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In the UK, where and how are "tenants in common" details officially recorded? When purchasing a property, we instructed the solicitor to set it up as tenants in common, with unequal shares in the beneficial interest. A few years later, I am struggling to find anything in writing confirming this was done or contact the solicitor who did the conveyancing. Some online research I have done seems to say "tenants in common" is not something recorded on the deed of transfer/ownership, but done elsewhere. Often a "deed of trust" is involved but I am not sure if this document is where the beneficial interest is legally set out, and if so if it is filed centrally anywhere. Some reading seemed to suggest the onus is on me to prove the "Tenants in Common" status otherwise it is assumed joint tenancy (co-ownership). Can someone clarify what documents actually formalise "tenants in common" and if they are lodged somewhere? Is it simply a document the owners arrange privately - so if we cannot find the document we can just make a newer one? | If the property is in england-and-wales and if it's... ...registered you will know that the owners are tenants in common because there will be a restriction registered in Section B Proprietorship Register that states: RESTRICTION: No disposition by a sole proprietor or the registered estate (except a trust corporation) under which capital money arises is to be registered unless authorized by an order of the court’. This restriction alerts a Solicitor or Conveyancer to the fact that the owners are tenants in common and one of them alone cannot sell the property. Source Further reading may be found at: How to read a title register about the proprietorship (B) register which shows: the class of the title the names of the current registered owners and the addresses we use to contact them (sometimes) how much they paid for it or an indication of its value on a stated date any restrictions – these are entries that limit the owner’s power to deal with the property, for example, to stop them selling or securing a loan without their mortgage lender’s consent (My emboldenment) | In most cases, there is no direct legal recourse for such a withdrawal. Money in a joint account is co-owned, and any account holder may withdraw any of it for any lawful purpose. As the article "What is a joint bank account?" from Bankrate.com states: The money in joint accounts belongs to both owners. Either person can withdraw or spend the money at will — even if they weren’t the one to deposit the funds. The bank makes no distinction between money deposited by one person or the other, making a joint account useful for handling shared expenses. But a joint bank account should only be opened with someone whom you trust, since that person has equal control over the account’s funds. If the account holders have a contract or legal agreement that controls what money can be withdrawn and for what purposes, then a violation of such an agreement might be a cause for legal action. But merely opening a joint account does not create such an agreement nor imply it. | The brother is under no obligation to buy, the sister is under no obligation to sell. As co-owners they each enjoy the right to use the property; that the sister chooses not to does not change the brother's right. If the property is owned as tenants in common (the most likely arrangement), the sister can sell or lease her share to whoever she likes without the brother's consent. She could even extend an invitation to an outlaw motor cycle gang to be house guests. If it is a joint tenancy, there is no sister's "share"; the siblings own the whole property as an indivisible whole. In that case both must agree to any dealings. | Anyone who processes personal data using electronic means or with some filing system is a data controller, as long as they fall within the GDPR's territorial scope, they're not doing the processing on behalf of another data controller, and they're not only doing the processing for purely personal or household purposes. In todays world, it's almost certain that electronic means are involved. And establishing a rental contract generally involves some personal data. We can also assume that both parties are in the UK, and that both are acting on their own behalf. So this leaves the household exception. Larry the landlord will not be covered by the household exception since they're using the personal data for a business purpose. Larry is a data controller. If Tim the tenant is renting a place to live in himself, he's probably acting for purely personal or household purposes and would not be a data controller. If Tim the tenant is renting space for his office, for a church, or for a chessclub in which he is a member, he's no longer acting for purely personal or household means. Depending on context, Tim or Tim's organization may be a data controller. The ICO's guidance on controllers and processors has a checklist “Are we a controller?” that lists common factors establishing controllership. On another page, they write: Wherever personal data is used for purposes other than personal or household processing, the organisation behind it is a controller. Personal or household processing means the personal data you’d usually have in your home, such as family photo albums, friends’ addresses and notes on the fridge, none of which would be covered by data protection laws unless there was another connection to a professional or commercial activity. | As Paul Johnson says, this is a planning permission thing. The parking places your landlord has leased you are real; they exist. They just don't have planning permission for all of them. It's no different to if the landlord got planning permission for a building of four flats, and built a block of six flats. Building those two additional flats would illegal, and the planning authority could take enforcement action against the landlord for it; however, letting those two additional flats out is perfectly legal. Similarly letting those parking places is legal; it's just that the planning authority may take action against the landlord to force two of the parking places to be removed. At that point the landlord would have to break the contract with the tenants of the parking places, and would be liable for damages. In practise, unless there are some activist neighbours, the planning authority won't take any enforcement action (spending money on legal action for two parking places is not high on their list of priorities). Even if there are some activist neighbours, they probably won't bother. Finally, any development becomes lawful after ten years, and if the development is used as dwellings, after four years. It is not clear to me whether the parking spaces would be considered as a separate development to the flats (and hence have a ten year limit), or whether they are ancillary to the dwellings (and hence have a four year limit). My suspicion is that the landlord was asked to sign an application for a Lawful Development Certificate (which essentially just certifies that the development is out of time for planning enforcement). If so, that means that ... the development is out of time for planning enforcement, so you have no need to worry. Incidentally, if I am right, your friend doesn't have any need to worry either, and is probably being put off the purchase by an overly cautious conveyancer. (Note: I am not a lawyer, and in particular, I am not your friend's lawyer.) | If it says "no pets" in the leasehold, then yes, that is enforceable. It doesn't have to be reasonable (in your opinion, or objectively) to be enforceable. Your choices are to either negotiate different leasehold terms, or to find a different leasehold. | There are two separate issues here. Firstly, the deposit. Any deposit is required by law to either be placed in an approved deposit scheme provider at the start of any tenancy, or be insured with a provider. Either way, the landlord (or their letting agent) is required to issue the tenant with certain prescribed information within a certain period, as well as meet a few other requirements. Failing to do this can result in the landlord having to return the deposit and pay a fine to the tenant - if the tenant is willing to take him to court. If the landlord has done everything by the book, they don't owe you anything. (If they've paid the deposit into a scheme, then they will not receive any interest, as it's kept by the scheme provider to pay for their services.) Secondly, the renewal fee. These are legal and commonplace. However, you're never obliged to renew your tenancy, as if the fixed term expires and you don't leave, then it automatically becomes a statutory periodic tenancy (often called a "rolling tenancy"). With a periodic tenancy, you can leave by giving one month's notice in writing; or your landlord can request that you leave by issuing a section 21 notice, which gives you two months to depart or face legal action. If you tell the landlord that you would like to change to a periodic tenancy when the current fixed term ends, then no-one has to do anything (though the letting agency may charge you an admin fee). The landlord cannot impose a new tenancy agreement, but they can issue a section 21 notice. Or, as you suggest, you can request a longer fixed term. This provides more security for you and the landlord - though it makes it harder to leave early, as you're potentially liable for the rent for the whole term. | Yes, they still have to go through the normal eviction process and must still provide the minimum number of days required by their local jurisdiction in order to vacate the property. By moving in and establishing residency, the tenant and landlord form an implied lease - the tenant does not need anything in writing in order to establish their legal rights to tenancy. More information: No written lease--Am I in trouble? |
To what extent are England and Wales one completely wedded jurisdiction? Are there any legal provisions that apply only to England or only to Wales but not respectively to the other? Why are they so closely associated with each other as to have just one tag on the site, but Northern Ireland and Scotland each seem to be their own worlds? | What Do England And Wales Share Legally? Why are they so closely associated with each other as to have just one tag on the site, but Northern Ireland and Scotland each seem to be their own worlds? Most laws of general applicability, such as criminal law, and private law (i.e. the law governing the interactions of private parties like property law, contract law, landlord-tenant law, employment law, etc.) are enacted by the National Parliament at Westminster (or effective as part of a shared English common law of case precedents) and shared by England and Wales which have a uniform integrated court system. In contrast, Scotland and Northern Ireland have greater autonomy to enact laws of general application because more authority has been devolved to those regional governments than to the National Assembly of Wales. They also have their own court systems. Historic Causes Wales was basically fully integrated into England starting in the 1200s and subsequently restored some autonomy. Scotland never lost its high level of autonomy and was initially joined to England only by virtue of having the same monarch, rather than being the same country. The United Kingdom was formed first by the personal union of monarchs from 1603 (under King James VI of Scotland a.k.a. King James I of England) followed by a federal style merger of governments approved by the Scottish and English parliaments in 1706-1707, rather than by conquest and it has much more government autonomy in generally applicable legislation and its judicial system than Wales does, and more than Ireland had when it was ruled by England. On the other hand, Scottish sentiment towards independence was not exactly unanimous in support of staying with the U.K. in the last referendum in 2014 when 44.7% of votes cast were for independence with 84.6% voter turnout (including voters as young as age 16). Northern Ireland's story is a bit more complicated as Ireland had a legal status similar to Wales from a similar medieval era, but this was complicated by the Irish independence struggle ultimately leading to the creation of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The fine line and complexity of the situation in Northern Ireland is illustrated by this map, and strong autonomy was necessary to allow it to maintain the fragile Protestant-Roman Catholic balance in a divided society there: Each of the components of the United Kingdom has a separate and historically determined status that is not exactly parallel to any of the others. England has no national assembly of its own, sufficing to use the national parliament for its laws despite the fact that some seats in that parliament that govern it are selected in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Likewise, before the U.S. gained independence, different parts of the U.S. had distinct relationships to the U.K., as did the various colonial possessions of the U.K. (e.g. India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Kenya, Tanzania, Hong Kong). The U.K. is an exemplary example of the philosophy that consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds. To pluck out just one more random example of the English tendency, "Scotland Yard", the national police force headquarters in the City of Westminster within the City of Greater London in England, has jurisdiction over England and Wales, but not over Scotland. Legal Distinctions Between England And Wales To provide a few other examples in addition to the example of language related laws noted by @WeatherVane (noted on my recent visit to England and Wales) and to embellish on that point a little further, the Welsh language is resurgent in Wales where it is a mandatory subject in public schools (often in the North with Welsh as the primary language of instruction) with about 30% of the population (more than 800,000 people) who either speak it as a first language (which is common among the very old and among young people in Northern Wales) by people who are mostly bilingual with English (but may reach for an English word or two now and then) or as a fluent second language. The Anglican Church is the established church in England, but not in Wales where it was disestablished in 1916. The legal implications of this are subtle, but not non-existent. Government agencies are not required to hoist the British flag with primacy over the Welsh flag, and indeed, the British flag is rarely seen there. Primary and secondary education are administered separately in England and Wales with attendant laws on issues like truancy, dress codes, financial arrangements, testing, and certain holidays. This distinction primarily exists to facilitate Welsh language instruction, which is the primary language of instruction in some schools, and a secondary language in others. More generally, the manner in which many government services (e.g. public housing) is administered, and in which tax dollars are expended is not precisely the same between England and Wales. Certain laws regulating immigrants (related to immigrant financial security and leases to immigrants, more or less) differ between England and Wales, although this is a temporary matter and the long term plan is for these laws to be integrated across the United Kingdom. The Welsh Senedd (a.k.a. National Assembly for Wales, i.e. the regional parliament) has some independent legislative power, although honestly, the scope of its legislation is typically closer to what you might see in a U.S. home rule city or a school board, than in a U.S. state government. In particular: The 20 areas of responsibility devolved to the National Assembly for Wales (and within which Welsh ministers exercise executive functions) are: Agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural development Ancient monuments and historical buildings Culture Economic development Education and training Environment Fire and rescue services and promotion of fire safety Food Health and social services Highways and transport Housing Local government National Assembly for Wales Public administration Social welfare Sport and recreation Tourism Town and country planning Water and flood defences Welsh language I suspect, but do not know, that land use regulation and occupational and business licensing in Wales is less favorable to big businesses and franchises, based upon the fact that such businesses are far more common in England than in Wales, even controlling for places that are similar in population density. But this could be due to historic or economic factors. | Country A and country B must do whatever they agree in the settlement of the conflict between themselves - returning or ceding of territory being one of these. Or they can disagree about these laying the seeds for further conflict. The most recent example of this is Russia's seizure of the Crimea from Ukraine; which they legitimised by a plebiscite. AFAIK, Ukraine and the international community has not accepted this but neither are they doing anything about it - legally Crimea is still part of Ukraine, practically it is part of Russia. | You might be misreading the extradition criterion The UK–USA extradition treaty has an example of the clause you're asking about: An offense shall be an extraditable offense if the conduct on which the offense is based is punishable under the laws in both States by deprivation of liberty for a period of one year or more or by a more severe penalty. Similar wording is used in all other treaties that I have reviewed: UK–Algeria ("offences which are punishable under the laws of both Parties by imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty for at least a period of one year") UK–Argentina (no extradition when "the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for less than one year") UK–Bolivia (same as Argentina) UK–Chile (same as Argentina) ... UK–U.A.E. ("offence is based is punishable under the laws of both Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of at least one year") If there is a treaty that requires there to be a mandatory minimum punishment of at least one year, I have not found it. While you say that "[u]sually, the minimum sentence for a crime has to be 12 months for an extradition to be allowed" and "[e]xtraditions are based on minimum sentence in the UK," my review of the treaties makes me doubt that. The rest of this answer explains how to interpret the clauses quoted above. It is enough that the offence gives rise to the "possibility of a term of imprisonment or other form of detention of more than one year." The inquiry is focused on the offence that the conduct is alleged to give rise to and the range of punishment available for that offence generally. E.g. an offence with a minimum punishment of a fine and a maximum punishment of 16 years in prison is an offence that is "punishable... by deprivation of liberty for a period of one year or more." Said another way: it is not necessary that the offence have a mandatory minimum of one year imprisonment. It is enough that the offence gives rise to the "possibility of a term of imprisonment or other form of detention of more than one year." See Canada v. Barrientos, 1995 ABCA 468 (CanLII) at para 103, Hetherington J., dissenting; but appeal allowed, for the reasons of Hetherington J. by the SCC in Canada v. Barrientos, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 531. In Barrientos, the courts were interpretating Article 2 of the Canada–U.S. extradition treaty, with wording substantially similar to the UK extradition treaties I reviewed above: "provided these offenses are punishable by the laws of both Contracting Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year." One remaining question is whether the decision-maker needs to consider the specific facts of defendant's conduct and make a preliminary estimation as to whether in fact a term of imprisonment more than one year is likely. This position has not been adopted in Canada. At the stage where a judge or Minister of Justice is determining the authority to proceed, this is not to become a "sort of sentencing hearing." See USA v. English, 2002 BCSC 1902 at para 23. | You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey. | Parliament in the UK is sovereign: Parliament [is] the supreme legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any law. Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and no Parliament can pass laws that future Parliaments cannot change. If parliament passed a law saying that it was a crime for "a black American woman sat at the front of the bus" and provided that it repealed all existing laws that would invalidate that law (e.g. the European Charter of Human Rights); then there is no defence to that crime if the prosecution proves the elements beyond reasonable doubt i.e. that you are a) black, b) American, c) a woman and d) sat at the front of the bus. In the UK there is no higher law that can be appealed to like a constitution. Over the years, UK parliaments have passed laws limiting their sovereignty, however, any current or future parliament could (in theory) repeal those limits. Just like the USA could (also in theory) repeal the Bill of Rights amendments to their constitution (or even replace the Constitution as a whole); albeit the process is different and less likely to succeed. The limitations on this are political, not legal. | The common law is permissive That is to say that, in a common law jurisdiction, the law is about what you must not do rather than about what you must do. Now, particular statutes may be phrased as requiring certain actions but, if you read them the “common law way” to coin a phrase, they are really imposing sanctions for doing the prohibited thing that falls outside those parameters. Since there is no legal prohibition on using multiple names (simultaneously or sequentially) you are free to do so. Now, there are common law prohibitions of, for example, fraud or tax evasion. So, if you use different names for the purpose of doing those prohibited things, then that is illegal but it is the specific criminality that is sanctioned, not the use of the alias in perpetrating it. The UK has a law that makes it a crime to not register the birth of a child. It also imposes some (and by most country’s standards, very few) restrictions on the name a child can be registered under. But there is no legal obligation on the child or their parents to use the registered name in any particular circumstances. There may be difficulties (amounting to impossibility in some cases) in obtaining a passport, opening a bank account, or claiming social security under a non-registered name but that is due to the necessity to identify the individual for which the name serves as a proxy. However, outside the requirements of specific statutes or administrative procedures, the common law position is that your name is what people call you and you identify as your name. The second part is important - I have been called dickhead on many occasions but I do not consider it to be my name. The UK has a patronymic tradition for surnames so, usually, on marriage, the female adopts the surname of the male and that, through the marriage certificate, becomes her registered name. However, it is extremely common for women to continue to use their original (and now not registered) name in their professional life and her new name in her private life. This can be problematic. My wife, has on server all occasions been refused permission to board a plane because the ticket (booked by others) was in her maiden name - a name for which she has no official identification. However, that’s a procedural problem - she didn’t do anything illegal. | This is more a political question than a legal one, so the answer is more political than legal. Countries are sovereign, and thus can decide which treaties affect them. The UK does not need to agree to any treaty with the EU. It can just refuse to sign the agreement, and just go on its own. Of course, this works both ways. In the same way the EU cannot impose a treaty on the UK about movement of people or the North Ireland borders, the UK cannot impose a treaty on the EU allowing it trade without tariffs. If the UK does not want the deal, the path is straightforward: the Parliament1 rejects the treaty proposal. Of course, then probably the EU will be way less amenable to a free trade pact. Someone being free to do something does not exempt that someone from the consequences of doing that something. If the treaty is put into effect, then at any moment the UK (either from action by the Executive1 or the Parliament1, that is to be internally decided by the UK) can just decide that EU trade is not worth following EU regulations and just withdraw from the treaty. Happens all the time. That the UK cannot unilaterally withdraw from the treaty means is that, should the UK unilaterally decide to leave the "backstop", the UK will be in breach of the treaty and so the EU can ask in international courts for compensation3. In contrast, in many treaties there are explicit clauses explaining the conditions (e.g. notification in advance to the other parties) that allow for a signatory to "lawfully" withdraw from the treaty. But certainly the EU cannot impose its laws on the UK against the decision of the Parliament (again, this is pretty much what "the UK is a sovereign country" means). 1 Elected by British citizens2. So much for "political discrimination". 2Actually it is something more complicated but not because of the EU but of the Empire, as there are some rules allowing citizens of British Overseas Territories or Commonwealth to vote. But that is a question completely internal to the UK. 3And of course, cancel the tariff-free part of the treaty and the agreements for after the backstop ends. | "Law" refers to rules; "jurisdiction" refers to the situations in which those laws apply. For example, the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the United States of America. But for the most part, it only applies within the territorial jursidction of the government that enacted it, i.e., places inside the borders of the United States, or to those over whom the United States has personal jurisdiction, i.e., United States citizens, permanent residents, those currently inside its borders. So the United States Congress could pass a law outlawing the sale of dogs, but it would have no effect on dogs in Canada, as Congress has no jurisdiction over dogs in Canada. Similarly, if a Canadian terrorist (the most dangerous kind, really) launched a missle over the border into the United States, the FBI could not arrest him in Toronto, as they lack jurisdiction to enforce the law outside the United States. "Jurisdiction" is also a concept that limits the powers of courts to hear cases. "Subject matter jurisdiction" refers to limits on the types of cases the court may hear, and "personal jurisdiction" refers to limits on whose cases the court may hear. For instance, if the New York Legislature established a small-claims courts to resolve claims for less than $10,000, your case might be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction if you sued someone for $10,001, or it might be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction if you sued someone who had no connection to New York. These explanations are admittedly incomplete and imprecise to provide a basic understanding of the concepts, rather than an overwhelming -- and boring -- exposition of the precise meanings of these terms. |
Constitutional Amdendment vs. Federal Law Federal law -- and even the regulations written up by Federal agencies -- are no less (perhaps even more) binding, than the Constitution. But they are far easier to pass and alter. Are there any standards on what can only be prohibited (or mandated) by a change in the Constitution vs. a lesser law? For example, the ban on alcohol (known as "Prohibition") was a Constitutional Amendment (the 18th), whereas the very similar (if not identical) in nature bans on narcotics were simply Federal (and State) laws. My own "gut feeling" -- without any formal legal education -- is that the Constitution proclaims something in general terms, and the laws then implement the details: banning actual particular activities, assigning punishments for different related violations, etcætera. This explanation would make sense, but it does not work for many cases, such as, for example, the ban on narcotics... | Your gut feeling is reasonably close, but not precisely correct. The Constitution sets the baseline rules for the powers of and interactions among the branches of the federal government, as well as the powers of and interactions between the state and federal governments. With only one exception (the dilution of a state's representation in the Senate), the Constitution can be amended to basically anything. It can make anything legal and it can make anything illegal. It generally addresses fairly high-leval legal principles, but there's no reason that it couldn't be amended to include a 9,000-page law specifically addressing every conceivable aspect of the regulation of nuclear energy. As it stands now and as it always has, the Constitution permits the federal government to write laws only with respect to certain topics. The states, meanwhile, retain authority to write laws on virtually any other topic. There are a variety of legal and historical reasons why prohibition took the form of a constitutional amendment while drug laws are handled legislatively, but one important consideration is the scope of Congress's power to regulate "interstate commerce." At the time of prohibition, it was not clear that Congress could regulate commercial activity that took place entirely within a single state. So if you grew all the ingredients for your whiskey in Kentucky, and you distilled those ingredients in Kentucky, and then you sold your whiskey in Kentucky exclusively to residents of Kentucky, it seemed that your conduct was outside the reach of Congress, and that any attempt to regulate it would be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge. The solution, therefore, was to amend the constitution and give that authority to Congress. About a decade after prohibition ended, though, the Supreme Court decided that the power to regulate interstate commerce includes not just transactions that cross state lines, but also any conduct that “exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce” Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). This broadens the Commerce Clause authority to cover virtually any economic activity. So even if you buy marijuana seeds from your next door neighbor, plant them in your own back yard, grow them for strictly personal use in your own home, and never sell anything to anyone, the courts will hold that your conduct affects the interstate market for marijuana, and is therefore subject to federal regulation. This standard substantially lowers the bar for Congress to act without a constitutional amendment, which is a big part of the reason there hasn't been an amendment to address narcotic use. | A law that conflicts with the Constitution is void The enactment of a treaty is still a law. Even though the US has a Constitutional mechanism for ratifying treaties, once ratified, they are the “law of the land”. | The question seems to somewhat misunderstand the role of courts in the united-states The United States uses a common-law system, ultimately derived from the law of Great Britain as it was at the time of the US Revolution, and thus incorporating its history largely derived from the practices of English Courts. There was a period in this history where much new law was made by judges, although a great deal of it was also made by statutes, that is by Parliament. In theory such judge-made laws merely "discovered" what the law "had always been" but in practice judges made much new law. Since then the incidence of judge made law has greatly declined in the UK, and has declined even more in the US. I think that it is fair to say that Judges in the US do not now make new law with any frequency. There is, however, a major exception to this. In the US, the Federal Constitution is the "supreme law of the land", and no federal or state statute, regulation or practice may stand if it does not conform to relevant requirements of the federal Constitution. (Nor may any local ordinance, regulation or practice.) But the federal constitution is written mostly in rather broad and general terms, requiring for example that "due process of law" be provided, but but not spelling out in detail what that means. It is therefore up to judges, and particularly to the judges of Federal appellate courts, and most particularly the US Supreme Court, to say when a law, regulation, or practice is in violation of some constitutional requirement, and what must be done to avoid such conflict. One example is the Miranda decision (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) holding that when admissions or confessions by criminal suspects questioned while under arrest were admitted into criminal trials, this violated the defendants' rights against compelled self-incrimination unless they had been advised of their rights under the law, including the right to remain silent and the right to legal counsel. This introduced a new substantive rule of law as a way to enforce a long-existing constitutional provision. The Wikipedia article says: Miranda was viewed by many as a radical change in American criminal law, since the Fifth Amendment was traditionally understood only to protect Americans against formal types of compulsion to confess, such as threats of contempt of court. It has had a significant impact on law enforcement in the United States, by making what became known as the Miranda warning part of routine police procedure to ensure that suspects were informed of their rights. But the concept of "Miranda warnings" quickly caught on across American law enforcement agencies, who came to call the practice "Mirandizing". A more recent example is the case of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) in which the US Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment together guaranteed a right to same-sex couples to marry. This again was a new substantive rule, significantly different from the previous practice for most of US history, as a way of defining and enforcing long-existing constitutional provisions. Related to these are cases where a law, or a provision of a law, is held to be unconstitutional, and thus not a valid law at all. An unconstitutional law may not validly be enforced. Such a case was West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) which held that laws requiring students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance (flag salute) in schools were unconstitutional. These sorts of actions do not occur in those common-law countries which do not have a formal written constitution that is superior to laws passed by the legislature. That is the case in the UK, for example. Aside from that sort of case, where constitutional rights are being asserted or constitutional requirements are being enforced, the main power of US judges over the law is to interpret the law (both statute and regulation) when it is unclear or ambiguous, and to decide exactly what it will mean and how it will be applied. These interpretations can be changed or completely reversed by later legislative action, that is by new laws passed by Congress or by a State legislature. This sort of interpretation occurs in all common-law countries, and also in civil-law countries, although to a somewhat lesser degree in civil-law countries. In general, civil-law countries tend to spell out their law in more specific detail in laws passed by the legislature, leaving somewhat less room for interpretation by courts and judges. By the way, my understanding is that Indonesia is not strictly a civil-law country, but uses a mixture of systems. The Wikipedia article "Law of Indonesia " says: Law of Indonesia is based on a civil law system, intermixed with customary law and the Roman Dutch law. Before the Dutch colonisation in the sixteenth century, indigenous kingdoms ruled the archipelago independently with their own custom laws, known as adat. Foreign influences from India, China and Arabia have not only affected the culture, but also weighed in the customary adat laws. I cannot speak to the specifics of how the courts of Indonesia have interpreted the law on drugs in that country. | The state can decriminalize all drugs under state law, no problem. They merely have to repeal their version of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and all related legislation. However, the federal drug statutes, contained in 21 U.S.C. 13, still apply because of the principle of dual sovereignty (if a state tried to explicitly overrule them, the Supremacy Clause would come into play). Let's take a look at some of the statutes under Title 21, Chapter 13, of the U.S. Code. Section 801 of that chapter described Congress's findings in enacting the Controlled Substances Act. §801(3) through (6) provide the basis for federal authority to regulate intrastate affairs with respect to drug trafficking and possession. The section claims that intrastate drugs "contribute to swelling the interstate traffic," and concludes that "federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic." Thus, the federal government will continue to enforce the federal controlled substances laws regardless of state legalization. A notable exception is the Rohrabacher-Farr amendment, which bans DOJ from using federal funds to prosecute medical marijuana programs legal under state law. However, the federal government isn't always successful in (and doesn't always attempt) regulating intrastate behaviors using its interstate commerce authority. For example, the original Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (since amended and complemented by a 1994 law using the condition-of-funding approach), was struck down by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The law, banning possession of handguns near schools, was found to be an overreach of the Commerce Clause authority. But it was amended by adding the additional interstate nexus of the gun having been moved interstate, which was a very minor limitation in practice. Since it only exempts individuals with a license issued by the state where the school is, it has significantly limited the ability of states to pass "constitutional carry" laws and allow for CCP reciprocity, because many highways and homes fall within its reach. So, if a state is willing to lose all of its federal funding, then Congress can't ever force it to create, maintain, or enforce a state law. But in many ways, the federal government can still enforce its will through criminal law on a number of intrastate activities. | Art. 1 Sect 5 of the Constitution empowers both houses to make their own rules. That means that they can articulate rules regarding what or how you can talk on the floor. It is held that the president of the senate can issue a ruling, and the ruling can be overridden by majority vote. If the Constitution were amended to be more specific about rules of conduct, then some such Senate rules might be unconstitutional and SCOTUS could invalidate the rule. The only specific constitutional requirement on conducting business is that a majority constitutes a quorum. | Your assumption is incorrect -- the Bill of Rights proper does not apply to the states, and pre-14th Amendment only bound the federal government. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 US 243. States could do whatever they wanted, subject to federal legislation on the matters given to the federal government and subject to their own constitutions. After the Civil War, the federal government was much less OK with so-called "black codes," restricting the rights of freedmen based on explicitly racial distinctions, with not even a fig leaf of justification that it applied to all citizens. The federal government could prevent federal discrimination, but no tools existed to prevent state discrimination. Hence, the 14th Amendment, which bound the states to adopt certain standards in their lawmaking and let Congress take action against those that didn't. | The problem with the proposal is that the Second Amendment doesn't specifically protect the right to bear guns – the word it uses is "arms". Restricting sale of bullets or gunpowder is just as much a restriction on the right to bear arms as restricting sale of guns. Likewise, freedom of the press doesn't refer to just the freedom to use a wine press for printing purposes, it also encompasses the purchase of ink, paper, type and drying racks. | They can't overturn the decision; but they don't have to. The holding in Dobbs was that the US Constitution does not provide a right to an abortion, and so a state law prohibiting abortions is not unconstitutional. Congress can't "overturn" it in the sense that they can't make the Constitution provide such a right, short of a constitutional amendment. But that in itself doesn't stop them from providing such a right in other ways, e.g. through ordinary legislation. Under the Supremacy Clause, such a law would supersede any state bans; provided that it falls within the scope of Congress's enumerated powers, which assertion would itself probably be challenged in court. If it's within their legislative power, then there's no conflict with Dobbs. To give a more mundane example, nobody thinks that there is a constitutional right to have an airline ticket refunded within 24 hours of purchase. If the Supreme Court ever had occasion to rule on the question, they would surely hold that nothing in the US Constitution says that people have this right. But Congress does have the power, under the Commerce Clause, to pass legislation that confers such a right on consumers. They have done so, and this law would not in any way conflict with the aforementioned hypothetical Supreme Court ruling. |
What does "sever ties with" mean in terms of inheritance? Apropos of this news article, in which, apparently, Elon Musk's transgender daughter wants to sever ties with her father: Hypothetically speaking, if Elon Musk wrote her out of his will, could she challenge the will and claim part of his estate despite stating that she wants to "sever ties" with him? If, on Elon Musk's death, he does not write her out of his will, could one of Musk's other children challenge the will, claim she severed ties, and distribute her part of the estate to the remaining beneficiaries, leaving her with nothing? | Legally, an announcement by one adult that s/he wants to "sever ties with" another has effectively no meaning. Presumably in the case mentioned the daughter intends to stop interacting with Musk, or significantly limit such interactions. She is free to do so. That has no legal effect on Musk's will. It might cause Musk to change his will, but that is his decision. He is free to leave money, even lots of money, to a person who has "severed ties" with him if he so chooses. So is anyone else. (Of course most people don't have as much to leave as Musk presumably will.) If Musk does choose to leave money to this daughter, her announcement of negative feelings towards Musk would not be grounds to challenge the will or to disinherit the daughter. There are various grounds on which a will may be challenged in US law. Perhaps the most common are undue influence, and lack of the needed mental competence. Announcing an intent to "sever ties" would not be a usual way to obtain undue influence over a person, and nothing in Musk's reported actions shows the kind of lack of mental competence which would render a will void. In short, the only way in which this or any similar announcement might change Musk's will is if it first changes his mind. As for the daughter challenging the will, she would have no more and no less rights to do so than if no announcement had been made. There are various legal grounds on which a will may be challenged, depending on the state. They are all fact-dependent, and can be done only if certain sorts of facts are alleged in the challenge. There is no way to know, now, if any such facts will be true when Musk dies. But the announcemt on its own will not matter. | The idea is that, by default, we should assume the payment is a gift, unless we have specific evidence to suggest that it is offered in exchange for something. In the first case, the father-in-law has given no indication as to why he is giving her the money. It could be that he is indifferent to whether she remarries or not, and simply wants her to have a steady income in either case. He may be presuming that, if she remarries, her new husband will be able to provide for her, but until such time, he (the father-in-law) will pay her way. We certainly do not have evidence to show that he actually wants her to stay unmarried and is paying her for that purpose. In the second case, the father-in-law has given us more evidence. His words make it explicit that he does want her not to remarry, and that he is paying her in order to get her not to. Since he is clearly paying money with the intention of getting another party to do something (or in this case, to refrain from doing something), we understand it as a contract. | The United States has a fairly strict definition of where you have an expectation of privacy, a public bus certainly isn't a private place. In public, anyone can take pictures and video of anyone or anything else. You may have some sort of case if the girl were to use those photos to knowingly help your father violate the restraining order, but it doesn't sound like you believe that was the case. | It would depend on how the ownership contract is written. 30% sounds like a minority stake, so I don't know how they could block new investments unless the contract requires a super-majority to approve new rounds of financing. How does the remaining 70% of ownership feel about this? If they are abiding by the terms of the ownership contract I don't see that this is questionable behavior on their part. This is a business relationship. Business partners may come to have different outlooks on the future of the company, and the best way to protect their investment. Consider flipping the viewpoint: "I'm a minority owner in a company I no longer have confidence in. I would like to dissolve the company and sell off the assets to re-coup as much of my original investment as I can. The other owners want to chase this to the bitter end, and do a new round of financing, which will significantly dilute my shares, without (in my opinion) giving the company a real chance of success. What can I do?" When the founder of your friend's company accepted money for shares in the company, they gave up absolute control over the company's direction. Assuming none of the parties are acting in violation of the ownership contract, the most reasonable way to resolve a conflict like this is to buy out the dissenting shareholders. | As long as what you are posting is factual, public knowledge then you shouldn't be in violation of any SEC rules. Short-selling in-and-of itself is perfectly legal, so is exercising your right to free speech, in so far as the things you say are true and known. Now if you made up some story about Musk and it caused the stock to fall where you gain, this could be a violation. Likewise if you have come to be in possession of private knowledge and blog about that, you could be in violation of SEC rules. | In the US, the right to publish is vested in the copyright holder, who is initially the author. That right can be transferred for example by a transfer agreement, and it can be inherited just as other property can be inherited. Under the terms of the will, it is most likely that the copyright was transferred to the spouse even if the will didn not say "including all copyright". There is a small chance that it wasn't disposed of if the wording of the will is restrictive enough (for example "I bequeath all real estate and tangible property to my wife", which doesn't include intellectual property). If so, that would definitively require the assistance of an attorney, and a court proceeding to dispose of the copyright. If there was no provision under the will for copyright, then the copyright could be divided accounting to the rules of succession of your state, however, the courts would want to be persuaded that it was not his intent that his wife receive the copyright as well. Possession of the physical manuscript is largely irrelevant – it does not give the manuscript-holder the right to override copyright law, although if you are in lawful possession of the only copy of the manuscript, you may be able to thwart plans to publish. Publishers generally require decent evidence that the person submitting the manuscript does legally hold copyright, when a work is submitted by someone other than the author. | I presume that the document refers to "barn" and "barnebarn". Norway has forced heirship laws, which refers to offspring as "barn", not limited to those under the age of majority. Interpreted in the context of Norwegian law, there is no assertion in using the word that it grants a right to minors. When you add the additional condition that the recipient must have reached the age of majority, there is no conflict. In this kolonihage bylaws document, which is probably similar to the one you are looking at, §11.2.1 requires that a tranferee fulfill the criteria required for the allocation of parcels, and §11.2.2 addresses the non-necessity of paying the transfer fee in the case of death of the member, and does not create a special inheritance right. It also says that the new contract must be established. But a minor cannot establish a contract, and in general cannot be forced to fulfill the obligations of a member as spelled out in §9. You should check with a lawyer to be certain, of course. | The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds. |
How could you commit tax fraud in the UAE where income tax does not exist? UAE does not have income tax but it has another form of tax. https://www.bdo.ae/en-gb/insights/new-tax-evasion-court-uae-en says that the UAE created a new court for tax evasion in November 2020. How could you commit tax fraud in countries UAE where taxes are paid differently? | UAE obviously taxes some entities and some transactions, so e.g. not keeping the appropriate records in those regards is considered tax evasion... according to the article linked in the question. On a quick google search, UAE implemented VAT in 2018. They also seem to have introduced a "federal corporate tax" payable from June 2023 by a law passed earlier this year. | Any country is free to decide what actions are considered to be crimes, and what crimes are prosecuted depending on whether you perform the action in the country, outside the country, and depending on whether you are a citizen, a resident, both, or neither. They can also decide what are accepted defences in court and which are not. Any other country is free to decide under which circumstances they will ever extradite someone to that first country. Now you have to check the laws of the individual countries. | Do I have to pay taxes if I register the domain but the website income belongs to someone else? No. The person or company who runs, and/or profits from, the business is the entity under obligation to pay all the applicable taxes: Value Added Tax, income tax, corporate tax, and so forth. Unless you charge a significant amount therefor (see the comments), the mere registration of just one domain is unlikely to trigger tax obligations. | The company probably owes U.S. and state corporate income taxes because income from services performed in the United States are usually considered "effectively connected" with the United States. The fact that the servers are located in the U.S. is pretty much irrelevant, relative to the fact that the services are performed while located in the United States. I can't think of a single tax case that has ever turned on the location of the servers in a company. Unlike a U.S. company, a foreign company is not taxed by the U.S. on its worldwide income, nor is the individual, a non-resident alien (having an F-1 visa rather than a green card) taxes on the individual's worldwide income. But, a non-U.S. person is still taxed on income that is effectively connected with the United States. Generally speaking income from property is not effectively connected with the United States merely because it is managed by someone located in the U.S., so if the company had owned an apartment in Brazil that it received rental income from, for example, that would not be subject to U.S. taxation. Also income from intangible property (like interest payments on loans or dividends on publicly held stock) is generally not subject to U.S. taxation if paid to a non-resident, non-citizen of the U.S. But, generally speaking, income from the performance of services is taxable in the place where the services are performed. For example, Colorado can impose state income taxes on income earned by a Texas baseball player while playing at a stadium in Denver. The lack of a salary or employee status shouldn't change the fact that the income received by the company from performance of services in the U.S. is effectively connected with the United States. When the owner performs services in the U.S., the company is performing services in the U.S. and so it is subject to taxation in the U.S. Dividend payments from the offshore company probably wouldn't be subject to U.S. taxation in this scenario, but the company itself would be subject to corporate income taxes in the U.S. from the profits it earned from the services performed in the U.S. | If the Attorney General has officially determined that you renounced US citizenship for the purpose of avoiding taxation, you have a lifetime ban under INA 212(a)(10)(E), and there is no immigrant waiver for this ban. See 9 FAM 302.12-6. I am not sure if the Attorney General has ever made such a determination about anyone. Otherwise, I don't see anything that would prevent you from immigrating to the US like any other foreigner. | Given that there are almost 200 countries on Earth and most people don't have any information about Lesotho (etc) it is impossible to say what the frequency of such taxes is. There are also many ways in which media-taxes are imposed, so it depends on which sub-class of taxes you're interested in. However, such taxes are by no means rare. Many countries impose a license requirement on televisions and / or radio: Albania, Austria, Bosnia, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Montenegro, South Korea, South Africa, UK and so on. It is also indirectly collected as a fee on electric bills in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Serbia, Pakistan, Turkey, Mauritius. In general, when broadcasting is state-supported, the state gets its money from taxes, so the case in Norway and Sweden seems to be that you pay a tax for broadcast, and it's just part of your taxes, just like in the US the local transit tax becomes part of your property tax. Note that I did not list a majority of the countries in the world, because I don't know about taxing and broadcasting in Lesotho (etc.). This page gives some information, but it's not authoritative or exhaustive. | Yes. Arbitration is a private, voluntary process, so two parties can agree to arbitrate virtually any dispute. However, because it is voluntary, Country B generally has no obligation to participate in the process once you've inititated it. | That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant. |
Is it legal to live in the woods in the USA? Can one chop down trees, build a cabin, and just park there? The question is about living on land that is not owned by a private individual in the USA, and is not designated as a state park or designated wildlife refuge, which have more restrictions. Suppose you left your cabin door open by mistake and someone else came in and doesn't want to leave your cabin. What would happen if you called police? | Much of "the woods" is owned by the US government, where your chances of any degree of success are highly variable. It is extremely unlikely that you can get away with it at all on a military base or in a national park. You may be able to get away with it for longer on Forest Service land (legally speaking, you're supposed to move along after 14 days), but if you're looking for a permanent legal claim to the land, that will not happen without an act of Congress. If public domain land has valuable minerals which you exploit, you may be able to chop down trees and build a cabin, but until Congress lifts the moratorium on mining claims patents, you cannot gain title to the land. (Public domain land is land not set aside for a specific purpose, such as a national park or wilderness area). Another possibility is to seize the land through adverse possession, as long as you satisfy the requirements for such an action in the state in question. Chopping down trees and building a cabin probably satisfy the requirements of actual possession, openness and notoriety. You would have to continuously live there for 5-30 years, depending on state, and have to have exclusive use of the land. If you get found and the owner tells you to leave (whether or not they get a court order), or if they say "I'll let you stay for a while", or they do a bit of landscaping, then you can't take the land (or, the clock restarts). There are a number of state-specific quirks such as whether you have to believe that the land is actually yours. Also, you can't dispossess a government. At some point, you will have to deal with the county, since you built the cabin without a permit. | You can contract to do anything that is not illegal. In many jurisdictions unconscionability is a thing that statute or case law makes illegal. These clauses may be unconscionable, however ... In most jurisdictions real estate rental agreements are highly regulated; particularly as regards eviction. So, even if these don't cross the line into unconscionable (and for what it's worth, they're nudging it at least) they are probably prohibited anyway. There probably is an independent third party that decides on evictions anyway in the form of a court or rental tribunal. | We have no way of knowing when this happened, but it is probably a fact, recorded some time in the past. Utility companies very frequently obtain a right-of-way (easement) which gives them certain rights to your property. Typically, this happened a long time ago when a previous owner agreed. As for gas pipelines, that typically includes "don't plant trees" restrictions. The easement is usually recorded in the county office where deeds are filed. The legal basis is generally "because you agreed, or some previous owner agreed". You can get a copy of the easement to see if "no trees" is actually part of the agreement. If yes, no point in arguing, if not, you could hire a lawyer if they are demanding that they are threatening you. They are allowed to be concerned and to ask you to cut trees regardless, but if it's not required by the terms of the easement, you can say "No, I'd rather keep my tree". | As the answer by Greendrake says, if you have a a legal reason, to enter property, you re not a trespasser. Trespassing is generally defined as entering on property against the expressed will of the owner or lawful occupant, without lawful authority. A firefighter is not trespassing when responding to a fire, even if the owner orders the firefighter to leave. A building inspector is not tresspassing while making an inspection (if local law grants an inspector access). Neither is a police officer with a warrant for entry, or a person with a court order to recover property. In some cases such lawful authority must be communicated to the owner, in others it need not be, this depends on the nature of the authority and the exact provisions of the governing law. Whether such a person entering with authority may be armed depends very much on the local law, and the nature of the authority. In some cases and some places such a person is free to be armed, in others this would be illegal. If one is lawfully present somewhere and is attacked, one is entitled to defend oneself (or another), although there may be a duty to avoid a confrontation by retreating if this is reasonably possible when not in one's own home in some jurisdictions (such as California). But the use of deadly force (such as a gun) is generally not lawful unless there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury. None of this is legally different when one is lawfully on another's property than when one is in a public place. California Law California Penal Code section 693 provides that: Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured: To prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof. To prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession. It should be read together with sections 692 and 694. Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instruction #505 reads: The defendant acted in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) if: The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/ [or] ) was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury [or was in imminent danger of being (raped/maimed/robbed/ )]; The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger; AND The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was imminent danger of death or great bodily injury to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else). Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified According to "California Self-Defense Laws" (a page posted by a CA law firm: California law allows use of force in self-defense or defense of others when you reasonably believe that you or they are in imminent danger of physical harm, and that force is necessary to stop the danger. However, you may only use the degree of force reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The page "California Self Defense Laws" from Findlaw reads: The right to use force -- even deadly force if necessary -- to defend oneself is a broadly accepted principle of the criminal justice system. But while all states allow defendants to claim self defense if they can back up such claims, states differ on the scope of what may be considered appropriate use of force and when it may be applied. ... As a general rule of thumb, any force used against an intruder must be proportionate to the harm reasonably feared. In People v. King {Crim. No. 20380. Supreme Court of California. August 29, 1978.} The California Supreme Court held that self-defense was a possible defense to a charge of possession of a handgun by a felon, and wrote about the right of self-defense in CA law. The opinion reads: [I]t is apparent that the conviction cannot stand if the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the right of self-defense as it related to the section 12021 charge. ... When enacting section 12021 and its predecessor statute, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of the several existing statutes giving any person the right to use force, including deadly force in appropriate circumstances, in defense of self or others. This right has been included in provisions of the Penal Code since its enactment in 1872. Section 692 provides: Lawful resistance to the commission of a public offense may be made: By the party about to be injured; By other parties." Section 693 provides: Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured: To prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof. To prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession. Section 694 extends the right to defend others, providing: Any other person, in aid or defense of the person about to be injured, may make resistance sufficient to prevent the offense. Although the extent of these rights has been defined and circumscribed by judicial decision (see, e.g., People v. Ceballos, supra, 12 Cal.3d 470) none of these sections has been amended to restrict the rights affirmed therein since its adoption over a century ago. Civil Code section 50, affirms the same rights, providing: Any necessary force may be used to protect from wrongful injury the person or property of oneself, or of a wife, husband, child, parent, or other relative, or member of one's family, or of a ward, servant, master, or guest. It, too, was adopted in 1872, and it was amended in 1874 to expand the right of defense first declared to encompass guests. Similarly the provisions of sections 197 and 198 governing the circumstances in which homicide is justifiable were included in the Penal Code of 1872, and are traceable to the Statutes of 1850. ... Use of a concealable firearm in self-defense is neither a crime nor an unlawful purpose. ... We conclude, therefore, that the prohibition of section 12021 was not intended to affect a felon's right to use a concealable firearm in self-defense, but was intended only to prohibit members of the affected classes from arming themselves with concealable firearms or having such weapons in their custody or control in circumstances other than those in which the right to use deadly force in self-defense exists or reasonably appears to exist. Thus, when a member of one of the affected classes is in imminent peril of great bodily harm or reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, and without preconceived design on his part a firearm is made available to him, his temporary possession of that weapon for a period no longer than that in which the necessity or apparent necessity to use it in self-defense continues, does not violate section 12021. As in all cases in which deadly force is used or threatened in self-defense, however, the use of the firearm must be reasonable under the circumstances and may be resorted to only if no other alternative means of avoiding the danger are available. In the case of a felon defending himself alone, such alternatives may include retreat where other persons would not be required to do so. | In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it. | There's the question whether something is lost property or abandoned property. You'd be allowed to keep abandoned property, but keeping lost property without looking for the owner is in many places considered theft. A car on your land is quite likely abandoned by the last driver (people don't usually lose cars). But the question is whether it is abandoned by the owner; if the car looks like it has some value then it is unlikely to be abandoned by the owner and more likely that it has been stolen. I'd report the car to the police; then it's up to them to find the owner or not. If they can find him, and the car was not abandoned, but actually lost (unlikely) or stolen (more likely), you have the satisfaction of being an honest person helping either a very stupid car owner or a crime victim to get their property back. If they can't find him, usually the property will then belong to the finder. | As stated, this is not a reasonable restriction and runs afoul of the Fair Housing Act. You cannot discriminate based on family status, with an exemption for "housing for older persons", and the act "does not limit the applicability of reasonable local, state, or federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling" (let's leave aside HOA restrictions for a moment). The number of occupants can legally be restricted in terms of a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest such as parking availability, safety, noise or securing the property. A restriction based on square footage or number of bedrooms might be reasonable: a blanket rule "no more than 4 people" is not reasonable. This article notes some of the state complication in interpreting "marital status", in terms of "not being married to each other". | 'Is it legal?' could mean one of two things. Does it break the criminal law; could I be arrested? There is no law criminalising photography or filming in a private place (assuming you're not doing something amounting to harrassment, or making something inherently illegal like child pornography). The act of filming per se is therefore not illegal in a criminal sense. However, the proprietor of a private place can ask you to stop filming or demand that you leave; if you fail to comply then you will be trespassing. Trespass is not a criminal offence (although the police will undoubtedly remove you if called). However, if your intent was to intimidate, obstruct or disrupt activity within the premises, you could be charged with Aggravated Trespass under s68 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Could the owner, or someone else, have a civil claim against me? This is more difficult to answer. Trespass is a tort, so the owner could in theory have a claim against you if you were filming against his wishes. However, he would have to prove some measurable amount of damage, and this is why few trespass cases come to court. The occupants of the premises may be able to sue if you breach their right to privacy (Article 8 ECHR, incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998); however, a court will balance this against your Article 10 right to freedom of expression. A court will consider all circumstances: for example, if you were filming in the toilets of a nightclub, the occupants' right to privacy may well outweigh your right to freedom of expression. A copyright owner may have a claim against you if you include their work in your film; for example, if you film inside a nightclub and substantial parts of songs are captured on your film, this may give rise to a claim. I am not a lawyer. Don't rely on free advice from strangers on the Internet. |
Could a President choose to give an existing SCOTUS Justice two votes when he would ordinarily appoint another justice? Could a President actually give a current Supreme Court Justice two votes when another justice died or resigned, as described in this Babylon Bee article, except with the consent of the Senate (that article implies that Trump gave Justice Thomas two votes without a Senate confirmation in)? UPDATE: I know the article is satire. | First of all, as noted in the comments, Babylon Bee is SATIRE. It's not intended to be news, just entertainment. But the real question is whether or not a President COULD do such a thing. Or perhaps better, could a President attempt to do something like this. If a President did attempt to do this, it would be totally without precedent and also without any constitutional authority. Since the US Constitution enumerates the powers between the branches and gives the President only the authority to appoint, with the advice of the Senate, a SCOTUS justice, trying to change things by giving an existing justice 2 votes would almost certainly be immediately challenged by the Senate. It also seems unlikely that such an action would be upheld as constitutional. Of course this is all speculative since nothing of this nature has happened. | What exactly would a prosecutor charge? State? Federal? It depends on whether it is a state or federal prosecutor. It appears that the president has at least flirted with violating both federal and state law, in which case he may be charged by both the federal and state prosecutors, each one laying charges under the relevant body of law. Would Trump be vulnerable to Federal prosecution of the phone call after he leaves office? Yes, if the facts support such a prosecution. It's not clear to me that the conversation constituted an unambiguous violation of the federal statute, but I have no knowledge of any precedent that might inform such a determination. | The only way that a member of the House of Representatives, or a U.S. Senator can be removed from office (other than by resignation, death, or expiration of a term of office without being re-elected) is by a two-thirds vote of the chamber removing that member. The relevant provision of the United States Constitution is Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 which states: Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. So, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives may be removed by a two-thirds vote of the U.S. House, and a U.S. Senator may be removed by a two-thirds vote of the U.S. Senate. This has been done five times since 1789 in the U.S. House, most recently in 2002. It has been done fifteen times since 1789 in the U.S. Senate (the most recent 14 times in 1861 and 1862 in connection with the U.S. Civil War). The case of William Blount in 1797 established the precedent that expulsion of a member by a chamber, rather than impeachment, is the proper process to remove a member of Congress. Members of Congress may not be recalled, and are not automatically removed from office upon conviction of a crime. Apart from the expulsion process, there is no way for voters or states to remove U.S. Senators not from their own state, something that doesn't make sense to be possible in the overall context of the structure of the United States government under the U.S. Constitution. Senate Rule XXIII in part provides that ``if the impeachment shall not, upon any of the articles presented, be sustained by the votes of two-thirds of the members present, a judgment of acquittal shall be entered;'' A quorum of the full Senate and not just those sworn in for the trial is required. The Senate rules in the case of an expulsion of a member are analogous. | Yes, the President can certainly veto such a law. Per the US Constitution (emphasis added): Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. This can have a very real effect: legislators are under no obligation to vote the same way on a veto override as on the original bill. The reason the President needs to supply written objections in the first place is that it lets legislators reconsider, see if they're swayed, or see if they think this is a matter where a Congressional majority needs to be respected even if they disagree (they can change their mind in either direction). They can also get a sense of public reaction. And because the threshold for this is "present and voting," it's possible that just more legislators show up. Even if legislators won't be swayed, it still matters for pocket vetoes. That's where the President neither signs the bill nor returns it within 10 days; normally this is equivalent to signing, but if Congress adjourns in the meantime, it means the bill does not become a law. Because "Congress adjourns" is a necessary part of a pocket veto, it's impossible to override the veto (you can't do it if you're not in session). And even when this doesn't apply either, it matters for politics. Example of a futile veto: Public Law 100-4. Passed 406-8 in the House, 93-6 in the Senate. Vetoed; veto was overridden 401-26 in the House and 86-14 in the Senate (note that at least 7 Senators who voted for the bill voted not to override the veto). Example of an effective veto: While technically there was a conference report agreed to by both houses, and it doesn't seem to have had a roll-call vote (my guess is it was agreed to by unanimous consent; side note: many, many laws don't have roll-calls to check on, because they're passed by voice vote or unanimous consent), H.R.10929 from the 95th Congress was passed in the House by a vote of 319-67 and in the Senate by 87-2. After President Carter vetoed it, the House voted on whether to override the veto. The motion to override was defeated 191-206: after the veto, they couldn't even get a simple majority to override the veto of the bill which had been passed by an overwhelming supermajority. I mentioned it above, but the two-thirds threshold is "present and voting." As a general rule, any time you see a fraction of something needed for a vote to succeed in a deliberative assembly, then unless it specifies some other denominator, it's talking about the fraction of members present and voting. Relevant CRS report on override procedure. | The Supreme Court does not handle hypotheticals. The court has interpreted Article III Section 2 Clause 1 of the Constitution, the Case or Controversy Clause as a limit on the powers of the judicial branch. The courts have jurisdiction over various types of cases and controversies but only those listed in the Constitution. This limits courts to hearing actual cases and prevents them from issuing advisory opinions. Additionally, in order to bring a case, the plaintiff must have standing to bring the suit. You can't sue the government just because you don't like a law (well, you can, your suit will just be dismissed because it lacks standing). You have to show That you have been, or will imminently be, injured (injury-in-fact) That there is a direct correlation between that injury and the law (causation) And that a favorable court decision will redress the injury (redressability) As a practical matter, the courts are already overwhelmed by the number of actual cases that come up and the Supreme Court can only hear a tiny fraction of the cases they are asked to hear. If they added the ability to hear hypothetical cases as well, the court could easily be overwhelmed by Senators and Representatives asking them to weigh in on every remotely controversial bill or amendment before Congress or interest groups bringing cases for speculative grievances. | Generally not. Federal court uses a principle known as the enrolled bill rule -- in deference to the coequal status of the three branches of government, the "enrolled bill" (the thing printed on fancy paper that actually went to the President for signature) is irrebuttable evidence that the law was properly passed. The courts cannot deal with inquiries into whether legislative process was followed; it's the legislature's job to decide what the right process is. They can't even look into whether the same text passed both houses -- as a matter of law, the enrolled bill is conclusive evidence that it did. Senate rules are enforceable in the Senate. But the Senate is the body in charge of enforcing them, not the courts. | "Double jeopardy" applies to a criminal proceeding, that is one that needs to be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," and involves criminal sanctions such as jail time. Once OJ was acquitted of criminal charges, he couldn't be tried again as a "criminal." The second trial was a civil trial, with a "lesser" standard of proof (preponderance of evidence), and lesser "damages" (money, not jail time). So even though the facts were the same, OJ was accused of violating a different standard, that is a different "law" so to speak. He could be tried for a "tort" just not a crime. Or put another way, "wrongful death" is not the same as murder. The latter requires intent. Wrongful death suggests "tortious" negligence, but not necessarily intent. | No. In order to practice law, one must establish an attorney-client relationship. Participation in Internet forums absolutely does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Everyone involved in law spends a disproportionate amount of time disclaiming this, so nobody inside the field will be confused on this point. I believe this is also directly stated in the Terms of Service. And as Jen notes, upvoting/downvoting is not even agreeing with the legal validity of the answer. Take the tour or read help pages for what voting means. It's perfectly conceivable for a psychic who knows how to sway people could write a better voted answer than three lawyers. |
How are plea bargains legal? The constitution says: The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury... Not: The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment or with the consent of the accused, shall be by Jury; How are plea bargains legal in the US? | The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas. | In the United States, the question that determines whether it's perjury is whether or not you believe what you said was true. Whoever— (1) having taken an oath..., willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) ... willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury. So if an attorney asks if you saw the defendant, and you believe you saw the defendant, "yes" is generally going to be the correct answer. You're free to qualify your answers or answer questions that weren't put to you, but you aren't obligated to do so. Generally speaking, our adversarial system puts the burden on the defense to ask if you're sure, how the lighting was, whether you were wearing your glasses, whether you were drunk, etc. | Yes. The jurisdiction I am familiar with is England and Wales. Conviction requires evidence (witness testimony is evidence) which proves the case "beyond reasonable doubt". It is open to the jury to find the witness so convincing that they find that they are sure the defendant committed the crime. In general of course, prosecutors prefer to have some supporting evidence (either additional witnesses, or circumstantial evidence - like DNA.) | No. There is a clear distinction between: evidence (or testimony), which consists of statements of fact given by witnesses on oath (subject to prosecution for perjury), governed by the rules of evidence, and which the jury is required to consider but not accept (in the sense that a verdict which is not supported by the evidence can be set aside on appeal), submissions, which consist of argument by the lawyers for the parties, which the jury is not required to consider or accept, and directions, which consist of statements of law given by the judge, which the jury is required to accept. The jury is required by its oath to follow the law as stated by the judge, even if it is wrong. The remedy for erroneous trial directions (an appeal) is different to the remedy for erroneous evidence (a perjury prosecution in the case of deliberate lies; nothing in the case of innocent errors). Because the jury has the power, but not the right, to nullify a charge by disobeying the judge’s directions, there is a sense in which the jury is free to reject the judge’s directions just as it is free to reject evidence. However, this is completely inconsistent with the theory that defines the roles of judge and jury. There is no legal basis for viewing judicial directions as a kind of expert testimony. ‘The power, but not the right’ Obie 2.0 asked about this phrase. It coems from the Case of the Dean of St Asaph, which is reported at R v Shipley (1784) 4 Doug 73. The relevant passage is summarised in Lord Devlin's Trial by Jury (1956), at p 87: Jury’s Power of Acquittal There may well be cases in which the killing is not in doubt and the formal direction not to return a verdict of manslaughter is therefore tantamount to a direction to return a verdict of Guilty. Still, if the direction is ignored, the court must, I think, accept the verdict. There is no way in which a verdict of acquittal can be nullified. As Lord Chief Justice Mansfield put it in 1784: “It is the duty of the judge, in all cases of general justice, to tell the jury how to do right, though they have it in their power to do wrong, which is a matter entirely between God and their own consciences.” Mr. Justice Willes said: “I admit the jury have the power of finding a verdict against the law and so they have of finding a verdict against evidence, but I deny they have the right to do so.” The Chief Justice of Australia held to similar effect in Gammage v The Queen (1969) 122 CLR 444, writing: [The jury] have no right, in my opinion, to return a verdict of manslaughter where they are satisfied of murder. But, as I have said, persistence by them in returning another verdict must ultimately result in the acceptance of that verdict. In that sense, but in no other sense, it is both within their power and, if you will, their privilege to return a wrong verdict. To answer Obie 2.0's question, the jury has the power to ignore the judge's directions, because – at least at the time Lord Devlin was writing in 1956 – a verdict of acquittal could not be nullified. However, the jury does not have the right to do so because the law requires it to follow the directions. As Ed999 observes, the law governing jury trials does vary between jurisdictions. In particular, some jurisdictions (which lack the United States' constitutional double jeopardy clause) now allow for a jury acquittal to be set aside on appeal. However, the fundamental distinction between a witness’s evidence and a judge’s directions was established in England centuries ago, and remains applicable throughout the common law world. It is worth specifically mentioning the United States because jury nullification remains a controversial topic in that jurisdiction. However, the basic principle that the jury is legally required to follow the judge’s directions was established in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), and described by Ginsburg J (albeit in a dissenting judgment) as ‘conclusive’ in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 447 (1994). In Sparf, the opinion of the court was: We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence. | Impeachment is unique in that it is a question of politics, not a question of law, that is being discussed at trial. The other exception is that the Senate, not the Supreme Court, is the High Court of Impeachment (that is, legal precedence is based on what the Senate says, not what the Supreme Court or any other appellant court says). There are a few minor details, but the main part of the trial will play out like a criminal trial, with the Managers (people named by the house to argue the case) taking the role of the Prosecution and the Senate as the Jury. Because the trial is purely political in nature, a jurist decision to on the matter before evidence is presented at trial is entirely legal. It's actually perfectly legal to have your own opinion prior to trial start in a normal criminal jury and to vote on that ground... but the attorneys will dismiss you from the pool if they find even a hint of this. Unlike the judicial system, the jurists of Impeachment Trial are the same 100 people (presently) and cannot be dismissed for any reason, including comments about how they will find in the trial. Jury Fixing or tampering is when the decision a jurist makes is colored by some outside motivation to the jurists own convictions (i.e. the crime boss has your family and won't kill them if you find his hired goon innocent.). It could be an issue if a senator was given some pork to vote against his/her choice, but Impeachment is incredibly rare in the U.S. system and there hasn't been any case where this was an issue (If Articles of Impeachment are brought, this will be the 20 case to reach the trial stage since the adoption of the Constitution, and the 3rd for a President.). | The General Rule Even if the charge is presented to a grand jury and it declines to indict, exactly the same charge that one grand jury declined to indict upon can be presented to a future grand jury and produce a valid indictment. A charge upon which a grand jury declines to indict is often not presented to a future grand jury as a matter of prosecutorial discretion or prosecutor's office policy, but generally this is not a mandatory rule. There may be some jurisdiction in the U.S. where this is not the case, and such a statute would not be unconstitutional if it were, but I am not aware of any state where this is prohibited, and I do not believe that this is the case in federal court. Justifications For The General Rule One reason that it is not a mandatory rule is that there is no practical way that a defendant could enforce the rule if it was a mandatory rule. Grand jury proceedings are secret (at least until an indictment is produced and then only as pertinent to the defendant indicted on the charges producing an indictment). Generally, even the judges in the court calling a grand jury have no access to its proceedings until it issues an indictment, and then has only slightly more latitude to review its proceedings than a defendant in the case. Agreements To Dismiss A Case Distinguished A prosecutor with jurisdiction over a criminal case that is presented to a grand jury could reach an agreement with a defendant that is binding not to prosecute on a charge in the future, but again, that would be an affirmative act of a prosecutor agreeing to honor a grand jury "no bill" and there would be no legal requirement that the prosecutor do so. Practical Limitations Note, however, that there is a downside to repeatedly bringing a case to a grand jury after receiving one or more "no bills". A prosecutor has a constitutional obligation arising under the Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to disclose all exculpatory evidence known to the prosecutor to the defense, upon request. Usually, when a grand jury declines to indict there is something in the evidence presented to it that is exculpatory. A repeated presentation of charges that one or more prior grand jury rejected that ultimately produces a grand jury indictment would usually be strongly suggestive of the fact that there is exculpatory evidence in existence that may not have been disclosed to the final grand jury and that needs to be disclosed to the defense prior to trial. Also, many criminal charges have a statute of limitations, and charges cannot be presented to a grand jury after the statute of limitations for the offense has expired. | Murder Which is the unlawful taking of a life with intent to do so. However, the doctrine of self-defence can make killing lawful: A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. if the prosecutor is of the opinion that the force used "is reasonable in the circumstances" they may not lay charges. If they do lay charges the judge may decide that there is no case to answer before going to trial if self-defence applies. If there is a trial this will probably be the strategy the defence employs and they may or may not be successful. If convicted the penalty is life imprisonment. Also, there is no UK law: there is the law of England and Wales, the law of Scotland and the law of Northern Ireland. | Some of the documents are here. As document 61 of the trial, the government motion for bench trial, argues, There is no constitutional right to a jury trial for criminal contempt charges resulting in a sentence of imprisonment of six months or less. Arpaio responds in document 62 that Defendant Arpaio acknowledges that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for defendants charged with “petty” offenses where the maximum sentence does not exceed six months imprisonment, but continues the argument (the point being that there is no question that there is no absolute right to a jury trial, esp. in the instant case). He argues Many of the actions of the referring judge will become an issue in the case, calling into question the objectives and motives of Judge Snow. A public official’s actions and motives should and must be decided by an impartial jury of the elected official’s peers. The court order is document 83. There, The Court finds that this case is appropriate for a bench trial. This case focuses on the application of facts to the law to determine if Defendant intentionally violated a court order. Essentially, since there is no right to a jury trial and no compelling reason to grant a jury trial (e.g. the court found no merit to his argument that there would be the appearance of impropriety), the motion for a bench trial was granted. The order cites case law regarding the "not longer that 6 months" rule from Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454; United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488; United States v. Aldridge, 995 F.2d 233; United States v. Berry, 232 F.3d 897. |
Can satire be libel? Can a clearly marked satirical article claiming someone said something (which they did not) that would seriously damage the person's reputation be considered libel? For example, if Biden actually said what this Babylon Bee article "claims," it would certainly harm his reputation. Could that article be considered libelous? | Something labeled, and indeed intended, as satire can be defamation if people believe that the statements made are in fact true of the person concerned (the subject), or that the satire implies such statements about subject; and the statements about the subject made or implied in the satire are in fact false; and such statements tend to harm the reputation of the subject. Satire can be, and has been, used as a cover for pointed statements about the subject, and in some cases such statements can constitute libel (or slander). In the US a libel plaintiff would have the additional burdens of: showing actual damage, or else showing that the statements fell into one of the limited categories of libel per se; and If the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, showing actual malice under the rule of Times v Sullivan. Those burdens exist in every US libel or defamation action, whether a satire is used or not. That something is labeled as or treated as a satire may indicate that it is not to be believed. That might go to the intention of the person or entity making the statement. It might also go to whether it is reasonable for people to take the statements as factual. But satire can be used as a thin cover for a factual statement. If (in a given case) it is being so used, or if people might well believe that it is, it can be defamatory. | There are three main aspects to this: Its their website, and their terms of service. They can enforce those terms, or change them (in some appropriate manner). You have no recourse if they remove you, block you, or delete your account, for example. That's the measure that you would probably have, virtually every time. To claim damages, or litigate beyond just website access control, requires a legal claim. But there's a catch there. To claim damages, they need to show actual damage, which they wish to be compensated for. If you misused their website but no actual harm can be shown, the total damage claimable is zero, whether or not you followed their rules. Merely entering dishonest information isn't by itself harm. So they would have to show they suffered damage/harm because of that, which is directly attributable to your behaviour, was foreseeably harmful etc, or similar. They also need to consider legal costs, and ability to enforce, especially if you are in a different country. If for some reason the computer use was also illegal, then a criminal act could be committed and they could notify law enforcement. For example suppose you did this in the little known country of Honestania, where the law says that to prevent trolling and online abuse, anything posted on social media under any but your own legal name is a crime. Or suppose you'd been banned from the system and ignoring/evading such a ban was criminal computer use or criminal trespass due to the forbidden/unauthorised access (which can happen in several places). But this is purely for completeness; I guess you'd know if you were taking it further, into criminal computer use. | It can be Defamation suits, in particular, are often undertaken to vindicate reputation rather than to secure monetary damages. This is one reason why suits awarding nominal damages for libel (sums such as $1, or six-pence or one farthing in the UK) are sometimes regarded as victories by plaintiffs, even though such plaintiffs gained no money, and in some cases had to spend much time,. effort, and money to get such a verdict. In other cases such low damages are known as "contemptuous damages" expressing the view that "Yes you were technically defamed, but your reputation was of no value". The damages of one half-penny awarded in Dering v Uris and Others (1964 had been taken in this latter sense. See also the Wikippedia section on "Nominal damages" where it is stated that: The [US] Supreme Court decided 8–1 in the 2021 case Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski that nominal damages are appropriate means to redress violated rights otherwise now rendered moot. In some kinds of cases in some jurisdictions a plaintiff may indicate that s/he does not desire monetary damages, only a judgement supporting his or her position. In other cases a suit must be framed as one for monetary damages, but the plaintiff may state that the verdict, not the damages, is what is most desired. There is noting illegal nor (in my view) immoral in bringing a suit more for public vindication than for money damages. There is, of course, a risk that the case will not turn out as the plaintiff wishes. Whether a states lack of interest in damages will favorably or unfavorably impress the judge or jury can vary widely, and cannot be predicted in general. Defamation case verdicts sometimes include an order for one side to apologize to the other. Whether such an apology has value is a matter of opinion. | In the US, it is not illegal to lie in general. This includes lying about someone: it's not illegal per se to lie about them. What is illegal is slander and libel: lying about someone in a way that hurts their reputation. The defamation doctrine in the US is generally a common-law doctrine (i.e. the rules and limits are based on court decisions, rather than on laws passed by legislatures), although it may differ state-by-state. Depending on the state, some defamation may be criminal; there is no federal criminal defamation. US defamation law is largely defined through its interaction with the First Amendment. While libel is not constitutionally protected, punishment for libel is seriously limited by the need to avoid either punishing protected speech, or chilling potential protected speech (i.e. discouraging people from saying something that would in fact be protected, because they aren't sure whether or not it's protected). Libel in the US only applies to a false statement of fact, or an opinion which implies some false fact. If it can't actually be proven incorrect, it can't be libelous in the US. The question of whether it's a statement of fact doesn't just depend on the literal speech; it includes things like the context, and is a question about what a reasonable person would think. If I were to claim that someone was "literally Hitler," for instance, no reasonable person would think I was seriously claiming that the person was the former leader of Nazi Germany. Now, no reasonable person who is familiar with Twitter would ever assume that the tweet meant Obama literally stood up in front of the UN and said "Please accept this nothingburger in place of a respectable climate plan." So, it only counts as libel if a reasonable person would think it implies some fact. But a reasonable person familiar with Twitter would most likely think Miesel is saying "The president's pollution plan is a pointless piece of political puffery planned to placate principalities and potentates." This is basically a matter of opinion. Even to the extent that it's not a matter of opinion, public figures in the US cannot win a defamation suit unless they show "actual malice:" the speaker must actually know or actually strongly suspect that their statement is false in some material way. It's not enough that a reasonable person would think "this might not be true;" the speaker themselves must doubt the truth of it (they must be reckless, not just negligent). Courts are also extremely deferential to defendants in these cases. While it is technically possible for a public figure to prove defamation, it is exceptionally difficult. If the person didn't know they were falsely attributing the quote, and honesty thought it was correct, they're in the clear. If the quote isn't supposed to be a statement of fact, but it implies false facts, but the speaker honestly thinks those facts are true, they're in the clear. Private figures don't have to meet the actual malice standard to prove defamation. They still need to show that the statement is a statement of fact or something implying false facts; if it's obviously a summary of something they really said, possibly with added editorial comment, they can't prove defamation. | In the united-states, there is no general right for a person to control or approve a biography or other account of that person's life. Many biographies are "unauthorized", which simply means that the subject, or in some cases the subject's heirs or family, did not cooperate with the biographer. Sometimes this is even considered to be a point in favor of such a work, on the assumption that an "authorized" biography would tend to slant or even censor things to meet the approval of the subject or the subject's family. There are some restrictions on an unauthorized biography. The first and most obvious is the law of defamation. A biography that includes statements that are both false and defamatory about a living subject could be the subject of a winning lawsuit. Damages in such cases can sometimes be sizable. However, the person suing must show false facts in the work. In many cases damage to reputation must also be shown, although there are some categories of statement that are considered defamation per se, where injury to reputation is assumed and need not be proved. These include a false statement that a person committed a crime, and a statement that a person was guilty of professional misconduct. It used to be considered defamation per se to allege that a woman had had sex outside of marriage, but I doubt that a court would so hold today. Beyond that, in the US, if the subject is a public official or public figure, s/he must show actual malice, that is that the false statement was made knowing that it was false, or with reckless disregard for its possible falsity. This can be hard to prove. In most jurisdictions only the person defamed can sue for defamation. Once that person is dead, no such suit can be brought. Moreover, in the very rare case where a person's reputation is so bad that a court finds that it can suffer no meaningful further injury for certain allegations, even if these were found to be false, the court may dismiss such a suit. See Dykstra v St. Martin's Press New York Superior Court, New York County, Docket Number 153676 for an example. However this would only be relevant in the very unusual case of a "libel-proof" plaintiff, and even then if the conduct of the author or publisher was egregious, the court might hold that punitive damages were possible. The defenses of truth, lack of actual malice, and newsworthiness are far more common. Indeed defamation suits in general are hard to win and expensive to bring. In some US states there is available the tort of publication of private facts. This is different from defamation in that it can still be brought when the facts published were true, while truth is a total defense against a defamation suit. However a private facts suit must establish that the facts were in fact private, or at least not widely known, and that they were published in a way that would be grossly offensive to a reasonable person. Facts that are considered of "legitimate public interest" or "newsworthy" are also not generally protected. Moreover, not every US state allows such suits at all. See Diaz vs Oakland Tribune, Inc 188 Cal Rpt 762 (1982) for a case in which a Private Facts case was sustained, and the steps taken by the subject to keep a sex transition private were a significant issue in the case. In Hawkins vs Multimedia inc 344 SE 2nd 145 (1986) a South Carolina court held that a news story identifying a teenage boy by name as the father of an "illegitimate" child was not newsworthy and a private facts judgement including punitive damages was upheld. In the US, First Amendment protections have been taken to indicate that the courts will not suppress or punish speech or writing without good reason. This makes it harder to win suits over biographies. There have been cases of magazine articles about a particular person who is in no way famous but who was considered "typical". Such stories have in several cases been upheld against challenges as of "legitimate public interest". See Arrington vs New York Times Company 434 N.E. 2nd 1319 (1982) In that case the objection was to the use of a person's photo on the cover of the New York Times Magazine who was not actually mentioned in the story, and who alleged that he was not similar to those who were mentioned. The use was upheld. | One example is Sweden. Ebba Busch, the leader of the Christian Democrat party, accepted an order of summary punishment for writing in a Facebook post that the lawyer of her opponent in a real estate dispute has a criminal conviction, which is true. She said, "I admit having committed a crime, that I in my soul and heart consider myself innocent of. [...] But in Sweden, even the truth can be libel." A professor of civil law commented: "I'm a bit worried that there could be a campaign for true statements on social media always to be permitted, it would amount to terrible consequences and a negative development. In Sweden, libel law has been used to counteract spreading of revenge porn and sex videos of young women. Truth is not unimportant, it is taken into account in the libel process. It would be a negative development if it became allowed to spread everything that is true, in that case you'd need a more precise proposal about how you would permit certain actions and not others." | Yes. Making statements in a legally protected confidential context is not publishing them, and in most jurisdictions, defamation must be published to create a cause of action. In such a case the patient might well have a cause of action against the therapist for violation of patient confidentially, and a complaint to the relevant authority could get the therapist's license revoked, or perhaps a censure from the licensing authority, whatever it is the the jurisdiction. Note "published" does not have to mean putting them in print, but does mean making them in such a way that general circulation of them is plausible. In addition, such statements may be coered by a qualified privilege. In Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 135, 387 A.2d 1129 (1978) the Maryland Supreme Court (reviewing a case from the Court of Special Appeals) held (at 135-136) that: ... the common law recognized that a person ought to be shielded against civil liability for defamation where, in good faith, he publishes a statement in furtherance of his own legitimate interests, or those shared in common with the recipient or third parties, ... The Maryland court went on to quote the Restatement (Second) of Torts, (Scope Note preceding § 593 (1977)) which states that if a privilege were not granted: information that should be given or received would not be communicated because of [the] fear of . . . persons capable of giving it that they would be held liable in an action of defamation if their statements were untrue. It would seem that a statement by a person to his or her own therapist, as a part of therapy, and intended to be held in confidence by the therapist, ought to fall under this definition of privilege, although I cannot find any actual case with this exact fact pattern. If the person knew or had reason to know that the therapist was likely to repeat the statement, that would be different. If the person and the therapist were not in a practitioner/patient relationship, with its normal expectations of confidentiality, that also would be different. | A contract can’t legalise illegality Let’s assume that absent the “simulation” disclosure in the ToS, this would be fraud. The question then becomes, does making the disclosure make it not fraud? Fraud requires dishonesty and deception. These are measured by what a reasonable person would determine from the overall conduct so a small piece of truth in amongst a web of half-truths and outright lies is still dishonest and deceptive. From the perspective of US law, is Bob doing this regarded a scam? No, but only because “scam” isn’t a legal term - it’s slang for fraud and this is fraud Is this a criminal case, or a civil case? Both What evidence can Tom provide to support the lawsuit? Whatever he has. However, in practice, these types of fraudsters are rarely ever caught and it’s even more rare for the victim to recover their money. They are usually off-shore in countries with either poor rule of law or which will not extradite their nationals. |
In the U.S. must treason be tried by a military tribunal? I've run into the claim that in the U.S. that treason must be tried by a military tribunal, even if the accused is a civilian. Is this true? I tried Googling the question, but it seems I don't know enough about the law to be able to find the answer that way. | It is not the case that treason must be tried by a military tribunal. See for example US v. Kawakita, which was an ordinary civilian jury trial. I cannot even imagine why one would think that there is any such requirement. Here is the federal law against treason, and nothing says "offenses must be tried in a military court". Perhaps that misconception was based on the use of military tribunals during the American Revolution, which preceded the creation of a US legal system. | "Seditious libel" has happened before, but not in the US. This comes up in NY Times v. Sullivan, which notes that For good reason, "no court of last resort in this country has ever held, or even suggested, that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American system of jurisprudence." City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 601, 139 N.E. This Volokh article gives various citations showing that a government entity cannot sue for libel. | The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law | Does he have some kind of libel or invasion of privacy case? The description of the "art work" is somewhat inconclusive. I will assume that the red lipstick and blue eye shadow in the fictional poster are suggestive of that soldier's "makeup". If the World War Two soldier were still alive and a straight male, he might have a claim of defamation insofar as the poster portrayed him as having a sexual orientation which is inaccurate, detrimental to his reputation, and tending to dissuade others from associating with the soldier. Policies against sexual discrimination aside, no straight male likes being falsely characterized as to sexual orientation (in part because of the undeniably harmful, lasting impact something like this would have in his environment). The defendant's possible allegation that the "art work" was hyperbole would be unavailing. That is because the suggestive poster is likely to impinge on viewers a detrimental concept of the soldier even if it is obvious to those viewers that the poster was not an actual, color photograph taken of him during the World War II. In most jurisdictions in the US, the defamed soldier would need to file suit within a year from the publication of the poster (an exception is Tennessee: six months) because the statute of limitations for claims of defamation is shorter than most others. | We look first to the Hutaree prosecution of 2012, US v. Stone where defendants were charged with seditious conspiracy: Specifically, the Government charges Defendants with conspiring to “oppose by force the authority” of the United States Government. Essential to that charge, Defendants must have agreed to oppose some positive assertion of authority by the United States Government; mere violations of the law do not suffice. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 693 (1887). In Baldwin, SCOTUS found (emphasis added) that All, therefore, depends on that part of the section which provides a punishment for ‘opposing’ by force the authority of the United States . . . . This evidently implies force against the government as a government. To constitute an offense under the first clause, the authority of the government must be opposed; that is to say, force must be brought to resist some positive assertion of authority by the government. A mere violation of law is not enough; there must be an attempt to prevent the actual exercise of authority. | In this case the Plaintiff, James Maloney, has previously been charged with a crime for possession of nunchucks. He is apparently suing to enjoin further enforcement of the law under which he was previously charged. US Federal courts will only take up a "case or controversy", which means an issue where actual, not theoretical rights are at stake, and in order to vindicate a constitutional right, it must either have previously been violated, or there must be a plausible and immediate threat to it. Claiming that a law is unconstitutional as part of a defense to a charge of violating that law is a common and probably the best known method of challenging a law (or a government action) for unconstitutionality. But there are other ways. One way is to apply for an injunction against enforcement of the law. That is the procedure that was followed in, for example, the recent case where there was a ruling against the ADA in a district court. In order to use that procedure, the plaintiff must present evidence that there is a credible threat that the law will be invoked against him (or her) if the action which the plaintiff claims is protected by a constitutional right is taken. In short, one need not put oneself in a position where one goes to prison or is found guilty of a crime if one loses the case to challenge the constitutionality of a law or of a government policy or action. But one must establish that it is a real "case or controversy", with real parties in opposition to each other, and real rights at stake, not a mere law student's exercise, nor a collusive case, with both "sides" having the same actual goal. In the case reported, the previous criminal charge helps to establish that this is a real issue. | An "inquisitorial" system is one where the Judge or Magistrate actively questions the accused and witnesses to attempt to determine the facts. The Judge may also determine, at least in part, what witnesses to call in what order. An "adversarial" system is one in which each side presents its case, and the judge acts as an umpire deciding on procedure, and possibly makes the final ruling (or directs a jury to do so) but is not actively involved in questioning witnesses or deciding what witnesses to call. I don't see anything which would prevent a common-law jurisdiction from establishing an "inquisitorial" system by statute except longstanding tradition, but as far as i know no such jurisdiction has ever had such a system in place for dealing with criminal matters. The informal procedures in some small claims courts do have judges more actively involved than in other courts. I think this is also true in some family courts as well. I think I have heard of some civil-law jurisdictions which use something like an adversary system, but i am not sure of that. Certainly a civil-law country could pass a law setting up such a system if it chose to. | So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds. |
Does the concept of a lodger or anything similar exist in US or Florida law? In some jurisdictions one who rents a room in a landlord's own residence is considered less than a tenant and doesn't receive the same protections against illegal eviction, etc. It seems that this concept doesn't exist in Florida. Does anything like this exist either in Florida or in the rest of the US? | Anti-discrimination laws in the U.S. have exceptions for someone who rents a room in a landlord's own residence, but generally speaking, for other purposes, there is not a distinction in U.S. or Florida law. People who stay at a place with the permission of the owner for a very brief period of time and not pursuant to a lease, such as someone who gains use of a particular seat in a movie theater pursuant to a purchased ticket, is, however, not a tenant with the full rights of a tenant, and is instead a licensee who does not have a property right to use that space, only a contract that can be terminated by the property owner or their agent at will, potentially with breach of contract damages if this is done without justification, but not with liability for violating a tenant's rights. In some cases, someone whose housing, at least part of the time, is for the convenience of the employer, like a medical resident who uses a sleeping room at a hospital, or a member of the crew of a ship who sleeps on the ship incident to their duties, may have reduced rights relative to housing when their employment is terminated for cause, although this is only sometimes clearly enunciated in statutes or case law and the law would not be terribly consistent in this area. | I suspect that the statute in question may be Section 11-104(1)(F) of municipal ordinances of the Town of Bloomsburg, PA, a university town (home to Bloomberg University of Pennsylvania, a public college) that purports to have special need for regulation based upon the large number of student rentals in the town and apparently applies primarily to house rentals to students. (If not, the ordinance in question may be modeled on this one, or this one may be modeled on the ordinance in question.) This ordinance imposes the following duties on people who have been granted landlord licenses, which the town requires of most landlords renting to students (a landlord is called the "owner" in the ordinance): The owner shall maintain a current and accurate list of the occupants in each regulated rental unit or dormitory unit which shall include their name, permanent address and permanent telephone number which shall be available to the Town for inspection upon reasonable notice. The owner shall notify the Town of changes in the occupancy within 10 days of the change and shall provide the name of the person who is not longer residing in the premises in the event a person departs and the name, permanent address and permanent telephone number of new occupants in the event a new person is added. On its face, this is probably valid. There is not a constitutional right to keep your own contact information or address, or your tenant's identity. Indeed, very similar requirements are routinely imposed upon operators of hotels and motels. And, I strongly suspect that in Pennsylvania, that towns of any reasonable population have more or less plenary authority to adopt ordinances that aren't specifically prohibited by other state or federal laws or constitutions or the town charter. I do not believe that there are any federal statutes that prohibit a town from imposing such a requirement, barring extraordinary circumstances like a duty to cooperate with national security measures, witness protection programs, or a federal organized crime investigation that don't benefit the average tenant. The kind of privacy policy and privacy disclosure laws in place at the national level apply mostly to health and financial information (and far more in Europe), but not generally to legally mandated disclosures of landlords to local governments. The requirements of a privacy policy don't apply here. The main federal privacy laws and some of the most notable state privacy laws are: The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) which affects websites that knowingly collect information about or targeted at children under the age of 13. Any such websites must post a privacy policy and adhere to enumerated information-sharing restrictions COPPA includes a "safe harbor" provision to promote Industry self-regulation. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires institutions "significantly engaged" in financial activities give "clear, conspicuous, and accurate statements" of their information-sharing practices. The Act also restricts use and sharing of financial information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rules requires notice in writing of the privacy practices of health care services, and this requirement also applies if the health service is electronic. The California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 – Business and Professions Code sections 22575-22579 requires "any commercial websites or online services that collect personal information on California residents through a web site to conspicuously post a privacy policy on the site". Both Nebraska and Pennsylvania have laws treating misleading statements in privacy policies published on websites as deceptive or fraudulent business practices. But, most of these laws apply only to Internet sharing of information by private firms, and the Nebraska and Pennsylvania laws don't require anyone to actually have a privacy policy. Those laws certainly don't pre-empt local ordinances. There is at least one state law that should supply an exemption to this statute in Pennsylvania pertaining to confidentiality for domestic violence victims that should override contrary town ordinances. Address Confidentiality Program (ACP): Victims can get a legal substitute address (usually a post office box) to use in place of their physical address; this address can be used whenever an address is required by public agencies. First class mail sent to the substitute address is forwarded to the victim's actual address. Probably the most fruitful means by which an ordinance like this one could be challenged would be to argue that the true intent of the ordinances when adopted or as it has been subsequently applied, is to use it for a purpose that the town is not allowed to engage in, such as enforcing immigration laws, suppressing voting rights, imposing a de facto poll tax, or engaging in discrimination against a protected class in violation of state and federal fair housing laws. College students, however, the expressly stated and plausible target of the ordinance, are not generally a protected class under fair housing legislation. There are precedents upholding zoning regulations discriminating against households of "Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals" aimed at students and other kind of populations whom municipal busybodies often find to be undesirable against federal constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). California's courts have been more hostile to this kind of legislation. See, e.g. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 125 (Cal. 1980) (an op-ed arguing that this was wrongly decided in the L.A. Times in 1990 is here), but that isn't very helpful in Pennsylvania, and California rather than Pennsylvania is the outlier nationally on this kind of issue. The general issue over free association and privacy rights in connection with housing and unrelated individuals is discussed in an up to date manner in a 2016 Florida Law Review article. Proving an improper purpose in an as applied or legislative intent based challenge to a facially neutral statute is very, very difficult in all but the most blatant cases (e.g. when town council members openly proclaim their improper purpose is that true purpose of the law). No doubt recognizing the possibility of such a challenge to the ordinance, this particular ordinance has a particularly lengthy and detailed legislative declaration regarding its purpose that no doubt is an effort to take a position that it has a proper purpose in the event of future litigation. This states: It is the purpose of this Part and the policy of the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg, in order to protect and promote the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens, to establish rights and obligations of owners and occupants relating to the rental of certain dwelling units and dormitory units in the Town of Bloomsburg and to encourage owners and occupants to maintain and improve the quality of rental housing within the community. It is also the policy of the Town that owners, managers and occupants share responsibilities to obey the various codes adopted to protect and promote public health, safety and welfare. As means to those ends, this Part provides for a system of inspections, issuance and renewal of occupancy licenses and sets penalties for violations. This Part shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its purposes and policies. In considering the adoption of this Part, the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings: A. While the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg acknowledges the significant contribution that Bloomsburg University, its students, faculty and staff makes to the culture and economy of the Town of Bloomsburg, in recent years, adverse effects of student housing on residential neighborhoods have increased and there has been an increase in destructive student behavior that threatens the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg. B. Accordingly, the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings relating to student housing and its effect on the residential neighborhoods of the Town of Bloomsburg and the effect of student lifestyles on the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg: (1) When compared to other unrelated cohabitating individuals and traditional families, groups of students have different hours, work and social habits and frequently cause noise, disturbances and problems in residential neighborhoods. (2) There is a greater incidence of violations of various codes of the Town at residential properties where owners rent such property to students. (3) There is a greater incidence of problems with the maintenance and upkeep of residential properties where owners rent such property to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (4) There is a greater incidence of disturbances which adversely affect the peace and quiet of the neighborhood at residential properties where owners rent to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (5) A concentration of student homes changes the character of a neighborhood from one with traditional family values to one that cannot maintain those and approximately 90% of the Town's student homes are concentrated in two areas of the Town which displaces middle and lower income housing by absorbing housing units and rendering the remaining units less desirable for more traditional residential use. (6) Since 1994, nine students have died as a result of fires in houses occupied by students; two students have died of alcohol overdose; one student has died as a result of exposure when he fell from a porch at a student party. (7) Since 1997, 155 reports of disruptive conduct under the Town's Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance involving student behavior have been filed. (8) Since 1996, 73 prosecutions for unlawfully occupying premises while smoke or fire detectors were not operational have been filed against students. (9) Since 1998, 295 prosecutions for underage drinking have been filed against students and 11 prosecutions were filed against non-student residents of the Town of Bloomsburg. (10) Since 1998, 43 student parties have been raided where arrests were made for underage drinking and furnishing alcohol to minors. (11) There are sufficient differences between student housing and nonstudent housing and the behavior of students and non-student residents to justify different regulations for each class of resident. (12) Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals are being modified for occupancy by two students requiring the relocating of bearing walls and the modification of utilities, sanitation facilities, means of ingress and egress and smoke and fire detection systems. (13) Inspections of dwelling units occupied by two students have revealed little or no life protecting equipment in the dwelling units such as smoke and fire alarms and detectors and fire extinguishers, over-loaded electrical services, heating systems needing servicing and the use of supplemental heaters, all of which create a dangerous living environment. (14) There is a significant occurrence of disruptive behavior in dwelling units occupied by less than three unrelated students as compared to dwelling units that are occupied by owners, traditional families or unrelated persons who are not students. (15) Students who remain in the occupancy of the premises for periods of time after they are no longer students contribute to the above-described problems. (16) Because of the demand for student housing in the Town of Bloomsburg, developers have expressed interest in developing properties for use as dormitories where students live in rooms without fixed kitchen facilities. (17) Dormitory type uses are not covered by the Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance which applies only to dwelling units. (18) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of providing the same protection and standards for students who reside in dormitories or dwelling units. (19) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of imposing the same responsibilities upon owners of dormitory units and dwelling units where students reside. (20) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg finds that Bloomsburg University has sufficient resources and interest to properly manage dormitories owned by it and there is no need to regulate such dormitories. Even though it probably isn't inherently invalid, it is unusual, so it is likely to be challenged if someone can find an angle to do so. And, I suspect that its purposes are not as pure as those formally identified in the text of the ordinance. In conclusion, while I would totally hate to have an ordinance like that one in my town, it isn't obviously invalid and would probably survive a facial challenge in the absence of evidence that is was being applied in an illegally discriminatory manner. | Purchasing a lot that contained the keys does not provide any rights to access the locks that those keys would open. What someone who did this would be charged with would vary by both location and also by prosecutorial discretion. The only exception in this scenario would be if the storage locker contained the deed to the property in question. | From the opinion in Fair Housing Council v. Roommate.com (2012): There's no indication that Congress intended to interfere with personal relationships inside the home. Congress wanted to address the problems of landlords discriminating in the sale and rental of housing, which deprived classes of housing opportunities. But a business transaction between a tenant and landlord is quite different from an arrangement between two people sharing the same living space. And, also from the opinion: Nothing in the language of the statute provides that a "housing accommodation" includes shared living quarters. Applying the ruling to your question it seems that if a landlord rents an entire house to a group then the group may make any determination they wish as to who will be members of the group sharing the living quarters, no matter how many bedrooms the dwelling has. On the other hand, if the landlord rents individual bedrooms as part of individual rental agreements that includes shared facilities such as kitchens and bathrooms, then the landlord may not discriminate in the renting of the individual bedrooms. | Often, evictions are bifurcated. An initial hearing determines all evidence necessary to determine if there is a default existing sufficient to justify an eviction, and if so, the eviction goes forward immediately despite the fact that not all issues in the case have been resolved. A later hearing resolved the precise dollar amount of any damages claim. If the grounds for eviction is non-payment of rent, and the amount of payments or the amount of obligations of the landlord that can be setoff against the rent due exceeds the amount of rent found to have not be paid, then it is a defense to an eviction in the initial possession phase. If the counterclaim is smaller than the amount of rent owed (or cannot for some reason be set off against the amount owed) then it is only at most, a setoff against a damages award in favor of the landlord. I'm have not researched, in particular, how this is handled in New Jersey, but I am providing this answer on the theory that some insight is better than nothing. For the purpose of this question assume the landlord does not dispute the tenants underlying claim. His only argument is that the tenant should counter sue and that it should not be raised as a defense for non payment / stop the eviction. If this is true, it is both an affirmative defense to the eviction claim and a basis for a counterclaim in most cases. The better practice would be to raise it both ways in the same lawsuit. But, if the counterclaim is not sufficient to overcome the claim that rent is owed and not paid in full, or triggers some other different alternative ground for an eviction (e.g., maybe the lease provides that application of a security deposit against rent owed is itself an event of default), then that wouldn't prevent an eviction. | You are allowed to sublet the whole of the premises but not part of it (VIII a); if you do you must create the agreement mentioned, pay to have it stamped by the government and pay £10 + VAT to the landlord. You must only use the premises as a domicile for one family; better make sure you rent those rooms to your cousins. | First of all, usually negligence by an HOA or its agents does not create liability for owners of the HOA directly. Instead, it creates a debt of the HOA, which the HOA might choose to pay through assessments on individual owners. But, the creditor probably doesn't have the right to compel the HOA to make those assessments, although they could starve the HOA of funds needed to operate and the creditors might be able to seize common interest property management by the HOA (depending, in part, on some quite subtle details of how the association has been set up that have varied, mostly as as matter of customary practice that changes in different time periods - in some HOAs, common interests are owned by the HOA, in others they are tenancy-in-common interests of the owners with limitations on transferability). Second, self-settled trusts (i.e. trusts for you benefit funded with money from you) are almost always ineffective (outside some select asset protection oriented jurisdictions of which Idaho is not one) as they are a form of fraudulent transfer. So, no it wouldn't work. In particular Idaho Statutes § 15-7-502(4) states: If a person is both a settlor and beneficiary of the same trust, a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of the settlor’s beneficial interest in such trust does not prevent the settlor’s creditors from satisfying claims from the settlor’s interest in the trust estate that relates to the portion of the trust that was contributed by the settlor. The same subsection clarifies that federal rules related to grantor trusts are not relevant to this determination, and other parts of the statute also clarify the relevant definitions. | Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease. |
Do I need a passport or ID card to have the right to work in the EU? I am due to start a job in the EU this August. Fortunately, I have recently acquired citizenship in an EU country, and so (I would think) have the right to work in the EU. Unfortunately, I do not yet have an EU passport or ID card -- and getting one would probably take several months. Question: Do I need a EU passport or EU ID card to legally work in the EU (or establish that I have the right to work in the EU)? Or is a certificate of citizenship sufficient? Addendum: in fact, the document that I have is not exactly a certificate of citizenship. Rather, it is a "Notification of the acquisition of citizenship" (there is a separate citizenship certificate that I can apply for). I'm not sure if this makes any difference. | Question: Do I need a EU passport or EU ID card to legally work in the EU (or establish that I have the right to work in the EU)? Or is a certificate of citizenship sufficient? Legally, your right to work is not contingent on this and there is no Europe-wide rule that makes holding any document mandatory. Importantly, if you do start working anyway, you are not committing a crime and cannot possibly be banned or forced to leave the country. You do have the right to work from the day you became an EU citizen and if any doubt arises down the line, you should be able to clear it up later. In practice, employers are sometimes supposed to check you are allowed to work (and for that would require some proof of your citizenship) but they don't necessarily need a passport or ID. What's typical on the other hand is that you have to provide an official proof of address (in the countries where you have to register your address with the authorities) and the local social security, insurance, or national tax number. Both of these will require dealing with the authorities and will be considerably more difficult, if not downright impossible, without a national ID card or passport (in fact it can even be difficult with a passport). I worked in multiple EU countries and I don't recall always having to present my ID to employers. I recall at least one instance (in Germany) where I could start working without one (it had just been stolen) and another one (in the Netherlands) where I started on the day after I arrived, without official address nor tax number (BSN). In both cases, I was expected to solve these issues within the first month and you risk a fine if you don't register within a week or two but it was neither illegal nor impossible to start working before all the formalities were completed. None of this means I would be completely comfortable about being months without a passport. But the main issue for you will be entering the country and what your employer's HR department is prepared to tolerate, not any sort of legal obligation to hold a passport to work. Note that in one of the cases I described above I went to the local consulate to get an emergency passport. It wouldn't have been possible back in my country of citizenship but there are some special procedures when you reside abroad. These rules change all the time and depend on your country of citizenship but that could be worth a try. | The law, at section 52(4) Data Protection Act 2018 does not expressly require a signature. What is needed is confirmation of one's identity: Where the controller has reasonable doubts about the identity of an individual making a request under section 45, 46 or 47, the controller may— (a) request the provision of additional information to enable the controller to confirm the identity, and (b) delay dealing with the request until the identity is confirmed. One option is to submit the request with an explanation as to why your signature has changed and wait and see if the data controller comes back for additional information. If you can't provide anything more, or they still won't process your request if you do, there's alway the option of appealing to the Information Commissioner's Office | The answer to your question is that your manager cannot ask you to undertake training without payment. All employees are entitled to be paid for the work they have done. They are also entitled to be paid if they are ready and willing to work but their employer has not provided them with any work to do, unless your employment contract says otherwise. https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/work/rights-at-work/rights-to-pay/ Zero hours contracts can be very complicated legal issues, but you are entitled to be paid for the time you spend there doing what your employer has asked you to do. However, if your employment were to be terminated due to a disagreement then you may not be able to make any claim before an Employment Tribunal as you do not yet have a sufficient length of employment. There are many legal complications, and each case is different and individual. Giving general legal advice is beset with all kinds of problems. You may wish to direct your employer to the Citizens' Advice page. If they do not agree to either pay you for your time there or allow you to leave when they do not wish to pay you then your best option might be to seek employment elsewhere. | I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down. | The document may, but probably doesn't say what it is you are witnessing. For example, a person witnessing a statutory declaration in NSW attests: their qualification to be a witness (JP, solicitor etc.) that they actually saw the declarant sign it that they asked the declarant if they believed their declaration was true that they have known the declarant for more than 12 months OR the declarant provided a photo ID and either their face matched the photo or they had a valid reason for not showing their face. If it doesn't say then what you are witnessing is that the signature was made by a person whom you could identify if necessary (e.g. if the person denied the signature). | Statelessness is a very serious condition. It is quite likely that a person such as you describe may be required to board an aeroplane to that country but will not be permitted to pass through immigration on arrival - Mehran Karimi Nasseri lived in Charles de Gaulle airport for 18 years in this condition. There are many people in the world who are stateless and this may or may not affect their lives. Citizenship is generally only an issue when crossing international borders or in employment situations, the latter is significant in advanced countries but less of an issue in countries with less-developed economies. | The official Scottish government website, under the section headed Proof of identity uses the terms "could" and "can" which, in the UK, do not impose a statutory duty or obligation unlike "must". It also confirms that: Landlords who rent properties to tenants in England and Wales must check that a tenant has a right to rent, and live, in the UK. You don't need to do this check in Scotland. (My emboldenment) So it seems there is no lawful reason to ask the question but asking, in and of itself, does not appear to be in breach of the Equality Act 2010. It is what the prospective landlord does with that information that may, or may not, make it so either by: s.13 Direct discrimination (1)A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. ... (5)If the protected characteristic is race, less favourable treatment includes segregating B from others. ... Or s.19 Indirect discrimination (1)A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's. (2)For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's if— (a)A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b)it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, (c)it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and (d)A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (3)The relevant protected characteristics are— ... race ... For completeness and clarity: s.9 Race (1)Race includes— ... (b)nationality; (c)ethnic or national origins. ... | I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on! |
Is this copyright infringement? Location: United States Given that copyright does not protect ideas Let's imagine app a and app b. These two apps are created by two different people. No patents are involved. The person that created app b had access to app a's full source code before working on app b. These two apps do the same thing. App a has 10 features. App b copied all 10 features from app a, but expressed all features in a different way where there is no substantial similarity. Would App b be copyright infringement? | The other answers get at this somewhat obliquely, but to be clear your assumption 7, that there is no substantial similarity, implies no infringement. Substantial similarity is an element of infringement. But it is also often a disputed element. On your fact pattern, it might even be the only disputed element in the case, and in a close case in a technical area such as this (where it would likely seem to a judge that it could go either way), a jury would simply vote on it. That is, no oracle of copyright doctrine would be consulted for "the answer" to the question of substantial similarity; a jury would just hear testimony from both sides and get some instructions from the judge on the applicable standard (which are rarely much, if any, help) and vote. Substantial similarity - that is, similarity that appropriates "enough" of the original work to be actionable - is very difficult to assess in any objective manner. This aspect drives many creative people in copyright-intensive specialized disciplines (such as software and music) crazy. Often when people have expertise in an area, it may seem "obvious" to various individuals what ought to be actionable and what shouldn't. But it is rare to find complete conensus. (Most copyright infringement cases involving music - e.g. the one involving Katy Perry's "Dark Horse" or Robin Thicke's "Blurred Lines" - attract a lot of attention because juries end up voting on an issue that almost anybody who has heard two songs could form an opinion about, and maybe a strong opinion about.) A loose analogy to your question would be in the criminal context, where the fact pattern is, so let's say A kills B, but didn't intend to, did A commit murder? In most jurisdictions the formal legal answer to that question would be "no, of course not, because intent is an element of the crime of murder." But in many murder cases intent is a highly disputed element (sometimes the only disputed element) and in close cases a jury just gets to vote on what they think from their understanding of the facts, or at least what is presented to them as the facts in court. (The standard of proof in criminal cases is formally different but in practice I am not sure it is at all different.) As another answer suggests, the fact pattern you describe sounds kind of "fishy," and while that does not doctrinally matter, let alone settle the issue, it might matter to a jury. Two cases somewhat along these lines are Google LLC v. Oracle, Inc. (which involved basically this fact pattern, with Google in the role of "app b") and Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l., Inc. (with Borland in the role of "app b", although the copying that occurred was not at the level of source code). They were both ultimately decided on other grounds (and the relevant issues only got to a jury in one of them), but in a world where other statutory defenses had not been asserted they both could have been decided simply by jury vote. | That would be pretty much a classical case of copyright infringement. Drawing a thing from memory is copying just as much as drawing a thing with the original before you or xeroxing a thing. The degree of match between the original and your copy may vary depending on how good your memory is, but that doesn't matter, because copyright protection is not about "making exact replicas", it is about copying in any form. | Software doesn't infringe any patents. Creating a product that includes the software may infringe the patent, and may infringe that patent because the software is included, but the software itself doesn't. Software on its own doesn't have any effect that could be patented, only as part of some machine. On the other hand, if you want to distribute software that is under the GPL v3.0 license, then a requirement is that you give everyone a patent license for all patents that would be infringed by using the software (as part of some machine), and if you are not the patent holder, then in practice that means you are not allowed to distribute the software. With your grand plan that you write software and then let the end users do the patent infringement, that will backfire in two ways: First, you'd be likely sued for contributory patent infringment, because it is you who enables the patent infringemnt. Second, you can be sued for copyright infringement because you have no license that allows you distribution of the software, depending on the Open Source license used. | If you want to implement this or a similar feature, you'd look up the patents, and either get a license (unlikely that Microsoft would give you a license), or figure out how to implement the feature without violating the patent. An example how a company I worked for worked around a patent: In order to compress data. in the best possible way, the idea was to try eight different methods to compress the data and pick the best compressed data. There was a patent for that (even though to me, this was quite obvious). Workaround: The software tried eight different methods and reported a number from 1 to 8 indicating which method gave the best result (unlike the patent, which actually gave the best result). Then the data was compressed once using the best method. No patent violation. You'd probably want a patent lawyer to check if your idea how to implement the feature violates the patent or not, and how to get around it. It takes a specific mindset that you and I don't have. And even good lawyers who are not patent lawyers might not be able to help you there. Commercial vs. open source/free software makes no difference, except that Microsoft might not bother suing you if there is no money to be made. Unless the intent is to prevent you from implementing the feature, in which case the would sue companies without money as well. | Both the displayed site (including all text and images) and the html, css, javascript and other code that generates the display are protected by copyright. This is true in pretty much every country. You would not be able to reuse them lawfully without permission, unless an exception to copyright applies. If no exception applies, and you have not obtained permission, this is copyright infringement. In most cases copyright infringement is treated as a tort (a civil matter), not as a crime. This means that law enforcement generally will take no action and have no interest in such a situation. The copyright owner could sue for infringement, and possibly collect money damages. In the US, statutory damages can be as high as $30,000, or up to $150,000 for "wilful" infringement, or as low as $750 (per work infringed). Or actual damages can be collected instead. In other countries, actual damages plus costs of suit are more likely, but the rule can be different in each country. The possible exceptions to copyright vary significantly in different countries. In the US the major exception is Fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and I have a question about copyright. What should I read before I ask it? for more information In general short snippets of code can probably be used under fair use, but substantial parts of the code or the displayed site are less likely to qualify as fair use. And if it is illegal then why are there so many legal open source or paid software and applications for cloning of website like httrack, cyotek, webcopy etc? Most of these tools have legitimate uses, including learning how a site is constructed without distributing copied content; and cloning or partial cloning of a site with permission. Even if the tools were mostly used for unlawful copying, that might well not be a high priority for law enforcement, and cross-border law enforcement (which this in many cases would involve) is often much harder for the police and other authorities. | It's possible that CAD has a separate licence from the authors of ABC that allows them to produce a closed source copy. If not, they have no right to distribute CAD. However two wrongs don't make a right, and so you don't get to violate the copyright of CAD.* Unfortunately, unless you are one of the authors of ABC, you have no standing to sue the authors of CAD. You can only notify the authors of ABC and hope they do. If the authors of ABC don't have the resources to pursue the matter, you may be out of luck. That's one of the reasons the FSF gets copyright assignments for their projects. * It turns out that this is a much more debateable issue than I first thought. Some courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work is not copyrightable. | The question as worded implies that if something is a parody it is automatically fair use or allowed in US copyright law. This is a myth. First of all, in a copyright context, the term "parody" is somewhat limited. In that sense, a "parody" is a new work which comments on the original (often but not always by mocking or ridiculing the original). A mere alternate version which modifies the form of the original, perhaps humorously, but not to comment on the original or perhaps on much of anything, is not a parody. A new work which modifies the original to comment on something else, but not on the original, is a satire. Of course many works may be both parodies and satires in this sense. See this law.se Q&A for extensive quotes from Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co 268 F.3d 1257 (The case of The Wind Done Gone vs Gone with the Wind) and discussion of what is and is not a parody in US copyright law, and when a parody is fair use. A parody, because it comments on the original, will often be found to be a fair use of the original. But not always. The full four-factor analysis must still be done, and the results are never certain until a court has passed on the specific case. See this law.se Q&A for more on fair use. I can't tell from the question whether the modified song is truly a parody in the sense used in copyright law. If not, it probably isn't fair use, although it might be for other reasons. By the way, a song written for a television show or video to be distributed commercially is a commercial use, even if a non-profit corporation is involved, and even if there is an educational purpose. Note that fair-use is a strictly US legal concept. Even if something is fair use under US law, it may be copyright infringement under the laws of some other country. | Algorithms are not subject to copyright. A particular implementation can be copyrighted, but an algorithm itself can't be copyrighted. Someone re-implementing the algorithm with their own code has done nothing to give you copyright claims against their work, and is not bound by any software license you use. That's what patents are for. |
GDPR Compliance for Application That Guesses Email Addresses I live in the U.S. and am developing a browser extension that grabs a person's first name, last name, and company name from their LinkedIn profile and then attempts to guess their email address based on popular email syntax. The extension does not send any emails, but does validate the email addresses it guesses to confirm accuracy. A couple of questions, based on the above info: Is my application/extension considered a data processor or data controller based on GDPR? Since I am only providing the user with an email address for the LinkedIn member, am I legally liable for what the user does with that email address (i.e. sending unsolicited messages)? What information should I store, or not store, for GDPR compliance and my own legal protection? (i.e. should I retain logs of when a user looked up a particular name, and what email was produced? Or should I immediately purge all info?) | I decided to rewrite this after the clarification in the comments. You can find the old version in the history. The question is not, actually, about a browser extension. It is about a web service that can be accessed by the browser extension. The way to access the service should make little difference, it could be clay tablets, homing pigeons, or this browser extension, what matters is the service. The service has two functions: Receive PII of the victim, sent by the customer, to calculate the probable email of the victim, and return this PII to the customer. The service operator could argue that the customer is really the data controller under GDPR rules, and that the service operator is only the data processor, but that is not a plausible use case. The customer would need to get and document the consent of the victim before the probable mail is calculated, so why would the customer pay the service operator for a service like this? There is already contact with the victim. Generate a database of specific company email patterns to enable 1. This would also use PII, from random employees of the company in question, and there is no customer to shield the service provider by pretending that consent was collected. The way around the first issue might be to sell the database and have all calculations on the customer's system, but that doesn't resolve the second issue, that of creating the database. This involves looking for patterns in PII of individuals, unless the target company is obliging enough to make the pattern public. | These are only tangentially related to the GDPR A government entity processing data in accordance with a member state law is ipso facto in compliance with the GDPR. That’s because lawful government data processing is a legitimate reason for processing data under the GDPR. If Germany, for example, passes a law saying German police can record every phone call in Germany, then that would be a lawful basis for processing under the GDPR. There may be constitutional or other legal limitations on such a law but as far as the GDPR is concerned, they’re fine. | GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls. | Yes, phone numbers would generally qualify as Personal Data under GDPR. It would be so irrespective of whether you have also stored other information along with the phone numbers or not, since also information that indirectly could identify a natural person is Personal Data (provided that there are, somewhere else, public or not public, a register of who holds the specific phone number). See Article 4(1) GDPR. (One could possibly argue that the phone numbers would not be considered personal data if there is no actual register of who owns a specific phone number with any other party. Or if such register is in practice not available for anyone. It might be so in some cases, although I would not rely on it.) Whether you have the right to process the phone numbers must be assessed based on its lawfulness (see Article 6 GDPR). It could be based on consent, performance of contract, legitimate interest or any other ground set out therein. | The GDPR does not prescribe how exactly consent must be managed, as long as consent was obtained in line with the GDPR's principles. Similarly, the EDPB does not provide concrete recommendations in its guidelines on consent, mainly noting that Controllers are free to develop methods to comply with this provision in a way that is fitting in their daily operations. I would not be too concerned with edge cases like failing HTTP requests, at least not any more than for other HTTP endpoints. If the user indicated consent, and you act on that indication of consent in good faith, that's probably fine. However, remember that you must provide a equally easy way for the user to revoke consent later. If the user changes their mind, they can use the mechanism that you offer to inspect their consent status, and revoke it if they want. But again, how to do that is largely up to you. | IP addresses are personal data. That means you need a legal basis to process them, but not necessarily consent from the user. That IP addresses should be treated as personal data in most contexts is clear, regardless of whether you can associate the IP address with a user ID. That you make such an association affirms that both the IP address and user ID are personal data in your context though. As the answers in the questions you linked indicate, there are alternative legal bases to consent. The GDPR offers a choice of six legal bases (Art 6(1) lit a–f). In most cases, you would instead rely on a “legitimate interest” for logging. But it's not enough to claim that you have a legitimate interest. You must have a clear purpose for which such logs would be necessary, and you would then have to weigh this legitimate interest against the interests, rights, and freedoms of the affected data subjects. If such logs are necessary for security and anti-abuse purposes, your legitimate interest test is likely to prevail. However, you must limit retention of the logged data and the included information to what is actually necessary. For example, keeping user IDs in there might not be necessary. If the association of IP addresses and user IDs is not necessary for a legitimate interest, then you would indeed need consent. Discussion on why IP addresses are personal data. You see many answers and opinions that IP addresses might not be personal data. Some of these are technically correct, but most are misinformed or outdated. I know only a single well-informed person that still disagrees. For everyone else such as the EU Commission, IP addresses are clearly personal data. Under the GDPR, personal data is any information that relates to an (indirectly) identifiable natural person. In the context of log files we can assume that the entries usually “relate” to a person, namely the person making the request. The exception would be requests triggered by automated systems. The more interesting question is whether the person to which the log entry relates is identifiable. While the GDPR does provide further guidance on the concept of identification in Recital 26, it does not provide clear unambiguous criteria. Thus, there is lots of debate about what that precisely means. One approach is to sidestep that debate and and notice that the GDPR's definition of personal data explicitly notes that a person might be identified “in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier” (Art 4(1)). Another but otherwise unrelated part of the GDPR mentions “internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags” as examples of online identifiers (Recital 30). We can also look more deeply into Recital 26 and see that “singling out” already counts as identification. We can use the IP address to single out one person's log entries from the set of log entries, so this could be interpreted as meaning that any stable user ID renders the data personal data – and an IP address is sufficiently stable in this context. Another part of Recital 26 says that we must consider “all the means reasonably likely to be used” for identification, even if this involves additional information from third parties. This phrasing is virtually identical to the GDPR's predecessor, the EU Data Protection Directive. On the basis of that DPD, the EU's top court (ECJ/CJEU) was asked to rule on the question whether dynamic IP addresses are personal data (the Breyer case, C‑582/14, judgement from 2016-10-19). It said yes. “It did not say yes”, some people will object. And they are technically correct. When someone rents an internet connection from an ISP, the ISP will have logs that connect the user's real-world identity to the IP address they were assigned at a time. You don't have access to the ISP's logs. But, if that user violated your rights (e.g. a cyberattack or copyright infringement), then you could (depending on civil vs criminal matters) report this to the appropriate authorities or to petition the court and they would have the right to order the ISP to disclose this information. The CJEU said that if this chain (you → authorities → ISP → user identity) is grounded in law, then the IP address would be identifiable. But whether there are suitable laws to compel the ISP to disclose this data would be up to national laws, and the CJEU doesn't concern itself with that. Spoiler: such laws are pretty common. To summarize typical objections: The IP address doesn't relate to a person: Can be a valid objection, but is not typically the case for user-facing web services. The Recital 30 argument is not valid because it's about profiling, not identification, and it only says that IP addresses may be used for profiling, not that they are always identifying: Technically correct, but I think that Recital 30 merely expresses the implied understanding that of course an IP address is an online identifier and permits identification by itself. “Singling out” does not apply because SOME_REASON: Indeed, this is an ill-defined term with no case law to guide us. However, regulators such as the EDPB and their predecessor WP29 routinely use “singling out” to mean being able to distinguish one person's data from other people's data. An IP address lets us do that. The Breyer judgement is not applicable because the defendant in that case was the German state, and the state has other legal means than ordinary website operators: Nothing in that case was specific to the website operator being a state or other authority. If the website operator can contact the appropriate authority and if they have the right to order the ISP to disclose the relevant data, then the IP address is identifiable. The CJEU didn't say “yes” in Breyer, it said “if”. So I'll take that as a “no”: The CJEU concerns itself with the interpretation of EU law, not with national laws. Specifically in the Breyer case, lower courts confirmed that German law has the necessary means. In other EU member states, further checks would be necessary but it would surprise me if there wouldn't be equivalent subpoena powers. If the ISP doesn't have the data, then the IP addresses are anonymous: Indeed, the CJEU scenario collapses if there is no additional data to be linked with the IP address. However: The CJEU used this scenario as an example to show that IP addresses can be identifiable. If that particular scenario fails, there could be other scenarios that still allow identification. The question of whether IP addresses are identifiable had of course been the subject of wider debate at the time. That the GDPR explicitly mentions IP addresses can be seen as a reaction to this debate. Thus, in a sense, the Breyer case is moot. It is still useful as an explanation of how broad “reasonably likely means” must be interpreted. | I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy. | The key issue here is the unauthorized collection of video thumbnails, not the use of cloud services. Under GDPR, every personal data processing activity has one or more controllers who are responsible for the activity, and every such activity needs a “legal basis”. With such cameras, the operator will typically be a controller, since they determine the purposes for which this camera is used. In this scenario, the operators – as part of their responsibility to conduct the data processing activity in a GDPR-compliant manner – had disabled any cloud features provided by the camera manufacturer. Despite this configuration, the camera manufacturer collected thumbnails and uploaded them to servers under their control. So, we likely have two distinct issues at hand: the camera manufacturer misled its customers about the privacy settings of the cameras. This is not necessarily a GDPR issue by itself. the manufacturer performed data processing activities in contravention of various aspects of the GDPR. Relevant aspects of the GDPR that might have been violated: the manufacturer did not have an Art 6 GDPR legal basis for this processing activity, such as a “legitimate interest” the manufacturer did not provide information per Art 13 GDPR to the people being monitored this way even if the cloud-based thumbnail processing were intended, this could be a violation against the Art 25 obligation to ensure “data protection by design and by default” depending on how the cloud storage services were configured, there might be violations against the Art 28 responsibility to contractually bind such vendors as data processors, or against the Chapter V rules on international data transfers Different actors might have different remedies against this violations: buyers of the camera might have remedies under consumer protection and product liability laws against the manufacturer data subjects of the illegal processing activity have remedies under the GDPR they can exercise their data subject rights against the data controllers, such as erasure of the thumbnails. However, this will be difficult to exercise in practice since the manufacturer will not have identifying information, and would then be free from having to fulfil certain data subject requests per Art 11 GDPR. they can lodge a complaint with a responsible supervisory authority, which would be the data protection agency in their EU/EEA member state (or the ICO in the UK). The EDPS is irrelevant here, since it is only the internal supervision authority for EU institutions. The competent supervisory authorities can levy fines. they can sue the data controllers, both for compliance (e.g. deleting unauthorized thumbnails) and for damages, if any were suffered. However, immaterial damages awarded for GDPR violations are typically fairly low, if they are recognized by the court at all. the right to judicial remedy (sue the controllers in court) and to lodge a complaint are independent. They largely pursue different remedies. Both can be used to seek compliance, but only supervisory authorities can impose fines, and only direct lawsuits by the data subjects can seek damages. |
Can someone replicate and freely use anyone's voice using AI? Suppose person A offers paid voiceover services, and is a popular voiceover artist. Person B wants person A's voice for their revenue-generating internet video projects, because they know it will offer a significant profits-boost. It is legally all right for person B to synthesize person A's voice (without their knowledge or consent) using a neural net and use that audio clip for the videos? That is, are people's voices copyrighted? | Not copyright as such because that is about protecting a 'work' — a voice is not a 'work'. As the court said in one of the following examples, "A voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not 'fixed.'" (You could copyright a roar or a yell — some kind of fixed arrangement of sound(s).) But some jurisdictions have recognised property rights in voices and/or that the voice is protected by the person's 'right of publicity' (the right to control the commercial exploitation of their identity, of which the voice is a part). For example: Bette Wins Ruling In ‘Sound-Alike’ Lawsuit - AP News June 23, 1988 SAN FRANCISCO (AP) _ A federal appeals court has reinstated a lawsuit filed by entertainer Bette Midler after an advertising agency allegedly tried to duplicate her voice and singing style in one of its ad campaigns. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously ruled Wednesday that Midler could pursue her suit against the Ford Motor Co. and the Young & Rubicam advertising agency. The court said certain personal attributes - such as a voice - can be considered property rights, protected by state law. ... U.S. District Judge Ferdinand Fernandez said Young & Rubicam acted like ″the average thief″ but dismissed Midler’s suit, saying no law prohibits imitation of a singer’s voice. But the appeals court disagreed. "A voice is as distinctive and personal as a face,″ the appeals court said. ″When a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs." judgment in Midler v Ford Another case in the US is Waits v Frito-Lay Inc. The US Court of Appeal found that a radio commercial's imitation of the voice of Tom Waits constituted a civil tort, "voice misappropriation". I'm not aware of any cases involving computer synthesis of voices. | It turns out that there is no difference between the ethical answer and the legal answer, in this case. The law recognizes the property right which a person has when they create a thing, such as a font, and that right is encoded in the law of copyright. The relevant US federal code is contained in Title 17, which you can read (essentially identical laws exist in virtually or perhaps actually all countries). The important thing to understand is that there is not a distinction between "privately" trespassing on a person's property and "publicly" trespassing on a person's property. The violation of the owner's property rights comes from taking the material without consent. There is a legally-recognized exception to the owner's rights, in the form of "fair use", which is widely misunderstood to mean "if it's not for profit, the property owner has no legal protection". Simply taking and using someone else's IP non-commercially is not "fair use". | This appears to be very clear to me: "NPR does not allow other websites to post our content..." I cannot think of a more clear way to say "Do not reproduce our content on your site." Since you asked about licensing the right to reproduce their content, and they flatly ignored your request, I think it is safe to assume that they are not interested in licensing that right to you, even for a fee. This is also consistent with their "NPR does not allow [any] other websites to post..." language. It is always the copyright holder's right to refuse to offer any particular person (or all persons generally) a license, no matter what payment they might offer. (With the exception of statutory licenses, which in the U.S. exist only for recording covers of musical works.) They have also ignored your request to recompense them for infringement already performed. If in the future they decide to take legal action against you for your past infringement (hugely unlikely that such a hassle would be worthwhile for NPR) or seek any out of court settlement (again, quite unlikely they will care enough), I'm sure they will let you know. As they've said in their email, you are welcome to link to NPR's content. You are, of course, not welcome to spread misinformation or lies about NPR by claiming something like, "Look at this wonderful article that NPR wrote purely for us, at our personal request," or "NPR thinks that In Home Teaching Agency XXX is a great company, so we built a curriculum around their content," when NPR has never said any such thing. Any legal issue around linking would probably be a trademark offense, by wrongfully suggesting that NPR endorses you, or by misrepresenting yourself as an agent of NPR. If you don't do either of things, and just say, "Here's an article on [subject X] published by NPR," you're probably fine. If you want to be very thorough, you could include a disclaimer on your site like, "In Home Teaching Agency XXX is not a licencee or partner of NPR. Links to NPR articles are included for educational purposes only," or similar. This seems pretty excessive to me, since a reasonable person won't assume that linking to an article from a major news source suggests a partnership, but I suppose it couldn't hurt to include such a disclaimer. | Unfortunately, the "but everyone does that" (BEDT) argument doesn't hold water as evidenced by prosecutions of looters. Would uploading this video be a copyright infringement? It would be hard to answer this part of the question without knowing where and from whom the clips had come from. If the clips came from a company like ESPN or a YouTuber that doesn't give you permission to be able to use their clips then yes this might be a copyright infringement. If you use video/clips that are labeled as creative commons then nt it wouldn't be an infringement. YouTube has a feature for this. Would my actions be fair use? First, we'll need to understand what fair-use is. Fair use is the ability to use copyright material under certain circumstances without permission. To best determine if using copyright-protected material in your work you should weigh it against the four factors of fair use. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; The nature of the copyrighted work; The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. More information about fair-use here Youtube outlines their fair use guidelines here | Copyright protection is about certain acts, and not about relationships between products. Copyright law says that the creator of an original work hold the exclusive right to copy and to authorize creation of derivative works. Copyright law does not say that anybody can freely create derivative works as long as they are different to a certain extent. So if you take an original Mario and modify it a teeny bit, that is a violation of copyright; if you take an original Mario and modify it hugely, that is a violation of copyright. Degree of similarity is relevant on some cases when the factual question arises whether the allegedly-infringing work is based on some protected original. This is most obvious in music cases, where all baroque music has some similarity to all other baroque music, all death metal has some similarity to all other death metal, and so on. There is not a legal quasi-statutory standard for measuring substantial similarity in music. The scientific underpinning of such a standard would be based on (weighted) combinatorics and the idea that there are only so many tunes possible (that would be a huge number, until you get to the "within a genre" condition). It seems obvious (by your "admission") that the derived works are based on protected works, so Nintendo's permission is required to legally create such works. However, you do or would hold copyright in your unauthorized derived work. Without a trail of evidence such as a SE question pointing to the connection, the derived images might be hard to connect to the originals. In addition, you may be able to avail yourself of a "fair use" defense, in case you get sued by the original creator. Factors favoring such a defense are the insubstantiality of the copying (a small portion) and the "transformativeness" of your creation. | Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement. | It would be copyright infringement. You had the copyright holders permission to make one copy of the song by downloading it. At that time, if you gave me a copy of that song, it could be argued that very, very little damage was caused because I just had downloaded that song myself with practically the same effect. Today, that argument is not valid anymore. So this is definitely copyright infringement. That's your question answered. I doubt that anyone would take action if you gave a copy to someone and it was found out. Making it available to the world for free download is another matter. That could easily get you into trouble; in the USA there could be a fine up to $150,000 without any proof of actual damages needed. | Seems unlikely that it will "forestall copyright infringement suits". Some jurisdictions, e.g the USA, say that "Works produced by mechanical processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are not registrable". On the face of it, in such a jurisdiction copyright can't exist in a randomly generated work. Which the TED talk doesn't mention. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJtm0MoOgiU Let's imagine a case in a jurisdiction where copyright can exist in such a work. There is a dispute between two artists or labels. The plaintiff produced a well known tune and accuses the defendant of copying this work. The defendant says the plaintiff didn't have copyright in that work because it wasn't original in the first place, there is a 1200GB TAR file (compressed file) on GitHub that contains all possible single octave, 8-note, 12-beat melody combos, which were produced before the plaintiff's work. The plaintiff says, "like the majority of the population I never heard of GitHub, let alone downloaded, uncompressed a 1200GB file and listened to every melody." That's all aside from plaintiffs or lawyers deciding they have a case or believing the mere threat of civil proceedings will cause the alleged infringer to acquiesce to their demands. I think they are making a point about the law rather than a realistic means of thwarting copyright disputes. It's reasonable of the creators to say there is a finite set of melodies and the likelihood of inadvertently 'creating' the same melody as someone else may be smaller than we think, maybe copyright law has led to some unjust outcomes and led to a chilling effect on music-making. |
Is it illegal to use a horn in circumstances other than which will prevent a collision I heard from a cyclist that motorists are legally prohibited from using their horns on the street to get people's attention or indeed for any reason other than to directly avert a collision. | From the Highway Code: Rule 112 The horn. Use only while your vehicle is moving and you need to warn other road users of your presence. Never sound your horn aggressively. You MUST NOT use your horn while stationary on the road when driving in a built-up area between the hours of 11.30 pm and 7.00 am except when another road user poses a danger. Law CUR reg 99 Rule 195 Zebra and parallel crossings. As you approach a zebra crossing ... do not wave, flash your lights or use your horn to invite pedestrians across; this could be dangerous if another vehicle is approaching be patient, do not sound your horn or rev your engine as this can be intimidating ... Rule 214 Animals. When passing animals, drive slowly. Give them plenty of room and be ready to stop. Do not scare animals by sounding your horn ... | California Vehicle Code chapter 11, division 7, article 1, section 22350: No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for weather, visibility, the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property. Section 22358.5: It is the intent of the Legislature that physical conditions such as width, curvature, grade and surface conditions, or any other condition readily apparent to a driver, in the absence of other factors, would not require special downward speed zoning, as the basic rule of section 22350 is sufficient regulation as to such conditions. Without knowing exactly what questions the officer was asked, it's impossible to know why you were ticketed and why you were found guilty, but "reasonable or prudent" and "endangers the safety of [others]" covers a great deal of ground. | The rules about use of lights, and keeping hands on the steering wheel are not new, but they may have been rephrased. It has always been the case that you should be in proper control of the vehicle (both hands on the wheel), and not to use the lights for thanking, or for inviting. Here are two extracts from the 1999 edition of The Highway Code. Flashing headlights. Only flash your headlights to let other road users know that you are there. Do not flash your headlights in an attempt to intimidate other road users. If another driver flashes his headlights never assume that it is a signal to go. Use your own judgement and proceed carefully. Once moving you should keep to the left, unless road signs or markings indicate otherwise. The exceptions are when you want to overtake, turn right or pass parked vehicles or pedestrians in the road keep well to the left on right-hand bends. This will improve your view of the road and help avoid the risk of colliding with traffic approaching from the opposite direction keep both hands on the wheel, where possible. This will help you to remain in full control of the vehicle at all times The recent changes concern vulnerable road users, and their priority. | "Does the needlessly obnoxious and antisocial manner in which they're behaving and clearly drugged intoxication create any kind of charge like disturbing the peace or something like that?" Probably. But you don't want to take the law into your own hands. Call the police and have them make the judgement. There is a lot of discretion involved; some police officers may simply tell the preacher to move on; others may detain him on public intoxication or being a nuisance, according to local and UK laws, as well as check for permits and licenses for street/public performances. Many people gathered around the busker to express support and appreciation for him as well as disgust toward the preachers unnecessary disrespect. That's well within rights, as long as the behavior doesn't degrade into the same type(s) that the preacher is exhibiting and possibly be a nuisance or worse (i.s., assault) as per the law. | Not necessarily. Your own statements and the statements of the officer would be legally sufficient to convict you. Also, your statement that you don't believe you are at fault is strongly at odds with a widely held interpretation of the traffic laws (not stated in the formal language of these statutes). The prevailing interpretation of the traffic laws is that you are always at fault if you rear end someone because you failed to maintain a safe distance, pretty much as a matter of strict liability and regardless of the circumstances, because a safe distance is almost by definition a distance that it is possible for you to come to a full stop from if the care in front of you suddenly comes to a stop for any reason. The only situation I can imagine where there wouldn't be liability for rear ending someone would be if you were at rest behind them at a stop light and they actively backed up into you. In practice, almost any judge and almost any jury, would convict you of failure to maintain a safe distance if you rear ended someone absent the most extraordinary of circumstances. I honestly don't know any lawyer or likely potential juror who wouldn't convict you under these circumstances with only the testimony of the police officer and your own testimony (which you would have to offer to have any shot at avoiding a conviction) to establish that you did indeed rear end someone. Police are allowed to lie to suspects of crimes, and often simply do not have an accurate understanding of how the legal system works. So, you are not entitled to rely on a statement made by a police officer. Of course, it is also certainly possible that his statement is consistent with local practice in your neighborhood traffic court. So, showing up to contest the charge might still make sense, and it wouldn't be uncommon to receive a plea bargain with fewer points against your license, just for showing up to court. | It's legal The Ohio Court of Appeals has addressed a nearly identical situation in State v. Paseka. The relevant law is, as you noted in the question, R.C. 4511.39, which states, in relevant part: No person shall turn a vehicle or trackless trolley or move right or left upon a highway ... without giving an appropriate signal The facts in this case are directly on point—an intersection where continuing straight puts one on a different road, while the original road requires a turn to stay on it: Appellant was traveling west on State Route 6. At a certain point, Route 6 veers to the left. As appellant approached that area of State Route 6, he chose to maintain a straight-ahead course which automatically placed him on Wahl Road. He was stopped for failing to activate his turn signal in violation of R.C. 4511.39. The court ruled that this did not violate the law requiring the use of a turn signal: It is undisputed that appellant’s straight-ahead entrance onto Wahl Road did not require him to turn his vehicle, nor did it require him to switch into a different lane. As such, we fail to see how appellant violated R.C. 4511.39. Here's the intersection in question, via Google Maps: Imagery ©2021 Google, Imagery ©2021 Maxar Technologies, State of Ohio / OSIP, USDA Farm Service Agency, Map data ©2021 | First, what the law says about "right of way" is who has to yield (nobody "has the right of way"). Vehicles always must yield to pedestrians. One of the principles is that you are to yield to the guy who gets there first -- if the guy on your left gets to the intersection first, you must yield to him. If you arrive at the same time, the guy on the left yields (at least in the US). The rationale is that there has to be a convention for deciding who must wait when two people want to occupy the same space in the intersection. That isn't what you are describing. You can turn left and he can turn right at the same time, and no collision should result. The other general rule is that you can turn only when it is safe to do so. If you can't see traffic coming from the left or from the right, then you can't turn. If the guy on the right is blocking your view of the right and you are blocking his view of the left, you will have to find some other social means of deciding who gets out of the way, the law doesn't help you. | If you were moving "with the flow of traffic" but over the limit, you were still breaking the law, and the cop can choose which car or cars to stop on any basis or none (except ones forbidden, such as racial in the US). This is almost surely not a valid defense, not in any jurisdiction that I know of at least. If you can show that to slow to the speed limit would have actually been unsafe, you might have a defense, but that is going to be hard to get a court to accept. |
Cookie Law: do anonymized analytics require cookie consent? In recent years a lot of privacy-aware analytics solutions have started popping up. These generally work using a very similar principle (see e.g. Fathom's algorithm): Create a fingerprint of the user using a hash of some combination of their IP, User-Agent, possibly other personally-identifiable information (PII) and a rotating salt. For the purpose of this question, assume that this creates an identifier that cannot be reversed back into PII. Use this identifier to determine whether the user has visited before, by storing it in a database along with the most recently visited page and time of visit. Aggregate all analytics to such a degree that no individual user can be identified. This conveniently gets around the issue of storing PII, since all stored information is either strongly anonymized (and minimal) or aggregated. Some of these solutions advertise "No need for cookie banners!" (see e.g. Plausible's landing page), implying that the need for informed consent is bypassed by the anonymization. Is there any legal basis for this? For the purpose of this question, assume GDPR isn't relevant (since no PII is stored), and only compliance with the ePrivacy Directive is in question. From my own reading the simple act of accessing the PII information in the first place, regardless of later anonymization, requires consent. As put by Article 5(3) of the Directive Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or the gaining of access to information already stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or her consent, having been provided with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia, about the purposes of the processing. (emphasis mine) As argued in a 2014 opinion on fingerprinting this also covers manufacturer-stored information such as User-Agents. In a 2014 opinion on anonymization it was argued that anonymization is a post-processing step, requiring consent to get the relevant information in the first place. In my opinion this means that, even despite the strong anonymization, and despite no PII being stored, these privacy-aware analytics solutions still require a cookie banner (as much as I hate to say it). The reason I'm asking this question regardless is that the claims of "no need for cookie banners" appears to be based on legal advice, having been checked by a legal team. Having no experience with law, this makes me think that I am missing something; what am I misunderstanding that makes this usage exempt from the ePrivacy Directive consent requirements? | First of all, in a GDPR contest, the process described is not strong anonymization. It may be hard for an outsider to go from the stored record to any PII, it is much easier for an outsider to "single out" an individual. This means that given a known individual, one can determine whether that person is among those listed in the records, or can determine this to a significant degree of probability. For this only the algorithm and the rotating salts are needed, one need not break the hash. Note also that the GDPR specifies that if a person can be singled out with the assistance of the site operator the data is not considered anonymized. Thus this data needs a lawful basis under the GDPR, and the various other GDPR requirement all apply. However, even if the data were totally anonymized, and say just added to a count of users with this or that User Agent, the process of reading local data (including but not limited to cookies) itself requires informed consent, and so a cookie banner or other interaction with similar info under the e-Privacy directive (EPD). The EPD, being a directive and not a regulation, must be implemented by national laws, and the exact provisions in those laws may differ somewhat from country to country. But I believe that all of them require consent before any local data is read. | Since you are from Europe, GDPR applies to all your processing activities per Art 3(1) GDPR, regardless of where the users are located. If you would like to avoid GDPR compliance, you would have to manage your business from abroad so that you no longer have an European establishment, and would have to avoid offering your services to people who are in Europe. So let's assume that you have no European establishment. Then, GDPR can only apply per Art 3(2) to those processing activities that relate to offering goods or services to people who are in Europe. For determining this, IP-based geolocation is indeed common. Very likely, you do not need consent for this. GDPR does not require consent for everything, just a legal basis. There are six potential legal bases in Art 6(1), though the relevant ones are consent, necessity for performing a contract, legal obligations, and necessity for a legitimate interest. For things like security checks, it would be common to claim a legitimate interest. Complying with GDPR can hurt revenue. However, data subjects have a right to data protection, but you do not have a right to a particular business model. Similarly, paying taxes can "hurt revenue", but it's not really optional. If your business model can't deal with GDPR compliance (or with taxes), it might not be a sound business model. In Europe, many newspapers have since moved from advertising-only to a consent-or-pay model. That is, the user is given a choice: You can read articles without tracking if you buy a subscription. You can access articles for free if you consent to tracking. The legality of this is hotly debated. In principle, such an approach can be compliant, but the details are problematic, for example that you can only buy subscriptions rather than individual articles, and that these subscriptions are often orders of magnitude more expensive than what would be earned through ads. But this might actually be easier to solve for a mobile application than for a website, due to the availability of in-app payment and micropayment infrastructure. In any case, GDPR limits how much you can "encourage" consent – per Art 7(4), you cannot make access to your service conditional on consent. There must be a way to use your app without consenting to anything, unless that consent is actually necessary for the app to work. For example, consenting to camera access is necessary for a QR code reader app to work. It is extremely unlikely that ads would be necessary in this sense. Users also must not suffer detriment for declining or withdrawing consent. From this, the EDPB has developed the concept of "permissible incentive" in their guidelines on consent. In this post, "Europe" means EU/EEA/UK as appropriate. | No. While UK data controllers must register with the ICO, they only have to provide general contact details. The ICO does not provide a public registry of data controllers. Outside of the UK, there is no requirement to register with the Supervisory Authority unless a DPO is appointed. Per Art 13 GDPR, every privacy notice must disclose the contact details of the controller, and of their DPO (if applicable). The GDPR does not require controllers to have a specific email address for data subject requests. Controllers have to fulfill the request regardless of the channel through with the request is made, so that normal channels for support or contact should be appropriate. The ICO writes in its guidance to controllers on the right to access requests: Are there any formal requirements? No. The UK GDPR does not set out formal requirements for a valid request. Therefore, an individual can make a SAR verbally or in writing, including by social media. They can make it to any part of your organisation and they do not have to direct it to a specific person or contact point. Of course, if a controller does not make contact details available or otherwise refuses to accept a valid data subject request, you can ask the ICO for assistance. | It may be legal or it may not For example, if any of the users are in the European Union, then the GDPR applies and the person storing the information is a data controller and has legal obligations. These include, having a legitimate reason for storing them, storing them only for as long as necessary for that reason, notifying the individuals that the data is being stored and why, deleting it upon a users request etc. | How to store consent According to the ICO, you need to store the following: Who consented the name of the individual, or other identifier (eg, online user name, session ID). When they consented a copy of a dated document, or online records that include a timestamp; or, for oral consent, a note of the time and date which was made at the time of the conversation. What they were told at the time A master copy of the document or data capture form containing the consent statement in use at that time, along with any separate privacy policy, including version numbers and dates matching the date consent was given. If consent was given orally, your records should include a copy of the script used at that time. How they consented For written consent, a copy of the relevant document or data capture form. If consent was given online, your records should include the data submitted as well as a timestamp to link it to the relevant version of the data capture form. If consent was given orally, you should keep a note of this made at the time of the conversation - it doesn’t need to be a full record of the conversation. Whether they have withdrawn consent And if so, when. Source (p33/34) Would a txt file of users who had consented be acceptable The ICO provides this example as unacceptable: You keep a spreadsheet with ‘consent provided’ against a customer’s name. Source (p34) This shows that a TXT file of usernames would not be acceptable, as there is not enough information stored What would be acceptable You would want a table that looks something like this | UserId | Date | PolicyRevision | Method | WithdrawalDate | How to verify this data has not been modified You could store a hash of the row on some form of blockchain, to prove that after the stated date the consent had not been modified, this would prevent having to store a copy of the user's ID on the blockchain. It would not prevent forging consent at the time you claim it was given, but short of having the user digitally sign the transaction with some key that you do not have access to, there would be no way to prevent this. | There are a number of misconceptions in this question. Firstly, the regulatory environment did not drastically change when the GDPR came into force in 2018. Previously, each EU member state had its own laws implementing the 95/46/EC Data Protection Directive. The GDPR harmonizes these laws, and replaces them with a single EU-wide law. However, the GDPR is largely identical with the DPD. In particular, both laws have the same definition of a controller. Secondly, the data controller is not a position to be designated, like a Data Protection Officer would be. A controller is whoever – alone or jointly with others – determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data. Whether someone can decide the purposes of processing is a matter of fact, not a matter of formalities. There can be more than one controller. Most likely, the institution hosting the research group is the controller. For individual researchers, the important aspect would be to demonstrate that they've fully complied with their institution's procedures at all times – that they acted as agents of the controller, not as controllers of their own. The institution might have a more difficult time mounting the defense if its technical and organizational measures were inadequate. For example, keeping an unattended server running for five years without security updates borders on gross negligence – so there should have been a procedure so that each system has a clear point of contact who is responsible for administrating the system. The controller should also have inventoried its systems and processing activities at the latest in preparation of GDPR, e.g. for an Art 30 record of processing activities. Your question suggests that no one could be at fault because no one did anything, but inaction and failure to fulfil responsibilities can also be a violation of law. If the institution wasn't convinced that this server was GDPR-compliant, the correct approach would have been to shut the server down, not to continue the processing of personal data. Of course, the controller may be able to demonstrate that this breach of GDPR was very minor, for example because the personal data was pseudonymized and because other technical measures (like firewalls) would have prevented unauthorized access. | Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins? Well, they can, but they have no legal backing to make it happen. Their chances of succeeding are about as good as me requesting a Ferrari, a Yacht and a Mansion. I can make that request. People will laugh. I will not get it. I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related You have no way to know who owns what email address. And it's none of your business. Your only interest should be in whether the address is owned by the person that is creating the account. You probably already do that by sending a confirmation link to the email address when people sign up. I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request The only way you have to comply with such a request is if the owner can prove their identity. As far as I understood, the "Finnish city" was three degrees away from that. They could not provide any proof they are who they said they are, they could not provide a finite list of accounts they claimed to own and they could not even provide proof they own those accounts. They literally just wrote an email with zero legal meaning. I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one The correct way to handle this is have a feature on your website where the account owner can delete their own account. GDPR compliant. Then you make a text template explaining how to use that feature and reply with that template to every request, no matter how stupid (like this case) they are. If they cannot identify themselves to you by proving they have access to their "own" email, they have no business wasting your time. Legally, they could provide you with a different method of identification. In case of a Finnish school, that would probably need to be power of attorney from all children's legal guardians and a specific way to identify the accounts that is consistent with the data given (for example if they entered their full name and address on your website). You would probably in your rights to demand a certified translation if it's all in Finnish. Apart from the fact that you as a private US citizen have no real means to check the validity of all that paperwork, personally, if I saw hundreds of pages of certified translated paperwork, I would probably just comply. Not sure it it were actually enough, but it certainly gets an A+ for effort to delete data from a private website. But a real lawyer might give better advice with a real case on their hands. Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) Indeed. You should not delete people's data because a random punk on the internet sent you an email. You need to identify who the request is from and if they are allowed to make such a request. Whether you have a legal duty to actually keep data, is up to you or your lawyer to find out. It depends on your data and laws. It is perfectly legal to make a website with a textfield that deletes any data you enter after a second. Destruction of data you own is only a problem if you break other laws with it. For example the IRS might not be amused if you destroyed invoices and other proof of taxable income. "Some dude claimed I must in an email" is not going to fly with them. That said, again, please, identify who you deal with, find out if their claim is valid. Don't do stuff because random internet punks write you an email. Because the next mail you get, will be from a Nigerian Prince. Please wisen up before opening that one. People on the internet, through stupidity or malice, might not have your best interests at heart. Don't believe random emails. | GDPR Article 4 paragraph 1 says: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; Recital 26 says Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. ... The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. Recital 30 says: Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. This may leave traces which, in particular when combined with unique identifiers and other information received by the servers, may be used to create profiles of the natural persons and identify them. An IP address hashed through a cryptographically secure one-way hash cannot reasonably be used to establish the original IP address, nor to geolocate, nor to directly identify the data subject. However if such addresses are stored in a database with a link to the subject's individual record, or to other data which identify the data subject, then they would clearly be personal information. The ICO's page on "What is personal data" says: ‘Online identifiers’ includes IP addresses and cookie identifiers which may be personal data. The page from GDPR.EU on "Personal Data" says: Any information that can lead to either the direct or indirect identification of an individual will likely be considered personal data under the GDPR. ... Any data that relate to an identifiable individual is personal data. The page on "Personal Data" from gdpr-info.eu says: Personal data are any information which are related to an identified or identifiable natural person. The data subjects are identifiable if they can be directly or indirectly identified, especially by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or one of several special characteristics, which expresses the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, commercial, cultural or social identity of these natural persons. In practice, these also include all data which are or can be assigned to a person in any kind of way. For example, the telephone, credit card or personnel number of a person, account data, number plate, appearance, customer number or address are all personal data. Since the definition includes “any information,” one must assume that the term “personal data” should be as broadly interpreted as possible. This is also suggested in case law of the European Court of Justice ... See also "Can a dynamic IP address constitute personal data?" If a hashed IP address is stored so that it can be related to a specific individual, it is personal data. as such, it would be subject to the GDPR. To store it one would need to identify a lawful basis under GDPR Article 6 This could be the Data subject's consent, or the Controller's legitimate interest. In either case the information should be included in the list of personal information collected (often in a privacy policy document), disclosed to the subject on request, adn deleted on request if possible. If that is done, such a use of a hashed IP, although personal information, would seem to be compliant. If a hashed IP is stored in such a way that it cannot be related to any particular user, then it would not constitute personal information, and no compliance issue would seem to exist. Limiting the retention time of a hashed IP is a good practice which would reduce any possible impact it might have. |
What happens if multiple people inherit a copyright? What happens if someone lists in his/her will that his/her estate will be equally divided among his/her children, and the estate includes a copyright (specifically to a music recording)? Do all heirs need to give consent for a copy to be made? Just one? A majority? | A copyright can be divided into as many pieces as the owners choose. Initially, all authors have a share m(an equal share unless they have an agreement on some other share arrangement), But each author (or later owner) can leave the copyright to multiple heirs, in equal or unequal shares. Each owner can sell all or part of the copyright (or usage rights) to one or more new owners. Under US law, any co-owner may permit a copy (or copies) to be made, or may grant a non-exclusive license. However, the co-owner doing this must account to the other co-owners for any profits made, and share them according to whatever agreement the co-owners may have (by share if there is no other agreement). But to grant an exclusive license, all co-owners must agree. The law in many other countries is different. In some countries, a majority of owners (by share usually) must agree to grant even a non-exclusive license. The co-owners may make an agreement to limit granting of licenses to some particular owner or representative or to require wider consent than a single co-owner. | What you are missing is that the original copyright holder can give permission to make derivative works with strings attached. There is no automatic right to derive something from a copyrighted work. Those strings could include constraints on what you create in the process of making the derivative work. Yes it is a string limiting what you can do with something you own, but you would have been warned in the license and had the choice to start from scratch. People do create work-alike software with no copyright strings using two teams and a "clean room" design process. It is a lot harder than modifying something another person has developed. Also, law and someone's understanding of morals need not be aligned at all. And, in patent law, just creating something all by yourself from scratch does not give you ownership. If someone else did it first and got a patent you can't make the item you might think you own. IP law is complex and looking for "fundamentals" may not get you anywhere. | It's possible that CAD has a separate licence from the authors of ABC that allows them to produce a closed source copy. If not, they have no right to distribute CAD. However two wrongs don't make a right, and so you don't get to violate the copyright of CAD.* Unfortunately, unless you are one of the authors of ABC, you have no standing to sue the authors of CAD. You can only notify the authors of ABC and hope they do. If the authors of ABC don't have the resources to pursue the matter, you may be out of luck. That's one of the reasons the FSF gets copyright assignments for their projects. * It turns out that this is a much more debateable issue than I first thought. Some courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work is not copyrightable. | Monopoly is a trademark of Parker Brothers. You would need to get permission to use that trademark. The artwork of the game is copyrighted and cannot be duplicated without violating that copyright. In general, the labels meaning phrases like "Go to Jail" and "New York Avenue" are probably copyrighted and some court decisions have decided that labels are a copyrightable element. However, there is some gray area. The game mechanics are not copyrightable and can be duplicated. What this means is that if you clone the game and use new labels (like new property names and card titles) then you are probably fine. You would have to make a novel board design. If you clone the game, but use the game's labels, then you could potentially lose in court. Of course, remember that corporations will sometimes sue just to intimidate people, even if they have a losing case. Just because your clone is non-infringing doesn't mean they won't sue you. It costs them money to sue people, so if your clone is obscure or not used by many people it could fly under the radar and be ignored by the company. If your clone was a success and became widely used, that would significantly increase the chance you could get sued. In most cases a company will threaten infringers before they sue them, because it is a lot cheaper to threaten somebody than sue them. Therefore, you could make your clone and just plan on discontinuing it if they threaten you. Of course, there is a small risk they would sue you anyway. If you made no money then you are probably safe because it would be a lot harder for them to argue that you commercially damaged them if you made no money. | I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. I would interpret the Copyright Board's interpretation in relation to tariffs when musical works copied for private use only, as the document's scope does not appear to extend beyond that. However, in BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] 3 FCR 241, a consortium of record industry corporations attempted to request confidential ISP account holder information. Essentially, the plaintiffs failed to bring adequate evidence to prove the magnitude of copyright infringement; additionally, it is specifically stated at [24-5] that: Subsection 80(1) [as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 24, s.50] of the Copyright Act provides as follows: 80. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the act of reproducing all or any substantial part of (a) a musical work embodied in a sound recording, ... onto an audio recording medium for the private use of the person who makes the copy does not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the musical work, the performer's performance, or the sound recording. Although the Copyright Modernization Act, did, in fact, introduce a number of amendments, Subsection 80 still reads as it does when the BMG case was decided. Since this case, I can find no court that has found this ruling to be invalid, and no cases which have considered and not applied this subsection. There is also Subsection 29.22 (1) (which applies to all works): 29.22 (1) It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to reproduce a work or other subject-matter or any substantial part of a work or other subject-matter if (a) the copy of the work or other subject-matter from which the reproduction is made is not an infringing copy; (b) the individual legally obtained the copy of the work or other subject-matter from which the reproduction is made, other than by borrowing it or renting it, and owns or is authorized to use the medium or device on which it is reproduced; (c) the individual, in order to make the reproduction, did not circumvent, as defined in section 41, a technological protection measure, as defined in that section, or cause one to be circumvented; (d) the individual does not give the reproduction away; and (e) the reproduction is used only for the individual’s private purposes. Subsection 80(1) creates a special exemption purely for musical works, and so the less restrictive conditions there should be found to apply to them instead. On the basis of the case above, and my consideration of the Copyright Act, I would find that reproduction of a musical work does not constitute copyright infringement, pursuant and subject to s 80(1) of the Act. | No If YT#1 gets a license from artist A, that permits YT#1 to do whatever copying and reuse is stated in the license. It might be narrow or very broad. Usually such a license will only grant permission to the person who asked. Unless the license also grants permission to YT#2, or to some broader group which includes YT#2, YT#2 cannot claim any rights under such a license. Assuming that the license does not include him or her, YT#2 has the same rights as any member of the public would, but no more. In general, pitch raising a piece of music is a way of creating a derivative work. In the US, under 17 USC 106 one needs permission from the copyright owner to create a derivative work. Otherwise doing so is copyright infringement. The laws of other countries, and the Berne Copyright Convention have similar provisions on this point. Creating a derivative work requires permission in all countries that I know about. "Piggybacking" is not a thing in copyright law. A copyright owner can give permission (usually called a license) to any person or group of persons that the owner pleases. The permission does not extend to anyone else. This is true in all countries. I should be clear that YT#2 needs permission from both YT#1, and from A. The way the question is worded I have been assuming that YT#2 had permission from YT#1, but a comment from grovkin made it clear that I needed to be more explicit about this. It is possible for a license to permit a person to pass on the license to others. For example, all CC licenses and all copyleft and most open source licenses do this, and others could. But the license must explicitly grant such permission. The one way in which a person might create a derivative work without permission and without it being infringement is if an exception to copyright applies. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more detail on fair use. Fair use decisions are made on a case by case basis, and generally depend on the detailed facts of the ase. But based on the limited info in the question, this would not qualify. It seems to use the whole piece of music, which tends to weigh against fair use. The new work does not seem to be transformative, that is, it seems to serve the same general purpose as the original. The new work might harm the economic value of the original, or might if many people did this. The original is creative, not factual. All of those weigh against fair use. Different countries have very different exceptions to copyright, and I do not know all of them. But the use described in the question does not seem to fit any that I know of. In any case, an exception to copyright applies to anyone, and does not depend on another person's license. It is thus never a form of "piggybacking". By the way, the question describes pitch raising ads "illegal". Making an unauthorized derivative work gives the copyright owner grounds to sue. If the owner does sue, and wins, s/he might be awarded money damages, and the court might issue an injunction ordering the infringer not to infringe again. But it would not normally be treated as a crime, and law enforcement would not be involved. In the US, only bulk copyright infringement, carried out as a business, is usually prosecuted (for example a factory churning out unauthorized music CDs). | It is legal Because of the first sale doctrine a person may freely sell a copy that they legitimately own. Copyright preserves the owner's right to make copies - Copy-right; once they have made (or authorised) a copy then the physical embodiment of that copy (record, CD, DVD, book etc.) is personal property and can be bought and sold like any other piece of personal property. The prohibition on copying its contents remains. | Trash is public property, see here for example: "The abandonment of property is the relinquishing of all title, possession, or claim to or of it". I think the assumption that a DNA code "belongs to you" is legally questionable. If you don't abandon it, you can own specific molecules of DNA. The only way to legally control replication of that pattern (garnerd via trash picking) would be via copyright or patent. But natually occurring DNA cannot be patented (Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.). As a natural fact, it is also not subject to copyright. |
What are some examples of important/influential Amicus briefs? I've been digging through Supreme court documents and it got me wondering - does anybody know any specific examples of Amicus briefs that may have changed the outcome of an important case? I couldn't easily find any on google, so I figured I would ask here. Any court or any period of time is okay, really. I don't study the law, but the Amicus brief seems like an interesting mechanism to me, perhaps one that could sway the majority opinion of a jury in an important precedent-setting case. | Amicus briefs are never seen by juries. They only guide judges, and in the vast majority of cases, only appellate court judges. They are predominantly filed in the U.S. Supreme Court, a state supreme court, or a U.S. Court of Appeals circuit's panel. One of the most influential and most famous was the ACLU's amicus brief in the Brown v. Board of Education case, although there are hundreds of notable cases in which amicus briefs are influential, and dozens that are famous. The Anti-Defamation League (an organization devoted to fighting anti-semitism) also filed an influential amicus brief in Brown v. Board of Education. It is rarely possible to know with certainty how important a brief was (other than through echos of language or reasoning from the brief in the opinion itself), as judicial deliberations are generally strictly confidential. In a far lower profile case, for example, I once litigated a case in the Colorado Supreme Court in which an amicus brief from the Colorado Bar Association was probably very influential. | Unless you are an ambassador or one of the US states, SCOTUS doesn't have original jurisdiction over your lawsuit, so they can't hear it either. If you've named all the judges of all the courts that do have jurisdiction, then one of them will handle it anyway, under the doctrine of necessity noted before. For cases that do fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, a jury trial is theoretically possible, but it appears it has not occurred since the 1790s, and only one has surviving records: Georgia v. Brailsford in 1794. See "Special Juries in the Supreme Court" by Lochlan F. Shelfer, Yale Law Journal 123:1, 2013-2014. Otherwise, non-jury original jurisdiction cases are usually delegated to a special master, a sort of "contract judge" who hears all the evidence and recommends a judgment that the full court typically rubber-stamps. | Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh. | I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking. | Judges and justices can file lawsuits like anyone else, but ordinarily the judges who are colleagues of the judge or justice would recuse themselves and it would be assigned to another venue at trial (in the case of a trial court judge), and on appeal would be assigned to judges who don't have a personal relationship with the judge (possibly sitting by assignment from another appellate jurisdiction or by senior judges who weren't on the bench when this judge was on the bench). A U.S. Supreme Court justice's suit would not be considered recusal worth by an unfamiliar lower court judge who is only theoretically in the jurisdiction of the justice and no suit by a U.S. Supreme Court justice has ever been deemed cert worthy. If it did reach the U.S. Supreme Court, the Justice would be expected to, but not required in any enforceable way, to recuse from hearing the case. | Article II of the Constitution does say that "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors". So it is true that a president or a federal judge could be impeached and removed from office, and it has happened to some extent 19 times – in 8 cases it went all the way to removal (as opposed to acquittal or resignation). However, this would not be a very effective way to avert a "crisis". Any judicial ruling is subject to appeal by a higher court, until you get to the Supreme Court. Moreover, impeaching a lower judge does not erase his or her rulings. So ultimately, a matter will be decided by SCOTUS. In anticipation of such a ruling, Congress might decide to get rid of some Supreme Court justice who they think might stand in the way. That was attempted with Samuel Chase, who was acquitted. Such a decision is not subject to judicial review (Nixon v. United States 506 U.S. 224). However, SCOTUS can also overturn that decision though that would be very unusual. It would also be very unusual for Congress to impeach a Supreme Court justice for having a position that they disagree with. At any rate, there is no such thing as a "deadlock" between branches of government. When the court rules, that is the end of the matter from a legal perspective. It is, in fact, entirely possible that a general will rule that the court or the president (or both) are wrong and will declare what the law now is, but that takes us out of the realm of legal discussions. | Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character. | Decisions that break with precedent do happen with some regularity, but far "from all the time" in the US. When they do happen, they are generally only at the top level of a state or federal court system, that is a State supreme Court (or equivalent, some states use a different term) or the US Supreme Court. There are several factors which discourage judges from simply ignoring precedent. First of all, all the training a lawyer receives teaches him or her to respect precedent, and to find rules by examining past cases. precedent is literally the stuff with which a lawyer works, rather more than the wording of statutes (although those are also important). Secondly, as a lawyer works as a litigator, judges will usually ground their decisions on precedents, particularly in appellate cases, explaining their decisions largely in terms of how they conform to or extend precedents. Thirdly, if a lower court judge fails to follow precedent, that judge will often be criticized by an appellate judge or justice, often in the course of an opinion overturning the lower-court judge's ruling. This does not feel pleasant to such a judge. Fourthly, decision that fail to follow precedent are often (although not always) criticized by legal scholars, particularly in law review articles and treatises. Fifthly, lower-court judges who often fail to follow precedents, are less likely to be recommended by senior judges for promotion to appellate positions. However, the actual appointments are controlled by politicians (in most cases) not other judges, so this factor may not be as strong it it would first seem. Only once a judge gets to the level of the Supreme Court of a state, or the Federal Supreme Court, is that judge (now a Justice) expected to alter precedents as needed, and most justices have said that they make such changes only reluctantly. I am not aware of any US state or federal statute or regulation that specifically;y requires judges to follow precedent. The most common way to alter precedent is not to overrule or ignore it, but to distinguish a prior case. This happens when a judge says something like: In the previous case of A v B when had situation X which lead to outcome Q. But in this current case we have the very different situation X1. In the case of X1, the outcome should be S instead of Q. If the new case becomes persuasive the old case A v B may apply to only one specific set of facts that almost never comes up, and the new rule apply to almost all other possible situations. The old case may cease to be cited or applied without ever being formally overruled. And, of course, where the rule is statutory, it may be changed if the legislature alters the law. If the rule is constitutional, it may be changed by a constitutional amendment. For example the 1830s case Barron v Baltimore held that the US bill of rights did not apply to the states, only to the Federal Government. But after the 1868 14th amendment, courts started to incorporate much of the bill of rights into the Due process clause of the 14th, and apply it against the states. This took place gradually, mostly during the period starting with 1898, up until about 1970, but with some incorporation coming as late as 2010 (Heller) |
Do I need permission from the media company if I want to write a news article from the same topic, using the original article as the only source? Suppose I want to write an article from a topic and there is an article that I want to use as the only source (I know that's not ideal, but this is just a hypothetical situation). The facts would 100% come from the original article, I would just rephrase them. Would this be allowed (if given credit) or do I need some extra permission from the media company to do that? Related (Not the same, since I'm not asking about needing to give credit. I want to give credit.): Do I need to give credit to the original writer if I rewrote something in my own words? | Copyright does not protect facts. If you use the media article as a source for facts, but restate them in essentially different words and with a different organization, you need no permission. Ethically you should cite your source, and attribute any brief quotes, but that is probably not legally required. | I'd like to sell t-shirts with the direwolve emblem of the "House Stark" in Game of Thrones, and of course, I've been immediately asking myself if HBO which produces the serie actually had some copyright on that emblem. This is not a close case. Your proposal, or anything remotely similar, would almost certainly constitute a copyright violation and result in a lawsuit by the producers of the show if not done with a license from the company. They would easily win this lawsuit. The damages that they were awarded would greatly exceed the amount of profits you made from your sales (realistically, more than a $1,000 per T-Shirt plus many tens of thousands of dollars of legal fees and costs would be typical). You would probably have to go bankrupt and some or all of the damages award against you might survive bankruptcy because your copyright violation was an intentional act. Every episode of the TV show is a copyrighted work and what you are proposing would be a "derivative work" since it is derived from the copyrighted TV show. Derivative works made without a license from a a copyright holder are a violation of copyright laws. There are also probably myriad specifically trademarked symbols and phrases that are registered with the appropriate government official (the Patent and Trademark Office for U.S. trademarks). So, it is highly likely that there would be a trademark violation as well if a license was not obtained. Your basic business model is at its very heart and essence fundamentally illegal. There is nothing you can do to fix it without getting written permission from the publishers who have probably long ago sold the rights to do this to somebody else for an immense amount of money. You should abandon this idea and try to come up with another business venture instead. | No, it means you can't copy it. By default, the copyright to a work is owned by its creator, and nobody else is allowed to copy it, or create derived works, without their permission. That permission can be granted by a license. "License unknown" doesn't really tell us anything, but it certainly isn't clearly granting you permission. So you don't have permission to copy, and thus you cannot. You would have to seek permission from the copyright holder. See also If no licence is distributed with an application/source code, what license applies by default if any? (Some jurisdictions do allow for "fair use" exceptions, which allow you to copy a work without permission. You haven't said what jurisdiction you are in.) | Evaluating a potential copyright violation is very fact-intensive, so we don't have enough information to answer the question. Making a copy is generally going to be a copyright violation, but there's still going to be a lot of breathing room under the fair use doctrine. Again, we'd need more details to provide a useful answer, but you may be able to analyze the question yourself using the following information. Analysis of fair-use defenses looks at four questions, and the answers to the questions can tip the scales in favor of or against a finding of fair use: Does your kind of copying affect the market for the original? To what extent can your copy fulfill the demand for the original? What if there were widespread copying of the kind you're considering? The more potential there is for the copies to replace the original, the less likely it is to be fair use. This is the most important factor in the analysis. Why did you make the copy? If you made the copy for purposes of news reporting, criticism, or commentary, it's more likely to be fair use. If you made a copy just so you could watch again later whenever you feel like it, that's may still be fair use, but it is somewhat less likely. If you made a copy so you could sell it for profit, that's almost certainly not fair use. How much did you copy? Did you copy the whole thing, or did you copy only as much as you needed to achieve your purpose under Question 2? If you copy "too much" -- both in the raw amount and as a fraction of the whole work -- it's less likely to be fair use. What did you copy? Such works can be copyrighted but are not part of the Highly creative works, such as poems, music, and movies, are at the "core" of copyright principles. A fair use analysis will be more stringent in these cases than when copying a purely factual work, such as a phone book, biography, or list of statistics. This is the least important factor in the analysis. So take all of those and imagine the answer to each on a spectrum. If you see things generally tipping in the direction of fair use, that's a good indication that you're going to be safe. If you see things tipping in the other direction, you may want to reconsider. Again, these can be notoriously tricky questions. If you're dealing with a real situation, you should consult an attorney to get an answer specific to your situation. | You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part) | Permission is not a physical thing that disappears when a piece of paper evidencing that permission is lost or handed to another party. When someone gives you permission as part of an agreement having the necessary characteristics of a contract, then the revocation of that permission is governed by the terms of the contract itself and your jurisdiction's contract-law. You may not need any permission to use the photos you paid to have taken. (For example, in the U.S. if they were taken in a public place and you are not displaying them for profit.) Or, you might need permission due to various rules or laws protecting minors – only an IP lawyer familiar with your jurisdiction can confirm this is the case – and, unless it was drafted by a competent lawyer, it is quite possible that your "permission statement" was legally insufficient or defective. Or, you might have legally secured necessary permission and still have that permission even though you handed the "permission statement" back to the parents of the subject. In practice: Only a lawyer in your jurisdiction can offer an opinion on which of these scenarios is in fact the case. And only via litigation can you establish further confidence that legal opinion is correct. | Please Note: This was written before the title change of this question and may no longer be applicable According to the Harvard website: In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 US 340 (1991) the United States Supreme Court held that copyright does not extend to a mere compilation of facts. In this case, it was a telephone directory much the same as the one in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the Court also ruled that something more than simple "sweat of the brow" labor was required before copyright protection would ensue, with some modicum of authorial originality necessary. Accordingly, it was held in Feist that copyright did not extend to a telephone directory, no matter how laborious a task its compilation was. The decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) is highly significant, therefore, in that it permits copyright or quasi-copyright protection to be extended to non-copyrightable material through the use of contract. One would have to consider each meta tag independently. For example, the "description" tag could by copyrightable since it is written for more than just the 'facts', such as a subtle advert for the site that is more than an objective description. However the 'og:type' would not be copyrightable since it would just be considered a fact. Now, if you are using it on another website and sourcing it properly, you could probably use it under "Fair Use" Uses That Are Generally Fair Uses Subject to some general limitations discussed later in this article, the following types of uses are usually deemed fair uses: Criticism and comment -- for example, quoting or excerpting a work in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment. News reporting -- for example, summarizing an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report. Research and scholarship -- for example, quoting a short passage in a scholarly, scientific, or technical work for illustration or clarification of the author's observations. Nonprofit educational uses -- for example, photocopying of limited portions of written works by teachers for classroom use. Parody -- that is, a work that ridicules another, usually well-known, work by imitating it in a comic way. A copyright would exist on the image. One would have to know what license currently applies to the image to know for sure, however, the "Fair Use" to copyright would still apply. With Fair Use, the entity type that uses the image is important. There is much more leniency when a non-profit uses copyrighted information than when the information is used in commercial activity. (With, of course, more exceptions.) | There is no US law licensing journalists or people who report the news, or requiring such people to identify themselves by legal name. Nor can there be under the US First Amendment. There is also no law requiring a person to identify himself or herself by legal name online. Some sites, including Wikipedia, have policies against having multiple undisclosed user IDs for the same person, but that is a matter of the site's own rules, not a matter of law. Any US law mandating this would again run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. This article on Anonymous Speech reviews and cites a number of US Supreme court cases on the subject of anonymity, mostly in political contexts. This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discusses the same general subject. Both articles mention that The Federalist (analyzing and advocating for the then-unratified US Constitution) was originally published under the pseudonym "Publis". The EFF Article "Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even After Speakers Lose Lawsuits" discusses the 6th Circuit case of Signature Management Team, LLC v. John Doe in which it was held that an anonymous blogger who lost a copyright infringement suit could nonetheless remain anonymous. This page apparently from a Harvard course, lists and briefly describes several cases on the same subject. In Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) an elected official sued an online poster for defamation, and sought to force the ISP involved to disclose the poster's identity. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against this, setting a standard offering greater protection for such anonymous online speech than previous cases had. This answer is very US-centric. Laws in other countries are different. The OP has not specified a country or jurisdiction. |
How can California not honor a fishing/hunting license or driving instruction permit issued by Oregon? (These are just examples; the question is more general; it applies to any states and any type of license.) California does not honor a driving instruction permit issued by another state if the holder is under 16, nor do they honor an out-of-state hunting or fishing license. Is this constitutional under the full faith and credit clause? I'm intentionally not tagging this as oregon or california because they're just examples. | The Full Faith and Credit clause says Full faith and credit ought to be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, of every other state; and the legislature shall, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings, shall be proved, and the effect which judgments, obtained in one state, shall have in another For example, if Jones has been found liable to Smith in California, according to this clause, Nevada must "believe" this finding of California, and cannot say "Jones has not been found liable to Smith". Likewise Arizona has to recognize the validity of court records from Tennessee, etc. Congress then passed a law, the source of 28 USC 1738, which says The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto. The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form. Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. Other laws such as 42 USC Ch 136 known in part as The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and 28 USC 1738B ("Full faith and credit for child support orders") were passed which take away state power to say "that's not our law". In the case of marriage (which was subject to state-specific recognition exceptions until US v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 fixed that) interstate recognition of marriage derives from the Equal Protection Clause – marriage is a fundamental right. Driving and fishing are not fundamental rights. The reason why driving licenses are recognized across states is that every state has a clause to that effect in their laws (for politically-sensible reasons). The reason why fishing licenses are not ?ever recognized across state lines is that it's not necessary, legally or politically, to do so. Even in states with teaching certification reciprocity, you still have to apply for a new license when you start teaching in another state. In other words, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not say "permission granted by one state shall be binding on all states". | Colorado law says: CRS 42-3-113 (6): The registration card issued for a vehicle required to be registered under this article shall, at all times while the vehicle is being operated upon a highway, be in the possession of the driver or carried in the vehicle and subject to inspection by any peace officer. Read literally, this requires the original card. It would probably be at an officer's discretion whether to accept a copy. By contrast, California has (emphasis mine): Vehicle Code 4454(a): Every owner, upon receipt of a registration card, shall maintain the same or a facsimile copy thereof with the vehicle for which issued. | This varies depending on the specific law of the state or locality involved. In New York, the word "POSTED", along with the name and address of the owner is sufficient to notify people not to intrude, and anyone ignoring such a sign is technically trespassing (although, in practice, if such a person leaves the property when asked, did no damage, and appeared honestly ignorant, it is likely that no legal action would be taken). In California, as specified by penal code section 553 (quoted in the linked answer) a sign for this purpose must include: the words “trespassing-loitering forbidden by law,” or words describing the use of the property followed by the words “no trespassing.” in letters at least two inches tall, and follow other specifications in the law. The word "Posted" is neither required nor sufficient, although the law calls land with such signs "posted property". | Neighbors(including us) around the property started to mow the part in front of their yard(the weeds grew very high) and continue to do so(is it illegal for us to mow this overgrown land?). There are probably city codes around maintenance of lawns, cutting grass and clearing weeds. You should alert the relevant authorities and they will make sure that the maintenance occurs. You should probably not do it yourself since (a) you don't owe the owner any favors and (b) you might cause trouble for yourself. Recently there was some mowing by large tractors but very little was cut and most of it grew back. The question is really whether their activities bring them into compliance with applicable city codes or not. If they are compliant and you simply don't like how they maintain their property, that is tough luck. If they are not compliant, you are well within your rights to vigorously report them to relevant code enforcement authorities. This overgrown golf course is home to many wild animals(coyotes, snakes, foxes, alligators, etc..) See above 1) Is there any legal action that we can take to force the land owner to maintain the land? See above 2) Could this land somehow under some law be divided and given to the maintainers. This is an interesting question. Technically there are circumstances wherein you could take what's called adverse possession of part or all of the property. This would probably include doing things like actually residing on some piece of that land and establishing a residence there - perhaps getting mail or paying taxes there or paying utilities or operating a business - for a certain period of time without any interference from the technical owner. If you can meet the requirements of adverse possession then you might be able to become a legal owner. Unless you have little to lose, however, actually doing it might be difficult. 3) Is it legal to walk/drive on this land. (I see people walking their dogs, and driving atv's and motor bikes on the golf course) Unless you have been given notice otherwise, it is perfectly legal to walk wherever you like. It is the owner's responsibility to provide reasonable notice and take reasonable precautions against unwanted trespass; e.g., putting up a wall or fence, closing and/or locking a door or gate, posting signs and/or hiring security to patrol the property and enforce property rights - or occasionally checking to make sure their property isn't overrun with squatters. | This was attributed to Dumblaws.com, which is now mercifully nonexistent. It is false, as is the supposed law against fishing for whales on Sunday (seriously? Whales in Ohio?). If someone makes such a claim and gives a specific citation like "ORC 1533.02", you can look that law up. Otherwise, you can go to the state's repository of laws, which is searchable (not all states are as enlightened). No laws mention "whale" or "housefly", and only 23 address "fly", only referring to insects in a couple of cases where e.g. bakery showcases must keep out dust and flies. You might take on this collection, hosted by a law firm. I haven't bothered to check if "It is illegal to drive a camel on the highway" in Nevada – that a least verifiably refers to a law that did exist. | As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury. | Yes, in Orange County, CA, in a residential zone or on residentially-developed property, this is a code violation. Specifically you are looking at Title 3, Division 13, Article 1, Sec 3-13-4(11): Sec. 3-13-4. - Prohibited Conduct. Except as provided in section 3-13-6, exemptions, it shall be unlawful for any responsible party having charge or possession of any real property in county territory to:... (11) Keep, store, or maintain upon any premises under his/her control any abandoned, wrecked, dismantled, or inoperative vehicle, or part thereof, except as permitted by Table 3-13-6(c). You may store/work on this vehicle from a building or location that is not visible from the street, but you cannot work on or store the vehicle on the street or driveway. You might also be able to erect a 6' tall opaque fence around the car, provided the fence meets standards. The code making this illegal is a county ordinance for Orange County, CA, which is not applicable to other counties in California (other counties/cities may have their own ordinances). Codes which cover this sort of activity are generally made at the county or city level. They vary dramatically from location to location, and are often different based on the zoning of the property within the county or city. | While Colorado does issue driver's licenses to homeless individuals, as you identified in your question, you need the help of a homeless shelter. I can see from your questions that you're reluctant to seek help from family, friends, or a shelter; however, I do not see a lawful way around Colorado's residency requirement without their assistance. Under C.R.S. § 42-2-107(1)(a)(II), the DMV cannot issue a driver's license "until [it] verifies all facts relative to such applicant's right to receive an instruction permit or minor driver's or driver's license including the age, identity, and residency of the applicant." Here is a link to Colorado's statutes. Unfortunately, I can't link to the specific provision cited above. The administrative rules further explain what is required for the department to verify residency. The regulations also talk about the exception for homeless people and specifically state that "Proof of residency documents are waived, if an applicant provides a letter on letterhead, signed by the director of a homeless shelter, certifying that the individual is homeless and stays at the shelter." 1 Colo. Code Regs. § 204- 30:16-2.12. Under the law and applicable registration, you cannot give a PO Box as your residence. You must give an actual address that you are supposed to be residing at. I don't know your individual circumstances; however, you might find it easier to stay at a friends house long enough to get your driver's license. Hope this is helpful to you. |
What are the laws regarding eviction of adult children from residence in the UK? What is the process in the UK for parents to evict an adult child that is living at home with them if he refuses to leave willingly? | The Protection from Eviction Act 1977 defines an excluded tenancy as, amongst other things, a tenancy that is granted for other than money or money's worth ((7)(a)). This means that someone who shares accommodation with the landlord does not have the protection from eviction that an ordinary tenant would have, as per Part 5. You should seek advice from a legal professional before taking action to evict, however, there is nothing in the Protection from Eviction Act that protects an excluded tenancy. It would probably still be advised that you give reasonable notice. | Trespass to land in most instances is a civil matter, and as such the police do not have the power to assist. Initially, the landowner should ask the trespasser to leave the land and if he/she does then all is well. If he/she refuses to leave the land then you will need to consider taking civil action. It could be dangerous for the landowner to try to remove the trespasser themselves. The owner of the land could commit several criminal offences if he forcibly removes the trespasser and his/her property from the land. The best and safest course of action is to obtain a court order, which, if breached, can then become a criminal matter. If the police do attend an incident such as this, they are merely there as observers for any possible criminal offences committed by either party. The police cannot assist in the removal of the trespassers or their property from the land in question. Emphasis mine. https://www.askthe.police.uk/content/Q56.htm | I guess you are interpreting the answer of the officer the wrong way. Minors do have rights. Plenty of them. But using a phone to contact people their legal guardian does not approve, or to consume media their legal guardian does not approve, is usually not a right minors have. And to make those restrictions stick, your mother took your phone away. Ask for it on your 18th birthday. But when one of you has called the police on a family situation like this, both of you have a problem that goes way beyond property rights. Do you have an adult you can talk to? A teacher? An uncle or aunt? A coach? Try talking to them. If they all side with your mother, consider that she might be right and you are wrong. But often both sides talk themselves into a corner, and a neutral viewpoint helps. If you are truly desperate about your situation, call Child Protective Services. But that could backfire if they believe your mother, and make the family situation worse. Taking a phone away is not neglect or abuse. | There are nuisance lawsuits and constructive eviction arguments--you can check with your local attorneys and perhaps tenants' rights organizations for detailed information. Just because marijuana is legal under state law (if certain steps were followed) does not mean that your landlord or another tenant can interfere with your use and enjoyment of your home. Civil consequences--such as a court order to the smoker to stop smoking, money damages, or a partial abatement of your rent until the smoking stops--may be achievable. It is important to follow the rules for your jurisdiction closely when starting a legal action, so you should talk to an expert in your jurisdiction if you want to pursue legal action. But where possible, most people deal with this kind of thing by moving. | I can't find any specific laws or cases in the United Kingdom. In Australia, bag searches must be consensual - shopkeepers and even security staff have no power to search your person or belongings. It is for this reason that you will often be asked by security staff to open your bag, and move belongings around inside that may obstruct their view. If they attempt to force you to surrender your bags for search by physical force or by intimidation, you may be entitled to bring a claim for the tort of assault and/or battery. You need only prove that these occurred, without actual loss or damage. In any case, they do not have the power to arrest or detain you unless they believe you have committed a crime, and in those circumstances, only reasonable force may be used. You are under no obligation to remain in the store. If they detain you against your will and you are later found not to have shoplifted, you may be entitled to bring a claim for the tort of false imprisonment, which is, again, actionable per se (you need not actually show damages) and serves to vindicate a person's right to liberty. | Charlie is not a party to the contract between Alice and Bob Alice and Charlie have no contractural relationship and Alice cannot require him to do anything nor is he liable to Alice in any way. Alice’s issue is with Bob who has clearly breached his contract. Alice can sue Bob for damages and may be able to end the lease. There is no trespass because Charlie is there with the permission of the leaseholder. From Charlie’s position there is no reason to believe that Bob does not have the authority to give this permission so Charlie is not in breach of the law. The police will see this as a civil matter and won’t intervene. | The important question is: was the £200 a fine (which is paid to the state) or compensation (which is paid to you)? Assuming it was a fine He doesn't (at the moment) owe you anything. However you can sue him for damages. Usually a claim for damages is time-barred after six years (and it is now seven years). However you weren't able to sue him yourself until you were 18, so you may have a couple of years left. However the clock may have started ticking immediately after the attack, on the grounds your parents or guardians could have sued. Talk to a solictor about this possibility; they should give you a free 30 minute consultation, and would probably take a case on a contigency fee (no-win no-fee) basis if it has any chance. In principle, you could have applied to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for compensation - but you are too late for that; you have to apply within two years (there are some exceptions, but none seem to apply to you). Assuming it was compensation He owes you £200. Now you need to enforce that payment - and again, the problem may be the six year clock. You will definitely need to talk to a lawyer about that. My gut feeling is that the £200 was probably a fine rather than compensation. | Given there was no answer here, I will state what I know about child abuse response, but note I am not a lawyer nor am I in Illinois, so my statements are likely generalized for most US states (individual laws vary by state, and I reside in Pennsylvania). In most US states, the police and child/youth services (that's what it's called in Pennsylvania but all states have similar services) work side by side and a complaint by the child to a police officer will have an emergency action taken to protect the child. The child is identified as a victim and the police and child/youth services have the obligation to protect the child and to keep them from harm. This is the main goal of police and children/youth services - to keep the child safe and act in the best interest of the child. Usually, a complaint to a child abuse center can take time to process. When a police complaint comes in it is more immediate, with police having more 'influence' with CYS (child/youth services). Especially when the child is in deadly danger (they were just stabbed, after all), the police may arrest the mother or abusive sibling or intervene therein to remove the child from the parents care with CYS-equivalent services working to find suitable alternative living situations for the child as a result of a order of removal/protection authorized by a judge. (PA at least had emergency situation response plans for these situations where a judge is just a phone call away). As well, the child will likely be made a ward of the state if the courts determine the mother cannot care for the child or is a threat as such (not caring enough to stop the brother may count), insomuch that the child may be removed from the dangerous situation and placed in the care of a willing relative or if none can be found will be placed in temporary foster care in a safer environment. Note that nothing happens rapidly without the initial complaint to the police. At age 16 the child is likely going to be taken more seriously (compared to a 12 year old, for example), and has the right to be allowed to reach out to hospital staff to ask to speak to a police officer - otherwise it takes a child abuse complaint from someone who knows the child and situation and that can sometimes take longer to process (though, the distance factor in the original question may make a complaint from overseas given a lower priority due to not knowing the person on a more personal in-person level) |
secretly recording a murder confession Let's say you had an opportunity to secretly record an acquaintance confessing to a murder decades prior. Can/would it be used by police/courts? Are there certain things about the recording that would improve its usefulness? (Questions that should be asked/answered/avoided, specific recording methods, etc) | Disclosure to police of an illegal recording is permitted by s. 193(2)(e), and in court by s. 193(2)(a). The recording could be excluded if the person who made the recording did so on behalf of police (to sidestep their obligation to obtain a warrant), but even then its importance as evidence may outweigh other Charter considerations. | No Voluntary disclosure, even accidental, by the client ends privilege. The information may still be confidential (inadmissible) if it happened in the appropriate circumstances, for example, as part of a mediation. Edit A recent decision of the High Court of Australia has determined that a litigant can use material that comes into its possession that would have attracted privilege irrespective of how this happens. In that case, the law firm was hacked by an unknown party, the information was given to a journalist and published and the litigant wanted to use it in their case - they were allowed to do so. The court decided that privilege is not a legal right that could found a course of action. Basically, it only prevents the compulsory production of such information - it doesn't protect the information itself. | can you hire a witness as your lawyer to exclude their testimony? That is pure fiction and misleading. Unfortunately scenes like that contribute to keep people ignorant about the law, which then makes it easier for courts to dissimulate their recurrent miscarriage of justice. But Purdue University v. Wartell, 5 N.E.3d 797 (2014) is an example where the Indiana courts did the right thing, and is pertinent to your question. There, Purdue University first assigned an investigator in regard to plaintiff's grievance, and thereafter the University tried to withhold information under pretext that the investigator was also its lawyer and thus that the information was protected by the privilege. Because that person hitherto had been portrayed only as an independent investigator, the Indiana courts concluded that Purdue University was estopped from invoking the attorney-client privilege (as well as the work-product doctrine). Thus, the guy in the film or series who said to be "screwed on Kardashian" reflects pure cluelessness about how the law supposedly operates. I have not seen the plot of that film or series, but the information that the friend-lawyer obtained prior to becoming O.J.'s attorney would not be protected by the privilege because it was not obtained in preparation for O.J.'s defense. If there were one star witness on the opposing side and they happened to be a lawyer, could you simply pay them off by hiring them as your lawyer? This question is somewhat unclear to me, but I will mention that lawyers have a duty to disclose to their potential or actual client any conflict of interests. The rules of so-called "professional conduct" discourage lawyers to ignore conflict of interests in that this conflict may impair their "services". And, as I explained previously, any information that a lawyer obtains as witness rather than as attorney in the matter is not protected by the privilege. Thus, as for If you committed a crime at a law-firm and everyone who witnessed it was a lawyer, is there any rule preventing you from just hiring all of them? the answer is: Nothing prevents the criminal from hiring all of them, but that information is not protected. | There are instances when the testimony may still be admitted. For example, a deposition may be admitted at trial either for impeaching or when a witness cannot attend, which involves the circumstance of death (FRCP 32(a)(4)(a)). Additionally, regarding hearsay, there are numerous exceptions. My Evidence professor said in class "If you cannot find a way to get evidence around a hearsay objection, you are not trying hard enough." One such hearsay exception states in the committee notes: Accordingly, the committee has amended rule 803(8) to refer to the provision of [proposed] rule 804(b)(5) [deleted], which allows the admission of such reports, records or other statements where the police officer or other law enforcement officer is unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process. | It seems to not be allowed for a UK police to lie. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 makes it illegal for the police to mislead a suspect in order to make them believe that the police have evidence which they do not or that the evidence they have is stronger than it is, or that there is a possibility of leniency (for example in return for ‘cooperation’) where none exists. Realistically, there is no reason that a police officer might lie to a suspect during interview. Also see from innocenceproject.org: The law does not allow lying to suspects, under any circumstances. | Massachusetts is a 'two-party' state. So you'd have to have consent from them to record. You could probably travel to a 'one-party' state such as one of the states listed here and call them while recording. In a one-party state, only one of the parties to the conversation needs to know about the recording. In those states you don't even need to inform them. It would be interesting to see if the law applied to where the call center is located. When calling credit card companies these days, the call may be routed to any number of places depending on call loads, and those places might be out of country as well. | First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not. | http://www.healthinfoprivacybc.ca/confidentiality/when-can-and-cant-they-tell-others is a pretty good summary. Different rules apply to private practices than public clinics and hospitals. I will assume that the clinic on campus is private. This is a summary of the summary about who your information can be shared with: Health care professionals can share information within your "circle of care". Specifically, they are allowed to assume your consent to this but you can explicitly withdraw that consent. This would include doctors within the same practice. Admin staff can access your information for administrative purposes. Anyone you have authorised them to share it with e.g. relatives, friends etc. The Medical Services Plan for billing and admin If you are unable to drive If there is suspected of child abuse If you are wounded by a gun or a knife If you are a danger to others For your specific questions: I asked about it and they said it's confidential, but confidential to the clinic. Correct, unless you explicitly revoke this. the counselling department can share information with the doctors This is tricker, these people may be either within your "circle of care" or they may be part of the same organisation. Notwithstanding, councillors are not doctors and are governed by the everyday laws related to confidentiality i.e. information given in confidence is confidential and everything else isn't. If you are told the limits of the confidentiality i.e. they tell the doctor, then those are the limits unless you renegotiate them. he would know I only have one kidney? Well you said "the counselling department can share information with the doctors" and this would require the information going the other way i.e. the doctor sharing with the councillor. Even if this type of sharing was OK in general (and I'm not sure it is, see above); the information shared should only be what is required for the councillor to do their job - the number of kidneys you have is probably irrelevant to this. What laws apply to situations like this where confidential information in one entity (medical office) decides to share it without the consent of the patients to another entity (the counselling dept.)? Well, we are not sure there are 2 entities: legally there may only be 1 - the university. Anyway, the laws are the Personal Information Protection Act and common law (Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 SCR 455) |
Divorced mom pays mortgage. She wants to get title in her name A divorced mom pays the mortgage on and lives in a house, but the house title is in both parents' names. The father is gone. The mom wants to move, but can't sell the house. How can the mom get the house title in her name without the father signing in Texas? | Short Answer Usually, a divorce decree doesn't leave former spouses as co-owners of the former marital residence, but sometimes this happens anyway. To oversimplify, if the divorce decree leaves a couple a co-owners, either of them can usually force the sale of the property and a division of the proceeds left after paying off the mortgage, in a special kind of lawsuit called a partition action. The rights of mortgage lenders and lienholders against both former spouses cannot be changed without paying off the loan in most cases. If a spouse who lives there isn't able to pay off the old loan and refinance it in their name alone, this usually means that the house will be sold to a third party with the net proceeds of the sale split. The net proceeds from the sale of the house are divided in proportion to their ownership interests in the co-owned property that can sometimes be tricky to calculate. Often the ability of either party to force a sale of the house in a partition action leads the parties to reach a settlement in the shadow of the possible outcome. Long Answer Caveats This answer sets forth the general rules that apply the vast majority of the time. There are some rare and obscure exceptions to these rules that can apply buried in dark corners of Texas law, and this answer doesn't not comprehensively ferret out every single such exception to the general rules. This answer also doesn't discuss ways in which outcomes that shouldn't be allowed by these rules can be made possible by one party or another's procedural mistakes in the court system, which is fact specific and can arise in certain situations. What Is A Divorce Decree? The only way a divorce case can end is for the divorce to be called off (either by mutual agreement or because one or both of the divorcing spouses die before the case is over), or for a divorce decree to be entered by the court, ending the marriage and establishing the rights of the parties after the divorce with respect to each other and their property. A divorce decree can be entered either by mutual agreement of the spouses in a divorce case, but if they can't agree, the judge in the divorce case will impose a divorce decree dividing property and handling other issues in the divorce as the divorce judge sees fit consistent with Texas law. Either way, it isn't official until it is signed by the judge. Sometimes a divorce decree will be very short, but will incorporate by reference one or more other documents like a mutually agreed separation agreement, or a parenting plan, or a schedule of who gets what property in the divorce. The Role of A Divorce Decree Almost anything can be done by mutual agreement (although all decisions related to children must be approved by the judge with a finding that the agreement is in the best interests of the children). A judge has far more limitations on what the judge can do in a divorce decree to establish the post-divorce property rights of the ex-spouses, but the judge still has great discretion in how the judge may make those decisions. Usually, the ownership of a house is handled in a way that leaves only one spouse owning the house in connection with a divorce proceeding. For example, ex-husband may be ordered to transfer the house to ex-wife, and ex-wife may be ordered to transfer her pension to ex-husband in exchange, if that is what the divorce decree says. One of the grounds for appealing a judge's divorce decree decision to a higher court is that the judge didn't adequately separate the spouses financially. But that doesn't mean that a divorce decree can never leave ex-spouses as co-owners of property. Once the divorce case is over, if nothing in the divorce decree separates ownership of the house, then the ex-husband and ex-wife have the same rights with respect to each other that a house co-owned by two people who were never married would have (unless the divorce decree states otherwise). Some divorce decrees, however, prohibit the sale or transfer of the house without the mutual consent of the former husband and former wife (for former husband and former husband, or former wife and former wife, in a same sex marriage), either indefinitely, or for some time period defined in the divorce decree. In rare cases, the divorcing spouses could agree to do something that leaves neither of them owning their house, like agreeing to sell it, or agreeing to give it to charity, or putting it in the trust for their children. The Rights Of Unmarried Co-Owners Of Property When A Divorce Decree Doesn't Provide Otherwise A lawsuit to terminate co-ownership of real estate without the consent of all of the owners of the real estate is called a partition action. In the case of a house that cannot feasibly be divided in kind the way that, for example, farmland could be, what a partition action does is force the house to be sold, with the proceeds divided. Conceivably, one spouse or the other could be both one of the two sellers, and one of the buyers at the partition sale if the spouse that is both selling and buying is the highest bidder in a sale that is open to the general public. In this case, the partition sale is functionally equivalent to cashing out the equity of a spouse who is not the highest bidder at a partition sale. Frequently, given the inevitability of an ultimate partition sale in these cases, the parties will instead reach a mutual agreement to either have one party cash out the other for an agreed valuation of the house and allocation of the equity in the house. Alternatively, another common form of settlement is that the co-owners will agree to sell the house for an agreed price to a third-party and then to divide the net proceeds either according to a pre-agreed formula or in litigation over net proceeds from the agreed sale held in a court controlled bank pending a judicial determination of each spouse's share of the proceeds. Partition actions aren't the most expensive kind of court case, but usually, at least one of the parties needs to have a lawyer for it to go smoothly and the legal fees aren't usually negligible either. Critically, the fact that "mom pays mortgage and lives in the house" doesn't matter much in a partition action after the divorce is over. Paying the mortgage and living in the house are frequently considered to cancel out, rather than changing the share of the equity to which each former spouse is entitled. An ex-wife cannot just get an ex-husband off of the title without being the highest bidder at a partition sale. If ex-husband is the highest bidder, he will stay on the title and she will be off the title and will have to move out or pay him rent. If the third-party is the highest bidden, she will have to move out or pay rent to the third-party, and neither of them will be on the title anymore. The Rights Of Mortgage And Lien Creditors The fact that both ex-spouses are responsible to the mortgage company (and any lienholders who have rights identical to mortgage companies for the purposes of this question) if they were both on the mortgage before the divorce can't be changed without the mortgage lenders consent (which is almost never given), unless the mortgage is paid off in full and (if necessary) refinanced. If there is a partition sale, the mortgage debt must be paid off before either spouse gets any of the proceeds from the partition sale. The Impact of Community Property Laws In Texas One complicating factor in this analysis is that Texas is a community property state. So, to determine what share of the equity in a house belongs to each spouse (if any) you have to apply community property rules that are deceptively simply, but are quite complicated to apply in practice. The general rule of community property in Texas is that property acquired before the marriage or by gift or inheritance by a single spouse, or allocated to a spouse in divorce decree, is separate property. All other property of the couple of community property. Any property for which separate property status can't be proven, or for which there is too much co-mingling of community and separate property, is community property. A spouse is entitled to 100% of the that spouse's separate property, and in addition, to 50% of the community property of the couple, upon divorce. Also, at death, a decedent can't leave the surviving spouse's separate property to someone else, can't leave the 50% of the property that is community property immediately prior to death, that is owned by the surviving spouse, to anyone other than the surviving spouse, without the surviving spouse's consent. Ideally, the divorce decree will spell out what percentage of each piece of land or other property that is owned by each former spouse once they are divorced. But, sometimes a divorce decree entered by mutual agreement, or by a judge, is sloppy and doesn't make that point clear. If the divorce decree doesn't clarify what percentage of the property is owed by each ex-spouse, this has to be cleared up later when the house is sold in a partition action, if there is no mutual agreement to the contrary. A valid pre-nuptial agreement, or a valid post-nuptial agreement, however, can modify the community property rules of Texas that would otherwise apply. The application of community property rules is also particularly complicated in cases where the couple spends part of their marriage in Texas, and part of their marriage either in a state that is not a community property state or that has very different community property laws on some key issues. The Impact Of Post-Divorce Economic Activity Related To The House Also, the amounts spent by the co-owners of the house after the divorce, and the question of whether one of the co-owner has been excluded from the co-owned house by the other, could change the share of each co-owner in the equity in the house after the divorce. The exact rules for how these adjustments are made are complicated, and are often subject to a judge's discretionary decision about this issue should be resolved in a partition action. Footnote Re Gender All of the rules discussed above, even if I haven't worded my explanations that way, are gender neutral. The rules are the same for ex-husbands as they are for ex-wives (and vice versa) in opposite sex marriages, for ex-husbands in same sex marriages, and for ex-wives in same sex marriages. | This is a close call, in the example that you suggest, because it won't have been executed with the proper formalities and it isn't clear that the content at a url would be fixed in its language at the time that the Will is executed. Subject to an exception for personal property memorandums (and a more subtle one for powers of appointment in trusts) you can't change the terms of a Will once it is signed except by a Codicil executed with the same formalities. Certainly, the best practice would be to assume that the answer is no. There are times when a reference to an external document in a will is allowed (e.g. a reference to real property by address rather than a full legal description found in a recorded deed), but a list of beneficiaries would ordinarily not be allowed unless it was effectively a reference to vital statistics records (e.g. "all children born to or adopted by me.") In general, references to external documents are not allowed when used to establish the nature of the testator's donative intent (a "testator" is someone who writes a will), unless it "describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification" and can't be modified after the Will is signed, but can be used to establish general facts about reality. One exception in Colorado is that a "personal property memorandum" designating who will receive specific items of tangible personal property can be incorporated by reference and does not have to be executed with the same formalities as a will. It isn't clear to me if a url could be a valid personal property memorandum and that issue has never been tested in Colorado. Colorado's probate laws are based on the Uniform Probate Code and would be substantially identical to any other jurisdiction that adopted the Uniform Probate Code's substantive provisions. The primary statutes governing this (which aren't necessarily easy to understand without context) are: Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-502. Execution--witnessed or notarized wills--holographic wills (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section and in sections 15-11-503, 15-11-506, and 15-11-513, a will shall be: (a) In writing; (b) Signed by the testator, or in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator's direction; and (c) Either: (I) Signed by at least two individuals, either prior to or after the testator's death, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he or she witnessed either the testator's signing of the will as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will; or (II) Acknowledged by the testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments. (2) A will that does not comply with subsection (1) of this section is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting. (3) Intent that the document constitute the testator's will can be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of the document that are not in the testator's handwriting. (4) For purposes of this section, “conscious presence” requires physical proximity to the testator but not necessarily within testator's line of sight. (5) For purposes of this part 5, “will” does not include a designated beneficiary agreement that is executed pursuant to article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-503. Writings intended as wills (1) Although a document, or writing added upon a document, was not executed in compliance with section 15-11-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: (a) The decedent's will; (b) A partial or complete revocation of the will; (c) An addition to or an alteration of the will; or (d) A partial or complete revival of the decedent's formerly revoked will or a formerly revoked portion of the will. (2) Subsection (1) of this section shall apply only if the document is signed or acknowledged by the decedent as his or her will or if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent erroneously signed a document intended to be the will of the decedent's spouse. (3) Whether a document or writing is treated under this section as if it had been executed in compliance with section 15-11-502 is a question of law to be decided by the court, in formal proceedings, and is not a question of fact for a jury to decide. (4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a designated beneficiary agreement under article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-510. Incorporation by reference A writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-511. Testamentary additions to trusts (1) A will may validly devise property to the trustee of a trust established or to be established (i) during the testator's lifetime by the testator, by the testator and some other person, or by some other person, including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance contracts, or (ii) at the testator's death by the testator's devise to the trustee, if the trust is identified in the testator's will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will, executed before, concurrently with, or after the execution of the testator's will or in another individual's will if that other individual has predeceased the testator, regardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust. The devise is not invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or because the trust was amended after the execution of the will or the testator's death. (2) Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, property devised to a trust described in subsection (1) of this section is not held under a testamentary trust of the testator, but it becomes a part of the trust to which it is devised, and is administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the governing instrument setting forth the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before or after the testator's death. (3) A revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator causes the devise to lapse, but exhaustion of trust corpus between the time of execution of the testator's will and the testator's death shall not constitute a lapse; a revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator shall not cause the devise to lapse, if the testator provides that, in such event, the devise shall constitute a devise to the trustee of the trust identified in the testator's will, and on the terms thereof, as they existed at the time of the execution of testator's will, or as they existed at the time of the revocation or termination of the trust, as the testator's will provides. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-512. Events of independent significance A will may dispose of property by reference to acts and events that have significance apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by the will, whether they occur before or after the execution of the will or before or after the testator's death. The execution or revocation of another individual's will is such an event. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-513. Separate writing or memorandum identifying devise of certain types of tangible personal property Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing shall be either in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by the testator and shall describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will. There is not a statutory definition of a "document" or a "writing" in the Colorado Probate Code. | This is a civil case, taking away your freedom is only for criminal offenses. Not paying your bills is not a criminal offense. It is up to the creditor to look for your assets, etc. A court can make you show up and answer questions about your assets and income. While you are in court the judge can make you give your gold watch to your creditor. Outside the parameters of the question there are circumstances like failure to pay child support when you do have the funds that can lead to incarceration. In some places you can be jailed for contempt of court if the court requires your presence to let the creditor have the ability to try to get access to your assets and you do not show up. | Does Amazon prohibit a family of adults from sharing a single Amazon account? No, or at least it seems unlikely. As outlined in my answer & comments on Law Meta, a domestic or family-oriented character is palpable in the clause. That weakens the notion that Amazon's intent is to preclude scenarios which are of a personal-domestic nature and short of commercial/sublicensed use. The language "You are responsible for [...] restricting access to your account" seems more permissive than something akin to "only you are allowed to access your account". The former language is consistent with the term "non-exclusive", which otherwise seems to have no relevance or purpose in the clause. Users' ability (if any) to enter multiple payment methods with different names (i.e., card holder name) could be an additional indication that the scenario you have in mind is acceptable to Amazon. It is easy for a company to implement a validation for the purpose of identifying significant discrepancies of holder names and/or to have the user confirm that all payment methods refer to one same owner. The latter approach is more conclusive for scenarios where a woman has changed names as a result of getting married or divorced. The fact (?) that Amazon declined to include that simple validation weakens the notion that the company is genuinely interested in sticking to a rule of one-person per account. | What you have heard is not exactly correct (and also depends, in part, on the Chapter under which the bankruptcy is filed). I will address the simplest case, a Chapter 7 liquidation of an individual, which is simpler, because a Chapter 7 liquidation is determined as of a point of time, while Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 reorganizations are conceptually more complex and don't just transfer rights to a trustee at a single point in time. When you file a Chapter 7, all of your property, including you rights to sue people that had accrued as of that date, are transferred to the bankruptcy trustee as an asset of the bankruptcy estate, and the right of anyone to sue you is stayed automatically until the bankruptcy court either authorizes the lawsuit, or discharges the debt associated with the lawsuit (there are actually a few cases where the automatic stay expires on its own after a certain amount of time). Rights to bring lawsuits that arise after the bankruptcy is filed, or can be brought at any time, like a divorce/custody suit, are not barred, although property and enforcement of economic rights in those cases may be stayed until the bankruptcy court takes action. Custody issues other than child support, and termination of marital status are not affected. For example, if you file for bankruptcy on Monday and are hit by a bus on Friday, your personal injury suit claim is probably yours and not the bankruptcy estate's and can be brought by you. But, if you are hit by a bus on Monday and then file for bankruptcy on Friday, your personal injury suit claim is probably property of the bankruptcy estate. (It is a bit more complicated than this, because your right to sue for a personal injury might be exempt property, at least in part, but this example conveys the gist of the concept.) There is a further complication in the analysis which is that domestic relations actions and probate court actions are normally considered to be outside of the jurisdiction of the federal courts (bankruptcy court is a federal court), even when there is diversity of citizenship, which doesn't change the basic conclusions above. | Your options are generally limited by where you have (or can establish) residency, along with where your communal property is held. There are (decreasing numbers of) jurisdictions known as "divorce mills" that have notoriously lenient rules for establishing residency and completing divorces. | If the parents left the brother, let's call him Bob, full or partial ownership of the house in a will, or a long-term right of tenancy, then he has a right to live there. If they left no will, their property will be handled according to the local law on intestacy. The details vary from one Australian state to another, but if neither has a living spouse, their children will probably split the estate. This will probably include a share of the house, and so Bob will have a right to live there, unless a different division is made. Or the house could be sold and the proceeds split. Bob would not have a right to live there merely because he had been living there for some years, or even all his life. Nor would Bob have such a right if he had been caring for his parents, not for that reason alone. Everything depends on who winds up owning the house. Generally the owner or owners get to decide who may live in the house. A person could also be given or left a right of occupancy. A co-owner normally has a right to live in a house. But there is no automatic right of a child to live in his or her parents' house. | According to Nolo, which is usually a good source of legal information, yes, an HOA generally does have the power to place a lien on your property if you do not pay your HOA dues, and to foreclose the lien (force sale) if it is still not paid. They have a specific page for Nevada explaining procedures and restrictions. You'll also have to read your covenant (CC&R) to see exactly what you agreed to when you bought the property, but Nolo seems to suggest that whatever's in there is likely to be enforceable. In particular, the covenant may state that the HOA's lien can include penalties and collection costs, and the law seems to allow that. There's a note on the Nolo Nevada page that an HOA may not foreclose a lien based only on a fine or penalty, so it's not clear what would happen if you paid only the outstanding dues but not the other charges. Personally, it seems to me excessive to sue over $400. Being on bad terms with your HOA seems likely to cause trouble down the road. Also, if it were me, I'd want to consult a lawyer to get a sense of the chances of winning. The fact that you were out of state and may have missed communications from the HOA or bank seems like it may weaken your case; they might argue that you had a responsibility to check your bank statements and have your mail forwarded. If you lose in court, you might be liable for the court costs in addition to what you currently owe. |
A website is refusing or failing to remove personal data I've requested removed: is this against GRPR? I have been a member of a website for 13 years and would like all of my old posts removed. I have contacted their support team however the experience has been dreadful: it look a lot of back and forth messaging until they understood what I need the support team is fairly disconnected from the tech team that can actually do it in 9 months of continuous messaging there has been little to no progress and I feel I'm running 'round in circles I had a quick at GDPR and these points don't apply: the personal data your company/organisation holds is needed to exercise the right of freedom of expression; there is a legal obligation to keep that data; for reasons of public interest (for example public health, scientific, statistical or historical research purposes). Is the website's refusal/failure to remove my personal data against GDPR ? What can I do about it ? | If the website's processing of your personal data is within the scope of the GDPR, then you have a qualified right to request the erasure of your personal data. It is relevant whether: the website operates within the EU; the website is operated by a company established in an EU country; the website aims to sell goods or services to people in the EU; or the website is routinely processing the personal data of people in the EU (including non-citizens). Furthermore, it is relevant whether your posts: contain one or more identifiers from which you could be personally identified, directly or indirectly, including by only the administrators or owners of the website; and by their content, directly reveal information relating to you. For example, let's say you posted on a forum saying that "I am a keen supporter of socialism", and your personal email address was used to sign up to the website, then you would have revealed information about your political beliefs, which by reference to a username, the website owners could use to uniquely identify you by your email address. You would not necessarily have to have used your name. If, for example, you posted something factual, like, "The Porsche 911 GT2 RS MR recorded the fastest lap time for a road-legal sports car on the Nürburgring," then it is only personal as long as it is associated with an identifier through which you could be identified. As such, the removal of the relationship could easily anonymise the post. A data controller has an obligation to provide means by which the data subject can exercise the rights guaranteed under Chapter 3 of the GDPR. Article 17 grants the right to "erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay" where the grounds under Art. 17 lit. 1 (a) to (f) are met. It may be relevant what the lawful basis of processing personal data was in the first place, such as in determining whether you can withdraw consent (i.e. you cannot withdraw consent if consent was not given), or in determining whether there is a right to object under Article 21 lit. 1. Derogations permissible under local implementing laws may provide for other exemptions or requirements to the right to erasure, so it is also important to determine the country of jurisdiction. | The COVID restrictions are new enough that there are few court decisions on how to interpret them. There are frequent requests for court injunctions seeking temporary relief. Some pass, some are denied. The website might accuse locations listed there of breaking the restrictions. Making such an accusation in public sounds like a very bad idea, especially if there is no solid documentation. But the aggrieved party would be any location falsely listed. The site may or may not be hosted in Germany. If it is not, it becomes a really interesting question which law applies. You might inform the authorities, but beyond that, forget it. | Keeping logs of chats would not necessarily be against the GDPR as you have suggested. For the IRC service provider/operator: these chats/logs would be within scope if EU-based users are involved and this means the data controller/processors would have legal obligations to comply with GDPR. The IRC service provider/operator would be the data controller and would be held ultimately responsible for the data stored/processed through the IRC service, including backups and logs kept etc, and this would mean any sub-processors they select (such as hosting provider) would also have to be GDPR compliant. Due to the nature of IRC chats being entirely public in the same way forum board posts and comments are public, the contract terms between the IRC service provider and the IRC users would need to be very clear that this is the case, and the IRC users would need to give consent for this processing (this is more complicated for children, see Article 8 regarding consent from the holder of parental responsibility). For IRC users (personal use): If you wish to keep the chat records for personal use only (i.e. not in connection with a business or your employment at a business), then an exemption applies: This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; ... (GDPR, Article 2: Material Scope, Paragraph 2(c), p.32) For IRC users (commercial/business use): In this case I don't think you would have any legal basis to store/process these chats/logs if they contain personal data without a legal agreement with the data controller which would require you to put in place the same protections they have to under GDPR but then allow your business to access the data for specific purposes. While the information may be published or considered to be in the 'public domain', for you to take a copy of it without permission and use it for a purpose they haven't consented to would not be allowed under GDPR. Additionally, to go through the process of removing personal data from the chats/logs would in itself be considered 'processing' under GDPR and therefore would be unauthorised without a legal agreement with the data controller. Practically therefore, your best options under this circumstance would be if: The IRC service provider implemented a 'favourites' feature to save within their own system the chat conversations you wish to retain and refer back to in future. Since they hold the data and you already have a user agreement with them there is no further complications (this is probably the best option); The IRC service provider implemented a feature to download an anonymized copy of a chat conversation (not ideal as there are no guaruntees a user will not include personal data in their messages, though the user agreement could state that message content will be considered to exclude personal data, in a similar way to how StackExchange do for this website, see the paragraph titled "Information You Choose to Display Publicly on the Network" on the StackExchange Privacy Policy). Your business considered an alternative communications solution, such as hosting its own real-time chat system or forum boards system, in which case your business would be the data controller, and while subject to GDPR you could then define the purposes for which the data will be used in your own user agreement. | It seems clear that this is personal information under the GDPR. If you are subject to the GDPR, you need to have a "lawful basis" to store or process such information. (You are subject to the GDPR if you are locates in the EU, or if your users are. My understanding is that it is location at the time the app is accessed that matters, not a user's citizenship. I am not totally sure about that, however. Unless your app is limited to non-EU access, it it probably safest to comply with the GDPR) The degree of precision of your location data will not matter -- a specific city is quite enough to make it personal data if it can be tied to a specific person. There are various lawful bases that may be relied on for processing and storage, but explicit consent is probably the one with the widest applicability. To use consent as the lawful basis, you must present an OPT-IN decision to the user, and record the results. If the user does nothing, the result must record lack of consent. You may not use a pre-checked consent box or another mechanism that has the effect of an opt-out choice. You should be clear about what information will be stored, and how it will or might be used. You will also need to consider how your app will function for those who do not consent, and how to handle requests to withdraw consent. So if an app obtains user consent to store location data in a manner that complies with the GDPR, it may store user location data. The consent should make the possible uses of the data clear. If the data is to be shared, the consent should make the possible extent of sharing clear. Some previous questions and answers here on law.se dealing with GDPR consent that seem possibly relevant: User consent required under GDPR What provisions should I make regarding GDPR consent when users do not sign themselves up? GDPR - Withdrawn user consent Opt Out Consent under GDPR | At least as of 2011, when regulations under the Information Technology Act related to privacy and data security were issued (some of the relevant statute sections and regulations are linked in this answer at Law.SE), there was no non-contractual right to have your data destroyed, although a terms of service for a site could give you that right contractually. Instead, usually, a term of service agreement will do exactly the opposite and give a site owner an irrevocable right to keep your data forever. I am not aware of any subsequent statutory, regulatory or case law developments in India which have changed this situation, but that kind of tweak of IT Act regulations in India wouldn't necessary make headlines outside of the local IT industry press coverage in obscure trade journals. The EU is the only place of which I am aware that has any individual right to have data destroyed or suppressed even if it doesn't violated copyright, wasn't obtained illegally and isn't fraudulent or defamatory. Even then, as I understand it, in the EU this is not a unilateral right that applies in all circumstances and is instead a specific remedy for certain situations that have a particularly intense privacy aspect to them. | I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy. | Names clearly are personal data and so a good question to ask for GDPR compliance is: Do you need to do what you want to do in order to offer your product or service? For your scenario a common answer seems to be that websites ask for the users first and last name during account creation. The reason is that they need this information to confirm the identity of the account creator. But the public profile only displays a user name that the user can pick freely. In general there is no good reason to publically show the legal names of users so websites don't do it. So for your website ask yourself, why do you want to publically show the names of your users? If you have a good reason to do that specify it in the user terms and go ahead. If you don't have a good reason don't do it. | Overview As described, only the last of these seems to be compliant ways of obtaining consent, and indeed even that is not fully compliant, although features not described might make it so. However, if there is a lawful basis for processing PI other than consent, under GDPR article 6, then there is no need to obtain consent at all, and doing so in an improper way is irrelevant. However storage of or access to local information (such as cookies) requires consent unless such storage or access is "strictly necessary" for providing a service which the user has requested. Relevant GDPR Provisions GDPR article 6 lists six possible lawful bases for processing personal data. These are, in summery: (a) consent; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract or to takwe steps requested by the Data Subject; (c) necessary for compliance with a legal obligation; (d) to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another person (e) or the performance of a task carried out in the public interest (f) legitimate interests of the Controller The other provisions cited here apply only to PI for which the lawful basis is consent. GDPR article 7 reads: (2) If the data subject’s consent is given in the context of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration which constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding. (3) The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. GDPR Recital 32 reads: Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. Consent should cover all processing activities carried out for the same purpose or purposes. When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them. If the data subject’s consent is to be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided. GDPR Recital 42 reads: ... in particular in the context of a written declaration on another matter, safeguards should ensure that the data subject is aware of the fact that and the extent to which consent is given. In accordance with Council Directive 93/13/EEC a declaration of consent pre-formulated by the controller should be provided in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language and it should not contain unfair terms. For consent to be informed, the data subject should be aware at least of the identity of the controller and the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended. Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment. GDPR Recital 43 reads: ... Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. Analysis I will review each of the scenarios in the question in turn. Scenario 1: not allowing [a user] to use the site until the user clicks Accept. No options, just an "Accept" button. This does not constitute freely given consent, because: The giving of consent is not "clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language" (Art 7(2)). There appears to be no way to withdraw consent (Art 7(3)). It appears that the provision of a service (use of the site) is conditional on consent not needed for that service (Art 7(3)). Consent is not informed and unambiguous (Recital 32). The use has not been informed of the extent to which consent is given (Recital 42). The subject has not been made aware of purposes of the processing (Recital 42). the data subject has no genuine or free choice (Recital 42). There is no provision for separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations. (Recital 43). Scenario 2: A banner stating that "By browsing the site you accept the conditions". Just an "x" to close the banner. Using the site is allowed while the banner is displayed. This does not constitute freely given consent, because: Consent was not "given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data" (Art 7(2)). The giving of consent is not "clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language" (Art 7(2)). There appears to be no way to withdraw consent (Art 7(3)). Consent is not informed and unambiguous (Recital 32). The use has not been informed of the extent to which consent is given (Recital 42). The subject has not been made aware of purposes of the processing (Recital 42). the data subject has no genuine or free choice (Recital 42). There is no provision for separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations. (Recital 43). Scenario 3: A banner with an "Accept" (and possibly "Reject") button. No other options. Site navigation is allowed while the banner is displaying. This does not constitute freely given consent, because: The giving of consent is not "clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language" (Art 7(2)). There appears to be no way to withdraw consent (Art 7(3)). Consent is not informed and unambiguous (Recital 32). The use has not been informed of the extent to which consent is given (Recital 42). The subject has not been made aware of purposes of the processing (Recital 42). There is no provision for separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations. (Recital 43). Scenario 4: A banner with an "Accept", "Reject" and also a "Settings" options where the user can fine tune the way his data is being used by the site. This might constitute freely given consent, provided that: a document is displayed or linked to that describes the kinds of PI that will be processed, and the purposes of the processing; There is some easy and obvious manner to withdraw consent, and to change the individual choices on what to consent to, after the banner has closed, or on any subsequent visit to the site; The consent section of the settings dialog must be clearly distinguished from other sections that do not deal with consent; Just where the lines must be drawn between "different personal data processing operations" which each requires the possibility of separate consent is not yet fully clear. And again, if the site or service does not store or otherwise process PI, or has a lawful basis for doing so other than consent, and does not store or access local information, it need not obtain consent at all, and the question of what constitutes freely given consent becomes irrelevant. Of course many sites do depend on consent as the lawful basis for much of their activity. |
If a US citizen murders a fellow citizen in a foreign country, where does the trial happen? If an American citizen murders another American citizen abroad in a country which an extradition treaty exists, but is first arrested back in the United States where they have since returned to - where does the prosecution occur? Specifically I ask the question because this happens in the fictional HBO show Search Party. After committing murder in Canada and returning home, the defendants are tried in U.S. court. I'm wondering if this is what would actually happen in real life. 18 U.S. Code § 1119 - "Foreign murder of United States nationals" seems to cover this topic but from my limited understanding it seems to imply that since the U.S. and Canada have a treaty the defendant(s) would be extradited to Canada for trial. Aside from this it also states: "...the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that the conduct took place in a country in which the person is no longer present" and I'm wondering what that process actually looks like. Does the Attorney General have to petition the other government for permission to prosecute them in the home country? Does it make a difference if the key witnesses are also all Americans, therefore arguing that chances of conviction are more likely if tried within the U.S. where all participants reside and are available to testify? Either way - does anyone know any famous/well known examples of this happening? I assume it must be well precedented in U.S. border regions. Sorry if this question is woefully unaware, that's why I'm seeking out expertise. | where does the prosecution occur? Prosecutions generally occur where a crime is committed. The area where a crime or other wrongdoing is committed is considered the proper "forum" for adjudicating the case. With respect to the law you cited, you should take note of the statutory limitations imposed upon the Attorney General in pursuing such a case (called a § 1119 prosecution). When considering the limitations, it is unlikely a trial of an American who killed an American in Canada would be tried in the United States. Those limitations begin with a prosecutor seeking written permission by the AG. This permission cannot be granted if the other country has already prosecuted the individual for the same conduct. Also, the AG can only give that permission if, after consulting the Secretary of State, he or she determines that the killing occurred in a jurisdiction where the suspect is "no longer present" and that the country is unable to "lawfully secure the person's return." and I'm wondering what that process actually looks like. This would be a consultation between Justice Department attorneys and the Assistant Secretary(ies) of State whose portfolio contains the foreign country in question. From the DOJ in particular, the Assistant AG for the Criminal Division is in charge of considering the above criteria and granting approvals. The Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section handles these issues within the Criminal Division. Does the Attorney General have to petition the other government for permission to prosecute them in the home country? No. The statutory limitations listed above necessitate that the suspect has already left that country and part of the AG's determination must be that it is unlikely that country will be able to secure the person's return. That said, might that country petition the United States that it wants the suspect to be returned to stand trial there? Potentially. Does it make a difference if the key witnesses are also all Americans, therefore arguing that chances of conviction are more likely if tried within the U.S. where all participants reside and are available to testify? This is, of course, a general consideration when determining which jurisdiction should handle a matter. It isn't clear to what degree it comes into consideration in this type of prosecution. does anyone know any famous/well known examples of this happening? Famous/well-known? I can't be sure, but see, e.g., United States v White, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Cal. 1997), United States v. Nipper, 198 F. Supp. 2d 818 (W.D. La. 2002), United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Brimager, 123 F.Supp.3d 1246 (S.D. Cal 2015). Interestingly, the statute gets substantial discussion and review in this Department of Justice White Paper entitled, Legality of a Lethal Operation by the Central Intelligene Agency Against a U.S. Citizen, in the context of whether the CIA could kill an American citizen in Yemen who has been reasonably determined to be a senior leader of al-Qaida. | There are problems with the claims. In summary: someone that in Sweden acts to defend themselves while "in peril" when subjected to — or are in imminent risk of — a criminal attack, will not the convicted, unless the act is "blatantly unjustifiable". Context We have a problem here in Sweden with people being ill-informed about the right to self-defence, and this is compounded by people with opinions spreading myths about it. Often these myths err on the side of claiming you have less rights than you really have. So, two things before we go on... The characters may have been unreliable. Do not ever assume that just because a character says something in a work of fiction, that the character is meant to know what they are talking about. And even if they are meant to know what they are talking about... The author may have been unreliable, and done their homework poorly. Keep this in mind... That said, the right to self-defence is not infinite. The law According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 3, §§ 1-2 and 6... If you intentionally kill someone, you get convicted of "murder" If you intentionally kill someone, but there were mitigating circumstances, you get convicted of "manslaughter" If you act in reckless disregard for the risk your actions are causing, and this leads to the death of someone, you get convicted of "causing the death of another", or what we here can call "reckless killing" And Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 24, § 1 states that an act performed in "peril" shall only lead to a conviction if the act was "blatantly unjustifiable". "Peril" is enumerated to exist in cases of... A commenced or imminent criminal attack on person or property A person has gained or trying to gain unauthorized access to a room, house, yard or ship A person refuses to leave a domicile after being told to If — when caught red-handed — a person uses violence or threats of violence to resist stolen property from being retaken When judging whether an act is "blatantly unjustifiable", the prosecutor must look at... the nature of the attack that caused the peril the significance of that which the attack was aimed at (such as a human life) other significant circumstances That last bit is interesting because it takes human psychology into consideration, and let the defendant's assessment of the peril be the standard by which the act is judged. The claim Let us start with the easy bit first... "if she killed the intruder, under Swedish law, she could very well be charged with manslaughter, and possibly murder if it could be proved that she placed the golf clubs around the house ahead of time." Murder? No. According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 3, §§ 1-2, a person that kills an intruder in their home could at the most be charged with manslaughter, because there are mitigating circumstances, i.e. the person felt threatened and there was a home invasion in progress. In order for this to become murder, she would more or less have to have invited the assailant or in any other way drawn them in with the intent to kill them. Yes, she prepared to defend herself or a potential intrusion, but without knowing for certain that the assailant would come at certain time or at least a certain day, any kind of premeditation towards killing is more or less impossible to prove. With this, murder is off the table. That claim is simply wrong. Whether it is the author or the character that is erring, I cannot say. So, manslaughter then, or the even lesser degree, called "causing the death of another", or reckless killing. Manslaughter would come up of she — when whacking them with the club — did so with the intent of killing them. The operative word here being intent. The prosecutor has to prove that intent. Sure, we can dream up scenarios where this is the case; the classic reason for why people do get convicted even acting in peril is when they keep harming the assailant after the danger has passed. But — again — just preparing for a potential intrusion is not enough to prove that intent. Finally, reckless killing. This is where such cases usually ends up. And — again — this usually happens because the defendant did something when the danger has obviously passed; the criminal attack was no longer imminent but passed. Conclusion Unless the protagonist in question had set up lethal traps; unless they had foreknowledge of an attack; unless they invited the assailant in with the intent to kill them; unless they fend off the attack and gets themselves into a perfectly safe situation and then proceeds to beat the assailant to death; and unless all of this can be proved, then it cannot become murder. Manslaughter or reckless killing, yes, there will be an investigation for that, but from the description of the situation — the protagonist fearing the assailant is dangerous and means them harm — preparing a home defence with strategically placed golf clubs does not in any way preclude the prosecution being dismissed as justifiable self-defence. Only(!) if the home invasion was obviously harmless, and/or the protagonist keeps harming the assailant after the home invasion has been staved off / neutralised, can a conviction for manslaughter or reckless killing become a possibility. Summary Yes, in Sweden a prosecutor will look at the case when you kill someone. But — no — in the situation described, a home invasion by someone perceived as wanting to cause harm, this is very unlikely to become "murder", for lack of premeditation. The remaining possible charges — manslaughter or reckless killing — will only result in a conviction if the situation was obviously and provably harmless in the eyes of the defendant, and they still killed the assailant. | There is no possibility of legally holding a country "to account" for an action. An individual could be legally tried for a crime (murder), and a country could via a political process be made to suffer the consequences if a leader performs some act (it need not be illegal). Germany, Iran and Russia have historically suffered certain consequences of actions held to be "officially sanctioned", and individuals such as Adolf Eichmann have been specifically punished; Fahad Shabib Albalawi and 4 others were sentanced to death for involvement in Khashoggi's murder. Punitive recourse against a country is always via political / military action. Khashoggi, specifically, was apparently a lawful permanent resident of the US, which is probably sufficient connection to the US for a suit based in the Alien Tort Statute. There have been various suits filed against individuals under this act, some of which succeeded, for example Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876. An individual could be sued under the Alien Tort Statute, but a foreign government enjoys sovereign immunity (the US government has limited its liability on that grounds, but Saudi Arabia has not). His fiance might then sue some individual, but Saudi Arabia itself could not be "held to account". | They could be prosecuted in any state where there was evidence that part of the crime was committed. Realistically, either State A or State B could prosecute for conspiracy to murder as an additional charge, because the conspiracy clearly spanned more than one state, even if they can't prove where the crime was committed, although physical evidence (e.g. traces of camp sites, footprints, testimony about landmarks, evidence of poop with human DNA from the victim in it), would usually make it possible to show that some part of the crime was committed in the state. There is probably also a federal crime that could be implicated such as "murder involving flight across a state line" (hypothetical, but I'm sure that there is something similar on the books). I'm not going to address the further hypothetical as it is too bizzare and law is ultimately very context specific. Find a more plausible fact pattern, perhaps with a different crime, and ask a separate question if you want to really address the issue. | In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge. | I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this. | No Federal law and most states have an notice of alibi rule that requires a defendant to identify witnesses who will testify as to their alibi and where the defendant claims to have been. The validity of these rules was upheld by the Supreme Court in Williams v Florida: The Fifth Amendment would not be violated if, after the alibi witness had given evidence, the court granted a continuance to allow the prosecution to seek rebuttal evidence (this point was conceded by Williams's lawyers). Consequently, all the notice-of-alibi law did was allow the prosecution to do so before the trial, instead of having to interrupt the trial. It did not provide the prosecution with more information to use against a defendant than they would eventually get in any event. | In the specific example you have given, Florida law could not be applied. A state has jurisdiction over a crime under constitutional due process limits on the scope of a state's criminal jurisdiction if the crime is either committed within the state (regardless of where the harm occurs) or is directed at or impacts the state (the classic example is a gunshot fired from the Ohio side of the state line killing someone located in Indiana, which could be prosecuted in either state, or in both states as it doesn't violate double jeopardy to be prosecuted for the same offense by more than one sovereign). Sometimes these issues are framed not as "jurisdictional" per se, but as "conflict of law" questions limited by the constitution. The proof that a crime was committed in the territory where it is applicable is called proof of locus delecti and depends upon the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it. To determine where a crime is committed depends on what acts constitute the crime, something that leaves considerable room for flexible interpretation and a careful reading of the exact wording of the relevant criminal statute. The most important limitation on the territorial jurisdiction of a U.S. state is the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This applies directly in the case of federal criminal prosecutions in the federal courts, and applies in state courts because it is incorporated to apply in state court cases through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States under 20th century case law applying the "Selective Incorporation doctrine." The Sixth Amendment mandates that criminal trials be conducted “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” If a suspect is not present in a state to be criminally prosecuted, then the options available to a state are (1) to toll the running of the statute of limitations while the suspect is outside the state to the extent permitted by the relevant state statute and the U.S. Constitution, (2) to bring a civil lawsuit against the suspect instead of a criminal prosecution, or (3) to seek extradition of the suspect, which must be granted under certain circumstances under the United State Constitution and reads as follows in the pertinent part: Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2: A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. (Note that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil lawsuits. Civil lawsuit trials can be conducted in a state other than the state where the breach of contract or tort giving rise to the lawsuit took place for jurisdictional purposes and not infrequently is brought in another state, although constitutional choice of law rules limit the circumstances under which a particular state's laws can be applied to a particular set of circumstances in a lawsuit.) The Sixth Amendment, on its face, prohibits Florida from prosecuting a case in the example given in the question involving a crime that was committed solely in Washington State. Of course, the exact definition of the crime might determine where it was committed. In traditional "common law" "blue collar" crimes there is usually no ambiguity over where it is committed except in the most extraordinary circumstances, but in prosecutions of conspiracies and crimes involving economic activity (such as owning or mailing something), the question of where a crime is committed can grow much fuzzier. For example, one could imagine a differently defined crime prohibiting providing funds to finance a purchase of marijuana in excess of 20 grams being committed both in Washington State and Florida at the same time (e.g. perhaps a purchase of marijuana in Washington State was financed by a Florida bank by delivering cash to a courier in Florida who is bound for Washington State knowing that the cash would be used to finance a marijuana purchase). Similar ideas apply in international circumstances where the Sixth Amendment and Extradition Clause do not apply. But, in those cases, the more flexible and less well defined "law of nations" as interpreted by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court and the President still does impose some territorial boundaries on prosecutions for actions which are not crimes in the country where they are committed under that country's domestic laws. But, those boundaries are not so hard and fast and the idea that a crime is committed in places where it has an impact allow for considerable flexibility in prosecuting crimes committed outside the United States. It has also been well settled since the earliest days of the United States that "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (U.S. Supreme Court 1825) and that this applies to states applying each other's penal laws as well. So, Florida cannot enforce a violation of the criminal laws of Washington State in its courts either. If you get in a bar fight in Seattle, you can't be prosecute for assault in a court in Orlando, even if both of the parties to the bar fight were Orlando residents and U.S. citizens. Some notable cases resolving the question of whether locus delecti is present in a particular case include the following: In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) although none of the defendants had entered the District of Columbia as part of their conspiracy to defraud the United States, they were convicted because one co-conspirator had committed overt acts in Columbia (225 U.S., at 363). So conspiracy is a continuing offense committed in all the districts where a co-conspirator acts on the agreement. Similarly, In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257 (1890) the sending of letters from New York to postmasters in Connecticut in an attempt to gain postage on credit, made Connecticut, where the mail he addressed and dispatched was received, an appropriate venue (136 U.S., at 266—268). A typical state statute on the subject from Colorado's Revised Statutes (2016) is as follows: § 18-1-201. State jurisdiction (1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commits, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if: (a) The conduct constitutes an offense and is committed either wholly or partly within the state; or (b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt, as defined by this code, to commit an offense within the state; or (c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within the state, and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or (d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense prohibited under the laws of this state and such other jurisdiction. (2) An offense is committed partly within this state if conduct occurs in this state which is an element of an offense or if the result of conduct in this state is such an element. In homicide, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death or the death itself; and if the body of a criminal homicide victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state. (3) Whether an offender is in or outside of the state is immaterial to the commission of an offense based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state. Case law under this statute sometimes describes the issue presented under this statute a question of "sovereign jurisdiction." See, e.g., People v. Cullen, 695 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1984). |
Change Price of Rental Property Listing I had a Zillow listing, but after some applications and talks with some local folk, I’ve realized I severely underpriced the rental property. Is it legal to change the price ? | You can change the rental price any time before there is an agreement with a particular rental applicant to rent the property at a particular price. Simply applying to rent property listed at a particular price does not result in a binding agreement to rent the property at that price. | If it says "no pets" in the leasehold, then yes, that is enforceable. It doesn't have to be reasonable (in your opinion, or objectively) to be enforceable. Your choices are to either negotiate different leasehold terms, or to find a different leasehold. | Every lot on the subdivision is and always will be acquired “through the Developer” Unless the developer still owns it. Somebody is the heir or assignee of the Developer - that’s who you need to seek approval from. Even if the Developer was at some point a company that got liquidated, the right of being the Developer would transfer to the creditors of that company. | While I don't like agreeing with a landlord, you are in the right here. Your tenants do not have the right to access the property now they have moved out. If they were still living there things would be different and it would be reasonable for them to fix minor damage (to preserve their deposit). They did not do so. Get the damage fixed professionally, keep all reciepts, and take it out of the deposit. | In general, a seller may make different and inconsistent sales terms with different customers on whatever basis the seller chooses. In some jurisdictions, for some kinds of transactions, specific laws may regulate this. They may require similar treatment, or advertised prices, or whatever. I do not know of any such laws governing the sale of oil, but there might be some. This will depend on the exact jurisdiction (country, state/province, and perhaps city or other locality). Please edit the question to specify the jurisdiction if you want a more specific answer. Price discrimination on the basis of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination laws, such as race or religion under US federal laws, would be illegal. Proving that the basis was unlawful might be hard, however. | The landlady is trying it on. The purpose of a deposit is to protect the landlord from being left out of pocket by: damage to the property rent arrears Reasonable wear and tear does not constitute damage. It seems unlikely that the stiff tap is as a result of damage. The hob is not so clear cut: the landlady could argue that it was damaged, albeit by accident, and the cost of repair taken from your deposit. If she insists that the only remedy is to replace the hob, she should make an appropriate deduction to reflect the fact that it is several years old and will be replaced by one that is new (thereby gaining her some value). It would be reasonable for you to expect to see the written report from the gas inspector who has condemned the whole hob in that case. But I find it hard to believe that: the plastic knob cannot be replaced doing so would make the hob unsafe, if the knob can be removed for cleaning it's my understanding that if the hob is indeed broken, I only have to pay what it was worth at the moment before it was broken. Your liability is to return her to the position she would have been in had the damage not occurred. If that means replacing a removable plastic part instead of the whole hob, that would be a reasonable remedy. | The tax man always wins. You can make mistakes to your own detriment, but not to the detriment to the state. Forgot to take a deduction that was available to you? Perfectly legal. You're not required to “optimize” your taxes. Forgot to declare taxable income? That is a problem, and you would need to amend your filings. You are required to accurately disclose all of your taxable income. Of course, not all income is taxable income. For example, occasionally selling personal items for less than their original value (i.e. at a loss) is not taxable. | There are some consequences for you, under the Seattle Residential Code. Per R103.5 Any person violating or failing to comply with the provisions of this code shall be subject to a cumulative civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $500 per day for each violation from the date the violation occurs or begins until compliance is achieved. $182,500 per year. Also under R103.4, Whenever any building or structure is being occupied contrary to the provisions of this code, the building official may order such occupancy discontinued and the building or structure, or portion thereof, vacated by notice. There should be a notation on your panel indicating permit number and approval, but if you have the permit number, you can check if the inspection was done and the work was approved (I think this will report status). The legal burden of assuring that the work was done correctly and paperwork is in order ultimately falls on the owner, though the city at least initially talks to the contractor. Insofar as a customer taking a picture doesn't count as an actual final inspection, I suspect that some cost- and time-saving short-cuts were taken. Following up on the new information about being a tenant, the primary legal question is whether you have a duty of care towards the landlord, since in engaging this company, the landlord's interest may be put at risk. The landlord may have protected his interest via a clause in the lease saying "you must get written permission to modify the property, and you assume full liability for resulting damages", so first thing to check is what the lease says (perhaps look for a "Tenant's duty of care" clause). In lieu of clear evidence that you caused damage to the owner (economic damage, by negligence w.r.t. his need to have proper permits and the whopping fines that follow), I don't see what the risk to you would be in just washing your hands of the problem. |
What is a "valid" restraining order? I honestly believe that a restraining order that I was arrested on was invalid, because it doesn't show up on my public record (rap sheet), and both the BCA, and director of public safety in my city have told me that there was no reason for being arrested on a restraining order that was never a matter of public record. This has prompted me to wonder for a while what the definition of "valid" is on a restraining order/order for protection (I know there is a difference) is. Basically I'm asking for an explanation of what "valid" is on a court order. I live in Minnesota, USA if that matters. | There are three kinds of restraining orders in Minnesota, but what they have in common is that a person petitions the court to order a person to e.g. stop the harassment and have no further contact. This order if granted by the court will be served on the respondent, and all actual restraining orders are valid. A forgery which was not actually ordered by the court is not a restraining order, and of course it is not legally valid. But you don't seem to be claiming that this is a forgery. In principle, a person can obtain a copy of a restraining order under The Minnesota Data Practices Act. However, there are limits on access to certain records. Minnesota Court Rule 4 restricts access to domestic abuse and harassment records, blocking disclosure until the respondent has been served with the order. If someone fails to obtain a record in such a case, it could be because the request was made before the order was served. Even if the request was improperly denied, that does not invalidate the court order. Subsequent comments by OP indicate the possibility that he was not given the restraining order, as required by law, which would substantially impact the validity of the arrest. This handbook from the courts spells out the rules for handling these orders. If it is impossible to personally serve the notice on respondent (he can't be found), then it is possible for the court to order notice by publication, where an item is placed in the newspaper (legal notices, which nobody reads). In other words, you can be "served" in the legal sense, but not know it (however, the police will know it, so if BCA is saying "we can't find any restraining order", this would be a plainly improper arrest). | The power of arrest is a common law power that predates police forces, that is, every citizen had an obligation to maintain the king's peace by arresting criminals. With the rise of modern police forces, the police inherited this general right to make arrest but it still remained a power of every citizen. How much of this right remains depends on your jurisdiction and how the common law of "arrest" has been transformed by statute and case law. The common law right only extends to arresting someone in the commission of a crime. In the example you cite, the arrests are probably unlawful and amount to the crime of kidnapping/deprivation of liberty/whatever its called where you are because the person is not at that moment committing a crime. To arrest someone who you believe committed a crime in the past, you need a warrant or a power granted to you by some other statute (e.g. powers granted to police officers). In either case, a person making an arrest is allowed to use reasonable force to do so. | While it is from a different jurisdiction, the following goes to the heart of the matter: Arrest, when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension of a person or the deprivation of a person's liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether the person has been deprived of personal liberty of movement. Directorate of Enforcement v Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440 at ¶46 (SC of India) In your example, the police officer has been deprived of "personal liberty of movement"; if they can still speak there would be no legal impediment to them placing the person who arrested them also under arrest. It would then be incumbent on both parties to deliver each other into lawful custody. The citizen would need to seek out a law enforcement officer to do this; the police officer has already done so, being their own law enforcement officer. After this, comes the paperwork. | Self-defence has nothing to do with whether you are performing an arrest (lawful or otherwise) Self-defence is a plea that you used reasonable force to protect yourself, others and in some jurisdictions, property, from immediate harm. There is, as you say, a “whole spectrum” of both the perception of the threat and the force used that go into determining if the actions of the defendant amounted to self-defence or not. That’s why it’s up to the jury to decide on a case by case basis. A person who has the power of arrest (law enforcement officers and citizens who actually witness a crime) is authorised to use reasonable force to effect that arrest. Of course, effecting an arrest may cause a situation to escalate to the point where self-defence becomes an issue. | There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order. | Following you around with the intent of harassing you is stalking. I don't know whether there's going to be a law actually requiring social distancing in Florida. In other states, I've seen laws set up to make it a crime to violate an order of the Director of Public Health or something like that. I don't know whether Florida actually has an order requiring social distancing by the general public. | (Lots of digging) https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/609.341 The above is a series of definitions for the purposes of criminal statues. Way down (noting that the page notes that this section was amended in 2021, so almost certainly in response to this case, given the amount of attention it has received), as subdivision 22, we have the definition: Subd. 22.Predatory crime. "Predatory crime" means a felony violation of section 609.185 (first-degree murder), 609.19 (second-degree murder), 609.195 (third-degree murder), 609.20 (first-degree manslaughter), 609.205 (second-degree manslaughter), 609.221 (first-degree assault), 609.222 (second-degree assault), 609.223 (third-degree assault), 609.24 (simple robbery), 609.245 (aggravated robbery), 609.25 (kidnapping), 609.255 (false imprisonment), 609.498 (tampering with a witness), 609.561 (first-degree arson), or 609.582, subdivision 1 (first-degree burglary). Thus, it looks like your Minnesota government website is not complete. However, the above seem like the most likely crimes to warrant inclusion on the register. The prominent reason in this instance is the registration will hamper Chauvin from regaining employment as a police officer in Minnesota or any other state. Where I live, there are reports of "problematic officers" being "shuffled" between departments; this would explicitly prevent that. | What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation. |
Is there any particular reason that Small Claims court monetary limits are generally higher in Canada than in the US? By Province/Territory in Canada: https://neighbourhoodlegal.ca/2022/05/15/small-claims-court-monetary-limit-across-canada/ By State in US: https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/small-claims-suits-how-much-30031.html | Two factors are at play. Currency Exchange Rates First off, don't forget that the Canadian numbers are in Canadian dollars while the U.S. numbers are in U.S. dollars. One Canadian dollars = 0.77 U.S. dollars. The monetary claim limits in U.S. dollars in Canadian courts (at this rate) are as follows: The Civil Division of the Provincial Court of Alberta hears claims up to $50,000. ($38,500 USD) The Civil Resolution Tribunal hears claims up to $5,000 ($3,850 USD) The Provincial Court of British Columbia’s Small Claims Court hears claims from $5,001 to $35,000 ($26,950 USD) The Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench’s Small Claims Court hears claims up to $15,000. ($11,550 USD) The Small Claims Court of New Brunswick hears claims up to $20,000. ($15,400 USD) The Provincial Court of Newfoundland and Labrador’s Small Claims Court hears claims up to $25,000. ($18,250 USD) The Territorial Court of the Northwest Territories hears claims up to $35,000 ($26,950 USD) The Nova Scotia Small Claims Court hears claims up to $25,000. ($18,250 USD) The Nunavut Court of Justice’s Small Claims Court hears claims up to $20,000. ($15,400 USD) The Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s Small Claims Court hears claims up to $35,000. ($26,950 USD) The Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island’s Small Claims Court hears claims up to $16,000. ($12,320 USD) The Small Claims Division at the Court of Québec hears claims up to $15,000. ($11,550 USD) The Provincial Court of Saskatchewan’s Small Claims Court hears claims up to $30,000. ($23,100 USD) Yukon’s Small Claims Court hears claims up to $25,000. ($18,250 USD) The Term "Small Claims Court" Is Used Differently Second, this isn't an apples to apples comparison. The Canadian limits are for what would be called limited jurisdiction civil courts in the U.S., (except perhaps, British Columbia's Civil Resolution Tribunal) and aren't strictly equivalent to U.S. small claims courts which are a bit like the "Judge Judy" show or "The People's Court" on U.S. television But, most U.S. jurisdictions distinguish between small claims cases, which have a lower dollar limit and in which plaintiffs cannot commence cases with lawyers, and have an extremely simplified process, and ordinary civil cases in limited jurisdiction courts, which still have lots of parties without lawyers, and have greatly simplified and shortened pretrial civil procedure, but have higher dollar limits and allow either party to be represented by lawyers without limitations. Most adversarial U.S. limited jurisdiction court cases that are not small claims court cases are filed by professional debt collection firms on behalf of businesses, en masse with many cases resolved by default judgment, or involve protective orders (e.g. in domestic violence situations). The charts below for U.S. Courts (from here as of 2015 and hence seven years out of date) illustrate the difference. As of 2022, Colorado's limits are $7,500 USD for small claims court and $25,000 for its limited jurisdiction court. Some states, like New York State, have different jurisdictional limits in limited jurisdiction courts in different parts of the state. According to the body text, some limited jurisdiction courts in the U.S. can entertain claims up to $200,000 USD (i.e. Mississippi and Texas). Intrastate Federalism Many courts of limited jurisdiction in the U.S. are part of local governments (e.g. a city or municipal court) rather than part of the state court system. State governments have often been reluctant to grant much authority to civil courts which are outside the state court system (that state legislatures can regulate directly) to local governments. In contrast, all of the limited jurisdiction courts in Canada are part of either a provincial level court system, or the courts of a self-governing territory (also, while not precisely on point, while Canada has federal courts, the jurisdiction of Canada's federal courts is very limited and the federal court dockets make up only a tiny part of the total judicial system case load in Canada). | As described, no. Paying employees with benefits instead of money is called in kind remuneration. There are various limits on in kind payments around the world, including the US. Very generally, in kind payments are only allowed for particular industries and occupations, only allowed up to a certain dollar value, and only allowed as a certain fraction of the employee's wages. Furthermore, the value of the benefit can't exceed the actual cost to the employer - a meal that's priced at $7.25 on the menu is sold at a profit, and would be worth less than the menu price as in kind remuneration. So, given the scenario described, a restaurant employer could not replace 100% of their employee's wages with food sold for the same amount. It's too high a percentage of the wage paid as in kind payment, and the menu price equivalent of the wage would not have sufficient in kind value. A more detailed description of in kind payment laws can be found here. It's a rather long document that's not particularly well-organized, and is structured by describing various aspects of law in different geographic locations, rather than describing all aspects of the law in a location-specific manner. I was able to find US-specific law by searching the document for "United States". | Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on. | Fee Shifting In Various Jurisdictions Spain (at least as of 1984) has rules on fee shifting (or the lack thereof) very similar to the American rule. The other countries of the E.U. (as of 1984) had rules similar to those of Britain's loser pays rule, although there was significant variation in detail from country to country that made this less of an omnibus statement than it might seem. See Werner Pfenningstorf, "The European Experience With Fee Shifting", 47(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 37 (1984). Most countries with civil law systems (i.e. those systems based upon the civil code tradition of Continental Europe rather than the common law tradition of England or something else entirely) outside of Europe in Africa and Asia are derived from the French Civil Code (most of West, Northwest and Central Africa, for example), or the German Civil Code (Korea and Japan, for example), and probably have followed in the footsteps on their parent legal traditions on this issue. This is also true of most formerly Communist Eastern European countries. Most countries in Spanish speaking Latin America, however, have legal systems derived from the Spanish legal tradition (and national constitutions modeled on that of the U.S.), so other countries besides the U.S. and Spain without automatic fee shifting to a prevailing party are probably located in Latin America. Some of these Latin American countries, however. probably adopted fee shifting rules of their own, and many of these countries declared independence from Spain before Spain adopted its civil code, so the extent to which those countries follow the Spanish model may not be as complete as in countries that gained independence later on. It is also worth noting that, however, in most civil law countries, the fees that an attorney can charge are usually significantly more highly regulated than in the United States, so the possibility of extremely high litigation fees is lower. Furthermore, civil litigation, in general, involves lower attorney fees on average in civil law countries (and in Islamic law and Chinese style Communist countries) than in the United States, in litigated cases, because the process is less attorney resource intensive due to civil procedure differences. So far as I know, fee shifting is also not used in Islamic law countries, where the basic assumption is that the parties are often pro se (i.e. without lawyers) and the institution of a professional legal class post-dates the establishment of the relevant legal rules. I do not know what the situation is in the People's Republic of China or similar legal systems. The American Rule It also bears noting that there are many exceptions to the "American rule" in U.S. law. While the American rule does not shift attorney fees, fees for out of pocket litigation expenses such as filing fees, copying charges, and expert witness fees are shifted as a matter of course to the prevailing party. Most professionally drafted written agreements have fee shifting provisions. Many specific statutes (e.g. civil rights actions and many labor law and consumer rights enforcement cases) also have fee shifting provisions (sometimes one sided, sometimes two sides). Fees can also be awarded in certain kinds of breach of fiduciary duty litigation contexts and in cases involving a dispute over a "common fund". In divorce cases, litigation costs of both sides are often (really usually) allocated by the court in proportion to ability to pay, as "winning" and "losing" are ill defined. The biggest areas where fees shifting would be unusual in the U.S. would be in common law tort lawsuits, such as negligence cases (e.g. automobile accidents and slip and fall cases), strict liability products liability cases, defamation cases, intentional harm cases, and fraud actions. The American rule also applies in cases of oral contracts or contracts drafted by inexpert non-lawyers. Even in those cases various kinds of litigation misconduct can result in fee shifting. In U.S. tort cases, defendants usually have their attorney fees paid for by their insurance company, and plaintiffs often have an attorney paid on a contingent fee basis. Furthermore, awards by juries for non-economic damages and/or punitive damages often makes it possible for a prevailing plaintiff to receive full or nearly full economic loss compensation in such lawsuits, with the non-economic and/or punitive damages awards effectively providing resources to pay the attorney for the plaintiff on top of economic loss compensation for the plaintiff. | Nope. Say I sue you successfully, and the court delivers a judgement that awards $1000 in damages. It is not the responsibility of the small claims court to ensure that the judgement is fulfilled. In fact, the debtor (person who lost) can outright refuse to pay the creditor (or the person who won). They are not in violation of any law at this point. However, the creditor can ask the court for options on enforcing their judgement, and these can include, but are not limited to: Garnishing wages Providing a court order Seizure of assets (through court sheriff, don't use this yourself or you end up getting into criminal matters) and others to enforce the judgement. The debtor isn't liable for refusing, unless when they are in violation of a court order. Violating a court order is a criminal matter, and the debtor could possibly be found guilty of contempt of court. Oh, and the case wouldn't move on to a higher court. Cases go to a higher court when an appeal is made, generally when there has been an error in enforcing the law. You also need to be provided leave to make an appeal. | Someone has pulled a sample motion of this type off of PACER (the public access Internet portal to civil filings in federal court). The example is more formal and structured than a lot of state court motion practice would be, however (e.g. few state court's require or encourage motions with a table of contents and a table of authorities). This example is 36 pages long, and many states don't even allow motions to run for more than 10-15 pages without leave of the court to do so in advance. There is a New Jersey federal court example here which is also on the formal and fussy side (although, in part, because the motion isn't just an arbitration motion and is also raising several additional unrelated issues which if omitted would cut it in half). See also one here. Another example, from a California state court, is closer to the mark for a typical state court filing. A court that handles residential landlord-tenant matters is probably even more "casual" and probably expects motions to get to the point more quickly. The core content is probably solid, although it would have to be customized to reference the state law statutory and procedural rules rather than the federal rules of civil procedure, and to analyze and set forth the facts of your case rather than those of some random person whose pleading is linked. This would also have to be adopted to state court practice standard, which typically uses different formatting for captions, signature blocks, whether or not line numbering is required, etc., and is often subject to other requirements. Some require that a certificate of service be filed as a separate document, while others routinely incorporate it in the main document. Many state courts require that a proposed order be submitted with a motion as a matter of state or local court rules, a few states require a cover sheet to be filed with motions, many states require you to confer with the other side in the case and to recite their position opposing or supporting the motion, or something in between, before filing it, and some courts require you to notify them once the deadline for a response has passed, regarding whether an opposition has been filed to the motion's request for relief or not. Similarly, some states courts require that motions be "verified" (i.e. have their allegations confirmed under oath) or supported by an affidavit setting forth the factual matters alleged in them. New York State structures a lot of motions as "orders to show cause" in which the court preliminarily reviews the relief requested and issues an order telling the other side that it will do something if they don't file an objection showing good cause for the court not to rule in that way by a given day, which must be formally delivered (i.e. "served") upon the other side by a deadline. I don't know if New Jersey local motion practice is similar. Many court systems also charge a "new case" filing fee for motions to compel arbitration that does not apply to other kinds of motions. Ideally, you'd want to review some motions (about pretty much anything) to get a feel for how this is usually done in New Jersey. | What you are referring to is a Rule 68 (FED. R. Civ. P. 68) offer of judgment (OOJ). Thus far, nearly every jurisdiction's court of appeals has refused to construe these as being binding on the Plaintiff if the offer is denied, even if it offers complete remuneration, especially in a putative class action. The underlying reasons when applied to a certified class differ fairly substantially from an individual plaintiff or a non-certified class. However, there are some kinds of cases where a Rule 68 offer could never fully compensate (as with cases where subjective or non-substantive forms of damage have been requested). A Rule 68 offer is a cost-flipping mechanism, often used by defense attorneys when they are making what they believe is a fair offer (very rarely is the offer one that is equal to the Plaintiff's demand, which is why this issue rarely arises). If a defense attorney makes an offer of judgment, and then the Plaintiff doesn't accept the offer, they need to get a jury verdict in an amount greater than the offer, or the costs are flipped. So, typically, if there is no OOJ and the Plaintiff wins even a nominal judgment (it can be a dollar) the Defendant always has to pay their costs, which can be substantial. When a Rule 68 offer is made, it's a carefully calculated amount that the defendant thinks the plaintiff can't get in a jury verdict, even if they win, but it's typically less than the demand. The reason a Rule 68 offer is almost never "full compensation" is that a Plaintiff's demand for settlement will typically be somewhere in the area of 3x the amount the Plaintiff's attorney estimates the case to be worth. The Plaintiff is informed of this by their lawyer, so they don't have unreasonable expectations. If you think about it, this makes sense from an ability to negotiate perspective, with the logic being that the Plaintiff wants to get as close to full value as they can, and the defense needs their client to think they've saved them from some huge judgement. If a plaintiff demanded only what the case was worth, it would have no chance of settling for true value, or if the case were to settle, the Defense lawyer wouldn't be able to move the Plaintiff down off their number in any substantial way. This way, the lawyers can play their game negotiating the case down to a fair value. Plaintiff gets what their case is worth and Defendant feels like their lawyer saved them from catastrophe. It's all illusion. The First Circuit recently joined the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that a Rule 68 offer made prior to class certification and rejected by Plaintiff does not moot the Plaintiff’s claim. The Plaintiff, a private high school, brought the action against the corporate developer of a college-entrance exam, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and an analogous state statute related to unsolicited faxes it received. Prior to Plaintiff’s deadline to move for class certification, the Defendant made an Offer Of Judgment, offering Plaintiff the amount it could receive under the two statutes for each fax. Plaintiff did not respond within 14 days, rendering the offer withdrawn under Rule 68, and instead moved for class certification. Defendant then moved to dismiss, arguing that the withdrawn offer rendered Plaintiff’s claims moot and divested the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, holding that Plaintiff’s claim was not moot, but certified the question of whether an unaccepted Rule 68 offer, made before certification, moots the entire action and deprives the court of jurisdiction. Generally speaking, aside from very specific types of cases involving contracts, or specific types of statutory relief, a Plaintiff typically includes counts for things like NIED (negligent infliction of emotional distress), pain and suffering, loss of consortium, loss of future earning capacity – these are a few of the types of counts whereby there is no specific value a defendant could ever point to being "fully satisfied" – the reason being, a jury needs to determine the legitimate value of these claims unless the Plaintiff accepts a settlement award whereby he/she/it feels as if it's fully satisfied. | The lawyer referred to in that article is suing in his capacity as the recipient of spam emails under California's anti-spam law. Not every jurisdiction has a law like this. I'm from Australia. In Australia, when we make laws prohibiting something, the law usually appoints a government agency to administer the law and bring prosecutions under it, and fines are paid to the government. In contrast, America has a lot of these laws where affected individuals can sue and collect the fines personally. So under the Californian law, you can get $1,000 per email for particular kinds of spam even if you haven't actually suffered any real damage: California Business and Professions Code s 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii). How? You need to work out who sent the spam, get evidence to prove it, and file a claim in a Californian court. Apparently you can sue in small claims court, which saves you on filing fees. It helps if you have many email accounts, because then you will receive many emails and therefore can collect many fines. One of that lawyer's wins was in Balsam v Trancos (2012) in the Californian Court of Appeal. Another example of a judgment discussing the Californian anti-spam law is Bontrager v Showmark Media. |
How Much Protection Does the Americans with Disabilities Act afford individuals with Sleep Disorders? I have some pretty complicated sleep apnea (diagnosed, service connected) that is in the process of being treated. Unfortunately, the type of device I require is on a significant back-order and there's really no telling when it's going to arrive. I've informed my employer, and I have a decent working relationship with my first-line regarding flexible arrival times, but other individuals within the organization have started to cause a stink, resulting in a counseling. Said counseling threatened termination should I be unable to arrive "on time". Note that I do not work in an environment where sleep issues can cause any sort of danger to myself or others. | There is no clear answer, though multiple sources feel that the answer is clearly "yes" and "no", and there is a reasonable probability that given the circumstances described, a court ruling would be favorable to plaintiff. This informal letter from the EEOC tends to conclude that sleep apnea is not a disability in the legal sense, but this letter (2003) was rescinded – still, it reveals one line of thinking and relevant case law. In Michaels v. McPherson Kansas, the appellate court refers to and upholds a lower court ruling that plaintiff suffered employment discrimination under the ADA (among other things). The appeal does not discuss the core issue in ADA law, whether the condition significantly limits a person's life, which strongly suggests that defendant accepted the conclusion that sleep apena can be a disability. On the other hand, in Taylor v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, a discrimination case involving sleep apnea was dismissed – but crucial to the dismissal was that he was successfully treated (also relevant was the lack of notice given the the employer). Finally, in Keyes v. Catholic Charities, federal court found that plaintiff's condition was not a disability under the meaning of the term in ADA. This does not mean that sleep apnea is "not a disability under the law", it means that "defendant is not disabled under the law", that is, the conclusion is based on the particulars of the individual condition, which is why the answer is "maybe yes, maybe no". There is a two-prong inquiry into the condition. First is a determination whether the person is “substantially limited in any major life activity other than working, such as walking, seeing, or hearing”, compared to the general population. If not, then an inquiry into work-related substantial limitations. A six month delay in seeking treatment undermined Keyes' argument that his condition was a substantial limitation, furthermore he had a CPAP machine, so essentially his condition was fixed – circumstances not application to the case you describe. See also Peter v. Lincoln Technical Institute, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 417 for various citations and the overall conclusion that no court in this circuit appears to have decided whether sleep apnea is, on its own, enough to qualify as a disability, probably because "a particular diagnosis, no matter how severe, ..., standing alone, is not sufficient to establish `disability'" | It does not really matter exactly how the employer chooses to count working hours. However, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires, among other things, that the employee is at least paid the official minimum wage for each hour worked, and gets overtime pay for >40 hours per week. The Act also defines what counts as "hour worked" for these purposes. The Fact Sheet # 79D from the U.S. Department of Labor gives more details about what counts as "hours worked" for domestic services under the FLSA. The general rule is that all time during the shift counts, whether the employee is busy or not: Generally, when an employee is “on duty” (that is they must be in the home and prepared to provide services when required), they are working. The only exception is that time spent sleeping may be deducted under certain circumstances: In some circumstances, an employer may exclude up to eight hours an employee spends sleeping at the worksite from the time for which an employee must be paid. The rules are different, depending on whether the employee permanently resides at the place of work ("Live-in employee), has shifts of >=24 hours or shifts of <24 hours. In your case the shift is >=24 hours, so the rule is (see page three of the document): Up to eight hours of sleep time may be excluded from hours worked, provided that: sleeping facilities are available the employee can usually sleep at least five hours without disturbance the employee agrees to exclude sleep time Even then, interruptions of sleep for work must be paid, and if the employee get <5 hours sleep during a given shift, no exclusion is possible. So in summary: For calculating hourly wage and overtime pay, the employer must count at least 16 hours for each 24 hour shift, and more if the employee cannot sleep for eight hours during the shift. It probably does not matter that the employer calls it "12 hours worked", but your mother is entitled to at least "minium wage x 16" for each shift worked, and is entitled to overtime pay (at least 1.5 times minimum wage) if she works more than two shifts per week. If the shift is ever reduced to less than 24 hours, even sleep time may not be excluded. | The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem. | In the UK this is governed by the Equality Act 2010, which prohibits discrimination against disabled persons. Official guidance as to what counts as "disability" can be found here, but the basic definition in the law (as paraphrased here) is "substantial" and "long term" difficulty in carrying out every-day tasks. ‘substantial’ is more than minor or trivial, eg it takes much longer than it usually would to complete a daily task like getting dressed ‘long-term’ means 12 months or more, eg a breathing condition that develops as a result of a lung infection. Allergies are long-term, so the question is whether a food allergy presents substantial difficulty in carrying out every-day tasks. The kind of every-day tasks that the guidance considers are things like getting dressed, preparing a meal, meeting work deadlines, typing or writing. The guidance does not specifically mention allergies. However the mere existence of an allergy would not create substantial difficulty in carrying out this kind of every-day task. So it would not be considered a disability. | Unless your contract, whether individual or collective, has a clause requiring this compensation you are out of luck. Sometimes one of the “benefits” for a company’s move is to leave behind workers who are not 100% committed to the company in that they would not move or commute a long way to keep their job. 30 miles isn’t very unusual where I live. In the U.S. most employment is on an "at will" basis. That means you can quit anytime you like without notice and you can be fired at any time for almost any reason or no reason, as long as the reason is not one of the protected reasons. | It is discrimination. However, it is legal, and generally not grounds for a lawsuit. Discrimination is legal, except when it is based upon certain specific categories, such as race, sex, and religion. For example, it is perfectly legal to discriminate for a position based on the possession of education degrees, skill certification or availability to work specific hours or days of the week. Immigration status (and specifically, needing a H1B sponsor in the future) is not a protected category, and as such it is legal to discriminate against this as a factor. Additionally, there are several downsides for hiring a H1B candidate, and foremost of which is sponsoring someone for an H1B visa is not a sure thing, since the H1B system is run as a lottery; as such, you may not receive a visa or extension, and thus be ineligible to legally work. | Here's a bit of Georgia law that is relevant. By law, your apartment shall have installed an approved battery operated smoke detector which shall be maintained in good working order unless any such building is otherwise required to have a smoke detector system pursuant to Code Section 25-2-13. Also, "Detectors shall be listed and meet the installation requirements of NFPA 72". Furthermore, Any occupant who fails to maintain a smoke detector in a dwelling, dwelling unit, or other facility, other than a nursing home, listed in subsection (a) of this Code section in good working order as required in this Code section shall be subject to a maximum fine of $25.00, provided that a warning shall be issued for a first violation. (note that there is a burden on the occupant, not just the landlord). However, Failure to maintain a smoke detector in good working order in a dwelling, dwelling unit, or other facility listed in subsection (a) of this Code section in violation of this Code section shall not be considered evidence of negligence, shall not be considered by the court on any question of liability of any person, corporation, or insurer, shall not be any basis for cancellation of coverage or increase in insurance rates, and shall not diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or occupancy of such dwelling, dwelling unit, or other facility listed in subsection (a) of this Code section. Whether or not a photoelectric smoke detector is NFPA-compliant is not a legal question, but you could read NFPA's comparison of ionizing and photoelectric detectors here. If we assume (as is reasonable to do) that you install an approved device, then there is no code violation by picking your own device, does not change liability, and can have no effect on insurance rate / cancellation. OTOH, it is conceivable that the lease is written to prohibit any monkeying around with the smoke detector. | Here's what I had to do : After going through this harrowing phase, I thought I will post an update in case some one is in such a situation. The Northern Territory's Personal Violence Restraining Order act has a clause (section 21) which basically says if the applicant believes a third party knows the defendant's name then the applicant can request the court to order the third party(power, water, electoral roll, etc) to provide the name if the applicant has already made reasonable efforts in finding out the persons name and hasn't been able to. The third parties will only oblige to a court order. I am almost certain every state/territories' act (in Australia) will have such a clause. It was a challenge to get the court registry to accept the application as the front counter staff/supervisor/supervisor's supervisor were all unaware of this provision (to make an application for a PVRO but get the judge to first order the third party). I had to carry with me the act with the highlighted portion for them to read, analyse and consult with other court staff to even take my application in. At least in the NT there are community legal help services available for no fee and I highly recommend them. |
Can a foreign name change document be accepted by US government institutions? Suppose Alice Jones nee Smith got married in Turkey, and she is issued a Turkish marriage certificate which certifies her new married name, and then she moves to the US and applies for a driver license which requires her birth certificate and name change document in her state. Is her Turkish name change document just as valid as an American issued one would be? | Each state, each local government, and each government agency can make their own rules on this question (if it was another U.S. state, a provision called the "full faith and credit clause" requires all other states to honor it). Usually, the Turkish name change document will be honored by any U.S, state or local government agency or institution if (1) the name change document or a copy of it, is certified or notarized, (2) there is an apostille from the appropriate Turkish national government official stating that the certification or notarization is valid, and (3) there is a translation of the document into English that accompanies the original document or certified copy of the document that is supported by a sworn certification from a foreign language translator that the translator is qualified to translate the document and that the translation of the document is true and correct. Sometimes, an agency or institution will also reserve the right to not honor a document if the relevant civil servant has a reasonable belief based upon some relevant fact, that the document is a fake. But, some agencies or institutions could have more relaxed, or more cumbersome, requirements by adopting regulations that say so. For example, many states have laws that allow you to do a name change for purposes of a driver's license from a pre-marital name without any other proof other than simply by declaring under oath that you got married on a particular day and changed your name, since that situation is rarely suspicious and covers the vast majority of cases. An alternative option would be to bring a name change petition to a U.S. court and to have it declare the the Turkish name change is valid, usually with essentially the same kind of evidence, but sometimes with the court allowing you to explain why you can't comply with some formality, because, for example, your country is at war and isn't issuing apostilles or your country doesn't have the concept of notarizing or certifying this particular kind of document, or because you would face persecution in that country if you had to go back to it in order to get that paperwork. Once this was done, all U.S. government, state, and local agencies and institutions would have to obey that court order, and if there are lots of agencies or institutions that have different or onerous requirements, this may be easier to do. There are also some states that recognize the concept of a common law name change. In these states, any name (and sometimes all names) that you voluntarily go by, or answer to, are legally your name, even if you don't have any paperwork to back it up. | Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here). | Your children may have automatically become US citizens at birth, depending on how long their mother lived in the US before they were born. US law says that any child born abroad to an unmarried US citizen mother is automatically a US citizen, as long as their mother had lived in the US continuously for at least one year before the child was born. There is a clear discussion of the legal requirements in Chapter 3 of the USICS Policy Manual: US Citizens at Birth . Your specific situation is covered by § C.2: Child of a US Citizen Mother (also at the bottom of the page!). (The underlying statute, §1409 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, is here. Like most of the INA, §1409 is not reader friendly.) | Short Answer I was wondering if it exists the possibility of signing a legal agreement before impregnation that states legally that both parents compromise into offering shared physical custody of the child to each other in case of divorce or separation. Do theses types of contract exists? are they legal? I currently live in Switzerland, but the question is meant generally. Agreements of this type are not valid in Switzerland, the U.S., Australia, or any other jurisdiction of which I am aware. There are some fine nuances to this general rule, however, that are explored below. Obviously, of course, there are many countries in the world, and there could be an outlier out there somewhere. Exceptions For Choice of Family Religion Agreements In particular, in some countries, such as Israel and India, the substantive family law rules that apply to a married couple and their children are governed by the religion of that family as determined by law. Thus, Muslims families and Hindu families in India, for example, are governed by different laws related to child custody. In these countries, there is a legislatively approved set of family laws for each faith, but the laws for members of one religion are not the same as the laws for members of another religion, and there are typically rules to determine which sets of family law to apply in cases where the parents of a child belong to different religions. Pre-nuptial agreements in these countries may govern, to some extent, how a married couple's religion is determined for intra-national choice of law purposes, although they cannot specifically resolve custody issues on a pre-dispute basis. U.S. Law In General This would not be enforceable in most U.S. states. Agreements between parents in matters involving children (even post-dispute) are generally not legally binding, because the court has an independent duty to evaluate the best interests of the child under the circumstances as they actually present themselves. Courts can and do appoint third-party guardians ad litem to evaluate the best interests of the children when they have any reason to doubt the judgment of the parents. Put another way, pre-nuptial agreements and post-nuptial agreements, may govern property division and maintenance and restoration of name and inheritance rights and enforcement of economic provision rules, in the event of death or divorce, but may not govern parental responsibilities or child support or the circumstances under which the marriage may be terminated. Post-Dispute Agreements In practice, if parents come to a post-dispute agreement that happens to track the outlines of a non-binding pre-dispute agreement regarding parenting time and parental responsibilities, and the agreed resolution seems reasonable after perfunctory due diligence, a Court would usually ratify that agreement without much second guessing. But, the pre-dispute agreement would be only marginally relevant in the event of a dispute and would not have legal validity. It might be considered by a court as one factor among many in addressing the parenting dispute, as a source of ideas for a resolution and to ascertain the expectations and perspectives of the parents, but would not be given much weight in most cases. Exceptions For Dispute Resolution Method Agreements The exception would be that in some jurisdictions, a mediation or arbitration clause for parenting disputes in a material agreement would be honored, although the same substantive law would apply, in theory. Exceptions For Assisted Contraception And Surrogacy Agreements Note, however, that most jurisdictions in the U.S., do honor and give legal effect to a contract regarding the intended parent in a medically assisted conception or surrogacy contract, in which a pregnancy arises through some means other than intercourse between a man and a woman which of the source of the sperm and egg from that man and that woman that gives rise to a fertilized egg (e.g. cases of sperm donation, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, etc.). In those cases, the default rule is generally that the legal parents of the resulting child are the intended parents under the contract. But, this is purely an agreement governing paternity, and not parenting once a child is born. Swiss Law While I do not have first hand knowledge of Swiss law, a digest of Swiss law prepared by Westlaw (a major law book publisher and online legal research provider) does state the rule of Swiss law clearly, however: The areas a pre-nuptial agreement can cover are fairly limited. The following cannot be determined in advance: The preconditions for a divorce, nullification or separation of a marriage are ultimately governed by law. Any agreements that are not compliant with the law are invalid. Agreements on arrangements for children, in particular about parental responsibility, visiting rights or maintenance, made in advance, are not binding. Any amounts saved in pension funds during a marriage are divided in the event of a divorce. Waiving such a division is only possible under very restrictive conditions. Agreements in a marital contract that are not compliant with the law are invalid. This source also identifies the precise statutes and treaties that apply to resolve these questions of Swiss law. Choice of Law and Forum Related Issues There is also an implicit choice of law issue presented. Choice Of Law and Forum Agreements Are Usually Void Generally speaking, under U.S. law, these issues are governed in domestic cases by the state that is the "home state" of a particular child under a statutory test and the parents may not contractually agree to a choice of venue. In international cases by the state and country that are the home state and country of the child under a test established by treaty which may not be contractually agreed to in advance. Since the applicable statutory tests in the U.S. usually direct a court to apply the laws of the state with which the child has the strongest residential connection (except for Native American children whose family law disputes are subject to tribal law), and since laws relating to divorce and parenting are matters of state and not federal law for the most part (except as to choice of law and choice of forum issues, and certain federal welfare program guidelines for child support that states have economic incentives to comply with and all do), the law governing parental rights and responsibilities (and over the circumstances when a couple may get divorced) may change over time as the family (and each particular child) moves over the course of their lives. In international cases where there is not treaty in place between the potentially relevant countries (and in which diplomatic personnel or members of foreign royal families or families of heads of state are not involved), a U.S. court will generally apply the law of its own state in all cases where it has jurisdiction over the child, or of both parents. Jurisdictional disputes and inconsistent decrees are resolved in part through diplomatic channels at the national level in these cases. There Is Little Variation In U.S. Substantive Custody Law In practice, this isn't a very important observation in domestic cases, however, because almost every U.S. state gives judges extremely broad discretion to handle custody disputes on a case by case basis under a "best interests of the child" standard during the last several decades (even though this isn't constitutionally required), subject only to the barest U.S. constitutional limitations prohibiting decisions that amount to a termination of a legal parental relationship without certain forms of due process, and there aren't huge differences in the case law applying that standard in practice between states. The differences between particular judges in a particular county would typically be as great or greater than the difference between different states, when it comes to final outcomes in disputed and litigated cases. Before the best interests of the child standard was adopted more or less universally, many states had a sex specific "tender years doctrine" that presumptively gave custody of younger children to mothers and older children to fathers. But that standard was held to be unconstitutional because it discriminated based upon sex. In each state where the tender years doctrine or similar sex specific custody doctrines were held to be unconstitutional, the "best interests of the child" standard was adopted rather than a gender neutral standard that provided more guidance to judges such as a dictate to maintain the status quo as much as possible such as a "primary caretaker presumption" (which many judges applying the "best interests of the child" standard actually apply in practice). Most European countries also follow the "best interests of the child" rule for child custody. One of the big differences between jurisdictions in their laws typically involve issues like the standing of people other than parents to intervene in parenting litigation, such as grandparents, stepparents and social workers, and the rights of these third-parties vis-a-vis the legally recognized fathers and mothers of a child, and the circumstances under which an adoption and related relinquishment of parental rights is valid. The procedures that apply in family law cases also often differ significantly between jurisdictions. Exception For Post-Dispute Choice of Law and Forum Agreements However, once there has been a litigated dispute in the first instance, that jurisdiction will generally retain authority over the parenting of the child set forth in a decree. But if there is an agreement of the parents which has been ratified by a court regarding choice of law and venue that will be honored in a post-dispute settlement agreement. Also, there are typically statutory circumstances that cause the original jurisdiction to address a parenting dispute to lose authority over the child. For example, suppose that a couple divorces in England with a separation agreement approved by a court that states that the divorce court in London shall have continuing jurisdiction over future custody and child support disputes and the London divorce court approves that agreement. A U.S. or Swiss court would usually defer to the London divorce court for these matters at that point, unless some emergency or change of circumstances undermined the relevance of London to future disputes involving the child. | Name-changing can facilitate escaping liability, so that e.g. if you are liable to someone for $20,000 and you change your name, you may be able to evade that liability. If a name change is made public, then others who have a legal claim against you are officially put on notice that Elmore James is now known as Lee Smith, and paperwork naming the respondent can be properly filled out. A criminal background check will not catch fact such as that you earlier caused damage to another person's property. | Legally your daughter is a US citizen How you go about demonstrating that is not a legal question, it’s a question about bureaucratic processes and off-limits for this site. | The Supreme Court rules in US v. Wong Kim Ark ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment, which states All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside It is not disputed that said areas are "in the United States". The court found that "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" is intended to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the national government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases,—children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state neither of which are the case in your scenario. Technically, the child is not "eligible" for citizenship, the child has US citizenship, it is just a matter of getting a government official to recognize it (e.g. in issuing a passport). | German law applies As your mother was a German national, German law applies to all her property worldwide. US state law applies As your mother was a permanent resident of a US state, its law applies. Conflict of Laws It is unlikely (read impossible) that you will be able to comply with both laws simultaneously. You, therefore, have a conflict of laws problem that can only be resolved by the courts. In most cases where this particular conflict occurs, the local courts will accept that they have jurisdiction, and will also accept the court of nationality's determination that the applicable law is that where the property is - i.e., they will ‘accept the renvoi', and apply their own law to the inheritance of the property. You will need to apply to the German court who will probably decide that the US portion be dealt with using US state law and the German portion be dealt with using German law. You then need to take that decision to your state court who will probably acquiesce. Probably. Fortunately, as the US and Germany have a tax treaty, you will only need to pay inheritance tax once. |
Can I get national permit for my personal car in India? I recently bought a new car (2 weeks ago). It is still in temporary registration. I am transferring to a different state (for around 2 years). Can I get national permit or some kind of permit instead of re-registering my car in the new state? Is there any better option? | No, not for 1+ years See section 47 of the Motor Vehicle Act 1988: (1) When a motor vehicle registered in one State has been kept in another State, for a period exceeding twelve months, the owner of the vehicle shall, within such period and in such form containing such particulars as may be prescribed by the Central Government, apply to the registering authority, within whose jurisdiction the vehicle then is, for the assignment of a new registration mark and shall present the certificate of registration to that registering authority: [...] Related: 1 2 | Yes, it is illegal in North Carolina, which defines your sex as what's on your birth certificate. At any point in your transition, even when it's long complete, you'll still have to use the restroom for the gender on your birth certificate (hypothetically assuming the law is still in place). See e.g. this CNN coverage and this followup. Will you actually be arrested? Probably only if there's a complaint. The police haven't yet figured out how they're supposed to enforce this law. | The law says don't drive an unsafe vehicle on the road. You disobeyed the law. There were methods of having your tyres fixed without driving on the road (e.g. taking the tyres to the mechanic in a different vehicle, calling a mobile mechanic etc.) so you have no defence of necessity. In all likelihood you will be convicted and penalised. You need legal advice. Whether it's fair or not is a philosophical consideration, not a legal one. | The location of your residence entrance is irrelevant for the law, what matters most is your "street address", i.e. mailing address. That is the address (therefore city) that you use for voter registration, and basically how you identify "where I live". If you lives 5 miles out in the country in an unincorporated area, you'd still use Needles (e.g.) as you mailing address: but you would not be able to vote for a mayor of Needles, just based on your mailing address. Both municipalities might claim jurisdiction based on the physical location of the property, especially for matters of building code. It should not be possible for both municipalities to tax the full value of your property, but they could split the assessment proportionally. The cities themselves are not collecting the tax, the county is (though property straddling a county line raises an interesting question). | I can't prove a negative, but it seems quite clear from my research that providing name and badge number is policy, not law. i.e. Many departments have a policy that their officers will provide name and badge number on request, but the punishment for failure to do so would be at the employment level not the legal level. This site has a fairly good selection of various police department policies I will note that Massachusetts appears to be an exception as mentioned by jimsug in his comment to another answer, they do require police to carry and show ID upon legal request (I did not look up what a "legal request" is) | Your options are generally limited by where you have (or can establish) residency, along with where your communal property is held. There are (decreasing numbers of) jurisdictions known as "divorce mills" that have notoriously lenient rules for establishing residency and completing divorces. | At the time of writing, students studying in Government Aided schools are not eligible for the 7.5% percent reservation in NEET exams. Petitions have been filed in courts challenging this. References: Why exclude govt-aided students from 7.5% quota? | Indian Express Plea challenges exclusion of government-aided school students from 7.5% medical admission quota | The Hindu | There is no basis for the view that requiring a driver's license is unconstitutional. First, it's critical to realize that a right to travel has nothing whatsoever to do with licensing drivers. A right to travel does not in any way mean there's a right to travel in a particular way. Likewise, using a car does not mean you're traveling. Schactman is about the right to obtain a passport, which is a requirement to travel overseas. Kent is likewise about international travel. Freedom of movement means the government cannot, without good cause (like being on parole), prevent you from traveling within the US, living where you choose, or working where you choose. Likewise, there's a right to international travel that means that without good cause, the government can't stop you from leaving the US or re-entering if you're a citizen. Requiring a drivers license to use public roads doesn't stop you from doing that -- there are other ways to travel. The Thompson v. Smith decision explicitly supports the idea that requiring drivers licenses is allowed. To quote a more representative section from the case: STREETS AND HIGHWAYS -- Right of Citizen of Travel and Transport Property -- Use of Ordinary Vehicles. -- The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day. This right is not a mere privilege which a city may permit or prohibit at will. STREETS AND HIGHWAYS -- Right of Citizen to Travel and Transport Property -- Use of Ordinary Vehicles -- Police Power. -- The right of a citizen to travel and transport property and to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day may, under the police power, be regulated by the city in the interest of public safety and welfare; but the city may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, to exercise it. AUTOMOBILES -- Drivers' Permits -- Arbitrary Revocation. -- The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking under rules of general application permits to drive an automobile on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or permitted to be held by some and refused to others of like qualifications, under like circumstances and conditions. While Chicago Motor Coach doesn't seem to be available online, searching it finds other sites stating that the real issue was a commercial operator licensed by the State of Illinois, and whether Chicago, as a municipality within Illinois, could require them to also be permitted by the city. Another line from it seems to be "Even the Legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience." To quote more recent precedent, Miller v. Reed from the 9th Circuit (a federal court of appeals, not a state court) states that The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right. (incidentally: Drivers licenses are not required by federal law. They are required by state laws.) |
Is it possible to use creatures from an RPG (like Dungeons and Dragons) in writing a book without infringing on copyrights? I am planning on writing a book that happens in a universe separate from Dungeons and Dragons universe but I want to have a character be a Kenku. I know that they are copyrighted for use in other RPGs. But what about in books? Would I just have to change the race name, but can I keep all the attributes? The Kenku is going to be cursed to look like a human. They talk by mimicking things they hear. The main character is trying to fix the curse but doesn't know that the Kenku is a Kenku. The main character thinks the Kenku is a human cursed with some type of impaired speech which makes it hard to understand him. How do I find what I am able to use and what I can't use? Would the be in the Open Gaming License? Or somewhere else? | Derivative work The Kenku first appeared in Dungeon Magazine 27 in 1991 and appears to be an original work as far as I can tell. It, therefore, enjoys copyright protection until 70 years after the author dies - it seems unlikely that the author died before 1950 so the copyright has probably not expired, AFAIK, the author is, in fact, still alive. Your usage is what is known as a derivative work and making derivative works is one of the rights that copyright grants to the copyright holder. You can't do it without permission unless you have a fair use defence: you don't. If you call your Kenku a duck; it's still a Kenku This is the inverse of the well-known duck test much beloved of philosophers and employment-law judges but equally relevant to copyright-law judges. Changing one (or several or even many) aspects of a copyrighted work is still copyright infringement. You are free to write something inspired by the Kenku but once "it looks like a Kenku, swims like a Kenku, and quacks like a Kenku, then it probably is a Kenku". | Most games have a TOS to playing that include provisions such as sales of in game items through out of game currencies (i.e. real world money changes hands for digital product or account). I believe Pokemon does have this as part of the TOS which could get you and potential customers banned from competition and possibly the modern online trade features, but am unable to look at the current TOS to verify. It should not be hard to find such a document and read for yourself. | Those posts are talking about making a modified copy of a copyrighted work. The key word is copy. You are not making a copy. Copyright is not about how a physical embodiment of a copyrighted work is treated. You can burn a book and shred a newspaper. Neither of those actions is making a copy. Also, cutting up a newspaper and pasting a picture on your wall has nothing to do with any “derivative works” issue. | Yes, you do. But you should not base your claim primarily on copyright, but just on the license contract you agreed to. It's typically much easier to prove that a party did not fulfill its part of a sales contract (here: Pay the agreed amount) than to prove violation of a copyright you own. Also, you then only need to sue one guy, and not care about every platform your game might be hosted on. This is particularly difficult here, since they have not done anything wrong. It's not their fault that the publisher didn't properly pay the programmer. They (very likely) got their copy of the game legally. For details, you should consult a lawyer. We can't give you detailed legal advice. | They have copyright in their additional text, and possibly in things like their visual design choices (fonts, layout etc). They may also have introduced a few deliberate typos to detect any literal copies from their version (rather as mapmakers add a few imaginary features to their maps). None of this creates any rights to the original text. You are still free to produce your own copies of the original text. Just get it from some other source so you can be sure not to include anything of theirs. | One cannot use the works of others unless one of the following applies: The copyright holder has given permission, usually in the form of a license, often explicit, but sometimes implied. The work is not protected by copyright. This can happen in several ways, but the most common is that the work is old enough that copyright has expired. In the US, works older than 1927 are currently out of copyright. So are some others, the rules are a bit complex. In many countries, if the author or creator died more than 70 years ago, the work is out of copyright. In some countries this is a different number, between 50 and 100 years. This is not likely to apply to a file distributed with current software. If an exception to copyright applies. In the US this would most likely be fair use. In the UK it would probably be fair dealing. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions that might apply, including personal use in some. AS a comment by Jen points out "use" here refers only to those rights protected by copyright, such as making and distributing copied, making nd distributing derivative works, and the like. (Displaying and publicly performing seem unlikely to apply.) Now lets consider the specific situation, and which if any of the reasons for lawful use might apply. License or other permission. There is no explicit license. Since the program is distributed to be run, there is an implicit license to make the sort of use of the file needed to run the program. If the documentation describes how to employ the file as part of running the program, there is almost surely an implied license to employ it in that way. There is not, however, permission to make copies unless that is needed to run the program. There is surely not permission to make derivative works of the file or distribute copies to others, even if you do not charge anything. Expired copyright This pretty clearly will not apply. Fair use This might apply, or might not. There isn't enough info in the question to tell, not even to make a good guess. If any use would be non commercial, that helps fair use a bit. If the use would be for a different purpose than the one the developers used it for, that helps fair use a lot. If the use of the file harmed the market for the program, or served as a substitute, that lean against fair use. without knowing what the file is, what it does, and how it might be used, one really cannot weven guess. | Copyright protection is about certain acts, and not about relationships between products. Copyright law says that the creator of an original work hold the exclusive right to copy and to authorize creation of derivative works. Copyright law does not say that anybody can freely create derivative works as long as they are different to a certain extent. So if you take an original Mario and modify it a teeny bit, that is a violation of copyright; if you take an original Mario and modify it hugely, that is a violation of copyright. Degree of similarity is relevant on some cases when the factual question arises whether the allegedly-infringing work is based on some protected original. This is most obvious in music cases, where all baroque music has some similarity to all other baroque music, all death metal has some similarity to all other death metal, and so on. There is not a legal quasi-statutory standard for measuring substantial similarity in music. The scientific underpinning of such a standard would be based on (weighted) combinatorics and the idea that there are only so many tunes possible (that would be a huge number, until you get to the "within a genre" condition). It seems obvious (by your "admission") that the derived works are based on protected works, so Nintendo's permission is required to legally create such works. However, you do or would hold copyright in your unauthorized derived work. Without a trail of evidence such as a SE question pointing to the connection, the derived images might be hard to connect to the originals. In addition, you may be able to avail yourself of a "fair use" defense, in case you get sued by the original creator. Factors favoring such a defense are the insubstantiality of the copying (a small portion) and the "transformativeness" of your creation. | No. GPL works are copyrighted (as are most creative works basically everywhere in the world, as soon as they're created, whether or not the author does anything about it), and copyright is what gives the GPL "teeth". Without copyright, you would generally be able to duplicate and distribute programs without any kind of license or permission from the author. Copyright law restricts your ability to do those things. The GPL is a license, which means it's a grant of permission. It says that you may copy and modify and do other things, provided that you comply with the other provisions set out in the license. Quoting from the GPL v3: You are not required to accept this License in order to receive or run a copy of the Program. [...] However, nothing other than this License grants you permission to propagate or modify any covered work. These actions infringe copyright if you do not accept this License. So if you were to distribute some GPL-licensed software in a way that didn't comply with the terms of the license, the legal framework that would allow someone to sue you to stop you doing that would be copyright law. |
Does the 5th Amendment only apply to federal government The 5th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States says No person shall be held to answer for a... crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury..., nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... First of all, most sources* seem to indicate that this only applies to federal government and that this particular law doesn't forbid citizens from committing murder (though other laws obviously do). Why is that? The Amendment doesn't say that it's only talking about federal government. In fact, the way its worded implies that it applies to anyone. It says that no person shall be held to answer for a... crime period. It doesn't say that no person shall be held to answer of a... crime by federal government. Why doesn't this amendment apply to citizens instead of only federal government? Second of all, if it does only apply to federal government, does that mean that government can declare it legal for citizens to kill a particular person? If not, how does the Fifth Amendment make that illegal if it only applies to federal government? Or if the Fifth Amendment is not the law that forbids government from doing as I described, what law does (if any)? In other words, what law makes it illegal for government to declare it legal for citizens to kill a certain person without that person being sentenced to death under the "due process of he law"? If it is the Fifth Amendment, how does it forbid government from so doing if the law applies to federal government only? * https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fifth_amendment https://system.uslegal.com/u-s-constitution/amendment-v/background/applicability-of-the-fifth-amendment-to-the-states/ | The Fifth Amendment, and all the other amendments in the "Bill of Rights" (numbers 1-10) were universally understood when passed to be restrictions on the Federal Government only. The courts treated them that way through the end of the US Civil War. This was made definite in the US Supreme Court case Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) Since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment the courts have decided that most of the provisions of the bill of rights also apply to actions by the states. A few do not apply, such as the requirement that indictments be by a grand jury, and the Third Amendment ban on quartering soldiers in private dwellings. This was done through a somewhat roundabout mechanism -- the Supreme Court decided that the protections of the Bill of Rights were included in the Due process clause of the 14th. As a result not all the provisions were made applicable at the same time. (Most were held to be incorporated during the period from 1925-1985. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) thru Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)). Modern legal opinions sometimes discuss incorporation as if it was a fact from the passage of the 14th in 1868. But the actual gradual process is clear in the case law. For example, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases was first incorporated in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), but only for death penalty cases, and only if "special circumstances" existed, such as a defendant who was illiterate, far from home and support, or feeble-minded. Later cases gradually found "special circumstances" in more and more fact patterns, and in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) the Court extended the right to all felony cases. It has later been extended to misdemeanor cases if jail time is a possible result. A similar history could be spelled out for the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination, or for the Fourth's against search and seizure, particularly the "exclusionary rule". I, and a number of legal scholars who have better rights to an opinion, think that the 14th's "Privileges and Immunities" clause would have been a more sensible means to this end, but for various reasons that isn't how it was done. Justice Thomas seems to be trying to reverse this -- he has made comments in a number of opinions of late that various things should be protected under the Privileges and Immunities clause of the 14th, rather than the Due Process clause.. Even if the Court adopts this theory, it probably won't change many outcomes. That is how the Fifth, and other Bill of rights Provisions like the Fourth (search and seizure) and the First (free speech and religion) have been applied to restrict the states. None of these provisions directly restrict private individuals. In some cases, courts have said that while individuals may not be forbidden to do things that are forbidden to governments under the Bill of Rights, the courts will not help you do such things, such as by enforcing contracts to do them. No person shall be held to answer for a... crime "held to answer" here means prosecuted in court. Only governments do that. That provision forbids criminal court cases that do not start with a grand Jury indictment. it is one of the few Bill of Rights provisions which the Supreme Court has held do not apply to the states. But in any case it is purely procedural. It doesn't say that crimes may not be prosecuted, nor that they must. It says only "if you want to try someone for a crime, this is a step you must go through." The other provisions of the Fifth all do apply to the states, such as the ban on double jeopardy, and the protection against self-incrimination. does that mean that government can declare it legal for citizens to kill a particular person? No. That would violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause if don3 by the Federal Government, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause and its Equal Protection clause if done by a state. It would probably also violate the provision against Bills of Attainder, and perhaps the provision against cruel and unusual punishment. Once upon a time, several hundred years before the US was founded, the government of England did just that. It was called "outlawry". For certain crimes, the punishment was to be put "outside the law". An "outlaw" (in this older sense) was not protected by the law. Anyone could kill an outlaw, or steal from one, and the legal system would do nothing about it. The US has never used outlawry. | Federal facilities are required to adhere to the flag code. Non-federal governmental entities are not, and the explanation is more complicated. In theory, the federal government should have very little power over the decision-making of state governments -- this is a principle of federalism and is expressly stated in the 10th Amendment. In practice, however, the federal government has a lot of power over state governments. Congress can condition the allotment of federal monies to states, i.e. block grants, as long as such a condition meets the five point test spelled out in South Dakota v. Dole. The most stringent of these points is that the condition "must not be coercive" so as to apply "irresistible pressure", creating a false choice where accepting money is the only realistic option (thus complying with the conditions). I couldn't find a clause within USC Title 4, Chapter 1 for withholding funds from states in the event of noncompliance, similar to one that exists for the national drinking age. Therefore states (state, county, municipal all treated as an extension of state power under the US Constitution) are not required to to adhere to the flag code. Theoretically, Congress could pass a new law that would condition the receipt of some federal funds on the states' compliance with the flag code. But the new low could face additional hurdles, since the condition must be "directly related to one of the main purposes for which... [the funds] are expended" (quoting from Dole). This restriction is the reason why states were given the right to opt out of the Obamacare medicare expansion without losing their pre-existing Medicaid funding (567 U. S. ____ (2012) at 51), and is also the reason why the recent "Sanctuary Cities Ban" is having legal trouble. It would be unlikely that any law like this would hold up. It's also worth noting that most states have their own flag law, which makes this whole discussion of the federal law's effect on state facilities. As you noted, since US v. Eichman, all criminal penalties for violating any flag code have been unenforceable against individuals. My best guess is that the proper method of enforcement in federal buildings is simply administrative action, since violating the code can provide cause for firing federal employees under Chapter 75 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. | In the United States, the government has, multiple times, destroyed homes while trying to catch a fugitive. And the homeowner sometimes makes a claim in federal court that this is an unconstitutional taking without compensation in violation of the 5th Amendment. In Lech v. Jackson, the 10th Circuit decided that the police and city were not liable for destroying a house while trying to arrest a criminal who had fled there. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. But in Baker v. City of McKinney, Texas, less than 3 months ago, a district court declined to dismiss a case in which police destroyed a home to catch a fleeing criminal. Allegedly, in this case the police were given a key to the door, a garage door opener, and the code to the back gate by the homeowner - and instead of using those, they used explosives on the garage door and used a BearCat to knock down the fence and the front door. I'm not sure to what extent those facts, perhaps showing that the scale of the destruction was unnecessary, matter. To the best of my knowledge the case is still ongoing. | The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact. | In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, SCOTUS held that A corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 and numerous preceding cases find that "the First Amendment applies to corporations". Corporations also enjoy the right to contract (protected by the Contract Clause), meaning that the government cannot willy-nilly invalidate a contract because one of the parties is a corporation, see Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518. (But, of course, any government can regulate any contract by process of law). In general, under 1 USC 1, In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise...the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals We know that corporations do not have the right to vote. Second Amendment corporate rights are district-specific at present: Seventh Circuit courts view firearms sellers like booksellers — as holders of constitutional rights. While gun sellers are subject to much stricter regulation than are booksellers, they are both protected by the Bill of Rights. Conversely, in the courts of the Fourth Circuit, gun sellers have no Second Amendment rights. Third Amendment rights are unknown. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 which is binding only in a few states, is the entirety of 3rd Amendment case law and does not enter the relevant legal territory. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, the court held that The Fourth Amendment protects a corporation and its officers from compulsory production of the corporate books and papers for use in a criminal proceeding against them when the information upon which the subpoenas were framed was derived by the Government through a previous unconstitutional search and seizure, planned and executed by its officials under color of a void writ, provided the defense of the Amendment be seasonably interposed, and not first raised as a collateral issue at the trial of the indictment. The article "A Corporation's Right to a Jury Trial under the Sixth Amendment", 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 375 explores the question of Sixth Amendment rights of corporations esp. the right to trial by jury – the summary is that this has yet to be clearly determined. US v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934 finds such a right as does United States v. R. L. Polk and Co., 438 F.2d 377 A corporation does not have the same right not to incriminate itself as does a natural person, but it does enjoy the same rights as individuals to trial by jury. However, corporate trial-by-jury rights are buried deep in questions about the "seriousness" of the prosecution. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 held that "Petitioners are not entitled to a jury trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3692", but this is about a specific statute and a question of whether the offense is petty, and the broad constitutional question remains. The right to an attorney seems to be secure, see this opinion by Merrick Garland, and citations therein. | There are literally hundreds of such laws. Most of them (perhaps all, if we exclude firearms-related crimes in Title 26) are contained in Title 18 of the US Code, part I. The problem is that your definition of "public insurrection" is too broad, since it would include lying to federal agents (a crime), insofar as the reason for 18 USC 1001 is to prevent impeding federal investigations by giving them false information. Assaulting a federal agent impedes government and is a crime. There is pretty much a federal version of any state-level crime of violence. There is the riot act, and a specific law against insurrection and rebellion. Chapter 115 is probably the most relevant: this is where the various "overthrowing the government" laws are. | It isn't a double negative, although it is a bit of an usual phrasing. The context that you are overlooking is that the United States Constitution does not say who is or is not allowed to vote because that authority is not vested in the federal government. There is no affirmative right to vote in the United States Constitution, there is merely a right not to be denied the right to vote for certain particular reasons. Responsibility for determining who is allowed to vote is vested in state governments. The right to vote for the House of Representatives is derivative of that decision pursuant to Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution which states: The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. The 19th Amendment prohibits state's from denying the right to vote on account of sex, but does not prohibit states from denying the right to vote on account of other grounds not specified in the 19th Amendment, such as property ownership, education, criminal record, possession of identification, etc. When the 19th Amendment was ratified, in 1920, some states (e.g. Colorado) already allowed women to vote, while others did not. Similarly, when the 15th Amendment was ratified some states prevented people from voting based upon race and others did not. And, so on. In practice, the modern trend is for states to enact laws allowing all U.S. citizens age eighteen or over to vote, subject primarily to limitations that vary quite a bit based upon criminal record or incarceration status. But, historically, when the power to set the franchise was vested in the states, race, gender, property ownership, age (in excess of eighteen), poll tax payments, and "civics" tests, have all been used at sometime or another to limit the right to vote. There is, however, some incentive for states not to be restrictive, because certain kinds of restrictions reduce the population of the state under the U.S. Constitution for purposes of allocated members of Congress and electoral votes. This is set forth in Section 2 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution (ratified in 1868) which states: Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. (Incidentally, there are no longer any people who qualify as "Indians not taxed" in the U.S. due to federal legislation that was adopted after 1868.) This set a presumptive baseline that males twenty-one years of age not disqualified by a criminal record are allowed to vote, but with a penalty for not doing so imposed at the state level in apportionment rather than in the form of a prohibition against doing so, before express prohibitions against certain kinds of restrictions of the franchise were adopted in the 15th, 19th, 24th and 26th Amendments. It is also useful to compare the examples of the 15th Amendment (ratified 1870), the 24th Amendment (ratified 1964) and the 26th Amendment (ratified 1971), which are parallel to the 19th Amendment and wouldn't make sense against a backdrop that the population, by default, is allowed to vote. Article XV (Amendment 15 - Rights of Citizens to Vote) The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. and Amendment XXIV (Amendment 24 - Abolition of the Poll Tax Qualification in Federal Elections) The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. and Amendment XXVI (Amendment 26 - Reduction of Voting Age Qualification) 1: The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age. affects 15 2: The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. | No. Arizona tried passing a law that, among other things: criminalized failure to comply with federal alien registration requirements, criminalized working without being authorized to work in the United States, and authorized state officers to arrest aliens without a warrant if they had probable cause that the alien had committed a crime that made them deportable. All three provisions were struck down in Arizona v. United States. The federal government has "occupied the field" on most immigration issues. That means they've regulated it so extensively that there is zero room for states to act independently. One of Arizona's laws that was struck down exactly duplicated a federal criminal statute, but even that went too far by allowing the state to apply its own enforcement priorities and prosecute cases the federal government would not. If a state made it a crime to be unlawfully present (which is not a federal crime), that intrudes even further on the federal immigration scheme. This doesn't mean a state can't alert the federal government to people who are unlawfully present. It doesn't necessarily mean state officers can't arrest for federal immigration crimes: a previous Ninth Circuit decision held that Arizona officers could arrest for federal immigration crimes on the same basis that they could arrest for state crimes, and the Supreme Court in Arizona v. US explicitly didn't address the question. However, if state officers make an arrest for a federal crime, the federal government still gets to decide whether or not to prosecute. What you're asking about would remove that federal control, so it is preempted by federal law. |
(Car accident) Is there a way to accept civil liability without incriminating yourself? Someone I know it was driving recently when another driver ran a red light and hit them. The police were called, and the other driver admitted everything. In addition to being at fault for the accident, they were given some tickets. Although I don’t have any plans of running any red lights, that got me thinking of whether there might be a better way to handle it if I did find myself in that situation. On the one hand, I think you’d have to be a scumbag to try to lie about who was at fault or weasel out of paying for the damages. But on the other hand, I feel like admitting to the police what I did seems contrary to the principle of not having to incriminate myself. Is there a way to accept civil liability without admitting a criminal violation? Are you allowed to tell the police, “I accept full responsibility for the accident, but I don’t wish to discuss what happened”? I understand that the police might still figure out what happened and I might get the ticket anyway, but I would really rather not help an officer give me a ticket. (I’m not implying that I anticipate making a lot of traffic violations, but everyone makes mistakes.) | Is there a way to accept civil liability without admitting a criminal violation? Are you allowed to tell the police, “I accept full responsibility for the accident, but I don’t wish to discuss what happened”? You can allow a default judgment as to liability to enter in a civil case (and then possibly even have a contested adversarial hearing on damages), or you can reach a settlement dismissing the case with prejudice in exchange for payment of a certain settlement without admission of liability. Indeed, this is what actually happens in about 90%+ of car accident cases that aren't resolved at trial or in a motion for summary judgment (something that is quite rare in a car accident case). Likewise, you can plea "no contest" or even being convicted following a trial of a traffic violation in connection with an accident, without the outcome of the traffic case having a binding effect on the outcome of a civil case, even though this seems contrary to the logic of how results in one case determine issues in other cases (called "collateral estoppel"). Basically, this rule has been enacted in most U.S. jurisdictions (usually by statute but in some rare cases by judicial decision), in order to prevent local traffic trial cases from turning into expensive high stakes battles that are really about liability for huge economic damages, in a traffic court process designed to efficiently deal with disputes in the tens to thousands of dollars at stake, rather than the tens of thousands to millions of dollars that are at stake in a personal injury case where there have been serious injuries. However, while the outcome and plea in a traffic case in not binding in a civil lawsuit involving a related accident, any testimony given under oath in one case can be used in the other case in almost all circumstances. | Yes Assuming you were assaulted (with or without battery) and you suffered injury (physical or otherwise) during that assault you are entitled to damages. The injury has to flow from the assault but not necessarily from the assaulter. For example, if you fled across the road and were struck by a car you could sue your attacker. Because assault is an intentional tort, it is not necessary for you to prove that actual financial loss was suffered - this is not negligence. The court can assess economic loss, non-economic loss and exemplary (punitive) damages. | UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence. | No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal. | First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat. | Your personal liability depends on your state law regarding the family car doctrine, so the answer there is "maybe" (Texas is not a state with that doctrine, so simple ownership of the car does not confer liability). You would be liable if your supervision of the child was negligent, which means approximately that you knew or should have known that she was a bad driver and would cause damage. Still, the insurance company is suppose to indemnify you (plural) against such loses, as long as they are legally required to do so. That would include many considerations, such as whether the driver was covered under the policy, whether the car was being used contrary to the terms of the policy (being used commercially), and so on. The insurance company is entitled to make a reasonable determination of whether they are responsible for the loss (and if so, to what extent). If they actually decline to cover the loss, you would need to sue them to make them comply with the terms of the policy (and your lawyer would give you a detailed explanation of why they are not liable, in case they aren't). The plaintiff works with his insurance company to recover his insured losses, and with his lawyer to recover any uninsured losses. His insurance company works with your insurance company, up to a point, and then the lawyers get involved. Your daughter does not work with his insurance company, and your insurance company probably has said something along the line "only talk to us". The insurance that a driver typically has may cover some of their own medical costs, but does not provide a payment for "pain and suffering": that is an uninsured loss. It is not generally required that drivers carry insurance to cover their own medical expenses – it is required that they insure against damages, in general, suffered by other parties (if the defendant is at fault). So there is probably nothing for the plaintiff to work out with his insurance company. In Texas, if the defendant is entirely at fault, defendant will be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 90% at fault, defendant will be liable for 90% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 49% at fault, defendant is not liable. Defendant can, in any event, also sue for damages, so if defendant is 49% at fault, defendant can recover 49% of her damages. The insurance companies might be able to talk it out and reach a clear resolution of the matter, but it could be more in their interest to throw the dice and work it out in court. One can always sue at the very start, and drop the suit if it becomes advantageous. | What you are describing may be the crime of insurance fraud: to avoid that, you would have to admit to the insurance company that you put a "Please steal me" sign in an unlocked car with the keys in the ignition, in a high-crime area. If we remove some of the elements of the scenario and reduce this to "leaving the keys in the ignition", this would probably be be considered contributory negligence, meaning that you failed to act prudently to protect your property. This can reduce the amount that the insurance company has to pay you. At this point, it depends on what state you're in, since sometimes a little bit of negligence (in Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia) means that you may get nothing. However, negligence hinges on an assessment of the actions and intentions of a party, and what you describe isn't "neglect", there is the direct intent that the car be stolen. Insurance policies exclude coverage for intentional loss. So the bottom line would be that the person would be out a car, and could be in prison for fraud if they did not reveal what they actually did. One should assume that the thieves took a lulz video of the sign before they stole the car, and posted it on FaceTube where it entered the viral hall of fame and was used against you in a court of law, so fraud is the worst choice. An alternative if you have a car is to donate it to charity, and take a tax write-off. | Not necessarily. Many jurisdictions prohibit admission of evidence of subsequent remedial acts to show liability, although it could be admitted to show that it was possible to do something. Also, the law of border trees is quite arcane and involved, and frequently subject to local ordinances, state laws, and common law rules all at once (and isn't terribly uniform from one place to another). But, usually, the bottom line for your liability to your neighbor will be whether you were negligent in maintaining the tree, which in the case of a healthy branch and an extraordinary storm, you usually would not be. |
Judges upholding the rule of law It's a judge's duty to decide disputes brought to them, but when people say that judges uphold the rule of law, does it mean that it only applies in the sense where judges were to deliver judgment in an impartial manner? | The Wikipedia article Rule of law favorably quotes the Encyclopedia Britannica defining the rule as: the mechanism, process, institution, practice, or norm that supports the equality of all citizens before the law, secures a nonarbitrary form of government, and more generally prevents the arbitrary use of power. In general the rule of law requires that written laws, as interpreted by the courts, be applied to all, and there there be no special exemptions that apply only to particular persons, nor special laws that only affect some people or groups. The rule is a statement of an ideal which is not always achieved. "when people say that judges uphold the rule of law" that means that the judge applies the appropriate previously enacted law, and does not make a decision based on the judge's own personal view of what the law ought to be. This includes the rule of Stare decesis that things once decided shall normally remain decided, that existing rules are not arbitrarily reversed or altered by a court. This would include the judge not deciding a case or issue on the basis of personal bias or prejudice, but it means more than that. It means that the law should not,change depend on what judge presides over a case. Again, this is an ideal not always achieved. | This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification. | The only relevant case heard by SCOTUS is Nixon v. US, 506 U.S. 224, where a federal judge was tried and convicted for actual crimes, but would not resign his position so continued to draw his salary. The key legal question was whether the matter is "justiciable" (meaning, not a political matter but a legal matter). Nixon's argument was that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, and the court held that the question (more specifically what it means to "try") is nonjusticiable. White & Blackmun, and Souter, wrote concurring opinions (which might be called on in a subsequent impeachment case) that reminds the reader (and future court) what was not part of the holding of the court, and what might therefore allow future impeachment review. White writes The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us even to consider his contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore reach the merits of the claim. I concur in the judgment because the Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" petitioner. He observes that the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed a trial by reasonable judges. But, I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to "try" impeachment cases. When asked at oral argument whether that direction would be satisfied if, after a House vote to impeach, the Senate, without any procedure whatsoever, unanimously found the accused guilty of being "a bad guy," counsel for the United States answered that the Government's theory "leads me to answer that question yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. Especially in light of this advice from the Solicitor General, I would not issue an invitation to the Senate to find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business, to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment process. Souter in his opinion states that One can, nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply" 'a bad guy,'", judicial interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. In other words, review of an impeachment is largely but not entirely off the table, at least until SCOTUS declares that impeachments are completely unreviewable, no matter what, period (unlikely to ever happen). | Now after 4 years I still can't get it off my mind and it's consuming me thinking that I was fooled into believing that the rule of law was the norm in this country (not the jungle law) and the beautiful constitution we have is not there just to look pretty, but something we can rely on. So, at this point, do I need legal help? Or mental help or some kind of miracle pill to help me cope with the situation (?) I know that 6' under we can have peace, but can I live a peaceful (bully free) life here too? We do have rule of law as a powerful norm in this country. But, we also live in a very complex society and the exact content of the law will always be the subject of fierce dispute. The solution is, pretty much, to lower your expectations. The vast majority of the time the law works. Your beliefs about exactly how far you are allowed to disobey an order from a law enforcement officer as a matter of practical reality, were miscalibrated. But, you did get out of jail the next day and the punishment you received was very survivable. In much of the world, this wouldn't be true. The rule of law doesn't mean that everyone perfectly obeys the law. It means that when the law is seriously broken in a manner that has big consequences that there is usually a way to legally mitigate the harm or to obtain a remedy. Pushing the limits of the freedoms the law gives you is rarely wise. But, that is no reason to refuse to live your life. It is one thing to learn from experience. But, sometimes, you can overlearn from experience and need to recognize that your anecdotal experience on a single occasion is not all that there is the law. | Criminal conviction by a judge after acquittal by a jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. A criminal conviction involves both a finding of fact and the application of the law, and a judge (unless this is a bench trial) doesn't find facts, he makes judgements of law. Overturning an acquittal after a jury trial would thus be in essence a whole new trial (moreover one where the defendant was not given a renewed opportunity to defend himself). | You're wrong in the first sentence So I agree, that a hung jury is in fact reasonable doubt by lack of concurrence, the defendant should be acquitted. No. A hung jury just means they can't decide on any item they should decide about, for whatever reason. Maybe they all want to see the defendant guilty but can't decide if it is murder 1st or 2nd degree, or one of them is just trying to stay out of work and just is contrarian to whatever the jury deliberates, wether guilty or not guilty. In either case they can not tell the judge what they can't agree about. They can only tell the judge that they can't agree on a verdict. Since the judge can't assume anything about the deliberations, he can only reset trial and swap the jury for one that actually might be able to decide. The whole Jury is tossed out, their deliberations don't matter anymore - their hung state does not influence the re-trial. | There is a special type of law enforcement officer, called a "bailiff" who is charged with maintaining order in a courtroom, and often, a bailiff is a direct subordinate of a judge who must follow the judge's orders. Judges can also issue special kinds of court orders, called "writs" which are a direction to a law enforcement agency generally to take certain action. But, in these cases, the law enforcement agency is effectively an "independent contractor" in relationship to the judge with considerable discretion regarding precisely how and when a writ is carried out. Somebody in the law enforcement agency to which a writ is directed is required to take action, but no individual law enforcement officer is personally compelled to comply with this order. The quote in question is not a statement about the legal authority of a judge, however. It is a statement of "realpolitik". The judge can't physically force or threaten law enforcement to do what they are told to do by a judge. The cops have the guns, not the judges. Instead, the judge relies upon law enforcement obeying the judge's orders because that is what law enforcement officers do. It's right in the job title. But, if law enforcement chose to ignore judges, in general, there is very little that judges could do about that (and in some countries, law enforcement does routinely ignore judicial directions). Some forms of executive branch authority to defy judicial orders is even legally codified, most starkly in the case of the pardon power. | The general rule is, anything is allowed unless it is forbidden (and not that you can only do things that are expressly permitted). The logical structure of law may be a bit more challenging than procedural programming logic, since it may require a global knowledge and evaluation of the entire code (typically but not absolutely, the scope of the search for "unless otherwise" conditions is restricted to "in this chapter"). In other words, the law is a set of propositions which must all be true, and unlike actual execution of instructions in a sequence, law is to be interpreted simultaneously but hierarchically (that is: the order in which clauses are written is not significant). The appearance that the law is self-contradictory is largely illusory, though the resolution of the conflict may require a careful reading of the law and knowledge of jurisdictional hierarchy (federal law is superior to state law, which entails a particular resolution of the apparent conflict). Sometimes there are real conflicts, which usually result from using words in conflicting ways (note the practice of re-defining words "in this chapter/section/title"). The reason why law is not a science is that law is normative, not descriptive: it dictates what is allowed (a determination made through the political process), and does not attempt to discover what independently is. The reason why the legal process cannot be implemented in software is that software does not yet correctly interpret natural language, and law is written in natural language following interpretations based on judgments of what choices a reasonable would make. Perhaps if you propose a piece of law that you think is contradictory, it would be possible to show how the contradiction is illusory. |
Could the President, Senate, and a foreign country circumvent the House to pass a law? If the Senate and President wanted to pass a law, but the House of Representatives voted against it, could the President and Senate pass it by including it in a treaty with a foreign country (assuming they found a country willing to help them bypass the House)? | Yes. The leading case relevant to the question is Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a self-executing bird migration treaty could override state law. It is also well established that a treaty may override a previously enacted federal statute. While there might be a requirement that the treaty not be a sham that really doesn't involve another county, or otherwise have an international component, as a practical matter, meeting this requirement is something that would almost always be possible. So, the President and a two-thirds majority of the Senate, in cooperation with a foreign country, by treaty, can accomplish legislative ends with which the House would not agree. As a practical matter, however, the two-thirds majority requirement for passage of a treaty in the Senate, the partisan organization of politics in the U.S., and the correlation of the partisan makeup of the Senate and the House, means that this observation is basically an irrelevant footnote. No treaty that could secure bipartisan support by two-thirds of U.S. Senators, and also be signed by the President, would not be able to be passed in the House. There has never been a time in U.S. history where one political faction has a two-thirds majority in the Senate and another political faction had a majority in the House. As a practical matter, it is almost always easier to pass ordinary legislation approved by majorities in the House and Senate, than it is to pass a self-executing treaty. The only scenario I could image where this might happen would be one in which an "old guard" President and Senate are in place, and then one election, some new political movement suddenly nearly sweeps the House and the U.S. Senate seats that are open due to some pivotal historic event, but there hasn't been more than a single Senate election or a Presidential election since that sea change in public opinion, something that very rarely has happened in other countries. | This is an interesting hypothetical. In this scenario, Country Z does not have jurisdiction to enforce such a law on foreign nationals, unless Country Z has an extradition treaty with Country A. Generally, however, these types of laws would never be enforced as they are egregious abuses of government, and could possibly be elevated to the International Court of Justice if Country Z actually charges any individuals with such a crime. In these instances, however, war is a very unlikely scenario, since this would often be expensive and any escalation would most likely be small skirmishes that would lead to an eventual ceasefire, with the encouragement of the international community, without the involvement of UN Peacekeeping troops. | Maybe, probably not. The leading case would appear to be Raines v. Byrd, 521 US 811, where 6 congressmen sued over a line-item veto law (later held to be unconstitutional). The court notes the established legal fact that To meet the standing requirements of Article III, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief". where that court added the italics; and the alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizable. This requires, among other things, that the plaintiff have suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized" In this case, the court find that "appellees have not been singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members of their respective bodies", and they are claiming institutional injury, arising "solely because they are Members of Congress...If one of the Members were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his successor instead". The court did, however, uphold standing in one legislative case, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, where there was an issue over whether the legislature had ratified a constitutional amendment when the Lt. Governor of Kansas cast a tie-breaking vote on the question (the allegation was that this was improper). The court held that the legislators "have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes", finding that their votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for naught although if they are right in their contentions their votes would have been sufficient to de- feat ratification. We think that these senators have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes. The Raines court finds that legislators "have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified" – but that was not the case in Raines (the line-item veto act had clearly passed). Applied to the Oprah hypothetical, senatorial vote would arguably have been completely nullified by the proposed process: that is the argument made in the present complaint, para 33-34. The end of sect. III of the Raines opinion gives extensive historical analysis of the fact that branches of government do not generally have standing to sue each other, closing with the note that Our regime contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts, well expressed by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974): "The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall [in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),] lies in the protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action. It is this role, not some amorphous general supervision of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests. There is a very narrow window through which the Senate might have standing to sue POTUS and otherwise, the answer is "no". The Oprah case is distinguished from Raines in that there is no political recourse to simply ignoring the appointments clause, except impeachment, and the courts might see such an action as equivalent to vote-nullification. | It depends on the language used to pass the statutes, but if in doubt then Spanish prevails. See section 13 of the Civil Code: In case of discrepancy between the English and Spanish texts of a statute passed by the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico, the text in which the same originated in either house, shall prevail in the construction of said statute, except in the following cases: (a) If the statute is a translation or adaptation of a statute of the United States or of any State or Territory thereof, the English text shall be given preference over the Spanish. (b) If the statute is of Spanish origin, the Spanish text shall be preferred to the English. (c) If the matter of preference cannot be decided under the foregoing rules, the Spanish text shall prevail. | Your gut feeling is reasonably close, but not precisely correct. The Constitution sets the baseline rules for the powers of and interactions among the branches of the federal government, as well as the powers of and interactions between the state and federal governments. With only one exception (the dilution of a state's representation in the Senate), the Constitution can be amended to basically anything. It can make anything legal and it can make anything illegal. It generally addresses fairly high-leval legal principles, but there's no reason that it couldn't be amended to include a 9,000-page law specifically addressing every conceivable aspect of the regulation of nuclear energy. As it stands now and as it always has, the Constitution permits the federal government to write laws only with respect to certain topics. The states, meanwhile, retain authority to write laws on virtually any other topic. There are a variety of legal and historical reasons why prohibition took the form of a constitutional amendment while drug laws are handled legislatively, but one important consideration is the scope of Congress's power to regulate "interstate commerce." At the time of prohibition, it was not clear that Congress could regulate commercial activity that took place entirely within a single state. So if you grew all the ingredients for your whiskey in Kentucky, and you distilled those ingredients in Kentucky, and then you sold your whiskey in Kentucky exclusively to residents of Kentucky, it seemed that your conduct was outside the reach of Congress, and that any attempt to regulate it would be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge. The solution, therefore, was to amend the constitution and give that authority to Congress. About a decade after prohibition ended, though, the Supreme Court decided that the power to regulate interstate commerce includes not just transactions that cross state lines, but also any conduct that “exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce” Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). This broadens the Commerce Clause authority to cover virtually any economic activity. So even if you buy marijuana seeds from your next door neighbor, plant them in your own back yard, grow them for strictly personal use in your own home, and never sell anything to anyone, the courts will hold that your conduct affects the interstate market for marijuana, and is therefore subject to federal regulation. This standard substantially lowers the bar for Congress to act without a constitutional amendment, which is a big part of the reason there hasn't been an amendment to address narcotic use. | The relevant statute, 28 USC 455 simply states what shall be, and does not suggest that the law could be enforced by any particular means. There have been cases where there was a suggestion of a hint of impropriety at SCOTUS and yet things proceeded. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 Rehnquist did not recuse himself despite being a White House lawyer and having expressed an opinion on the legality of certain arrests, and that was the end of that matter. | The veto aspect of the scenario is a red herring. All bills not passed into law by the end of a Congress die (subject to a small 10-day window for approval by a President). This is a frequently asked question at the Library of Congress: If a bill from any Congress does not become law during the Congress in which it is introduced, it is considered “dead.” For a “dead” bill to be enacted in a new Congress, it would have to be reintroduced with a new number and begin anew its journey through the legislative process. This is because when Americans elect a Congress, "[t]hey are electing a particular Congress, which lasts two years. So through 2013 and 2014, the 113th U.S. Congress has been making laws. For 2015 and 2016, the 114th U.S. Congress will be in office. ... When one Congress expires, all the pending legislation goes with it" (The Congressional Institute). "The spirit of the Constitution evidently requires the performance of every act necessary to the enactment and approval of laws to be perfect before the adjournment of Congress" (H. R. Report No. 108, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., June 11, 1864, as quoted in Edwards, below). There is only one exception, discussed in Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932). It was held that even if a Congress has adjourned at the end of that Congress's term, the President still has the full ten days to approve a bill presented from that former Congress. | No because clause 1 of section 3 originally said: The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote. The legislature could have required a vote (of the legislature) and that could have been regulated. However, if the legislature decided that a committee could appoint senators that couldn’t have been, for example. |
Where would one find the briefing schedule/deadlines for amicus curiae for a SCOTUS case? Say I wanted to file an amicus curiae for an upcoming SCOTUS case; where would I go to find the deadline to file? I've looked on places like SCOTUS blog, Ballotpedia, Oyez, Wikipedia, and found nothing. Am I searching wrong? | Supreme Court Rule 37 places the deadline to file an amicus brief in support of certiorari at "30 days after the case is placed on the docket or a response is called for by the Court, whichever is later." The Court doesn't generate briefing schedules for each case, so you have to calculate those dates yourself. A case is "placed on the docket" upon filing of the petition for certiorari. Respondents are not required to file any response to the petition, but in some cases, the Court will ask them to do so. Both events will appear on the Court's online docket, so you can find those dates and add 30 days. For instance, in Kowall v. Benson, the Petitioner filed for certiorari on April 15, 2022, so the deadline for an amicus brief would have been May 15. But on May 31, the Court asked the Respondent to file a response brief, so that kicked the deadline out another 30 days, to June 30. | The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary. | In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order. | A blog post tracked this to Fiore v. White, a 1999 case in which Breyer wrote an opinion certifying a question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after which SCOTUS reversed the Third Circuit per curiam. The Third Circuit opinion in question was written by Circuit Judge Samuel Alito. | The first question would be whether those papers are indeed "legit", and we don't do product reviews. Assuming the company didn't mess up and she was legally served, the next question would be whether she responded (in the legal sense) or not. If she failed to respond at all within 21 days (add 9 days if she is out of state), then your next step would be to file default divorce paperwork (presumably that's covered in the service you paid for). If she agreed to the divorce and the courts knows that, then you file some more paperwork and she doesn't have to show up to anything. If she disagreed, there will be an "answer" and possibly a counterpetition. There is an exchange of paperwork w.r.t. assets, a mandatory mediation stage, more paperwork, disclosures etc. and a pre-trial conference, followed by a trial. If you are at this stage, attendance is mandatory. As long as you have proof of service, nobody requested a postponement, and there is some evidence to support your claim, a default judgment can be issued. It's not clear what "divorce proceeding" you are referring to that involves her attendance. However, you can file divorce paperwork yourself or using an online service, and using an online service does not render the paperwork illegitimate. It's not guaranteed that the service did what would be necessary for you to get the outcome you desire, but that's beyond the scope of what we can tell you. | Judges and justices can file lawsuits like anyone else, but ordinarily the judges who are colleagues of the judge or justice would recuse themselves and it would be assigned to another venue at trial (in the case of a trial court judge), and on appeal would be assigned to judges who don't have a personal relationship with the judge (possibly sitting by assignment from another appellate jurisdiction or by senior judges who weren't on the bench when this judge was on the bench). A U.S. Supreme Court justice's suit would not be considered recusal worth by an unfamiliar lower court judge who is only theoretically in the jurisdiction of the justice and no suit by a U.S. Supreme Court justice has ever been deemed cert worthy. If it did reach the U.S. Supreme Court, the Justice would be expected to, but not required in any enforceable way, to recuse from hearing the case. | The law was first promulgated on June 8, 1940 By the 76th Congress. The original text is here. It doesn’t seem to be a particularly important piece of legislation and I can find commentary on it and I’m not going to read the debates - if you do, please get back to us. Two points to note, it was passed at a time when most of the rest of the world was at war and the US was quietly preparing to be at war and it seems to be intended to fill a gap in state law since conviction under state law is a defence under Federal. | Although the constitution doesn't explicitly require your vote to be equal in strength, surely the founders intended with the word 'vote' that you at least get to choose who you vote for. Quite the contrary. The founders specifically intended that smaller states should have disproportionate strength - they knew exactly what they were doing. This was one of the major design goals of the Constitution and is reflected in several other areas (e.g. the structure of the Senate); the smaller states wouldn't have agreed to join the Union if such concessions hadn't been made. There's a general principle in law that "the specific overrides the general". You're not going to get anywhere by trying to read into the word "vote" when there is explicit text saying something different. If the founders intended the word "vote" to imply "equal power for everyone", then why would they have specified, in great detail, a system which does exactly the opposite? For that matter, the founders didn't particularly intend that the people be able to vote for president at all! Article II, Section 1 says only that "each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors..." There is no requirement that the state should hold an election to determine the appointment of the electors. According to Wikipedia, five states initially had the electors chosen by the state legislature, without having the people vote at all, and South Carolina continued to use this system until 1860. The 14th Amendment, section 2, appears to require that all eligible voters (male and 21 at the time, since modified by the 19th and 26th Amendments) be allowed to vote for their electors, but even there the wording is "any election" which appears to leave open the possibility of having no election at all. (It hasn't been tested as far as I know.) I think that your proposed lawsuit would be quickly dismissed, possibly as "frivolous". |
Can GEICO appeal this case "GEICO ordered to pay Missouri woman $5.2 million after she contracted STD in a car"? Can GEICO try to appeal this case "GEICO ordered to pay Missouri woman $5.2 million after she contracted STD in a car" ? What options does GEICO have regarding this case ? The full story about this case is posted by CNN at this link: https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/09/us/geico-insurance-std-settlement-missouri/index.html (CNN) - A Missouri woman was awarded $5.2 million in a settlement from insurance company GEICO after contracting a sexually transmitted disease from her partner in his vehicle, which was insured by the company, court documents show. The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld that award this week. The woman, a Jackson County resident, said she contracted Human papillomavirus (HPV) from her partner, according to court documents. On Tuesday, the Missouri Court of Appeals filed an opinion confirming the initial Jackson County Circuit Court arbitration award finding against GEICO. | Can GEICO try to appeal this case "GEICO ordered to pay Missouri woman $5.2 million after she contracted STD in a car"? Probably, but there's probably not much likelihood of success since the state courts have apparently interpreted a 2017 law to that effect. What options does GEICO have regarding this case? GEICO has a pending suit in federal court, scheduled apparently for October, to determine whether the damages awarded in the state courts are in fact covered by the insured party's policy. If GEICO prevails in that suit, it won't have to pay. It was hoping to prevail in this suit to avoid the expense of litigating the federal suit, but that did not come to pass. That suit is separate from the state litigation, not an appeal. The state litigation concerned the sexual partner's liability to the claimant, and the federal litigation concerns coverage; there are several potential reasons for its not being covered. | Venue The location where you file the claim is the court that will hear it unless: you both agree the judge orders a different venue based on submissions from the parties (unlikely in a small claim) Costs Costs awards in small claims are rare and generally do not extend to the legal fees and if they do, the amount is capped. Costs for reasonable expenses of witnesses are slightly more common. In general, costs are limited to what is reasonable - to get the costs of travel and accommodation for the Liverpool solicitor, the party would have to argue that there was no available equivalent representation available locally. This might be arguable if you need a QC expert in say, international maritime law, it seems unlikely for a small claims matter. Personal Comment Don't go to court for £100 - settle the damn thing or walk away. In the time and worry you spend on it you could earn that sum five times over. | Sending a letter to the red light camera company or police department may or may not get the charge dropped before trial. But whether the charge gets dropped before trial isn't the important question -- after all, people sometimes do get charged wrongly -- rather, the question is, if it goes to trial, whether you will win. Since this question is about California, all traffic tickets in California, including red light camera tickets, are criminal cases (that's why the case will be named "People of the State of California v. [your name]" in court documents). The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and the standard of evidence is "beyond a reasonable doubt". There is no provision in California law to fine or otherwise punish the owner of a vehicle for a moving violation, except through a conviction as the driver who committed the violation. If you plead not guilty and it goes to trial, the burden will be on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver was you. If the driver in the picture does not look like you, there is no way they can meet that burden, and the court must find you not guilty. (In most cases the prosecution will immediately drop the case when they discover that the picture does not look like you.) Note that you have an absolute right to not testify in your own criminal trial where you are the defendant, so there is no way they can force you to testify at the trial about who the driver was if it was not you (which would be irrelevant to the case against you anyhow). If you do not say who the driver was, and the police department fail to guess who it was (e.g. by searching for drivers whose licenses share the same address as you for someone who looks like the one in the picture), then nobody gets fined or punished for the violation. This is true even if you know full well who the driver was, or even if you were pictured sitting right next to them. You don't need to claim not to know who the driver was, because whether you know or not doesn't matter -- you have no legal obligation to tell the identity of the driver even if you know, and you cannot be fined or otherwise punished for the violation if you intentionally refuse to tell. | Health care providers in the US may send protected patient records to other health care providers for the purposes of treatment, either of the patient whose information it was or of a different patient (for instance, a doctor could send a chart of a different patient with a similar issue). This can be done without patient authorization, except for two cases: if the patient has requested more restrictions on use of their information and the provider agreed to those restrictions, and with psychotherapy notes. Source: HHS. WhatsApp specifically does not appear to be compliant with HIPAA, which is the US medical privacy law. However, there are many similar systems that are compliant. The body of your question asks about taking a smartphone screenshot; with many secure messaging systems, this is perfectly acceptable, and the principle of a doctor consulting with another doctor about a patient is actually encouraged. HIPAA violations do not by themselves result in any action against a medical license, nor can anyone besides the US government file suit based on a violation (everyone else is limited to complaining to the US government). Private lawsuits and (especially) license consequences are determined by state law, and are state- and situation-dependent. A doctor who calls a press conference to announce that this patient of his has HIV is more likely to face sanctions than a doctor whose violation was just not using a secure enough messaging client. HIPAA violations like this are not that uncommon, and generally result in at most a fine against the practice. | That is a bit of queer provision. I'm not going to answer your first question because I think that it is a gray area with no definitive answer. In answer to your second question, my strong suspicion is that it is drafted in the shadow of a particular state consumer protection act. An arbitration clause is allowed to change your procedural rights, but cannot change substantive rights that cannot be waived by a pre-dispute contractual agreement. If it does that, it is void and you can go to court instead of an arbitration forum. Many consumer protection laws provide that a prevailing party is entitled to minimum statutory damages in lieu of actual damages if they are smaller, in addition to your reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs if you prevail. This is done to make it economically viable for private citizens to sue over violations of the consumer protection law that would otherwise involve actual damages too small to be worth suing over, without having to bring a class action. If the relevant consumer protection law has a minimum $5,000 statutory damages amount for some claims covered by the clause, this clause would prevent it from being invalidated, while allowing the merchant to still have access to the consumer unfriendly arbitration forum in which class action lawsuits are probably also barred while class action lawsuits would not be in court. For a big merchant, it is far better to have to pay $5,000 and attorneys' fees to the handful of people who bring arbitrations and win them, than to lose a single class action lawsuit for millions of dollars. | is there any legal action I can take against the dealership to enforce their compliance with our contractual agreement? Yes, you can sue for breach of contract. You would probably seek an order for specific performance. You could also claim damages but it is difficult to see exactly what damage you have suffered. Is there a reasonable timeline that they must deliver within if a date is not specified in the contract? Yes, where a contract is silent on a date for performance of an obligation they must be carried out in a reasonable time. From the circumstances 4 months is starting to seem unreasonable but they will no doubt argue that it is reasonable- this is something the court would decide. | Your attorney can file a lawsuit against the other driver, and legal liability can be determined in court. Your want to let an attorney do this, because the one thing that keeps you from being (expensively) counter-sued for defamation is that you didn't name the driver and insurance company. It is extremely unlikely that the other driver accused you of liability ("liable" is a legal conclusion, not a fact). Instead, there is a dispute over the facts. During the trial, both sides get to present their evidence and the judge will determine who is actually liable. If you are found liable, your insurance company may have to pay up. If the other guy is found liable, his company will have to pay up. Or, fault can be split 50-50 (in which case you will be out of luck because you don't have collision insurance to cover your losses). If the insurance company believes that the facts support their client and that you will lose in court, they are not going to volunteer to pay your losses. If they believe that the facts support you, or are closer to 50-50 w.r.t. fault, they are unlikely to volunteer to give you money. If the driver makes a material plainly false statement to his insurance company, they might have recourse against him. Lying under oath is perjury which is a criminal offense. But mis-remembering facts or having incorrect beliefs is not a crime and won't lead to any legal problems for the driver. The belief that you are not at fault is not a lie. If the facts are as cut and dried as you make them out to be, the matter will be easily sorted out in court. | State law may provide for criminal prosecution for vandalism, which could result in a fine or even imprisonment. The state can prosecute you, private individuals cannot. Fines imposed by a private organization are only enforceable through contracts, where damages could be recovered, but penalties cannot be assessed. ("Late fees" are in the class of "liquidated damages", where the agreement says what the late fee is – they don't just make up a number). Ga. Code § 44-3-223 does require you to "comply with all lawful provisions of the property owners' association instrument", but if it isn't in the instrument, you do not have to comply. |
Can a restaurant bypass Oregon's straw law by also selling boxes of straws? It appears that a restaurant could very easily circumvent Oregon's plastic straw law (2019 SB90) by selling boxes of disposable plastic straws in addition to selling food and drink (with individual straws). Section 1(1)(b): “Convenience store” means a business that, for compensation, offers or provides a range of commodities that includes food and beverages. Section 1(2): (a) A food and beverage provider or convenience store may not provide a single-use plastic straw to a consumer unless the consumer specifically requests the single-use plastic straw. ... (c) The prohibition in paragraph (a) of this subsection does not apply to a convenience store that: (A) Sells or offers single-use plastic straws for sale in bulk or unconnected with a sale or provision of food or a beverage... By selling straws, food, and drink, I believe they are "for compensation, offer[ing] or provid[ing] a range of commodities that includes food and beverages," and therefore are a "convenience store." They are "[s]ell[ing] or offer[ing] single-use plastic straws for sale in bulk or unconnected with a sale or provision of food or a beverage", so the prohibition does not apply. Is this correct? | Rather than deciding that a restaurant is a convenience store, the restaurant owner can, following the text that you quoted ("unless the consumer specifically requests the single-use plastic straw"), wait for the customer to request a straw, in which case they can give the customer a straw. If a restaurant owner decides to declare that it is a convenience store and not a restaurant, there could be unintended consquences, since (for examples) a convenience store can't serve a glass of beer. | I believe that under federal law, the franchise owner cannot avoid overtime in this way. A similar case was considered by the Labor Department in 2005 (FLSA2005-17NA): This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning the application of the overtime requirements of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to employees who work at two different health care facilities operated by one management company. It is our opinion that all hours worked at any of the facilities must be combined for the purpose of calculating hours worked under the FLSA. The letter explains the logic pretty clearly, with citations. When an employee is "jointly" employed by two or more employers, then the hours are all combined for overtime purposes. 29 CFR 791.2(b) explains how "jointly" is determined: Where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employers, or works for two or more employers at different times during the workweek, a joint employment relationship generally will be considered to exist in situations such as: (1) Where there is an arrangement between the employers to share the employee's services, as, for example, to interchange employees; or (2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the employee; or (3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer. Paragraph (1) applies: the two employers (the two restaurants) have an arrangement to share the employee's services (the owner is explicitly dividing their hours). Paragraph (3) also applies: both employers are under common control, since the same person owns both. They certainly are "not completely dissociated". The same logic would seem to apply even if the two locations are different restaurants, or different types of businesses. The 2005 letter explains further: Factors that are relevant in finding joint employment include, for example, whether there are common officers or directors of the companies; the nature of the common management support provided; whether employees have priority for vacancies at the other companies; whether there are any common insurance, pension or payroll systems; and whether there are any common hiring seniority, recordkeeping or billing systems. These also seem likely to apply in your hypothetical cases. | Federal law bars possession of guns by felons and also bars the use of straw purchasers. The primary statute involved in 18 U.S.C. § 992(g). Being in a gun show would not be per se illegal, absent an atypical parole or probation condition. But, in this case it looks like the individuals held the guns which would constitute possession, and it looks like they also arranged for a straw purchase. Merely touching a gun with a single finger would probably not constitute possession of a gun for this purpose, although the incentive not to test the boundaries is great, because the sentences are so severe. (Incidentally, there are more convictions for this offense in Missouri than anyplace else in the United States). | No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive. | Bartenders and their employers face stiff regulatory penalties (including fines and loss of a license to serve alcohol), and they also face potentially massive lawsuit liability for serving alcohol to someone is who too drunk if the patron later leaves and drives drunk or other harm results (such lawsuits are sometimes called "dramshop actions"). If a bartender serves a "virgin" drink when a regular one is ordered, without the customer's knowledge, this could result in liability for breach of contract (with the damages likely being either a nominal $1 or the difference between the cost of the regular drink and the virgin drink if the customer is charged the higher price). But affirmative defenses of illegality of the proposed contract (when the customers orders an alcoholic drink) might void liability. It could also result in liability for fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment. But again, unless the customer is up-charged for the alcoholic price while getting a less expensive drink, the damages would be nominal (unlikely to exceed $1) and affirmative defenses might apply. | The felon-possession law is Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503, which distinguishes Category I restricted person and Category II restricted person, a complex definitions that distinguish felons in general and violent felons, as defined at Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5. In the case stricter case, the law says: (2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under the person's custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or control: (a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or (b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree felony. and in the less strict case: (3) A Category II restricted person who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or control: (a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or (b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. The law does not impose any restrictions unrestricted people. A "dangerous weapon" is defined in 76-10-501(6)(a) as "a firearm; or an object that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury". They add a bit of subjectivity to their definition of "dangerous weapon" (i.e. "we'll decide after the fact if the thing is a dangerous weapon"), because: (b) The following factors are used in determining whether any object, other than a firearm, is a dangerous weapon: (i) the location and circumstances in which the object was used or possessed; (ii) the primary purpose for which the object was made; (iii) the character of the wound, if any, produced by the object's unlawful use; (iv) the manner in which the object was unlawfully used; (v) whether the manner in which the object is used or possessed constitutes a potential imminent threat to public safety; and (vi) the lawful purposes for which the object may be used. The felon could not have a stun gun with the intent to use it as a dangerous weapon, but it is not prohibited for a felon to have one to use on for legal purposes. There are contexts where stun guns are held to be dangerous weapons (United States v. Wallace, 800 F.2d 1509. Some states define stun guns as dangerous weapons, but that is not the case in Utah. It is also illegal for an unrestricted person to "sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any firearm or dangerous weapon to any person, knowing that the recipient is" a restricted person, and in cases of flagrant negligence the court might find that allowing such a person access to a dangerous weapon constituted "transferring" the weapon. | You've already found an answer to the question about theft in the linked answer, that since they do not take the goods, nor even intend to take them away permanently there can be no consideration for theft here. There may be a case of criminal damage though, reading up on CPS website brings up some interesting points, notably: Damage is not defined by the Act and what constitutes damage is a matter of fact and degree. The courts have construed the term liberally and included damage that is not permanent such as smearing mud on the walls of a police cell. The damage need not be visible or tangible if it affects the value or performance of the property. It could be argued that by rearranging merchandise in a shop, with clear intent to disrupt its operation you are affecting the performance of the store, and that just may fall under criminal damage. Especially when done regularly, or in an organized way; something that demonstrably affects the business. Though in practice I doubt that anyone, besides the people "hiding" the papers, will care. Shelves in most newspaper stores are inspected and restocked multiple times a day, and as a part of normal customers routine stuff gets moved around and later corrected by staff. | In England and Wales and Scotland, 'licensed premises', i.e. premises authorised to serve alcohol, are obliged to provide free drinking water to customers on request. Unlicensed premises are not obliged to provide drinking water. In England and Wales, all licensed premises "must ensure that free potable water is provided on request to customers where it is reasonably available". https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2014/9780111116906/schedule?view=plain In Scotland, all licensed premises are obliged to provide "tap water fit for drinking" free to customers on request. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2005/16/schedule/4/paragraph/8/2005-12-21?view=plain In Northern Ireland there is no law providing for giving customers free water on request. Schools in Great Britain (i.e. not Northern Ireland) are obliged to supply free drinking water. England https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/1943/made Scotland https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2020/153/regulation/7/made Wales https://www.legislation.gov.uk/mwa/2009/3/section/5 All UK workplaces must provide workers an "adequate supply of wholesome drinking water". https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1992/3004/regulation/22/made |
Open Source License restrictions and recent sanctions against Russia Does there exist an open source license like GPL, GPLv2, BSD and so on which allows author to prohibit usage of the licensed software in some country? | For the GPL "family" of open source licenses, the answer is no. The GPL FAQ answers a closely related question: I'd like to license my code under the GPL, but I'd also like to make it clear that it can't be used for military and/or commercial uses. Can I do this? (#NoMilitary) No, because those two goals contradict each other. The GNU GPL is designed specifically to prevent the addition of further restrictions. GPLv3 allows a very limited set of them, in section 7, but any other added restriction can be removed by the user. More generally, a license that limits who can use a program, or for what, is not a free software license. I'd also recommend looking into "Why programs must not limit the freedom to run them" (the page linked by the FAQ). Stallman there argues (among other lines) that copyright is about limiting, well, copies rather than running the program. Similar to limiting the production of copies of a book as opposed to restricting what you are allowed to do with the information contained in the book. (I may add: or restricting who is allowed to read it.) Also, "Imagine selling pens with conditions about what you can write with them." (So this is basically the FSF's position) The OSI definition of what requirements a software license must meet in order to be considered open source by them has relevant clauses: Free Redistribution (though this says that anyone can distribute the software, it does not directly talk about restricting to whom the software may be given) No Discrimination Against Persons or Groups No Discrimination Against Fields of Endeavor The OSI has a newsletter post "Open Source responds to the Russia-Ukraine war: First thoughts from the Executive Director", which links to a further discussion on the topic. This is more about politics and ethics than legal questions. However, I think it's relevant in 2 ways: For the situation at hand: They point out that while the open source definitions do not allow the license to have such restrictions, there is nothing that forces you (or a repository provider) to serve "customers" from all regions worldwide. I.e., geoblocking downloads is not prohibited by the FOSS licenses. It does show that there is a discussion on licenses that are somewhat more restrictive than the current open source definitions. As David Siegel points out, there's nothing to keep you from putting such restrictions into a proprietary license. And if there are sufficiently many people who want to do that, we may see "more restricted open source" licenses in the future. (IANAL, but I'd expect there may be limits to what can be restricted in a boilerplate license wrt. anti-discrimination laws.) Independently of what the license allows, people are anyways bound by general law, e.g. sanctions. | Software licenses are protected by copyright, meaning that you need the author's permission to copy them. One way to get permission is to buy a license, since many of them are for sale. Sometimes (e.g. CC licenses) a license to copy the license is granted. You can also read and understand what is in a license, and use that knowledge to write your own. This is different from copying the license, since what you are extracting from the existing licenses is the ideas, not the specific expression. | You cannot safely rely on the US doctrine of Fair Use, except if the rights-holder sues you in US courts. In France, there are limited exceptions to the authors proprietary rights. Under Art. L-122-5, there are some relevant potential exceptions: 3ºa) analyses and short quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational, scientific or informatory nature of the work in which they are incorporated... 4º. parody, pastiche and caricature, observing the rules of the genre. Your description of the intended use does not fit these criteria. Consulting with a copyright attorney is advised, if you don't want to obtain a license. | The GPL does not explicitly specify a time within which the source code must be provided, which probably means a "reasonable time" is allowed. What is "reasonable" would eventually be evaluated by a court, if the matter ever got that far. But please note that only the copyright holder (or the holder's authorized agent) can sue for infringement. The license does not give other people a right to sue for infringement, and I doubt that any license could grant such a right. One could inform the copyright holder who could sue, but the holder need not sue, and undertaking such a suit would involve expense, time, and effort. Whether the offer to provide the source constitutes a binding agreement is not clear, and may well vary in different jurisdictions. The question does not state any particular jurisdiction. | The Google terms of service do not prohibit using their translate programs to create something that you sell. TOS for using their API would be irrelevant, since that isn't what you're doing. There is no clear copyright issue: as far as I can tell, there is not yet any case law suggesting that the output of a program can be owned by the copyright-holder of the program. (Copyright must be held by a legal person, i.e. an actual person or a corporation, and a program cannot yet be a legal person). A human-performed translation is subject to copyright protection since what is protected is that which is created by the (translating) author, and a program lacks that creative element. A translation owes its existence to the program-user using a particular tool to create the work, be it a pen or a translation program. What is unclear at present is whether a person using machine translation in a permitted fashion to create a derivative work thereby gains copyright to that derived work. | In general this is protected by the first amendment. It is not in general a problem describing how one can one can do something illegal. But there are special cases to be careful with. You might want to do some research into the limits on free speech. It would be hard to provide an answer that fully covers all your different cases and you would need to be more specific about what illegal activity you want to describe. In describing how to do something illegal, you might accidentally share information that you are not allowed to share. When you post things online, this can be considered as publishing or exporting. Therefore certain export restrictions might apply. Also, It is illegal to publish bomb making manuals, with the knowledge or intent that this information be used to commit a federal crime of violence. See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/842. There are restrictions on publishing material relating to cryptography without having an export license. Granted, this isn't necessarily related to publishing things that are illegal, but just to give an idea about how publishing/exporting knowledge can causes problems. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the_United_States ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) sets restrictions on what you can publish about arms. What you publish can't be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” See for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandenburg_v._Ohio. One might imagine that you could get into trouble if someone interprets what you do as inciting or producing a lawless action. It might sound obvious, but you want to make sure that you have the right to share the information that you have. The information that you are providing might be copyrighted in some way. | You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license. | It's possible that CAD has a separate licence from the authors of ABC that allows them to produce a closed source copy. If not, they have no right to distribute CAD. However two wrongs don't make a right, and so you don't get to violate the copyright of CAD.* Unfortunately, unless you are one of the authors of ABC, you have no standing to sue the authors of CAD. You can only notify the authors of ABC and hope they do. If the authors of ABC don't have the resources to pursue the matter, you may be out of luck. That's one of the reasons the FSF gets copyright assignments for their projects. * It turns out that this is a much more debateable issue than I first thought. Some courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work is not copyrightable. |
Must restaurants serve water for free to their customers in France? https://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/Publications/Vie-pratique/Fiches-pratiques/Carafe-d-eau-verre-d-eau (mirror 1, mirror 2) states: La carafe d'eau ordinaire en accompagnement du repas est inclue dans le prix du repas. The flask of ordinary water accompanying the meal is included in the price of the meal However, as Relaxed mentioned: The page doesn't exactly state that, it says that restaurants cannot charge for tap water, not that they must serve some. Must restaurants serve water for free to their customers in France? | First of all, the site you found is governmental, so a rather good find in the first place. It indicates: Au restaurant, la carafe d'eau ordinaire en accompagnement du repas est inclue dans le prix du repas. En outre, les établissements de restauration et débits de boisson doivent indiquer la possibilité pour les consommateurs de demander de l'eau potable gratuite. In the restaurant, the carafe of plain water to accompany the meal is included in the price of the meal. In addition, catering establishments and drinking establishments must indicate the possibility for consumers to request free drinking water. The relevant law cited in the further article is Order No. 25-268 of June 8, 1967, which was repealed in 2016, but speaks about that such a charge needs to be included in the price. However, a different order concerning the display of prices from 1987/1990 is still active. This specifies in Article 5: Les cartes et menus doivent comporter, pour chaque prestation, le prix ainsi que la mention "boisson comprise" ou "boisson non comprise" et, dans tous les cas, indiquer pour les boissons la nature et la contenance offerte. Cards and menus must include, for each service, the price as well as the mention "drink included" or "drink not included" and, in all cases, indicate for the drinks the nature and the capacity offered. Likewise, an environmental law in the shape of Article L541-15-10 demands the following: A compter du 1er janvier 2022, [...] Les établissements de restauration et débits de boisson sont tenus d'indiquer de manière visible sur leur carte ou sur un espace d'affichage la possibilité pour les consommateurs de demander de l'eau potable gratuite. Ces établissements doivent donner accès à leurs clients à une eau potable fraîche ou tempérée, correspondant à un usage de boisson. From 1 January 2022, [...] Restaurants and drinking establishments are required to indicate in a visible manner on their menu or on a display space the possibility for consumers to request free drinking water. These establishments must give their customers access to fresh or temperate drinking water, corresponding to the use of beverages. Since the latter law actually requires them to give access to free drinking water (which is tap water) on request, they are allowed to not bring it out with the meal, as long as they have the required note that tells about it. However, many restaurants will deliver a flask of it on its own, sometimes even before you order. As a side note: the serving of free water to meals is pretty much a custom in France, even if the waste reduction law of 2022 is very new still and the old law that had mandated it went away in 2016. When I last was in Paris in about 2005, I had to ask for water in one restaurant as they didn't deliver it on their own with the meal, upon which the server asked if I would prefer it chilled or warmed. In none of the about 10 different food places I visited in the week, water or table charges did show up on the bill, very much in accordance with the 1987/90 law. In one restaurant also the slices of baguette served while we choose our meals were off the bill, even though we asked for a refill of those. | I am not from Denver, so it may be different there, but I would think most people would take that to mean the appliance meets UL standards or other safety standards and has been certified. Each governing body, be it a town, county, state, or country, gets to decide who can certify an appliance. | In the second case, is there anything to declare to the taxes? Yes, just like in the scenario of depositing in your bank account. Otherwise it would be easy for everybody to avoid the heavy tax burden by bartering or transacting without the use of official currency. The Code général des impôts in its Article 13 includes in the concept of bénéfice ou revenu imposable the market value of profits and benefits in kind ("y compris la valeur des profits et avantages en nature"). | Quebec has more stringent sweepstakes laws than the rest of Canada: Companies don't exclude residents of Quebec from sweepstakes because they don't want to advertise in Quebec, or because they have anything against the residents of that province. The reason why so many sweepstakes are void in Quebec is that the sponsors must follow a stringent set of laws set out by Quebec's Regie des alcools, des courses et des jeux (RACJ), which governs alcohol, lotteries, contests, gambling, and more. ... For example, in order for sweepstakes with prizes worth more than a certain value to be open to residents of Quebec, the companies sponsoring the sweepstakes must take some or all of the following steps: Register the sweepstakes rules and all advertisements used to promote the contest with the Quebec government at least 30 days ahead of the sweepstakes' launch. Publish the full text of the sweepstakes' rules at least 10 days before the giveaway begins. Pay a fee of up to 10% of the sweepstakes' value, depending on who is allowed to enter. Agree to allow the government of Quebec to mediate any lawsuits arising from the contest. Follow strict guidelines about the contents of the sweepstakes rules. Allow the government of Quebec the right to approve any changes to the giveaway that need to be made once it has started, and to approve canceling the giveaway if it becomes necessary to do so. File a written report after the contest has concluded, attesting that the prizes have been delivered or attempted to be delivered. Agree to let the RACJ mediate any disagreements with the public. File security in the amount of the prize value, to ensure that the prizes are actually awarded. The full set of laws can be found in chapter L-6, r. 6 of Quebec Consolidated Statutes. Note that under Quebec law, a "publicity contest" (concours publicitaire) is a contest, a lottery scheme, a game, a plan or an operation which results in the awarding of a prize, carried on for the object of promoting the commercial interests of the person for whom it is carried on. So even though chance plays a minimal role in the contest you've described, it's still regulated by the stringent requirements of Quebec law. In contrast, in the rest of Canada, promotional contests are governed by Section 74.06 of the (federal) Competition Act. A set of enforcement guidelines can be found on the Competition Bureau's website; they basically require anyone running a contest to: give "adequate and fair disclosure... of the number and approximate value of the prizes, of the area or areas to which they relate and of any fact within the knowledge of the person that affects materially the chances of winning;" not "unduly delay" the distribution of the prizes, and select winners on the basis of skill or on the basis of random chance. [I think this basically bars giving the prize to the boss's nephew.] However, there is nothing about fees, securities, publishing the rules in advance, submitting one's advertising materials to the government, etc. Given the relative ease of running a contest in the rest of Canada compared to Quebec, one can easily see how a company might not find it worthwhile to allow Quebecers to enter and win. | This question is controlled almost entirely by local municipal and county ordinances. It is not a question of federal law that is uniform across the U.S. and in most cases it is not even a question of state law. So, there is no single answer to your question. Most localities regulate this with some combination of hotel specific building codes (usually incorporated by reference from a uniform building code promulgated by a private non-profit organization as a model building code provision) and hotel specific local zoning ordinances. | There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later. | I think this relates to individual stores interpretation of California's "ABC Laws": § 25658. Sale to and consumption by person under 21 years of age; Use by peace officers to apprehend sellers of alcoholic beverages to minors (a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (c), every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away any alcoholic beverage to any person under 21 years of age is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Except as provided in Section 25667 or 25668, any person under 21 years of age who purchases any alcoholic beverage, or any person under 21 years of age who consumes any alcoholic beverage in any on-sale premises, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (c) Any person who violates subdivision (a) by purchasing any alcoholic beverage for, or furnishing, giving, or giving away any alcoholic beverage to, a person under 21 years of age, and the person under 21 years of age thereafter consumes the alcohol and thereby proximately causes great bodily injury or death to himself, herself, or any other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The last part is the part that scares business owners. Some interpret it as "if they furnish alcohol to you (a person over 21) and have reasonable suspicion that the purchase will be given to the minor, the person furnishing the alcohol is guilty of a misdemeanor". This is absolutely true in the case of bar owners/bartenders. If they sell somebody a drink, even if that person is over 21, and that drink is then given to a minor, they can be (probably not successfully) held responsible in some form for any injury that person sustains or commits as a result of alcohol consumption. Some stores take this much more seriously (because a violation can mean the loss/suspension of the liquor license) than others, and it is at the stores discretion to deny the sale based on any suspicion, whether based in reality or not. | This is from a Canadian point of view, but the rules regarding how corporations run is generally pretty standard. I took a few classes in corporate governance, but I'm working mostly from memory, so hopefully most of the information is accurate! A corporation is its own entity, separate from any shareholders, and it can make whatever policies it wants. Unless you are an officer or on the board of directors, your participation in the company usually will be limited to voting in shareholders' meetings and receiving dividends. Refusal of service is a policy matter, so the fact that you are a shareholder (or anyone else, for that matter!) should be irrelevant. In fact, you might be denied service because you're an officer due to conflicts of interest. If the company was unincorporated, you may have more rights, but you'd probably be subject to some sort of agreement. |
How are general damages for assault calculated? For example, in discrimination suits, one has the Vento scale as a guide to calculating damages. Does anything similar exist for trespass to person? | You are looking for the Judicial College Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases, which had its sixteenth edition published in April 2022. This book sets out the range of compensation based on the type of injury suffered. The scale is very detailed. For example, we can find in Chapter 7, (G) Injuries to the elbow (a) A severely disabling injury - £39170 to £54830 (b) Less severe injuries causing impairment of function but not involving major surgery or significant disability - £15650 to £32010 (c) Moderate or minor injury (i) Injuries fully resolving after about one year - In the region of £3530 (ii) Injuries with the majority of symptoms resolving within 18 to 24 months but with nuisance level symptoms persisting after that - In the region of £6500 (iii) Injuries recovering after three years with nuisance symptoms thereafter and/or requiring surgery - Up to £12590 There are lots of other rules about the calculations, which are beyond what can be summarised in a text box. In the case of assault, one might find reference to Chapter 4, which is on psychiatric effects including PTSD, as well as to the physical injuries. Probably the most important note is that they are Guidelines, not Rules, and so the court can deviate from them at its pleasure. But this is what the judge will have at their fingertips during the proceedings. Because these concern damages, receipt of an award will depend on whether the respondent actually has the money. For that reason, there is a statutory scheme, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, which can make additional payments to victims of violent crime. CICS awards are reduced based on civil damages already paid, because you can't be compensated twice for the same injury. They are also calculated after any insurance payout, so it's in the nature of a final resort. The CICS tariffs are not the same as the JCG ones. Taking the elbow example, CICS 2012 rates damage to one elbow with substantial recovery at £1500 (level A2), and with continuing significant disability at £6200 (level A7). Other eligibility rules and procedures are different as well. In practice, the majority of CICS awards are for between £1000 and £2400 (bands A1 to A4); there is a proposed simplification of the bands into fewer levels, but this has not yet been implemented. | The Example of Colorado Law In Colorado, a private individual who is a victim of theft can bring a lawsuit for civil theft in which a prevailing theft victim can recover the actual economic amount of the theft (including pre-judgment interest at the statutory rate from lost use of the stolen property per a separate pre-judgment interest statute), treble damages (i.e. actual damages plus twice that amount as a civil penalty), and their attorneys' fees and the costs of the litigation. Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-4-405. Rights in stolen property All property obtained by theft, robbery, or burglary shall be restored to the owner, and no sale, whether in good faith on the part of the purchaser or not, shall divest the owner of his right to such property. The owner may maintain an action not only against the taker thereof but also against any person in whose possession he finds the property. In any such action, the owner may recover two hundred dollars or three times the amount of the actual damages sustained by him, whichever is greater, and may also recover costs of the action and reasonable attorney fees; but monetary damages and attorney fees shall not be recoverable from a good-faith purchaser or good-faith holder of the property. Returning the property stolen doesn't change the fact that civil theft was committed, it only reduces the amount of the damages by the amount repaid and prevents interest from continuing to accrue. In practice, it would be very uncommon for someone to bring a suit for civil theft after they are repaid. But, nothing in principle prevents this from happening until the statute of limitations runs (in Colorado that is probably three years from the date that the theft is discovered), although there might be an argument that accepting the funds returned by mutual agreement might constitute a waiver of their claim, or might give rise to equitable defenses of estoppel or laches. Criminal Charges Of course, in the U.S., even if the company doesn't press charges, a prosecutor does have the authority to press criminal charges without their consent. A theft victim does not have the legal authority to relieve you of criminal liability for theft. There are some countries other than the U.S. where a theft victim can relieve someone who committed theft of criminal liability (if I recall correctly, Germany is one of them), but that is a minority position internationally as a legal matter (although actual practice is often different). Civil Lawsuits For Theft In Other Jurisdictions While most states do not have a statutory civil theft statute, almost every state and country would allow a civil lawsuit for "conversion" or the equivalent for taking property that does not belong to you for your own benefit (which is a tort). Other U.S. states and other countries would vary over whether repayment of funds converted prior to commencement of a lawsuit limits actual damages and exemplary damages based upon actual damages to pre-judgment interest, or even constitutes a complete defense, or not. Most U.S. states allow for an award of punitive damages in connection with an intentional tort (statutes of limitations and pre-judgment interest award rules vary greatly). Most non-U.S. jurisdictions would not allow an award of punitive damages in a civil action involving an intentional tort. In the absence of a statutory authorization of the kind found in Colorado, attorneys' fees and costs would normally not be allowed for a U.S. plaintiff in an intentional tort case like this one, but most non-U.S. courts would allow an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a prevailing party in a case like this one. Practical Considerations The fact that you repaid the funds makes some defenses to future civil or criminal charges very challenging. You can't truthfully deny that you repaid the funds and that comes close to an admission of guilt. But, if you state under oath that you engaged in this conduct, you make yourself vulnerable to criminal prosecution based upon that testimony under oath. In practice, one reason that the business is actually unlikely to sue you in this situation (unless they discovered that more than $50,000 was taken) is that having lost your job and paid them $50,000 you may not be able to pay even a large judgment if it was awarded against you (although such a judgment, if entered, would probably not be dischargeable in bankruptcy under U.S. law). So, the cost-benefit analysis of such a suit for the company might not make much sense. Also, while having a suit like this filed against you would certainly damage your reputation seriously in a way that could be located with a public records search, it might also moderately harm the reputation of the company which revealed that its internal controls were lax enough to make it possible for the theft to happen. In the case of a large business the damage that this could do to the fair market value of the business and its creditworthiness might outweigh the benefit it would receive from bringing such a lawsuit. | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. | When the matter is final (no more appeals), the winner in the suit will request a writ of execution to collect whatever is owed. This may involve seizing a person's cash, car and so on. There are limits to what can be seized (some things are exempt by law), for example they can't outright seize a person's home. However, they can put a lien on it, meaning that when the house is sold, the proceeds go to the winner. There are various limits on what can be taken, for example Social Security benefits, welfare, child support – the details are largely determined by state law. There is also a process where the loser's wages can be garnished (there are federal and state limits on how much can be taken). Ultimately, it may not be possible to collect everything. However, today's lack of funds does not necessarily mean permanent lack of funds. A judgment will be valid for a long time and may be renewed. The reason for liability for damages comes down to basic justice. If you harm a person to some extent, you should compensate them accordingly for the wrong that you have done to them. The job of the jury is to determine two factual questions: (1) did the defendant wrongfully harm the plaintiff, and (2) what is the extent of harm. The ability of a defendant to pay such an amount does not affect the answer to those two questions, so inability to pay is legally irrelevant. how much harm was done | I suspect that you would not be convicted in the present case, because the jury would be sympathetic to the plight of the person being dragged out and unsympathetic to the behavior of the draggers. However, we should set aside the emotional elements of a jury trial and focus on legal principles. The basic question is whether a person has the right to use force to defend against an unlawful battery: "a person is privileged to use such force as reasonably appears necessary to defend him or herself against an apparent threat of unlawful and immediate violence from another". This right to defense also extends to defense of others. But it has to appear to be to unlawful, which is to say, you have to reasonably believe that the force used against the victim is unlawful. If a couple of thugs try to drag a person away, then an observer probably has a reasonable belief that this is an unlawful battery. But if a couple of police officers are observed dragging a person away (arresting him), apparently acting officially, the force used (up to a point) is apparently lawful and would not constitute battery of the victim. For defensive force against police to be lawful, the forced used by the police must be excessive. The outcome then depends on what a reasonable person would conclude (this is where the jury or judge makes a rather subjective decision). If a reasonable person would conclude that the assailants are acting lawfully in arresting the person, then a higher bar must be clear to justifiably use force in defense of others. Wearing a jacket that says "Police" favors the "appears lawful" side (though if you happened to know for a fact that the person wearing the jacket is not a police officer, then the "police exception" would not be applicable). In the relevant case, the facts point to the appearance of a lawful arrest (even if were to turn out to be judged unlawful). In the case that this is an apparent arrest, it would have to be the case that a reasonable person would find the force used to be excessive. Generally speaking, force used by officers is held to be reasonable, except in some cases where it is not. See for example the matter of Eric Garner, where the officers involved were not indicted. On the third hand, in this case, it might matter what the actual legal status of the "officers" is (they are not Chicago police). | To start off, you appear to be confusing assault and battery. Assault does not require physical contact in order for it to occur. Verbal assault is still a crime, but in your situation it doesn't appear that any verbal assault has occurred - he is not actively threatening you with harm, and you are not in fear of being harmed. Yelling can sometimes qualify as verbal assault, but any form of verbal assault is very hard to prove because it leaves no evidence. Unless someone other than the two parties involved comes forward, it likely won't go anywhere. Assuming this has been going on for some time, what you appear to be experiencing is harassment which usually qualifies as a civil matter, and police will not take any action other than asking one of you to leave in order to resolve the issue. Most often, they will ask you (as the person being harassed) to leave, but that can also be in your benefit. If you can prove the other person's harassment caused you to have to leave in order to be comfortable again, then you can claim damages and can sue that other person for the harassment - basically suing for damages of not being able to live in and enjoy your residence which you pay for, as well as any additional costs you encountered by having to find an alternate place to live because of their actions. Again, this is difficult to prove without someone else who has witnessed the continued harassment stepping forward (e.g. your guest who might have only witnessed it once is probably not an incredibly strong witness, because harassment is often defined as having persisted over time, and they cannot testify to more than what they saw in one night). The case would likely just devolve to a matter of "he-said" between the two of you - he will likely claim you just didn't like him and are making things up to get money out of him. You'd need to make sure you have other evidence that supports your side of the story. As far as claiming self-defense, my completely non-legal and mostly combination of "I wish this were common sense" and "I hate when people try to justify unneeded violence" advice is never rely on the self-defense plea. Unless you are in fear of your life, your best course of action if he threatens violence or actually hits you is to leave and let the police handle it. If you have physical marks on you and he has none on him, the case becomes much more clear-cut. If you fight back, and you both have marks, then it again becomes a case of "he-said" and it's hard to prove who initiated the confrontation without cooperating witnesses, and you'd likely both end up being arrested when the police showed up if they can't determine who the instigator was. Just because you know something was in self-defense doesn't necessarily mean the police, a judge, or a jury will believe you. Ultimately, if you're uncomfortable with the place you're living, you should start planning to move elsewhere immediately (which you appear to be doing). If you can both a) avoid financial damages to yourself by preventing yourself being put into a situation that requires you to move quickly without much planning and b) prevent the continued harassment - then you should. Don't let the pot just keep boiling over until it explodes all over the kitchen. You have the power to make this stop too, and you shouldn't rely on other people making the situation go away for you (e.g. your landlord is bound by a contract, and evicting a tenant based on your word can open them to a lot of legal troubles - they have to be very careful with how they handle such a situation). Yes, it sucks that it's not your fault you have to go through the extra effort or move away to resolve the situation, but getting yourself out of the situation should be your number one priority, and doing it yourself is often the easiest solution. | The only avenue for tenant liability would be if the tenant is responsible for the damage. The courts have not assigned responsibility for damage resulting from other people's disagreement with a political expression to the person expressing the viewpoint. You are generally free to peacefully express yourself, and as a renter this would be part of your right of "quiet enjoyment of the premise". If there is a lease condition that says "no political signs", then maybe that's a violation of the contract, but that might also be an illegal term in your state or city (under landlord-tenant laws). Since you have the right to express your opinion, the courts must respect that right and not deem that engaging in political expression negates your other rights. In general, if someone commits a crime, the law does not say "but you take the blame if you express your political opinion". | So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense. |
Is recording someone without their direct knowledge in one's own home legal? Consider the following scenarios: Alice visits Bob's home and he has surveillance devices in operation for security which record all of their interactions. Alice visits Bob's home after they go on a date and as a matter of general practice Bob surreptitiously starts a recorder as insurance in case she later attempts to accuse him of rape. Alice visits Bob's home and they anticipate the interaction to be fraught. Bob doesn't know whether she might try to coerce or blackmail him, so he starts a recorder without her knowledge. In each of these cases, has Bob done anything wrong? Does it make a difference if he only refers to the recordings himself and does not publish or disclose them? Does it make a difference if he only relies on them to prove Alice's lies or wrongdoing, thus retrospectively vindicating that Bob indeed had a reasonable excuse to be motivated to record her after all? Does it make a difference that it is Bob's home? How does the situation differ from a shop running CCTV on their own premises? What if it was a phone conversation rather than in person at Bob's home? | In England and Wales, in general it is legal to make a recording in one's own home without the knowledge or consent of the other participants. In general the law with regard to recordings is more strict in non-domestic contexts than it is in domestic contexts. For example, a business must "make all reasonable efforts" to inform a caller that their telephone call may be recorded. A business has obligations under data protection law that the householder does not have. Depending on the circumstances the homeowner might commit a civil tort (breach of confidence) or criminal offence if he discloses or publishes the recording made without the consent of the other participants. E.g. submitting it as evidence to court is OK, sharing it with friends or publishing it on the internet is likely not OK. In the specific context of the homeowner making a recording of a sexual act with another person and the other person has not consented to the making of the recording: if the homeowner shares the recording they might be investigated/prosecuted for the criminal offence of voyeurism (s67(3) Sexual Offences Act 2003) in R. v Richards the Court of Appeal ruled that the making of the recording for one's own sexual gratification amounts to the criminal offence of voyeurism (s67(3) Sexual Offences Act 2003) | england-and-wales There is nothing in the criminal law to compel Party X to identify Party Y in this scenario - they are under no legal obligation to contact the police or anyone else, and a witness summons, for example, cannot be served as there is no trial. That said, one option is for the victim to make a complaint to the police for an alleged offence of what is colloquially referred to as "revenge porn" contrary to s.33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015: (1) It is an offence for a person to disclose a private sexual photograph or film if the disclosure is made — (a) without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or film, and (b) with the intention of causing that individual distress. ... The definitions of "private" and "sexual" may be found at s.35: (2) A photograph or film is “private” if it shows something that is not of a kind ordinarily seen in public. (3) A photograph or film is “sexual” if — (a) it shows all or part of an individual's exposed genitals or pubic area, (b) it shows something that a reasonable person would consider to be sexual because of its nature, or (c) its content, taken as a whole, is such that a reasonable person would consider it to be sexual. The police can then ask Party X to either provide a witness statement identifying Party Y or, if Party X is concerned about unwarranted repercussions etc, to provide this information in confidence and their involvement will be protected as Sensitive Material as per para 2.1(9) and 6.14 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Code of Practice. | Art. 17 GDPR, Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) requires “erasure of personal data concerning him or her”. That’s all personal data. However, this only applies when this article applies. Section 1 details when this is and sections 2 and 3 detail limitations and exceptions to the right of erasure. For example, you would be allowed to keep financial records that you're legally obligated to keep. So, if they have the right, you have to delete all their personal data that is not exempted. Aggregate statistics and other anonymous data in the sense of Recital 26 are not personal data and don't have to be deleted. Whether the kinds of data you have mentioned would be sufficiently anonymous would require further analysis. | Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway. | Indirectly, no the wording of the caution is "You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence." It is illegal to question someone if they have asked for legal advice. so if you ask for a solicitor they are not allowed to question you, and you cannot (by definition) fail to answer their questions if they're not allowed to ask them. Reference from https://www.gov.uk/arrested-your-rights/legal-advice-at-the-police-station "Once you’ve asked for legal advice, the police can’t question you until you’ve got it - with some exceptions." | There is nothing preventing the OP's "subject" from making a Subject Access Request in these circumstances From the British Transport Police's Privacy Notice page, under the heading "How we use personal data": This privacy notice explains: ... the rights individuals have when we process their personal data. ... Right of Access: You can request access to the personal data we hold about you free of charge. You can request access to the personal data we hold about you using the contact details in this privacy notice. ... We collect personal data from a variety of sources, including: ... sound and visual images (e.g. from body worn cameras, CCTV, or facial recognition software); ... our own CCTV systems and body worn cameras. There's more detail in the link, which I have not replicated here to save space and avoid unnecessary "noise", but the above should cover the relevant points raised by the OP | As always, it depends. However, it is by no means certain that any public facing hobby project, such as a web app, is exempt from having to comply with the GDPR. Since the GDPR is only a few days old, we have of course no case law based upon the GDPR itself yet. However, when considering this, one should take the following two facts into consideration. 1. The "personal use exeption" in the GDPR is not new. The personal use exemption is unchanged from the article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. (There as a lot of lobbying for removing "purely" from the sentence – but drafters wanted to keep it.) 2. Case-law under the previous regulation restricts the scope of the exception The ECJ has ruled on the scope of the personal use exception in two cases: C-101/01 C-212/13 In both these cases, the ECJ took an extremely restrictive view, and concluded that the personal use exemption did not apply to the processing done by these individuals. In C-101/01 it can be argued that the hobby project as a blogger was connected to the controllers professional activity (she was a catechist in a local church, and blogged about her work. including her colleagues). But in C-212/13, there no such connection to professional or commercial activity. Here, the controller operated a CCTV to protect his home, but set it up to also capture public space, and that was enough for the ECJ to decide that the personal use exception did not apply. Discussion Case-law based upon Directive 95/46/EC is in no way binding for a future court that need to rule based upon the GDPR. We need to wait for case-law decided under the GDPR to be able to have some degree of certainty about the scope of the "private use exception" under GDPR. However, given what we know about how the ECJ has ruled in these cases in the past, I think it is hazardous to think that just because what you are doing on the web is just a "hobby project" not connected to professional or commercial activity, you are exempt from complying with the GDPR. Conclusion IMHO, you may be exempt, or you may not be exempt. I think it really depends on your activity in your hobby project, and to what extent this project processes the personal data of other people than yourself. | This question needs more detail. As a cybersecurity professional I can provide some technical context around what I believe to be the situation. While I do not know the legal precedence, technically, IP addresses cannot typically be attributed to an individual person. There are a number of reasons for this. In a local network, IP addresses are not unique. Rather, they are distributed by the DHCP server, and are reassigned at intervals. Forensic attribution to an individual in most environments would require a DHCP log linking the IP to the machine’s MAC address, with time stamps that correlate to the individual’s logon to that machine at the same time. If the IP correlation involves a VPN, it gets more difficult. I would need to know where the log/evidence was obtained to determine what the IPs in question actually correlate to. If the evidence was obtained in local area network of the suspect, the IP addresses are likely assigned by the DHCP server (see previous). If they are obtained after encryption in transit to decryption, then very little can be determined. If they were obtained at the VPN server log, these IPs likely belong to an ISP which in turn may or may not be able to show what machine initiated the conversation. Digital photos often contain EXIF data, which is metadata about the photo. This data can contain details like, device make and model, sometimes location, time and date... If the defendant owns a Nikon such and such and the photo was taken with a Nikon such and such, and was uploaded using a VPN the defendant has an account with, and the defendant was in that location at the time and place of the photo... there may be enough there... but I’m not a lawyer. I believe the discovery should include any EXIF metadata and logs to be used as evidence. You may need a special technical whiteness to educate the court on what can and cannot be determined (technically) given the evidence. Things to consider for such a witness could include: EXIF, forensic certification, network administration experience, VPN, TCPIP, OSI Model, Network Address Translation (NAT). Again, nothing here should be considered legal advise. Seek professional legal counsel. |
In what court would one sue another for assault as trespass to person? In England and Wales, what court can one use to sue another for assaulting them. | Civil justice in England and Wales is mainly dealt with in the county courts and, in the case of more substantial or complex cases, the High Court. The jurisdiction covers a very wide range – from quite small or simple claims, for example damaged goods or recovery of debt, to large claims between multi-national companies. https://www.judiciary.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-justice-system/jurisdictions/civil-jurisdiction/ | Legal Context This kind of argument is often called a "defense of others" defense which is available in every jurisdiction of which I am aware. Almost every state has a specific description of when this is permitted as part of their criminal code, usually in a general principles section at the beginning, or in the sections pertaining to crimes of violence. Some details vary from one state to another, but none of the facts presented in this hypothetical really push the envelope in terms of distinctions between one state's law and another. Most of the differences involve situations when the use of deadly force is allowed. For example, states differ regarding when deadly force allowed to prevent a burglary of your home or business which is in progress, particularly if it is possible to avoid a use of deadly force at all by retreating in a manner that puts you at no one at any significant risk of bodily injury. But, the scenario presented does not appear to involve the use of deadly force (although the definition of "deadly force" can be slippery and lead to some subtle variations in what is permitted from state to state). Another common nuance of variation between states involves the circumstances under which physical force or deadly physical force is authorized to make a citizens arrest, but this situation is also not implicated by your hypothetical. Once Thug is beat up, the scenario ends without any effort to detain Thug until the police arrive. Generally speaking, a defense of others defense that justifies a use of force under criminal law will also not give rise to civil liability in a lawsuit for assault and battery as opposed to a criminal prosecution for it. A Sample Defense Of Others Statute The pertinent section of the Colorado Revised Statutes (2016), strongly influenced by the language of the Model Penal Code (which never adopted in full by any state but highly influential stylistically in how U.S. criminal codes are drafted) is very typical of the majority rule regarding the defense of others and reads as follows (emphasizing the language relevant to the scenario in the question): § 18-1-704. Use of physical force in defense of a person (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204 ; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force if: (a) With intent to cause bodily injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that other person; or (b) He is the initial aggressor; except that his use of physical force upon another person under the circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so, but the latter nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force; or (c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law. (4) In a case in which the defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction regarding self-defense as an affirmative defense, the court shall allow the defendant to present evidence, when relevant, that he or she was acting in self-defense. If the defendant presents evidence of self-defense, the court shall instruct the jury with a self-defense law instruction. The court shall instruct the jury that it may consider the evidence of self-defense in determining whether the defendant acted recklessly, with extreme indifference, or in a criminally negligent manner. However, the self-defense law instruction shall not be an affirmative defense instruction and the prosecuting attorney shall not have the burden of disproving self-defense. This section shall not apply to strict liability crimes. Analysis of the Hypothetical Facts Is Paul guilty of assault and battery for attacking Thug, or would self-defense or some other standard defense apply? Paul is probably not guilty of assault and battery for attacking Thug because a defense of others defense justifies his actions. Paul is using physical force to defend a third person (and presumably himself as well once once he is involved in the fray) from what he reasonably believes to be the use of unlawful physical force by Thug, and generally, under those circumstances Paul may use a degree of force which Paul reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. Paul is most vulnerable in this scenario on the question of whether he reasonably believed that the degree of force he used was reasonably necessary for the purpose of defending Emily and himself from Thug's unlawful use of physical force, or whether he went further than what was reasonably necessary for a few minutes that left Thug "incapacitated and thoroughly bloodied". For example, suppose that Paul had already caused Thug to try to flee the scene after the first minute at which point Thug was slightly bruised and afraid of Paul, but was not at all incapacitated. But, suppose that despite this fact that Paul, awash with adrenaline from the fight, continued to pummel Thug for a couple more minutes as Thug repeatedly tried to flee the scene only to be dragged back by Paul. Suppose that Paul continued the fight after it was no longer necessary because Paul wanted to punish Thug for his mistreatment of Emily and to discourage other people from trying to attack Emily in the future, even after Paul knew that there was already no real risk that Thug himself would continue to use unlawful physical force against Emily no or in the near future. Under these circumstances, which aren't inconsistent with the hypothetical facts, if this extra couple of minutes caused Thug to be much more badly injured than he otherwise would have been if Thug had been allowed to flee after the first minute, then Paul could still be guilty of assault and battery, even though his actions were legally justified for the first minute of the fight. There is no indication that either Paul or Emily provoked the attack on Emily, or that either Paul or Emily was the initial aggressor, or that this was actually a pre-agreed dueling situation. So each of these circumstances which would be exceptions to the general rule that the defense of others is justified do not apply to this case. There is likewise no indication that Paul used "deadly force" as opposed to mere "physical force" in handling the situation. It is likely that Paul would have committed a crime if he had shot and killed Thug instead of beating him up, if Paul knew perfectly well at the time that he was capable of beating up Thug and making Thug go away for good as a result without resorting to a firearm, unless the attack on Emily was severe enough for Paul to reasonably believe that the attack was putting Emily at a real risk of serious bodily injury. | If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent? | Edits added below to outline Florida's laws based on OP's comment Jurisdiction does matter but here is a general answer regarding "stand your ground" laws. States that have so-called "stand your ground laws" each have their own language concerning the law. "Stand your ground laws" are often misunderstood but, generally, just mean that a person has no duty to retreat when using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or the defense of others. Your examples are more akin to "castle doctrine" laws which I touch on below. Note that all of these laws vary by jurisdiction. I've provided partial examples from Arizona, New York and California. Using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or defense of others is complex law and even a complete example from any particular jurisdiction will not be able to cover all circumstances. Each case will be determined by a judge or jury based on the facts of that particular case. Arizona's "stand your ground" statute, as an example, states: B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act. "Stand your ground" simply means that a person doesn't have to first attempt to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force. Arizona's statute regarding justification for self-defense states (emphasis mine): A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. B. The threat or use of physical force against another is not justified: In response to verbal provocation alone; or To resist an arrest that the person knows or should know is being made by a peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that allowed by law; or If the person provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely withdraw from the encounter; and (b) The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person. Note the phrase, "extent a reasonable person." This means that the actions of a person using deadly force will be measured against what a "reasonable person" would do in similar circumstances. Some states have a duty to retreat, particularly when in a public place, before using deadly force. New York, as an example, has a "duty to retreat" before using deadly force except in specific circumstances (emphasis mine): A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is: (i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or (ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter`s direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30; or (b) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery; or (c) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20. Castle Doctrine Laws typically refer to what one may do in their own home when it comes to the use of deadly force. Some states have extended the "castle doctrine" to include personal automobiles as well. California's "castle doctrine" statute, as an example, states that if one is in their own home and someone "unlawfully and forcibly" enters the home one can presume that the person in his or her residence "held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury": Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury. In California's statute both the resident and the person using force to gain entry have to know or have reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. If a person simply entered an unlocked home then the resident would have to have some other reasonable reason to believe that they were in imminent peril of death or great bodily injury. Wikipedia has a reasonable entry on the adoption of "stand your ground" and "castle doctrine" statutes and gives a state-by-state breakdown of both. Note that these laws have seen a lot of change recently and any particular entry for a state may not be accurate. Florida's self-defense laws Florida's "Use or threatened use of force in defense of person" states: 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.— (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Florida outlines the cases where use, or threatened use, of force is justified. Notice that in the law Florida specifically states that the person threatened does not have a duty to retreat. Florida also specifically states that a person has a "right to stand his or her ground" if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be and is not engaged in criminal activity. Florida statute also specifically outlines the right to use self-defense within one's home and vehicle. Florida has a "castle doctrine" similar to what was outlined above and similar in nature to New York's and California's laws: The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; Florida has a longer list of exemptions related to who may have used force to enter a home including ownership interest in the property or vehicle, children and grandchildren, the person who engaged defensive force was involved in criminal activity and law enforcement officers. Florida's Justifiable Use Of Force is chapter 776 discusses when force can be used. There was an attempt by the Florida legislature in 2019 to change the standard by which use of force could be justified from "reasonably believes" force is necessary to "a reasonably cautious and prudent person in the same circumstances would objectively believe" force was necessary. The bill was withdrawn in May, 2019. | While the elements of criminal trespass vary from one U.S. state to another, the majority rule is that a good faith belief that you have a claim of a legal right to be present on property (even if you are ultimately found to be incorrect on the merits) prevents you from having the intent necessary to commit criminal trespass. The majority rule is that there is strict civil liability for trespass without regard to intent, but the minority rule that civil trespass is an intentional tort isn't terribly uncommon either, in which case criminal and civil liability for trespass would often be the same. Given the legitimate possibility on reasonable grounds that someone inside some given building is not actually supposed to be there, how might this apply to the law about it being mandatory to leave? What if you claimed you either did not think they were really in charge, or that you simply had no way of verifying? This is irrelevant. The burden is on you not to go into property where you are not allowed to be, and not on someone else to tell you to leave. If you know you have no right to be on the property, the fact that you believe someone else may also not have the authority to control who is on the property is not a defense to criminal trespass. You can be guilty of criminal trespass in most jurisdictions even if no one asks you to leave, if you know that you do not have permission to be on the property. Lack of permission is the default in the absence of someone with apparent authority to do so telling you otherwise. | Trespass to chattels — which is "intentionally… dispossessing another of the chattel, or using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another." But don't hold your breath re having a valid case. An attempt to sue would likely be dismissed as de minimis. This is just a trivial interpersonal issue. | What is the legality of someone putting a virtual hot spot on your property without permission? I know we are in uncharted territory but how would this compare to setting up a contest that would require going on your property without permission? The existence of a game does not authorise entrance to private property, barring some agreement with the owner. That is - if it is trespassing without Pokemon Go (or, for that matter Ingress), then it is trespassing while playing them. That being said, the creators of the game are free to place their in-game targets anywhere they please, and it is hard to imagine a scenario where they would be liable for their users' actions, unless they have not taken reasonable steps to prevent their users from doing so - Niantic clearly instruct their users to respect the law and also, only require that their users be within a certain distance of these points, not actually be at them. Is it currently legal to say Go to person X house and touch a tree? If not, does the current law extend to augmented reality? Nope, unless it can be done without entering private property (which includes the airspace above the property, to some extent). And there are no special cases for augmented reality. Now, there is some possibility that if they create a private nuisance - by being too loud, or by otherwise interfering with the use of the property - owners of a property could bring a claim in tort against players for doing so - or charges for a public nuisance, when done in a public area. | massachusetts This is a matter of state law, so let's look at a particular state: Massachusetts. My answer below is largely based on the Massachusetts model jury instructions for self-defense cases. Short answer: the most problematic part of using force in the situation you describe is that you have a "duty to retreat" in the state of Massachusetts. In other words, you would not be justified in using force in your own defense or your wife's defense unless there was no reasonable way to get away from the assailant. (The opposite of a "duty to retreat" state is a "stand your ground" state; the Wikipedia article on the subject lists which US states are which.) Long answer: You would be acting in defense of another (p. 17 of the instructions): [A] person may use reasonable force when that is necessary to help another person, if it reasonably appears that the person being aided is in a situation where the law would allow him to act in self-defense himself. In other words, your use of force to defend your wife is acceptable if it reasonably appears to you that your wife is in a situation where she would be justified in using self-defense. So would she be justified in using non-deadly force in self-defence? To prove that the defendant did not act in self-defense, the Commonwealth must prove one of the following things beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant did not reasonably believe he (she) was being attacked or immediately about to be attacked, and that his (her) safety was in immediate danger; or Second, that the defendant did not do everything reasonable in the circumstances to avoid physical combat before resorting to force; or Third, that the defendant used more force to defend himself (herself) than was reasonably necessary in the circumstances. The second point would be the tricky one for your hypothetical case. In a public space, you have the "duty to retreat"; this duty does not apply in your home (the "castle doctrine"), but it does apply everywhere else. Here are the model jury instructions for this point of law: A person cannot lawfully act in self-defense unless he or she has exhausted all other reasonable alternatives before resorting to force. A person may use physical force in self-defense only if he (she) could not get out of the situation in some other way that was available and reasonable at the time. The Commonwealth may prove the defendant did not act in self-defense by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant resorted to force without using avenues of escape that were reasonably available and which would not have exposed the defendant to further danger. You may consider any evidence about where the incident took place, whether or not the defendant might have been able to escape by walking away or otherwise getting to safety or by summoning help if that could be done in time, or by holding the attacker at bay if the means were available, or by some other method. You may consider whether the use of force reasonably seemed to be the only means of protection in the circumstances. You may take into account that a person who is attacked may have to decide what to do quickly and while under emotional strain. |
Is it possible to claim civil compensation for assault with video evidence available? Obviously assault is a criminal matter, but what provisions are available that govern claiming civil compensation for assault for which indisputable video evidence exists? Is a police report required if the video evidence establishes the facts beyond a reasonable doubt? How are damages typically calculated? | Trespass to person Assault, battery and false imprisonment are all intentional torts that fall within the collective name of trespass to person. They are all actionable per se meaning the defendant does not have to prove damages. Damages that are recoverable are general (pain, suffering and loss of amenity) and special (direct economic loss like doctor’s bills and loss of past and future wages). The onus is on the plaintiff to prove these losses; if they can’t but can prove the trespass, they will receive nominal damages (£1). | england-and-wales Yes, generally speaking, a confession may be given in evidence - including the one recorded by Carlos - under section 76 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): (1)In any proceedings a confession made by an accused person may be given in evidence against him in so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the court in pursuance of this section. The defence may apply for it to be ruled inadmissible if it satisfies one of the conditions s.76(2): If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by an accused person, it is represented to the court that the confession was or may have been obtained— (a)by oppression of the person who made it; or (b)in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in consequence thereof, the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as aforesaid. NB PACE makes no distinction between confessions made to members of the public or to the police under caution (what some refer to as being read his rights). The next step is to establish whether the recording meets the rules of evidence concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence at section 114 Criminal Justice Act 2003 - s.114(1)(d) and 2(a) (emboldened) seem to me to be the most relevant to this scenario: (1)In criminal proceedings a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings is admissible as evidence of any matter stated if, but only if— (a)any provision of this Chapter or any other statutory provision makes it admissible, (b)any rule of law preserved by section 118 makes it admissible, (c)all parties to the proceedings agree to it being admissible, or (d)the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for it to be admissible. (2)In deciding whether a statement not made in oral evidence should be admitted under subsection (1)(d), the court must have regard to the following factors (and to any others it considers relevant)— (a)how much probative value the statement has (assuming it to be true) in relation to a matter in issue in the proceedings, or how valuable it is for the understanding of other evidence in the case; (b)what other evidence has been, or can be, given on the matter or evidence mentioned in paragraph (a); (c)how important the matter or evidence mentioned in paragraph (a) is in the context of the case as a whole; (d)the circumstances in which the statement was made; (e)how reliable the maker of the statement appears to be; (f)how reliable the evidence of the making of the statement appears to be; (g)whether oral evidence of the matter stated can be given and, if not, why it cannot; (h)the amount of difficulty involved in challenging the statement; (i)the extent to which that difficulty would be likely to prejudice the party facing it. (3)Nothing in this Chapter affects the exclusion of evidence of a statement on grounds other than the fact that it is a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings. But... A confession, on its own and without supporting and/or corroborative evidence, is not normally sufficient to bring a prosecution and is fraught with potential risks - Operation Midland being a similar example of when it can go horribly wrong if just one bit of evidence is taken at face value without it being properly verified or tested. | I've contested many of my own traffic tickets in a state where traffic tickets are also considered misdemeanor criminal violations. I would appear in court before the time limit on your ticket. I'd plead not guilty, and I would not waive any rights- which means I would request a trial by jury. Under Georgia law you do have the right to a jury trial IF your ticket is not considered a petty offense. Otherwise you can have a bench trial. If your case starts in a Municipal Court and you request a jury trial, the case will be sent to the State or Superior Court of that county. Jury trials on traffic citations are rare, but it is probably a good tactic because you might be able to work out a better solution than you can in Municipal court. Once the court accepts your plea, then I would make sure the court set a pre-trial hearing. At this hearing make a motion to the judge that you would like the dash-cam video of the officer and the vehicle he stopped you in. If the prosecutor argues that it's not relevant (and they might) explain to the judge why they are relevant (the officer didn't realize exactly what intersection you were at). IMPORTANT: Introduction of your own evidence requires that you 'lay the foundation' of the evidence. This usually means that you must declare officially in court, in front of the prosecution, that your evidence (pictures you take, etc.) are taken by you, and that they are 'true and correct' representations of the location where the alleged offense took place, and that the date and time was (whatever it was). You usually must state this while under oath. OTHERWISE, the prosecution will object to your evidence most likely on the grounds of no foundation. Please read up on how to lay the foundation in either a trial or in a pre-trial setting. For something like this you might need to just present the evidence and lay your foundation at trial. So you'll need to read up on how to lay foundation and present your evidence at trial. You could get lucky and the officer won't show up at trial. So in that case I would make a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution (you can't cross examine a witness that didn't show up) You'll get to choose jurors, etc. in a process called Voire Dire. So read up on that too. You will not be forced to testify if you don't want to (because of the constitutional right to not incriminate yourself) but if you do choose to testify, the prosecution can ask you questions). | Be careful: from the Wikipedia article, it appears that there is a state criminal trial and there will be a federal criminal trial. In addition, there is a federal civil suit which incorporates some stats law claims. The defense in each trial may be different. Have you read the complaint in the civil case? As an example, count 1 alleges, in paragraph 214, that the defendants' actions were "without legal cause." An obvious defense is to show that the actions were actually justified under the law. The law under which they would have been justified would be state law. It's still possible that the state law justification isn't sufficient, but that is another point to be argued in court. If they can't prevail in showing that state law did authorize their actions then the act was certainly unlawful under both state and federal law. Do defendants have standing to invoke self-defense given the context or did they give this up at some point in time? Standing is a threshold that plaintiffs must meet. But defendants can certainly argue self defense. Whether they can prevail on that argument depends on the facts of the case as determined by the court, in particular by the "finder of fact," which is the jury in a jury trial and the judge in a bench trial. The facts that I'm aware of in the public record suggest that the defendants would not prevail on such an argument, but that doesn't deprive them of the right to advance it in court. If someone claims that Arbery was grabbing for the shotgun then the defendants have a right to introduce any evidence of that fact that they may have. It is for the finder of fact to judge the credibility of the evidence. | You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment. | It may not be libel, but it may violate other statutes and may support a judgement against the person publishing this information as long as there is an injury-in-fact ("an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"). A recent case, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins 578 U.S. ___ (2016) considered the case where a company created a profile for a person. That profile stated "that he is married, has children, is in his 50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent, and holds a graduate degree". The plaintiff asserted that all of this was incorrect. The plaintiff made a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act because the information was false. However, mere violation of statute is not sufficient to meet the "injury-in-fact" requirement for standing. Congress can't create standing via statute. Injury-in-fact still requires a "concrete" injury. This does not need to be a physical, tangible injury. But, it does need to be concrete. On its own, publication of false information, even when statute prohibits it, does not create standing. There must be an injury-in-fact. | Based on the question, this was not perjury; if the officer did not review the footage, the fact that his testimony was in error indicates a mistake, nothing more. To even consider a perjury charge, the prosecuting authorities would need evidence that the officer knew the testimony was wrong when he gave it. You do not indicate the jurisdiction, so nobody can say whether an appeal would lie (since new evidence has come to light), whether the conviction could be quashed for procedural failure (if multiple requests for evidence were really not received) or whether a complaint could be made against the prosecutor, the defence lawyer, or even the judge. But no case has ever been strengthened by brandishing about words like 'perjury' without being able to substantiate them. | The jury would never hear the recording The recording and its provenience would be provided to the prosecution who would, rightly, have issues with its admissibility. The defence and prosecution would make submissions on this to the judge, normally well before the trial date and the empaneling of the jury. If the recording had genuinely emerged during the trial, such submissions would be made without the jury seeing them. The submissions would typically be in writing rather than verbal. If the judge decided the evidence was inadmissible the jury would never see it and never know of its existence. If the jury somehow found out about it anyway, this would be grounds for an immediate mistrial and we would start again with a new jury. Illegally obtained evidence is not automatically inadmissible Hong Kong is not the United States - admitting or excluding illegally obtained evidence is at the discretion of the judge based on where the interests of overall justice are best served. In any event, the absolute prohibition in the US applies only to prosecution evidence - evidence illegally obtained by the defence is subject to the same rules as in Hong Kong; the judge decides. |
What is the time limit for reporting an incident of criminal assault to the police for which you possess video evidence? Suppose Bob assaults Alice by punching and kicking her, as well as surrounding her with a bunch of colleagues with her back against a wall because she voiced political viewpoints which Bob and his associates find objectionable while they were trying to stage a demonstration. Alice caught numerous of their strikes and blows on camera, even while they often tried to grab her phone out of her hand and demanded that she stop filming them (on public property). Alice was so flustered on the day that she didn't have energy to go to the police but is now left with regrets. How long does she have to file a proper police report of the assault? | 6 months or unlimited England and Wales has a limit on summary offences of 6 months. Common assault is usually a summary offence. Note that the limitation period is from the offence to the bringing of charges so, as a practical matter, the report needs to be made early enough to allow for investigation. For indictable offences, there is no limit. However, the older the crime, the harder it is to get a conviction. | I will address only the legal issues. Prosecutors for very good public policy reasons are not required to prosecute every crime they have suspicions about. When exercising this discretion they consider: Is the act, in fact, criminal - many of the things you list, while reprehensible, unethical, and possibly immoral are not actually criminal. Do they have the resources (time, staff, money) to collect the evidence and run this case as opposed to the thousands of other crimes out there. There are always more crimes than can be prosecuted and these have to be prioritised in some way. Do they have enough evidence to gain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. People can be fired or resign on suspicion, they can't be convicted on it. | I live in MD near DC, and have been ticketed by the cameras in both DC and MD. At least for speeding and red-light violations (and I think for all camera detected violations) these are just fines, not true moving violations in that no license points are assessed, and there is no impact on insurance, provided the ticket is paid, unlike what would have happened had an officer written the ticket in person. One can contest the ticket, but it is not likely to be worth the time and trouble. This policy of not assessing points is precisely because there is no assured way of determining who the driver is with current technology, although cameras that can see the driver through the windshield and match him or her against a database by facial recognition may be coming. Currently a human reviews the images in an effort to rule out false positives and certify that an actual violation is shown. The name and title of this person is shown on the notice I get, at least from MD. What one can do "proactively": do not speed or go through red lights pay all camera tickets promptly (or file the paperwork to contest them). If unpaid beyond the deadline they turn into more serious violations that do carry points, just like failing to attend a court date. | Yes The Prosecutor for the local jurisdiction could formally file charges. No complaint by Rock is legally required, and given the video evidence available, Rock's testimony might not be as essential as a victim's testimony often is. But if Rock were to testify that the fight was staged, and no real assault occurred, the case would probably fall apart. That would not be good for the prosecutor's reputation, and might well be a reason not to proceed without a clear statement from Rock. See also: "Pressing charges" - is it needed to bring a charge? | This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't | It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot. | There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle. | Claim is irrelevant. Specific to Maryland Law, Assault occurs when one makes or attempts to make physical contact with another OR intentionally frightens another. Alice saying she helped to steal the car and your definition of the theft as "accosted Carol" implies one of the three forms of Assault took place. Alice just admitted to commiting the crime she thought was wrongly charged to her. The crime she was trying to get out of is called "Assault and Battery" which is where Assault leads to actual injury or physical harm to the victim OR attempts to actually injure or harm another OR puts them in fear of such action. In Maryland Law, the Battery portion almost always is paired with assault while in other states, it might be possible to commit Battery without Assault (though in these states, normally a separate assault charge to Battery is usually added.). As a helpful tip, the two words general break down as follows: Assault: The act of threatening harm or making unwanted non-injurious contact with another person. Battery: Causing Injurious Harm to another person. In Maryland, Alice was rightly charged with assault. Upon capture, Bob will recieve an "Assault and Battery" charge for hitting Carol with the stolen card and may get an addition simple Assault charge for the threats before he drove away. |
Under what French law can the government hold a company responsible for what the consumers do with the product they sell? Paris (dpa) - The French environment ministry has vowed to tackle the scourge of billions of discarded cigarette butts which litter the country's streets, parks and nature. Within six years, the ministry wants to see a 40 per cent reduction in the estimated 23.5 billion cigarette butts that smokers toss away thoughtlessly every year, officials said in a statement on Tuesday. The ministry wants to make tobacco companies responsible. A recycling and anti-waste law passed last year requires them to take care of the whereabouts of their products after their "end of life." https://www.dpa-international.com/topic/france-tackle-scourge-discarded-cigarette-butts-urn%3Anewsml%3Adpa.com%3A20090101%3A210811-99-800669 Under what French law can the government hold a company responsible for what the consumers do with the product they sell? I am trying to understand how this is even possible. Is there a French law that allows this to be done? | This is quite common across jurisdictions For example, people who mine uranium are often made responsible for disposing of the waste product at the end of life. More generally, most mine licences require remediation of the land at the end of the mine’s life. Another common one is to make tyre manufacturer’s responsible for their disposal. Governments can pass laws that make a business responsible for dealing with the use and disposal of their products. In practice, these schemes usually require the company to pay the remediation cost to the government or into a trust at the time the product is made or sold. These funds are then invested and drawn down on to deal with the actual disposal. Which is exactly what the article says: A recycling and anti-waste law passed last year requires them to take care of the whereabouts of their products after their "end of life." The tobacco industry will contribute 80 million euros (93.8 million dollars) per year which a newly approved institution will allocate to projects aimed at eliminating cigarette butts and raising awareness, the ministry said. | Spoliation of evidence, once a suit is filed The reason Bob requests the video from Alice Corp is not that he is concerned about his GDPR rights, it is because he wants to file a lawsuit. In fact, it would be super helpful if Bob had filed the lawsuit and served it together with the GDPR request, so there is a pending case... and added a paragraph that he demands the preservation of all evidence at that point. In either case, the sudden deletion of the files by their DPO Charly, after Alice Corp was put on legal notice that they have to preserve evidence, is spoliation, indeed, it would be the very definition: The intentional destruction or alteration of relevant evidence in existing or pending litigation. 1 The main remedy for spoliation is the imposition of a rebuttable presumption of fact that the lost or destroyed evidence would have been unfavourable to the party that destroyed it. This presumption can be rebutted by evidence showing that the “spoliator” did not intend to affect the litigation by destroying the evidence (McDougall v. Black & Decker Canada Inc., 2008 CarswellAlta 1686 (Alta. C.A.)). So, we have the DPO performing spoliation, and thus the lawsuit for the beating will assume that the destroyed video showed exactly what Bob alleged that Alice Corp's security team did to him. in england-and-wales DPO Charly can be further sued for destroying evidence under Section 2 (16) Criminal Justice Act 1987. Spoliation might even happen before the case begins with filing & summons According to an article by Chris Dale, discussion spoliation in england-and-wales the case of Earles v Barclays Bank Plc [2009] EWHC 2500 (Mercantile) (08 October 2009) was named as one of the best descriptions of spoliation in English law. That case indeed is illustrative, as it might be explicitly applicable to the case as described (emphasis mine): 28 [I]n this jurisdiction [Bermingham/England] as in Australia, there is no duty to preserve documents prior to the commencement of proceedings: British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v. Cowell [2002] V.S.C.A. 197, a decision approved in this country by Morritt V.C. in Douglas v. Hello [2003] EWHC 55 at [86]. However, the leading text book in this area – Documentary Evidence by Charles Hollander QC- suggests in paragraph 10-06 of the 10th edition that "there might be cases where it was appropriate to draw adverse inferences from a party's conduct before the commencement of proceedings." In my judgment there would have to be some clear evidence of deliberate spoliation in anticipation of litigation before one could legitimately draw evidential "adverse inferences" in those circumstances. There is no such evidential basis in this case. 29 After the commencement of proceedings the situation is radically different. In Woods v. Martins Bank Ltd [1959] 1 Q.B. 55 at 60, Salmon J. said "It cannot be too clearly understood that solicitors owe a duty to the court, as officers of the court to make sure, as far as possible, that no relevant documents have been omitted from their client's list". 30 In the case of documents not preserved after the commencement of proceedings then the defaulting party risk "adverse inferences" being drawn for such "spoliation": Infabricks Ltd v. Jaytex Ltd [1985] FSR 75. So, yes, we got it in a judgment from the High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division, Birmingham District Registry, Mercantile Court: if it is extremely likely, that proceedings will begin shortly, destroying the video might be spoliation in anticipation of litigation, and thus be problematic even before proceedings started. As a remedy, an adverse inference might be drawn to the content of it. 1 - RESOURCE ID W-015-7809 © 2022 THOMSON REUTERS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | The law is here (too long to quote, or understand). There is a proposed modification of the law which may be enacted. In the section Justification, it is noted that under the existing law a global corporation may technically "own" five subsidiary corporations. Company A may own a winery in France while Company D may own a hotel containing a restaurant in New York. Under New York Law, the liquor license for the restaurant would be prohibited - and it could be subject to financial penalties. So the restrictions are broader that you mention (ownership of stock is an "interest"), but certainly what you mention is prohibited. The proposed law limits the effect to an interest in a restaurant or brewery "licensed under this chapter", i.e. in the state of New York (currently, a NY manufacturer cannot have an interest in an alcohol-selling restaurant anywhere). | Arizona does not license chemists, though they do license pharmacists. There is a law against possession of drug paraphernalia, violation of which is a felony. The law also says In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, a court or other authority shall consider, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, the following: Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use. Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, under any state or federal law relating to any drug. The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this chapter. The proximity of the object to drugs. The existence of any residue of drugs on the object. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to deliver it to persons whom he knows, or should reasonably know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of this chapter. Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use. Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use. National and local advertising concerning its use. The manner in which the object is displayed for sale. Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of tobacco products. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to the total sales of the business enterprise. The existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in the community. Expert testimony concerning its use. The size of your equipment would be relevant in defending against such a charge; your publications in the field of chemistry would be relevant. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that you were using the glassware to make drugs. Paraphernalia is defined as all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human body a drug in violation of this chapter. so a garden shovel can be used to grow marijuana, but that is not enough. The prosecution has to prove that the items "are used, intended for use or designed for use" in drug making – not just that they could be so used. | In summary, At the time of writing, Michael Gove has overall ministerial responsibility for making planning regulations, with a good part of the role delegated to Rachel Maclean as Minister of State for Housing. The detail of regulatory verbiage is the work of civil service lawyers, based on policy formed within the department as a result of the general political process. There are various rules for how these functions arise and get transferred around government, described below. The Secretary of State can make regulations about flag display These pieces of secondary legislation, as their names suggest, are made under the authority of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Several sections of the Act empower regulations to be made by "the Secretary of State", e.g. in s.220(1) we read Regulations under this Act shall make provision for restricting or regulating the display of advertisements so far as appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient in the interests of amenity or public safety. and the full Parliamentary procedure for making them is spelled out in s.333. This comports with the regulatory preambles, e.g. for the 2007 regulations, saying: The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 220, 221, 223(1), 224(3) and 333(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, makes the following Regulations "The Secretary of State" means a specific Secretary chosen by the Prime Minister Note that the Act just said "the Secretary of State", whereas we have just read about a specific Secretary. What's going on here is that primary legislation just wants to say "whoever in Cabinet has a job that is most relevant", since functions get transferred around, departments created or abolished, etc., and nobody really wants to update a zillion Acts every time that happens. Instead, there is a framework pattern where powers will be given to "the Secretary of State" generally, but will be executed by a specific one according to the division of responsibilities in the government of the day. That will sometimes be just a matter of agreement within Cabinet, but at other times be encoded in secondary legislation - a "Transfer of Functions Order". Those Orders are also needed to handle special situations like - transferring property and legal obligations when departments are created, merged, split or abolished making amendments to legislation which did happen to mention a specific minister ministers who are not a "Secretary of State" as such, but hold another ministerial title, such as "Lord Privy Seal" These Orders are made under the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975, and are in the form of orders of the King on the advice of the Privy Council - which is to say, that the Prime Minister decides who does which jobs. Historically, this is something of an accident, since the number of Secretaries of State has increased along with the scope of government, and it was convenient to appoint lots of people to the same formal office rather than invent fresh jobs - especially in the days before ministers were paid. In any case, flag decisions would currently be made under the authority of the minister responsible for planning affairs, the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, Michael Gove. That comes from a 2021 order when that position was created, inheriting all functions from the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. Those in turn derive from a 2018 order taking them from the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, and so on back in time. SoS authority can be exercised by other people who work for him Additionally, the SoS can delegate functions to junior ministers; for example, the 2021 regulations state that they are Signed by authority of the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government Christopher PincherMinister of StateMinistry of Housing, Communities and Local Government Intra-departmental delegation of functions also requires the agreement of the Prime Minister, although some functions must be performed by the Secretary of State personally. That relates to the so-called "Carltona doctrine", named for a 1943 court case Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560, which establishes that a minister is generally responsible for his whole department, and that when some function is conferred on the Secretary of State, it usually doesn't mean that he has to do it himself. Most administrative functions are like that, although the actual laying of secondary legislation before Parliament has to be done by a member of Parliament, i.e. a member of the ministerial team. Following the downfall of Mr Pincher, the junior minister responsible for planning is currently Rachel Maclean, so she would be likely to be taking lead responsibility for putting through planning regulations. So all this doesn't mean that Mr Gove personally decides which flags fall into which category, although observers of his career know that we can't rule that out. But he is responsible for the actions of his department, and the secondary legislation would be laid before Parliament in his name and on his instructions. On the making of flags and sausages Regarding "how and on what considerations" these decisions are made, I have no specific knowledge for flag-related policy. But in general, the secondary legislation is written by civil service lawyers on the basis of government policy, and then approved (or at least not disapproved) by Parliament. For example, after Brexit, the EU flag was removed from the list. The mechanism would be that various people who had never heard of the Town and Country Planning Act became upset about flying of the EU flag, and either wrote to ministers or were Cabinet ministers already. Internally to the department, there would have been a mandate to stop the flag being flown, civil servants would figure out the legal steps, and draft the statutory instrument. In the end we get a regulation saying In Class H in Schedule 1, in paragraph (b) of column (1) omit the words "the European Union,". even though only planning experts would know or care about "Class H in Schedule 1". Similar remarks apply to the companion regulation giving prominence to the Union flag over the Scottish flag, which was a political reaction in Westminster to the SNP-led government in Scotland. Someone who is upset about a regulation, or just wants it to be different, may be able to challenge it through the political process in the same sort of way. There are also avenues for judicial review, if regulations have been made in a way which is irrational, or exceeding the scope of what the original Act allowed, or other similar reasons - but these are difficult to pursue in court. For example, it is more than three months since the 2021 regulations were made, so it is now too late to mount a judicial challenge. | Reports I've seen are that these seed shipments have false customs declarations, claiming that they contain something else, e.g. this one which was declared as "ring". That would violate 18 USC 542: Whoever enters or introduces, or attempts to enter or introduce, into the commerce of the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance, or makes any false statement in any declaration without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, or procures the making of any such false statement as to any matter material thereto without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, whether or not the United States shall or may be deprived of any lawful duties; or Whoever is guilty of any willful act or omission whereby the United States shall or may be deprived of any lawful duties accruing upon merchandise embraced or referred to in such invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission— Shall be fined for each offense under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Indeed, if they had been properly labeled "seeds", the packages would probably have been intercepted by US Customs and never have been delivered in the first place. International shipment of seeds and other agricultural products tends to be tightly regulated due to the risk of spreading plant diseases. There is also the Federal Seeds Act, 7 USC 1581: The importation into the United States is prohibited of— (1) any agricultural or vegetable seeds if any such seed contains noxious-weed seeds or the labeling of which is false or misleading in any respect; Under 7 USC 1596 violation is punishable by a fine of up to $1000 for the first offense, and up to $2000 for each subsequent offense. | Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display. | You cannot use a trademark in a way that may cause confusion that your goods and services are associated with or endorsed by the trade marked goods and services. If you are clear that they are not then you shouldn't have any problems on that front. You also cannot defame the brand: that is make derogatory comments that are not true. On a practical note, when Pepsi (for example) sends you a cease & desist notice, what are you going to do? They can go to the petty cash tin for $2 million to make your life a legal hell for 18-36 months: how much do you have to defend your rights? |
How can I gather data from past cases in the US? Is it possible? I want to understand the following: Let's say I wanted to generate a report on the trends in outcomes of civil cases. Is there anywhere I could download any kind of data related to it? The parties involved, maybe information about the size of compensation, result of the case, etc. Is this kind of information available anywhere, in any format (table, PDF document, etc.)? | Let's say I wanted to generate a report on the trends in outcomes of civil cases. Is there anywhere I could download any kind of data related to it? The parties involved, maybe information about the size of compensation, result of the case etc. The raw data is a matter of public record, but it isn't available in a downloadable format. You have to go court by court, or case by case, look at the public records, code and classify it, and then analyze the data yourself. Some summaries are available in annual reports of the federal court system and of many state court systems, but this typically looks at total dockets, and dockets by type of cases, but rarely looks at outcomes. The most detailed outcomes you are likely to get from these sources are number of cases terminated in a year (often by geographic subcategory), number of jury or bench trials with some division by type of case, number of defendants adjudicated, and number of dismissals prior to trial. The U.S. Sentencing Commission does more analysis of outcomes from detailed case data. Many professors writing articles for academic journals do it the hard way, and there are some collaborations of professors and research institutes that collect large, detailed (although not complete) databases, for example, limited to federal courts (where it is easy to get data on individual cases in PACER) or to, for example, 75 most populous counties with cooperative custodians of records. But, often you need to be an accredited member of the collaboration working on that to get access to the raw data. One commercial source is a firm called the Jury Verdict Reporter that regularly publishes detailed data on as many jury verdicts as it can, but this is quite an expensive resource to use. | A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer. | The core principle of stare decisis is that the law should not depend on what judge you got; two cases with the same facts should have the same outcome. In the common-law tradition, there weren't really written statutes; there was only "what's been done in the past," and so the only reference you'd have to what the law should be in some situation is past court decisions. If judges didn't have some constraints to rule similarly to before, there really wouldn't be any legal standards (because there was no written law to go back to; in civil-law countries, there always has been a written law, so precedent isn't so important). Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent. However, judges are expected to obey precedent, and for the most part do what they're supposed to do. If they don't, the case will likely be reversed on appeal. Binding precedent only applies within the area a court serves; a court doesn't have to listen to precedent from a different court that has nothing to do with the case. The rule is that precedent from any court up the appeals chain is binding; federal district courts are bound by their circuit court and SCOTUS, state courts are bound by higher state courts and SCOTUS (but not other federal courts, as the case can't be appealed to them). A court can sometimes overrule its own precedent, but the cases where it can do that are rare (and so applying a higher court's precedent can also be viewed as "if you appeal to them they'll say X, so we're saying X.") | Yes in general Generally, almost all western jurisdictions (be they civil law or common law) have some way to get medical records into evidence, be that via subpoenaing, or by discovery requests or court orders. In most cases, the party that brings the suit is also the patient or their legal representative, and they give (or imply) consent to the use of the records. And in cases where the defendant's medical records are required, usually, the defense wants those in too to prove some condition. And then there are cases where the state or their representatives brings the charge. They usually can bring a warrant or court order to obtain the documents. Then there are Medical records that had been made specifically on the behest of the state. Here, the warrant is usually filed to obtain the samples or access to the body to be investigated, the record itself forms the basis for the investigators to proceed - and is not under client-doctor confidentially in the first place. It had been made specifically for the state and it is a state-owned medical record, be they made on request of the executive power (police) with a warrant signed by a judge or on behalf of the judicative after a court order to evaluate capacity (see below). However, medical records can generally only be obtained if the records are relevant to the case at hand and only to the degree necessary: You can't request the medical records about a person's fertility status in a case that discusses damages for his broken arm. As a result, the medical record available in court might be only an extract from the original, with irrelevant passages sealed or redacted. Unlike many people think, it's quite common to get some medical records into court in some way or another: As the basis of injury cases If you have a case of physical injury, the injuries themselves need to be proven in court. This is done generally by getting the medical records - thus they can be subpoenaed by a party, usually the injured party here. Then a medical expert can discuss them, be they a court-appointed one or paid by either of the parties. In this category also fall mandatory reports of certain types of wounds or situations. As such, the treating doctor has to provide a medical report with enumerated types of injuries, like bullet wounds or where child abuse might be the reason. Very necessarily in malpractice cases Malpractice is pretty much injury on steroids: the injuring party made the records and would never want to give them up to the one suing them - if they could. Alice shall remove Appendix. It goes haywire and the day after Charly needs to cut Bob open again. Now Bob sues Alice for malpractice. Bob needs medical records from both Alice, the doctor who botched it, and Charly, who was fixing Alice's error. Generally, both records are subpoena-able to the degree relevant and necessary, and indeed the opposing medical opinions on the operation and records form the very basis of the case for either side. Without the ability to subpoena the - in this case unmodified - records from the injuring doctor, proving - or defending - a case of malpractice would be impossible: the very truth of the allegation should be in the medical records. It's routine in cases around death What is the very last medical record a person can ever get? An autopsy record! That's a very sensitive medical record, but they routinely are used in homicide cases. Oftentimes, the investigators also subpoena the medical records of the victim from their doctors to corroborate the autopsy record, while the defense might subpoena them to try and disprove it. Even in civil cases, like the OJ-Simpson civil damages case, autopsy and medical records from an accompanying criminal case can and will be "pulled" (copied over) from the other trial's docket. Regularly in child protection cases Whenever child protection is on the line, be them protective orders or who a child will live with after the child protection service (whatever its name is) is in on a case, then medical records are often required to bolster one side. Those records could be medical records from quite many doctors, be they physicals or psychological evaluations... Sometimes the medical records required here are only created due to court-ordered medical or psychological evaluation by a doctor. Whenever incompetence defense is called When the lawyer claims temporary incompetence or insanity, courts generally order a psychological evaluation. These medical records are evidence, but usually don't need to be subpoenaed: they have a waiver form to be disclosed to the court almost built-in. Are they available to the public? Medical records are part of truth-finding, but they are also quite sensitive. As a result, most medical records can not be gotten from the court and enter the dockets under seal. Another option is, that they enter the docket partially or even mostly redacted, with passages blackened. | What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? A combination of a) and b). The plaintiff should gather other evidence with which to disprove the denials of authorship, or at least to question the reliability the publisher's testimony. The jury needs that evidence in order to discern who is credible. Whether decisive or not for credibility purposes, any material inconsistencies the plaintiff is able to point out from the witness's testimony(-ies) tend to guide the fact-finder (i.e., the jury) on matters of credibility. Whenever possible, the evidence should include admissible documents from when the events took place. For instance, records reflecting the submission & editing process of that article. Those documents typically are obtained by subpoenaing the publisher and/or relevant non-parties, accordingly. That will reduce the chances of testimony deficiencies, whether these stem from witnesses' perjury, lack of memory, inability to clearly articulate what they know, or inability to testify at all (due to witness's illness or death by the time the matter goes to trial). | Once a case has been commenced, you can definitely lose, or you can probably lose. If you decline to proceed, you definitely lose. If you proceed, the jury (or judge as the case might be), might find some witnesses more believable than others and might find that the forensic evidence is not as convincing as it seems. Empirical evidence suggests that criminal trials reach the correct conclusion in about 90% of cases that aren't resolved on an uncontested basis. Generally speaking, the Crown is only going to press a case where the prosecutor subjectively believes that they are correct that the defendant is, at least, guilty of something. So, a Crown prosecutor can also justify "rolling the dice" in a case with a low probability of winning, because at a minimum, a factually guilty defendant (whether it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or not in a particular trial with a particular finder of fact) has to suffer through a trial which is a form of punishment (particularly if the defendant can't secure pre-trial release). Also, while the Crown prosecutor ultimately represents the state and not the victim, the victim of a crime is a quasi-client and sometimes a victim who often has personal knowledge of a defendant's factual guilt, really wants to have their "day in court" and a chance to present their case to the public for all to hear. Law enforcement officers working on the case may want it to go to trial for similar reasons. Strategically, bringing even weak cases to trial also makes a Crown prosecutors threat to go forward with a trial even in a seemingly weak case more credible and that can increase the prosecutor's negotiating power. Also, a trial always reveals information, and sometimes the information revealed in a trial that is lost can provide value in future law enforcement efforts. Finally, prosecutors are humans and people, in general, don't like to admit their own mistakes. So, they may go forward even when their case is weak because they don't want to admit that they were mistaken and would prefer to have somebody else say they were wrong than to admit error. The personality type that doesn't admit mistakes is pretty common in this area. | Google Scholar is not specifically a legal research tool. The search does return many court and legal documents Which court opinions do you include? Currently, Google Scholar allows you to search and read published opinions of US state appellate and supreme court cases since 1950, US federal district, appellate, tax and bankruptcy courts since 1923 and US Supreme Court cases since 1791. In addition, it includes citations for cases cited by indexed opinions or journal articles which allows you to find influential cases (usually older or international) which are not yet online or publicly available. From https://scholar.google.com/intl/en/scholar/help.html#coverage but by reading those inclusions, you can see that it's not as complete as some of the paid commercial services available. The most important criticism of Google Scholar for legal research appears to be the lack of a way to fully Shepardize cases; see Shepard's Citations - Wikipedia Shepardizing determines if cases have been overruled (or reaffirmed, questioned, or cited by later cases). Google Scholar will show case citations; but they are not as complete as commercial services. See https://www.google.com/search?q=google+scholar+shepardize for critical references. If you're going to argue with a lawyer, completely Shepardizing your relevant cases is rather important. | There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence. |
Where does the name Freedom of Information Act arise from? I think there was a question that previously addressed the sequence in which it appeared in different parts of the world and traced the progression of its spread. But I'm now asking on one hand, how/why the concept was spread, and on the other how the name came to be in the first place: it is actually a pretty awkward name because information can't have freedom other than in the saying which attempts to ascribe it desire and propensity for freedom as a metaphorical device with which to make its point, "information wants to be free." But Freedom of Information Acts' naming seems so cheesy, so what is the logic behind it? | The original law was 80 Stat 383, PL 89-554, which is a massive reorganization of the structure of federal agencies. It created title 5 entitled "Government Organization and Employees". The act itself was not given a name: it did contain provisions in §552 requiring that information be made available, as opposed to being kept secret. Subsequently in 1974, PL 93-502 amended the law specifically w.r.t. §552, and the act begins with the text To amend section 552 of title 5, United States Code, known as the Freedom of Information Act Essentially, by this act of Congress, §552 was legislatively deemed to be "known as" the Freedom of Information Act. The expression was used earlier, see the documents here. This speech (June 20 1966) by Rep. Moss sets forth the arguments for the relevant bill S.1160 which amended title 5,, saying Our system of government is based on the participation of the governed, and as our population grows in numbers it is essential that it also grow in knowledge and understanding. We must remove every barrier to information about—and understanding of—government activities consistent with our security if the American public is to be adequately equipped to fulfill the ever more demanding role of responsible citizenship This is the sense in which the bill was about "freedom of information". In the speech, he also refers (p. 3 of the scan) to the chairmen of the "Freedom of Information Committees", and LBJ in his signing statement I have always felt that freedom of information is so important to our form of government that it should not be restricted except when there is an important reason for doing so This gave rise to an informal name to the act, which then was "codified" in 1974 by another act of Congress. | It does not need to be expressly defined in statute in order to be legally effective. Courts have no trouble interpreting ordinary words used in their conventional way. And there is no other definition that could work instead, considering the full body of law that (1) intends to apply to the whole of the United Kingdom, (2) often distinguishes between "Great Britain" and "Northern Ireland", (3) often distinguishes between "England", "Wales", "Scotland" and "Northern Ireland", (4) treats "Great Britain" as synonymous with England, Wales and Scotland, and (5) often uses "Great Britain" without further ceremony, as if it's a term that doesn't need to be explained. It is helpful that legislation (at least in the modern era) is consistent about the view that "Great Britain" refers precisely to England, Wales and Scotland all together. By virtue of the Interpretation Act 1978, "United Kingdom" means Great Britain and Northern Ireland. from which we may deduce immediately that Great Britain means the United Kingdom except for Northern Ireland. There is no sibling '"Great Britain" means...' clause, but construing it any other way than the normal meaning would not work. From the combined definitions of "England", "Wales", "British Islands", etc. - which by reference, also deal with such historically doubtful areas as Berwick and Monmouthshire - there is no other way to interpret the term "Great Britain" without distorting the required meaning of "United Kingdom". Including too much or too little in "Great Britain" would give the wrong result, in particular for statutory extent clauses that refer to the whole United Kingdom and ought not to accidentally leave out Cornwall or include Hanover. We do not need to go as far as the Acts of Union, which is lucky since that would entangle us in concerns about whether "England" includes "Wales", or other historical anomalies that are not relevant in current law. I would treat the Acts of Union as giving added force to the conventional meaning, rather than being the source of that meaning, since there are uses of the term which seem to be more about Great Britain considered as a place than the political entity. For example, the Food Safety Act 1990 s.18(3) talks about "any food which has not previously been used for human consumption in Great Britain", which seems to talk more about the food culture of the place, even predating the Acts of Union, than about the Kingdom of Great Britain or its successors. The term "Great Britain" is frequently used in statutes in the customary way. For example, The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 s.28 creates a "Great Britain register" and a "Northern Ireland register" of political parties, and s.38(1)(3)(b) provides for the "Great Britain register" to cover precisely England, Scotland and Wales. The Northern Ireland Act 1998 s.87 is about provisions of UK social security law that operate differently in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Electricity Act 1989 (as amended) provides for the issue of "GB certificates" as opposed to "NI certificates", and also defines "the relevant part of Great Britain" as meaning either "England and Wales" or "Scotland" (s.32M(1)). The Agriculture Act 2020 s.35 provides for a "red meat levy" to be paid between "one country in Great Britain" and "another such country", and goes on in 35(8) to list the levy bodies for England, Scotland and Wales. So all of this points to the same common meaning as in everyday life. In court, for example, Lord Hoffman in Serco v Lawson [2006] UKHL 3 had to consider the Employment Rights Act 1996 s.196, since repealed, which governed "work wholly or mainly outside Great Britain". (And by the way, in 196(1)(b) is a listing of "England and Wales" and "Scotland" as the two possible bodies of law relating to Great Britain.) In his judgement, he says: It is true that section 244(1) says that the Act "extends" to England and Wales and Scotland ("Great Britain"). But that means only that it forms part of the law of Great Britain and does not form part of the law of any other territory (like Northern Ireland or the Channel Islands) for which Parliament could have legislated. That is, he does not find it difficult to gloss the extent provision in 244(1), which doesn't include the exact words "Great Britain", as actually referring to Great Britain. Other legislation refers to "Great Britain" as a locale, like the Wild Animals in Circuses Act 2019 which talks about "an animal of a kind which is not commonly domesticated in Great Britain". This is a straightforward reference to the kind of activities typically going on in that location, treating it as the island(s) and not the political entity. The expression does not include the territorial sea, by default; some statutes include it, like the Gas Act 1986 s.5(9) which says: For the purposes of this section a place is within the jurisdiction of Great Britain if it is in Great Britain, in the territorial sea adjacent to Great Britain or in an area designated under section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964. There are several other instances of particular statutes defining "Great Britain" to include adjacent waters, but they do not define the core concept of Great Britain otherwise. They do not need to. | Congress did exactly this in the war of 1812. Normally, laws passed by Congress must be published after being made. In 1789, the First Congress instructed the Secretary of State with the duty of printing new statutes at least three newspapers, and the current law puts it in the hands of the Archivist of the United States; in between, there have been variations. On March 3, 1811, Congress passed a law saying simply: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this act, and the act passed during the present session of Congress, entitled “An act to enable the President of the United States, under certain contingencies, to take possession of the country lying east of the river Perdido, and south of the state of Georgia and the Mississippi territory, and for other purposes,” and the declaration accompanying the same, be not printed or published, until the end of the next session of Congress, unless directed by the President of the United States, any law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding. This overrode the normal publication rules in order to hide the existence of the cited earlier law, and of its own existence. The proceedings in Congress also took place in secret session, including the signing of the bills by the President, James Madison. As the title suggests, the earlier statute authorized Madison to use military force to take possession of the disputed territory (which was also claimed by Spain), establish a provisional government there, and use $100k of newly appropriated funds to do so. A further law of 1813, with the same secrecy provision, extended the territory and gave $20k more. These statutes were not published until 1818, after the war had ended and a further law reformed the publication of statute law in general. The supposed secrecy was also compromised in practice by the fact that the annexation of West Florida was widely known once it started happening. As far as we know, Congress has not experimented any further with suspending publication of its legislative activity. It is allowed to meet in secret session, and the Constitution allows secret material to be omitted from the official journal. Nowadays, we know pretty well when secret sessions have taken place, even if we don't know what happened during them. It would be practically very hard for Congress to hide the fact that it had met and passed a law. The closest modern counterpart is not a secret act, but the use of a "classified schedule of authorizations" or "classified annex" to direct spending on things that Congress does not wish to reveal. For example, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (1068 page PDF), there are references like: "there is appropriated $125,000,000, for an additional amount for 'National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund', to remain available until September 30, 2024, which shall only be used for the acquisition and retention of certain materials, as specified in the classified annex accompanying this Act" "The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (17) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this division." The second bullet point covers billions of dollars of total spending, but it is not revealed that we are spending $7.18bn on a project to explode the moon, or whatever. So in this appropriations case, your hypothetical is pretty real: Congress could pass emergency legislation authorizing spending on something, without revealing what the something was. Other kinds of laws would raise their own issues. For example, a secret criminal statute would very likely fall foul of the Constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. The concept of a secret law is in many ways objectionable - natural justice, interference with democratic accountability, etc. - which makes it politically difficult as well as legally questionable. | Anyone can say anything on Wikipedia – even they tagged that claim as requiring a citation. There's no way to directly prove that there is no such requirement, but these guys maintains that there are no such laws in the US, and EFF says the same thing. This Wiki page agrees, giving details about a specific bill introduced in the House and also in the Senate in the 111th Congress that did not become a law (it did not survive the scrutiny of the judiciary committee in either case). Another failed attempt was in the 112th Congress. | If a line in your will bequeaths something that you don't have the power to give (e.g. you bequeath something that you don't own at the time of your death), that line has no legal effect. If I died and left you the house at 10 Downing Street in London, for example, you wouldn't actually be getting it. If your will contains enough of those lines and/or they seem excessively unreasonable, it may cause the validity of the will to be challenged on the basis that you weren't competent to prepare and sign it. If the people reading it think it's reasonable, it may have a social effect based on what it conveys to them, which could lead to voluntary compliance with your wish (especially if the main obstacle to that being realized is a mistaken understanding of and desire to respect your wishes). That could help make peace, for example, if a surviving parent's remarriage would otherwise be opposed by children (or the surviving partner) or others based solely on a mistaken understanding of the wishes of the deceased. It could also make for a really awkward moment, depending on the views of and relationships between survivors. Addressing user662852's comment on the question: You can also use a will to name a guardian for anyone you have guardianship over, which is usually more important for children (e.g. see "Why Every Parent Needs a Will."). | I'm sorry to deflate what is clearly a very philosophically interesting question, but the law is straightforward here. The truth, essentially, is the set of facts that you believe to be true. Yes. It means that you will not lie by omission, and that you will provide the relevant facts. No, you don't need to recount history since the first instant of the big bang. Only expert witnesses may answer by giving their opinion or evaluation. This is presumed accurate by their experience and where it is not accurate, the other side may present opposing expert witnesses to contest their conclusion or evaluation. Laypeople are permitted to answer only with their recollection of facts. Lawyers may not ask them what their opinion is, although by your definition every question is about opinion, since perception and memory is limited. But the question "What colour was Mr Smith's house?" and "What architectural style informed the facade of Mr Smith's house?" require different amounts of expertise and opinion. "Truth" isn't jargon, or even technical language here. I generally aim to be truthful, and so when someone asks me what time it is, I don't feel compelled to answer to the nano/picosecond. Would you call me a liar? Am I lying by omission? Similarly, if someone asks me what colour a car is, I don't feel compelled to say "I can't possibly know, because my perception may differ from yours. If you honestly feel that when someone asks you to be truthful about something, then you must either be lying, or lying by omission if you don't start your answer with the first instant of the big bang, your problem is not one of law. | The law was first promulgated on June 8, 1940 By the 76th Congress. The original text is here. It doesn’t seem to be a particularly important piece of legislation and I can find commentary on it and I’m not going to read the debates - if you do, please get back to us. Two points to note, it was passed at a time when most of the rest of the world was at war and the US was quietly preparing to be at war and it seems to be intended to fill a gap in state law since conviction under state law is a defence under Federal. | In the US, Congress may pass an act, and this creates one kind of law (if it is promulgated: signed, ignored, or re-passed with a super-majority). Some of those acts direct the executive branch to do things, and pursuant to that act, a regulation is promulgated. Together with case law, the whole thing is "law". A bill (in the House, or the Senate) may result in an act being passed by both houses. It may go through a number of drafts between the point when it is first introduced and the time it becomes an act. |
Can a parent insist that her child (teen) stop assisting police? This is based on a situation early in the novel The Witness by Norah Roberts. Suppose that a sixteen-year-old girl (E) witnessed a serious crime, in fact a double murder, apparently by an organized crime figure. E reports the crime to the police, gives a detailed statement, and identifies pictures of those involved from photo-spreads. The people she identifies are known to the police as active members of an organized crime group. At this point E's mother (S) arrives at the place where E is being interviewed. S, who is the sole custodial parent of E, demands that E come home with her, and that she not go off with the US Marshalls to a safe house, and not prepare to testify. S is well-off, and can afford to hire private security, and a good lawyer. This all happens in the city of Chicago (or more exactly, one of its neighborhoods, Lincoln Park) in the state of Illinois, in the US. Can S legally insist on E coming with her, over the objections of both E and the US Marshals and police? Can S obtain a court order requiring the Marshalls to surrender custody of E to S? Update I should have mentioned that the police and representatives of the US Marshal's service believe, and state to S, that E is in serious danger from the organized crime group involved. | E can leave at any time E is not detained and there is no basis to detain her. As a child, that decision can be made by a parent. E can be subpoenaed to testify but she does not have to talk to law enforcement (and would be wise not to). | Ah, but destroying the insulin is not "tantamount to to murdering the victim". Any pharmacy or hospital can supply more. Once the villain is secured, or the cop and victim are away from the villain, additional supplies can be obtained. That does not justify deadly force. (And since the T J Hooker series was set in a large US city, such supplies would have been readily available, 24/7. If the setting was far away from any such supplies, the case would be different.) However, if the cop has plausible reason to fear that the villain will attack him or the victim, and pose a serious threat of injury or death, the cop can use as much force as is reasonably required to defend himself or the victim, including deadly force if that is needed. He may not use more force than is reasonably required, but in practice once it is established that there was a valid threat, or reasonable grounds to believe that there was a threat, the cop's judgement on how much force was needed will only be overruled in a really egregious case. Under current law, the cop may not use deadly force simply to stop the suspect from escaping, unless there is some unusual factor involved. I think the law may have been interpreted differently on that point when the TV show was made, in the early 1980s. | A police officer (or any other random person) would not be guilty of a crime or subject to civil liability for standing by and watching a suicide occur when it could be prevented, unless the person attempting to commit suicide was in his custody and he failed to take reasonable care to prevent a suicide in which case the officer could be subject to civil liability. It would not be a violation of the law, however, for a police officer (or in most cases, even a private citizen) to intervene to attempt to stop an attempted suicide. Likewise, prisons and prison guards can have civil liability for failing to prevent the suicide of someone in their custody. Of course, a police officer might still receive a negative employment evaluation from his supervisor for such conduct, or might even be fired for it depending on the rules of a particular department, as it would reflect poorly on the police department and show bad judgment on the officers part. In general, an affirmative duty enforceable by a lawsuit to take reasonable efforts to prevent someone from committing suicide applies in circumstances where the person attempting to commit suicide is in someone else's care and custody and has their liberty constrained. So, there could be liability on the part of a hospital or treating medical personnel (I've actually brought such a case that was dismissed due to malpractice in missing a deadline by local co-counsel who was then disciplined for ethical violations by the State of Illinois for his conduct.) In the absence of such a relationship, a legal duty to take affirmative action to prevent a suicide generally does not arise. Certain medical facilities and providers are required to make anonymized incident reports for the purpose of creating national public health statistics on a periodic basis. In certain extreme circumstances, there are duties to report someone who is a threat to others which may also include a risk of suicide, to authorities, but those are quite narrowly interpreted, and actual legal consequences from failing to warn are very rare. There may be other reporting requirements in educational institutions and for mental health professionals, but I am not personally aware of them and I do not believe that they are national in scope. Usually, for criminal liability, there would have to be actual affirmative acts to aid or to attempt to cause a suicide. | There is a defense of provocation This doesn’t apply in this instance because the provocation must be such that it would case a reasonable person to lose control. No reasonable person shoots a six year old. | Your ability to assert your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not limited to cases where you are on trial or have been accused of a crime. Your ability to assert that right is also not an absolute bar against being ordered to testify: if you are given immunity, you can be forced to testify. Alice cannot hold Bob in contempt – only the judge can. Bob can explain to the judge why a simple truthful "yes" or "no" answer is not possible, if he knows how to do that (does he understand the notion of a false presupposition, or unclarity?). He could for example assert truthfully that he does not understand the question (pointing to the distinction between "Charlie's body falling on the vase, causing it to fall and break", and "Charlie acting with apparent intent to break the vase", since it's not patently obvious that the former scenario constitutes "breaking the vase"). However (changing the scenario a bit), he has to understand that if the question is "Did Charlie shoot Delilah?" and the fact is that Ethan forced Charlie to shoot Delilah, saying "No" based on a theory of blame is not reasonably interpreted as truthful testimony. Taking the 5th, without setting forth your basis (not understanding the question) runs the risk that the prosecution will grant immunity from prosecution, and therefore you don't get to avoid answering the question. Immunity covers various things except that it does not cover prosecution for perjurious testimony. See US v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115: the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial for false swearing because, at the time he was granted immunity, the privilege would not have protected him against false testimony that he later might decide to give. Immunity is conferred under the control of some applicable statutory law, such as 18 USC 6002 which says that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. | The Testimony Of Children Under Oath Do Children As Young As Seven Years Old Testify In U.S. Courts? Could it actually happen in American courts? Yes. It can and does happen on a regular basis, although a seven year old is at the very lower end of the range at which children are called to testify as witnesses with any regularity. Any witness which a court determines is competent to testify, which includes many, but not all, minors, testifies under oath. Some jurisdictions have a hard and fast minimum age at which someone can be competent to testify (often age seven is the minimum), while other states make it a rule of reason for the court to evaluate on a case by case basis. Child testimony can be used in any kind of case, not just sex offenses against children or child abuse and neglect cases, although those cases are the kind of cases where child testimony is most common. Special Arrangements Sometimes Made For Child Testimony While special arrangements for the form and circumstances of that testimony can sometimes be ordered by a court (sometimes raising constitutional issues regarding whether the "confrontation clause" right of a criminal defendant is violated in a criminal case under U.S. Constitutional law), the default rule is that a minor testifies in the same manner as anyone else. Often the exact wording of the oath is changed when a child can't reasonable be expected to understand the normal wording. Perjury In Cases Of Child Testimony Under Oath If the person testifying under oath is a minor, a perjury offense would be presumptively tried in juvenile court rather than an adult criminal court. Also, it is possible that even if a child is sworn and testifying under oath, that a child will not be old enough to prosecute for the crime of perjury, even in juvenile court, if the child intentionally commits perjury. An oath has symbolic value and is believed by many people to have an effect, even when there is no credible threat of a perjury prosecution for lying under oath. In practice, perjury prosecutions, even for adults, for court testimony, are vanishingly rare even in pretty clear cases, even though the crime is committed basically every day that courts are open for business. For example, there are dozens of such prosecutions a year in Colorado including both in court and out of court sworn statements, and there are tens of thousands of evidentiary hearings and evidentiary trials each year in Colorado, or which perjury is actually committed in perhaps 5%-10% of such hearings and trials. Alternatives To Child Testimony Under Oath Evidence Of Unsworn Out Of Court Statements Made By Children It is also possible for things that a minor says to be recounted by someone who heard them said or a transcript of a conversation with someone that was not under oath (in which case it is hearsay, but may come within an exception to the hearsay rule), or via a videotape of a child saying something (which is a record to be authenticated prior to its admission). But, in both of those cases, what the child says that the court considers as evidence is not testimony. Interviews In Chambers Of Children Another process by which courts obtain information from children, often in child custody cases, is for the judge to personally interview the children, not under oath and not with testimony taken down by a court reporter, either in or outside the presence of counsel for the parties (and almost always not in the presence of parents or any audience present at a hearing) in the judges chambers. This is primarily done not to elicit evidence of facts, per se, so much as to discern the preferences, desires and concerns of the children themselves as expressed directly. Statements of preferences, desires and opinions of children, because they are not statements of fact and are instead statements of opinion, are by definition not capable of being prosecuted for perjury, since their truth or falsity is not objectively determinable. These interviews are given more weight in the case of older children than in the case of younger children and this process would not be used at all for infants or pre-schoolers. | Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings. | Yes, why not? It happens all the time. Usually the witness will just say, "I am not sure" or "I don't remember, exactly". Also, if Bob is the only witness, how would anyone prove that he was committing "perjury"? In the case of an uncooperative or dissimulating witness, Judges sometimes can hold them in contempt of court, but it is pretty rare. In general, the court has to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the witness is refusing to testify honestly. (See "Federal Grand Jury Practice and Procedure" by Paul Diamond) It depends very much on the situation. Note that just trying to act "drunk" would not be a good idea, because that is contempt of court. |
Is it appropriate for an expert witness to meet and have dinner with the legal team? Do you need to disclose that in a report? See 0:08 in "Amber Heard Perpetrated Intimate Partner Violence Towards Johnny Depp" Says Psychologist Is it appropriate to meet and have dinner with the legal team as an expert and does the expert need to disclose that in a report? I thought it was weird that the expert had dinner when there can be the appearance of a conflict of interest. | It is common for a legal team, particularly in a major case, to meet with a potential expert witness before hiring that witness.. It is also common for the team to meet with such an expert as testimony is being prepared. Food is often served at such meetings. | No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal. | There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney. | Yes, why not? It happens all the time. Usually the witness will just say, "I am not sure" or "I don't remember, exactly". Also, if Bob is the only witness, how would anyone prove that he was committing "perjury"? In the case of an uncooperative or dissimulating witness, Judges sometimes can hold them in contempt of court, but it is pretty rare. In general, the court has to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the witness is refusing to testify honestly. (See "Federal Grand Jury Practice and Procedure" by Paul Diamond) It depends very much on the situation. Note that just trying to act "drunk" would not be a good idea, because that is contempt of court. | This is normal. It only seems imbalanced because only the prosecutor has been able to call witnesses so far. Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 611: Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. At this point, only the prosecution has put on its witnesses, so it hasn't had an opportunity cross examine anyone, and the defense has been able to lead because it has only been able to cross examine. Were the prosecutor to call the defendant's wife or mother or something like that, he would probably be permitted to use leading questions. And when the defense puts on its case, the roles will reverse: the defense attorneys will have to use open-ended questioning for any witness he calls, and the prosecutor will be able to use leading questions. | In the United States, different jurisdictions have different rules about what topics may be addressed in cross examination. In the federal courts, Fed. R. Evid. 611 generally discourages cross examination on matters not addressed in the direct examination, although it also permits questions on "matters affecting the witness’s credibility." So if a witness is asked on direct examination only about whether A stopped at the intersection before B crashed into him, the cross examination probably shouldn't go into questions about how severe the injuries were, what the weather conditions were, etc. But the court should allow cross-examination on whether the witness is the plaintiff's sister, or whether the witness was previously convicted of perjury. (Despite the rule, the court has a great deal of latitude as to how to handle these questions, practically speaking.) In the state courts, the rules may be different. In Ohio, for instance, Rule 611 is roughly identical, except that it generally allows questions on "all relevant matters." So now the questions about the weather and injuries are fair game, along with the questions about the witness's credibility. In any event, the questions will remain subject to the other rules of evidence, so questions about sexual history might be excluded by the rape shield, and questions about irrelevant matters should be prohibited, as well. | united-states "I know is it illegal for authorities to question a suspect when their lawyer isn’t present" This is not really true, at least in the US. The suspect must explicitly ask for a lawyer. Even saying "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" (ie Davis v. U.S. (512 U.S. 453 (1994)) isn't enough, they have to say "I want a lawyer". Until they invoke the right, an officer can question all they want (provided they were informed of these rights, except for certain situations which are relatively complicated. See Miranda Rights). So no, an officer questioning you without a lawyer is neither a crime nor illegal. Once you invoke your Miranda right though, they have to respect that. With or without your lawyer, this is called interrogation. You can filter your responses through a lawyer, or waive your right to a lawyer and answer directly. | Unless you received an order from the court prohibiting contact, it might be legal; but it's probably not the best idea. Let the lawyers handle it Attorneys have far better, more effective means of dealing with this situation than the course of action you describe. Lawyers have productive tools to accomplish the job and they know how to use them. For example, assume the best-case-scenario results from your idea and you get the other side to admit their affidavit is fallacious in some way. "Aha!" you shout. "Success! Daylight!" But then what? It's not on record. You can't testify to the admission because that's hearsay. Now imagine they next share this information about your little conversation with the counterparty that had them sign the affidavit in the first place. After first being alerted of your concerns, they both now act in concert to shore up their stories and you never see that "daylight" again. Contrast that outcome with one where your guy or gal's attorney deposes the witness under oath, gets them to concede to your version of the facts then introduces the deposition as favorable evidence at trial. That's a much better outcome for "your side." Wouldn't you agree? Be wary of unintended consequences Generally speaking, such direct contact between the parties is often problematic and rarely helpful. (Except, in some cases, when direct contact between the parties leads to a negotiated settlement. Which happens far less often than the direct contact going sideways making the situation even more intractable.) Before you launch off on your own and do something that might be counterproductive. First, identify the areas of the affidavit that you think are inaccurate. Give that information to the party you support, then have them run it by their attorney to figure out the best way to handle the situation. |
If a person would confess a speeding event many years after it happened, what would be the consequences? I'm writing a story and I wanted some accuracy on this matter, specifically for the consequences on the person to whom this would happen. Imagine a situation a public person (this will be important later) did, for the sake of fun, speeding with a car on public ways and the warning and fines couldn't be sent to the person who did it, due to lack of identification on car or having fake plates, something as absurd as this. Then, many years later (originally I thought of having the speeding event happening in 2014 and the person coming clean and confessing it in 2019 or 2020, giving this sort of time window), the author of the speeding and driving with an unmarked car comes to the public and confess what they did, not only to the media (it's a public person, a sort of celebrity) but also to the law enforcement agencies which this could apply. What would realistically happen to this person, legally speaking? PS: I did not include a country which this sort of event would happen as I'm still deciding where in the story this could happen, so I don't know whether there's an element of the penalty expiring or not. | england-and-wales What would realistically happen to this person, legally speaking? Nothing The most common speeding offence is at section 89(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 A person who drives a motor vehicle on a road at a speed exceeding a limit imposed by or under any enactment to which this section applies shall be guilty of an offence. And, section 1(1)(c) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 requires a Notice of Intended Prosecution (NIP) be served to the car’s registered keeper within 14 days of the offence, but as the car had false plates there is no way to identify who this was. If that 14 day deadline is not met, then the driver cannot be prosecuted regardless of any confession. | The police (and any other involved public agencies) do not work for Steve. They make their own decisions. You didn't specify a location, and requirements to consent to a search vary by location. It wouldn't be surprising, though, if Steve can't legally consent to a search of someone else's room (but possibly could consent to search of common areas). One possibility you don't seem to have considered is that the police or prosecutor would, if Steve is willing to testify, use Steve's testimony as probable cause to get a warrant. Then they could obtain text messages from Mike's service provider (even if he's deleted them from his phone), search his room without his consent, etc. Details again vary by location. Finally, any jail/prison term is typically up to a judge or jury, not the police. Pre-trial detention is typically up to a judge or magistrate. (Also, outside the scope of your question, but if there is any chance Steve has allowed himself to become involved in the misdeeds, even slightly, Steve would be wise to talk to a lawyer. Or if he suspects the police could believe that.) | This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough. | An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all? | Unfortunately, the police are correct The limit on filing a civil claim (a lawsuit where you seek monetary compensation) is before you turn 40. If you were 11 in 1985 then it is too late to sue your assaulter. For criminal prosecution, the law was changed in 2016. Prior to the change, the limitation was the same as for civil cases. After the change, there is no limit but only if the offence was committed on or after 1 January 2017. Assuming that your reference to Kelly is to this guy - the alleged offences were committed in the 1990s and the prosecutions are under Illinois, Minnesota and Federal law (the Federal crimes alleged are not the sexual assault of a minor). Each state has it's own rules. | Unlikely, but specific facts may change this. The fact a vehicle gets the approval of the NHTSA and/or other safety regulatory bodies will probably mean that it already passed a certain level of safety testing, and any reasons for a recall will only surface after orders of magnitude greater sample and/or testing time. Therefore, the probability of causing endangering participants in traffic and others are negligible. The duty of notice will most likely be on the manufacturer under a product liability theory. Driving continuously and/or repeatedly after notice may be a different matter if it actually results in harming one — theoretically even oneself. | Not all illegal things are crimes. Lack of evidence. They are asked to testify, and they say "what I said in my book was a lie". There is no general law against lying, except when under oath. Statute of limitations. Saying "10 years ago I did smoke drugs" means that any offence is no longer prosecutable. Lack of details. Which jurisdiction were they in? When did they commit the act, how many acts? You cannot be arrested for being a "bank robber" or a "murderer". You are charged with "robbing Bank X on 123 Fake Street the Thursday 25 April 2018" or "murdering Jim Thio in January 2017". Otherwise the defendant would have a hard time defending himself (how to prove that you have not killed anyone at any time?) All of the above combined with prosecutorial discretion in the form that any possible prosecutor will most likely determine that bringing charges would be just a waste of time and resources. UPDATE February 2018: Just for the sake of completeness, a reference to the situation of Jacques Cassandri, who did boast about a serious crime(a robbery in a Societe Generale vault in 1976) in a book. Unfortunately for him, he made some kind of mistake/miscalculation and the crime had not yet expired, so he has become an example of someone being prosecuted by confessing a crime in a book. | also, what is "cannot be punished on account thereof because they lacked criminal responsibility due to the intoxication or if this cannot be ruled out"? I can not understand This means that if a person, while drunk, does soemthign that would otherwise be a crime, but the person cannot be charged because s/he was too drunk to know that s/he was committing a crime, such a person can insted be charged with having become intoxicated, and given up to the same punishment that would have been given for conviction for doign the unlawful act. For example, if a person damaged property while under the influence of alcohol (drunk), it might be impossible under German law to prosecute for the crime of intentionally damaging property, because one could not prove that the person knew what s/he was doing, and knew that it was criminal. In such a case the person could be charged with having intentionally or carelessly become drunk, but the penalty can't be more than the penalty for having damaged property would have been, nor can it be more than five years. As a practical matter, I think it very unlikely that the police would seek to impose a fine if they didn't issue any ticket or other paperwork at the scene, nor mention any such intention. However, they might be legally able to do so. |
Why is the Privacy Act called the Privacy Act? The American Privacy Act allows subjects to access copies of records held on them by US government agencies. But what does it have to do with privacy? | what does it have to do with privacy? This can be explained by reference to the full title of the Privacy Act 1974 (as amended): An Act to amend title 5, United States Code, by adding a section 552a, to safeguard individual privacy from the misuse of Federal records, to provide that individuals be granted access to records concerning them which are maintained by Federal agencies, to establish a Privacy Protection Study Commission, and for other purposes. (my emboldenment) | The DOJ has a handy FAQ about declassification on their site. There are statutory and E.O. provisions for automatic declassification of information (I think the most common one in practice is "historically important information after 25 years"). Though this is subject to review and may be rejected in particular situations, dictated by much the same provisions. As for reclassifying automatically declassified information, the FAQ says: CAN INFORMATION THAT HAS BEEN AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED BE RECLASSIFIED? Yes. Information that has not previously been disclosed to the public under proper authority may be classified or reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under the FOIA, Presidential Records Act, 44 USC 2204(c)(1), the Privacy Act of 1974, or the mandatory review provisions of E.O. 13526, only if such classification or reclassification meets the requirements of E.O. 13526, and is accomplished on a document-by-document basis with the personal participation or under the direction of the agency head, the deputy agency head, or the senior agency official. Information may not be reclassified after declassification and release to the public under proper authority. Similar provisions were detailed in E.O. 12958. A "proper authority" would not include, say, leaks, like those due to Snowden. Note that, as for Trump's situation, while he most surely counted as a "proper authority" while President, there is no indication whatsoever that the information was also released to the public under his or any other proper authority. A recent and somewhat controversial example of reclassification began in 1999 under the Clinton administration, as a result of aforementioned E.O. 12958, and lasted for several years after. To justify their reclassification program, officials at CIA and military agencies have argued that during the implementation of Executive Order 12958, President Clinton's program for bulk declassification of historical federal records, many sensitive intelligence-related documents that remained classified were inadvertently released at NARA, especially in State Department files. Even though researchers had been combing through and copying documents from those collections for years, CIA and other agencies compelled NARA to grant them access to the open files so they could reclassify documents. A separate article from the same link provides: ...security officials at DOE had become concerned that the implementation of EO 12958 had led to the inadvertent release in State Department and other agency records at NARA of "unmarked" restricted and formerly restricted data on nuclear weapons. In the fall of 1998, Congress formally authorized the Department of Energy to remove from public document repositories any and all sensitive nuclear weapons design-related information pursuant to Section 3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, entitled "Protection Against Inadvertent Release of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data." The argument the agencies seemed to advance for this reclassification is that prior declassifications had not undergone the proper equity considerations: meaning that agencies other than the ones who declassified them had an interest and say in their classification, which should not have been overlooked. While some complained about the reclassification of information that had entered the public domain—the material had been on the public shelves for years, and some of it had even been published and a good deal more of it sifted through by various parties—this did not seem to matter to the agencies. Much as classified information leaked by Snowden or anyone else remains classified, the information becoming common/public knowledge does not necessarily automatically affect its classification status, or ability to be (re)classified. | Neither the GDPR, nor the CCPA, nor any other data protection law that I am aware of, requires that when information is deleted on request, that similar information not be collected and stored in future. Under the GDPR Article 6 there would have to be a lawful basis for any processing, including storage, assuming that the GDPR applies to the directory in question. There could be a claim that such processing was lawful under article 6(e) "performance of a task carried out in the public interest". I do not know if any such claim has been adjudicated. Thus there is no need to hold a database of previously erased records to determine if a new record should be blocked as "previously deleted". The Wikimedia Foundation, which runs Wikipedia, I believe takes the position that the GDPR does not apply to Wikipedia, I am not sure of their detailed arguments. But surely articles on well-known people, such as a former US president, would be covered under the same provisions as would cover news reports and historical books about such a person. Perhaps that would also come under article 6(e) | I presume you are addressing the various wiretapping laws. In all of those channels, one would have a reasonable expectation of privacy, in contrast to using CB radio or a megaphone. However the context of using the instrument affects that expectation, for example if your phone is on speaker you do not have a reasonable expectation that those around you cannot hear your conversation, when there are others around you. Also, there is no expectation of privacy surrounding employers monitoring employee emails for valid business purposes – but the federal government can't intercept your emails (without a warrant) just because you are using business email. The expectation of privacy is really about the surrounding circumstance, not the instrument you use. | IANAL, But the information commissioners office (UK) describe personal data as: (bolding mine) The GDPR applies to ‘personal data’ meaning any information relating to an identifiable person who can be directly or indirectly identified in particular by reference to an identifier. This definition provides for a wide range of personal identifiers to constitute personal data, including name, identification number, location data or online identifier, reflecting changes in technology and the way organisations collect information about people. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/key-definitions/ So I would say that in your case it is personal information. In principle, regardless of if you can identify an individual, personal data is that which can be used to potentially identify an individual. For an extreme example of why this is important: Lets say your app sells AIDs medication. Can a hacker who got in and stole your database, be able to use that with information they stole elsewhere to identify people with AIDs and blackmail them, in a way that they wouldn't if you had not stored this identifier? Plus, if you want to err on the side of caution, there's no legal penalty for telling the user about non-personal information you store. | It's not illegal to ask. Whether they can give it to you, and under what circumstances, is another, much more complicated matter. For instance, if the database contains health information covered by HIPAA in the United States, or personal information covered by laws like GDPR or CCPA, the customer's ability to share the database may be restricted, either requiring additional confidentiality obligations/use restrictions, or preventing sharing entirely. | It is neither legal nor illegal, but would depend on the circumstances. For example, such use of a smart assistant might be perfectly fine if the childcare provider could demonstrate a legitimate interest for using the smart assistant, and gave reasonable notice about audio being recorded. Parental permission is likely not necessary. In practice, doing this right would be far too much effort. For example: Has the necessary information per GDPR Art 13 been provided, taking into account the EDPB guidelines on transparency? Under what legal basis are conversations sent to Amazon, an US-based provider, taking into account the Schrems II ruling? How will data subject rights be satisfied, in particular the right to access to these recordings, the right to erasure, and the right to object to further processing? Having discovered such processing of personal data that isn't necessarily kosher, a parent/guardian might start by objecting (GDPR Art 21) to further processing. This could be satisfied by powering off the Alexa devices in all rooms where the child is expected to be. The childcare should respond within one month. If no satisfactory response has been received, one option would be to lodge a complain with the supervisory authority, which would be the ICO in the UK. | GDPR rights and obligations cover different things: A duty of the data processor towards the government of the country where they operate to present certain documentation, and to implement technical and organizational measures to protect data. These would be audited by government agencies, not the individual customer. A single data subject cannot waive them. A duty of the data processor to process and store personal data only with a legal justification. User consent is one possible justification, if it is informed, revokable, etc. So a single data subject can waive a "ban" on storing his or her data in a database along with all the other users who waived that "ban," but the duties towards the government regarding that data would still apply. A duty of the data processor to respond to an Article 15 request by the data subject in a certain way and timeframe. If a data subject writes a letter to the data processor and explicitly states that the letter is not an Article 15 request, then Article 15 does not apply. The data subject would of course have the right to make an Article 15 request at a later time. |
Could the US abolish copyright? I know this isn't politically feasible, but is it legally possible for the United States to abolish copyright? Could the government withdraw from all treaties that require copyright, then repeal all copyright-related laws? I know the Constitution allows copyright, but does it require it to be recognized? | There is no constitutional requirement that Congress provide copyright protection in the US. Congress could, if it so chooses, repeal Title 17 of the US Code, and afford no copyright protection whatsoever. Given that the US has protected copyright from its earliest days, that copyright protection in English law dates to the 1600s, that almost every nation currently has a Law protecting copyright, and that such protection is a requirement of membership in the World Trade organization (WTO) I find it highly unlikely that such a change in the law will be made in the foreseeable future. But Congress does have the power to abolish copyright in the US. | First I should point out that the Google question is about a different situation, the "snippet" issue where a tiny part of a web page is redistributed, where the issue of resolved in the US by appeal to the "fair use" defense. The proposed scenario as written here is broader since it would go beyond a couple of lines, and goes up to the limit of copy an entire web page. That is copyright infringement, with or without an associated link. Copyright protection is not just about attribution, it is about control. If you can limit your copying appropriately, you may survive under a fair use analysis; but you need to hire a lawyer with experience in copyright litigation to vet your notions of what is "a small amount" etc. | united-states In the US it is not unlawful to produce and display a video arguing for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, whether the intent is to support that invasion or to document the claims of those who do support it, and argue that they are invalid. Such a video would be protected by copyright, and copying it and redistributing it with subtitles might well be an infringement of that copyright, if done without permission. On the other hand, doing so with the intent of educating others about Russian claims might constitute fair use. If so, it would not be copyright infringement under US law. Aside from the copyright issue (which would be up to the copyright holder to take action on) US law does not really care what the motivation for posting such a sub-titled video might be. Whether or not it is "beneficial for the whole human civilization" is not relevant to US law. It is protected by the First Amendment against government suppression. That would not affect YouTube, as a private actor,, determining not to host it on their site. | united-states You are protected by copyright as a matter of law, even if you don't post a copyright notice, although you have slightly more procedural rights if you do post a copyright notice and there would need to be a filing with the copyright registrar (a division of the Library of Congress) before you brought suit. You can't really get any other intellectual property protections for it except possibly a trademark if you have a distinctive mark or name or logo for the app. | US Laws are Free of Copyright Federal Works 17 USC 105 says: Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise. The phrase "work of the United States Government" has been interpreted to mean any work created by an officer or employee of the government in the course of his or her official duties. See 17 USC 101 for the official definition. This includes the text of (any and all) legislation. The official texts of all US laws (and federal regulations) are in the public domain, and no one may claim copyright on them. Strictly speaking, this is not a matter of "fair use". Fair use is an exception for limited uses of copyrighted content. The texts of these laws are not protected by copyright at all, and never have been. State Works In addition, while works of the various US states are not automatically in the public domain, the text of state laws, and I believe of the various state and local regulations are also in the public domain. This Wikipedia article says: Federal statutes are in the public domain and no copyright attaches to them. The same is true of court decisions. In State of Georgia vs Public Resource Org, Inc 11th Circuit No. 17-11589, (October 19, 2018) a three-judge panel of the US 11th Circuit Court of Appeals wrote: The general rule that legislative codifications are uncopyrightable derives from an understanding of the nature of law and the basic idea that the People, as the reservoir of all sovereignty, are the source of our law. For purposes of the Copyright Act, this means that the People are the constructive authors of those official legal promulgations of government that represent an exercise of sovereign authority. And because they are the authors, the People are the owners of these works, meaning that the works are intrinsically public domain material and, therefore, uncopyrightable. The Wikipedia article linked above quotes State of Georgia v. Harrison Co, 548 F.Supp 110, 114 (N.D. Ga 1982) as saying: The citizens are the authors of the law, and therefore its owners, regardless of who actually drafts the provisions, because the law derives its authority from the consent of the public, expressed through the democratic process. It also quotes a US copyright office publication as saying: As a matter of longstanding public policy, the U.S. Copyright Office will not register a government edict that has been issued by any state, local, or territorial government, including legislative enactments, judicial decisions, administrative rulings, public ordinances, or similar types of official legal materials. Likewise, the Office will not register a government edict issued by any foreign government or any translation prepared by a government employee acting within the course of his or her official duties. However, some states do attempt to claim copyright in electronic versions of their state codes. The 2015 LA Times story "Georgia claims that publishing its state laws for free online is 'terrorism'" reports on a recent infringement suit by the State of Georgia against Carl Malamud, who makes copies of the Georgia Annotated Code available for free online. The state claimed that the annotations are protected by copyright. In State of Georgia vs Public Resource Org, Inc 11th Circuit No. 17-11589, (October 19, 2018) a three-judge panel of the US 11th Circuit Court of Appeals found this claim to be without merit. After a thorough review of the law, and an examination of the annotations, we conclude that no valid copyright interest can be asserted in any part of the OCGA. ... In most states the “official” code is comprised of statutory text alone, and all agree that a state’s codification cannot be copyrighted because the authorship is ultimately attributable to the People. ... When a legislature enacts a law, or a court writes an opinion rendering an official interpretation of the law in a case or controversy, they are undisputedly speaking on behalf of the People, who are properly regarded as the author of the work. ... Because we conclude that no copyright can be held in the annotations, we have no occasion to address the parties’ other arguments regarding originality and fair use. Non-US Laws UK laws are protected under Crown Copyright, although permissive licenses for reproducing copies are easily available. Many other countries have similar provisions. The US, however, does not generally recognize such copyrights. The position of the US Copyright Office is that: [T]he Office will not register a government edict issued by any foreign government or any translation prepared by a government employee acting within the course of his or her official duties. Laws Incorporating Copyrighted Works by Reference Laws sometimes include by reference privately developed and copyrighted documents. For example, building codes and other safety codes may be developed by private groups, often national non-profit organizations, and incorporated into state laws by reference. This means that the text of the privately developed code is legally part of the law, and the law cannot be fully understood and complied with without reading the code. But the code is a copyrighted work, and the copyright holder may charge for copies. For example, this official Texas web page says: The Texas statutes, administrative rules, and local ordinances occasionally adopt, incorporate, or refer to technical codes published by independent organizations. These codes describe scientific and safety standards for structures and discuss specifications for fire safety, electrical systems, plumbing fixtures, construction practices, and many other topics. ... Codes are not reprinted within the statutes or the local ordinances themselves. They are "adopted by reference" or "incorporated by reference" and are usually available to review at the city clerk's office and at some public libraries. Please contact your local public library or your local government for assistance accessing codes not available online. Federal Copyrights However, this does not mean that anything "published by the US government" is in the public domain or is free of copyright. The Federal government often hires contractors to prepare various works. These works are protected by copyright. Frequently, the contracts will assign this copyright to the Federal government, which as 17 USC 105 says: ... is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise. Such works are therefore copyrighted, and the copyright holder is or may be the US Federal Government. They are protected in the same way and to the same degree as works of private authorship. Many works funded by the US Federal Government fall into this category. | Legally, such services have no special status. They're not necessary for copyright to exist, and their status as evidence is not in any way special. This is one of those rare cases where a blockchain actually does make sense. Recently the idea of Non-Fungible Tokens has come up in the context of blockchains, and typically these are very accurately dated. NFT's can be sold, but that is not necessary for them to be created. | Not in US law, at least. Under the 1999 decision Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp (36 F. Supp. 2d 191) such images are not protected by copyright. As the Wikipedia article says, the court here ruled that exact photographic copies of public domain images could not be protected by copyright in the United States because the copies lack originality. Even though accurate reproductions might require a great deal of skill, experience and effort, the key element to determine whether a work is copyrightable under US law is originality. This decision has been generally followed in US copyright law thereafter. At the time it was claimed that UK law took a different view, but I understand that more recently the UK also follows the Bridgeman rule, although I cannot confirm that at the moment. See also this article about the Bridgeman case and its effects. The service probably puts that notice onto all its newspaper reproductions, not checking which ones are from originals still under copyright. EDIT: As some comments point out, the formatting used to present the digital version, if not a slavish copy of the original newspaper, might be original enough for copyright protection. Therefore one should copy only the digitized text, or elements obviously a direct copy of the original newspaper which is in the public domain. The digitizing service will not get any copyright on the original text or images, even if the formatting has enough originality for protection. | The Soviet Union generally had no copyright treaties with the western world before 1973. So, anything before then is public domain. The USSR had a policy of public domain and considered anything published to be the property of the "people", including anything published in the west. Even for works produced after 1973, they would have to be registered for copyright in the United States to claim a copyright here. |
What would be the legal repercussions of a UK government employee coming out as homosexual in the 1970s? This question is inspired by an incident in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (the Hollywood film version starring Gary Oldman, not the novel or the BBC miniseries with Alec Guinness). One of the British spies, Peter Guillam (played by Benedict Cumberbatch), is secretly homosexual. Partway through the film, on the advice of George Smiley, he abruptly terminates his romantic relationship and evicts his male lover. The reason he does this is because Smiley's vital counter-espionage operation cannot risk being discovered, and Guillam leading a double-life inevitably leads to discrepancies that, if anyone were to probe, could conceivably lead to the discovery of Smiley's mole hunt. My question is: would it have been legally acceptable for Guillam to resolve his dilemma by coming out of the closet? In 1973, did homosexuals in the British government face any kind of legal discrimination? Were they barred from serving in the government, or the intelligence service, or from living in London, or anything else? Was there any legal reason a gay man could not have had Peter Guillam's job in Her Majesty's Government in 1973? For a more detailed discussion of the fictional context, see this answer of mine on Movies.SE which prompted me to consult you fine folks. | Many The UK is not a unified jurisdiction. While the Sexual Offences Act 1967 decriminalised homosexuality in England and Wales, it was still a crime in Scotland until 1980 and Northern Ireland until 1982. However, even after 1967, an estimated 15,000-plus gay men were convicted of homosexual acts that still remained criminal. While homosexuality was decimalised; it was only legal if it took place in total privacy: at home, behind closed doors and curtains with no one else in the dwelling. The age of consent was 21, compared to 16 for heterosexual sex. It was a crime if there were more than 2 people involved or if they were filmed or photographed. In 1966, the year before decriminalisation, there were 420 convictions for homosexuality; in 1974, there were 1,711 convictions for still criminal activities around homosexuality. Perversely, decriminalisation led to a more zealous police force targeting gays for what had not been decriminalized about their lifestyle. It was still a crime for members of the armed services and for merchant seaman, decriminalised in 1994. It was still legal to sack civilian sailors for homosexuality until 2017. Notwithstanding, even where there was no criminality, there was no protection against discrimination until various laws were introduced between 2003-2007. Socially, there was enormous prejudice against homosexuals through the 1970s, 1980s and continuing to today in some communities. I can remember the nasty jokes, abuse and, in some cases, physical violence and murders directed against gays when I was at school and university. The categorisation of AIDS as the "gay disease" did nothing to alleviate this prejudice. For a spy to be openly homosexual? Not a chance it hell. It would be seen as a weakness that could be exploited by the enemy. | The statute reads (emphasis mine): A person is guilty of adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Suppose Alvin has sex with Betty while Betty is married to Charlie. Does Alvin's conduct satisfy the elements of the crime? Alvin engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (namely Betty) at a time when the other person (Betty again) had a living spouse (namely Charlie). So yes, Alvin has violated this law. Betty has also violated the law (the first clause instead of the second). Betty engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (Alvin) at a time when he (Betty; the pronoun "he" is meant to be gender-neutral in the statute's style of writing) had a living spouse (Charlie). However, this law is effectively unenforced in modern times. According to https://www.dbnylaw.com/adultery-is-still-a-crime-in-new-york-state/: It is extremely rare for anyone to be arrested just for adultery. Indeed, since 1972, only 13 persons have been charged with adultery. Of those 13 persons, only five actually were convicted of the crime. In virtually every one of those cases, there was some other crime that was committed and the prosecuting attorney added adultery as just one of many crimes committed. If Charlie files a complaint regarding the affair, it is almost certain that the police and prosecutors will ignore it, and that nobody will actually be charged with anything. | "Lightsaber" is a trademarked term, so it's gotta be called something else. The idea behind a lightsaber is older than Star Wars, anyhow idea are not protected by copyright. The actual design of such a weapon would be protected, but it would be a matter for the jury to decide if the supposedly-infringing design was a copy of a Lucasfilms-protected object, or that of the cover of Analog, Jan. 1969. The "setting" of the movie is completely irrelevant, all that counts is whether the object "copies" the plaintiff's design. In light of the earlier Wolfling design, it's not a foregone conclusion that all lightsaber-resembling objects are infringing. Available evidence indicates that you will be sued if you do it, so consult a really good IP attorney. | Eddie Slovik was executed by firing squad for desertion during World War II (the only U.S. solider to have the death sentence carried out for desertion during the war). He requested from his commander an assignment behind the front lines, was denied, and took it upon himself to leave his post, walk to the rear and presented a note to a cook there confessing to the crime of desertion. Hundreds of U.S. soldiers (on both sides) were executed during the Civil War for desertion, or "simply walking away." Ebenezer Leffingwell was almost executed during the Revolutionary War for "running away from where the firing was, with every mark of fear and trepidation." This case is complicated by the fact that, after first being told to return, Leffingwell made a feint to do so then tried to desert again. After Col. Joseph Reed again "admonished" him with the broadside of his saber and instructing him back to the fight, Leffingwell turned and attempted to fire his weapon at his superior, though it failed to discharge. General George Washington approved the sentence, and Leffingwell received a last minute pardon after his grave had already been dug and the firing squad had lined up. To answer your title question, there is this quote from Wikipedia: The maximum U.S. penalty for desertion in wartime remains death, although this punishment was last applied to Eddie Slovik in 1945. No U.S. serviceman has received more than 24 months imprisonment for desertion or missing movement post-September 11, 2001 It also highlights § 885. Art. 85 from the 2012 edition of US Manual for Court Martial: Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct. | 34 CFR 106.15 covers admissions, and (e) says Subpart C does not apply to any public institution of undergraduate higher education which traditionally and continually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students of one sex. Subpart C, then, kind of redundantly prohibits "discrimination on the basis of sex in admission and recruitment", so that means there is no prohibition against single-sex public institutions of undergraduate education. The remainder of Title 9 applies, though. "Public" institution does not mean "government-run", it means "open to the public", which Wellesley is, although it is not government-run. I am not positive, but I think DLI is not a public school (even though it is operated by the US Army). | Assuming that the documents were either true, or Manning reasonably believed that they were true, there would be no cause of action for defamation. Many of the documents disclosed would have been confidential in some sense, but usually a violation of a confidentiality statute has a criminal sanction associated with it, but does not carry with it a private cause of action – in part, because conceptually, the party actually harmed is considered to be the government and not the person about whom information is revealed. It is also possible that Manning could utilize the state secrets privilege as a defense and have such a suit dismissed on the grounds that a full and adequate defense of the claims would require the disclosure of official state secrets. For example, if a covert agent were murdered due to a wrongful disclosure of information, usually official disclosure of the fact of being a covert agent would be required to prove the case, and that evidence would be barred by the state secrets privilege, effectively barring the lawsuit entirely. Constitutional claims of privacy violations under the 4th Amendment generally relate to the wrongful acquisition of information and not its wrongful disclosure. The constitution bars unreasonable search and seizure, not unreasonable disclosure of information. The only privacy tort that might be applicable is "Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts." (A sister privacy tort, Intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into privacy affairs, is directed at the collection of data phase and not the dissemination phase). See Restatement of the Law (Second) of Torts, §§ 652B and 652D. But, this tort raises serious First Amendment concerns and has not been widely adopted. Realistically, this tort is unconstitutional in the absence of an affirmative contractual or quasi-contractual duty not to reveal facts that runs to the person making the disclosure, and in general, Manning would not have that kind of relationship. The classic public disclosure of embarrassing private facts case would involve a lawyer's or psychotherapist's revelations about a client. Also, in the case of the public disclosure tort the basis for damages is largely personal emotional distress and violation of trust, as opposed to damage to reputation, per se. The requirement is that the disclosure be embarrassing or breach of contract, not that it harm someone's reputation since you have no legal right to a reputation that differs from the truth. | None The First Amendment says: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... Jack has exercised his freedom of speech and has not been fined, imprisoned or otherwise punished by law. Freedom to speak does not ensure freedom from consequences We can use your example of anti-LGBTQ comments or we can substitute any other thing you like: anti-veteran, pro-veteran, anti-Trump, pro-Trump, anti-Ice Hockey, pro-Ice Hockey or, of course, pro-LGBTQ. Jack can say what he likes on any of those subjects and anybody else can take offence to them and act accordingly. In terms of voters in an election - this the ultimately epitome of free speech, they can vote for who they like for whatever reason they like. In terms of people serving on a board, they voluntarily restrict their freedom to speak because of their duty to the organisation they represent. Whatever their views in private, by agreeing to take on the duty they agree that they will act in accordance with the ethics and ethos of the organisation in public. If they don’t, they can be disciplined; usually for the catch-all offence of bringing the organisation into disrepute. Providing the organisation follows its internally mandated procedures and affords natural justice (I.e. it follows due process), no court will overturn its right to act according to its principals. | It can (and has) been argued that some of the post-bellum trials of Germans and Japanese (but no Italians because they were Allies now) proceeded on shaky legal grounds. However, the arguments of your friend are wrong. In addition, many of the cases proceeded on solid legal foundations based on war crimes (e.g. the Commando Order) and treatment of prisoners-of-war (e.g. the Stalag-Luft III murders). Citizens and non-citizens are protected by the law and were even in Nazi Germany, albeit not equally. The Nuremberg Laws did not classify Jews as non-humans, merely as non-citizens (which is not to trivialise their awfulness). Superior orders has never been a recognised defence for criminal acts under civil or common law. The first recorded rejection of this defence was in the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474. The roots of modern International Law can be traced to the 16th century and were definitely well advanced by the 19th, let alone the mid-20th. Nations accepted that international treaties and diplomacy were supported by international law and these included the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906 and 1929, since updated in 1949 (of which Germany was a signatory) among many others. In addition, since the Enabling Act (which instituted Hitler's dictatorship) was quite probably illegal, it can be reasonably argued that all actions that flowed from it (i.e. basically everything that the Nazi's were tried for) was illegal under German law. |
Paternity of non-marital children I came across this document today: Sometimes a married woman gives birth to a child whose biological father is not her husband. Although the husband is not the child’s biological parent, he is the child’s legal parent under Michigan law. The husband is the legal parent of every child born or conceived during the marriage. The reverse is not true. If a man fathers another woman’s child while he is married, his wife is not the legal mother of that child. As the legal father of the children born during his marriage, a husband may have custody and parenting time. He may also be responsible for providing child support and health insurance. The biological father of such a child has no parental rights or responsibilities for the child. I'm not sure if the information is accurate, but according to the above text, when a wife cheats, it is marriage not biology that decides the paternity of the child. I got some questions: If my wife cheats on me, I would still be the legal parent of the child. If I don't want this paternity, is there a legal process to disavow it? If I fall in love with a married woman and we give birth to a child, I am the biological but not legal parent of the child. Is there a legal process for me to claim paternity of the child from the woman's husband? The document says "The reverse is not true". Why the decision about paternity is different between a wife cheats on a husband and a husband cheats on a wife? | I'm not sure if the information is accurate, but according to the above text, when a wife cheats, it is marriage not biology that decides the paternity of the child. I got some questions: If my wife cheats on me, I would still be the legal parent of the child. If I don't want this paternity, is there a legal process to disavow it? In most states, yes (I can't think of any exceptions, but there are 50 states and more self-governing territories and this is a matter of state law). Typically there is a statute of limitations of one to five years from the date of birth for a husband or person listed as a father on a birth certificate to bring a legal action to disavow paternity. See, e.g., California Family Code §§ 7540-7541 (setting a two year statute of limitations from a child's birth for a person with standing to dispute that a cuckolded husband is the legal father with genetic evidence). Note also that the process and statute of limitations are usually not the same, if, for example, a child wishes to prove that the child's biological father is someone other than the legally presumed father of that child. If I fall in love with a married woman and we give birth to a child, I am the biological but not legal parent of the child. Is there a legal process for me to claim paternity of the child from the woman's husband? Sometimes yes, and sometimes no. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), held that a state is not constitutionally required to make such a process available, but some states do anyway. The details of how this plays out under New York State law are described in this Law.SE question and answer. An analysis of the relevant portions of Minnesota law can be found here. For example, in California, Family Code Section 7541 limits standing to dispute paternity to spouses, people "presumed to be a parent" under Family Code Section 7611, or representatives of children seeking to establish or disestablish the paternity of someone "presumed to be a parent" under Family Code Section 7611. So, the only people eligible to be found to be parents are (excluding spent provisions of only historical interest): A husband who was married to the mother at the time of the birth or within 300 days before the birth. § 7611(a). A putative husband who would have been a spouse under § 7611(a), who marriage is annulled (e.g. because a marriage license expired or a husband was too closely related to the mother or either spouse is already married). § 7611(b). A putative husband who cohabited with the mother within 300 days before the birth whose attempt to married was too obviously defective to require an annulment (e.g. two fifteen year olds who have a church wedding without a marriage license). § 7611(b). A husband of the mother who marries the mother after the birth and is also named as a father on the birth certificate, in a voluntary written promise, or in a court order. § 7611(c). A putative husband who attempt to marry the mother after the birth and is named as a father on the birth certificate, in a voluntary written promise, or in a court order. § 7611(c). A person "who receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child." § 7611(d). A parent who dies while the "child is in utero" if this is established in a probate court proceeding. § 7511(f). Thus, in California, a father of the child of a woman married to someone else, who is still alive, (or someone of behalf of the child seeking to establish that he is the father) can only dispute the paternity of the husband of the child's mother (if the husband himself or the mother does not challenge the husband's paternity) if he "receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child." Simply claiming paternity without "receiving the child into his home" isn't sufficient to overcome the presumption that the mother's husband is the father in California unless the mother of the child or her husband disputes this presumption. The document says "The reverse is not true". Why the decision about paternity is different between a wife cheats on a husband and a husband cheats on a wife? Because maternity (absent a surrogacy arrangement) is almost never in doubt, while paternity is often in doubt. Furthermore, it wasn't possible when these doctrines were formulated (centuries ago) to determine paternity reliably in all cases anyway, at least at an affordable price. Cheap and reliable paternity tests, that can be used in pretty much any circumstances{1}, have only been possible for less than forty years, which is why a case like Michael H. v. Gerald D. didn't come up until then. {1} There have been particular cases, for example, when mother and father are both white and a child is at least partially black, where it has always been possible to do so (although even that scenario isn't 100% accurate, as illustrated by a famous historical case in which both parents had a modest amount of African ancestry that wasn't visible phenotypically). Similarly, there was the scenario of @MartinBonner where husband "was away at sea/war at the time conception would have had to occurred". Later on, blood types could disprove paternity in some cases, but not prove it with any certainty. There is a quasi-magical process described in the Old Testament for resolving such disputes involving the wife drinking a semi-poisonous liquid. In the Roman Empire, those cases were resolved by the husband who had a right to commit infanticide if he wished. In modern times, something close to the existing legal process has usually been available, complicated in certain eras by criminalized adultery, "heart balm" civil actions, and fault based divorce. | I know of no laws at the federal or state level that explicitly extend their protection to poly relationships. However, any law that purports to outlaw a polyamorous relationship among consenting adults should be looked at very skeptically, as it would likely be found unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. While that case dealt with homosexual relationships, it seems unlikely that the courts would conclude that heterosexual couples, throuples, etc., are entitled to less protection. Adultery laws exist in many jurisdictions, and many of them have survived constitutional challenges. But as far as I know, all those challenges relied on legal principles and precedents -- in particular, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) -- that Lawrence explicitly overruled. In this regard, I would not expect anyone in a polyamorous relationship to encourter meaningful legal jeopardy as a result of that relationship, assuming that the relationship(s) were otherwise legal and out in the open. If A is unaware of her spouse's relationship with C, for instance, that could cause problems in a divorce proceeding. I don't know of any legal options specifically designed for this sort of arrangement, but the more interconnected and interdependent these groups are, the more likely it becomes that some sort of written agreement would become worthwhile -- not as a response to legal danger arising from the polyamorous nature of the relationship, just to address the fact that someone is eventually going to fall short, potentially causing problems for the whole group. There are many lawyers who specialize in LGBT issues, and I'd imagine that some of them would be able to provide more detailed advice about how to deal with this type of situation. | No To declare that a parent is "unfit" in the US requires at least a decision by a government agency (often called "child protective services" or "child welfare" depending on the state) usually confirmed by a judge. Medical testimony may be persuasive, but neither doctors nor hospitals may make such determinations. | In the US, no, courts would not enforce such a contract. It would be deemed not in the public interest, perhaps unconscionable. Of course, two willing adults could make and honor such an agreement but that would only work as long as the woman didn't change her mind. What is "fair" in a situation like this is a little tricky but, ultimately, any child's welfare is going to be a major consideration in any court decision. | if the child exchange time and locations are fixed, and the husband can no longer legally drive, does this effectively nullify his visitation rights? No. He can get a ride from someone or get an Uber or Lyft or Taxi or take a bus. The drop off location is near her house, not his, and even if public transportation were an option he would not be the type to use it. He's more the type that would ignore the suspension of his license and go pick up the kids in his car anyway. He is also the kind to try to attempt to manipulate the wife into doing what he wants regardless of what a court order says. Emotional abuse and manipulation were a big part of his game, but fortunately she has gotten much better at ignoring it. What he is inclined to do and why have nothing to do with whether or not it is legal. If he has his license revoked and attempts to pick up the children as always, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she allows him to pick up the kids? Practically speaking, no, particularly in light of a court order to transfer custody. Theoretically, it is remotely possible, even though it is very unlikely. In theory, she could be held liable for negligent child neglect by allowing this to happen, particularly if the children were then harmed in an automobile accident. If he was visibly drunk or intoxicated at the time of the transfer, however, her risk of criminal liability would be considerable. Would there be any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses to allow him to pick up the children himself with a suspended license/registration? Potentially, she could be held in contempt of court for refusing to follow a court order. Her better course would be to call the police when he arrived to report that he is driving with suspended license, to not transfer the children and wait until they arrive (seeking cover inside a home and advising the 911 operator again if the situation starts to escalate into a potentially violent situation), and to explain to the police that he is also attempting to endanger the children by trying to drive with them on a suspended license. There is a good chance that he would be arrested and that the police would leave her with the children. The police might, rather than arresting him, drive him home with the kids and tell him not to drive and cite him for driving with a suspended license. Then, she should make an emergency motion to the court, regardless of how it is resolved by the police, seeking permission to formally give her a right to refuse to transfer if he arrives unaccompanied with a suspended license. If he attempts to convince her to drop the kids off somewhere else (presumably at his house) due to the suspension of his license, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses? Probably not. This time he's not following the court order, not her. It would still be advisable for her to file an emergency motion with the court explaining the situation. | Generally, in non-emergency situations, the state with jurisdiction over parenting issues related to children including relinquishment and adoption is vested in the courts of the "home state" of the child. A child's "home state" is defined by statute by a coordinated definitions set forth in parallel laws at the state (the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction And Enforcement Act in 49 states) and federal (the Parental Kidnapping Prevent Act) level. This definition of "home state" provides a fairly precise definition of something that approximately matches your intuition regarding the state where the child resides in most cases. There is also an international treaty with a similar home state definition. The state where the child was born ceases to be relevant at the point at which that state ceases to be the child's "home state". But, once a state's courts take jurisdiction over parenting issues for a child, the barrier to divest that state of jurisdiction is higher than it would be if there was no prior litigation. So, the state establishing the child support decree would often be the "home state" in the fact pattern set forth in this question. I will refrain from discussing the substantive law of voluntary relinquishment following an acknowledgment of paternity and payment of child support at length in this post as it is beyond the scope of what was asked. Suffice it to say that this is generally disfavored and is sometimes impossible. Also, the actions that could lead to involuntary termination of parental rights (even for mere non-support) also often have parallel felony criminal sanctions associated with them. | To answer the last question, the court cannot order a DNA test, see Kumar v. Gupta, on privacy grounds: "such tests impinge upon the right of privacy of an individual and could also have major societal repercussions". This is not a hard line, but it would be safe to conclude that in a case like the present, the Court’s decision should be rendered only after balancing the interests of the parties, i.e, the quest for truth, and the social and cultural implications involved therein See Puttaswamy v. India, the landmark case that established the constitutional right to privacy. DNA evidence is not absolutely barred, see Banarsi Dass V. Teeku Dutta and citations therein, finding most importantly that There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act. Various rulings have clarified that Section 112 establishes a defeasible presumption, and not a mindless bar to evidence: It is rebuttable presumption of law that a child born during the lawful wedlock is legitimate, and that access occurred between the parents. In other words, yes and no. As summarized in that ruling, tests cannot be ordered routinely or as a form of discovery, "There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act", the court must balance the consequences of ordering such a test ("branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman"), and a person cannot be compelled to give a blood sample. | I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible. |
What would happen if this would to happen in a paternity case? Let's say, for instance, you as a man were to be sued for child support. You then went to city hall to see if you have been declared as a father on any child's birth certificate. The government official then provides you with a legal document that you are not legally any child's father. If you were to go to the child support hearing with this document and tell the Judge that as long as the law of non-contradiction holds in this courtroom either the document you got from the government is lying or this woman is lying. The judge must tell me who is telling the truth, the government or this woman. Two contradictions cannot both be true at the same time. What do you think would happen in this hypothetical? | There are a couple of flaws in your hypothetical. Nobody, certainly not the state, represents the birth records as inerrant or complete. Birth records frequently have to be corrected. In fact the point of many paternity suits is to correct the official birth record. Sometimes the father, or even the mother will be listed as "unknown" on the birth record, so the absence of a birth record naming a person as a father is not dispositive. No government official would ever issue a legal document declaring that the man is not any child's legal father because the records don't establish that. At best they could issue a document stating that the man was not the father of record for any child in the state. Anyway, the exercise would be pointless. The only birth record the court would be interested in would be that for the child before them. None of the other birth records would be relevant to the case at hand. The court in a paternity case would ask for evidence, such as birth certificates, or statements acknowledging paternity. If the two parties continued to dispute paternity, the court would order a paternity test. Older blood typing tests sometimes left paternity ambiguous, but modern DNA paternity testing is can achieve 99.99% certainty, baring fraud or laboratory error. | Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later. | This wouldn't be customary and is probably improper, but the judge may have been trying to do you a favor. In the absence of being under oath, the judge could not consider anything said in your closing statement as evidence. If you are under oath, the judge can weigh something you say in your closing statement against the other evidence when making a ruling. | Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged. | This is what we mean when we say something falls between the cracks. Sorry for that. First off, in the United States, family law is not federal, it is individual to each state. This means there is no federal agency or official charged with enforcing family law. When it comes to marriage and divorce, the federal government and their border agents are after those seeking to gain benefit through fraud (i.e., attempting to attain status through fraudulent marriage). Likewise, they don't have formal cross-jurisdictional protocols controlling the right of the US government to demand personal, private family law records from other governments. Nor do they have the means to pursue that. What this means, in practical terms, is that no family law judge sitting in the US has authority, interest or means in international marriage and divorce beyond those cases initiated in their court. I hope you read that slowly and carefully. Ask me if you need clarification. I suspect that you have a very specific cause in mind that necessitates you being in possession of a divorce decree. And I get the impression that you and your ex-spouse are in agreement and working together to solve this. You might find it valuable, at this point, to take a step back a little further into history. Let's consider your marriage. You two know you got married. I suspect that your friends, loved ones, and hopefully family know you got married. Then there is that clerk somewhere in Denmark (who records more than 100 marriages every week) who knows you got married. Theoretically. Possibly. Maybe. You've been residing in Russia for some years now, and the Russian government doesn't know you are married. Marriage is illegal there. So, in actuality the Russian government, if asked by some official of some other government, can only state with truth and authority that it is certain that you are NOT married. At the same time, some US federal official decides to investigate the most highly unlikely case ever. Someone is trying to gain entry, not by claiming marriage but by hiding a marriage. (ridiculous!) So, with a budget of zero, and the authority to match, goes from country to country demanding that they open up the (extremely) private records of family courts in search of the evidence he needs. When they ask him to demonstrate cause, he boldly tells them that his sharp mind is cause enough. They agree and give him cups of tea as he searches through the private affairs of their residents. It is never-ending, but he is proud to be working to stop the flood of unwanted divorced persons trying to gain entry to the USA. - - - - You get the picture. Also, consider the option of an international divorce. I would provide a reference here, but a simple Google search will yield many providers. It is expensive and time-consuming, but an available option. I'd rank it last. There are also varied laws by jurisdiction - internationally. I'm not expert enough to know of any jurisdictions that might not require extended residency. I suspect some won't. I am confident, on the other hand, that there are several that you might access with relative short windows of required residency. This Wikipedia article should give you a good start. You are also maybe a little fast in dismissing Denmark as a possible venue. European Union states, at one time, experienced a tangled mess regarding family law across jurisdictions and specifically divorce. In 2003, however, the EU implemented Regulation 2201/2003 providing for conferred jurisdictional competence by way of exception in cases involving applicants for divorce similarly situated to you. And now jurisprudence, in a wonderful show, is beginning to catch up with regulation and public sentiment on the matter. The provisions seem complicated, but they are definitely outside the abilities of a couple of Russians who have managed to get this far. Here's a starting point to get the ball rolling. Aside from those three solutions, you might be stuck. You would be ill-advised to seek some creative solution outside of the law. And I struggle to think of anything that might work. Unfortunately, justice and law are often connected by a mere thread, and sometimes not at all. You are left to forge ahead on behalf of others, who enjoy the fruits of your labour. For that, you have our gratitude. And while I am no expert on the fight for justice, There is this man - an American, who is. He wasn't gay, so much as black. Be he figured out a lot regarding justice. There are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that "an unjust law is no law at all." -Martin Luther King Jr. I salute you. | if the child exchange time and locations are fixed, and the husband can no longer legally drive, does this effectively nullify his visitation rights? No. He can get a ride from someone or get an Uber or Lyft or Taxi or take a bus. The drop off location is near her house, not his, and even if public transportation were an option he would not be the type to use it. He's more the type that would ignore the suspension of his license and go pick up the kids in his car anyway. He is also the kind to try to attempt to manipulate the wife into doing what he wants regardless of what a court order says. Emotional abuse and manipulation were a big part of his game, but fortunately she has gotten much better at ignoring it. What he is inclined to do and why have nothing to do with whether or not it is legal. If he has his license revoked and attempts to pick up the children as always, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she allows him to pick up the kids? Practically speaking, no, particularly in light of a court order to transfer custody. Theoretically, it is remotely possible, even though it is very unlikely. In theory, she could be held liable for negligent child neglect by allowing this to happen, particularly if the children were then harmed in an automobile accident. If he was visibly drunk or intoxicated at the time of the transfer, however, her risk of criminal liability would be considerable. Would there be any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses to allow him to pick up the children himself with a suspended license/registration? Potentially, she could be held in contempt of court for refusing to follow a court order. Her better course would be to call the police when he arrived to report that he is driving with suspended license, to not transfer the children and wait until they arrive (seeking cover inside a home and advising the 911 operator again if the situation starts to escalate into a potentially violent situation), and to explain to the police that he is also attempting to endanger the children by trying to drive with them on a suspended license. There is a good chance that he would be arrested and that the police would leave her with the children. The police might, rather than arresting him, drive him home with the kids and tell him not to drive and cite him for driving with a suspended license. Then, she should make an emergency motion to the court, regardless of how it is resolved by the police, seeking permission to formally give her a right to refuse to transfer if he arrives unaccompanied with a suspended license. If he attempts to convince her to drop the kids off somewhere else (presumably at his house) due to the suspension of his license, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses? Probably not. This time he's not following the court order, not her. It would still be advisable for her to file an emergency motion with the court explaining the situation. | Can a divorced man win a downward modification of alimony and/or child support if he were tricked into a marriage by a child that wasn't his? The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. Will the man likely be able to get reduced child support and/or alimony on the claim that he was tricked into a marriage he would not otherwise have undertaken? Generally speaking, marriages induced by fraud about anything other than the extreme case of fraud involving who someone is marrying in the act of marriage itself (i.e. someone believed they were marrying John Smith from Denver but actually was married to John Smith from Los Angeles, whom they had never met before, because the marriage ceremony was conducted with disguises and they didn't look closely at the marriage certificate), has no impact on marital rights. Evidence regarding fraud to induce a marriage wouldn't even be admissible at trial because it wouldn't be legally relevant. This has no impact on alimony. Paternity can be contested by filing a paternity suit within the statute of limitations for doing so which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (usually within two to five years of the child's birth). If the husband prevails in a timely paternity contest, child support will not be owed. Otherwise, actual genetic paternity would be irrelevant. In California, the statute of limitations to disavow paternity of a child born to one's wife is two years from the date of birth. N.B. I am making some interpretations of inexact language in the question. It says: The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. But I assume that what is really meant is that one or both of the members of the couple file for divorce and that in the course of the divorce proceeding the wife seeks alimony and child support. If the divorce proceeding is concluded without an adjudication of paternity that would usually preclude a later lawsuit to disavow paternity. | They cannot force a contract on you after the fact. You should leave these numbskulls alone, they are clearly up to something that makes them likely to be sued. I am adding the following: it's not illegal as far as I know to declare anything you want to a person as long as it isn't a threat. "You are now beholden to give me your firstborn makle child." lol, no. |
Is it legal or acceptable to use a photo of my ID, instead of my actual ID? I'm in the process of trying to get rid of my wallet - all of my bank and reward cards are on my phone, so I can use Google Pay for my purchases and points. I have two cards left, my bank card (which I need for purchases over £30) and my driving licence. So, if I was pulled over or needed proof of ID (for alcohol, for example), would a photograph of my driving licence be legal or acceptable? I've found a few questions and articles on this already, but they all seem to be US based and 3+ years old: Quora - Is it legal to use a picture of your license instead of the actual license if you don’t have your wallet on you? Quora - Is it legal drive with a photo of your driver’s license in lieu of the license? Digital driver's license - The 2016-2018 US landscape | Regarding being pulled over, the guidance at Learn to drive a car: step by step states (emphasis mine): If a police officer asks you to, you must be able to show: your driving licence a valid insurance certificate a valid MOT certificate (if your vehicle needs one) If you don’t have the documents with you at the time, you may be asked to take them to a police station within 7 days. | Losing your passport is fine, happens all the time But that’s not what you are talking about, is it? You’re intending to deliberately destroy it. While destroying a passport is not a specific offence under the Act or the Rules, your proposed course of action is still illegal. The passport doesn’t belong to you. It belongs to India and deliberately destroying other people’s stuff is illegal. To get a new passport you would necessarily be lying and giving false information on a passport application is an offence. Of course, one wonders why your family are looking at your passport; just don’t show it to them. | No, it's not legal. The General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) apply given that you are in the UK (regardless of where the Data Processor is based). The UK GDPR is slightly modified due to Brexit, but the same principles apply. The only plausible legal basis for this actions would be that you consent to it, and you're entitled to withdraw that consent at any time. Some may claim that Article 6.1(b) applies, i.e. that it's necessary to send marketing email in order to fulfil the contract, but GDPR is clear that bundling such consent into a contract for service simply to permit the data processor additional actions isn't allowed, as I'll demonstrate. UK GDPR requires that consent to use your personal information (in this case, your email address) for the stated purpose be freely given. Consent to use your information for direct marketing is not freely given if it's inseparable from the consent to use it for some other service, as per para 43: Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. And Article 7.4 backs this up with When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. The intent of Article 6.1(b) is that only the processing required for the service you have bought is allowed (e.g. if you supply your address for delivery of stuff you've bought, the data processor can use that address to send you the stuff, but is not allowed to add a contract term that allows them to send you unwanted stuff). Examples of emails that Article 6.1(b) would allow (in my assessment) include things such as notification of upcoming downtime, or a reminder that subscriptions are due, but not unsolicited advertisements for other products. There's a grey area that's open to interpretation, where adverts are piggybacked onto actual service messages. | I know of no legal restrictions on using the title of Doctor in the United states. I know next to nothing about Canadian law and can't speak on that. Falsely claiming to have a license to practice medicine is probably illegal, depending on circumstances, and practicing medicine without a license is most certainly illegal, and there a numerous federal and state laws that would apply. But simply styling one's self as Dr. is unlikely to be held by a court as a claim to hold a medical license, or a particular degree. It's, of course, misleading and generally frowned to use the Dr. prefix unless one has earned an MD or PhD. Some holders of honorary doctorates use it as well, though some debate whether that's acceptable or not. | I think it's important to keep in mind the essence of your actions. @Mowzer gave a great answer on the matter in hand, but I'd like to add a point of view. Is it illegal to eat while driving? Like pointed out by @Mowzer, if no law prohibits it, it's allowed by default (lots of countries have this premise). But what about the consequences of your actions? Maybe there's no law against eating in the car, but there sure is one in my country that specific says that you are not allowed to drive without using both hands in the wheel. The only exception to this rule is to take out your hand from the wheel to use the stick to change gears. Another point of view to add is the liability. Let's say you're minding your own business while driving and a lunatic trying to commit suicide jumps in front of your car. It's a pretty straight-forward case, you have no reason to be blamed. Now, let's add to the same scenario your snack; with a small change, you are now facing a accident that may have been caused by reckless driving (another thing commonly illegal). To sum up, the law is not really like math that have axioms that determine true or false statements without any distinguishment. That's why every case is single handled in the law by it's particularities. | I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely. | Dale has the right answer, but I'd like to elaborate on why it isn't lawful (as compared to why it would be unlawful). I know it doesn't work that way on line, but it's simpler to think of a credit card as a physical piece of plastic. The bank will have issued this to their customer. It will have a number and an expiry date. You have no way of knowing whether a replacement card has been issued. Even if one has, the customer has authorised you to charge a specific card - you do not have the customer's authorisation to charge a different card with a different expiry date. By guessing the expiry date, you would be making a representation to the bank that the customer has authorised you to charge that card (if it exists), when they have not. | Because breaking the law is not breach of contract (Necessarily). Were you to use the model to 3D-print a gun and rob banks with it, without this clause, you have not broken the contract. That would mean that the provider could neither sue you for any damages the use of their model in your crime spree might have caused them, nor can they legally terminate the licence with you. |
Legal Solicitation Is it legal (or allowed by bar rules) for a lawyer/law firm to use public records (such as arrest records) to find and reach out to potential clients? This question comes from a question on another site about public arrest records and an answer suggested it was so lawyers could reach out to potential clients. The answer is making a claim that there would be a difference depending on how they reach out to the potential client such a via mail or talking to them in person. As a side note would the answer change if they did not use public records? | england-and-wales No. This type of approach is a breach of the Solicitors Regulation Authority's (SRA) Code of Conduct for solicitors, Registered European Lawyers, and Registered Foreign Lawyers Paragraph 8.9 of the Code states that: You do not make unsolicited approaches to members of the public, with the exception of current or former clients, in order to advertise legal services provided by you, or your business or employer. This requirement is clarified by SRA Guidance that says: ...advertising to the public is permitted, subject to certain conditions... ... Specifically, you are allowed to advertise your services to the public so long as this is done in a non-intrusive and non-targeted way. This means, for example, that you may place an advert on the radio or TV, on billboards, in a local newspaper, online or on a social media platform. However, this advertising is limited... Paragraphs 8.9 and 7.1(c)1 of the Standards and Regulations prohibit unsolicited approaches to members of the public which, even if permitted by law, may feel unwelcome or intrusive. ... This means you cannot make direct or specifically targeted "approaches" to members of the public in person, by phone or via other means which target them individually. (My emphasis) This guidance goes on to give an example of prohibited advertising of the sort suggested by the OP: Firm A identifies from online media a list of people who have recently been involved in a major road traffic accident. The firm sends them a letter saying that it can help claim compensation. We [i.e. the SRA] would consider this a breach of our standards as it involves a targeted approach to specific members of the public which may feel intrusive to those who receive it due to the particular circumstances that they find themselves in. 1Paragraph 7.1 (c) of the Code of Conduct for Firms applies the same standard to firms. | I am not a lawyer either, though I have been through Pennsylvania a few times. The relevant law is 18 Pa.C.S. 5703, which prohibits recording without consent of all parties (Penna is a "two-party consent" state, like Florida and Washington). Unfortunately, violation of that law is a third degree felony, which has a maximum of 7 year prison. A specific instance of someone getting in trouble for recording their boss is Commonwealth v. Smith (Smith used a cell phone to record his boss, then argued that a cell phone isn't a "device"; the court determined that it is, and that was Feb 16 2016 so who knows the final outcome). An attorney in Pennsylvania might be able to tell you how often people actually serve time for violating the law. You should call one. | You need permission to copy unless fair use applies Does this mean that when someone sends you their resume, it is unlawful to pass it on to others unless the author gives permission? First note that copyright law only applies to copying. If someone were to give you a physical copy of their resume (assuming such a thing would happen in this day and age) then giving this to someone else without copying it is not copyright violation. There may be privacy issues involved but that’s another issue. Further, in the United States, there is a fair use doctrine which allows limited copying without permission in certain circumstances. This is likely to apply in a lot of situations around copying resumes. Finally, permission does not have to be explicit. For example, if you receive a resume in the course of a job application then permission to make copies for that purpose can be assumed to have been implicitly given. Can you get sued if the resume finds its way to someone the author did not intend to see it, and the author suffers some harm as a result? Under privacy law, possibly. Under copyright law, no. What you can be sued for is making a copy. It doesn’t matter where this ends up. Is distributing a resume in the context of professional networking considered as implicit consent to allow sharing with anyone under the US legal system? No. It’s explicit consent because those networking sites have Terms and Conditions that explicitly deal with copyright. For example, if you post your resume on LinkedIn, you agree to this. | This practice is probably not illegal, but I think it is at best ethically dubious. The invoice specifies ""Advising in relation to employment agreement with X", but according to the question no advice about X was given or even asked for, and while advice about Y was discussed, no such advice was given. That suggests that the asker owes the solicitor nothing. However the asker was informed of the hourly charge and then continued to discuss the issue. it could be argued that the constitutes an implicit contract to pay that rate for those discussions. It seems that the asker never said "does that rate apply to this telephone call", nor did the solicitor say "that hourly clock starts now if you want to continue". This leaves the situation less clear than it could have been. The second email, as described, seems to imply that the work of giving advice had not yet commenced, and thus no fee was due for services to date. A person in this situation could reply with a letter (sent by email or postal mail or better both) saying that no advice was given, no useful service was performed, and there was no agreement to pay for any service, so no fee is due. If the solicitor takes this to a court case, the asker may well want to consider consulting a different legal professional. This is a case where the exact facts may well matter, so no more precise answer can, I think, be given here. | In such a case the person who bypasses the terms knows that use of the site is conditioned on agreement to the terms, and has taken an explicit action to continue past the terms and use the site. I suspect that if a dispute were to arise where this is relevant, it would be held that taking such action was legally equivalent to clicking "I agree". But I don't know of any court case on this point, and i can't be sure what a court would do. If having intentionally bypassed the terms, such a person tried to raise his or her lack of consent to the terms as a defense to some obligation imposed by those terms, such equitable concepts as "unclean hands" and estoppel might be raised, since such a person, in effect, leads the other party, the site owner, to believe that s/he has accepted the terms, I suspect that such a person will be treated as having accepted them. If this becomes at all common, I suppose that the designers of such sites will in future store a record of such consent being given, and not allow the user to proceed unless it has been. | "Solicit" means "ask for". A solicitation can be refused, and it is still a solicitation. That's why the law says "solicit, accept, or receive". | Asking as such is hardly ever illegal. Any stranger can ask you to pick up their kids from school, like you always can tell them where to go. What I guess you are actually asking is whether the PI can require you to do it. No they probably cannot: it would have nothing to do with the matter of your contract or nature of your professional relationship with them. However, if they are in the position of power, they will have discretion in making decisions that will affect you. Whereas you legally can tell them where to get off, it might be good idea to attempt some interpersonal workplace tactics first. | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. |
Advertisements and fair use If someone publishes an article about advertisements that included screen captures from a website, is there any risk of being sued or would that qualify as fair use? If it makes a difference, assume the article is a criticism of the advertisements and the underlying businesses. Are there any other considerations such as trademarks when reusing images from internet advertisements in this way? | Fair use is always a fact-driven issue, and the details matter. That said, copying a single ad in order to criticism the ad, or comment on it, is very likely to be found to be fair use. If only a section of the ad were shown, to illuminate the point being made, that would make a fair use holding more likely. Or if the entire ad was shown in low resolution's for context, and a detail shown in higher resolution, that would also help. Such an ad is largely factual, not creative in the way that a work of fiction or fine art is, which leans toward fair use. Such a reproduction of the ad will not serve as a replacement, nor harm the market for the ad, which leans toward fair use. The use seems to be transformative, which leans significantly toward fair use. If the whole ad is shown that leans somewhat against fair use, but that does not prevent the use being held to be fair use. As for trademark protection, that is not likely to be an issue. Trademarks are protected against being used in trade (also known as "in commerce") without permission. This means using the mark to label, identify, or advertise a product or service of the same general type as the product the mark is properly associated with. Using the mark, or a similar mark, in such a way that people are likely to be confused into thinking that a product or service came from the same source as the mark, or approved, endorsed or sponsored by the mark owner, is usually infringement. Using the mark to discuss the product or service, and in particular using it as the name of the product or service, is nominative use. Nominative use is not infringement. Using an ad that includes trademarks to discuss the associated product is a form of nominative use. | Fair Use is determined on four traditional factors: the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. A recent example analyzing Fair Use in a similar situation would be Author's Guild vs Google (which came out just before this question was asked), regarding Google Books. Plaintiffs, authors of published books under copyright, filed suit against Google for copyright infringement. Google, acting without permission of rights holders, has made digital copies of tens of millions of books, including plaintiffs’, through its Library Project and its Google books project. The district court concluded that Google’s actions constituted fair use under 17 U.S.C. 107. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Google. The court concluded that: (1) Google’s unauthorized digitizing of copyright-protected works, creation of a search functionality, and display of snippets from those works are non-infringing fair uses. The purpose of the copying is highly transformative, the public display of text is limited, and the revelations do not provide a significant market substitute for the protected aspects of the originals. Google’s commercial nature and profit motivation do not justify denial of fair use. (2) Google’s provision of digitized copies to the libraries that supplied the books, on the understanding that the libraries will use the copies in a manner consistent with the copyright law, also does not constitute infringement. Nor, on this record, is Google a contributory infringer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. Thus, in this situation, the author of such a database would have a decently strong argument for Fair Use. But, it may be easier to just get a license to use the data instead of risking court. That decision should be made while consulting an attorney. | Copyright exists whether they make that statement or not. Giving such notice informs the public that the work is copyrighted, who owns it, and when it was published. If the work is infringed, the defendant will not be able to use an innocent infringement defense. There's nothing special about using the domain name, as it's probably the name or DBA of the business that owns the domain. | Unfortunately the answer is a vague "it depends." Commercial versus non-commercial is not clearly defined in actual law, and is usually up to the specific license to define what it considers to be commercial use. If you were putting them on your business cards, then it's just being used for advertising and whether it's commercial use is a bit controversial. If the license explicitly prohibits the use of the work in advertising, then the license should explicitly mention that and should not rely on the term "commercial use" to cover or protect it. Creative Commons ran an excellent study on commercial versus noncommercial use back in 2009: Defining “Noncommercial” - A Study of How the Online Population Understands “Noncommercial Use” In the United States, for example, the Copyright Act does not define a copyright owner’s rights in terms of commercial or noncommercial use. Instead, copyright law sometimes attaches legal significance to whether a use is “commercial” or “noncommercial” or whether a user is deemed to be a commercial or noncommercial entity, However, rarely are the terms defined, and the law offers no specific guidance on how to differentiate between commercial and noncommercial uses or users of copyrighted works. If you were putting them on a business card you were making for the client, then that would be more clearly identified as commercial use because you're using it in something you are selling for a profit. What your client will be using them for is not relevant, because you're the one selling them to the client and you need to have the right to be able to do that. | There are three questions relevant to this issue: Who owned the copyright in the first place? Was the copyright transferred? If not, was a license given to the site to use the content? In general, under most countries' laws, the person who creates an original work owns the copyright. The person with the copyright has the right to copy and distribute the work, and the right to prevent others from doing so. In some cases, such as where a work is created as a "work for hire" by certain employees under certain circumstances, the initial copyright is held by a third party. You will need a lawyer familiar with your jurisdiction and your circumstances to determine if this is the case. Finally, even if you own the copyright, you can license others to use your content. This may be in an express written document, or it may be an implied license--implied, for instance, by the act of posting it on their blog. The existence and scope of such a license is, again, something that will have to be determined based on your country's specific laws and your specific situation. The bottom line is: if you submitted articles to that blog, you can't complain that they posted them. Depending on the license in effect, you might be able to get them taken down, or you might not. You need a lawyer, not the internet, to tell you what your rights are in this very specific case. | Whether the use of excerpts from songs protected by copyright in the cover version of a different song is a "fair use" under US law is always a fact-driven question, and often there is no clear answer to fair use issues short of a lawsuit. One must remember that fair use is a specifically united-states legal concept, and that reproduction of such a cover version outside the US would not be protected by fair use, even if it was fair use under US law. Fair use is defined by 17 USC 107. That law spells out the four factors that must always be considered in any fair use claim. They are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. These have been explained and analyzed in several answers here on law.se, recently including this answer. In this case the commercial nature of the compilation probably causes factor (1) to lean against fair use. The creative character of the songs being used will cause factor (2) to lean slightly against fair use. That the use is for a charitable purpose might have a positive effect on factor (1), although it does not fit the "educational" purpose specifically mentioned in the law. I don't see how this would be in any way relevant to the other three factors, but it might influence the decisions of copyright owners. There is not enough information in the question to even approximate an analysis of the other two factors in this case. Note that the "substantiality" mentioned in factor (2) refers to how much of the source work is used, not how large a part of the resulting work it forms. Note also that there is a wide range of what has been acceptable here. In one famous case (Harper v Nation Enterprises) some 300 words of a 500 page book were found not to be fair use because they were held to be the "heart of the work"; in that case there was also a substantial market effect. One might want to consult a lawyer with expertise in copyright and music to get a better idea if the specific use seems likely to be a fair use. Alternatively, one could ask the copyright owners of the works of which excerpts are to be included if a license can be obtained. Some owners will in some cases provide licenses for a small fee or even for no fee if the source is properly acknowledged. Others will not. Licensing of one song by a given artist does not affect whether use of another song by the same artist is or is not fair use, but it might influence the willingness of that artist to license the second song on favorable terms. | This is relatively uncharted legal territory, so until multiple cases establish some sort of precedent, we can only guess. I know of no legal requirement that a Browser or User has to submit cookies or referrer data or other meta-information accurately. In that regard, a user is unlikely to be prosecuted just for submitting HTTP headers. It is likely closely related to Free Speech issues. The DMCA spells out that it is illegal to circumvent copyright protection measures. While this law is typically used to make it illegal to copy DVDs, video-games or streaming movies, it is possible that the "3-free articles" policy could be interpreted as a copyright protection mechanism, and defeating it by changing HTTP headers is a circumvention. A good summary is here. A specific site's TOS (Terms of Service) probably contains language that spells out it is a violation to use the site in a manner other than as it is intended. This is a typical anti-hacking, anti-screen-scraping provision. Altering a browser session to circumvent their services is probably a violation of the license to access the site, and may open a user to a civil lawsuit for damages or even criminal hacking charges (the details of which are different state-to-state) | I agree that you have a very strong copyright fair use case. Although the logo is creative and you're using the entire thing, your use is for a nonprofit educational purpose and does not affect the value of the work. The logo is also probably trademarked. But you aren't using the mark in commerce, so I don't think that will be a problem for you. |
Isn't it a clear conflict of interest that expert witnesses are paid/compensated handsomely for their testimony? Unless you're in some public office (in which case you are compelled to), expert witnesses are monetarily compensated "handsomely" to offer their testimony. See https://law.stackexchange.com/a/70502/45435 But isn't this a clear conflict of interest? If I was told for some Amazon review "We paid this guy thousands of dollars, and he just happened to review us 5 stars ^_^", how is anyone supposed to believe that? Similarly, in a court, the exact same thing is happening, right? E.g. "We paid this expert engineer thousands of dollars, but he says it's a random error that could've happened, okay? ^_^". Or is the fact that expert witnesses get huge payments just completely swept under the rug and out of sight of jury consideration? Similar to how jury nullification isn't explicitly instructed to jurors because it would only complicate the process? | No Experts’ time is valuable. Courts would not be able to get qualified experts to testify if they were not compensated. As per your previous question, the crucial point is that they are paid to tell the truth, not to be an advocate for one side. But Sometimes Yes There have been scandals where a cottage industry of experts sprung up, based solely on there being a market for expert witnesses. These witnesses knew that the way to keep getting hired was to always confidently testify that they could prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Bite-mark analysis is an entire field which is now held to have operated as a pseudoscience, and where some prolific “expert witnesses” were caught committing fraud. Similarly, the Texas Forensic Science Commission conducted a review of numerous wrongful convictions for arson in 2012, although there the motive was not money. They were not being paid to testify one way and not the other. Forensic examiners in Texas were simply basing their testimony on myths and old wives’ tales handed down by their predecessors, which turned out to be false when tested under the scientific method. When put to the test, accidental fires could cause all the signs that Texas forensic examiners had sworn were proof of the use of an accelerant to commit arson. Again, though, these “experts” got their jobs by always giving the prosecution the evidence of guilt it wanted. I have listed examples of experts shilling for the prosecution, mainly because most of the cases that come to mind of highly-compensated experts shilling in defense of someone work for corporations on what are more political than legal controversies. Even Then, not Really Even in those examples of misconduct (or incompetence), the false experts were caught because the defense was allowed to hire experts of their own. If the only experts allowed to testify had been the state’s forensic examiners, no one would ever have tested their claims about the difference between arson and accidental fires scientifically. Even though they had no direct financial incentive to testify, they saw their jobs working for the state as working for the prosecution. Removing the financial motive would not remove all possible bias or suspicion of bias, either. For example, in the wrongful-conviction reviews of both bite marks and arson, one of the most common counterarguments were that the experts arguing to overturn the convictions of people who had no money to pay them were passionate opponents of the death penalty, and therefore supposedly biased. | There actually is a practical effect to a "not proven" v. "not guilty" verdict in Scotland, but it is mostly sociological or social in nature rather than legal. If your question is, are there future legal concerns, than no. Not proven is, to be sure, an acquittal. However, it is an acquittal that the tells the public something important: that the trier(s) of fact thought the person likely guilty. That's a fairly substantial distinction. In Scotland, a criminal case may be decided either "in solemn procedure", which is simply the Scot term for a jury trial v. "in summary" or in "summary procedure" which is the U.S. equivalent of a bench trial. The difference between the two (and the divergence from the U.S. procedural vehicle) is that for lesser crimes the accused doesn't have an automatic right of a jury trial for any criminal matter. In some ways this lesser included makes up for the fact that the Scottish accused is without absolute right to choose jury or bench trial, which in the U.S. can be very meaningful from a tactical perspective. Think of how important the make-up and emotional proclivities of juries are to both convictions and acquittals. A bench trial can be beneficial to the truly unlikable defendant, or in especially brutal crimes, where juries may convict out of fear or sympathy for the victim, even if the case is weak. At the same time, they may nullify the conviction for the sympathetic defendant. Juries are notoriously emotional and bias driven. Being able to choose a bench trial where the judge will follow the evidence and avoid the emotional response of a jury can be invaluable. Just as a sympathetic defendant can appeal to the emotions of the jury for acquittal or jury nullification, on the opposite spectrum. In Scotland, lesser crimes are always (with limited exclusions) tried by a judge, while more serious allegations always (again w/ limited exclusions) get a jury trial, automatically. The defendant does not choose the type of trial he is afforded. Hence, a defense or a prosecution cannot fiddle with the balance of proof based on emotion or lack there of. They get what they get. There are various rules procedurally that differ in comparison, but since this isn't the question that is the general rule and should suffice for background. Also hugely important is the fact that in Scotland, jurors decide a case by majority vote (like a civil trial in the U.S.); hence, there are no hung juries and they don't need a consensus. So, one way or another the verdict will be given in a Scottish criminal action. Scots also get comparatively huge juries to any other country (15 jurors) and they only need 8 in agreement to reach a verdict. Tactically, the "not proven" is a lesser included verdict (like U.S. uses lesser included charges in cases that are weaker for the prosecution). This lesser included finding can be used by choice when the Prosecution has a sympathetic defendant or when the defendant is probably guilty or unlikable. If the jury thinks the defendant (called "accused") probably did the crime, but the prosecution has failed to prove the elements, they can/will issue a "not proven" verdict. This sends a big message. This, again, is typically only reserved for those cases when there is strong but not conclusive proof that someone committed a crime. They don't want to profess their innocence with a not guilty verdict, so they are still acquitted, but with he stigma of the "not proven" verdict attached. Some estimates have from 1/5 to a full 1/3 of all acquittal verdicts by Scottish juries as "not proven" as opposed to "not guilty". Not proven can also be used by judges in the bench trial (summary procedure), however it's much less common. The proportion of 'not proven" acquittals in general is higher in the more severe cases; but so then are the proportion of acquittals versus convictions. These would likely be hung juries in the U.S.. Both in the "solemn" and the "summary" acquittals, not proven is interpreted as indicating that the jury or judge, respectively, is not convinced of the innocence of the accused; in fact, they may be morally or even factually convinced that the accused is guilty, but do not find the proofs sufficient for a conviction under the elements of the crime on the jury instruction/verdict form. I look at this as similar to the adage oft used in the U.S., which is an acquittal, despite the fact that the verdict is termed "not guilty" does by no means indicate the person is in fact "not guilty", it just means the prosecution couldn't prove its case. Sociologists in the U.S., as well as legal scholars, have studied the phenomenon, and it appears that most not guilty verdicts in fact let go a guilty person. This can be intuited by the evidence the jury never saw, either by suppression from bad searches, by the exclusion of witness testimony due to procedural rules like hearsay, privilege, etc., and other forms of keeping relevant evidence from the jury to protect the rights of the accused. But in the U.S. the person can go forth and say, "Hey, I was proven not guilty!" Scotland also has another interesting rule of criminal procedure, whereby a criminal can't be convicted without corroborated evidence. What this means is that if all the prosecution has is the victim witness, by way of proof, testifying, and no physical or corroboration testimony, Scottish law requires acquittal, but often will be so by the verdict "not proven". This is huge, if you think about it. Use, for example, a rape trial. A woman testifies, saying that Joe Schmoe climbed through her window and raped her. She knows Joe - he's her neighbor. Nobody saw him climb in. But she knows it's him. He leaves no physical evidence, having shaved his entire body and used appropriate protection (gloves, condemn, etc.). She has a rape kit done. Rape is obvious, but the only proof is her testimony. Joe goes free. But in Scotland, he goes free with a stigma attached. He's found "not proven" rather than "not guilty". I think this corroboration rule has a lot to do with why this verdict system still exists. In the U.S. the trier of fact would weigh the testimony and decide if one person was substantially more believable than the other, and a verdict would issue. That is a substantial difference, procedurally. Since Scotland doesn't have the hung jury because there is no consensus required they use the "not proven" in the same way a U.S. jury uses the hung jury when one or more jurors thinks the prosecution didn't prove their case but it's fairly clear the defendant is, in fact guilty. Then, you will often get a "hold out" juror, and since the U.S. requires a unanimous verdict, the hold out hangs the jury. It's sort of the opposite of jury nullification. The person knows that the evidence fell short, but their conscience can't reconcile letting the person go free, so they will vote guilty to hang the jury, almost ensuring the prosecution gets another shot. There has been a lot of debate about this three verdict system in comparative law circles, with many legal scholars saying it's antiquated. But I think it serves an important purpose. It carries the stigma of likely guilt for those people who probably committed the crime but got off. Further, the hung jury cost tax payers millions of dollars in the U.S., and this is often the side effect of people not wanting there to be absolutely no recognition of the fact that the accused probably committed (especially serious) crime(s). The Scots, on the other hand, have found away to accomplish this without the cost and emotional toll multiple trials takes on all the players involved, from witnesses and victims, their families, the accused, and even the lawyers and the prosecutions, who have to put in all the work of a trial just to start anew. Here is a really good scholarly article that deals with this interesting phenomenon not seen in (I don't believe) any other country: https://journals.iupui.edu/index.php/iiclr/article/viewFile/17848/18019 | No employer has ever the right to withhold your pay check for work you have done. It is strictly illegal. Even if they had 100% evidence that you caused damage and were responsible for that damage, they still can't withhold your pay. They have to pay you, and then they can try to take you to court. The reason for this law is exactly cases like yours, where people try to avoid payment. If the "powerful attorney" tells you that you are not getting paid, then that "powerful attorney" is making a big mistake, because any lawyer would love to take your case to court and see the judge cutting the "powerful attorney" down to size. If you don't want a lawyer now, then you can write a letter by registered mail telling them that you worked for them, how much the payment due is, that they are legally required to make that payment, and that you will take them to court if they are not paying. If there is a conflict between law and a "powerful attorney", the law wins, and the law is on your side. | Prejudice and bias goes to credibility The trier of fact has to decide how much weight to give each piece of evidence including witness testimony. A clearly prejudiced or biased witness will, all else being equal, deserve less weight than a more unbiased or less prejudiced witness. Or, at least, one who is less obviously biased and prejudiced - because everyone is biased and prejudiced. A witness who clearly and unequivocally declared their bias and prejudice probably deserves more credit than one who reveals it unwillingly during examination. The witnesses you use are the people who were there - you don’t get to choose their character. | There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later. | I think what you're talking about is probably quite rare. There are certainly law firms that market their ability to thoroughly investigate the facts, aggressively question or impeach hostile witnesses, present compelling evidence at trial, or make persuasive oral arguments. But I don't think I've ever heard of a firm that treats any particular litigation tactic as its specialty rather than treating it as part of its specialization in domestic relations, DUI defense, employment law, etc. If you think of litigating at different stages of a case as "techniques or functions," then I'd point to the various firms that consider themselves trial specialists, or appellate specialists, or even Supreme Court specialists. Even then, though, any of those specialties is going to involve a variety of discrete techniques or functions. A trial lawyer needs to do investigations and cross examinations and closing statements, and a Supreme Court specialist needs to be able to petition for cert, draft merit briefs, and give oral arguments. | The defence in a criminal case has no obligation to inform the prosecution of anything. The onus is on the prosecution to provide the evidence to convict and the defence doesn't have to and indeed shouldn't help them do it. The defence can and probably would use conflicting statements by a prosecution witness to discredit that witness in the eyes of the jury. These do not have to be material to the case: just showing the witness is inconsistent in general is helpful. | A witness is not evidence, but what a witness says (their testimony) may be evidence. Or, the body of a person who happened to be a witness is evidence. I suspect that there is a translation problem. It is always physically possible to try pay a person to lie and AFAIK never legal: the person who lies and the person who induces the lie will be punished by law. The witness who testifies will have to swear that their testimony is the truth. |
When can an employer dock one's pay in the UK? I'm not sure if it matters whether the employer is a private individual or a company and whether the parameters are then different, but assume that the employee is not doing a very good job, snoozing on the job, taking personal phone calls, late into work, etc. When does an employer become entitled to dock an employee's salary? | The relevant legislation is the Employment Act 1996, but in plainer language ACAS describe that they can make deductions for the following reasons: the employee's contract specifically allows the deduction it was agreed in writing beforehand they overpaid the employee by mistake it’s required by law, for example Income Tax or a court order the employee missed work because you were on strike or taking industrial action The first two provide pretty wide latitude into what they can make deductions for so long as it's in the contract/a written agreement The employer can't make deductions that would result in your wage dropping below minimum wage except in the following circumstances: tax or National Insurance something the employee has done which their contract says they’re liable for, such as damage to a vehicle through reckless driving repayment of a loan or advance wages an overpayment made to the employee made by mistake buying shares, other securities or share options in the business accommodation provided to the employee – find out more about accommodation deductions on GOV.UK something the employee uses – for example union subscriptions or pension contributions I'm not sure if it matters whether the employer is a private individual or a company Nope - for these purposes an employer is an employer To look at your specific examples: but assume that the employee is not doing a very good job No.. incompetence can get you sacked or fired - but it can't get your wages docked. At least not unless there was some performance-related-pay element to your wages already in the contract. But that would be difficult, it would have to be quantifiable. There's a reason why such structures typically have a base salary with performance-related elements paid as bonuses, because it's easier to simply not pay extra if thresholds aren't met than it is to deduct from a base wage. snoozing on the job Again not unless that was specified in advance - and that would be an oddly specific thing to include. Most likely they'd just get fired, in the majority of employment scenarios taking unauthorized sleeps on the job is going into Gross Negligence territory if there's a pattern. taking personal phone calls Taking personal calls is something that's more likely to be covered by a contract or company policy - but again it's more likely to lead to disciplinary action or sacking than wages being docked. You'd have to get into measuring how much time was lost in order to dock the appropriate amount etc. late into work You'd think this would be a slam dunk - you're late and therefore not meeting your contractual obligations. But in reality the same requirements as above apply - there needs to be explicit agreement in advance of the deduction in either your contract or other written consent for an employer to dock wages. It's probably more common than the other examples for such a provision to exist, but it still needs to be there. | Summary If they didn't steal your withholding, it depends a great deal. But if your employer stole your withholding, the IRS will sue them on your behalf. You will absolutely have grounds to sue them, and because tax law is so cut and dried in these situations, in that case, you will almost certainly win. You need to contact the IRS immediately and advise them what your employer has done. This is more important than anything else because until you do, you can't be sure the IRS will figure out what happened (they might. They're really good at tax stuff). If your employer didn't advise you that you are now responsible for paying your own quarterly estimated income taxes, the IRS will almost certainly grant you relief from penalties for failure to file timely and they could potentially abate interest as well, depending on the circumstances. They are especially likely to grant penalty and possibly interest abatement if you've never filed 1099 before. If your employer withheld tax from your pay that they then failed to turn over to the IRS, good news for you - bad news for them. The IRS takes no mercy whatsoever on employers who steal tax withholding from employees. Advising the IRS that this may have been the case is all you should need to do - the IRS can check its own records, your employer's records, etc. They will let you know once they've determined whether your money is where it's supposed to be; if anything is out of order, rest assured they will already be pursuing the case against your employer. In this case, the IRS will waive all penalties and interest that may have been assessed as a consequence of your employer's failure to turn over your withholding. If you are currently unable to pay, that's not the end of the world. Make the IRS aware of your current financial circumstances and your inability to pay due to unemployment. They have installment agreements you can request, or if that won't work, they can temporarily suspend collection action while you get things straightened out. There's a bunch of paperwork they'll ask for, and penalties and interest will continue to accrue, but as long as you let them know the situation, they will apply a dramatically reduced rate to reflect your efforts to comply. | If an offer is accepted, you have a contract Oral contracts are binding for most transactions. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? However, from the circumstances, it’s not clear that there was an offer subject to acceptance. Had the wages been agreed? The hours of work? The annual leave? The sick leave? If these were undetermined then there is no contract. | Does an employer have to provide drinking water to their employees? Yes they do; consult the Welfare at Work publication by the HSE. It is also stated in the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 schedule 3 s10. Can you simply leave if your workplace's water supply stopped working? Not necessarily, I would consider factors such as time the workplace has been without water, whether the employer was prompt in fixing the issue, how impactful to work the lack of water was, was free water accessible in a nearby area etc. These are things that would support your case if you wanted to take your employer to court. Though it doesn't say you wouldn't be allowed to leave work, I'm not sure if the pure fact that the water supply has stopped working would be enough to justify you simply leaving the premises. | What §670 BGB basically says is that the default is that companies have to reimburse you for expenses that you incurred for interviewing with them. If they don't want to reimburse you, they have to tell you so in writing before you incur any costs. That way it's your decision if you still want to go if you have to pay for expenses yourself. It does not mean your expenses have to be paid, it means you should know beforehand whether they will be paid. So what I take from your story is that you never actually asked the company for reimbursement, expecting the Agentur für Arbeit to pay that for you. Well, no company is going to pay your expenses if you don't ask for it. And that's not a crime. You also never told the Agentur für Arbeit that you were not informed beforehand that your expenses would not be paid. They asked for proof, you delivered proof. It's not their job to find out how or when you got handed this written statement and if that constitutes a violation of §670. And as a little reality check: paying your expenses (probably something along the lines of a cab fare or bus ticket?) is way more cost effective for the AA than suing a small company for the same amount. Just the time of the lawyer filing the suit will probably cost more than your public transportation ticket for the next year. | There is no legislation in Germany that explicitly states how long you have to wait in such a situation. First let's look what happened: According to your work contract, you are obligated to be available for work and follow the directions of your employer. Let's not go into nuances of the latter duty, because they depend on what type of work you are doing. Your employer is obligated to pay you if you fulfill your duties. What happened is called Annahmeverzug (default of acceptance) in German civil law (§ 615 BGB): Kommt der Dienstberechtigte mit der Annahme der Dienste in Verzug, so kann der Verpflichtete für die infolge des Verzugs nicht geleisteten Dienste die vereinbarte Vergütung verlangen, ohne zur Nachleistung verpflichtet zu sein. Er muss sich jedoch den Wert desjenigen anrechnen lassen, was er infolge des Unterbleibens der Dienstleistung erspart oder durch anderweitige Verwendung seiner Dienste erwirbt oder zu erwerben böswillig unterlässt. … English translation: If the person entitled to services is in default in accepting the services, then the party owing the services may demand the agreed remuneration for the services not rendered as the result of the default without being obliged to provide cure. However, he must allow to be credited against him what he saves as a result of not performing the services or acquires or wilfully fails to acquire through use of his employment elsewhere. … If your employer doesn't enable you to work, they have to pay you for your time. You don't have to make up that time. If you save money by not working or had the opportunity to earn money by other means1 during that time, this can be deducted from your pay. Now, the question is how you fulfill your duty of being available for work. This depends on the specifics and really can only be answered by a lawyer or court (and IANAL). You do not need to endure hardships but have to accept reasonable inconveniences. Thus, you can leave if waiting becomes more than an inconvenience (usually that will be caused by weather or by bodily functions). If you leave, you should still be available for work unless that becomes unreasonable, e.g., because you could use that time to earn money by other means. 1 Usually, it can be safely assumed that you don't have that opportunity. However, a daytaler might easily have that opportunity. | Can an employer charge employee/contractor a processing fee for payment? No. The matter depends on whether the person qualifies as employee for purposes of the British Columbia Employment Standards Act. Your description suggests that you meet criterion (b) of the definition of employee insofar as you are (i.e., if you are) "a person an employer allows, directly or indirectly, to perform work normally performed by an employee". See section 1(1) of the Act. Section 21(1) prohibits an employer to "directly or indirectly, withhold, deduct or require payment of all or part of an employee's wages for any purpose", and item (2) prohibits the employer to "require an employee to pay any of the employer's business costs except as permitted by the regulations". There is no indication that the alleged business cost of e-transfers would be one such exception. do I have any recourse for such a small amount of money that isn't worth starting a law suit over? You have the option to file a complaint in "an office of the Employment Standards Branch". See sections 74 et seq for further details. You are not specifying the amount of the e-transfer that is being deducted from your compensation. The smaller the amount(s) at issue, the more important it will be for your complaint to persuasively explain how it is not "frivolous, vexatious or trivial". See section 76(c). Directing the employer's attention to the aforementioned statutory prohibition prior to filing a complaint tends to disprove allegations of vexation. That is because you are giving the employer an opportunity to mend its conduct and avert the proceedings that otherwise would take place. That being said, a very occasional cost of few cents is very likely to lead to a conclusion of vexation or bad faith regardless of your preliminary steps. In most other contexts, though, it is in your best interest to stay aware of the obligations that are being presented/proposed to you so that your actions do not constitute an acceptance of terms & conditions you would rather reject. Not all contracts come in the form of a written document signed by the parties. | They have exactly zero legal grounds to withhold your last paycheck. From Code of Virginia 40.1: All employers operating a business shall establish regular pay periods and rates of pay for employees except executive personnel. All such employers shall pay salaried employees at least once each month and employees paid on an hourly rate at least once every two weeks or twice in each month, except that (i) a student who is currently enrolled in a work-study program or its equivalent administered by any secondary school, institution of higher education or trade school, and (ii) employees whose weekly wages total more than 150 percent of the average weekly wage of the Commonwealth as defined in § 65.2-500, upon agreement by each affected employee, may be paid once each month if the institution or employer so chooses. Upon termination of employment an employee shall be paid all wages or salaries due him for work performed prior thereto; such payment shall be made on or before the date on which he would have been paid for such work had his employment not been terminated. The Virginia Department of Labor and Industry unfortunately does not take claims if there is a written contract and recommends you pursue the matter in court. You may want to consult with a local labor attorney to get an idea of where to go from here, even if you plan to file in small claims court. Virginia extortion law doesn't appear to apply to withholding stolen property, but their claim that release of the last paycheck is consideration for signing the NDA may be some other civil wrong, like conversion. I do not know whether you could recover damages above the wage owed for that. |
What is the penalty for a bad-acting witness/expert? Say Alice from the defense/prosecution meets with Bob, some expert/witness, to establish some "facts", and then Alice agrees to call Bob to the stand to establish those "facts" for the court. But when called the the stand, Bob presents the opposite statements, and completely sabotage's everything Alice was banking on. Are there any repercussions for Bob, or anything to dissuade him from doing this? Because if there are no repercussions, what's stopping Bob from going to the opposing side to accept money/a favour to do this for them? Also, just to be clear, consider the topic to not be a "fact", but more so something that is highly contested/controversial. E.g. some "experts" may classify someone as insane, while others would classify the opposite, meaning there's no actual undisputed "fact" per se, and any "expert" is at liberty to think one side or the other. As one final example about a bad-acting witness/expert, consider the following scenario: Alice wants to establish her client was suffering some malediction. What's stopping her from calling Dr. SnakeOil (or Dr. Oz) to testify as such? Does the expert have to be established as legit by going through some interview as if he were applying to a company? | The first thing to keep in mind is that, before appearing on the stand, an expert witness will have given a sworn deposition and delivered a written report of his or her findings. They could expect to be questioned about anything they say under oath that contradicts something else they said under oath. It’s not illegal for an expert to admit they were wrong before, or that there are other facts that support a different conclusion—indeed, a witness on the stand might be obligated to—but it might not do their professional reputation and their credibility with the jury any good, either. In the U.S., the opposing counsel is generally allowed to contact a witness, and take a statement, but may not ask the witness to testify falsely or offer any inducement prohibited by law. (See Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 173/Model Rule (MR) 3.4.) It would certainly be illegal for a witness to take money from both parties in the case without informing them or the court, or to swear that whatever the highest bidder pays them to say is their expert opinion. If this happened under direct examination, the lawyer would probably cut their losses by asking no further questions and getting the witness off the stand. Putting the witness on the stand would give the other side an opportunity to cross-examine them. Grilling your own expert as a hostile witness, even if the judge allowed it, would only make your position seem tendentious. Nothing stops an expert witness from giving testimony that is more helpful to the other side. They are witnesses, not lawyers, and their duty is to tell the truth, not to zealously advocate on behalf of some client. | The defence in a criminal case has no obligation to inform the prosecution of anything. The onus is on the prosecution to provide the evidence to convict and the defence doesn't have to and indeed shouldn't help them do it. The defence can and probably would use conflicting statements by a prosecution witness to discredit that witness in the eyes of the jury. These do not have to be material to the case: just showing the witness is inconsistent in general is helpful. | You can't prove a negative, so they can't be convicted of perjury for lying about whether they remember; Yes, they can. The government can convict the witness of perjury by proving that they did remember. This may be difficult, but it's not impossible. Now you may say that we can't ever prove with certainty what a person did or didn't remember. But the legal standard isn't certainty, it's beyond a reasonable doubt. So a jury is allowed to draw a reasonable inference about whether they remembered, based on evidence of their outward behavior and other circumstances. As an extreme example, suppose Alice was overheard chatting freely about topic X an hour before the trial, but when asked about topic X on the stand, said she didn't remember. When presented with evidence of her earlier conversation, a jury could reasonably infer that she was lying about not remembering. Is it possible that she truly had a memory lapse in the intervening hour? Sure, anything is possible. Is it reasonable to believe that she did? Probably not. The US Department of Justice's Criminal Resource Manual has this to say on the subject: Witnesses who claim not to remember, rather than deny a fact, may be prosecuted for perjury. However, the government must prove both that the witness at one time knew the fact and that the witness must have remembered it at the time he or she testified. United States v. Chen, 933 F.2d 793, 795 (9th Cir. 1991). If the dates of the transaction and testimony are sufficiently close, memory may be inferred. Instances in which the witness remembered other events that occurred at the same time or earlier than the event in question, or mentioned the event either immediately before or after his testimony, would be probative of the witness's memory at the time of the testimony. The two witness rule does not apply to prosecutions based on false memory lapses, and circumstantial evidence is sufficient, since there is no direct evidence possible concerning what the defendant actually believed. Gebhard v. United States, 422 F.2d 281, 287 (9th Cir. 1970). There's a similar issue in all laws that deal with a person's knowledge or intent. Suppose Alice hits Bob with a stick and he dies. To convict Alice of murder, it must be proved that by hitting Bob, she intended to kill him. Can we ever really know what was in her heart? Maybe not, but if there is evidence that shortly beforehand, she told someone that she was going to kill Bob, it would be a reasonable inference that this was her intention. | An "inquisitorial" system is one where the Judge or Magistrate actively questions the accused and witnesses to attempt to determine the facts. The Judge may also determine, at least in part, what witnesses to call in what order. An "adversarial" system is one in which each side presents its case, and the judge acts as an umpire deciding on procedure, and possibly makes the final ruling (or directs a jury to do so) but is not actively involved in questioning witnesses or deciding what witnesses to call. I don't see anything which would prevent a common-law jurisdiction from establishing an "inquisitorial" system by statute except longstanding tradition, but as far as i know no such jurisdiction has ever had such a system in place for dealing with criminal matters. The informal procedures in some small claims courts do have judges more actively involved than in other courts. I think this is also true in some family courts as well. I think I have heard of some civil-law jurisdictions which use something like an adversary system, but i am not sure of that. Certainly a civil-law country could pass a law setting up such a system if it chose to. | The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available. | The defence sees the prosecution evidence; witnesses don’t From context, it appears that Ms. DeCoutere was a prosecution witness, not the defendant. As such, she would not be privy to the evidence that either the prosecution or defence had or intended to present. No doubt both the prosecution and the defence would have known about the photograph and, I would imagine, it was introduced by the defence precisely because it contradicted the witness’ testimony. Further, revealing such evidence to her by either side would be misconduct - witnesses are supposed to recount the facts as they recall them without prompting or aide memoirs (police are an exception - they are allowed to refer to their own notebooks). | If Bob acknowledges how he has altered the evidence at the time he submits it, there shouldn't be any issues with it turning into falsification, which generally only becomes a problem when it's done with an intent to mislead the court. More likely, an opposing party would raise an authenticity objection, i.e, that the evidence has been altered and is therefore not trustworthy. It's probably going to be up to the judge whether to sustain that objection or not, and I'd expect the court's decision to turn in large part on how plausible it finds Bobs allegations of fraud and retaliation. I'd also expect that the Court would be less concerned with the pitch alteration than the redaction of portions of the recording. If we don't know what Bob is saying, it makes it hard to understand the full context of the conversation. Of course, all of this assumes that Bob hasn't already been forced to turn over the original recordings to Company, which he will be. The parties have a right to each other's evidence, and they are required to identify their witnesses to each other. The moment Company knows about the recording, it is going to submit a discovery request demanding a copy, and Bob will be obligated to comply. If Bob objects that doing so would expose the representatives to retaliation, I would expect the court to warn Company against tampering with witnesses and then order Bob to comply with his discovery obligations. | There is a big difference between knowing something and proving it. A lawyer who knows a client is guilty can take steps to prevent the state from proving guilt. (E.g., motion to exclude evidence, cross examining witnesses.) The belief that a client has committed a crime does not necessarily mean one knows what specific crime was committed. Is a killing Murder 1, Murder 2, or manslaughter? There are defenses even when an act may be a crime. E.g., self defense, insanity, justifiable. Lawyers are not permitted to assist in perjury. E.g., allow the client to testify to something he knows is false. |
Could a contract make a Bible passage legally binding on the signers? Suppose John Doe and James Smith, who are both Christians and members of the same church, sign a contract including the following clause: Any disputes between John Doe and James Smith shall be resolved in accordance with the Bible text of Matthew 18:15-17 as translated in the King James Version. Matthew 18:15-17 says: Moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican.” Would this have any legal significance? If I understand correctly, it would make the church an arbitrator. Is that right? | If Doe and Smith agree with your position that the church will be the arbitrator, they should go unto the church and get their problem resolved, which is in itself significant. If one of them rejects that interpretation, it is possible that one of them will sue in regular court to get the matter resolved. If neither of them accepts that interpretation, that clause will not be part of the legal argument that the court decides on. The court will only touch on this passage if exactly one of the parties agrees with the passage and makes it part of his argument. Then that person will have the burden of arguing that a certain outcome is mandated by the agreement – for example "this is a binding arbitration clause, you must let The Church decide". The courts will have to consider the evidence that this is indeed what the parties agreed to. It then depends on the evidence that the two sides offer for their positions, as to their respective understandings of the contract language. A preponderance of evidence could favor the interpretation that you offer, but that is a fact-intensive question of Biblical interpretation, and not a legal one. | The parties can be required under oath to explain what they understand the plain meaning of the words to be. Where they disagree about the plain meaning of the words, they can use expert witnesses to give weight to their interpretation. Once the judge determines the plain meaning of the words (either by agreement between the parties or by reference to expert witnesses or other evidence), it is a matter of standard contract interpretation. Even in the case of an idioticon, where no expert witnesses are available, if the disagreement between the parties surrounds only a few words, the judge could find that there is no actual ambiguity because the context. Also, the judge could refer to parole evidence if needed. The purpose of the written contract is to provide evidence of your agreement. It is a bad idea to create evidence that you both may want to rely upon at some point if nobody else can understand it. | On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article. | No Contracts are not bound by due process. Due process is a rule of how a lawsuit has to be handled, not how a contract is to be handled. All the Due Process clauses in the US constitution simply don't apply. The only things that apply are the contract language, and the underlying/overwriting laws. If your contract stipulates that it is terminated by winning a coin flip against the other party, that's fine. If it stipulates, that you have to find 15 people supporting you in terminating the contract, that's fine. If it states that the other party can terminate for any and all reasons, including no reason, that's what the contract says, and fine. The contract would have to establish that you actually have a process, and how it is handled. My hypothesis is that these common practices combined with the plain language of the TOS of these social media platforms that grant complete autonomous impunity to the platform[...] This part is correct. They have the complete impunity because of how the contract is written. However, that does not make the contract illusory: you can decide not to agree to it and not go to the place, so it is mutual acceptance. Both sides are bound to perform something until the contract is terminated. An illusory contract would be that Alice gets 2000 USD for nothing (only one side performs). But both sides perform. The contract is to follow the TOS in exchange for site access. Both sides offer something: access in exchange for adherence to rules. The claim of non-mutuality is frivolous: If you claim "I don't agree to the TOS and contract", you can't at the same time get the benefits of the contract either: you signed the contract to follow the TOS in exchange to access the site, and if you don't want to follow the TOS, you have to terminate the contract and can't access the site. You can't eat your cake and have it too. Also, there is a severability clause, which is valid: even if a clause would be illegal, it would be replaced by the closest legal clause, overwritten by the legal minimum, or removed, whichever is the least impact. The rest of the TOS is untouched and fully valid. Your conclusion is wrong and meritless. | canada1 The judgment you have read about is South West Terminal Ltd. v Achter Land, 2023 SKKB 116. The judge did not hold that "👍" is categorically considered to be binding agreement. The judge applied the modern approach to contractual interpretation outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53 and Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral v. Aga, 2021 SCC 22. This requires judges to interpret the text of the contract and indicators of acceptance in light of the surrounding circumstances. Regarding interpretation, see Sattva: a decision-maker must read the contract as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract. Consideration of the surrounding circumstances recognizes that ascertaining contractual intention can be difficult when looking at words on their own, because words alone do not have an immutable or absolute meaning Regarding formation, see Aga (internal citations removed): [36] For present purposes, it will suffice to focus on the requirement of intention to create legal relations. As G. H. L. Fridman explains, “the test of agreement for legal purposes is whether parties have indicated to the outside world, in the form of the objective reasonable bystander, their intention to contract and the terms of such contract”. This requirement can be understood as an aspect of valid offer and acceptance, in the sense that a valid offer and acceptance must objectively manifest an intention to be legally bound. [37] The test for an intention to create legal relations is objective. The question is not what the parties subjectively had in mind but whether their conduct was such that a reasonable person would conclude that they intended to be bound. In answering this question, courts are not limited to the four corners of the purported agreement, but may consider the surrounding circumstances. See also Owners, Strata Plan LMS 3905 v. Crystal Square Parking Corp., 2020 SCC 29, para. 37: the offer, acceptance, consideration and terms may be inferred from the parties’ conduct and from the surrounding circumstances The conclusion about the 👍 emoji was case-specific. See paras. 62-63: [62] ... Again, based on the facts in this case – the texting of a contract and then the seeking and receipt of approval was consistent with the previous process between SWT and Achter to enter into grain contracts. [63] This court readily acknowledges that a 👍 emoji is a non-traditional means to “sign” a document but nevertheless under these circumstances this was a valid way to convey the two purposes of a “signature” – to identify the signator (Chris using his unique cell phone number) and as I have found above – to convey Achter’s acceptance of the flax contract. 1."Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions – while it might not answer your question directly, your question will be here for others who may be from those jurisdictions." | It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial. | Does this still count as consideration, even though there was never any possibility of B getting anything out of it? Yes. The sole fact that the promisee and the beneficiary are different and unrelated entities does not invalidate a contract. In terms of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 302(1)(b), what matters is that "the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance". | An important doctrine of contract law is privity of contract, to the effect that only parties to an agreement have legal obligations and benefits from the contract. However, there can be third-party beneficiaries, where a third person may gain a benefit, and may rely on that benefit. For example, A agrees to work for B, who will pay C (perhaps because A owes money to C); C can then sue B for non-payment. In order for this right to materialize, C's rights must have "vested", for example C must have relied on the agreement to his detriment, or he has agreed to this with at least one party, or there can be some clause in the contract whereby his rights vest. That said, in order for a person to by obligated by a contract, they must be a party to the contract – they must have agreed to take on an obligation. (A person can also be obligated, without assent, if there is a specific law – e.g. you are obligated to pay the government your taxes, even if yo didn't agree to it). |
Can a council absolve themselves of responsibility for actions on their property? Having moved into a brand new property a year ago, we have been plagued by a noise nuisance from the city council owned car park across the road from us (I hate to be the person that moves to a place and then complains about it, but this isn't normal activity like an airport, pub, club etc). From 8pm until the early hours of the morning most days of the week (worse at weekends) youths with cars and motorbikes have been congregating underneath the flyover in the car park, revving their engines, shouting, playing loud music, racing each other around the car park and (more recently) having horn blowing contests. This can literally be until they choose to disperse at some point after midnight, so you can imagine how hard it is to sleep with this going on. The exit to the car park is pretty much outside our property, and they use the road our property is on as a race way - they exit the car park, do a high speed circuit of the block and return to the car park. 6 months ago I raised this issue with the city council through their noise nuisance complaints website, but I received a reply that the council only deals with noise nuisance issues caused by council or private tenants or property owners - any noise nuisance issues on council land is not their responsibility, and instead directed me to the local wardens or the police. The local wardens only patrol up to 8pm, so they have already said they cannot do anything. I have thus far lodged more than 40 complaints with the police non-emergency number, and not once has anyone been sent out, even when the report has been after midnight. I have ample video and audio evidence of the nuisance (one of the first things suggested online is to keep a diary of the nuisance, so I set up a Raspberry Pi to record raw audio and the decibel level a few months back), and my neighbours have similar issues and are backing us. Legal action is the next recourse, and the only people I can take action against are the council as its their property - but they are saying its not their problem... So my question is thus - can the city council actually absolve themselves of legal responsibility for actions on their property? Private property owners cannot do this, they are responsible for the noise on their property, so why can the council? | Actually, neither the council nor a private owner are responsible for illegal actions by unauthorised people on their property. This is obvious: if an intruder enters your property and, while there, shoots someone you cannot be held responsible. However ... Since you have made them aware that there are intruders on their property acting illegally and causing a nuisance to the neighbours and they have done nothing they are quite likely negligent, even recklessly negligent. Rather than sue them, consult a lawyer and get them to write a letter that if they do not take action by X date you are going to sue them. | In the United States, there is no potential liability for the municipality or the police department. There is no legally enforceable duty of police to act to prevent either violations of the law, or apprehend criminals, or to prevent suicide of people who are not in police custody. Other countries have different laws on this subject. | The bouncer is employed (or (sub)contracted) by the owner/lessee of premises - someone with the right to evict persons from their private property per the common law rights to exclusive use of one's property. When the bouncer evicts you, they are exercising this right on behalf of and as the agent for the owner, who could do it, but instead has assigned limited agency to the bouncer to do that for them. Entrance to (and remaining on) a property may be authorised and revoked at any time - at the time that consent is not given or is withdrawn, you become a trespasser and the police may be called upon to forcibly remove you from the premises. For example, I can have a party at my house, but if I don't like someone, I'm entitled to ask them to leave. I could also ask a friend to ask that person to leave, if I didn't want to do it myself. Note that bouncers aren't empowered to physically evict anyone except for the general right to use reasonable and proportionate force. For instance, someone that was just standing around in the nightclub probably couldn't be physically thrown out, but someone who was causing harm to themselves or others could be restrained or repelled as appropriate (and if restrained, you'd need to be very careful to do so in the course of effecting a citizen's arrest, otherwise you'd probably be committing false imprisonment). There may be statutory provisions that bestow additional rights and responsibilities upon bouncers, but this is the basic premise. I'm fairly certain that this would apply in all Australian jurisdictions; probably in all common law jurisdictions. | Police are subject to the same law as everybody else A report of a crime by a police officer should get the same consideration as any other report. However, there is a perennial problem that is inherent in any organization policing its own - quis custodiet ipsos custodes. For that reason, many jurisdictions have internal or external integrity commissions or ombudsmen to deal with this problem. Also, police, by the nature of their job, can annoy people and may therefore attract vexatious complaints. | No First, no new laws came into effect - new restrictions under existing law did. Specifically, the Premier declared a State of Disaster under s23(1) of the Emergency Management Act 1986 which requires it to be broadcast from a broadcasting station in Victoria (the televised press conference did that) and published in the government gazette (see first link). The government gazette is the communication channel for the promulgation of law - once it's in that then you are deemed to know it. The specific restrictions were communicated in the press conference and the power to impose them comes from s24(2)(d): (2) In addition to and without in any way limiting the generality of subsection (1), in a state of disaster the Minister may— (d) control and restrict entry into, movement within and departure from the disaster area or any part of it Note that this is a different Act than the previous restrictions which were under s200 of the public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008. Second, ignorance is only an excuse when the law says it is an excuse. Neither of the above laws do that. Most laws don't do that. An example of one that does (that I know from personal experience) is s58 of the new-south-wales Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) Regulation 2017 which says: For the purposes of section 68(2)(b) of the Act, the use of an unregistered registrable vehicle on a road or on a road related area is permitted if the person using the vehicle-- (a) was not the responsible person for the vehicle at the relevant time, and (b) did not know, and could not reasonably have known, that the vehicle was unregistered at the relevant time. However, even here, the ignorance plea is in relation to the facts of the situation, not the applicable law. My son drove my company car while unregistered and pled this defence. The regulator denied that he had a reasonable excuse because he should have checked the registration status using the NSW Government App before driving it. That is, my son had a duty to make all reasonable efforts to establish the registration status of the vehicle. However, they used their discretion and waived the fine. Which brings me to ... Third, officers, prosecutors and judges have discretion in how they apply the law. While ignorance is not an excuse, it is a factor that they can consider in deciding if you should be penalised and how much that penalty should be. | The appeals court has found that the county court judge made a decision that was consistent with the evidence that was presented at trial. As such, the decision is sound. It appears that the defendant tried to present additional/different evidence or different arguments about the law in the appeal than they did at trial - this is not permitted. As to responsibility, the defendant and their legal team were responsible for deciding how to run their case and what evidence to present and what arguments to run. What evidence to present and how to present it and what submissions to make on the law is a tactical decision for each party. You can get it wrong. That doesn't let you try again on appeal. If your barrister has been negligent, and that directly caused you to lose, you can sue your barrister. In terms of interpreting a particular paragraph of a judgement, the appeals court may or may not make comment on a particular paragraph but the reasons, while important, are not really subject to interpretation other than that. A judgement will give orders, these should be very precise and not open to interpretation - things like "the defendant will pay X to the plaintiff" or "the case is dismissed" etc. | Rob is responsible. No Bull! Around the world, the law of wandering cattle depends on the details. New Zealand is no different. This case is covered by s 26 of the Impounding Act of 1955, Damages for Trespass. As you said, S 26(1)(d) says Bob is entitled to damages whenever his "land (whether fenced or unfenced) is situated in a city." This is different to the rest of the country, where animals must be fenced out. S 26(2) of the Impounding Act says the damage is owed by Rob, as the owner of the stock: (2) In any case where damages are payable under this section the amount of any damage shall be recoverable by action from the owner of the stock. It may be that Rob and Alice have some arrangement that Alice will indemnify Rob against any trespass damages. But that agreement does not change the underlying law; it only allows him to recoup his loses (by suing his mother, if necessary!). Added: Something fun to read Law professor Robert Ellickson studied how people actually resolve disputes over wandering cattle in Shasta county in northern California. There's a readable summary of what he found here. (The title of his book, "Order without law," sums up his main finding -- there are rules that are enforced, but those rules have little to do with the formal law or law enforcement.) | Charged? Of course, the police can charge you with anything at any time Could you be convicted? Maybe. Their best shot is charging you with “Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act” also called constructive manslaughter. The Crown must prove your act: was intentional, was unlawful, leads the reasonable person to realise that some other person is at risk of physical harm, and caused the death. The first two are uncontestable: the protesters are deliberately engaging in an illegal act. No 3 would be up to the jury. No 4 is also up to the jury and would turn on the evidence that the delay to the ambulance caused the death. |
Is keeping on the homepage the link to a past article with comments over the vote a violation of the electoral silence? In Italy there is a law which states that 24 hours before the start of a vote, be it an election or a referendum, the campaign must stop. It is called the electoral silence and in this period every voter should be allow to think without being bombarded by external influences. In the contemporary age there could be (actually there is) the case of a newspaper publishing on the online site a commentary with some vote recommendation before the start of the silence, but then the link is kept on the homepage during the voting day. Is it a violation of the silence? | This article is a useful introduction to restrictions on political advertising in the EU, where §3.4 (p 33) covers Italy. Silenzio elettorale is covered by art 9. of Norme per la disciplina della propaganda elettorale. The statutory situation is not entirely clear to me, but the main controlling fact relevant to the internet question is that AGCOM issues rules. An English legal analysis (from an Italian law firm) is here. Their undernourished analysis of the silence period is Finally, Italian legislation prohibits political propaganda on election day and on the day before. Although AGCOM is not competent for ascertaining infringements of said prohibition, it considers important to call everyone to turn the attention on these provisions. Indeed, they are important to guarantee effective protections of the constituents. As such, in the Authority’s opinion, the prohibition applies to all media. Clearly, the law applies to internet platforms. What is not clear is whether the prohibition as applied to web pages is against "adding content", or does it require the elimination of previously-distributed content and scrubbing of links to such content. Perhaps the matter will be clarified in court one day. | The question to be answered is "did the state prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt", the answer to which should have no reasonable doubt. The interests of the defendant are sufficiently protected by the basic burden of proof requirement. The alternative that a single vote of not guilty exonerates the defendant would seriously hobble the interests of the people, and the alternative of automatic mistrial would make trials prohibitively expensive. The unanimity requirement does mean that in case of initial disagreement, parties have to re-think their positions, which is not a bad thing. The question of whethar a supermajority of guilty votes suffices for conviction was decided in a recent case, Ramos v. Louisiana, allowing conviction with a 10-2 vote. The court takes unanimity to be a basic common law right from the 14th century. Louisiana and Oregon had unconventional schemes allowing less than unanimous decisions: the reasoning behind the unanimity requirement is discussed extensively in that opinion. Since Alito, Roberts and Kagan dissented in part, the rationale for the other view is also spelled out. | No The Texas suit alleges that significant changes were made to the election rules in the various defendant states, and that these were not approved by the legislatures of those states, but were made by administrative or court decisions. It also claims that differences in local practice and polices made absentee or mail-in voting easier, or invalid votes less likely to be detected, in some counties than in others, meaning that voters in some parts of those states were treated differently than voters in other parts. Note that this theory has not yet been accepted, or in any way passed on, by SCOTUS. But even assuming that the theory were to be accepted, it would require, at most, strict adherence to the election statutes of each state, and that changes or variances be approved by the state legislature. It would have nothing to say about the actual content of the various state laws, unless those laws treated different parts of a state differently, in which case there would be an equal protection violation. The Electors clause, cited in this suit, gives to the legislature of each state the power to "direct" how electors are to be appointed. This is done through laws, statutes. The suit cites this clause as a source of authority, and nothing in it could be taken as suggesting a requirement of national uniformity in election law. I have not yet seen the response to this suit, if indeed one has been filed. It may be that a response would argue that the changes were, in fact, authorized by provisions of the various state laws granting authority to officials. No one knows how the Court will respond to this suit. But even if it were to rule for the plaintiff Texas, that would not impose a national standard, nor permit one state to challenge the provisions of the law of another. It might permit one state to challenge how well another state had applied its own law. | colorado No Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-4-304 (5) Each presidential elector shall vote for the presidential candidate and, by separate ballot, vice-presidential candidate who received the highest number of votes at the preceding general election in this state. By law, the electors have to vote for the winner of the statewide popular vote. Nobody has the authority to make them do anything else. And if they try to vote differently of their own accord, the Colorado Secretary of State may void their vote and replace them with another elector. This happened in the 2016 election, and the voiding of the vote was eventually upheld by the US Supreme Court (Baca v. Colorado Department of State). I suppose the legislature might be able to repeal 1-4-304, but the governor could veto, and a 2/3 majority of both chambers would be needed in order to override. There would likely also be court challenges as to whether the repeal could affect an election that had already taken place. | According to Texas law, Election code 61.014(b): A person may not use any mechanical or electronic means of recording images or sound within 100 feet of a voting station. However, the punishment appears to be only this: The presiding judge may require a person who violates this section to turn off the device or to leave the polling place. | Under GDPR, can I request to be forgotten and re-register for a trail? No (unless they are stupid.) The "right to be forgotten" does not mean they have to delete your data. They can keep personal data about if they have "legitimate interests" to keep these data. Stopping clients from abusing their "free trial" system is a legitimate interest. | Yes, such as this limitation on free speech. Initially, the limitation was "Clear and Present Danger" test (Schenk v. United States, 1919) which held that speech inciting lawless action was not protected speech and thus could be crimilized speech (i.e. Schenk publishing anti-draft fliers during World War I, which advocated draft dodging which at the time was a crime under the Espionage act of 1917). This was later over ruled to the "Bad Tendency" test which allowed for advocacy of criminal actions to be criminilized (Whitney v. United States, 1927. Whitney was accused of helping establish the American Communist Labor Party (ACLP), which held as a party platform the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government in favor of one advocated by the ACLP. This is standard to most Communist Parties at the time around the world. The difference between Schenk and Whitney was that Schenk actively called for a criminal action, where as Schenk was speaking of a future action following other party successes). This was overturned again by Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969) which introduced the "Imminent Lawless Action" test. This explicitly overturned Whitney in addition to other cases not mentioned such as Abrams v. United States (1915), Giltrow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951). It does not overrule Schenk, but it did cast doubt upon the decision made. In the case, KKK leader Brandenburg made a speech advocating for revenge against African Americans and Jews as well as expressing the belief that the United States government actively surpressed White Americans and needed to be opposed. He was charged as advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Imminent Lawless Action added the important componant that the violation must be advocacy of lawless action (revenge against racial minorities) must have a definite future date (like "tonight", "tomorrow", or specific time and date) and a vague future time will not count. And must show intent to break the law (Brandenburg did not specifically intend to break the law... he wanted it changed so it would not be legal before he took action). Additionaly, they found that the mere advocacy of resisting the government did not have any language componant that suggested violent resistance. Brandenburg, as discussed, overturned the reaffirmed B and put Schenk on some shaky ground as parts of Shenk were still relevant (Schenk first introduced that Free Speech was not without restrictions, but some of the case law was not relevent anymore, as Whitney used it as a basis in that decision, as did to a limited extent Dennis, which didn't work well with Whitney for other reasons. It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court does not typically take cases that wholly reaffirm past cases. Typically, their rulings are to clarify situations in a previous case that are not stated by the current extant rulings. For example, if the Supreme Court took a case that called Roe v. Wade into question, the case would more likely test whether Roe allows for a particular practice that isn't all that clear in Roe. It may affirm that Roe is still law, but the new case is not consistent with Roe, which will place a restriction on Roe, but not, figuratively, (pardon the pun) throw the baby out with the bath water. | The location of your residence entrance is irrelevant for the law, what matters most is your "street address", i.e. mailing address. That is the address (therefore city) that you use for voter registration, and basically how you identify "where I live". If you lives 5 miles out in the country in an unincorporated area, you'd still use Needles (e.g.) as you mailing address: but you would not be able to vote for a mayor of Needles, just based on your mailing address. Both municipalities might claim jurisdiction based on the physical location of the property, especially for matters of building code. It should not be possible for both municipalities to tax the full value of your property, but they could split the assessment proportionally. The cities themselves are not collecting the tax, the county is (though property straddling a county line raises an interesting question). |
Must I allow access to every one of my landlord's representatives I live in a flat that I rent. I understand that I must provide my landlord and their representatives access to the flat for things like maintenance (after proper notice from them when not in an emergency situation). However, if the landlord has to perform some kind of maintenance on the flat as per some legal requirement. Can I refuse entry to a specific representative of theirs (e.g. a plumber), and if so, on what basis am I allowed to refuse? Response to answer/comment: My reasoning for wanting to refuse them access is as follows: I do not trust the representative (rep). Mostly because I don't know them so why should I. I currently work from home. This particular rep has been very unprofessional, particularly with communication and time management (always late, has twice cancelled after they were due at the property, always underestimates ETAs - by months sometimes). After many complaints about this, I am sure the rep has passive-aggressively, and purposefully employed this same behavior to get back at me - though I have no proof of this. Given the above, I have to adjust my work schedule during their visits to mitigate disruption to my work and to monitor their work. This, coupled with their poor time management, wastes my time. The landlord is not offering me any compensation for this, nor are they offering any guarantee of the rep's punctuality. On one occasion, in the flat, when I tried to nail down a follow-up appointment with said rep, and also complained to them about their tardiness. They were rude to me. | I am assuming in this answer that the lease or rental agreement provides the landlord with a right of access for required maintenance. The question is not clear on that point. If there is a specific and reasonable ground for refusing a particular representative or agent of the landlord, you might be able to do so. If, for example, that particular worker had previously insulted you in your apartment, or had attempted to steal from you there, you could probably refuse entrance and request the landlord to send a different worker to do the job. But in general the landlord may choose his or her agents, and if it is a reasonable for an agent to be admitted, you must admit whatever agent the landlord sends. You can probably demand reasonable notice, depending on the terms of the lease. You may be able to demand to be present when the agent is to be in the premises, again depending on the lease. But I fo not think that the tenant can arbitrarily choose which agent the landlord will use. | You should have seen this coming. This might vary a bit from place to place, however it would generally be accepted that if you are in a rented place, you have to pay rent. Most jurisdictions would have some law which requires pro-rata'd payment for the time you actually stay, there would not be any requiring the landlord let you stay free. An uninvested third party might ask "Why would a landlord provide you with 5 days free rent". Another way to look at it is that one of the elements of a contract is consideration (think payment) - Thus in contracting to stay in his place longer you should expect to provide consideration - and pro-rata'd rent would be typical. | The primary legal question is whether the resident (tenant) has breached a duty of care. There are all sorts of laws establishing duties of care, such as between doctor and patient, which may be created by a legislature or may be part of common law tradition. There is a duty of care imposed on a landlord w.r.t. the tenant, requiring that the premise be "secure", therefore a landlord might easily be held liable if the main door into the building was not locked. This duty is a specific instance of a general duty from tradesman/businessman to customer. As far as I can determine, there is no such statutory duty imposed on tenants in Washington state, and none from case law being revealed by a few cursory searches. In order to be subsumed under general "everybody has a duty to everybody else" law, the damage would have to be foreseeable. It is said that "If something is foreseeable, it is a probable and predictable consequence of the defendant’s negligent actions or inaction". This mean that a reasonable person would have known that, under the circumstances, the damage is likely to result. Circumstances vary quite a bit, and there is no general rule about holding the door open for another person. If there is abundant signage reminding tenants to never ever let in a stranger no matter that their excuse and/or if the premise is in a crime war-zone, the outcome is more likely to be considered to be foreseeable. | Legal answer A blanket "no pets" clause is unenforceable, and would remove even the requirement for you to ask before keeping pets (ref:landlordlawblog). This is why the clause contract has the phrase "the Landlord’s consent [...] will not be unreasonably withheld". You shouldn't take this phrasing to mean that the landlord is happy for pets given certain conditions; rather the landlord doesn't want pets, but has used the letting agent's standard contract which has been written with advice from lawyers. Withholding consent with no explanation is unreasonable (see landlordlawblog ref above). The landlord simply wanting no pets, in and of itself, is almost certainly unreasonable. Given that you proposed damage repairs and cleaning, I am personally convinced that the rejection is unreasonable. That said, the landlord might be able to reasonably withhold consent on noise grounds (parrots can annoy neighbours!), but can only do so by stating that to you (which he hasn't done). (Im)practical answer 1 You can try fighting it out in the courts if you like. You could well win, but this will cost you money (and probably a lot of stress) and antagonise your landlord. The landlord will then want to get rid of you (both because you're doing something he doesn't want to the property, and because you took him to court). He'll want to get rid of you with the minimum notice possible; if you're in a fixed term, that's the end of the fixed term; if you're in a periodic tenancy it's probably 2 months. In theory landlords can't carry out retaliatory evictions. But your only chance of fighting a retaliatory eviction is... the courts! Cue more cost and stress. And it's very possible that the landlord might successfully come up with another reason to justify the eviction, e.g. "I want to sell the property", "I want to provide my nephew with a home", or if he tries putting the rent up and you refuse "I can get more rental income by re-letting the property". (Im)practical answer 2 You could just get the parrot anyway. The landlord won't find out until his next inspection, and even then will find it difficult to evict you in the middle of a fixed term for such a minor breach of contract... but that doesn't stop him evicting you at the earliest possible "no reason" eviction date. This would again be either the end of the fixed term or 2 months if you're on a periodic tenancy. And you wouldn't be able to fight this as a "retaliatory eviction", as there will be no registered disagreement between you. Practical answer Your legal rights and your practical options aren't the same thing, unfortunately. Your best option is probably to give up on the idea of getting a parrot. | It is the terms of the lease that govern what you may and may not do, so if pets are not disallowed, they are allowed. You are not a party to the contract between the landlord and the agent, so whatever the landlord may have told the agent is technically irrelevant to you. However, this may be an indication that the landlord plans to change policy; it might also mean that the agent misunderstood something. That is where you stand legally. | I don't have enough to comment but I know where I live it's the landlords responsibility to take care of mold. That being said, if it is mold caused by negligence of the tenant e.g. always leaving the window open in the rain or something, then the landlord can claim compensation. Where I live the landlord keeps some of the damage deposit he must prove to the tenant why he did so within a months time of when he was supposed to return the damage deposit. For example if it cost him $200 to repair damage done by the mold, he must return the rest of the damage deposit and a letter explaining why $200 was kept, and the receipts. Where do you live? The laws really do very greatly from region to region. It has been my observation that it's not that uncommon for landlords to try and sneak something into the lease that isn't really allowed by law. | she immediately stated that I need to provide 60 days notice She is wrong. See Minnesota statute 504B.135(a). Absent any agreement that supersedes the statute, the landlord cannot unilaterally stretch the notice period to 60 days. Is it legal for a landlord to say my rent is due 5 days earlier than we had verbally agreed? Is it legal for a landlord to do this right after I tell them that I am planning on moving out? No. The lanlord cannot unilaterally alter the implied contract that exists between you two, including the pattern of you paying rent on the 6th of the month. To prove in court that this was indeed the pattern, it suffices to show the receipts your landlord has the statutory obligation to provide to you immediately upon making each one of your payments. See 504B.118. The landlord is just "making sure" you will not recommend her to other prospective tenants. | This guide from Shelter lists the steps you should take. It can be summarised as: if the landlord fails to arrange the repairs, contact your local council. If they can't help, you can arrange the repairs yourself and request that the landlord reimburse you. If the landlord still refuses to co-operate, then you can pursue legal action. It's important that you document everything you're doing, and keep the landlord fully informed at every step. The guide states that you can deduct the cost from future rent. But it also says: You do not have the right to withhold your rent if your landlord refuses to do repairs. If you don't pay rent, the landlord could take steps to evict you. ...so you may want to get expert advice before going any further. |
Can I be charged for murder if I throw peanuts at someone who has a severe peanut allergy and they die as a result of that? Assuming I already knew that they had a peanut allergy, and my intention was to hurt them, but not necessarily to kill them. | You don't specify a jurisdiction but taking the US as an example, yes you could be charged with 2nd Degree Murder - you intended to harm them but not specifically to kill them: A second situation that constitutes second-degree murder is where the perpetrator intends only to cause serious bodily harm but knows that death could result from the act. For example, in the situation above, instead of shooting Bill, Adam grabs a shovel and whacks Bill in the head with all his strength. While Adam didn't specifically intend to kill Bill when he hit him, he did intend to strike him with the shovel knowing that such a blow to the head carried with it a distinct possibility of death. Adam killing Bill in this way would be classified as murder in the second degree. In English law you'd be facing charges for Voluntary Manslaughter | There are many cases where it is quite obvious that A has illegally killed B, but where it is much less obvious whether this was first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter. The usual approach is to charge A with all three, and then convict for the highest that the jury agrees with (for example, the jury might agree that it was at least second degree murder, but not agree that it was first degree murder beyond reasonable ground). A prosecutor who wants a first degree murder conviction might charge with first degree murder only, hoping that the jury will agree with the charge rather than letting a proven killer go free. This may fatally backfire. If a proven killer is only charged with first degree murder, and there is insufficient evidence for first degree murder, then yes, with a responsible jury that killer will go free. If the only charge requires proof of premeditation, and there is no proof, then that charge will not succeed. | The double jeopardy clause would prevent you from being retried by the government that tried you for murder (probably a U.S. state). But, you could be tried for fraud and obstruction of justice at the state level, and you could be tried for murder if an appropriate federal offense were located, at the federal level. Often conspiracy to deprive someone of their civil rights is used as a federal offense when there is a state level acquittal, and it isn't impossible to imagine that happening in this case as the victim had a right to the protection of the laws, and the state had a right to enforce the criminal laws, which was deprived in a manner that could be called "under color of state law.' | The main source of liability would be "for injuries caused by the act 'of things that he has under his guard'" (this article). As stated in Art. 1383. of the 1804 Civil Code, "Everyone is liable for the injury he has caused not only by his act, but also by his negligence or imprudence". Then the question is whether the teacher was negligent in allowing a poisoning to happen. It is much more difficult to judge French standards, since court rulings do not generally create legal principles. To take two extremes, suppose on the one hand that a teacher were to store a bottle of sulfuric acid on the table where anyone could take it. Knowing that some rapscallion might take the bottle and prank someone with it, the teacher might have neglected her duty as a teacher to safeguard students. However, if it is safely locked up and yet someone manages to get into the locker (e.g. they have a safe-cracking device that nobody expects a student to have access to), then she probably would not be liable. The difference comes from whether there is fault in the teacher's choices of action, that is, is that choice something that a reasonable person would know is wrong. It's not clear from the description how Bob got the substance: finding a means of preventing students from accessing dangerous materials should be the main goal, and probably does not require stopping experimentation. But facts about the school might imply that the risk is not practically controllable (e.g. no locks on the chemical cabinet). | It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question. | In the US, it depends on the jurisdiction because each state has its own homicide statutes: but, the defining elements don't differ a lot. Drawing on Washington state law, the first question is whether you intended to kill a person (it doesn't have to be a specific person). If you did, you have committed first-degree murder. It is first-degree murder, because it requires a certain amount of advance planning to kill with a drone. It does not matter that the drone houses the gun that killed the person and a program determines when the gun fires (the "it was the drone, not me" defense gets you nowhere: otherwise, you could always claim "It wasn't me, it was my gun / knife / fist".) If instead this is a badly-designed pig-slaughtering drone, then it could be manslaughter in the first degree, if the act was reckless, or manslaughter in the second degree, if the act was with criminal negligence. To determine which it is, you look at the definitions: A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. versus A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. So it would depend on whether you decided that safeguards which would prevent shooting people were too much bother (you know there is a risk and set aside that concern), or it didn't occur to you that a flying gun might hurt a person. | It is not necessarily a crime to do this, but the gift to you and from you to Betty would be disregarded and treated as if gift directly from Alice to Betty, if the IRS knew all of the facts. A gift implies a donative intent directed at you. When there is an understanding that you are acting at Alice's direction, you aren't receiving a gift, you are acting as Alice's agent. This said, this scheme, or the alternative it seeks to prevent, has no impact on Betty, because gift taxes are imposed on the donor rather than the recipient of the gift. And, in most cases, a gift in excess of the $14,000 per person per year gift tax exemption will have only a minimal impact. This is because each person is entitled to make a combination of gifts in excess of the exemption during life and transfers to non-spouses and non-charities at death of $11,200,000 per lifetime (adjusted annually for inflation). Usually, all that is necessary if the limit is exceeded is for the donor to file form 706 (a federal gift tax return) at the same time as the donor's income tax return, and this form is very simple if the only gifts given are cash gifts. Transfers to a U.S. citizen spouse are gift and estate tax free, as are gifts to foreign and domestic charities. Spouses who file a Form 709 in a year may treat gifts given by one spouse as actually given half by each spouse. If someone dies not having used their entire $11,200,000 (adjusted for inflation) lifetime exemption, their surviving spouse, if any, inherits that unused portion and can use it at their death in addition to their own lifetime exemption. So, Alice and Betty are trying to evade a tax law that is easy and trouble free to comply with, and may provide future benefits by documenting the intent of the parties with respect to a large gift (so that someone doesn't later try to characterize it as a loan or contribution to a trust estate, for example). While it isn't a crime, it is ill advised and won't benefit them materially in the end. | Theoretically you could, but that's highly unlikely if what you say is all there is to it. The prosecutor would have to have good evidence that you had a criminal intent, for example intended to make off with the goods. You could even attach a note of explanation to overcome any suspicion of criminal intent. |
Am I at risk by storing or using software that violates copyright? Imagine the following scenario: A software company copies code from some open source project and includes it in their own software without giving credit to the original authors, violating the open source license and copyright. The software company then gives me the software and its source code under a proprietary license. If I am not aware of the copyright violation, am I at risk of legal consequences if I store the source code on my computer and use the software? Suppose that at some point I become aware of the copyright violation. Am I at risk at this point? | If you copy copyrighted material without permission or another exemption, you are at risk It doesn’t matter if you know the material is subject to copyright, it doesn’t matter if you think you have permission but don’t, it doesn’t even matter if you knowingly make the copy or if it is some background process you don’t know about. Copyright law is really simple: if you make an unlawful copy, you broke it. If this seems unduly harsh, remember you are dealing with a law with its roots in the 18th century that was internationalised at the beginning of the 20th century. Making copies then was a hard, deliberate process - you couldn’t “accidentally” or “inadvertently” make a copy of a literary or artistic work. Now you can - the world has changed, the law hasn’t. | Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz. | Both. The user made an infringing copy with the upload, the developer did with the download. Further the ToS between the app owner and the user will not protect them from being sued by the owner of the copyright. They don't have any ToS with them. | It's not fair use. Fair use is when you do something that normally only the copyright holder can do. Playing a video game is the ordinary, intended use of the work. In the United States, ordinary use is not protected by copyright. 17 USC 106 sets out the rights protected by copyright. The include copying the work, producing derivative works, distributing the work, and so on. None of these are ordinary use. Someone could perhaps argue that you are creating a derivative work. I doubt that argument would work because you are not taking any protectable elements from the work. But if anyone did argue that, it would make sense to also argue that if that's so, your use would still be covered under fair use because it's transformative, does not substitute for the original work in any way, and takes very little of the work. | You are in general correct, KBurchfiel. A code snippet such as import math; or For i := 1 to 10 print i; has no originality, and is not protected by copyright. A post eplaining the meaning an usage of such a snippet might well be original enough to be protected by US copyright, indeed it probably would. But the code on its own would not be. Anyone could read such a post, and if s/he understood it, use the code snippet and not be in violation of copyright, not compelled to place the entire program in which such a snippet was used under a CC-=BY-SA license. The creative commons people would prefer that a CC license not be applied to a publication that is not protected by copyright, and if it is so applied it is legally meaningless. But they have no legal way to enforce such a preference. A stack exchange post that consisted of nothing but such an uncopyrightable code snippet, with no explanation r discussion, might well be downvoted or even deleted. But that is a matter of site policy on what is a useful answer, not a matter of copyright. Using an excerpt from a copyrighted work so small that the excerpt alone would be uncopyrightable, would probably be fair use under US law, and might well be fair dealing in UK law. Something that is fair use does not compel the reuser to abide by the terms of a CC license, because those terms apply only when the content could not be reused without the CC license's permission. However, a code snippet does not need to be very much more original than the above examples before it becomes copyrightable. Whether it can be used via fair use rather than via the CC-BY-SA license is a very fact-based decision (the usual four-factor analysis is spelled out in 17 USC 107).. But if the snippet can be rewritten to express the same concepts but in a different expression, then there is no copyright issue, and again the CC license will not apply. If the snippet is complex and original enough to be copyrightable (a fairly low bar) and it is re-used unchanged, under conditions where fair use does not apply, then the CC-BY-SA license's terms must be complied with for the use to be legal. That is several "IFs" however. The exact details of a specific case will matter in such cases, there is not one rule for all snippets, all posts, or all programs. | It is not possible to say that this is generally fair use, although sometimes it would be. A copy for personal use is still a copyright right violation on its face, and fair use does not categorically exclude non-commercial or personal use of copyrighted works. It is a highly fact specific inquiry. The likelihood of anyone discovering that you have done so and deciding to sue over it is slight, but that doesn't mean that there isn't potential copyright infringement liability. Compare this to speeding. People do it all the time, and even driving one mile per hour above the speed limit is still a traffic violation. But it is rare for less serious violations to be ticketed. | Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark. | My understanding is that here "derived from the program" means "created by modifying the source code of the program" and not "created by running the program". Certainly that is the way all users that I have heard of treat the matter. Note that a commercial program, such as a word processor, will be fully protected by copyright, but the maker does not claim to have any rights over documents written using it. "Derived" here seems pretty clearly to mean "derivative work" in the sense in which that term is used in copyright law. In copyright law "derived work" is a term of art with a definition specific to that field. |
What are the legal restrictions on police Taser use? Looking online it is hard to find the specific rules for Taser use by the police. I have found this from the National Police Chiefs' Concil: Why use [Conducted Energy Devices (CED)] at all? CEDs provide an additional option to resolve situations, including the threat of serious violence, which can come from any section of the public. And the Police Foundation: Currently Taser is only to be used where firearms would have been authorised or where an officer faces severe violence such that he or she needs to use force to protect the public, themselves and/or the subject And the College of Policing: Taser should only be used as a proportionate response to an identified threat. It should not be used to simply gain compliance with instructions or procedures where compliance is not linked to such a threat There was a case in the news earlier this year where they seem to have been used outside this situation. It is described so, by the 80 year old target of the taser who was awaken by the officers, and was in his pajamas: “At least four fully-dressed police officers carrying machine guns shone dazzling flashlights in my face, all shouting and shouting something unintelligible at me. They gave me no instructions, nothing. “Suddenly one of them fired this Taser at me and the electricity started to zap. It hit me in the stomach and upper leg and I fell on the kitchen floor, powerless. “Then they jumped on me, knelt on my back to pin me to the tiled floor, twisted my arms behind my back, handcuffed me and told me I was under arrest for a fight.” This sounds completely contrary to the statements above. Is there any criminal law that restricts police Taser use? What charges could be brought in such situations, and what defenses could be used? | I will only offer a general answer as I have no desire to enter the quagmire of potential sub-judice bearing in mind the cited case seems to be under investigation according to the BBC article: The Metropolitan Police has apologised and referred itself to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC). The IOPC has since instructed the Met to conduct the investigation, but said if the complainant was unhappy with the outcome he would have the right of review. Beyond the requirements to pass various courses and achieving regular re-accreditation to carry a Taser - either as an Autorised Firearms Officer (AFO) or an Autorised Taser Officer (ATO) - there are no specific rules covering its use not already covered by the OP's links. The relevant legislation is no different from, say, using a baton, applying handcuffs, spraying PAVA, or just by getting hold of someone to stop them running away - it must be reasonable in the circumstances. There are three areas of law that permit a police officer to use force, Taser or otherwise: Section 117, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Where any provision of this Act — (a) confers a power on a constable [e.g. to make and arrest]; and (b) does not provide that the power may only be exercised with the consent of some person, other than a police officer, the officer may use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of the power. Section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967: (1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. (2) Subsection (1) above shall replace the rules of the common law on the question when force used for a purpose mentioned in the subsection is justified by that purpose. Common Law allows a person to use reasonable force to: (a) Defend himself from an attack. (b) Prevent an attack on another person [..] (c) Defend his property. All officers are trained to use the National Decision Model to assist with "dynamic risk assessment" when considering using force. If an officer cannot reasonably justify its use as being necessary and proportionate to a perceived threat then, in all likelihood, it may well be at the very least unlawful assault. What offences an officer commits, if any, will depend on the particular circumstances. | united-states It is not required for a person to formally assert a fifth- or a first-amendment right when questioned by the police. One can simply be silent, refuse to answer any questions, without giving any reasons. But probably more effective and just as legal is to say "I won't answer any questions until I have talked with a lawyer. I want a lawyer, now." That is perhaps less likely than using the words "plead the fifth" to be assumed to be a confession of guilt, although some people and some police may take almost anything as a confession of guilt. By the way some of the points you distilled from the video (which I have not watched yet) are correct, some are half-truths, and some are quite incorrect. For example: The 5th amendment was not designed as a shelter for the guilty (despite it often being used as such). It was designed to help prevent you from unknowingly incriminating yourself. As a matter of history, this is quite incorrect. It arose historically out of a reaction to government procedures deemed oppressive. See https://law.stackexchange.com/a/63690/17500 for more detail. But helping people avoid unintentionally incriminating themselves is one of its major current functions. You can't talk your way out of getting arrested. Sometimes you can, but it is never safe to count on it. You can't know in advance if it will work, and more often than not it doesn't. Everything you tell the police can be used against you but not to help you. Not quite. If your statement is recorded, as is likely nowadays, the whole statement must be given to your lawyer and entered into evidence if you are eventually charged. (See Brady vs Maryland) Things said in your own favor may be discounted as self-serving, but the judge and jury will still hear them. But they can be very risky. | It's not an interrogation Nothing makes Mr. Hansen a police investigator. He is a private person talking with another private person. His testimony or the recording of the interview might or might not be admissible in trial, that's for the court to decide. But Miranda warnings are only needed when you are under arrest or when you are in a custodial interrogation. Hansen, agent of the police? There's arguments that Hansen might or might not have acted as an agent of the police, and in one case he was deputized. However, that does not change that for Miranda you need an arrest or custodial interrogation (e.g. where one is not free to leave). As far as I am aware, none of the people interviewed was in such a situation and technically free to go at any time - making Miranda not required. | Because a "sting" does not trigger the prerequisites for the warning The Miranda Warning has triggering events: The circumstances triggering the Miranda safeguards, i.e. Miranda warnings, are "custody" and "interrogation". Custody means formal arrest or the deprivation of freedom to an extent associated with formal arrest. Interrogation means explicit questioning or actions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The Constitution does not require that a defendant be advised of the Miranda rights as part of the arrest procedure, or once an officer has probable cause to arrest, or if the defendant has become a suspect of the focus of an investigation. If you voluntarily speak to a police officer (uniformed or undercover, identified as such or not) while not being both in custody and subject to interrogation, that speech can be used in evidence. | In all common law countries, this would be the tort of battery (thus, illegal). The police might lawfully lay hands on the person, under certain conditions. First, the police would have to be legally arresting the person; second, the person would have to be (unlawfully) resisting that arrest. If the person acts in a way that a police officer "has reason to believe to be so mentally ill as to be incapable of taking care of himself", he may arrest the person (Mental Health Act 1987 art. 23). Part III (art. 20 ff) provides the legal background for the second path for arrest, via involuntary commitment. Under the circumstances you describe, a court would have to first order the person taken into custody (leading to an arrest, and possibly being subdued). The police would not be authorized to administer a sedative, so they would have to use physical restraint (handcuffs, hammer-lock and so on). The process is either initiated by a psychiatric professional, or by a relative (art. 20), then the court determines whether the person is to be so detained. | It ultimately depends on the situation, but here's a general breakdown: Many states in the United States have anti-trespassing laws that allow citizens to use deadly force in response to threat of bodily harm. These laws and statutes intersect to provide more protections for gun owners encountering trespassers, burglars, or thieves in their home. However, pointing a gun at someone can be considered assault on the idea that it is a threat that puts someone in fear of harm. Thus, the legality of pointing your gun at someone depends on numerous factors. To name a few, it depends on How a state's criminal laws are defined What was the trespassing incident? Was the trespasser in one's home, or on one's property Whether one feared bodily harm from the trespasser Here's a real instance of this happening in the US: A farmer from New Hampshire was sentenced to 3 years in prison after brandishing his handgun to a trespasser. See article here. | Answering the question title, a Texas law enforcement officer can certainly make arrests in Louisiana these days under the right circumstances (I'm not about to look up the laws as of 1934). For starters, Louisiana law grants any person the authority to make an arrest when the person being arrested has committed a felony, whether or not that felony was committed in the presence of the person making the arrest. This is normally a legally risky thing to do (the arrest is illegal unless the person actually committed a felony, while a cop's felony arrest is legal as long as the cop had probable cause), but in this case the pair had been involved in a kidnapping and a robbery in Louisiana. Any person could have made a lawful arrest, and could have used necessary force to effect that arrest. But suppose the gang turned out to be innocent of the Louisiana crimes. In that case, a citizen's arrest would be illegal. But the Texas lawmen weren't at the ambush alone. They were there with the parish sheriff and a deputy, who were Louisiana peace officers with the authority to make an arrest on probable cause. And under Article 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, A peace officer making a lawful arrest may call upon as many persons as he considers necessary to aid him in making the arrest. A person thus called upon shall be considered a peace officer for such purposes. Neither of these things depends on the Texas officers' status as Texas officers. There are some arrests which are legal based on that (e.g. hot pursuit), and a Texas officer has some extra powers in Louisiana based on federal law that make an arrest easier (e.g. cops in the US can carry concealed firearms nationwide without needing a CCW permit), but under normal circumstances a Texas police officer has no special authority to make an arrest in Louisiana. However, it's not at all uncommon for police agencies in different states (or at the state and federal level) to cooperate on something, and there are ways to make it work out. With more planning, there are normally formal ways to do it instead of needing to rely on "we'll ask you for assistance" (for instance, officers could formally be appointed as deputies in the appropriate agency; this happens a lot on federal task forces, where a deputized state or local cop gets nationwide jurisdiction). If Bonnie and Clyde existed these days but the feds wanted to involve state cops, they'd just set up a federal task force, make Hamer a special deputy US marshal, and go from there. | In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest. |
What is the most comparable American law to GDPR right to subject access? Privacy Act? HIPAA seems comparable but only applies to medical data, but is there anything more general than that? How does privacy act compare to data subject access rights under gdpr? Is it that it only applies to government entities but not private sector data controllers? | HIPAA seems comparable but only applies to medical data, but is there anything more general than that? Not really, at least at the national level. There is no comprehensive national regulation of data privacy in the United States. There are regulations related to health information (HIPAA), to educational records, to tax information, to census information, credit reporting agencies, and to banking records (as well, of course, as to national security information). There are also largely consistent restrictions at the state level related to the juvenile justice process. But data privacy is not a subject of general regulation in the U.S. Instead, the data privacy regulations of the U.S. consist of a patchwork of fragmentary state and federal laws and regulations, superimposed on a significant and not entirely consistent or well developed body of common law precedents such as the privacy torts set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which some states have adopted fully, some states have rejected almost completely, and some states have adopted in part or with significant modifications. The U.S. Constitutional law of the First Amendment also heavily colors how other legal limitations and authorizations are construed and drafted, because the right to distribute truthful information without restriction has long been considered one of the core protections of the First Amendment, even in the much less vigorously protected area of commercial speech. Some states have more general regulations, and the most important of these is California, both because it is a large and economically significant state, and because it is the home to many of the leading U.S. technology companies, many of which expressly adopt of the law of the State of California in choice of law clauses in their terms of service and contracts. The California law most similar to the GDPR is the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) which gives consumers rights with respect to the use of the personal information that businesses collect about them and the CCPA regulations that provide guidance on how to implement the law. The website of the State of California's attorney general provides some answers to frequently asked questions about this law. | I'd rather not, but this might be compliant if you make sure that the personal data under your responsibility remains secure and protected even if it is processed abroad. Since the UK has left the EU, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between implications of the EU GDPR and the UK GDPR. These are functionally equivalent, but in the matter of international data transfers the practical details have diverged. In my answer that you cited, I argued that any website processes personal data, and is thus potentially in-scope for the GDPR. If you cause another organization to process this personal data outside of the UK, you are performing an international data transfer (called “restricted transfer” in UK guidance). For example, such non-UK processing occurs if you use cloud services that run outside of the UK. The UK ICO has guidance on international data transfers. As in an EU GDPR context, you can only perform the transfer if the data remains suitably protected, or one of the exceptions applies. The data remains suitably protected if the target country was attested and “adequate” level of data protection, or if you have implemented appropriate safeguards. As of 2022, the list of countries considered adequate is generally equivalent to the EU list of adequacy decisions. Notably, the US is no longer on that list after the Schrems II decision that invalidated the Privacy Shield Agreement. Since this decision was made before Exit Day, it also applies in the UK. This leaves “appropriate safeguards” for UK→US restricted transfers. In the linked ICO page, read the section Is the restricted transfer covered by appropriate safeguards?. In brief, you will need to perform a Transfer Impact Assessment, and sign Standard Contractual Clauses with the US data importer. In a Transfer Impact Assessment (TIA), you check that the data remains protected despite the transfer into a country without an adequate level of data protection. There is no official guidance on conducting a TIA, but the IAPP has a template and the EU EDPB has recommendations on supplemental measures to protect data transfers, which might reduce the risk and affect a TIA in your favor. It's worth noting that the EDPB recommendations were written in the wake of the Schrems II ruling, and can be summarized as “compliance is impossible when using US-based cloud services”. But this is your assessment, and TBH it seems the UK is a bit more relaxed than the EU in this regard. The Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) are a pre-formulated contract that binds the foreign data importer to handle the data properly. In essence, this translates relevant aspects of the UK GDPR into contract law. Many service providers already provide a Data Processing Agreement that includes SCCs by reference, but you'll have to make sure that these contracts have been entered in a legally binding manner. Sometimes these apply automatically as part of the terms of service, sometimes you need to explicitly sign these documents. But SCCs are one detail where UK GDPR compliance and EU GDPR compliance diverges a bit. The old EU SCC templates from 2004/2010 can no longer be used and have been replaced. For compliance with the EU GDPR, the new 2021 SCCs must be used. For compliance with the UK GDPR, you have two options. You can either use the 2022 International Data Transfer Agreement (IDTA), or you can use the 2021 EU SCCs along with the 2022 UK International Data Transfer Addendum which modifies the EU SCCs in some details. Don't want to deal with TIAs and SCCs? Switch to a hosting provider that only processes the personal data under your control in the UK, or in a country with an adequacy decision (e.g. EU, Canada, Israel). | Certainly. A phone number is personal information (and on top of that, WhatsApp may provide some "profile info" from the people you contact). It is not difficult to identify a person by its phone number. So, sharing the phone number of the people affected should take into account the restrictions of GDPR. For instance, the Spanish Data Protection Agency (Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, AEPD) established in its Resolution R/03041/2017 that the Town Hall of Boecillo had violated the GDPR because it had created a WhatsApp group of citizens. Those citizens had provided their phone numbers to be informed about town hall activities, but they had not agreed to share their numbers with the other members of the group. And that was a very generic group. Doing a "patients recovering from cancer" or "drug abusers under treatment" or "people who need food assistence" group would involve sharing personal information that gets the maximum protection (in some specific instancies it could be that your information sharing that information is illegal even if the users gave you full consents). So yes, creating a WhatsApp group could very easily lead to a GDPR violation, and in fact it has been ruled at least once that it has. The fact that people cannot send messages is irrelevant. It would not make the issue any better or worse. After all, if I send a message through WhatsApp I am implicitly giving permission to everyone in the group to read it. | It would be legal for a healthcare professional to sign an NDA prohibiting them from revealing certain information to a patient. Some examples: the password to the computer system; the home phone number and address of the chief of staff. It would not be legal to use an NDA as a basis for denying a patient the right to access their medical records when the HIPAA privacy rule mandates disclosure to the patient (with exceptions). | As stated by GDPR article 3 you are required to follow it under the following circumstance: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. You can read the recourse better at What is the legal mechanism by which the GDPR might apply to a business with no presence in the EU?, but in short the US will allow the EU court to press it's rulings due to wanting to keep its trades, treaties and other similar things in place. | the statute only applies to EU residents Wrong. GDPR applies to everyone in the EU (Art. 3). This means tourists are also covered. Residence status is completely irrelevant (Recital 14(1)): The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence There is no provision for data processors/controllers to demand proof from data subjects of them being located in the EU. You can challenge them, but if they refuse to provide proof you will still be liable to fulfill their GDPR request should they indeed be present in the EU. | Various Privacy Laws may Apply If you live in the EU, the site may be required to delete this information under the GDPR. If you live in the UK, you may have the right to deletion under the UK-GDPR. In each case the procedure for enforcing such a right if the business does not respond depends on the law of your country, and would involve a suit in the courts of that country. Even if a judgement including a court order is obtained, enforcing this on a US firm may not be easy. If you live in California, you may have a right to the deletion of the info under the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) (soon to be replaced by a modified version, the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA)). If you live in Virginia, you may have rights under the Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (VCDPA). All these right are subject to various exceptions. Several other states, including Colorado, have passed similar laws, but they have not yet gone into effect. See also "Consumers’ “Right to Delete” under US State Privacy Laws" published by Consumer Privacy World and written by By Glenn A. Brown on March 3, 2021. Since the information was collected (posted) when you were less than 12, your parents may have the right to request deletion under the Federal Children's Online privacy Protection Act (COPPA) The DMCA deals with alleged copyright violations, not with personal privacy issues. CCPA / CPRA The CCPA right to delete applies only to information supplied by the Data Subject (DS). The CCPA right to delete is given by California Civil Code section 1798.105 The Buisness has 10 days to acknowledge a request, and 45 days to respond, which may be extended for an additional 45 days. Note also that the CCPA requires various notices to be delivered to the consumer, and normally requires a privacy policy to be posted. This must include notification of the consumer's rights. Under the CCPA a consumer may not sue a firm directly to enforce the right to delete. Instead a complaint may be made to the California Attorney General, who is empowered to take enforcement action. Only in cases of a data breach ca a consumer sue a firm directly. Note that he CCPA appliws only to firms that: are for-profit businesses that do business in California and Have a gross annual revenue of over $25 million; or Buy, receive, or sell the personal information of 50,000 or more California residents, households, or devices; or Derive 50% or more of their annual revenue from selling California residents’ personal information. See also the official page "California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)" VCDPA Section 59.1-573 (A) provides that (A) A consumer may invoke the consumer rights authorized pursuant to this subsection at any time by submitting a request to a controller specifying the consumer rights the consumer wishes to invoke. A known child's parent or legal guardian may invoke such consumer rights on behalf of the child regarding processing personal data belonging to the known child. A controller shall comply with an authenticated consumer request to exercise the right: ... (A) 3. To delete personal data provided by or obtained about the consumer; (A) 4. To obtain a copy of the consumer's personal data that the consumer previously provided to the controller in a portable and, to the extent technically feasible, readily usable format that allows the consumer to transmit the data to another controller without hindrance, where the processing is carried out by automated means; and (A) 5. To opt out of the processing of the personal data for purposes of (i) targeted advertising, (ii) the sale of personal data, or (iii) profiling in furtherance of decisions that produce legal or similarly significant effects concerning the consumer. Under subsection B the controller (firm) has 45 days to respond, which may be extended for up to an additional 45 days Under 59.1-574 (A) a controller has verious obligations including to: Limit the collection of personal data to what is adequate, relevant, and reasonably necessary ... and to: Not process sensitive data concerning a consumer without obtaining the consumer's consent, or, in the case of the processing of sensitive data concerning a known child, without processing such data in accordance with the federal Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (15 U.S.C. з 6501 et seq.). Under subsectiuon (B) the rights may not be waived by contract. Under subsection (c) the controller must provide: a reasonably accessible, clear, and meaningful privacy notice and this notice must contain: one or more secure and reliable means for consumers to submit a request to exercise their consumer rights under this chapter. Such means shall take into account the ways in which consumers normally interact with the controller, the need for secure and reliable communication of such requests, and the ability of the controller to authenticate the identity of the consumer making the request. Controllers shall not require a consumer to create a new account in order to exercise consumer rights pursuant to з 59.1-573 but may require a consumer to use an existing account. various exemptions are provided for in the VCDPA. As with the CCPA, the previsions may only be enforced by the state Attorney General, not by private lawsuit. The VCDPA only applies to: persons that conduct business in the Commonwealth or produce products or services that are targeted to residents of the Commonwealth and that (i) during a calendar year, control or process personal data of at least 100,000 consumers or (ii) control or process personal data of at least 25,000 consumers and derive over 50 percent of gross revenue from the sale of personal data. In many ways it is quite similar to the CCPA. COPPA COPPA is a federal law that applies to services, including websites, that collect personal information about children under age 13. It imposes various responsibilities and restrictions on such providers, and give the parents of such children various rights. According to the FTC pagw "Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step Compliance Plan for Your Business"" Even if parents have agreed that you may collect information from their kids, parents have ongoing rights — and you have continuing obligations. If a parent asks, you must: give them a way to review the personal information collected from their child; give them a way to revoke their consent and refuse the further use or collection of personal information from their child; and delete their child’s personal information. The FTC's FAQ on COPPA states: The primary goal of COPPA is to place parents in control over what information is collected from their young children online. The Rule was designed to protect children under age 13, while accounting for the dynamic nature of the Internet. The Rule applies to operators of commercial websites and online services (including mobile apps and IoT devices, such as smart toys) directed to children under 13 that collect, use, or disclose personal information from children, or on whose behalf such information is collected or maintained (such as when personal information is collected by an ad network to serve targeted advertising). The Rule also applies to operators of general audience websites or online services with actual knowledge that they are collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children under 13, and to websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information directly from users of another website or online service directed to children. Operators covered by the Rule must: ... Provide parents access to their child's personal information to review and/or have the information deleted; ... Maintain the confidentiality, security, and integrity of information they collect from children, including by taking reasonable steps to release such information only to parties capable of maintaining its confidentiality and security; Retain personal information collected online from a child for only as long as is necessary to fulfill the purpose for which it was collected and delete the information using reasonable measures to protect against its unauthorized access or use; The same page says that COPPA: applies to operators of commercial websites and online services (including mobile apps and IoT devices) directed to children under 13 that collect, use, or disclose personal information from children. It also applies to operators of general audience websites or online services with actual knowledge that they are collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children under 13. The Rule also applies to websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information directly from users of another website or online service directed to children. The FTC, some other federal agencies, and US states may enforce the COPPA Rule. | No, a company cannot suspend your GDPR rights – contracts can't override the law. Your rights as a data subject apply as long as your personal data is being processed. However, there is no requirement in the GDPR that they fulfill your data subject rights through a self-service mechanism like a “download my data” button. They can require you to use another support channel. (But Google offers infamously bad support.) In some cases, the service may legitimately decide that they cannot give you access to the data, for example if they believe that you are not the actual data subject (e.g. if they think that you hacked the account). The right to access must not adversely affect other people (Art 15(4)). If they have doubts about your identity, they can require further information to verify you (Art 12(6)). If your requests are excessive or unfounded (if you are spamming them), they can also turn down the requests (Art 12(5)). |
How it is proven that an e-mail or text message (SMS) was not forged by the recipient? Here, it was said that a text message is legally binding. But I am interesting in that what would happen when the sender says that the message was not sent by them. It is not a challenging problem to get any „forged“ text message (or e-mail) to the device. Will the court request an information about the message from the service provider? Do mobile operators even store the text of the messages (in the EU)? What would happen when the operator would not able to provide the information? Imagine this situation: I sell something. The sender wants to buy that. I receive a text message (using SMS), sent to me using a mobile network operator. Let's say that it says that the sender wants to buy that 100 €. I aggree. I modify the text of the message in the device (without changing the length, sender information, timestamps, character encoding etc.). Now, the message says that the sender must pay 200 €. The sender receives the thing, pays 100 €. I use the message as a evidence of that the sender agreed to pay 200 €. The sender also tries to use the (original) message stored in sender's device as an evidence for that the price was 100 €. How can it be proven (e.g. at the court) that one of the messages was actually sent by the sender? I can imagine that the mobile network operator would provide an information about the message, but what if the text was not stored by the operator? | Each side presents the evidence that they wish and the court decides who to believe This will involve lay witnesses who testify to what they saw and heard, expert witnesses who can give opinions and physical evidence. The onus of proof lies on the plaintiff, the one seeking the extra money, so they have to prove their version. If the court gives more weight to their version, they win. If the give less weight or equal weight, they lose. | A contract can’t legalise illegality Let’s assume that absent the “simulation” disclosure in the ToS, this would be fraud. The question then becomes, does making the disclosure make it not fraud? Fraud requires dishonesty and deception. These are measured by what a reasonable person would determine from the overall conduct so a small piece of truth in amongst a web of half-truths and outright lies is still dishonest and deceptive. From the perspective of US law, is Bob doing this regarded a scam? No, but only because “scam” isn’t a legal term - it’s slang for fraud and this is fraud Is this a criminal case, or a civil case? Both What evidence can Tom provide to support the lawsuit? Whatever he has. However, in practice, these types of fraudsters are rarely ever caught and it’s even more rare for the victim to recover their money. They are usually off-shore in countries with either poor rule of law or which will not extradite their nationals. | Fraud may be a crime, or a tort (civil wrong): only criminal fraud can be a "felony". The Washington criminal laws about fraud are here, and they are all fairly specific, such as selling or destroying encumbered property (which is a misdemeanor anyhow), or conducting a mock auction. Most frauds are misdemeanors, though forgeries are in the felony category. It also includes identity thefts, again the emphasis being on false documents. Based on your description, this is not a crime, it is a civil wrong, meaning that she will have to sue the guy to get her money back. The Attorney General's office will not get involved unless there is a widespread state interest (for example, very many Washington residents being victimized), and then the involvement would be suing on behalf of the victims. That said, if the swindle was carried out by phone, then that is potentially a violation of a federal felony law, 18 USC 1343. It would not matter if the parties are in the same state, because phone service counts as "interstate commerce". So the details of phone involvement matter. Saying that you "have to" charge for processing a refund is not per se fraudulent and texting someone that "I'll have to charge an extra $2,000" doesn't make this wire fraud. But there is some potential for a federal wire fraud angle. | Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A. | As the previous reply says, you can't steal something if it was yours already. That's by definition – stealing can only be of something that isn't your possession. However there are three ways you can have a problem despite this, partly referred to in another answer: If there is a law or other legal basis for the other person to have control and keep that object, either for a while or indefinitely. So if your phone is legitimately taken by a police officer, you can't "steal" it but you may still not have the right to take it. But this would be treated as some other crime, not "theft." If you cannot gain legal access it, and would have to commit another kind of crime to get it back. So you can't legally get back money by hacking someone's bank account, or defrauding them, or get back an object by breaking down their front door or using illegal force, or by making unlawful threats and blackmail.On the other hand, if you were invited by them to visit their house (or persuaded them to let you visit) and you found it and took it back while visiting under their consent, or they gave you a lift and while in the car you rummaged in the glove compartment and saw your property there, then the issue of legal consent for access is potentially a non-issue, meaning that taking it back under those conditions (even against their objections when they realised) may well be technically legal in many cases, depending on the exact facts of the case and applicable law. (less likely) If something has happened that means, technically, it isn't yours any more, or never was yours. For example, you accidentally give or throw your valuable phone away in error and someone else legitimately (in law) assumes ownership afterwards, or sign away or renounce something without realising it, or allow someone to use something in a way that gives them some ownership-like rights over it, so that by law you are deemed to have relinquished or waived some/all of your rights as an owner (the other person was honest and didn't defraud you), and you later try to take it back without consent, then in principle you could now be seen as stealing it back.You might also believe something is absolutely yours but in fact legally you don't own it and never did. For example you 'bought' some music or software, or a right to use something under license, and believe you actually own it or that you have a moral right to own it. So, later on, you sell it, dispose of it to someone else, or treat it as yours, when in law, it never was yours to do these things. Technically depending on the situation and exact wording of the law, this might be construed as stealing, in some cases and some jurisdictions. Between these legal limits, there is a grey area where you can get it back in practice despite an illegality. For example if the unlawful access is so minor you are sure it won't be a criminal issue, or you're sure it wouldn't be reported, you might chance it. But that's not a legal issue as much as a personal one. An interesting variant of this applies in English law, although I doubt it has any legal relevance in US law. In English law, "theft" was defined by the Theft Act 1968 as, "A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with intention to permanently deprive the other of it". This meant that a person who could show a court that they did not "intend" to "permanently deprive", or did not act "dishonestly" or "appropriate" the property (treat it as if they were its owner), might in fact have a strong legal defence against a charge of theft. Update from comment below "If you saw it in a shop would you be able to take it and run away?" You wouldn't have to. In almost all cases if something isn't legally yours, you can't legally pass ownership to anyone else, such as a store, whether for money or not, because it wasn't ever yours to pass good (legal) title. So the item is still owned by its original legitimate owner, meaning the exact same legal position still applies as above, if you had discovered it was in someone's house. It could change hands many times (not just once) from thief to fence to store to shopper to friend as a gift, and even so, the same would still apply - it would remain yours in law. If anything it's a bit easier if you saw it in a shop. A shop usually consents to members of the public entering - they don't have to ask normally! - and you might ask to see the item or look closely (if it's locked in the window). You now have it with consent and without any crime. If confident, you can walk out completely legally with your possession. (Tracking down the "rogue" or recovering any money paid for it, is their problem not yours in the eyes of the law). That said, realistically you wouldn't do it that way. This is slipping into personal view rather than law, but this is how I'd do it instead of "grab and run." Assuming a "typical" store and store staff, you would ask them to fetch the manager, and you would explain firmly that you claim this is your stolen property, and therefore not owned by them (nor do they have any rights to make any decisions about it), and you are taking it back. You would offer sight of ID or some means of contact, telling them this is so that they have a means to contact you, if they wish to dispute it via lawyers or police. You would offer to wait for the police if they wish, but maintain that you are not parting with it and they may call the police if they disagree; when they arrive, tell the police exactly the same, and that you have given your ID and waited there, as a mark of good faith, and invite them to come back with you to see where you live or proof of purchase or anything else, if relevant. You would tell the police that if they think you have committed a crime according to the law then they must of course arrest you for it, but if not, you now wish to go. You would meet any police request to give it to the police or store by asserting that it is your property and you would rather not, or by asking if you will be committing a criminal offence (if so which) if you refuse, and refuse if you feel able to do so. Then follow whichever way it goes. You would do these things because they are fair, reasonable, and they mark you out as someone asserting a right, not a thief yourself, and they reduce the odds that you will be taken for a thief, or meet with violence in their efforts to recover it. After all, the storekeeper and police can claim "reasonable belief" for any of their actions afterwards, so it's best that you reduce their likelihood of something nasty. | Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability. | is this absolutely required to be considered a valid document in most jurisdictions, most notably, the European Union? Not at all. There is no legal requirement that contracts, terms of service, and so forth be drafted, devised, or even validated by a lawyer. Law requires that certain types of contract be notarized. That refers to the moment where the parties sign/formalize the contract, which is different from --and independent of-- whether its terms were written by a lawyer. A messaging service like the one you have in mind definitely is not subject to such requirement either. | Yes. The formation of a contract requires (among other things) that the parties intend to be legally bound. Their sending the offer from a corporate email address shows this. You replying in the same way shows your intention. Signatures are optional. Consider, verbal contracts are binding; how do you sign those? |
What (if any) crime is it to keep using a tool owned by a company after you no longer work there? This question is partially based on a question on workplace but to make it more easily answerable I will specify some of the circumstances more. Suppose an employee is issued a computer to use for his work. Suppose further that the employment contract allows for reasonable personal use of the computer (if this is not common we can assume that personal use is not strictly forbidden by the contract/internal rules). Suppose that the employee is notified by his superior before termination that he should return the computer in an email that is addressed to the HR and the employee is cc'd on it, where the manager asks HR how the return should be processed. The HR does not respond regarding how to process the return of the computer. Employee is now no longer employed but has the computer in their possession. They take no steps to return the computer to the company. But they do not actively avoid doing so if the company takes steps to get it back. Is that a crime of any sort? Suppose that furthermore the employee continues using the computer for personal stuff and allows their family to do so too. Is this a crime of any sort? Please assume that the original contract is sufficiently vague with regards to how the employee is supposed to actually return equipment given to them, and also probably ignore the various breach of contracts issues in case the company has internal rules regarding any kind of security or safety issues. For jurisdiction assume US, if state specific, let's go with California. | Many states, including Colorado, at Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-4-401, have consolidated a wide variety of common law crimes related to taking property that doesn't belong to you into a single consolidated theft statute which is very broadly defined. In those states, this offense would constitute theft. The definition of theft in Colorado (at Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-4-401(1) is as follows: A person commits theft when he or she knowingly obtains, retains, or exercises control over anything of value of another without authorization or by threat or deception; or receives, loans money by pawn or pledge on, or disposes of anything of value or belonging to another that he or she knows or believes to have been stolen, and: (a) Intends to deprive the other person permanently of the use or benefit of the thing of value; (b) Knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the thing of value in such manner as to deprive the other person permanently of its use or benefit; (c) Uses, conceals, or abandons the thing of value intending that such use, concealment, or abandonment will deprive the other person permanently of its use or benefit; (d) Demands any consideration to which he or she is not legally entitled as a condition of restoring the thing of value to the other person; or (e) Knowingly retains the thing of value more than seventy-two hours after the agreed-upon time of return in any lease or hire agreement. Thus, it is legally theft when the employee concludes that he doesn't plan to return the computer, but not when he is planning on returning it and just hasn't gotten around to doing that. But, as a practical matter, a conviction can probably be obtained from circumstantial evidence and a failure to return the item within a reasonable time (if there is no more specific standard set for the time that it is required to be returned and if no demand for its return is made by the company). In states that don't have a consolidated theft statute, figuring out which of the various common law property crimes such as larceny and embezzlement apply to this fact pattern is trickier and will come down to the exact language of the statutes in question and the case law interpreting those statutes. Larceny, at common law, was the non-violent taking of tangible personal property with an intent to permanently deprive its owner of it. Embezzlement, at common law, was the taking of property from someone who has placed you in a position of trust with respect to that property without authorization. There are, in states with such distinct subtypes of theft, legitimate arguments that either, both, or neither, or those specific offenses apply to this fact pattern. The position of trust component takes the facts further from the heartland of larceny. The fact that it is tangible personal property rather than money, takes it further away from the heartland of embezzlement. There are probably other specific common law theft offenses that could also be implicated that I haven't mentioned. | must all interaction be through a lawyer after receiving the first letter? Consistent with others' answer, no, you don't need a lawyer. But your question in and of itself is indicative of the steep learning curve you would need to undergo in order to avoid "shooting yourself in the foot", as the saying goes. By this I am not encouraging you to get a lawyer (in fact, here on stackexchange and elsewhere I promote litigation in pro per). Instead, I encourage people to learn about the applicable statutes, procedural laws, how to conduct legal research, and to draft/present their arguments in court. Here are some suggestions regarding your response letter: Avoid sarcastic admissions such as "Right, for sure I am at fault for the employer's [fill_in_the_blanks]". If you ask for a clarification, clearly state that you expect reasonably sufficient detail as well as any and all records that substantiate the alleged damages. Although that won't strictly limit the allegations the employer can make in court proceedings, the attorney's reply might help evidencing the employer's vexatious approach later on. Avoid wording that may be misinterpreted as consciousness of guilt. Be assertive and truthful. Keep in mind the lawyer is gauging (1) how easily he can intimidate you, and (2) whether he can make additional claims to harass you via court proceedings. From now on, all your interactions with the attorney and the employer should be in writing (preferably email, given its reproducibility). When unethical individuals are aware that their position is devoid of merit, they are very tempted to indulge in false accusations (of threat, for example). Thus, communications in writing constitute objectively verifiable proof of who is acting unlawfully. Even if the attorney premises on your contract (or employment agreement/manual, or company's guidelines) the alleged damages, the clauses at issue might be illegal and therefore void. For instance, from 2007-2012 my former employer (an Indian IT intermediary) prohibited me --via contract-- to disclose my salary. The contract contained the typical lawyered babbling, but that doesn't mean that all of it was legal. In 2013 I realized that the prohibition violated Michigan law, and he had no option but to strike the entire clause. That being said, I didn't sue him for that, but for other more important matters which are currently pending review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Absent any further context in your inquiry, it is hard to make additional suggestions on how to proceed. | If someone gave a gift than requested it back is it legal? The request itself is legal, but that does not mean that you have to comply with it. I never promised anything that tied to the tablet. So I'm not sure if it counts as a conditional gift. It does not. An unconditional gift (which initially you did not even want) fails to meet the elements of a cognizable doctrine such as contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, or unjust enrichment. he says he will report the tablet as stolen if I don't return it He might get in trouble if he does that, since he knows or should know that the tablet was never stolen. He gave it away despite your initial refusal(s). As such, he might incur false reporting of a crime. | You own it In general, if you own an object, you can do what you like with it if you otherwise comply with the law. It is possible that a particular object may be protected under heritage or similar law, but if it isn’t, and you comply with environmental and safety law, you grind that thing into dust if you want to. Of course, if it did, you would never be able to delete a voicemail, email, or throw out used notepaper - they’re all copyright. | Your question has two distinct aspects which have to be considered separately: criminal law and civil law. I will give an opinion on both aspects, but first I have to give you a word of warning: This case is not clear in the sense that the law can be immediately apply. For a full answer you need the services of a practicing lawyer who does the necessary research. I have a degree in German Law and I have had some practice in IT law, so I know what I am talking about, but I am currently not practicing it and I have done no research for this case. So please, pretty please, don't base any important decision on my opinion. It is a mere guidance, not more. Criminal Law The German Criminal Code (StGB) specifies two cyber crimes explicitly: Computer Fraud (Computerbetrug, § 263a StGB), which you violate when you gain some illegal monetary advantage using a computer, for example a hacker using your stolen credit card data to transfer funds to his account. Computer Sabotage (Computersabotage, § 303b StGB), which applies when you cause damage with a computer, for example a hacker attacking the power grid. The second option clearly does not apply here, but the first one could. That would depend on the answer to a couple of questions, most importantly if a user would gain some monetary advantage at your expense and if that advantage would be illegal. The first of these questions (advantage at your expense) already does not have a clear and universal answer. As it is quite common with fraud, this criminal law question has a civil law aspect (more on that on part two of the answer). The two ways how this could create an advantage to an attacker world be... A contract would not be enacted between you and the attacker, but he would take advantage of you believing in the contract's validity. This option would though probably not apply here, judging from the (spoiler alert) civil law part of the question. A valid contract would be created, but the terms and conditions would not apply and that would cause an illegal financial advantage for the attacker at your cost. Since the base contract would still be in effect and that comes with the obligation to pay, that advantage would have to be in the terms and conditions not applying. You can construct such a case, but that would depend on the terms in question, so there can not be an answer here. There is though a good chance that the terms would still apply (see below), so there will probably be no damage. The other aspect is if this advantage would be through illegal use of the system, which is an interesting question in your case, since the link is publicly accessible. But, then again you can also fake a POST, so you can argue that it is always possible to make the terms not appear. An aspect to be considered though, is that merely attempting computer fraud is already an offense. An attacker who thinks he can gain a monetary advantage from such an attack could be still punished, even if it is not even possible to commit the crime due to the circumstances (this by itself is an interesting question in criminal law). The bigger danger that I see is that your solution makes it easy for an attacker to make their own site and then use your public link to book on your site (in a man in the middle attack). That would clearly be an offense, but it would be the attacker's not your client's. But since your success depends on the trustworthiness of your site, I would recommend to look for a safer solution (such as POST with https). To summarize that part: There is a possibility that accessing the site in the described way is a crime, but I would say it is rather not due to the lack of damage. It is though possible that an attacker still commits a crime by attempting such an attack. You should in any case make your site safer to make it harder to commit MITM attacks. Civil Law The civil law side is whether the terms can be accepted in the described way. This is a case for the law of general terms and conditions (Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen or AGB). In a few words, for AGB to apply, the have to be notified to the client and he has to accept them. If your site is used how it is supposed to be, both conditions are met. In the (invalid) way you have described, the first condition is in question. Since the user knows that using the described URL means accepting the terms, I would consider the second condition to be satisfied. So how can the terms apply if the user has not seen them? In case you provide no shortcut to the accepted link and you also prevent that it can be found in another way (e.g. through a search engine), the direct link would be equivalent to someone signing terms and conditions without reading them, although he has had a chance to do so. That would still make the terms apply, because the client would have been given the chance to read them, which is the only thing the seller needs to do. So chances are that your terms would still apply (thus negating the financial advantage necessary for a crime). However, AGB law is a complex subject that is generally handled by specialists. Any opinion of someone who is not such a specialist has to be handled with care. That includes my opinion. | It is legal for a manufacturer to sell a device which is capable of being misused. For example, a wifi-capable router can be sold even if it is "open" by default. A Bluetooth device has a shorter range than wifi, but in principle can connect to any other device. An owner's legal liability is not different given wifi vs. Bluetooth. Whether or not there is criminal liability for a third person who connects to the device also does not specifically depend on whether the device uses Bluetooth technology, as opposed to some other technology. 18 USC 1030 is the general federal law prohibiting "unauthorized access". In the case of a bed, two legal question arise: is it a "computer", and is it "protected"? It is an electronic high speed data processing device which performs logical, arithmetic, storage and communications facilities, i.e. it is a computer (in the legal sense). It probably is not protected, because it is not "used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication", that is, it is not connected to the internet (unless it is). State laws tend to be broader, not having the "interstate commerce" limitation, so accessing the bed would violate Washington's analog of the federal law. However, under Washington law, the access is probably not "without authorization". That term is defined as knowingly circumvent technological access barriers to a data system in order to obtain information without the express or implied permission of the owner, where such technological access measures are specifically designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining such information, but does not include white hat security research or circumventing a technological measure that does not effectively control access to a computer. The term "without the express or implied permission" does not include access in violation of a duty, agreement, or contractual obligation, such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement, with an internet service provider, internet website, or employer. The term "circumvent technological access barriers" may include unauthorized elevation of privileges, such as allowing a normal user to execute code as administrator, or allowing a remote person without any privileges to run code. One question is whether there is any technological access barrier that the user circumvents (I don't know if it is possible to circumvent "hidden mode"). Since the term "may include ... allowing a remote person without any privileges to run code", and since playing music on speakers involves running code, then the remote user may be criminally liable. On the third hand, the language of that paragraph ("technological access measures are specifically designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining such information, but does not include ... circumventing a technological measure that does not effectively control access to a computer") clearly indicates a legislative intent to address deliberately overcoming active access barriers and not accidentally connecting to an unprotected, open system. Plus, the law also says that you are accessing the computer "in order to obtain information", but that is not the purpose of transmitting sound to speakers. | This would be unauthorized access to a computer. The offence is found in Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Note that this is a criminal offence, approaching the police about it might be the best way of handling the situation (if you want to go that route, and also, I'm not a lawyer). | In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say. |
Considerations other than the offer in a real estate bidding war My wife and I just apparently lost out on a property and I am trying to understand what happened. It was a trust, listed by an attorney. The deceased had no children and No relatives in the area. It listed for $200k. We were the first people to look at the property and offered $236k cash, no contingency. After many days of waiting, we lost the property. As it turns out, it sold for 214.5k. I understand that sometimes people send a sappy letter to the seller to make a better case but I would think an attorney would be more resilient. Besides, isn’t the attorneys fiduciary responsibility to get the most for the property? What other reason could there be? | The attorney's responsibility is framed in terms of the interest of the client, which is not always money. If the trust has some social agenda, that rather than the dollar amount would be the attorney's responsibility. I would want my property to not be subdivided into smaller lots, and I would communicate that interest to my attorney, but that's just me. Since we don't know all of the facts (about you and the trust), all we can say is that "interest" and "duty" are not always about dollar amounts. | The fault lies with the people who vandalized your house. In general, whoever causes you damage is responsible (liable) for that damage. This is true whether or not you are selling your house, having guests over, letting a friend stay over for a night or a week, or whatever the circumstance is. Insurance is there to cover many such losses: if a friend trashes your house in a drunken rage, your insurance will cover the damage, but they will invoke the doctrine of subrogation whereby they get to go after the friend, and you have to cooperate. In a situation where nobody has a clue who did the damage, the only possible way that the agent has any responsibility is if they were negligent in their duty to take care of the house. For your specific case, you'd need to discuss the forensic facts with your attorney. But generally speaking, the issue would be whether the agent had breached his/her professional duty of care, which is best understood as comparing his actions (or lack) compares to actions of other professionals in the same circumstance. If a house has 3 or 4 sets of visitors simultaneously, it is really not possible for an agent to supervise all of them at once. So the question would be, was this the result of one concentrated vandalism attack, or serial vandalism. The former is more in the realm of "stuff happens", and the latter is indicative of an endemic lack of care. To repeat, the fault lies with the miscreants who vandalized your house. You, or your insurance company, may nevertheless have to bear the financial burden. Your insurance company will certainly have an interest in spreading responsibility to the realty firm, if warranted by the facts. | Certain things are your separate property, and only you can sell them (but you are also responsible for them). That would include things acquired before the marriage; also anything inherited by just one of you, or gifts provably given to just one of you. Other things are community (marital) property, including your pants and probably your dog. Writing your name on the object or a piece of associated paper doesn't really matter, what matters is how it was acquired. One party can sell their half-interest in joint property, but nobody (?) would buy a property interest in a dog, they would buy the dog. For another person to actually buy a dog, they would have to buy a 100% interest in the dog, meaning that you would have to agree to the sale. When it comes to property with a solid title system, such as real estate, one party cannot sell the whole property without the consent of the co-owner. However, a co-owner could petition the courts to force a partition of the property, where the courts would order that the proceeds be divided equitably. Ohio law on division of marital property is spelled out here. Getting a lawyer is really the only reasonable solution. You can't just "put a block" on selling stuff. If you want the tools, somebody has to collect the tools and take care of them, and they can't just break in to the house in the middle of the night to do this. | You understand the business of landlording before you get started. You don't landlord for the purpose of evicting someone. You landlord for the purpose of exchanging keys for a duration for money, specifically by creating a leasehold estate that you sell to your tenant. Your tenant has the leasehold, you don't have the money, in part because it sounds like you didn't collect any before you handed over the keys or confirm your tenants' ability and history of paying. You now want to nullify the leasehold. In general this is the eviction you ask about. You are now reliant on a court in your jurisdiction to enforce the contract law with respect to the lease language and prevailing local ordinances. I cannot speak specifically to NY courts but they have a reputation as tenant friendly so you need to demonstrate your professional approach and locally required paperwork such as a certificate of occupancy, business license, etc. All lined up to make it easy for a judge to agree with you. You have an uphill battle. Turning off utilities (as mentioned in another post of yours) is not a professional move and will bias many judges against you. No certificate of occupancy may mean your original lease contract created a leasehold contrary to a public policy of NY which could put a judge in a bind if they found your case compelling. If a competent lawyer would cost $15k then it sounds like it might be cheapest to offer the tenant a couple thousand for the keys and a signed release to walk away–spend a couple hundred on the lawyer for this. Do not give them the money until they are out and give you the keys. This is called cash for keys. | They almost surely have no liability to you for the loss of, or damage to, your property, as the standard rental agreement that you signed almost certainly relieves them of this responsibility. If you have insurance (even though you didn't provide them with proof of insurance) that would probably cover your loses. If not, you are probably just screwed and have no recourse. | You are talking about "joint tenancy." I am familiar with bank accounts having multiple owners characterized as "Joint tenants with rights of survivorship" (JTWROS). This keeps the account out of probate: a death certificate simply removes the name of any owner who dies. But a probate court afraid that a deceased may not have enough assets to satisfy debts can still freeze the account for the duration of probate. These really are not tools for estate planning. For example, you can't use them to avoid gift or estate taxes. Also a JTWROS account is fully exposed to the liability/creditors of every owner. So no, a JTWROS does not shield assets from creditors. Finally, encumbrance of or distribution from a JTWROS account requires the consent of every owner. Any unresolved disputes are probably headed to court. | It is almost certainly legal for the sitter to keep the money. She was ready to provide the service, and it is not her fault she couldn't (and she may have turned down other opportunities because she had this one). I think your fiance's claim would be against the firm providing the security service (they are the ones that frustrated the contract). I foresee the following problems: What are her losses? She was prepared to pay $315 (which she has paid), and the dog has been looked after. Where is the loss? (She may be able to argue that it was worth $315 to her, not to have to owe her mother a favour. I don't know if that will fly.) The contract with the security firm almost certainly waives liability for this sort of thing. She would have to convince the court that the contract terms were unreasonable/unconscionable (or whatever the term is in the local jurisdiction). There are two obvious options here: a) see if there is legal cover on her household insurance (or her pet insurance); b) forget it (it's only $175 all told). | There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later. |
What are the requirements for terminating an employee? Does it matter whether employer is company or individual? Must certain amount of notice be given? What other requirements are there that must be followed? Can notice be dispensed if the task is of an urgent nature and employee must be replaced as a matter of urgency? | Does it matter whether employer is company or individual? No. Must certain amount of notice be given? Yes - the notice period maybe specified in the contract but even if it isn't there are statutory notice periods that apply depending on length of employment etc. So if the following criteria are met they are legally classed as an employee they have worked for the employer for at least a month Then certain minimums apply: If they have worked for the employer for: 1 month to 2 years – statutory notice is 1 week 2 to 12 years – statutory notice is 1 week for each full year they have worked 12 years or more – statutory notice is 12 weeks A notice period in the contract (i.e. "contractual notice") can exceed the statutory minimums but it can't reduce them. What other requirements are there that must be followed? This is pretty broad and I don't really want to reproduce everything here but the ACAS page on dismissals covers the basics. Can notice be dispensed if the task is of an urgent nature and employee must be replaced as a matter of urgency? Dismissal without notice is possible in cases of Gross Misconduct but that is about what the employee has done - nothing to do with the urgency of replacing them. However, if both parties agree a notice period can end early: The employee can ask if they can leave before their notice period ends. They should get agreement from their employer in writing. If the employee does not get agreement to leave early they could be in breach of contract. If the employee leaves early, the employer only has to pay them for the time that they’ve worked. If an employer wants them gone immediately they can do that if it's either in the contract but they still have to pay them for the notice period. They can also offer payment in lieu of notice if it's not in the contract but it's then up to the employee if they agree. | If the employment was at will, the most the company could have done was fire her. If the employment has already been ended on good terms, the most the company can do is refuse to rehire her and/or give bad references. As you point out, no contract existed and they'd have a devil of a time proving damages anyway. | In the U.S. a board member would not be an employee just by virtue of being a board member, even if they were compensated for attending board meetings. The CEO, an employee, might or might not also be a board member. Employees can be fired by their manager. A board member can't be fired from the board but, typically, only removed by a vote of shareholders. They are not assigned tasks by managers of the company. This is 100% clear in CA under employment code 622 (a) “Employee” does not include a director of a corporation or association performing services in his or her capacity as a director. I was a CEO of a private company I co-founded I was a board member as a result of voting myself on the board via my stock ownership. The majority of the board could fire me as CEO but I would still be a board member. If outside board members did get compensation, it would be as a consultant, paid with a 1099. The CA code does say that a board member could take on actual work, like auditing financial information, that might fall under the activities of an employee. | Legally obtain employee’s covid vaccination status without employee’s consent? No Request employee to provide one. On grounds of what law? Anyone can ask anyone anything, however, I presume you are asking when they can demand to see your certificate. Employers have a general right to issue reasonable and lawful instructions to employees and failing to comply is misconduct. The direction to show a certificate is certainly legal and almost certainly reasonable given the employer’s obligations under Work Health and Safety law. More directly, all businesses in NSW are required to have and update a COVID-Safe Plan. It is perfectly reasonable for them to require employees to divulge their vaccination status. In certain workplaces it may be appropriate for them to mandate vaccinations. Also, there are various Public Health Orders under the Public Health Act 2010 that mandate vaccinations for health care workers, aged care workers (and visitors), child care and care workers. An employer has a legal obligation to check this. In addition, there are requirements under the Public Health (COVID-19 General) Order 2021 under the Public Health Act 2010 requiring some business to check in all visitors to the premises (including employees) including checking their vaccination status. This is what a status check looks like. There are 45 types of premises and events in this category listed in Schedule 5. Terminate employment should employee decide not provide this information or openly declare that they do not want to get vaccinated? What is the law allowing to discriminate the employee on their vaccination status? This is a typical office environment, nothing to do with health care or public sector. Yes. More specifically, refusing a lawful and reasonable instruction is misconduct and, if persistent, may warrant dismissal. If they refuse vaccination in a workplace where vaccines are legally mandated or where the employer has required them (and the requirement is reasonable to protect the legitimate interests of the business), they are similarly disobeying a lawful and reasonable direction. Case law in industries where flu vaccines are mandated is clear - refusal to have them is a legitimate reason for dismissal. There is no doubt this will be good law for COVID vaccines. Decisions on whether an employer not in a mandated industries can make vaccines mandatory have only been made at the Tribunal level so no precedents have been set but the general thrust of these decisions is if it is a reasonable precaution to protect other employees or the public (e.g. if social distancing and PPE is impractical or not likely to be effective): yes. So far, no employee has been successful in an unfair dismissal claim. | That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure. | Yes If you look at the law pertaining to the work week and opting out of the maximum, which is also in The Working Time Regulations 1998 (with my emphasis in bold): 4.—(1) Subject to regulation 5, a worker’s working time, including overtime, in any reference period which is applicable in his case shall not exceed an average of 48 hours for each seven days. ... (3) Subject to paragraphs (4) and (5) and any agreement under regulation 23(b), the reference periods which apply in the case of a worker are ... So if we go to 23(b): A collective agreement or a workforce agreement may— (a)modify or exclude the application of regulations 6(1) to (3) and (7), 10(1), 11(1) and (2) and 12(1), and (b)for objective or technical reasons or reasons concerning the organization of work, modify the application of regulation 4(3) and (4) by the substitution, for each reference to 17 weeks, of a different period, being a period not exceeding 52 weeks, in relation to particular workers or groups of workers. | Yes, it also applies. However, an employment implies they agree to having employment related data stored and processed (e.g., to be paid). When there are performance related bonuses in the contract, this will likely (but IANAL) imply they agree to performance data being collected and stored appropriately. Furthermore I would assume most of such data processing (such as knowing who is responsible for a certain change, who created a file, modified it etc.) falls into "legitimate interests" of the employer, as this information may be necessary for operations. I'd assume (still IANAL) that much of the consequence wrt. GDPR is the right to have your data erased. So a company should be prepared to remove such data when an employee leaves the company, e.g., by clearing the responsible person fields upon request. At least for data where there is no legal requirement to have such data provenance. But: consult your lawyer for a proper legal opinion! | You can be fired in Canada for criticizing the employer, or even complaining about the weather. There is a distinction between Termination Without Cause and Termination With Cause. In the latter case, which requires a serious reason related to the employee's conduct, you can be fired without advance notice and with no severance pay. If the employees actions are fundamentally inconsistent with their obligation to the employer or are substantially prejudicial to the business in a way that damages employer's business or reputation, they may be terminated with cause. Examples of cause would include insubordination, theft, or abusing customers. If you want to fire a person without cause (and assuming that this is an indefinite employment contract as opposed to a fixed-term contract), you have to give "reasonable notice". There is a statutory minimum, but the courts usually apply a higher common law standard which means that you need to hire a labor lawyer to know what that period is, though 24 months is apparently a relatively safe figure (not always safe). The factors entering into that decision are described here (kind of job, length of service, age, availability of similar jobs; plus, how the termination was handled). You may also owe severance or termination pay, related to length of service and wages. Here is a calculator for Ontario. This article covers some instances in Québec where social media criticism did result in successful suspension, indicating that the employee's duty of loyalty is not entirely null when it comes to social media. In the BC case of Kim v. ITU, the court found that the dismissal over social media posts critical of the company was not for cause. However, part of the company's failure in this case was that they failed to respond immediately to what they saw as inappropriate behavior (boorish Twitter behavior). Assuming that the statements made are accurate and expressed respectfully, the prospects for Termination With Cause are significantly diminished. The prospects for some disciplinary action (suspension for a period of time) remains high -- multiple terminations were modified to long suspensions. |
Are Discord bots allowed to store deleted messages and let people view them? There are many Discord bots around which look at messages sent by users, but are they legally allowed to store messages in files, and even store messages which were since deleted by the users who sent them? I'm asking this question because my friend recently built a Discord bot which does just this. It includes a command (showlog) which sends some of the log in Discord. For example, this is some of the data which that bot recorded: BubkisLord - yeessss (Official Year 9 GATE - spam) BubkisLord - ahahaha (Official Year 9 GATE - spam) BubkisLord - showlog (Official Year 9 GATE - spam) BubkisLord - MAUH HAHAHAHAHAHA (Official Year 9 GATE - spam) BubkisLord - yeyesss (Official Year 9 GATE - spam) BubkisLord - showlog (The Server Of Bubkis - 🙂-general) Spock - ? (The Server Of Bubkis - 🙂-general) BubkisLord - showlog (The Server Of Bubkis - 🙂-general) BubkisLord - good (The Server Of Bubkis - 🙂-general) Anyone in the same server as the bot can view the log. Another one of our friends asked a question about whether it was actually allowed to store the deleted messages of users, and that got us confused. It might not be allowed, because if someone chooses to remove their content, it shouldn't be easily accessible to everyone, and it especially shouldn't be accessible to everyone in any server which that bot is in. But I skimmed through Discord's Terms of Service, and the Discord API Developer Policy, and could find no reference. Is it allowed? Is it not? By the way, all people affected at this point in time are living in Australia (specifically, Western Australia). | It may be legal or it may not For example, if any of the users are in the European Union, then the GDPR applies and the person storing the information is a data controller and has legal obligations. These include, having a legitimate reason for storing them, storing them only for as long as necessary for that reason, notifying the individuals that the data is being stored and why, deleting it upon a users request etc. | united-states Messaging (and other online communication) are fixed media. A face-to-face conversation, or a telephone call, does not exist at all - except in the mental recollections of the participants. And those are always very problematic as evidence, because people's recall is inaccurate. Whereas communication in a fixed medium is durable: a newspaper, a sound recording, security camera footage. It stands on its own and can be examined by experts. What catches a lot of people off guard about the Internet is they are mostly fixed media. Prior to the Internet, investigation of harassment almost entirely depended on anecdotal evidence. It was difficult to prosecute cases which were entirely based on the victim's word. The closest any of this came to objective evidence was a polygraph, and that wasn't reliable. Of course we want bona-fide victims protected, but what keeps a malicious actor from putting someone else in jail with words alone? Now with the Internet, much of the evidence is rendered in fixed media. This is a "breath of fresh air" for such prosecutions! However, just like any other physical evidence, it must be brought into evidence by the testimony of persons, and that testimony gets to be cross-examined. And this is where your concerns about provenance get addressed. A party will assert that the messages are forged, and that will be examined. The validity of evidence is itself on trial. There are two evaluations: first whether the evidence is even valid enough to present to a jury, and evidence that makes the cut is then examined and cross-examined in front of the jury. Keep in mind that contrary to TV drama, there's no "surprise evidence". Almost any evidence - and certainly ALL evidence in a fixed medium - must be shared with the other party long before trial. Pre-trial, it will be challenged, the phone/device subpoenaed and turned over to experts for analysis. If it is evident that the party "has conveniently deleted or lost" the material, the evidence will be thrown out. And if the party is proven to have falsified the data, they're in much worse shape. A lot of chat services keep chat logs on the server/cloud, in the clear. Getting those is as easy as subpoenaing them, and that will be a canonical answer because the ISP would have no reason to lie. For a service where chat logs are kept in the clear only by individuals who choose to keep them, then "reading those logs into evidence" will involve a cross-examination of the parties involved as to their honesty and motivations. I don't know what and how WhatsApp stores when they log chats, so I don't know if there's any cryptographic information there that could be authenticated. But certainly if "he" presents one chat log, and "she" presents a different chat log, then we're clear around to "he said, she said". But all of it together can be examined. For instance, linguists can look at other chats, discern the writing styles of each party, and then look at the disputed lines and examine who is more likely to have written those. And they give testimony on that. So it is evidence, but it gets two rounds of possible challenge: First as to whether the evidence is reliable enough to even present to the jury, and then experts testifying in front of the jury their opinion of its reliability. | In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any. | First of all, although the GDPR is stated to apply to any site which processes the data of any person who is in the EU, it is not clear how a site not located in the EU, does not business in the EU, and does not primarily target EU residents as its audience can be required to comply with the GDPR. To the best of my knowledge, no such case has yet been brought, much less decided. There has also been some debate on whether an IP address constitutes Personal Data under the GDPR, and if it always does so, or only under particular conditions. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that (under the predecessor Directive 95/46/EC) that a dynamic IP address was personal data. But in that case the web site was run by the German Federal Government, which surely has wider scope for getting info from a German ISP than a small private US web activist does. There is not yet any case law that I know of on the applicability of the GDPR to IP addresses in any case at all similar to the one in the question. Joe would in my view be wise to at least learn that logs are being kept, and post a disclosure of this on the site. Whether Joe needs to do more than that is less than clear at this time. | You clearly cannot provide data that you haven't stored – and not storing data is a good thing under the Art 5(1)(c) Data Minimization Principle. Despite the Art 20 data portability right being conditional on that the data subject has provided data and not on that data has been stored, I think responding to such a request with “sorry, as per our privacy policy we do not store this data” would be perfectly fine. It is also curious that you are using consent as the legal basis for the purpose of selecting the website language. How do you obtain consent from visitors? How can you prove that you got consent? In many ways, consent is the legal basis of last resort, and I'd think that legitimate interest would be a much more straightforward approach in your case. | "Botnet" refers to an illicit collection of remotely-controlled computers taking commands from a C2 (Command and Control server) and is thus by definition always illegal. However, there is no law against releasing or using software which accepts commands of various types from a central server, and this is quite common for remote access tools, as long as the user consents. It is only called a botnet if the users do not consent to its presence. If they do consent, it's not a botnet. One example is DarkComet, which includes features such as remote file editing, screen viewing, and keylogging. All of these features have legitimate uses, and a network of computers controlled with this software would not be considered a botnet unless it was created illegally in the first place. It's like the term "battery". Battery is never legal, but that doesn't mean that boxers are breaking the law by participating in that sport and punching each other. If you consent to being punched, then it's not battery. Likewise if you consent to running a remote access tool, it's not a botnet. | Great question - I work for a London based company who use a large amount of location data. The process for deletion of data is not as simple as it first sounds. We recently had a deep dive with our legal team and as a result actually created a product to process deletions. Personal data from users/customer is carried for lots of reasons, not just marketing. What if you're asked to delete data that is needed to bill customers, information that may be relevant to a legal case or information that needs by law to be retained for the purposes of audit? GDPR does not make it illegal to carry personal information, it simply needs you to justify why you are keeping the information - inform the named person about this and provide them with a timescale for deletion. For example if you are required by law to store a record of emails to document the work done, but the user asks you to delete that information. You would be entitled to keep that information but only for the purposes of maintaining that audit trail. You would delete all associated customer data that was unnecessary such as CRM info, payment details etc.. but could keep the audit trail. The proper way to respond to the user's deletion request would be "your data will be kept in a secure server for the purposes of maintaining an audit trail for x amount of time. Once this time has elapsed it will be deleted. If you are unhappy with our use of this data please contact our data officer". GDPR isn't designed to catch you out - if you have a legitimate reason to keep that information then you are entitled to. The law was designed to stop marketers and advertisers hoarding huge amounts of information, as well as undermine Google/Facebook's duopoly on our personal information. | You are right that a visitor of a website does not expect to be tracked upon opening the website. But when using Google Analytics configured in the way explained in my other post, the visitor is not tracked. At least not in a way which violates the GDPR. You worry about the cookies. I also found this article which also does and suggests to either: change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, so it will be removed when the browser is closed. To do this, set the Cookie Expiration variable in your Google Analytics Settings to 0. completely disable cookies. (GA does not require cookies). To do this, set the storage field to none: ga('create', 'UA-XXXXX-Y', { 'storage': 'none' }); If you do not disable cookies, cookies can be used for tracking, which is more general defined in the GDPR as profiling. Profiling is defined in Art. 4 GDPR as: ‘profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements; Art. 22(1) GDPR disallows profiling. Therefore in the settings menu from Google Analytics you have to disable data sharing and data collection. So data will only be used for the analytics function. But because you have configured to Anonymize your visitors IP Address, the part of the IP address used for this, is no longer considered personal data. This is because approx. 250 other users share the same part of the ip address which is stored, so data is not distinguishable between those 250 users. The anonymisation used by google is currently considered good enough. At least by the Dutch DPA. This might change if someone proves it is not good enough anonymized. Note that I am not a lawyer either, but I have read from multiple experts that analytics can be a "legitimate interest", the same way marketing can be a legitimate interest. This way configured the privacy impact is considered very low. It is also very important to note that a DPA consideres GA Google Analytics compliant. Even if a court would not agree in the future, you are acting in good faith if you follow those instructions, so you will probably not be fined. The DPA does currently not suggest to change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, or disable cookies completely. Note that the GDPR does not require doing anything to make it technical impossible to track someone. If a website has access to the data to track someone, but "promises" not to do that, that is fine. And rules regarding the usage of cookies in general, is not part of the GDPR, but (currently) part of the ePrivacy Directive. Only the way to ask for consent for storing cookies is defined in the GDPR. |
Can I be married to multiple people? One person is from the US, one UK, one somewhere else All of the countries above allow dual citizenship if that's relevant. I won't be a US or UK citizen. I can marry them in the country where they're from I'm going to split my time in 3 countries equally but they'll live full time in their country. I won't lie to them. Is this ok? | No, and certainly not for the reason implied (essentially a one spouse per jurisdiction in which one has citizenship rule which doesn't exist anywhere). At least under the law of every U.S. jurisdiction, you cannot be married to more than one person at the same time (anywhere in the world), and it is a crime to do so. Several dozen countries in the world recognize polygamy as legal (mostly in predominantly Muslim countries, not all of which allow polygamy, and in Africa where pre-Christian custom permits it), of course, and this does not violate the laws of those jurisdictions. The U.K. does not generally permit polygamy, but gives some recognition to and does not criminalize, polygamous marriages entered into in a place where it is lawful. But the concept proposed in the question would still not be legal under U.K. law. UPDATE: A California court ruling concurs with this analysis. | Sample answer: Be a US citizen - automatic US tax residency Own a UK property and live there for 91 days to gain UK tax residency Spend 60 days in India plus a total of 365 days over the previous 4 years Spend 62 days in Norway, having been tax resident there the previous year. If I understand correctly, this status can be maintained indefinitely by spending 62 days there per year once first gained. Spend 120 days in Paraguay On the last day of the tax year, start working in the Philippines on an indefinite contract Spend 183 days or more in Singapore during the prior tax year Spend a total of 270 days in Mauritius over the current tax year and the previous two years (our calendar is getting pretty constrained at this point but I think this is still all technically possible) Have access to a spare room that a friend informally keeps available for you in Germany Be a member of the crew of a vessel registered in Mozambique Have at least one essential connection to Sweden, having been tax resident there less than 5 years previously Have a spouse who lives as a permanent resident in Spain and is somehow a contributing member of the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (triggering Australian tax residency) Total tax residencies: 13 Total marginal income tax rate after double tax treaties and reliefs for the tie break: no idea | The whole institution of marriage is subject to arbitrary interpretation/twisting within/by any sovereign jurisdiction. Countries are normally within their rights to recognise marriages subject to any conditions they like, or even completely repudiate the institution of marriage altogether. Is there an international law to protect his/her rights to marry to a person of his/her choice? No. what are the legal ways for this person to protect his/her rights to marry? A few options: Elect a politician/party that will change the law; or If you do not care whether the government recognises your marriage if done the way you want, just marry where/how you want and live with it; or If you need the government to recognise your marriage (e.g. for relationship property protection etc.), move to a country where your "rights to marry" will be protected the way you want. | There are certain requirements of Statehood according to the Montevideo Convention on Statehood of 1933, which is just a codification of international customary law: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Is it "legal" to buy a piece of land and claim it to be another country than before(either inventing a new one or migrating it to an already existing one)? According to international law, it is. Sure. But just because you say something is the case, doesn't mean it is. Always. Sometimes it is. But for present purposes, let's say that if you found an uninhabited island and said that you were a country, that wouldn't be the case - nor if you bought it from a man living on it. If you found some land that belonged to another country and decided to claim it as that of an existing country, then it would depend on the specific circumstances. That's exactly what happened to the Krim island in the Ukraine(now Russia maybe?), right? I don't think so. As far as I know, the annexation of territory isn't considered sale. In any case, the ownership of this land is still under dispute. So, if it's possible without the influence of these international institutions, trying this in an area with their influence would be easier, right? If trying this means declaring some land you have purchased to be a new sovereign state Nope. You probably still don't meet the requirements for statehood. If trying this means the acquisition of some land by an existing sovereign state Maybe. Probably not. The Montevideo Convention requires that statehood not be gained through force; while member states' interests may be greater where they are more invested, the requirements for acquisition of territory are the same no matter where you are. What would prevent me from creating my own nation? Money, defensibility, recognition, the fact that you probably don't own any land that you "buy" (depending on the jurisdiction and real estate system), the fact that you generally can't unilaterally declare yourself a sovereign state. | You seem to have put a lot of thought into this - which is good. However, the short answer is: There is no legal solution. To address your points: And legally, my future wife has the right to divorce me even if I did nothing wrong (no-fault). Yes (at least in most jurisdictions). And then, according to the US Census Bureau [1], mothers usually get primary custody (unless she is on drugs or abusive, which she isn't). And according to the Indiana Parenting Guidelines [2], babies only get one night per week with the non-custodial parent. And even as a teenager, only alternating weekends. Here, it depends. What you describe is indeed what happens often, but not always. Rules vary a lot, and change, but there is an increasing trend to have joint custody in case of a divorce. The details vary, but joint custody can extend to joint physical custody or shared parenting, where both parents take turns looking after the child. This is possible in the United States. In practice, in case of separation the parents will have to work out a parenting plan - ideally together, or in court if needs be. What the result is will depend on circumstances, and on the opinion of the court what is in the children's best interest. This may or may not mean joint physical custody. Child support payments are based on custody, so I would need to pay her child support. And since she always planned on her husband financially supporting her, then I would need to pay her alimony too. And because of imputed income, I couldn't afford to take a lower-paying job with more flexibility. Again, this depends. For example, with joint physical custody, there may be only small or no child support payments if both parents care for the children about equal time. And even if child support is due, there may be no alimony payments if the mother can work (even if she chooses not to). Again, a lot depends on the specific case and jurisdiction. Also, while it is not possible to reduce child support in a pre-nup (because theses payments belong to the child), you can (to some extent) limit alimony payments in a pre-nup. Is there any way out of this situation? How can I ensure, starting now before my children are born, that their primary caregiver is me? Here we are leaving legal territory. The short answer is: There is no way to ensure this, certainly not using legal means. The only good approach is to get to know your partner first, and make sure you have similar views on how to approach parenting. If she wants to be a stay-at-home mom, and you want to share both work and parenting (such as in a shared earning/shared parenting marriage) then you need to think (and speak) about how to reconcile these views. You may find that you are just not compatible on that point. Then take appropriate consequences. To put it plainly: In my opinion, if you do not trust your partner to respect your wishes on parenting together, she is probably not the right person for you to have children with. | Be very cautious about this! It depends on whether your visa is "single entry" or "multiple entry". From the US State Department: Depending on your nationality, visas can be issued from a single entry (application) up to multiple/unlimited entries. If you have a single entry visa and leave the US for Canada, you will NOT be allowed to renter the US from Candada. You'll have to return to your home country and apply for a new US visa. I know of grad students who went on a day trip to Vancouver BC from Seattle and were not allowed to re-enter the US from Canada. It was a disaster for them. | Skyborn are a known phenomenon. Country Citizenship? Generally, the kid automatically gets citizenship from his mom (and father) through bloodline, so our skyborn on that plane is likely that citizenship(s). There are cases that can't grant a citizenship that way (among them: Vatican is only granted ex officio) The sky is also treated as an extension of the land below. If the country you fly over has Jus Soli, it grants citizenship to the baby born above it. The USA has Jus Soli in its 14th amendment, our skyborn baby has dual citizenship to whatever country the mom is from. And in case the plane is over unclaimed water - think a nonstop flight Vancouver-Tokyo by Lufthansa - maritime law applies: The airplane is registered somewhere and treated as territory of that land while over international water. Lufthansa is in Germany, so the kid is, on paper, born in Berlin Germany (as that is what Germany prescribes for air- or seaborn). Germany does not use the unrestricted jus soli but the first test is the bloodline to determine what's the kid's citizenship is, unless the kid would have no citizenship through bloodline. So, if any one parent is German, the child is German. jus soli applies mostly to children of someone who has a permanent residence permit for at least 3 years and has been in Germany for the last 8 years: then the kid is (also) German, even if that grants dual citizenship - till the child is 23 and has to choose one of its citizenships. However, if all known parents are stateless or can't grant the kid citizenship through their bloodline (Yes, that happens!), then the kid born on this international flight has the right to become a German citizen - but some rules still apply. Which City/District/State is responsible? Now, which state's office is responsible? That is even more tricky. Technically, OP's kid that is born in Nebraskan Airspace is a Nebraskan, so it should be a Nebraskan birth-certificate. But the general rule in maritime practice would be to file the papers in the next port the ship lands, that would be Maryland if applied to planes. For a german registered ship or plane (my Lufthansa example), the responsible municipality would be Berlin, unless another municipality is responsible. US State citizenship? And then, I thank hszmv for this US Addendum: It should be pointed out that in the U.S. state citizenship is based on primary residency and can be changed over time. I've personally been a Maryland citizen, a Florida Citizen, and a Maryland citizen for a second time in my life. Usually state citizenship denotes exclusively where your vote is cast. No state can restrict a U.S. citizen from taking up residence in that state per constitution. So the Nebraska vs. MD distinction is academic only... the kid could move to California for the rest of his life without much fanfare. So, as a result, let's assume the parents of the Skyborn actually live in New York. Then te kid gets registered as a New York Citizen, his place of birth is "Above Nebraska" (or the state's equivalent rule) on OP's hypothetical. The couple on the Lufthansa flight could ask to have Berlin (Germany) written into the record, as that is where the interior of all Lufthansa planes is to be considered under the law over international waters. | Claiming to be independent is probably not a crime: the family that say they have set up the Principality of Sealand have never been prosecuted (though that may have something to do with the difficulty of arresting them). It does not, however, excuse a British subject from the ordinary duties of paying taxes and the like; anyone in a more accessible (and more clearly British) part of the country would be subject to the normal forms of law enforcement, including imprisonment for contempt of court if they refused to obey court orders. Despite the more eccentric theories of the 'sovereign citizen' movement (who do exist in the UK), the fact that somebody living in Britain is subject to British laws is not open to negotiation. Resisting this law enforcement by force would not be a good idea: as well as the fact that the Government has access to bigger and better armed forces than you do, it would probably render you guilty of treason. The Treason Act 1351 (as amended and translated) makes it illegal to "levy war against our lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere"; the good news is that the death penalty for treason was abolished in 1998 (some time after that for murder). |
Could the President abolish the Supreme Court? Article II, Section 2, of the US Constitution states: [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law[.] At some point, most presidents have probably gotten annoyed by something the Supreme Court did. Could the President decide to stop appointing Supreme Court judges, in violation of this duty ("shall"), even to the point where no judges remain? This seems like it would be harder to do legally than the Senate abolishing the Court (see question on that over here). Alternatively, could the President satisfy his duty while still reaching the same end by nominating only candidates who (s/)he knows will never be confirmed (e.g. because they are nowhere near qualified)? Could is intended to refer to legally could; political feasibility considerations would be at Politics, not Law. A much narrower related question: Could President Obama do as Sen. McConnell says and leave the SCOTUS nominations to the next President? | As far as I know, no single president has ever been in office long enough to see all supreme court judges retire, resign or die. So waiving his right to appoint new judges would just achieve two things: He would have less judges in his favor than if he'd just appoint a new one. He would help the next president, possibly from the other party, who could then appoint more judges to his taste, or possibly reap the rewards by not doing so. I guess no sane president would do that (and no insane president, either). | No punishment followed because those policies are not the law, and, even it was found out earlier, no Inspector General would have the authority to dismiss Mrs. Cliton, it's POTUS's prerogative, as I understand it. That is true for maybe 10 people max in a government department. For the tens or hundreds of thousands of employees who weren't appointed by the President to serve at their pleasure, violating policies can lead to suspension, fines, or dismissal. | The pardons would stand and continue to be valid. There is a minority view that the "except in cases of impeachment" language in the pardon clause of the U.S. Constitution deprives a President of the pardon power after impeachment until there is a U.S. Senate non-conviction. But the majority view is that this clause merely states that the loss of political office and prohibition on seeking future political office resulting from a U.S. Senate conviction in an impeachment trial cannot be removed via the pardon power. In the majority view, a President has all of the powers and authority of the office, including the pardon power, until the moment of a U.S. Senate conviction following a impeachment by the U.S. House (or the end of his term of office due to resignation or expiration of the President's term of office). Neither view, of course, has ever been resolved authoritatively in the courts because it has never come up before historically. Also, a group pardon would not absolve the President himself of criminal liability. The majority view (again never tested because no President has ever attempted to do so) is that a President may not pardon himself at all. But all other persons who benefit from the pardon would be relieved of criminal liability as a result. | There is no definitive answer, which can only be determined by SCOTUS if faced with a case. DOJ has opined twice that "the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions". The Impeachment Clause (art.I, §3, cl.7) says Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law The exegesis of this clause is that this means a sitting president cannot first be prosecuted for a crime, but must first be removed from office. The counter-argument is that "nevertheless" indicates that this clause only states that a president can be removed and then prosecuted, and that removal does not preclude further action. In other words, the law has yet to be determined on this matter. | Yes. In some common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and even some U.S. states, the government may under some circumstances refer a legal question to the appropriate Supreme Court (Privy Council in the U.K.) for an advisory opinion. These opinions are non-binding, but have large influence because they are often made by the same judges that would otherwise end up dealing with the question should it occur in a case. One common law country in particular stands out in this field: Ireland. Under Article 26 of the Irish Constitution the President may, with some exceptions, refer a bill to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality. The referral is optional, but once made, the Supreme Court's decision is binding. The relevant portion: 3 1° In every case in which the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article is repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President shall decline to sign such Bill. [...] 3° In every other case the President shall sign the Bill as soon as may be after the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been pronounced. This power was last used successfully in 2004. | The other answer is incorrect. In fact, the question you're asking turns on the meaning of the phrase "the whole number of electors appointed." This could be interpreted either way, and as far as I know this ambiguity has never been considered by a court or by congress. It would only matter under the following conditions: Some states appoint fewer electors than the number to which they are entitled. The candidate with the greatest number of votes has more votes than half the number of electors actually appointed, but less than or equal to half the number of electors that should have been appointed. One way to look at this ambiguity is that it depends on how you parse the structure of the amendment. It could be either: a majority of (the whole number of electors) (appointed) a majority of the whole number of (electors appointed) In the first case, "appoint" refers to the sentence in Article 2 that specifies, determines, or "appoints" the number of electors. This reading is supported, for example, by the first definition of appoint at Merriam-Webster online, which is to fix or set officially, as in "to appoint a trial date." However, if you look at Article 2, it says Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress. Here, appoint is used in its second sense, to name officially. This suggests that a failure by any state to appoint any elector to which it is entitled reduces "the whole number of electors appointed" because some available places in the Electoral College have not had anyone appointed to fill them. I favor the second interpretation, but I suspect that if the conditions outlined above actually did arise, Congress would choose the politically expedient interpretation. That is, if the candidate with the most votes was of the party in control of Congress, they would take the second interpretation, and if that candidate of the other party, they would take the first. I further suspect that the courts would not get involved. | Article IX, Section 5 of the constitution says: Removal by impeachment or address. Every person holding any civil office under this State, may be removed by impeachment, for misdemeanor in office; and every person holding any office, may be removed by the Governor on the address of both branches of the Legislature. But before such address shall pass either House, the causes of removal shall be stated and entered on the journal of the House in which it originated, and a copy thereof served on the person in office, that the person may be admitted to a hearing in that person's own defense. This provides at least some mechanism for removing an AG. A subcomittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Maine Legislature reports here on the broader question of tenure of office. p. 5 opines that "Many members of the executive branch of Maine government hold their offices at the pleasure of the Governor and may be removed from office by the Governor's direction to vacate". p. 6 then holds that "For civil officers whose tenure is set by the Constitution, removal from office may only occur through impeachment or address," and the Attorney General is enumerated as one of those Constitutional Officers (referencing Article IX Section 11). The State of Maine web page says that there are three branches of government plus three constitutional officers (state, treasurer, AG) and one statutory officer, thus the AG is not part of the executive branch (and thus the AG does not serve at the pleasure of the Governor). | Sure Obama can sue Trump for defamation. Libel is a civil offense and committing libel is not a part of Trump's role as president. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. But not for personal acts. See Is the US President immune from civil lawsuits? But a libel action would be difficult to win; they're both public figures, which makes the defamation threshold higher: Public officials and figures have a harder time proving defamation. The public has a right to criticize the people who govern them, so the least protection from defamation is given to public officials. When officials are accused of something that involves their behavior in office, they have to prove all of the above elements of defamation and they must also prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice." Defamation Law Made Simple | Nolo.com The "actual malice" part is interesting: In the landmark 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court .... acknowledged that in public discussions -- especially about public figures like politicians -- mistakes can be made. If those mistakes are "honestly made," the Court said, they should be protected from defamation actions. The court made a rule that public officials could sue for statements made about their public conduct only if the statements were made with "actual malice." "Actual malice" means that the person who made the statement knew it wasn't true, or didn't care whether it was true or not and was reckless with the truth -- for example, when someone has doubts about the truth of a statement but does not bother to check further before publishing it. (same link above) Could malice be proved? Was Trump reckless with the truth? Could be. But would Obama sue? What's the cost/benefit analysis to him and his legacy, politically and personally? Trump was taking a political or personal risk - or he's being stupid - with such accusations, since he may feel invulnerable. He has sued and been sued and settled many times: see Legal affairs of Donald Trump I think both would not want to be in court; because once in court, they (and their lawyers) both have subpoena power and both would have to answer nearly any question put to them about their public (and possibly private; but not official) lives. Trump has interestingly enough talked about "opening up the libel laws" so he can more easily sue people. But if he did that, it cuts both ways: he would be easier to take to court. See Can Libel Laws Be Changed Under Trump? In my opinion, Obama is much better off ignoring Trump and letting the FBI, DOJ, Congress and the Intel Community do their jobs - have the facts fall where they may - and and not become a right-wing talk radio subject for the rest of his life, as well as risk being deposed himself in court. Edit 3/21/17: From a timely piece in The New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-first-amendment-applies-to-trumps-presidency While it is unlikely that former President Barack Obama would sue Trump for libel, he very likely has a strong case. The First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/opinion-trump-could-lose-lawsuit-for-libeling-obama/ that “there seems no doubt that Trump’s statement was false, defamatory, and at the very least made with reckless disregard for the truth.” That is the test for damaging the reputation of a public figure or official: Trump either made his assertions with knowledge of their falsity or with disregard of a high degree of probability that they were false. Obama, Stone is confident, could prove that Trump made his false charge, as the Supreme Court defined the standard, with “actual malice.” |
Up to what point can an OS design and theme mimic another operating system? I am wondering to what point can the desktop theme imitate another, without being sued for copyright violation or plagiarism. Are there any commonly accepted rules in the jurisprudence of what is and is not allowed? Let's take for example the Linuxfx distro, which themes are imitating those of Windows 10 or Windows 11: https://www.linuxfx.org/ The graphical interface looks very close from the one of Windows. Some softwares like Microsoft Edge are available for Linux. So, it is perfectly normal that the exact icon of this browser displays in the interface. But there are other aspects that surprise me more. When looking at screenshots, the Windows "Start button" icon at the bottom left looks the native one (or very close). Some icons, the inner layout of Windows, texts, colors and even the desktop background look identical or at least very similar. As a software is a whole, there is work associated with its design, how can a distro like LinuxFx and its Windows themes exist without being sued by Microsoft for plagiarism / copyright infringment? | how can a distro like LinuxFx and its Windows themes exist without being sued by Microsoft for plagiarism / copyright infringement? It's Microsoft's choice to either sue for copyright infringement or ignore the infringement. Microsoft would weigh the cost/benefits of a lawsuit that would hinge on the judge/jury deciding the fairly gray area of what constitutes enough infringement for LinuxFx be liable and result in damages for Microsoft. Would a judge/jury rule in favor of what Microsoft sees as design and copyright infringement? Or would Microsoft lose and end up with bad PR after spending a lot of money? Or, as ohwilleke mentions: LinuxFx and Microsoft may have a license agreement, so there could already be a legal agreement that LinuxFx can legally "copy" the Microsoft interface. | It is illegal to make copies of copyrighted materials without license. In the case of software, obviously it will be illegal to make copies by copying and installing the software without a license, but we are not talking about that. If I have a legitimate license of say Photoshop, and I start the application, parts or all of the code will be loaded into the RAM of my computer, which is a copy. According to copyright law, it is legal for me to make that copy. You are allowed to copy legitimately owned software into RAM to execute it. If your copy of Photoshop is illegal, and you start the application, the copy that is made into RAM is again copyright infringement. Having read the software license for the software that you get when you buy a Mac, it seems that if you steal my computer and just start the operating system, you are committing copyright infringement, and it seems that if you buy such a stolen computer and just start the operating system, you are committing copyright infringement as well, because the license that I received when I purchased the computer covers anyone using it with my permission, and covers anyone who legally buys the computer from me, but doesn't cover a thief. Now does this affect the work that you did? No, you have the full copyright on your work. Copyright law doesn't require that your tools are all used legitimately. | THE FOLLOWING OPINION IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE Based on your screenshot and description, I don't see anything infringing. If the data you are using is from your own sources, and what you show is not a scan or photo of their guide, and your layout is thus unique in specifics (not a direct copy), it wouldn't be an "infringement" as far as copyright law is concerned. Things you cannot copyright: A font (except as a computer font file but not as used in a document). A concept (a main issue here). A idea for a "way" or "order" to display data. Mere data or facts can not be copyrighted nor can ideas. Anything sourced from the US government (trail data, topos, etc.) Something not in printed, physical, or recorded form. That is, the copyright only extends to those things as they are realized in print, or as a recording for audio or video, or a physical statute, etc. A live performance is not copyrightable for instance, nor are ideas. The Law: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. For instance, an icon of a TENT is the common form (like a font) of indicating a camp ground. They may be able to copyright the specific instance of their tent icon, but they cannot prevent you from using some other triangle to represent a tent for a campground. And in facts yours is completely different. Displaying data a particular "way" like 1e for 1 mile east is not copyrightable when it is common for the type of guide. It's just data. CONCEPTS AND DATA ARE NOT COPYRIGHTABLE, only the ACTUAL specific page or work in total as rendered. More below, but your page seems totally different. OTHER FORMS OF IP PROTECTION Now, just because some intellectual property can't be protected by copyright, does not mean it is a free-for-all. For instance, a "way" of doing something can be PATENTED (process patent). And "ornamental design" can be given a design patent. A logo or brand name can be given a trademark. Here's an interesting court ruling on the subject of data display. Basically it can't be an abstraction/concept. It has to be in a definable, physical, novel form. NOTE: it has been possible to copyright a "look and feel" but that applies to software, not static printed media. And the courts have been reversing on that a lot as time goes on. BUT WAIT...THERE'S MORE So, I am going to GUESS that you are talking about AT Guide by David Miller? It's pretty rich of him to claim copyright over the "manner of the display of data" when APPARENTLY he is using concepts of data display as described by EDWARD TUFT So, LOL. Is this the guide they claim you are "copying"?? THESE AREN'T THE ICONS YOU'RE LOOKING FOR Okay, so let's go one by one and their claims against you: 1. The way of representing distances between shelters "The Way" of presenting something is not copyrightable, only an expressive or final form. Some forms of "organization or selection" that may make a work in total copyrightable, but not on their own in isolation. 2. The sideways orientation of the elevation profile Presenting some elements "sideways" is not copyrightable (WTF LOL OMG RUS) the same as number 1. Turning an element sideways does not, on it's own, rise to the level of "creative or non-obvious." 3. The icons Your icons are completely different. If you copied and used his ACTUAL icons, you might have had some issue, but your icons are not even remotely the same. Using icons to indicate services or features is COMMON. Not copyrightable. http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/works-not-covered-copyright In general, copyright does not protect individual words, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; or mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents. (However, copyright protection may be available, if the artwork of the symbol or design contains sufficient creativity.) 4. The convention of representing direction/distance for waypoints. Again, "The Way" of doing something is not copyrightable, nor is data or facts. 1.1E or 2.3NW are common are they not? I've seen similar treatments elsewhere. It's "obvious and not novel." FINAL FORM, EXPRESSIVE FORM is copyrightable NOT FORMATTING CONCEPTS. Basically, he is saying something along the lines of "I'm formatting paragraphs with a double space, so you can't." The "actual" icon drawings he used are copyrightable. Your icons are clearly different. I assume your mountain-top profile line is taken from some publicly available survey source? So long as you never used a scan of the actual line he uses (and even then?), because he cannot copyright the mountain top profiles themselves! DOES HE EVEN HAVE A VALID COPYRIGHT? For that question, I'd say yes with limitations. His work is a compilation of data. Data can not be copyrighted, but the unique arrangement can in context of the work in total. These three conditions must ALL be present (from http://www.rbs2.com/ccompile.pdf): The collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data. The selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials The creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement of an original work of authorship. So It seem to be that his guide meets these, but his copyright is for his work in total. You are NOT using his data. You are using your OWN data. Based on my reading of Key vs Chinatown Today you are not even close to infringing. You are doing your OWN selection, and your OWN arrangement. It does not matter that you may be using some similar typographic or charting conventions. Those cannot be copyrighted. You are doing your own thing, and "similarity is not infringement." SEARCH AND YOU WILL FIND On the subject of the copyright, here's the copyright on AT guide: https://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search_Arg=A.T.+Guide&Search_Code=TALL&PID=FgMjtJ244OxoFULrVoob_CEI8bc_M&SEQ=20190506230418&CNT=25&HIST=1 If the link doesn't work due to expiration or a cookie, it should look like this: It's a matter of using the USPTO search engine "its way" — it's not Google and requires specific search strings. Looks like the assignee or owner is https://antigravitygear.com ? Did THEY contact you or David Miller? Or did they claim to be an attorney? I'd love to see the email. Attorneys don't email dunning letters, by the way (though they may if it was a DMCA takedown request I suppose, but I still doubt it.) If it was an attorney it would be via US mail on attorney letterhead. To the best of my knowledge, you can't file proof of service on an email, it has to be USPS or trackable. This means the guy that made the other PDF is annoyed or whatever. If he claimed to be an attorney, that's VERY illegal if he's not. And one final note: Just being non-profit does not absolve you of copyright infringement. But as I said, I see no infringement here. The other answer that asserted these are covered under "works of art" is not withstanding. There is nothing "expressive" about Miller's guide. Also that other answer cited a source for AUSTRALIAN law, not US. Mere typographic elements do not rise to "an expressive work of art". A mountain profile that is nothing but a illustrative line based on data also does not. | I suspect contract law will affect the ability to do this. Terms like "USB" and the associated logos etc are intellectual property (trademarks, copyrights, etc) owned by the USB Consortium. If you don't comply with their terms, you probably cannot describe your product as a USB product. THE USB-IF LOGOS MAY BE USED ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH PRODUCTS WHICH HAVE PASSED USB-IF COMPLIANCE TESTING AND ARE CURRENTLY ON THE INTEGRATORS LIST. THIS REQUIRES THAT THE COMPANY BE ASSIGNED A USB VENDOR ID NUMBER. | This sounds like a case where there can be differences as to if something is a design that can be copyrighted or if it is a matter of a trademark held by the artist who drew the circle. If someone began a copyright infringement action against you, claiming copyright of the shape of a circle, your defense could be the Threshold of originality (Wikipedia). The threshold of originality is a concept in copyright law (Wikipedia) that is used to assess whether a particular work can be copyrighted. It is used to distinguish works that are sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection from those that are not. In this context, "originality" refers to "coming from someone as the originator/author" (insofar as it somehow reflects the author's personality), rather than "never having occurred or existed before" (which would amount to the protection of something new, as in patent protection). Obviously, circles, squares, triangles, pyramids, etc., even straight lines, have all existed for a long time. Simple shapes can, of course, be included as part of a more complex design, and that design as a whole is copyrighted as soon as you complete the design. You don't need to claim copyright; you already have it. If you did a design that was fairly simple and were accused of copyright infringement, it might come down to a court case to determine the threshold of the threshold of originality. Now, if you did a painting of a circle that looked like another painting of a circle, then you could be accused of trademark infringement, because the artist you allegedly copied could say that they have such a distinctive style that is is their trademark. A trademark, trade mark, or trade-mark is a recognizable sign, design, or expression which identifies products or services of a particular source from those of others...Trademarks (Wikipedia) Trademarks are also designs, of course, but are protected in a different method different than copyrights. So many decisions about copyright infringement come down to the judgement and opinions of a jury, because of the fungibility of what exactly constitutes originality and what constitutes a copy, part of a copy or a derivative. Trademark infringement hinges on how recognizable that design as a mark is and if there can be confusions between the two. For a much more in depth outline of copyright, see I have a question about copyright. What should I read before I ask it? - Law Meta Stack Exchange. | The basic principle about copyright protection is that the expression of an idea is protected, but the idea itself is not. So wholesale copying without permission is infringing. But the abstract algorithm is not protected by copyright (and let us assume that it also isn't patented). By way of analog, an insertion sort is a pretty easy concept to grasp, and once you understand it, you can re-create it, independent of how the original example (where from you learned about the sort) is expressed. So the question is whether it is necessary for you to copy that code (copyright protects against copying), or can you independently re-express the algorithmic idea (ideas are not protected)? | It infringes the copyright. It can easily be proved that both XOR1 and XOR2 derive from the source work by XOR-ing the streams with each other. It's just like any encrypted copy: it infringes the copyright, but only those who can decrypt it are in a position to know that it infringes the copyright. The posts on the forum are illegal because they infringe the copyright; it doesn't matter that they are derived works rather than the work itself, just as your drawing of a copyright-protected image infringes copyright because it is a derived work without being the work itself. | Monopoly is a trademark of Parker Brothers. You would need to get permission to use that trademark. The artwork of the game is copyrighted and cannot be duplicated without violating that copyright. In general, the labels meaning phrases like "Go to Jail" and "New York Avenue" are probably copyrighted and some court decisions have decided that labels are a copyrightable element. However, there is some gray area. The game mechanics are not copyrightable and can be duplicated. What this means is that if you clone the game and use new labels (like new property names and card titles) then you are probably fine. You would have to make a novel board design. If you clone the game, but use the game's labels, then you could potentially lose in court. Of course, remember that corporations will sometimes sue just to intimidate people, even if they have a losing case. Just because your clone is non-infringing doesn't mean they won't sue you. It costs them money to sue people, so if your clone is obscure or not used by many people it could fly under the radar and be ignored by the company. If your clone was a success and became widely used, that would significantly increase the chance you could get sued. In most cases a company will threaten infringers before they sue them, because it is a lot cheaper to threaten somebody than sue them. Therefore, you could make your clone and just plan on discontinuing it if they threaten you. Of course, there is a small risk they would sue you anyway. If you made no money then you are probably safe because it would be a lot harder for them to argue that you commercially damaged them if you made no money. |
Legal status of sodium pentothal (thiopental) in the United Kingdom Is sodium pentothal (thiopental) legal in the United Kingdom? To be quite honest, I have not checked the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. From Wikipedia. It was previously the first of three drugs administered during most lethal injections in the United States, but the U.S. manufacturer Hospira stopped manufacturing the drug and the EU banned the export of the drug for this purpose. and there is another paragraph. After its use for execution of Jeffrey Landrigan in the U.S., the UK introduced a ban on the export of sodium thiopental in December 2010,[15] after it was established that no European supplies to the U.S. were being used for any other purpose. I am also interested in the laws of other countries. | In the UK sodium thiopental is a controlled substance, it is licensed for use as a general anaesthetic (and I think it has other medical purposes). Your quoted passages refer to the so-called 'export ban'. Following campaigning by, among others, Alistair Carmichael MP and Reprieve, the UK Government prohibited export of the drug without authorisation. In applying for an export licence for the drug you must persuade the Government that it is not intended for use in capital punishment. The campaigners sought to prevent exports of drugs used in lethal injections. Previously the Government had said it would not ban exports of sodium thiopental because it is a medicine with legitimate medical purposes and in any case could be obtained from other countries, e.g. (in the particular case below) Austria, so a ban would make no difference to the USA's supply but it would harm UK business. Nevertheless the Government maintained its opposition to the death penalty in all circumstances. That decision was challenged by judicial review - the claimants said the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills had "acted unlawfully in refusing to exercise his powers under the Export Control Act 2002 to make an order prohibiting its export to the United States". If I understand correctly the judicial review failed on two of the three grounds and decision was deferred on the last ground; subsequently the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, changed his mind as it had emerged the export's purpose was solely for use in lethal injections and the Government had after all committed to oppose the death penalty. The Queen (on the application of Zagorski and Baze) Claimants - v - Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and Archimedes Pharma UK Ltd EWHC 3110 (Admin)[2010] http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2010/3110.html https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-bans-export-of-lethal-injection-drugs-to-the-us | Are UK Tier 4 rules law? Yes. The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (All Tiers) (England) Regulations 2020 (SI 2020/1374) has been amended by SI 2020/1611. Unfortunately, the amendment is only available as pdf at the moment and I can't copy-and-paste it on my phone for you. SI 2020/1374 and all subsequent amendments may be found here... https://www.legislation.gov.uk/primary+secondary?title=Coronavirus%20all%20tiers ETA: The Introductory Text to SI 2020/1374 states: The Secretary of State makes the following Regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 45C(1), (3)(c), (4)(b), (4)(d), 45F(2) and 45P of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/22/contents | Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing. | Does the said law (or any other law or treaty) prohibit Indians to get the pre-natal gender screening test done outside India (in any country where this is legal)? YES, in theory but I cannot find any relevant case law where this has been considered by the court. Section 23(3) of the Pre-Conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act 1994 (PCPNDT) creates the offence for non-medical practitioners etc: Any person who seeks the aid of any [medical practioner etc] or any other person for sex selection or for conducting pre-natal diagnostic techniques on any pregnant women for the purposes other than those specified in sub-section (2) of section 4, he shall, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees for the first offence and for any subsequent offence with imprisonment which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. And section 4(1) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction for any offences committed by: any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India... Normally, criminal justice action would only be considered once the parties returned to India, but note that section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 allows for trials in absentia. However I cannot find any relevant case law to say whether this has actually happened in this type of scenario. | The only other Federal laws were the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 and the Boggs Act, which depended on the Marihuana Tax Act. There were labeling requirements under the Pure Food and Drug Act, and the Uniform State Narcotic Act set forth laws for states to adopt, if they wanted. Drug prohibition was left to the states in the event that they did not adopt the laws set forth by the acts above. | It is capitalized because the word NEXIUM has a conspicuous definition. In other words, they're using it in the specific way they have defined it to mean. This is to differentiate it from any other meaning it may have in some other context. Obviously with NEXIUM, it's a word they just made up and it's very unlikely that it could ever be confused with anything other than their particular drug. But what if the drug were called PRAXIA? The word praxia might be confused with the medical term. It's also the name of a city in Romania (I just learned that while looking that word up). But PRAXIA in all caps refers specifically to their drug, and there can be no ambiguity between that and other uses of the term. This is especially important for drugs, since they are legally required to disclose the side effects in their advertising, and you wouldn't want someone potentially confusing the name of the drug with the condition it treats. You see this in contracts as well. When a contract provision is written in ALL CAPS, it is done to conspicuously call attention to the text, either because it is redefining an established legal term or is modifying rights you may have under the law (e.g. LIMITED WARRANTY, SEVERABILITY, BINDING ARBITRATION, etc.) There is no established rule for this, by the way. It's mostly a matter of style. Some laws require conspicuous disclosure of certain provisions in contracts, so ALL CAPS has traditionally been used to meet that requirement. NOTE: The term "Nexium" (not in caps) is simply the registered trademark for the drug. It simply protects their intellectual property (i.e. the name), and isn't intended to describe or define anything in a legal way. Fun fact: Subway got sued for making "Footlong" sandwiches that were not actually 12 inches in length. They tried to argue that "Footlong" was a trademark and not intended to convey the length of their sandwiches. They settled the lawsuit, because really, that's a jackass move right there. I wonder, though... If they'd called it a FOOTLONG, would that have made a difference? ;-) | There is commonly a law like RCW 69.50.309 which says that A person to whom or for whose use any controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed by a practitioner, and the owner of any animal for which such controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed may lawfully possess it only in the container in which it was delivered to him or her by the person selling or dispensing the same. A controlled substance is "a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in Schedules I through V as set forth in federal or state laws, or federal or commission rules". Schedule V includes some opiates with low potential for abuse and dependency. It does not include prescription antibiotics, and does not include Ibuprofen and other OTC NSAIDs. The cop may be right about keeping your narcotics in the original container, but wrong about anything less. I can't presently locate the Oklahoma analog of this law. After diligent searching, I even suspect that Oklahoma does not have such an "original container" law. It would count as a "counterfeit substance" if it is a controlled substance and is in a container with labeling that is not that of the original distributor, but if the contain is completely blank, it is not legally a "counterfeit substance". And again, that only applies to controlled substances. | Everything is allowed unless the law says it isn’t Common law systems like the USA are ‘exceptions based’ - the law permits everything except what it prohibits. So, your question is backwards - rather than looking for laws that allow it, you need to look for laws that prohibit, restrict or regulate it. There are laws that regulate this but none that prohibit it. |
Why are common people selected for jury duty? Why are common people selected to be the jury in the USA? Shouldn't people that know the law to decide criminal's fate? Why pick just some twelve random people to be the jury and decide the outcome of a trial instead of people who have extensive knowledge of the law? | Because it's explicitly a jury of your peers That is, every person is entitled to have their guilt or innocence decided by people "like them" - not kings, lords or, heaven forbid, lawyers. The jury doesn't need to know the law and indeed, in many jurisdictions, lawyers are explicitly disqualified from jury service (hint: if you want to avoid jury service, get a law degree). The role of the jury is to decide the facts - what happened and whether that meets the prosecution's burden of proof. The jury is told what the law is by the judge - that's their job. Most law shows on TV skip over the very important role of the judge's instructions to the jury. These usually go along the lines of (greatly abridged and paraphrased) "If you decide that X, Y & Z are true then you must return a guilty verdict but if any of them are not true you must return not guilty." A very brief potted history of the jury system is contained in this answer: Why 12 Jurors, why not 11, 10, 9, 1? Now, this is, according to those from common law traditions, the great truth and beauty of the jury system. To those from civil, sharia and other legal traditions: it's just stupid. | The title question is overly-ambitious: it is not guaranteed, and nobody thinks that it is. The law does what is practical to achieve the desired result. Actual failure one way or the other is mostly irrelevant until a clear pattern to the failure is found, then there might be a legal resolution, but it might also require a political resolution. One consideration is whether it is possible for a defendant to receive a fair trial in a certain jurisdiction. Generally, you are tried in the jurisdiction where the offense occurred, sometimes (rarely) the venue can be changed to a more neutral location. This consideration is significant in high-profile cases. For example, the trials of Lee Boyd Malvo and John Allen Muhammad took place relatively far away from the scene of the crime. The trial judge must weigh the arguments for an inconvenient trial location, and in this trial the judge refused a petition for a change of venue. The judge stated that "As far as change of venue, I do not think that that would give the defendant any kind of a fair trial beyond what we are doing here today. I don’t think there’s any place in the state of Minnesota that has not been subjected to extreme amounts of publicity on this case" A second layer of protection is that prospective jurors may be excused. If a juror declares in advance (during voir dire or elsewhere) that the defendant is guilty, they will be excused for cause. The defense (or prosecution) also has some number of peremptory challenges – in this case, the defense has 5 and the prosecution has 3. In this category, a seated juror can be excused for cause (this happened), when a juror admits that some news e.g. about the city's settlement had prejudiced the juror. Also related to juror selection is that juror must swear to follow the law in reaching a decision. The third layer of protection is limiting testimony, for instance if the prosecution were to ask a witness something like "Won't there be major riots if Chauvin isn't convicted?", the defense would presumably object and prevent such testimony from getting uttered in the first place, or getting officially stricken if it somehow gets out. The fourth layer of protection is that jurors are meticulously instructed as to the logic of decision-making. If you can find a copy, there are here (MN does not make the instructions freely publicly available). Here are the California instructions. Additionally, a judge might attempt to limit what can be said by the media, or might sequester the jury so that they cannot hear any such publicity during the trial (but that's impossible for pre-trial publicity). Another layer is that a mistrial can be declared. However, what goes on in the jury room is in a black box that the legal system cannot generally touch. If a juror was paid off, that could be touched by the legal system, but there is nothing that can be done if it turns out that a juror has a bias in favor of the prosecution, despite the premise of neutrality. Finally, if the facts are so clear, a judge might overturn a conviction on the grounds that a reasonable jury could not reach that conclusion, based on the facts and the law. By "final" I ignore the possibility of an appeal. | First, while Law and Order should not be taken as an accurate depiction of a New York trial, it especially should not be taken as an accurate depiction of an Australian trial. Australian law, while it has some major similarities with US law (both ultimately derive from the law of England), is not US law. With procedural matters (such as "may jurors ask questions of witnesses"), it can potentially differ from court to court. In general, jurors may not simply ask a witness a question. The jury's job is not to investigate and figure out if the defendant was guilty or not; it's to evaluate the cases presented by each side. US (and Australian, as far as I know) courts use what's known as the adversarial model, where the prosecution and the defense both present the best cases they can and a neutral third party decides which case was stronger. In a US criminal trial, the state is expected to justify why someone should be in jail; the jury shouldn't be helping them justify it. This isn't how all jurisdictions around the world work, but it's how the US does. One concern with juror questions is that it has the risk that the juror will not be impartial. Jurors are not supposed to get into arguments with witnesses, or to go after them to try to prove a point. In your case, the juror might be introducing an entirely different line of reasoning from the one either side is presenting, and that's simply not their job. People have raised the concern that a juror thinking up questions might be deciding the case before they hear all the evidence, and might give too much weight to the answers to their own questions (or read a lot into it if a question is denied). There are also rules on what questions may be legally asked; lawyers know these and jurors generally don't, which is why jurors may almost never directly ask a question to a witness. Where they can ask questions, it's virtually always written questions, which the judge reviews, gives to both sides to see if anyone objects, and then reads to the witness in a neutral tone. | No, but... Common law does not apply in countries that follow the legal school of Code Civil, aka civil law legal system, such as Germany or France. Some basic principles are common between them and common law: While there's generally no right to a jury, the innocence part actually stems in both cases from ROMAN law: in dubio pro reo - in the case of doubt, (you have to decide) for the accused. The similar Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat - Proof lies on him who asserts, not on him who denies - is the source: It was butchered into "innocent until proven guilty", but the sentiment is the same. Other countries that have no relation to common law are based on Sharia and Fiqh. There is absolutely no relation to Roman law either. However, there is a presumption of innocence, or as one of the largest Scholars of Islamic law Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib said in the mid-600s: "Avert the prescribed punishment by rejecting doubtful evidence." However, what is considered doubtful is quite different. On the other hand, presumption of guilt was the foundational principle in other legal systems! | Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say. | This is still common practice in most, if not all, of the mountain west states in the United States in rural areas, although, obviously, nobody rides horses from court house to court house these days. I don't know if it is done in rural areas in other states. Typically, general jurisdiction trial court judges in these areas are assigned to a multi-county district, but there are court houses in each county. Judges in the district rotate between county court houses to preside over court cases on a schedule worked out with court administrators. | No - there is no general requirement to be fair to all applicants when selecting someone for a job. It's not even clear how this would work - you would need to define what "fair" means in this context, and there would be many competing definitions. Is it fair to prefer an applicant who has more experience because they received help from their parents with landing their first job? Is it fair to prefer someone with a certain look for an acting job? Is it fair to prefer someone who happens to have a similar personality to the person hiring? So if the employer finds it more convenient to use the same test every year, and if they do not mind that this gives some applicants an advantage, they are free to do that. The only exception is that discrimination based on certain, specific factors (often called "protected characteristics") is usually outlawed. The list depends on jurisdictions, but usually includes things like gender, race and age. However, even in that case discrimination is allowed if the business can demonstrate a genuine need - for example, when looking for an actor, it is allowed to hire based on gender. | The most innocent of your scenarios is "against the rules", so less innocent acts fair worse. The idea behind researching legal theory and precedent (presumably not presidents) is that surely it is good for a juror to know what the law is. But that thinking is wrong. The judge will instruct you as to what the law is, and will also instruct you that "the law" is limited to what he says it is. I will draw on the instructions for an antitrust case, Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar. The core instruction is: It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply the law as I give it to you. The preliminary instructions (the pattern instructions for California civil trials) say the same basic thing: At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. The judge instructs the jury that: When a party has the burden of proof on any claim or affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or affirmative defense is more probably true than not true. Your research might find alternative statements of the law out there, which seem entirely plausible. That doesn't matter: you have to set aside whatever ideas (about the law) that you've gotten from anybody besides the judge. In fact, if the judge makes a (serious) mistake and rules against a party in a manner that is contrary to established law, and you know this (it doesn't matter how), you are supposed to apply the law (including rulings during trial as to admissibility) as given to you by the judge. As for a case of a juror knowing that the judge was mistaken (specifically, knowing based on his pre-existing knowledge of statutes and case law – not based on forbidden research during a trial), we can get the "should" from the absolute instruction to follow the judges instructions. Additionally, if you read transcripts of voir dire (not a trivial task), you can observe judges probing attorneys who happen to be in the prospective pool, asking questions to determine whether that person can just do as they are told. But it would be difficult to establish a "hard rule". There never will be an instruction that says "You must follow my orders even if you know for a fact that my orders are wrong" – jury instructions never admit the possibility of judicial error. |
Which country's laws apply to a company in country A hiring remote workers in country B? If a company in a country A does remote hiring of employees in a country B, laws of which of these two countries have to be considered? context: in some countries hiring employees has very strict laws (gender, race discrimination e.g.), while in some countries there are no laws for admission interviews and a company can choose whoever they prefer to employ. Thank you. | The laws of both countries apply | Washington State is an "At Will" employment state meaning that, with exception to some protected classes and bargaining, the employer may terminate the employee for any reason the employer can cite, or no reason at all. If the firm used it as a benefit of the job but it wasn't agreed upon on the contract, its not a deception as if you can hold the job to the down season, you have less work to do. If a promise was made for employment into the down season during the negotiating of the job, and this was documented, it could be. It could be that he did all the work required of him, but another higher went above and beyond and he got the ax because he was the newest and the lesser performer. Either way, the employer is well within their right to fire an employee for any reason they choose absent discrimination based on protected class status. | No they are not the same statement. Who has jurisdiction? Let's disentangle a few things: A jurisdiction is an entity that has sovereignty to make, interpret and enforce its own laws. Each country in the world is a jurisdiction. Sub-national entities like states, provinces and municipalities may be a jurisdiction depending on the operation of law in the country they are part of. Some supra-national bodies like the EU and the UN are jurisdictions. To some extent, even companies, clubs and similar bodies are jurisdictions to the extent that they can make, interpret and enforce its own rules. A jurisdiction can decide that it has jurisdiction based on a whole raft of matters including: where the event took place where the party(s) are resident where the party(s) are citizens registration of things like planes, trains and automobiles if money passed through their financial system etc. A court or tribunal has jurisdiction if the jurisdiction has jurisdiction and it is the correct body within its jurisdiction to hear a particular matter. Which laws apply? Once a court or tribunal has decided that it does have jurisdiction it then needs to know what law to apply. This may be the law of their jurisdiction or another jurisdiction or both. Example For example, imagine there is a company in New York, USA that sells a product to a consumer in New South Wales, Australia. Further suppose that the contract says it will be governed by the laws of Ontario, Canada (don't ask me why). In the event of dispute, let's say the consumer begins proceedings in the Local Court in New South Wales. The New York company petitions the court to say that the correct forum is the court in Ontario, or New York, or Mexico where the product shipped from but certainly not New South Wales. The court in New South Wales will consider the jurisdictional arguments and decide if it does or does not have jurisdiction. If it decides that it doesn't then the customer would have to bring an action somewhere else (where the process repeats). Worth noting that the New York company would be precluded from arguing in that forum that New South Wales was the right jurisdiction because they can't have their cake ... If it decides that it does have jurisdiction then it would consider what law applies. Its quite probable that they would accept that the contract is governed by Quebec law. However, Australian law, most specifically the Australian Consumer Law would also apply. If there was a claim on a tortuous basis this might be New South Wales or New York law. They would then proceed to decide the case on the applicable law including working out how to reconcile any incompatibilities. | That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure. | Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...". | In the UK, you would need a new contract, because the old company will not be able to pay you and will possibly cease to exist, but that contract must not put you at any disadvantage. Basically, all terms would have to be the same, and the time at the previous company would have to count as continuous employment. | The following answer applies in the situation where all countries involved are member states of the European Union: Can the tax services in countryA confiscate accounts that are opened in countryB by me? All countries in the European Union (EU) are party to the Brussels Regulation (Regulation No. 1215/2012), this regulation means that judgments made in one EU member state may be enforced in another EU member state, against those person who judgment is made against. It may take some time, procedurally, for the judgment creditor to do this, but they are entitled to do so. Anyway, what this means for someone in such a position is that they contact a lawyer in "countryA's" jurisdiction to help appeal or find a way to mitigate the judgment since it was awarded as a result of fraud. Alternatively, when proceedings begin to register the judgment in countryB, one in such a position may choose to hire a lawyer practicing in countryB to challenge the registration of the judgment | Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure. |
Can US Supreme Court justices / judges be "rotated" out against their will? In last night's US Presidential Debate, candidate and US Senator Bernie Sanders asserted the option of being able to "rotate" Supreme Court judges / justices to other courts. As quoted in The Hill: "I do not believe in packing the court," Sanders said during the second of the first two 2020 Democratic presidential debates. "We’ve got a terrible 5-4 majority conservative court right now. But I do believe constitutionally we have the power to rotate judges to other courts and that brings in new blood into the Supreme Court and a majority I hope that will understand that a woman has a right to control her own body and that corporations cannot run the United States of America." For background, Article III, Section 1 of the US constitution is in full: The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Article II, Section 2, states in part: [The President,] by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for... Is Sanders' claim (in bold above) correct? Does the US President, or anyone else for that matter (other than a Supreme Court justice choosing to retire from their position on the Supreme Court) have the power to "rotate" those judges to other courts? Consistent with Sanders' claim, this question is asked under the current US constitution assuming no amendments; just about anything is possible via amendment. Also, while a bunch of folks on Law.SE might be able to speculate or find persuasive arguments posted in answers below, who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? A couple law professors posts proposals here (and in more detail here, reviewed here), one for a rotating panel of appeals court judges to serve on the Supreme Court, and another for a 15-justice Court with 5 appointed by each party and 5 picked unanimously by those 10, without the ability to hear cases if those seats are empty. There is also a proposal circulating for 18-year term limits followed by remainder-of-lifetime service on a circuit court. If any of those, or other strategies, appear constitutional at present, an explanation of why would be a great answer, as would be an explanation of why any proposal involving rotation consistent with Sanders's quote would not be possible under the current constitution unamended. Note: The question framing intentionally excludes consideration of any person or military force who might have the physical firepower to remove Supreme Court justices in a way that would leave them unable to serve as a judge in another federal court. That's not "rotating" off. | I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand. | Unless you are an ambassador or one of the US states, SCOTUS doesn't have original jurisdiction over your lawsuit, so they can't hear it either. If you've named all the judges of all the courts that do have jurisdiction, then one of them will handle it anyway, under the doctrine of necessity noted before. For cases that do fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, a jury trial is theoretically possible, but it appears it has not occurred since the 1790s, and only one has surviving records: Georgia v. Brailsford in 1794. See "Special Juries in the Supreme Court" by Lochlan F. Shelfer, Yale Law Journal 123:1, 2013-2014. Otherwise, non-jury original jurisdiction cases are usually delegated to a special master, a sort of "contract judge" who hears all the evidence and recommends a judgment that the full court typically rubber-stamps. | First, while most US court systems do have rules against frivolous lawsuits, most judges are loathed to employ them because the punishment is that the vexatious litigant would be denied the use of courts for when they do actually have a case of merit. Declaring someone a vexatious litigant also does not 100% block someone from filing suits. Normally they can file if a judge or officer of the court (i.e. a lawyer) signs off on the case. Since most lawyers won't touch the kind of cases that vexatious litigants tend to file, the litigant tends to be representing themselves pro se (Lawyers taking these types of cases tend to get disbarred quite quickly as they are effectively taking money from clients who they ought to know don't have a snowball's chance in hell... with global warming in full effect... in an El Nino year). Furthermore, being declared a vexatious litigant in one state does not ban you from filing in another state and most election cases at the time of writing have yet to reach the Federal Level (and even then, such a declaration is not a nationwide ban. It only bans the litigant in federal courts. All 50 states have to separately ban the litigant in their own legal system). Secondly, while there are a number of cases over the past election that were dismissed, only a handful were filed by Trump's legal team. Many were filed by down-ballot Republicans or even voting citizens in many cases who's desired outcome just happens to align with Trump's desired outcomes. While most have been dismissed, it's wrong to say they were filed by Trump or his legal team. The right to litigate election results is quite broad as to who has the standing to file these cases and it varies from state to state. Finally, not all cases dismissed are dismissed "with prejudice" which means that while the case in it's current state is not acceptable for a court to hear, it's not without merit to be heard once the deficiencies are amended. As an example, one early case filed and dismissed was seeking an injunction to stop the vote-counting until the court could rule on the matter of how well ballot observers could actually "observe" the ballots being counted. However, between the time the case was filed and the judge heard the case, the ballots were all counted, which meant that the relief sought by the plaintiff (i.e. Trump) was physically impossible to grant BUT the legal question of whether ballot observers were allowed to properly observe the counting is still valid, so it was dismissed "Without Prejudice" which means the plaintiff could amend the case and refile as the relief needed to be changed. Essentially the judge is willing to at least hear the arguments but cannot grant the relief for damages sought. In the U.S., Judges cannot hear cases that are moot, even if there is a valid argument to be made (to give a criminal angle to this, yes, a judge should hear the evidence that a man committed mass murder... but only if that accused mass murderer is still alive to be punished... if he's dead there's really nothing the Judge can do.). | I know of no specific provision of the Constitution that would forbid it. I know of no court case in which it has been found unconstitutional. There's no "irony" clause in the Constitution. Taxation without representation may have been a grievance, but there's no inherent reason why the framers would have had to forbid it. US citizens do still have the "freedom to expatriate" (and avoid taxation) if they renounce their citizenship. There are already other examples of "taxation without representation" in US law (e.g. District of Columbia), which also have not been found unconstitutional in court, as far as I know. In many cases, expatriates can still vote for federal offices, including Congress (e.g. in a state where they used to live, or where a parent used to live). See https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/registration-ballots. The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes" with few limitations. There is certainly no explicit exception for expatriates. As far as I can tell, it would be constitutional if Congress were to impose an income tax on everybody in the world, regardless of residency or citizenship; it would just be hard to enforce. | Yes Ideally a case will be conducted by the same judge throughout, however, there are a multitude of personal, professional and administrative reasons why this might not happen - litigation can take years and like every other workplace people come and go, have changing family circumstances, sickness, vacations etc. A litigant should not be alarmed and trust that the new judge has got themselves up to speed. For most people, litigation is a rare and confusing experience, for judges it’s just another day at the office. | The core principle of stare decisis is that the law should not depend on what judge you got; two cases with the same facts should have the same outcome. In the common-law tradition, there weren't really written statutes; there was only "what's been done in the past," and so the only reference you'd have to what the law should be in some situation is past court decisions. If judges didn't have some constraints to rule similarly to before, there really wouldn't be any legal standards (because there was no written law to go back to; in civil-law countries, there always has been a written law, so precedent isn't so important). Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent. However, judges are expected to obey precedent, and for the most part do what they're supposed to do. If they don't, the case will likely be reversed on appeal. Binding precedent only applies within the area a court serves; a court doesn't have to listen to precedent from a different court that has nothing to do with the case. The rule is that precedent from any court up the appeals chain is binding; federal district courts are bound by their circuit court and SCOTUS, state courts are bound by higher state courts and SCOTUS (but not other federal courts, as the case can't be appealed to them). A court can sometimes overrule its own precedent, but the cases where it can do that are rare (and so applying a higher court's precedent can also be viewed as "if you appeal to them they'll say X, so we're saying X.") | The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form. | SCOTUS blog regularly does posts on that kind of topic (see, e.g., their Stat Pack) and if you looked at their sources or the authors of those posts, you could probably easily find more. There are people who do that and make their findings publicly available, but I don't know them off hand. |
Difference between German citizenship and ability to obtain a passport? Would additional citizenships remove these German ones? I am a US citizen born in the US to US citizen parents who also hold dual citizenship (of Colombia for one and of Germany for the other). I hold a US passport. As far as I can tell on the German Consulate website, I immediately, at birth, also became a German citizen by descent because "Children born in wedlock after Jan. 1, 1975, acquired German citizenship if one of the parents was a German citizen at the time of their birth". The German state has record of this since I was registered at a German consulate by my parents after I was born. My dad did not get his US citizenship until I was around 5. Furthermore, according to national law 19362, I am also entitled to Uruguayan citizenship because my grandfather, an Uruguayan citizen, was born & raised in Uruguay. I have not yet applied for this citizenship. I have several questions: I am already a German citizen simply because of my dad's citizenship at the time of my birth, correct? Applying for a German passport would be a related, but separate step? i.e., my current lack of German passport is not reflective of my citizenship status? If I were to apply for this Uruguayan citizenship via law 19362, would I be required by Germany to rescind my German citizenship and/or my right to a German passport? If the answer is yes to number 2, would it be possible to, in the future, rescind the Uruguayan citizenship and subsequently get the German one back? Is this allowed on both sides? The information on rescinding is tough to find. | Being automaticly citizens of the US and Uruguay, causes no problem with your German citizenship. For Uruguay, you are appling for recognition of your citizenship at birth as a grandchild of a Uruguayan citizen. Only when you, as an adult, apply for nationisation (i.e. that country considers you to be a foreigner at the time of the application) would you lose your German citizenship automaticly when this application has been granted, unless you apply for an exception beforhand. Such an exception would only be granted when you can prove that you still have strong ties to Germany. | The answer is "it depends," of course. An asylum application may be considered less credible if the applicant entered as a tourist. The applicant would have to explain what changed between the time of entry and the time of the asylum application. (Perhaps a change of government at home? The start of a civil war?) Many countries expect applications for a work permit to be made from outside. Such an application may take much longer to process than a tourist visa, which makes the stay as a tourist problematic. On the other hand, there are countries which allow some tourists to file immigration applications. For instance, Canadian citizens and some others can apply for a German residence permit while they are in Germany. | Yes, of course you still owe it. There's no logical reason why ceasing to be a citizen should relieve you of existing obligations. The State Department mentions this explicitly Persons who wish to renounce U.S. citizenship should be aware of the fact that renunciation of U.S. citizenship may have no effect on their U.S. tax or military service obligations (contact the Internal Revenue Service or U.S. Selective Service for more information). In addition, the act of renouncing U.S. citizenship does not allow persons to avoid possible prosecution for crimes which they may have committed or may commit in the future which violate United States law, or escape the repayment of financial obligations, including child support payments, previously incurred in the United States or incurred as United States citizens abroad. I think the "may" is just to cover their butts - I can't find any indication of any provision that would forgive tax debts when you renounce. Indeed, renouncing your citizenship may cause you to owe more tax, because of the expatriation tax. Basically, all your unrealized capital gains are treated as if they were realized and taxed on the day before your expatriation, and you owe capital gains tax on them. | From a German perspective, it would be absolutely normal and expected that you're providing identity & contact information publicly. Per §5 TMG (Impressumspflicht / Anbieterkennzeichnung) this is required for German tele-media offerings, such as websites or email providers, even if non-commercial. Whereas for you as an upstanding and diligent email provider an abuse@... address should be enough, the German context expects a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit… There absolutely are privacy and free speech issues with this compelled self-doxxing. But by running an email service, you're not just acting as a private person. Your privacy interests and the transparency and security interests of other people have to be balanced. Now since you are not in Germany, the TMG does not apply to you. You have no legal obligation to provide this information. However, the ISP also has no legal obligation to to deliver your email. The ISP does have an obligation to apply appropriate organizational and technical safety measures. It seems that one organizational measure they have found appropriate is that they will only deliver emails from providers that provide public contact information, as would be the norm in Germany. I am not entirely sure how the GDPR applies here. The GDPR doesn't really allow or prohibit disclosures of personal data, it just requires that every purpose of processing for personal data has a legal bases per GDPR Art 6. One such legal basis is a legitimate interest, which boils down to a balancing test between your rights and freedoms and other people's interests. I'm also not sure if the contact information should be classified as personal data in this context, because the contact info primarily relates to your role as an email provider. I'm also not sure if the ISP is processing your personal data in the sense of the GDPR when they merely require you to publish it on your own site. They would be processing it as soon as they scrape, store, or otherwise use this info. | The UN has a copy of the extradition treaty between the US and Brazil, the short version of it is that the treaty lays out in Article II an exhaustive list of crimes that are extraditable, skimming the list I don't see defamation (since of course in real life it's not a federal crime). As a general principle, Country A won't extradite someone to Country B if the conduct they are accused of in Country B is not a crime in Country A, if Country A does not think Country B would provide a fair trial, or if the person is convicted if the punishment likely to be imposed by Country B would be illegal under the laws of Country A (this comes up a lot with extradition from Europe to the US if a possible punishment for the crime is death). So in your hypothetical Brazil would probably be unwilling to extradite its own citizen for the crime the US accuses them of. I think another part of your question is whether the US or Brazil would have jurisdiction over this defamation. In theory, both could claim jurisdiction over it. In practice most criminal conduct is criminal relatively universally, especially among similarly geolocated countries, so the rest of this paragraph is assuming both countries did consider the defamation criminal and extraditable. As a matter of judicial effectiveness an Internet crime would probably be prosecuted in the country where the person resides. There would likely be a language barrier too, if the US court would have to employ a Portuguese translator. However, this is all largely a political question more than a legal one, if the US really wanted to make an example of this person in their own country the US could try to use political leverage to get Brazil to extradite them. The US could also wait until the person travelled abroad and petition the third country to imprison and extradite them. That's something that happens more commonly for citizens of a country that the US does not have an extradition treaty with. | The State Department is mischaracterizing the law, which requires only that the US citizen "bear" a valid US passport, not that the US citizen "use" the passport. This law, 8 USC 1185(b), used to have a fairly stiff penalty, and it used to apply only in time of war. When the wartime element was removed in 1978, so was the penalty. It now reads Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport. If a US citizen attempts to leave the US without a valid US passport, there is a very small chance that the departure could be prevented by a CBP officer, but in the normal course of affairs the traveler would not even encounter a CBP officer, so the possibility is very remote indeed. There is nothing, however, that prevents a US citizen who also holds a passport issued by another country from using the other passport while also carrying a valid US passport. See also What is the penalty for US citizens entering/leaving the US on a foreign passport? at Travel and Can someone be penalized for an "unlawful" act if no penalty is specified? on this site. | Yes, in most jurisdictions citizenship or residency is not a pre-requisite for standing. However, be aware that there are plenty of jurisdictions where the practical effect of being non-native gives you effectively no chance of winning. "Fair" in some countries means their citizens always beat foreigners. | Note that, criminals are not allowed to apply for a German citizenship, so I don't know whether the German government would consider being a deserter as a being criminal. First of all, they would deny a criminal German citizenry, but that goes only for crimes, that are also illegal in Germany (Sec. 12a § 2 Nationality Act, § 12a Abs. 2 StAG). Were you - for instance - convicted for muder you couldn't become a German citizen. Desertion in that sense however is not a criminal offence in Germany, so you're good. Regarding double citizenship, Sec. 12 § 1 2nd sentence no. 2 Nationality Act (§ 12 Abs. 1 S. 2 Nr. 2 StAG) allows you to keep your original citizenship, if the country of origin "regularly refuses to grant release from citizenship", which should be the case here. Therefore, you could become a German citizen according to Sec. 10 Nationality Act (§ 10 StAG). |
Are terms of use considered a contract from GDPR point of view? If service terms of use doesn’t talk about setting up a contract between the company and the user, can you use «execution of contract» as the lawfulness for GDPR processing ? If signup data is required to provide the service, do you need consent or does mentioning «by signing up you agree to the terms of use and privacy policy» enough ? | Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc. | Please note that Google Analytics do not anonymize the data you collect on its behalf unless you configure it to do IP-anonymization. If you use Google Analytics and do not use this feature, you need to have a DPA (Data Processing Addendum) in place with Google in order to comply with the GDPR. This is a real hassle, so unless you absolutely need fine-grained demographic data, it is strongly recommended that you use IP-anonymization. According to our data protection supervisory authority, this is sufficient to comply with the GDPR vis-a-vis Google Analytics. Does data that is anonymized need to be collect in the event of a GDPR Subject Access Request? No. But as the controller, you need to make sure that is is anonymized. | I don't think you would be responsible for whether your software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner. For GDPR compliance, it is important who the data controller is. The data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of a personal data processing activity, i.e. the why and how. The data controller alone is responsible for their GDPR compliance. When a data controller wants to run some software, it's the data controller's responsibility to ensure that this software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner (or possibly not at all). Determining purposes and means of processing When someone other than the developer runs a software, the question is who might be a controller: you as the developer, they as the operator, or neither, or both? The operator is clearly a controller: they determine a purpose for data processing (e.g. to manage staff) and have determined means to perform that processing (e.g. to use the software). The developer may or may not be a controller. Clearly, the developer has made choices about how the processing of personal data will be performed, i.e. has determined some means of processing. E.g. the developer has developed a particular architecture, chosen a way to store personal data, and has implemented some security measures. But determining some means is not sufficient to be a data controller, see discussion below. Has the developer participated in determining the purposes of processing? I think this will depend on the specific functionality provided by the software in question. If the software just does what it says and processes the data for the operator's purposes, everything should be fine. If the software also processes data for the developer's purposes, that developer might be a controller. For example, if analytics or crash reports are collected by the developer, that would be a clear indication that the developer would be a (joint) controller. So depending on specific factors, the operator might be the sole controller, or the operator and developer might be joint controllers. Essential vs non-essential means What about the developer determining some means? When does this make the developer a joint controller? The EDPB has created a theory of essential vs non-essential means: 40. As regards the determination of means, a distinction can be made between essential and non-essential means. “Essential means” are traditionally and inherently reserved to the controller. While non-essential means can also be determined by the processor, essential means are to be determined by the controller. “Essential means” are means that are closely linked to the purpose and the scope of the processing, such as the type of personal data which are processed (“which data shall be processed?”), the duration of the processing (“for how long shall they be processed?”), the categories of recipients (“who shall have access to them?”) and the categories of data subjects (“whose personal data are being processed?”). Together with the purpose of processing, the essential means are also closely linked to the question of whether the processing is lawful, necessary and proportionate. “Non-essential means” concern more practical aspects of implementation, such as the choice for a particular type of hard- or software or the detailed security measures which may be left to the processor to decide on. – EDPB guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, added formatting for legibility Looking through that list of essential means, some might be determined by a software's developer, but I wouldn't expect this to be the case for this kind of open source software. types of personal data: the software certainly sets a framework for processing specific kinds of personal data, e.g. by providing database fields for names, contact details, and schedules. But ultimately, the developer does not control which data is actually collected and filled into those fields – the developer does not cause specific kinds of personal data to be processed with the system. duration of processing: unless the software is programmed with a fixed retention schedule, it should be impossible to argue that the developer has determined the duration of processing. Even then, it would also be the operator who has determined this duration to be appropriate, rather than editing the open-source software to change the duration. But typically, no such retention schedule is enforced, and retention would depend solely on the operator (who can use an admin interface or a database console to erase old records). categories of recipients: typically, the developer does not determine to whom the data in the system will be given. But if the system sends data to third parties by itself, this might change. For example, if the system is pre-configured to store data in an existing cloud database instance, or to a specific analytics server, the developer might be acting as a controller. Here, good software engineering and legal risk minimization coincide. Best practices for web apps state that account credentials and connection strings shouldn't be hardcoded or committed to a repository, and should instead be provided externally (e.g. via environment variables). categories of data subjects: this depends solely on how the software is used. The developer has no way to determine whose data the operator will enter into the system. If the developer isn't a controller, might they be a data processor instead? In a GDPR context, a data processor is whoever processes personal data on behalf of a controller. The developer is clearly not a processor in this scenario because both the “processing” and “on behalf” criteria fail. The developer has no access to the data in the operator's instance, so cannot process the personal data. There is no direct relationship between the developer and the operator. The operator has not delegated authority to the developer so that the developer would be acting “on behalf” of the operator. There is a legal relationship between the two roles (the developer has licensed the software to the operator) but that is entirely irrelevant in a data protection context. The GDPR isn't directly about cookies While the GDPR does cover how personal data can be processed with cookies, the famous “cookie law” is actually separate: those cookie consent requirements stem from EU member state's implementations of the ePrivacy directive. Instead of talking about “controllers”, ePrivacy has concepts such as the “provider of an information society service”. While this role fits perfectly to an operator/provider who runs a web app in a publicly accessible manner, it does not fit a developer who merely makes some source code available. Is the developer even subject to the GDPR? The GDPR can only apply to data controllers and processor who process personal data. As discussed above, the developer is probably not processing personal data at all. Even if the developer were processing personal data, it is questionable if GDPR would apply assuming the developer has no “establishment” in the EU (e.g. an office). Then, the question would be whether those processing activities are either related to offering goods or services to data subjects in Europe, or whether the processing activities involve monitoring the behavior of people who are physically in Europe. Unless the developer is actively targeting European businesses with marketing for this software, the answer is very likely “no”. Could the operator sue the developer for providing software that isn't GDPR-compliant? The operator can sue anyone for any reason, but is probably not going to win. As discussed, the operator is a data controller. They are responsible for ensuring that their purposes and means are GDPR-compliant. That involves selecting suitable software. The data controller would be neglecting their own responsibilities if they just download some random software and start feeding personal data into it. Things might be different if the operator specifically advertises GDPR compliance features but you're not going to do that. It's also worth noting that common open source licenses like the Apache License 2.0 include a warranty and liability disclaimer. To which degree they protect the developer ultimately depends on national laws, but they make it difficult for the operator to make a legal argument that they're entitled to a GDPR-compliant product. See also the related question: Do warranty disclaimers in software licenses carry any legal weight? What can you do? First, don't worry too much. Given how much bad software there is on the internet, surprisingly few developer get into legal trouble for writing source code that's buggy or missing some features. Second, consider choosing a license for your project that includes a reasonable warranty/liability disclaimer. Third, make the state of your project clear in your README file. If someone knows that this is alpha-quality software and that no compliance features were implemented, it's their own fault if they actually use that software. | The GDPR is wide in scope, and flexible in application. Therefore it is not possible to give an absolute yes/no as to whether masking text with asterisks is or is not lawful. We can gain a deeper insight by looking at the GDPR itself. Firstly, the definition of processing (Art. 4 lit. 2): any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction As mentioned by amon, the principles relating to processing of personal data (Art. 5) are highly relevant, insofar as the activity constitutes processing. In particular, purpose limitation: [Personal data shall be] collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes ...and data minimisation: [Personal data shall be] adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed I would argue that making available the personal data on an invoice is processing. There are two separate operations: Making the data available to authenticated users; and Making the data available to non-authenticated users The purpose of making it available to authenticated users may be different to the purpose of making it available to non-authenticated users. Again acknowledging amon, the necessity of making the data available to non-authenticated users must be examined, as too must the means by which a non-authenticated user gains access to an invoice: are they using a URL that contains a token of some kind? Is this unique in some way? It could be that the presentation of a token itself constitutes authentication and thus authorisation to view the entire invoice, in which case further redaction may not be necessary if there is a clear necessity to disclose the entire contents to such a user. Whether the token expires or is limited to a certain referrer would be part of complying with the integrity and confidentiality principle and Art. 32 (Security of processing) by implementation of technical measures. When considering pseudonymisation and anonymisation, you will note that the redaction of name and address data from a certain view of the invoice, while nevertheless displaying the invoice number, constitutes pseudonymisation, since it would be possible with unfettered access to the remaining data, to determine the name and address from the invoice number, but not for the non-authenticated user whose view is redacted. In such a case, I fail to see how or why the replacement of a string with the same number of asterisks, or starting with the real character is secure or even practical, when the entire field could simply be replaced with a fixed-width string of asterisks or other filler, thus providing the user with no right or necessity to view the personal data with no further insight into what the personal data may or may not be. | Contacting a business email about a business matter is usually fine, but in this case we have an unsolicited marketing communication (spam), not really a business matter. The client's jurisdiction likely has more specific rules about spam. Also, it is unusual (read: presumably illegitimate) to contact individual employees rather than the company's official address with the offering. From the GDPR perspective, every processing of personal data (such as email addresses that might identify natural persons) needs a legal basis (Art 6). Let's go through them: consent? No. necessary for performance of a contract involving the data subject? No. legal obligation? No. vital interests? No. public interest? No. legitimate interest? Perhaps. The client has a legitimate interest to conduct their business. However, this legitimate interest must not be overridden by the data subject's interests, rights, and freedoms. Such as the interest in not being disturbed by spam mails. It is the Data Controller's (your client's) responsibility to balance the legitimate interest themselves to determine whether they have a legal basis, but I really don't think that they do. In conclusion, your client's idea is a bad idea: They likely do not have a legal basis for this under the GDPR. They are likely violating more specific anti-spam laws in their jurisdiction. They are working hard to get their domain put on spam filter lists. Note that already the step of collecting employee email addresses is personal data processing and needs a legal basis. Of course, the GDPR does not apply when the client is not established in the EU and only processes the addresses of persons that are not in the EU. | GDPR rights and obligations cover different things: A duty of the data processor towards the government of the country where they operate to present certain documentation, and to implement technical and organizational measures to protect data. These would be audited by government agencies, not the individual customer. A single data subject cannot waive them. A duty of the data processor to process and store personal data only with a legal justification. User consent is one possible justification, if it is informed, revokable, etc. So a single data subject can waive a "ban" on storing his or her data in a database along with all the other users who waived that "ban," but the duties towards the government regarding that data would still apply. A duty of the data processor to respond to an Article 15 request by the data subject in a certain way and timeframe. If a data subject writes a letter to the data processor and explicitly states that the letter is not an Article 15 request, then Article 15 does not apply. The data subject would of course have the right to make an Article 15 request at a later time. | Can you have valid Terms and Condictions when there is no entity mentioned? No, but the example you post is inapplicable because the terms clearly state in the beginning that the agreement is between "you" and "Binance operators". The latter is defined shortly thereafter. Thus, it certainly identifies the entity. A contract does not need to exhaustively list all information such as parties' registration(s) or domicile. As long as a reasonable person is able to grasp who are the entities entering a contract, that contract is binding and enforceable. If it cannot be ascertained from the contract who the counterparty(-ies) is(are), then neither party can prove that he and other entity(-ies) knowingly and willfully agreed to an exchange of considerations or promises thereof. Accordingly, nobody would have standing to sue others for breach of contract. | b. the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based [...] That refers to Article 6(1)(a): Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: a. the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; Article 7 contains the conditions for consent. As far as I know, Facebook has never requested consent as specified in Article 7. You have accepted the Terms of Service, but that does not count as also explained in recital 43 Consent is presumed not to be freely given [...] if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. So because you have not given consent as defined in the GDPR, you cannot withdraw consent. But even if you can withdraw consent, it would only apply to data processing based on Article 6(1)(a). Facebook would not base the processing of data regarding friendships on Article 6.1a, because it looks to me that is a key feature of Facebook. Even regarding the past friendship with John Doe, processing would probably be based on Article 6.1f, for example because John Doe has interests in keeping that data. Only if for example the knowledge of that past friendship is used to display an ad, it would be possible to withdraw consent of that data processing, but that would not lead to deleting any data. Facebook would still know about that friendship, you would still see an ad, but which ad is shown, would not be based on that past friendship. |
What are the "usual" laws for taking antiquities? It is in the news that a British geologist has been sentenced to 15 years for "intentionally taking or trying to take out of Iraq an antiquity", specifically 12 stones and shards of broken pottery which were in his and his college/friend possession as they attempted to leave the country. His main defense seems to be that he had no idea he was breaking Iraqi laws. I know very little about archaeology, and less about laws around the world, but I would expect most if not all countries to prohibit the removal of antiquities without specific permission. I am also aware that one of the most important types of antiquity are pottery fragments, in terms of what we have learnt about history. I would expect a geologist with an interest in international archaeology to know more about laws regarding this than me. What are the "usual" laws about taking such items out of a country? Any relevant jurisdiction would be interesting, but the best answer would compare multiple jurisdictions to give any idea of what someone who was familiar with this field might justifiably expect the law to be. | Here are examples from Tanzania, Kenya, Norway, Canada, and Iraq. See this article for an analysis of the myriad laws of Greece. The general situation is that there is no general situation, and it is necessary to read the law of the country, contemplating for all objects whether their export is allowed or forbidden. Many expressions are used to refer to restricted items, such as "cultural object", "monument", "antiquity". It turns out that paintings, boats and their parts that are older that 50 years old are on the list for Norway, but not Iraq. Tanzanian law is a bit flexible, in that "ethnographic objects" are on the list requiring a permit, defined as a think made by humans "for use in any social or cultural activity whether or not it is still being used by any community in Tanzania", regardless of age, "but does not include any object made, shaped, painted, carved, inscribed or otherwise produced or modified by human agency in Tanzania for sale as a curio" (because sale of tourist trinkets is big business in Tanzania). At times, an "informal export permit" can be required for goods of questionable provenance (for example, carved doors). Most often, the definition of restricted items is framed in terms of kind of item and age, for example ethnographic object in an African or Asian style from before 1940 (Tanzania), the aforementioned Norwegian items either "before 1950" or "more than 50 years old". Ignorance of the law is no excuse, nor is inability to guess what will be considered to have "cultural significance". | You're largely correct, though there's some vocabulary you're using that could go either way in terms of proper understanding. My comments on your understanding, presuming we're dealing with two Berne countries (UCC is largely irrelevant these days): My understanding of copyright is that it grants the author an exclusive right to distribute their work in whatever manner they'd like for some amount of time (determined by the copyright duration in a country). Generally correct though there can be many exceptions here (fair use, technical/temporary copying, first-sale doctrine, etc.). Can a person in Country A legally use the adapted work? I'm assuming no [...], Basically correct, whoever holds rights to the original work could theoretically still assert their rights in Country A on any portion of the derivative work that was part of the original. [...] does that mean that the author of the work created in Country B does not technically have all the rights to the work they created, since they have no control over whether their work can be distributed in Country A? This is splitting hairs, but while the derivative author has the rights given to them by copyright law, they aren't absolute. In particular in this case, regardless of which country, they still don't have any inherent exclusive rights over the original work. With respect to country B, those exclusive rights have expired so they don't bind the derivative author, but they haven't expired in country A. If that is the case, then would these rights be "granted" to the author of the adaptation when the copyright finally expires in Country A? Again splitting hairs, but its more helpful to express that no rights are actively granted by the expiration of copyright in Country A, it's just that no one holds those rights anymore (here there might be a language issue too, generally in copyright law "rights" refers to those exclusive actions that may be taken by the copyright holder, and not always to the "right" i.e. "freedom" for someone to do something). | This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas). | Such things are in fact legal in some US jurisdictions, as part of plea bargains. In fact such pleas are not uncommon. More usual is the case where a person pleads guilty to a lesser crime, so as to qualify for a lower sentence, when all involved know that the lesser crime was not committed by anyone. It is simply a device to get a compromise sentence and avoid a trial. In some jurisdictions the Judge, in the course of accepting a guilty plea, requires that the accused admit specific facts that form a minimal legal basis for conviction of the crime pled to. In others no such admission is made. But even where such an admission is made, the truth of such an admission is not usually checked. The Judge will generally make sure that the accused understands the effect of a guilty plea, the rights given up by such a plea, and the possible range of sentences that will result. If the Judge believes that the plea constitutes a miscarriage of justice, for example that a totally innocent person is yielding to improper pressure from the prosecutor, the Judge can refuse the plea, but this is very rare in practice. | Check your local law. In Washington, the chapter RCW 63.21 says what you are supposed to do. The first part of the law has apparently been satisfieds: Any person who finds property that is not unlawful to possess, the owner of which is unknown, and who wishes to claim the found property Then you need to get a signed appraisal stating current market value from a qualified person engaged in buying or selling the items, or by a district court judge (I have no idea where district court judges get their qualifications to appraise bricks), then within 7 days, report this to the cief LEO where the stuff was found (and surrender it, if requested). You also have to serve written notice upon that officer stating your to claim the property. The burden now shifts to the government, which must publish notices in a local newspaper at least weakly, for 2 weeks. The notice might be publishable in a no-cost venue, in case the publication cost is greater than the value of the stuff. If the owner appears and establishes ownership, that's the end of the finder's potential interest. If the owner does not show up, the property will be released to the finder once he has paid the government's publishing expenses plus $10, but if the goods are appraised at less than publishing cost, there is no fee. As a finder, you have 30 days after that 60 days to pay required costs, otherwise it goes to the government. There are some exceptions, things not subject to finders-keepers (crab pots, secured vessels, motor vehicles, unclaimed property in the hands of a bailee). If you do not comply with these requirements, you forfeit any right to the property and you are liable to the property owner for the value of the bricks. Under the definition of theft, you have a defense that The property or service was appropriated openly and avowedly under a claim of title made in good faith, even though the claim be untenable since you presumably intend to claim ownership of the bricks under the lost property statute. | The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission. | The law does not say. It is up to the judgment of the judge to determine what constitutes "Le fait de provoquer directement à des actes de terrorisme ou de faire publiquement l'apologie de ces actes". I would not have predicted that the act constituted "faire publiquement l'apologie", but if that expression can reasonably construed as meaning "indicating approval of", then I understand the conclusion. The law does not mention SSIDs, that simply falls under the penumbra of "publicly approving of terrorism", and there isn't a specific list of forbidden acts. Analogously, Holocaust denial is against the law in France, and there is not a specific list of things that you can't say, there is a general rule from which specifics can be inferred. Publicly saying "Free Kurdistan!" could be construed as supporting PKK and thus approving of terrorism, but that would be quite a stretch. Using the SSID Pkk21, on the other hand, could be a problem. | The powers given to law enforcement professionals will be detailed in the relevant law that establishes them. I would suspect that the decision to cordon off an area would fall within the purview of the officer on the scene; the idea that a police officer would need to seek permission before cordoning off a motor vehicle accident or chemical spill is unworkable. I would also suspect that other emergency personnel (e.g. ambulance and fire-fighters) would have similar powers. However, such cordoning off would be a temporary measure and if it was maintained for an unreasonable period it would be open to challenge through an administrative or judicial process. If the police decided that a feature was a permanent hazard then they could seek a court order on the owner of the property to provide some measure to adequately protect the public, by either removing the hazard or providing some permanent barrier, under whatever laws seemed most appropriate. |
How can one gain access to isolated pockets of open access land? What rights do members of the public have to access isolated areas of open access land, if any at all? That is to say areas of access land which are (i) not crossed by and do not adjoin any public rights of way or (ii) areas of access land which are separated from all other nearby access land and rights of way by excepted land. Examples of such land can be found in these locations: Example 0 Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 - Notice the railway line which isolates the western part of the access land Example 5 - Notice the track leading to the road is not marked as a right of way As far as I can tell, no specific provision is made for cases such as this in the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000: “means of access”, in relation to land, means (a) any opening in a wall, fence or hedge bounding the land (or part of the land), with or without a gate, stile or other works for regulating passage through the opening, (b) any stairs or steps for enabling persons to enter on the land (or part of the land), or (c) any bridge, stepping stone or other works for crossing a watercourse, ditch or bog on the land or adjoining the boundary of the land. This appears to make the implicit assumption that the relevant access land will be adjacent to some form of right of way. | If, as your question stipulates, there are no public rights of way (such as an easement) to the enclaved public area, then you must gain permission from the private landowner to cross their land before accessing the public area. If it's possible to fly over the private land using something like a helicopter or a plane, as long as you fly high enough, That wouldn't require permission. | Because the courts or the legislature decide they have them There is no doubt that both the courts and the legislature in common law countries have the ability to find, create, or extend rights and this has been done in the past. This is, in fact, where legal rights were created. The US Bill of Rights was created by the people in 1791. If the people in 2191 want to grant rights to AIs then they can do this. This is legally possible. Whether it's a good idea is a matter of philosophy and politics. | There are a number of rules related to trespassing vegetation, reviewed in Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355. Virginia law was set in Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519, that encroaching trees and plants are not nuisances merely because they cast shade, drop leaves, flowers, or fruit, or just because they happen to encroach upon adjoining property either above or below the ground. However, encroaching trees and plants may be regarded as a nuisance when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of actual harm to adjoining property. If so, the owner of the tree or plant may be held responsible for harm caused to [adjoining property], and may also be required to cut back the encroaching branches or roots, assuming the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance. so under the circumstances, you can't make him do anything. However, the court continues that the adjoining landowner may, at his own expense, cut away the encroaching vegetation to the property line whether or not the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance or is otherwise causing harm or possible harm to the adjoining property. You are, however, responsible for damage to the tree caused by such trimming, and you can't trespass onto his property to trim it (fences are often an approximation of property lines) | The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in effect since 1976 and currently signed by about 179 countries, has in Article 12 Paragraph 4: No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. It's not absolute, as it would allow for a person to be deprived of that right if it weren't "arbitrary". But it's the strongest statement I've found so far. | In the US, does a person photographing private property (houses, farms etc.) while standing on public ground (road, park etc.) commit any offence? No. In general, while standing on public land, it is legal for your eyes to glance onto everything around you. You cannot be arrested and imprisoned for allowing your gaze to pass over your neighbours lawn. It is legal for you to take out a tripod, canvas and paintbrushes and paint the general scene, even if it includes, for example, a tree standing on private land. Instead of a paintbrush, you may use a camera to create a picture of the scene. There are a few exceptions Some military installations Some installations operated by the department of energy (e.g. some nuclear power stations) You cannot photograph people where they have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" - Note that this is not dependant on how the people feel about it. You can photograph a couple kissing at a bus stop, you probably can't legally point a telephoto lens at their bedroom window through a broken privacy-fence. will they commit any offence by publishing the photos They may need copyright permission from the owners of any identifiable works of art included and may need model releases from identifiable people included. There are specific exceptions allowing the publishing of photographs of sculptures and buildings that are visible from public spaces. See The Photographer's Right | If a trespasser openly and notoriously, exclusively and continuously possesses your property by building a fence on your land for the right time period, they automatically own the land. It still takes a court proceeding to record the passing of title (the trespasser has to prove in court that it is legally theirs). The trespasser would also have to establish that the recent survey was correct (survey errors do exist): was there an earlier survey in connection with the fence that established different boundaries? If (as it turns out) this has become his property, he abstractly has title to it, but only you and he know about it. The trespasser may have an interest in officially changing the property description, because it will officially increase the size of his lot and thus the value of the house+land. This also will increase their tax burden (while decreasing yours). The county has no knowledge of the fence: they go off of the official record, which says that you own that wedge. You also may have an interest in changing the property description, primarily to reduce your tax bite. There could also be issues with your resale of the property, since a mortgage company may require a survey of the property. Whether or not that is bad is hard to say: the consequence could be that the buyer is alerted to the fact that the lot is smaller than advertised and so on; in the current market I doubt anyone would care. If the fence goes away and you start using the land, then it will officially revert to you after a while. If you catch the party and complain within 10 years, you may recover the property (RCW 7.28.010). The limitations statute says that The period prescribed for the commencement of actions shall be as follows: Within ten years: (1) For actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, his or her ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action. That ship has (apparently) long since sailed. There is a different law pertaining to "Adverse possession under title deducible of record" which shortens the limit to 7 years, which is even less useful to the original owner. RCW 7.28.070 also shortens the time limit for an adverse possession case, to 7 years: Every person in actual, open and notorious possession of lands..who shall for seven successive years continue in possession, and shall also during said time pay all taxes legally assessed on such lands or tenements, shall be ... the legal owner of said lands There is another (more recent) tax-related provision, RCW 7.28.083. (1) A party who prevails against the holder of record title at the time an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession was filed, or against a subsequent purchaser from such holder, may be required to: (a) Reimburse such holder or purchaser for part or all of any taxes or assessments levied on the real property during the period the prevailing party was in possession of the real property in question and which are proven by competent evidence to have been paid by such holder or purchaser; This does not require them to have paid taxes, it say that the victor in the dispute may nevertheless be ordered to reimburse taxes paid by the other party (assuming the other party has paid the tax). So there is some chance of getting the taxes back. The reimbursement is at the court's discretion (continuing that section): (2) If the court orders reimbursement for taxes or assessments paid or payment of taxes or assessments due under subsection (1) of this section, the court shall determine how to allocate taxes or assessments between the property acquired by adverse possession and the property retained by the title holder. In making its determination, the court shall consider all the facts and shall order such reimbursement or payment as appears equitable and just. One should also pay attention to the last provision in that statute: (3) The prevailing party in an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession may request the court to award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The court may award all or a portion of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if, after considering all the facts, the court determines such an award is equitable and just. That means that the victor can request the loser to pay his attorney's fees. This is delicate math, balancing the chance of recovering some paid taxes vs. paying the other guy's costs. You could try calling the assessor to find out how much the decrease in lot size might net you (the land vs. improvement proportion of taxes is all over the map in KC, easily ranging from 60% to 250% depending on year). One additional feature of adverse possession is that it must be "hostile", i.e. without permission. If a neighbor builds on your land, you can explicitly give them revocable permission (to avoid "no you didn't" arguments, explicit and revocable written permission, signed by the neighbor, would bar an adverse possession claim). This raises an interesting question, to which I don't know the answer. Suppose the prior owner gave permission to the fence builder, and did not demand the removal of the fence when he sold the property or right after the neighbor sold his property (there was only on act of granting permission). Does the clock start from your acquisition of the property (whereupon the element of hostility is satisfied)? Or does it start from the point where they acquired the property and were in hostile possession of the land (I would bet a quarter that that's the answer). If (or, given that) the fence was moved further onto your property more recently, there is a chance to recover the newly-taken piece of land. If you grant them revocable permission to build a fence on your property, you would not be subject to an adverse possession taking for the newly-taken land. If at some point you tell them to tear down the fence and they refuse, you can sue them and the court will (almost certainly) order the removal of the fence. The neighbor might then initiate an action to quiet title on the originally-taken piece of land, so you'd be back to where you were 4 years ago. From a practical perspective, this is well-worth the small amount of money involved to consult with an attorney to get legal advice. The legal matter probably will not go away quickly, and they may be presently inclined to settle in a manner more in your favor. | Maryland has no law requiring a neighbor to not plant / trim trees that might shade a solar panel (on the ground or on the roof). There are laws against deeds, declarations, covenants, contracts etc. (excepting registered historic properties) which prohibit of roof panels (e.g. as part of a HOA's rules). The law also recognizes the right to enter into an easement agreement, but that requires agreement by the neighbor. California has a law requiring tree trimming that would cover this case. | The UK does have free lawyers for those who cannot afford an attorney. In fact, it is even more liberal than the US, including representation in civil cases for the most part as well (there are a few exceptions, like libel, and from what I've read, even that is changing). Rather than the main source of free representation being called public defenders, they are referred to as Legal Aid, which is a government funded agency much like public defenders are in the United States. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that legal aid will be made available to those who lack sufficient resources, in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. In the event legal aid is too busy to accept a new client, the court will appoint a solicitor from a list of private firms/practitioners that will act in the same capacity. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees the right to a fair trial in both civil and criminal proceedings. This has been interpreted as providing for a general requirement of some measure of “equality of arms” between the state and the individual or between the parties in the case, and the overall structure of the article, as well as the case law of the Court, stresses the vital connection between the right to legal assistance and the general interest in guaranteeing the right to a fair trial. When faced with a criminal charge, the right to legal assistance is explicitly set out in Article 6 (3) (c). An entitlement to free legal aid in civil cases is available in cases where the absence of legal support would make any equality of arms impossible and would effectively deprive an applicant of access to the proceedings as such, for example, when a case can be filed to a court only if assisted by a lawyer in circumstances when an applicant cannot clearly afford one. My guess is, if your friend was denied counsel under legal aid, she has too much income or to many assets to qualify, or she is involved in a case that does not qualify. That said, the right to counsel in in the UK is a right for the indigent in most types of cases (even civil) and is becoming more and more fundamental as imposed by findings of the European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence. Here is a link where you can at least begin to get some information. https://www.gov.uk/legal-aid/overview |
Is it legal to wear a short a little transparent like this, outside? Is it legal or prohibited to wear, for example in my garden where I can be seen by others, or at the beach, a semi-transparent shorts and my organs under (…like the picture)? | Public nudity is not generally prohibited in most of Europe, only exhibitionism is (exhibitionism: openly presenting your private parts in a way to stimulate sexual desire). Now that does not mean you can really walk around nude everywhere. If there are other people around, you may be fined for "public harassment". That will typically only give a small fine, though. Particularly in Germany, but also in parts of France, beaches are normally fine. While there are often separate areas for nude bathing, usually people don't really care, unless there are a lots of children around. In Germany, almost nobody wears something for a swim before breakfast. And IIRC wearing nothing in your house or even in your garden is perfectly fine, even if it can be seen from outside. So while you might be looked at strangely if you only wear those shorts (particularly in the middle of a town) I don't think much will happen. | The fact that something is illegal does not imply that it is illegal to post pictures of it happening. In general, under U.S. law, free speech protects almost all forms of communications subject to a handful of narrow exceptions and this is not one of them. There are many legitimate reasons one might want to post video of a fight (e.g. to identify crime perpetrators for purposes of prosecuting them), but no legitimate purpose is legally necessary. Surely as a platform Reddit cant hide against it being a platform of free speech in this case? They most definitely can. Reddit is also not responsible for user posted content under Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act, even if it were illegal for the person posting it to post the content | You are right that this is probably a private space; you are wrong in thinking it is your private space; it isn't. The space belongs to your employer and they can do whatever they want with their space unless there is a law that says they can't. As to what type of "hidden surveillance" is allowed that depends on your particular circumstances including what state and federal laws apply and the employment contract you are covered by. As a starting point, if this was happening in Australia then: If you gave permission, all would be legal If you did not give permission: it would be illegal to record anything taking place across a public telecommunications system (i.e. phone tapping) it would be legal for anyone to make an audio recording (not phone tapping) of any conversation to which they were a party it would be legal to make a video recording without sound. | In the United States, I would strongly expect that an accurate depiction of historical fact (even if uncomfortably graphic) would be protected under the First Ammendment. Otherwise, the government could functionally censor the worst parts of history (as being too awful to discuss or depict), which is exactly the kind of thing the First Amendment is designed to prevent. There are three important categories of speech that are not protected: (1) "fighting words" directed at a person intended to provoke a fight, (2) words that infict emotional distress such that it qualifies as a tort, and (3) speech that court finds to qualify as "obscenity". Of these three, your game probably will not qualify for the first, since it generally requires speech directed at a specific person or people. I also suspect (less confidently) that an emotional-distress tort would not succeed since your game is not directed at any particular living people. Even if the game caused emotional distress to someone, your public release of the game probably could not qualify as a tort against that specific player who happens to experience emotional distress. The Miller test is used to determine if a work is obscenity. Wikipeida summarizes its three parts, all of which must be satisfied to constitute obscenity: Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards", would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law, Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The first two are explicitly sexual in nature. I don't know if there is any similar prohibition against hyper-violence, but even if there were, as long as your game does not run afoul of the "lacks serious artistic value" condition, you will be on the safe side of the line. Note that none of this stops anyone from initiating legal action against you (which may cause headaches for you); it only stops those legal actions from succeededing. | I think you would have difficulty distorting the situation - Pokemon Go is not magic that defies existing laws, and this would be no different to a mall issuing a trespass notice (which is effectively how they would kick you out) for any other reason. I would question the ability of a store to "Arrest" you - that is a job for the police - After they trespass you (ie by giving you notice to leave), if you come back again then they can call the police to arrest you - but its not as clear-cut as someone seeing you playing a game and arresting you. I don't think Pokemon players are a "protected class" of people, so finding a valid cause of action might be tricky. About the best you could do would be to talk with your wallet (ie shop elsewhere with your friends), but for my money that would make me more likely to go to that mall ! | Yes The US constitution is in the public domain. Anyone may publish a version of it, including an altered version. No US law forbidding publication of an altered version would itself be constitutional -- the First Amendment would prevent such a law. However, if an altered version were sold under such conditions that a customer might reasonably believe it to be an unaltered version, that might be false advertising, or perhaps fraud, because the seller would be deceiving the customer as to what the product is. | Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform. | Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful. |
Why does the Ninth Circuit court include so many states? It appears odd that the ninth circuit contains not just so many states, which by itself would not be unique, but so many states with addition of California. Circuit courts for NY, FL, TX from what I see only contain a few states. What was the reason for this, or this is just not unusual? | Basically, it is a historical accident with a healthy mix of partisan politics thrown into the mix. The history is recounted here. Circuits were much less important until the intermediate U.S. Court of Appeals for the various circuits were created by Congress, in the Judiciary Act of 1891, commonly known as the Evarts Act, established nine courts of appeals, one for each judicial circuit at the time. Before that time, circuits were simply an administrative tool of the U.S. Supreme Court for assigning work loads of justices assigned to tasks in connection with these circuits, which was adjusted from time to time with the 9th Circuit being the last one to be created in the pre-intermediate appellate court era. The Tenth Circuit was established on February 28, 1929, under Tenth Circuit Reorganization Act of 1929, which broke the then-Eighth Circuit into the Eighth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit. The circuits have generally have had three or more states, have not split any states, and have been contiguous. As new states were admitted this ended up leaving lots of states in the 9th Circuit and there was no where else to add Hawaii and Alaska. Reassigning a state from the 9th Circuit to an existing circuit is complicated because it leaves open the question of which circuits precedents to turn to for pre-split law. If one turns to the new circuit's pre-reassignment case law, the law in the reassigned states suddenly changes on a variety of issues upon which people have acted in reliance on the old law. If one turns to the old circuit's pre-reassignment case law, then the case law is not uniform for all states in the circuit. Politically, splitting up the 9th Circuit has been discussed seriously many times, but there has not been a political consensus around a particular proposal to do it. The fact that the 9th Circuit has quite a few states in it really isn't the main issue. The issue is that it has a huge number of cases relative to the other circuits. As a result, a split is justified by the sound non-partisan reason that it is much larger in terms of caseload than any other circuit giving it more judges, twenty-nine, than any other circuit, and limiting the effectiveness of its en banc review process which doesn't include all sitting judges to resolve intra-circuit concerns about a three judge appeal panel's resolution of a case. The conservative states whose politicians want out of the left leaning 9th Circuit don't have enough population, collectively, to justify a circuit of their own, and wouldn't be fully contiguous, which makes their politically driven split proposals problematic. Arizona, Idaho, Montana and Alaska would like to be in a more conservative circuit. Hawaii, Washington State, Oregon, and California, are by and large, content to be in a liberal leaning circuit. Nevada is relatively ambivalent, but it is convenient for it to be in the same circuit as California because the two states have so many economic ties with each other that sharing the same body of federal precedent is convenient. Guam and the Marianas Islands, which are U.S. territories in the 9th Circuit, don't really have a say in the matter. California is also so dominant in terms of case load, that a California plus one or more states solution for one of the resulting circuits in a split, with the remaining states in another circuit, leaves the circuit with California in it overloaded and too large, while the remaining states in the other circuit with too small of a docket. More than 50 percent of the Ninth Circuit caseload comes from the Central District of California. This is more than the caseload of some other entire U.S. Court of Appeals circuits. California as a whole accounts for about 63% of the 9th Circuit's work (about 18 judges worth), and about 13% of the number of appeals lodged nationwide. The First Circuit, which includes Maine, New Hampshire, Massachussetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut, is the smallest of the U.S. Court of Appeals Circuits which manages with just six judges, about half as many as are necessary to consider appeals from the Central District of California alone. | It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action. | The U.S. Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to set everyday procedural rules in state court, although it can mandate processes that flow from the constitution. In criminal cases, this allows it to regulate courtroom conduct that is prejudicial to defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has prohibited keeping criminal defendants facing trial in a cage in the courtroom as is common in many jurisdictions elsewhere in the world. The Rittenhouse case took place in state court, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has limited authority in such matters. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has broad authority to establish court rules in the federal courts and could adopt rules in those courts if it deemed fit, and if its proposed rules were not legislatively vetoed by Congress. | As a linguist who reads laws for a hobby, I would say that "and" legally means what it was intended to mean. There are often interpretive statutes which say that "and" can be read as "or" or vice versa, when necessary (as in ORC 1.02 "And" may be read "or," and "or" may be read "and" if the sense requires it. Delaware doesn't have that as a rule, but it is a rule employed by courts "as required". One approach to interpretation is to discern intent from surrounding text, so we would look at the whole code. The general context is the rule that "A building or land shall be used only for the following purposes". Following Article XXVII of the code, other uses could be permitted because "§115-32. Special use exceptions may be permitted by the Board of Adjustment and in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVII of this chapter and may include...". That section ends with "C:Other special use exceptions as follows", and includes "Private garages for more than four automobiles and with floor area of more than 900 square feet in a residential district". From the list of things enumerated in §115-32, there is no coherent pattern – some things are in the list of special exceptions, some things are in this list, some not. So the "surrounding text" approach doesn't help in this case. Scrutiny of legislative debate is sometimes invoked, especially at the federal level, but there is negligible chance that there is any such evidence here. The almost-final approach is to spell out the competing interpretations, and see if anything jumps out as ridiculous (because it is assumed that lawmakers do not pass ridiculous laws). The two interpretations are "both must be true", versus "one must be true". Since the general rule is that you can go ahead unless it is restricted, then with the "both" interpretation, you need a special exception permit if you simultaneously plan to have more than 4 automobiles (which means, 5+, so 4 is allowed) and floor area greater than 900 sf. Thus if you plan for only 4 cars, or can fit the 5 cars into 900 sf, then you would not require a permit (on the "both" interpretation). Which btw is the literal interpretation of "and". This is not an absurd scenario (using a generous 10'x18' space, which I derived from parking slot regulations in Danbury CT). So it is reasonable to think they meant "both". The "either of these" interpretation says that they are being even more restrictive – you need permission to have a 5+ car garage (regardless of size), and you need permission to have a garage larger than 800 sf (even if there were only 1 car in it). This seems a bit specific since there isn't generally a size restriction on structures in the code – except that playhouses are limited to 150 sf. and can't be tall enough for an adult to stand up. Since the literal meaning of "and" is "both at once", and since no facts about the code say otherwise (i.e. that interpretation does not result in an absurd nullification of some other provision), an objective court should interpret this rule to mean "both at once", thus the government imposes the fewest restrictions on your property. No way to know what they will do. | Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say. | Short answer: Yes. There are some matters in the exclusive original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, which consists of suits between U.S. states and/or foreign states with each other and suits involving diplomats. On average, one or two such suits are filed each year. The original jurisdiction in these cases is created by Article III of the United States Constitution (Section 2, Clause 2), and is exclusive in these cases by virtue of the 1789 Judiciary Act. The 11th Amendment also plays a role in this analysis. Long answer: The original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court is set forth in Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United State Constitution, which states: In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. Basically, these are cases of a state against the United States and/or another state, often regarding boundary disputes, interpretations of interstate compacts, or water rights, or cases involving diplomats adjudicating the extent of diplomatic immunity. (Incidentally, almost all, but not all of the cases in the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction are discretionary, but appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court from three judge panels ruling in certain election law cases are of right.) How rare are these suit in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court? On average, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered about one per year on the merits since it came into existence. This has been between 0.5% and 2% of the U.S. Supreme Court's overall caseload of merits cases in modern times. (These days the U.S. Supreme Court typically decides about 70 case a year on the merits and evaluates about 5,000 certiorari petitions each year.) Between 1789 and 1959, the Court issued written opinions in only 123 original cases. Since 1960, the Court has received fewer than 140 motions for leave to file original cases, nearly half of which were denied a hearing. The majority of cases filed have been in disputes between two or more states. The Court has generally accepted state party cases dealing with boundary and water disputes, but it has been much less likely to field original cases dealing with contract disputes and other subjects not deemed sufficiently substantial for the Court's resources. In practice, when a case in the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is filed, it is almost always assigned immediately to a "special master" who develops the case until it is ready for U.S. Supreme Court review. The U.S. Supreme Court briefly allowed non-residents of a state to sue state governments in its original jurisdiction, but this authority was quickly eliminated by the passage of the 11th Amendment (which has also been interpreted as codifying the principal of a state's sovereign immunity from suits by its own citizens outside its own courts without its consent). In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress made the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction exclusive in suits between two or more states, between a state and a foreign government, and in suits against ambassadors and other public ministers. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the remainder of suits to which a state was a party was to be concurrent, presumably with state courts since the statute did not expressly confer these cases upon the inferior federal courts. Notably, this exclusivity rule does not apply to suits between a state and the United States, or to suits brought by states against non-residents (whether or not they are U.S. persons), although such suits have been interpreted to be within the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court: In the 1892 case of United States v. Texas , Justice John Marshall Harlan ruled that since the federal judicial power extended to "cases in which the United States was a party," and the Court was granted jurisdiction over cases to which a state was a party, the Court would take jurisdiction in a United States suit against a state. Such suits by the United States increased after the 1890s and usually involved disputes with states over land, though in the late twentieth century they also included a few suits to enforce provisions of the Federal Voting Rights Act. As a result of the 11th Amendment and the 1789 Judiciary Act, the U.S. District Courts only have jurisdiction over states when they consent to suit in the forum (usually for federal law cases involving bankruptcies), or when the United States is a party and no private individuals are parties (as in the federal district court case Arizona v. United States mentioned in the comments) since U.S. District Courts have jurisdiction over all suits to which the United States is a party. U.S. District Court jurisdiction is limited, however, by doctrines of state sovereign immunity, to cases seeking only injunctive relief that seek to enforce the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution (although this is circumvented, in part, by bringing suits against state officials as opposed to state governments themselves). So basically, states themselves can only be sued in U.S. District Courts by the United States for injunctive relief under the 14th Amendment. (For this purpose, unlike many other purposes under the U.S. Constitution, the term "state" does not include local governments which can be sued in federal court, and often are sued there for civil rights violations.) Also, despite the seemingly mandatory nature of the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, it declines to hear about half of the cases presented to it in that capacity. The Supreme Court further limited its original docket by declaring that it would exercise discretion over whether to hear cases even if they were legitimately within the Court's jurisdiction. In a series of cases in 1971, including Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp ., the Court declined to hear environmental pollution claims brought by states against corporations that dealt with complex and technical factual questions. The justices ruled that the states had other available forums to bring their claims and that the cases were not "appropriate" for the Court in light of its primary function as the nation's highest appellate tribunal. The Court resolved to examine the "seriousness and dignity" of claims so as to preserve its resources for consideration of appeals involving federal questions. The Supreme Court soon expanded its appropriateness doctrine to decline to hear some cases between two states, even where the Court's jurisdiction was exclusive. The U.S. Supreme Court also has the statutory authority (almost never used) under the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651) to issue writs of habeas corpus filed directly in the U.S. Supreme Court rather than a lower court, although strictly speaking it doesn't add to the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction. About 60 habeas corpus cases are filed directly in the U.S. Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction each year, although very few are granted. The text of the All Writs Act is as follows: (a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. (b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction. According to Wikipedia (with appropriate citation to authority): Application of the All Writs Act requires the fulfillment of four conditions: The absence of alternative remedies—the act is only applicable when other judicial tools are not available. An independent basis for jurisdiction—the act authorizes writs in aid of jurisdiction, but does not in itself create any federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Necessary or appropriate in aid of jurisdiction—the writ must be necessary or appropriate to the particular case. Usages and principles of law—the statute requires courts to issue writs "agreeable to the usages and principles of law". | There have been instances where the US Supreme Court has held over cases to the next term, and instances where they ordered a case re-argued in the next term. Brown vs Board of Education was a particularly well known case that was reargued. I believe that such occasions are rare, and that the court makes a significant effort to decide each case in the same term where certiorari is granted. Once exception is when the Court has a vacancy and is waiting fora new Justice to be confirmed, and the Justices in office are tied. Then cases with 4-4 splits are often held and re-argued. More often, the Justices decide, after granting certiorari, that this was a mistake, and dismiss the case altogether. The phrase used is that the writ is "dismissed as improvidently granted" or "DIGed". This has the same ultimate effect as if certiorari had never been granted -- the lower court decision is left standing, and no Supreme Court precedent is created. This is still fairly rare. To the best of my knowledge there is no rule requiring decision within any specific time, but I have never heard of a case held over for more than one term. | Your options are generally limited by where you have (or can establish) residency, along with where your communal property is held. There are (decreasing numbers of) jurisdictions known as "divorce mills" that have notoriously lenient rules for establishing residency and completing divorces. |
Parking on the road and private traffic cones on a road in the UK Outside a private residence in the UK, the road is a slight curve and is narrow where 2 cars can only just get past each other. It is a road between two villages. Is it legal to park a car there which can obscure traffic sight lines to the extent that some passing cars brake hard when there is oncoming traffic? Is it legal to park a car on the curved road if there is a parking layby opposite the house which is offroad and has been used for 40 years? Is it legal to park a car on a curved road which then causes traffic, including heavy buses, to use part of a neighbour's driveway for passing purposes which has caused the driveway to sink in one place? Is it legal to put a traffic cone in front of and sometimes to the side of the car on the curved road which reduces road width further? Note: I am aware of this thread, but that seems to be a little more specific for (building) property. | england-and-wales The OP's linked question seems to cover the placement of cones on the road. The relevant legislation (from which some of the Highway Code derives its rules) and potential offences for the parking described are: Wilful obstruction, contrary to section 137, Highways Act 1980: (1) If a person, without lawful authority or excuse, in any way wilfully obstructs the free passage along a highway he is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.(i.e. £1,000) And Leaving vehicles in dangerous positions contrary to section 22, Road Traffic Act 1988: If a person in charge of a vehicle causes or permits the vehicle or a trailer drawn by it to remain at rest on a road in such a position or in such condition or in such circumstances as to involve a danger of injury to other persons using the road, he is guilty of an offence. (also £1,000 maximum fine) | What is the legality of someone putting a virtual hot spot on your property without permission? I know we are in uncharted territory but how would this compare to setting up a contest that would require going on your property without permission? The existence of a game does not authorise entrance to private property, barring some agreement with the owner. That is - if it is trespassing without Pokemon Go (or, for that matter Ingress), then it is trespassing while playing them. That being said, the creators of the game are free to place their in-game targets anywhere they please, and it is hard to imagine a scenario where they would be liable for their users' actions, unless they have not taken reasonable steps to prevent their users from doing so - Niantic clearly instruct their users to respect the law and also, only require that their users be within a certain distance of these points, not actually be at them. Is it currently legal to say Go to person X house and touch a tree? If not, does the current law extend to augmented reality? Nope, unless it can be done without entering private property (which includes the airspace above the property, to some extent). And there are no special cases for augmented reality. Now, there is some possibility that if they create a private nuisance - by being too loud, or by otherwise interfering with the use of the property - owners of a property could bring a claim in tort against players for doing so - or charges for a public nuisance, when done in a public area. | In California, the law for public bridges and highways appears to be as follows (emphasis mine): CA St & Hwy Code § 30843 (2017) Any person who operates a motor vehicle over a toll bridge or toll highway crossing and the approaches thereto constructed or acquired by any bridge and highway district, at the entrance to which appropriate signs have been erected to notify traffic that it is entering upon a toll bridge crossing or its approaches and is subject to the payment of tolls beyond the sign, is guilty of a misdemeanor in each of the following cases: (a) If the person refuses to pay the tolls. (b) If the person turns, or attempts to turn, the vehicle around in the bridge, approach, or toll plaza where signs have been erected forbidding the turning. (c) If the person refuses to pass through the toll gates after having come within the area where signs have been erected notifying traffic that it is entering the area where toll is collectible or where vehicles may not turn around and where vehicles are required to pass through the toll gates for the purpose of collecting tolls. So it appears the "last exit before toll" signs are sufficient. It doesn't say anything about posting the actual cost of the tolls. | Offer them a cup of tea In England and Wales, people have extensive rights to access private land so long as they don't interfere with the owner's lawful use of that land. You have the right to access some land for walking or certain other leisure activities. You can: use public roads and pavements or public rights of way, for example footpaths or bridleways use your right to roam on open access land including mountains, moors, heaths, downs, common land and some land around the England Coast Path If neither of these apply, you may still be able to access private land if: the land was used as a public right of way in the past - check old maps and documents the land was accessed by the public for at least 20 years and nobody has asked them to stop the landowner has given permission (‘permissive access’) It is a very rare piece of rural land to which at least one of these doesn't apply in England and Wales. Obviously, this is not going to be applicable to most urban and suburban land and your solicitor should have checked that an ancient highway doesn't run through your living room before you bought the place. If it does, then you have to let people walk through your living room - you can ask them to wipe their feet first. If they are actually trespassing then unless they damage your property you have no right to damages. If they commit a crime such as aggravated trespass or burgulary, you can call the police. You can also take them to court to get an order requiring them to leave and, if you are wise, prohibiting them from returning. Or, you can just take the opportunity for a cup of tea and a chat. | It's legal The Ohio Court of Appeals has addressed a nearly identical situation in State v. Paseka. The relevant law is, as you noted in the question, R.C. 4511.39, which states, in relevant part: No person shall turn a vehicle or trackless trolley or move right or left upon a highway ... without giving an appropriate signal The facts in this case are directly on point—an intersection where continuing straight puts one on a different road, while the original road requires a turn to stay on it: Appellant was traveling west on State Route 6. At a certain point, Route 6 veers to the left. As appellant approached that area of State Route 6, he chose to maintain a straight-ahead course which automatically placed him on Wahl Road. He was stopped for failing to activate his turn signal in violation of R.C. 4511.39. The court ruled that this did not violate the law requiring the use of a turn signal: It is undisputed that appellant’s straight-ahead entrance onto Wahl Road did not require him to turn his vehicle, nor did it require him to switch into a different lane. As such, we fail to see how appellant violated R.C. 4511.39. Here's the intersection in question, via Google Maps: Imagery ©2021 Google, Imagery ©2021 Maxar Technologies, State of Ohio / OSIP, USDA Farm Service Agency, Map data ©2021 | In the US, does a person photographing private property (houses, farms etc.) while standing on public ground (road, park etc.) commit any offence? No. In general, while standing on public land, it is legal for your eyes to glance onto everything around you. You cannot be arrested and imprisoned for allowing your gaze to pass over your neighbours lawn. It is legal for you to take out a tripod, canvas and paintbrushes and paint the general scene, even if it includes, for example, a tree standing on private land. Instead of a paintbrush, you may use a camera to create a picture of the scene. There are a few exceptions Some military installations Some installations operated by the department of energy (e.g. some nuclear power stations) You cannot photograph people where they have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" - Note that this is not dependant on how the people feel about it. You can photograph a couple kissing at a bus stop, you probably can't legally point a telephoto lens at their bedroom window through a broken privacy-fence. will they commit any offence by publishing the photos They may need copyright permission from the owners of any identifiable works of art included and may need model releases from identifiable people included. There are specific exceptions allowing the publishing of photographs of sculptures and buildings that are visible from public spaces. See The Photographer's Right | Laws regarding billboards and advertising are very local in nature and are typically handled under city/county zoning ordinances. Start with calling your local county zoning office. They will tell you the city/county laws regarding your particular residential zoning overlay, if city or state laws supersede county laws, and recent changes in law that might matter and if the sign might be grandfathered. There can be different types of "residential" zoning and the city/county will tell you this; some allow limited commercial use and signage, and some don't. The housing subdivision you are in may also have covenants; you'll know if there are covenants if you received information when you bought property in that subdivision. 1,2,3,4,8: These depend on local laws. 5: Very generally speaking, land owners typically do not have absolute rights to land usage; that is the rationale behind zoning laws (among others, like health and public safety, building codes, national defense, etc.), because some types of land usage impact adjacent users and the general public. 6, 7: Potential consequences include fines and requirements to take the billboard down, but again, those possibilities are very localized. The size of the billboard could come into play; again, this will be very localized. Some signage may be grandfathered, too. In order for the city/county to look at the situation and possibly take action, you may have to file a written protest with the zoning office; they would help with the process. You may have to present your case at a public city council or county commission meeting, but that basically involves saying such and such is happening and you want the city/county attorney to look into relevant laws. It would help your case if you had a list of names of others in the area who are also unhappy about the billboard. I doubt you will need legal representation to lodge a protest, but if it comes to that, Google for free legal aid in your area. If the city/county attorney won't take action (which is possible, as this involves prosecutorial discretion as to if the city/county wants to press the issue with the landowner), you can look for free legal aid in your area and consider your options. | The Ct. driver's manual p. 44 says that "Solid yellow lines may be crossed to make a left turn to or from an alley, private road, driveway, or street", and also "A double solid white line prohibits lane changing" (turning left is not the same as lane changing). In Washington, there is a fine of $136 for crossing a double white line, but this is related to the hyper-limited access pay lanes on the freeway. I have not found anything in the Connecticut code that indicates an analogous absolute prohibition against crossing a double white. In lieu of a statutory prohibition, you may succeed in arguing that it was a legal turn, as long as the turn was in compliance with the rest of the law, e.g. you signalled, you yielded right of way (which essentially means he was driving so fast that he appeared after you started to turn). His speed may be contributing negligence that prevents you from being liable, so it just depends. |
Is there any protection regarding social media accounts and background checks? Suppose Alice was applying for a new role. As part of a background check she is asked for usernames for any social media she uses. She gives details of her public Twitter and LinkedIn accounts (which have been curated as a professional persona), but neglects to mention others: Stack Exchange: Some of her posts asking "beginner questions" could be considered detrimental to her performance of the role Grindr: Her use of the service could reveal that she has a protected characteristic (which had no relevance to her performance of the role) 4chan: Her posts included what could be considered as unpopular opinions (which had no relevance to her performance of the role) Suppose at a later date (after she has started work at the new company) the company becomes aware of one or more of these social media accounts. Would that be a legitimate cause for termination? Any jurisdiction would be interesting. I guess that in "employment at will" states in the US one can be fired for anything, but would hiding a protected characteristic be protected? In the rest of the world (the UK in particular) we have quite strong protections, but lying in the recruitment process is generally a good enough excuse for termination. Is there any specific protection for privacy in social media? | united-states Even in the 49 U.S. states that are "employment at will" states in the U.S., there are reasons for which termination of employment is prohibited under both state and federal law, and termination without cause entitles an employee to unemployment benefit if certain other conditions are met. Most unionized employees, most public sector employees, most private sector employees in Montana, and a small number of employees (mostly senior management) with written employment contracts that so provide can only be fired for cause. There is a split of authority in the U.S. on the status of not making full disclosure is something that the employer required you to disclose and that you represented that you did disclose in the hiring process, such as your social media accounts. This is commonly called "resume fraud" even though it actually applies more broadly than resumes. Also, sometimes the question might be resolved differently under parallel state and federal laws. In general, in the U.S., asking about social media accounts is something that an employer may permissibly ask unless it is use to facilitate discrimination on a prohibited ground. One rule, which applies in some jurisdictions, is that "resume fraud" (i.e. a material misstatement in a resume or employment application) discovered by an employer after an otherwise wrongful termination can serve as a lawful basis for terminating employment that excuses the wrongful basis for termination of employment (at least assuming that the information withheld or misrepresented was on a matter that the employer could lawfully consider). Even if the information not disclosed was not itself a basis upon which the employer would not have hired someone, the dishonestly in the hiring process would be a basis for termination of employment. For example: The Seventh Circuit, which covers Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, has consistently held that it’s permissible for employers to reject job applicants and fire employees who are suspected of engaging in resumé fraud. The rationale for the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is very straightforward: lying to employers is a legitimate and non-discriminatory basis for turning down an applicant or firing an employee. The cases of Carter v. Tennant Co., Aubuchon v. Knauf Fiberglass and Gilty v. Village of Oak Park all stand for this proposition. . . . . If the employer, as part of its investigation of the allegations in the lawsuit, discovers that the employee engaged in resumé fraud, can the employer use that belated discovery to its advantage? According to the United States Supreme Court, the answer is yes. More specifically, in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., the Supreme Court essentially held that an employer’s belated discovery of an independent, alternative basis for firing an employee (e.g., resumé fraud) can be used by the employer to reduce the plaintiff’s potential recovery. (Think of this as the employer’s “if we knew then what we know now, we wouldn’t have hired you in the first place” defense.) In other jurisdictions, "resume fraud" is not itself a basis for discharge, although it might be used as evidence to support an initially claimed valid reason for terminating employment in the face of an employee allegation that this was a mere pretext for wrongful termination. I don't know which states or how many U.S. states fall in each category. The former rule is the rule in almost all cases under federal private sector employment law. A variety of cases that address the question in the context of public employment sector employment can be found here. In addition to these general rules of law, there are also often reasonable questions of fact about whether a prospective employee substantially complied with an employer's social media disclosure question on a fact by fact basis that turns on the exact wording of the question and the reasonable interpretations that language could be given by the employee. For example, if a question has a social media disclosure requirement and one doesn't disclose a blog, one might reasonably argue that a blog is not a social media account, depending on the language used in the question. | Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this. | This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy. | It follows from case law from the ECJ, e.g. C‑70/10 (28 January 2010) and C-582/14 (19 October 2016), that IP-addresses are personal data. Since my interpretation of the case law differs from the interpretation offered by @Greendrake, I'll go into the relevant case law in a bit more detail than I did in my initial answer. TL;DR: Yes, IP-addresses in server logs are personal data and you need to declare IP-address logging in your privacy policy. As I said, we need to examine the case law I mentioned in the introduction to find out whether IP-addresses are personal data. The first of those are ECJ C-70/10. In this, the court concludes that all IP-addresses are "protected personal data": It is common ground, first, that the injunction requiring installation of the contested filtering system would involve a systematic analysis of all content and the collection and identification of users’ IP addresses from which unlawful content on the network is sent. Those addresses are protected personal data because they allow those users to be precisely identified. (my emphasis) Then, in 2016, the ECJ ruled in a more narrow case ECJ C‑582/14 specifically ruling on dynamic IP-addresses: The court goes through a number of deliberations, then concludes: Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person. It is very clear from this text that the court does not challenge or invalidate ECJ C-70/10 on static IP-addresses. The court is very careful, in its ruling to point out its ruling is specifically about dynamic IP-addresses. So the ruling of ECJ C-70/10 still stands for static IP-addresses, these are always protected personal data. I believe this case law is summarized in Recital 30 of the GDPR. This recital lists the identifiers that may make natural persons identifiable: Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. (my emphasis). Since it follows from case law that static IP-addresses always makes the data subject identifiable, and dynamic IP-addresses may make the data subject identifiable, I will conclude, based on jurisprudence alone, that: Unless you are able to filter your logs to exclude static IP-addresses. I think you must consider IP-addresses protected personal data under the GDPR. However, in ECJ C‑582/14, the ruling about dynamic IP-addresses hinges on the controller having legal means to identify the data subject by connecting the IP address to some other data. The court seems to think that getting access to ISP logs is the only means of doing that. This is wrong. In 2015, the Norwegian computer scientist Einar Otto Stangvik identified 78 Norwegians who seem to have downloaded abuse material starting only with their IP-addresses. Stangvik did this while working as a consultant for Norway's larges newspaper VG. I know Stangvik and I am familiar with the methods he used. I've tried them myself, and they work. Stangvik did not have access to ISP logs, he did not do anything illagal, and the 78 natural persons identified only by means of their IP-address, combined with other data the Stangvik had legal access to. I will not go into details, I will just say this: If you know how to do this, getting to the natural person when you know the IP-address is not difficult or labour-consuming. To return to the question: It also follows from the GDPR that logging of IP-addresses falls under its definition of "processing". Your privacy policy should list all personal data personal data that is collected by yourself and third parties ("processors" in the terminology of the GDPR) that you rely on. Your hosting company is such a third party, and you need to declare the logging of IP-addresses in your privacy policy. | I'm not a lawyer, but I am an NHS employee, and can more concretely answer your questions. Has any crime been committed, and if so, is there any point in pursuing this with the police? If so, how do I go about it? Yes, in-fact, several crimes have been committed. Firstly, NHS employees are prohibited from viewing patient's personal information that they are not specifically treating. In opening your letter from the NHS, the nurse in question violated this practice. It's a breach of both privacy and trust. This is taught at the NHS and the nurse would be aware of this. Secondly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse has committed workplace fraud. They have impersonated a patient, and in doing so, cost the NHS money and time it won't get back by cancelling your appointment. Again, this is also taught within the NHS, and the nurse would be aware of this too. Thirdly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse may have put a life in danger in doing so, which is effectively gross negligence at a minimum. Although this can be reported to the police, it'll be more effective to report it to the appropriate NHS bodies. Even if a crime has not been committed, I would think that at the very least, opening someone's mail and then impersonating them and cancelling the surgery would at least be viewed as unprofessional, especially for someone employed in the NHS. Is there a procedure for making a complaint against an NHS worker? There are several different approaches, given the various breaches of trust. As BlueDogRanch mentioned, you can file a compliant to NHS England, which includes via email. Be sure to get appropriate information like the nurse's name, address, and if possible any details (like appointment reference numbers) to aid the investigation. Secondly, because of the cost incurred via the malicious cancellation of an appointment, costing time and money (and running the risk of opening the NHS to litigation), you can also report the fraudulent aspects to the NHS Counter Fraud Authority. | If it’s relevant, yes However, Twitter’s position is that they have disclosed all the data that the contract requires them to disclose. It is likely that case will turn on whether they have or not. Data they haven’t disclosed is not relevant to answering that question. | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. | Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task. |
Why would American Airlines be at fault and not the arresting office? Context: SOURCE Michael Lowe filed his lawsuit on Monday in Tarrant County, Texas, after he says he was arrested last July for a crime he didn't commit. According to the lawsuit, a duty-free shop at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport in Tarrant County was burglarized in May 2020. Surveillance footage of the incident showed the culprit was a passenger of American flight 2248, and investigators obtained a search warrant ordering the airline to produce "any and all recorded travel data for all individuals" on that flight, the suit stated. Instead, Lowe said, American only produced identification for one passenger -- him. Why would the airline have any responsibility? Let us assume that the evidence excludes Mr. Lowe. I realize that they the airline has deep pockets / insurance so from that standpoint they are "ripe" for the picking. That being said, they did not arrest Mr. Lowe and the video evidence should have immediately exonerated Lowe. IANAL. | The problem was that the arresting officer and the investigating officer were two different people. After American airlines misidentified Mr Lowe as the suspect a warrant was issued for an arrest, and it wasn't until about a year later when officers in New Mexico ran his name and found that he had a warrant that they detained him. So their actions were perfectly proper. The length of his detention was primarily because the USA functions as separate legal jurisdictions, so you can be held for some time on a warrant for another state. Possibly the investigating officer should not have relied on American Airlines identification of the suspect. However, Mr. Lowe would have to overcome the qualified immunity bar to sue the PD. The case against the airline is that of negligence: they had no duty to single out Mr. Lowe; they could just have turned over all the data, as requested. Having chosen effectively to carry out their own investigation, the claim is that they owed a common law duty of care to Mr. Lowe to do it competently. It's clear that misidentifying Mr. Lowe as the suspect was likely to do him harm, so it's a reasonable foundation for a claim. More than that, we will have to see. | Disclaimer: there are whole sections of criminal law courses that deal with this issue and the various laws and precedents that have shaped american jurisprudence relating to right of privacy, expectation of privacy, and search and seizure. So, this is more of a primer than a comprehensive answer. That being said, the Fourth Amendment, which protects the people from unreasonable search and seizure by the government, dictates that there must be probable cause for a search warrant to issue. However, in addition to the restrictions that are imposed by the Fourth Amendment, several states’ constitutions, as well as a variety of state and federal statutes, rules of procedure, and law court rulings interpret these edicts further, limiting the process for obtaining a search warrant (a state can add additional safeguards, or impose more stringent requirements, but not less than the 4th amendment demands). On the federal level alone, the laws on search and seizure are also limited in scope by sections appearing in Title 18, Part II, Chapter 205 – Searches and Seizures. 18 U.S.C. § 3101-18. Federal warrants are further governed by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Only Judges and magistrates may issue search warrants. To obtain a warrant, law enforcement officers must show that there is probable cause (i.e. grounds) that search is legally justified. Officers must support this showing with sworn statements (affidavits) under oath, and must describe in particularity the place they will search and the items they will seize. Judges must consider the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether or not to issue the warrant. When issuing a search warrant, the judge may restrict how and when the police conduct the search. Police officers (a broad term I'm using for ease of discussion to include all manner of state and federal investigators operating under color of law) seeking a warrant do not need to show that the people being searched (or those whose property is being searched) actually, or even probably, committed the crime(s) in question. Rather, officers merely need to show probable cause exists to show that the evidence sought-after is likely there and upon discovery may implicate some person or persons in criminal activity (that has been committed). A landmark case that resulted in some reforms is Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), in which the Supreme Court opined that a search conducted by the police at a student newspaper, where the newspaper was not implicated or connected to any criminal activity, was a legal search under the Fourth Amendment, because the police suspected it had photographic evidence of the identities of demonstrators who assaulted police officers. Afterward, however, some jurisdictions responded by passing laws restricting or forbidding these kinds of searches - so again, what stands as acceptable procedure is not static. While you may not often hear of requests for warrants being denied, it does happen if there is insufficient PC pled in the affidavit; General unawareness is not surprising as it is not something often made public, although there are instances. Most officers know when they have enough for a warrant and know how to adequately swear out an affidavit so that PC is present enough for the judge to sign the warrant in good faith. However, some Judges are more stringent and demanding than others with regard to how the PC was obtained,the scope of the warrant under those facts, etc. Certainly, not every application is granted. Cornell has a great primer of this issue and you can find article when application for a warrant was denied...especially in higher profile investigations. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/search_warrant | Yes The airline is entitled to recover what the passenger cost it - that’s how damages work. If it’s successful in its legal pursuit of the passenger it’s also entitled to legal costs (generally, legal costs are complicated). This can either be the actual amount or a genuine pre-estimate of that amount in the contract, called a liquidated damages amount. Liquidated damages do not have to be accurate in the particular circumstances but they must be a reasonable expectation of what an average breach would cost the airline. Too large and they risk being a penalty and unenforceable - only governments can punish. | Any compensation would be under the guise of EU regulation EC No 261/2004. Under the assumption that they claim the cancellation is due to Extraordinary Circumstances, then "compensation is not due if the carrier can prove that the cancellation is caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken". Non-exhaustive examples of such circumstances are "air traffic management decisions, political instability, adverse weather conditions and security risks". Lightening is clearly such a circumstance, and a strike probably is (since there is no legal requirement to always accede to union demands). Legal recourse is via the relevant national authority, apparently LBA in this case. They indicate that they will make an initial assessment. The ultimate recourse is a lawsuit against the airline. | I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking. | Revised for clarity in light of comments State and local police can arrest anyone who they have probable cause to believe is breaking state or local law. Like all LEOs, Federal LEOs can break some state and local laws while enforcing Federal law. When they grab someone off the street and hold them in a cell, they are detaining them, not kidnapping them, and so on. However, to avoid arrest, the Feds have to identify themselves. That's because state and local LEO who know they are dealing with Feds on federal business no longer have probable cause to believe a crime is being committed. State and local police can arrest Federal LEOs who they: a) have probable cause to believe are breaking state or local; and, b) have no reason to believe are Feds enforcing Federal law. In other words: Any Fed who refuses to identify herself to a local LEO can be arrested if there is probable cause. State and local police cannot, however, arrest Federal LEOs just because they are not wearing insignias. That is because: a) there are no federal statutes requiring federal LEOs to identify themselves; b) the Supremacy Clause says federal law takes precedence over state and local law that conflict with it; c) at least in Portland, the feds were not operating under any sort of formal agreement with Portland or Oregon officials that required them to have identification. While it is hard to prove a negative, the question of whether Federal LEOs are required to identify themselves has been looked at recently by reputable sources. They all agree there is no such law. For example, the answer from Lawfare: Broadly speaking, law enforcement officers do not have a legal duty to disclose either their identities or their agencies of affiliation, even if asked directly. Certain municipalities require police officers to identify themselves if asked, but there is currently no federal statute requiring officer disclosure of such information. The article points out that the two main types of cases involving police identifying themselves really don't apply: police who are working undercover, notably in sting operations, and police searching and seizing property. They go on to point out: Separate from the question of federal law, several states have adopted laws and regulations requiring law enforcement to identify themselves. For example, under New York City’s Right to Know Act, a broad set of police reforms that went into effect in October 2018, officers must tell civilians at the start of some interactions “their name, rank, command, and shield number.” (Also, many departments have policies that generally require officers to identify themselves, although with exceptions. You can see examples of the policies here.) Again, these local laws do not apply to Feds because of the Supremacy Clause. NOTE: As several of the news stories note, the lack of identification will make it very hard to hold Federal LEOs accountable for their actions. Accountability requires identity. | In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order. | The best course of action for Barr would be to file an objection to the subpoena in the proper court (probably the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) under or by analogy to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d) (which governs disputes over subpoenas in civil cases in the federal courts), if he thinks that there are matters he cannot lawfully divulge or thinks it is improper to divulge even if they are not privileged, and to let a judge decide. Generally speaking, in a civil action, you can only object to a subpoena by following this process and Congress has increasingly used the civil lawsuit discovery process as a benchmark. Failure to file an objection with the proper court, or at least in a response to Congress by the date required in the subpoena to produce the materials, will generally constitute a waiver of the objections that might otherwise have been asserted to the subpoena. Simply not responding without explanation by the due date would be a pretty clear case of Contempt of Congress which is the basis for both a civil action and criminal contempt charges. For example, in the Lynch case, cited below, the Court stated with respect to information that was withheld without any claim of privilege: Failure to provide any grounds for withholding particular records does not comply with the order or enable the Court to resolve defendant’s privilege claims as to those documents. Accordingly, defendant must produce the material withheld without any proffered justification. This said, in any dispute between Congress and the Executive Branch there is always some uncertainty, and the courts strongly favor negotiation and conferral between the parties before bringing these matters to a head. A general discussion of Congressional subpoenas can be found here, recognizing, however, that while there are a variety of grounds for redaction asserted in the Mueller report case, "Executive Privilege" is not among them and so the special considerations that apply to an assertion of executive privilege do not apply. The authority of the judicial branch to resolve these issues has been upheld, for example, in the cases of United States v. Nixon (U.S. 1974) and Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Lynch (D. D.C 2016) (both of which involved the more difficult scenario of an assertion of executive privilege in addition to the more ordinary assertions of privileges like the grand jury privilege). Not infrequently, the judge will review the unredacted material in camera (i.e. privately in chambers without showing it to the requesting party) to determine if the claim of privilege or other basis for redaction is really valid (e.g. maybe something that was redacted under the label grand jury testimony is not, in fact, grand jury testimony). But, there is case law to support the notion that Congress would have to demonstrate some specific reason why it doubts the accuracy of the assertions of the executive branch regarding redactions in this particular case to make it necessary for there to be an in camera review. In the Lynch case (which is a non-precedential opinion itself) the Court said: As for whether the redactions are what they purport to be, the Court notes that counsel for even the most disputatious parties are often called upon to trust each other, and that the judiciary relies regularly on declarations by the executive branch that matters redacted from FOIA productions are what they are described to be in the Vaughn index. See Loving v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that district court had not abused its discretion by relying on agency’s Vaughn index and declaration in determining whether a disputed document contained segregable portions); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The reviewing court may rely on the description of the withheld records set forth in the Vaughn index and the agency’s declaration that it released all segregable information.”). The Court has been provided with no reason to believe that its assistance is needed to verify for counsel for one branch of government assertions made in pleadings by an officer of the court representing another, equal branch of government. If in the end, a neutral is required to read each individual redaction and confirm that what the Department claims is simply a name or a telephone number is in fact a name or a telephone number, the parties can arrange for that on their own. These discretionary issues are likely to be influenced by the partisan leanings of the particular judges involved. Another question is to whom a subpoena could be directed. While attorney-general Barr is one possible person to whom it could be directed, Mueller himself is another possible person to whom a subpoena could be directed and that might lead to a more tractable counter-party in the lawsuit and might simplify some of the conflicts of interest present in a subpoena of the attorney-general himself that in criminal contempt cases is enforceable by his subordinates, i.e. U.S. attorneys, who are required by law to bring such charges. |
Are works created by US government employees in the performance of their duties treated as public domain outside the US? Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise. -- 17 U.S. Code § 105 Are such works distributed in the public domain outside the United States? | There are several official and unofficial sources that say that the public domain status of works of the US Federal Government only applies within the US. Specifically: "Government Works" on USA.GOV According to "Copyright Exceptions for U.S. Government Works": U.S. copyright laws may not protect U.S. government works outside the country. But the work may be protected under the copyright laws of other jurisdictions when used in these jurisdictions. The U.S. government may assert copyright outside of the United States for U.S. government works. Government Copyright FAQ on cendi.gov According to Frequently Asked Questions about Copyright: Issues Affecting the U.S. Government (CENDI/2008-1) (Revised December 2017) FAQ Item 3.1.7: 3.1.7 Does the Government have copyright protection in U.S. Government works in other countries? Yes, the copyright exclusion for works of the U.S. Government is not intended to have any impact on protection of these works abroad (S. REP. NO. 473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1976)). Therefore, the U.S. Government may obtain protection in other countries depending on the treatment of government works by the national copyright law of the particular country. Copyright is sometimes asserted by U.S. Government agencies outside the United States. US House report on the 1976 Copyright Act According to that part of the "House report no. 94–1476" included as "Historical and Revision Notes" to the test of 17 USC 105 in the version of "TITLE 17—COPYRIGHTS" on Govinfo The prohibition on copyright protection for United States Government works is not intended to have any effect on protection of these works abroad. Works of the governments of most other countries are copyrighted. There are no valid policy reasons for denying such protection to United States Government works in foreign countries, or for precluding the Government from making licenses for the use of its works abroad. Public Domain Sherpa According to "Public Domain Sherpa": US government agencies may claim copyright abroad While US government works generally are in the public domain in the US, they may be protected by copyright abroad. The feds may claim copyright protection for US government works in other countries depending on how those countries treat their own government works. So just be aware that US government agencies sometimes claim copyright in their works outside the US. Protecting Government Works According to the section "Copyright Protection Abroad For Government Works" of "Protecting Government Works: The Copyright Issue" by Paul C. Manz, Michael J. Zelenka, Raymond S. Wittig, and Sally A. Smit in ... If another signatory to the Berne Convention, however, allows copyright protection of its government works (i.e., Crown Copyright of the United Kingdom31 or Canadian Copyright Act32), it is clear that that country’s courts must afford protection to similar works of the U.S. Government, despite the fact that the work could not be protected in the United States. Congressional legislative history supports this position. [The document goes on to quote the same passage of the house report notes to 17 USC 105 quoted above.] ... For a work to be eligible in a foreign country for copyright protection, it must qualify under the particular laws and requirements specific to that country (i.e., in the United Kingdom copyright requirements are provided in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988). Other countries and their laws may differ from the requirements for copyright protection as set forth in the United States Copyright Act. ... Berne Article 5 Paragraph 2 of the Berne Copyright Convention specifies that (emphasis added): ... such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the existence of protection in the country of origin of the work. Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed. | I'm going to focus on one part of your question, because I think it is informative to the entire question: "By publishing those data in a copyrighted book are they now in the public domain?" Insofar as copyright is concerned, the "facts" are simply never copyrightable. What is copyrightable is the expression of the fact. So you publish a book and it contains many facts. You retain copyright over how you expressed the facts, meaning the word choice, format of presentation and so on. The discussion of this point always leads people to ask the following two questions: What if the "facts" are closely related to the way they are expressed? For example, a phonebook contains "facts" about phone numbers. The individual numbers are not subject to copyright. But if the way they were organized was clever (i.e. not merely alphabetical) the presentation may be copyrighted. Doesn't that line get blurred? Why doesn't "the presentation order" count as a "fact?" It does get blurred! And courts use nuanced case law and judgment to figure out which side of the line a given thing is. However, one backstop is that if AN EXPRESSION is so closely related to the IDEA BEING EXPRESSED that the IDEA cannot be otherwise expressed, then then the EXPRESSION is not subject to copyright protection. To answer your specific questions: The book is subject to copyright. The facts in the book are not. Someone else could publish a book with the same measurements so long as they are expressing the facts with sufficient difference from the original. I'm not familiar with CUSIP numbers. However, there are two things to say here. (A) it sounds like you are describing a contractual relationship between the people who have the numbers. This is not governed by copyright; it is governed by contract between the parties. If these numbers could be treated as a "trade secret" they might be protected IP in that way. But given that they are likely circulated at least a bit, they don't seem like candidates for "trade secret" protection. To your question, "what is the effect of one person leaking?" If "trade secret" law was doing any "work" here... then yes, the trade secret would be undone once the information was public. But like I said, its likely this is actually all about contracts not intellectual property protection. (B) The "facts" of "which number is associated with which instrument" is likely NOT subject to copyright at any time. The specific numbering code COULD BE copyrighted, but in reality is almost certainly TOO CLOSELY tied to the IDEA being expressed to be copyrighted. Could the number be expressed otherwise? If not, then its likely not protected by copyright. -- Big take away here: You seem to be confused about the concept of "facts" getting into the public domain. That's not exactly what copyright is about. Copyright would protect the expression of facts. An expression can become public domain if it is sufficiently old or if the creator designates it as public domain work. But simply "putting something out there" does nothing to alter the copyright status of the thing. | united-states You are protected by copyright as a matter of law, even if you don't post a copyright notice, although you have slightly more procedural rights if you do post a copyright notice and there would need to be a filing with the copyright registrar (a division of the Library of Congress) before you brought suit. You can't really get any other intellectual property protections for it except possibly a trademark if you have a distinctive mark or name or logo for the app. | All Government produced documents in the United States are public domain, as they belong to the people. The company may be asking for license to use their film, which may include several other clips that they put in any order. Their film, specifically, including any explanatory dialog, commentary, or editing choices, are not fair game. However, the clip you are asking about is not copyrighted and is fair for any use. | No It says right on the page you linked: These downloads are not public domain, as they are parts of content that has already been licensed and distributed. Although using these downloads may be permissible as long as the project itself falls under the rule of "Fair Use," it is ill-advised to use these downloads for any project intended for profitable gain or commercial advertisement, unless otherwise stated by Kyutwo.com. | Facts cannot be copyrighted. Such a project does not violate copyright law, and if you're in the United States, it is protected by the First Amendment. | The US does not provide copyright protection for font design. As long as you dont distribute font generating programs, that would themselves be copyrighted, you are not infringing. Your derived information is okay because it is derived from a non-copyrightable work and is therefore not a derivative work. https://law.stackexchange.com/a/25673/1340 | No, it means you can't copy it. By default, the copyright to a work is owned by its creator, and nobody else is allowed to copy it, or create derived works, without their permission. That permission can be granted by a license. "License unknown" doesn't really tell us anything, but it certainly isn't clearly granting you permission. So you don't have permission to copy, and thus you cannot. You would have to seek permission from the copyright holder. See also If no licence is distributed with an application/source code, what license applies by default if any? (Some jurisdictions do allow for "fair use" exceptions, which allow you to copy a work without permission. You haven't said what jurisdiction you are in.) |
Why would a jury award more punitive damages than is allowed by the law? I read on https://www.npr.org/2022/06/01/1102118755/depp-heard-trial-verdict: The seven-member jury found that Depp is entitled to $10 million in compensatory damages and punitive damages of $5 million. But, because Virginia state law limits punitive damages to $350,000, the actual amount to be awarded Depp is $10.35 millions. Why would a jury award more punitive damages than what the law allows? | The jury isn't told what the law allows. They are told to come up with a number and if it exceeds what the law allows, the judge modifies it in response to post-judgment motions. | Fraud new-south-wales There are a number of offences that fall under the broad category of fraud. The most relevant for this type of behaviour is in s192E of the Crimes Act 1900: "Obtain financial advantage or cause financial advantage by deception" which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years. In order to understand what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt it is useful to look at the suggested jury direction from the Criminal Bench Book (a crib sheet for judges): [The accused] is charged that [he/she] by a deception dishonestly [obtained a financial advantage for himself/herself] or [kept a financial advantage that he/she had]. The Crown contends that the financial advantage is [set out the financial advantage]. It does not matter whether the financial advantage alleged was permanent or temporary. The deception that the Crown alleges that the accused perpetrated was [set out the deception]. It must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the financial advantage was obtained as a result of that deception and that the accused perpetrated that deception intentionally to obtain the financial advantage or acted recklessly in that regard. Here reckless means foreseeing the possibility that as a result of the deception [he/she] would [obtain a financial advantage] or [retain the financial advantage that he/she had] and carrying on with the deception notwithstanding that possibility. However, the Crown does not need to prove a particular person was deceived. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in [his/her] deceptive conduct. Dishonest in this context means that the accused acted dishonestly according to the standards of ordinary people. You as ordinary members of the community determine what is dishonest conduct in this regard. You must not only find beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in deceiving [the victim] but also that [he/she] knew that [his/her] conduct was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. It is not enough that a person is shithouse at delivering on their contractual obligations: even repeatedly so. That just makes them a bad business person, not a criminal. They must have acted dishonestly and deceived their victims from the get-go with the intention of not fulfilling their bargain or have been reckless as to their ability to do so. If you believe that you have knowledge of criminal fraud, you should report it to the police who have the discretion to investigate and prosecute. As a general rule, police devote fewer resources to non-violent crime than they do to violent crime and less to crimes where the victim has handed over property/money than those where it was taken from them involuntarily so fraud tends to be lower on their radar. | Yes, one should not publish evidence until a verdict is reached. This includes any possible appeals. In common law, doing so has long been one of the contempt of court offences called sub judice, or "publishing information that interferes with a fair trial". The main point is that the jury should not be influenced by any information other than what they hear in the courtroom. In New Zealand, the offence was recently codified. | I'm curious as to how the US legal system determines who should present evidence and how much evidence is required by them to prove one side of an argument against a counterargument. In General In both criminal and civil cases in common law legal systems (legal systems derived from the English legal system, basically, the U.S., U.K., Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh), the burden of proof is on the party seeking to have a court do something. So, if the absence of evidence, the party seeking relief loses. Proof Of The Elements Of The Charge Or Cause Of Action Presentation of Evidence and the Prima Facie Case The party seeking court action presents their evidence first. If at the close of their opening case that party has not presented enough evidence to meet their burden of proof with respect to every "element" of the list of legal elements that they must prove to prevail in court, that party has not established a "prima facie case" and the case is dismissed without granting relief. If the prosecution or party bringing a civil case establishes a prima facie case, or if the defense does ask to have the case dismissed for failing to establish a prima facie case at the close of the evidence of the party asking the court to do something, then the defense presents their evidence if the defense wishes to do so (this is optional). (If the defense does present evidence, the prosecution or civil party seeking relief can then present a rebuttal case to disprove the new points of evidence in the defense case, and so on, back and forth until all evidence is taken.) Evaluating The Evidence In Light Of The Burden Of Proof Once both the party asking the court to do something and the defense have presented all of their evidence, the trier of fact (i.e. the jury in a jury trial, or a judge in a bench trial) decides if every element of the case of the party asking the court to do something has been established by the relevant burden of proof. In a civil case, the burden of proof is usually a "preponderance of the evidence" (i.e. that the evidence more strongly favors that the element was established than that it was not established); some elements on some claims in civil cases must be established by the higher standard of "clear and convincing evidence." In a criminal case, the burden of proof is "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". Affirmative Defenses In addition to elements of a case that must be established to make a prima facie case, there are also "affirmative defenses" to a request that a court do something. Examples of affirmative defenses include self-defense, statute of limitations, immunity from suit, a pardon in a criminal case, etc. A defendant can win ether by showing that the party asking the court to do something has failed to meet their burden of proof with respect to one or more elements of the case, or by showing that an affirmative defense bars the request. In both criminal cases and civil cases, the burden is on the defense to show that there is at least some evidence that justifies consideration of an affirmative defense. This is called a "burden of production." In a civil case (and in some criminal cases in some jurisdictions), the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense by preponderance of the evidence. In some criminal cases in some jurisdictions, once the defense has met a burden of production with regard to an affirmative defense, the prosecution must rule out the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt to prevail. Deciding Who Wins Once both the party asking the court to do something and the defense have presented all of their evidence, the trier of fact (i.e. the jury in a jury trial, or a judge in a bench trial) decides if an affirmative defenses prohibit the party asking the court to do something from prevailing. The party asking the court to do something wins unless the defense can show that this party did not meet the burden of proof as to any one element of a particular criminal charge or civil cause of action (for each charge or cause of action), or that an affirmative defense bars that particular charge or cause of action. Often cases have conflicting testimony regarding what happened. The jury (or judge in a bench trial) can choose to belief that one person is telling the truth and that the other statement is either a lie or is unintentionally inaccurate for some reason. If the jury (or judge in a bench trial) isn't at all sure whose statement is true and whose is not, this favors the defendant if one is not more credible than the other. Complex Cases In a simple case, there is just one charge or cause of action, and there is just one defendant. But, often, there are multiple charges or causes of action, and each one must be evaluated as to each defendant of the multiple defendants in a single trial. In a civil case, sometimes there are counterclaims that defendants are trying to prove against plaintiffs, or cross-claims that defendants or counterclaim defendants are trying to prove against each other that have to be evaluated. Also, in civil cases, sometimes one or more of the defendants is also prosecuting one or more separate causes of action against someone other than the original plaintiffs or co-defendants. In that case, that defendant is also a third-party plaintiff, and someone other than the original plaintiff and defendants is a third-party defendant (third-party defendants can also bring third-party counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff, third-party crossclaims against third-party codefendants, or their own claims against new parties or against the original plaintiffs). Other Rules Special Statutes Regarding Proof Of Facts Sometimes, there are particular kind of facts for which a statute says that a "prima facie case" is established automatically if a certain kind of evidence is presented. For example, it is common for the law to say that a prima facie case regarding ownership of real estate, or the status of a bus as a school bus, is established by presenting a copy of an official document that says so. Usually, when a statute says something like that, the prima facie case can still be overcome, for example, by presenting a subsequent document that shows that the real estate was then sold to someone else, or that the school bus status of the bus was later revoked. But, when a statute like that is present, the plaintiff or prosecutor doesn't have a duty to prove the negative that there was no subsequent sale of the real estate or that the school bus status certificate was still in force on the date of the incident. Rules of Evidence There are also "rules of evidence" that govern what kind of facts can be presented at a trial to prove a case. For example, in a U.S. criminal trial a fact cannot be established with evidence that is hearsay, such as an affidavit or a statement that a witness heard someone else say and is retelling to the court. A very important rule of evidence in U.S. criminal trials that flows from the United States Constitution, is the evidence obtained by law enforcement illegally may not be presented by the prosecution, even if it definitively shows that a defendant is guilty. This is called the "exclusionary rule." Application To Facts Is it up to the prosecution to present full and complete evidence that the system only takes pictures when the bus is stopped (presumably reviewing source code or conducting tests) or is there some kind of legal concept of "good enough at a glance" evidence where they've met some minimum burden of proof that the picture is taken when the system is turned on and it's only on when the bus is stopped, therefore it must be functioning as expected? The prosecution has to convince the jury (or the judge in a bench trial) that every element of the crime as define in the statute has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that any affirmative defense upon which the defense meets a burden of production has been overcome by the relevant burden of proof. Usually, this is a broad legal standard, and the jury (or judge in a bench trial) has to decide if the burden of proof has been met by the facts presented which were legally admissible as evidence. It wouldn't be uncommon for a defendant to present no new evidence in a defense case (other than having cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses) and merely argue at the completion of the prosecution's case that the evidence presented didn't establish a particular element of the prosecution's case beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, the defense might argue that the picture presented by the prosecution was not taken when the bus was at a complete stop, and if the prosecution didn't present some convincing evidence that the bus was at a complete stop when the picture was taken (e.g. the testimony of the bus driver and other witnesses), the defense should win. But, it is almost always up to the jury (or the judge in a bench trial) to decide if the prosecution's evidence is good enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution proved the case. Often a defendant will not want to call any witnesses beyond the witnesses presented in the prosecution case, because a defendant's witness might cause the jury to overcome its doubt that a fact only weakly proved by the prosecution was actually true, for example, when only one not very credible prosecution witness had testified regarding the same fact. If the identical case were presented to two different juries, one jury could decide to believe the bus driver who said that the bus was at a stop when the picture was taken, and a different jury could decide not to belief the bus driver, and both decisions would be valid. Consequences Of A Verdict If the judge or jury acquits the defendant in a criminal case, the case is over and there is no appeal. If the jury is hung (there is no unanimous ruling to convict or acquit (but see endnote)), in a criminal case, there is a mistrial and the defendant can be tried again. If the jury convicts, one of the grounds for an appeal by the defendant is that the evidence was insufficient to prove some element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the appellate court agrees than the conviction is overturned and there can be a retrial (or in some cases, the defendant is acquitted). Appellate Review Of The Sufficiency Of The Proof The law recognizes that different juries could interpret exactly the same facts in different ways and will reverse a conviction because the burden of proof was not met only if "no reasonable jury" could have interpreted the evidence in a manner consistent with a conviction. For example, on appeal, an appellate court will always assume that the jury thought that every pro-defendant witness, whose credibility was questioned in any way by the prosecution, was lying and that the jury believed that every pro-prosecution witness was telling the truth, even if the defense presented evidence that could have caused a reasonable juror to question the truthfulness of a prosecution witness. Appeals for failure to prove something beyond a reasonable doubt can be easier in a bench trial than in a jury trial because following a bench trial the judge will often publicly state the actual reasons in terms of findings of fact and law that the judge used to reach a conclusion. So, the defendant need only show that a key fact actually found by the judge was not supported by the requisite proof. END NOTE Oregon State, and prior to 2019, Louisiana, did not require juries in all criminal cases to be unanimous. | Assuming that this wasn't a planned murder or assault, the most serious charge would be vehicular homicide. In the US, this is governed by state law, but states are not radically different in whether this is a crime. In Washington, under RCW 46.61.520, vehicular homicide is a class A felony, punishable by imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum term fixed by the court of not less than twenty years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than fifty thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine The crimes is defined as causing death while driving (a) While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502; or (b) In a reckless manner; or (c) With disregard for the safety of others. and such speeding is highly likely to be found to constitute the element of recklessness. There are also hit-and-run charges, which is a class B felony (10 years and $20,000). A person can be found guilty of both charges, and the judge can apply the prison sentences consecutively, meaning you add them up, rather than serve the jail time at the same time (in this case, essentially dispensing with the hit-and-run term). The law is written so that a killing is a crime, and if you kill two people that could be two charges (the question is whether there is a single act or two – most likely there was a single act in this particular case). There is no state where recklessly killing a person while driving is legal. First degree murder could be considered under 9A.32.030 if a person "Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person". That kind of charge was applied to the Charlottesville driver, but it is highly unlikely to be applied to even the most extreme speeding. The actual penalty imposed depends on the sentencing laws of the state. In Washington there is a complex calculation based on the severity of the crime (16 degrees – vehicular homicide is level 11), prior criminal history, whether there are multiple convictions (vehicular homicide and hit-and-run). Aggravating and mitigating circumstances can also be considered to compute the actual sentence; I don't see any way for a non-specialist to guess what the actual penalty would be in this case. | Yes it affects them. Judges are pursuing their vocation as a career and there are career paths within the judicial system just as there are in every other career. Screw up too many times and your career ends at your present level. Judges are also professionals and most take professional pride in doing their jobs well. Having a decision overturned is professionally embarrassing. As a matter of public policy, there is no sanction that is directly applied to the judge otherwise judges would be too cautious to make decisions. Anyone who makes professional decisions will get them wrong from time to time - they generally are not punished. That said there are judicial errors that stem from making the wrong judgement (so to say) call and judicial errors that stem from royally screwing up. The former are far less damaging than the latter. For an example of the former, a judge is applying a relatively new statute for which there have been no other decisions and interprets the legislation in a reasonable way but one the appeal court disagrees with. For an example of the latter, deciding the matter on a basis which neither party put before the court and which the judge did not draw to the parties attention during the trial - as a common law country, the New Zealand legal system is adversarial: the court exists to decide the dispute between the parties on the basis the parties argue, not to go on a "frolic of its own". In addition, appeal courts can only overrule a decision if the judge has made an error of law, not if they have made an error of fact. A judge is allowed to be wrong about the facts but not about the law. In practice, the distinction is not trivial. In a jury trial, the jury decides the facts, the judge decides the law - appeals can only be on the basis of what the judge did, not on the basis of what the jury did (barring egregious misconduct by the jury). In a judge only trial the judge decides both but an appeal can only be on matters of law. | I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well. | When a person unlawfully kills someone else they have committed a crime against the state (murder, manslaughter etc.) and a civil wrong (a tort) against the victim (specifically, the tort of wrongful death). The state responds with charging the perpetrator with a crime and attempting to prove that they did the deed "beyond reasonable doubt". If convicted the criminal is "punished" by incarceration or death or a fine or community service etc. The victim (through their estate) or other affected people (family, dependents etc.) can respond by suing the perpetrator for compensation (money) for the damage they caused. If the plaintiff proves their case "on the balance of probabilities" the perpetrator will owe the plaintiffs whatever damages the court awards. There are many crime/tort mirrors (many have the same name): theft and conversion, trespass and trespass, fraud and fraud, kidnapping and false imprisonment etc. Because of the different threshold of proof between criminal and civil liability, it is much easier to win a civil case. |
Is it unlawful to benefit from discounts on customer accounts without the customer knowing? The question has to do specifically with Amazon AWS services but maybe the question can be more generalized as in the title. Also, the jurisdiction is Japan but I imagine the practice described below could be carried out anywhere. We are using AWS EC2 services, which is sort of like renting virtualized servers on the cloud, through a 3rd party vendor. We recently found out that the vendor was applying Savings Plans, which are cost discounts you receive in exchange for long term commitments to use AWS services, and other cost saving methods to our account without our knowledge. What this means is that due to the Savings Plans, etc. the actual cost of AWS services is lower. However, in the monthly billing from the vendor we are charged the full amount (no discounts), and the vendor pockets all the cost savings. Over the last year from this practice the vendor has been able to make extra tens of thousands of dollars. The point of contention here is not that we are being overcharged or that the billing is incorrect. We are being billed what we initially agreed to, which I guess is the "full price". The issue is that there is nothing in the contract that states that the vendor can benefit from discounts on AWS services that we, not the vendor, are using and paying for. In addition, we did not even know about the existence of Savings Plans and other cost saving measures and there was no explanation from the vendor, and so it could be said that the vendor willingly benefited from our ignorance. (The vendor claims that they explained about AWS cost saving measures but nobody at the office I work with remembers any such explanation). So is there anything unlawful here? Is there any legal recourse? Or is this just lawful, albeit yucky, behavior? | You have a contract with the 3rd party vendor. The 3rd party vendor has a contract with Amazon. These two contracts are not related in any way. | No, it's not legal. The General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) apply given that you are in the UK (regardless of where the Data Processor is based). The UK GDPR is slightly modified due to Brexit, but the same principles apply. The only plausible legal basis for this actions would be that you consent to it, and you're entitled to withdraw that consent at any time. Some may claim that Article 6.1(b) applies, i.e. that it's necessary to send marketing email in order to fulfil the contract, but GDPR is clear that bundling such consent into a contract for service simply to permit the data processor additional actions isn't allowed, as I'll demonstrate. UK GDPR requires that consent to use your personal information (in this case, your email address) for the stated purpose be freely given. Consent to use your information for direct marketing is not freely given if it's inseparable from the consent to use it for some other service, as per para 43: Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. And Article 7.4 backs this up with When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. The intent of Article 6.1(b) is that only the processing required for the service you have bought is allowed (e.g. if you supply your address for delivery of stuff you've bought, the data processor can use that address to send you the stuff, but is not allowed to add a contract term that allows them to send you unwanted stuff). Examples of emails that Article 6.1(b) would allow (in my assessment) include things such as notification of upcoming downtime, or a reminder that subscriptions are due, but not unsolicited advertisements for other products. There's a grey area that's open to interpretation, where adverts are piggybacked onto actual service messages. | If I understand your question correctly, you have some clients who have paid you for services that you have not yet provided and, indeed, they have not yet requested. Is this correct? The accounting term for this is a "prepayment". The correct accounting treatment is to increase an asset account (your bank account) and create a liability account (Prepayments or something similar). You need to talk to your accountant about how to treat these for consumption and income taxes. Legally, these people are now creditors of your business - just like all of your suppliers and employees. There is no legal requirement to escrow or otherwise treat this as trust money. Basically, if your business goes bust they will lose their money. This is something that you should have dealt with in your contract with your customers - if you are running an online business then you should get a lawyer to revise your terms of service to cover things like how they can ask for a refund (and how long you have to get it to them) and how long (or if) they forfeit the funds. As it stands the money effectively becomes yours after whatever time under a statute of limitation applies to transactions of this type and size (under whatever law applies to the contract) since after that time they cannot sue to get it back. | People running web servers are generally liable for contributory culpability, when some user breaks the law by putting the material on the server. There are legal mechanisms for relieving the server guy from this burden. The best-known mechanism is "DMCA takedown", where you publish contact information so that an offended person can serve up a proper legal claim that you are distributing material that they own copyright to. If you follow the rules, you may enjoy "safe harbor" protection against contributory liability: one of the requirements is that you have to take infringing material down. The specific requirements can depend on the nature of the liability and jurisdiction, but generally involves a "hands off" involvement where the person has no knowledge of what's going on on his server. So just disclaiming responsibility does not work. There are other more serious violations, such as distribution of child porn or transmission of top secret information. Jurisdiction is not totally central to internet questions, and I could sue you (the server guy) in US courts, or (depending on the offense: copyright infringement of a particular item) in UK courts. Nailing this down specifically to Sweden is harder, but recall that The Pirate Bay had a whopping judgment against them. | No, the only purpose of a money order is that it's effectively a form of guaranteed cash that only one person can access. There are no additional protections offered by it. However, given that you are amenable to paying a little extra to facilitate your payments, you may want to consider using a credit card in the future. Provided it's not an all the time thing, credit cards will withhold payments on your behalf if a vendor fails to fulfill their obligations. This means that you're not liable for the cost of the merchant sending you the wrong thing or ignoring your order requests. I've personally done this for several things: Hotel reservation that was borderline unsuitable for human habitation. When a vendor failed to send something I'd purchased. When proceeding with this, bear in mind that the credit card company will want you to make such a claim as soon as possible and to provide as much information as possible to support your claim. If you've e-mail chains, save them. If you've been communicating by phone, write down and provide a summary of your communications. If you have an issue, don't wait a month to raise the concern, do it within a week. Probably about once a year I need to do something like this. Generally what this does is it starts a dispute process whereby the credit company will contact the vendor to get their side of the story (usually they don't respond to them either). After 60 days, the charge is dropped from your bill and presumably the credit card company refuses to pay for the disputed item. Ultimately, this gets you the best possible result. You get your money back and you didn't have to go to court to do it. | No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive. | The GDPR does not outlaw such processing of personal data. It merely regulates how and for what purposes you can process personal data. In general, you can conduct any processing activity as long as it has a clear purpose and a legal basis. Here, the purpose would likely be something like “conducting business with my clients” and the legal basis would be a “legitimate interest”. A legitimate interest always requires a balancing test that weighs your interests against the interests and rights of the affected persons. For example, can the affected persons reasonably expect such processing activities? In a professional setting, it can probably expected that business partners keep notes about contact persons so your intended processing could be fine. The GDPR does impose some general constraints. There are general principles like data minimization and storage limitation – you should only collect data that is necessary for your purpose, and shouldn't store it for longer than necessary. You should think about appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to protect the processing activity, for example about how your CRM is hosted, how backups are made and how security updates are installed, who has access to the personal data, and how the people with access to the personal data can be trained. For example, such training might inform your employees that they can only use the data in the CRM for business purposes, but absolutely not for personal purposes like asking Gina from reception out for a date. | Your question has two distinct aspects which have to be considered separately: criminal law and civil law. I will give an opinion on both aspects, but first I have to give you a word of warning: This case is not clear in the sense that the law can be immediately apply. For a full answer you need the services of a practicing lawyer who does the necessary research. I have a degree in German Law and I have had some practice in IT law, so I know what I am talking about, but I am currently not practicing it and I have done no research for this case. So please, pretty please, don't base any important decision on my opinion. It is a mere guidance, not more. Criminal Law The German Criminal Code (StGB) specifies two cyber crimes explicitly: Computer Fraud (Computerbetrug, § 263a StGB), which you violate when you gain some illegal monetary advantage using a computer, for example a hacker using your stolen credit card data to transfer funds to his account. Computer Sabotage (Computersabotage, § 303b StGB), which applies when you cause damage with a computer, for example a hacker attacking the power grid. The second option clearly does not apply here, but the first one could. That would depend on the answer to a couple of questions, most importantly if a user would gain some monetary advantage at your expense and if that advantage would be illegal. The first of these questions (advantage at your expense) already does not have a clear and universal answer. As it is quite common with fraud, this criminal law question has a civil law aspect (more on that on part two of the answer). The two ways how this could create an advantage to an attacker world be... A contract would not be enacted between you and the attacker, but he would take advantage of you believing in the contract's validity. This option would though probably not apply here, judging from the (spoiler alert) civil law part of the question. A valid contract would be created, but the terms and conditions would not apply and that would cause an illegal financial advantage for the attacker at your cost. Since the base contract would still be in effect and that comes with the obligation to pay, that advantage would have to be in the terms and conditions not applying. You can construct such a case, but that would depend on the terms in question, so there can not be an answer here. There is though a good chance that the terms would still apply (see below), so there will probably be no damage. The other aspect is if this advantage would be through illegal use of the system, which is an interesting question in your case, since the link is publicly accessible. But, then again you can also fake a POST, so you can argue that it is always possible to make the terms not appear. An aspect to be considered though, is that merely attempting computer fraud is already an offense. An attacker who thinks he can gain a monetary advantage from such an attack could be still punished, even if it is not even possible to commit the crime due to the circumstances (this by itself is an interesting question in criminal law). The bigger danger that I see is that your solution makes it easy for an attacker to make their own site and then use your public link to book on your site (in a man in the middle attack). That would clearly be an offense, but it would be the attacker's not your client's. But since your success depends on the trustworthiness of your site, I would recommend to look for a safer solution (such as POST with https). To summarize that part: There is a possibility that accessing the site in the described way is a crime, but I would say it is rather not due to the lack of damage. It is though possible that an attacker still commits a crime by attempting such an attack. You should in any case make your site safer to make it harder to commit MITM attacks. Civil Law The civil law side is whether the terms can be accepted in the described way. This is a case for the law of general terms and conditions (Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen or AGB). In a few words, for AGB to apply, the have to be notified to the client and he has to accept them. If your site is used how it is supposed to be, both conditions are met. In the (invalid) way you have described, the first condition is in question. Since the user knows that using the described URL means accepting the terms, I would consider the second condition to be satisfied. So how can the terms apply if the user has not seen them? In case you provide no shortcut to the accepted link and you also prevent that it can be found in another way (e.g. through a search engine), the direct link would be equivalent to someone signing terms and conditions without reading them, although he has had a chance to do so. That would still make the terms apply, because the client would have been given the chance to read them, which is the only thing the seller needs to do. So chances are that your terms would still apply (thus negating the financial advantage necessary for a crime). However, AGB law is a complex subject that is generally handled by specialists. Any opinion of someone who is not such a specialist has to be handled with care. That includes my opinion. |
In Florida, is there a law which causes restaurants refuse to hire minors, or to forbid minors to operate some equipment? The 2021 Florida Statues state, (2) No minor under 18 years of age, whether such person’s disabilities of nonage have been removed, shall be employed or permitted or suffered to work in any of the following places of employment or in any of the following occupations, provided that the provisions of paragraphs (b), (e), (g), (h), (j), (m), (o), and (q) shall not apply to the employment of student learners under the conditions prescribed in s. 450.161: (a) In or around explosive or radioactive materials. (b) On any scaffolding, roof, superstructure, residential or nonresidential building construction, or ladder above 6 feet. (c) In or around toxic substances or corrosives, including pesticides or herbicides, unless proper field entry time allowances have been followed. (d) Any mining occupation. (e) In the operation of power-driven woodworking machines. (f) In the operation of power-driven hoisting apparatus. (g) In the operation of power-driven metal forming, punching, or shearing machines. (h) Slaughtering, meat packing, processing, or rendering, except as provided in 29 C.F.R. s. 570.61(c). (i) In the operation of power-driven bakery machinery. (j) In the operation of power-driven paper products and printing machines. (k) Manufacturing brick, tile, and like products. (l) Wrecking or demolition. (m) Excavation operations. (n) Logging or sawmilling. (o) Working on electric apparatus or wiring. (p) Firefighting. (q) Operating or assisting to operate, including starting, stopping, connecting or disconnecting, feeding, or any other activity involving physical contact associated with operating, a tractor over 20 PTO horsepower, any trencher or earthmoving equipment, fork lift, or any harvesting, planting, or plowing machinery, or any moving machinery. So it appears that minors should be able to do pretty much anything an adult can when working at a restaurant. Yet, when I was working at a certain fast food place, I was not allowed to use the tomato or onion slicers (which were fully mechanical), and only allowed to use a plastic knife, but not a metal one. I was permitted to use the oven though; wouldn't that be a violation of (i)? Many food places also refuse to hire anyone in back of house under 18, despite some not being too different from those such as McDonald's or Wendy's. Is there any law which imposes extra liability on restaurants in such cases, or otherwise inclines restaurants not to hire minors or allow them to operate equipment? | Some of the categories involve restaurants (i.e. 1(h) and 1(i)), and employers may not want to go through the student learner exception hoops. Every employer has to get worker's compensation insurance for all of their employees. Those rates may be prohibitively high for minors in some kinds of activities. More generally, employers don't want to have worker's compensation claims or injured employees and may simply not trust younger employees to be safe. Some jobs involve access to alcohol that employers want to limit. Some jobs involve contractual authority or decision making that the employer wants to limit to adults. | I'm not going to comment on what your manager is doing specifically, since I don't know all the facts. But in general: As a general rule, businesses have freedom of contract. This means they can choose to do business with, or not do business with, anyone they want. There are specific laws that create exceptions to this freedom of contract. The most important are federal and state civil rights laws, which prohibit many businesses from discriminating on the basis of certain protected classes, such as race, sex, religion, etc. In general, "locals vs. out-of-towners" is not a protected class, and therefore no law explicitly prohibits this type of discrimination. However, it's possible a court could find that "locals" is a proxy for some actual protected class--for example, if the hotel is in a city and the "locals" are predominantly Black. | I think it's important to keep in mind the essence of your actions. @Mowzer gave a great answer on the matter in hand, but I'd like to add a point of view. Is it illegal to eat while driving? Like pointed out by @Mowzer, if no law prohibits it, it's allowed by default (lots of countries have this premise). But what about the consequences of your actions? Maybe there's no law against eating in the car, but there sure is one in my country that specific says that you are not allowed to drive without using both hands in the wheel. The only exception to this rule is to take out your hand from the wheel to use the stick to change gears. Another point of view to add is the liability. Let's say you're minding your own business while driving and a lunatic trying to commit suicide jumps in front of your car. It's a pretty straight-forward case, you have no reason to be blamed. Now, let's add to the same scenario your snack; with a small change, you are now facing a accident that may have been caused by reckless driving (another thing commonly illegal). To sum up, the law is not really like math that have axioms that determine true or false statements without any distinguishment. That's why every case is single handled in the law by it's particularities. | Possibly I am Australian so I am not familiar with Albertan labour law but I have done a little research and the underlying common law principles are similar. I will assume that you are covered by Albertan law and not the Canada Labour Code. The next part of the answer is based on A Guide to Rights and Responsibilities in Alberta Workplaces. First, if you lost it they would need to ask you to pay for it, they could not deduct it from your pay without a garnishee order (p. 10). Second, if the device is safety equipment, and it is certainly arguable that it is, then it is the employee's responsibility to use it and the employer's responsibility to keep it in safe working order; this would include replacing it if it were lost (p. 12). The common law position depends on a) the contract and b) if any negligence were involved. Contract What does your current employment contract say about your use of the employer's equipment generally and this item in particular? If it says something then, unless it is an illegal term, that is what happens. If it is silent, then it turns on the particular circumstances. Also, a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, if they are trying to introduce a new term then you have to agree to it; remembering that there may be consequences to taking a stand against your employer, you should say that you do not agree - this removes the risk that the employer could argue that there was tacit agreement. Negligence In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of torts, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, as an employee this is virtually a given; breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), this would depend on the circumstances of the loss or damage. You have to take reasonable care of the equipment - this is not a subjective standard, you need to do everything that a person in your position can do to protect the equipment from loss or damage; the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff. This has to do with the "proximity" of the harm, if for example the device needed a battery change and you took it to a technician who damaged the item in changing the battery then your actions are not proximate to the loss; and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. Well, if it is lost or damaged this is pretty unarguable. So, if you take reasonable care of the device and, notwithstanding, it is lost or damaged then you would not be liable for negligence ... probably. Talk to your union rep; this is exactly the sort of stuff that they are there to sort out. | Are minors allowed to possess handguns in Oregon? Yes, with exceptions, although they may not purchase or own handguns, and are not permitted to conceal carry handguns. Oregon Revised Statutes § 166.470 prohibits any person from intentionally selling, delivering, or otherwise transferring a handgun to anyone under 21 years of age, ORS § 166.470(1)(a), except the temporary transfer of any firearm to a minor for hunting, target practice, or any other lawful purpose. ORS § 166.470(3)(b). The other primary statute that is relevant is Oregon Revised Statutes § 166.250 which also provides that minors may possess any firearm temporarily for hunting, target practice, or any other lawful purpose. ORS § 166.250(2)(a)(B). But, despite this general rule, a minor may not possess a firearm if they are under 18 years of age, and while a minor, committed the equivalent of an adult felony or a misdemeanor involving violence, within four years of being charged with possession. ORS § 166.250(1)(c). (Source). | I would serve the parents (certified mail), with a "cease and desist" letter, telling them that the children are repeatedly trespassing on your property and that you want them to stop; even get the police involved if you have to. I know it sounds harsh, but you said New England; that's where I live and I know the trespass laws are not in your favor ... especially when it comes to kids. Take Connecticut as an example: This is their law on trespass and kids (not just attractive nuisance!): A possessor of land owes each person who enters his land a certain duty of care based on the person's status. The legal significance is that a possessor of land has the duty to an invitee to inspect the premises for hidden defects and to repair or erect safeguards, if necessary, to make the premises reasonably safe. He has no duty to inspect or to repair or erect safeguards for licensees. But he is liable if he knows of a condition, realizes it involves unreasonable risk, has reason to believe the licensee will not discover it, and he permits the licensee to enter or remain without warning or making the condition reasonably safe. Generally, an owner owes trespassers no duty of care because he has no reason to expect them to be on his property. Therefore, he does not have to warn or protect them from potentially harmful conditions on the property. However, an exception applies if a property owner knows, or has reason to anticipate, that children will trespass on his land. In this case, a special duty arises and the owner must take steps to protect children from any of the property's dangerous conditions. The post you just made indicates even you think that the rock walls, or other "normal garden features" could be dangerous; and they can be! The law requires that you take reasonable steps to eliminate the condition or by otherwise keeping children away from it. DUTY OWED TO TRESPASSER In Connecticut, the following rules apply to a possessor of land with respect to a trespasser. He may not intentionally harm the trespasser or lay a trap for him. The trespasser is entitled to due care after his presence is actually known. There is no duty owed regarding the condition of the premises. The possessor of land has no duty to trespassers if he is engaged in a dangerous activity until the person's presence is know. The possessor of land has no duty to warn trespassers of dangerous hidden conditions (Conn. Law of Torts, § 47). Duty Owed to Trespassing Children Connecticut's appellate courts have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts rule regarding the duty of a property owner to trespassing children (Duggan v. Esposito, 178 Conn. 156 (1979), Neal v. Shiels, Inc., 166 Conn. 3 (1974), Greene v. DiFazio, 148 Conn. 419 (1961), Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110 (1937), Yeske v. Avon Old Farms School, Inc., 1 Conn. App. 195 (1984)). Under this rule, if an owner knows or has reason to know that children will be on his property, he has the duty to protect them from injury by either fixing the harmful condition or ensuring that the children will not have access to that part of the property. The rule states that a possessor of land is liable for harm to trespassing children caused by an artificial condition on the land if (1) the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass in that place, (2) the condition is one the possessor knows or has reason to know and should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to children, (3) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk, (4) the utility of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight compared with the risk to children involved, and (5) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise protect children (Restatement (Second), 2 Torts 339). Put in the letter that you are disclaiming any liability for injury to them that may occur on your property, and make them aware of all the ways they could be injured – so they've been informed. You don't have a duty to remove rock walls because unsupervised kids jump off them. They are not invitees, they are trespassers. So make it known you do not want them on the land and for any further breach you will call the police. Because otherwise you could be responsible. Using CT again as an example, you could include the legal statute about trespass in your notice: Trespass Crimes and Infractions A person commits first degree criminal trespass when (1) he enters or remains in a building or any other premises after the owner or an authorized person personally communicates an order to leave or not enter and (2) he knows that he is not licensed or privileged to be there. This crime also applies to entering or remaining at a place in violation of a retraining or protective order. This is a class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison, a fine of up to $2,000, or both (CGS § 53a-107). A person commits second degree criminal trespass when he enters or remains in a building knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so. This is a class B misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in prison, a fine of up to $1,000, or both (CGS § 53a-108). A person commits third degree criminal trespass when, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any premises for hunting, trapping, or fishing or enters or remains in premises that are posted in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders or that are fenced or enclosed to exclude intruders. This also applies to state lands near state institutions. This is a class C misdemeanor punishable by up to three months in prison, a fine of up to $500, or both (CGS § 53a-109). It is a defense to these crimes if (1) the building was abandoned, (2) the premises at the time of entry were open to the public and the person complied with all lawful conditions on access and remaining on the premises, or (3) the person reasonably believed that the owner (or someone else with the power to do so) would have or did license him to enter or remain on the premises (CGS § 53a-110). A person commits simple trespass if, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters premises without intent to harm any property. This is an infraction punishable by a fine, currently $77 plus costs and fees if paid by mail (CGS § 53a-110a). A separate infraction covers trespass on railroad property when a person enters or remains on the property without lawful authority or consent of the railroad carrier. This is currently a $121 fine plus costs and fees if paid by mail (CGS § 53a-110d). You could just substitute your state's laws if you're in MA, or RI, or wherever. You could have a lawyer draft this letter for probably $200 (free if you have a friend who practices :~) and that will really scare them. Tell them they will be liable for any damage the kids cause/or may cause to your property. But without doubt, put them on notice! | It is not absolutely against the law to produce schedule 1 substances (such as marijuana). Per 21 USC 822(a)(1), Every person who manufactures or distributes any controlled substance or list I chemical...shall obtain annually a registration issued by the Attorney General which entails specific permissions to make, distribute etc, under (b). If you turn to the prohibitions in 21 USC 841, it starts the list of prohibitions saying "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful...". The code is liberally littered with the expression "unauthorized". The Attorney General is given authority under 21 USC 811 to make rules, thus can permit production. It's not actually clear who the grower is in the Compassionate IND program. In the Randall case, the "doctrine of necessity" was apparently invoked successfully which led to charges against Randall being dropped. The legal details of the AGs blind eye towards states like Washington are a little hazy, as it were. | It probably depends on whether the employer is covered by a relevant non-discrimination statute. Most employers in the United States are covered, but some are small enough to be exempt. Federal law exempts employers with under 15 employees and religious organizations. There might also be a relevant state law. It also would depend upon whether the EEOC or a court found that "be blessed" was a compelled religious statement in violation of a worker's beliefs, and whether allowing the worker not to say it would be a "reasonable accommodation." This is a strong case, and I suspect that the worker would win on both counts but it isn't a completely open and shut case. There is arguably a secular meaning to the word "blessed" and a court could conceivably find that there is a legitimate and indispensible business purpose for insisting that every single person in the worker's position need to make this statement, although I doubt that a court would do so. |
What is the penalty for a bad-acting juror? Let's say Bob is part of the jury during a trial. But Bob is a dishonest/bad juror. What penalties could he face, and what party would be prosecuting him? The particular scenarios I have in mind are: Bob happily blabs to the media and exposes all the other jurors and what they've said and who they are. All for some clout, or money. Bob secretly tells the prosecution/defense that he'll do whatever they ask to manipulate the jury, for a favour. Bob is a nutcase, and acts in bad faith to manipulate the jury just for the hell of it. For example, "filibustering" and wasting everyone's time, without explicitly stepping into maliciousness. | united-states This will vary somewhat by jurisdiction. But in most US states: Bob happily blabs to the media and exposes all the other jurors and what they've said and who they are. All for some clout, or money. If the authorities can trace these stories back to Bob (and they will put some effort into tracing them) Bob may well be found guilty of criminal contempt of court, fined, and sentenced to a short period in jail. He may also lose the right to be on a jury in future. Bob secretly tells the prosecution/defense that he'll do whatever they ask to manipulate the jury, for a favour. If this comes out, Bob could be convicted of soliciting a bribe, and if the scheme went forward, of both accepting a bribe, and jury tampering (or either, depending on the evidence). These are serious crimes, and Bob might well spend several years in prison. Bob is a nutcase, and acts in bad faith to manipulate the jury just for the hell of it. For example, "filibustering" and wasting everyone's time, without explicitly stepping into maliciousness. It is not unlawful to be a nutcase. The judge could order Bob removed from the jury if his disruptions were serious enough. If Bob actually violated th explicit instructions issued by the judge, he might be convicted of contempt, as in case 1, but this is rather less likely. A comment adds the scenario: Bob knows that the guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but still tries to sway the jury for a not-guilty verdict (whether he tells other jurors what's going on or not) and will hang the jury if that fails, because he doesn't believe the defendant should get in trouble for it This is an instance of "jury nullification". Bob is within his legal rights, and cannot be punished, nor removed from the jury. Bob can try to convince the other jurors that the law is unjust, or that the possible penalties are too severe for what the accused did, or of some other reason not to convict. If they agree, and acquit the accused, the acquittal stands, however contrary to the letter of the law. If they do not agree, there is a mistrial because of a hung jury. The prosecution may (but need not) retry the accused. | Bob will be convicted if he is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Now it is a logical fact that he cannot be guilty of both crimes, but it is entirely possible that his first conviction was incorrect and he is guilty of murder. His defense would point out that the first conviction creates reasonable doubt about his guilt in the murder case. The prosecution would have to show how it doesn't, for example by finding a police officer who forged the evidence in the first case. And then the defence would point out that the fact that evidence against Bob was forged once means reasonable doubt for the evidence in the second case. Fact is, the prosecution must show guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the murder, and the fact that Bob was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for a different crime, and that he cannot have committed both crimes, makes the prosecutions task a lot harder. Now what if the prosecution finds a second criminal who is an exact visual match for Bob? On the positive side, this would explain how there are two videos apparently showing Bob committing two crimes in different places. It would put the prosecution into the difficult position to have to prove which one is the murderer. And they can't say "Bob is in jail already, so it must have been Bill", because now Bob's first conviction looks very unsafe. | Willfully telling an untruth or making a misrepresentation under oath is perjury; the reason you do so or the substance of it is irrelevant. It is the act of perjury itself that is an offense and led to the impeachment. | was there a good way to publicly shame Bob, and prevent him from getting his next job, without breaking Carol’s confidence? Apparently not. The conclusion that Bob's violations of company policy are short of breaking any laws leaves little to no reason for publicly shaming him. Details on the company policy, the facts, and the statements might make a difference, but your description is generic in that regard and would require us to speculate on what they could be. Could there have been grounds for a lawsuit? It largely depends on the terms of the publications, their veracity & import, and --if false or unfounded-- their effect on Bob's prospects and/or whether the statements are defamatory per se. Would a truth defense for a statement such as, “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct,” require disclosing the investigation? Yes. A defendant has the burden to prove the [affirmative] defense(s) on which he intends to premise his position. Note that the statement “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct” in and of itself is not really a truth defense because it is inconclusive as to whether Bob was found to have incurred misconduct. The sole fact that Bob was investigated does not justify imputing to him disreputable conduct. Would a defense that the investigation gave them legitimate reasons to believe that the insinuation they made is true require them to disclose it? Yes. Bob is entitled to gather from the defendant the bases for the latter's allegations. Otherwise defamers would systematically elude their liability by sticking to generic allegations only. Are there other good defenses that could have gotten the lawsuit dismissed as frivolous? That requires us to speculate because we are given no details about the underlying events, Bob's pleadings, the evidence obtained during discovery, and so forth. That being said, a prevailing defense does not imply that the lawsuit is frivolous. Would the identities of the witnesses have been redacted? No. The fact that Bob did not break any laws suggests that the matter does not warrant measures akin to witness protection. Nor does your description reflect that the communications are protected by some privilege. Is it credible that Ethan had a good legal reason to keep this “in the family” for Carol’s sake? That is unanswerable because, inter alia, it is not about the law, it is unclear what exactly "Carol's sake" entails, and the substance of the company's other scandals as well as Ethan's reason(s) are unspecified. Ethan's "good legal reason" does not necessarily have to protect or advance "Carol's sake". | In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge. | You could ask the bailiff to bring this concern to the attention of the judge. If you feel the need to protect yourself, you should. If you are really sincerely scared, stand your ground and refuse to participate for this reason in your response to the judge, even if this puts you at risk of a contempt of court sanction - better to being in jail briefly than to be physically harmed by another juror. The judge might release you from jury service or dismiss the threatening juror, or might declare a mistrial if you bring this to the judge's attention. The mistrial could result in the de facto acquittal of the defendant in a criminal case, especially if no alternates are available and dismissing you or the threatening juror would bring the jury below a quorum, so keep this in mind. I would also not tell the bailiff what position you are being coerced to take, merely that you are being coerced with physical threats. And I would identify the threatening juror (who might also be removed). Of course, if you are actually on a jury right now, you are almost surely violating your obligations as a juror by going on line to ask this question. | When the required number of jurors vote "yes" (or "no", or whatever the question is), then the jury has reached a verdict. There is no provision whereby the presiding juror can re-interpret "yes" as "no". In the case you describe, if a unanimous verdict is required that despite a reasonable inference that the last juror believes the defendant to be guilty, he has voted not guilty so the jury has not reached a verdict. In case the guy in charge decides "In this case no means yes", thus falsely presents a supposed unanimous verdict, there is still an option for juror polling, in which case the not-guilty juror gets a chance to affirm his not guilty vote; though one of the parties has to request jury polling. If during polling the juror's response is not a clear "yes", then it could be more complicated. | I completely agree with Jen's answer and I am writing here to discuss some deeper historical dimensions to the question. Historically, notion of using a 23 member grand jury dates to the reign of King Edward III whose reign started in the year 1368 in England. It is not derived from the 23 members of the Lesser Sanhedrins in ancient Israel. The grand jury was changed from having 12 members to having 23 members at least seventy-eight years after King Edward I expelled all Jews from England in the year 1290, at a time when the expulsion of Jews from England was still in effect. The Grand Jury can also be traced to the time of the Norman conquest of England in 1066. There is evidence that the courts of that time summoned a body of sworn neighbors to present crimes that had come to their knowledge. Since the members of that accusing jury were selected from small jurisdictions, it was natural that they could present accusations based on their personal knowledge. Historians agree that the Assize [court session or assembly] of Clarendon in 1166 provided the ground work for our present Grand Jury system. During the reign of Henry II (1154-1189), to regain for the crown the powers usurped by Thomas Becket, Chancellor of England, 12 "good and lawful men" in each village were assembled to reveal the names of those suspected of crimes. It was during this same period that juries were divided into two types, civil and criminal, with the development of each influencing the other. The oath taken by these jurors provided that they would carry out their duties faithfully, that they would aggrieve no one through enmity nor deference to anyone through love, and that they would conceal those things that they had heard. By the year 1290, these accusing juries were given the authority to inquire into the maintenance of bridges and highways, defects of jails, and whether the Sheriff had kept in jail anyone who should have been brought before the justices. "Le Grand Inquest" evolved during the reign of Edward III (1368), when the "accusatory jury" was increased in number from 12 to 23, with a majority vote necessary to indict anyone accused of crime. A grand jury is an ex parte proceeding run by a prosecutor in secret with only the most minimal judicial involvement. Counsel for the suspects can represent the suspects as witnesses if they are called to testify before the grand jury, but cannot make arguments on applying the law to the facts or legal arguments to a grand jury. To indict, twelve members of a grand jury must vote to indict (no matter how many members the grand jury has), and a majority of the grand jury must support the indictment (which is why 23 grand jurors is the upper limit). So, for example, in a federal grand jury with 16 members, three quarters of them must vote in favor of doing so to indict a suspect. The increase in the size of the grand jury from twelve to twenty-three made it easier to indict criminal defendants by relaxing the unanimity requirement for an indictment that had existed when there were only twelve jurors on a grand jury. The grand jury is supposed to vote to indict if it finds that there is probable cause to find that a defendant committed a crime under the law explained to it by the prosecutor and the evidence that is presented to it by the prosecutor. One grand jury's refusal to indict a suspect does not preclude a prosecutor from presenting the same charges against the same suspect to a different grand jury later on. Federal grand juries almost always vote to indict. At the state level, indictment rates vary widely from one county to another, and from state to state. The grand jury requirement exists in the U.S. under state law mostly in states in the Eastern U.S., while most Western states allow grand juries to be convened but only do so in exceptional cases (usually for political reasons or as a secret means for prosecutors to gather evidence). In the early decades of the United States grand juries played a major role in public matters. During that period counties followed the traditional practice of requiring all decisions be made by at least twelve of the grand jurors, (e.g., for a twenty-three-person grand jury, twelve people would constitute a bare majority). Any citizen could bring a matter before a grand jury directly, from a public work that needed repair, to the delinquent conduct of a public official, to a complaint of a crime, and grand juries could conduct their own investigations. In that era most criminal prosecutions were conducted by private parties, either a law enforcement officer, a lawyer hired by a crime victim or their family, or even by laymen. A layman could bring a bill of indictment to the grand jury; if the grand jury found there was sufficient evidence for a trial, that the act was a crime under law, and that the court had jurisdiction, it would return the indictment to the complainant. The grand jury would then appoint the complaining party to exercise the authority of an attorney general, that is, one having a general power of attorney to represent the state in the case. The grand jury served to screen out incompetent or malicious prosecutions. The advent of official public prosecutors in the later decades of the 19th century largely displaced private prosecutions. (Source) Grand juries were popular in the Eastern states because in the Revolutionary War period and the period leading up to the Revolutionary War in the United States, grand juries were used as a tool of resistance to what was perceived as oppressive British rule by citizens of the American colonies. But, that fervor had faded and the difficulty of finding grand jurors on the frontier discouraged the use of this institution of people migrated to the west to form new states, and as the prosecution of crimes came to be the sole or predominant province of professional prosecutors employed by the state. In states that don't require grand jury indictments in all felony cases, an adversarial preliminary hearing before a judge to screen for probable cause is used in in lieu of a grand jury in some felony cases. The only country other than the United States which still uses grand juries is Liberia, which was founded by freed slaves from the U.S. |
Why aren't we allowed to intervene if a child is being psychologically abused? In my understanding, there are two types of child abuses: physical abuse and psychological abuse. For the former, we can call social worker/police to intervene. But for the latter, we cannot do anything. I heard that it's because of the privacy law. I understand the importance of privacy, but why doesn't it count the latter as equaled as the former too? I live in Vietnam, but I think any jurisprudence has the same approach | This answer is based upon united-states law. Outside the United States that law may, and indeed, is likely to, differ, as the legal analysis in U.S. law is unusual in multiple respects with regard to these issue. The premise of the question is basically incorrect. There is not a stark legal definitional distinction between physical abuse and psychological abuse. Child abuse and neglect are defined by Federal and State laws. At the State level, child abuse and neglect may be defined in both civil and criminal statutes. This publication presents civil definitions that determine the grounds for intervention by State child protective agencies. At the Federal level, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) has defined child abuse and neglect as "any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caregiver that results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse, or exploitation, or an act or failure to act that presents an imminent risk of serious harm. CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-320), 42 U.S.C. § 5101, Note (§ 3). (Source). This definition and other definitions were contained in the 2010 amendments to the Act, but were not codified in the United States Code's text. State definitions very considerably, but significantly overlap with the CAPTA definition. For example, a non-exclusive list of conduct that constitutes misdemeanor or low level felony child abuse in Colorado if you engage in it includes: you are in a position of trust in relation to the child, and you participate in a continued pattern of conduct that results in the child’s malnourishment; you fail to ensure the child’s access to proper medical care; you participate in a continued pattern of cruel punishment or unreasonable isolation or confinement of the child; you make repeated threats of harm or death to the child or to a significant person in the child’s life in the presence of the child; you commit a continued pattern of acts of domestic violence in the presence of the child; or you participate in a continued pattern of extreme deprivation of hygienic or sanitary conditions in the child’s daily living environment. (The criminal child abuse statute, Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-6-401, is somewhat tricky to parse). Some of this conduct causes emotional harm more than physical harm. As is typical, this only moderately overlaps with the civil standard for termination of parental rights in Colorado pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes §§ 19-3-102 and 19-5-105 which state in the pertinent parts: C.R.S. § 19-3-102: (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (g) The child tests positive at birth for either a schedule I controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-203, C.R.S., or a schedule II controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-204, C.R.S., unless the child tests positive for a schedule II controlled substance as a result of the mother's lawful intake of such substance as prescribed. (2) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has subjected another child or children to an identifiable pattern of habitual abuse; and (b) Such parent, guardian, or legal custodian has been the respondent in another proceeding under this article in which a court has adjudicated another child to be neglected or dependent based upon allegations of sexual or physical abuse, or a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that such parent's, guardian's, or legal custodian's abuse or neglect has caused the death of another child; and (c) The pattern of habitual abuse described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) and the type of abuse described in the allegations specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2) pose a current threat to the child. C.R.S. § 19-5-105: (3) If, after the inquiry, the other birth parent is identified to the satisfaction of the court or if more than one person is identified as a possible parent, each shall be given notice of the proceeding in accordance with subsection (5) of this section, including notice of the person's right to waive his or her right to appear and contest. If any of them waives his or her right to appear and contest or fails to appear or, if appearing, cannot personally assume legal and physical custody, taking into account the child's age, needs, and individual circumstances, such person's parent-child legal relationship with reference to the child shall be terminated. If the other birth parent or a person representing himself or herself to be the other birth parent appears and demonstrates the desire and ability to personally assume legal and physical custody of the child, taking into account the child's age, needs, and individual circumstances, the court shall proceed to determine parentage under article 4 of this title. If the court determines that the person is the other birth parent, the court shall set a hearing, as expeditiously as possible, to determine whether the interests of the child or of the community require that the other parent's rights be terminated or, if they are not terminated, to determine whether: (a) To award custody to the other birth parent or to the physical custodian of the child; or (b) To direct that a dependency and neglect action be filed pursuant to part 5 of article 3 of this title with appropriate orders for the protection of the child during the pendency of the action. (3.1) The court may order the termination of the other birth parent's parental rights upon a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child and that there is clear and convincing evidence of one or more of the following: (a) That the parent is unfit. In considering the fitness of the child's parent, the court shall consider, but shall not be limited to, the following: (I) Emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency of the parent of such duration or nature as to render the parent unlikely, within a reasonable period of time, to care for the ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child; (II) A single incident of life-threatening or serious bodily injury or disfigurement of the child or other children; (III) Conduct toward the child or other children of a physically or sexually abusive nature; (IV) A history of violent behavior that demonstrates that the individual is unfit to maintain a parent-child relationship with the minor, which may include an incidence of sexual assault, as defined in section 19-1-103 (96.5), that resulted in the conception of the child; (V) Excessive use of intoxicating liquors or use of controlled substances, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5), C.R.S., that affects the ability of the individual to care and provide for the child; (VI) Neglect of the child or other children; (VII) Injury or death of a sibling or other children due to proven abuse or neglect by such parent; (VIII) Whether, on two or more occasions, a child in the physical custody of the parent has been adjudicated dependent or neglected in a proceeding under article 3 of this title or comparable proceedings under the laws of another state or the federal government; (IX) Whether, on one or more prior occasions, a parent has had his or her parent-child legal relationship terminated pursuant to this section or article 3 of this title or comparable proceedings under the laws of another state or the federal government. (b) That the parent has not established a substantial, positive relationship with the child. The court shall consider, but shall not be limited to, the following in determining whether the parent has established a substantial, positive relationship with the child: (I) Whether the parent has maintained regular and meaningful contact with the child; (II) Whether the parent has openly lived with the child for at least one hundred eighty days within the year preceding the filing of the relinquishment petition or, if the child is less than one year old at the time of the filing of the relinquishment petition, for at least one-half of the child's life; and (III) Whether the parent has openly held out the child as his or her own child. The items in bold have, or could sometimes have, a significant emotional well-being component. In practice, however, this is limited by the constitutional right to raise one's children without undue government interference in circumstances where there is not an imminent risk of serious harm, under the substantive due process doctrine dimensions of the 14th Amendment due process clause, This is especially true when one's child rearing methods of a religious basis implicating the Free Exercise clause of the 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as incorporated against the states through the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. While these constitutional defenses can be asserted in both cases of alleged physical abuse and alleged psychological abuse, these defenses are particularly hard to penetrate in cases of psychological abuse. In particular, In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the "Supreme Court also recognized a substantive due process right 'to control the education of one's children', thus voiding state laws mandating for all students to attend public school." It said: We think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. These are sometimes described as "privacy rights" (and also include the right to legal contraception and the abortion rights of Roe v. Wade), but in this context, a "privacy right" is not the right to keep something unknown to the general public in the literal sense of the words. Instead, it is a privacy right in the less common sense of the words meaning a right to autonomy and freedom of conscience of a parent, associated with the underlying purposes of other constitutional rights that protect more literal forms of privacy. The other issue is that there is less of a consensus concerning what constitutes psychological abuse sufficiently clearly that it is publicly sanctionable, than there is concerning what constitutes physical abuse. Striking a child for reasons other than to improve a child's behavior is usually considered physical child abuse. Intentionally undermining a child's self-esteem, in contrast, for example, can be justified in myriad ways. | Can someone be arrested for not being ‘nice’ to police? Yes. The arrest may later be declared unlawful, and the cop could later be disciplined by his boss, but if a cop wants to arrest you now for any reason they just can. Seems weird and an abuse of power to me. The available means of dealing with abuse of power have never been in excess. Could they win such a case? Yes. So could your friend. It depends on many many factors. | I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983. | There are both statutes and customs aimed at preventing "Malicious Prosecution" and "Abuse of Process." (In Pennsylvania, for example, the 1980 Dragonetti Act allows the victim of a frivolous lawsuit to counter-sue for compensatory damages.) One can also buy insurance against this type of risk: Umbrella liability policies will generally provide a defense against civil lawsuits and any damages awarded, as will many business insurance policies. Of course, none of this is to say that a skilled legal team can't avoid all of these countermeasures and, in practice, take up a significant amount of your time and trouble. We do not have a perfect system of justice. | No To declare that a parent is "unfit" in the US requires at least a decision by a government agency (often called "child protective services" or "child welfare" depending on the state) usually confirmed by a judge. Medical testimony may be persuasive, but neither doctors nor hospitals may make such determinations. | Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine. | Every State in the union has some form of involuntary mental health hold. Regardless of whether or not the patient claims it was an accident, it is incumbent upon the hospital or facility where the individual is held (which is typically at least 72 hours) to do an in-depth analysis of whether the person is a danger to themselves or others. While in this scenario it may've been an inadvertent overdose, the empirical evidence suggests it could have been intentional as the practitioner cannot see into the thoughts and motivations behind the patient's actions. Even taking the patient at face-value, addiction to the extent of overdose is also a mental health issue, which may cause a person to be a danger to themselves. From a clinical perspective, it is much more likely than not that one of the two scenarios occurred, versus a truly mistaken overdose. One would need to mistake their actions numerous times in a day to take so much as to overdose. If you look at it from the inverse perspective, if the facility failed to keep a person who'd just overdosed, or the first responder failed to initiate a hold and the person later died, minimally they would be liable if sued by the family in an action for wrongful death. The unfortunate facts are that if a person was set on committing suicide, it unlikely they would be forthcoming with that fact, for this very reason (the mandatory hold), so a person's word cannot be the determining factor. Even if someone was not intentionally trying to take their life, having taken enough Xanax to cause medical overdose would suggest the potential that even if not suicidal, the individual was at a minimum abusing the medication by taking much more than prescribed (or in a way that is contraindicated - such as with alcohol or other depressants) and potentially suffering from benzodiazepine addiction. Either way, if the hold was not initiated or cut short - and then someone ended up dying from an overdoes - the responsibility and potential liability is the same. A person who is suicidal can reassess what may be a snap decision, or have a chemical imbalance stabilized, or a severe addiction identified in that amount of time. For the person who ctually takes so much medication as to mistakenly cause overdose, this is certainly inconvenient; however, 72 hours is a short time in the grand scheme of things to potentially save a life. The law will nearly always err on the side of safety and prevention. | There isn't any indication in that news story that the disabled son was anywhere nearby. I agree the situation you describe sounds like a legitimate use of the placard, but it seems in this situation, the placard was being used in a manner totally unrelated to the transport of a disabled person. My guess is that the cops cited her because the son wasn't in the car, and was not inside the establishment at which she parked. California code has this to say: A person to whom a disabled person placard has been issued may permit another person to use the placard only while in the presence or reasonable proximity of the disabled person for the purpose of transporting the disabled person. So as long as the disabled person is within a "reasonable proximity", and the placard is being used to transport them, they do not have to be inside the car to make using the placard legitimate. In this case, the woman was just transporting herself and using the placard anyway, which is illegal. |
If a stateless person commits a crime in Bir Tawil (land that belongs to no country), which country will regulate the punishment? Let's imagine a guy Bob. Bob has no citizenship (stateless). Bob ended up on a land that doesn't belong to any country (Bir Tawil). Bob commited a particular crime (let's say, he murdered another stateless person) in Bir Tawil. The world beyond Bir Tawil knows about this crime, and now Bob is considered a murderer. Bob is still situated in Bir Tawil. P.S. This is a theoretical question, thus it doesn't matter how Bob ended up in Bir Tawil, or why he killed another stateless person, etc. Here are my questions: Can Bob be arrested by Egyptian, Sudanese, or any other countries' police/special forces, while he resides in Bir Tawil? Can Bob be arrested by Egyptian, Sudanese, or any other countries' police/special forces, while he resides in one of recognized countries (Egypt, Sudan, or any other)? Which country takes the responsibility of bringing Bob to the court and sentencing him to punishment? | Bir Tawil has no settled population, but members of the Ababda and Bishari tribes pass through the region. Both are nomadic Sunni Muslim people with very traditional worldviews. Their de facto control of the region makes them the arbiters of justice there. Rather than pursuing this murder through the courts of a nearby country (each of which is likely to ignore the murder), as a practical matter, the people present in Bir Tawil are very likely to treat the matter as one governed by Sunni Islamic law (which they view as universal in application) and to take justice into their own hands in accordance with the means prescribed by Islamic law (i.e. tribal leaders are likely to capture and behead him after a summary Islamic law proceeding). In the alternative, to the extent that our stateless person's victim has come within the protection of a local clan, that clan may seek vengeance upon the murderer in order to protect the clan's honor. | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | Swiss customs has a form to submit questions like this and they gave me a very informative answer. As it turns out the receiver is also part of the customs process. If for some reason customs decides to open an investigation assuming that something regarding declaration/import was wrong the receiver will also be part of the investigation and it is possible that they determine that the receiver is at fault as well. In this case in addition to the import fee additional fines or fees might be imposed on the receiver. I do not know how they determine this, but from a law perspective it is clear. There is always the option to just report a wrong declaration upon receiving the package which means you have to pay the import fee, but no other fines, fees or investigations will include the receiver (assuming the goods involved can be imported legally). The legal part points towards (this part sadly does not exist in English): Zollschuldner Art. 70 Zollgesetz (specifically section 70 (2) c.). For the unlikely reason that the swiss administrative legal code becomes unavailable this is said article translated by me: Customs debtors have to pay customs fee, or if they become unavailable make guarantee for it (materially). Customs debors include: a) The person sending goods across the border (sender) b) The person responsible declaring the goods c) The person on whos behalf goods are ordered <-- Some interesting tidbits: Transport compaines are not liable for anything Your heirs inherit your customs penalties (i.e. you order something from another country, then your heirs have to pay customs fees if you happen to die) Buying a company also means buying their customs obligations. | Is a country an institution or an entity? Neither. It's a sovereign state (a "political entity", not an entity in the sense of a legal persona). | Extradition is done for specific charges. A principle found in virtually all extradition treaties called the "rule of specialty" says that the country requesting extradition may not prosecute the defendant for any crimes except the ones for which extradition was granted without the permission of the extraditing country, except for crimes committed after the defendant is extradited. This protection expires once the defendant has been released from jail and had a fair chance to leave the country. The rule of specialty doesn't necessarily mean the other charge needs to be dropped, but the defendant can't be tried for it as long as the rule applies. If they're later in the country for another reason (or don't leave when they have the chance), they can potentially be rearrested for the other crime. But as long as they're only in the country because they were extradited, they can't be tried for any other past crimes without the extraditing country's permission. | This is tied up in the concept of sovereignty - nation states have control over their territories and citizens and they recognise the right of other nation states to do likewise. The USA, China (Hong Kong) and Panama are all sovereign states, they each decide what the law is within their own territory and they can’t tell each other what to do; they can ask, however, that’s what diplomats do. If a HK domiciled company provides HK based servers then they have to comply with HK law irrespective of where their customers are located. The USA could pass a law requiring US companies (like ISPs) to keep logs of traffic to and from HK servers but they cannot force a HK company to do anything, unless and until it operates in a place where the US has jurisdiction which means both the right and the ability to enforce their law. | Actually, there is not a government kill list, that is just a meme. The First Amendment says (starts) "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...". That means a number of different concrete things: there shall be no laws prohibiting any religion, or preferring a religion, not may there be laws impeding or promoting the practice of a religion. The government therefore cannot reward or punish a person for believing in skin walkers, nor for turning themselves into a coyote (if they can do it). The old practice of burning witches at the stake is illegal, similarly at least under current understandings of the law it would be illegal to punish those without a religion with a fine or death. The aforementioned person can thus practice witchcraft – up to a point. One cannot get away with murder by claiming that they are just practicing the Ásatru ritual of blót. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah is an example of how the government can not restrict a religious practice (banning animal sacrifices of a particular religion), Employment Division v. Smith is an example of a neutral prohibition which happens to impinge on a religion (outlawing certain drugs limits a religious practice). | Different socities, including some that are not considered sovereign nations, create laws, that is enforceable rules of conduct, in different ways. Not all write them down. But they are all Law in that they are rulwa that societies can and will enforce mon their members. I recommend reading Legal Systems Very Different from Ours by David D. Friedman (Professor of Law at Santa Clara University). There are free versions available on the web, and the final version is available from Amazon. It includes chapters on several systems where law is not written, including: Pirate Law Prisoners’ Law Romani Law Comanche, Kiowa and Cheyenne: The Plains Indians Somali Law Other chapters deal with systems where law may have been written, but its method of formation and operation are very different from the models usually discussed on this site. This include Roman law, Imperial Chinese law, Jewish law, Early Irish Law, and the law of saga-period Iceland. |
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