UN has a copy of the extradition treaty between the US and Brazil, the short version of it is that the treaty lays out in Article II an exhaustive list of crimes that are extraditable, skimming the list I don't see defamation (since of course in real life it's not a federal crime). As a general principle, Country A won't extradite someone to Country B if the conduct they are accused of in Country B is not a crime in Country A, if Country A does not think Country B would provide a fair trial, or if the person is convicted if the punishment likely to be imposed by Country B would be illegal under the laws of Country A (this comes up a lot with extradition from Europe to the US if a possible punishment for the crime is death). So in your hypothetical Brazil would probably be unwilling to extradite its own citizen for the crime the US accuses them of. I think another part of your question is whether the US or Brazil would have jurisdiction over this defamation. In theory, both could claim jurisdiction over it. In practice most criminal conduct is criminal relatively universally, especially among similarly geolocated countries, so the rest of this paragraph is assuming both countries did consider the defamation criminal and extraditable. As a matter of judicial effectiveness an Internet crime would probably be prosecuted in the country where the person resides. There would likely be a language barrier too, if the US court would have to employ a Portuguese translator. However, this is all largely a political question more than a legal one, if the US really wanted to make an example of this person in their own country the US could try to use political leverage to get Brazil to extradite them. The US could also wait until the person travelled abroad and petition the third country to imprison and extradite them. That's something that happens more commonly for citizens of a country that the US does not have an extradition treaty with. | Countries can, and do, extradite accused criminals even in the absence of an extradition treaty. There is always some political context to any extradition decision. In particular the sending country's judgement of the fairness of the requesting country's system of courts will be a factor. As to the practicalities, the requesting country will often supply hearing transcripts with its request. In some cases witness may travel to the potential sending country to testify at a hearing there. Some countries will prosecute a person found in their jurisdiction for crimes allegedly committed elsewhere. Others will not, or only in limited circumstnces. Some treaties, such as the treaty on air piracy, require a county to either extradite or prosecute an accused. There is no one answer to what happens in such circumstances. | The statute of limitations sets out the period of time after a crime has been within which formal criminal proceedings must be commenced. If the police or DA were to request and receive an arrest warrant that met the requirements of the Fourth Amendment then the person would be a fugitive and time spent as a fugitive does not count. From Groh v Ramirez: The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The requirement is that the person to be seized must be "particularly described" - that is unambiguously identified. A name will do that but so will a commonly used alias. | At the federal level, per 18 USC 751, escaping is a crime. In United States v. Allen, 432 F.2d 939 it was held that an arrest need not be lawful in order for an escape to be illegal; Laws v. US states that "This court has said that a sentence imposed for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751 is 'not affected by the validity of the sentences being served at the time of the escape'", giving numerous citations. I don't find cases where the escapee was exonerated; prosecutors have the discretion to not prosecute for committing a crime, so it would be hard to find a case where the legality of such a conviction was upheld (also, hard to find a jury willing to convict in such circumstances). |
Is a traffic ticket an arrest? If a police officer gives a motorist a traffic ticket, is that technically considered an arrest? I know that some police behaviors are as follows: Detaining — with reasonable suspicion Investigating — with reasonable suspicion Questioning — potential suspects or witnesses Arresting — with probable cause During a traffic stop, the police officer clearly has probable cause sufficient for an arrest because s/he presumably witnessed the offense. Is there a separate category specifically for traffic stops? Or is that considered a subset of the broader category of making an arrest? The reason for this question is the language in this California statute: CA Codes (veh:40300-40313) Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this code, not declared to be a felony, the arrested person shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of the offense and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where the arrest is made in any of the following cases: (a) When the person arrested fails to present his driver's license or other satisfactory evidence of his identity for examination. (b) When the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to appear in court. (c) When the person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate. (d) When the person arrested is charged with violating Section 23152. See this SO question and answer. | It is not an arrest. There are many supporting cases to indicate why a traffic stop is not an arrest, but a ruling from the Supreme Court of the United States answers the issue in any state of the United States. Quoting page 5 of the opinion of the court in a 2015 case, RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES: “[A] relatively brief encounter,” a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968)). See also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U. S. 323, 330 (2009). The main issue of the case was suppression of evidence acquired after an unconstitutional delay of a traffic stop. Thus the above is binding precedent and not dicta, since otherwise the evidence would not have been suppressed. | In Spain, most traffic offenses are usually considered administrative sanctions and involve just a relatively small fine, and perhaps losing some points in your licence. In those cases, if the driver if the vehicle cannot be established (your example, or a far regular one of a parking violation in which the officer did not see who did park it and will not wait by the side of the parker until the driver appears), the fine just goes to the registered owner. When the fine is reported to the registered owner of the vehicle, he can report who was the actual driver who broke the law at the time of the offense. I do not know what would happen if the person named does not recognize his responsability, but my guess is that the owner has to pay the fine (HINT: do not lend your car to someone who cannot be trusted). If the infraction is so excessive that it becomes a matter of penal law then there must be a trial and then the accused must be established without reasonable doubt, so in that case such a stunt maybe could work. | Can a vigilante perform an arrest? This depends on whether the vigilante has the power to perform a citizen's arrest. The rules depend on the jurisdiction (and vary from state to state in the US), but generally the power to perform a citizen's arrest is quite limited. It may include the power to 'pre-empt' an offence if the would-be offender has attempted to commit the offence. However, often the power is limited to particularly serious offences (eg. felonies). There may also be a requirement that the crime occurred in the citizen's presence, or that the citizen was unable to contact the police instead. Is evidence obtained by a vigilante admissible? In the United States, the constitutional exclusionary rule generally prevents evidence from being admitted if the government obtained it illegally. I answered a general question about the scope of the exclusionary rule here. However, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained illegally by a private individual: Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). In Burdeau, the defendant's papers had been stolen and turned over to the government, which proposed to present them as evidence to a grand jury. The Supreme Court said: In the present case, the record clearly shows that no official of the federal government had anything to do with the wrongful seizure of the petitioner's property ... there was no invasion of the security afforded by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure, as whatever wrong was done was the act of individuals in taking the property of another ... We assume that petitioner has an unquestionable right of redress against those who illegally and wrongfully took his private property under the circumstances herein disclosed, but with such remedies we are not now concerned. However, the exclusionary rule in some states goes beyond the Fourth Amendment. For example, article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that evidence illegally obtained 'by an officer or other person' is inadmissible. This provision was apparently enacted to deter vigilantes: Bubany and Cockerell, 'Excluding Criminal Evidence Texas-Style: Can Private Searches Poison the Fruit?' 12 Texas Tech Law Review 611 (1981), p 625. Can such evidence be admitted even if the vigilante is not present? Assuming that no exclusionary rule applies, evidence obtained by a vigilante can potentially be admitted through the testimony of a police officer or other witness, subject to the rule against hearsay and the question of reliability. The rule against hearsay means that a police officer cannot give evidence that a vigilante told them that the accused was guilty. Evidence of this kind is not admissible because the accused has no opportunity to challenge the reliability of the source of the information in cross-examination. The rule against hearsay does not apply when the probative value of the evidence does not depend on the truth of the absent vigilante's assertion. If the evidence provided by the vigilante is really 'damning' then it might fall into this category. For example, a vigilante might provide the police with a weapon that has the accused and victim's DNA on it, or tell the police that incriminating evidence can be found at a particular location. A police officer can then give evidence that the weapon was tested and found to have matching DNA, or a search warrant was executed and the incriminating evidence was found. There is no admissibility issue here. However, the fact that the police were tipped off by a vigilante who has broken the law and is not present to face court may cause the jury to reject the evidence as unreliable (ie. it could have been planted). | The answer is somewhat similar to the "corollary" question, in that this wouldn't be the only information taken into account at a motion to suppress and one would need know why the officer requested (in your scenario demanded) to search you in the first place. There are scenarios whereby he could search you without benefit of a warrant. Was he chasing you from a crime scene? Were you attempting to flee? Did he see something illegal before demanding the search that may have made it legal despite you thinking it not? The analysis is different if you are in the car versus in your house. That said, regardless of where, a consent search is just not likely to happen in this way. In your car, the officer has the right to take your keys to "secure the scene," or if there is a reasonable suspicion that you may attempt to flee. Typically, the officer will say "turn off your car" without taking your keys. Despite what's typical, though, they certainly can take your keys if circumstances make it necessary and that (the mere taking of keys) does not constitute a search. Keep in mind that the police can search a car without a warrant in a number of circumstances, without your consent, that would not be available to them with a dwelling. Courts will typically give police much more latitude to search a vehicle than a home. Under the "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement, individuals have less of an expectation of privacy when driving a car and there is also a much greater chance of losing the evidence in a car vs. a dwelling, since it's mobile. Generally, the police can search your car if: You have given the officer consent (in this scenario you've not – unless you hand them the keys without protesting – and then this would be considered implied consent); The officer has probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in your car; The officer reasonably believes a search is necessary for their own protection (e.g., they can search for a weapon, if they have reasonable suspicion); You have been arrested and the search is related to that arrest (such as for drunk driving or for drugs, they can search for alcohol or drugs). There are tons of contextually specific rules that dictate when each of these situations is OK, and when they're not, as well as where they can search under what scenarios. It is not a one size fits all analysis. In fact, warrantless and consent searches may be some of the most variable analyses criminal attorneys and judges undertake to explore. The law on these topics is voluminous. Searching your car after you've given the officer the keys, assuming there was no basis and you actually said "you're not consenting," can result in suppression, but not necessarily as the fight is a lot tougher when it comes to a car. (E.g., if you said no earlier, but then handed the cop the keys later without renewing the objection, this could be considered an implied consent.) Similar to the other question, there is also going to be a whole other side to the story, with evidence aside from your testimony dictating what the ruling will be. A dwelling is different from a car, although your question makes some assumptions here that I would find very hard to see happening in real life (having represented both police, municipalities, and defendants to criminal searches).... It would be highly unlikely for an officer to threaten to break in like this ... especially in a dwelling where neighbors and passersby can see what's happening and would not only watch, but would probably video it. This is not to suggest that threats and actual wrongdoing doesn't happen, it's just not typically in this way. Police know the law. They rarely do things so blatantly unlawful that not only will nearly ensure that any evidence is inadmissible, but (in a case like this) where they will also probably lose their job. Short of a pursuit where the police are chasing someone into a house, I have never heard of a forced entry in a situation like you're describing. While we don't know the circumstances leading to the encounter, I am assuming that the search isn't pursuant to a chase, since you're having a discussion with the officer and if you're chased from the scene of a crime and run into your house, they're coming in. They are not having discussions. However, since we don't know what the circumstances are that lead to you being approached in the first place, it's difficult to analyze whether he has the right to enter warrantlessly. What we do know is that with a dwelling, it is much less likely to be lawful. As with the other question, the analysis as to whether consent was given or not is far from simple. Suspects are much less likely to give consent to search a dwelling as they are a car, and if they do, the search is often limited to a certain area, so chances of suppression are much better. That said, others will often give consent to the police when requested of them (spouses, kids, landlords, hotel owners, etc). Just imagine ... there are literally thousands of warrantless searches done every single year in the U.S., nearly all of which are alleged to be based on some form of consent. Assume every one of those people has a lawyer; that means nearly every one of those cases is arguing the consent was bad, some way, some how. Duress is one of the most common arguments when someone gives permission; either explicitly (like what you are proposing), implicitly (they came with 10 grimacing cops, so the guy thought he didn't have a choice). Most of the time, however, there is no duress, people just simply didn't know they can say no, or they think the cops won't find what they're hiding. Cops can do a lot of things to get you to allow for a warrantless search. They can even lie to people to get them to consent, and officers are not required to notify the suspect that he has a right to refuse to consent (however, telling the suspect they have the right to refuse is helpful to rebut the coercion argument). In United States v. Mendenhall, "The fact that the officers themselves informed the respondent that she was free to withhold her consent substantially lessened the probability that their conduct could reasonably have appeared to her to be coercive." Keep in mind, a big part of the reason why these scenarios are unlikely is not just that the police can find a way in that won't be so challengeable, if they really can't get a legitimate warrant and need to find a deleterious way in. It's also because 9 in 10 times when a police officer does a consent search, the suspect signs a consent form. That's not to say that people don't get coerced or get searched due to duress, they do. But typically not in so blatant a way. There are shades of grey in most of these cases. So, to answer whether you can get the search suppressed if it leads to an arrest under these facts; the only answer that is definite, is that nobody can be sure. If consent searches, their exceptions, and all ways the evidence gets in and the evidence is kept out interests you ... read these two law review articles. There are probably 200 cases footnoted between them! http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/MaclinT011508.pdf http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-81-6-Sutherland.pdf | An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all? | It is a felony to escape from a jail; see California Penal Code section 4532. (Escapes from a prison are covered in section 4530). However, California law recognizes a necessity defense when a crime is committed in order to avoid "significant bodily harm". (See the link for other important elements of the defense.) This defense would probably only be viable if after escaping, the inmate turned himself in as promptly as he reasonably could, once clear of the immediate danger of harm. He could go to any police station or law enforcement office; or he could call any police agency, explain the situation, and wait for them to come and arrest him. He would then presumably be taken to a different jail. If the inmate thinks the jail is unsafe, he can sue the state in either state or federal court (the latter as a civil rights case). It's unlikely that a court would order his release on this basis; more likely, they would order the state to improve conditions in some specific way, and they might award monetary damages to the inmate if he is injured. He also would probably not be able to stay out of jail during the suit. If the state arrests him, they'll put him in jail unless a court orders his release (or he's granted bail, or his case is otherwise resolved). If he hides to avoid arrest, then he's a fugitive. I seem to recall there's a general principle that fugitives don't have access to the courts. | If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment. | When the LEO violently assaulted the citizen on the easement is he out of his jurisdiction? No. Federal law enforcement officers' jurisdiction generally* includes the entire US. Federal and state jurisdiction are said to be concurrent with one another. If the federal law enforcement officer has a lawful basis to effect an arrest, the arrest can be effected on a state† highway easement. Is there any immediate or long term consequence for an officer committing crimes or doing so egregiously (with or without qualified immunity) out of his jurisdiction as opposed to doing so in his jurisdiction? If the officer were outside his jurisdiction (which isn't the case here) then the officer is generally treated as any other private individual. In this case, "outside his jurisdiction" means "in another country," which brings up all sorts of additional complications that aren't really in scope here, largely because the laws and legal systems of other countries are different from those in the US. Are there any nuances to jurisdiction and law enforcement by LEOs that a first amendment auditor should be aware of? There are plenty, but perhaps the most prominent one, if the internet is any guide, is that an officer is not required to articulate the basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause at the time of a Terry stop or an arrest. The time for this is much later, after a judge is involved. Arguing with an officer on this score is just going to make things worse. Instead, one should cooperate while stating one's objections clearly and calmly, especially making it clear that cooperation does not imply consent. * Some categories of officers do have more limited jurisdiction: thanks to cpast for the example of park rangers, whose jurisdiction is essentially restricted to national parks. The officers in this case are CBP field officers. There is a wide misconception that CBP officers' jurisdiction is limited to within 100 miles of the border, but that 100-mile limit only applies to their power to board and search vessels and vehicles without a warrant in order to prevent illegal entry into the US. Their power to make warrantless arrests "for any offence against the United States" committed in their presence is not geographically restricted. † The original video was filmed in South Portland, Maine, and the roadway is a municipal street, Gannett Drive, to be precise. The point remains, however, that it is a public right-of-way, and federal officers are not "out of their jurisdiction" simply because they've left a federal facility and entered a public place. |
Is there a way to determine if an email address is personal information? The GDPR defines personal data as: Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. My understanding is that this means that [email protected] is personal data, but [email protected] is not. Looking at the list of Data Protection Officers at the ICO site there are all sorts of emails, some obviously personal and many that appear generic. I could write an algorithm to try and determine if any email is in one class or another, but it could go wrong (perhaps Sally Ales is truncated to sales@ or David Peter Oliver to dpo@). If I wanted to process this list (excluding personal information so as to be sure of compliance with the GDPR), is there an approved, recommended or even just suggested method of programmatically determining if an email address is personal information or not? It is worth noting that there are over 1 million rows in the data protection public register above, so a programmatic solution is required. | Treat all email addresses as if they are personal data. All email addresses that belong to a specific person are personal data of that person, regardless of the specific form of the address. If your list contains the email addresses of data protection officers then all of them are personal data. The only exception I could see would be email addresses that clearly belong to a corporation that is they are addresses of a legal person which is not a natural person. | I believe in this case, your company (OrgX) is a data processor and your customer's organization (OrgY) is the data controller. OrgY is responsible for establishing a lawful basis for sending you (OrgX) the personal data for their employees. Note that consent is just one of six lawful bases outlined in article 6(1). I'm no expert, but I believe OrgY's admin can claim they have a legitimate interest in sending their employee's personal data for training sake. In either case, the data processor is not responsible for establishing the lawful basis for processing. Of course, data processors aren't completely off the hook. GDPR outlines specific requirements for data processors (see chapter 4, particularly article 28). | The status of any PII (Personally Identifiable Information) is the same in GDPR regardless of location, or who enters it. Its goals are (among others) to stop any actor (company / government or other) from hiding responsibility about their use and practices around people's data. GDPR does even apply to anything offline and on paper. Basically it means you have to validate any entry field is free of PII before processing it. Or make it clear in your privacy statement how you handle this use-case. | In the general case, it seems unlikely, based on the wording (which is convoluted). In certain cases, if the president of Russia posts "My name is Vladimir Putin", that post is personal data. On the other hand, you might, based on my writing, conclude that I am from the US, and you might even conclude that I'm in Washington state, but that doesn't distinguish me from 7.5 million others, so on those grounds that is not personal data. Eventually, though, you might identify me specifically from other things that I may have said on SE. The definition depends on two parts. First, personal data is "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". Any "information" provided by a natural person is "related to" that person (as is any "information" that is about such a person). The second part defines "identifiable natural person", that is, who is an "identifiable person"? Every person can, in principle, be identified by reference to some label or description of fact about them, so every person is an identifiable person, under this definition. This means that every piece of text that refers to an individual (not even text which can identify the person) is "personal data". Obviously, any individual can be uniquely identified by some collection of identifiers; the problem is that the wording of the law does not explicitly say "using that supposed personal data". If I mention that I have a relative named Knudt, that would technically be personal data: I've given information that relates to a person, though you have no idea (and could not possibly figure out) who that person is. Another term that the regulation defines and uses in a few places is "pseudonymization", which is defined as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person The point of interest here is that this says that "personal data" which cannot be attributed to an individual is, nevertheless, still personal data. I think the most important part of the regulation is art. 6, which defines lawfulness of processing, especially para 4., which allows consideration to be given to safeguards such as pseudonymization. | If you are purely a designer (and not contracted for the daily operation of the site), the answer is "no". GDPR Article 4 defines the "roles" responsible for complying with GDPR, and there are two: Controller and Processor. The Controller is the one who calls the shots. In particular: Decides what personal data to process. This is usually the owner of the web site. The Processor is the one that actually does the processing. This is usually some company providing some sort of data processing service (e.g. SaaS, PaaS, etc.). The relationship between the Processor and the Controller must be contractual. The contract is called a DPA (Data Protection Agreement or Data Processing Addendum). As a designer, you don't fit into any of these roles. If your contract with the client is silent on liability for GDPR compliance, then you have no liability. This goes for projects completed both before and after the May 25 deadline. Of course, if there are GDPR clauses in your contract, then you must fulfil them just as have to fulfil any other contractual obligation. But unlike the controller and the processor, there are no automatic legal liability for a designer or programmer. | GDPR rights and obligations cover different things: A duty of the data processor towards the government of the country where they operate to present certain documentation, and to implement technical and organizational measures to protect data. These would be audited by government agencies, not the individual customer. A single data subject cannot waive them. A duty of the data processor to process and store personal data only with a legal justification. User consent is one possible justification, if it is informed, revokable, etc. So a single data subject can waive a "ban" on storing his or her data in a database along with all the other users who waived that "ban," but the duties towards the government regarding that data would still apply. A duty of the data processor to respond to an Article 15 request by the data subject in a certain way and timeframe. If a data subject writes a letter to the data processor and explicitly states that the letter is not an Article 15 request, then Article 15 does not apply. The data subject would of course have the right to make an Article 15 request at a later time. | GDPR does not require consent. It requires a legal basis. Consent is only one legal basis among many. Some other legal bases are: legitimate interest (implying an opt out solution) necessity for performance of a contract If your customers pay you to deliver email updates, that contract is the legal basis for sending email updates. The only wrinkle is that as you describe your service, the emails aren't an essential part of the service. Alternatively, you might assert that there's a legitimate interest to deliver updates via email so that updates aren't missed. In that case you must allow the users to object, e.g. via ab unsubscribe link in the email and via their account settings. Because a prior business relationship exists, there's a strong case for legitimate interest – even if this were marketing emails (!). Legitimate interest requires you to balance the legitimate interest with the data subject's rights and freedoms though. Your updates are most likely not marketing, so any advice you might read relating to marketing emailings is irrelevant. GDPR applies because you are established in the EU. The regulation applies in relation to all your users, not just EU users. If and when Brexit happens you will still be covered by the Data Protection Act, which transcribes the GDPR's requirements into UK law. However, processing data from EU users will then count as an international transfer which requires extra compliance work, at least until the EU issues an adequacy decision for the UK. | You are right that a visitor of a website does not expect to be tracked upon opening the website. But when using Google Analytics configured in the way explained in my other post, the visitor is not tracked. At least not in a way which violates the GDPR. You worry about the cookies. I also found this article which also does and suggests to either: change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, so it will be removed when the browser is closed. To do this, set the Cookie Expiration variable in your Google Analytics Settings to 0. completely disable cookies. (GA does not require cookies). To do this, set the storage field to none: ga('create', 'UA-XXXXX-Y', { 'storage': 'none' }); If you do not disable cookies, cookies can be used for tracking, which is more general defined in the GDPR as profiling. Profiling is defined in Art. 4 GDPR as: ‘profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements; Art. 22(1) GDPR disallows profiling. Therefore in the settings menu from Google Analytics you have to disable data sharing and data collection. So data will only be used for the analytics function. But because you have configured to Anonymize your visitors IP Address, the part of the IP address used for this, is no longer considered personal data. This is because approx. 250 other users share the same part of the ip address which is stored, so data is not distinguishable between those 250 users. The anonymisation used by google is currently considered good enough. At least by the Dutch DPA. This might change if someone proves it is not good enough anonymized. Note that I am not a lawyer either, but I have read from multiple experts that analytics can be a "legitimate interest", the same way marketing can be a legitimate interest. This way configured the privacy impact is considered very low. It is also very important to note that a DPA consideres GA Google Analytics compliant. Even if a court would not agree in the future, you are acting in good faith if you follow those instructions, so you will probably not be fined. The DPA does currently not suggest to change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, or disable cookies completely. Note that the GDPR does not require doing anything to make it technical impossible to track someone. If a website has access to the data to track someone, but "promises" not to do that, that is fine. And rules regarding the usage of cookies in general, is not part of the GDPR, but (currently) part of the ePrivacy Directive. Only the way to ask for consent for storing cookies is defined in the GDPR. |
Ordered to unlock my car trunk. May I lawfully refuse? Consider the hypothetical situation where I am stopped by a patrol officer. After handing over the required documents (driver's license, vehicle registration, proof of insurance), he orders me to unlock the trunk. Clearly, this is for the purpose of conducting a search. If I comply, I'm worried that the court will take this as consent to that search. If I do not comply, I'm worried that I might be prosecuted for disobeying an order. So, may I refuse to comply with the order, or does the policeman making it an order render any subsequent search to be non-consensual? (I welcome any generalization of this question and the principles involved.) | If you comply without protest, this will be taken as consent to a search, and make anything found admissible. One can verbally object. The ACLU suggests the form "I do not consent to searches" to any request to search your car, your house, your person or any other property of yours or under your control. There is no need to give any reason for your refusal. However, one is required to follow any "lawful orders" given by police officer during a traffic or pedestrian stop.[1] Failure to follow lawful orders may well be a separate crime. Even if the lawfulness is suspect, it is usually better to comply and challenge the order later, in court. One might make a second objection, such as "I don't see that you have probable cause for a search, and I do not give consent. Are you ordering me to permit a search?" If the officer clearly orders you to open the trunk, one might place the keys in reach of the officer, while not opening the trunk oneself. That might help establish that there was no consent to the search, and require probable cause to be established before anything found could be used in a trial. One might also repeat, as the officer opens the trunk "I am not consenting to any search." If it is possible for any person present to record video without obstructing the officer(s) that might hrlp to establish the absence of consent and other relevant facts, later. People in general have a right to make such recordings, but not to obstruct or interfere with police activity. Duty to Obey The Washington Post in an opinion article dated July 23, 2015 "Sandra Bland and the ‘lawful order’ problem" wrote: The Bland video brings up an overlooked problem with the law of police-citizen encounters. The police can back up their orders with force because it’s often a crime to disobey a lawful order from a police officer. But from a citizen’s perspective, it’s often impossible to know what is a lawful order. As a result, it’s often impossible for citizens to know what they can and can’t do during a police encounter. The first problem is knowing what counts as an “order.” If an officer approaches you and asks you to do something, that’s normally just a request and not an order. But if there’s a law on the books saying that you have to comply with the officer’s request, then the request is treated as an order. You can’t know what is an “order” unless you study the law first, which you’re unlikely to have done before the officer approached you. In the case of Oregon v Rose Mary ILLIG-RENN, 42 P.3d 62 (2006) The Supreme Court of Oregon held that ORS 162.247(1)(b), a statute that makes it a crime to "refuse[] to obey a lawful order by [a] peace officer." is constructional against challenges under the Oregon and US Federal constitutions. Sources [1]: Virginia Code section 18.2-464. Failure to obey order of conservator of the peace Virginia Code Section § 18.2-463. Refusal to aid officer in execution of his office. Florida Statutes 316.072(3) "*OBEDIENCE TO POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.—It is unlawful and a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, for any person willfully to fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law enforcement officer, traffic crash investigation officer as described in s. 316.640, traffic infraction enforcement officer as described in s. 316.640, or member of the fire department at the scene of a fire, rescue operation, or other emergency. *" (Oregon) ORS 162.247(1)(b) Interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer A person commits the crime of interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer if the person, knowing that another person is a peace officer or a parole and probation officer ... Refuses to obey a lawful order by the peace officer or parole and probation officer. California Vehicle Code - VEH § 2800 (a) It is unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order, signal, or direction of a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code, when that peace officer is in uniform and is performing duties pursuant to any of the provisions of this code, or to refuse to submit to a lawful inspection pursuant to this code. North Carolina § 20-114.1. Willful failure to obey law-enforcement or traffic-control officer (a) No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law-enforcement officer or traffic-control officer invested by law with authority to direct, control or regulate traffic, which order or direction related to the control of traffic. | I overdosed on an illegal drug and called an ambulance. I was honest and told them what I took. [emphasis added] You stated that you had possession, and had recently used a notable amount, of an illegal substance. That is reasonable cause (or "probable cause" in some jurisdictions) for a search, regardless of a warrant, and they do not need permission. For example, as FindLaw.com explains, in the USA. [p]olice may use firsthand information, or tips from an informant to justify the need to search your property. If an informant's information is used, police must prove that the information is reliable under the circumstances. | Are you required to comply with a police officer's order to put your baby down in an uncertain situation and allow yourself to be handcuffed? Of course. If holding a baby could immunize people against arrest, every criminal would have a baby around whenever possible. Similarly, suppose an officer legitimately fears for his or her life or safety, or the lives or safety of others, on the basis of a suspicion that someone carrying a baby is about to produce a weapon and use it against someone. Courts, at least in the US, give wide and explicit deference to police officers in stressful situations like that, and they recognize that even if, in hindsight, it is perfectly clear that there was no danger, the officer must be allowed the leeway to act on his or her suspicions in case they are correct. The officer will of course have some obligations to ensure the welfare of the child after separation from the adult, but the only immediate recourse the adult has is to appeal to the officer directly, or perhaps the officer's supervisor if he or she is available. Any other enforcement of the officer's obligation will have to take place in the courts after the fact. | No. Police are not permitted to impose any punishment whatsoever. Their role in the American justice system is to prevent and investigate criminal offenses. What you're describing is a punishment for a criminal offense, even though it is imposed outside the criminal justice system. The same principles that prevent an officer from punching a suspect in the face or demanding a cash payment to not write a ticket prohibit a police officer from imposing a punishment of his own design, with or without your consent. | Does said police department have any obligation to ID, investigate and detain / arrest the false caller? No. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 US 748 (2005). Usually, police do investigate, but that is a matter of department policy and political expectations, not a legal obligation to do so. | If the police order you to sit in an interrogation room and you are not permitted to leave, by definition, you have been arrested. Detaining someone against their will for longer than necessary to answer a few questions on the spot (which is a lesser imposition on your freedom called a "Terry stop") is what it means to be arrested. Legally, the police are only allowed to arrest you if they have probable cause to believe that you have committed a crime. I believe that you are confusing arrested (being detained by law enforcement against your will for more than a Terry stop), with being booked, or being charged with a crime. Generally speaking people are arrested first, and then booked next, and then charged with a crime after that, although this isn't always the order in which this happens. In much the same way, if the police observe someone committing a crime, they will first handcuff them which places them under arrest, and then book them sometime not too long later when they arrive at the police station, and then formally charge them sometime after that after a conversation with the prosecuting attorney to see if the prosecuting attorney is willing to pursue the case. Booking generally involves bringing someone to a police station, getting identifying information, taking a mug shot, taking finger prints, and depending upon what the police want to do, searching your person and inventorying your possessions prior to putting you in a jail cell in jail garb. Usually, however, the grand jury or the prosecuting attorney (it varies by jurisdiction) does have subpoena power to compel you to provide information under oath prior to trial as a witness, following the service of a subpoena upon you a reasonable time in advance as set forth in the relevant court rules, unless you invoke your 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination and are not granted immunity from prosecution based upon your testimony in exchange, or you invoke some other legal privilege against having to testify. They can, of course, simply ask you to come to an interrogation room and answer questions, and merely imply that it is mandatory without actually saying that you must and without clarifying the situation. In that case, which is extremely common, their legal right to interrogate you flows from your own consent. If you answer their questions, your answers could provide the police with probable cause to arrest you that they didn't have when they started asking questions. Indeed, often, when police interrogate you before booking you, they are doing so because they need your statements to establish the probable cause needed to legally arrest you. This is why criminal defense attorneys counsel people to immediate ask for a lawyer and refuse to answer any questions other than those needed to establish your identity. You can also ask if you are under arrest and if you are free to leave (which are mutually exclusive). If they say you are not under arrest, you are free to leave, unless you are appearing pursuant to a subpoena. | Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave*. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. *As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant). | If they have no legal grounds then it would be trespass to chattels However, they do have legal grounds. Following the procedure laid out in the relevant Act makes the car refuse under the Act notwithstanding your opinion. Move it or lose it. Or seek an injunction preventing the council removing the vehicle- this will likely fail. |
Can same-sex sex committed in (e.g.) western countries be prosecuted in (e.g.) Morocco? Pretty much the title, is same-sex sex also illegal when not committed in a homophobic country when visiting there? E.g. could social media posts put you on trial when you'd visit such countries? | That depends entirely on the laws of the country involved. Some countries do make having homosexual relations a crime, indeed a very serious one. I haven't heard of one which prosecutes for being in a same-sex marriage or relationship entered into in another country, but such a country could hold such a trial if it chose to. Perhaps more likely, if a same-sex couple visited such a country, evidence of a continuing same-sex relationship might be treated as evidence of same-sex sexual acts, and thus of a crime under that country's laws. | "Polyamory" is usually used to refer to having more than one romantic relationship at a time, which is pretty unobjectionable as far as the law is concerned. It might get you into trouble in a divorce proceeding, but the laws that still exist addressing it are largely dead letters. I assume you're asking more about polygamy, or having more than one one spouse at a time. I was surprised to learn that there hasn't been much activity in this area since Obergefell, at least not a lot that has led to development of the arguments you're asking for. The most on-point case I can find is Collier v. Fox, No. CV 15-83-BLG-SPW-TJC, 2018 WL 1247411 (D. Mont. Feb. 22, 2018), where a married couple and another woman sued the state because its criminal and civil laws prohibited the second woman from entering into the marriage. The court tossed the challenge to the criminal prohibition based on the parties' standing, saying that there was not a sufficient threat of criminal prosecution, and it dismissed the challenge to the civil restrictions based on Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878), where the Supreme Court said that each state has the right "to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its dominion." There was no appeal, so the decision was never reviewed. The only other case I've seen directly challenging the laws was Sevier v. Thompson, No. 2:16-CV-659-DN-EJF, 2018 WL 1378803 (D. Utah Jan. 26, 2018), where some anti-gay activists tried to overturn Obergefell by suing to force Utah to let one of them marry a computer and three of them marry each other. If you can't guess how this ends, I'll tell you that it does not end well. The plaintiffs all admitted that they didn't actually want the relief they were asking for, so the court threw the case out on standing. The same dude also tried to intervene in a lawsuit (United States v. North Carolina, No. 1:16CV425, 2016 WL 7335627 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2016)]) over the North Carolina bathroom bill, saying that a man trying to marry a machine or marry multiple people belonged in the same category as a man trying to marry a man or a man who identifies as a woman. I'm sure you won't be surprised to learn that the court told him to go to hell again. Because these were all tossed at the very early stages, there wasn't much development of the arguments for or against polygamy, though it was clear that everyone was basically talking about an extension of Obergefell's recognition that "the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person." There have been several scholarly articles, though, addressing the issue. A few that popped up include: A Yale law professor considering whether plural-marriage bans could survive a challenge based on equal protection rather than due process; A Loyola Marymount professor reviewed several post-Obergefell books considering the future of plural marriage and concludes that (1) Western condemnation of plural marriage is strongly informed by racism and xenophobia, (2) legal reactions against plural marriage may do more to harm the people they are meant to protect, and (3) whatever benefits may accompany plural marriage, banning it does not entail the same kinds of harms as bans on gay marriage; and A William & Mary law student published an article running through the different ways a court might analyze the question and argued that Obergefell should generally permit polygamy, regardless of which test a court applies. | We can start by looking at the text of the law. US federal law 18 USC § 2252A(a)(3)(B) says: Any person who... knowingly... advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the material or purported material is, or contains— (i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct... shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). I'm not sure how much posting the name without the link would protect you, given that you posted it with the explicit intent that someone would go and look at it. On the other hand, your intent was not to "advertise" or "promote" it, and you didn't actually "distribute" the material. | Anti-discrimination laws apply to certain protected classes only. Homelessness (real or assumed) is not one of them, so it is perfectly legal to bar such people from your premises. It is also perfectly legal to bar people with red hair (assuming this is not indirect discrimination against certain racial groups). Nobody is required to serve everybody who comes in; what you are not allowed to do is ban women, homosexuals or other groups set out in the applicable statutes. | Communicable diseases are endemic to the human condition Some places, times and situations are riskier than others but there is always a risk in widespread travel. Outside of disease spread, there are other risks in travel; for example, if no-one traveled at all there would be no motor vehicle deaths. On the flip-side, not traveling has its own dangers; for example, you will not die in a house fire if you are in your car. Of course, there are enormous benefits to widespread travel; economic, cultural and personal - life is to be experienced after all. If you stop the skier from skiing, then you have just damaged the livelihood of all the people who depend on tourism; the airline, the hotel, the bartender, the ski technician, the baker in the ski resort etc. Everything is allowed unless it is prohibited By and large, this is the way that the law works. It's legal to do anything you like. Unless it isn't. It isn't illegal to travel to, say, Finland. So you can. If the government (of whichever country) decides that the costs of allowing people to travel to Finland now outweigh the benefits then they can prohibit it. However, that is a political decision; not a legal one. As for your drink-driving example, I am old enough to remember when it wasn't illegal to drive drunk, although I was too young to drive. Of course, if you are in Somalia or Kenya it's still legal. Also, what counts a drunk varies by country - you can have a couple in Finland but cross over into Russia and you are breaking the law. Why does Finland allow such recklessness? Because it's a political decision and politicians in Finland and Russia have reached different conclusions about what level of risk is acceptable. Same with travel restrictions. | Criminal Code 293 outlaws polygamy and bigamy, and identifies as an offender Every one who (a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter into (i) any form of polygamy, or (ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage, or (b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony, contract or consent that purports to sanction a relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii) In other words, it is against the law to go through the ceremony with multiple partners, and to "enter into a conjugal union", even if not solemnized in any particular fashion. "Common law marriage" is broadly recognized in Canada (except in Quebec), with specific details governed by the province. This too is a case where people who "act as if" married are treated as actually married, given certain circumstances (which exist in a polygamous marriage). The question of having children is not relevant to the law, indeed having sex is not a requirement for something to be deemed a polygamous marriage, and the law against polygamy also says nor is it necessary on the trial to prove that the persons who are alleged to have entered into the relationship had or intended to have sexual intercourse. In this particular case, we do not know the specific details, but it is reasonable to assume that there was no posturing or faking, and there were multiple solemnization ceremonies, so the polygamy is overt. The claim is that it is constitutionally protected. | Can you unambiguously, legally, and conclusively determine what is and is not a "porn site"? I'm sure many are easy... but what about that "Swimsuit modeling" site, or the "Artistic Nudes" site featuring classic French Renaissance paintings? There will always be a grey area. What makes a "site" in a legal sense? Consider all the blog sites filled with user generated content: If just a few pages out of tens-of-thousands are hardcore, indisputable porn, would you require the entire domain to be classified XXX, even if 99% of its content is completely innocent? Who would enforce this? Are you proposing an "Internet Police" force to review all new domain names and their content before they get approved? That is called "Prior Restraint on Free Speech", and is established law. Suppose a site does get approved, then immediately changes the content of their pages from Cooking Recipes to hard-core porn. Who is going to review and approve every update to every website, when sites are updated constantly?! Maybe you're proposing that any individual who finds porn on a .ORG site has the right to sue for damages? This would likely clog the courts with endless vigilante lawsuits about what content belongs on which domain. This is a flat out horrible, poorly thought out idea. | It is not entrapment because entrapment must be done by officers of the State (police usually). A member of the public inducing another to commit a crime is not entrapment and not a defense to having committed it. Entrapment is a "thing" in Ireland as it is in all common law jurisdictions, however, the specific limits on what police can and cannot do vary by jurisdiction. Police posing as underage children to catch pedophiles is legal throughout Australia (i.e., not entrapment). Police are more restricted in Canada and the USA but I believe that online "trawling" by police is legal in those jurisdictions too, however, they must remain more "passive" than Australian police. Yes, there is a crime being committed, the crime of attempting to engage in underage sex. It doesn't matter that the actual crime attempted is impossible to commit because the "victim" is not actually underage. Evidence is evidence – it doesn't matter who collects it. However, amateurs in the handling of evidence are more likely to botch it up in a way that would allow the defense to have it ruled inadmissible than professionals (although even they can botch it up). |
Can disrupting an online video game be illegal? Imagine for example, a person makes an online game unplayable by flooding the game with bot accounts, winning games through cheating etc, but the person doesn't steal any data and they aren't violating copyright either since they are just sending packets of bytes to the server. Can the editor/publisher of the game do anything in this case ? | united-kingdom Assuming "editor" does not authorise the player to flood the game with bots then this would be an offence contrary to section 3 Computer Misuse Act 1990 (with relevant provisions emboldened by me): (1) A person is guilty of an offence if— (a) he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer; (b) at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and (c) either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies. (2) This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act— (a) to impair the operation of any computer; (b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer; or (c) to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any such data; or (d) to enable any of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) above to be done. (3) This subsection applies if the person is reckless as to whether the act will do any of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) / to (c)of subsection (2) above. (4) The intention referred to in subsection (2) above, or the recklessness referred to in subsection (3) above, need not relate to— (a) any particular computer; (b)xany particular program or data; or (c) a program or data of any particular kind. (5) In this section— (a) a reference to doing an act includes a reference to causing an act to be done; (b) “act” includes a series of acts; (c) a reference to impairing, preventing or hindering something includes a reference to doing so temporarily. (6) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable— (a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both; (b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both; (c) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or to a fine or to both Whether or not game cheating would be prosecuted is fact dependant. | Intellectual property law varies considerably by jurisdiction, and doesn't just involve copyright, but also trademarks, and patents. The first problem you are going to run into is that "Risko!" is probably protected as a commercial trademark rather than copyright. In the US at least, making minor changes to a trademark generally doesn't get you off the hook for unlicensed use. The owner of the "Risko!" trademark could bring suit against you for trademark infringement and it would be up to a judge or possibly a jury to decide whether "Risko" is different enough from "Risko!" that confusion would be unlikely. If they won the suit they could collect damages and their legal costs. There was a protracted and important trademark lawsuit in the US over the names "Monopoly" and "Anti-Monopoly" for board games. An economist, Ralph Anspach, had introduced a game he called "Anti-monopoly". He was sued by the Parker Brothers company for infringing on their trademark for "Monopoly". After 10 years the US Supreme Court ruled in Anspach's favor, finding that "Monopoly" had become a generic term for a type of board game and was no longer a valid trademark. You can't necessarily count on being "small potatoes" so that they'll simply ignore your possible infringement. In US law, failure to enforce their trademark rights can lead to the loss of trademark rights and remedies, so companies are less likely to let minor infringements slide. The situation in Italy may be different. Your artwork and graphical components are another potential problem. Those probably are covered by copyright. Again, the holder of the copyright for the "Risko!" artwork could sue you for violating their copyright on the artwork. A judge or jury would then evaluate whether your artwork was "derivative" of the "Risko!" artwork. If the court finds that your artwork is derivative, you might have to pay damages and legal costs. There are actually a ton of Risk inspired games already available online, but they seem to stay away from names that sounds anything like "Risk" and anything that looks like the Risk artwork. | In a hypothetical case like you are describing, you could make a contract with them regarding the duplication of the content, irrespective of copyright law. Their violation of that contract would not necessarily be a copyright violation (which would allow statutory damages), but you might win a breach of contract lawsuit. But if someone took it from them and made copies, you would likely not have a case against that person because copyright would not protect you and you have no contract with them. In addition, you could obtain a very "thin copyright" in a particular new presentation of the material. This would mean that copyright law would apply, but only to the particular presentation (e.g. new footnotes, a particular layout, etc...) If considering doing this IRL, you should consult a copyright attorney. | Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation. | Quoting content may or may not constitute copyright infringement, depending on the various factors that go into the fair use defense. Short quotes which are made for the purpose of discussion, research and commentary and not for copy would be squarely in the domain of "fair use" under US law. That means that the copyright owner would not succeed in suing you for quoting them: under the statutory mechanism for recognizing his right to his intellectual product, there is a limit on how much control he can exert over your behavior (since the two of you have not worked out some kind of agreement -- copyright law creates rights even when there is no contract). As for Facebook, you have a contract with them, embodied in the terms of service. You have been given permission to access material that they host (permission is required, under copyright law), and their permission is conditional. It says "you may access stuff on our platform only as long as you do X": if that includes a clause "don't be nasty", then that limits your right to speak freely and be as nasty as you'd like. If it says "don't quote even a little", that means you cannot quote even a little, even when you would have the statutory right to quote a little (or, to be nasty). Fair use would mean that you can't be sued for copyright infringement of the stuff that you quoted a little of. You can, however, be expelled from Facebook. You probably cannot be sued for "accessing Facebook without permission". There is a federal law against unauthorized access of computer networks, and there was a failed attempt to construe violation of a TOS as "unauthorized access" – it isn't. But accessing Facebook necessarily involves copying (that's how computers work), and there is no "fair use" defense whereby everybody has a fair use right to access Facebook. Theoretically you could be sued for copyright infringement, for accessing Facebook's intellectual property without permission. Also, Facebook can rescind your permission to access their content (see this case), and once you have been banned, it is a crime to further access their network. This assumes that there is no overriding limit on contracts that would nullify a no-quoting condition. There is no such limit on contracts in the US, so such a contract would be enforceable. There is also nothing illegal (unenforceable) about a TOS which prohibits automated methods of access. | No. You may not do this. As your post points out this is a blatant copyright violation. It isn't remotely in the realm of fair use. | A TOS is not intrinsically illegal, but an interpretation of a TOS may or may not be supported by a court, that remains to be seen. It probably does not constitute a "deceptive practice" under FTC standards. The TOS is your permission to use the software, and there can be no question that they have the right to impose conditions on customer use of the software. E.g. Amazon cannot freely use software that is only licensed for free educational use. They speak of "ownership" of IP so created and explicitly disclaim any claims about Current Law in Your Jurisdiction. At the crucial point in the agreement, they switch to talking about the license (BY-NC) that they grant when you are not a paid member. The exact details of this ownership are not part of the free tier TOS, but they do seem to add certain protections to "owned" content created under the Pro plan – they are under no legal obligation to make all content universally visible and usable. | Generally speaking, it is illegal for you to do this. Copyright gives the creator of the image the exclusive right to copy it, and just making copies to send to other people is probably not going to be fair use. Making copies without a license from the copyright holder would therefore be copyright infringement. Are there likely to be any consequences for doing this? Probably not. |
What does "Have you been drinking?" really mean? If a police officer asks a driver "Have you been drinking?", then the driver should either plead the fifth (and not answer the question), or answer the question truthfully. Let's assume the driver only answers yes or no for the moment, without divulging further details. Is there a legal definition or understanding which determines whether the driver answered truthfully? Is the question essentially equivalent to "Do you think you currently have any measurable blood alcohol level?" | 'Have you been drinking?' isn't a question with a strictly defined legal meaning. It's the opening gambit in a conversation intended to assess whether it's worth proceeding to a sobriety test. And that's it. Further linguistic analysis is pointless. | What are the reasons/ legal requirements that the police might need my personal information, given that I had not been able to provide any further information/ witness testimony to the incident that they were investigating? The police in england-and-wales have a duty to undertake reasonable lines of enquiry and to carry out a proportionate investigation in to allegations of crime. No-one is legally obliged to answer house to house questions but, notwithstanding the honesty and integrity of the majority of members of the public, any information held by the police may need to be corroborated to identify or eliminate suspects, witnesses, evidential opportunities or other lines of enquiry. Also, if it is established that someone has no information that may assist the investigation this is recorded to prevent duplication of effort thus enabling the police to focus their resources accordingly. All the while complying with the relevant privacy and data retention legislation. | If it was for a criminal case, the jury would have to decide if they believed the person who claimed he/she cracked the code. Really, any evidence is interpreted by the jury if it is regarding facts. 1) An issue of fact, not law. A question of fact is resolved by a trier of fact, i.e. a jury or, at a bench trial, a judge, weighing the strength of evidence and credibility of witnesses. Conversely, a question of law is always resolved by a judge. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/question_of_fact | In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect. | new-york-state No. New York's DUI law forbids the operation of a motor vehicle when your "ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol", but it defines "motor vehicle" to exclude "electrically-driven mobility assistance devices operated or driven by a person with a disability." If you are using a wheelchair because of a disability, you are therefore not subject to the DUI statute. | A related post is here. Are police required to record in car dashcam video for traffic tickets in NJ, USA? Probably not. Is there any way to find out if they aren’t telling the truth? Ask and hope you are not lied to. Can I contact the police chief, mayor, or municipal judge? You can contact the police chief or mayor if you can get through to them. They are not required to answer you unless you make a formal discovery request or public records request. You cannot make ex parte contact with a judge when the other side's lawyer (in this case, the city's lawyer) is not present. How can I defend myself in court trial if the judge always believes highly credible police officers over defendants if I don’t have video? You can tell your side of the story under oath with any details that makes your story believable. You are correct that the judge will usually believe the police officer and not you. So, usually you will lose. This is one reason that most people try to plea bargain their traffic tickets, rather than going to trial. Due process rights give you an opportunity to tell your side of the story when contesting a ticket, but it doesn't give you a right to win (even if you are actually in the right) if the judge or other trier of fact doesn't believe what you have to say. It does not appear that you have a right to a jury trial in a traffic case in New Jersey, although this depends to some extent on the kind of violation being charged, so you are probably stuck with the beliefs of the municipal court judge about who is the more credible witness. | In 50/50 custody you have the right to stand your ground to ensure the safety and well being of your children. You do not need to involve police unless it is an emergency. "911 Operator, what is the emergency". Only call them when you feel your children are in grave danger. For example, you know for sure that the other parent is drunk and driving, or the other parent is drunk and on the ground unable to move and the child is in danger, etc. If you involve the police over your partner excessive drinking than, and they find that she was not excessively drinking, you will face false accusation charges and her lawyer will try to make you look like the bad guy trying to take away her children. how drunk does my ex have to be for me to deny a drop-off? Is it entirely based upon outward signs or blood-alcohol level? You should not search for drugs or alcohol, or administer tests, as to avoid the accusation of an illegal search. You can, however, based on your judgment of common sense assess the situation and see how drunk (s)he is and make your decision based on that circumstances. Make a 1-page log to document the date, time, situation description (3-5 sentences of what you see and why you make that decision.) It would be wise to have a witness around, so write down the person name as well for reference, (NOT MANY PEOPLE LIKE TO BE WITNESSES, But you can write down the people names that you know were around that incident.) Don't tell your partner that you are making the log. Suprise them in the court when you have a full page of incidents due to drinking. Am I correct in assuming that in order to protect myself from being accused of denying visitation, that (in the future) I need to involve the police if I suspect her of being intoxicated? *Always protect yourself! Be Your Own Advocate. * Don't involve the police unless its am emergency, read the first comment above. If I involve the police, do I need to be sure that she is extremely intoxicated in order to avoid a "false alarm"? (Obviously, this scares me as I'd prefer she didn't drink at all) This drinking incident is alarming itself. However, you should consult with your family law attorney. I would say that document five issues if it exceeds 5 in one month than filing a motion with the court to adjust the drinking problem, and that you request the child to be with you 60/40 custody. You must be able to demonstrate that you have the time, commitment and resources to take over the 60/40 custody. What options do I have, if any, if she drinks around him in her own home? Is she within her legal right as long as she doesn't get in a car, doesn't pass out or does something blatantly abusive? File a motion to adjust the custody, speak with your family law attorney. | No That is nothing but fiction. Assuming that this is in the US, the police would (probably, there are some exceptions) have had to deliver the well-known "Miranda" warnings, that the suspect has the right to silence, the right to consult a lawyer, and the right to have a free lawyer if unable to afford one, and that statements may be used against the subject. If, after those warnings, the suspect chooses to confess, or to make a statement, that confession or statement would be fully admissible, even if the suspect did not have a lawyer present, unless there was some other reason for the statement to be excluded. No such reason is mentioned in the question. It is simply not the case in the US that a confession is excluded just because no lawyer was present, nor is that the law anywhere that I know of. If the police failed to give the warnings when they were required, then any statements or confessions would be excluded. The decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) says: law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible. ... the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. [Footnote 4] As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. That tells you exactly what the police are forbidden to do. Nowhere does it say that a lawyer must be present. Indeed it says the opposite: The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. That means that s/he can confess after being warned, and such confession would be admissible, provided that s/he knew and understood those rights. |
Can you sue your own business? If an employee of my LLC negligently causes injury to me in the course of their employment, can I sue my LLC, like a non-owner could? | Yes Unless your business is a sole proprietorship it operates as a legal entity seperate from its owners. It owns its assets an acrues its own liabilities. It can be sued and it can sue others. It can also agree to its own contracts. Typically the only thing a legal entity that is not a natural person cannot do is sign a marriage contract. Depending on the industry there may be no need to sue. There exist many mandatory workplace insurance to cover accidents in the workplace. You may have to share details of the injury with them but they may be uninterested in whos at fault. | Liable, yes. How much liable, depends. There would be copyright infringement, and with copyright infringement the exact facts count. Like did you commit copyright infringement to make money, were you aware that you committed copyright infringement etc. With your contract, it seems clear you didn't set out to commit copyright infringement to make money (because you paid someone else telling them not to commit copyright infringement). Up to the point where you learned what happened, you didn't know it was copyright infringement. After this, you better remove all the infringing works, because now you know it's copyright infringement, and now you are saving money by not hiring a second developer. Obviously you can sue the employee for damages. | Acme is bound by Bob's actions so long as they were conducted with "apparent authority" from the perspective of Client C and involved his work duties, even if he carried them out contrary to company policy - unless Client C knew for a fact that Bob was violating company policy and didn't have authority within the company to do so when he was doing these things. Acme, directly, or Acme's insurance carrier, in a subrogation suit after it has settled the claim from Client C, could probably sue Bob, especially if he willfully violated company policy for the purpose of harming client C. This is rarely done, but ultimately Bob owes duties to Acme which he violated which probably give rise to liability, although proving that and collecting the judgment would both be difficult. If Bob had authority within the organization to deviate from company policy, however, which he would have a good cause to claim that he did, this would be a full defense to such a suit, since Bob was always acting as a disclosed agent of Acme. Client C probably cannot sue Bob directly, whether or not it sues Acme. In contract matters (which this would include) a disclosed agent is not responsible for the acts he carries out on behalf of his principal. For example, an employee who signs a promissory note on behalf of a company in an official capacity as a disclosed agent of the company isn't responsible for paying the note. This is different than the rule in tort cases where the principal and anyone whose actions personally caused the tort caused the problem is liable. For example, if the employee got into a car accident that was his fault while he was driving on the job for the company, both the company and the employee would be liable to the person who was hurt. The circumstances that you describe sound more like a breach of contract than they do like a tort, so Bob would probably not have any personal liability to Client C. Could Bob or Acme (or both) face any criminal liability? Unless Bob was the CEO or other senior officer of the company, Acme wouldn't face criminal liability, because he is too far down the chain of command to cause Acme the entity to have the requisite criminal intent. Realistically, failing to "verify that equipment rental invoices match delivery records before notifying the client to approve the invoices for payment" does not amount to a crime no matter who does it. This might be careless or a breach of contract, but it is not fraud or theft because it lack the necessary criminal intent. If Bob actively photoshopped equipment rental invoices with a specific intent to defraud Client C, he would probably be criminally liable for fraud, although even that isn't an open and shut case as it still basically involves failure to perform a contract according to its terms and a mere breach of contract is generally not a crime unless you intended not to perform it in the first place, when you entered into the contract. | You need a lawyer There is no magic phrase to do what you want. The company will care about defending their assets, while you will want to defend yours. Only a lawyer will be able to tailor the condition that makes sense based on what your job's domain covers and your side projects. It is entirely possible that your personal projects conflict with your employer's, and you must then put your personal projects on hold or risk getting sued. e.g.) developing two pieces of software that does the same thing. Your lawyer will be able to advise on how that looks and what to do. No random strangers on the internet can give you accurate advice. | I have already contacted a lawyer and paid all the money I had and they didn't help me resolve anything, the guy just talked to me for a little bit. He essentially just took my $600 and no action was made. He said the best thing to do would be to wait it out because the contracts were never fulfilled by them and they can't claim my inventions etc if I am an independent contractor. To me it just sounded like a bunch of BS and not a real solution to this. You paid $600 for expert advice which told you to do nothing. You think the advice is bullshit and intend to go full steam ahead against the advice given. I'd say it is very likely that the lawyer is a better expert than you, so you should follow his advice. You are in a hole, you were told to stop digging, and you intend to continue digging. Don't. There are times where doing nothing is the best advice. In this case, you intend to accuse someone of breach of contract. That has a good chance of landing you in court. A company cannot afford to ignore such a statement. You claim the contract is void and you want to cancel it - but you can't cancel a void contract. It's void. Listen to your lawyer. | Suing them and winning may not be that difficult, and you can generally sue a business even if it ceases to operate as a going concern. Collecting the judgment you win, however, is likely to be very difficult. Still if you are going to sue, the sooner the better, because outside of bankruptcy, the general rule is that the person who is first in time to actually seize the available assets of a company with more debts than assets is first in right to those assets. Also a squeaky wheel is often the one that gets the grease. "Shaming" companies on social media often works for going concerns, but is rarely effective when a company is actually going out of business soon. There are special remedies available against recipients of improperly diverted funds when funds are deliberately sucked out of the organization without receiving anything in exchange for its money (this is called a "fraudulent transfer"), but those cases are expensive to bring and hard to prove. Often in the case of a legitimately failing business, operating losses and not improper diversion of funds from the company, is the reason that it doesn't have enough money to pay all of its debts in full, so this remedy is not available. Winning a lawsuit simply gives you a piece of paper stating that the defendant owes you money which you can then use to seize money and property from the defendant and/or people who owe the defendant money, if you can find either of those things. But, you can't get blood out of a turnip, and the alternative formal collection mechanism (forcing an involuntary bankruptcy) requires the coordination of multiple significant creditors and may not provide much better results if the company has genuinely run out of money, although unpaid wages are often entitled to priority in bankruptcy up to a certain dollar amount which is a preference that is not generally available outside of bankruptcy court. There are sometimes laws that can be invoked to hold people affiliated with the management of a defunct business personally responsible for unpaid wages (sometimes the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and sometimes state wage claim acts). And, very rarely in egregious cases that affect lots of people where there was an intent to stiff you before you finished earning new wages at the company, a local or state prosecutor will prosecute a company or its officers for "wage theft". Finally, "freelancers" often have far fewer rights in efforts to collect wages than true employees, so a mere independent contractor is in a weaker position and should consider that fact when deciding whether or not to settle. Bottom line: consider seriously accepting a settlement because the cost of collection and the unavailability of assets to collect from once it goes out of business may make a bird in the hand worth more than two in the bush. | Do I need to create an LLC if I already own the domain? No. Can someone legally create an LLC with the same name as my domain? Yes. Just trying to understand what the difference is between an LLC and a business An LLC, a "limited liability company," is a kind of legal entity that has a separate identity from the members of the LLC. The members' liability is limited with respect to the company's liability, hence the name. A business is a commercial activity. The two concepts are independent. A person can have a business without forming a corporation, or indeed many businesses. A single corporation can also have many businesses. Back to the question about someone forming an LLC using your domain name, this raises the issue of trademark protection. In the US, at least, you can't register a trademark unless it is "in use in commerce" (15 USC 1051(a)(3)(C)), which means explicitly that you cannot use the mark "merely to reserve a right in" it (15 USC 1127). But there are many subtleties of trademark protection that are widely misunderstood by most people, so if you anticipate wanting trademark protection for a name, you will probably want to learn about how trademark protection works and likely talk to a trademark lawyer. | If he is a professional engineer, then he is almost certainly (supposed to be) licensed and insured. You could probably recover damages simply by reporting them to his insurer. Also, some states have insurance pools that provide for claims against professionals that they license. |
Do I need a cookie policy/cookie consent on my website just because I use PayPal buttons? I'm building a website, and the only third party element in it is a PayPal button I use for payments. The PayPal button opens a pop-up window which has its own cookie consent banner. Does that mean I also need a cookie policy/cookie consent banner on my website? Other than that, I save the clients' billing information in the database, which I assume means I need at least a privacy policy, but I don't understand if I need a cookie consent banner just for that PayPal button. | You need a privacy notice for any website (if you're subject to GDPR). Having a PayPal button alone does not trigger such an requirement, since any website is already processing personal data such as IP addresses even if there's no third party content. But it's good that you think about issues for including third party content. As rulings such as the Fashion ID case and the more recent Google Fonts judgement have clarified, you are responsible having a suitable legal basis when you cause visitor's personal data to be disclosed to third parties. Even just embedding/loading a button or logo can cause personal data such as IP addresses to be disclosed to the recipients. You might have a legal basis if earlier, the user already opted in to payment with PayPal (could be consent per Art 6(1)(a) GDPR, or necessity for performing the contract per Art 6(1)(b)). Loading the embedded content just because the user might want to use it is probably not compliant though. For example, the common PayPal donation button is problematic. Thus, instead of linking a PayPal SDK, you might want to host the code + assets for the PayPal payment functionality on your own servers, or only load the PayPal content after the user unambiguously indicated that they want to use this content. I've discussed the PayPal donate button previously, as well as background on the Fashion ID case and click-to-consent wrappers for embedded content. What the Fashion ID case made very clear though is that you're only responsible for compliance for those data processing activity where you can actually influence the “purposes and means” of processing. You have no control over what PayPal does with the data on their servers, so they are solely responsible for that. And if the PayPal button navigates to a PayPal website, you're not responsible for what cookies PayPal sets on its own website. It is thus correct that the PayPal popup has its own cookie banner – you are not responsible for the contents of the popup. You also don't need to collect consent for cookies and similar technologies that are strictly necessary to provide a service that was explicitly requested by the user. For example, session cookies, XSRF protection cookies, and cookies containing a shopping cart are often such strictly necessary cookies. You must still be transparent about the use of such cookies, but you probably don't need a banner to announce this. So I think that you can probably go without a cookie banner, though you should probably get consent before loading PayPal content into your page, and you will likely want to be transparent about cookies as part of your privacy notice. | According to Josh Aas, Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) Executive Director, (the umbrella 501(c)(3) for Let's Encrypt): "It is not against our terms to charge for services using our certificates, though we'd strongly prefer that HTTPS just be part of every offering as a default with no additional fees." My host sells SSL letsencrypt certificates - Help - Let's Encrypt Community Support That said, what your old company is doing is charging for their time and expertise (aided possibly by their own automated software they developed) to install SSL certificates for their own webhosting customers on their own servers. The company is not reselling the SSLs; they are selling the service of installing the certificates. It's not easy to install and automate the updating of 90-day SSLs from Let's Encrypt. So what your old company is doing is making it easy - for a fee - for their customers to use a somewhat difficult to use free service with the rest of their paid webhosting. The customers are not getting any information about what certificate they are buying. That could be. Check the TOS and information that each customer gets when they use the webhosting service with an SSL from Let's Encrypt. Many customers may only be concerned with if the SSL works, or not. And I'm sure the webhosting company does not divulge all aspects of their services to their customers, especially concerning security of their webservers and other business systems. | I'm curious to know, because Google allowed their ownership of the domain to expire, why do they still have the rights to it even when it was bought by another individual. You're making an incorrect assumption here. The domain was never allowed to expire. An error in Google's domain registration interface allowed him to make an order for the domain. The domain was never actually purchased, but the act of ordering the domain gave Mr. Ved access to the domain in Google's Webmaster Tools. As the domain was never actually available for purchase, Mr. Ved had no rights to it. (The domain is not even registered through Google's domain registration interface; it's under a completely separate company, MarkMonitor, that specializes in high-value domains.) | It is not obvious that it violates the TOS (which is a complex wall of text and links to chase). §3 states that "we need you to make the following commitments", followed by some subsections – you can re-interpret this as an agreement on your part to do this stuff. Those subsections relate to "legitimate accounts and users" (not relevant), "what you can do" (potentially relevant), "permissions you give" (granting them license to use your stuff), not infringing on their copyright. The second subsection about what you can "do" says that you can't "violate these or other terms", or do anything unlawful, or infringing, nor may you upload viruses, or scrape Facebook data. So it turns out that there is nothing specific in that subsection, but it does say that you won;t violate "other terms". §5 presents a bunch of other possible terms and policies: Community Standards, Commercial Terms, Advertising Policies, Self-Serve Ad Terms, Facebook Pages, Groups and Events Policy, Meta Platform Terms, Developer Payment Terms, Community Payment Terms, Commerce Policies, Meta Brand Resources, Music Guidelines and Live Policies. Those primarily apply to advertisers, group-pages, developers, commercial use and content broadcast via Meta. Community Standard applies to everybody, and as you should predict there is a long list of specific sub-categories such as "Violence and Criminal Behavior", "Safety", "Objectionable Content", "Inauthenticity" etc. You would have to hire a lawyer to do an exhaustive search and interpretation. However, it appears that using an ad blocking app is not forbidden on FB, and that seems to be what that extension is. But you should read it for yourself. All. Of. It. It may have violated the older TOS, but that clause seems to me missing from the present TOS. | If the website containing the GDPR-wall processes any personal data of users who hit the GDPR-wall, the GDPR applies to that website. This can be as simple as writing a logfile of all visits to the website. In this case it will be illegal if the website owner does not comply with the GDPR. However a supervisory authority would probably not spent any time on such a minor violation. As long as the the website with the GDPR-wall does not process any personal data, the GDPR does not apply, so nothing in the GDPR can forbid the GDPR-wall. Some related remarks: The GDPR does not require a "privacy policy" on the website if the website does not process any personal data. If personal data is processed based on consent, that consent must be freely given. Also it may not be disruptive. So a cookie wall asking for consent would be illegal. But the GDPR does not care about any other disruptive popups, as long as they are not related to asking for consent. Using GeoIP is a perfect way to implement such a GDPR-Wall, because it would block everyone from within the EU, but nobody else. So it blocks exactly those for who the GDPR would apply. In such a case it would not be reasonable to expect anything more from a website owner. A user which uses a proxy, can not expect to be protected by the GDPR, because it bypasses a restriction set by the owner of the website. A webserver does use the IP-address of all incoming requests, to send the reply back. That could be considered a processing of personal data, but everybody seems to agree it is not. I am not sure why. But I do agree that it would be very impractical if that is considered processing of personal data. I added an example from the Washington Post So you have to pay $9/month for a GDPR compliant subscription. Because the price you have to pay is not unacceptable high, I think it would be valid to offer the premium version this way. This does not force you to choose one of the other subscriptions. In december 2018, the Austrian DPA (DSB) has confirmed that a similar offer is lawful. On derstandard.at you get a choice between free access with tracking and advertising, or pay 6 Euro/Month for tracking free access. Because 6 Euro/Month is cheaper than subscribing to the printed edition, the DSB accepted that as a valid choice. More information can be found on noyb.eu or, (with more details but in German), on wbs-law.de. | You will need to obtain permission from the company whose logo you intend to use before using it. Just because you use a product from that company in your devices doesn't necessarily give you permission to use their logo. Many companies have co-marketing plans that you can apply to be a part of but generally you and your product must meet certain requirements in order to be a part of it. | IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics. | Probably Terms and Conditions extract: 7.2 Limitations on Closing Your Account. You may not close your Account to evade an investigation. If you attempt to close your Account while we are conducting an investigation, we may hold your funds for up to 180 Days to protect PayPal or a third party against the risk of Reversals, Chargebacks, Claims, fees, fines, penalties and other liabilities of whatever nature. You will remain liable for all obligations related to your Account even after the Account is closed. 10.6 Information about you a. PayPal reserves the right to request additional information from you, other than what is referred to in this Agreement, to allow it to comply with its anti-money laundering obligations. You agree to comply with any request for further information as we reasonably require to enable us to comply with our anti-money laundering obligations. This may include, without limitation, requiring you to fax, email or otherwise provide to us certain identification documents. You also agree to provide us, upon our reasonable request and at your own expense, information about your finance and operations, including, without limitation, your most recent financial statements (certified or otherwise) and merchant processing statements (if applicable). This is the contract that you agreed to be bound by. |
Can I include EULA-licensed IP core in GPL codebase? I work on little hardware project in Verilog. It would be published on GitLab and would be available for Open Source community. It is licensed as GPL 3. I want to include external IP component in my codebase. It is licensed as EULA. Can I do it? The IP represents a PLL, which divides one single 50 MHz clock input into two other clock outputs of lesser frequencies. It was developed by Altera Corporation. Altera supplies this PLL IP and many other IPs with their EDA named Quartus. Source headers in such IPs look similar: // (C) 2001-2013 Altera Corporation. All rrights reserved. // Your use of Altera Corporation's design tools, logic functions and other // software and tools, and its AMPP partner logic functions, and any output // files any of the foregoing (including device programming or simulation // files), and any associated documentation or information are expressly subject // to the terms and conditions of the Altera Program License Subscription // Agreement, Altera MegaCore Function License Agreement, or other applicable // license agreement, including, without limitation, that your use is for the // sole purpose of programming logic devices manufactured by Altera and sold by // Altera or its authorized distributors. Please refer to the applicable // agreement for further details. As I see, only sole purposes are available for me. But my project will be hosted on GitLab and will be available for many. So I can't distribute this IP? The second question. How these Altera IP cores are used by other IT companies? They can't even sell their products if they wires FPGA chips configured with these proprietary IPs? No sole using is presumed in this case. Many thanks. | There are two licenses, and two parties involved who can sue you if you violate copyright by copying their IP without permission according their license. If you give source code that you are only allowed to give to Altera customers to non-Altera customers, Altera can sue you for copyright infringement. If you don’t give them the source code, the copyright holder of the GPL licensed source code can sue you for copyright infringement. Interesting question is who can sue non-Altera customers you give the source code to. And what happens if Altera customers think they are allowed to distribute the code because it is GPL licensed. So you not only commit copyright infringement, you also create a legal mess for others. And for everyone: even if code claims it is GPL licensed, you need to watch out. | First off: Legally, everything is copyrighted anyway. Licensing is not at all necessary. Hence, even if a court would disagree with # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0, that would just make it closed source. Having said that, the law generally doesn't bother with trivialities such as "file headers". Any commonly accepted way to state the copyright and license terms is OK. Your LICENSE is such a common convention. If you want to avoid all doubt what is covered under that license, put a reference to that LICENSE in each header. If you have just five files in one directory that are all licensed the same, I wouldn't even bother with that. Again, the default position is that everything is closed source. | The GCIDE dictionary itself is licensed under GPL-3.0. It consists of a bunch of files with markup, no software involved. Indeed, the GPL can also be applied to non-software works, though it is unusual. When you use material under some license, you must comply with the terms of the license. In case of the GPL, there are two highly relevant conditions: Everyone who receives a copy of the covered work (original or modified, in whole or in part) must receive the complete corresponding source code of the work, under the terms of the GPL-3.0. If you create a derivative work of the covered work, the derivative work can only be distributed under the GPL-3.0. However, selling the covered material is perfectly fine. The GPL does not forbid you to make money, however you must not profit from your requirement to provide the corresponding source code. Here, the core question is whether your mobile game would be a derivative work of the GPL-licensed dictionary. If your game merely loads the dictionary as a data file, I don't think they would form a single derived work. However, if you compile the dictionary into your app, this would be more difficult to argue. Ultimately, what is a derivative work will depend on a court. It could therefore be helpful to keep your app as clearly non-derivative as possible. I would avoid baking the dictionary into the app's binary but store it separately as a data file, would show attribution notices in reasonable places (e.g. a screen with attribution notices and the complete license text), and would make it possible for users to export a copy of the dictionary files. Furthermore, the GPL-3.0 may require you to allow users to modify this file, for example by making it possible to import a modified dictionary into your app. | You can't grant or license that which is not yours. For example, the Slack terms of service say: We grant to Customer a non-sublicensable, non-transferable, non-exclusive, limited license for Customer and its Authorized Users to use the object code version of these components, but solely as necessary to use the Services and in accordance with the Contract and the User Terms. So Slack's agreement with Org A does not give A any right to let any other organization B use the software. It does not matter how A and B are related, nor whether B is nonprofit or for-profit, nor what A would be getting in exchange. If B wants to use it, they need to make their own agreement with Slack. | Not having immediate access to the source doesn't preclude a finding of copyright infringement. If you have seen the source material, subconscious infringement can happen. However, in this example, both the short phrases doctrine and the merger doctrine would likely prevent the is_prime function from having copyright. Words and short phrases are not individually copyrightable, so the name would be free to take. Regarding the implementing code, if it isn't an exact copy (i.e. copy and paste), courts will apply the abstraction-filtration-comparision test. They may find that you took the selection and arrangement of instructions from the original source, albiet using different names. That selection and arrangement would probably be considered a substantial similarity and, if not for the merger doctrine, infringement. However, given the limited number of ways to express the prime-detection algorithm means that the expression of that idea has merged with the idea, and thus is not protected by copyright. (Or in some jurisdictions, merger is a defence to infringement rather than a bar to copyrightability). | Generally, this question is not a singular inquiry as its wording may suggest on its face. What typically tends to come up as the subject of dispute is rooted in the urban legend that one cannot obtain a patent (utility) on software. This is substantially incorrect, and any patent attorney asserting to the veracity of this makes a substantially false conclusory statement of law knowingly and willfully controverting the actual state of law in, at least, all Western jurisdictions as it omits to assert to the fact that one is not barred to obtain a patent on any system that comprises of non-obvious software, and hardware to run on is entitled to a patent — except in the U.S. where one must also comply with the Alice decision requiring that at least one hardware component in addition to the hardware of a generic computer be necessary for the utility of the system. However, in the U.S., one may obtain a software-centered patent through a (i) method or (ii) a computer program product in addition to (iii) systems or apparatuses which are available avenues for patents everywhere else. When disputes around IP and software come up, this is typically at the crux of the debate: May one obtain a software patent? The answer is: One is not barred merely because the non-obvious aspect of an invention is software. For example, if one uses hardware that are prior art, in fact, patented to someone else, but by the use of software a system, method and/or computer program product achieves a different objective (since utility patents, axiomatically, must have a utility objective) one may obtain a patent, and a layman may very well consider their invention of the system as that particular component that appears to them as having required any inventive steps, encompasses the inventive novelty (understandably) which, in many cases may be software. So the advice from a patent attorney that “you can’t patent software” is simply malicious (or wide and far disbarringly incompetent). One may patent software so long as it is an invention, and the administrative (or at times judicial) process requirements are complied with. Nevertheless, since the question inquired about “IP”, below is the answer to other avenues of intellectual property. Copyrights The software code written to make this operable could be the subject of copyright as long as it is not substantially identical with another solution (or such to give reasons to believe it to be a derivative thereof) that also put buttons in the four corners. The visual design may possibly also enjoy copyright protection, but that is less plausible to imagine since not only the copyrighted work of art is protected, but anything that may objectively be deemed a derivative work (regardless of whether the “re-author” actually knew about the copyrighted material that it may be deemed the derivate of). Design patents It is possible that one could get design patents for the actual graphical design of the layout provided there isn’t something substantially similar already out there protected by a design patent. Utility patents This would most certainly not overcome obviousness, that is, the requirement for one to obtain a patent which needs that a presented invention not be obvious for anyone “with ordinary skill in the art” (an ordinarily knowledgable person in the field of the specific area of tech). Trademark I have a hard time stretching my imagination to see how this could be applicable. | Yes, commercial use is allowed for the AGPLv3 license. You can charge for your use of the software so long as you provide a way for the public to download the source code in its entirety. | Whenever there is a license to share things, the license creator wants the license to be widely used, but absolutely does not want slightly different licenses that could be used to trick people, or that just cause legal problems when used. Normal copyright law applies. And for the reasons above, the GPL license as an example allows you to copy the license verbatim but absolutely doesn’t allow you to make any modifications other than changing who is the person licensing a work. I would be curious what happens legally if someone licenses something with a sneakily modified copy of the GPL and then makes claims against a licensee who assumed it was the original GPL. |
Are there any legal jurisdictions where members of parole boards are accountable for crimes committed by parolees? It has been reported that spree killer Myles Sanderson was previously released on parole despite having been convicted of a large number of violent offences. Since it is hardly the first time that this has happened, I was wondering if there are any legal jurisdictions where parole board members can be held legally liable for the actions of the people that they parole? If so, what is their level of liability? | In Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 defendants were found liable for "grossly negligent and reckless release of prisoner Mitchell Thomas Blazak" resulting in death. That case led to a significant holding, we now abolish the absolute immunity previously granted to public officials in their discretionary functions In Tarter v. NY, 113 A.D.2d 587, liability was found for release of a convict who then injured a person: the board negligently failed to follow statutory criteria and the board's own guidelines, not acting "in accordance with law". With respect to the decision by the parole board to release a prisoner, the statute directs that certain factors and criteria be considered, mandates that the parole board follow guidelines established for that purpose, and provides that any determination is deemed a judicial function and shall not be reviewable if done in accordance with law The key here is that states may have laws governing the release of prisoners, so parole is not a purely discretionary act, there may be statutory limits. | So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification. | Everyone goes free. Each individual in the room is considered innocent until proven guilty. If the prosecution cannot prove that Bob was guilty of the murder then Bob is considered innocent. The same goes for each of the other 19. However if all 20 people were part of some other crime which led to the death of Jake then they might be found guilty under accomplice liability. | Does any American state have a statute under which Joanne would be liable for her son's death? Probably not. None of the mother's conduct seems like a basis for a homicide prosecution. Suicide is only prosecuted, in states that allow it to be prosecuted at all, for conduct with a calculated purpose to cause a suicide, or encouragement of someone to commit suicide. These facts don't show that. There is no intent to cause suicide and there is no encouragement of the son to commit suicide by on the mother. A survey of selected laws on point by the Connecticut Legislative Research Service can be found here. The case law and related legal theory is reviewed and analyzed in this law review article with the following abstract: In 2017, a Massachusetts court convicted Michelle Carter of manslaughter for encouraging the suicide of Conrad Roy by text message, but imposed a sentence of only fifteen months. The conviction was unprecedented in imposing homicide liability for verbal encouragement of apparently voluntary suicide. Yet if Carter killed, her purpose that Roy die arguably merited liability for murder and a much longer sentence. This Article argues that our ambivalence about whether and how much to punish Carter reflects suicide’s dual character as both a harm to be prevented and a choice to be respected. As such, the Carter case requires us to choose between competing conceptions of criminal law, one utilitarian and one libertarian. A utilitarian criminal law seeks to punish inciting suicide to reduce harm. A libertarian criminal law, on the other hand, justifies voluntary suicide as an exercise of liberty, and incitement of suicide as valuable speech. Utilitarian values are implicit in the foreseeability standards prevailing in the law of causation, but libertarian values are implicit in the reluctance of prosecutors to seek, and legislatures to define, homicide liability for assisting suicide. The prevalence of statutes punishing assisting—but not encouraging—suicide as a nonhomicide offense reflects a compromise between these values. These statutes are best interpreted as imposing accomplice liability for conduct left unpunished for two antithetical reasons: it is justified in so far as the suicide is autonomous and excused in so far as the suicide is involuntary. This explains why aiding suicide is punished, but less severely than homicide. Yet even these statutes would not punish Carter’s conduct of encouragement alone. Her conviction although seemingly required by prevailing causation doctrine, is unprecedented. Guyora Binder and Luis Chiesa, "The Puzzle of Inciting Suicide" 56 American Criminal Law Review 65 (2019). In any jurisdiction, could anyone but Joanne, in light of the aforementioned circumstances, face liability for Jordan's death? Maybe the bullies could be prosecuted for homicide or some lesser charge like harassment intended to provoke a suicide or something like that. More facts would have to be developed on that point. Maybe teachers have civil liability for negligence, but not criminal liability for not intervening since they didn't intend to cause or encourage the suicide. | Possibly negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter. Really dependson the state where this happens and the exact elements that need to be proven. Lester has asked his wife to do something that he knows might result in her death and does not warn her. He probably has a duty to warn her. | What the jury must do A jury must follow the law it is given by a judge. A jury cannot "go rogue" and bring back a verdict on something that has not been charged and/or that the jury has not been told to consider. So, whether a jury has the option of convicting a defendant of a lesser included offense - a crime contained within a more serious crime - depends on the instructions the judge gives. Is it up to the judge and the judge alone? Not necessarily. Typically, judges must issue the lesser included offense instructions to the jury if the lesser included offense is part of the charged offense if there exists significant evidence the defendant only committed that lesser crime. So, only if the evidence supports such instructions. Further, at least in some jurisdictions, a trial judge may not instruct jurors on a lesser included offense if there has been no request to do so by the defendant. There appears to be a disagreement over what, if any, power a prosecutor should have in making such a request. One side would argue that a prosecutor would want to ask for it so that a defendant who is getting off on the larger crime doesn't skate completely free on, for example, a technicality. Another side would argue that prosecutors should not have a say because they are in fact who control which charges are submitted to the grand jury for indictment. | In the U.S, at least for some time in our not too distant history, there were a substantial number of jurisdictions that allowed people to "read in" to a law degree, meaning exactly what @cpast said in his comment - that people who were so inclined and with the intellectual aptitude to understand old english common law and modern stare decisis (essentially, appellate precedent), as well as statuary and regulatory texts, could simply study their way to a law degree. It was assumed (quite rightly) that if one could manage to pass a 2-4 day bar examination that they should be considered eligible to apply for a license to practice through admission to the bar just as legitimately as those people who earned their juris doctorate. This is keeping in mind that passing the exam does/did not guarantee licensure/being sworn in, as in depth background checks and ethical fitness analysis are also conducted which form the final determination for fitness to be admitted. California was, for a long while, known as the most challenging state's bar exam to pass. For a long while, it was a true "read in" state, meaning anyone had the right to take the bar exam. Because of this, the California Penal system actually turned out quite a few amazing street-smart criminal lawyers; men, who spent years in prison reading the law, who came out to take and pass the bar exam. It is also true that in CA, as well as other states, conviction of crime (even felonies) does not necessarily mean exclusion from licensure based on failure to pass the background/fitness inquiry (it can, but it isn't automatic if you can establish rehabilitation). Excluding crimes of moral turpitude, such as perjury, embezzlement, certain thefts where a fiduciary duty existed (those were the only crimes that were considered automatically exclusionary), one could be allowed to make a plea of rehabilitation to the Board of Bar Overseers ("BBO"). Crimes that account for the bulk of prison sentences, like aggravated violence, drug dealing/trafficking, etc. are not crimes of moral turpitude. However, there are no longer any states in the U.S. where you can truly "read in" to the law. @Jason Aller is exactly right, that in the early 80's the ABA, as well as the association of accredited legal institutions (not to be robbed of their mortgage of the mind) lobbied and cajoled the practice right away. There are still the states that allow an education of apprenticeship, whereby rather than being self-taught, you are allowed to be mentored by a senior attorney with a certain level of experience, where they would attest that you worked a certain number of hours (usually each week or month – typically something akin to full time) under their tutelage. Each of the states Jason Aller cites has some form of this. After a certain number of years, those individuals are allowed to sit for the bar. However, that does not mean they can be lawyers ... even if they pass. I recently read a journal article discussing how each year more and more states seem to further delimit who can be lawyers, for the sole purpose of not wanting to create too much competition in the profession. Background analysis now puts a great focus on financial responsibility: meaning if one's credit score isn't up to par they can be shut out of the practice because it's argued that if they cannot be financially prudent with their own finances, they cannot be trusted to manage client funds. About a quarter of all people who take the bar on the first shot fail. Those who don't pass by the 3rd try usually never do, and if they do, they are unlikely to practice as they are unlikely to get jobs (unless they hang out a shingle, so to speak). Most states require having graduated from an accredited law school. Massachusetts has at least one unaccredited law school (it was two, but I believe one just got accredited). A grad of that school can only be licensed in MA, nowhere else, except maybe one or two other states. More and more states are also deciding not to let lawyers from other states practice in their jurisdictions by "waiving in", which is where you can pay to get licensed and transfer your scores (instead of experienced lawyers having to take the bar again) from reciprocal states. It is a club where membership is purposely limited and continues to be more and more exclusive (and not in a good way). You can probably see from all these trends that there is a big push to keep people out, for no other reason than fear of competition. If this trend holds, it seems likely that the apprentice's right to "read in" will sooner, rather than later, become altogether a thing of the past too. Law school education is undoubebly valuable in that it teaches you how to learn in a socratic way. It shows you how to spot issues and understand archaic text, and helps you to understand the rules of procedure in a theoretical and comprehensive way. However, for most, what it does not do is teach you how to practice law. When I was in law school, I was lucky enough to go to a school with the choice of a clinical semester or year (I also broke the rules and worked full time as a law clerk, year round, from year one). Many schools had no clinical programs. Students who weren't able to do these things didn't know what a pleading was or how to draft one, had never seen a motion for summary judgment, had no idea how to take or defend a deposition &ndash all things lawyers must be good at doing and that are not taught in law school. At that time, over a decade ago, the machination of legal scholars had contemplated adding yet another year to law school curriculum, to require a clinical year, so that graduates did have a clue what practicing law was all about. Opponents argued that instead the 3L elective year should just be traded from classroom to clinical (rather than adding another year and another 40-70 thousand tuition dollars). Neither side could agree so neither has become the norm. But what has happened since then is that more and more states have limited the right to take the bar exam by right, from having learned the law thru the practice of "reading in", which had already become the highly regulated practice of "documented apprenticeship". My guess would be that those persons who learned by apprenticeship may not be as adept at picking apart cases or legal research as a law school grad (but may be), but they would almost certainly be more informed in the actual practice of law. Here is a fairly comprehensive article about the U.S. states that allow it, and what their rules are for completing the apprenticeship "degree". It cites that of nearly 90k people taking the bar, 60 took this route. From the perspective of a practicing lawyer with what I like to call "a mortgage of the mind", I find this trend pretty disheartening. One shouldn't need to pay a quarter-million dollars to gain the knowledge and right to sit for the bar. | Ordinarily, you can be convicted of more than one crime for the same actions, but the sentences are served concurrently, rather than consecutively. So, for example, if the first degree murder but not the second degree murder charges were reversed on appeal (e.g. because the first degree murder charges were for "felony murder" and the appellate court found that the evidence showing the related felony should have been suppressed at trial due to an unlawful search), the second degree murder charges would remain in place. |
what is it called when you are forced to breach a contract? I am a union construction worker. Under my agreement with the union, I agree to be sent where the union sees fit, and not quit. (I'm an apprentice) Having recently completed a job, the contractor wanted to transfer me to another location. For personal, and possibly medical reasons, I declined, and requested a lay-off. The contractor instead issued me a "quit-ticket" which claims I have quit the job. This breeches my contract with the union. The job is completed, as in the work at the job site is finished, and there is no more work for me to do. My question is whether this is some form of extortion, or what the legal term is for this type of scenario. They could have fired me, or laid me off, neither of which would force me to breech my union contract. I have other questions too, about the legality of forced transfers, though that might be a different question. | what is it called when you are forced to breach a contract? You might be referring to constructive termination or constructive discharge. Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (1982) explains that a claim of constructive termination arises where "working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shows would have compelled to resign" (citations omitted). Whether a reasonable person in your shoes would feel compelled to resign depends on what your "personal, and possibly medical reasons" are/were at the time of the events and whether the employer sought to take advantage of that. | The answer to your question is that your manager cannot ask you to undertake training without payment. All employees are entitled to be paid for the work they have done. They are also entitled to be paid if they are ready and willing to work but their employer has not provided them with any work to do, unless your employment contract says otherwise. https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/work/rights-at-work/rights-to-pay/ Zero hours contracts can be very complicated legal issues, but you are entitled to be paid for the time you spend there doing what your employer has asked you to do. However, if your employment were to be terminated due to a disagreement then you may not be able to make any claim before an Employment Tribunal as you do not yet have a sufficient length of employment. There are many legal complications, and each case is different and individual. Giving general legal advice is beset with all kinds of problems. You may wish to direct your employer to the Citizens' Advice page. If they do not agree to either pay you for your time there or allow you to leave when they do not wish to pay you then your best option might be to seek employment elsewhere. | From point 4: transferring all rights and obligations of Company A to Company B Among those rights and obligations are the rights and obligations arising from Company A's agreement with Employee. Employee is therefore still subject to the agreement, which is enforceable by Company B. If the agreement is carefully drafted, it will make explicit mention of Company A's "successors in interest" or some similar phrase or phrases. Even if there is no mention, the rights and obligations associated with this agreement will transfer (perhaps unless the agreement explicitly provides that they will not, but, let's be realistic, of course it does not so provide). | Given that the purpose of the bonus is to incentivize you to stay, and you are willing to do that, I see no reason why you shouldn't keep the signing bonus if you are fired. While this is not totally without ambiguity, it is at least a fair reading of the statement that a pay back applies only to a voluntary departure, and ambiguities are generally interpreted against the drafter. Also, keeping the signing bonus compensates you for having to start up at a new job only to have it promptly dissipate. | NO (mostly). Servitude means that the employer, or owner of the indenture, or whatever, can use physical force to make the indentee carry out the work given. If the indentee runs away they can be arrested and forcibly returned. This is distinct from the law of contracts. If Alice agrees to provide labour for Bob and subsequently fails to fulfil the contract then Alice may have to pay damages, but that is all. Even in cases of crminial fraud where Alice never meant to provide the labour in the first place, the penalty is defined by law, and would not be the provision of the contracted labour. As the OP notes, military service is generally an indenture-style contract; desertion is a crime. However the other party in that case is the government acting under law rather than a third party acting in their own self-interest. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits all forms of servitude. | Yes I would reach the same conclusion as DaleM, i.e. that the arbitration clause still applies to the dispute in the question, but for a different reason.<1> While the severability principle is indeed a concept in arbitration law, I don't believe that is the relevant doctrine here.<2> Termination Of Employment v. Termination Of An Employment Contract What terminates when a period of employment ends is the employment itself, not the contract of employment. The contract remains effective as to rights and obligations arising during the course of the employment covered by the contract. (This concept would also sometimes be described in terms along the lines of "the right to a remedy for the workplace injury and the right to have disputes related to that resolved in arbitration are vested rights" that are not modified when the contract term of employment ends.) This concept isn't particular to the arbitration obligation. For example, if contract of employment that did not contain an arbitration clause provided that the employee was paid $200 an hour for the first six months and $220 an hour for the second six months of a one year fixed term employment agreement, but the employer failed to adjust paychecks according after the first six months and continued paying the employee at $200 an hour instead (assume to avoid the issue of waiver that this wasn't readily apparent on the face of the paystubs provided to the employee), the employee could bring suit thirteen months after the employee's employment terminated for the $20 an hour not paid as agreed during the last six months of the contract even though the employment period had ended. The contract still remains in force to govern the rights and obligations of the parties arising during the period of employment. Examples Of Termination Of The Contract Itself In contrast, sometimes one contract is replaced, even retroactively, with another contract, in what is called a "novation" of the original contract. This truly does terminate the old contract, so that only the replacement contract remains. So, if, for example, the original employment contract contained an arbitration clause, but this was replaced by a new employment contract without an arbitration clause three months later (in the sample case, before the worker was injured<3>), then the arbitration clause would not apply because the contract, and not just the employment was terminated. Similarly, support that the workplace injury was the second dispute between the employer and employee that had come up. The first was a dispute over the rate of pay received which was resolved by a settlement agreement negotiated by lawyers for the parties before either arbitration or litigation in court was commenced, which expressly terminated all rights, known and unknown, of the parties arising under the contract, and the second was the workplace injury for which the relationship of the injury to work was only discovered later on. In this case, the contract and not just the employment had been expressly terminated, and so the arbitration clause would not apply to the workplace injury dispute (which would be barred by the settlement agreement and which may or may not have had an arbitration clause of its own). End Notes <1> At least assuming that the dispute would have been subject to arbitration if a dispute were litigated while the employee was still employed. There can be circumstances when a workplace injury is not subject to arbitration even if the employer and employee undoubtedly agreed to an arbitration clause that applies to the dispute in question. For example, workplace injuries arising from sexual assault are not subject to arbitration in the United States. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402. <2> The severability principle usually concerns a determination of the enforceability of an arbitration clause in the face of certain kinds of arguments that the entire contract as a whole is voidable. It also does not apply in cases where there is a dispute over whether any contract of any kind was formed in the first place. For example, if someone presented the court with a contract containing an arbitration clause and sought to compel arbitration, and the defense to a motion to compel arbitration was that the defendant had never met or had any connection with or communication with the defendant or anyone related to the alleged contract. <3> The hard case, where the novation takes place after the injury, is complicated by legal doctrines regarding the conditions under which a vested legal right can be waived, which may or may not be met depending upon the circumstances under which the novation was entered into by the parties and presents conceptually distinct legal questions in addition to the legal questions already present in the simple case where the injury takes place after the novation. | Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job. | This is a confusing issue in most common law jurisdictions and AFAIK, Canada and Australia still rely on common law definitions of this. First, any arrangement where someone provides services in return for compensation is a contract. If worker is an employee then the contract is an employment contract and is subject to whatever laws apply to employees (things like, workers' compensation, withholding of tax, superannuation etc.). If the worker is instead operating their own business that is independent of the principal's business they are independent contractors and employee law doesn't apply. In most cases it is easy to determine if someone is an employee or is a contractor. For example, if your business hires a bookkeeper to work set hours for which they are paid a salary from which you detect and remit tax, etc. then they are clearly an employee. Your external accountant who does your year end taxes, has their own premises and contracts to many other businesses is clearly an independent contractor. However, the dividing line is not clear cut in edge cases. Using British Columbia as an example: Calling a person an independent contractor, even if the worker agrees, does not decide the issue. In order to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor under the Act, it is important to consider the definitions of “employee”, “employer” and “work”. The Act defines these terms very broadly. The courts have developed some common law tests that may be useful, but they must be considered in a manner consistent with the definitions and purposes of the Act. Some of these tests include how much direction and control the worker is subject to, whether the worker operates their own business and has their own clients, whether the worker has a chance of profit or a risk of loss, whether the work they are doing is integral to the business and whether there is an ongoing relationship. The longer a person works for another, the more closely the worker’s duties are connected to the purpose of the business, the more the person who pays the worker controls the material and tools and directs the activities, the more likely it is that the relationship is one of employer/employee. So, deciding if a person is an employee or contractor is not up to the worker or the principal and what they may or may not have written on a piece of paper! The entire relationship must be considered. As an additional complication, legislation is not uniform between state/provincial and federal levels of government and even within the same jurisdiction. For example, in Australia, it is possible that a person is an independent contractor for Federal income tax law but an employee for state workers' compensation law. |
Scammed by partners. Is there something I can do? I'll make it as brief as possible. Simply put, I knew this group of people who were building something (it had to do with IT). I knew they'd something, but I also knew they wouldn't get anything done because they're very naive and have zero business sense. So I offered them to partner with my company to add more tech on top of it and approach some investors I knew. One of these investors was interested and agreed to finance the project. His condition was that he bring some acquaintances on board, which of course we accepted, even though I knew one of these people and knew he was shady as hell. On top of that, they're both lawyers. So we set up an LLC in Singapore. The investor added capital and some expertise, the group I first contacted added their idea and more work, and I added all my knowledge, as well as my entire team, offices, equipment, etc. I was then also appointed CEO. After about three months, the investor started complaining about ridiculous things, including things that didn't exist. I was demoted from CEO to Head of Design, and my right-hand man (a nuclear engineer) went from Head of Development to Developer. Since we didn't care about titles, we accepted it (not happily, but accepted). Then the investor and his shady friends started insisting that since I was no longer CEO, I should give most of my shares to them. I didn't accept that, and things got really weird after that. Finally, they told me that they wanted me out of the company and wanted all my shares. I was so tired that I told them I'd no problem leaving the company, but they'd never get the shares for free. They offered me a ridiculous amount for my 21%, which I didn't accept. Three days later, I learned that they'd set up another company in Singapore and stolen all my work. Last month they removed every trace of my work, but of course I've all kinds of evidence and I'd even show screenshots from Archive.org. I really don't know if I can do anything. There's a lot of money involved because they've started to get the funds from VC. Based on the calculations I did and the amounts I knew they were going to ask for (because I got the whole thing rolling), I think they've secured at least 2 million by now, or at least have some sort of agreement on that money. So it's tempting to follow up on it. I've all kinds of evidence, I even recorded our last conversation ( letting they know I was doing it ), but on the other hand I'm afraid I don't have many chances and I don't even know where to start (hire a lawyer in Singapore? litigate from my country?). | You would start by contacting a local lawyer. At some point you may want to take them to court, and an important question is, what court has jurisdiction? If you sue them in your country, there may be an issue in trying to collect on any judgment, but maybe it is manageable. Do your country's court have jurisdiction? That depends on your country's laws. Step one is to find out if it is even possible to sue them locally. Bear in mind that even though you set up an LLC in Singapore, you are not necessarily suing that LLC, you might be suing another corporation or set of people. So "Singapore" is not necessarily the only other choice. Start local, even if it turns out that you have to engage a multi-national law firm with lawyers everywhere. | You should talk to an attorney, but based on what you've provided, there are potential claims for copyright infringement, trade secret misappropriation, conversion, unfair trade practices, and probably quite a bit more. | There is no IP in ideas! There is copyright in writing it down - they can't use your exact words without permission. However, sending it to them in the form of a suggestion would give them a pretty much unassailable argument that you have given them an implicit licence. You can patent an invention (not an idea), claim IP in a trade mark (also, not an idea), register a design (again, not an idea) and hold copyright in an artistic work (once more, not an idea). They are required to keep confidences but offering them a suggestion probably doesn't count as supplying confidential information. I can see no risk in acting on customer suggestions. Hence, the idea to raise prices can be acted on or not at the discretion of the company. | Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams. | It sounds to me like the parties made proposals with an intent to draw them up and formalize them but didn't intend to form binding agreements. The first agreement sounds vague. The second was committed to writing, suggesting that the written deal was to be the real agreement, and not executed. In the last case, it doesn't appear that there was an agreement because there was no meeting of the minds on the essential term, which was the price. Going to court is expensive. It is expensive whether this is litigating underlying disputes or trying to enforce an alleged oral settlement that is disputed. Also, settlement discussions that don't result in a resolution are not admissible as evidence in court. Making a deal would be nice, but Dave's concept of what constitutes a deal seems to be out of touch with reality. | If you are producing and selling it, that is an absolute bar to patentability by anyone else (this is known as prior art). So if you are using it very publicly before they file, they can't get the patent. | What would you suggest I should do in this situation? Do not sign the NDA and do not get intimidated by Mr A. Instead, think about how you can prove the terms you two already agreed. Mr A is trying to override the initial agreement with one which clearly is more favorable to him. Your problem is that proving the terms of a verbal agreement is quite difficult, especially once the counterparty's/partner's attitude has worsened that much. This is why you two should have signed a contract at an earlier stage. Hopefully at least some your communications with him are in writing, since the substance of those records might support your account of the facts and therewith a fact-finder could infer the terms of the initial agreement. In those communications Mr A might have inadvertently said something that weakens or defeats his legal position. Depending on how much your friend knew about the matter, you might also want to secure an affidavit from him, any written communications you had with him in that regard, and also ask him (in writing) to preserve records of any communications he has had with Mr A from the time your friend was making the connection that led to this partnership. That being said, it is important to emphasize that these lines of action will be unavailing if you agree to Mr A's new terms. | Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job. |
What legally happens when someone takes your bank card and uses it? If someone steals your wallet, takes the money and uses it to buy something that is theft against you. If someone steals your wallet, takes the bank card and uses that to buy something what crime are they committing, against whom? This is prompted by the story in the news about this happening: A woman has described how criminals raided her gym locker, stole her wallet and went on an £8,000 shopping spree while she was exercising. Charlotte said she was told her card had been used to make about £8,000 worth of purchases from her current account, with goods bought from the Apple store at Westfield shopping centre in Shepherd's Bush, the Apple store in Regent Street, and Selfridges on Oxford Street - all within 90 minutes. While Santander had managed to stop some of the purchases, she would still be £5,000 out of pocket. "I was very rudely and bluntly told 'you will not be getting your money back. It's your fault because they've used your PIN'," she said. ... Santander apologised for initially "incorrectly declining her refund request and for the customer service she received", and it has paid her £750 in compensation [after the story went viral and attracted press attention]. If the crime was theft against the account holder this would make sense, as the money was taken from the account holder. If the crime was fraud against the bank, it seems like this would not directly affect the account holder. What actually is happening here, what crime is being committed against whom? The case and myself are in the UK but any jurisdiction would be interesting. | Burglary, theft and fraud(s) The burglary and theft are trivial and unlikely to be prosecuted - it’s the breaking in (burglary) and taking (theft) of the possessions including the physical card itself. Using someone else’s credit card without permission is fraud - in this case it appears there were several frauds. All are crimes against the Queen. While crimes may have victims, they are perpetrated against the state, which, in the UK is the Sovereign. The gym was a victim of burglary, the cardholder was a victim of theft, the cardholder and the bank are victims of frauds. Any of these aggrieved people may seek damages from the perpetrator(s) (who appear to be unknown at this time) for whatever their losses are. Their most likely causes of action are the torts of conversion (the civil equivalent of theft) and fraud (the civil equivalent of, well, fraud). The allocation of the loss between the bank and the cardholder is a matter of the contract between them and financial regulations. | No. Theft is, in most jurisdiction, an action by which the offender takes another person's property with the intent to permanently deprive them of it. The clerk isn't taking any property from the store, and she doesn't have any intent to deprive the store of anything. She is therefore not guilty of theft. If she were doing this intentionally -- either in league with the customer or even without the customer knowing -- she could likely be held liable for the theft, either on a conspiracy theory or perhaps an innocent-agency theory. The lack of criminal liability of course does not mean that there can be no accountability. The employer is free to terminate the employee, and it will have different options -- depending on jurisdiction -- to recover the value of the uncharged printers, perhaps by docking her paycheck or through a negligence action. | The Bank of England actually makes this pretty clear with the following line: Legal tender has a very narrow and technical meaning, which relates to settling debts. It means that if you are in debt to someone then you can’t be sued for non-payment if you offer full payment of your debts in legal tender. Essentially, if you are in debt (frequent examples are a taxi ride or a meal at a sit-down restaurant) then you can use legal tender to pay off that debt. But that doesn't necessarily mean they have to accept it. It only means that they cannot sue you if they do refuse to accept it. But the refusal wouldn't itself alleviate the debt either. They could technically return to you at some point and say "ok, fine, we'll take the cash" and you'd still be obligated to provide it to pay off your debt. It's also worth emphasizing that this only applies to situations where the payment is to alleviate a debt, for services that have already been provided before you are billed. It would not apply while buying groceries at the supermarket. Even restaurants where you pay for your food up-front and then receive it afterwards can refuse cash payment. In those situations the services are prepaid and you are not ever alleviating a debt. | UK-based answer here: The crux of your question revolves around whether the buyer(B) had committed an illegal act by withholding information that would have prevented the seller(A) from selling the good at the price he did. The act that B would seemingly be guilty of would be fraudulent misrepresentation A misrepresentation is a false statement of fact or law which induces the representee to enter a contract. The important thing here is if there is a "false statement". In your scenario, there was no false statement made, let alone one which induced A into selling his stamp to B. So there is no fraudulent misrepresentation, or misrepresentation of any kind. Looking at the law of fraud: s3 Fraud Act 2006: A person commits fraud by failing to disclose information when => The defendant: failed to disclose information to another person when he was under a legal duty to disclose that information dishonestly intending, by that failure, to make a gain or cause a loss. With regards to the scenario you've given, no fraud would have been committed because the buyer was under no legal duty to disclose such information | I think you would have difficulty distorting the situation - Pokemon Go is not magic that defies existing laws, and this would be no different to a mall issuing a trespass notice (which is effectively how they would kick you out) for any other reason. I would question the ability of a store to "Arrest" you - that is a job for the police - After they trespass you (ie by giving you notice to leave), if you come back again then they can call the police to arrest you - but its not as clear-cut as someone seeing you playing a game and arresting you. I don't think Pokemon players are a "protected class" of people, so finding a valid cause of action might be tricky. About the best you could do would be to talk with your wallet (ie shop elsewhere with your friends), but for my money that would make me more likely to go to that mall ! | I think Dale M is essentially correct. Let me give more detail by quoting the Theft Act 1968: 1 Basic definition of theft (1) A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; and “thief” and “steal” shall be construed accordingly. (2) It is immaterial whether the appropriation is made with a view to gain, or is made for the thief’s own benefit. 3 “Appropriates”. (1) Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, and this includes, where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner. (2) Where property or a right or interest in property is or purports to be transferred for value to a person acting in good faith, no later assumption by him of rights which he believed himself to be acquiring shall, by reason of any defect in the transferor’s title, amount to theft of the property. You assume the rights of an owner by placing a notice offering it to other people. Therefore it is theft. I presume similar laws exist in other juristictions. | Yes, its legal Economically, there is no difference between a cash discount and a card surcharge; legally, there is. That’s because the law prohibits charging more than the advertised price for a given payment method but doesn’t prohibit charging less. Of course, it’s likely there is some illegality here but it’s not against the customer. A business doesn't give a 10% discount to avoid paying a 1-2% fee. They do it because they are not reporting (some of) their cash sales to the tax authorities and are therefore saving the 25% VAT and 18% company tax. | This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't |
Was or is possession of screwdriver illegal in the UK? I stumbled on this article (may be NSFW or disturbing), which states about the defendant in a case from 2004: The court heard that [defendant] had [a previous conviction] for possession of a screwdriver, which he said was for protection. This made me wonder: Was the mere possession of a screwdriver really illegal in the UK? And if yes, do most Britons not have screwdrivers at home? Searching the Internet, I could find that carrying a screwdriver might be considered illegal if one had no good reason to do so, but nothing about mere possession. | Was or is possession of screwdriver illegal in the UK? Yes, if the screwdriver's intended purpose is for a criminal act. There's not enough detail in the article, but the most likely scenarios are: Offensive Weapon, contrary to section 1 Prevention of Crime Act 1953: (1)Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence ... [...] (4)In this section “ public place ” includes any highway, or in Scotland any road within the meaning of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 and any other premises or place to which at the material time the public have or are permitted to have access, whether on payment or otherwise; and "offensive weapon” means any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him or by some other person. Going Equipped to steal, contrary to section 25 Theft Act 1968: (1)A person shall be guilty of an offence if, when not at his place of abode, he has with him any article for use in the course of or in connection with any burglary or theft. (2)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. (3)Where a person is charged with an offence under this section, proof that he had with him any article made or adapted for use in committing a burglary or theft shall be evidence that he had it with him for such use. [...] (5)For purposes of this section an offence under section 12(1) of this Act of taking a conveyance shall be treated as theft. Possession with intent to destroy or damage property, contrary to section 3 Criminal Damage Act 1971: A person who has anything in his custody or under his control intending without lawful excuse to use it or cause or permit another to use it— (a)to destroy or damage any property belonging to some other person; or (b)to destroy or damage his own or the user’s property in a way which he knows is likely to endanger the life of some other person; shall be guilty of an offence. [with a maximum sentence of 10 years] NB in this jurisdiction, possession of a weapon for self-protection is not, except in some very narrow circumstances, a reasonable excuse to carrying one. | UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence. | Scotland: Duty of finder - Section 67 of the Civic Government Scotland Act 1982 no threshold is stated, by non compliance fine of £ 50 Northern Ireland: Cash If you find cash, please hand this into your nearest police station. Cash that is not reunited with the owner is donated to charity. England: The item I've found is of low value or can't be directly identified to a person You don't need to report this to us. Please make reasonable enquiries to try to find the owner, these could include asking people nearby or in offices or shops. You could also consider leaving a note with your details. If you can't find the owner there's nothing more we can do and you should dispose of the item. Note: What is to be considered to be low value is not stated. Other jurasdictions have a threshold. In Germany it is € 10 (§ 965 (2) BGB). That would then be £ 8,43 at the present rate. For any amount larger, it must be reported to the police. If the owner is not found (again dependent on jurasdiction) it may be given to you. If the owner is found, a reward between 3 and 5% can be claimed (§ 971 BGB). Section 965 - German Civil Code (BGB) Duty of the finder to notify (1) A person who finds a lost thing and takes possession of it must without undue delay notify the loser or the owner or another person entitled to receive. (2) If the finder does not know the person entitled to receive or does not know that person’s whereabouts, the finder must without undue delay notify the competent authority of the finding and the circumstances that may be material to determine the person entitled to receive. If the thing is not worth more than ten euros, no notification is necessary. Note: The original version of the law (1896) it was 3 Marks. Sources: Section 67 of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 If you find treasure or lost goods - Citizens Advice Scotland Know What To Do - When You Have Lost or Found Property (Northern Ireland) Report lost or found property | The Met The item I've found is of low value or can't be directly identified to a person | The Met Section 965 - Duty of the finder to notify (Germany) | No, abuse of power is not necessarily criminal Imagine a judge that is “heightist” - they always rule in favor of defendants who are taller than 175cm and always rule against those who are shorter irrespective of the merits of the case. This is clearly an abuse of power. It’s not illegal because “height” is not a category protected from discrimination (AFAIK). However, it is a failure to correctly discharge their legal obligations. | It isn't clear that the example you give is illegal police action, but let's assume that it is for the sake of this question, since it doesn't affect the analysis. If possession is not compelled, then it is voluntary. | Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all "completely illegal" regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a "criminal conviction"). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been "decriminalised" - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority. | When the suspect is being arrested for this indictable only offence, are the police allowed to then arrest the suspect for the summary only offences too whilst the police are still inside of the suspect's house? YES, as long as the arresting officer suspects an offence has been committed and believes the arrest is necessary for any of the reasons given in s.24 PACE summarised here Could a suspect have those summary only offences thrown out of court? NO. There may be other reasons to offer no evidence at trial, but being arrested for a summary only offence in the circumstances described is not one of them. | Note that an essential element of the offense here is "with purpose to use it criminally." The specifications in B allow a presumption of such purpose, but such a presumption is rebuttable. The tools of a locksmith are somewhat different from those of a criminal "cracksman", I understand, and would probably not be considered "designed or specially adapted for criminal use". But even if they were, proof of regular employment as a locksmith would tend to rebut the presumption of criminal intent. Possession of tools with the intent of lawfully opening one's own lock would not be criminal intent, but a judge or jury might not be convinced of that. |
License or not for open source code published by the manufacturer? Do I need license for the Arduino code that a company has posted in their websites when I buy their sensors to use them to my Arduino? For instance, I buy a CO2 sensor and I use the company's code in order to make this CO2 sensor work with my Arduino. Do I need license if I want to patent a machine using the latter sensor? | Unknown based on what you have posted in your question. But answer lies in the terms under which the source code is made available or licensed. The most common scenario is that such "sample" source code is provided as help to the purchaser of their product and you'll often see things that permit its use in conjunction with the hardware product. You'll also often see disclaimers that say the code is for demonstration purposes only and it not warrantied to do anything at all. But again, you'll need to review the actual language under which the code is provided and then understand and follow its terms and conditions. | Being or not being open source makes fairly little difference in trademark law. If a commercial firm (Yoyodyne, say) had used the name "Portable Network Graphics" and the abbreviation "PNG" in trade, and taken such further steps as would be needed to protect it in the relevant countries, that firm would have a protectable trademark. Note that in some countries, a trademark must be registered to have any protection at all (much of the EU follows this rule). In others, use in commerce can offer some protection even without registration (the US follows this rule). Had this happened (in an alternate reality) Yoyodyne could have sent a cease and desist letter when open source developers started using the mark. If the devs did not cease, Yoyodyne might have obtained an injunction, or damages for trademark infringement, or both. They could also have issued a takedown notie to the site hosting the project. But had Yoyodyne failed to defend the mark effectively and allowed it to become generic, Yoyodyne might have lost all rights to it. Also, had Yoyodyne ceased to use it in trade for a significant period, they might have lost rights. This is a place where the different laws in different countries might lead to different results. Note that "Portable Network Graphics" is rather descriptive, and not particularly distinctive. Descriptive marks, like "Tasty Pizza" generally get weaker protection, while more distinctive marks, such as "LuAnn's Tastee Pizza" are more strongly protected, in general. Again this depends on the country, and the specific facts. In general the first to use, or to register a mark, gets the rights. When one entity is the first to use, but a different one is first to register, things can get confusing, and results will be different in different countries. Note that a Cease and Desist letter is not a legal requirement. It is a threat of possible future legal action, and often an offer to avoid such action if the recipient does as the sender requests. The recipient can comply with the letter, wait for court action, or try to make some sort of compromise deal. Open source projects, as other answers suggest, often choose to comply. | No. GPL works are copyrighted (as are most creative works basically everywhere in the world, as soon as they're created, whether or not the author does anything about it), and copyright is what gives the GPL "teeth". Without copyright, you would generally be able to duplicate and distribute programs without any kind of license or permission from the author. Copyright law restricts your ability to do those things. The GPL is a license, which means it's a grant of permission. It says that you may copy and modify and do other things, provided that you comply with the other provisions set out in the license. Quoting from the GPL v3: You are not required to accept this License in order to receive or run a copy of the Program. [...] However, nothing other than this License grants you permission to propagate or modify any covered work. These actions infringe copyright if you do not accept this License. So if you were to distribute some GPL-licensed software in a way that didn't comply with the terms of the license, the legal framework that would allow someone to sue you to stop you doing that would be copyright law. | Generally speaking, you must be Licensed, or enter a written agreement, in order to use any logos from any company, especially any time the reference is referenced commercially. There are exceptions to the rule, and some are more lenient than others, but you should always check before showing any company's trademarks or brand icons. For example, Intel® allows third parties to refer to them by name, but displaying a logo requires a license or written permission, per their Trademarks and Brands guideline. You'll find that most companies are probably willing to overlook violations of Licensing as long as the product is placed in a favorable light, since's that's basically free advertising, but you'll want to take the extra few moments and simply call them and ask. A ten minute call could save you tons in legal fees and/or fines. From what I've seen, most companies will allow use of their company name for most commercial and non-commercial uses, but reserve some logos only for licensed partners, and others still only for themselves. They will also generally specify appearance guidelines, such as rendering ® and ™ only the first time on each page of printed material, as well as a specific guideline for sentences and phrases that the name may or may not appear in. They also usually specify that such phrases may not imply that the company is a partner or representative of the company, etc. You can see Intel's Trademark Symbols and Acknowledgements page for an example of what you'd expect to be required to do. This page also gives some example sentences of acceptable and unacceptable phrases. For example: Correct Usage Look for PCs with Intel® Core™ processors. Incorrect Usage Look for PCs with Intel® Core. Mostly, they're concerned about making sure ™ is used correctly, as well as specifying that they make processors, not entire systems. You'll want to try and stay on the good side of their legal department, and represent fairly. | Can anybody create their own license? That is to say, can I for example create my own license under which I can license software? Yep. It's just a contract granting rights to use a copyrighted work. You can write your own contracts, so you can write your own software license. It's just often recommended that you don't, because common licenses are more well-understood, and inexperienced drafters may make errors that could result in problems, such as unintended restrictions, failing to restrict things that were intended to be restricted, or creating provisions that aren't enforceable in some/all jurisdictions. Can you mandate how a software will be released? Yes. Many software licenses, including GPL, do. The restrictions you describe in your example sound similar to CC BY-NC-SA. Also, would the following clause even be legal? Using this software you agree that any work and intellectual property based on or created with this software will be under the [INSERT_NAME_LICENSE] license, even after any and all code from this software is removed in a future update, or even if the work is rebuilt from the ground up I'm not entirely certain, but "even after any and all code from this software is removed in a future update, or even if the work is rebuilt from the ground up" seems, in my opinion, unlikely to be enforceable—especially "even if the work is rebuilt from the ground up." How would you differentiate a complete rebuild from a totally new piece of software? More broadly, once your copyrighted code is no longer in the product, there's nothing for them to license from you. It's hard to imagine how you'd be able to claim that you're harmed by someone releasing a new version of a product that used to contain your code under a different license. Without harm to you, there's nothing for a court to redress. | It does mean that you cannot reuse any parts of the source code, even small simple ones. You would have to rebuild the code from scratch. There is a significant chance that the code would be "substantially similar" to the code that you were hired to build, also that if anybody else were to write a bubble sort or 24-to-am/pm conversion routine, it would look the same, where even variable names (which should describe function) are the same or very similar. In case of an infringement lawsuit, you would have to defend yourself by showing that there are only a few ways to code a given function. Copyright protects only the "expression", not the abstract idea. A linked list is an idea, which can't be protected by copyright; same with recursion, pointers, stacks, object-oriented programming... Anything that involves copy and paste is infringement. If you re-read the copyrighted code and then try to reconstruct it, you probably crossed the infringement line. If you remember the problems and solutions and accidentally write somewhat similar code, that is probably on the safe side. From the perspective of the programmer not wanting to always reinvent the wheel, it would be most useful to make a distinction in the contract between "the essentials of the customer's program" versus "incidental utility work". The difficulty will arise in saying specifically what is essential vs. incidental. For instance, I know that if I were to hire you to develop a speech-recognition system, low-level audio-acquisition and encoding would not be essential to my purpose, whereas DSP parsing routines would be the center of my interest. The programmer would then want to retain recycling rights to all non-essential code. | At least in theory an end user could be sued for infringing on a patent, especially a method claim. Given the cost of a patent lawsuit, this strikes me as extremely unlikely to happen though, unless the user in question were an extremely large company, or something on that order. Theoretically, the only difference between open-source software and proprietary software would be that availability of the source code makes it easier to prove use of a patent in open-source software. Releasing the software as open-source doesn't confer any immunity from patent law or anything like that though. Realistically, however, the chances of being sued for infringement if you're basically giving away the software in question are fairly remote. It rarely makes sense for a patent holder to spend millions of dollars on a lawsuit where they stand no chance of even recovering their cost (but no, that certainly should not be taken as legal advice that you're free to infringe on patents, or anything similar--in fact, none of this should be taken as legal advice at all). If you can actually prove that a technique was published or publicly known and used (e.g., in a product that was offered for sale) well before the patent was applied for, the patent is probably invalid (and if proven so in court, the case would normally be dismissed with prejudice, which basically means the patent holder wouldn't be able to sue anybody else for infringement of that patent). I'd note, however, that in my experience this is much less common than most people imagine--many look at (for example) the title of a patent, and assume it lacks originality because it refers to some well-known technique, and ignore the claims where it details the precise differences between the previously known technique and what the patent really covers. Just for example, the EFF used to have a web page talking about a (now long-since expired) patent on how to draw a cursor on screen. In an apparent attempt at scaring the unwary, they showed code they claimed infringed in the patent--despite the fact that the patent's "background of the invention" specifically cited the technique they showed as being previously known, and not covered by the patent. | This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy. |
On the age of consent and the age of criminal responsibility The age of consent is 16 in the UK. The age of criminal responsibility in england-and-wales and northern-ireland is 10, and 12 in scotland. Given that the age of consent is the age at which an individual is deemed legally competent to understand the notion of consent - without which they cannot knowingly engage in a non-consensual act - how is it possible for anyone under the age of 16 to be prosecuted for rape? (Granted it can be argued that a person understands consent with regards to others first and themselves second, but that would likely run counter to Theory of Mind and developmental psychology as a whole!) | There are several policy goals surrounding the age of criminal responsibility. One aspect is that by the age of criminal responsibility people have a sufficient awareness of societal norms and understanding of the wrongfulness of their conduct that they be eligible for criminal charges. Another aspect is that for people under the age of criminal responsibility, they may not respond to criminal charges and punishment in the same way as older people. That is, the criminal system may not be the most effective means of correction and rehabilitation of such young offenders. There is no bright line that accurately captures these factors, and thus many jurisdictions have more than one step in transitioning from the incapable child to the fully capable adult. For example, in the US and Canada, juveniles/youth over the age of criminal consent but not yet 18 years old are generally not treated the same as adults. The policy goals behind the age of consent relate to understanding of the consequences of sex, vulnerability to people in positions of power or influence, and protection of society's norms of purity. There is no reason why these different policy goals would result in the same age threshold. | Section 277 of the Sentencing Act 2020 provides: 277 Suspended sentence order for person aged 21 or over: availability (1) This section applies where, in dealing with an offender for an offence, a court passes a sentence of imprisonment. (2) A suspended sentence order (see section 286) is available in relation to that sentence if the term of the sentence of imprisonment is (a) at least 14 days, but (b) not more than 2 years. Chapter 5 of Part 10 of the Act contains provisions relating to suspended sentence orders (SSOs). The following are applicable: 286 (2) A suspended sentence order may also specify one or more available community requirements with which the offender must comply during the supervision period. 286 (4) The community requirements are listed in column 1 of the community requirements table (see section 287). 286 (5) Provision about each requirement is made by the provisions of Schedule 9 mentioned in the corresponding entry in column 2 of that table. The community requirements table in section 287 contains the following community requirements which may be imposed as part of a SSO: Unpaid work requirement Rehabilitation activity requirement Programme requirement Prohibited activity requirement Curfew requirement Exclusion requirement Residence requirement Foreign travel prohibition requirement Mental health treatment requirement Drug rehabilitation requirement Alcohol treatment requirement Alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirement Attendance centre requirement Electronic compliance monitoring requirement Electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement Each of these are described in detail in Schedule 9. I wasn't able to find the sentencing judgment for this particular case, but my guess would be that the judge imposed either an unpaid work requierment or a rehabilitation activity requirement (the 1st and 2nd on the list). None of the others appear to be applicable. Part 1 of Schedule 9: 1(1) In this Code “unpaid work requirement”, in relation to a relevant order, means a requirement that the offender must perform unpaid work in accordance with the instructions of the responsible officer as to (a) the work to be performed, and (b) the times, during a period of 12 months, at which the offender is to perform it. Part 2 of Schedule 9: 4(1) In this Code “rehabilitation activity requirement”, in relation to a relevant order, means a requirement that, during the relevant period, the offender must comply with any instructions given by the responsible officer to do either or both of the following (a) attend appointments; (b) participate in activities. 5(4) The responsible officer, when instructing the offender to participate in activities, may require the offender (a) to participate in specified activities and, while doing so, comply with instructions given by the person in charge of the activities, or (b) to go to a specified place and, while there, comply with any instructions given by the person in charge of the place. | Isn't anyone 18 or older guaranteed full constitutional rights? No. How can someone between 18 and 21 be denied the right to own a gun based on age? The Second Amendment authorizes reasonable regulation of the right to own a gun (it contemplates a "well-regulated" militia). Nothing in the U.S. Constitution states that age 18 is the age of majority for all purposes. The U.S. Constitution merely states that the right to vote in a federal election cannot be denied on the basis of an age older than age eighteen. (A U.S. state could let 14 year olds vote if it wanted to do so.) But, many legal rights are limited to persons aged twenty-one or older (e.g. drinking, tobacco smoking, serving as an executor of a decedent's estate, etc.), or to some other age (e.g., age discrimination in employment laws start at age 40, legal discrimination for senior citizen oriented housing starts at age 55, eligibility to run for the U.S. House starts at age 25, for the U.S. Senate at age 30, and for the Presidency at age 35.) Historically, until the Vietnam War, the age of majority for most (but not all) purposes in the United States was twenty-one years of age. A majority of U.S. courts that have considered the issue have found that an age twenty-one restriction on the right to bear some or all arms is a reasonable regulation of the Second Amendment right that is constitutionally permitted, although there is a split of authority and one or two cases have reached the opposite conclusion. | This answer assumes Europe as jurisdiction, not the United States. This will vary wildly across jurisdictions, but given that this question is unanswered for two weeks now, I will provide an answer for Europe, specifically the Czech Republic. It will be somewhat different in other states. First, the list of criminal offenses a corporation can commit is specified in the law. It is exactly that, a list. Of the 300 crimes an individual can commit here, about 100 of them can also be done by a corporation. It is hard to discover why these hundred crimes were chosen specifically. Logic used to make this list eludes me. For example, a corporation can commit Rape, but not Murder. It can commit a Terrorist attack but not Terror. It can commit Threatening a public official but not Oppression. I looked through the explanatory notes for the law and I discoved the reason: Strictly only those crimes were created for corporations that were required by higher european law, which only moves the question higher up. I did not look up what the European Parliament had to say about this. There is one crime that was added specifically, later on, to the list, and that is Usury. In principle, all crimes committed by an individual can be done by a corporation, because a crime is considered to be committed by a corporation if the action is done by an employee in the name of the corporation. | Firstly, there is no jurisdiction in the US where rape is a potentially capital crime, and murder is not - so you are discussing a hypothetical (and rather implausible) jurisdiction. Given your jurisdiction is hypothetical, you can make the law be what you would like. Secondly, duress is accepted in almost all jurisdictions as a defence to a charge of anything except homicide (and some jurisdictions allow it to reduce the severity of a homicide charge). Courts can be reluctant to accept a charge of duress, but a bullet wound would probably be persuasive. I don't know if someone who had just been shot would be physically able to perform though. The precise crimes the perpetrator is guilty of would depend on your specific jurisdiction, but I would expect at least: rape (because they organized it) kidnap shooting the brother | england-and-wales What would realistically happen to this person, legally speaking? Nothing The most common speeding offence is at section 89(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 A person who drives a motor vehicle on a road at a speed exceeding a limit imposed by or under any enactment to which this section applies shall be guilty of an offence. And, section 1(1)(c) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 requires a Notice of Intended Prosecution (NIP) be served to the car’s registered keeper within 14 days of the offence, but as the car had false plates there is no way to identify who this was. If that 14 day deadline is not met, then the driver cannot be prosecuted regardless of any confession. | england-and-wales Yes As well as the general offence of comtempt of court by publishing facts in breach of a court order, there are also two statutory provisions making it an offence if those facts reveal a person's identity (maliciously or not): section 1, Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992: (1) Where an allegation has been made that an offence to which this Act applies has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person’s lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed. (2) Where a person is accused of an offence to which this Act applies, no matter likely to lead members of the public to identify a person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed (“the complainant”) shall during the complainant’s lifetime be included in any publication. [...] The relevant offences are listed in section 2 (being rape and a number of other serious sexual offences). section 49, Children and Young Persons Act 1933: (1) No matter relating to any child or young person concerned in proceedings to which this section applies shall while he is under the age of 18 be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify him as someone concerned in the proceedings. (2) The proceedings to which this section applies are— (a) proceedings in a youth court; (b) proceedings on appeal from a youth court (including proceedings by way of case stated); (c) proceedings in a magistrates' court under Schedule 7 to the Sentencing Code (proceedings for breach, revocation or amendment of youth rehabilitation orders); (d) proceedings on appeal from a magistrates' court arising out of any proceedings mentioned in paragraph (c) (including proceedings by way of case stated). [...] | I think your confusion stems from assuming there is a universal definition of "minor" across laws, jurisdictions, and rights. 18 is the age of majority for the purpose of voting (26th Amendment), the death penalty, labor law (although age 14 is the minimum age for employment), and many other laws. But, 21 is the age required to buy alcohol in all states (by their own choice in order to receive highway funding). Nothing requires the age of majority to be consistent across different sections of code or statute or between jurisdictions (except when constitutionally prescribed, like voting age, or minimum age for certain elected offices). There are many counties that prohibit purchase of alcohol at any age. The age of consent varies between 14 and 18 across US states. Age 65 is a threshold for certain tax credits. You need to be 25 in order to be a member of the US House of Representatives, 30 to be a Senator, 35 to be President. You are only protected from age discrimination if you are 40 or older. Here is a rough list of various age-based thresholds for various rights, privileges, or responsibilities in the US. (I havn't vetted this whole list, and some are clearly satire, but the ones I know about are consistent with my understanding.) |
Motion to strike a dismissed PO How can a plaintiff avoid being faced with unfair prejudice after a defendant does a motion to strike all evidence from a dismissed PO? Since without the evidence the plaintiff can't defend their actions for the dismissed PO, wouldn't that be unfair prejudice? They would automatically be guilty of something in the eyes of the judge. Can rule 403 allow the plaintiff to ask the judge to strike the judgement of the dismissed PO too if the evidence on it is not allowed? | The order of operations is important I assume that plaintiff filed for a Protective Order. To get this granted, the plaintiff has to allege some kind of wrongdoing and evidence of that. If the defendant responds, then the plaintiff can amend their filing. Then the defendant once more can respond to the allegations. If the plaintiff wants to amend the filing once more, they need to ask the court to be allowed to do so, and that opens the door for the defendant to answer once more. That's all history for the case presented: The court apparently found the evidence lacking and dismissed the application for a PO. Plaintiff can only file for reconsideration or appeal but not bring in new evidence at this point. Dismissed Cases are not automatically evidence A case that did not establish its burden of proof and was dismissed - especially with prejudice - has not established that the evidence in it is good. You have to ask each item to be admitted separately and re-establish that it is good evidence. A bulk filing "I want to bring this case as evidence" is generally denied unless you prevailed in that case. A dismissed case is one you didn't prevail in. Get a Lawyer! It seems like you are in serious need of legal counsel to clear up the situation. Contact a lawyer for at least a free consultation if you even have a case. | First, if the police officer had reasonable cause to believe that a crime was in progress then the search would not be illegal in the first place. However, let's assume the search was illegal. Normally the evidence would be excluded under the exclusionary rule. However, there are two exceptions known as the independent source and attenuation doctrines. The evidence of the police officer as to the imprisonment would be excluded. However, the evidence of the victims is independent of that illegal search and their testimony would be admissible. Further, that testimony would allow independent discovery and admissibility of any physical evidence in the property. However, if the victims were dead, then there would be no independent discovery and none of the evidence would be admissible. | The court clerk was right. A judge is not supposed to interact with a party (at least not in the absence of the adversary) except during court hearings for which the adversary was notified and given an opportunity to attend. Also, there is no need for you to prove the mere fact that you went to court. That in itself is either inconsequential or palpable from the hearing transcripts. When you file in court papers such as a motion or a response to a motion, you may --and should-- bring an extra copy for the clerk to stamp it. That a clerk does with no objections. The stamp reflects the date on which you file your document(s). That stamp incidentally evidences that you or someone on your behalf went to court but, again, that sole fact is inconsequential. There is no such thing as "motion to appeal". A litigant may initiate an appeal, or appellate process, once the judge has decided a case in its entirety or in part. If the ruling to be appealed does not close the case, the upper court might refuse to review the issue(s) appealed until the whole case has been decided (that refusal is known as denial of the appellant's leave to appeal). Your description nowhere indicates that the judge has already made any rulings or that there have been any hearings on your matter. Your mention of prior motions suggests that you should gain acquaintance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and of Appellate Procedure. Those rules cover several aspects of litigation, including motion practice, the allowed methods of service, and the requirements to file an appeal in upper courts. | A plaintiff wins a civil claim by proving their case on the balance of probabilities - that is, is their case more likely than the defence case. The court will decide if it is more likely that the employee was terminated for attempting to make a workers compensation claim or if it is more likely they were fired for the reason the company gives. When I’m called upon to make such decisions I apply the duck test: If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. ... even if someone is trying to tell me it’s a chicken. | I don't believe it is contradictory. Some kinds of injury are inherently difficult to calculate (e.g. damage to reputation caused by slander) but the judge or jury, as the case may be, will review the evidence and do the best they can. Lord Reed says as much in paragraph 38 of his judgment. ... and as a practical matter, it appears the damages, in this case, were both calculable and supported by evidence. The Court's primary focus was not whether damages could be calculated but rather the measure of damages (i.e. the method of calculation). | Technically anyone can sit on a jury. Lawyers are not automatically excluded from juries anymore, as being called for jury duty is a right and a duty that the law abhors automatically excluding people from. That is the official line on this. However, in reality, lawyers will always be stricken from serving by one of the lawyers trying the case. Each lawyer has a certain number of preemptory strikes (the ability to get rid of a juror for any reason, aside from those protected by law, such as race, religion, etc). They also have unlimited "for cause strikes," which are when a juror is biased in some way. Lawyers trying the case almost always try to use a cause strike to get a lawyer off, saying that they are biased toward either Defense or Plaintiffs based on the type of law they practice. The judge will usually not let them use a cause strike, saying that an attorney is ethical enough to apply the facts to the law and not sway the jury based on their personal biases that everyone has; plus, we're officers of the court so we have a duty to be ethical. Hence, they are typically forced to use a preemptory strike to get a lawyer off, but they will, every time. (If the lawyer just tried a similar case, then they'd get to use for cause.) The real reason that the lawyer from one side or the other definitely wants a lawyer off is that the jury instructions presented by each side to the judge are crafted in a way that each word carries specific meaning and, with that, is designed to lead to a certain way of thinking. Once the lawyers have fought over the instructions and the judge decides what will be presented, the jury only gets them in writing...in some states not even in writing, they only get them read to them without a copy to take back to the room. If a lawyer is in the jury, that person will undoubtedly be able to explain exactly what the law requires for a finding, or exactly why a certain finding should be had. They will advocate one way or another; this is undeniable. The instructions are purposefully confusing. The reason is this: when we fight over jury instruction, inherently, one of us will want an instruction that is hard to understand, for a lay person. This is because we want them to apply the law as it is commonly (mis)understood, not as it truly is, because that's not good for our case. To have a lawyer on the jury would defeat the finely crafted instruction and its potential to confuse. They would undoubtedly explain the instruction to the jury. One may think this would be helpful, however, juries are told that any special knowledge they have about anything pertaining to the case shall not be shared as it could sway the jury. This is most true when it comes to a lawyer sitting. When a jury doesn't understand a jury instruction, their only recourse is to send a question to the judge. In states where they have the instruction in writing, all he can say is "read carefully;" he cannot give his interpretation of what the instruction means. If a judge did give his own interpretation that is grounds for a mistrial or an appeal at least. A lawyer on the jury would be able to explain, "Oh, what this really means is X," and this is bad from one side's perspective, almost always. We all have biases, and even finely determined rules of law can be subtly pushed toward one direction or another with the use of a certain word over another, or the placement of one element before another. Generally, unless the side who would most want the attorney off had exhausted their preemptory strikes, and lost the argument to remove for cause, there is very little chance a lawyer will serve. The fact of the matter is that both sides are very likely to want a lawyer stricken from the jury pool, (even from the side who may believe the lawyer to have leanings in their favor). It is essential to control as many factors as possible in a jury trial, and an attorney on the panel is just a wild card. The potential always exists that if a lawyer ends up on the jury, they could explain the elements of the case to their fellow jurors, who may then not rely as fully upon the carefully crafted language in the instruction(s). This could backfire on either side when certain portions of the language used may be intentionally vague or difficult to parse though for someone who doesn't practice law. Anyone interested in the process of choosing and striking jurors (in the U.S.), through the process of voir dire, this is a fairly comprehensive article on the topic. | The validity of the NDA is not an easy question, but a related one is more clear. A lawyer in the U.S. in most states is not permitted to threaten criminal or administrative action (e.g. reporting someone to immigration or tax officials), to gain advantage in a civil case. You can unilaterally bring criminal charges or take administrative action, but it is deemed to be unethical and against public policy to refrain from bringing criminal charges or taking administration action to gain civil advantages. An NDA of the type described arguably violated the same public policy and might be invalidated as a result. Put another way, there is a privilege to make certain reports to public officials without legal consequences and such an NDA might violate that privilege. Some of these privileges found in what are called "whistle blower" statutes specifically prohibit this kind of agreement as to some specific kinds of illegal conduct, but not others. There isn't a general rule. This said, it is not black and white. For example, a private NDA can't prevent someone from testifying under subpoena, but can prevent someone from voluntarily testifying in the absence of a legal compulsion to do so such as a subpoena. Suppose a woman is sexually assaulted at work, and is given an NDA to sign. Can the company legally require her not to disclose the conduct of an illegal activity? I can imagine this example coming out different ways in different jurisdictions. For example, some states have a legal duty (rarely enforced) that requires people to report felonies, and an NDA in this case would contradict that affirmative legal duty, while others do not. Another source of gray in the analysis is that there is a difference between not reporting a sexual assault that actually happened, and, as part of a larger settlement, executing an affidavit stating under penalty of perjury and under oath that a sexual assault didn't happen. The first is potentially an NDA that is void as a matter of public policy. The other, in principle, is a settlement that the person signing the affidavit can only enter into if it is true. There is nothing, in general, wrong, about requiring someone to confirm that certain representations are true as part of a business transaction or contract and allowing the contract to go forwards only if certain facts are true. The gray gets deeper, because whether a sexual assault happened or not is not always a subjectively black and white clear issue of pure fact. (It is subjective because an affidavit or affirmation is made to the best of the declarant or affiants' knowledge and belief, not as a matter of objective fact.) For example, someone may not have perfect memory of what happened, or there could be doubt over the question of whether the perpetrators acted recklessly (the Model Penal Code intent requirement for sexual assault) or merely with criminal negligence (which would not be sexual assault under the Model Penal Code). A statement made under oath about whether a sexual assault happened to the best of your knowledge, thus, might be a mixture of factual issues (A penetrated B at a certain date and time) and legal or not perfectly factually known ones (A acted with X intent regarding consent during that act). So, in a case where there was some room to argue either way about how to characterize what happened and about what actually did happen, there might be some room for a settling party to make a non-perjured statement consistent with the settlement and then to agree not to a true NDA, but instead to not make statements which, if the affidavit is true, would be false. In a plea bargain in a criminal case, one can plead "no contest" without agreeing that the crime factually happened, but that isn't really possibly in the context of an affidavit about what really happened, with an NDA limited to not disclosing the incident since it was already agreed as a matter of sworn fact that there is nothing to disclose that rises the level of a crime. | You can't normally ask the court to "recuse" an attorney, because "recusal" is normally restricted to the judge leaving the case. The more common term is moving to disqualify opposing counsel. |
Would a tautological law have any effect? Is there any case where a law saying something like "Any person who commits theft is guilty of theft" would have any effect? | "Any person who commits theft is guilty of theft" This is not tautological. "Any person who commits theft commits theft" or perhaps "Any person who commits theft is a thief" is tautological. But the hypothetical law as written makes theft something that someone can be guilty of, that is, theft is an offence and illegal. The exact consequences depend on other provisions and the legal system itself. If a common law jurisdiction abandons common law offences in favour of a criminal code and such code does not contain "any person who commits theft is guilty of theft", then theft would be legal (or at least not criminalized by such code). Theft has to have an operable definition for the law to be effective, but the definition does not have to be explicit in the statutes when there are other sources of laws. The courts are meant to interpret the words in law reasonably, relying on ordinary definitions of expressions, the discernible intention of the legislature, history and social development. There can be unconstitutionally (or otherwise unacceptably) vague laws, but in common law jurisdictions, at least the usual crimes like theft and murder have been interpreted by the courts over hundreds of years with a rich body of case law and legal literature. Crimes like piracy benefit from a multitude of internationals conventions and case laws in many jurisdictions, for example, the Canadian definition of piracy is almost a tautology: 74 (1) Every one commits piracy who does any act that, by the law of nations, is piracy. Of course, the operative provision is exactly the one with the words "is guilty of" (2) Every one who commits piracy while in or out of Canada is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life. | SCOTUS blog regularly does posts on that kind of topic (see, e.g., their Stat Pack) and if you looked at their sources or the authors of those posts, you could probably easily find more. There are people who do that and make their findings publicly available, but I don't know them off hand. | It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial. | Not for that reason This would not make the Act invalid. The interaction between the two laws would simply mean that criminal prosecution would only succeed for acts on or after the Act came into effect. So, even though the law purports to invoke criminal sanction for acts before it came into effect, the Constitution says it can’t so it doesn’t. That doesn’t render the law invalid, just unenforceable for that period. | No In many but not all common law jurisdictions, a person who comitts an "inherently dangerous" crime can be found guilt of "felony murder" (not manslaughter). The Wikipedia article says: In most jurisdictions, to qualify as an underlying offense for a felony murder charge, the underlying offense must present a foreseeable danger to life, and the link between the offense and the death must not be too remote. For example, if the recipient of a forged check has a fatal allergic reaction to the ink, most courts will not hold the forger guilty of murder, as the cause of death is too remote from the criminal act. Floyd was arrested on an accusation that he passed a counterfeit $20 bill. This is not an "inherently dangerous" felony. Nor has it ever been established that he had the criminal intent that would have been required to convict him of a crime. Indeed it has not been proved that he knew the bill was counterfeit. But a finding of criminal intent to commit the underlying felony is essential to invoking teh felony murder rule. MN code 609.632 subdivision 3 requires "intent to defraud" and "having reason to know that the money order, currency, note, or obligation or security is forged, counterfeited, falsely made, altered, or printed". Moreover when the value is under $1,000 the possible penalties are much lighter and may not even be a felony. In any case passing a phoney $20 is not the kind of offense for which the felony murder rule is normally invoked, nor is being killed by an arresting officer a plausible, outcome, althoguh obviously it is possible. Further sources The University of Minnesota's page on "felony Murder" says: When the defendant commits a felony that is inherently dangerous to life, he or she does so knowing that some innocent victim may die. In essence, this awareness is similar to implied malice, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. What is difficult to justify is a conviction for felony murder when the felony is not inherently dangerous to life. Thus most jurisdictions limit the felony murder doctrine to felonies that create a foreseeable risk of violence or death. ... Joaquin, who has just lost his job, decides to burn down his apartment building because he can’t afford to pay the rent. Joaquin carefully soaks his apartment with lighter fluid, exits into the hallway, and throws a lit, lighter-fluid-soaked towel into the apartment. He then runs outside to watch the entire building burn down. Several tenants die of smoke inhalation because of the fire. In jurisdictions that recognize felony murder, Joaquin can probably be charged with and convicted of murder for every one of these deaths. In this example, Joaquin did not intend to kill the tenants. However, he did most likely have the criminal intent necessary for arson. Therefore, felony murder convictions are appropriate. Note that Joaquin exhibited extreme indifference to whether the tenants in the building lived or died, which could also constitute the criminal intent of implied malice or depraved heart. The Minnesota code Section 609.19 MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE says: Subd. 2.Unintentional murders. Whoever does either of the following is guilty of unintentional murder in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40 years: (1) causes the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence or a drive-by shooting; [Paragraph (2) deals with death "while intentionally inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily harm upon the victim" which clearly does not apply in this case.] | A contract that tells one party or another to do an illegal thing is void ab initio: courts will not recognize it or give force to it. A contract which doesnt explicitly tell either party to do something illegal but if during the course of fulfilling either party's end of the bargain they commit an illegal act it is up to the courts discretion what happens, whether to find the contract void or to maintain the contract (its a matter of public policy whether they allow the contract to continue existing, or if the contract was such that illegal acts were expected to be commited then the court will likely remder it void) Either way, you cannot indemnify someone for committing an illegal act. | There is a relevant law, Title 18 section 907 which states that "A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally". So possession of lock picks is not a crime per se. In Com. v. Gendrachi 389 A.2d 604 we are reminded that "intent need not be directly proved, but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the incident out of which the charges arise". The accused was busted in mildly suspicious circumstances at 5:20 am in the dead of winter, urinating. The court notes that "There is no evidence that appellant's hands were on the door or that he made an attempt to extract the tools from his pocket and apply them to the door. In fact, there is no act or statement by appellant that would lead one to infer that he intended to use the tools at that time", and that "appellant is a certified locksmith and it is not unreasonable to find the tools of his trade in his pocket, especially when he is wearing his work attire". Note that this is on appeal: he was convicted initially. The point is that there is a lot of slop in cashing out the legal concept of "intent". Pennsylvania does not, apparently, have any specific laws that refer to lock picks. It does have a statute that addresses having criminal tools, which are defined as (including) "Anything used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have". Mr. Gendrachi had those very tools, and the appeals court did not say anything to suggest that the tools were not "criminal tools" (and in FN 5 they actually point out that the Commonwealth cannot say that the tools were weapons, a ludicrous proposition never raised by anyone – so by failing to deny that lock picks are criminal tools, they are adoptively admitting that they are criminal tools). Thus I conclude that there is a law in PA, that lock picks are burglary tools, and that the government would have to prove intent to use criminally. | Yes. Helping someone to commit a criminal offense is generally a crime identical to the offense itself. Under Texas Penal Code section 7.02: A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if ... he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. |
Is it illegal to send email to someone’s work account? Let’s say I want to reach out to someone working in a company like Apple or Google. For example I have a girlfriend working in Apple and we broke up. Then I send an email to her work account with spicy details asking her to explain or to reconcile…… private stuff. Is it legal or illegal for me to send this kind of email to my ex girlfriend’s work account? If I send an email from my personal email, like Yahoo!, to her work's email is it ok? | No, it is not illegal. The company has no standing to punish you for that. Companies can't sue random people for sending random email... that was largely settled under the (YOU)-CAN-SPAM Act, when in the guise of standardizing US anti-spam laws, spam was largely legalized and state laws were pre-empted and barred from existing. However, all the other laws still apply Laws on harassment, for instance. Sometimes people with mental illness think another human "owes them" a relationship (which kind of misses the point of what a relationship is, but never mind that). And those people, who sadly are an all-too-common cliché, tend to act badly in very predictable ways. As such, we have plenty of laws on the books (and plenty of family court judges who have seen it all) to dispense consequences to the misbehavior and protection to the victim. All those laws really don't care in which medium one might violate them: sky-writing, naval light signal, email, whatever. | Yes, their waiver has no legal basis and is invalid under the GDPR. They should have hired a better lawyer. GDPR rights cannot be waived (mrllp.com). The last bit should have been: Therefore, in consideration of my participation in any project, I understand that retaining my name and email address, as described above, does not require my consent and that the right of erasure, as spelled out in the GDRP Article 17 (1) b does not apply. The legal basis for our lawful processing of this personal data is Article 6 (1) f ("processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller"). I.e. there is nothing in the GDPR that compels GitLab to erase this information, but their waiver is bogus. Keeping track of individual contributions in a software projects is necessary for a number of reasons, including security (if somebody contributes code that jeopardizes security, you want to audit everything that person has contributed). | According to Blackmail Overview :: Justia (emphasis mine): A blackmailer typically has information that is damaging to the victim, and uses threats to reveal that information in order to coerce the victim. Blackmail is considered a crime regardless of whether the information is true or false. The central element of the crime is the blackmailer’s intent to obtain money, property, or services from the victim with threats of revealing the information. So it's still a crime, at least in the US. But the enforcement problems are tracing the original emailer, which, due to (I assume) multiple email relay IPs, address spoofing, etc, and the big issue of identifying the actual individual who pressed the metaphorical "send" key on the bulk email script, the jurisdiction of that person, etc. As Ron pointed out, BitcoinWhosWho shows no one has fallen for it, even though millions of these emails get sent every day, gauging from the number that I get myself. | Junk mail is perfectly legal From Preventing unsolicited mail published by the House of Commons Library: It is not illegal for a company to send unsolicited mail unless the material is obscene or threatening. No legislation exists which can protect a householder from receiving it. If postage has been paid, Royal Mail is legally obliged to deliver all addressed mail, which includes mail that is addressed “to the occupier” as well as mail that is personally addressed. However, there are various options available to an individual who wishes to stop unwanted and unsolicited direct marketing mail. From you description, it appears that Dominos paid for the mail to be delivered “to the occupier” and the Royal Mail has a legal obligation to do so (unless you opt out). | a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days. | No You say you won't disclose personal information, therefore, you can't disclose personal information. Now, if your privacy policy said "We won't disclose your personal information except ..." then, so long as you did the "..." that would be fine (subject to privacy law). | You cannot contract outside the law Any "contract" that purports to break the law isn't a contract - it's an unenforceable agreement. For example, across all jurisdictions, a contract that is unconscionable is void. So is a contract that requires one of the parties to break the law - a "contract" for murder for example. In addition, you cannot call an employment relationship a "business" relationship - if the relationship meets the requirements of an employer-employee relationship then that's what it is and woe betide you if you haven't complied with all relevant entitlement, tax, insurance and safety laws. In addition, all of the relationships you listed are contracts. | Obviously you can refuse, nobody can force you to give them a new passport. There may be consequences. The worst: The company's country likely has laws that require the company to make sure you have the right to work there, and to have evidence of it. If you are an EU citizen in an EU country, a valid EU passport would be that evidence. When your passport expires, the company might not have anything that is legally sufficient to allow you working for them. They could have the choice between breaking the law, risking a fine, or firing you. This will depend on the exact laws of the country, and likely somewhere deep in the small print of the laws :-) In the UK, where this isn't relevant anymore, the laws were changed in 2014 to require that you have a valid passport. So in the last seven years you would have had to give them a valid passport. BTW. Having a copy of your valid passport can make it possible for your employer to buy you flight tickets for foreign countries, for example, which could be useful. I was once in a situation away from home where I unexpectedly needed a copy of my passport (privately), called HR, and they emailed me a copy of it, so that was also useful. |
Is it illegal for an adult to contact a minor asking for parent info? By an ex-friend's parent I was sent a message saying “remove this video and have a parent contact me, if not I will find a parent contact and tell them what things you are posting”. What I posted was a video saying I don’t like my ex-best friend who was attempting to control me and that I have better friends now. Also shall I add I have no clue how this man got my number assuming my ex-friend and I deleted each other's numbers and have no way of knowing each other's number? | In the united-states, the First Amendment right to freedom of speech generally protects an adult who contacts a minor seeking contact information for her parents. Although there are several exceptions to the right to free speech, this speech falls within none of them. | Note that "pedophilia" is a psycological or social term, and not a legal term. What laws prohibit is the creation, distribution, and possession of child pronography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. This means that there is no offense if no real child is involved, and this is also true of the various other US laws on child porn. Since the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) erotica which appear to depict a minor engaging in sexual activity, but which are not depictions of any actual child are protected speech under the US First Amendment and are therefor not criminal. So called "furry cub porn" might include modified images of actual minors, in which case it would seem to be covered under US laws against child porn. But if the character is totally invented, or is based on an adult rather than a minor, then it would seem to come under the rule of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Note, the law in other countries is significantly different. In particular in the UK a realistic drawing may be considered to be a "pesudo-photograph" even if not based on an actual person, and may be punishable in the same way as an actual photo of an actual minor. Note also, the making, distribution, or posse ion of 'child porn' is a very serious criminal offense. I am not a lawyer, and one should not rely on this post to determine what acts are and are not legally safe. If there is any question, consult a lawyer. Note also that under the above statute (18 U.S.C. § 2251), something may be "child pornography" if the person involved is a minor, even if that person is old enough under local law to consent to sexual activity, and even if the person did in fact so consent, and even if there was no intent to distribute the image or video. So a person taking, say, a cell-phone video of him- or herself having sex with a 17-year-old, intended for personal watching only, in a state where the age of consent to sex is 16, can still be found guilty under this law, and such cases have occurred. | These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information. | I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server. | This depends on the nature of the "ban" ---i.e., who issued it, what legal power they have, and what it actually requires you to refrain from doing. You say it is "their ban" so I am going to assume that this is just a decision that the store has made not to allow you entry. If it is indeed the store itself that has "banned" you, this would not prevent you from calling them to apologise for whatever you did. Calling a business on the phone cannot generally be considered a trespass --- at most, if you were to repeatedly call and harass a business over and over again, it might give rise to a nuisance suit. Unless you have extremely strange laws in your jurisdiction, it is almost certainly not against the law for you to call a business that has banned you, a fortiori if this phone call is made for the purposes of apologising for whatever you did that led to the ban. Although it does not appear to be the situation in this case, if this ban was an actual restraining order of some kind issued by a Court, then it might indeed prevent you from contacting the business (in which case breaching it would lead to an action for contempt of court, not trespass). If a Court were to issue you with an injunction or restraining order of some kind to ban you from a business, then that instrument would specify what you are prevented from doing. You would then need to be very careful to comply with that order. In short: there is a great deal of difference between a "ban" made by a store as the owner of property, and a ban issued by a court through an injunction or restraining order. | Is the question just whether a company can contact its customers to ensure that they're happy with the company's services? If so, the answer is generally yes. I can think of no reason why this would change based on the fact that someone saw her using the services of a competitor. Your mother seems to be treating the phone call as an accusation, but it appears to be standard customer-relationship maintenance. If she chooses to approach it differently, she can use it to improve her bargaining power with Gym 1. | Ark. Code 5-60-120 is very clear that the act of intercepting is a crime. Not just "recording and using", not just "recording", but intercepting in any way. Specifically: It is unlawful for a person to intercept a wire, landline, oral, telephonic communication, or wireless communication, and to record or possess a recording of the communication unless the person is a party to the communication or one (1) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception and recording. Intercepting is illegal, therefore it is not "okay". Perhaps the "sort of a lawyer" was speaking of the probability of getting caught doing it. | a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself. |
Attorney-Client Privilege after disbarment Suppose Amy was a lawyer, and then was disbarred. Next, she conceals her disbarment, and advertises as a lawyer. Barbara now hires Amy as her lawyer, completely unaware of Amy's disbarment. Barbara and Amy have some written communication about a case that Barbara is involved in. Next, it comes to light that Amy has been disbarred, and was breaking the law by working as a lawyer. Can the communications between Barbara and Amy be subpoenaed, or are they protected by Attorney-Client privilege? I'm interested in US law, any state. | Can the communications between Barbara and Amy be subpoenaed, or are they protected by Attorney-Client privilege? The communications remain protected by the attorney-client privilege. People Ex Rel. Herrera v. Stender, 212 Cal.App.4th 614 (2012) describes a pattern of unauthorized practice of law by a former lawyer who allegedly kept giving legal advice without informing his clients about his disbarment. The opinion nowhere suggests that their attorney-client privilege was invalidated or waived. Quite the contrary. For instance, the court reiterates the intent to "protect individuals in need of legal advice from seeking assistance from Martin R. Guajardo in the mistaken belief that he is a licensed attorney", Id. at 628. That intent is palpable also in the mention of "ad hoc measures from the court's equitable arsenal" to preserve the clients' privilege, Id. at 647, 650 (quotation marks omitted, brackets added). See also In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219F.3d 175, 183 (2000): [W]hen waiver occurs as a result of inadvertent [...] disclosure, courts have limited the scope of that waiver based on the circumstances involved and overall fairness. (citations omitted). Your premise that Amy concealed her disbarment and made intentional misrepresentations about being authorized to practice law implies that Barbara's disclosures to Amy were inadvertent. U.S. v. Warburg Pincus LLC, U.S. Dist. Court, Vermont (June 2022) reflects that "the attorney-client privilege can remain intact despite a one-time leak of privileged information" (citing cases). A multiplicity of communications between Amy and Barbara seems unlike to defeat Barbara's privilege as long as the premise of Barbara's [reasonable] unawareness holds. | Submit emails in their totality Your testimonial affidavit can quote or cite them as applicable. There is no protection of anyone’s privacy in court. By the way, the email where admissions were made is probably inadmissible if it was sent were in the course of bona fide negotiation to resolve the dispute. If the other party objects they will be thrown out - I wouldn’t hang my case on them. | How does John protect himself from false claims (e.g. if the woman decides to roll down the stairs and blame him)? It would be very helpful if John has evidence of Oxana making false statements about him or others, and/or of Oxana threatening to make them. False accusations are common --and hardly ever prosecuted-- in a context of divorce. Examples of that are police reports (here and here) and excerpts of court proceedings that ensued during my father's (desisted) proceedings to divorce his 2nd wife (for additional excerpts, see also at 22:49-24:29). According to one of those police reports, my father's 2nd wife allegedly extorted him with "You'll have to pay me even until my ring!" (see page 15 of the pdf file) at the time they were going through the divorce proceedings he filed. Based on your description, it is not far-fetched that John could end up experiencing a similar mess as reflected in these police reports. Note: I don't know whether the poorly written quote from page 15 of the pdf was my father's translation of their interactions or whether he merely transcribed them to the police. Is there any downside to basically putting a camera in every room of the house except hers? John is strongly suggested to check Ohio law to avoid criminal charges. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 750.539d(1)(a) prohibits to "Install, place, or use in any private place, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing, recording, transmitting, photographing, or eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in that place.". As a wife, Oxana would be reasonably entitled to that privacy in rooms other than --and including-- her room. Moreover, placing cameras in every room will not preempt false accusations. For instance, Oxana could still calumniate John by falsely alleging that he and the daughter went to a hotel to have intercourse. How do you find a good divorce lawyer? Before you even decide to retain a lawyer, see this report about New Jersey Family Court, where judges and attorneys allegedly are in the habit of dragging divorce cases for as long as it is profitable to the lawyers (obviously, at the expense of the parties pursuing the divorce). I don't really follow --and have never litigated-- divorce matters, but the multi-year divorce & custody case of Tsimhoni --formerly presided by Michigan infamous judge Lisa Gorcyca-- illustrates that NJ is not the only state where parties fall prey of legal malpractice. John should search for Ohio court opinions related to divorce matters and get acquainted with the applicable concepts, laws, and doctrines. For that purpose, one free, very useful resource is http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch . Court opinions usually cite relevant statutes, whence John can get an idea of what laws are decisive on divorce matters. Is it reasonable to ask for some sort of record of past outcomes (are there standards to provide full and complete records like for financial companies)? It is reasonable, but no, there are no such standards at all. An attorney will most likely allege grounds of attorney-client privilege, the extensive time that would be needed to redact court documents, and possibly other excuses to deny John's request. Instead, John should go to the court in his county and study as many files of divorce cases as he can. A number of courts display some information of cases in their website. For example, some Michigan trial courts have deployed Odyssey (see here and here), whence a party could search from home whether an attorney has litigated cases in that court and how long they've taken. To see the contents of complaints/motions/etc., John can read them only in the courthouse, unless the county court has configured Odyssey (or its equivalent) to allow the public to read the contents from elsewhere. I don't know what progress Ohio courts have made on this. Regardless of the attorney's transparency to share with John any redacted records about his performance, another important variable is the judge. In this regard, see the next item. Is it reasonable to ask to pay way less if the lawyer fails to get certain terms? Unfortunately, that is neither reaonsable nor realistic. Just from meeting with John, it is impossible for the attorney to know aspects such as: whether John is truthful and the meritorious party; how much trouble Oxana will cause during the divorce proceedings (see the aforementioned police reports); how vexatious the opposing counsel will be; whether John will weaken or sabotage his case during an unforeseen situation or lose control as a result of exasperation; whether the case will be presided by a judge who follows the law (instead of incurring personal bias or influence trafficking); if the judge engages in influence trafficking instead of following the law, whether the attorney is in cozy terms with that judge; whether the opposing counsel is in even cozier terms with that judge; in the event that the matter is appealed, any of the three previous items may apply; whether the parties settle (or John desists for whatever reason). Given the multitude of unknown/uncertain variables and possible outcomes, no person (attorney or otherwise) could establish beforehand the semi-contingent pricing that you have in mind. Do the lawyers even do anything other than fill out paperwork? Yes, they do, but that doesn't necessarily mean that what their work is any effective. Even if the lawyer is diligent, the court might negligently fail to enforce its own orders. | How are such no-show-no-tell boundaries established They largely stem from the rules of evidence which are complicated, vary from state to state and knowing which is a big part of what litigation attorneys are paid for. Parties to litigation become aware of all the evidence/topics that their counterparts wish to broach in the courtroom well in advance — during discovery. They will usually disagree whether some bits and pieces can be presented to the jury. In this case the court will hold admissibility hearings — again, well in advance before the trial. Despite all the preparations, some of these disagreements arise during the trial, and then they are resolved in place by way of voiced objections. The attorneys and the judge talk about them using professional jargon of the rules of evidence — having themselves seen all the evidence in advance. does the jury get to know them No, the jury doesn't need to follow the professional talk. In fact, they should hear as little as possible of it — which is the reason why admissibility disagreements are resolved in advance as much as possible. If serious issues arise during the trial, the judge will ask the attorneys to speak to them in chambers — away from the jury. Or they will ask the jury to take a break while the professionals talk. The jury just needs to listen to the evidence that is allowed in, and disregard any evidence the judge say they have to. is this also in the public record somehow? It is in the court record. It may be accessible to the public if the court allows. If someone wishes to see the record they need to apply to the court, provide reasons and a judge will decide if anything can be released. | Assuming that the documents were either true, or Manning reasonably believed that they were true, there would be no cause of action for defamation. Many of the documents disclosed would have been confidential in some sense, but usually a violation of a confidentiality statute has a criminal sanction associated with it, but does not carry with it a private cause of action – in part, because conceptually, the party actually harmed is considered to be the government and not the person about whom information is revealed. It is also possible that Manning could utilize the state secrets privilege as a defense and have such a suit dismissed on the grounds that a full and adequate defense of the claims would require the disclosure of official state secrets. For example, if a covert agent were murdered due to a wrongful disclosure of information, usually official disclosure of the fact of being a covert agent would be required to prove the case, and that evidence would be barred by the state secrets privilege, effectively barring the lawsuit entirely. Constitutional claims of privacy violations under the 4th Amendment generally relate to the wrongful acquisition of information and not its wrongful disclosure. The constitution bars unreasonable search and seizure, not unreasonable disclosure of information. The only privacy tort that might be applicable is "Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts." (A sister privacy tort, Intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into privacy affairs, is directed at the collection of data phase and not the dissemination phase). See Restatement of the Law (Second) of Torts, §§ 652B and 652D. But, this tort raises serious First Amendment concerns and has not been widely adopted. Realistically, this tort is unconstitutional in the absence of an affirmative contractual or quasi-contractual duty not to reveal facts that runs to the person making the disclosure, and in general, Manning would not have that kind of relationship. The classic public disclosure of embarrassing private facts case would involve a lawyer's or psychotherapist's revelations about a client. Also, in the case of the public disclosure tort the basis for damages is largely personal emotional distress and violation of trust, as opposed to damage to reputation, per se. The requirement is that the disclosure be embarrassing or breach of contract, not that it harm someone's reputation since you have no legal right to a reputation that differs from the truth. | The parenthesized part means that if you are being compelled by law to disclose some confidential information, you must promptly notify the company of that fact. They could they respond by trying to get you excluded as a witness, or to limit your testimony, but you don't have to care what they do once they've been notified that you were subpoenaed. It may well be that every time the opposing side asks you a question, "your" side will object, and the judge will decide whether to sustain or overrule the objection. The only way in which you would defer to the company lawyer is by not answering the question before the question is finished (i.e. give the attorney 2 seconds to voice an objection). You would not have to "bring" the employer's lawyer along to a deposition, but that lawyer would probably be present and would similarly raise objections, if he felt like it. Your duty is simply to tell the company that you are being compelled to testify. In case the police or a detective agency are investigating the matter and they come to interview you, you are not compelled by law to answer (or to hand over documents), therefore you are supposed to decline to answer (and you are not obligated to inform the company that someone asked a question). As for an administrative subpoena, the perhaps tricky part will be knowing whether you are being compelled to testify, or invited to testify. The wording of the paperwork should inform you whether this is compulsory. | How much would I be expected to reveal if not directly connected to the case? For example, if I was asked, "What were you doing in the alley at night?," would you be required to reveal the information if it is potentially humiliating (e.g. you were having an affair) or illegal (e.g. you were getting illegal drugs)? The latter case seems to violate the protection against self-incrimination. Or what happens if you just lie about something inconsequential? You have to answer any permissible questions (i.e. consistent with the rules of evidence) asked. If you were doing something illegal you can claim the fifth and not testify unless you are given "transaction immunity" that your testimony will not be used against you in a criminal case against you. Usually perjury prosecutions require that the lie be about a material fact. Suppose you receive a death threat (either verbal or in writing) from the person charged with and who committed the crime. Something along the lines of: if you testify against me, then my friends will kill you after the trial. What legal options do you have? Tell the prosecutor on the case and ask the prosecutor to provide protection to you and to go after the people making the threat. The witness protection program was created for these cases. | The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence. |
What can be done about a thief that has happened in the past My husband and I (we are gay) live in the US, he came here as a runaway at age 14. He ran away because he was abused by his adoptive father. He had no contact with his family for the next 18-plus years. When his father died, his mother contacted him, and they began to rebuild a relationship. She came to the US 8 different times to visit over the next 25 years. I failed to mention that upon his father's death he left his mother a very, very wealthy woman. Over the years of visits and many phone conversations his mother assured my husband at her death, he and his younger brother would never want for anything. She told him that there was a trust that would handle everything. My husband received a phone call from his aunt in mid-May of last year (2021) who told him his mother had died several weeks before of lung cancer. Because of the pandemic, the funeral was virtual. My husband's mother had many personal assets as well as a bank account and most probably real estate holding. There was only my Husband and his younger brother, no other siblings. My husband received NOTHING! No one will give us any information about anything. We were told that there was most likely no will because there was a trust. My question isn't a trusted company responsible for treating the client's assets fairly? His brother knows we have no money to get a lawyer so he simply took everything, isn't this the same as stealing? | We can't give personal legal advice, but we can explain in general terms what the law is. Apparently, the mother, brother and estate are outside the US, in country X. The disposition of the estate follows the laws of X, so you would need an attorney who can practice law in country X. The primary issue is, (1) how are estates probated in X and (2) what provisions, if any, did the deceased(s) make for the disposition of the estate (was there a will; a trust; did one or more parents die intestate?). To simplify matters, we will assume that the laws of X are very similar to US law (which is not uniform – it is state-specific, but broadly similar). In the US, assets can be in a trust and can be directly transferred to a beneficiary. The disposition of the assets may be irrevocable, meaning that the person setting it up can decide who gets what, and then that cannot be changed. It is thus possible that a child could be excluded as a beneficiary of a trust. E.g. the father could set up a trust with just the mother and brother as beneficiaries. The mother may simply have been misinformed as to what the trust document said. Or, there could have been illegal misappropriation of funds, even something as heinous as providing fraudulent documents purporting that an actually living beneficiary is dead. In other words, even though you can't afford a (foreign) attorney, that is realistically the only way to get a clear answer, if the brother is being uncooperative or untruthful. | Overview of Notice Requirements To Fathers Prior To Adoption In Illinois The father has some rights, but they are very limited in Illinois under the kind of circumstances set forth in the ER dialog. If the mother wants to put up the child for adoption and doesn't want to reveal anything about the father, perhaps with the specific intent of preventing him from interfering with the adoption, she has the practical ability to do so without penalty. In practice, either an "involved father", or spouse who theoretically could be the father during the course of a marriage, is very likely to receive notice of an adoption and to be required to consent to it, unless parental rights have been terminated or the father raped the mother. But, this isn't the kind of situation present in the ER dialog. But, an "uninvolved father" (even if uninvolved through no fault of his own because he doesn't know that he has gotten the mother pregnant, for example) is entitled only to a registered letter to his last known address and mention in a newspaper legal classified advertisement, generally as provided by the mother if she chooses to cooperate in providing accurate information. He has really no recourse if he isn't given the notice he is entitled to under the statute. His pretty much exclusive remedy is to go through the hoops of the Putative Father Registry and then to file a paternity action in court, on very tight timelines, which he has probably never heard of and is in practice incapable of managing to comply with 95%+ of the time. Unless he was voluntarily and accurately put on the birth certificate by the mother, an "uninvolved father" has a very decent chance of getting no notice at all and not being able to do anything about it even if he later learns of the child's existence, unless the mother is clear that he is the father and acts with more good faith towards him in the notice process than is commonplace. There are criminal penalties for providing false information about the father, but if the petition is brought by someone other than the mother (as is usually the case) the mother faces no penalties for failing to be forthright on the birth certificate or in cooperating with the people who are filing the adoption petition. She generally need only sign a surrender of the child. She may or may not make any statements under oath or penalty of perjury, depending upon the way the relevant statute is interpreted and there are ways she can avoid much exposure to criminal liability in answering vaguely or inaccurately or claiming not to know. So, a mother has a practical ability to put her child up for adoption without the involvement of an "uninvolved father" without any real penalty for doing so, although there is at least a moral expectation that she will be forthright with the people handling the adoption process when they make an effort to get information about the father. Unless the father is informed by someone that the mother is pregnant, and he knows which state the mother will give birth to the child in or move to in order to conduct the adoption in, and he is aware of the tough requirements of the putative father's registry, the father has no real reason to know that he has to do anything to prevent his child from being adopted, unless the mother provides his accurate name and address to the people prepare the adoption papers. He has no real clear and obvious way to learn what he has to do in order to prevent an adoption from going through, and is very likely to think he is entitled to more notice than he actually is, and thus to be less pro-active that he needs to be to preserve his paternity rights. If he's lucky, he could also get notice through a newspaper legal advertisement publications that someone who cares about him (he almost surely doesn't read them) could see - but even if he learns by publication he may have a hard time taking the acts required to give him the right to deny consent to an adoption in time for it to matter legally. The process is also very unforgiving towards fathers who change their minds, even if they change their minds before the legal adoption process is over. Generally speaking, a father has no right to have an attorney appointed for him in a case where he is trying to assert his paternity if he is unable to afford one himself. In addition to the requirements of Illinois law set forth below, there is also generally a requirement to affirmatively state in adoption proceeding if the father is, or might be, a member of a Native American tribe, as that goes to the jurisdictional issue of the applicability of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, which requires notice, at a minimum, to the father's Indian tribe, even if notice cannot be given to the father. The Relevant Laws With regard to Illinois adoption laws there are a couple of statutes that are relevant: A Petition for adoption must state under oath per § 750 ILCS 50/5(f) (line breaks inserted editorially for ease of readability in this online format and not present in the original): The names, if known, and the place of residence, if known, of the parents; and whether such parents are minors, or otherwise under any legal disability. The names and addresses of the parents shall be omitted and they shall not be made parties defendant to the petition if (1) the rights of the parents have been terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (2) the child has been surrendered to an agency, or (3) the parent or parents have been served with the notice provided in Section 12a of this Act and said parent or parents have filed a disclaimer of paternity as therein provided or have failed to file such declaration of paternity or a request for notice as provided in said Section, or (4) the parent is a putative father or legal father of the child who has waived his parental rights by signing a waiver as provided in subsection S of Section 10; . . . Whatever orders, judgments or decrees have heretofore been entered by any court affecting (1) adoption or custody of the child, or (2) the adoptive, custodial or parental rights of either petitioner, including the prior denial of any petition for adoption pertaining to such child, or to the petitioners, or either of them. I've omitted provisions related to children with no living parents which involve notice to guardians and next of kin, and provisions related to "standby adoption" which is also beyond the scope of this question. Surrender to an agency is basically putting a child up for adoption before adoptive parents are lined up, and otherwise involves the same surrender or waiver process. Notice requirements per § 750 ILCS 50/7 are as follows (emphasis and line breaks added): A. All persons named in the petition for adoption or standby adoption, other than the petitioners and any party who has previously either denied being a parent pursuant to Section 12a of this Act or whose rights have been terminated pursuant to Section 12a of this Act, but including the person sought to be adopted, shall be made parties defendant by name, and if the name or names of any such persons are alleged in the petition to be unknown such persons shall be made parties defendant under the name and style of "All whom it may concern". In all such actions petitioner or his attorney shall file, at the office of the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, an affidavit showing that the defendant resides or has gone out of this State, or on due inquiry cannot be found, or is concealed within this State, so that process cannot be served upon him, and stating the place of residence of the defendant, if known, or that upon diligent inquiry his place of residence cannot be ascertained, the clerk shall cause publication to be made in some newspaper published in the county in which the action is pending. . . . In the event there is service on any of the parties by publication, the publication shall contain notice of pendency of the action, the name of the person to be adopted and the name of the parties to be served by publication, and the date on or after which default may be entered against such parties. . . . B. A minor defendant who has been served in accordance with this Section may be defaulted in the same manner as any other defendant. C. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of this or any other law, and in addition to the notice requirements of any law pertaining to persons other than those specified in this subsection, the persons entitled to notice that a petition has been filed under Section 5 of this Act shall include: (a) any person adjudicated by a court in this State to be the father of the child; (b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of the United States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the court order has been filed with the Putative Father Registry under Section 12.1 of this Act; (c) any person who at the time of the filing of the petition is registered in the Putative Father Registry under Section 12.1 of this Act as the putative father of the child; (d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's father; (e) any person who is openly living with the child or the child's mother at the time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the child's father; (f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother in a written, sworn statement, including an Affidavit of Identification as specified under Section 11 of this Act; (g) any person who was married to the child's mother on the date of the child's birth or within 300 days prior to the child's birth. The sole purpose of notice under this Section shall be to enable the person receiving notice to appear in the adoption proceedings to present evidence to the court relevant to whether the consent or surrender of the person to the adoption is required pursuant to Section 8 of this Act. If the court determines that the consent or surrender of the person is not required pursuant to Section 8, then the person shall not be entitled to participate in the proceedings or to any further notice of the proceedings. and § 750 ILCS 50/12a. Notice to putative father Upon the written request to any Clerk of any Circuit Court . . . a notice, the declaration of paternity and the disclaimer of paternity may be served on a putative father in the same manner as Summons is served in other civil proceedings, or, in lieu of personal service, service may be made as follows: . . . The Clerk shall forthwith mail to the putative father, at the address appearing in the Affidavit, the copy of the notice, the declaration of paternity and the disclaimer of paternity, by certified mail, return receipt requested; Consent requirements are as follows (line breaks added editorially, provisions for cases where there is a surrender to an agency and then a later adoption rather than a direct adoption, which are substantially similar, are also omitted): § 750 ILCS 50/8. Consents to adoption and surrenders for purposes of adoption (a) Except as hereinafter provided in this Section consents or surrenders shall be required in all cases, unless the person whose consent or surrender would otherwise be required shall be found by the court: (1) to be an unfit person as defined in Section 1 of this Act, by clear and convincing evidence; or (2) not to be the biological or adoptive father of the child; or (3) to have waived his parental rights to the child under Section 12a or 12.1 or subsection S of Section 10 of this Act; or (4) to be the parent of an adult sought to be adopted; or (5) to be the father of the child as a result of criminal sexual abuse or assault as defined under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012; or (6) to be the father of a child who: (i) is a family member of the mother of the child, and the mother is under the age of 18 at the time of the child's conception; for purposes of this subsection, a "family member" is a parent, step-parent, grandparent, step-grandparent, sibling, or cousin of the first degree, whether by whole blood, half-blood, or adoption, as well as a person age 18 or over at the time of the child's conception who has resided in the household with the mother continuously for at least one year; or (ii) is at least 5 years older than the child's mother, and the mother was under the age of 17 at the time of the child's conception, unless the mother and father voluntarily acknowledge the father's paternity of the child by marrying or by establishing the father's paternity by consent of the parties pursuant to the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 or pursuant to a substantially similar statute in another state. A criminal conviction of any offense pursuant to Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-1.70, 12C-5, 12C-10, 12C-35, 12C-40, 12C-45, 18-6, 19-6, or Article 12 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 is not required. (b) Where consents are required in the case of an adoption of a minor child, the consents of the following persons shall be sufficient: (1) (A) The mother of the minor child; and (B) The father of the minor child, if the father: (i) was married to the mother on the date of birth of the child or within 300 days before the birth of the child, except for a husband or former husband who has been found by a court of competent jurisdiction not to be the biological father of the child; or (ii) is the father of the child under a judgment for adoption, an order of parentage, or an acknowledgment of parentage or paternity pursuant to subsection (a) of Section 5 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 or pursuant to Article 3 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015; or (iii) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents less than 6 months after birth, openly lived with the child, the child's biological mother, or both, and held himself out to be the child's biological father during the first 30 days following the birth of the child; or (iv) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents less than 6 months after birth, made a good faith effort to pay a reasonable amount of the expenses related to the birth of the child and to provide a reasonable amount for the financial support of the child before the expiration of 30 days following the birth of the child, provided that the court may consider in its determination all relevant circumstances, including the financial condition of both biological parents; or (v) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents more than 6 months after birth, has maintained substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child as manifested by: (I) the payment by the father toward the support of the child of a fair and reasonable sum, according to the father's means, and either (II) the father's visiting the child at least monthly when physically and financially able to do so and not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child, or (III) the father's regular communication with the child or with the person or agency having the care or custody of the child, when physically and financially unable to visit the child or prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child. The subjective intent of the father, whether expressed or otherwise unsupported by evidence of acts specified in this sub-paragraph as manifesting such intent, shall not preclude a determination that the father failed to maintain substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child; or (vi) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents more than six months after birth, openly lived with the child for a period of six months within the one year period immediately preceding the placement of the child for adoption and openly held himself out to be the father of the child; or (vii) has timely registered with Putative Father Registry, as provided in Section 12.1 of this Act, and prior to the expiration of 30 days from the date of such registration, commenced legal proceedings to establish paternity under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, under the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, or under the law of the jurisdiction of the child's birth; or . . . (4) Any person or agency having legal custody of a child by court order if the parental rights of the parents have been judicially terminated, and the court having jurisdiction of the guardianship of the child has authorized the consent to the adoption; or (5) The execution and verification of the petition by any petitioner who is also a parent of the child sought to be adopted shall be sufficient evidence of such parent's consent to the adoption. There are rules governing when a parent may consent to adoption: § 750 ILCS 50/9. Time for signing a waiver, consent, or surrender A. A consent or a surrender signed not less than 72 hours after the birth of the child is irrevocable except as provided in Section 11 of this Act. B. No consent or surrender shall be signed within the 72 hour period immediately following the birth of the child. C. A consent or a surrender may be signed by the father prior to the birth of the child. Such consent or surrender shall be revoked if, within 72 hours after the birth of the child, the father who gave such consent or surrender, notifies in writing the person, agency or court representative who acknowledged the surrender or consent or any individual representing or connected with such person, agency or court representative of the revocation of the consent or surrender. D. Any consent or surrender signed in accordance with paragraph C above which is not revoked within 72 hours after the birth of the child is irrevocable except as provided in Section 11 of this Act. . . . F. A waiver as provided in subsection S of Section 10 of this Act may be signed by a putative father or legal father of the child at any time prior to or after the birth of the child. A waiver is irrevocable except as provided in Section 11 of this Act. Consents and waivers have to follow a standard form with warnings in it set forth in Section 10 of the Act. An Affidavit of Identification by the mother has legal effect is she executes it as set forth in the section below, but it is optional and other forms of due diligence are permitted: § 750 ILCS 50/11. Consents, surrenders, waivers, irrevocability (a) A consent to adoption or standby adoption by a parent, including a minor, executed and acknowledged in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 of this Act, or a surrender of a child by a parent, including a minor, to an agency for the purpose of adoption shall be irrevocable unless it shall have been obtained by fraud or duress on the part of the person before whom such consent, surrender, or other document equivalent to a surrender is acknowledged pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of this Act or on the part of the adopting parents or their agents and a court of competent jurisdiction shall so find. No action to void or revoke a consent to or surrender for adoption, including an action based on fraud or duress, may be commenced after 12 months from the date the consent or surrender was executed. The consent or surrender of a parent who is a minor shall not be voidable because of such minority. (a-1) A waiver signed by a putative or legal father, including a minor, executed and acknowledged in accordance with Section 10 of this Act, shall be irrevocable unless it shall have been obtained by fraud or duress on the part of the adopting parents or their agents and a court of competent jurisdiction shall so find. No action to void a waiver may be commenced after 12 months from the date the waiver was executed. The waiver of a putative or legal father who is a minor shall not be voidable because of such minority. (b) The petitioners in an adoption proceeding are entitled to rely upon a sworn statement of the biological mother of the child to be adopted identifying the father of her child. The affidavit shall be conclusive evidence as to the biological mother regarding the facts stated therein, and shall create a rebuttable presumption of truth as to the biological father only. Except as provided in Section 11 of this Act, the biological mother of the child shall be permanently barred from attacking the proceeding thereafter. The biological mother shall execute such affidavit in writing and under oath. The affidavit shall be executed by the biological mother before or at the time of execution of the consent or surrender, and shall be retained by the court and be a part of the Court's files. One could read the language above as requiring an Affidavit of Identification, but there is also a fair reading of it that states that it is only one possible means of many to determine who is entitled to notice. In other words "shall execute" could mean that if you execute it at all, it must be in writing and under oath. The "shall be executed by the biological mother before or at the time of execution of the consent or surrender" language seems more firm, but in practice, even if she does sign it under oath, if she simply says "I don't know" there is really no way that anyone can prove anything different in a way that would stick and criminal perjury convictions, in practice, are almost completely non-existent. The Putative Father registry is subject to the following rules: § 750 ILCS 50/12.1. Putative Father Registry The Department of Children and Family Services shall establish a Putative Father Registry for the purpose of determining the identity and location of a putative father of a minor child who is, or is expected to be, the subject of an adoption proceeding, in order to provide notice of such proceeding to the putative father. . . . (a) The Department shall maintain the following information in the Registry: (1) With respect to the putative father: (i) Name, including any other names by which the putative father may be known and that he may provide to the Registry; (ii)Address at which he may be served with notice of a petition under this Act, including any change of address; (iii) Social Security Number; (iv)Date of birth; and (v) If applicable, a certified copy of an order by a court of this State or of another state or territory of the United States adjudicating the putative father to be the father of the child. (2) With respect to the mother of the child: (i) Name, including all other names known to the putative father by which the mother may be known; (ii) If known to the putative father, her last address; (iii)Social Security Number; and (iv)Date of birth. (3) If known to the putative father, the name, gender, place of birth, and date of birth or anticipated date of birth of the child. (4) The date that the Department received the putative father's registration. . . . (b) A putative father may register with the Department before the birth of the child but shall register no later than 30 days after the birth of the child. All registrations shall be in writing and signed by the putative father. No fee shall be charged for the initial registration. The Department shall have no independent obligation to gather the information to be maintained. (c) An interested party, including persons intending to adopt a child, a child welfare agency with whom the mother has placed or has given written notice of her intention to place a child for adoption, the mother of the child, or an attorney representing an interested party may request that the Department search the Registry to determine whether a putative father is registered in relation to a child who is or may be the subject to an adoption petition. . . . (d) A search of the Registry may be proven by the production of a certified copy of the registration form, or by the certified statement of the administrator of the Registry that after a search, no registration of a putative father in relation to a child who is or may be the subject of an adoption petition could be located. (e) Except as otherwise provided, information contained within the Registry is confidential and shall not be published or open to public inspection. (f) A person who knowingly or intentionally registers false information under this Section commits a Class B misdemeanor. A person who knowingly or intentionally releases confidential information in violation of this Section commits a Class B misdemeanor. (g) Except as provided in subsections (b) or (c) of Section 8 of this Act, a putative father who fails to register with the Putative Father Registry as provided in this Section is barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to assert any interest in the child, unless he proves by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) it was not possible for him to register within the period of time specified in subsection (b) of this Section; and (2) his failure to register was through no fault of his own; and (3) he registered within 10 days after it became possible for him to file. A lack of knowledge of the pregnancy or birth is not an acceptable reason for failure to register. (h) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of Section 8 of this Act, failure to timely register with the Putative Father Registry (i) shall be deemed to be a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of the child, and the consent or surrender of that person to the adoption of the child is not required, and (ii) shall constitute an abandonment of the child and shall be prima facie evidence of sufficient grounds to support termination of such father's parental rights under this Act. (i) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to a child born out of wedlock, if there is no showing that a putative father has executed a consent or surrender or waived his rights regarding the proposed adoption, certification as specified in subsection (d) shall be filed with the court prior to entry of a final judgment order of adoption. (j) The Registry shall not be used to notify a putative father who is the father of a child as a result of criminal sexual abuse or assault as defined under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012. This is limited by two other main provisions: § 750 ILCS 50/20b. Time limit for relief from final judgment or order A petition for relief from a final order or judgment entered in a proceeding under this Act, after 30 days from the entry thereof under the provisions of Sec. 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise, must be filed not later than one year after the entry of the order or judgment. and Illinois Compiled Statutes Rights and Remedies Chapter 750. Families Act 55. Contest of Adoptions Act Current through P.A. 99-0919 (2015-2016) § 750 ILCS 55/1. No attack upon or proceedings contesting the validity of an adoption decree heretofore entered shall be made either directly or collaterally because of the failure to serve notice on or give notice to the reputed father, unless such attack or proceedings shall be instituted within one year after the effective date of this Act. (The effective date was in 1949.) | Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice. | Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country. | The physical cash in the bank is not your property, at least not in US law (according to Scalia). It becomes your property when the withdrawal is performed by some means specified in your contract. A deposit gives you a contractual right to demand money from the bank. Bank robbery is a crime. Having money deposited with the bank doesn't change that. The only possible chance a robber has at trial is jury nullification. I haven't found records for that in Lebanon, but it does have jury trials. Impartial review classifies Lebanon's justice system as somewhat corrupt, but generally compliant with the basic principles. So it might be possible to get away with it at trial, but a very long shot. | She never said that She said: When I joined that family, that was the last time, until we came here, that I saw my passport, my driver's licence, my keys. All that gets turned over With respect to my adult children and their passports, the same is true in my house. I ask them for their passports when they aren’t needed, they give them to me, I store them in a safe place and I give them back to them when they need them. That’s just a sensible precaution against them being lost and in no way illegal. Now if I took their passports without permission and withheld them when they wanted them, that would be illegal as it would for anyone else including the Queen (who, I’m sure, had absolutely nothing to do with it - that’s the job of the Keeper of the Royal Passports or some such). Similarly, if you came to my house and I offered to take your coat and you gave it to me and I gave it back when you left, that would be perfectly legal. When I pull up in my car, I put my keys in a bowl in the laundry (unless I forget and then I can’t find them and it’s really annoying). I would prefer instead to have an employee jump into the car, park it and put the keys in their bowl so that when I want the car latter, it’s their job to remember where they left the keys. But I can’t afford that. | Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority. | There might be some relevant state law. Michigan has a Social Security Number Privacy Act, which limits use of SS numbers, such as publically displaying an amount of a number, use it as an account number, require it to be transmitted insecurely over the internet, mail it etc. However, it is allowed under 3(a) to mail a number in a document if the purpose is to identify an individual, especially 3(a)(iv), to Lawfully pursue or enforce a person's legal rights, including, but not limited to, an audit, collection, investigation, or transfer of a tax, employee benefit, debt, claim, receivable, or account or an interest in a receivable or account. It would depends on your state, but it is highly likely that debt collection is an allowed purpose (even if it not a real debt, just a good-faith mistake). This gives a brief overview of state laws. |
Would anyone have standing to challenge Biden's student loan forgiveness program? Assuming that President Biden does sign an Executive Order to forgive student loans, would anyone have standing to challenge this action in court? Presumably those whose debt was discharged won't have standing because they didn't suffer any damages but how about Congress or some other government institution? | Not less than a full house of Congress, and perhaps Congress as a whole, might have standing. It is hard to see anyone else who would. The law of Congressional standing (the link is to a report of the Congressional Research Service, a policy research arm of the Library of Congress that does research for Congress) is quite involved and is not perfectly consistent and clear. Congress would argue that it has suffered an institutional injury as an institution and perhaps authorize someone to bring suit on its behalf via a joint resolution. As the Court explained in Arizona State Legislature, an “institutional injury” is an injury that “scarcely zeroe[s] in on any individual member,” but rather “impact[s] all Members of Congress and both Houses . . . equally.” There is considerable uncertainty regarding how this would be applied which is not really at issue in this case at the present time since Democrats control both houses of Congress and support the President in this policy. Individuals legislators lack standing to sue in a case like this one. See also Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, "Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court", 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571 (2014); Matthew L. Hall, "Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation", 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1539 (2012). A blog entry from a law professor considers the question and comes up with the Congressional standing analysis above, the notion that a loan serving company paid on the dollar value of the loans serviced might have standing (which isn't inconceivable but is a stretch), and finally considers "competitor standing", a minority view that I do not think is sound in these circumstances (because the forgiveness is retroactive only and does not change competitive positions going forward). | To be determined. Warren Decision [t]he duty to provide public services is owed to the public at large, and, absent a special relationship between the police and an individual, no specific legal duty exists [emphasis added] Castle Rock and Warren denied the existence of a legal duty to specific individuals of performance of law enforcement activity given the specific fact pattern in those cases. These rulings have been generalized into what's been called the No Duty to Rescue Doctrine (NDRD). It's possible a future court could uphold those principles and apply the NDRD to the Parkland case. Or not. Depends on the arguments of fact and law made in court to that effect. The primary argument against applying the NDRD might be as you described, i.e., the specific nature of Peterson's duty assignment to Parkland. One interesting angle on this question is if Peterson owed a duty to act, then who rightfully owned the debt of his obligation? One could argue the Sherrif's department that employed Peterson was the sole lawful holder of his duty to perform and not the school or the victims. In short, it's all very complex and the specific facts at play (which are still surfacing) will be determinative as no applicable statutes or case law yet exist that extend beyond the cited references. | It's not clear what the big deal is. Congress has already passed vast numbers of laws for POTUS to enforce, and has left the details of implementation up to the executive branch. The main limitation is that you need a Congress to fund any new federal government projects. The Constitution anticipates this problem, and there are clauses regarding filling vacancies (clearly applicable to the dead). Assuming that zombies are rioting in the streets, POTUS can invoke the National Emergencies Act, issuing an executive order to call out the National Guard. | Yes. In 1872 President Grant was stopped for speeding (on horseback, mind you). The officer, observing that he had stopped the President of the United States, initially let him go with nothing but a verbal warning. Later the same day, the same officer stopped Grant again speeding in the same place. The officer then informed Grant that he would have to be taken in, to which Grant gave a reply encouraging the officer to do his duty. Grant was then taken to the police station where he was charged with speeding, and held until he paid a $20 fine, at which point he was released. In summary, POTUS was: Charged with an offence Deprived of his liberty for committing said offence Held until he served his punishment (paying $20) ... all without impeachment. Now, this was a long time ago. I think that today, this is unlikely, since Secret Service would (legal or not) shield the President from arrests (national security reasons). However if a state level authority did manage to arrest the President for a crime and refused to let him go, then the Vice President and cabinet would invoke the 25th Amendment (on the grounds that the President is unable to discharge his duties due to imprisonment), so that the imprisoned person would now be a former president. | No. There are few if any checks on any President for any Pardons issued (a general Impeachment may be the only check but there has never been a strong call for impeachment for a pardon.). Further more, the protection against Double Jeopardy is in effect meaning future Presidents cannot prosecute the pardon recipient for any crimes that were pardoned by a previous president, though they may prosecute any future criminal incidents perpetrated by the pardoned person that are not related to the events surrounding the pardoned crime. | Vice President Aaron Burr was indicted in his last year as Vice President in both New Jersey and New York. The crime was killing Alexander Hamilton in an (illegal) duel. His solution? Simply don't go to those states. Eventually the charges were dropped on technical reasons. But it was nevertheless clear that no one considered it a particular problem for a sitting Vice President to be indicted in multiple states at a time, or even just one. This bit of history is even mentioned in the revised DOJ opinion referred to in Putvi's answer. Ultimately that opinion decides that the comparison between a Vice President and President is apples-to-oranges nonsense—their relative levels of power, importance, and constitutional stature are radically different—, and no substantive inferences could be made from a VP's indictability to the President's. Of course, this DOJ opinion is just the opinion of DOJ lawyers. It is not a court opinion, nor otherwise binding. It does strike me as well-written and logically strong, but it is wholly untested in a court of law (SCOTUS or otherwise). It is simply their advice on what the best course of action the DOJ can take is, given their particular function and powers within the US government and overall constitution. The main conclusion being that those functions and powers are inadequate for the DOJ to decide if it is constitutionally sound to indict a sitting President (that's a job for the judiciary), and so simply advises that they avoid that powder keg and never do so. The opinions actually do specifically hold that it might be constitutional in the right situations; they simply conclude they cannot and should not be the ones deciding if a particular case qualifies or not. For a more definitive answer, you may have to wait for various court cases against President Trump and his administration to make their way through the system. In several of them the President's/White House's lawyers have argued for absolute immunity on all criminal matters, state or federal. The judges have, to date, seemed disinclined to agree; many seem straight-up shocked that this is being seriously proposed to them. But those cases are still in progress, so we can at best make random guesses at what the actual opinions will be, and it is even harder to know what will happen on the almost-certain appeals up to the Supreme Court. | I will assume for this question you are referring to a US Department of Education backed loan. In that case, according to the US DoE website: If you, the borrower, die, then your federal student loans will be discharged. If you are a parent PLUS loan borrower, then the loan may be discharged if you die, or if the student on whose behalf you obtained the loan dies. The loan will be discharged if a family member or other representative provides a certified copy of the death certificate to the school (for a Federal Perkins Loan) or to the loan servicer (for a Direct Loan or FFEL Program loan). For more information, contact your loan servicer. If, however, it is a private student loan, it will have to be paid by the estate. | There is nothing wrong with this requirement. The teacher or professor isn't requiring you to change your opinion. Instead, the requirement is simply to marshall evidence in favor of an opinion that you may not hold. Being able to do this is a valuable rhetorical skill (and a skill which lawyers must routinely employ). For example, in competitive debate, you often do not have the freedom to decide whether you will be arguing in favor or against a resolution, and may not even know which side you will be advancing until moments before the event starts. Freedom of conscience does not extend to freedom from understanding people who disagree with your deeply held belief. UPDATE: Requiring a whole classroom of students (possibly many classrooms of students) to advocate with multiple representatives for a bill does seem problematic, in terms of election laws and probably in terms of the legal requirements that apply to the university, and also possibly in terms of "forced speech", because in requiring the advocacy to be submitted to the official and take a particular position, goes beyond the "let's pretend" veneer that applies in most debate contexts. |
How does representing oneself affect one's chance of winning a lawsuit? Statistically, how much less likely is a pro se litigant in "regular" court (i.e. not arbitration or small claims court) to win against a litigant with a lawyer than another litigant with a lawyer would be? For example, what percent of pro se plaintiffs or defendants have won lawsuits compared to those with lawyers? | australia Statistics are difficult to come by and straight comparisons are not valid: Greiner and Pattanayak’s observations about the difficulty in measuring the impact of self-representation on outcomes because of the trouble in separating the ‘hopeless, sure-win, or representation-makes-a-difference cases.' … whether lawyers change case outcomes is very difficult to determine empirically. There are many confounding factors, including what counts as a good outcome, how outcomes can be measured, the strength of the case, the quality of the lawyer, the ability of the litigant, the nature of the forum, the approach of the judge, and the complexity of the law on the issue. This 2018 report has the following info: in the Federal Administrative Appeals Tribunal unrepresented persons were successful 22.5% and represented 51.3% the County Court of Victoria had 43 Judicial Registrar reviews of which 23 settled - 14 with representation, 9 without. the Supreme Court of Queensland said SRL were successful in 4.9% of civil and 18.9% of criminal appeals and there was, therefore, a ‘need for increased legal aid funding and pro bono assistance at appellate level’. The High Court of Australia kept statistics between 1992-93 and 2005-06: 1.5% of SRL succeeded in their appeals compared with 27.7% of represented. The report surveys united-states outcomes: Sandefur’s meta-analysis of such US studies concluded that parties are more likely to win when legally represented but the relative advantage of being legally represented or an SRL varies significantly. She noted that legal representation is most likely to be advantageous in adversarial settings and in procedurally complex areas of law. In contrast, Greiner and Pattanayak found no significant effect on outcomes for SRLs in their randomised trial, nor in the other literature on outcomes for SRLs. However, more SRL felt that the outcome was fair and were satisfied with the process than represented litigants. SRL are more likely to proceed to adjudication than to settle and this may both affect their relative success and their satisfaction with the process. There is a lack of understanding by some SRLs that court is seen as a last resort and that most lawyers will take a conciliatory approach in order to settle before adjudication. Toy-Cronin highlights that it ‘comes as a surprise to many LiPs that much litigation work occurs outside the court and that through the preparatory stage and right up to the door of the courtroom, there is encouragement to settle.; Toy-Cronin argues that many of these reasons represent the tension arising from the projected accessibility of the court and protecting the scarce resource of hearing time in court. In essence, SRLs ‘lack strategic overview [which] means they do not know where a reasonable settlement lies, [they] can be difficult to communicate with, and … expect resolution by way of adjudication.’ That is, a SRL is more likely to want their day in court. Lawyers don't because they know court is an all-or-nothing coin toss on the contentious issues and completely unnecessary on ones where the law and fact are reasonably certain. | Because your legal fees and contract damages are not "in addition to" your risk; they are your risk. If you pay the retainer and lose, you don't lose anything more than the retainer and damages. If you pay the retainer and win, you don't win anything more than the retainer and damages. The only kind of argument I can see here is that you're incurring some kind of psychic cost by enduring the uncertainty surrounding the litigation, but I can't remember ever seeing a case -- in Florida or elsewhere -- in which the court recognized taking on risk as a compensable harm, especially in a contract case, where damages are much more limited than in other kinds of cases. Risk is just a necessary feature of an adversarial legal system. | If you're in the United States, another lawyer in a firm you've hired may or may not be your attorney, but it would not be uncommon for him to have some involvement in the case, and he would be expected to treat you as a client in terms of privilege and conflicts of interest. Just the same, this is something you need to be very direct on. "Are you my attorney?" or "Have we established an attorney-client relationship?" are going to be your best options. | One important formal difference is that self-represented litigants cannot claim the same costs if they prevail in a civil case. Costs are capped at 2/3 of what they would have received, had they been represented. ("Disbursements", such as court fees, are not subject to the same limit.) Moreover, their deemed hourly rate is £19/hr, unless it's possible to demonstrate that they've incurred greater financial loss as a result of doing the work. This is much less than the billed rate for qualified counsel. A less practical privilege is wearing gowns and wigs. Self-represented litigants are not allowed to pretend that they are barristers by donning their finest horsehair, or going on about "my learned friend". Solicitor-advocates are "my friend" but laypeople should not use this language at all. Outside of the courtroom, ordinary people can in principle do their own conveyancing (for example), but there are many practical obstacles. One is being fully exposed to the costs of mistakes. Mortgage lenders will often refuse to let random members of the public take care of the legal intricacies, and some solicitors on the other side will advise their clients not to bother. There are also a few technicalities which are easier for practicing solicitors, such as access to DX (a specialist private postal service) for shuttling reams of paper documents across the country. Case law (Domb v Isoz [1980] 1 All ER 942) lets solicitors effect an exchange of contracts by telephone, but this has not been recognised for other people, who continue to have to do it physically. | Your attorney can file a lawsuit against the other driver, and legal liability can be determined in court. Your want to let an attorney do this, because the one thing that keeps you from being (expensively) counter-sued for defamation is that you didn't name the driver and insurance company. It is extremely unlikely that the other driver accused you of liability ("liable" is a legal conclusion, not a fact). Instead, there is a dispute over the facts. During the trial, both sides get to present their evidence and the judge will determine who is actually liable. If you are found liable, your insurance company may have to pay up. If the other guy is found liable, his company will have to pay up. Or, fault can be split 50-50 (in which case you will be out of luck because you don't have collision insurance to cover your losses). If the insurance company believes that the facts support their client and that you will lose in court, they are not going to volunteer to pay your losses. If they believe that the facts support you, or are closer to 50-50 w.r.t. fault, they are unlikely to volunteer to give you money. If the driver makes a material plainly false statement to his insurance company, they might have recourse against him. Lying under oath is perjury which is a criminal offense. But mis-remembering facts or having incorrect beliefs is not a crime and won't lead to any legal problems for the driver. The belief that you are not at fault is not a lie. If the facts are as cut and dried as you make them out to be, the matter will be easily sorted out in court. | Law is more like sport than mathematics You don’t know how it will turn out until you play the game. If a case goes to trial it’s because at both sides believe they can win. Both sides probably have good reasons for their belief. At least one of them is wrong. | The only way in which you could be "incorrectly listed as a defendant" is if somehow your name was typed in as a party (there would be a glaring gap, that no paragraph of the complaint says anything about you as a defendant). Assuming the situation is nothing so bizarre as a typo, you are a defendant. Whether or not you are liable in this case is a matter of fact and law, and the plaintiff's attorney has probably done due diligence in suing everybody imaginable. Perhaps the plaintiff lied to his attorney about material facts (read the complaint); or perhaps there is a credible legal theory under which you would be liable (read the complaint). Your attorney will take care of your problems, to the best of his ability. He may be able to persuade the plaintiff's attorney that they stand no realistic hope of winning and some chance of getting smacked for pointlessly involving you. If the plaintiff's attorney isn't persuaded by the argument, your attorney could submit the legal arguments as a motion to dismiss. If the judge is not persuaded (at this stage), you (your attorney) will have to counter the arguments presented at trial. | You want a lawyer who accepts tenant-side landlord tenant cases, usually a solo practitioner or small law firm or legal clinic. Medium to large sized law firms usually don't practice that kind of law at all, or only represent landlords, as a matter of policy. The usual problem, however, is that lawyers are often too expensive relative to the amount in controversy to make sense to hire to fully represent you in a matter like this one. You might want to have a "limited engagement" such as a one time consult with a lawyer, rather than a full retention of a lawyer, over an issue like this one. |
Why is it legal for professors to present out-of-date information as practical and fact, when doctors are expected to give patients the latest cures? Why is it illegal for doctors to not give the latest cure, keep in touch with the latest cures, find everything for the patient, but professors do not lose a practicing license as a result of teaching the out-of-date information and can tell their students (patients) to go figure out what prescription (information) they need themselves? Doing that as a doctor would be to tell their patients to die and succumb to nature. Imagine if a doctor during a visit in clinic did not give a diagnosis but instead gives lectures about history of some disease and medicine starting from Roman history on how to cure your illness via medieval methods and told you that you have to build a medicine from scratch and cure yourself or use the medieval methods that they present as facts and current medicine, and you leave the doctor's office not having a prescription and have a bill of a couple thousand dollars. A doctor has to show you the best cancer medicines available if you were to have cancer, but a professor may produce figures that are out-of-date and never update their lecture slides. Professors often teach from historical perspectives minus the last 70 years' of new developments, and ask you to figure out everything new/practical yourself, and you pay them a hundred dollars or more per lecture. I cannot name the law requiring professors to disclose if their lecture slides have out-of-date information but I am sure I can sue my doctor for prescribing a drug or handing me a drug that is out-of-date/was reverted to banned without telling me. Imagine if your doctor treated you with the same contempt as a professor. | Because the law of negligence has developed to include a duty of care between physicians and patients and the standard of care encompasses the things you describe. The common law conceives of the doctor and patient in such a close relationship of neighbor-ness that it makes sense to impose such a duty. The harm that flows from breach of that duty is often reasonably foreseeable. Another distinction is that you come to a physician with an illness and expect care and they purport to deliver it. Their care and advice is often not a product/service that you might have the option of not buying. There is no competing legal duty that pulls the physician in any other direction than to meet the standard of care. There is no corresponding duty of care between an instructor and student to instruct any particular syllabus content. It would be a novel addition to the common law if this were to be recongized. There is no standard of care dictating the content of the syllabus. Any obligation to deliver a particular syllabus would be placed on the professor by the university (perhaps further dicated by professional accrediting bodies). I do not foresee the common law developing to include such a duty of care between professor and student. The value of academic freedom weighs against the law imposing a strict duty on syllabus content and the kind of harm that might flow from presenting out-of-date information is vague and not often reasonably foreseeable. Such a duty could give rise to a spectre of of indeterminate liability. And it isn't clear that the interest in presenting the latest and current theories always outweighs the interest in presenting a historical perspective. These are all reasons why I highly doubt the common law would ever evolve to recognize the duty you're proposing. | The answer isn't really legal (though some jurisdictions regulate the use of such titles through statute), but academic. It depends on specific countries. Italy, for instance, allows all graduates, including undergraduates, to use the title doctor. However, in general the title doctor is reserved for those in medical professions, upon graduation, or holders of post-graduate doctoral degrees - the PhD, DLitt., LLD, and so on. The purpose is, for medical graduates, to allow them to identify themselves as medical practitioners. However, for doctoral graduates, the purpose is to recognise your contributions to the academic field. The JD is a qualifying degree - you've hardly contributed to the field. The JD is absolutely not similar to a doctoral program. It is far more similar to the LLB, however its origins are rooted in the equalisation of professional degrees in the USA - the LLB was conferred upon those who had already completed their first degree, and so the change to a JD was merely so that they could confer a "second" degree. | germany How illegal is it to give your prescription medicine to another person (in any amount)? Under the conditions: you are a private person you are giving (not selling) it is not, in itsself, illegal to give your prescription medicine to another person. OLG Stuttgart, Beschluss vom 18.01.2012 - 4 Ss 664/11 - openJur Nur die berufs- oder gewerbsmäßige Abgabe von Arzneimitteln, die apothekenpflichtig oder von einem Arzt verschrieben worden sind, an Endverbraucher außerhalb von Apotheken unterliegt der Strafbarkeit nach §§ 95 Abs. Abs. 1 Nr. 4, 43 Abs. 3 Satz 1 AMG. Die Abgabe verschreibungspflichtiger Arzneimittel an Verbraucher ist nach § 96 Nr. 13 AMG nur strafbar, wenn der Handelnde Apotheker oder eine sonst zur Abgabe von Arzneimitteln befugte Person ist. Das Tatbestandsmerkmal der Berufs- oder Gewerbsmäßigkeit bezieht sich auf sämtliche Tathandlungen des § 97 Abs. 2 Nr. 10 AMG. Die unerlaubte Abgabe auf Grund ärztlicher Verschreibung erworbener Betäubungsmittel an einen Dritten ist nicht von § 4 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 a BtMG gedeckt. 3a: auf Grund ärztlicher, zahnärztlicher oder tierärztlicher Verschreibung, Only the professional or commercial sale of pharmaceuticals that are sold in pharmacies or have been prescribed by a doctor to end users outside of pharmacies is subject to criminal liability under Sections 95 (1) No. 4, 43 (3) sentence 1 AMG. According to § 96 No. 13 AMG, the supply of prescription drugs to consumers is only punishable if the person acting is a pharmacist or another person authorized to supply drugs. The constituent element of professional or commercial activity refers to all acts of § 97 para. 2 no. 10 AMG. The unauthorized supply of narcotics acquired on the basis of a doctor's prescription to a third party is not covered by § 4 Para. 1 No. 3 a BtMG. 3a: on the basis of a medical, dental or veterinary prescription, Sources: OLG Stuttgart, Beschluss vom 18.01.2012 - 4 Ss 664/11 - openJur Medicinal Products Act (Arzneimittelgesetz – AMG) §43 - Pharmacy-only requirement, placing on the market by veterinarians §95 - Penal Provisions §96 - Penal Provisions §97 - Provisions on administrative fines | The "logbook" is required by federal law, part of the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005. See 21 USC 830 (e) (1) (A): Each regulated seller shall ensure that, subject to subparagraph (F), sales by such seller of a scheduled listed chemical product at retail are made in accordance with the following [...] (ii) The seller maintains, in accordance with criteria issued by the Attorney General, a written or electronic list of such sales that identifies the products by name, the quantity sold, the names and addresses of purchasers, and the dates and times of the sales (which list is referred to in this subsection as the “logbook”), except that such requirement does not apply to any purchase by an individual of a single sales package if that package contains not more than 60 milligrams of pseudoephedrine. "Scheduled listed chemical" is defined in 21 USC 802 (45) and includes pseudoephedrine (the active ingredient of Sudafed). As you can see, no distinction is drawn between prescription and OTC purchases. HIPAA became law in 1996. I'm not sure whether HIPAA would normally forbid the keeping of such a logbook (it mostly restricts how a provider can disclose information, not so much how it can store information), but even if it did, CMEA was passed later, so it would take precedence. Thus there is no way to "enable HIPAA" to avoid CMEA's requirements. (The passage quoted above does indicate a possible way to avoid the logbook: buy less than 60 mg at a time. That seems to correspond to two standard tablets. However, it's conceivable that a pharmacy might decide it wants to put such purchases in its logbook anyway; it's not clear to me that HIPAA or any other law would forbid them from making that a condition of purchase.) There may also be specific laws in your state placing further restrictions on pseudoephedrine purchases. | Presumably you consented to have an x-ray. It is a reasonable assumption that it was not your intention to simply be given the films without interpretation by a radiologist. If that was your intention then the obligation would be on you to make that clear since it is so far from ordinary practice that no reasonable person could know that. To use your analogy it would be like you asking to have your window washed but not wanting to have the soapy water rinsed off afterwards (assuming these were separately billable services). Further, rights and obligations under contracts are transferable by default. So it is perfectly legitimate for the lab to outsource the radiography without having to ask you. | It is not legal to give false responses on such a declaration. The point of anti-discrimination laws is that they say when it is legal vs. not legal to discriminate against an employee, and Alex is expected to have faith in the legal system to protect his legal rights. Dissatisfaction with the outcome of the law may be understandable, but still does not legally justify falsifying information given to an employer. In certain cases (look for the fine print and mentions of "penalty of perjury") you can be fined and imprisoned for lying. More commonly, your employment can be terminated when you are discovered. You may also be held liable for consequences of such lies. Your employer's health insurance contract might require truthful and accurate reporting of medical facts and a lie about your condition could result in termination of coverage. | It is legal. What would be illegal is for a public school to promote or inhibit a religion. You can teach all sorts of facts that touch on religion (millennia of Western history) and you can e.g. survey the major religions of the worlds as a cultural phenomenon. You can use circumlocutions or proper names. It's not illegal to confess to having personal beliefs. This is about public schools, which is an arm of the government. A person who is in a school, for example a student, is not prohibited from promoting or demoting a religion, therefore a student who clearly and openly advocates the Pastafarian faith is not to be sanctioned, except insofar as the conduct is objectively disruptive. This is because the student is clearly not acting as an agent of a government institution. Things are a little murky when it comes to teachers and guest speakers. Teachers do not lose their First Amendment rights when they enter the classroom. Here is a summary of pertinent court rulings. The main principle that comes from such cases is that school districts can direct teachers to refrain from certain actions when there is a reasonable belief that the actions would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Individual teachers have been ordered to not engage in silent reading of prayers in school (Roberts v. Madigan). Case law on guest lecturers is probably close to zero, since guest lecturers don't have the same kind of property right to be at the school expressing themselves as teachers do. | There aren't bright line rules in the area of fair use (which is the core issue - you are clearly copying a work that has copyright protected portions, at least - the question is whether fair use provides a defense and whether some portions are not copyright protected). This inquiry is fact specific and driven by general standards. Context such as whether the use would be free or commercial matter as well. For your own notes, anything goes pretty much. This generally wouldn't constitute "publication" of the work and would be for personal educational used by someone who paid for the book anyway. For shared notes - it depends. Also not all kinds of copying is created equal. Some parts of textbooks are themselves in the public domain or not protectable by copyright. For example, even a lengthy quote from a scientific journal article would probably be allowed with attribution. It would also be easier to evaluate based upon the type of textbook. A history textbook can have protection similar to trade non-fiction and can have very original exposition. An algebra textbook, less so. Your question also points to an end run. If the professor is the author of the textbook (many of mine were in something of a racket), you could get permission from the author. |
If someone does not downvote defamatory post does that mean they endorse it? If someone does not downvote defamatory posts on Stackexchange are they liable for defamation under Indian Penal code? I am refering to section 499 and section 500. | No They do not commit the necessary actus reus by ignoring, or not even reading, a defamatory post. To be guilty, one has to act: by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation | First, I don’t believe the author is using quotation marks to indicate an actual quotation, it is being used for emphasis and to group the words as a concept. That concept is that while it may seem undemocratic for a judge to overturn a law enacted by a democratically elected assembly, the “higher democracy” is that it protects the democratic institutions themselves by limiting the power of the legislature to what the higher law of a constitution allows. | Section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 sets the limitation period for defamation cases to 1 year. However, under section 32A, the court is, in certain situations, allowed to disapply the limitation period to defamation cases. Essentially a court may lift the period if they think it is just and fair to do so. They will take into consideration factors such as the extent to which enforcing the limitation period would unfairly prejudice the claimant, whether new evidence came to light (and if it ought to have come to light sooner) etc. It all really depends on the merits and circumstances of your case. I would recommend seeing a solicitor on the matter. | Sure Obama can sue Trump for defamation. Libel is a civil offense and committing libel is not a part of Trump's role as president. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. But not for personal acts. See Is the US President immune from civil lawsuits? But a libel action would be difficult to win; they're both public figures, which makes the defamation threshold higher: Public officials and figures have a harder time proving defamation. The public has a right to criticize the people who govern them, so the least protection from defamation is given to public officials. When officials are accused of something that involves their behavior in office, they have to prove all of the above elements of defamation and they must also prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice." Defamation Law Made Simple | Nolo.com The "actual malice" part is interesting: In the landmark 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court .... acknowledged that in public discussions -- especially about public figures like politicians -- mistakes can be made. If those mistakes are "honestly made," the Court said, they should be protected from defamation actions. The court made a rule that public officials could sue for statements made about their public conduct only if the statements were made with "actual malice." "Actual malice" means that the person who made the statement knew it wasn't true, or didn't care whether it was true or not and was reckless with the truth -- for example, when someone has doubts about the truth of a statement but does not bother to check further before publishing it. (same link above) Could malice be proved? Was Trump reckless with the truth? Could be. But would Obama sue? What's the cost/benefit analysis to him and his legacy, politically and personally? Trump was taking a political or personal risk - or he's being stupid - with such accusations, since he may feel invulnerable. He has sued and been sued and settled many times: see Legal affairs of Donald Trump I think both would not want to be in court; because once in court, they (and their lawyers) both have subpoena power and both would have to answer nearly any question put to them about their public (and possibly private; but not official) lives. Trump has interestingly enough talked about "opening up the libel laws" so he can more easily sue people. But if he did that, it cuts both ways: he would be easier to take to court. See Can Libel Laws Be Changed Under Trump? In my opinion, Obama is much better off ignoring Trump and letting the FBI, DOJ, Congress and the Intel Community do their jobs - have the facts fall where they may - and and not become a right-wing talk radio subject for the rest of his life, as well as risk being deposed himself in court. Edit 3/21/17: From a timely piece in The New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-first-amendment-applies-to-trumps-presidency While it is unlikely that former President Barack Obama would sue Trump for libel, he very likely has a strong case. The First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/opinion-trump-could-lose-lawsuit-for-libeling-obama/ that “there seems no doubt that Trump’s statement was false, defamatory, and at the very least made with reckless disregard for the truth.” That is the test for damaging the reputation of a public figure or official: Trump either made his assertions with knowledge of their falsity or with disregard of a high degree of probability that they were false. Obama, Stone is confident, could prove that Trump made his false charge, as the Supreme Court defined the standard, with “actual malice.” | Yes Defamation is the communication of a false statement that harms the reputation of an individual person, business, product, group, government, religion, or nation. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defamation | Yes you can, and you can even include "editorials or subjective content". However, if you include factual statements, or words that imply factual statements, the company could claim that they are false, and therefore defamatory. Indeed they might claim that in any case. If you make no false statements of fact, they should not be able to win a defamation suit, but you might need to spend time and money defending yourself if they choose to sue. The detailed rules on defamation vary by jurisdiction, in the US by state. But in no US state can defamation be found against a person who neither made nor implied a false statement of fact. Use of the name of the company, along with "boycott" as in "BoycottXYXCorp.com" would not infringe any trademark XYZ might have. It is clearly Nominative use, as no one could reasonably believe that such a site was run by, sponsored, or endorsed by XYZ. Again, XYZ could always sue, even if they are highly likely to lose quickly. | No. In order to practice law, one must establish an attorney-client relationship. Participation in Internet forums absolutely does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Everyone involved in law spends a disproportionate amount of time disclaiming this, so nobody inside the field will be confused on this point. I believe this is also directly stated in the Terms of Service. And as Jen notes, upvoting/downvoting is not even agreeing with the legal validity of the answer. Take the tour or read help pages for what voting means. It's perfectly conceivable for a psychic who knows how to sway people could write a better voted answer than three lawyers. | Both Bob and Charles are liable for infringement in the US. The fact that Charles had no idea that Bob was an infringer is not a defense, but it mitigates the statutory damages consequences for him. Either party can negotiate with Alice after the fact for a license, and Alice can grant either party but not the other permission to copy. The terms of the license that Alice gives Bob could either allow CCo reposting, or some more restrictive redistribution right. If the license requires a notice prohibiting further redistribution and Bob omits that notification, Bob will have breached the terms of the license in omitting the notification, so we're back to square 1. If Alice fails to specify a no-redistribution notification condition on Bob's reposting, Alice may have granted an implied license to the world, a matter which has to be determined by the courts. |
What happens if a Constitutional amendment passed after ratification of a treaty contradicts that treaty? Suppose a Constitutional amendment was passed establishing an absolute right to circumvent DRM. This is in direct contradiction to the WIPO copyright treaty, which requires signatory countries (including the US) to prohibit such circumvention. In this case, which law takes precedence: the treaty or the Constitution? Copyright/DRM circumvention is just an example here; the question is about conflicts between treaties and the Constitution. | A law that conflicts with the Constitution is void The enactment of a treaty is still a law. Even though the US has a Constitutional mechanism for ratifying treaties, once ratified, they are the “law of the land”. | The precedent is very clear and was accurately applied by the judge A treaty does not create domestic law and is only applicable to the extent that it is incorporated into domestic law. She extensively quotes the relevant precedents in the judgement at [42-49]. | Technically, there is no such thing as an unconstitutional law. There are laws which have been passed, but whose unconstitutionality has not been discovered yet. But once a law is legally deemed to be unconstitutional, it stops being a law. The constitution is a recipe for running the government. If Congress enacts legislature which it has no authority to enact, the courts have the authority to discover this and reveal it in an opinion. | There is no constitutional requirement that Congress provide copyright protection in the US. Congress could, if it so chooses, repeal Title 17 of the US Code, and afford no copyright protection whatsoever. Given that the US has protected copyright from its earliest days, that copyright protection in English law dates to the 1600s, that almost every nation currently has a Law protecting copyright, and that such protection is a requirement of membership in the World Trade organization (WTO) I find it highly unlikely that such a change in the law will be made in the foreseeable future. But Congress does have the power to abolish copyright in the US. | Patents become enforceable when granted, not before. However there is something called provisional rights (absolutely nothing to do with provisional applications). In the US, under 35 USC 154(d), if a claim in a published application is “substantially identical” to a claim that eventually issues, a patent owner can get damages of at least a reasonable royalty on units produced between the publication and notice and the issue date. Enforcement on this must await the granting of the patent. The infringer must have actual notice of the published application. It is rarely invoked see this article. | This would require a constitutional amendment (overriding the First Amendment), which can be done in two ways. Congress can write an amendment and submit it to the states; or the states can call for a convention. None of these methods can be implemented by any number of courts. | No rights are absolute. In particular, Charter s. 1 specifies rights are "subject only to reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Generally speaking, when rights are infringed the courts will consider it a justifiable infringement if it serves a substantial purpose while proportionate, rational and minimally infringing (Oakes test, though there's a heap of subsequent case law refining the test). While the exact order text isn't yet available, determining constitutionality would typically be a detailed analysis a judge would have to perform after hearing arguments from parties to a case (I assume the order will eventually be published here). In my own opinion, I would imagine such an order without appropriate medical exemption would be unconstitutional. It would seem to be disproportionate to deny freedom of movement to a presumably very small number of persons who could do little to remedy their medical condition. As a similar example from another province, a Quebec court ruled that a Covid-19 curfew requiring people to remain inside at night would not apply to homeless people due to discriminatory and disproportionate effect. Assuming the order to be similar in nature to existing BC orders on gatherings and mask-wearing, I would imagine lack of religious exceptions to be constitutional, as those orders have already been challenged and upheld against religious objections (though I believe appeals are still possible). The nature of the identified infringements against religious groups was considered reasonably proportionate, rational and minimal enough when weighed against the legitimate governmental need to contain the spread of Covid-19. P.S. The Canadian Bill of Rights has in practice been largely superseded by the Charter. Furthermore, it is completely inapplicable here as it is a federal statute with no effect on provincial matters. | A contract is a legally binding agreement governing a commercial relationship under national law. A treaty is a legally binding agreement between nation states once ratified and given effect under each nations local law. MOU are agreements that are not legally binding. That doesn’t mean there aren’t consequences for breaking them - just not legally enforceable ones. |
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