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Limits on sources of fact or law for a court (incl. appeal) There are specific rules for introducing sources of fact in a normal (first-instance) trial, either through evidence or through witnesses, with constraints around hearsay, etcetera. A fact (or an alleged fact) introduced or referred to in a trial needs to be sourced following these rules, or be disregarded. It would also seem logical to me (although I'm not sure about it) that since a suit where one party fails to attend entails a default judgement in favor of the other party, then a judge must only apply a law if it has been invoked by at least one party in the trial (when it comes to sentencing I mean, not on procedural grounds during the trial itself). Is that inference true ? It seems to me (as said in the movie On the Basis of Sex) that a US court of appeals and the Supreme Court work like the french Court of Cassation, in that it only (re)judges questions of law, and not questions of facts. If so, does the same standard of only applying sources of law mentioned during the trial apply there ? I'm asking the question after having read the infamously leaked Alito opinion from Dobbs v. Jackson, which ends by exhaustively listing old state abortion laws. Although I didn't read the transcript of the hearing that thoroughly, I doubt all these sources of law (or of fact, depending on how you look at it, since the opinion cites them as evidence and does not seek to apply them) were all cited by the party arguing against Roe. If judges (and justices) are not bound by what law(s) and which facts have been cited by the parties, what is the limit on how judges can do the parties' job, inventing their legal arguments for them ? If they are not, how could a poorly-defended case be prevented from setting a terrible jurisprudence precedent ? Final question, is there a difference between how these rules bind judges and justices (i.e in Courts of Appeals vs in the Supreme Court) ?	David Siegel's answer correctly explains how appellate courts consider laws and arguments not addressed in the courts below. To clarify on the comparison to the Court of Cassation, though: A trial court is generally limited to considering the facts that are properly introduced by the parties, though a court may also take "judicial notice" of certain facts that are highly unlikely to be disputed. On review, courts of appeal are generally limited to facts supported by the evidence in the trial-court record, though they may also take judicial notice of other facts. A party is generally unable to introduce new evidence during an appeal. It is not correct that an appellate court will not review factual determinations, as those reviews probably happen in more cases than not. But -- just as with legal determinations -- those reviews can happen with varying levels of deference. For instance, if a case is tried to a jury, an appellate court will be exceedingly deferential to the jury's factual determinations, on the theory that the jury is best positioned to evaluate the evidence, gauge credibility, make reasonable inferences, etc. A judge who makes a factual determination based on in-court testimony will enjoy a similar measure of deference. But if a court makes a factual determination based only on documents submitted in support of a motion, or otherwise lacks an opportunity to evaluate a witness in person, the appellate court will be more open to different interpretations of the evidence. Legal determinations are likewise subject to varying levels of deference. At one end is the abuse-of-discretion standard. If a trial court determines that evidence is admissible or inadmissible, for instance, an appellate court will apply the abuse-of-discretion standard, which (to oversimplify) asks not whether the ruling was incorrect under the controlling law, but whether the ruling was reached without regard to the controlling law. On the other end is de novo review, in which the appellate court gives virtually no deference to the trial court and undertakes its own independent legal analysis. Perhaps even more deferential is plain-error review, which asks (to oversimplify) whether the trial court's error is so apparent that it barely needs to be debated. If the error is obvious enough (and satisfies several other criteria), the appellate court may reverse the trial court.	Appeal proofing decisions is a common practice of trial judges (and even intermediate appellate court judges and state supreme court judges) well known to practitioners and even discussed by law professors in class at times, but I'd have a hard time coming up with a reference where it was discussed. There is probably a law review article that discusses the practice somewhere. It also comes in several versions. One is to make copious findings of fact (especially on credibility) that are hard to reverse on appeal. A judicial finding that someone had an intent to defraud another party based upon his demeanor when he testified about that issue can overcome all sorts of technical objections to a claim in a lawsuit on a more strict liability basis like breach of contract. Another is to give a "soon to lose" party everything he wants procedurally, even when he isn't entitled to it so he can't appeal on procedural grounds. For example, a court might admit otherwise inadmissible evidence over the objection of the other party and then rule against the party seeking to admit that evidence anyway on the merits. Lawyers often assume that this is happening when a judge starts making blatantly incorrect rulings on procedural issues against them repeatedly in an otherwise strong case in a bench trial. A third is to provide an alternative holding that reaches the same conclusion in case for a different legal reason in the event that an appellate court does not agree with the primary holding. A fourth (mostly limited to appellate contexts) is to decide a case on grounds that make the case uninteresting to review on further appeal (e.g. finding that a factual conclusion is supported by evidence in the record, or that an issue wasn't preserved adequately in a trial court) or beyond the jurisdiction of other courts (e.g. deciding a case based upon state law so that the U.S. Supreme Court won't review it).	No Only the ratio decidendi of a case sets binding precedent. By definition, that has to be in the decision of the court’s majority because that’s what decided the case. If a minority decision disagrees with the majority on ratio, then the majority is the binding precedent. If the point is obiter, then it’s merely persuasive, not binding, irrespective of where it is.	Any court from a municipal traffic court on up can declare a law unconstitutional and the U.S. Supreme Court is almost never the court that does so in the first instance. Also, while the jurisdiction stripping law that you suggest might be unconstitutional, it is not obviously unconstitutional. The relevant language is in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution (this has been modified by the 11th Amendment in ways that are not pertinent to the issue at hand): The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-- to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. The key language being the language in bold, who scope and limitations are the subject of hot debate in legal scholarship. For example, both military tribunal law for non-soldiers and the collateral review of death sentences implicate this provision. An issue related to U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction over military court-martial court composition will be heard this year in oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court. There is also debate over whether the jurisdiction of every single federal court can be removed from a matter within the judicial power of the United States. In that regard, keep in mind that the United States federal court system did not have direct appeals of criminal convictions at all until the 1890s, although you could challenge, for example, the jurisdiction of a criminal court over your case with a writ of habeas corpus which is a collateral attack on a conviction in a separate civil lawsuit formally directed at your prison warden. That being said, as far as I know, a law is considered in effect until declared unconstitutional. It is illegal to break an unconstitutional law, until declared so. You are wrong. A law that is unconstitutional on its face is, in terms of legal theory, unconstitutional immediately upon enactment and a court simply acknowledges that fact. It is not illegal to break an unconstitutional law even if no court has yet declared it to be unconstitutional (in U.S. jurisprudence). A law that is unconstitutional as applied is unconstitutional in application at the moment it is applied unconstitutionally, and again, a court merely acknowledges that fact.	Courts only decide disputes If the written contract says X but the parties agree they meant Y, then the court adopts Y. However, if the written contract says X but one party asserts Y and the other Z, the court takes the written contract as definitive. The parol evidence rule would prevent any evidence being introduced if X is unambiguous. Plaintiff presents contemporaneous evidence that the parties did not intend the Written Agreement to be integrated, even though the template they used contains the integration clause. The plaintiff can’t introduce that evidence in the first place unless there is some ambiguity to be resolved. If it’s plain on the face that integration (whatever that is) was intended then we’re done here counsel, move along. But what if at the same time that they signed the Written Agreement in question the parties signed another agreement covering some of the same subjects? If the documents don’t create a practical conflict then we’re in the same place as before. If they do then the court will try to resolve that within the written documents - a later document will usually prevail over an earlier one and a more detailed document over a more general one. Extrinsic evidence is almost always excluded. Or what if there is incontrovertible evidence that both parties subsequently and intentionally acted contrary to some term of the Written Agreement? That would suggest that the Written Agreement did not represent the Actual Agreement. No, that would constitute a waiver by one or both parties - you can choose not to enforce (waive) your rights under a contract. This can be one off or, if repeated often enough, a waiver for all future breaches. Alternatively, the parties are free to change the terms of their contract; maybe that’s what happened.	The decision of a court consists of several things: The orders made A summary of the evidence The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the facts of the case are The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the law applying to those facts is The judge's reasoning from those findings of facts and law to the orders that were made (ratio decidendi) Reasoning on how things might have been decided otherwise (or the same way) if the facts or the law were different (obiter dicta). We hope that the judge is articulate enough that we can tell which is which. Where there is more than one judge there is more than one opinion. However, there is still ratio decidendi and obiter dicta across all the opinions. Typically, a dissenting judge disagrees with the ratio decidendi in whole or part and his reasoning about that is obiter dicta. The ratio decidendi – "the point in a case that determines the judgement" or "the principle that the case establishes" – creates binding precedent. The obiter dicta creates persuasive precedent. A binding precedent is just that – it binds the decisions of lower ranked courts in the hierarchy. If the facts of the current case match the facts of the precedent then the judge must follow the precedent even if they disagree with it – indeed there are many decisions where the judge expresses their disagreement with the precedent in no uncertain terms. In addition, there can be conflicting precedent, for example, where the High Court of Australia has made a decision on a piece of legislation that conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court of NSW on an essentially similar provision in a different Act. A wise judge in such a situation should do what McDougal J did in Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190 and issue orders referring it to a court that can overturn one (or both) of the precedents. A persuasive precedent can influence the decisions of other courts – they are an authority a judge can look to in formulating their reasons but they are free to consider and reject them even if the facts match. Obiter dicta from same level or higher courts in the hierarchy is persuasive precedent as is ratio decidendi and obiter dicta from same level courts and courts in other jurisdictions.	It doesn't really matter exactly what the judge says as long as it's clear whether the judge is sustaining or overruling the objection. With that said, in movies you'll rarely see the person asking the question get to respond to the objection, but you'll notice in the trial that happens in most cases. For example, if one party objects that a question calls for hearsay, the examiner may defend their question by pointing out that the statement is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, or that it falls into one of the hearsay exceptions. At that point the judge is responding to both parties and someone else or possibly multiple people have spoken since the objection was originally raised, so she might specify that she's "overruling the objection" as opposed to just saying overruled, so it just makes it clearer on the record what she's ruling about. It's worth noting as well that she might need to specify which objection she's sustaining if more than one objection is raised. In this trial both hearsay and relevance objections have been raised at the same time, and the judge might specify that she's sustaining e.g. only relevance. This can tell the examiner whether they are free to keep going down the same line of questioning with different questions, if the objection sustained was hearsay, or to move to another line of questioning, if the objection sustained was relevance.	An appeal to ignorance asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false. That is not in any way the situation here. The defendant knows if he/she has or has not so the only available answers under oath are "yes" or "no" - the jury knows this too so any other answer will be seen as disingenuous. However, this information (affirmative or negative) is off limits to the jury as it could prejudice their decision, hence the mistrial. A quick judge could instruct the defendant not to answer and instruct the jury to disregard the question but if a conviction results the defence team could use the fact that it was asked as grounds for appeal. A judge must decide if the interests of justice are better served by a retrial or a tainted conviction.
Do international sanctions have an impact on Open Source Software? Background Recently I was reading about embargoes and sanctions on Iran (also this link) and before Sudan, and it got me thinking about how they could impact Open Source Software. Sanctions being applied not only by USA but sometime by other states and unions of countries (EU for example). I know that equipment from, say, an American manufacturer, could not be supplied to North Korea (for example an Oracle Server or a Cisco router) pending legal action. Thus i wondered if there was anything that restricted the use of an American made Open Source Software in say, North Korea. What I understood On the Open Source Initiative website, they state that : Can I stop "evil people" from using my program? No. The Open Source Definition specifies that Open Source licenses may not discriminate against persons or groups. Giving everyone freedom means giving evil people freedom, too. The notion of "good people" and "evil people" is beyond the scope of this question, but this tells me that anybody, anywhere could in fact use it without any troubles at all (talking about only the usage of the software). However, naively, even if I would see the MIT License as an Open Source License, I see it as well, naively, as a License created under US Law by an American Institution (MIT License). My question is divided as this: Can developers from a state under such sanction, use Open Source Software as they want ? Could developers of the Open Source Software be sued for the use of their creation by the states under sanction ? If a team of developers of another country were to help the developers to use the Open Source Software (support, online help etc.), could they face legal action ? NB : I am a software developer in Europe, I do not have prior knowledge of international or laws in the USA.	Generally, such sanctions prevent certain sorts of transactions in goods and services with nationals or entities of the nation under sanction. The exact list of transactions prohibited or restricted varies. If Open source software were being provided as a service, so that the recipient paid directly for a license, or for customization or configuration work, or for some sort of consulting or assistance, such transactions could be banned or restricted by a sanctions regime, but might not be. (If the sanctions included that particular class of transactions.) However, if it is merely a matter of an open source product being published, for anyone to download, install, and use, I don't see how that would be barred or restricted by any sanctions of the sort recently in use.	OK, seems I was right to begin with, but after building some work with this I had to be sure. The problem seems to step from a lot of not-lawyers overinterpreting the reach and applicability of copyright law, which, with a few asides, is the full extent of the AGPL. Additionally, the software is not based in an English-speaking country, which may have thrown the interpreted meaning of "derivative product", as opposed to simply "product". The AGPL is indeed in almost all ways the same as the GPL version 3; in fact you can see this by diffing the two documents. The only extension of the GPLv3 made for AGPL applies to software being run on a server. While it is indeed possible to include code in the final files, which might, in theory, constitute a significant portion of this program, that does not happen. The AGPL is apparently also meant almost exclusively for software, though the wording does include the ambiguous phrase "and other products"; this concerned me as it felt as though it might apply to the resources created by the work. It, broadly speaking, does not. So, I've got nothing to worry about--unless I was distributing derivative software, which would be an entirely different question and subject to this.	I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B).	If the tool circumvents Windows' copy protection (which is a computer question, not a legal one, but I cannot imagine a circumstance in which this isn't access-circumvention), then it is a violation of 17 USC 1201, which forbids "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title". It is both illegal to use, and to "manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic" in such a program.	There is also the part that says "except as expressly permitted by law". In the USA, you are allowed to run the software. This means the operating system making the copy that transfers the software from your hard drive to the RAM of the computer, and all necessary changes there. And this includes modifications to relocate the software, or to protect it against certain attacks by hackers, and I'm confident that Apple checked that it includes translating x86 machine code to ARM machine code and store the translated copy together with the original. Similar things have been done already around 2000 or so, and no software manufacturer has ever complained.	The problem is that open source licenses incl AGPL have legal force because copyright prevents copying + modifying software by default (software is treated as a “literary work” and therefore enjoys copyright protection). But copyright on datasets and ML models is very different – if it is even recognized at all. Thus, similar copyleft techniques would only work in particular jurisdictions. For example, the EU recognizes “database rights”. A copyleft license that accounts for this is CC-BY-SA-4.0, meaning that in an EU context, databases based on the original database would have to use the same license. However, database rights are not recognized in the US (facts are not copyrightable, and the “sweat of the brow” doctrine is not recognized). Thus, the CC-BY-SA-4.0 license would not have any copyleft effect with respect to databases in an US context. Independently of copyright in the database as a whole, the data in the database might be copyrighted material, for example if the database contains text or images, complicating matters further. Machine learning models derived from a data set are much more difficult. Clearly, ML models that have been trained are not a creative work and are therefore not eligible for independent copyright protection. At most, it can be argued that the model is an automatically transformed version of the input data, so that copyright in the input data implies copyright in the model.1 Perhaps hyperparameter choices could reflect some creative input. This is very much an active topic of debate. Given this uncertainty, it would be impossible to create a public license that works reliably. 1. An interesting discussion topic is the potential effect on Microsoft's Copilot ML model which was also trained on GPL-licensed source code. Instead of deriving force from copyright law, it would be possible to impose conditions via a contract, i.e. EULA-like terms that only provide access to the material after the terms have been accepted. But again, this is difficult. Contract law differs wildly between jurisdictions. For example, a contract is defined by the “meeting of minds” in some jurisdictions; by offer, acceptance, and consideration in others. But how does such a contract ensure appropriate consideration? How can acceptance be ensured if the material is publicly available? For these reasons, I think that unless broad international agreement emerges about IP protections for machine learning models, such a copyleft system for ML models is impossible. It is worth noting that the lack of such protections is probably quite good for innovation and research, since researchers are free to improve each other's work without legal concerns. The idea of copyleft is a hack to subvert the “everything is forbidden by default” system of copyright, but “everything is allowed by default” might be better.2 2. To continue the Microsoft Copilot example: some copyleft advocates like Bradley M Kuhn are sceptical about Copilot's GPL compliance, but remind us that copyleft maximalism means copyright maximalism, and that this is not the goal of open source. https://sfconservancy.org/blog/2022/feb/03/github-copilot-copyleft-gpl/	You have a false premise: "it offers the same conditions", and "MIT license is functionally equivalent to CC-BY". These premises are not true. CC-BY: applies to more than just software; it applies to artistic or literary work, databases, other material disclaims endorsement explicitly withholds moral rights explicitly does not license patent rights (MIT license gives anyone who obtains a copy of the software the right to use it, a patent right) prescribes the acceptable forms of attribution Those are just some of the differences.	We can't really know until the ruling is made. The Supreme Court might issue a ruling that encompasses all software APIs, or may predicate its ruling on this more specific situation, e.g. that because Oracle's library is so extensive its structure can be copyrighted even if that does not necessarily mean that any individual function signature can be copyrighted. They could also decide based on something unrelated to the heart of the copyright question - skimming through the petition for a writ of certiorari, they could make a decision based on the original implied license from Sun, for example. Hopefully their decision will answer the copyright question of function declarations completely, but it isn't required to.
Does an API with a rate limit need to provide requests remaining? I'm writing code to make requests from a public API. They give me an API key, and the API provides 1000 requests per day for free, and a max of 60 per minute. In the event that I pass one of those limits, I will be liable for a fee. I don't have to enter my payment details to use the API. This all seems fine. However, there is no count of how many requests I've used on a given day on the website or on my account page, nor in the API's response (in the response header or data). So, given a line of code that calls the API, there is no way for me to know whether running it will cost me money. When I ask the company, they say it's up to me to add a counter and keep track. So unless all my applications/environments tell each other how many requests I've used, then I have no means of tracking how many I have remaining. In addition, I don't know what time the count resets each day, or each minute. So even if I keep track and only have one application that uses the API, there's no way for me to know if my count equals their count because I don't know when they reset it. The only thing they'll tell me is when I owe them money by going over the limit. Is this okay, or is there some legal expectation that they tell me when a request will cost me money, such as returning a count of requests remaining this day/minute? The company's headquarters is in the UK, but the API is used worldwide. Edit: After some further looking at the company's website and documentation, and comparing to what it used to say using Archive.org, I've determined that it will probably not incur charges if I reach a limit, but further requests will instead return HTTP 429 (the code for "rate limit exceeded"), which seems much more reasonable.	You could establish your own server which calls the API and maintains a counter, and have al your applications call that server, the server call the API, and the server can also return a count to the application, or even return a failure code if the count is too high. As for when the count turns over, a few days experiment should establish that, but given that the API is based in the EU, I would guess it turns over at midnight UTC (aka Greenwich mean time), but of course that is only a guess. Has the API management declined even to tell when the count rolls over? That seems odd. As to the legal obligations of the API management, it would be good practice for them to have the API return a count, but I don't see that they can be required to do that. I don't know of (and could not find) any law which mandates such a count. I do think that they should inform you of the time of day at which they roll the count over. I have not yet found a law which specifically requires this.	This is a matter of state law, and so could in theory vary from state to state. But I think that in most, if not all, US states, a public utility like a water or electric company must take any customer unless they have a history of unpaid bills or the like. They don't have to lay new pipes or run new wires to bring service to you if it is at a location not previously served, however. In the Maryland code, § 7-307 ( Termination of service to low income customers) provides: (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, the Commission shall adopt regulations concerning the prohibition against or limitation of authority of a public service company to terminate service for gas or electricity to a low income residential customer during the heating season for nonpayment. (2) In adopting the regulations required under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Commission shall consider and may include provisions relating to: (i) the circumstances under which service may and may not be limited or terminated; (ii) the minimum heating levels required to maintain life, health, and safety; (iii) the medical, age, disabling, or other individual characteristics that are relevant to a prohibition against or limitation on the termination of service; (and other provisions) That the Public Service Commission is empowered, and indeed obliged, to issue binding regulations on when service may be terminated might imply a duty to provide service in the first place, but that is not as clear as I would like. I know that in practice a utility runs a credit check and may demand a deposit if the results are not satisfactory, but I do not see a law compelling that behavior. It may be in regulations adopted by the commission.	client must provide me a suite in his hotel that costs $10K for a night based on a contract we held in the past (the contract has expired as of 31-Dec-18 but he never rendered the service because I didn't ask for it. The contract mentioning $10K has expired and is no longer relevant. You had a chance for a $10K suite before 31 Dec 2018 but you did not take it. There is no obligation on the client to keep this chance for you indefinitely. What happens now ($6K suite) is a completely new contract you have accepted. You are not entitled to anything in relation to the $10K suite from the past opportunity.	There are two "cancellations" here. There is a contract between the customer and the company. This contract was ended. Also, as part of GDPR obligations, the data of the former customer was removed. Now the "credit" part suggests a pre-paid phone, which are often described as "no contract". Legally this is incorrect. There is a contractual obligation for the phone company to deliver phone services (typically expressed in minutes of call time, # of text messages and/or MB of data). Now the pre-paid contract with high likelihood had a clause which dealt with inactive accounts. For instance, the minutes of call time may expire after 5 years. A "credit" that has not been converted to minutes, messages, or megabytes may also expire. When this happened, the company might need to keep the customer data on their records for two more years (for legal reasons), so the 7 year period does not sound weird at all. As soon as the legal reason to retain the data has ended, the GDPR indeed states that the data should be removed. That act is not connected to the credit expiring years before.	If you have an agreement with a company that specifies "you agree to give me something of value, in case I give you something of value", you have a contract. In order for there to be a contract, there has to be actual acceptance of the offer. You can put out on a web page some contract stating those terms, and if you get positive acceptance of the contract (hence the standard click-through technology), then as long as you have done the thing promised, you can bill them for doing the thing promised. It's not clear what thing of value you are offering on the web page, since it's not "doing actual work". Them sending you an email isn't you doing something. One thing you could do is block all incoming emails, and for money you agree to unblock emails from registered subscribers. Just announcing that you will bill anyone for emailing you does not create a contract, because the emailer need not have even seen your announcement. This is why e-contracts need a click-through button. It's legal to request money, but there is no legal obligation for them to comply. That will be $10, please.	Obtaining consent for cookies is not required by the GDPR at all. Instead it is covered by the e-privacy directive, which as a directive rather than a regulation, must be implements by specific legislation in each individual country. The exact requirements vary with the law of each country. An e-privacy regulation has been proposed, which would have scope similar to the GDPR, would replace the Directive, and would not require national implementing legislation. However it has not yet been adopted. Proposed versions have significantly different requirements than the current Directive. Nor does the GDPR require consent for advertising that does not involve the processing of personal information, unlike some other privacy laws such as the California CCPA. However, if the Google package sets cookies without consent that are not strictly necessary for operation of the web site, it might well fail compliance with some of those national laws implementing e-privacy. Also, even necessary cookies must be disclosed to the user, as I understand it, possibly only in general terms. Several national Data Protection agencies have said that cookie compliance is not a major priority, at least not until an e-privacy regulation is in place. But that does not mean that lack of compliance is legal. Unfortunately I see no way for a developer using the Google package to correct this issue within the package. One would either have to implement a different solution, or trust that Google will fix this before enforcement becomes a serious issue. However, the app developer could add a separate general cookie consent banner, and turn off all adds if consent is not given, I believe.	You are processing the users IP address in order to carry out the translation to a physical location (see my comment for the technical issues with that) and an IP address is most certainly considered personal information, so yes under the GDPR you are going to need a published policy because you are both data controller and data processor. You need to inform the user of what you are doing, and you need to tell them of the legal basis for the processing (there are several under the GDPR, of which consent is only one - but in your case its going to be the easiest to justify). If you use a third party service for the location translation, you also need to inform the user of that and make available the third party services data processing policy.	Do I need to inform the user about storing the score locally? No, there is no need as long as you don't transmit, store or process any personal info. It's doubtful that the score could be considered personal info, but you're not sending it to your servers in any way, so you don't seem to be processing it anyway. Do I need consent for using non-personal AdMob? You have to check this with AdMob, but usually, if it is non-personal, they shouldn't be processing any PI, so you're clear without informing. Do I need to ask for the age? How should I handle kids? Again, you're not processing any PI, so regarding GDPR there isn't any problem. Can I disallow a user from using the app if consent is not given? If you needed consent, no, it would be unlawful to block a user for not giving consent, unless it is impossible to provide the service without it. See recital 43: Consent is presumed not to be freely given if [...] the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance.
Is it legal for an oil company to charge customers a different price per gallon for the same oil? I found out recently that my oil company is charging me and some of my neighbors almost twice as much as other neighbors for the same type of oil. The difference is per gallon so the amount shouldn't be a factor. Is there any legal recourse we can take or any protections against upselling a utility? Or should we just try to use this information to negotiate a better price next time?	In general, a seller may make different and inconsistent sales terms with different customers on whatever basis the seller chooses. In some jurisdictions, for some kinds of transactions, specific laws may regulate this. They may require similar treatment, or advertised prices, or whatever. I do not know of any such laws governing the sale of oil, but there might be some. This will depend on the exact jurisdiction (country, state/province, and perhaps city or other locality). Please edit the question to specify the jurisdiction if you want a more specific answer. Price discrimination on the basis of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination laws, such as race or religion under US federal laws, would be illegal. Proving that the basis was unlawful might be hard, however.	In general, anyone can buy potentially dangerous chemicals. My local service station sells petrol, my local liquor store sells alcohol, my local supermarket sells ammonia, my local pool shop sells chlorine, my local hardware store sells poisons and my local chemist sells drugs. The world is full of dangerous stuff and all of it is for sale. Certain governments may regulate the sale of certain products. Such regulations may cover packaging, storage, quantities, reporting and limits on who can be a buyer or seller. For example, who can be a buyer of Uranium is pretty strictly limited. The decision about what and how to regulate is a political one, not a legal one. In general, governments apply a cost/benefit approach (including political costs/benefits). The fact that one (or a small number) of people use something inappropriately must be balanced with the cost that regulation imposed on government and legitimate users. Also, in most parts of the developed world people are allowed to take risks with their own bodies - climbing mountains, surfing, parachuting and, yes, injecting themselves with foreign substances. It’s unwise but it’s not illegal. I am unable to assist you with who would be responsible for regulating such matters in France but I can suggest that neither the FDA nor the EPA would be relevant in the USA because its neither a food nor a drug (FDA) nor is it being sole in quantities that are likely to adversely affect the environment (EPA).	When a contract states a thing that you get for a stated price, that means you should get the thing described, and you pay the stated price. If the landlord makes a mistake and wishes he had charged more, he can wait until the end of the lease period and then increase the price as he desires. He cannot raise the price until the end of the contract, and cannot retroactively charge that increase. (It's impossible to imagine there being contract language that allows that outcome, but we will assume there is no such clause). If the stated area is not as stated, especially if the area is actually smaller, the landlord is in breach of the contract, and could be sued for damages. It would depends on how different the areas are, when it comes to assigning damages. For example, 4 sqm in a unit with 800 sqm is not likely to result in any loss to the tenant. If the unit is bigger than stated, the prospects for damages are even less, perhaps a bit for added heating cost. Either way, if the size is incorrectly described, that is the landlord's fault, though probably not worth bothering with a lawsuit.	Technically the signage implied an agreement, and allowed you to infer one. But yes, I think that management could not legally insist on more than the posted price, whether for a lost ticket, or for a particular duration. (Unless the sign included "prices subject to change without notice" or something of the sort.) As a practical matter, challenge this is going to be a pain. The employees on the spot probably have no authority to vary the price merely because the amount programmed into the register differs from the posted sign. At least they will claim not to have such authority. And they won't release the car without being paid the $80 that they will insist is the proper price. To challenge this, a person would probably have to pay under protest, and then sue for a refund, I would hope in a small claims court. Most people will not go to that trouble for $10, which perhaps the management counts on. Publicity might be more effective.	Just think of the subtenant cum owner as two separate people with two separate roles. Tenant = T Subtenant = ST Old owner = OO New Owner = NO The rights of the tenant vis-avis the new owner will be informed by the lease and the local laws. Generally, if the sale happens in the middle of the existing lease, the NO is obligated by the terms, as is the T. NO cannot just kick T out, and T cannot just break the lease. The lease may say what could happen and local laws will apply. Likewise, ST has whatever contract with T that previously existed. Pretend NO and ST are different people. If T owes NO $1000 per month, and ST owes T $400 a month, that continues even though ST and NO are the same person. Depends on what kind of dispute. See above. All contracts continue, subject to whatever the lease with the original owner and the subtenancy agreement say abut modifying or breaking the lease and sublease. Local laws apply. Note, if the subtenancy was "off the books" or was done when not allowed by the original owner, and if it was not in a place that the local law says owners cannot deny subleasing, then tenant might not have any protection. ST, now that he is owner could just move out and stop paying. On the other hand, even if he is the owner, he cannot just say "I am the owner now, so I am moving back in for free" because the original lease gave the tenant use of the whole property. But ST could just drop out because T always owed OO, and now NO, the full rent. Do you mean if rather than sublease, they were both on the original lease? Interesting, but just imagine it as the obligations before the sale = the obligations after the sale. I don't know though. There are some tax implications for an owner occupied rental.	It is illegal to sell alcohol to a minor in Washington (RCW 66.44.270). The seller can get into various kinds of trouble, including losing their license, under liquor board regulations. However, as long as the establishment follows the rules for acceptable ID, they escape liability if in fact they sell alcohol to a minor: the license holder is legally allowed to accept an identification of the specific type. That is the sense in which this is required by law: the customer must have actually presented the identification, in order for the establishment to escape liability (RCW 66.20.210). Looking old enough is not the issue. It is legal to sell alcohol to a person who is over 21, and the law does not require presentation of identification as a condition for a sale. However, under RCW 66.20.180 a person is require to produce ID "upon request of any licensee, peace officer, or enforcement officer of the board". The legal risk attached to sales in an age-marginal situation is very high, and actual presentation of ID is required to escape liability by the establishment, so in that sense, it is "required by law". All requests to produce ID for liquor sales (at least in Washington, and leaving out deliveries which are governed by other laws) are driven by company policy. Typical policies are quite rational, being designed to protect the company's interest in not getting into a heap of trouble for an under-age sale. There is no law saying when you must ask, or when you are protected if you don't ask. Usually, store policy is to use "common sense" so that 90 year olds are not required to produce ID (they may be asked, jokingly). Non-compliance with RCW 66.20.180 carries no legal penalty, that is, there is nothing in the statute that says "if the customer doesn't...". The most obvious would be that the seller would refuse to sell, which the seller can arbitrarily do anyhow. There is no statutory penalty imposed on a licensee if they request ID of a person over 21 and the person fails / refuses to produce the ID. Obviously, the licensee cannot be punished if a customer fails to provide ID (and leaves), especially if they lost it. But the law "requires" them to provide an ID, with ne except "unless you leave / put the bottle back". Somewhat less obviously, if the legislature wants to, it can enact a provision that once a licensee requests ID, they are forbidden to sell alcohol to that customer until ID is provided. But there currently is no such law. "The law" also included regulations, such as WAC 314-17-105. This regulation is a chart, and the relevant entry is PERMIT: Failure to produce permit or identification upon request. See RCW 66.20.310 and 66.20.180. for which the 1st offense consequence is "5-day permit suspension OR $100 monetary option". This is a problematic regulation (potential lawsuit fodder), since it can be interpreted in a number of ways. The question is, of whom is the permit or identification predicated? Only the licensee has a permit, but customers and employees can both have identification. If we interpret this regulation as meaning "Failure by licensee or customer", then we arrive at the absurd conclusion that if a customer fails to produce ID on request, the establishment is fined. It is important to note that this regulation is under a chapter about server training, thus the regulation can only reasonably be interpreted as being about licensee providing identification.	It would be up to your HOA agreement. If you signed a contract agreeing to pay for services then yes. If not then no. An HOA agreement is just a contract like any other and you would have to abide by what you agreed to. Also, they may not have an actual contract for you to sign, but by moving to the community you would be agreeing to follow the by laws of the HOA. If you have a disagreement with them that can not be resolved, you can let a judge decide in court, but that could cost more than just getting the service. https://www.wishtv.com/news/local-news/indianapolis-man-battles-homeowners-association-over-solar-panels/ So to sum it up, you can refuse but they have the right to take you to court if they choose. I would assume a judge would rule in your favor since it's an issue of what goes on in your own home, but there is really no way for anyone to say what someone else will do.	Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant).
Does parliamentary privilege have unintended consequences for journalism? If statements made under parliamentary privilege seem to constitute evidence of impropriety, can journalists report on this without risking defamation penalties? Hypothetically, if a politician "appeared" to perjure themselves (e.g. by giving inconsistent statements to various public committee hearings) or alternatively made a speech that "appeared" to implicate someone in a crime (which that person had not already been accused of elsewhere), then would journalists be free to report on this? Or would those journalists be exposing themselves to claims of defamation, since they would inherently be imputing someone's character on the basis of no evidence that could be presented in court (even though their source material does exist on the public record)? For context, I'm trying to understand whether the recent cases against YouTube & FriendlyJordies have any consequences more broadly for investigative journalism on the topic of potential political corruption (although related legislation seems to let the government imprison their critics even without involving the courts).	Consequence? Yes. Unintended? Not so much. Source Sources of Parliamentary Privilege In new-south-wales, Parliamentary Privilege derives from Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 (no, 1688 is not a mistake) which provides: ... the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament. What are "proceedings in Parliament"? "[P]roceedings in Parliament" is defined by case law. In Canadian and English jurisprudence, the definition includes things done outside Parliament in the furtherance of Parliamentary business such as correspondence, and press releases. The leading cases are Roman Corp Ltd v Hudson's Bay Oil and Gas Co Ltd and Re Clark and Attorney-General of Canada for Canada, and Rost v Edwards for England and Wales. Australian case law is split. The leading case is Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Chatterton in the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court where Zelling AJC held that privilege applies to restatements by an MP outside Parliament of things said inside, possibly including answering questions about those things in an interview. Prior J rejected this and Jacob J didn't address it. That's one win, one loss and one DNF for those keeping score. For the Federal Parliament, the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 defines "proceedings in Parliament" as: ... all words and spoken acts done in the course of, or for purposes of or incidental to, the transacting of the business of a House or of a committee, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes: (a) the giving of evidence before a House or a committee, and evidence so given; (b) the presentation or submission of a document to a House or a committee; (c) the preparation of a document for purposes of or incidental to the transacting of any such business; and (d) the formulation, making or publication of a document, including a report, by or pursuant to an order of a House or a committee and the document so formulated, made or published The northern-territory has similar legislation. In Laurance v Katter, there was a judicial split in the Court of Appeal in the Queensland Supreme Court about whether this definition was unconstitutional. Pincus JA held that s 16(3) was incompatible with the implied freedom of political communication. Following the High Court's decision in R v Richards; Ex part Fitzpatrick and Browne, Fitzpatrick P held that s 16 could not be invalidated or read down to accommodate the implied freedom of political communication. Davies JA read down s 16(3); in his view, the section was enacted merely to make it clear that parliamentary privilege applies not only where a member or witness is sued but also where evidence is sought to be tendered; in both cases, the privilege applies only where the parliamentary proceedings would be impeached or questioned. Davies JA then held that this was not the case in these proceedings. The High Court gave special leave to appeal this decision but the matter was settled before the appeal was heard. So, the exact boundaries of Parliamentary privilege in Australia remain uncertain. However, a prudent journalist should assume that it extends not just to statements made in the House or before a Committee but to statements about those statements made outside by the MP or their staff. Who has the privilege? The privilege belongs to Parliament, not any individual MP, and can only be waived by Parliament. It cannot be invalidated by the courts due to the doctrine of separation of powers. Australian parliaments take the attitude that the waiver of privilege is a procedural matter about their own internal workings and does not require legislation. In England and Wales, legislation has been passed that allows an MP to waive privilege over their (and only their) statements but no such law exists in Australia. Effect of Parliamentary Privilege There are two limbs to Parliamentary Privilege: It provides absolute immunity to the MP (and possibly their staff) for statements made under privilege. That is, following Barilaro v Shanks-Markovina (No 2) [2021] FCA 950, anything and everything that is under privilege is completely inadmissible in court. By legislation in each Australian jurisdiction, qualified immunity is provided for the "fair and accurate reports of parliamentary proceedings. Thus, a media organization is protected from liability for defamation in respect of the publication of a fair and accurate report of parliamentary proceedings unless the plaintiff can establish that, in publishing the report, the media organization was actuated by malice." The Federal and Northern Territory legislation appears to go further and may provide absolute immunity but that has not been tested. Actuated by malice Malice in law does not mean what it means in everyday English. It means, with respect to defamation, that a statement was made either knowing that it was untrue or with reckless disregard for its truthfulness. In other words, you were deliberately lying, or you made no effort to find out if you were lying. Within the context of Parliamentary Privilege, you cannot rely on the truthfulness of statements made in Parliament to establish that what you reported was the truth. The existence of the statements might be admissible, for example, to establish if privilege attaches to them but the content of the statements themselves has no probative value. In some ways, this is like a hearsay statement: you can testify that the statement was made (if that's relevant) but you cannot testify that there is any truth-value to what was said. Therefore, if you make a nasty remark (that goes beyond "fair and accurate reports") and your only reliance on the truthfulness of your statement comes from things under Parliamentary Privilege then you have no defence to a defamation claim. So, accusing someone of perjury for what they said to a parliamentary committee rather than just reporting what they said is clearly actuated by malice: it may be true but you know that you can't prove it's true - that amounts to reckless disregard for the truth. Consequences The purpose of Parliamentary Privilege is to allow MPs to vigorously advance the interests of their constituencies (i.e. us) without the fear that they will be called to account for what they say in either a civil or criminal court. It has been argued that some uses of Parliamentary Privilege are an abuse, particularly where they subvert the operations of the judiciary or law enforcement such as by naming suspects, defendants, and witnesses or where the statements would be defamation but for the privilege. However, if they are, it is for the Parliament to discipline the MP by sanction or expulsion, or for the electorate to do so through the ballot box. Such discipline is rare, partly because no one wants to unleash a weapon that could be turned upon themselves but mostly, because Parliament is loath to interfere in the electorate's right to choose their own representatives even if they are wankers. This privilege is clearly at odds with the principle of free speech and inhibits the ability of media outlets to editorialise on matters covered by privilege. This consequence is not unintended, rather it is a deliberate trade-off of one pillar of democratic life against another.	No. In the United States, lying is not a crime. Unless it is done: under oath (in which case it's called perjury) or to a law enforcement agent conducting an investigation (in which case it's called obstruction). There are also the civil torts of slander (oral) and libel (written) if someone lies and damages the reputation or business interests of a person or company. Collectively, and without distinction, these are called defamation. Lying also has a close cousin — the civil tort of fraud — which usually applies to inducement into a transaction or a contract. There are also consumer protection statutes (federal and state) that deal with truth in advertising, truth in lending, lemon laws, etc. But those are primarily civil statutes and the last two are pretty far afield from your question. But none of that applies to the Facebook case you described. So, no.	canada Damages for libel have been awarded based on publication to a single individual. The elements of defamation are (Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, para. 28): (1) that the impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; (2) that the words in fact referred to the plaintiff; and (3) that the words were published, meaning that they were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff. For an example, see Faryna v. Chorny, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A). A letter "imputing unchastity" of a housekeeper was sent to a single individual.	Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare	does a reference for a candidate employee have liability for what they say about the candidate? To my understanding lying isn't illegal. Lying is unlawful to the extent that the liar's deliberate intent to mislead other(s) causes or is likely to cause unwarranted harm. This is regardless of whether "the person acting as a reference isn't under obligation not to be a reference". Lies can directly harm the candidate and/or the company, and others indirectly. The harm to the candidate is known as, or comes in the form of, defamation. Depending on the jurisdiction, an intent to mislead might not even be a prerrequisite for liability. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 600.2911(7) allows suits for libel or slander if "the defamatory falsehood concerns the private individual and was published negligently" (emphasis added). The liar's intent to mislead and his knowledge of the falsehood of his statements can only worsen the harm inflicted and his liability therefor. Likewise, the liar can be liable to the company for inducing it to hire a candidate the company would not have hired had it known the truth. Liability ensues when the hired candidate makes the company incur losses which would be prevented by relying on a truthful reference. If the reference is truthful, the chances for liability are significantly narrower. These scenarios typically involve matters of privacy or disclosures that are protected/sanctioned by law.	“Serious harm” is a requirement in the Defamation Act 2013 The Supreme Court interpreted it in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd & Anor [2019] UKSC 27 (12 June 2019) at [10-20]: ... it not only raises the threshold of seriousness above that envisaged in Jameel (Yousef) and Thornton, but requires its application to be determined by reference to the actual facts about its impact and not just to the meaning of the words. You, as the plaintiff must prove on the balance of probabilities that you have or are likely to suffer serious harm. That is harm that is greater than the previous common law threshold of substantial. In this case, the court agreed that serious harm had been done so it’s useful to consider what Lord Sumption said about the evidence that had (correctly) convinced the trial judge at [21] (my emphasis): On the footing that (as I would hold) Mr Lachaux must demonstrate as a fact that the harm caused by the publications complained of was serious, Warby J held that it was. He heard evidence from Mr Lachaux himself and three other witnesses of fact, and received written evidence from his solicitor. He also received agreed figures, some of them estimates, of the print runs and estimated readership of the publications complained of and the user numbers for online publications. He based his finding of serious harm on (i) the scale of the publications; (ii) the fact that the statements complained of had come to the attention of at least one identifiable person in the United Kingdom who knew Mr Lachaux and (iii) that they were likely to have come to the attention of others who either knew him or would come to know him in future; and (iv) the gravity of the statements themselves, according to the meaning attributed to them by Sir David Eady. Mr Lachaux would have been entitled to produce evidence from those who had read the statements about its impact on them. But I do not accept, any more than the judge did, that his case must necessarily fail for want of such evidence. The judge’s finding was based on a combination of the meaning of the words, the situation of Mr Lachaux, the circumstances of publication and the inherent probabilities. There is no reason why inferences of fact as to the seriousness of the harm done to Mr Lachaux’s reputation should not be drawn from considerations of this kind. Warby J’s task was to evaluate the material before him, and arrive at a conclusion on an issue on which precision will rarely be possible. A concurrent assessment of the facts was made by the Court of Appeal. Findings of this kind would only rarely be disturbed by this court, in the absence of some error of principle potentially critical to the outcome. So, you must prove that it is likely that prospective employers/schools will see the defamatory statements and that they are so grave that it is likely that you would be refused a position because of them.	Impeachment is unique in that it is a question of politics, not a question of law, that is being discussed at trial. The other exception is that the Senate, not the Supreme Court, is the High Court of Impeachment (that is, legal precedence is based on what the Senate says, not what the Supreme Court or any other appellant court says). There are a few minor details, but the main part of the trial will play out like a criminal trial, with the Managers (people named by the house to argue the case) taking the role of the Prosecution and the Senate as the Jury. Because the trial is purely political in nature, a jurist decision to on the matter before evidence is presented at trial is entirely legal. It's actually perfectly legal to have your own opinion prior to trial start in a normal criminal jury and to vote on that ground... but the attorneys will dismiss you from the pool if they find even a hint of this. Unlike the judicial system, the jurists of Impeachment Trial are the same 100 people (presently) and cannot be dismissed for any reason, including comments about how they will find in the trial. Jury Fixing or tampering is when the decision a jurist makes is colored by some outside motivation to the jurists own convictions (i.e. the crime boss has your family and won't kill them if you find his hired goon innocent.). It could be an issue if a senator was given some pork to vote against his/her choice, but Impeachment is incredibly rare in the U.S. system and there hasn't been any case where this was an issue (If Articles of Impeachment are brought, this will be the 20 case to reach the trial stage since the adoption of the Constitution, and the 3rd for a President.).	If someone testifying before congress refuses to respond to appropriate questions (questions within the scope of the congressional inquiry), that person can be cited for contempt of Congress. One way to avoid this is if the witness can invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. That says that a person may not be compelled to be a witness against himself (or herself) in a criminal case, and has been interpreted to mean that if testimony might in future be used against the witness in a criminal case, it cannot be required, even if the current occasion is not a criminal case. However, if a person has been granted immunity in a particular matter, no testimony can be used against the person in a criminal case on that matter, and so there is no Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify on that matter. This applies to testimony before a court as well as before Congress. The grant of immunity must be at least as comprehensive as the refusal to testify would have been, or the privilege remains. Therefore, if a person has been granted immunity on a subject, that person cannot refuse to testify before Congress by invoking the Fifth Amendment. If the person does refuse, s/he can be cited for contempt of Congress. However, the person can raise a claim that the inquiry was not a proper one, for example because the subject was not a proper one fo Congressional inquiry, or that the Committee was not properly authorized. If the court upholds such a claim, the person will not be convicted of contempt. Also, while Congress can issue a citation, the Justice Department is not required to prosecute the person, and may choose to let the issue drop. Or the court might not convict on some other ground. And of course Congress (or one house of it) has to vote to issue the citation, which it might decide not to do, for political reasons, or indeed for any reason at all. So a grant of immunity alone is not enough to say that testimony will be compelled, but it is a significant step towards such compulsion. Note that under Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964), a state grant of immunity also bars Federal use of the compelled testimony or its fruits, and under Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) a Federal grant of immunity bars state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits. See also This Justia essay on "the Power to Compel Testimony" which covers the whole subject with multiple case citations.
Commissioned a logo that contains a stock image, can I still trademark it? I have a question similar to this one here but with circumstances that are a bit different. I purchased a logo from a seller online through Fiverr a few months ago. Since then I have incorporated this logo in various areas and have spent a lot of money on it. Unbeknownst to me, a large part of it includes a stock graph they found online. I found this out after doing a reverse image search of the graphic online. I traced that stock image to multiple stock photo websites and a lot of them mention that their content can't be used for logos or trademarks, which was my whole intent when purchasing a logo. Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Here's all of the relevant info I have: The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bound by any terms of the stock photo website The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image.	Not only can’t you trademark it, you can’t use it The original logo is covered by copyright which belongs, prima facie, to the original artist. It doesn’t matter that they are based in Russia; Russia and the US are both signatories to the Berne Convention which means they protect each other’s copyright. That means you can only use it if it is fair use (it isn’t) or if you have the copyright owner’s permission (you don’t). Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Not if the seller didn’t have permission to make those changes. Creation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights copyright gives. The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. See above. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. They already have copyright. They would need to register it in the US before they could sue but there is no impediment to them doing so. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bounded by any terms of the stock photo website Makes no difference. Just because you didn’t steal the car, that doesn’t make it ok for you to drive it. The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. Not relevant at all. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image. You can’t sell something you don’t own. If the seller had no right to upload the photo (as it seems they didn’t), the terms of the website don’t matter. The true owner never agreed to those terms and isn’t bound by them.	You cannot use a trademark in a way that may cause confusion that your goods and services are associated with or endorsed by the trade marked goods and services. If you are clear that they are not then you shouldn't have any problems on that front. You also cannot defame the brand: that is make derogatory comments that are not true. On a practical note, when Pepsi (for example) sends you a cease & desist notice, what are you going to do? They can go to the petty cash tin for $2 million to make your life a legal hell for 18-36 months: how much do you have to defend your rights?	20th Century Fox have a trademark on "Simpsons." They have trademarks on "Bart Simpson", on "D'oh", on "Duff Beer". I would assume that they take their trademarks seriously. What you can't do is to use someone else's trademark to make people believe your commercial product is related to theirs. It's quite reasonable to assume that someone seeing your book in a store would think it is written by the makers of The Simpsons show and therefore buy it. Even if you say that isn't your intention, it is what would happen. I'd try coming up with some different titles, maybe "How to write animated TV shows" with "Example: The Simpsons" (well, you are the writer so you should come up with something better), and take them to a lawyer. And then contact the makers of the show (again asking the lawyer for advice how to do this) because even if your lawyer says the title is fine, that doesn't mean you can't be sued.	What a lovely question! US Copyright law is clear: the author of a creative work owns the copyright unless it is work for hire. In this instance, the photographer is not doing work for hire so they own the copyright. However, the photographer does not own a copy of the photograph – that is owned by the owner of the camera. The photographer cannot demand that they give him a copy but the parties can agree on such a transfer on whatever terms they like. As the owner of a “physical” copy they can do what they like with that copy but they cannot duplicate it except as fair use or as licensed. They could sell the memory card to whomever they like but the new owner couldn’t copy it either so it would seriously limit publication. Similarly they could move the file provided there was only one copy. Arguably, they could make a print of it providing they deleted the electronic version without copyright violation. Which brings us to who owns the copyright now. The camera owner can argue that the photographer has gifted the copyright to them. This is quite a strong argument as the parties' intentions at the time of arranging the taking of the photograph is that the photographer would have no further interest in it – after all he probably doesn’t want to hang a photo of some strangers on his wall. However, in many jurisdictions, including the united-states, copyright transfers must be in writing. As a fallback position the camera owner can argue there is an implicit license given even if copyright was not transferred. The scope of the license then becomes an issue. It is probably indisputable that the license is perpetual and royalty free. What is arguable is if the license allows commercial exploitation or only personal use. This is where the battle lines would be drawn and I don’t know how it would play out. Other jurisdictions are different For example, in Australia, copyright in a photo commissioned “for valuable consideration” for a “private or domestic purpose” vests in the commissioning party, not the photographer; even though this is not work for hire by an employee. For the circumstances you describe, the purpose is “private or domestic” but there is no “valuable consideration” so the photographer owns the copyright in this case. However, if there was an agreement to “pay” the photographer (even one as simple as “I’ll take your family photo if you’ll take mine”) then the person who asked for the photo to be taken owns the copyright.	You are confusing two separate concepts: trademark and copyright. I'll give you a broad overview of both of these, although the details will differ depending on what country's law we're talking about. A copyright is held by the creator of a work of artistic expression. It gives the creator certain exclusive rights, including the right to create copies of the work and to prepare derivative works. For example: The movie "Star Wars" is a work of artistic expression. You cannot copy "Star Wars," or any significant part of it--including the script, the music, etc.--without the permission of the copyright owner, unless your use fits into one of the exceptions to copyright in your jurisdiction. Likewise, you cannot write your own book featuring the Star Wars characters: that would be a derivative work, a work based on the original work, and would violate the rights of the copyright holder. Without having read the book in question, I'm not going to comment on whether it does or doesn't infringe the film's copyright. But ideas can't be copyrighted. A film review, for instance, isn't a copyright violation--and a longer work discussing the ideas involved in a film isn't necessarily a copyright violation, either. Copyright only protects the expression itself--the language, the images. You are very limited in how much of that you can copy, but as long as you're using your own words, copyright protection is less of a concern. Trademarks, on the other hand, are intended to protect a business from customer confusion. Trademarks are not protected in the same way as copyrights; the key analysis of a trademark infringement lawsuit is: does it create confusion about the origin of the goods? For example: if you slap a swoosh on a shoe, Nike will sue you. If you use a swoosh in a political cartoon criticizing Nike, they won't, because nobody is going to think Nike wrote the political cartoon. So: If you write a book and call it: "Ewoks Gone Wild: A Star Wars Story," Disney will sue you, because it would be reasonable for someone who saw that book in a store to think that Disney authorized that book. If you wrote a book called "Forcing the Issue: The Hermeneutics of Science Fiction Movies from Star Wars to Inception", the case would be less clear-cut. But the important thing to understand is that these issues are complicated. There are exceptions to these rules; there are applications that may not be obvious to the non-lawyer ("initial interest confusion" is one minefield in U.S. trademark law), there are national and EU-specific considerations, there are safe harbors, and there are practical considerations, like whether you can afford to fight a lawsuit even if you're in the right. Therefore, I'm not going to tell you whether your hypothetical work would infringe anyone's copyright or trademark, and I'm not going to give you a set of rules on how to avoid it. The only person you should be listening to that sort of advice from is a real, non-anonymous-internet lawyer, licensed to practice in your jurisdiction, who is familiar with the specific details of your specific situation.	Your app is a simple case of copyright infringement. All the Pokémon are copyrighted, the lettering and names are also protect by trademarks. Trying to claim fair use will be outright impossible: you'll use huge portions of the individually protected Pokemon (the iconic ones like Pikachu) and you are usurping a market they are already in. They have given licenses for apps (Pokemon Go). Pokemon are artistic and some form of fiction. The last straw might be if you'd do a rather obvious parody, but even then, I see no way to show Fair Use with what you stated. No disclaimer can change that, and publishing your work might open you to a huge lawsuit with damages for each individually protected Pokemon you infringed on. With between 750 $ minimum and 150,000 $ absolute upper limit per infringed item (last is for willful infringement), you don't want to infringe on Pokemon, as you could be very easily liable for a number in the 6 to 9 digits! Even if Nintendo might only try to get the statutory damages for all the 900 Pokémon, that is a number of at least 675,4000 $. And that's before looking at Trademarks. Pikachu has about 6 live word marks and there are 111 different Pokémon trademarks filed (some expired or dead)!	No, you can’t For at least 1 and up to 4 reasons You don’t own the copyright in the photograph. You risk the tort of passing off by implying that Jim endorses your company when he in fact knows nothing about it. While it may be well understood in the memosphere that there is no such endorsement, you are taking it outside that context. In jurisdictions with laws against misleading and deceptive conduct, the same facts that lead to passing off are also likely misleading and deceptive. In jurisdictions which protect personality rights or require model releases, you don’t have consent.	If you are utilizing the name of the characters just so users can rate them (by rate - I mean rank, review, critique) you should be fine. Copyrights are subject to "fair use" by the public. For purposes such as review, criticism, and comment - this is generally considered to be fair use. Is the site commercial or for-profit? That could impact the analysis, but only if you are making money flowing from the use of the actual copyrighted material(s), rather than advertising (like Adsense) or something similar (this should not suggest that those type sites cannot violate copyright, but it's part of the analysis). If it is something you are investing money into creating, you may want to get a formal legal opinion. But if the site if for fun, or hobby, you are likely fine if what's described is the only use. http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/copyright-fair-use-and-how-it-works-for-online-images/ This link is to a great, easy to read and understand article on fair use, what it is and what it allows. Keep in mind each case is fact intensive, however, from what you are describing this seems fine.
is requiring "auto pay" for a better car insurence payment plan considered discrimination my car insurance company doubles up my first monthly payment if i dont use auto pay. is this considered discrimination. Why should I be penalized for not giving access to my bank account.....	It may be discrimination, but it is not discrimination based upon any reason that the company is prohibited from engaging in. This conduct is legal in pretty much all U.S. jurisdictions.	If the employee has the choice - bonus and membership, or no bonus - then I expect the offer to be legal. Since it is a real bonus and part of your salary you will have to pay income tax on it. What might be illegal, but not your concern, is if your company tells investors how well the company is doing, and how well the membership scheme is doing, when in reality 80% of members are employees paying effectively nothing.	Your personal liability depends on your state law regarding the family car doctrine, so the answer there is "maybe" (Texas is not a state with that doctrine, so simple ownership of the car does not confer liability). You would be liable if your supervision of the child was negligent, which means approximately that you knew or should have known that she was a bad driver and would cause damage. Still, the insurance company is suppose to indemnify you (plural) against such loses, as long as they are legally required to do so. That would include many considerations, such as whether the driver was covered under the policy, whether the car was being used contrary to the terms of the policy (being used commercially), and so on. The insurance company is entitled to make a reasonable determination of whether they are responsible for the loss (and if so, to what extent). If they actually decline to cover the loss, you would need to sue them to make them comply with the terms of the policy (and your lawyer would give you a detailed explanation of why they are not liable, in case they aren't). The plaintiff works with his insurance company to recover his insured losses, and with his lawyer to recover any uninsured losses. His insurance company works with your insurance company, up to a point, and then the lawyers get involved. Your daughter does not work with his insurance company, and your insurance company probably has said something along the line "only talk to us". The insurance that a driver typically has may cover some of their own medical costs, but does not provide a payment for "pain and suffering": that is an uninsured loss. It is not generally required that drivers carry insurance to cover their own medical expenses – it is required that they insure against damages, in general, suffered by other parties (if the defendant is at fault). So there is probably nothing for the plaintiff to work out with his insurance company. In Texas, if the defendant is entirely at fault, defendant will be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 90% at fault, defendant will be liable for 90% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 49% at fault, defendant is not liable. Defendant can, in any event, also sue for damages, so if defendant is 49% at fault, defendant can recover 49% of her damages. The insurance companies might be able to talk it out and reach a clear resolution of the matter, but it could be more in their interest to throw the dice and work it out in court. One can always sue at the very start, and drop the suit if it becomes advantageous.	In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split"	The most likely reason the other driver doesn't want to go through insurance is to avoid a raise in his premiums. However, there could be more serious consequences, up to and including having his insurance cancelled, for example, if the son was not supposed to be driving the car, or based on the criminal nature of the offense. However, there can be serious consequences to not dealing with insurance. Some (if not all) insurance policies require him to report the accident; by failing to do so, he may risk losing his insurance. More importantly to you, if he does not report a claim to his insurance, his insurance will not pay it. This is important to you, because insurance companies, as a general rule, pay claims. Random people don't always; they ignore you, they move out of state, they go bankrupt. If this is a serious amount of money, you need to talk to a lawyer before you enter into a contract with this person, to make sure that it's enforceable, and that if you don't get paid, you have some recourse.	At this point, there is little legal recourse. Once the delay becomes "unreasonable", you might be able to sue them and get some compensation. I do not know what would constitute an "unreasonable" delay in your circumstances and I don't doubt that a month seems unreasonable. You have explained the reasons for the delay, so it's not like they are waiting around for no reason. They are not required to hire more agents to process the claim; unfortunately, they are not legally required to act in a fashion that customers like (i.e. aggressively work to solve the problem). It does sound like there is a customer-service problem, which is what reviews and the BBB are about. You can of course be on the phone with the mechanic and the insurance agency, and if things get severe you can file a complaint with the state insurance commissioner.	Yes, this is legal, unless Richardson, TX has a specific local law making it illegal. In the US, discrimination is legal, unless it discriminates against one or more specific enumerated classes. Under federal law, and as far as I am aware, Texas law, students are NOT a protected class. As such discrimination against them is legal, unless Richardson, TX or its incorporating county have a specific law or regulation prohibiting it. Incidentally, age is generally not a protected class, and when it is a protected class, it is generally only illegal to discriminate against people above a specified age, not below. Note that discrimination happens all the time, over a variety of factors, that many people don't even consider discrimination. For example, many colleges and universities discriminate on the basis of GPAs for acceptance to various programs; this is legal. In the past, many colleges and universities discriminated against potential students on the basis of sex or race, which is now illegal.	Discriminatory pricing is a real thing. See this BuzzFeed video on discriminatory pricing as an example on how men's and women's products cost differently, even if the men's product consumes more raw material yet still costs less. However, it's illegal for hotels to charge different rates for their rooms, or for restaurants to charge unfairly or give preferential treatment; they are "public accommodations" protected under the various Civil Rights Acts. However, colleges are exempt from current laws, and it's not just tech colleges; even traditional colleges require different SAT scores for entry based on race and/or gender, and also charge different tuition. They are private accommodations and are therefore generally allowed to do this. For example, you'll have a much harder time getting in to Harvard if you're of a particular race, even if you can afford the tuition, simply because you'll be expected to have a higher SAT score. There was a class action lawsuit in California over this (the students were above 4.0 GPA, yet denied entry based on race), and as a result of law changes afterwards, California institutions can no longer do this. This is not the situation in the rest of the country, as no Federal law yet exists that protects minorities, gender, sexual orientation, etc, in regards to higher education. Also, sometimes merely proving a gap exists might not be noticeable, as companies are also starting to display pages on their websites based on data-mined information about visitors, possibly including information that would otherwise be discriminatory if it were done in person, and hiding the information from the general public. Discrimination is a difficult beast to tame, and until the law is introduced that all products and services must be offered to all consumers at the same price regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, etc, businesses will continue to find ways to discriminate in legal ways.
Can a landlord ever claim court fee costs from a difficult tenant associated with judicial proceedings related to seeking eviction orders? Suppose Theodore the statutory periodic assured tenant is served with a Notice under s.21, Housing Act 1988 by Larry his landlord and then stays until Larry applies to a court for a possession order by posting a £300+ fee. Then Theodore stays again until Larry pays additional £100+ fee to request for bailiffs to remove Theodore. Suppose Larry further pays a lawyer £1000 to submit all of these processes to the court etc. 4 months later, bailiffs have come and ushered Theodore out of the premises. Can Larry ever claim any of these legal costs of £1400+ from Theodore? What are the rules that determine whether Larry will be awarded these or any of these costs?	Yes: Your landlord can start court action once the date on the section 21 notice has passed. The costs of an eviction can be at least £500. You may have to pay for the costs of the eviction if the notice is valid. Source - Shelter Even if the landlord's claim is successful, whether it is actually settled by the tenant may well depend on their financial status and ability to pay.	As soon as possible. Liability There is no contract here so you would be relying on the tort of negligence and/or trespass. If you have suffered damage from somebody else's negligence then they are liable for your loss. Part of the problem that you face is you need to determine exactly who was potentially negligent. It probably isn't your neighbour! It is quite likely that your neighbour was using a contractor; a contractor is not an agent and so your neighbour has not been negligent, the contractor has. If you were to sue your neighbour in those circumstances you would lose. You need to take steps now to find out exactly who the person was who caused the damage - that's the person you would need to sue. To win a negligence claim, you need to prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. If the facts are as you say: They probably have a duty, They probably failed in that duty, See below, You have clearly suffered harm or damage. Types of loss or damage The treatment of loss or damage under the law depends on what type of loss it is: Direct loss includes the repair and rehabilitation of the property - this would generally be recoverable, i.e. legally it is a cause of harm. Consequential loss includes the loss of rental income during the period that the property is unavailable. Alternatively, a court may consider that the loss is the cost of you providing alternative accommodation to the tenant if this was an obligation on you; this could be more or less than the rent. It would also include relocation costs etc. This is also generally recoverable. Pure economic loss would include loss of earnings if the tenant terminated the lease and you were unable to find a replacement or were forced to lower the rent as well as any advertising or agent's costs. While it is possible to recover this, it is quite likely that this would be considered unforeseeable and therefore not a legal cause of harm. The legal reasoning is that the loss (tenant terminating the lease) is too far removed from the proximate cause (damage to the unit) to hold the defendant responsible for it. You have already indicated that the tenant is trying to use the circumstances to their advantage; this is not something that could have been foreseen. Duty to mitigate loss You have a duty to mitigate the loss caused by the negligence. This would normally include ensuring that repairs were carried out in the most time and cost-efficient way possible. The defendant is only liable for reasonable costs; not actual costs. Insurance If a third party is liable for the loss, then they are liable for the loss irrespective of if it is covered by your insurance. Your insurance company can sue in your name to recover whatever they have lost; while they can, they will only if they believe it is commercially worthwhile. You need to talk to your insurer to determine what they will cover and what they won't and if they are going to seek to recover and what they will do if you seek to recover - they may choose to take the lead and tack your stuff on the back.	A settlement is fundamentally a contract where parties A and B promise to do certain things (one of them being "stop litigating"). A court order is an enforceable order to do something. A contract cannot be directly enforced (where force is used to make a person comply), it requires a court order for actual enforcement. The conditions of a contract might be enforceable, but you can't get the sheriff to come out based just on a contract. It appears that you got to the "facilitation" phase where the parties talk about the issue and the CRT case manager talks to the parties in neutral terms, aiming for an agreement. If you don't reach an agreement, the Tribunal Decision Process escalates the matter. Under the decision process, the CRT member makes a decision, and it can be enforced in court. They state that "For a $25 fee, the CRT can turn your agreement into an order, if both parties agree that an order should be issued. This is called a “consent resolution order”." I suppose that you did not go through that step, and you only have an agreement. So you would need a separate court process to get a court order. Because everything that you did in this negotiation phase is confidential, if you want CRT to give you something that is enforceable, you have to present the case from the beginning, since they don't have access to what has happened before. The problem in your account is that a settlement has to be reached by yourselves – possibly with the assistance of the CRT case manager. I assume you did actually get a settlement (agreement) with the landlord, but have not filed for a consent resolution order. It may be that the case is too old for you to just pay the $25, and it does require agreement by the other party. Read their FAQ about how cases end.	The relevant part of Texas law is in the property code, §§92.101-92.109 §92.104 allows them to "deduct from the deposit damages and charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the lease or as a result of breaching the lease", and then they must "give to the tenant the balance of the security deposit, if any, together with a written description and itemized list of all deductions" (except when there is uncontroversial rent owed). §92.109 states what the landlord's liability is, namely a landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of this subchapter is liable for an amount equal to the sum of $100, three times the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld, and the tenant's reasonable attorney's fees in a suit to recover the deposit. This requires bad faith, not just being wrong. If you dispute the deductions, you can sue the landlord to recover the deposit. The law also provides that "In an action brought by a tenant under this subchapter, the landlord has the burden of proving that the retention of any portion of the security deposit was reasonable". In order to extract more money from you for putative damages, the landlord will have to sue you and establish that there was an additional $2,000 damages. If the court finds that you did actually did damage the apartment, you may be ordered to compensate the landlord. Until you get such an order, you don't owe them anything; you may be able to recover the damage deposit if the "damage" was insignificant. This sketches the process of suing in Justice Court to get your deposit back, highlighting details like the demand letter that you might not have known you have to write. As far as your credit history is concerned, this is not entirely clear. The Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates the industry of credit reporting, and crucially you can dispute false claims of debts. This does not prevent a person from making such a claim. I do not have an account with the Big 3 reporting services, so I don't know what their standards are for recording a putative debt. However, you can insert a suitable statement in your record disputing the validity of the claim. It is most likely that the landlord would sell the putative debt to a collection agency. That industry is regulated by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and there is a procedure about disputing an alleged debt.	It’s not a problem Is there any reasonable prospect that you or the landlord would argue in a dispute that you are not the tenant? No. Is there any reasonable prospect on all the available evidence that such an argument would succeed? No. Therefore, no problem. Where this can be a problem is if someone commences legal action in the wrong name (e.g. the landlord sues “Travis Parks” instead of “Parks Travis”] and there is a summary judgement (if there is a hearing the mistake will be sorted out). A judgement cannot be enforced except on the named person. It can also be a problem if the lease is in the name of a company. Because companies are ‘virtual’ people, they can only act through agents and their name (and number in some jurisdictions) is the only thing that identifies them.	I haven't listened to the podcast, but this is probably referring to the anticipated "Renters Reform Bill". A white paper was published on 16 June 2022. There is no Bill before Parliament yet, so the mooted changes are quite a long way from happening. (Additionally, the usual political churn may mean that this does not happen at all. The Secretary of State has already changed, and will likely change again once there is a new Prime Minister; political priorities may shift in all sorts of ways; there could be a general election; etc.) One proposal from the government is (section 3.1): We will abolish Section 21 evictions and simplify tenancy structures. To achieve this, we will move all tenants who would previously have had an Assured Tenancy or Assured Shorthold Tenancy onto a single system of periodic tenancies. Tenants will need to provide two months’ notice when leaving a tenancy, ensuring landlords recoup the costs of finding a tenant and avoid lengthy void periods. This will provide greater security for tenants while retaining the important flexibility that privately rented accommodation offers. This will enable tenants to leave poor quality properties without remaining liable for the rent or to move more easily when their circumstances change, for example to take up a new job opportunity. Landlords will only be able to evict a tenant in reasonable circumstances, which will be defined in law, supporting tenants to save with fewer unwanted moves. Currently, tenants on an AST cannot leave their tenancy during the fixed term, unless the tenancy agreement specifically provides for this with a "break clause". A break clause might say that after six months, the tenant is allowed to terminate the arrangement with one month of notice to the landlord. Or there might be no break clause at all, so that the arrangement can end early only if the landlord and tenant agree ("surrendering the tenancy"). Once the fixed term ends, it can be renewed for another fixed term, or terminated, or else it rolls on to become a "periodic tenancy", typically month-to-month. The tenant can give notice to quit during this time. The government's proposal seems to amount to having no initial fixed term, but a statutory periodic tenancy from the get-go. As far as timing, the white paper says: We will provide at least six months’ notice of our first implementation date, after which all new tenancies will be periodic and governed by the new rules. Specific timing will depend on when Royal Assent is secured. To avoid a two-tier rental sector, and to make sure landlords and tenants are clear on their rights, all existing tenancies will transition to the new system on a second implementation date. After this point, all tenants will be protected from Section 21 eviction. We will allow at least twelve months between the first and second dates. Again, the Bill has not been introduced to Parliament or even published in draft, so Royal Assent is a long way off.	Anyone found not guilty may apply to the judge to have his legal costs paid out of central funds; this is not automatic, but is usual if the court agrees that the charges should not have been brought. The amount payable is set out by regulations depending on where the case was heard; since October 2012 it has been set at legal aid rates, which are unlikely to cover a full defence team. Somebody who did not have a lawyer can charge for the time he himself spent on the case, but this is assessed at a standard rate similar to minimum wage, even if he happens to be an expensive lawyer. No compensation is payable for health or other problems incident on a criminal case; it is considered a part of the rule of law that charges will be brought against defendants, and that some of them will be found not guilty. It may, of course, be possible to sue the complainant for defamation or even to bring an action for malicious prosecution; a lawyer would have to advise on this, but the mere fact of acquittal is certainly not enough to found an action.	No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement").
How does HIPAA apply to foreign entities? Since HIPAA is a U.S. law, my guess is that it only protects U.S. citizens or residents, but is there any part of the law that explicitly limits its protections to such persons? More practically, if a U.S. citizen consults with a doctor in England, is that doctor required to comply with HIPAA?	HIPAA applies to covered entities Which, broadly speaking are entities that provide health care in the USA regardless of where they might be based. The nationality of the patient is irrelevant.	It would be legal for a healthcare professional to sign an NDA prohibiting them from revealing certain information to a patient. Some examples: the password to the computer system; the home phone number and address of the chief of staff. It would not be legal to use an NDA as a basis for denying a patient the right to access their medical records when the HIPAA privacy rule mandates disclosure to the patient (with exceptions).	You generally are not required to share your medical details with people you don't want to. That said, the camp would also not be required to allow people who don't comply to enroll. They can't force you to divulge your information, but you can't force them to let you come if you don't, either. HIPAA deals with the ability of healthcare providers to disclose medical information to parties who aren't the patient themselves - it would be a HIPAA violation for your doctor to disclose your information directly to the camp without your consent. HIPAA has absolutely no bearing on who you choose to disclose your own information to, however - you can disclose your own information to anyone you want.	There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.	In general property owners and employers can impose any rules on their property and employees (respectively) that are not prohibited by law. Granted, there are extensive statutes and regulations to protect "employee rights." I have not heard of protections that include "possession of prescribed medications," but that does not mean they don't exist in your jurisdiction. If you really want to know whether you have a legal right as an employee, and you can't find it in written law or regulation, you would have to consult regulators or employment law attorneys in your jurisdiction. (As a practical matter, of course, it might make sense to first find out whether one's employer wants to assert a policy infringing the right in question.)	Businesses are not required to do what the card says, they are required to do what the card-holder says, to the extend that what the card holder says relates to giving or denying consent to be vaccinated. Since they don't vaccinate people who are unconscious, consent will always be directly obtained from the patient and the card has absolutely no effect. Also, control subjects are selected at random and the subject does not know what group they are in. Possession of such a card therefore has zero scientific effect.	Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task.	No. HIPAA places no limits on who you may share your medical records with - only on those with who your doctors (et al) can share. The HIV laws you refer to, place a positive obligation on you to share the information.
Can i feed birds in my patio in Illinois I am living in a town home in one of the North-west suburbs of Chicago. This is a newly constructed town-home with wooden decks in the patios of all the residents. The community is not yet fully construction completed. My children like to feed birds and we put bird seeds in our patio. Now i see that since the day i started bird-feeding, I am starting to see bird droppings in both my immediate neighbor's patios. I understand bird-feeding is unlawful in Chicago city area, but i am a bit unaware of the law in this place since i didnt see any boards that i usually see in Chicago. I see one of my immediate neighbor has noticed this and he has installed the silver strips on the edges of his patio that keeps birds away from his place. My other neighbor has not yet moved in and might not be aware of this. Now my question is - Am i allowed bird-feeding in my patio? What if in future one of my neighbors takes objection? Is there anything in Illinois law that protects my right of bird-feeding in my property?	There is no law against feeding birds, in Chicago or elsewhere in Illinois. The city does have a law against keeping pigeons whereby It shall be unlawful for any person to import, sell, own, keep or otherwise possess any live pigeon within any area designated as a residence district under the Chicago Zoning Ordinance. but this does not extend to feeding pigeons. Rumors may have gotten started because the DNR had recommended removing bird feeders for (bird) health reasons, but that is not a legal prohibition and anyhow has since expired.	Can anyone help me understand who's liable for any damages that occur? Yes, a judge. Seriously, in almost all cases in a collision between a turning car and a straight traveling cyclist, the car will be held responsible on the basis that the turn should not be commenced unless and until it can be completed safely. If the car has to stop during the turn, the turn shouldn't have been commenced. The only exception would be if evidence could be provided that the cyclist collided deliberately. Does it matter if it's the car that's damaged or the bicycle that's damaged? No	An essential component of your contract with them is that they will provide you with food free of animal stuff (the exact nature of "vegan approved" may be up for debate, but actual meat should not be included). So they breached their contract with you, and you might sue them for breach of contract. The case of Gupta v. Asha (orders were mixed up) could be useful in this matter. In this case, Hindus were served samosas containing beef, despite repeated assertions that they were vegetarian. Plaintiffs sued, the case was dismissed, and the appeals court deemed that the lower court was part right and part wrong. The important thing to understand is that you have to claim a specific legal wrong (and your attorney would advise you about that). Those plaintiffs made a claim under NJ product liability law, and that was dismissed because the product wasn't defective, it was simply the wrong product. They also made a claim regarding fraud, and there was at least a legal question behind that claim, but because there was no ascertainable loss (e.g. the plaintiffs were not hospitalized because of the omission), so that claim too was dismissed. Likewise a negligence claim was dismissed. Plaintiffs did get to first base w.r.t. the claim of emotional distress arising from breach of contract. I have no evidence regarding the final disposition of the case: the point is that there might be a legal basis for a lawsuit in your state, but you would need to secure the paid assistance of an attorney.	Not even real roaches are an emergency. The event was foreseeable and scheduleable. According to the terms of your lease, you are entitled to a 2 day warning. From your description, the landlord did not violate the lease, but he came close to it, perhaps to the point that the courts would consider it as good as a breach. In Chicago, §5-12-050 of the municipal code mandates 2-day notice, and the following section says that If the landlord makes an unlawful entry or a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner or makes repeated unreasonable demands for entry otherwise lawful, but which have the effect of harassing the tenant, the tenant may obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, or terminate the rental agreement pursuant to the notice provisions of Section 5-12-110(a). In each case, the tenant may recover an amount equal to not more than one month's rent or twice the damage sustained by him, whichever is greater.	States can, and some states do, have "mini-Sherman" anti-trust laws of their own. Whether a city could have such a law would depend on whether the state had delegated that power to cities. I haven't heard of a city that has such a law, but I haven't really looked. Or if a state has a "mini-Sherman" law, a city could perhaps bring action under such a law, depending on its exact terms. Or a city could impose a licensing scheme on a specific industry that also prevented a monopoly, similar to the requirements that many cities and towns place on taxicabs, or on bars. Both of those typically limit the number of units that a single entity may own. So perhaps it could be done for parking.	This hinges on what you mean by "spy". Generally, a landlord cannot enter a leased or rented property* without the tenant's consent, nor can their agents. (They can arrive and ask to enter, as can your neighbors whether or not you own your home, but you are not required to acquiesce in either case). A landlord can view the publicly viewable portions of the property at their leisure, as can their agents, or any member of the public for that matter. A landlord could possibly be notified of a tenant's actions in a number of ways: such as viewing the public portions of the property, being notified (or billed) by utilities or public agencies, or receiving complaints from the neighbors. A neighbor has no more, and no less, legal ability to spy on you if you owned your home vs if you rent your home. So, they would have no more right to, say, spy at your house with a telescope than if you owned the property yourself, but no less right to complain if you have a loud (or audible) party or a large number of guests; the only difference being they can complain to someone who could potentially do much more than they could if you owned the property yourself. Thus, the answer to your question depends on what is meant by "spying". *This assumes that this is a separate property; a landlord who rents out a room in their own home often has far greater rights.	In the US, the laws that govern habitable residences and the related issues - such as land zoning, health regulations, sewer and water services, private and commercial building codes, etc. - are very localized at the city and county levels. So you need to check with the city and county where you want to place such a structure and determine the relevant laws. Commercial buildings are much more heavily regulated than private residences. (And some federal laws and codes could supersede local laws.) Many cities and counties have their zoning and building codes and requirements online, as well as permitting systems to apply for building and utility hookup permits. It's true that some counties in the US have minimal zoning or building codes, so yes, you could move a shed to land you own in that county and build your own road, haul your water, put up solar panels, dig an outhouse, and not deal with any - or very few - regulations. But cities and towns will be much more regulated, since zoning and building codes are used to insure public safety, and services such as water and sewer are supported by taxes and protect public health. In other words, you may not legally be able to live in a shed that does not have city sewer, water and electric service. There may also be building codes for minimum size of bedrooms, egress windows for fire, ventilation, heating systems, so even if a small house is sold as a complete residence in a package, it may not pass local building codes. Breaking zoning, building and health codes can result in the local inspectors visiting and determining if the residence is up to code; they will not typically need a warrant or your permission to enter. They can order you to bring the residence up to code, if possible; or condemn the structure and require you to move out.	We have no way of knowing when this happened, but it is probably a fact, recorded some time in the past. Utility companies very frequently obtain a right-of-way (easement) which gives them certain rights to your property. Typically, this happened a long time ago when a previous owner agreed. As for gas pipelines, that typically includes "don't plant trees" restrictions. The easement is usually recorded in the county office where deeds are filed. The legal basis is generally "because you agreed, or some previous owner agreed". You can get a copy of the easement to see if "no trees" is actually part of the agreement. If yes, no point in arguing, if not, you could hire a lawyer if they are demanding that they are threatening you. They are allowed to be concerned and to ask you to cut trees regardless, but if it's not required by the terms of the easement, you can say "No, I'd rather keep my tree".
How legal it is to use a famous movie phrase as the title of my next videogame. Details inside: I already asked this question several years ago, but it's a little different this time. Last time, the phrase was: "The world Is Yours" from Scarface movie and videogame (it's the title). Was going to use it: Inside the game, not the title. Just a reference, like an achievement name for getting all the "things" which had nothing to do with Scarface. Simplified answer was: Has nothing to do with Scarface? just the phrase? it's ok. Now, the phrase is: <SECRET BECAUSE GAME IN DEVELOPMENT ;)>. But it's a more famous phrase. Will be used: As the game title/name. And it has a little bit of something to do with the movie: Both the movie and my game are about Space (Stars, Black Holes, etc). So basically, I will use a famous phrase from a space movie as the title of my space game. No other things are similar, no character names, no similar story, nothing at all. Just both are about space. So I expect the same answer? ;)	General Rules The rules on this vary somewhat by country. In some counties the is no trademark protection unless a mark is formally registers. In others use "in trade" offers a degree of protection even in the absence of registration. The US follows the second rule. Some of Europe follows the first. But in pretty much all countries trademarks (aka trade marks) are only protected when they are "used in commerce" and are only protected against other uses "in commerce". This mans that a phrase or design or other possible mark is only protected when it is functioning as a mark, that is it is used by the maker to identify or advertise a product or service (hereafter I use "product" to mean either or both). Moreover a mark is only protected when an alleged infringer uses the mark (or a similar mark) in such a way that people might reasonably be confused into thinking that the infringer's product comes from the same source as the products of the owner of the mark, or is approved, sponsored, or endorsed by the owner of the mark. A simple literary or pop-culture reference is normally not trademark infringement. This is both because a well-known phrase is not usually protectable as a mark at all, and because a reference to it is normally not infringement, even if the mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion is a very important concept in trademark cases. Examples The phrase "Elementary, my dear Watson" Is often used as a reference to the Sherlock Holmes stories and novels. But it was never used to brand or advertise those stories, so its use in a novel or video game now would not be infringement. Even if a game used that phrase as a title, it would not be infringement, because the phrase is not protected. All this would still be true even if the Sherlock Holmes stories were still being published. The tagline "In space, no one can here you scream" was used extensively to advertise the movie Alien. It had some protection as a mark (in the US), and might well have been registered for fuller protection (I haven't checked the US register of trademarks, or any other for this phrase). A game titled with this phrase might well be infringing. A game where a character speaks the phrase at some point probably will not be infringing. Caution All that said, exactly where the limits of infringement lie depend on the detailed factual situation. Before investing sizable amounts of money or time and effort on such a project, it might be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about trademark law in one's particular jurisdiction, and make sure that the risk of suit is not to great for one's tolerance.	Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.	I'm pretty sure in France you have moral rights and copyrights. I am writing from New Zealand, but we have some similar intellectual property laws due to being member countries of the World Intellectual Property Organisation. We are also both member countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO has the TRIPS agreement which relates to IP). So my answer may or may not be right – check what it says in France's copyright acts: you should be able to search for terms like first owner, and moral rights, films/videos, etc. The school isn't your employer, and so the basic rule is that you as the author are automatically the first owner. Since you're not really at school to create anything or research for the school, I don't think the court would enforce a blanket term that you had to agree to that the school owns intellectual property in what you create. You probably own the copyright. You also have moral rights in what you have created, which means even if the school does own the copyright in your work, you can request they attribute it to you if they show it in public (online). Not all works have moral rights. However, in NZ if you create a film/video you do have moral rights in it.	How close is such a statement corresponding with the reality? Legally, such language is a meaningless statement of future intent that at best makes clear that the person making the statement isn't waiving any of their legal rights. Certainly, no infringer would have standing to sue if they failed to do so. Whether a joint venture member or foreign reseller could sue the company for failing to enforce its IP rights is another question that presents itself very differently and depends upon much more than what the warning labels state, such as the language in the joint partnership or reseller's agreement with the copyright owner. Also, in criminal copyright violation cases, even if the copyright owner asks for the maximum possible consequences, the U.S. Justice Department is under no obligation whatsoever to go along with that request. Likewise, a judge has no obligation to impose the maximum penalty allowed by law following a criminal conviction, even if the copyright owner and the U.S. Justice Department both request a maximum sentence for someone who pleas guilty or is convicted of the offense following a trial. In practice, something like 98% of federal criminal cases, and a similar percentage of federal civil cases, result in agreed resolutions which result in less severe penalties than the maximum penalties allowed by law. This happens as a result of a mutual agreement to resolve the case with a guilty plea, or a settlement agreement in a civil case, or both. Also, in practice, none of these companies, nor the federal government's prosecutors, have the resources to press anything but the most clear and serious copyright violation cases, and cases that are valuable for P.R. purposes. Anything else is essentially a random lottery from myriad cases that could have been brought in order to counteract the argument (both political and legal) that their copyright protections are empty and completely unenforced is a large part of the cases to which the statutes would make it seem that they apply. Also, in a case brought by a joint venture owner or reseller for failure to enforce a copyright which causes the partner damages, presumably in some sort of breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty action, there would be no way to prove damages from all of the non-enforcement, since enforcing every known infringement would not be cost effective and would reduce the net profits of everyone involved.	The argument would have to be either a derivative work under copyright, or a trade dress/trademark claim. Neither sounds very solid at all. Neither copyright nor trade dress/trademark protect ideas like a TV format. They can only protect very similar expressions of an idea that necessarily flow one from the other and, for example, the game mechanics can't be protected by copyright.	No This summarizes the situation with Disney specifically. The Disney trademarks are so ubiquitous and recognizable as being Disney's and not, for example, yours that your use is bound to create confusion in the minds of the public that your business is in some way associated with Disney. That is the essence of trademark infringement. In particular, where your business has nothing to do with the characters it is clear that you are only using them for the cachet of the Disney reputation. Disney will defend their trademarks - this is not at all unlikely.	By changing the name, the filmmakers are signaling that the character in the movie is not acting the way the real-life person acted. It is not uncommon for historical fiction--which is basically what the "Moneyball" film is--to combine historical characters for narrative purposes, or to invent new characters to drive the plot. If you see a movie where Henry V stops to talk to Joe Welshman, a common soldier, before a battle, you assume that Henry V was at that battle, but you don't assume that the soldier is a historical person whose words with the king happened to be recorded on a nearby tape recorder. So, if you watch a movie where some characters have real people's names, like Billy Beane, and others have invented names, like Peter Brand, you don't necessarily assume that Brand represents a one-to-one correspondence with one real person. More likely, his part represents things that were done by multiple people, or were done in a different way that is not as narratively convenient. As you say, if you read the book, you will recognize the character--but you will also recognize the changes, and understand why the name was changed.	There are several things going on with Akinator and their use of trademarked names and characters. If you look at akinator.com Legal Notices it says: 2 – Copyright – Reproduction rights All the content of this site falls under French and international legislation on copyright and intellectual property. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part of this website, in any form or by any means is strictly prohibited without prior authorisation of the publications director. All products and trademarks mentioned are property of their respective owners. (emphasis mine) The fact that they mention that all trademarks belong to their respective owners is good, but it's a formality. What it appears the site really relies on for use of trademarked characters is what's called Nominative Use, which is a type of "trademark fair use." The product or service cannot be readily identified without using the trademark (e.g. trademark is descriptive of a person, place, or product attribute). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominative_use Akinator has to use the names and trademarks to identify those names and trademarks. Akinator could possibly be sued to establish their type of fair use is not valid in their case, but it's probably not worth it for the companies to pursue. And, most companies would rather people use and see their trademarks in a marketing and money-making fair use sense rather than sue to stop their use. See In the US, when is fair use a defense to copyright infringement? for a full description of Fair Use. Now, when you get to the "answer" part of the game, you will see a "copyright" link. Part of that resulting page says Displayed pictures are accessible from the web. It is Elokence's policy to respond to notices of alleged copyright infringement that comply with applicable international intellectual property law and make the necessary changes. In respect of Elokence's Intellectual Property Policy, Elokence operates a complaints procedure accessible via the form below. So the company has given itself a further bit of protection by only using images on the web they can link to (at least in the web browser game; I don't know about the App), so that means the image is already "out there", uploaded by someone else, and Akinator can claim they didn't upload it. And, further, there is a contact form for trademark holders to send DMCA takedown notices for their work. It's a belt and suspenders approach to the use of trademarks in their game.
Is it incumbent on a trademark holder to conduct trade under that mark? In the United States is it incumbent on a trademark holder to conduct trade under that trademark to retain the trademark? For example, Venus pencils was an old trademark that was bought in 1973 by Faber Castell and is no longer used. No pencils have been produced under this trademark in over 40 years. So, let's imagine someone starts making pencils using this trademark, could Faber Castell bring a successful action against them, or has Faber Castell lost the ability to control the trademark by failing to use it?	Trademarks must be used to retain validity Trademarks are subject to a use it or lose it rule. In Australia, non use for 3 years ends the trademark.	I agree that you have a very strong copyright fair use case. Although the logo is creative and you're using the entire thing, your use is for a nonprofit educational purpose and does not affect the value of the work. The logo is also probably trademarked. But you aren't using the mark in commerce, so I don't think that will be a problem for you.	the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.	If you aren't publicly registering a trade name you are probably engaged in illegal conduct. Among other things, by doing this, you are effectively hiding yourself from any lawsuits arising from the business that accurately name the defendant. You can have a business mascot or trade name, but you have to disclose that this is what it is and provide a means by which a reasonable person who needs to sue you could properly identify you.	Good question. A trade mark simply protects the company's exclusive right to use it to identify their goods and services. (R) means that the trade mark has been registered, TM means that, while not registered, the company is claiming a trade mark. Trade marks do not have to be registered to be enforceable. You are certainly not infringing their trade mark by what you are doing and you are not laying claim to the trade mark, so there is no requirement to use the symbols. Best practice is to use the symbols and identify who they belong to: "Intel and Core are trade marks of xyz".	Can I sell below parody T-Shirts? Sure, you can sell those shirts. But there is no guarantee that your own determination and claim of Fair Use for a parody would prevail in court. The determination that your use of those derivative designs - Fair Use as a Parody - is not yours to make; it is for a court to make, if and when the copyright holders of those two franchises choose to take you to court. Your determination of Fair Use could only be valid in the US; there may be no Fair Use law in your country, and any relevant international laws and agreements will impact what the legal steps the copyright holders can take against you. Read Fair Use again for exceptions to the law and about international laws such as as Berne Convention and World Intellectual Property Organization. Warner Brothers (Superman) and Paramount (Godfather) could decide at any time to confront you with a cease and desist letter or a lawsuit to challenge your claim of Fair Use. They may win; you may win your defense of their lawsuit. That's a risk you will take. The fact that other people currently produce shirts with similar designs doesn't mean anything. They may not have been confronted by the copyright holders; or the copyright holders may not care to confront small producers of possibly infringing designs and products.	Under United States law: Using a trademark solely to refer to files compatible with a trademarked program would be allowed under the doctrine of nominative fair use. The Ninth Circuit sets out the three-part test for nominative fair use in New Kids on the Block v. New America Pub, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992): "[T]he product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark" "[O]nly so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service" "[T]he user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder." Simply referring to the name of a trademarked program to describe its file format (and not doing so in a way that suggests "sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder," such as slapping a "Certified Adobe Photoshop Compatible" sticker on the box or something like that) would meet these requirements. The International Trademark Association elaborates a bit on the doctrine and gives some examples here.	The use may constitute trademark infringement if it implies sponsorship or endorsement I'm going to assume US jurisdiction for this question, because you've not provided one, and you haven't provided enough car manufacturer names to suggest that this wouldn't apply to the US. I'll also only cover Federal law (the cases were tried in state courts), so be aware that there may be additional responsibilities under state law that I don't examine here. 15 U.S. Code § 1114: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 15 U.S. Code § 1125: (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. These actions - the use of the trademarked manufacturer logo within the app - is likely to constitute trademark infringement, if the trademark owner's permission is not sought prior to publication, and the use of the trademark is likely to cause confusion as to the source, sponsorship or approval of the goods. What this means, is that if the trademarks are used in such a way that a reasonable person is likely to think that: The product is an official product from the owner/brand associated with the trademark; The product is sponsored by the owner/brand associated with the trademark; or The product is approved or endorsed by the owner/brand associated with the trademark. Then an action in trademark infringement may be brought by the trademark owner. Consider the following two cases: Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) In this case, judgement was made for the defendant, as the defendant's field was not considered close enough to the plaintiff's for there to be a likely chance of confusion. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) In this case the trial judge decided that the trademarks Slickcraft and Sleekcraft were unlikely to cause confusion. This ruling was overturned on appeal and an injunction was ordered by the court. Possible defenses Nominative use of a mark When a mark is used solely to identify a product, this use is privileged. A descriptive mark used for its primary purpose Descriptive marks are a subtype of trademarks, which are descriptive in nature but have acquired a secondary meaning. Here, using a descriptive mark for its primary purpose has been found not to constitute infringement. General First Amendment protection Satire and parody are generally recognized as defenses if the primary purpose of the use is not directly commercial. If the products are not similar enough to be likely to cause confusion; and The use does not imply endorsement, sponsorship or approval of the product by the trademark owner then it should be fine. It seems that the situation in the question above would not give rise to confusion (unless the car manufacturer also develops an app, for instance), the second issue - endorsement - should be avoided. Many programs will have a legal section that includes ownership information and disclaims any association with the trademark owner(s). I have not been able to locate any cases where the effect of these sections have been tested. Further reading Overview of Trademark Law
Can a natural US person hold citizenship while remaining non-juridical? What law should be referenced regarding when and how a natural person becomes a juridical person in the US? According to Wikipedia: While human beings acquire legal personhood when they are born, juridical persons do so when they are incorporated in accordance with law. How does this incorporation tie into citizenship and in what ways is the contract legally binding under commercial or common law?	Natural persons are not and cannot become juridical persons. Juridical persons are entities that are not natural persons, but which it's necessary or convenient to treat in many respects as though they were natural persons. The categories are mutually exclusive. There is no "contract" involved in citizenship from a legal standpoint (there's a concept of a "social contract," but that's a philosophical justification for government and not an actual legally binding agreement with specific terms); citizenship is not subject to commercial law in any way. Incorporation has nothing whatsoever to do with citizenship; a natural person is not incorporated, and is a citizen as a natural person. That citizenship is the ordinary notion of citizenship.	Probably not, because there is no legal case or controversy, and the law is clear enough. In US v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, SCOTUS held that A child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution The opinion has a long analysis of the "subject to jurisdiction" clause, reasoning that this excludes only children of diplomats, who are not subject to US law. Harris's parents were not immune diplomats so she was never immune to US jurisdiction. They are never forced to take any case, and are especially not likely to take a case so lacking in legal merits.	Does this mean that all four of the above are "equipotent"? No. The inclusion of these foundational documents in the Front Matter of the United States Code does not indicate anything regarding their legal status. It is more of a political statement, as a preamble to all laws in today's sovereign federal state, describing the foundation of the United States of America and its constitutional order. The only constitutional law in force today in the U.S. is the Constitution for the United States of America, beginning with We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. and the subsequent amendments. The ratification of the Constitution replaced any previous constitutional orders in effect between the States. A new government was created by the Constitution and replaced the old one under the Articles of the Confederation: Both Governments could not be understood to exist at the same time. The New Government did not commence until the old Government expired. It is apparent that the government did not commence on the Constitution being ratified by the ninth State; for these ratifications were to be reported to Congress, whose continuing existence was recognized by the Convention, and who were requested to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of bringing the new Government into operation. In fact, Congress did continue to act as a Government until it dissolved on the 1st of November, by the successive disappearance of its Members. It existed potentially until the 2d of March, the day proceeding that on which the Members of the new Congress were directed to assemble. Owings v. Speed The States abandoned their old agreement (the Articles of Confederation) and subjected themselves to the new Constitution. Of course, the other documents remain historically very significant and may shine lights on the interpretation of the present Constitution, for example, in Texas v. White, the reference made to the concept of "perpetual union" found in the Articles. The Declaration of Independence is not so much a legal document per se but a declaration of the existence of the States sovereign from the British Crown; but such sovereignty is not a result from the declaration, but from the acts of war. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, while remaining in effect under the Constitution by Acts of (the new) Congress, is in any case spent as its territorial extent is extinguished by the establishment and admission of states, who enjoy equal status under the Constitution. See for example, Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans and Strader v. Graham.	Your children may have automatically become US citizens at birth, depending on how long their mother lived in the US before they were born. US law says that any child born abroad to an unmarried US citizen mother is automatically a US citizen, as long as their mother had lived in the US continuously for at least one year before the child was born. There is a clear discussion of the legal requirements in Chapter 3 of the USICS Policy Manual: US Citizens at Birth . Your specific situation is covered by § C.2: Child of a US Citizen Mother (also at the bottom of the page!). (The underlying statute, §1409 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, is here. Like most of the INA, §1409 is not reader friendly.)	Immigration and naturalization is pretty far out of my comfort zone, but I'm confident that the answer is yes. Although people often believe that a foreign embassy is considered the territory of that country, I don't know of any law that supports that belief. Instead, through the Vienna Convention, the embassy grounds remain the territory of the host state but are provided a variety of protections and immunities because of their diplomatic status. With the embassy on U.S. soil, the child would therefore satisfy the "born ... in the United States" prong of the 14th Amendment's Citizenship Clause.* But that would not be the end of the analysis, as birthright citizenship also requires not just that the child is born in the United States, but also that the child be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." So if the child were born to an American citizen who had entered the Indian embassy to get a travel visa, the child would be both born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, making it eligible for birthright citizenship. But if the child were born to Indian ambassador or to diplomatic staff, who would generally be able to claim diplomatic immunity, that child would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and would not be able to claim birthright citizenship. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73, (1872) ("The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States."). * I haven't been able to find any cases saying this explicitly, but all the cases involving children born in foreign embassies sort of skip over the question as though they just assume that the child was born in the United States. See, e.g., Raya v. Clinton, 703 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. Va. 2010); Nikoi v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 939 F.2d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1991) These cases also go on to conclude that those children are not citizens of the United States, because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."	Yes From the American perspective: U.S. law does not mention dual nationality1 or require a person to choose one nationality or another. A U.S. citizen may naturalize in a foreign state without any risk to his or her U.S. citizenship. Source: U.S. Department of State — Bureau of Consular Affairs And from the British: Dual citizenship (also known as dual nationality) is allowed in the UK. This means you can be a British citizen and also a citizen of other countries. Source: Gov.Uk 1Section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states that “the term ‘national of the United States’ means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” Therefore, U.S. citizens are also U.S. nationals. Non-citizen nationality status refers only individuals who were born either in American Samoa or on Swains Island to parents who are not citizens of the United States [Source: Dept of State, as above]	In summary: Statute law allows Ireland to revoke your naturalisation on the grounds of acquiring another citizenship. But this law has recently been found unconstitutional. In practice, the government does not do this anyway. In the case of the UK, it is particularly unlikely. As an Irish citizen, there is no particular reason to pursue UK naturalisation. The law As of now, the possibility deprivation of Irish nationality for any reason is unclear, because of a ruling of the Supreme Court (Damache v Minister for Justice [2020] IESC 63) that declared the statute allowing for this to be unconstitutional. That was because the law (section 19 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956) did not provide enough procedural safeguards. The Minister would initiate the process and make the final decision after expert advice, but was not an "independent and impartial decision-maker". It is now for the legislature to replace section 19 so as to cure the defect. Under section 19, the grounds for revoking a certificate of naturalisation include: (b) that the person to whom it was granted has, by any overt act, shown himself to have failed in his duty of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State and (e) that the person to whom it is granted has by any voluntary act, other than marriage or entry into a civil partnership, acquired another citizenship. The issue in Damache was (b) following the appellant's conviction for terrorism offences in the United States. Regarding (e), it would seem on its face that acquiring UK nationality might trigger the possibility of revocation. However, in the scenario envisaged, that would leave you without any EU nationality, and in the Tjebbes case of 2019 (ECLI:EU:C:2019:189) the European Court of Justice found that such deprivation would only be possible after consideration of the specific consequences for the person concerned and their family. This point was not reached in Damache but would also tend to rule out any "automatic" loss of nationality; it would have to be the result of some longer and more involved process. Whatever replaces section 19 would have to be of this kind. Special considerations also apply if loss of Irish nationality would leave you stateless, but that is not the issue in question. The policy Aside from cases of immigration fraud and terrorism, the State has rarely initiated processes under section 19. In fact, official guidance on immigration and nationality admits a policy of dual nationality being allowed. For the United Kingdom, there are many people who are dual British and Irish nationals. The understanding between the governments with respect to the Common Travel Area, the Good Friday Agreement, and the general historic situation, would make it very unlikely that Ireland would treat acquisition of British nationality as a problem. The British-Irish Agreement of 1998 includes that both governments respect the "right to hold both British and Irish citizenship" for the people of Northern Ireland. Even if you are not a person of Northern Ireland, any action by the government of Ireland that would be seen as potentially touching on this right is politically untenable. Irish citizens have full rights in the UK anyway Under UK law, an Irish citizen can enter without a visa, live there as long as they want, get a job, claim benefits, vote in elections, be elected as an MP, and do everything that a UK citizen can normally do. There may be a vanishingly few exceptions for national security jobs. Because of this, there isn't much reason why being naturalised in the UK would be worthwhile. You could do so for sentimental reasons but as far as the UK's concerned, you already hold a status that's just as good. Extra note: UK honours (In response to a comment below.) The British Crown does grant honours, including knighthoods, to non-UK citizens and dual/multiple citizens, in some circumstances. It depends on whether the other nationality has King Charles III as head of state, and the attitude of the foreign government. Therefore, Canadians do not get knighthoods (Charles is King but the Canadian government would rather not), Belizians do (Charles is King and the government is fine with it), and Americans can get it as an honorary award that does not come with the Sir/Dame title. For Ireland, Terry Wogan is an example of how this works. He was an Irish citizen who lived and worked in the UK for many years. In order to receive a British knighthood, he had to take up British citizenship (which was granted on an expedited basis), becoming Sir Terry. On the other hand, Bob Geldof is an Irish citizen (only) who holds an honorary British KBE, and is not formally entitled to be Sir Bob - much like American recipients such as Rudy Guiliani. The Irish government does not object to either possibility, although some individuals do. An American-Irish-British triple citizen would be able to receive a UK knighthood and use the title Sir, assuming that the British government was willing to grant it, and unless there were some foreign legal blocker (e.g. the U.S. government does not allow federal officeholders to receive overseas decorations).	Quite possibly such hypothetical non-human intelligent beings would be treated as legal persons, but one cannot be sure in advance. If when humans first encountered such beings, they routinely treated them as persons, that might well influence any later legal treatment. If, on the other hand, humans initial treated such beings as "dumb animals". Eventually, there would no doubt have to be new law passed, or a court ruling on how existing law was to be applied to such beings, rt quite possibly both. One wouldhope that the law would treat such beings as fully human, but such past cases as Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) make tyhst less assuted than one might wish.
What are statutory schedules and why are they so named? For example housing act 1988 has schedule 2. But what is a schedule and what differentiates it from a section or a chapter or an annex?	A statutory schedule is an addendum to a duly enacted law that is included in the law itself, even though its contents are more similar to what would usually be found in a regulation. This stylistic device allows the language of the main statute itself to describe the content of the law briefly and in a readable fashion, while putting specific details, often details that vary by time period or product regulated or location, in an appendix that can be perused once one has groked the primary statute itself. It also allows for statutory amendments to be made to the details in the schedule without amending the core statute, which can be helpful for people trying to work out the legislative history of the statute. Schedules are common in lists of fees that are amended from time to time by statute, in laws that implement treaties that are themselves structured that way, in laws establishing customs duties or excise taxes, in laws that are phased in over time, and in laws where the legislative process reaches a consensus on the main structure of the statute which is drafted at that time before a consensus is reached on the specific details of some of its "moving parts".	When does an agreement start and end? I need a definition of 2 weeks deadline in UK law I highly doubt UK law provides a definition for that. When material, that precision ought to be provided in --or deduced from-- the contract itself, its nature, or its circumstances in order to override the ordinary meaning of week. The term "week" ordinarily means a period of consecutive days. This suggests that, in the example you outline, the extension includes the entire Monday of the second week. As you rightly point out, this criterion gives the sender no incentive to email his notification during working hours. However, that issue is presumed to be factored in when stipulating the deadline of fourteen days. The language "time of transmission" is inconclusive as to whether the term "time" is intended for greater precision of deadline or merely to preempt the effect of significant discrepancies of time zone. For instance, if the sender emails his notification from U.S. West Coast Monday night, it counts as sending it on Tuesday because by then in the UK it was already Tuesday. You would otherwise need additional elements to support the position that "time of transmission" was meant for expiration of deadline to match the hour and minute of the notification.	Inferring from the question, it appears that: The tenancy is an Assured Shorthold Tenancy. The tenancy agreement started on 16 December 2014. The initial fixed term was for 12 months. (Please comment below if any of this is incorrect). A Section 21 order gives notice that, unless the tenant leaves by the date given in the document, the landlord will begin legal proceedings against the tenant, in order to obtain a court order forcing the tenant to leave. To answer the OP's questions: Does it mean that she wants to use her right to cancel the contract after 2 months? It looks like that to me but I am not 100% sure. Yes - but if this is before the end of the fixed term (which I'm assuming is 15 December) there must be a clause in the tenancy agreement (normally called a "break clause") allowing the fixed term to be terminated early. If there is no break clause, then you cannot be asked to leave before the end of the fixed term. What does it mean "after 16/11/2015"? After can mean anything... even end of contract in December. Yes. The landlord would like you to leave before the date shown - but if you don't, the landlord can begin legal proceedings any time after that. Is this a legal document or just something she made up? It is a legal document. Section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 allows a landlord to ask a tenant to leave without having to give a reason. The landlord must meet certain conditions in order for the notice to be valid. What happens if I want to leave the house later because I don't find alternative? You'll need to discuss that with the landlord. However, if you don't leave by the end of the fixed term, you are entitled to stay (and pay rent!) until a court (not the landlord) orders your eviction. EDIT: This website goes into a lot more detail about the whole Section 21 procedure.	Let's analyse the landlord's claims: You have an assured shorthold tenancy agreement. The fact that there isn't a written contract doesn't change this as a verbal agreement is legally binding. That's true. A tenancy exists even if this was never written down, and it's an AST by default if the requirements for being one are met. Payment of rent constitutes acceptance of these terms. Payment of rent by the tenant, and its acceptance by the landlord, is sufficient for a tenancy to be regarded as existing. The tenancy can only be terminated early from the permission of the landlord. That's rubbish. A tenant can always end a tenancy, but there may be restrictions. In particular, a tenant cannot end a tenancy before the end of a fixed term without the agreement of the landlord, but the landlord has an obligation to find new tenants if this happens. However, I've been unable to find any information as to whether a fixed term exists if there's no written agreement. Assuming there is no fixed term, then for a month-to-month tenancy, the tenant must provide one month's notice to end the tenancy, with that month ending at the end of a rental period (i.e. the day before the next payment would be due). If you leave early this is legally abandonment and you are still responsible for paying rent for the duration of the tenancy That's true. ... if you do leave next month I'll consider you in rent arrears and pursue payment through legal means That is possible - but if you give notice as described above, then the tenancy will end, and (assuming you're up to date with the rent) you'll no longer be liable.	That is, you don't even have to give them a copy of the contract. In the same way you might reference some legal code without actually copying the legal code directly into the contract. If you do not communicate material terms of the contract to your contractor, the contract will be unenforceable due to lack of meeting of minds. Referencing "some legal code", provided that that code is publicly available is fine: your contractor can look it up and decide if they are happy with it. But doing the same with "Independent Contractor Agreement #123" will only work if you provide a copy of it to your contractor. For example, it can be attached to the paper being signed as a Schedule. So, in a nut shell, abstracting prose out is fine as long as it is communicated/attached.	You have two questions here. A search by the government must be reasonable, under the 4th Amendment, meaning that a warrant is required or exigent circumstances must exist. Simple entering (without searching) is governed by Civil Code 1954. The law governing residential rentals is not explicit, because a a dormitory might be considered not to be a "residential dwelling unit". Some states explicitly exclude university dormitories, but that seems not to be the case in CA. There are some specific exclusions where dormitories are excluded (such as 1946.2 regarding termination), so the lack of an exclusion for dormitories can't follow from an assumption that a dormitory is not a residential dwelling unit. Clearly, a normal apartment that happens to be owned by the university and is rented out to students (as exist in many universities) clearly is an ordinary rental. So it seems that a dormitory is not legally exempted from 1954: they can only enter with permission or in specific circumstances.	I don't know of a specific legal term but such clauses are quite common in contracts which consist of more than one document. The English words "priority", "prevail" and "precedence" have the meaning you want, however, "precedence" runs the risk of being confused with "precedent" which does have a very specific legal meaning. A clause similar to: If there is any inconsistency or ambiguity between the English and Japanese language versions of the contract, the English version shall prevail. You need to make very sure that this clause can be translated unambiguously into Japanese!	There are two separate issues here. Firstly, the deposit. Any deposit is required by law to either be placed in an approved deposit scheme provider at the start of any tenancy, or be insured with a provider. Either way, the landlord (or their letting agent) is required to issue the tenant with certain prescribed information within a certain period, as well as meet a few other requirements. Failing to do this can result in the landlord having to return the deposit and pay a fine to the tenant - if the tenant is willing to take him to court. If the landlord has done everything by the book, they don't owe you anything. (If they've paid the deposit into a scheme, then they will not receive any interest, as it's kept by the scheme provider to pay for their services.) Secondly, the renewal fee. These are legal and commonplace. However, you're never obliged to renew your tenancy, as if the fixed term expires and you don't leave, then it automatically becomes a statutory periodic tenancy (often called a "rolling tenancy"). With a periodic tenancy, you can leave by giving one month's notice in writing; or your landlord can request that you leave by issuing a section 21 notice, which gives you two months to depart or face legal action. If you tell the landlord that you would like to change to a periodic tenancy when the current fixed term ends, then no-one has to do anything (though the letting agency may charge you an admin fee). The landlord cannot impose a new tenancy agreement, but they can issue a section 21 notice. Or, as you suggest, you can request a longer fixed term. This provides more security for you and the landlord - though it makes it harder to leave early, as you're potentially liable for the rent for the whole term.
Do design patents/copyright cover "remixing" of spare parts? Given a design patent, that covers a specific product. Do I infringe on that design patent, if I take a visible and identifiable spare part (which contains no branding) and use that part in a different product, which I then intend to sell? How about copyright? Reproducing that spare part would probably infringe on the copyright. But what if I just buy the spare part, integrate it into a different product and sell it?	In your example is the spare part the subject of a design patent? I assume it is not. When you combine the spare part to create a “different product” does the finished product resemble the drawings in the design patent? If, in its intended use, the final thing is close enough to the design patent to fall within its scope then you might by indirectly infringing by inducing people to infringe. The scope of a design patent is very difficult to determine reliably. This has nothing to do with how you got the components of your product, just how the completed thing looks. Copyright does not cover products (unless it is a model of a building or a statue or mold for a statue).	Yes, assuming the material was given the standard license. You would be creating a derivative work, and only the copyright owner has the right to authorize creation of a derivative work. See the copyright FAQ for general information. The owner can file a DMCA takedown notice with YouTube and they will by policy notify you of the infringement claim and unless you file a counter-notice (you legally couldn't given the facts you're asserting), they will take it down. The owner can also sue you.	I agree that you have a very strong copyright fair use case. Although the logo is creative and you're using the entire thing, your use is for a nonprofit educational purpose and does not affect the value of the work. The logo is also probably trademarked. But you aren't using the mark in commerce, so I don't think that will be a problem for you.	Seems unlikely that it will "forestall copyright infringement suits". Some jurisdictions, e.g the USA, say that "Works produced by mechanical processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are not registrable". On the face of it, in such a jurisdiction copyright can't exist in a randomly generated work. Which the TED talk doesn't mention. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJtm0MoOgiU Let's imagine a case in a jurisdiction where copyright can exist in such a work. There is a dispute between two artists or labels. The plaintiff produced a well known tune and accuses the defendant of copying this work. The defendant says the plaintiff didn't have copyright in that work because it wasn't original in the first place, there is a 1200GB TAR file (compressed file) on GitHub that contains all possible single octave, 8-note, 12-beat melody combos, which were produced before the plaintiff's work. The plaintiff says, "like the majority of the population I never heard of GitHub, let alone downloaded, uncompressed a 1200GB file and listened to every melody." That's all aside from plaintiffs or lawyers deciding they have a case or believing the mere threat of civil proceedings will cause the alleged infringer to acquiesce to their demands. I think they are making a point about the law rather than a realistic means of thwarting copyright disputes. It's reasonable of the creators to say there is a finite set of melodies and the likelihood of inadvertently 'creating' the same melody as someone else may be smaller than we think, maybe copyright law has led to some unjust outcomes and led to a chilling effect on music-making.	If soemoen sues you for infringement of a design copyright, it would be a valid defense that the plaintiff had in fact taken the design elements from your prior work, or indeed from the work of a third party, and so had no valid copyright. Proving this may be easy or hard, depending on the specifics of the situation. Registration will prove that your work existed and you claimed it as original on a specific date. It would not be a perfect defense: if the other party claimed that you had copied prior to that date an infringement action could proceed. The effect of registration is somewhat different in US law and the law of various EU countries. In the US, for one thing, one must register before bringing an infringement suit, and the date of registration may affect the availability of statutory damages, and of an award of the costs and fees for bringing suit. Note that the protection offered by a design copyright is limited: copyright will never protect an ide3a or concept, and so only the specific expression of a design can be protected by copyright. What this means will vary in particular cases. Specific artwork or logos will each carry its own copyright, and if they are original creations of yours, you can register them. (These would not be design copyrights, but ordinary copyrights.) You can also obtain a single registration for the website as a whole. It is very unusual for one who copies a work, or elements of that work, to then sue the original creator for infringement. Given the existence of archive services, it is often fairly easy to prove how a site looked on a particular date. Ensuring that your site has been archived as soon as possible would make it easier to show that it was not copied from a later work. Some services will archive a particular site on request.	There is no provision for automatically relicensing infringing works (for example, distributing a program that contains parts covered by the GNU GPL and that is therefore a derived work will not automatically place the infringing program under GPL, even if that is the expected way for derived works to comply with the license. Instead, the derived work becomes at the very least undistributable, as there are competing copyright holders that disagree.	The creator of the derivative work has copyright in the derivative work. The copyright would protect only the new elements of the derivative work. Wikipedia is a good place to start. In the case of a book with updated grammar, depending on the extent of the changes, it would probably be easier to copy the original directly than to eliminate the updates from a copy of the derivative work.	The idea for an app is not subject to copyright. Only the artifacts of the app itself (sourcecode, images, texts, sounds, etc.) can be. So if one only copies the idea and creates their own version of all the other assets, then they are not violating copyright. However, in some cases, ideas can be subject to patents. But patents on software are tricky. First of all, only new ideas can be patented. When a supposed new idea was already published before, then that's called "prior art" and you can not patent it. Then getting a patent means a lot of investment in money and time (which is very different from copyright which you get automatically the moment you make something copyright-worthy). So not everything that could theoretically be patented gets patented. And then, many jurisdictions do not recognize software patents at all, and those which do have different limits on what is and is not patentable when it comes to software. This means patents are rarely a concern when copying the app idea of someone else, but not never. And another possible concern is the third pillar of intellectual property: Trademarks. This protects the name of the app. Trademark law oversimplified forbids to create a competing product with a name which might confuse customers. So if you created StevesSuperCoolAppForCoolPeople and I create StevesSuperCoolAppForCoolPeople - Simplified Edition, then I would be violating your trademark, because my product name sounds as if it was your product, when it is in fact an unrelated product with a similar purpose.
Is it illegal anywhere in Europe to modify one's own personal transport? Let's say I have a car and I want to make some modifications myself without a professional. It can be just for fun or personal research/testing. I may just add a train horn, an auto-braking system, a semi-self-driving system, something like that. Assuming I don't make a change that clearly and directly makes driving dangerous, like disconnecting the brakes, is it illegal anywhere in Europe to modify one's own vehicle (car, motorbike, etc) like that?	It will very much depend on what you modify. If you only drive on your own land, that's mostly fine (possibly not fine if your own land is a road accessible to the public). What will cause you problems: The manufacturer has a general permission to distribute car models with certain characteristics in your country. There's trouble if your modification means your modified car doesn't have these characteristics. Your car insurance is for a certain car model. Your insurance may be invalid if you modify your car. As "boy racers" were mentioned, part of the insurance cost is based on the type of drivers this car model attracts. If you change it from "boring old family car driven by boring old dads who never have accidents" to "exciting boy racer car driven by maniacs who crash their car regularly", you would be expected to tell your insurance so they can adapt their insurance. As far as passing your MOT test goes: If you don't advise the tester of the change, and therefore the fact that your car is unsafe is missed, your MOT is not valid. Same in the time between making changes and the next MOT if your changes made the car unsafe. Usually that will be found out at the worst possible time: After you are involved in a costly accident.	The Radiocommunications Agency (now OFCOM) issued some guidance about this in 2001. The specific offence is defined by s5 Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949: Any person who ... uses any wireless telegraphy apparatus with intent to obtain information as to the contents, sender or addressee of any message (whether sent by means of wireless telegraphy or not) of which neither the person using the apparatus nor a person on whose behalf he is acting is an intended recipient ... shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. It's also an offence under s5(1)(b)(ii) to disclose the contents of any such message, so the reception and disclosure of radio messages not sent by or addressed to you are both offences. I don't know if there have been any successful prosecutions specifically for monitoring aircraft communications. I doubt whether a hobbyist listening for his own enjoyment would attract the attention of the authorities, but if he started to publish recordings of the traffic then that might well do it.	I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy.	Be careful of the 10% time “perk”. It is not your own time. It is work time where you are self-directed. Any project unrelated to your work should be on your actual own time not dork time that is free of specific assignment. Fortunately the section 39 of the UK patent law is short and relatively straightforward. It is focused on “the course of your usual duties” not on whose time you were on or whose equipment you were using. It belongs to them if - (a) it was made in the course of the normal duties of the employee or in the course of duties falling outside his normal duties, but specifically assigned to him, and the circumstances in either case were such that an invention might reasonably be expected to result from the carrying out of his duties; or (b) the invention was made in the course of the duties of the employee and, at the time of making the invention, because of the nature of his duties and the particular responsibilities arising from the nature of his duties he had a special obligation to further the interests of the employer’s undertaking. Otherwise it’s yours. See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-patent-act-1977/section-39-employees-inventions-right-to-employees-inventions	Caution: I am not a lawyer. It depends on who is doing the collecting and storing. If it is done "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity", then it is exempt from the GDPR, as per Art. 2. Beware, however, that "purely personal activity" means that you do not share or publish them. In this court case, having the name or phone number of someone else on your "personal" website constitutes "processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46".	I can't see any law that would make this illegal. If you don't like it, you can either pay the upgrade, or not fly Ryanair.	First of all, although the GDPR is stated to apply to any site which processes the data of any person who is in the EU, it is not clear how a site not located in the EU, does not business in the EU, and does not primarily target EU residents as its audience can be required to comply with the GDPR. To the best of my knowledge, no such case has yet been brought, much less decided. There has also been some debate on whether an IP address constitutes Personal Data under the GDPR, and if it always does so, or only under particular conditions. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that (under the predecessor Directive 95/46/EC) that a dynamic IP address was personal data. But in that case the web site was run by the German Federal Government, which surely has wider scope for getting info from a German ISP than a small private US web activist does. There is not yet any case law that I know of on the applicability of the GDPR to IP addresses in any case at all similar to the one in the question. Joe would in my view be wise to at least learn that logs are being kept, and post a disclosure of this on the site. Whether Joe needs to do more than that is less than clear at this time.	I assume this refers to the case covered here: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/may/22/facebook-fined-mishandling-user-information-ireland-eu-meta The gist is: Under GDPR you can only transfer personal data from inside the European Union to the outside if you have procedures in place that ensures it is still protected to European standards. Facebook was found to have failed in that regards, specifically when it came to access by US spy agencies. It seems indeed quite plausible that it is not possible to transfer personal data from the EU to the US in a way that is compatible with both EU and US law. The EU and the US are in negotiations to find a way to make this legally possible. But until then, it seems that if you do have a European subsidary and want to keep all of your account data in the same place, it needs to be a place with robust privacy protections. That doesn't require it to be in the EU, but something like US, Russia or China would be illegal.
What offences are punishable by death in Canada in 2022? Summary It is possible to charge with, convict of, and sentence for serious offences at any time, even 120 years later. The punishment is determined by checking the punishment at two points in time: at the time of commission, and at the time of sentencing. The lesser punishment applies. However, after expiry or repeal of a law, the punishment is not considered to have been reduced to zero but is instead the same penalty as immediately before expiry or repeal. The penalty for murder, treason, and piracy was lowered to life imprisonment, so sentences in 2022 for those crimes, even if committed in the past, cannot result in a death sentence, since section 11(i) of the Charter would reduce the penalty. The same applies to various military offences whose punishments were reduced from death to life imprisonment. Sentencing in 2022 for older crimes might result in a death sentence. What are those crimes that could result in a death sentence, or are there none? No limitation There is no statute of limitations on hybrid and indictable offences, so people can be charged with hybrid and indictable offences at any time. This means an accused can be charged with and found guilty of offences committed 120 years ago. However, summary offences must be charged within 12 months after they are committed. Punishment In Canada, anyone can be charged with, convicted of, and sentenced for an offence committed in the past if it was an actual offence at the time of commission, even after expiry or repeal of the law for that offence. The offence for the charge does not need to be an offence at the time of charge, conviction, or sentencing, as long as it was an offence at the time of commission. A person can still be charged with a repealed offence as long as the offence is in existence at the time that the offence was committed. http://criminalnotebook.ca/index.php/Repealed_Offences Under Section 11(i) of the Charter, "Any person charged with an offence has the right: if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for the offence has been varied between the time of commission and the time of sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser punishment." However, if something was previously an offence, but it later became no longer an offence, then the punishment was not "varied" and the punishment still applies to those convicted before it stopped being an offence. For example, if X is an offence on 2000-01-01 but no longer an offence on 2000-01-02, then "X on 2000-01-01" is an offence subject to the penalty if convicted on 2001-01-03, but "X on 2000-01-02" is not an offence. The penalty immediately before the repeal would be the penalty at the time of sentencing for the purpose of section 11(i) of the Charter specifying lesser punishment, under the Interpretation Act: 43 Where an enactment is repealed in whole or in part, the repeal does not […] (d) affect any offence committed against or contravention of the provisions of the enactment so repealed, or any punishment, penalty or forfeiture incurred under the enactment so repealed, or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any right, privilege, obligation or liability referred to in paragraph (c) or in respect of any punishment, penalty or forfeiture referred to in paragraph (d), and an investigation, legal proceeding or remedy as described in paragraph (e) may be instituted, continued or enforced, and the punishment, penalty or forfeiture may be imposed as if the enactment had not been so repealed. As an example, on 2018-12-11, someone was charged with "pretending to practise witchcraft" under section 365(b) of the Criminal Code, even though it was repealed two days later on 2018-12-13, and conviction and sentencing were still possible when the article was published on 2018-12-19. Timmins police charged 33-year-old Tiffany Butch on Dec. 11, accusing her of demanding money in return for lifting a curse. Two days later, Section 365 of the Criminal Code — which prohibits "pretending to practise witchcraft" — was formally repealed. It's likely that Butch, who goes by the nickname "White Witch of the North," will be the last person in Canada to be charged, and potentially tried, for the offence. Marc Depatie, a spokesperson for the Timmins force, said police and prosecutors work with the laws that are on the books at the time of the alleged offence, pointing to historical sexual offences as an example. "That's why police and the Crown attorneys keep ancient, or aged, versions of the Criminal Code on hand, to see what laws apply," he said. Depatie said the fact that the offence was about to be scrubbed from the Criminal Code was not a factor in the decision to lay the charge. Elements of the case were "best captured" by that section of the Criminal Code in consultation with the local Crown attorney's office, he said. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/witchcraft-criminal-code-charge-1.4951071 In these types of fraud cases, if the accused pays restitution, they would drop the charges, which is the outcome of that case when the Crown withdrew charges on 2019-03-26. However, if they pressed for charges and a conviction occurred later, a sentence would be based on the lesser of the penalty at the time of commission and time of sentencing, which would be up to imprisonment of 2 years less one day plus a fine of not more than $5,000. Even though section 365(b) would have been repealed at the time of sentencing, the punishment would still apply. The article correctly says she was "likely" to be the last person charged and potentially tried, since later charges under this section were possible until 2019-12-12, 12 months after a possible charge for that offence committed on 2018-12-12. In the case of a conviction for "having sexual relations with a stepdaughter in violation of paragraph 153(1)(a) of the Criminal Code (now repealed)" repealed at the time of sentencing (the section was also renumbered to 158, implying the offence was committed between 1970 and 1985), the court does not consider a repeal as the punishment being "varied" to zero: The Court of Appeal also rejected the argument of there being a section 11(i) benefit due to the punishment having been, in effect, reduced to zero by the previous offence having been repealed […] Section 11(i) does not afford the right to any “lesser punishment” that was temporarily available in the time between the commission of the offence and sentencing for that offence. Thus, in cases where an offence was committed before a lesser punishment became available, and where sentencing occurred after that lesser punishment was eliminated, the offender would not have the benefit of the lesser punishment available in the interim period. Rather, section 11(i) provides a binary right, granting only the lesser of two punishments: that on the date of the offence and that on the date of sentencing (Poulin, supra). https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art11i.html If sentencing occurs after repeal or expiry of an offence, the punishment still applies. The punishment at the time of sentencing, for the purpose of section 11(i), would be the punishment immediately before the repeal or expiry (see section 43 of Interpretation Act cited above). Abolition of death penalty offences committed later The penalty for murder, treason, and piracy was lowered to life imprisonment effective 1976-07-26, and the penalty for various military offences was lowered to life imprisonment effective 1999-09-01. Anyone convicted of these offences today would suffer life imprisonment instead of death, so these offences are no longer punishable by death, even if they were committed before 1976. In Criminal Law Amendment Act (No. 2), 1976, they also explicitly commute all death sentences for three particular offences: [(4) is omitted because it is similar to (2)] 25 (1) If, on the day this Act comes into force, any person is under a sentence of death for murder punishable by death that has not been commuted, that sentence thereupon becomes a sentence of imprisonment for life for first degree murder without eligibility for parole until he has served twenty-five years of his sentence. (2) If, after the coming into force of this Act, an appeal against conviction by a person under a sentence of death upon the coming into force of this Act for murder punishable by death is dismissed, that sentence thereupon becomes a sentence of imprisonment for life for first degree murder without eligibility for parole until he has served twenty-five years of his sentence. (3) If, on the day this Act comes into force, any person is under sentence of death for treason or piracy that has not been commuted, that sentence is deemed to have been commuted to imprisonment for life with like effect as if the commutation had been granted before the day this Act came into force. They commute death sentences only for murder, treason, and piracy, so other older offences could still be punishable by death. Death penalty not "cruel and unusual" The Supreme Court found that the death penalty and even mandatory death penalty are not "cruel and unusual treatment or punishment" under section 2(b) of the Bill of Rights (Miller et al. v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680). However, the lesser punishment of life imprisonment without parole was recently found to be "cruel" punsishment (R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23). Would this judgement have any effect on death penalty sentencing in 2022? Or would it have no effect, because life imprisonment without parole is different from death (and somehow a punishment could be "cruel" but lesser than a punishment that is not "cruel"), or because it would be retroactive? Main Question If there is some capital offence from a long time ago that is no longer an offence, without any reduction to its punishment, and someone in 2022 is convicted of committing that offence while it was still an offence, then it would be punishable by the death penalty. For example, if Y was an offence with death specified as the minimum punishment, but then it was repealed effective 1921-01-01 with death still specified as the minimum punishment when it was repealed, then someone convicted in 2022 of "Y on 1920-12-31" would be necessarily sentenced to death. Similarly, if an offence specified death as the maximum punishment, then someone convicted of it would be possibly sentenced to death. Do these offences exist, and if so, what are they? (even though the federal cabinet would probably commute a death sentence in 2022) It would be hypocritical for Canada to characterize itself as a country opposed to capital punishment by refusing extradition when the possibility of death penalty would "shock the conscience", while simutaneously subjecting those under its jurisdiction to liability of death penalty for ancient, repealed/expired offences. Is there anything preventing this, such as a lack of applicable offences?	Do these offences exist,... None exist for civilian offences since 1976 and for miltary offences since 1999. All death penalties have been lowered to life imprisonment and for any conviction after that point in time only the lower punishment would apply. Since 1963, all convictions where the death penalty did apply, were commuted to life imprisonment. So there are no cases open where the death penalty would still apply. You cannot be convicted for a crime that no longer exists (repealed). You cannot be sentenced to a punishment that no longer applies (lowered). Nulla poena sine lege (no penalty without law) - Wikipedia After the Confederation period (1867), the number of offences punishable by death were reduced to three: murder, rape, and treason. The last execution took place on the 1962-12-11. After that all death sentences were commuted as a matter of policy. The abolition of the death penalty for murder, treason, and piracy came into force on the 1976-07-26. Other military offences (cowardice, desertion, unlawful surrender, and spying for the enemy), if committed traitorously, still existed until September 1999 (the last one was carried out in 1945). Capital punishment in Canada - Wikipedia The death penalty was de facto abolished in Canada in January 1963 and de jure in September 1999.	No, section 11 only applies to criminal offences and quasi-criminal offences with criminal proceedings. See Guindon v. Canada 2015 SCC 41 (Wikipedia, full text) esp. at para. 64.	The penalty in this case What, for example, is the penalty for what this person is accused of doing? This (or at least an upper limit) is given in the very article you cite: At the time of his arrest the Vatican said that if convicted he could face up to 12 years in jail. There's your answer to that question. The laws of the Vatican - and a good reference I don't want to embark on a complete explanation of the way laws work in the Vatican City, but I have found a "good reference". In a nutshell, The VCS came into existence as a sovereign nation in 1929 with the signing of the Lateran Treaty between the Holy See and the Kingdom of Italy. The signing effectively ended the “Roman Question,” the decades old tension between the Catholic Church and the nation of Italy. Prior to the treaty, the relationship between the Church and the country was governed by the Law of Papal Guarantees, an Italian law that allowed the Pope a certain amount of autonomy within the borders of Italy. The Lateran Treaty consisted of three separate documents spread over twenty-seven articles and four annexes: an agreement acknowledging the Vatican as an independent state, also known as the Treaty of Conciliation; a concordat on church state relations between the city state and Italy; and a financial convention liquidating the financial claims of the Holy See against Italy. In signing the treaty, Italy ceded 108.7 acres of Rome to the Holy See, thus creating the world’s smallest sovereign nation. At the signing, Pope Pius XI was represented by Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, papal secretary of state, while King Emanuel III was represented by Benito Mussolini, prime minister of Italy. The Lateran Treaty was incorporated into the Italian Constitution sixteen years later in 1947. . . . On the same day that the Lateran Treaty was signed, the VCS adopted a constitution in the form of six constitutional (or fundamental) laws: Fundamental Law of the City of the Vatican; Law of the Source of Laws; Law on the Rights of Citizenship and Sojourn; Law on Administrative Organization; Law on Economic, Commercial, and Professional Organization; and Law of Public Security. Under the second of these laws, the sources of VCS law were comprised of the Codex Iuris Canonici (Canon Law Code), and “[t]he laws promulgated for the City of the Vatican by the Sovereign Pontiff or by any other authority delegated by him, as well as the regulations lawfully issued by the competent authority.” Article 3 of this law also allowed for the use of Italian law as well as provincial and municipal Roman law when they did not conflict with canon law, the rules of the Lateran Treaty (and, later, the 1984 Concordat), or divine law. The role of the Pope The VCS is a unique entity in that the state’s monarch is also the spiritual leader of the Roman Catholic Church throughout the world. As the elected absolute temporal monarch of the state, the Pope has full legislative, executive, and judicial authority over the jurisdiction. The Pope delegates most of this authority to a variety of organs within the Vatican City, all of whose members may be appointed or removed at the discretion of the Pope. The powers and duties of these various organs are described in detail later in this article. In other words, everybody answers to the Pope. He may not oversee this particular case, but he theoretically could. More specifically, though, The judicial system of the VCS is organized as follows: a sole judge (Giudice Unico) presiding over a court of limited jurisdiction; a three-judge Tribunal (Tribunale); a four-member Court of Appeals (Corte d’Appello); and, finally, the Supreme Court of Appeals (Corte di Cassazione). It is important to distinguish these judicial organs from those of the Roman Curia, which is the administrative arm of the Holy See. Cases from temporal VCS courts are not generally reported, but a listing of the types of cases tried before each of the courts is published in L’Attivita della Santa Sede, the annual yearbook.	First, I need to correct a misconception you seem to have. The length of time you spend in jail does not normally determine if something is a felony or a misdemeanor. Whether something is a felony or a misdemeanor is based on how you're charged. And it's not like you happen to be charged with something with a maximum sentence of 365 or 366 days; if you are being charged with a felony, it's because the decision was made that your alleged crime was serious and should be treated as a felony. If you're being charged with a misdemeanor, ditto. Prosecutors charge knowing the difference between the two. The distinction was not originally "punishable by more than a year in prison" vs. "punishable by at most a year." In fact, it originated well before the idea that the default punishment for most crimes is confinement for a term, where the term is dependent on the severity of the crime. The original distinction was about forfeiture. A felony was a violation of a feudal relationship between a lord and a vassal; if a vassal violates their duty of loyalty to their lord, their relationship ends and their property is forfeit to that lord. Not all serious crimes were felonies. Murder was normally not a felony, because it didn't violate that duty of loyalty. Later on (post-Normans), murder and other serious crimes did result in forfeiture. The term broadened to include these crimes; at this point, "felony" meant "this crime results in your property being forfeit." These were also the most severe crimes. This is the point where "felony" meaning "exceptionally severe crime" really became established. However, the technical distinction based on forfeiture became muddied, because of another punishment that almost always went along with it: execution. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, complained that people are mixing these two up. The meaning generally shifted to "crimes which were punished by death," but scholars did know that the proper meaning should really be "crimes punished with forfeiture." The distinction mattered. Because felonies were so serious, the procedure involved differed in several respects. I happen to know you're in the US and my main source is also about the US, so let's hop across the Atlantic Ocean to the colonies. Here, forfeiture was pretty much unknown around the time of independence. The popular understanding of "felony" was still "capital crime;" the legal understanding tended to be "the common-law felonies plus things the legislature designated as a felony." Nearer the end of the 18th century, the number of crimes punishable by death dropped substantially in the US. The default punishment for most serious crimes shifted from execution to confinement in a prison (this is when prison became the default sentence for even very serious crimes in the US). These new prisons were very different from the older jails: they were designed to reform their inmates, and turn them into productive members of society. But not all crimes need that; with less serious crimes, you don't have to go about fixing a character flaw, you just have to show to the criminal that doing this bad thing results in this punishment. The lack of a firm definition of felony became a serious problem shortly after this change. Originally in the US, things worked basically like in England. Legislatures passed laws, which might refer to older laws by name, but there was no organizing principle. Lots of the criminal law was bound up in precedent. It was extremely difficult to find out for sure what the law even was. Instead, there was a major push to codify the law. That means you would have a code, which contained, in organized form, all the laws relating to crime. One of the earliest and most influential American penal codes was actually never adopted. It was written by Edward Livingstone for Louisiana, and was intended to wholly supplant the common law (Louisiana would be the perfect state for this, because it still has a civil law tradition). Livingston didn't use the term "felony," but did distinguish between "crimes" and "misdemeanors." The main systematic difference was not in the penal code itself (the punishments were set out on a crime-by-crime basis), but in the corrections code. Crimes were punished in a penitentiary designed to reform the prisoner; misdemeanors were punished by simple imprisonment. Crimes were all punished by more than a year, while misdemeanors could be punished by anywhere from a few days to two years. The important thing was where and how you were punished, not for how long. While this code was never adopted, it had a major influence on the New York code of 1829. The New York code was designed to rationalize the law, but not do too much in the way of substantive changes. In particular, the old idea of a "felony" was not abolished; it was preserved, with real significance (part of the point of keeping the term was that they didn't want to lose all its baggage), and so it needed a definition. They basically adopted Livingstone's definition. Felonies were always the more serious crimes; since serious crimes were now evidence of character flaws to be reformed in a penitentiary, the crimes where you got sent for reform were the felonies (plus, of course, those punished by death). All others were misdemeanors. They also decided that punishment for more than a year, in a jail that's not designed to reform you, was bad; no jail sentence could be more than a year. Since confinement continues to be the main form of punishment, this definition has managed to stick without issue. The forfeiture and capital punishment definitions became obsolete as those punishments became completely obsolete or very, very limited in use. That's pretty much how things got where they are now. It makes some amount of sense to distinguish between bad crimes and not-so-bad crimes, without needing to list out the bad crimes. This is not actually unique to English law; the French penal code also makes this distinction. The term survived the feudal context in which it originated because it was useful. As confinement became the main type of punishment, and as (at the same time) confinement for serious crimes was paired with efforts to reform and rehabilitate criminals, the old distinction shifted to distinguishing between things where you needed that reform and things where you just needed punishment. Then, it shifted in some places to being about the length of said punishment, as an alternative way of expressing the same basic idea but which could be more easily applied to varying systems. Main source: Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early American Republic, 57 Clev. St. L. Rev. 461 (2009)	also, what is "cannot be punished on account thereof because they lacked criminal responsibility due to the intoxication or if this cannot be ruled out"? I can not understand This means that if a person, while drunk, does soemthign that would otherwise be a crime, but the person cannot be charged because s/he was too drunk to know that s/he was committing a crime, such a person can insted be charged with having become intoxicated, and given up to the same punishment that would have been given for conviction for doign the unlawful act. For example, if a person damaged property while under the influence of alcohol (drunk), it might be impossible under German law to prosecute for the crime of intentionally damaging property, because one could not prove that the person knew what s/he was doing, and knew that it was criminal. In such a case the person could be charged with having intentionally or carelessly become drunk, but the penalty can't be more than the penalty for having damaged property would have been, nor can it be more than five years. As a practical matter, I think it very unlikely that the police would seek to impose a fine if they didn't issue any ticket or other paperwork at the scene, nor mention any such intention. However, they might be legally able to do so.	In the US, a person is generally protected from being tried for the same offense twice, but they are not necessarily absolutely "protected". If a jury convicts a person but the judge enters a directed verdict of not guilty, the prosecution can appeal that action (Wilson v. US, 420 U.S. 332). The reason is that the acquittal could be disposed of on appeal without subjecting the person to a second trial. In contrast, in Fong Foo v. US, 369 U.S. 141 the trial judge ordered the jury to enter a verdict of acquittal. The appeals court rejected the judges basis for ordering an acquittal: but Fong Foo was "protected" because there could not be a second trial (double jeopardy), and it does not follow that the jury would have convicted but for the judge's order. The question reduces to the limited circumstances under which the prosecution can appeal a verdict. For instance, the prosecution can appeal a tre-trial motion to dismiss, and since there was no trial, there is no second jeopardy. Within a single jurisdiction, the only circumstance allowing a second trial involves bribery of a judge (Aleman v. Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F.3d 302), where the basis for allowing a second trial is that defendant was not in jeopardy with the first trial. New evidence does not override a defendant's protection against a second trial, whether it is new DNA evidence or a confession. It does not matter if this evidence arises seconds after the final verdict is entered, or months after. Or even before, but the prosecution was unaware.	Charged? Of course, the police can charge you with anything at any time Could you be convicted? Maybe. Their best shot is charging you with “Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act” also called constructive manslaughter. The Crown must prove your act: was intentional, was unlawful, leads the reasonable person to realise that some other person is at risk of physical harm, and caused the death. The first two are uncontestable: the protesters are deliberately engaging in an illegal act. No 3 would be up to the jury. No 4 is also up to the jury and would turn on the evidence that the delay to the ambulance caused the death.	Is the government exempt from anti discrimination legislation Broadly speaking, the government (in Canada, the executive power vested in Her Majesty the Queen) is not subject to any law unless the legislature binds the Crown explicitly. In this case, Ontario Human Rights Code does bind the government and any agency of the Crown. However, Canada is a federal country, and for certain areas exclusively regulated by the federal government, provincial laws may not apply fully. This is the case for human rights and employment laws; the federal government along with federally regulated industries (banking, telecommunications, airlines etc.) enjoy immunity from provincial human rights codes. But they are still subject to the federal Canada Human Rights Act (which only apply to businesses under the federal jurisdiction), which also prohibit age discrimination. Additionally, government actions are also subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 15 of which prohibits discrimination based on age. what is with the huge number of jobs that list "Must be eligible to participate in the Canada Summer Jobs (CSJ) program" as a requirement (with <30 being the top listed requirement). For example, the Canada Summer Jobs (CSJ) program you referred to in the question is a federal program within the spending power of the Parliament of Canada and are immune from provincial laws that interfere with its application. Ontario laws simply to no apply in this case (but federal law and the Charter does) even if an action physically happens in Ontario. What Exemptions are there to the Age Discrimination laws in Ontario? Anti-discrimination law in general only prohibits "unreasonable" discriminations. If someone can show that they have "good reason" to discriminate, it can be legal. For example, it is legal for a casting director to choose a black man to portray Martin Luther King Jr. instead of a white woman. It is also legal to discriminate against people with certain disabilities if they are in fact unable to carry out tasks required in a job even with reasonable accommodation. It is also legal for an employer (or for the law to require an employer) to give special leaves to women for pregnancy and childbirth, even though otherwise discrimination is not permitted based on sex. Age-based discounts for example are usually not illegal (and even explicitly legal in Ontario's legislation for senior's discounts) if the purpose is genuine (e.g. less spending power for teens and seniors). While age requirements are on its face a discrimination, youth programs usually qualify as affirmative action programs that are designed to ameliorate the conditions of a disadvantaged group. It is the same basis why certain gender-, race- or age-based scholarships and grants are legal. In the employment context, the government considers youths as a disadvantaged group and improving youth employment is a reasonable government objective. The Charter allows affirmative programs by the government: (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. and both federal and Ontario human rights legislations allow special programs: 14 (1) A right under Part I is not infringed by the implementation of a special program designed to relieve hardship or economic disadvantage or to assist disadvantaged persons or groups to achieve or attempt to achieve equal opportunity or that is likely to contribute to the elimination of the infringement of rights under Part I. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 14 (1). 16 (1) It is not a discriminatory practice for a person to adopt or carry out a special program, plan or arrangement designed to prevent disadvantages that are likely to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce disadvantages that are suffered by, any group of individuals when those disadvantages would be based on or related to the prohibited grounds of discrimination, by improving opportunities respecting goods, services, facilities, accommodation or employment in relation to that group. Canadian Human Rights Act
In "he said"/ "she said" discrepancies, how must a landlord prove timely valid service of eviction notices? Suppose Larry the landlord applied to court for possession order and presents a back dated copy of section 21 notice from 65 days ago. The court serves notice of hearing to the property and tenant attends claiming it is the first they've seen of the landlord wanting the property back and there was never any such notice served. What does the court do? Accept or reject that valid notice was served? Conversely, what stops a tenant from quietly discarding notices received and then in court denying receiving them?	The onus lies on the landlord The landlord is the one asserting a right (to evict), therefore, they bear the onus of proving that they have that right. The court will look at the evidence both parties have that the notice was served. For the tenant this is likely to be brief testimony that they never received it. For the landlord, they will testify as to how it was served (personal service, mail etc.) and provide evidence that supports that testimony (photos of them handing it to the tenant, receipts for mail etc.). Please note that only some types of service are valid and laws around service are highly technical. The court will give weight to the evidence (decide what they believe and what they don’t, who they find reliable and who they don’t). The onus in a civil case is “the balance of probabilities” which means if they find the landlord’s version more likely then the notice was served. If they find the tenant’s more likely or both equally likely, it wasn’t.	The government of California has an extensive manual that says what you can and cannot do. To terminate a lease (a rental agreement for a year is a lease), there would have to be just cause for eviction (p. 65), such as failing to pay rent, violating terms of the agreement, cockfighting, and so on, and that does not include being a pain in the neck. Nor would the need to make repairs justify terminating a lease. On p. 79 they clarify that retaliatory eviction for exercising their legal rights is prohibited per California Civil Code 1942.5, and will result in fines. P. 35 ff. covers landlords entering: you may enter to make repairs, but must give 24 hour written notice (6 days if mailed), entering between 8am and 5pm business days, but you can also arrive at alternative times orally. If the local code-enforcers require you to do some modifications on the property, that is a separate matter and does not create a just cause for terminating the lease. For instance, if the electric service is not properly grounded and they require you to fix that, that does not constitute the structure "being destroyed". If the repairs make the building actually and certifiably uninhabitable, you might be on the hook for finding lodging for the tenant for the period of the repairs, so ask your attorney about that. Assuming that the tenant is not somehow responsible for the problem being repaired, then you will almost certainly have to keep the person for the duration of the lease.	The usual default rule is that a purchaser is bound to honor a lease on the same terms as the previous owner, and that purchase agreements are subject to existing valid leases. However, the Ontario Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 (S.o. 2006, chapter 17) section 49 (2) says: If a landlord who is an owner as defined in clause (a) or (b) of the definition of “owner” in subsection 1 (1) of the Condominium Act, 1998 owns a unit, as defined in subsection 1 (1) of that Act, that is a rental unit and has entered into an agreement of purchase and sale of the unit, the landlord may, on behalf of the purchaser, give the tenant of the unit a notice terminating the tenancy, if the purchaser in good faith requires possession of the unit for the purpose of residential occupation by, (a) the purchaser; (b) the purchaser’s spouse; (c) a child or parent of the purchaser or the purchaser’s spouse; or (d) a person who provides or will provide care services to the purchaser, the purchaser’s spouse, or a child or parent of the purchaser or the purchaser’s spouse, if the person receiving the care services resides or will reside in the building, related group of buildings, mobile home park or land lease community in which the rental unit is located. 2006, c. 17, s. 49 (2). I take that to mean that IF the purchaser intends to reside in the unit (or have one of the people in (2)(a)-(d) reside there), then and only then, you can be given notice to leave. Acceding to par (3) of the same section the notice must be at least 60 days, and must be to the end of a rental period (probably a month), and that 60 days may not start until after the landlord has actually signed a sales agreement for the unit. And the landlord can only do this if the new owner has specifically indicated a requirement for possession of the unit as a residence, not to rent to someone else. You may want to seek out a tenants assistance organization, or possibly a lawyer, since it sounds as if the landlord is going beyond what the law permits. EDIT: As to showing the unit, section 26(3) of the same act provides that: Entry to show rental unit to prospective tenants (3) A landlord may enter the rental unit without written notice to show the unit to prospective tenants if, (a) the landlord and tenant have agreed that the tenancy will be terminated or one of them has given notice of termination to the other; (b) the landlord enters the unit between the hours of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.; and (c) before entering, the landlord informs or makes a reasonable effort to inform the tenant of the intention to do so. 2006, c. 17, s. 26 (3). and section 27 (2) and 27 (3) further provide that: (2) A landlord or, with the written authorization of a landlord, a broker or salesperson registered under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, may enter a rental unit in accordance with written notice given to the tenant at least 24 hours before the time of entry to allow a potential purchaser to view the rental unit. 2006, c. 17, s. 27 (2). (3) The written notice under subsection (1) or (2) shall specify the reason for entry, the day of entry and a time of entry between the hours of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. 2006, c. 17, s. 27 (3). So it seems that the landlord may show the unit to prospective purchasers during reasonable hours. However another provision says that the landlord may not interfere with your "quiet enjoyment" of the premises, so the frequency of showing probably must be reasonable.	You could first look for a force majeure clause in the lease which says something about natural disasters and the like. If there is a clause which says e.g. "Landlord will not be held responsible for problems arising from ice storms", that doesn't help you, but maybe it specifies e.g. rent reduction of $2/day for lack of electricity. That doesn't mean he can ignore the law. However, in this situation, a particular reading of the law ("there must be an infallible supply of electricity") imposes an impossible requirement on the landlord, and the courts probably won't require a landlord to do the impossible. It is not clear that your situation violates either the letter or the spirit of the law. Take clause (d): your "heating facilities" presumably conformed to applicable law at the time of installation and have since been maintained, and they are adequate, but they don't work if the grid doesn't supply power (and that is not a matter under the landlord's control). In other words, he provided the "infrastructure", and the problem is on the power company's end. Likewise "electrical lighting with wiring and electrical equipment" -- an ordinary interpretation of that clause is "wires and fixtures", and doesn't include "flow of electrons", which is supplied by your local power company.	Since they have allready given you a form to fill that you have sent back with the original receipts, I will assume that the major preconditions have been fulfilled (mainly that they have asked you to come in writing and have not exclude reimbursement). This a case of civil law based on §670 BGB. Since they have not fullfilled their obligation, you must send them a reminder (Mahnung) in the form of a registered letter, requiring them to do so within a reasonable timeframe (like 10 working days after receipt of the letter). look for standard letters on this topic (Mahnungen) The letter should be descriptive in nature (i.e. a Judge, after reading a copy of the letter, will understand the whole situation). Nowadays such a letter should be sent through your local Amsgericht, so that they can certify that your copy of the letter was included in the original letter. If they don't react to this, then you must charge them. This is a basic description of the needed method. Look up the details of the process and/or for someone to assist you. Section 670 Reimbursement of expenses If the mandatary, for the purpose of performing the mandate, incurs expenses that he may consider to be necessary in the circumstances, then the mandator is obliged to make reimbursement. Sources §670 - German Civil Code (BGB) Wer trägt die Reisekosten für das Vorstellungsgespräch? - ingenieur.de	In Texas, if the lease states that the landlord can inter for some purpose, the landlord can enter for that purpose. I assume there is no statement in the lease. Then the landlord has no right to enter except in emergencies and for routine inspections or repair. This right, however, stems from the courts and not statutes, and you could theoretically sue the landlord to prevent such an inspection (you would need a good attorney, to overcome the presumption that reasonable routine inspections with notice are allowed).	No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement").	The beginning of the tenancy is defined in section 45(2) of the Housing Act 1988 as: the day on which the tenancy is entered into or, if it is later, the day on which, under the terms of any lease, agreement or other document, the tenant is entitled to possession under the tenancy. (This applies to the statutory instrument because it is made under section 21B of the 1988 Act, and definitions carry over from primary to secondary legislation in this way.) The definition probably matches what people would expect. Section 21B, and the 2015 Regulations, just say that the landlord has to give this information to their tenant. But it follows that if the tenancy has begun, then the landlord's obligation also begins. It binds from day 1. Therefore, the government is justified in saying in the booklet: The landlord, or the letting agent, should give the current version of this guide to the tenant when a new assured shorthold tenancy starts. Because of all the other paperwork involved, it's most common for the booklet to be given as part of the bundle of documents when the tenancy agreement is signed - so, along with the inventory and so on. This is typically not too distant in time from when the tenant is entitled to actually move in, and landlords will often only sign on the day itself even if the tenant has completed their part of the formalities earlier. Perhaps your doubt is about whether it is "OK" for the landlord to provide the booklet before the actual start date of the tenancy, as opposed to waiting until the tenancy is in effect. In the same way, we could imagine a prospective tenant wanting to see the energy performance certificate well before agreeing to sign anything. Does the landlord have to give them another copy on day 1 of the tenancy, even though it's the same as the copy they already have? In fact, there are specific different rules for those other items of information. The most recent gas safety certificate must normally be given "to any new tenant of premises ... before that tenant occupies those premises" (SI 1998/2451 reg.36(6)(b)) The EPC must be given to any prospective tenant at the earliest opportunity, and in any event must have been given to "the person who ultimately becomes the buyer or tenant" (SI 2012/3118 reg.6, and compare the definition of "prospective tenant" in regulation 3). The EICR must similarly be given to new and prospective tenants before they occupy the premises (SI 2022/312 reg.3(e)). So these are meant to be given before the tenancy begins. They are part of what the prospective tenant should know before deciding whether to sign the agreement. The government's model tenancy agreement has checklists for landlord and tenant in relation to these documents, plus the "How to rent" booklet. That is consistent with the idea that the tenant is meant to have this information on the day that the tenancy is to begin, whether that's because they're just being given it now, or because they've already seen it. Armed with all the knowledge, they can now proceed to signing the agreement. Indeed, the content of the "How to rent" booklet makes it less useful if it's provided after the agreement has started. A lot of the material is about searching for a property, making sure that you are prepared to sign, and avoiding bad behaviour by potential landlords. Even though it would meet the letter of the law to only get this information after signing (but still on the day), it also meets letter and spirit to get it on the day, before signing. Or if you had it even earlier, it would be a bold argument to say that the landlord hadn't given you the information just because they emailed it to you a week before the tenancy actually began - especially if you have checked the appropriate little box on the tenancy agreement to say you received it. Nonetheless, because the only practical consequence for landlords is their ability to serve a s.21 notice, it's also common for them to play it safe and send another copy of the booklet before sending the notice itself. They will also often send updated copies as they arise, even though the regulation doesn't require it; some insurers ask for this just to really cement the chance of making a proper s.21 notice. I'm not aware of judicial precedent on early delivery of the booklet, but we can get some guidance from a recent Court of Appeal decision on s.21A, Trecarrell House v Rouncefield [2020] EWCA Civ 760. This case examined the nature of breaches and remedies that prevent serving an eviction notice. The conclusion was that if the tenant received a gas safety certificate "before or with" the s.21 notice, then the landlord has fulfilled their obligation - they are not irreparably in breach just becuse they did not give that information at the beginning. What matters for the Housing Act is that the tenant received it by the time that it was needed for the s.21 process. Likewise, it would seem that if the tenant had the "How to rent" booklet from the landlord before the beginning of their tenancy, then the landlord is not in breach - because the tenant has the information the whole time even though the act of giving the booklet predated the tenancy itself.
Where in statute are the grounds of section 8 eviction notices spelled out? I'd like to find the original statutory source for all of the respective parameters of different section 8 eviction grounds, for assured shorthold tenancies in England & Wales. I read section 8 of the Housing Act 1988 on legislation.gov, but surprisingly to no avail.	Section 8 of the Housing Act 1988 provides that (2) The court shall not make an order for possession on any of the grounds in Schedule 2 to this Act unless that ground and particulars of it are specified in the notice under this section; but the grounds specified in such a notice may be altered or added to with the leave of the court. Section 7 of the same Act also provides that (1) The court shall not make an order for possession of a dwelling-house let on an assured tenancy except on one or more of the grounds set out in Schedule 2 to this Act; [...]	She has no legal right to your stuff, and every legal right to the apartment. The only way adjudicate such a conflict of rights is with a restraining order. A temporary order would expire in 3 weeks. Item 14 in the petition requests exclusive use, possession, and control of the property. However, that path of restraints is tailored to domestic violence, so item 27 has you describe the alleged abuse: Abuse means to intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to you; or to place you or another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or to harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, keep you under surveillance, impersonate (on the Internet, electronically or otherwise), batter, telephone, or contact you; or to disturb your peace; or to destroy your personal property. Note that the description refers to destroying your personal property, not pawing through it. It's really impossible to know if the judge will exercise his discretion to include "reasonable fear of destruction (or theft) of personal property", since the ex-roommate has no further interest in the apartment. There is an alternative path of a harassment restraining order, which does not require a defined domestic relationship (such as ex-roommate), where "harassment" is violence or threats of violence against you, or a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed you and caused you substantial emotional distress. A course of conduct is more than one act and that seems even less likely.	Yes, but not without notice KS Stat § 58-2557 (2015) 58-2557. Landlord's right to enter; limitations. (a) The landlord shall have the right to enter the dwelling unit at reasonable hours, after reasonable notice to the tenant, in order to ... exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, ...	Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Preliminary issues Firstly, as some of the comments have highlighted, this could be a scam. I have personally come across such a scam on two occassions. The scammer rents a property short term (e.g. 2-3 weeks) on AirBnB. They then pose as a landlord or letting agent and advertise the same property as a long term let. They collect a deposit and rent from any person who wants to be a tenant. They may even copy the keys and give each "tenant" a set. On move in day, you arrive at the property to find that you are not the only person trying to move boxes in. It has always struck me that landlords are generally very careful to vet their tenants by checking ID, proof of address, obtaining references, and running credit checks. Yet tenants rarely do any vetting at all of their landlords. A very basic and easy check you can do is to purchase the title register (not title plan) for the property from the Land Registry. This costs £3 and will give you the name of the person who owns the property. If the property is an apartment then you will generally want the leasehold title register (not the freehold). Once you have the name, you can then ask your landlord to provide proof that they are that person. Secondly, you've tagged the question united-kingdom, but the UK is actually comprised of multiple legal jurisdictions and housing law varies among them (particularly in Scotland). I'm answering this on the basis of england-and-wales. Third, questions asking for legal advice on real situations are off-topic here. My answer will just address the general issues and shouldn't be taken as advice for your situation. Contract and due dates There is nothing in contract law which prevents obligations from arising before the date that the contract is agreed. It is not unusual for parties to draft contracts which govern past behaviour. In that sense, it is perfectly acceptable to agree a contract on 12 August which requires rent to have been paid on 8 August (albeit it would be inadvisable to agree such a contract as you would immediately be in breach if you had not already paid). On the other hand, a contract which purports to have been agreed on a date which is earlier than when it was actually agreed, can amount to fraud. I would be wary of a subsequent email which purports to allow a later due date which contradicts the contract. Unless there is a clause in the contract allowing for the landlord to postpone due dates, the email is unenforceable and your real due date is still 8 August. The attempt to change the due date is effectively a variation of the contract, and a variation which is not permitted in the contract itself needs to be executed as a second contract. That means you need all the elements of a contract: offer/acceptance, intention to be bound, and consideration. The problem here is the latter. The landlord is providing consideration (a later due date) but you are offering nothing in return. Holding the room "The agent told me they cannot hold my room too long due to the high volume of interest in booking the rooms." "Once you have signed this agreement you will be liable for the full rent set out in the agreement unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company." These two positions are contradictory. If you agreed a tenancy (as implied by the second quote), then you have a contract which is legally binding on both parties. The first quote is incorrect - there is nothing to "hold" because the room is already yours. On the other hand, it may be that what you agreed was a holding deposit agreement (rather than a tenancy agreement) which is merely a commitment on the part of the tenant to forfeit a sum of money (which by law cannot exceed 1 week's rent) in the event that the tenant (as opposed to the landlord) decides not to proceed with the tenancy. The wording from the second quote (liability for full rent) implies that it is a tenancy agreement rather than a holding deposit agreement. Or, in the alternative, that it is an illegal holding deposit agreement which asks for more money to be forfeited than is lawful. You'll need to read your full contract to understand what it is. If it's a tenancy agreement, it will be obvious from the wording that you have actually rented the property. Obligation to pay rent "My question is do I have any legal responsibility to pay for the entire rent by the new due date (25 August) for APT1?" Unfortunately, if you have signed a tenancy agreement, then you are legally bound to fulfill your obligations under it (provided such obligations do not break the law). If it contains a clause stating that you must pay 51 weeks's rent, then that is what you must do. "If they told me they cannot hold my booking any longer, do I need them to confirm in writing that I'm released from the agreement?" As a general rule of contract law, nothing needs to be in writing unless (a) the law requires it to be in writing or (b) the contract requires it to be in writing. You agree non-written contracts all the time when you go shopping, use the bus, etc. The same applies to taking actions which are governed by a pre-existing contract e.g. giving your taxi driver verbal directions once you are en-route. The phrase "unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company" says nothing about the release needing to be in writing; therefore it can be verbal (provided that there isn't another clause somewhere else in the contract which requires it to be in writing). Be aware however that verbal statements can be difficult to prove.	As a general rule, legal language is interpreted loosely with respect to singular versus plural, or male versus female (in interpreting pronouns). A clause that uses the word "tenant" can thus be construed as referring to multiple tenants, and "tenants" can also refer to a single tenant. Likewise, "he, him" refers to a third person, regardless of gender. If the intent of an agreement is that only a single person shall reside in a place, then the wording of the contract would have to say that, and you can't derive that from using "tenant" rather than "tenant or tenants". I don't think the issue comes down to "treating y'all as one person", it comes down to whether the obligation is joint, a series of several obligations, or a joint and several obligation. You would look for expressions like "We and each of us agree...", vs. "Each of us agree...", or "We agree..." to sort that out: I assume that the language just says "Tenant agrees...", that is, there is nothing at all in the wording of the lease that resolves the matter. Tenant (whoever that is) has an obligation to Landlord to pay rent. It doesn't matter if Tenant is 1 person or 10: you have to pay the rent. If 5 out of 10 of those people mysteriously disappear, the other 5 still have to pay a now-doubled rent per person. Each person is fully responsible for all of the lease obligations, and if you are the only reliable person in a lease with 10 parties, you could get stuck with the entire obligation. If Tenant needs to go away for some reason, Tenant can normally negotiate with another person to assume their obligations, so Tenant would come up with an arrangement with a new person, and the new person would have an obligation to (old) Tenant – this is basically a private arrangement that doesn't involve the Landlord. However: it is pretty standard that landlords get a say in letting in new tenants, and you have a clause in your agreement that says that. There are two ways for the old tenant to "go away". One is to completely terminate the old agreement, and the landlord signs a new lease with the new person: the old tenant is completely free of any subsequent obligations, and if the new tenant fails to pay rent, the landlord has to go after the new tenant. The other way is by assigning his obligation (as described above): the agreement is between the old tenant and the new tenant (with the landlord's consent). The question now is, what is the meaning of the clause "the assignee shall sign a separate written agreement with Landlord and Tenant"? (Earlier, I missed the significance of "Landlord and Tenant"). The core question is whether the new arrangement is a novation, or is it an assignment? A novation requires agreement between all parties, and that is what seems to be implied here. California landlord law then tells you that this "makes the new tenant (rather than the original tenant) solely responsible to the landlord". In contrast, "Like a sublease, an assignment is a contract between the original tenant and the new tenant (not the landlord)". Since this involves the landlord, the conclusion is inescapable that this is not actually an assignment (despite the use of the word "assignee"). All of the parties to the agreement would have to agree to these new terms, if in fact there is an agreement that substitutes D for C in this agreement with the landlord (a notation). If C remains on the hook and this is just a personal arrangement between C and D (with Landlords consent) – which is not what the clause says – then you don't get a vote in the C-D arrangement.	There is nothing in that contract that says anything about 3 months notice period. The 3 months is the legal default for contracts that do not expire on their own, unlike yours, that has all properties of a limited time contract. I would personally see the detailed description of how you can end this contract as overriding any legal default. But as always, with this specific contract in the original language, you need to see a lawyer to know for sure. Your contract clearly states: you can leave your appartment whenever you want, even before the agreed upon time. If you leave between the 15th and the end of a month, you have to pay for that month in full. If you leave between the 1st and the 14th of the month, you have to pay the fair share of the rent for the days you where there. So for example, on a 30 day month if you lived there for 10 days, you still have to pay a third of the rent and the landlord will return the rest if you paid for the month in advance. If you live there for 16 days, you have to pay for the full month and nothing will be returned if you paid for the month in advance. Please note that you need to "hand over" the vacated rental object during normal business hours. So don't go in there on the evening of the 14th at 16:59. And don't try to "hand it over" when you haven't moved your stuff out yet. At the hand over, you give the keys to the landlord and that is it, it is the last thing you do. Very likely your landlord will want to have a look at the rental object while you are there, so they can make sure it is all in order, you did not damage it or did not leave any of your stuff. Generally speaking, there is nothing your landlord could do to you if you decide to leave early. They cannot make you leave even earlier or any other retaliatory shenanigans you may have heard of in other countries. In Germany, such contracts are not adversarial. You don't need to keep it a secret to the last second. If you know you want to leave on a certain date, inform your land lord, make an appointment for the "hand over" well in advance and save yourself (and them) all the stress from doing things last minute.	http://www.tenantslegalcenter.com/html/eviction_notices.html 3 DAY NOTICE TO CURE BREACH (sometimes called PERFORM COVENANT) OR QUIT is used to notify a tenant that he/she has 3 days to do or stop doing something as per the rental agreement or the law. The tenant can comply with the notice or vacate within the 3 days. If the tenant vacates within the 3 days, he/she is NOT relieved from the rent obligation under the lease or rental agreement. So, the notice must be based on a law and/or the lease agreement. Presumably, the law and/or lease provision must be cited in the notice. The City of San Diego has a GOOD CAUSE law (Right to Know Ordinance) protecting certain tenants in a residential tenancy of at least TWO years and that good cause must be written in the notice. You state that you've been there seven years, so this law applies. To count the days of a notice, you begin on the next day after service as the first day. Weekends and holidays are counted but the last day of a notice to act generally may not land on a weekend or holiday. If it does, and if applicable to that notice, the "last day" can carry over to the next business day. For example, if a 3 day notice to pay rent is served on a Thursday, we count Friday as the first day Sunday is the third day. Since the last day of this type of notice cannot be a Sunday, the "third day" is then Monday (giving the tenant four days instead of three) to pay the rent. If that Monday was a legal holiday, then Tuesday would then be the "third" day (giving the tenant five days instead of three) to pay the rent. http://www.rogerfranklin.org/Instructions_for_Landlords_2017.pdf B. SERVE THE THREE-DAY NOTICE 1. After the Three-Day Notice has been filled out and signed, you must serve it on the tenant. The Three-Day Notice may be served either: (a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, or (b) If the tenant is absent from is place of residence and from his usual place of business, by leaving a copy with some person over the age of eighteen (18) years at either place, AND mailing a copy of the Three-Day Notice addressed to the tenant, postage prepaid, first-class mail, to his place of residence; or (c) If such place of residence and business cannot be ascertained and a person over the age of eighteen cannot be found at the tenant’s residence, then by affixing a copy of the Three-Day Notice in a conspicuous place on the property, AND mailing a copy of the Three Day Notice to the tenant at his residence. So if the notice was just left at your apartment, and was not delivered personally or mailed, then the service is invalid.	In RI it appears that two days notice and a reasonable purpose is enough. There are states that list the reasons a landlord can access a unit; RI is not one of those states. http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/title34/34-18/34-18-26.HTM
What are the historical reasons that France adopted civil rather than common law? The story I heard is that revolutionaries thought that judges were corrupt and thus should be left to interpret the law, and thus should closely follow codified rules. Is that historically accurate?	Yes. France invented the civil law system and adopted it in connection with the French Revolution. Napoleon commissioned it in 1804. The summary of the story is here. As Wikipedia explains: Before the Napoleonic Code, France did not have a single set of laws; law consisted mainly of local customs, which had sometimes been officially compiled in "custumals" (coutumes), notably the Custom of Paris. There were also exemptions, privileges, and special charters granted by the kings or other feudal lords. During the Revolution, the last vestiges of feudalism were abolished. Specifically, as to civil law, the many different bodies of law used in different parts of France were to be replaced by a single legal code. The Constituent Assembly, on 5 October 1790, voted for a codification of the laws of France, the Constitution of 1791 promised one, and the National Assembly adopted a unanimous resolution on 4 September 1791, providing that “there shall be a code of civil laws common for the entire realm.” However, it was the National Convention in 1793 which established a special commission headed by Jean-Jacques Régis de Cambacérès to oversee the drafting process. His drafts of 1793 (for which he had been given a one-month deadline), 1794, and 1796 were all rejected by a National Convention and Directory more concerned with the turmoil resulting from the various wars and strife with other European powers. The first contained 719 articles and was very revolutionary, but was rejected for being too technical and criticized for not being radical or philosophical enough. The second, with only 297 articles, was rejected for being too brief and was criticized for being a mere manual of morals. The third, expanded to 1,104 articles, was presented under the Directory, a conservative regime, but never even came up for discussion. Another commission, established in 1799, presented that December a fourth scheme drafted in part by Jean-Ignace Jacqueminot (1754–1813). Jacqueminot's draft, the so-called loi Jacqueminot, dealt almost exclusively with persons and emphasized the need to reform the Revolutionary divorce laws, to strengthen parental authority and increase the testator's freedom to dispose of the free portion of his estate. It was, of course, rejected. Napoleonic reforms Napoleon set out to reform the French legal system in accordance with the ideas of the French Revolution, because the old feudal and royal laws seemed confusing and contradictory. After multiple rejected drafts by other commissions, a fresh start was made after Napoleon came to power in 1799. A commission of four eminent jurists was appointed in 1800, including Louis-Joseph Fauré and chaired by Cambacérès (now Second Consul), and sometimes by the First Consul, Napoleon himself. The Code was complete by 1801, after intensive scrutiny by the Council of State, but was not published until 21 March 1804. It was promulgated as the "Civil Code of the French" (Code civil des Français), but was renamed "the Napoleonic Code" (Code Napoléon) from 1807 to 1815, and once again after the Second French Empire. The process developed mainly out of the various customs, but was inspired by Justinian's sixth-century codification of Roman law, the Corpus Iuris Civilis and, within that, Justinian's Code (Codex). The Napoleonic Code, however, differed from Justinian's in important ways: it incorporated all kinds of earlier rules, not only legislation; it was not a collection of edited extracts, but a comprehensive rewrite; its structure was much more rational; it had no religious content, and it was written in the vernacular. The development of the Napoleonic Code was a fundamental change in the nature of the civil law system, making laws clearer and more accessible. It also superseded the former conflict between royal legislative power and, particularly in the final years before the Revolution, protests by judges representing views and privileges of the social classes to which they belonged. Such conflict led the Revolutionaries to take a negative view of judges making law. This is reflected in the Napoleonic Code provision prohibiting judges from deciding a case by way of introducing a general rule (Article 5), since the creation of general rules is an exercise of legislative and not of judicial power. In theory, there is thus no case law in France. However, the courts still had to fill in the gaps in the laws and regulations and, indeed, were prohibited from refusing to do so (Article 4). Moreover, both the code and legislation have required judicial interpretation. Thus a vast body of case law has come into existence. There is no rule of stare decisis	Why do you want to know? I think that the reason this question seems so obscure is because it does not involve sufficient context and specificity. It can't be answered until one knows the reason that it matters to know if a rule is new or not. In a particular context, these questions usually have obvious and clear answers. The murkiness arises only when one tries to overgeneralize. The life of law is not reason, it is experience. In general, it is almost never fruitful to try to apply legal principles of any kind to their logical conclusion without grounding that logic in fact specific and context specific precedents and applications. That approach to legal reasoning is a classic rookie mistake that gets a lot of young associate attorneys doing legal research into trouble by overstating the confidence that they should have in their conclusions when there is no case right on point addressing a situation. For example, if a federal government agency publishes something in the federal register that does not exactly restate an existing regulation, then it is a rule change, in the narrow sense that is changes an existing published narrowly defined Code of Federal Regulations rule. The process by which one does so derives from the Administrative Procedures Act and other authorizing legislation passed by Congress and also custom and case law interpreting these, so it isn't self-referential. A completely different context in which the question of whether there is a "new rule" of law is when a court according to the principles of stare decisis makes a ruling interpreting the constitution in a manner different from or expanding upon previously rulings interpreting the constitution in a similar circumstance. In this context, this matters because a "new rule" of constitutional law is generally given only prospective effect, while an interpretation of an existing rule of law that merely expands upon existing precedents in a foreseeable way has retroactive effect. In this situation, as in any case in which one tries to determine the best definition to apply under the law, the best approach is to look for a definition that produces just results given the consequences of a particular definition v. another particular definition. In that context, the determination of whether a rule is a "new rule" should depend upon foreseeability and the amount of reliance that people put on the old rule as opposed to the new rule being in force. There is no good reason to have transsubstantive legal meta-rules that apply to both of these situations. The former mechanistic rule makes sense in its context and makes the status quo clear and the events that constitute a change in the rule clear, while the latter consequence oriented definition makes sense in the completely different context where it is used. Surely, there are other contexts in which the question of what constitutes a "new rule" could have different consequences still. For example, to determine what constitutes a new v. old rule of U.S. Senate procedure, or to determine which statute is newer or older for purposes of determining which statute of two that conflict should be given effect when there was a cosmetic recodification of the section numbers of one of the titles but not the other without changing the substantive meaning of the recodified statute. The determination should generally be made on a case by case basis as there is no important purpose served by having a uniform metarule to answer these questions. If you are getting paradoxes trying to apply your legal theory, you are probably doing it wrong. For what it is worth, I have a dim opinion of Hart as someone who uses lots of words to say nothing of consequence or use, and I am not familiar with Biagoli or Suber. In general, legal theorists are not terribly influential in how the law is applied and interpreted in practice, although, of course, there are always exceptions.	He has this phrased like it's the ability to decide which laws you follow, and that it's an ability being withheld from the general public (although I seriously doubt that at least the former is the case). This is yet another false claim made by "freemen" or those who claim "common law defences". Notice of Understanding has no legal meaning unless the context demands that it evidences a meeting of the minds for the purposes of contract formation. It is a well-settled principle of common law that in order to be bound by a contract, there must be an agreement. Put simply, I cannot bind someone simply by sending them a Notice unless it is a right conferred on me by some earlier statute or legislation, or legally binding agreement. I tried searching for a solid definition, but all I could find was people/organization's Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights. The reason you've found nothing official about the terms Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights is that there is nothing official or legal about those terms. They are ordinary terms with ordinary meaning being bastardised by deluded people who believe they can fine the government and refuse to be bound by the law of the land. Of course, none of this holds up. What is the purpose of declaring your Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights? It might make you feel better, even though it has no legal, practical or other effect.	Any precedent can be overturned by any court at the same or higher level in the hierarchy So, for your example of a High Court precedent, it can be overturned at Supreme Court, Court of Appeal or High Court levels. However, the longer a precedent is in place, the less likely it is to be overturned because one of the objectives of the legal system is to provide certainty - a system that routinely overturns precedent doesn’t do that. Also, a precedent that is often cited with approval is more compelling because it’s no longer just one judges reading of the law, many other judges agree. Also, the judiciary tends to be conservative in overturning precedent. Most judges see it as their role to interpret law made by the legislature. If the people/legislature think their interpretation is wrong then the judiciary tends to feel that the legislature is the body who should change the law. That said, really old common law precedent that hasn’t been cited for a long while may be readily overturned if it comes up because social expectations may have changed.	There is no such law mandating this layout, nor is there any law permitting the defendant to demand a change to it. The arrangement seems most likely to have been driven by security concerns when courts began removing "the dock" and letting the defendant past the bar to sit with his attorneys. One court has also concluded that it was meant to assist the government "because it bears the burden of proof." It's of course impossible to prove a negative like this, but I'll note that Kenneth Lay's attorneys raised the issue in the Enron case, and they were unable to cite a single case saying that the defendant has the option to sit closer to the jury. If they couldn't find it, it probably doesn't exist. Meanwhile, the government was able to find several cases saying that the defendant does not have the right to demand a change, though it did not have any cases saying that the layout is mandatory. Instead, it described itself as "traditionally" having a right to the table. In that case, the judge ended up splitting the baby. Saying that there was "no law" to inform his decision, he sat the government next to the jury during its case, and it sat the defense next to the jury during its case. That was quite a bit more generous than the Seventh Circuit, which has rejected the jury-proximity argument as frivolous. So there are some cases addressing the issue, but I don't know of any case where a court has actually looked at the issue and given any real consideration to the due-process implications of the substantial empirical evidence suggesting that the party closest to the jury enjoys an advantage.	Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy).	Your question isn't quite as simple as it sounds; some civil cases are tried before juries, and though a judge can give directions to a jury to give a particular verdict, they are not always required to obey; there are eighteenth-century English cases on the point that established that principle for most related jurisdictions. But your last sentence does have a simple answer: No. A judge usually takes an oath on assuming office, to administer the law without fear or favour. That means he will investigate the relevant law (with the assistance of the parties' lawyers), and enforce what it says. "This law would be unfair to the customer, so I will ignore it" would be just as bad as "The mechanic threatened to hit me with a wrench, so I find for him". Of course, most jurisdictions do have overriding principles of fairness; it may be that this contract term was not shown to the customer, so is not enforceable, or it may be that it is contrary to public policy to be uncertain what repairs will cost. But unless there is an explicit legal reason, the judge will have to find for the mechanic. It would be neither improper nor unusual for the judgment to include the sentence "This result is clearly unfair to the customer, and I urge the legislature to look at closing the loophole; nevertheless, the law is clear, and I find the customer must pay the increased price."	It is complicated to answer why a law is what it is. Judge Frank Esterbrook writes (in the forward to Reading Law by Scalia and Garner): Every legislator has an intent, which usually cannot be discovered, since most say nothing before voting on most bills; and the legislature is a collective body that does not have a mind; it "intends" only that the text be adopted, and statutory texts usually are compromises that match no one's first preference. If some legislators say one thing and others something else, if some interest groups favor one outcome and others something different; how does the interpreter choose which path to follow? I will provide the historical background leading to the current fair use statute and case law, but take from it what you will as to why it is what it is. Fair use is a statutory defence provided by 17 USC 107. Its application is clearly demonstrated in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Fair use was an "exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act". (Campbell) Courts had been finding exceptions for "fair abridgements" and other precursors to fair use as far back as under the Statute of Anne of 1710. (Campbell, citing William Patry's "The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law".) This doctrine worked its way into US case law in the nineteenth century. In Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CCD Mass. 1841)1, Justice Story distilled the essence of law and methodology from the earlier cases: "look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." (Campbell) Folsom states: There must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work. This early incorporation of fair use focused on whether something new was being created, or whether the "chief value" of the original work was being taken. This primary focus on transformativeness has stuck with with fair use doctrine until today. Campbell said (internal citations removed): The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's words, whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation ("supplanting" the original), or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is "transformative". Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use. Campbell also includes the following statement of rationale for why Congress included section 107: Congress meant § 107 "to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way" and intended that courts continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 66 (1976) (hereinafter House Report); S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 62 (1975) (hereinafter Senate Report). There is no support for your separation of "parody, comment, and criticism " from "teaching, research, and news reporting", or that there are differing amounts of commercial use allowed for these types of work. The statute lists together "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research" as examples purposes. The statute requires that "whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes" be considered in all fair use cases. There is also very little if any First Amendment rationale expressed for the fair use doctrine. The intersection of the First Amendment and copyright law is more clearly found in the idea/expression dichotomy. 1. Folsom v. Marsh full opinion text
Is "swiss army knife" a protected trademark? I want to create the slogan for my library (in the programming, the library is distributable pre-made code for reuse) like "The Swiss army knife for type-safe TypeScript programmers"). But can I use the "Swiss army knife" so simply? Is it the trademark?	"Swiss Army Knife" is indeed a trademark. Indeed, it is a very special trademark, because after the last of the Geneva Conventions was adopted, the use of the Swiss insignia used in the Swiss Army Knife's trademarked logo was prohibited except for grandfathered trademarks such as the one you identify. But use of a trademark is infringing only when it is used in connection with the sale of a good or service to imply that the good or service sold is endorsed by or affiliated with the owner of the trademark. In the context you describe, the trademark is not being used in that fashion, and so it is not infringing.	What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation.	Band names usually are trademarks. For Example AC/DC is trademarked in the US for Auto parts (REG: 5849299) Music, Picks and Bags (REG: 86551440) and pretty much any other thing used as merchandize (REG:75982466). Oh, and they are a famous mark with their AC-thunderbolt-DC. Not every band does go out and pay trademarking fees and register their trademark, but in the united-states they are not obligated to! They use their name in the marketplace, they possibly have their own merchandize, so you infringe on their market. Other countries have different rules, for example germany has the "first registered" rule - whoever registers a mark first gets it exclusively, no matter who registers it.	No. A trademark is specific to an industry or type of products or services. And, while it is virtually impossible to get a new trade name with a three letter acronym because almost all of them are taken, three words that start with the same letters as a three letter acronym is not infringement on the acronym. You might very well be infringing if you used "I.B.M." to sell computer equipment. But, "Internal brilliance method", spelled out, would not infringe I.B.M., even in the computer equipment industry, and "I.B.M." in the food service industry, for example, would not be trademark infringement on the International Business Machines" trademark of "I.B.M." for good and services of the type that it offers.	Yes, such a site can be created without infringing copyright Facts about the game are facts.They are not protected by copyright. Criticism of, and comment about the game, is an activity protected by the US First Amendment. Making such comments is very likely to be fair use under US copyright law. In general the author of a work, such as a book or a game, or the maker of a product, has no right to grant or withhold permission to discuss or comment on the work. This is true not only under US law, but also in the law of most countries (perhaps of all countries). The name of the game might well be protected as a trademark. But that does not allow the trademark owner to prevent discussion of the game, clearly identified by the name of of the game. As long as nothing is being sold or rented, or advertised for sale or rental under that name, and there is no attempt to claim that the site is sponsored or approved by the trademark owner, and there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no trademark infringement. This is true under US law, and under the trademark laws of most other countries. A wiki is a specific technology. It can be used for community discussion, or for a company's internal documentation, or for any of many other purposes. Wikipedia has popularized this technology. Not all community discussion sites are wikis, however, nor are all wikis for community discussion. Just as not all novels are books printed on paper, and not all books are novels. In any case, setting up a wiki about a topic such as a game, a movie, or a novel does not require permission from the owner or creator of the game or of any trademarks associated with the game or work. The same would be true for a discussion forum about such a game or work that is not a wiki. If a wiki uses excessive quotes from game dialog, or uses the game's logo without permission, or reproduces other game assets, such as character art, maps, and the like without permission, that might be copyright infringement.	No, it is certainly not legally safe to sell a shirt with such an image printed on it. There are two compatible facts to consider: Wikipedia is correct that the image is not covered by copyright in the United States. The image is likely protected by trademark law, which Wikipedia also notes, directly under the public domain information: This work includes material that may be protected as a trademark in some jurisdictions. If you want to use it, you have to ensure that you have the legal right to do so and that you do not infringe any trademark rights. Copyright Copyright provides a monopoly on the reproduction of creative works, but copyright only applies to sufficiently creative works. In cases such as these, Wikipedia is expressing the opinion that the work in question is too simple or too utilitarian to meet the threshold of originality and/or creativity for copyright. For the U.S. specifically, consider 37 CFR 202.1 which enumerates some categories of work excluded from copyright protection: The following are examples of works not subject to copyright and applications for registration of such works cannot be entertained: (a) Words and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or contents; [...] (e) Typeface as typeface. Category (a) excludes the word "Marvel" or "Nirvana" from copyright protection, while category (e) excludes the creative choices that went into the styling of the text. (Note that fonts -- the software that creates/renders a typeface on a page -- are copyrightable in the U.S., but a font's "output" of typefaced text is not similarly protected.) Therefore, in the U.S., that "Marvel" image is likely not copyrightable, since it is just a single word with a particular stylized typeface (the use of which does not make it copyright-eligible either). This may be different from other jurisdictions, some which do recognize the use of the typeface as protectable element under copyright. Trademark Trademark law is a completely distinct area of law that applies to the use of logos, phrases, and other elements to identify a vendor in commerce. The words "Toyota" and "Camry" are not eligible for copyright protection, but the government affords the Toyota Motor Corporation a monopoly on the use of those words to identify the source and model of a car. If you built your own car and tried to attached the name "Toyota Camry" to it without their permission, you would be liable for trademark infringement. Similarly, logos that are too simple to qualify for copyright may still be covered by trademark law, if the company has registered them as trademarks or otherwise uses them distinctively in trade. This is likely the case here. If you put that rectangular Marvel logo on a shirt, you would be misrepresenting your product as being authorized by Marvel Entertainment and be liable for trademark infringement.	All the CC licenses permit anyone to use the licensed content, and to make copies of it for others. Some of them permit using it for commercial purposes, others (the ones including the -NC- clause) do not. Some CC licenses permit creating modified versions of the original work (derivative works), others (the ones including the -ND- clause) do not. I do not know of any standard license which allows users to create and distribute derivative works, but not to distribute the original. The license used by Project Gutenberg permits re-use and re-distribution, but if a fee is charged beyond recouping expenses requires the removal of the PG name and logo. One problem is that if derivative works are allowed, this would include works which are only trivial modifications to the original, which would have the effect of allowing distribution of the original. If the main concern is about commercial sales, possibly a CC-NC-SA license would effectively serve the purpose? That allows redistribution, including of derivative works, but forbids commercial reuse or distribution without separate permission, and requires all redistribution to be under the same license. Otherwise a new license for this situation might have to be created. It is often a good idea to have the assistance of a lawyer with IP expertise in creating a new license, or the wording chosen may have unexpected effects or include unintended contradictions. Or one could simply place a basic copyright notice along with text such as "Modified versions may be created only with permission from the author. Request permission at [email protected]". However, if the work proves popular, there might be a large volume of requests.	I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies.
Is it illegal to ride a drunk horse? Tedd owns a riding horse. One day, Tedd notices that his horse has somehow gotten itself drunk. Tedd has someplace where he needs to be, so he saddles up his drunken horse and rides to his destination. Has a crime been committed? Answers are welcome from any jurisdiction where alcohol is legal, but I'm especially interested in how the law stands in minnesota. (Google is unhelpful here, as searches for "is it illegal to ride a drunk horse" or similar make it think I'm trying to ask it whether riding a horse is illegal if the rider is drunk, when what I'm actually interested in is the situation if the horse is drunk.)	germany In Germany, the described situation could lead to a fine up to € 2000. As the rider of a horse, you are subject to the existing traffic rules and regulations for all vehicle traffic (§28(2) StVO). As the 'driver' of the vehicle, it is your responsibility to ensure that the vehicle is safe to drive (§23(1) StVO). The administrative offense for the rider of a horse is defined in §49(2) StVO and the possible fine for this offense in §24(3)(5) StVG. Straßenverkehrs-Ordnung (StVO) 2013 Road Traffic Regulations no English version of law text § 23 - Sonstige Pflichten von Fahrzeugführenden (1)... Wer ein Fahrzeug führt, hat zudem dafür zu sorgen, dass das Fahrzeug, der Zug, das Gespann sowie die Ladung und die Besetzung vorschriftsmäßig sind und dass die Verkehrssicherheit des Fahrzeugs durch die Ladung oder die Besetzung nicht leidet. ... § 23 - Other obligations of vehicle drivers (1)... Anyone who drives a vehicle must also ensure that the vehicle, the train, the combination, the load and the occupants are in accordance with the regulations and that the road safety of the vehicle is not impaired by the load or the occupants. ... § 28 - Tiere (2) Wer reitet, Pferde oder Vieh führt oder Vieh treibt, unterliegt sinngemäß den für den gesamten Fahrverkehr einheitlich bestehenden Verkehrsregeln und Anordnungen. ... § 28 - Animals ... (2) Anyone who rides horses, leads horses or cattle or drives cattle is subject to the existing traffic rules and regulations for all vehicle traffic. ... § 49 - Ordnungswidrigkeiten (2) Ordnungswidrig im Sinne des § 24 Absatz 1 des Straßenverkehrsgesetzes handelt auch, wer vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig § 24(3)(5) StVG: Geldstrafe bis zu € 2000 ... 4. Als Reiter, Führer von Pferden, Treiber oder Führer von Vieh entgegen § 28 Absatz 2 einer für den gesamten Fahrverkehr einheitlich bestehenden Verkehrsregel oder Anordnung zuwiderhandelt, ... § 49 - Administrative offenses ... (2) Anyone who acts intentionally or negligently is also an administrative offense within the meaning of Section 24 (1) of the Road Traffic Act [§ 24(3)(5) StVG: Fine up to € 2000] ... 4. As a rider, handler of horses, drivers or handlers of cattle, contrary to § 28 paragraph 2, violates a traffic rule or order that applies uniformly to all traffic, ... What is a 'vehicle' (Fahrzeug)? Everything that is not definded in §24 StVO: (1) Schiebe- und Greifreifenrollstühle, Rodelschlitten, Kinderwagen, Roller, Kinderfahrräder, Inline-Skates, Rollschuhe und ähnliche nicht motorbetriebene Fortbewegungsmittel sind nicht Fahrzeuge im Sinne der Verordnung. Für den Verkehr mit diesen Fortbewegungsmitteln gelten die Vorschriften für den Fußgängerverkehr entsprechend. (2) Mit Krankenfahrstühlen oder mit anderen als in Absatz 1 genannten Rollstühlen darf dort, wo Fußgängerverkehr zulässig ist, gefahren werden, jedoch nur mit Schrittgeschwindigkeit. (1) sliding and push rim wheelchairs, toboggans, strollers, scooters, children's bikes, inline skates, roller skates and similar non-motorized means of transportation are not vehicles for the purposes of the regulation. For the marketing of these means of transport regulations for pedestrian traffic apply accordingly. (2) With wheelchairs or with other as mentioned in paragraph 1 wheelchairs may be driven where pedestrian traffic is allowed, but only at walking speed. What is a 'Motor vehicle' (Kraftfahrzeug)? §1 - Zulassung - Straßenverkehrsgesetz (StVG) ... (2) Als Kraftfahrzeuge im Sinne dieses Gesetzes gelten Landfahrzeuge, die durch Maschinenkraft bewegt werden, ohne an Bahngleise gebunden zu sein. (2) Motor vehicles within the meaning of this Act are land vehicles that are moved by machine power without being tied to railway tracks.	No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412	Is he committing a crime in Albania? It would help if you posted the statutes that regulate or prohibit betting, since the terms thereof would shed light on the legal definition (aka prima facie elements) of betting and/or the legislative intent behind those statutes. Absent that information, your description reflects that most certainly the Albanian is committing a crime. The Albanian's conduct matches --at least-- the ordinary meaning of betting: he is not disbursing (or promising to disburse) money merely for fun or leisure, but for the prospect of possibly profiting from an uncertain event of which he officially has no control. Doing it through a third party located in another country changes nothing in this regard. Am I committing a crime in Italy? The Italian might be considered an accessory of that conduct being classified as criminal in Albania. Thus, facilitating activity that is prohibited in Albania could turn out to be problematic even for the Italian. Furthermore, even if betting is legal in Italy, the Italian might be in trouble under the laws of Italy if taking money (without the requisite license) from someone else to make bets constitutes unauthorized business of gambling. The condition that the Italian would retain a portion of any profits makes the business (or for-profit) element quite evident.	Is receiving intimate stimulation while driving illegal? Under Michigan law, it seems illegal. What you describe is one particular case of a general family of scenarios where recklessness or negligence are elements of a driver-related offense. Thus, it would be inefficient and redundant to enact a statute to prohibit that specific hypothetical situation. MCL 257.626(2) sanctions the operation of a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, and as you mention It's pretty obvious to me why this is a dangerous practice MCL 257.626b sanctions the operation of a vehicle in a careless or negligent manner likely to endanger any person or property, but without wantonness or recklessness. A prosecutor might try to file charges also on the basis of MCL 750.335, which sanctions "open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior".	I think this relates to individual stores interpretation of California's "ABC Laws": § 25658. Sale to and consumption by person under 21 years of age; Use by peace officers to apprehend sellers of alcoholic beverages to minors (a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (c), every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away any alcoholic beverage to any person under 21 years of age is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Except as provided in Section 25667 or 25668, any person under 21 years of age who purchases any alcoholic beverage, or any person under 21 years of age who consumes any alcoholic beverage in any on-sale premises, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (c) Any person who violates subdivision (a) by purchasing any alcoholic beverage for, or furnishing, giving, or giving away any alcoholic beverage to, a person under 21 years of age, and the person under 21 years of age thereafter consumes the alcohol and thereby proximately causes great bodily injury or death to himself, herself, or any other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The last part is the part that scares business owners. Some interpret it as "if they furnish alcohol to you (a person over 21) and have reasonable suspicion that the purchase will be given to the minor, the person furnishing the alcohol is guilty of a misdemeanor". This is absolutely true in the case of bar owners/bartenders. If they sell somebody a drink, even if that person is over 21, and that drink is then given to a minor, they can be (probably not successfully) held responsible in some form for any injury that person sustains or commits as a result of alcohol consumption. Some stores take this much more seriously (because a violation can mean the loss/suspension of the liquor license) than others, and it is at the stores discretion to deny the sale based on any suspicion, whether based in reality or not.	According to German law (Jugendschutzgesetz), §9: Minors 14 years of age and older may drink undistilled alcoholic beverages, such as wine and beer, when accompanied by a Custodial Person, Minors 16 years of age and older may drink undistilled alcoholic beverages, such as wine and beer, without accompaniment, and Adults (18 and older) may drink distilled spirits without restriction as well. Note that the act of drinking itself is not illegal for a minor. It is only the offering or facilitating of alcohol that is illegal (and punishable).	CRS 18-3-402 states that (1) Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: (a) The actor causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will which is to say, sex must be consensual. The essence of a legal order for specific performance is that the party's "consent" is irrelevant. This is not limited to Colorado, and would hold in any jurisdiction where prostitution is legal. A court would not order specific performance in this case, neither in Colorado nor Nevada. Nor would the court order specific performance in case the contract allowed one party to beat the other to a pulp. The contract itself is illegal in Colorado, but not in Nevada (certain counties excluded). In that case, the other party is out $5 in Colorado. In Nevada, they would be entitled to a refund (amount to be determined, depending on the facts of the meat pie).	Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it.
My pediatrician would not see my child until I pay a bill that I don't owe Yesterday I took my child to the pediatrician's office as she was ill. We were told that we had an outstanding bill and unless we pay it, the pediatrician will not see my child. We were very confused about this and decided to pay it anyway to have my child seen by the doctor. Later we found out that the bill is about a procedure that my child has never received. Or in other words, the bill should not be ours in the first place and it was a mistake of the pediatrician's office. This experience makes me feel humiliated and discriminated. What can I do about this experience that my pediatrician would not see my child until I pay a bill that I don't owe?	A doctor can choose their patients A doctor has a professional duty to render aid in an emergency. However, apart from this and assuming the decision is not made for a prohibited or unlawfully discriminatory reason, they can refuse to see whoever they want. What you have here is poor customer relations, not illegally. Find a better doctor.	This is a very common situation, and -- assuming this is happening in the United States -- it is pretty clear that Attorney is behaving exactly as he should under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Mother is the "technical" client and the "real" client. Son is not a client in any sense; he is merely a person paying the bills. If Mother wants to involve Son, she can do that on her own, but Attorney is prohibited from disclosing his privileged communications with Mother and from substituting Son's preferences/judgments for those of his client. If Son does not like what the lawyer is doing, he can encourage Mother to direct Attorney to change course, or Son can inform Attorney that he will stop paying for Attorney's services.	The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.	Suppose the shop bills you $2000 and you have a $750 deductible. You pay them $750, your insurance company pays $1250. Now suppose instead that the shop purports to waive the deductible. In order to get the insurance company to pay $1250 they still have to bill $2000. Then they don't collect the $750 from you. Presumably they write it off as bad debt. It smells like insurance fraud to me, on two counts: first, the shop expects to receive $1250 for a service but they produce a bill of $2000 for the insurance company's benefit and then do not seek payment from the insured party for any balance purportedly due beyond $1250. Second, the insured party has a contract with the insurer undertaking to pay the first $750 of the claim but has conspired with the shop to avoid paying that amount through deception. Had the shop played by the rules, they would have billed $1250 and the insurer would have paid $500. The shop isn't waiving your deductible; it's getting it out of the insurance company by fraud, with your collusion. Another way of handling this is that the auto body shop submits an estimate for the cost necessary to restore the car to a certain degree but then restores the car to a lesser degree. If everyone is aware that this is happening then it might be acceptable, depending on the terms of the insurance policy.	I have already contacted a lawyer and paid all the money I had and they didn't help me resolve anything, the guy just talked to me for a little bit. He essentially just took my $600 and no action was made. He said the best thing to do would be to wait it out because the contracts were never fulfilled by them and they can't claim my inventions etc if I am an independent contractor. To me it just sounded like a bunch of BS and not a real solution to this. You paid $600 for expert advice which told you to do nothing. You think the advice is bullshit and intend to go full steam ahead against the advice given. I'd say it is very likely that the lawyer is a better expert than you, so you should follow his advice. You are in a hole, you were told to stop digging, and you intend to continue digging. Don't. There are times where doing nothing is the best advice. In this case, you intend to accuse someone of breach of contract. That has a good chance of landing you in court. A company cannot afford to ignore such a statement. You claim the contract is void and you want to cancel it - but you can't cancel a void contract. It's void. Listen to your lawyer.	Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word.	Your personal liability depends on your state law regarding the family car doctrine, so the answer there is "maybe" (Texas is not a state with that doctrine, so simple ownership of the car does not confer liability). You would be liable if your supervision of the child was negligent, which means approximately that you knew or should have known that she was a bad driver and would cause damage. Still, the insurance company is suppose to indemnify you (plural) against such loses, as long as they are legally required to do so. That would include many considerations, such as whether the driver was covered under the policy, whether the car was being used contrary to the terms of the policy (being used commercially), and so on. The insurance company is entitled to make a reasonable determination of whether they are responsible for the loss (and if so, to what extent). If they actually decline to cover the loss, you would need to sue them to make them comply with the terms of the policy (and your lawyer would give you a detailed explanation of why they are not liable, in case they aren't). The plaintiff works with his insurance company to recover his insured losses, and with his lawyer to recover any uninsured losses. His insurance company works with your insurance company, up to a point, and then the lawyers get involved. Your daughter does not work with his insurance company, and your insurance company probably has said something along the line "only talk to us". The insurance that a driver typically has may cover some of their own medical costs, but does not provide a payment for "pain and suffering": that is an uninsured loss. It is not generally required that drivers carry insurance to cover their own medical expenses – it is required that they insure against damages, in general, suffered by other parties (if the defendant is at fault). So there is probably nothing for the plaintiff to work out with his insurance company. In Texas, if the defendant is entirely at fault, defendant will be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 90% at fault, defendant will be liable for 90% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 49% at fault, defendant is not liable. Defendant can, in any event, also sue for damages, so if defendant is 49% at fault, defendant can recover 49% of her damages. The insurance companies might be able to talk it out and reach a clear resolution of the matter, but it could be more in their interest to throw the dice and work it out in court. One can always sue at the very start, and drop the suit if it becomes advantageous.	They have to pay you for all hours "worked". If you are an intern, it would come down to whether you are an unpaid intern and therefore agreed to that or if you are a paid employee. I noticed your post said you were an intern and then were asked to stay on, so I don't know if you stayed on as an intern or employee. Employees should be compensated for their time and effort, so if you are an employee you should get some compensation. As for how you claim it, you are going to have to talk to them. If it bothers you that you won't be paid for the training and they won't agree to pay you, your best bet is to find a different job. This article lists how to take them to a tribunal or talk to a union, if you do not want a different job and wish to pursue the matter: https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/work/rights-at-work/pay/problems-getting-paid/#ifnotgettinganywhere
Statutory right to return shoes bought online that don't fit Online shoe seller's policy is to allow returns within fourteen days of purchase at buyer's expense if the shoes have their tags on them and are not worn outdoors. I received mine tried them on and a friend said that the only way to really know is to try walking in them on the street so I took off the tags and then went out with them for about an hour's outing. I then found that they didn't fit and then went online and consulted the seller's return policy finding that I'd already violated it. Is the return policy statutorily valid and am I now stuck with keeping the small shoes?	Since you bought these online the Consumer Contract Regulations are going to be in effect here (if the price of the goods was over £42 anyway), (legislation) Where your cutting the tags off and wearing them outside for an hour comes into play is that would probably be considered "excessive handling" and they might be able to make a deduction from the amount of the refund. Your business can make a deduction from the value of the goods if you consider the customer has handled the goods excessively. You can’t deduct monies from the refund simply because the goods have been removed from the packaging or because the goods have been tried on or checked. In essence, distance selling purchasers are entitled to handle goods in the same way that they would in a normal retail store. That therefore includes touching the item or trying it on. Since no retail store is going to let you cut the tags from a pair of shoes and walk outside for an hour in them I'd say that test is probably met here. How much can they deduct? As the CCR puts it (emphasis mine): (9) If (in the case of a sales contract) the value of the goods is diminished by any amount as a result of handling of the goods by the consumer beyond what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods, the trader may recover that amount from the consumer, up to the contract price. Which is likely where the "saleable condition" aspect is coming from - if they aren't in a condition where the retailer can sell them on they've essentially lost their full value. If the retailer makes returned goods available for sale on the site at reduced prices (like the "Amazon warehouse" deals) then a deduction of the difference in sale price between that and full retail is more likely.	When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints.	There are only two arguments you can make: The match making website did something wrong. I don't see how you can make this argument unless you have some reason to suspect they actually did something wrong. Strict liability applies. I think this fails for two reasons. One is that no theory of strict liability that I know of would apply to this situation. The other is that this is precisely the kind of risk that a user of the site should be protecting themselves from because it is much easier to detect fraud when you have extensive contact with someone than when you just operate a matchmaking service. So absent some evidence they did something wrong, such as ignoring specific warning signs from this particular user, there is no way such a suit could succeed.	You've already found an answer to the question about theft in the linked answer, that since they do not take the goods, nor even intend to take them away permanently there can be no consideration for theft here. There may be a case of criminal damage though, reading up on CPS website brings up some interesting points, notably: Damage is not defined by the Act and what constitutes damage is a matter of fact and degree. The courts have construed the term liberally and included damage that is not permanent such as smearing mud on the walls of a police cell. The damage need not be visible or tangible if it affects the value or performance of the property. It could be argued that by rearranging merchandise in a shop, with clear intent to disrupt its operation you are affecting the performance of the store, and that just may fall under criminal damage. Especially when done regularly, or in an organized way; something that demonstrably affects the business. Though in practice I doubt that anyone, besides the people "hiding" the papers, will care. Shelves in most newspaper stores are inspected and restocked multiple times a day, and as a part of normal customers routine stuff gets moved around and later corrected by staff.	I would assume that the seller ('Transferor') still owned numbers 7 and 11 at the time of the sale. If so, this clause means that the owners of 7 and 11 (now and in the future) have a right of way on the path coloured blue on the plan. The land still belongs to number 9, but the owners cannot build on it so as to block the path. (As mckenzm comments, "on foot only" is an important qualification; the neighbours do not have a right to install utilities under the path, and the owner can put in obstacles that prevent bringing cycles down it).	Yes From clause 7 of the Ebay agreement: When you enter into a transaction you create a legally binding contract with another user, unless the item is listed in a category under the Non-binding bid policy. You have a contract, if you don't fulfil your obligations under it you can be sued. You can only terminate a contract a) if the contract provides for termination and the relevant circumstances have happened, or b) due to a breach of a condition (but not a warranty) of the contract by the other party or c) some very limited and highly technical circumstances at law. The fact that the other party is rude doesn't fit within b) or c) and, barring some very unusual contract terms, won't fit in a) either. Make good on your legally enforcable promise.	You need to look at the domain registrar's TOS to determine their polices for canceling a domain after the fact in the way they did, i.e. claiming the domain is "premium" and as such allowing them to cancel and raise the price and re-offer the domain. The registrar may, in fact, have such a policy in their TOS that you agreed to when you opened an account with them and registered a domain. "Clicking through" and accepting a TOS is a binding contract. Their policy may hinge on an "escrow" hold on the domain for a certain time until your payment clears, they do due diligence, or other reasons, and by agreeing to the TOS you allowed them to reserve the right to cancel or re-offer the registration. However, such a policy is at least (I think) ethically challenged and at most could be illegal - US and local laws in your your jurisdiction may come into play - in terms of ICANN's policies. You may have success opening a complaint with ICANN, the international organization that oversees domain registrars and works to resolve complaints such as cyber-squatting, issues with the way registrars operate, etc. See Registrant Rights and Responsibilities Under the 2009 Registrar Accreditation Agreement - ICANN. If the registrar doesn't have a clear policy on the form of cancellation and re-offer you have been subjected to, your next step is definitely looking at Dispute Resolution Options - ICANN. Keep all your documents and emails, and log all phone calls or chats with the registrar. Make screenshots of your Cloudflare account and Google's web cache. And, it might be helpful to do a Google search for that registrar and "domain cancellation" or more relevant keywords to see if anything similar has happened in the past and the outcomes; those stories may give you ideas for other options. You may also need to find a local lawyer to advise you on your next steps, or talk to a free legal aid clinic in your area.	In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.
Website URL & blog name - Trademark I have a plan to create a general blog related to technology and internet marketing and I have chosen the name "LearnIT" and while registering the domain name I found there is already a company called learn it and their domain is "learnit.com" Can I create a blog name with "learn it" and register a domain name "learnit.net"? Would the company make legal problems for my blog? We are not related to the same business and I am not cloning their name. I just got this name suddenly in my brain, and also it is a general term.	"LearnIT" and "Learn it" are both descriptive, and thus are generally weak trademarks. It is not unlikely that a challenge would result in cancellation of any trademark on either, or in allowing a similar trademark in an unrelated category of business. For the matter of that, you don't seem to have determined whether the other company is making any trademark claims. In some countries there is no trademark protection unless a mark is registered. In others, including the US, use without registration can create some protection for a mark. It will also be relevant where the other company is doing business, and where you plan to. Trademark protection is always specific to a particular country, and generally requires proof of use in commerce in each such country (or of a plan to start such use in the near future). Domain registration is a different thing, and is not necessarily tied to a trademark (although registering a domain that infringes an existing trademark will often be disallowed). It appears that "learnit.net" is listed as available. That does not mean that a dispute filed by the other company would not be successful. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) states in section 2 that: By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to maintain or renew a domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that (a) the statements that you made in your Registration Agreement are complete and accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the registration of the domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not registering the domain name for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not knowingly use the domain name in violation of any applicable laws or regulations. It is your responsibility to determine whether your domain name registration infringes or violates someone else's rights. If you register a domain name, and another person or firm complains that the name is "confusingly similar" to an existing name or to a valid trademark, you might be required to participate in an arbitration proceeding under the UDRP, or else forfeit the registration. Note that nothing happens if no one complains. Section 4(s) of the policy reads: You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts ... that (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. In the administrative proceeding, the complainant must prove that each of these three elements are present. "Bad faith" can be shown by evidence that you obtained the domain for purposes of selling or renting it, not for use; that you intended to prevent a valid trademark owner from obtaining the name, and have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; that your purpose was to disrupt the business of the other; that you intended to attract users who were looking for the other site. The page "What Are 'Look-Alike' Domain Names?" states: An essential element of any domain name dispute is whether the domain name bears some important resemblance to a relevant trademark. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) refers to this as the “identical or confusingly similar” test. In many cases, a disputed domain name actually contains the trademark, and in other cases it may contain a typographical variation of the trademark (such as by omitting a single letter; transposing two letters; or substituting one letter for another, often adjacent to it on a keyboard). Yet in other cases, a disputed domain name may simply look like the trademark at issue, even if the domain name doesn’t contain the trademark or fall into any of the popular cybersquatting tricks described above. I refer to these simply as “look-alike domain names.” You may wish to determine if the operator of the learnit.com site has in fact obtained a trademark on "learn it". Most national trademark systems provide a means to search the trademark registers. This will not be conclusive, but may give a reasonable idea. One option is to consult a lawyer skilled in trademark law. Another might be to reach out to the exposition firm and ask if they would have any objection to your proposed blog. If they don't object, the will be no problem. Another option is to choose a domain that is not as similar to that of the existing site. One technique that can help avoid an accusation of bad faith is to provide an notice where someone first opening the blog site will see it, something like: This is XY.net. You may have been looking for XX.com,which is about {short description} If co, click here. with a link to the other site. Such a notice might help establish that you were not using the domain to improperly attract traffic looking for the other site.	"Pastiche" is a literary, not a legal term, and as a professional coder, I would not use it to describe code that to some extent imitated other code. The legal question here is: is your code a derivative work of the code it is based on, and if it is, did you have permission to make that work. Copyright, in an Berne Convention country, which includes the EU, does not protect ideas and concepts, it protects expression. It protects the choices of words and symbols, and other forms of expression. If all you did was study example code, presented for educational purposes, and then write code that performs a similar function, using the same general techniques, then I don't think you have infringed copyright. That, after all, is why people post code to Stack Overflow and similar sites, to allow them to learn how to use specific coding techniques, including in commercial projects. I have used techniques posted to SO to do coding as part of my paid job. The usual test for copying under US law is "substantial similarity". This takes into account cases where there is essentially only one way to say or code something. I don't know the exact tests under the various laws of various EU countries, and they will not all be the same. But I suspect that on this point they are, well, substantially similar :). I can't advise on your specific situation. But if it is as described, I don't think you have a problem.	Both are to some extent correct, but as might be expected, the USPTO site is more accurate. Trademarks owned by virtue of use, rather than registration, are protected only in the market area in where actual use can be documented. Even state registration may be limited to a geographic market area in which use can be shown, and may not extend to the whole state unless use throughout the state, or at least in most major markets in the state, can be shown. As discussed in the news story "Burger King Is Banned From Opening Within 20 Miles Of This Original, Mom-And-Pop Burger King Sign" The owners of a small restaurant branded "Burger King" secured a state-level trademark on that name, but it only serves to exclude the well-known fast-food chain from a 20-mile circle. Remember, the prime purpose of a trademark is to identify the source of goods or services, and to prevent one supplier from benefiting by the reputation of another. In an area where the first supplier does not do business, there is considered to be no such risk of unfair competition. Also, nationwide protection is one of the benefits of federal registration. In addition, a mark is only protected for the same class of goods or services. Nationwide use of "Pear" as a mark for a brand of computer would not prevent use of the same word as a mark for a brand of automobile, say, or for a restaurant chain. Note also that trademarks are normally at most national in scope. A US Federal registration will offer no protection in Canada, or any other country.	Copyright is irrelevant, because names are not protected by copyright. Trademark is relevant: a name can be protected by a trademark. "Yoda" is a registered trademark owned by Lucasfilms, a subsidiary of Disney. There is a list of goods and services where the property right is asserted, so for example you could get sued for peddling art books under this name. It just depends on what your business does. For instance, a plumbing business isn't competing with Lucasfilms w.r.t. that class of goods and services.	You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part)	There's no "common law copyright" in the US. There's common law trademark, but copyrights and trademarks are different things. All copyright is based on federal copyright statutes, and an unregistered copyright is just called an unregistered copyright. What an unregistered copyright gives you is almost the same thing as a registered copyright: the exclusive right to exercise various rights (reproduction, distribution, public performance/display, etc.) Registration is required before you can actually file an infringement lawsuit, but it's OK if you only registered it after learning about the infringement. The main reason to register the work early is that you might be able to collect higher damages if it was registered before the infringement. If the work was unregistered when the infringement happened, you can only collect actual damages. If it was already registered, you can instead opt to collect statutory damages. Statutory damages don't require you to show actual loss; instead, the court awards between $750 and $30,000 per work based on what it considers fair. The lower limit can go down to $200 if the infringer had no reason to think they were infringing, and the upper limit can go up to $150,000 if the infringement was willful. You can also collect attorney's fees if it was already registered. In the comments, the question was raised of whether someone else might be able to register the copyright for your work before you and what would happen then. When I say "registration is required before filing a lawsuit," the requirement is that you submit the registration paperwork properly, pay the fee, and wait for the Copyright Office to act on the application. If they accept the registration, you're all set. Even if they refuse, though, you can still file an infringement claim -- you just have to also serve the head of the Copyright Office, who has the option of jumping into the case to argue about whether the work could legally be registered. You can also sue the Copyright Office to get judicial review of a denial under the Administrative Procedure Act (refusal still lets you file infringement lawsuits, but you can't get statutory damages or attorney's fees against an infringer unless the Copyright Office actually accepted the registration).	To answer part of your question, the takedown and restoration process of the DMCA is not required. It is a legal way a hosting site can stay in the clear for copyright infringement. Therefore, if the site didn't take down what you complained about, they're participating in copyright infringement (if that's what's happening). Since they did not take down the material (assuming your DMCA was in the right legal form), if you do sue over copyright infringement you can sue the site as well as whoever uploaded your stuff to the site. I don't think that linking to your stuff would itself be copyright infringement, so I'd suggest consulting a lawyer specializing in IP.	A basic rule of trademark law is that a trademark is protected only for use in the same industry, or in regard to the same general sort of thing. "Maxwell House" for example, is the name of a brand of Coffee, and no doubt a trademark. If A business used it as the name of a brand of mobile home, it would not infringe the mark of the coffee brand. "Java" as a term for coffee , has been slang for any and all coffee at least as far back as WWII. I doubt that it is a currently active trademark in any case. It is, however, the name of a currently active programming language. Calling a new computer technology "Java" would probably infringe that (although the makers of javascript, a quite different computer language, seem to have gotten away with it). But it is hard to see how a realty company would so infringe. Of course there might be details which would cause this name to be infringing in fact, that I have no way of knowing. You could play safe with Sumatra Realty instead. Evin a quickly dismissed suit for trademark infringement could cost a startup time and money that might be a fatal handicap.
Could you sue God? The premise of the movie "The man who sued God" is that a person who lost his boat in a lightning storm. His boat insurer then decided it was an act of God and did not cover it He heard the term "act of God" and decided to sue the Catholic church because apparently they act as agents for this God fellow? Would such a case be considered frivolous in the US or could it have some unlikely legs?	United States ex rel. Gerald Mayo v. Satan and His Staff 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D.Pa. 1971), was dismissed because the petitioner failed to provide directions on how to serve Satan, and because of doubt about the court's jurisdiction over Satan. According to the Wikipedia article on Chambers v God: The lawsuit was dismissed in October 2008 because a summons notifying God of the lawsuit could not be delivered to the defendant, who has no listed address. Similar problems would probably prevent any future lawsuit against God or Satan from proceeding to a trial. The suggested suit also misunderstands the technical nature of the term "act of God", at least in modern use.	This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.	Bob has to sue in a court of competent jurisdiction To enliven jurisdiction, there has to be some connection between the parties or the event and the jurisdiction. Since Bob, the manufacturer and (presumably) the harmful incident all took place in County X, of State Y or Country A then they are the only jurisdictions that might be competent. The courts of County Z, State M or Country B are all going to say "not my problem". For the USA, there are only State courts and Federal courts. States may have courts that are called county courts but they are enlivened by the state sovereign - counties and cites are self-governing administrative districts, not sovereign states. Federal courts have jurisdiction where the subject matter is about a Federal Statute, the Constitution or a treaty. This dispute would appear to be based on tort or contract law which is a state matter. Federal courts can have jurisdiction if the parties are in different states and the amount in dispute is more than $75,000. This would not appear to be the case. So, as a state matter, the plaintiff can bring the case to any competent court. The defendant can apply to have it moved to a more convenient court. Arguments will be heard and, at some cost, you'll probably end up where you should have started.	LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision.	We may soon have a more definitive answer. A Grand Junction, Colorado newspaper is suing a politician for calling it "fake news", and the resolution of that case and the hypothetical that you propose would turn on the same legal principle. It is highly unlikely that such a lawsuit would prevail, because "fake news" probably doesn't constitute libel per se, because the comment could be construed as hyperbole or as a statement of opinion (neither of which are actionable), and even potentially, because a "speech and debate clause" defense under the state constitution might apply (depending upon the context in which the statement was made by the politician). The context of the particular tweet cited generally defines specified organizations as "the FAKE NEWS media" rather than accusing them of any particular instance of making a false statement, so it is probably an opinion or hyperbole. But, if the statement were made knowing it was false or with reckless disregard as to truth or falsity, and if the term "fake news" in the context in which it was used could be legitimately construed the imply a statement of fact which is not true, it wouldn't be impossible for the lawsuit to succeed, and depending upon the context of the statement, it could have such an implication. A suit against Trump could also implicate Presidential immunity doctrines which are more robust than immunity doctrines for other public officials, particularly if the "fake news" comment could be construed as part of the official duties of the President (for which there is absolute immunity) as opposed to his unofficial duties. The immunity question is a closer one than the question on the merits of defamation law about which there is much more case law to flesh out what is and isn't covered.	In law, there is a distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law. If the law prohibits X, and you think you're doing Y, that's a mistake of fact. If the law prohibits X, and you know you're doing X, but you think the law prohibits Y, that's a mistake of law. Mistake of fact is generally a defense (although that principle is being eroded), but mistake of law is not. In your hypothetical, you clearly had the intent to sell coffee, so you had mens rea. Mens rea refers to the intent to perform the act that is illegal, not the intent to break the law. If you intend to follow the law, but intentionally perform an act that is against the law, it is the latter that forms mens rea; mens rea refers to your intent regarding the act you are performing, not your intent regarding the law.	It isn't that uncommon to do something similar to this, which is called a "test case". One of the more familiar examples of this kind of litigation conduct is the case of Plessy v. Ferguson. There have been test cases, for example, that involved important questions of E.U. jurisdiction in civil law countries as well.	This is manslaughter of the vehicular variety Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:... (c) Vehicular— (1) ... driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. This is what they call a wobbler, and could be charged as a felony or a misdemeanor. In the latter case, the maximum penalty is a year in county jail and in the former it is six years in state prison. If the cause was ordinary negligence, it is just a misdemeanor. The details of gross negligence are set forth in the jury instruction CALCRIM 592 A person acts with gross negligence when: He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury; AND A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act. The "absent-mindedness" defense seems a bit far fetched, but still not everybody who drives inattentively is prosecuted for a felony, or even a misdemeanor. However, it is really hard to imagine not being acutely aware of the fact that people drive on the right side of the road here. Without a more-detailed story, I don't see a basis for deciding what level of negligence a prosecutor is likely to argue for, and what the prosecutor's agenda is: somewhere between no prosecution, and (most likely) misdemeanor manslaughter.
How is a derivative work defined wrt "low entropy" artwork CryptoPunks are a set of 10,000 Ethereum-based NFTs, each token corresponding to a unique 24 x 24 pixel cartoonish figure. They have been automatically generated from human generated components representing traits and types of characters. They are quite valuable, for example CryptoPunk 1886 sold for $1.06M in July last year. It had only 6 colours: The creators, Larva Labs are somewhat litigious and have sued CryptoPhunks, who made versions that have been “hand-flipped” (ie. look the other way), as well as being a different size and having a border. Suppose one was to take this idea a bit further, and generate many small images with vaguely face-like features. Because of the limited number of colours distinguishable to the human eye, and with only 576 pixels in a 24*24 image, many are going to be more similar to CryptoPunk 1886 than CryptoPhunks 1886. With a large enough set it is quite possible that an identical image could be produced (there are less than 10^10 combinations for a 24 x 24 8 bit RGB image). If Larva Labs claimed these similar images were derivative works, and it was demonstrable that they were generated independently, would it be legally justifiable to claiming that they were derivative works?	There is no case law as yet However, the most likely situation is that there is no copyright in the original works because they are computer-generated. There is certainly copyright in the code that created the art but the output of that code, the art itself, would probably not be subject to copyright. Copyright only exists in art created by humans. The US Ninth Circuit has held that animals cannot create copyrighted works. Subsequently, the US Copyright office has rejected applications for registration (a prerequisite to a suit in the US) of computer-generated art because it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.” While this position has not been tested in the courts, I don't think they are any more likely to grant copyright to a program than they were to a monkey. What's going on? The OP states that there is litigation: there isn't. What there is, is a DCMA takedown request from Larva Labs. If this is complied with that will be the end of the matter; if it isn't then there may be litigation. However, before Larva Labs could sue CryptoPunks in the US they would first need to get a writ of mandamus to force the USCO to register it. If they try and fail then there will be a legally binding court decision that Larva Labs don't own the copyright in any of their computer-generated art. Which kills their business model and, presumably, them. This would be a very high-risk move. They may choose to sue in a jurisdiction where registration is not a prerequisite, however, that court would still need to be satisfied that there was a copyright that could be breached. So that's just a different take on the same problem. I have ignored the issue of NFTs as these are legally problematic in their own right and irrelevant to the main question. However, the NFT and the artwork are not the same thing.	The words "proprietary format" are important. Are you sure the format is proprietary? If it is, then it's likely protected in which case they might have grounds to sue (but that does not mean they would definetly win). If the format is not proprietary, and so long as you don't share data which is proprietary then I believe you fine. I'm not a lawyer - but I cite GIF files as an example. They were still protected by the US and some other countries until at least the late 90s and there were various threats to open source linux companies who shared code that used the file format. I'm not aware of anything other than threats and never heard of any company being sued, let alone winning or losing. Another example that comes to mind is the RedHat ISO format. My understanding is RedHat could not stop anyone from sharing open source, but they could prevent folks from sharing the format they assembled and shared the open source. Again, I am not sure if it was ever tested in any court of law anywhere.	Here's where you went wrong legally: Suppose I legally obtain some digital image created by somebody else (e.g., by downloading from a public website). That, right there, is copyright infringement- unless the copyright owner has granted permission or the image is public domain you cannot copy it - this breaches "the right to make reproductions". By posting it on the web (assuming that it isn't itself an infringing copy) they have given implied permission for you to look at it in a web browser but not to copy it into a presentation even if that presentation is never presented. If it is presented then that makes the infringement worse - it adds breaches of "the right to communicate to the public" and "the right to use the work as a basis for an audiovisual work". How is this different from the computer wallpaper? It isn't. If you are using the one of the defaults that shipped with the OS then the license gives you permission. If you are using someone else's copyright without permission then it's a breach. There are defenses to copyright infringement but these are quite nationally variable - search this or other sites for "fair dealing" and "fair use".	It means that you state the fact and represent that it is true If you make a material false representation in the formation of a contract and the other party enters the contract in reliance on that, then that contract is void. This would appear to be the case here. When a contract is void neither party can enforce their rights, nor are they required to perform their obligations under that contract. The practical effect for a cryptocurrency broker is they have your money and your crypto coin and you can’t sue to get either back.	There is no simple answer. Whether stolen bitcoin can be recovered with a court order will depend on the facts, the jurisdiction, and the legal basis for the claim. There is a significant difference between tracing by a civil litigant, and asset forfeiture to the state. I’ll talk about tracing, because it’s based on common law principles that apply in many countries, rather than statutes which are unique to each jurisdiction. The first hurdle in establishing a civil claim against the recipient of stolen bitcoin is the need to show that cryptocurrency is property. It has been suggested that cryptocurrencies might not be property because they are merely information, or because they are not classifiable either as things in possession or things in action. However, the LawTech Delivery Panel published a legal statement on cryptoassets and smart contracts (November 2019) which analysed these arguments and concluded that “cryptoassets are to be treated in principle as property.” This analysis was adopted by the High Court of Justice in England for the purpose of making disclosure and freezing orders against Bitfinex in respect of an account holding ransomware proceeds: AA v Persons Unknown [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm). The next issue is the application of the nemo dat rule, which is the subject of your previous question. According to this honours thesis published by the University of Otago, until the courts recognise cryptocurrency as “money,” the nemo dat rule will have the effect that “the legal title to stolen cryptocurrency will likely always rest with the original owner” and “an innocent third party having received stolen cryptocurrency will always be liable to a claim from the original owner.” However, the LawTech Delivery Panel legal statement analysed the problem differently and concluded that an on-chain cryptocurrency transaction creates a new asset rather than transferring an existing asset: Although one can describe and conceptualise the process as a transfer … it is not really analogous to the delivery of a tangible object or the assignment of a legal right, where the same thing passes, unchanged, from one person to another. Instead, the transferor typically brings into existence a new cryptoasset, with a new pair of data parameters: a new or modified public parameter and a new private key. According to this analysis, the recovery of stolen bitcoin would involve applying the equitable principles used to trace assets wrongfully transferred into a mixed fund. Such a claim cannot be made against a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. On the other hand, stolen assets can be traced into the hands of a third party who knowingly receives them. Thus, whether the receiver of stolen bitcoin is liable to return them to the original owner is likely to turn more on the receiver’s state of mind than the percentage of stolen bitcoin received.	In the United States, the case law on framing as copyright infringement is fairly scarce and somewhat conflicting. Consider first the 2007 Ninth Circuit Appeals ruling in Perfect 10 vs. Amazon.com. Google included framed images on their site. Google did not have the right to display these image works, but the ruling says ultimately that they did not display the works (emphasis mine): Instead of communicating a copy of the image, Google provides HTML instructions that direct a user’s browser to a website publisher’s computer that stores the full-size photographic image. Providing these HTML instructions is not equivalent to showing a copy. First, the HTML instructions are lines of text, not a photographic image. Second, HTML instructions do not themselves cause infringing images to appear on the user’s computer screen. The HTML merely gives the address of the image to the user’s browser. The browser then interacts with the computer that stores the infringing image. It is this interaction that causes an infringing image to appear on the user’s computer screen. Perfect 10 argues that Google displays a copy of the fullsize images by framing the full-size images, which gives the impression that Google is showing the image within a single Google webpage. While in-line linking and framing may cause some computer users to believe they are viewing a single Google webpage, the Copyright Act, unlike the Trademark Act, does not protect a copyright holder against acts that cause consumer confusion. Note that this second paragraph highlights that iframe linking may not be a copyright violation, but it may be illegal for other reasons, e.g., trademark violation, by confusing the origin of the framed content. This ruling appears to be in contradiction to the 1998 district court case Futuredontics Inc. v. Applied Anagramic Inc., which found that framing creates a derivative work. The most striking difference from the Perfect 10 case is in the following passage (emphasis mine): Defendants primarily rely on Louis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. [...]. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that a Game Genie which merely enhances audiovisual displays which originate in Nintendo game cartridges does not constitute a derivative work because... it does "not incorporate a portion of a copyrighted work in some concrete or permanent form." Id. at 968 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the Game Genie could not duplicate or recast a Nintendo game's output. Galoob did distinguish Mirage and noted that the Mirage decision would have been different had the plaintiff "distributed lenses that merely [*10] enabled users to view several art works simultaneously." Id. Nevertheless, Galoob... is distinguishable from the instant case. Galoob does not foreclose Plaintiff from establishing that AAI's web page, incorporates Futuredontic's web page in some "concrete or permanent form" or that AAI's framed link duplicates or recasts Plaintiff's web page. There appears to be a fundamental disagreement between these two cases over whether a webpage that includes a link actually "displays" the linked work. The Perfect 10 ruling viewed the page as HTML instructions that were only related to linked works insofar as those instructions could cause a user's browser to render framed content from a copyright holder different from the author of the HTML page. By contrast, the Futuredonics case considered the intended rendered output of a browser as a derivative work that includes the framed page in a "concrete or permanent form" and that "duplicates" the framed page. I'm not sure how to reconcile these two cases. Perfect 10 is more recent and from a higher court, but I'm insufficiently skilled in law to determine if and how that counts for anything. It's also possible that facts of the two cases are sufficiently different that the different rulings could be reconciled and both remain true simultaneously. Now that we've considered the case law, if you will indulge me in a moment of armchair speculation, let us consider an interesting hypothetical. Suppose I am the owner of apsillers.com. I host an HTML page on my site at http://apsillers.com/my_favorite_stories.html. My my_favorite_stories.html page frames a public domain resource at http://example.com/PD_Story.html. (I am not the owner of example.com.) Surely, we can agree that this is not copyright infringement. At a later time, the owner of example.com changes the text at http://example.com/PD_Story.htmlto include copyrighted content whose use by me would constitute infringement. My my_favorite_stories.html page remain totally unaltered. Does my_favorite_stories.html now violate copyright? The Perfect 10 ruling says no, because my_favorite_stories.html is only instructions. The Futuredontics ruling would appear to say yes, because it considers the final rendered output of the HTML, which now suddenly includes infringing content. It seems powerfully counterintuitive that the infringing status of my written work (my_favorite_stories.html) should change, dependent on the copyright status of a linked resource, when the content of my written work has remained totally unaltered. Perhaps you might argue that my case is different because I did not intend at the time I wrote my HTML page to infringe copyright. However, intent is irrelevant in making the initial yes/no determination of infringement (but may grant me a lesser punishment, as it would be innocent infringement.)	The text and content (including all diagrams and illustrations) of the 1847 work (and of any other work published in 1847) are in the public domain in the US and everywhere in the world. You may freely use them verbatim or in any modified form that you wish. You are not even legally required to credit your source, although not to do so would be unethical, in my view. The version by Nicholas Rougeux that is linked to in the question has the licensing statement: Posters and website design are copyright Nicholas Rougeux. All other content and diagrams are under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license (CC BY-SA 4.0). This will not apply to any content copied from the 1847 version, of course. You may use any of the new content and diagrams so released, or make and use derivative works based on those elements, provided that you comply with the CC BY-SA 4.0 license. This has a number of provisions, but the major ones are that you must release your work under the same license, must acknowledge your source work, and must not impose any additional conditions or restrictions on users of your derived work. These are spelled out in sections 3.a and 3.b of the license (linked above). Please read the full terms if you intend to use this license. If this procedure will satisfy your purpose, you do not need any further permission from Nicholas Rougeux, nor to pay any fees or royalties to him. If you do not choose to place your work under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license, then you must not use the diagrams from Rougeux's version, nor modified versions directly based on them, nor an overall design clearly and directly based on the original design of that version, unless you secure permission from Rougeux (or the current copyright holder of Rougeux's version, whoever that may be). Given that Rougeux chose to release under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license, he may well be unwilling to grant permission under a different license, but that is his choice to make. Exception: in the US, you may use content from the Rougeux version to the limited extent permitted by fair use. This is not likely to cover the use of all or a large number of diagrams, particularly for a competing version of the same base work. Without specific information on how much content you would be using from that version, and how similar it would be to the original, no one can reliably determine if fair use would apply or not, but fair use is most likely to apply when a strictly limited amount of content is reused, and particularly when it is used for a different purpose than the original. Also, fair use is a strictly US legal content, and a work that might be held to be fair use by a US court might be considered an infringement by the courts of some other counties. Other countries have their own exceptions to copyright which are different in scope and terms from fair use. Many of them are significantly narrower. Note that a work posted to the internet is in effect published in all countries, and a copyright holder might choose to sue in any country s/he pleases. US courts might well enforce such a judgement even if it would not have been the judgement of a US court. Rogeux (or any other creator of a new edition) can have no copyright in elements already present in Byrne's 1847 work. Any similarity to Rogeux's work that is because of a similarity to Byrne's 1847 work is not copyright infringement. But any new elements introduced by Rogeux (or anyone else), including the manner of adding interactivity to a diagram, may well be protected by copyright (although the idea of having an interactive version of the diagram will not be). Any new or significantly modified text or diagrams introduced in a later version will be protected. As to any other versions of the 1847 "Byrne's Euclid" that may have been published, the publishers gain no copyright over the original 1847 work or any of its elements, including text, diagrams, or color scheme. Provided you do not use any original content newly introduced in such editions, you do not need to secure any permission from, or pay any fee to, the copyright holders of such editions. However, you may not use any such original content, or modified versions clearly based on such original content, without permission, unless an exception to copyright, such as fair use, applies. All that I said above about fair use would then apply. A copyright holder may grant or refuse permission to use a protected work or create a derivative work on any terms that s/he chooses, and charge any fee or royalty rate s/he thinks proper. Lack of response to a request for permission must be treated as if the response was "No".	If you change a single character, that's clearly a partial copy. Copyright protection has a limited extent, however. The protected work must be original and not obvious. For example, there are only so many ways to write a function that computes the average of two numbers, so the copyright owner of one body of code cannot claim infringement by the author of a second body of code simply because they both have a function float Average(float a, float b) { return (a + b) / 2; } A surefire way to avoid infringing copyright is to specify the function of the code and then have someone who has never seen the code write it from scratch. This is sometimes called clean-room engineering. Otherwise, there is no way to answer your question definitively. If you create a modified copy of the code (a "derived work" in copyright terminology), there is no strict formula available to evaluate the extent of the infringement. It comes down to a case-specific analysis of the facts by a judge. Depending on the jurisdiction, which you have not specified, there may be specific laws or judicial precedent that guide the judge, but the determination will still require a specific analysis of the facts. For example, if the alleged infringer raises these arguments, the judge would have to determine how obvious the code is, or whether the copyright claimant even owns the copyright to the code.
Can sole member LLC add 1% partnership to deduct large business expenses? A sole member LLC has business expenses that can only be partially deducted from the individual's taxes because they far exceed the company's income. The company changes to a partnership adding an individual but with only 1% interest. The new partner contributes cash to the company to cover the business expense deficit and then deducts that same amount as a business expense from their new company from the taxes on their own existing income. By diverting an amount that would have been paid to the IRS to their new company and then deducting that same amount, the overall transaction nets to zero but the company covers it's business expenses. Can partners only deduct business expenses proportional to their interest in the company? Even if they made an equivalent cash contribution to the company? Can someone only deduct business expenses from taxes on income from that business only or all of their income regardless of the source?	Contributing cash to a company is not tax deductible It’s either a capital contribution or a loan; either way it’s not an expense deductible to the individual (nor income to the company).	I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney.	A business owned by a debtor is not itself liable for the debts of its owners. But, a membership interest in an LLC is one of your assets and is normally not exempt from creditors, so legal process may be used to collect a money judgment obtained by a creditor in a suit against the membership interest owner from this asset. There are several ways of doing this that a creditor can utilize, each of which is discussed below. Charging Orders And Writs of Garnishment The presumptive way for a judgment creditor to collect a judgment from a debtor's LLC membership interest asset to do this is to either garnish any monies the LLC owes to you with a writ of garnishment (so that the LLC would pay the amounts due to the debtor to the creditor instead), or to impose a "charging order" on the LLC interest, which is like a writ of garnishment that remains in force until the full amount of the debt authorizing the charging order is satisfied. The downside of a writ of garnishment or charging order is that the people who control the LLC can often defer distributions to the members indefinitely, which deprives you of the funds that would otherwise have been distributed to you, but doesn't let the creditor have those funds either. Some LLCs require that certain distributions be made to owners and require that the LLC be liquidated under certain circumstances (e.g. the completion of a real estate development project). But, those LLCs are the exception rather than the rule. Normally, an LLC only makes distributions to its members when the people who control that LLC decide to do so by a majority vote of the managers or of the managing-members as the case may be. Writs of Execution Directed To Membership Interests There is a split in authority between states (with many states not having resolved the issue) over whether you can enforce a money judgment against the owner of a membership interest not just by collecting money due to the owner as a result of the membership interest and instead use a writ of execution to seize the membership interest and sell it in a sheriff's sale to whomever bids at the sale (much like someone might seize a parcel of real estate or a car to pay a debtor's debts to a judgment creditor). In most states, even if this is allowed, the buyer at the auction gets the right to distributions from the membership interest seized, but not a vote on how the business of the company is conducted, unless the other members agree to grant the new owner voting rights or the operating agreement of the LLC provides otherwise. All of the remedies so far presume that the asset to be collected out of consists of the ownership interest in the LLC (analogous to shares of stock) rather than the assets of the LLC itself. Reverse Piercing Seizing assets of the LLC itself, rather than merely the ownership interest in the LLC, is called "reverse piercing". Usually, reverse piercing is not allowed. But, there are some circumstances where reverse piercing is sometimes allowed. Almost all jurisdictions allow reverse piercing in some circumstances, but those circumstances vary considerably from state to state based upon both the language of the relevant LLC statute and the relevant case law. There are four main circumstances that justify reverse piercing. Single Member LLCs One is the case of a single member LLC where the creditor obtains ownership of 100% of the LLC. In these circumstances, courts have allowed creditors to dissolve the LLC and reach its assets, because neither the debtor nor any third party other than the creditor has any legitimate ownership interest in the property. Alter Ego Cases Another is the case where the assets of the LLC and the personal assets of the debtor are co-mingled or there is not clear documentation existing prior to the litigation establishing which underlying assets belong to the LLC and which belong to its owner. In these cases, reverse piercing is allowed because the existence of a company identity has been disregarded and there is no de facto distinction between company assets and personal assets. This justification for reverse piercing is sometimes called an "alter ego" theory. Fraudulent Transfers A third case where reverse piercing is allowed is where the contribution of the asset to the capital of the LLC was a "fraudulent transfer" from the individual debtor to the LLC (e.g. if the $1 million parcel of real estate was sold to the LLC for $100 at a time when the debtor was insolvent or rendered insolvent as a result of the transfer). Contributing an asset to the capital of an LLC in exchange for a membership interest with a capital account in the LLC's books set based upon the fair market value of the asset contributed to the LLC is usually not considered a fraudulent transfer, but could be in particular facts and circumstances where it has the intended effect of hindering creditors or concealing an asset. Equitable Reverse Piercing Based Upon Control Of The Entity A fourth case where reverse piercing is sometimes allowed is where the debtor does not own 100% of the LLC but has the ability to dissolve the LLC or force its assets to be distributed in kind to him, without the assent of the other LLC owners, because the debtor controls the LLC. Whether this is allowed or not is another issue upon which there is a split of authority and in many cases simply an absence of authority which would make such a case one of first impression in a state.	Maybe, but maybe not; or, It all depends As with most questions about private foundations, the answer to your question depends on the details about: a) your specific situation; and, b) how exactly the IRS has interpreted the relevant tax code. To figure out what options you have, and which will work best for you, you need to talk to a tax attorney who has worked with foundations. That said, it seems to me that the natural way to accomplish your goal is by treating your work as a “direct charitable activity” of the foundation. “Direct charitable activities” are, as the name suggests, charitable activities that the foundation does itself, rather than paying someone else to do. The money used to pay for “direct charitable activities” does count against the distribution requirement. You really need to talk to a knowledgeable lawyer. In the meantime, you might find this survey of the relevant law, or this survey of what foundations are actually doing, useful. Talk to an attorney about “direct charitable activities”!	Although crypto space may be little regulated, insurance is in most jurisdictions highly regulated. Any such arrangement would need to comply with current laws on insurance, until and unless modified laws to cover this sort of thing are passed, and then it would need to comply with those. Tax authorities generally allow one to declare "other business income" or "other investment income" without forming a legal entity. I cannot say how such income would be classified in any given jurisdiction. Whether the platform, or some legal entity associated with the platform, would need to be registered will depend on the current laws and regulations governing insurance, and on the way in which teh contracts are structured. A disclaimer cannot prevent one from being sued. The contracts would need to carefully and explicitly state who is liable for what. Programs cannot be held accountable for anything. Legal entities, including operators of programs, can be. If negligence in the creation or operation of a program causes a loss, the operator may well be liable. Programs cannot be sued for anything. Legal entities, including operators of programs, can be. It may well be essential to constitute the "platform" as a legal entity of some sort. Otherwise its operator will be liable for its actions. I cannot be sure. I once encountered a somewhat similar system in which insurance was provided by individuals exchanging contracts, so that in a sense each member insured all the others. There was a company that supervised and provided legal and administrative services to the group of individuals, and collected fees for this. That sounds a bit similar to the suggested platform, but I don't know exactly how that company was organized. The system was called "NJ CURE". I don't know if it is still in operation.	Tim Lymington got it right in the comment. If they don't get a wage, but expect a share of profit and/or loss, they are your partners and would be "members" of the LLC. Then you don't need workers comp or even to pay any salary at all. Of course, they will also be entitled to a share of the business, but from the description it sounds like they should be.	If your LLC made 300K before paying salaries, and paid 300K total in salaries, that seems quite reasonable. You might have a point if the order of events was: LLC pays 100K in salaries, LLC gets sued for 200K, LLC raises salaries by 200K. Note that the owners have to pay income tax on 300k earnings, plus whatever else employers and employees have to pay. And an LLC doesn't pay salaries to owners, it pays salaries to employees who be sheer coincidence are also owners. It's a different matter if the company pays dividends. A company must keep dividends low enough so that it can run its business, including paying damages for lawsuits that it knows about. So if the company planned all along to pay 300k in dividends, then is sued for 200k, they likely have to reduce the dividends.	Sure You run a restaurant employing relatives and cronies and you scrupulously pay them and their taxes. Say $500k. That is clean money. You take some money from running the restaurant but not enough to cover costs. Say $200k. However, you declare that your revenues were actually $800k with the difference being $600k of dirty money which “customers” paid in cash. You pay your taxes on your $300k profit and now have nice clean legitimate money. Now, what legitimate businesses typically do is underreport their cash income to minimise taxes but a laundering front overreports and pays too much tax to clean the money. For every $1 of dirty money going in you only get 70c out (or whatever depending on local taxes) but that money is clean.
Was Gay Marriage Legalized in Massachusetts in 2005? The organization MassResistance claims otherwise: MassResistance had an interesting day yesterday (4-12-05) at the Judiciary Committee hearing on the three bills submitted by Article 8 Alliance and their sponsor, Rep. Emile Goguen. Bill H652 is the "Bill of Address", calling for removal of the four justices of the Mass. Supreme Judicial Court (who ruled that John Adams really wanted men to be able to marry each other). Bill H653 is would define marriage as one man + one woman without allowing civil unions. (How odd... It appears the House Clerk has made an error, and listed it as a proposed Constitutional amendment! Since Article 8 is opposed to the concept of amending the Constitution in this way, it's hard to understand how this happened...) Bill H654 points out that "gay marriage" is still not legal! We got a copy of the testimony on 654 from the citizen behind this bill, and reprint it here: I ask the Committee to pay special attention to Bill H654, which I asked Rep. Goguen to file. This bill would essentially nullify the so-called "marriages" of homosexual couples which have taken place since May 17, 2004, when the Goodridge ruling went into effect. NOTE THAT LANGUAGE: "when the Court ruling went into effect"! I remind the Committee that the Legislature never did anything to comply with this illegitimate ruling (which supposedly legalized homosexual marriage) -- nor should they have. The Court had no authority to speak on marriage. Only the Legislature and Governor have authority in this area, according to our Massachusetts Constitution. The Legislature never did bring Massachusetts statutes into line with this ruling. "Gender-neutral" language to amend existing marriage statues never was passed. Therefore, all so-called "marriages" between homosexual couples which have taken place since May 17, 2004 are without statutory basis, and should be considered null and void. Is this correct? If not why?	Yes The only accurate thing in the linked article is: "I am not a Constitutional lawyer." That could be taken further into "I have no real idea how our legal and political systems work." One of the tasks of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is to interpret the laws of Massachusetts including the Massachusetts Constitution. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health the court decided that the Constitution provided for equal protection and due process and that if the state wished to discriminate against people on the basis of sex they needed a good reason. The reasons the state put forward were: providing a 'favorable setting for procreation'; ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the department defines as 'a two-parent family with one parent of each sex'; and preserving scarce State and private financial resources. On 1. the court said marriage is irrelevant for procreation and vice-versa. On 2. they said Massachusetts law on child welfare dealt with the "best interests of the child" and that it is not in those interests for the state to deprive the child of benefits because it doesn't like the sexual orientation of the parents. On 3. they said equal protection means equal protection. In a common law legal system like Massachusetts where courts have the power to strike down legislation then that takes effect as soon as the decision is published. The law ceases to exist without the legislature or the executive doing anything. Now, the people of Massachusetts are free to amend their constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage or remove equal protection rights if they want. However, at the time and subsequently, the majority don't want.	Any court from a municipal traffic court on up can declare a law unconstitutional and the U.S. Supreme Court is almost never the court that does so in the first instance. Also, while the jurisdiction stripping law that you suggest might be unconstitutional, it is not obviously unconstitutional. The relevant language is in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution (this has been modified by the 11th Amendment in ways that are not pertinent to the issue at hand): The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-- to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. The key language being the language in bold, who scope and limitations are the subject of hot debate in legal scholarship. For example, both military tribunal law for non-soldiers and the collateral review of death sentences implicate this provision. An issue related to U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction over military court-martial court composition will be heard this year in oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court. There is also debate over whether the jurisdiction of every single federal court can be removed from a matter within the judicial power of the United States. In that regard, keep in mind that the United States federal court system did not have direct appeals of criminal convictions at all until the 1890s, although you could challenge, for example, the jurisdiction of a criminal court over your case with a writ of habeas corpus which is a collateral attack on a conviction in a separate civil lawsuit formally directed at your prison warden. That being said, as far as I know, a law is considered in effect until declared unconstitutional. It is illegal to break an unconstitutional law, until declared so. You are wrong. A law that is unconstitutional on its face is, in terms of legal theory, unconstitutional immediately upon enactment and a court simply acknowledges that fact. It is not illegal to break an unconstitutional law even if no court has yet declared it to be unconstitutional (in U.S. jurisprudence). A law that is unconstitutional as applied is unconstitutional in application at the moment it is applied unconstitutionally, and again, a court merely acknowledges that fact.	Questions about "why a law is ..." are political questions not legal questions and you may get better traction on politics. However, I will address the legal issues and offer some speculation on the politics. The states named in the preamble to the Constitution (an Act of British Parliament) as original states were New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Western Australia was not named at the time of the passing of the Act or Royal Assent because the people of that colony had not vet made their mind up. Legal Issues WA decided to join in a vote held on 31 December 1900 and Australia came into being on 1 January 1901. Therefore, even though not named as such, WA was an "original state". Since all 6 states in the Federation are "original states" the clauses have no practical effect at present. However, there have been a number of proposals to add new states, either by subdividing existing states or by granting statehood to the territories of Northern Territory and/or the Australian Capital Territory. If such were to come to pass, the clauses would have practical effect. In 1998, Norther Territorials rejected an offer of statehood that would have given them 3 senators as a state and 2 representatives based on population (currently they have 2 senators and 2 representatives). Clearly, they were not being given the same privileges as an "original state". In 2015 all Australian governments agreed in principle that the NT should become a state by 2018, however, as it is now 2017 and no action has been taken this seems unlikely. Political Issues Politics is complicated: just as much in the late 19th century as it is in the early 21st. Negotiations between the colonies were fraught and federation was by no means a certain outcome. New Zealand and Fiji dropped out early and each forged its own path to nationhood. However, by the late 1890s it was clear that the 5 eastern colonies would federate with or without Western Australia. It seems likely that this provision served multiple purposes including: putting pressure on WA to join at the outset - the deal they got as a "Johnny come lately" may not have been as good. protecting "white" Australia - the drafters of the Constitution were men of their times, that is to say: racist, misogynist bigots. Any non-original states were likely to be former British colonies in the Pacific or South-East Asia, this clause would allow the nation to reduce the influence these non-white states might have.	This depends on how far along you're waiting for court rulings to set in, and if you count laws of Congress passed under the 13th amendment's enforcement clause. There were quite a lot of things that got ruled as violations of the 13th and 14th amendments (mostly the 14th), but many were not ruled or legislated that way for decades. Some were even ruled to have an essentially opposite effect of what the current (overturning) precedents do. "Separate but equal" was challenged on 13th amendment grounds, but was upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), and wasn't overturned, on 14th amendment grounds, until 58 years later in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Your particular situation sounds like peonage, which was outlawed by Congress in 1867 via the enforcement clause. This law specifically banned "the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise." However, peonage cases continued to make their way into the courts for more than 40 years thereafter, such as Clyatt v. United States (1905)— which ruled that peonage was involuntary servitude— and Bailey v. Alabama (1911). These cases affirmed that the 13th amendment abolished not just chattel slavery but essentially all forms of involuntary or indentured servitude (except as punishment for a crime). Though exactly what qualifies as "involuntary servitude" is still something courts decide on a case-by-case basis; the draft doesn't, nor does mandatory community service to graduate high school.	"Law" is actually a very broad term, which encompasses statutes, rules, regulations, precedent and I'm sure some other things that I'm forgetting. The popular understanding of "law" is the statute, which involves Congress (at the federal level) or the legislature (and the state level). That is the kind of law that we say is "passed". At the federal level, some number of representatives or senators will introduce a bill into the House or Senate, and it is discussed in a relevant committee; if it is approved, it moves to debate by the whole House / Senate and if it passes it moves to the other house. Once it has passed both the House and Senate, it goes to the President where it may be signed, rejected, or ignored. If signed, it becomes "a law", if rejected (vetoed) it can become law anyhow if it gains a 2/3 majority vote in both houses. If the President ignores it ("pocket veto"), it becomes law in 10 days (Sunday is not a day), unless Congress is not in session. Oh, and, that's just the tip of the iceberg. At the state level, there is a similar process, with the further option of referenda and initiatives. In the former case, a particular law will have been passed by the legislature and then it is put to a popular vote for affirmation / overturning, and in the latter case a new law is proposed by the people (generally through a petitioning process) and then voted on by the populace. There is a fair amount of variation on how this works and what can be done, by state. A law can be repealed (withdrawn) by passing a law that repeals a given part of the existing law, and it can be re-written. The Supreme Court of the jurisdiction can also withdraw a (part of a) law if it is found to be unconstitutional. No foreign body can override US law, although if the US is bound by treaty (which necessarily involves another country) then we might have to do whatever that treaty says, because we approved the treaty. One limit on what we can be forced into by treaties is that a treaty cannot violate the constitution. The largest source of law in the US is actually not statutory, it is regulatory law, where a regulatory agency writes rules with the force of law (so really, it is law). In that case, there has to be a statutory basis, where at the federal level a law is passed empowering an agency to write rules, where the scope of the regulation is supposed to be related to the empowering statute in some manner. In that case, there is a vetting process, but basically no voting, just an announcement, some discussion, and eventually the rules are set. Analogous processes exist at the state level. We also have various county and city governmental bodies, where e.g. the city council can vote to create a law; or, they can empower an agency to write regulations. Yet another source of law is the Executive Order, where the president can decree that such and such will be the case (as long as it has something to do with what the executive branch does). These are somewhat limited in scope, but every president seems to like to test what that limit is. Governors get to do it too! And lastly, courts have an indirect power to make law, by ruling on how an existing law is to be interpreted (as well as ruling that a law or part of a law is unconstitutional).	This happened recently in Washington state, when the state Supreme Court ordered the state government to comply with a constitutional funding mandate (McCleary v. Washington, 2012). The state did not comply for 6 years and was fined ($100,000 per day) for 3 years. I don't recall that the state paid a penny, and the courts did not demand payment of fines for that period. Public opinion did not have any obvious effect, but you could take this to Politics SE to get a lot of opinions as to whether public opinion mattered. The federal government can't get involved, unless they (the federal government) first make a federal issue out of it, perhaps because of some law suit. Power of enforcement is essential non-existent, given a sufficiently non-cooperative state government. I should point out that the court's order was a bit vague, that is, it was not "release Smith from custody instantly", it required the government to act to the satisfaction of the court.	Current Place of Magna Carta in US law Magna Carta is not now a current statute in any part of the US. I don't think it ever was (not since the US became independent of the UK), but I am not sure of that. Its words influenced the drafters of the US Federal Constitution. In some cases it may thus be helpful in understanding the original intention of the framers, but probably The Federalist and the records of the debates of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention are far more persuasive and more helpful. The major decisions of the Marshall Court are also very relevant. The US Supreme Court can and does change its interpretation of laws passed by Congress and of the Constitution. The words of Magna Carta are not more binding than Supreme Court decisions. In fact they are not binding at all, on any court or official in the US in any way. They are part of our legal history, but they are mnot current law, no more than the Code of Justinian or the Laws of Hammurabi are. The detailed procedural rules of Magna Carta are certainly not in fore in the US in 2022, nor in the UK either. The Ninth Amendment, which protects unenumerated rights of the states and the People does not protect,such procedural details, At least it has never been held to do so, to the best of my knowledge. I don't even know of a case where such a contention was seriously argued. The question states that: The meaning of “Due Process of Law” of the Fifth Amendment is, primarily, chapter 28 of Magna Carta and everything that built on it by judicial decisions. There is a sense in which this is true, but a very weak one. The concept of “Due Process of Law” was to some extent spelled out in Magna Carta, and later court decisions and legal and political philosophers (such as Locke) built on it. But most of the specifics of what constitute "due process" at the time of Magna Carta have since been dropped, and most of the current requirements were added much later. The idea of a hearing before an impartial tribunal, where the accused can present evidence, goes back to MC. Other requirements of due process, such as a right to a lawyer, rights against self-incrimination, rights against double jeopardy, the right of an accused to testify under oath, the right of an accused to issue subpoenas to witnesses, the right to an impartial jury, The right to be free of search, seizure or arrest unless probable cause has been shown under oath, and many others were added long after MC, some not until the 20th century. Such one-time aspects of due process as the right to be tried by members of one's own social class, a vital aspect of MC, are long gone, and never really existed in the US. Two-Witness Rule There was an early debate in a Supreme Court case, a perjury case if I recall correctly, on the need for two witnesses for conviction, but later statues have altered that rule. I don't know of any such rule ever applying to arrests in the US. It surely does not apply now. Coke and Magna Carta Early in the 1600s Lord Justice Edward Coke used the text of Magna Carta (among other things) to argue that Equity courts should not be able to use injunctions to stop cases pending in common-law courts. To do this he gave to Magna Carta a semi-sacred status it did not have when it was originally issued. (Indeed J.C. Holt, in his classic study Magna Carta, arguses that the charter was a victory for King John, and a defeat for the Barons, because the Barons allowed themselves to be bought off by promises that John never intended to keep, and that were not, in fact, kept. He further argues that it was the re-issues over the period 50-100 years later that gave MC what contemporary force it had, but that it was Coke's invocation of it that gave it the modern reputation as a foundation of freedom. I agree.) Coke claimed things for Magna Carta it could not have meant at the time it was issued, as the equity courts did not exist as an institution at that time, and would not for several generations. Charles Rembar, in his excellent non-technical history of Anglo-american law, The Law of the Land: The Evolution of Our Legal System (ISBN: 978-1-5040-1566-0; 1980) wrote (pp. 57-8): Early in the 1600s, Lord Justice Coke declared that neither king nor Parliament could transgress fundamental principles of common law. In time the proposition was true enough for king (also, academic: he himself could make no law, fundamental or trivial), but it has never held for Parliament; no one in office followed Coke along this line, not even Coke himself. Removed from the bench, he entered the House of Commons, and fought the Stuarts there. In the last stage of his long career, Coke asserted the utter supremacy of Parliament, an assertion which by the century’s end had become the constitutional law of England. The equation of "Due Process of Law" with "Law of the land" was part of this argument on Coke's part; it was, in effect, a piece of spin, which not all later scholars have noticed. "Due process" was, at beat, a part of the "law of the land", and it was always subject to modification by Act of Parliament (earlier, by acts of King-in-Council). It is true tht the US Supreme court has taken "Due process" in a procedural sense, to imply in most cases the right to a hearing, before an impartial tribunal, including a right to present witnesses and evidence, and that several of these principles are mentioned in Magna Carta, and come down to us from MC through much legal history. Magna Carta in the Case of Murray's Lessee In the case of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856) The US Supreme Court looked back throigh legal history to consider what is and is not permitted by the US Fifth Amendment, and its "Due process" clause. This is the kind of extensive excursion into legal history that was more common in Court opinions from the fist half of the Nineteenth Century that it is now. (Rembar remarked, on p 170 of The Law of the Land, "the Supreme Court, ... is fond of legal history and often gets it wrong.) But it is important to note how that opinion from the Taney Court (not the previous Marshall Court) used Magna Carta. The court wrote: [59 U. S. 277] We must examine the Constitution itself to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. We apprehend there has been no period since the establishment of the English monarchy when there has not been, by the law of the land, a summary method for the recovery of debts due to the crown, and especially those due from receivers of the revenues. It is difficult, at this day, to trace with precision all the proceedings had for these purposes in the earliest ages of the common law. In short that court is interested in Magna Carta only as it has influenced US state and Federal statutes. It in no way states or implies that the exact procedure of Magna Carta must be that of the current US, or is assumed to be such in the absence of a statute changing that procedure. Rather it looks at how US States adopted procedures derived from MC as a guide to the meaning of the Due process clause. After discussing at 59 U. S. 278 what the procedure for retrieving money from tax officials who had allegedly retained it improperly under the statutes of the Tudors (already long after Magna Carta, although well before Coke) the Court wrote: [59 U. S. 278] This brief sketch of the modes of proceeding to ascertain and enforce payment of balances due from receivers of the revenue in England is sufficient to show that the methods of ascertaining the existence and amount of such debts and compelling their payment have varied widely from the usual course of the common law on other subjects, and that, as respects such debts due from such officers, "the law of the land" authorized the employment of auditors, and an inquisition without notice, and a species of execution bearing a very close resemblance to what is termed a warrant of distress in the act of 1820, now in question. It is certain that this diversity in "the law of the land" between public defaulters and ordinary debtors was understood in this country, and entered into the legislation of the colonies and provinces, and more especially of the States, after the declaration of independence and before the formation of the Constitution of the United States. ... [59 U. S. 279-280] Provisions not distinguishable from these in principle may be found in the acts of Connecticut (Revision of 1784, p. 198), of Pennsylvania, 1782 (2 Laws of Penn. 13); of South Carolina, 1788 (5 Stats. of S.C. 55); New York, 1788 (1 Jones & Varick's Laws, 34); see also 1 Henning's Stats. of Virginia, 319, 343; 12 ibid. 562; Laws of Vermont (1797, 1800), 340. Since the formation of the Constitution of the United States, other States have passed similar laws. This legislative construction of the Constitution, commencing so early in the government when the first occasion for this manner of proceeding arose, continued throughout its existence, and repeatedly acted on by the judiciary and the executive, is entitled to no inconsiderable weight upon the question whether the proceeding adopted by it was "due process of law." *Prigg v. Pennsylvania-, 16 Pet. 621; United States v. Nourse, 9 Pet. 8; Randolph's Case, 2 Brock. 447; Nourse's Case, 4 Cranch C.C.R. 151. Tested by the common and statute law of England prior to the emigration of our ancestors, and by the laws of many of the States at the time of the adoption of this amendment, the proceedings authorized by the act of 1820 cannot be denied to be due process of law when applied to the ascertainment and recovery of balances due to the government from a collector of customs It is to support this last conclusion on what is and is not Due Process under the Fifth Amendment that the Court examined history, including Magna Carta. All the rest of this discussion of history was Obiter Dictum not binding precedent. And of course, not Supreme Court precedent is binding on future Supreme Court rulings. The court can and does overturn its own decisions, and change its interpretations of the Constitution. Wooden v. United States and its citation of Murray's Lessee In Wooden v. United States (Mar. 7, 2022, No. 20-5279), Justice GORSUCH in his opinion concurring in the result, but dissenting from the majority opinion's reasoning, wrote, starting on page 6 of his separate opinion: Consider lenity’s relationship to due process. Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, neither the federal government nor the States may deprive individuals of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" Amdts. 5, 14. Generally, that guarantee requires governments seeking to take a person’s freedom or possessions to adhere to “those settled usages and modes of proceeding” found in the common law. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856); N. Chapman & M. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L. J. 1672, 1774–1775 (2012). And among those “settled usages” is the ancient rule that the law must afford ordinary people fair notice of its demands. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. ___, – (2018) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3– 5). Lenity works to enforce the fair notice requirement by ensuring that an individual’s liberty always prevails over ambiguous law. Early cases confirm the message. In United States v. Wiltberger, a sailor had killed an individual on a river in China. 5 Wheat. 76, 77 (1820). But the federal statute under which he was charged criminalized manslaughter only on the “‘high seas.’” Id., at 93 (quoting Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 12, 1 Stat. 115). Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that other parts of the law might have suggested Congress intended to capture the sailor’s conduct. 5 Wheat., at 105. But he insisted that “penal laws are to be construed strictly” because of “the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals”—and, more specifically, the right of every person to suffer only those punishments dictated by “the plain meaning of words.” ... United States v. Mann tells a similar story. 26 F. Cas. 1153 (No. 15,718) (CC NH 1812). ... As the framers understood, “subjecting . . . men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law . . . ha[s] been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instrumen[t] of tyranny.” The Federalist No. 84, pp. 511–512 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); see also McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931) Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law . . . fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand The first thing to note is that this is not a majority opinion, and so not binding law. Indeed another opinion in this case specifically responds to Justice Gorsuch's views, taking issue with them. The next thing to note is that while the opinion does cite Murray’s Lessee, it never so much as mentions Magna Carta, nor does it quote any of the mentions of Magna Carta in Murray’s Lessee. Justice Gorsuch cites Murray’s Lessee to support two principles. One is the "rule of lenity" whch says theist when there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, it shall be read so as to favor the accused. The other is the "rule of fair notice" which says that a person shall not be convicted of crime unless some law clearly makes the actions charged criminal. Justice Gorsuch derives both of these from the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. To establish this, he cites, not Magna Carta, nor cases from Tudor times, nor US cases from before the Constitution, but US Supreme Court cases written by Justices Marshall and Story (both members of the Marshall Court), and one of the numbers of The Federalist (often considered a good guide to the intentions of the framers). Nothing in this citation implies that the detailed procedures of Magna Carta are now in force, nor that they ever were in the US. It applies only a general rule of law, not a detailed procedure, and that on the basis of US Supreme Court precedent, not because Magna Carta says so. The Great Charter may have been one of the earliest statements of these rules, but it is the reconfirmation of them, in case after US case, that makes them part of US law today.	I did a lot of digging through case law and statutes, but I don't see a definition for "biological sex" anywhere in federal law, though after looking through those cases, it seems pretty clear that courts think of "biological sex" as a definition of "sex," and that they take it to mean the sex listed on your birth certificate. Even if we could find a straightforward statutory definition, it probably wouldn't do much to inform the interpretation of this memorandum, as it would only apply to the specific section of law in which the definition was included.
In Canada can employer force employees not to discuss wage? In Canada can an employer require its employees not to discuss wages (either internal or external of the company)? What if the employee signed a confidentiality agreement where they agreed not to discuss wages? I would really appreciate citation from authoritative sources.	In Canada can employer force employees not to discuss wage? Not in Ontario. That would violate Section 74(1) of the Employment Standards Act, 2000: No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall intimidate, dismiss or otherwise penalize an employee or threaten to do so, (a) because the employee, (v.2) discloses the employee’s rate of pay to another employee for the purpose of determining or assisting another person in determining whether an employer is complying with Part XII (Equal Pay for Equal Work) See also Section 74.12(1)(a)(v.2). What if the employee signed a confidentiality agreement where they agreed not to discuss wages? The agreement would be void in that regard. See Section 5 of the same Standards: [...] [N]o employer or agent of an employer and no employee or agent of an employee shall contract out of or waive an employment standard and any such contracting out or waiver is void. The allowed exceptions are any clauses that provide a greater benefit to an employee than the employment standard (see 5(2)).	While there is no statutory law in British Columbia that requires that employees give notice of resignation, employees can be contractually obligated to give notice and even absent a contractual requirement there is a common law obligation in Canada that employees give notice. There's no fixed two week notice requirement, the amount of notice required depends on the circumstances. It would be necessary for an employer to prove damages that resulted from an employee quitting without giving notice or sufficient notice. An example of this would be Consbec v Peter Walker where the defendant was determined to have failed to give reasonable notice of his resignation: [212] Peter was obliged to provide Consbec with notice of his resignation. He did not give notice. The Law [213] The purpose of notice is to provide time for the employer to make arrangements to have the work that the departing employee looked after by others, or to find another employee. However on appeal (2016 BCCA 114) the BC Court of Appeal determined that Consbec hadn't proven any damages had occurred as a result, so no damages were awarded: [82] Although Consbec validly incurred costs and expenses of $5,875 as a result of Peter’s failure to give one month’s notice, it also saved $6,083 by not having to pay Peter’s salary during that period (i.e., $73,000/12). Accordingly, it suffered no damages as a result of Peter’s failure to give notice. In many ways having a notice period specified in a contract is a much better option than ultimately leaving it up to a court decide. There seems to be very little precedent for this, especially for non-fiduciary employees. In Consbec the trial judge opted not to make a determination of what notice period was required in the case, something the appeal court determined was an error. The appeal court determined that a one month notice period was reasonable, but didn't explain how it came to this determination. On the other hand, lawsuits like these a very rare for low ranking employees with little or no authority. As in the Consbec case, it would be hard for an employer prove damages. If Consbec hadn't been seeking large damages on other claims it's unlikely it would've brought a lawsuit. Someone who tried to falsely claim to be sick in order to avoid having to work their remaining notice period would likely at minimum owe their employer the same damages as if they had failed to give notice. If the sick time is paid and/or includes benefits they'd have to pay back or compensate the the employer for these wages and benefits. In addition, because they're still employed, they still owe a duty of loyalty to their employers that former employees do not, and so could face additional damages for doing things like working for a competitor. Someone who started work at another job couldn't use this as an excuse to avoid working during the required notice period. The person would have meet their obligations to both employers and both employers would be entitled to damages for the employee failing to do so. Again, the employee could face additional damages than those caused by their failure to work.	Yes, it also applies. However, an employment implies they agree to having employment related data stored and processed (e.g., to be paid). When there are performance related bonuses in the contract, this will likely (but IANAL) imply they agree to performance data being collected and stored appropriately. Furthermore I would assume most of such data processing (such as knowing who is responsible for a certain change, who created a file, modified it etc.) falls into "legitimate interests" of the employer, as this information may be necessary for operations. I'd assume (still IANAL) that much of the consequence wrt. GDPR is the right to have your data erased. So a company should be prepared to remove such data when an employee leaves the company, e.g., by clearing the responsible person fields upon request. At least for data where there is no legal requirement to have such data provenance. But: consult your lawyer for a proper legal opinion!	Can an employer apply one-off pay cuts via forced contributions? No. This type of issues pertains to state law, and many (if not all) jurisdictions in the U.S. have statutes prohibiting forced deductions that are neither ordered by court, nor pursuant to bargaining agreements, nor as required or expressly permitted by law. See, for instance, MCL 408.477 and .478. The case of the CEO's book sounds in clear violation of MCL 408.477(2) since the user who asked on Workplace SE mentions that the employees did not consent to that deduction. Even if an employee consents to the deduction, it is important to discern between (1) his altruistic consent, and (2) his concession for the sake of continuation of employment. Unless the consent is altruistic, the clause(s) allowing for the deduction might be rendered null and enforceable by virtue of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 178(1) in relation to the aforementioned statutes. Any form of deductions as a permissible sanction (as fining when the employee gets late to work) would have to be provided in the agreement between employer and employee. Otherwise it is unlawful.	The page you link is a good summary. It describes the employer obligations under the Ontario Employment Standards Act. Eating periods are described at section 20: 20 (1) An employer shall give an employee an eating period of at least 30 minutes at intervals that will result in the employee working no more than five consecutive hours without an eating period. Exception (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the employer and the employee agree, whether or not in writing, that the employee is to be given two eating periods that together total at least 30 minutes in each consecutive five-hour period. This section has been applied several times by the Ontario Labour Relations Board and appears to have been given its plain meaning. There are two ways that the Act lets an employer provide those breaks: Provide full 30-minute eating period(s) so that the employee works no more than five consecutive hours without an eating period. By agreement, provide two eating periods that total 30 minutes, "in each consecutive five-hour period" If proceeding by option two, the 30 minutes of eating period have to occur "in each consecutive five-hour period." The Ontario Labour Relations Board has described these two options and has said that option two requires the breaks to be "within" each consecutive five-hour period. See Rusty's at Blue Inc. / M & S Accounting v Erica Solmes, 2022 CanLII 56373 (paragraph 125, emphasis in original): Section 20 requires an employer to give an employee an eating period of 30 minutes after no more than five consecutive hours of work, or (with the agreement of the employee) two eating periods totalling 30 minutes within each consecutive five-hour period. Whether an employee is entitled to a single 30-minute eating period or to two eating periods totalling 30 minutes, the eating periods must be uninterrupted. The other answer and the page you link also describes an "exceptional circumstances" exception, but that is describing section 19 of the Act. Those exceptional circumstances can only let an employer get around the requirements of sections 17 and 18. Those are not relevant to the eating-period requirements. An employer may require an employee to work more than the maximum number of hours permitted under section 17 or to work during a period that is required to be free from performing work under section 18 only as follows	Certain kinds of pay secrecy measures are illegal under the National Labor Relations Act, a 1935 law. It's not the strongest prohibition, however, because the consequences of violating it are rather weak (especially compared to other employment claims). Some government entities or contractors are under more stringent rules by executive order, and states may have their own laws. Here's a Department of Labor fact sheet. Here's a 2014 NPR story on the subject.	am I right in my understanding of "payment in lieu" in the above scenario? No. You are not being “paid in lieu” of anything; you are being paid your accrued entitlement. Payment in lieu refers to payment instead of some other obligation. In employment it usually refers to an employer paying an employee instead of requiring the employee to work out the notice period which of the daily rates at the top of the post should I request? Neither. The correct rate is the one your employer used - your annual rate divided by the number of days you get paid for. Annual leave continues to accrue while you are on annual leave (or any other paid leave). is there a legal basis for such a request? No.	No enforceable contract can contain illegal clauses and work Contracts can not remove some rights and never can bypass obligations. Talking to the police at times is a requirement by law, as is taking to the labor board. Responding to a subpoena is legally forced by the court. An NDA might limit the amount what you can say, and a contract might limit who you can sue, but can not ban you from suing at all. In germany, a contract that tries to curtail such requirements would be Sittenwidrig and make all clauses that try to limit the rights fully Void and nill ab initio - in fact, it can be used as evidence against the drafting party that they tried to do so. So to stay legal and keep the clause working in the limited fashion where it is not demanded, the clause cuts the contract to explicitly exclude such situations.
What if you cannot pay the damages in a civil law suit? This question is in response to the defamation case between Mr Johnny Depp and Miss Amber Heard. Mr Depp claims that the defamation damages amount to 50 million dollars. Now suppose that the jury awards damages in the full amount asked. What happens if Miss Heard cannot find 50 million dollars to pay Mr Depp? Or in general, what happens if the defendant does not have enough money to pay a civil judgement?	Short Answer If a judgment debtor is unable to pay the full amount of a judgment entered against the judgment debtor in a lawsuit, then the judgment creditor doesn't get paid until the judgment debtor is able to pay and the judgment creditor takes action to enforce the judgment at that time. To the extent the a judgment debt has an ability to pay as determined from assets and income which are not exemption from creditor's claims under the relevant state law, there are a variety of court supervised means by which a judgment creditor can involuntarily have that those assets and that income turned over to the judgment creditor. Many judgments are never paid in full. Long Answer Judgment Creditor's Rights, In General A money judgment entered in a lawsuit is a right of a judgment creditor represented by a court registry entry or piece of paper to use involuntary debt collection methods to obtain property (defined broadly) from a judgment debtor. Until the judgment is paid in full, the judgment creditor can continue to use these methods so long as there are assets not exempt from creditors, or income not exempt from creditors that the judgment debtor has available to them. Judgment creditors can't collect from someone who has no assets or income that is not exempt from creditors claims (a complicated list that varies from state to state and can be different as a general rule, in bankruptcy, in probate, and for special kinds of debts like child support debts). When a judgment debtor has no non-exempt assets or income worth that are cost effective to collect, the judgment debtor is called "judgment-proof" and the judgment creditor has no ability to collect further until the judgment debtor ceases to be judgment-proof. Despite the long list of options for judgment creditors set forth below, in practice, lots of judgments are paid voluntarily and lots of judgments expire before they are paid in full because the judgment debtor is judgment-proof or are discharged in bankruptcy. Formal means of involuntarily collection discussed below are the exception rather than the rule. This is, in part, because having unpaid judgments is horrible for your credit, in part, because collection activity is extremely disruptive to the judgment-debtor's life, and in part, because judgments accrue post-judgment interest which is often at a high interest rate so there is an incentive to pay it off sooner so that the judgment debtor owes less to the judgment creditor overall. Another factor is that most people get judgments against them because they owe debts that they don't have an ability to pay (e.g. due to a lost job) and the existence of a money judgment against them doesn't create an ability to pay. Voluntary compromises between judgment creditors and judgment debtors pursuant to agreed payment plans with judgment creditors not taking collection action way judgment debtors are current on payment plans are also very common, since they solve many hardships arising from formal collection for the judgment debtor and reduce collection costs for the judgment creditor. The relevant law of creditor's rights and debtor's remedies, with the exception of bankruptcy and a few nationally mandated exemptions from creditors is predominantly a matter of state law. For almost all practical purposes, the remedies available for failing to pay a federal court civil judgment are the same as those available for failing to pay a state or local court civil judgment. Typical Collection Methods Typically, a judgment creditor can: Impose judgment liens on real property owned by the judgment debtor (subject to a homestead exemption) and foreclosed on that lien to get the property in full or partial payment of the debt. It is also possible to impose a judgment lien and refrain from foreclosing and instead to wait until property is sold and collect from proceeds at a closing upon that sale of property subject to a judgment lien. Judgment liens have a very high priority in bankruptcy once they have been imposed on property and all formalities for doing so are completed. Garnish bank accounts, wages, and other amounts owed by third-parties to the judgment debtor. Set off money owed by the judgment creditor to the judgment debtor against money owed by the judgment debtor to the judgment creditor. Seize tangible personal property (e.g. cars, gold bars) that are not exempt from the claims of creditors from a third-party, and also some intangible property (e.g. shares of stock in a corporation). Compel the judgment debtor to disclose the judgment debtor's assets and income sources under oath to the judgment creditor. Imposing a "charging order" on a pass through entity interest like an LLC. Sue people to whom the judgment debtor transferred property without substantially equivalent value within the applicable time period to "claw back" those assets that were given away or sold in bargain sales within the applicable statute of limitations. Assets subject to liens or mortgages can be placed in receiverships pending their seizure in foreclosure sale. In unusual circumstances, a court can order that specific property be transferred or delivered by the judgment debtor to the judgment creditor in exchange for a specified credit against the judgment. Additional remedies are available to child support creditors (and in rare cases certain other creditors). For example, denying child support debtors driver's licenses, professional licenses, seizing tax refunds, and throwing the judgment debtor in jail for willfully failing to pay child support when there is an actual ability to pay the child support debt. But, no debtor can be incarcerated merely for inability to pay, if this is established. Collect from guarantors or sureties of the debt including insurance companies in the case of insured claims, and bonding companies in the case of bonded debtors for debts covered by a bond. Similarly, private sector employers are typically liable for all judgments entered in the course of lawsuits naming them against their employees for tortious conduct (e.g. accidents) in the course of their employment and can be a source of collection for a debt. In certain circumstances, usually due to a voluntary mortgage-type agreement but also for certain kinds of debts related to property, a judgment debtor has a lien on real or personal property before the lawsuit is filed that can be enforced as a "secured debt" by seizing the collateral, often, even without finishing a lawsuit. But, ordinary lawsuit judgments usually don't have these rights. Duration Of A Judgment Typically judgments confer these debt collection rights for a fixed period of time, often six years in a court of limited jurisdiction (e.g. small claims court) and often twenty years in a court of general jurisdiction (which typically also has criminal jurisdiction over felonies). Often, these deadlines for collection can be extended and renewed if payment is not made in full during that time period if the judgment creditor takes affirmative legal action to do so in the right time period near the expiration of the judgment. Often a judgment debtor who is judgment proof when the judgment is entered may somehow gain assets (e.g. winning the lottery or receiving an inheritance) many years later at which point the judgment creditor can use the judgment to collect from the judgment debtor. Geographic Scope Of Collection Rights Initially, a judgment applies only in the state where it is entered, but it can easily be transferred to another state in most cases, with a basically administrative effort. The "full faith and credit clause" of the U.S. Constitution makes it easy to transfer a money judgment from one U.S. state to another U.S. state. But, the process is trickier in a foreign country. Many U.S. tort judgments (including judgments for defamation) are not automatically recognized in most foreign countries and may have to be reproven to collect on a claim in a foreign country (at least in part and often with fewer damages) from assets only subject to the foreign country's jurisdiction. If a U.S. person diverts or transfers assets to a country where a U.S. judgment cannot be enforced, however, with an intent to harm that creditor or creditors in general, that U.S. person can often be held in contempt of court and incarcerated until those assets are voluntarily repatriated. Voluntarily Repayment A judgment debtor can voluntarily pay amounts owed on a judgment and often does so in order to reduce the amount of post-judgment interest that accrues on the debt. The judgment debtor and judgment creditor can agree to payment plans or other resolutions in lieu of using the formal rights set forth above. "Voluntary" in this sense, however, is a somewhat loaded term. In practice, the terms and amounts of "voluntary" payments of judgment debts are negotiated "in the shadow" of the judgment creditor and judgment debtor's formal legal collection rights and defenses, with the parties sharing in some kind of windfall arising from the fact that collection costs are reduced when there is a voluntary repayment rather than formal legal action. Creditors Rights Related To Gifts And Third-Party Trusts Judgment creditors generally can't collect out of benefits provided in kind for the benefit of a judgment debtor gratuitously by a third-party with no wealth or income traceable to the judgment debtor who has no duty to pay a third-party judgment. For example, a judgment creditor can't collect from a house owned by a wife prior to marriage and titled in wife's name and not derived from husband's assets, in a non-community property state, where a husband lives rent-free and with food and health care provided free of cost, with his wife, if the judgment debt is not for household necessities). Similarly, assets in a discretionary spendthrift trust set up by the parents of a non-disabled adult judgment debtor to which the judgment debtor did not directly or indirectly contribution, which makes distributions to the judgment debtor only by making purchase for the benefit of the judgment debtor that don't give rise to non-exempt property of the judgment debtor can't be reached by a judgment creditor. Fighting Money Judgments Judgment debtors can appeal a money judgment, or seek to have it set aside, for narrow legal reasons, most of which have short deadlines. Once there are no appeals left and the most common post-judgment motions have been exhausted, the judgment is final and there are far fewer ways to set it aside (usually, discharge in bankruptcy, expiration of the judgment for being too old, and the argument that the court didn't have jurisdiction to enter the judgment in the first place are the main ways to set aside a final judgment where the main deadlines have already expired. The relevant deadlines usually run from the date that the money judgment is entered even if the debtor was unaware that the money judgment was entered). A judgment debtor, pending appeal, can post a bond for an amount greater than the amount of the judgment (125% plus anticipated appellate court costs in Colorado) to prevent the judgment creditor from collecting by these means pending appeal, from which the judgment is payable if the appeal is unsuccessful in whole or in part. A bankruptcy also temporarily suspends collection efforts without court approval in order to allow for an ordinary liquidation and distribution of assets and/or reorganization of a debtor's financial affairs. A "debt collector" as that is defined under state and federal law respectively, has various legal rules that the debt collector must follow when collecting debts that result in penalties (although rarely the loss of any ability to enforce a judgment debt) if not complied with, which can be enforced by debtors, in class action lawsuits, or by the relevant government officials (often the U.S. Justice Department and state attorneys-general). Bankruptcy For Individuals A judgment debtor can file for bankruptcy, if this option is available, in which case the collection of the judgment is handled in the bankruptcy process. A Chapter 7, once assets available at the time of filing are distributed to creditors, discharges some, but not all, kinds of debts. Some kinds of debts (e.g. most intentional tortious conduct judgments including most defamation judgments) can't be discharged in bankruptcy if a timely objection to discharge of that debt is filed by the debtor in a bankruptcy case. More complicated kinds of bankruptcies are available for individuals under Chapters 11, 12 and 13, which usually involve payment plans and/or customized treatment of certain assets. In most but not all bankruptcies (even under Chapter 7), an individual debtor must enter into a payment plan to creditors in addition to giving up all non-exempt assets. Disposition Of A Judgment Creditor's Claims At Death One a judgment debtor dies, if there is a judgment outstanding, the judgment creditor can file a claim in the estate of the judgment debtor and that is paid to the extent that there are funds available and not exempt from creditor's claims in order of priority under the law. But, next of kin are not responsible for a judgment debtor's debts. Probate estates cannot file for bankruptcy, but a probate proceeding often has an impact on creditors similar to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy (although by no means identical). Entity Debtors The analysis is similar, but bankruptcy works differently and there are far fewer exemptions from creditors, in the case of a judgment owed by an entity that is a judgment debtor to a judgment creditor. A full treatment of entity insolvency proceedings is beyond the scope of a reasonable answer to this question. Entities filing Chapter 7 bankruptcies and availing themselves of non-bankruptcy insolvency proceedings don't have their debts discharged, but become shells with debts, but not assets since all of their assets get distributed to creditors. Entities that reorganize under Chapter 11 can arrange to pay creditors less than the full amount that they are owed subject to some basic ground rules which usually entitled creditors to at least as much over the duration of a Chapter 11 plan as the creditor would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy.	Can the subject actually sue me in England, or is it possible to sue only in the EU country I posted the article from, or in the US where the article is actually hosted? Yes. If the online encyclopedia is available in the UK, then you have libelled them in the UK and, indeed, in every country where it is available. They can choose to sue in and under the laws of any country where they were libelled. If the subject can and does sue in England, what happens exactly? This is laid out in the Civil Procedure Rules Am I correct in presuming that I will be notified of this by mail and asked to enter a defence? You will definitely need to be served with the Particulars of Claim, however, this may come by other methods than snail mail. If so, what happens if I ignore the matter? Will a default judgment against me necessarily be entered, or will the court duly consider the plaintiff's case, perform the bare minimum investigation/reasoning necessary to determine which arguments of theirs are (un)sound, and so possibly rule in my favour? A default judgement will be entered providing the Particulars of Claim show a cause of action on its face. The court will not examine any evidence or enquire into the veracity of the statements made on the Particulars of Claim. In short, unless the plaintiff has ballsed something up - you lose. If I do choose to respond, can I hire an England-based lawyer to handle everything remotely, or can I be compelled to physically attend the court in England? You are generally not required to attend court in a civil matter unless you need to testify. Even then, arrangements can be made for remote testimony. If the court rules for the plaintiff and awards damages, can this judgment be enforced in the EU, or would it apply only in the UK? It can be enforced in the EU. As a courtesy or by treaty, domestic jurisdictions will enforce foreign judgements in most cases. If the court rules in my favour, would I recoup my legal fees? You will probably recoup some but not all of your legal fees, say 50-60%. Costs orders are complicated - talk to your lawyer.	Sec. 171.208(c) of the law provides: (c) Notwithstanding Subsection (b), a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed or induced in violation of this subchapter, or for the particular conduct that aided or abetted an abortion performed or induced in violation of this subchapter. The apparent intention, as I see it, is that a defendant is only supposed to have to pay the $10,000 damages once, so that it's not possible for a large number of plaintiffs to sue and collect. Some others have pointed out that there may be a loophole in case there are judgments in several cases before the defendant pays for the first one, and that in such a situation the defendant might be required to pay more than once. It doesn't seem to me, on its face, that such a loophole was intended, but we may have to wait and see how courts handle it. In any case, it would seem that the defendant could minimize this possibility by paying the judgment as quickly as possible.	Some simplified points of basic defamation law as background: A critical element of defamation law is that the defendant said something false. You therefore can't win a defamation case if it's based on a statement that can't be proven false: "You are annoying." "You are ugly." "You are a bad lawyer." If a statement can't be proven false, it is considered opinion. Statments of opinion are virtually always protected by the First Amendment. Powell's brief relies on this framework to argue that because her statements were statements of opinion, no defamation could have occurred. It's like defending against a murder charge by saying that no one died. Although it isn't generally referred to as the "reasonable person standard," reasonableness comes into this question because part of the calculus in assessing whether a statement is fact or opinion is to ask whether a reasonable person would understand the statement to be making an assertion of fact. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). By leaning into that language, Powell is not saying that reasonable people would not have any reaction or would not have any specific reaction to her statements; instead, she is saying that reasonable people would not have understood her statements to be assertions of fact. Her argument seems to turn on the fact that she was speaking as an attorney representing a political candidate in a lawsuit, and that reasonable people understand statements made in that context to be "inherently prone to exaggeration and hyperbole” and "view them only as claims that await testing by the courts through the adversary process." For what it's worth, that seems to me like a pretty weak argument. While people expect a certain amount of puffery from their candidates, they also expect that lawyers representing the President of the United States aren't going into court with frivolous allegations. More importantly, though, I think she's running the analysis incorrectly. Rather than asking whether a reasonable person would understand her statements to assertions of fact, she's asking whether a reasonable person would think that she was prone to exaggerate in the setting in which she made those statements. As I understand it, a speaker cannot cloak statements of fact from liability by merely refraining from uttering them until she finds herself in a context where people expect some amount of loose speech. Even if you're a partisan hack with no credibility appearing on a TV show hosted by another partisan hack with no credibility, you generally can't accuse your opponent of being a murderer or child molester or something like that. Those are still assertions of fact, even if they're bookended with statements that "Donald Trump is the greatest president this country will ever have." The brief does not rely at all on Hustler or the First Amendment protections for parody that were discussed in the previous answer. These tests are closely related, however, as both defenses claim that the speech was not "false" in the relevant sense.	Bottom line I'd tread pretty carefully here. If you paid $2000 for the photo, you might want to check to see if it came with a licensing agreement. Background One way to view this is through the lens of privacy. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A subjects privacy invaders to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other. Because you mention public personas and your facts don't involve disclosing private details, negative publicity, or interfering with seclusion, one might think appropriation of name or likeness applies. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy. Comment (a) to this section explains that a person's identity is in the nature of a property right. Courts have tended to recognize an individual's interest in the exclusive use of his or her own identity, going so far as to require licensing for usage. The most common way to violate this "property right" is by appropriating someone's name or likeness to promote a business or product. Cases abound on the subject, but a classic one is White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). To summarize, Samsung ran a picture-based ad featuring a futuristic robot dressed in an evening gown and turning "Wheel of Fortune"-styled letters. Vanna White was nonplussed and brought suit, which she won on appeal. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit argued the operative question wasn't how Samsung appropriated her likeness, but whether they had done so. The point of citing White here is simply to observe that a person's "likeness" probably extends even further than mere photo reproduction. Back to your facts: posting actual images of celebrities for a commercial purpose appears a much more clear cut appropriation of likeness than White. While it may seem similar, I'd distinguish your situation from that of restaurant "Walls of Fame"---which showcase signed photos of celebrities with the owner---in that the celebrities you mention weren't using your product or service at the time of the photograph. You might argue the photos aren't being used for advertising, but the plaintiff would counter that you posted them on a client-facing business website. In the Ninth Circuit this would be a question of whether there was an appropriation, not the way in which it was accomplished. For argument's sake, assume the court agrees your usage isn't commercial. Even that doesn't necessarily mean you're in the clear. In § 652C, and varying state-by-state, non-commercial purposes are also subject to scrutiny: Comment (b). Apart from statute, however, the rule stated is not limited to commercial appropriation. It applies also when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff's name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one. Statutes in some states have, however, limited the liability to commercial uses of the name or likeness. It's important to remember the Restatement isn't binding: it simply attempts to "restate" what courts (which are binding) have had to say on the topic. If you paid a lot of money for the photo, it might pay to see if it came with a licensing agreement.	In the US it's very simple: How does the party that makes the lawsuit get the money in this scenario? They don't. Winning a lawsuit against a person is a legal confirmation that they really do owe you the money. It also gives you the ability to do certain things to try to collect: you could seize their assets or garnish their wages. If they don't have any assets or any income then you are out of luck. You can't take what doesn't exist. As the saying goes, "you can't squeeze blood from a turnip". A bit of legal jargon sometimes used here is to say that such a defendant is judgment proof. Even if you win a lawsuit against them, it won't do you any good, because they just don't have any money. If the person cannot pay it off, does it transfer over to their relatives? No. People are not responsible for the debts of their relatives.	You cannot be successfully sued nor charged with a crime in the US merely because a movie, book, or other work is violent. Consider the rape scenes in the movie Deliverance, or John Hersey's The Wall, a 1950 novel which describes in detail the Warsaw Ghetto and the massacre and torture of its inhabitants by the Nazis during WWII. Or Plevier's Stalingrad, a 1940s novel about the aftermath of the Battle of Stalingrad, also during WWII, and the suffering of both Russian and German soldiers and civilians there. (Both novels were later filmed in less violent versions.) Many other examples could easily be mentioned. Triggering anxiety or PTSD in a reader or watcher would not be grounds for a suit either -- attempts to bring such suits have been dismissed. Claims that violent works inspire or encourage crime or anti-social acts have led to attempts to regulate such works, from comic books in the 1950s to video games in the 1990s. None of these works have prevailed. The so-called Comics Code Authority survived for a time because it was a strictly voluntary process -- some publishers never submitted content to the CCA censors. The Motion Picture Production Code was similarly voluntary, as is the current system of movie ratings. Works that defame someone can be the subject of libel suits. But to win such a suit in the US, the plaintiff must show that statements were made that were false, and not matters of opinion. The plaintiff must also show that such statements were "of and concerning" the plaintiff, that is that they were specifically about the plaintiff. The plaintiff must in most cases further show actual harm to the plaintiff's reputation, unless the false statements were of the limited category known as per se libel, which give rise to a presumption of harm. These include false claims of improper business or professional conduct, false claims that the plaintiff committed a serious crime, or false claims of sexual improprieties. Moreover, in many cases in the US the plaintiff must show actual malice, that is that the defamer made the false statements knowing them to be false, or with reckless disregard for whether or not they were true. This applies when the person bringing suit is a public official or public figure. Mere general violence will not be grounds for a libel suit. Incitement Several comments have asked if violent depictions could constitute incitement and therefore be unlawful. The current rule in the US is that speech (or writing) can only be punished as incitement if it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". This language comes from Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), and has thus been stable for over 50 years. Prior to that the US Supreme Court used the "clear and present danger" test, first adopted in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) The actual passage from Schenck was: The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. In Brandenberg the Supreme Court held Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute unconstitutional, because that law generally criminalized simple advocacy of violence. Under neither test would a book or movie that simply depicted violence be subject to legal action simply for that reason. A work would have to specifically advocate violence. Under the current Brandenberg test the work would have to urge people to violent lawbreaking right away, when it is read or watched. and actual lawbreaking would need to occur, or be reasonably likely to occur, for legal action to be constitutional. Actions against incitement under this test have been largely aimed at speeches before crowds or groups, urging them to riot or take other violent and unlawful action right then. While a book, movie, or video could be incitement under this test, it would need to be much more than just violent, it would need to strongly advocate present unlawful violence. That is not what the question asked about.	The important question is: was the £200 a fine (which is paid to the state) or compensation (which is paid to you)? Assuming it was a fine He doesn't (at the moment) owe you anything. However you can sue him for damages. Usually a claim for damages is time-barred after six years (and it is now seven years). However you weren't able to sue him yourself until you were 18, so you may have a couple of years left. However the clock may have started ticking immediately after the attack, on the grounds your parents or guardians could have sued. Talk to a solictor about this possibility; they should give you a free 30 minute consultation, and would probably take a case on a contigency fee (no-win no-fee) basis if it has any chance. In principle, you could have applied to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for compensation - but you are too late for that; you have to apply within two years (there are some exceptions, but none seem to apply to you). Assuming it was compensation He owes you £200. Now you need to enforce that payment - and again, the problem may be the six year clock. You will definitely need to talk to a lawyer about that. My gut feeling is that the £200 was probably a fine rather than compensation.
Should the village compensate for wrong land measurement? I bought a house 10 years ago. Now, I'm thinking of building a home addition but I'm having some issues. The border of the land doesn't give me enough clearance to make the home addition flash with the house. I need 14 feet clearance from the neighbors border. I talked to my neighbor 1 and he said that whoever owned his house he also owned my house and he split the land and sold my house separately. Now, how was he able to sell my house with wrong land measurement, not giving enough clearance from my house? The code is to have at least 14 feet. My house is maybe 8 feet away from the border. I understand that in the time he sold my house the code might have been different. But since the village changed the code they should have taken into account situations like this and offer compensation to those who will be affected by this. My neighbor 1 doesn't want to sell his 4 feet of his land to me so far. Shouldn't the village compensate me or him for allowing the sale with wrong measurement or for changing the rule? Is there any law I can apply and pursue the correction of the land dimensions? Note: The neighbor on the right side has enough clearance so I have a suspicion that the rule might have been in place in those days.	Shouldn't the village compensate me or him for allowing the sale with wrong measurement or for changing the rule? No. It is very common for local governments to make changes to zoning ordinances, building codes, etc, that have the effect of restricting the way that property can be used. In most cases this is not considered to be a "taking" for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, even if it reduces the value of the property, and the government does not have to compensate the property owner. See for instance Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Roughly speaking, the Takings Clause only applies if the regulations are so restrictive that the land cannot really be used at all. Here you are still perfectly able to use the existing house, and it sounds like you can even build an addition - you just can't build in the exact way that you want. You'll either need to design your addition to comply with the current setback rules, or see if you can get the village to approve a variance.	The mortgage is not relevant in the way you think it is What matters is who owns the property. The owner(s) of the property must agree with the tenant (or, more likely here, boarder) on the terms. The owner(s) need to agree between themselves how to split the income although for tax purposes it would generally be assessed in proportion to the owner’s shares. Note that the mortgage may not allow tenants or boarders or may require the permission of the mortgage.	I know that in many countries, including the US, the UK, and most, perhaps all, of Europe, it is common for houses to be sold while still under construction, so no such legal prohibition exists (or at least is enforced) in any of those countries. I have never heard of any country which has a general law against such a practice, but I cannot be sure for all countri8es in the world. There are other was to "prevent contractor delays and/or construction malformations and even constructions deformations". Many counties have building codes, which make improper building techniques unlawful. In some countries failure to adhere to proper professional standards in such matters is unlawful, and it is usual for the purchase of an unfinished building to involve a contract, in which performance standards and dates are spelled out. Failure to adhere to such requirements would give the purchaser grounds for a lawsuit for damages.	Your options are generally limited by where you have (or can establish) residency, along with where your communal property is held. There are (decreasing numbers of) jurisdictions known as "divorce mills" that have notoriously lenient rules for establishing residency and completing divorces.	I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? You have probably waived your claim if you proceed with the deal knowing about the Realtor's conduct. What would your damages be? Could you have mitigated them by not agreeing to the deal? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this? Lawyers aren't that specialized. I would not recognize a "personal" attorney as something necessarily different from a "Real estate attorney" and the questions involved are not so complex that a general practice attorney couldn't handle them. Familiarity with real estate issues would be desirable (e.g. you wouldn't want to hire someone whose practice was exclusively as a criminal defense attorney or a personal injury lawyer, or a patent lawyer, for this task), but a great many lawyers who describe their practices differently would have the relevant experience and knowledge.	The technical difference is that theft is illegal, and adverse possession is not. I'm assuming you're talking about why there's a difference. Historically, there are two basic reasons for adverse possession. First, land lasts for a very long time, and a sale is generally invalid unless the seller has valid title. That means that no property title is secure, because someone could always come out of the woodwork with a claim that your great-great-great-grandfather threw their great-great-great-grandfather off the land 300 years ago. Not only is all land title insecure, but you might not even be able to defend such a claim (do you know the history of your land for the past 300 years?) Adverse possession, then, is a way to let people know no one else can claim title to their land based on something so long ago no one remembers properly. Even with modern public land registries (which did not always exist), this situation can still arise if someone mistakenly believes that they own some land and starts using it. The second reason is that if someone isn't doing anything with the land for a long time, and someone else is doing something useful with it, the government would rather give it to the person doing something useful. People who lose property through adverse possession are unwilling to take the extremely minor steps needed to keep their property. It tends to move land from totally nonproductive users to productive users, and then keeps those nonproductive users from kicking out people who improved the land and keeping the improvements. The notion that leaving something for too long removes your right to claim it is not restricted to real estate. Almost everything in law has a time limit of some sort.	"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.	As Paul Johnson says, this is a planning permission thing. The parking places your landlord has leased you are real; they exist. They just don't have planning permission for all of them. It's no different to if the landlord got planning permission for a building of four flats, and built a block of six flats. Building those two additional flats would illegal, and the planning authority could take enforcement action against the landlord for it; however, letting those two additional flats out is perfectly legal. Similarly letting those parking places is legal; it's just that the planning authority may take action against the landlord to force two of the parking places to be removed. At that point the landlord would have to break the contract with the tenants of the parking places, and would be liable for damages. In practise, unless there are some activist neighbours, the planning authority won't take any enforcement action (spending money on legal action for two parking places is not high on their list of priorities). Even if there are some activist neighbours, they probably won't bother. Finally, any development becomes lawful after ten years, and if the development is used as dwellings, after four years. It is not clear to me whether the parking spaces would be considered as a separate development to the flats (and hence have a ten year limit), or whether they are ancillary to the dwellings (and hence have a four year limit). My suspicion is that the landlord was asked to sign an application for a Lawful Development Certificate (which essentially just certifies that the development is out of time for planning enforcement). If so, that means that ... the development is out of time for planning enforcement, so you have no need to worry. Incidentally, if I am right, your friend doesn't have any need to worry either, and is probably being put off the purchase by an overly cautious conveyancer. (Note: I am not a lawyer, and in particular, I am not your friend's lawyer.)
Is there any copyright or other legal issues with copying a website content and show it on another domain? I found a website with good and rich content that is generated by its users. It's a kind of professional social media that people write long content. The website is too old, and it's usually not easy to find its contents by search engines. I've decided to crawl & copy the website contents and publish those contents on another domain, but I'll link to the original source. Above each article, it might be something like: "Originally posted on example.com by John Doe" Is there any copyright or legal issues with that?	Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on.	Hosting copyrighted material on your servers is probably a bad idea, but software that changes how such material is displayed is likely fine – and there already are tools doing similar things. For example, the news publisher Axel Springer sued adblocker maker Eyeo for copyright infringement in Germany in 2021, since the adblocker manipulates the contents of a web page. This was rejected by the court. (See summary by The Register which also provides US context, summary by Eyeo, actual ruling (in German)). Core argument in that case was that adblockers do not distribute protected works, and do not create derivate works of the website. They merely change how the website is interpreted by a browser. However, the details here are dependent on German copyright law and on the specific capabilities used by adblockers – it might not generalize to other scenarios. Some browsers (e.g. Safari, Firefox) offer a reading mode that strips out all website contents except the main content, and then displays it in a more legible fashion. This strips out all navigation, sidebars, ads, and so on. So far, I don't think this kind of functionality has been challenged. This existing reading mode sounds quite similar to the reformatting tool you're envisaging. There are similar tools available in many programming languages, such as the Arc90 readability project (software, archived website), which is in turn inspired by the Instapaper app. Read-it-later apps like Instapaper and Pocket do involve a bit of a grey zone though, since they involve server-side storage of articles.	Online file converters are legal: there is no law that prohibits a person from making a program available and executing online, including creating output in the form of a file. It is possible that some person may illegally copy copyright-protected material then use a website to modify that material, in which case the question of vicarious liability for copyright infringement could arise, so we appeal to the DMCA safe harbor provisions to see what the website must do. First, the owner of copyright must submit a properly constructed takedown notice to the website. Crucially, the notice must contain sufficient information that the website operator can find and take down the item(s) in question. Assuming that the complainant can supply the "where is it" information, then there is a notice and counter-notice routine where the uploader is informed and can deny the accusation – the website operator doesn't evaluate the merits of the claim, he only sees that the formalities were observed. If the operator follows the rules, he cannot be held vicariously liable. If the link does not expire and if it is somehow promulgated, the technical potential for being a contributor to copyright infringement becomes very real, but it puts the operator in no worse a legal position than Youtube. So the question is not just related to OCILLA, it is entirely covered by that law. Questions of how users or website owners are "supposed to" act don't figure into this. If the website owner does not comply with those provisions, they have no access to the safe harbor provisions, and they can be sued. However, the website itself remains legally "permitted" (there never was a prohibition of such a website).	In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost.	This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta.	Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement.	The facts you describe are very likely an infringing derivative work which would provide a basis for a lawsuit against the person operating the website. But, nothing is certain, and these determinations are highly fact specific. It is highly unlikely that the government would enforce a violation of copyright alleged in these circumstances criminally.	THE FOLLOWING OPINION IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE Based on your screenshot and description, I don't see anything infringing. If the data you are using is from your own sources, and what you show is not a scan or photo of their guide, and your layout is thus unique in specifics (not a direct copy), it wouldn't be an "infringement" as far as copyright law is concerned. Things you cannot copyright: A font (except as a computer font file but not as used in a document). A concept (a main issue here). A idea for a "way" or "order" to display data. Mere data or facts can not be copyrighted nor can ideas. Anything sourced from the US government (trail data, topos, etc.) Something not in printed, physical, or recorded form. That is, the copyright only extends to those things as they are realized in print, or as a recording for audio or video, or a physical statute, etc. A live performance is not copyrightable for instance, nor are ideas. The Law: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. For instance, an icon of a TENT is the common form (like a font) of indicating a camp ground. They may be able to copyright the specific instance of their tent icon, but they cannot prevent you from using some other triangle to represent a tent for a campground. And in facts yours is completely different. Displaying data a particular "way" like 1e for 1 mile east is not copyrightable when it is common for the type of guide. It's just data. CONCEPTS AND DATA ARE NOT COPYRIGHTABLE, only the ACTUAL specific page or work in total as rendered. More below, but your page seems totally different. OTHER FORMS OF IP PROTECTION Now, just because some intellectual property can't be protected by copyright, does not mean it is a free-for-all. For instance, a "way" of doing something can be PATENTED (process patent). And "ornamental design" can be given a design patent. A logo or brand name can be given a trademark. Here's an interesting court ruling on the subject of data display. Basically it can't be an abstraction/concept. It has to be in a definable, physical, novel form. NOTE: it has been possible to copyright a "look and feel" but that applies to software, not static printed media. And the courts have been reversing on that a lot as time goes on. BUT WAIT...THERE'S MORE So, I am going to GUESS that you are talking about AT Guide by David Miller? It's pretty rich of him to claim copyright over the "manner of the display of data" when APPARENTLY he is using concepts of data display as described by EDWARD TUFT So, LOL. Is this the guide they claim you are "copying"?? THESE AREN'T THE ICONS YOU'RE LOOKING FOR Okay, so let's go one by one and their claims against you: 1. The way of representing distances between shelters "The Way" of presenting something is not copyrightable, only an expressive or final form. Some forms of "organization or selection" that may make a work in total copyrightable, but not on their own in isolation. 2. The sideways orientation of the elevation profile Presenting some elements "sideways" is not copyrightable (WTF LOL OMG RUS) the same as number 1. Turning an element sideways does not, on it's own, rise to the level of "creative or non-obvious." 3. The icons Your icons are completely different. If you copied and used his ACTUAL icons, you might have had some issue, but your icons are not even remotely the same. Using icons to indicate services or features is COMMON. Not copyrightable. http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/works-not-covered-copyright In general, copyright does not protect individual words, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; or mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents. (However, copyright protection may be available, if the artwork of the symbol or design contains sufficient creativity.) 4. The convention of representing direction/distance for waypoints. Again, "The Way" of doing something is not copyrightable, nor is data or facts. 1.1E or 2.3NW are common are they not? I've seen similar treatments elsewhere. It's "obvious and not novel." FINAL FORM, EXPRESSIVE FORM is copyrightable NOT FORMATTING CONCEPTS. Basically, he is saying something along the lines of "I'm formatting paragraphs with a double space, so you can't." The "actual" icon drawings he used are copyrightable. Your icons are clearly different. I assume your mountain-top profile line is taken from some publicly available survey source? So long as you never used a scan of the actual line he uses (and even then?), because he cannot copyright the mountain top profiles themselves! DOES HE EVEN HAVE A VALID COPYRIGHT? For that question, I'd say yes with limitations. His work is a compilation of data. Data can not be copyrighted, but the unique arrangement can in context of the work in total. These three conditions must ALL be present (from http://www.rbs2.com/ccompile.pdf): The collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data. The selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials The creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement of an original work of authorship. So It seem to be that his guide meets these, but his copyright is for his work in total. You are NOT using his data. You are using your OWN data. Based on my reading of Key vs Chinatown Today you are not even close to infringing. You are doing your OWN selection, and your OWN arrangement. It does not matter that you may be using some similar typographic or charting conventions. Those cannot be copyrighted. You are doing your own thing, and "similarity is not infringement." SEARCH AND YOU WILL FIND On the subject of the copyright, here's the copyright on AT guide: https://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search_Arg=A.T.+Guide&Search_Code=TALL&PID=FgMjtJ244OxoFULrVoob_CEI8bc_M&SEQ=20190506230418&CNT=25&HIST=1 If the link doesn't work due to expiration or a cookie, it should look like this: It's a matter of using the USPTO search engine "its way" — it's not Google and requires specific search strings. Looks like the assignee or owner is https://antigravitygear.com ? Did THEY contact you or David Miller? Or did they claim to be an attorney? I'd love to see the email. Attorneys don't email dunning letters, by the way (though they may if it was a DMCA takedown request I suppose, but I still doubt it.) If it was an attorney it would be via US mail on attorney letterhead. To the best of my knowledge, you can't file proof of service on an email, it has to be USPS or trackable. This means the guy that made the other PDF is annoyed or whatever. If he claimed to be an attorney, that's VERY illegal if he's not. And one final note: Just being non-profit does not absolve you of copyright infringement. But as I said, I see no infringement here. The other answer that asserted these are covered under "works of art" is not withstanding. There is nothing "expressive" about Miller's guide. Also that other answer cited a source for AUSTRALIAN law, not US. Mere typographic elements do not rise to "an expressive work of art". A mountain profile that is nothing but a illustrative line based on data also does not.
Possible change of state of residency, questions? My partner recently got a job in a neighboring state and will be moving there and asked me to move with her. She leased an apartment in her name and added me in as an occupant but she's the "owner" of the lease and would be the one responsible for rent/bills etc. This is something we came to an agreement on due to some circumstances. It would only be a temporary move and after 3 years the contract for the job ends and we will move back to our home state As for myself, I just put in for a transfer to another location my company has there and will transfer back to my original location when we move back. I don't believe I should have to go and change my state of residency, drivers license, car registration/plates, insurance etc) since I consider where I am now my permanent home. It's just a temporary relocation. Legally, could I leave everything as is since the apartment "technically?" isn't mine (I'd just be staying there with her? She knows about this and is fine with it). I'd be filing my taxes as someone that commutes out of state to work and residing in their current home state etc. Is there anything I'm missing/not aware of that would make this a bad idea? Or is this a normal thing people do commonly and I'm overthinking it.	I just put in for a transfer to another location my company has there and will transfer back to my original location when we move back. I don't believe I should have to go and change my state of residency, drivers license, car registration/plates, insurance etc) since I consider where I am now my permanent home. It's just a temporary relocation. While this arguably works for the common law concept of domicile, as a practical matter, if you live someplace for the majority of a year, and often more than 30 days, you are considered to reside there. You should change your driver's license, car registration/plates, insurance, voter's registration, etc., unless there is an extremely compelling reason to do otherwise, and not just different tax rates and more bureaucratic inconvenience. A planned three year stay doesn't cut it, especially, if you don't own a home or have a residential lease on a residence in the state you want to claim as your residence. The main exceptions would be someone who is in an institutional setting, such as attending college residentially for nine months a year while supported by their parents, in a prison, or in military service, where different conventions sometimes apply. Legally, could I leave everything as is since the apartment "technically?" isn't mine (I'd just be staying there with her? No. Residency and who owns or leases the place where you are living are two entirely different things. The many people who don't have a lease or own a home are still residents of the places where they live. For that matter, even if you are not a citizen of the U.S., you can still be a resident of a particular state or locality. I'd be filing my taxes as someone that commutes out of state to work and residing in their current home state etc. Nope. For state income tax purposes, you reside in the state where you sleep a majority of the nights in a year. There are sometimes more complicated rules that apply to apportion income between states, but that is the strong general rule. Is there anything I'm missing/not aware of that would make this a bad idea? Or is this a normal thing people do commonly and I'm overthinking it. This is a bad idea and not a normal thing that people do commonly. At a minimum, it will leave you with bureaucratic tangles and at risk of serious state tax audits (which, reading between the lines, seems like the most plausible reason you are thinking about this approach). At worst, you could be exposed to liability for having improper tax payments and car insurance in place, and potential criminal liability for misrepresenting your residence. It might not end up coming to a head and being a problem, but the probability that it will is significant.	Just think of the subtenant cum owner as two separate people with two separate roles. Tenant = T Subtenant = ST Old owner = OO New Owner = NO The rights of the tenant vis-avis the new owner will be informed by the lease and the local laws. Generally, if the sale happens in the middle of the existing lease, the NO is obligated by the terms, as is the T. NO cannot just kick T out, and T cannot just break the lease. The lease may say what could happen and local laws will apply. Likewise, ST has whatever contract with T that previously existed. Pretend NO and ST are different people. If T owes NO $1000 per month, and ST owes T $400 a month, that continues even though ST and NO are the same person. Depends on what kind of dispute. See above. All contracts continue, subject to whatever the lease with the original owner and the subtenancy agreement say abut modifying or breaking the lease and sublease. Local laws apply. Note, if the subtenancy was "off the books" or was done when not allowed by the original owner, and if it was not in a place that the local law says owners cannot deny subleasing, then tenant might not have any protection. ST, now that he is owner could just move out and stop paying. On the other hand, even if he is the owner, he cannot just say "I am the owner now, so I am moving back in for free" because the original lease gave the tenant use of the whole property. But ST could just drop out because T always owed OO, and now NO, the full rent. Do you mean if rather than sublease, they were both on the original lease? Interesting, but just imagine it as the obligations before the sale = the obligations after the sale. I don't know though. There are some tax implications for an owner occupied rental.	I am not a lawyer: If they sue you it will probably be for fraud, then the DA will investigate and can easily find out who you are. If they can prove that you signed the contract is another story. If the clause in the contract is valid yet another. Getting a lawyer might be wise, especially if your visa depends on a clean legal record. Have you talked to them yet? If you can afford it, you or your new company could pay off he months salary to the old company. In my opinion it's fair, they probably turned down a lot of other applicants an will either need to search again or find a good temp to replace you. Think there was something that you cannot quit a contract before it starts, but another option would be to start working for them and then realizing during the test period that it's a bad match. However, best lawyer up! Search for "Kündigung vor Beschäftigungsbeginn" (Cancellation before the start of employment) Quick google suggests that they might be right if they have it in the contract, but the lawyer will know for sure. Look for someone who does "Arbeitsrecht".	In general, a properly signed lease is binding. But there are exceptions, and they vary depending on the jurisdiction: country, state/province, and even city or county in many places. You mention a claim that the property should not be leased "because the owner needs it". In some jurisdictions, there is a special exception if the owner personally, or a member of the owner's immediate family, intended to live in the property. It is not clear form the question if such an exception would apply. it might well be that a person in the position described in the question has a valid and enforceable lease, and could simply remain in the property, paying rent, and the owner would have no valid grounds for eviction. But this kind of case will depend on the exact wording of the rental agreement, and on the exact provisions of the applicable laws, which vary widely depending on the location of the property. A person in this kind of situation would b wise to consult a local lawyer who will know local property law, and how the provisions of the agreement and other claims will be treated by local courts. There may also be local tenant assistance organizations, run by the government or by non-profit groups, who will know local law and can assist in such cases. A general answer cannot be gotten from a forum such as this which an individual should rely upon in such a case, particularly when the question does not even state what country, let alone what specific locality, is involved.	We don't give specific legal advice and one might VTC, but I think your phrasing is not quite right, and you are just curious about the possibility of binding the landlord to a term across leases. The first thing that a term in a contract has to so is say exactly what must be done by whom (or not done). You need to describe more precisely what it means for all future rent and rent increases to be commensurate with the current rent. You can think of conditions like "no more than 2% per annum" or "no more than 15% per annum", and then you can figure out what number is acceptable to the two of you. I would be surprised if you could come up with an agreeable number. Second, you'd have to make this limit "perpetual", which is pretty much impossible. You could negotiate the terms of the next lease today which would prevent an increase of rent by more thay you're happy with, but until governmental controls say exactly what a legal rent increase is, the property owner has the right to raise the rent by a million dollars, and you have the right to move elsewhere. It's as hard to permanently lock a landlord into an arrangement as it is to lock a tenant into renting a specific residence. Every year, you have the right to terminate the lease if the rent goes too high for you, and every year the landlord has the right to raise the rent if the current arrangement isn't sufficiently profitable. Incidentally, you might want to check with AHFC to see if you can actually do this. Your expectations don't determine what relief they provide, just make sure that you provided accurate answers to their questions and reported all income that you're required to report.	she immediately stated that I need to provide 60 days notice She is wrong. See Minnesota statute 504B.135(a). Absent any agreement that supersedes the statute, the landlord cannot unilaterally stretch the notice period to 60 days. Is it legal for a landlord to say my rent is due 5 days earlier than we had verbally agreed? Is it legal for a landlord to do this right after I tell them that I am planning on moving out? No. The lanlord cannot unilaterally alter the implied contract that exists between you two, including the pattern of you paying rent on the 6th of the month. To prove in court that this was indeed the pattern, it suffices to show the receipts your landlord has the statutory obligation to provide to you immediately upon making each one of your payments. See 504B.118. The landlord is just "making sure" you will not recommend her to other prospective tenants.	I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract.	renting a single room with three other guys each renting their own rooms means exactly what it says. What you are paying for is that room, plus shared access to the common areas. Without knowing exactly what your lease says, especially with respect to the common areas, it's difficult to give a proper answer. I suspect that the lease for your room says nothing about who can live in the other rooms. Unless the lease says otherwise, the landlord has full control of the common areas. (Compare with a large apartment building, with hallways, stairwells, lobbies, etc., which must be maintained by the landlord.) This isn't an unusual arrangement, but I've never understood why anyone, landlord or tenant, would want it. There's far too much potential for conflict. You, yourself, could be a totally obnoxious person that the other three guys can't stand, but they'd have to put up with you. Their only alternatives are to move out or to ask the landlord to evict you. Moving out would be a lot of trouble for everyone. But, depending upon jurisdiction, as long as you're paying the rent on time and not causing damage to the property, eviction could be a very difficult and long process. And eviction is hardly in the landlord's interest. It costs a lot of money and time, and might not be granted even if she did apply. Why might a landlord spend so much time at the house they're renting? I'd be concerned about the implications of a woman going out of her way to do yoga in an area rented to four men. That is the part that sounds most strange in this situation. How do I resolve this? I'd start looking for a room somewhere else.
Does material usury exist in Canada? Is material usury in Canada prohibited by law? Having a European background, I know that material usury in Europe is prohibited if the price is more than two times the average price, and there is a critical situation or some kind of abuse (like overcharging foreigners). While having to pay hundreds of Euros to get a replacement for a lost apartment key (critical) would apply to this criterion, getting a cheap collectors edition of something of course not (not critical). I was wondering whether the same applies to Canada, yet I was only able to find usury prohibition laws in connection with interest rates.	Not under that name In common law countries, like Canada, the concept is known by the delightfully visceral term price gouging or, in emergency circumstances, profiteering. This is not regulated at a Federal level in Canada. A brief overview of provincial level laws can be found here. Typically, they require prices that are not just excessive - they need to be unconscionable which is a very high bar.	Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough).	Let’s say I go to a cash machine, ask for £100, and the machine gives me £10,000. I use my banking app and see that £100 left my account, not £10,000. At this point I haven’t done anything illegal. If I asked for another £100 and got £10,000 again, that might be illegal. But the extra £9,900 are not mine. They are the bank’s money. If I try to keep it, that is simply theft.	I can't speak directly to South African law. I am an American (but not a lawyer). Much of the relevant American law is derived from English common law, and I will assume for the purposes of this answer that this is true for South African law as well. In this example, you lent a car to a friend, and from the sound of it, primarily for the friend's benefit. (If it had been an "exchange of favors," and s/he let you use a beach house in return, a different "standard of care" would apply.) Because of this fact, your friend owes you a high standard of care for your car. Even "ordinary" wear and tear would be too much. Basically, your friend was responsible for the car's "upkeep," and was supposed to return it to you in as nearly the "original" condition as possible. Not having done so, s/he could be liable to you for getting you a "new" car of the same make, or at least a car that was no older, and had no more miles that yours had, when you lent it.	I know that in many countries, including the US, the UK, and most, perhaps all, of Europe, it is common for houses to be sold while still under construction, so no such legal prohibition exists (or at least is enforced) in any of those countries. I have never heard of any country which has a general law against such a practice, but I cannot be sure for all countri8es in the world. There are other was to "prevent contractor delays and/or construction malformations and even constructions deformations". Many counties have building codes, which make improper building techniques unlawful. In some countries failure to adhere to proper professional standards in such matters is unlawful, and it is usual for the purchase of an unfinished building to involve a contract, in which performance standards and dates are spelled out. Failure to adhere to such requirements would give the purchaser grounds for a lawsuit for damages.	I don't believe Canada uses the public official/figure distinction. American defamation law uses the distinction to determine whether to require proof of actual malice, but Canada does not require proof of actual malice. Canadian defamation law has a lot of other parallels to American defamation law, though, especially in terms of privilege. I'd expect the University could claim any of several available privileges, including truth, qualified privilege, and fair comment. And because it's a government institution, it's conceivable that it might even claim absolute privilege, though I definitely don't know enough about their interpretations of the privilege to say one way or another. For a broad primer on defamation law in Ontario, you can check out this report from the Law Commission of Ontario.	Florida Title XXXIX, chapter 687 of the 2022 Florida Statutes covers usury. The technical definitions of what it is are earlier, but the punishment is as follows (I skipped the couple of exceptions to it) 687.04 Penalty for usury; not to apply in certain situations.—Any person, or any agent, officer, or other representative of any person, willfully violating the provisions of s. 687.03 shall forfeit the entire interest so charged, or contracted to be charged or reserved, and only the actual principal sum of such usurious contract can be enforced in any court in this state, either at law or in equity; and when said usurious interest is taken or reserved, or has been paid, then and in that event the person who has taken or reserved, or has been paid, either directly or indirectly, such usurious interest shall forfeit to the party from whom such usurious interest has been reserved, taken, or exacted in any way double the amount of interest so reserved, taken, or exacted. So basically the lender can only collect the original amount loaned, no interest, and if they already collected some of the interest, they have to return that at a 2 for 1 rate. It's a civil law, so I don't know if that's what you meant by "breaking the law/illegal", but they can go to court to recover the interest doubled. The contract wouldn't change anything, as you can't enforce the terms of an illegal contract.	FDIC Regulation 500 prohibits discrimination in making loans on the basis of "National origin" but not on the basis of immigration status. This story from The Nation says that Bank of America is denying accounts to non-citizens, and arguing that it is legal because of increased risks, although there are current court challenges to this. Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A is a case now pending challenging loan denials based on immigration status. This has particularly come up in regard to DACA recipients, rather than people with LPR status. The US "public accommodation" laws probably do not apply, as a bank is not usually considered a place of public accommodation. Any specific state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of immigration status might apply. In short, this is an issue still not clearly settled. There seems to be no law or regulation requiring banks to ask for citizenship information, much less to deny accounts based on it, and it would be well to seek a bank with a different policy if possible. The above is very US-specific. Many countries do limit banking access based on citizenship, i understand. I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. Before challenging any bank action, you may well wish to seek advice from a lawyer.
"Mama" is now a trademark word. Does that mean we can't use the word any more (e.g. for Etsy products)? Someone just registered a trademark on the word "Mama" UK00003645697 Status: Registered Mark type: Word Mark text: Mama File date: 23 May 2021 Classes: 42 What does it mean for digital sellers, on Etsy for example? Can we sell things that use the word "Mama"? Can we use it in tags?	Trademarks apply only to a limited field. If you follow the link, it reports that it applies to class 42, graphic art design. So you are free to use (and register "mama" for your food delivery service, for example.	Trademarks protect against consumer confusion. Ask yourself if a consumer seeing that image with the "studio" portion removed might think that the altered image represents the same company as the original image. Of course, the answer will be "yes." But in the end it also depends on how the trademark is used. You've used the original image in the question; have you violated the trademark? No. Do you violate Tesco's trademark when you say "I went shopping at Tesco"? No. Do you violate their trademark when you sell food using the name "Tesco"? Yes. A distinctive graphic design such as this will also be protected by copyright, so you will also have to consider whether your intended use infringes copyright.	"LearnIT" and "Learn it" are both descriptive, and thus are generally weak trademarks. It is not unlikely that a challenge would result in cancellation of any trademark on either, or in allowing a similar trademark in an unrelated category of business. For the matter of that, you don't seem to have determined whether the other company is making any trademark claims. In some countries there is no trademark protection unless a mark is registered. In others, including the US, use without registration can create some protection for a mark. It will also be relevant where the other company is doing business, and where you plan to. Trademark protection is always specific to a particular country, and generally requires proof of use in commerce in each such country (or of a plan to start such use in the near future). Domain registration is a different thing, and is not necessarily tied to a trademark (although registering a domain that infringes an existing trademark will often be disallowed). It appears that "learnit.net" is listed as available. That does not mean that a dispute filed by the other company would not be successful. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) states in section 2 that: By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to maintain or renew a domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that (a) the statements that you made in your Registration Agreement are complete and accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the registration of the domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not registering the domain name for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not knowingly use the domain name in violation of any applicable laws or regulations. It is your responsibility to determine whether your domain name registration infringes or violates someone else's rights. If you register a domain name, and another person or firm complains that the name is "confusingly similar" to an existing name or to a valid trademark, you might be required to participate in an arbitration proceeding under the UDRP, or else forfeit the registration. Note that nothing happens if no one complains. Section 4(s) of the policy reads: You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts ... that (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. In the administrative proceeding, the complainant must prove that each of these three elements are present. "Bad faith" can be shown by evidence that you obtained the domain for purposes of selling or renting it, not for use; that you intended to prevent a valid trademark owner from obtaining the name, and have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; that your purpose was to disrupt the business of the other; that you intended to attract users who were looking for the other site. The page "What Are 'Look-Alike' Domain Names?" states: An essential element of any domain name dispute is whether the domain name bears some important resemblance to a relevant trademark. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) refers to this as the “identical or confusingly similar” test. In many cases, a disputed domain name actually contains the trademark, and in other cases it may contain a typographical variation of the trademark (such as by omitting a single letter; transposing two letters; or substituting one letter for another, often adjacent to it on a keyboard). Yet in other cases, a disputed domain name may simply look like the trademark at issue, even if the domain name doesn’t contain the trademark or fall into any of the popular cybersquatting tricks described above. I refer to these simply as “look-alike domain names.” You may wish to determine if the operator of the learnit.com site has in fact obtained a trademark on "learn it". Most national trademark systems provide a means to search the trademark registers. This will not be conclusive, but may give a reasonable idea. One option is to consult a lawyer skilled in trademark law. Another might be to reach out to the exposition firm and ask if they would have any objection to your proposed blog. If they don't object, the will be no problem. Another option is to choose a domain that is not as similar to that of the existing site. One technique that can help avoid an accusation of bad faith is to provide an notice where someone first opening the blog site will see it, something like: This is XY.net. You may have been looking for XX.com,which is about {short description} If co, click here. with a link to the other site. Such a notice might help establish that you were not using the domain to improperly attract traffic looking for the other site.	You cannot use the libraries trademarks, but that does not stop you from using your own. For example, you cannot use the name Twitter Bootstrap to endorse, promote or use as the name of your project.	You cannot copyright a word or name in and of itself, so you can't sue someone for having a novel titled 13 so long as their novel is distinct from your own. Trademarks can use certain words or word combinations, but often in a way that is stylized or symbolic of a particular unique style and may include font, coloring, and other unique artistic takes. For example, McDonalds cannot copyright or trademark the letter "M" but it can trademark the "Golden Arches" a unique stylized "M" that they use as signage to at all their locations. If the name is a brand of a certain product such, then the name can be trademarked but only with respect to that product. For example, if the Acme Wash-Master is a dish washing machine they can't sue Ace Wash Master, a unique dog bathing system, for using the name "Wash Master" since it's both styled different (Acme uses a dash between words. ACE uses a space) and non-competitive product lines (most people would not wash dishes in a dog bathing device... and one would certainly hope that no dog owners ever said to themselves "Fido stinks and my tub is busted. The dish washer will do in a pinch!").	The register of trademarks can indeed be searched before an application is filed, and any prudent applicant will make, or pay an expert to make, such a search. Note that each country has its own trademark register (although some EU countries are working on a shared EU register, I understand). Marks registered in one country will not be protected under the laws of another, unless they separately qualify for protection under the laws of the second country. Note that in the US, marks that have never been registered but are in active use receive some trade mark protection, although not as much as those that have been registered. Searching for unregistered marks in current use is significantly harder than searching for registered marks. Application may be refused for conflict with an active, unregistered mark. Also in the US, registered marks may have their registrations canceled if they are not in use for a significant time, I believe at least 5 years. Many advise hiring a firm that specializes in trademark applications to do the entire application, including searches. This involves significant added cost. US trademark searches may be done via the Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) Some information about doing such searches is provided at Search trademark database (an official USPTO page). That page states: Private trademark attorneys If you are an applicant, registrant, or party to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board proceedings domiciled in the United States or its territories, you are not required to have a U.S.-licensed attorney represent you at the USPTO. However, deciding what to search for and interpreting your results can be complicated. There are many factors to consider in determining likelihood of confusion. We can’t advise you on how to do a clearance search for your mark, do one for you, or interpret your search results. Therefore, we strongly encourage you to hire a U.S.-licensed attorney who specializes in trademark law to guide you throughout the application process. If you are a foreign-domiciled applicant, registrant, or party to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board proceedings, you must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is licensed to practice law in the United States. See the why hire a private trademark attorney webpage to learn more about what an attorney can do for you and how to find one. For more information about conducting a clearance search, please watch the news broadcast-style video titled “Searching” (video #3 in the Trademark Information Network (TMIN) series). I am sure that similar searches of the register in other countries are available.	Copyright is irrelevant, because names are not protected by copyright. Trademark is relevant: a name can be protected by a trademark. "Yoda" is a registered trademark owned by Lucasfilms, a subsidiary of Disney. There is a list of goods and services where the property right is asserted, so for example you could get sued for peddling art books under this name. It just depends on what your business does. For instance, a plumbing business isn't competing with Lucasfilms w.r.t. that class of goods and services.	I think you will find that "sign" here means "mark" and includes a word, a phrase, or a logo, or a combination of any of these. Indeed section 6 of the act defines this: "sign" includes the following or any combination of the following, namely, any letter, word, name, signature, numeral, device, brand, heading, label, ticket, aspect of packaging, shape, colour, sound or scent. The main test is whether the two marks are "confusingly similar" or whether prospective customers are likely to be confused into thinking that one seller is actually the other, or into attributing to one the goodwill or reputation of the other. (This standard is much the same under US law or the laws of a good many other countries.) This is a very fact-intensive determination, and is to some extent a judgement call. But a difference in one letter only, with little or no difference in sound, might well be sufficiently similar to cause confusion. Note that section 10 of the law defines this: For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion, and thus this might well be a case of infringement. Note that for infringement to be found, in addition to the marks being "deceptively similar", the goods or services must also be similar or in the same category, (or goods "closely related" to protected services or vice versa) unless the mark being infringed on is "well known".
Nonprofit for religious blog? If I write a religious blog (specifically with posts explaining the meaning of Bible verses, similar to sermons but written instead of spoken), could I start a 501c3 to run the site, donate money to the 501c3 to pay for Web hosting, and write off the donations on my tax return?	The IRS page "Exemption Requirements - 501(c)(3) Organizations" describes the basic requirements for an organization to qualify as tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3). The linked page "Application Process" starts a sequence walking a potential applicant throgh the requirements. Key requirements are: Form: a 501(c)(3) organization must be a trust, a corporation, or an association; Purpose: a 501(c)(3) organization must have an exempt purpose. "Advancement of religion" is one acceptable purpose; Benefits: a 501(c)(3) organization must not have any of its funds be for the benefit of any shareholder, member or private individual, and must not serve private intersts (as the IRS defiens that term). See https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/inurement-private-benefit-charitable-organizations for more detail. Note that an application must be signed and filed with information about the organization. An annual filing is required thereafter. Note also that under current US Federal tax law, only contributions in excess of 10% of a taxpayer's Adjusted Gross income (AGI) may be deducted. This is a somewhat recent change, previously the limit was much lower (2.5% of AGI at one time). This means that many people will see little or no tax benefit unless they contribute a fairly sizable amount. But one would be wise to consult one's tax advisor or one's past year tax return to see what the AGI was, and learn what amount of deduction is likely in future years. Of course, Congress can change the tax laws at any time. Note also that deductions from income only save a taxpayer his or her marginal rate on taxation. That is, if the taxpayer is in a 15% bracket, a contribution of $100 more than the AGI threshold will save the taxpayer $15. Contributions up to and including the AGI threshold will have no effect on the tax owed. Once money is contributed to a 501(c)(3) organization it may not be simply taken back, even if the contributor is also the operator of the organization.	I'd like to sell t-shirts with the direwolve emblem of the "House Stark" in Game of Thrones, and of course, I've been immediately asking myself if HBO which produces the serie actually had some copyright on that emblem. This is not a close case. Your proposal, or anything remotely similar, would almost certainly constitute a copyright violation and result in a lawsuit by the producers of the show if not done with a license from the company. They would easily win this lawsuit. The damages that they were awarded would greatly exceed the amount of profits you made from your sales (realistically, more than a $1,000 per T-Shirt plus many tens of thousands of dollars of legal fees and costs would be typical). You would probably have to go bankrupt and some or all of the damages award against you might survive bankruptcy because your copyright violation was an intentional act. Every episode of the TV show is a copyrighted work and what you are proposing would be a "derivative work" since it is derived from the copyrighted TV show. Derivative works made without a license from a a copyright holder are a violation of copyright laws. There are also probably myriad specifically trademarked symbols and phrases that are registered with the appropriate government official (the Patent and Trademark Office for U.S. trademarks). So, it is highly likely that there would be a trademark violation as well if a license was not obtained. Your basic business model is at its very heart and essence fundamentally illegal. There is nothing you can do to fix it without getting written permission from the publishers who have probably long ago sold the rights to do this to somebody else for an immense amount of money. You should abandon this idea and try to come up with another business venture instead.	According to Wikipedia, the organization that holds Vatican copyrights has the following policy: [N]ews organizations can quote from the pope's speeches, encyclicals and other writings without charge. They can also publish full texts free provided they cite Vatican copyright ... but if a text is published separately ... payment is due. You say that no Vatican copyright was cited, which is too bad - they'd have a good argument that they already had permission. it must have a copyright Correct. Published or unpublished, it has a copyright from the moment it was fixed. it's a translation, which require official permission. Translations are considered derivative works, which is a right protected under copyright. So you need permission, fair use, or some other law that allows you to use it. it's the whole document, and so not under fair use Well, not so fast. There are four factors included in fair use, and that's only one of them. The factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; Is the website offering this work for religious purposes, or for profit? (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; I'm not really sure where religious works fall under this factor, honestly. (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; The whole work is used, so this factor would be against fair use. (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Is there a market for this work? Does the Vatican sell it, or use it to drive traffic, or anything? If so, this factor would be against fair use. If not, the translation probably does not affect the market for the work, and this factor would be in favor of fair use.	The law related to the internal organization of corporations is a matter of state law. You cite the correct authority: The board of directors of a nonprofit corporation shall consist of one or more members. The number of directors shall be fixed by or in the manner provided in the bylaws. If not so fixed, the number of directors shall be the same as that stated in the articles or three if no number is so stated. 15 Pa. Stat. and Consol. Stat. Ann. § 5723 (West). The statement of the state attorney general is merely a suggestion. Although, in an entity with audited financial statements the audited financial reports must disclose that the organization lacks "adequate internal financial controls". But, non-profit entities such as charitable trusts or "corporations sole" (such as most legally distinct entities in the Roman Catholic Church) have only a single person with full control over everything that a Board of Directors does. The IRS likewise does not impose a minimum number of directors for a 501(c)(3) organization, or for any other kind of corporation. Nothing in the relevant statue requires that it have more than one, and many non-profits (e.g. probably a majority of churches) have only one director.	This is pretty much the entire purpose of a redirect, and almost always permissible. If your witness has given an unhelpfully incomplete answer, it is not just "advisable" to ask those follow-up questions, but perhaps mandatory as an ethical matter.	Non-Profits Need Not Have Owners But Must Have A Lawful Purpose Any non-profit company, for example, a 501(c)(3), is ownerless and can be run by a self-perpetuating board if desired, rather than having delegates that provide an outside source for new board members. In that case you have to set forth a purpose of the company or trust, to which its assets and profits must be used, and it must be managed in accordance with that purpose. You can also have a "private foundation" that is effectively ownerless, again with a designated charitable purpose. Generally speaking, the law limits how much compensation can be paid to officers and employees of such a company and restricts self-dealing transactions by such a company. You probably cannot create a valid trust or business with no beneficiaries and no designated charitable purpose which is supposed to merely accumulate its profits and assets. Ownerless Cooperatives Are An Oxymoron Your reference in this and other posts to an "ownerless cooperative" is basically an oxymoron. A cooperative is an entity owned by a class of people who have a contractual relationship with the entity (usually consumers or producers) who are the owners of the company with voting control and who are entitled to an adjustment of their transaction prices with the cooperative via a rebate or surplus check proportionate to the dollar volume of their dealings with the cooperative (Northwest Mutual, must rural electric companies, and most credit unions would be examples of consumer cooperatives, Ocean Spray is a good example of a producers cooperative). An ownerless entity is pretty much by definition not a cooperative. An excellent overview of forms of entity organization other than investor owned stock corporations can be found in The Ownership of Enterprise by Henry Hansmann. The Life Of The Law Is Not Math Or Logic Honestly, it sounds like, in your several posts on the subject, that you are attempting the hide the ball of an ulterior purposes which is material to the legality and organization of an entity. The law is not like science or mathematics. You can't prove a bunch of isolated propositions and then string them together logically. The law operates on an entire comprehensive "fact pattern" and even if every step of your chain of reasoning to an ultimately result is supported by legal authority, this does not mean that this will be the result you get when you put all of the pieces together. That kind of logical reasoning doesn't work in a legal context. The heading of this section is a paraphrase of a famous statement about the law by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience... The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. from "The Common Law" (1881) at page 1. Blockchains Are Not The Legal Innovation That They Claim To Be Using blockchain technology to manage "tokens" of voting control in an entity is ultimately completely irrelevant. Blockchain technology is just another alternative to certificated shares, shares kept on an ownership ledger, or shares kept through secondary shareholding intermediaries or brokers. The technology used to keep track of voting control or economic ownership is irrelevant, and some common entities (e.g. homeowner's associations) have ownership that is basically determined via a crude public blockchain called the county clerk and recorder's records. People who think that blockchains provide any significant legal innovation into anything (e.g. here) are fundamentally misguided and typically are not people familiar with the law who have misconceptions about how the law works. Also, contrary to the hype, blockchains are not fraud-proof and indeed, involve serious systemic risks of instability because an error in an old transaction can disrupt lots of current claims. Claims such as those made here that blockchain transactions are irrefutable are naive and basically false. A block chain is a bit like a real property record system without an adverse possession rule to make ancient glitches irrelevant. Moreover, blockchains are a solution to a non-problem. Authenticating ownership and voting rights, economic entitlements, and corporate actions is something that has never posed a very significant economic problem ever since writing was invented. These are economic problems that were already effectively solved in the days of the Minoans, and widespread ownership of well authenticated entities by numerous ever shifting groups of owners was a problem well in hand by the days of the British East India Company. Anonymous Ownership Or Contribution Records Are Illegal Truly anonymous ownership, however, is legally prohibited, even though ownership need not be made a matter of public record. In the case of for profit entities, by securities regulation which requires disclosure for purposes of exercising voting rights and for disclosing large blocks of ownership as required by law, and for purposes of tax law. In the case of non-profit entities, it is prohibited by virtue of laws regulating private foundations that impose tax requirements when certain concentrations of contributions come from a small, related group of people. In the case of political organizations, campaign finance laws require disclosure.	You cannot call yourself anything that is deceptive or misleading. Given that "Spiritual Councillor Practitioner" doesn't mean anything you should be OK. However, be aware that if you give advice in a professional capacity and people act on that advice to their detriment then they can sue you. That said, taking money from people for the provision of a service for which you do not have any particular qualifications may be unethical and could get you in some kind of hot water.	Currently there is nowhere in the USA where polygamy is legal. So regardless of their sexual or gender expression or orientation, being married to MORE THAN ONE person at the same time is illegal. If, however, it turned out that someone had more than one spouse at their death, I'm sure that property distribution would be a matter for the probate court to sort out. As far as legally-married "trans spouses", for lack of a better term, I don't see why that would that impact inheritance in any way?
Is there a license for Google's animal sound effects? If you Google "animal sounds," Google presents an array of such sound effects. Inspecting the element with a broser allows me to download the effect. There is no licensing information available. May I use these sounds in a commercial project?	Interesting that they don't give a source and also don't link to anywhere (such as Wikimedia commons). So I assume that content is google's own. So generally speaking: No, when no license is provided, that means you can't use whatever it is in a project of yours (whether commercially or not), because the "default", when nothing is specified, is that no license is given. So unless you find a license that grants you a permission on google's own content, these sounds can't be used freely.	Strictly speaking, yes, Microsoft owns the copyright for all that stuff. But they grant users a license. So it's a matter of knowing what they let us do with it. I grabbed the EULA for Excel 2013. You'll want to check your version. My reading of this is that you can do the thing that you want to do. M. ADDITIONAL LICENSING REQUIREMENTS AND/OR USE RIGHTS ... Media Elements. Microsoft grants you a license to copy, distribute, perform and display media elements (images, clip art, animations, sounds, music, video clips, templates and other forms of content) included with the software in projects and documents, except that you may not: (i) sell, license or distribute copies of any media elements by themselves or as a product if the primary value of the product is the media elements; (ii) grant your customers rights to further license or distribute the media elements; (iii) license or distribute for commercial purposes media elements that include the representation of identifiable individuals, governments, logos, trademarks, or emblems or use these types of images in ways that could imply an endorsement or association with your product, entity or activity; or (iv) create obscene or scandalous works using the media elements. Other media elements, which are accessible on Office.com or on other websites through features of the software, are governed by the terms on those websites.	Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz.	No These are derivative works and making them is copyright breach. Doing this as a hobby or even for the entertainment of friends in private is likely fair use. Distribution or performance in public (monitored or not) is likely not fair use and you would need a licence. Here is a summary of the relevant law in australia.	The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use.	I am not a lawyer; I am especially not your lawyer; this is not legal advice; if you want legal advice, hire a lawyer. Idk. But probably not. The YouTube terms of service seem to prohibit this pretty clearly: You agree not to distribute in any medium any part of the Service or the Content without YouTube's prior written authorization, unless YouTube makes available the means for such distribution through functionality offered by the Service (such as the Embeddable Player)... You agree not to access Content through any technology or means other than the video playback pages of the Service itself, the Embeddable Player, or other explicitly authorized means YouTube may designate. Now, were YouTube itself licensing the videos in question under the CC license, they might be prohibited from enforcing that term: You may not offer or impose any additional or different terms or conditions on, or apply any Effective Technological Measures to, the Licensed Material if doing so restricts exercise of the Licensed Rights by any recipient of the Licensed Material. though I'm not sure if the language in question would apply. However, it seems likely that in most cases, YouTube is using the material in question under the license to which users agreed when they created their accounts, and therefore is not bound by the term in question. All that said, it's entirely possible that the clause in the YouTube ToS prohibiting downloading does not apply for whatever reason (unconscionable in a contract of adhesion, browsewrap agreement doesn't form a contract to begin with, it's superseded by either some other agreement (part of the API EULA, etc), it's contrary to some law in your jurisdiction, etc). Just to be very clear, though, there is no COPYRIGHT CONCERN preventing uses like the one you mentioned.	It Depends If the person reusing the image (lets call that person R for reuser) is not complying with the terms of the Creative commons license, which include a requirement to provide attribution of the source work, then R cannot rely on the license, and the granting of the license ad the presence of a license declaration is legally irrelevant. R must have some other basis to reuse the image. This could be an exception to copyright, such as fair use or fair dealing. Or possibly the image is not protected by copyright, for example because its copyright has expired, or because it is a work of the US Federal Government being used in the US. In the absence of such a basis, R is infringing copyright. In much of the world copyright now lasts for 70 years after the death of the author (or of all co-authors). In some different terms apply, ranging from life+50 to life+100. Sound recordings and photos get shorter terms in some countries. In the US the term is life+70 for recent works, but for work created and published before 1978 more complex rules apply, depending on the date of publication, and whether laws on notice and renewal were complied with. See the well-known chart Copyright Term and the Public Domain for the various cases and when copyright expires in each case. The question asks about fair use. This is a US-specific legal concept. It is designed to be flexible, an is highly fact-dependent. As a result it is rarely possible to say if a use will qualify as a fair use with certainty until a court passes on it. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more on fair use. Not providing attribution is itself often considered to weigh against fair use. The question does not give enough detail to make even a good guess as to whether such a use is likely to be held to be fair use. Identifying the kind of eagle has some educational value, which might favor fair use to some extent, but must be considered in light of the overall purpose of the use, which is not described. There is no indication as to whether the original work is creative or factual, or whether the reuse would be likely to harm the market for the original. Much use of images on social media does not stand up under a fair use analysis. Providing proper attribution might well help any fair use claim. See also Do you have to give attribution if an image falls under Creative Commons?	The Oracle Binary Code License Agreement for the Java SE Platform Products and JavaFX writes: LICENSE TO USE. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement including, but not limited to, the Java Technology Restrictions of the Supplemental License Terms, Oracle grants you a non-exclusive, non-transferable, limited license without license fees to reproduce and use internally the Software complete and unmodified for the sole purpose of running Programs. THE LICENSE SET FORTH IN THIS SECTION 2 DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE COMMERCIAL FEATURES. YOUR RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO THE COMMERCIAL FEATURES ARE AS SET FORTH IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL TERMS ALONG WITH ADDITIONAL LICENSES FOR DEVELOPERS AND PUBLISHERS. That is, Oracle is giving you permission to use Java for running any program, commercial or otherwise. Google vs. Oracle is not about calling the Java API, but reimplementing it on a new platform. Every computer program runs the risk of violating a third party's patents. That does not depend on the the programming language. Which is more "open source" is not clear cut, it depends on the particular JVM or CLR implementation in question. Mono is open source under the MIT licence, OpenJDK open source under the GPL v2 (with classpath extension).
Are there really US federal laws involving immigration that result in fake job interviews? On this page someone answered the question “Do employers waste time interviewing people?” with the following: yes often it is to conform to federal guidelines - so they are directed to higher the CEO’s nephew, but they get government contracts so they HAVE to follow the proper forms and pretend to interview for the position, wasting managers, HR and candidates time. This workplace stack exchange answer contains the claim that sometimes employers interview candidates they don’t want to hire because: They have an H-1B candidate already lined up and ready to go, and they don't actually want to give the job to anyone else, but are legally required to pretend to look for people. Legally, they're supposed to prefer to hire an American worker if possible, but in practice, the law is very difficult to enforce because the company can always come up with some excuse for why candidate X wasn't good enough. And of course, sometimes the H-1B candidate really is irreplaceable. I have so far been unable to find any official reference to either government contract requirements or federal laws requiring job interviews. Are either of these claims accurate?	Concerning the requirement to interview US workers before hiring workers for H-1B visas, this is covered in 8 USC §1182 (n)(1)(G)(i): (i) In the case of an application described in subparagraph (E)(ii), subject to clause (ii), the employer, prior to filing the application— (I) has taken good faith steps to recruit, in the United States using procedures that meet industry-wide standards and offering compensation that is at least as great as that required to be offered to H–1B nonimmigrants under subparagraph (A), United States workers for the job for which the nonimmigrant or nonimmigrants is or are sought; and (II) has offered the job to any United States worker who applies and is equally or better qualified for the job for which the nonimmigrant or nonimmigrants is or are sought. "Industry-wide standards" for the recruitment process typically means posting advertisements and conducting job interviews. Of course, if the company never intended to hire anyone but the H-1B candidate, that's not really "good faith", but this can be difficult for the feds to prove. Note that this requirement doesn't apply to all employers. Section (E)(ii) says that this rule only applies to those employers who are "H–1B-dependent" (which amounts to having a certain number of employees working under H–1B visas) and to those who have been caught willfully violating these rules within the past five years. I am unsure about the rules surrounding federal contracts, so folks should feel free to edit this answer to include such information.	The standard of care to determine documents are accurate varies. For example, in an ordinary notarized document, notarizing the signature of an imposter will ordinarily only impose liability on the notary for harm caused by the fraudulent imposter signing, if the notary is negligent, i.e. fails to use the reasonable care of a similarly situated notary. But, suppose that instead of a notary, the imposter uses a fake ID to get a bank to confirm his identity as part of a "guaranteed signature", which is a parallel system of confirming people's identities arising from an industry organization and mostly used to confirm identity in life insurance payouts and other non-probate transfers (e.g. pay on death bank accounts). In the bank that guarantees the signature is duped, the bank has strict liability without regard to fault to the party that is harmed by the imposter's bad signature. In the case of fake signatures on checks, there is an elaborate web of statutes in Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code and some related federal regulations, but basically, it boils down to the harm from a forged check falling on the person who dealt most closely with the imposter. The standard for a Fake IDs used to get alcohol is particularly tricky because rather than flowing from a common law rule, it usually depends upon the exact language of a liquor regulation statute and related regulations, so it is often non-uniform. There is not a general rule governing this situation and that situation is very common in American law. More often than not, you can not determine the correct answer to a legal question by simply applying a general rule to a new situation. Law is not physics.	As a adult of sound mind, you are responsible for your actions. Background checks for job applications are common place to determine suitability. The employers have the right (and responsibility) to choose what is in their best interest. If through your previous and present actions, they come to the conclusion that you will become a liability to their interests, they will determine that you are not suitable for the position. Not being suitable for a position is not a discrimination, but a determination of fact. Rights and responsibilities go hand in hand. The same is true for the employers. They too have the obligation to act in their own that of their other employees that of their clients interests. In cases where a judge comes to a conclusion that the rights of others are being impeaded, they will most likely decide for that party. It is unlikely that a judge will assume that an individual is the center of the universe and that everyone else must revolve around that individual.	Question: Do I need a EU passport or EU ID card to legally work in the EU (or establish that I have the right to work in the EU)? Or is a certificate of citizenship sufficient? Legally, your right to work is not contingent on this and there is no Europe-wide rule that makes holding any document mandatory. Importantly, if you do start working anyway, you are not committing a crime and cannot possibly be banned or forced to leave the country. You do have the right to work from the day you became an EU citizen and if any doubt arises down the line, you should be able to clear it up later. In practice, employers are sometimes supposed to check you are allowed to work (and for that would require some proof of your citizenship) but they don't necessarily need a passport or ID. What's typical on the other hand is that you have to provide an official proof of address (in the countries where you have to register your address with the authorities) and the local social security, insurance, or national tax number. Both of these will require dealing with the authorities and will be considerably more difficult, if not downright impossible, without a national ID card or passport (in fact it can even be difficult with a passport). I worked in multiple EU countries and I don't recall always having to present my ID to employers. I recall at least one instance (in Germany) where I could start working without one (it had just been stolen) and another one (in the Netherlands) where I started on the day after I arrived, without official address nor tax number (BSN). In both cases, I was expected to solve these issues within the first month and you risk a fine if you don't register within a week or two but it was neither illegal nor impossible to start working before all the formalities were completed. None of this means I would be completely comfortable about being months without a passport. But the main issue for you will be entering the country and what your employer's HR department is prepared to tolerate, not any sort of legal obligation to hold a passport to work. Note that in one of the cases I described above I went to the local consulate to get an emergency passport. It wouldn't have been possible back in my country of citizenship but there are some special procedures when you reside abroad. These rules change all the time and depend on your country of citizenship but that could be worth a try.	In general, "a signed piece of paper" is not "a contract". It may be a record of a contract, but the contract itself is the meeting of minds where an agreement is reached and doesn't depend on the existence of the piece of paper. (Depending on the jurisdiction, some sorts of contract are required to be in writing, but this doesn't usually apply to employment contracts; it's usually contracts involving land.) What is far more worrying to me is that you don't know how much they are going to pay you. That suggests there hasn't been a meeting of minds, and there is no contract. (It might be that "the going rate" is good enough to form a contract - to determine that would require advice from a local lawyer.) I suggest you don't write up a formal agreement, but nag your boss to decide how much they are actually going to pay you.	The Company is performing wage theft I have never heard of a wage method that pays a salary according to hours but doens't pay for hours over 40. Monthly Salary, by definition, is paid regardless of hours. Your contract doesn't give hours, it just gives a monthly total. That's a contract, and you should be paid according to the contract. In terms of fairness, it certainly isn't right to dock pay for weeks you worked less than 40 but not give you credit for weeks you wored more than 40. Now, it's not clear if you moved to direct employment for the second month. If you did, the first month would be a contract violation, and the second would be a violation of wage & labor law. A company can't pay you salary as an exempt (exempt from hourly wage laws, like management) employee and also dock you pay according to hours worked. So what can you do? If you are still a contractor and actually want the job, not much more than arguing with payroll. Since you (why?) decided to be a contractor instead of a direct hire, you have exactly zero protections to getting let go. If you are a direct employee, you have protections from bringing action about being paid fairly, though your long-term prospects there would be problematic if you have to take the company to task using the government. Any HR rep should know all of the above. But never just go to HR without talking to your manager first. Remember that HR works for management, and working against your manager is generally a bad career move.	Issues of strategy rest with counsel, not the client. Thus, in the situation you posit, the lawyer is not required to follow the client's desires. One might observe, however, that a competent lawyer will avoid the conflict entirely by addressing the issue before accepting the client. If the client is firm in wanting to direct the lawyer's negotiation or litigation strategy, and the lawyer is unwilling to do so, the lawyer should decline to take on the case. When I practiced, prospective clients who wanted to run things were very politely declined and shown the door. I don't see anything unethical about accepting such conditions from a prospective client, but the attorney isn't required to do so, and can decline the employment.	In the linked question the requirement that is allegedly a lie is in a severance agreement which states that: The contract has terms that require me to tell anyone who asks that I was not, in fact, laid off, but instead that I voluntarily resigned from the company. I would not call that a lie. It is, instead, a mutual agreed change in the reason for leaving employment, that by virtue of an agreement for severance being executed, becomes true. The termination of employment may have initially started out as a layoff, but once you agree to leave in exchange for a severance payment instead, it becomes a voluntary resignation. The colloquial meaning of the word "lie" includes lots of things (like broken promises) which are not considered to be lies in the legal sense, or even if a more strict sense of the word "lie." Similarly, a contract hiring you to be an actor and in the course of an acting performance, to say things that are not factually true to an audience that knows you are acting, is also not a lie. The set of things that aren't legally fraud (which would cause a contractual requirement to be void as contrary to public policy), but are "lies" in a strict sense yet aren't illegal, is pretty narrow. It might encompass a contract as a P.R. agency for a political campaign that requires that agency to produce materials consistent with a candidate's message. But there aren't all that many other examples I can think of.
Can you plead the 5th in a civil case? There seems to be the idea that the right not to self-incriminate does not apply to civil cases. Is that true?	Yes, One Can In the United States, one may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify or otherwise give information that might tend to implicate the speaker in a crime. This is true in any court proceeding, civil or criminal, whether the person asserting the privilege is an accused, a witness, or a party to a civil case. It may be asserted in a Grand Jury or trial proceeding. One may also assert the privilege under police interrogation, or in an administrative proceeding. One may also assert it when testifying before Congress, a state legislature, or any local legislative body. One may also assert it when testifying before a government agency, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission. Asserting the privilege is often informally called "pleading the Fifth", although strictly speaking "pleading" is something that only an accused does (as in "I plead not guilty"). The availability of the privilege in civil cases has been true at least since the Saline Bank case of 1828 (see below). The privilege is not available when no criminal prosecution is legally possible, such as when the statute of limitations has expired, or when the law invoked has been held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, and no other valid law applies. Thus, if an authorized government official (usually a prosecutor) offers a grant of immunity, the privilege is no longer available on matters covered by the grant, and the person asserting it must then testify on such matters. The privilege may be asserted when the person doing so is actually guilty, or when the person is not guilty, but has a reasonable belief that the statements asked for might be used against the speaker in some current or future criminal proceeding. A person who has been tried for a crime nut had the case end in a mistrial, or a dismissal without prejudice, could still be re-tried for that accusation, and so may assert the privilege. Any assertion must be clear, but need not use a specific form of worfs. The standard form advised by many lawyers is I decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me. but less formal wording such as 'I take the Fifth" will also serve to assert the privilege. When the privilege is asserted in a court case, the Judge may question the person asserting it in private, off the record, to determine whether the fear of incrimination is reasonable. Case Law Saline Bank (1828) In the case of United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. 100 (1828) Chief Justice Marshall wrote: It is apparent that, in every step of the suit, the facts required to be discovered in support of this suit would expose the parties to danger. The rule clearly is that a party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to penalties, and this case falls within it. [This case was cited in Murphy, below] Saline Bank was a civil suit by the US treasury in Federal curt against an apparently unincorporated bank, but a Virginia state law of the time made it a crime to operate or participate in a bank without a proper charter. Thus the Marshall Court held that a witness in a civil suit could assert the privilege against the future possibility of a state criminal proceeding. Kastigar (1972) In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) the US Supreme Court wrote (footnotes omitted): It [the privilege against self-incrimination] can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has been zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the privilege [Citing the Miranda case in a footnote]. (Kastigar was a case in which people subpoenaed before a Grand Jury asserted the privilege, were granted immunity, and still refused to testify, alleging that the grant of immunity was not enough to revoke the privialge. They were held in contempt, appealed, and the Court held that the immunity was sufficient to allow the witnesses to be compelled to testify. In the court of its opinion, the Kastigar Court reviewed the history of the privilege and of immunity statutes in some detail.) Murphy (1964) In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) the US Supreme Court wrote: We have held today that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be deemed fully applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. ... Petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor concerning a work stoppage at the Hoboken, New Jersey, piers. After refusing to respond to certain questions about the stoppage on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminated them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey and New York. [Footnote 2] Notwithstanding this grant of immunity, they still refused to respond to the questions on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law, to which the grant of immunity did not purport to extend. [This case was cited in Kastigar above.] McCarthy v. Arndstein (1924) In McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (footnotes omitted, boldface added) The US Supreme Court wrote: The case is now before us on rehearing, granted in order to permit argument of the proposition, not presented by counsel before, that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to an examination of the bankrupt made for the purpose of obtaining possession of property belonging to his estate. ... The contention now is that the privilege against self-incrimination ought to have been disallowed because, under the Constitution, it does not extend to the examination of a bankrupt in a bankruptcy proceeding. The government insists broadly that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in any civil proceeding. The contrary must be accepted as settled. The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. The privilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also a party defendant. It protects likewise the owner of goods which may be forfeited in a penal proceeding. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 142 U. S. 563-564. The government urges more strongly a narrower contention. It claims that the constitutional privilege does not relieve a bankrupt from the duty to give information which is sought for the purpose of discovering his estate. It asserts that, in England, such an exception to the common law privilege prevails, and that the exception had been established there prior to the Declaration of Independence. Whatever may be the rule in England, it is clear that, in America, the constitutional prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination has not been so limited.	It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay? And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case (Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal.	There are cases out there like Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, State v. Unnamed Defendant, Williams v. Unnamed Defendant; there have been indictments of John Doe who was only identified via a DNA profile. Not knowing the actual name of a person wouldn't pose a problem per se, and it seems that when the name is not known, John or Jane Doe is generally filled in. There was in instance a year ago in the UK where rioters who refused to identify themselves, and prosecution decided to drop the case.	The burden of proof is always on the plaintiff (except for counterclaims brought by the defendant against the plaintiff). In your example, the businessman has to prove that he did not rape her.	Assuming that privilege applies, no Not all communications with your lawyer trigger privilege and if it doesn’t then the lawyer is not your lawyer and is under the same obligation to report as any other member of the public. If privilege does apply then they must keep your secrets. If they are defending you and you confess to the crime then they can: represent you if you plead guilty withdraw unless that would prejudice your defence continue to act providing that they do not: suggest someone else committed the offence set up a defence inconsistent with the confession they can: argue the prosecution has not made their case, that you are not guilty of the offence charged by reason of law, or argue for any other (non prohibited) reason that you should not be convicted.	If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear.	The legal term for what you're talking about is "prejudice." When a lawsuit (or a claim, or a party) is dismissed by a court "with prejudice," that means that the same cause of action cannot be brought again by the same plaintiff against the same defendant. It is also possible to dismiss a claim "without prejudice," meaning the same claim can be brought at a later date. When, exactly, a civil case can be dismissed with or without prejudice will depend on the jurisdiction where you're litigating. However, the general rule is that once the suit is underway, most dismissals are with prejudice. For example, in U.S. federal court, the plaintiff has the right to dismiss the suit without prejudice only up until the defendant responds to the complaint (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)), unless all of the defendants agree to be sued again later (this does happen, sometimes, but normally only as part of a broader settlement). So, yes; you can lose your substantive legal rights if you refuse to follow the court's procedural rules. Most courts, especially in federal court, where there is a fairly permissive standard of pleading, will give plenty of leeway to pro se litigants, but in the end they have to follow the rules. In my own experience, when pro se claims are dismissed, it's generally on the merits. If cases are dismissed for procedural reasons, it's almost always a case of a pro se litigant refusing to listen to the judge's clear instructions for what they need to do (or, more often, not do).	Although the assailant (or their estate if they are killed) could lodge a claim for damages it does not necessarily follow that they would win - they would have to show that the shooting was not legitimate self-defence but rather was unlawful by, for example, negligence or use of excessive force - say by shooting them when they didn't pose an immediate and unjustified threat. The Federation rules, as far as I can see, are not actual legislation. Although they should be adhered to in normal circumstances, this shooting would be, in the given circumstances, legitimate self-defence according to Article 122-5 of the Code Pénal which says: N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, devant une atteinte injustifiée envers elle-même ou autrui, accomplit, dans le même temps, un acte commandé par la nécessité de la légitime défense d'elle-même ou d'autrui, sauf s'il y a disproportion entre les moyens de défense employés et la gravité de l'atteinte. N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, pour interrompre l'exécution d'un crime ou d'un délit contre un bien, accomplit un acte de défense, autre qu'un homicide volontaire, lorsque cet acte est strictement nécessaire au but poursuivi dès lors que les moyens employés sont proportionnés à la gravité de l'infraction. Which Google translates to English as: The person who, in the face of an unjustified attack on himself or others, performs, at the same time, an act ordered by the necessity of the self-defense of himself or of others, is not criminally liable, except 'there is a disproportion between the means of defense employed and the seriousness of the infringement. The person who, in order to interrupt the execution of a crime or an offense against property, performs an act of defense, other than intentional homicide, when this act is strictly necessary for the aim pursued, is not criminally liable. provided that the means employed are proportionate to the gravity of the offense.
Can the military see my sealed juvenile record during the background check? I applied for US Military Engineering Internships in California. I talked to a recruiter and he said there will be a background check. I am now in a college. When I was 14, I made a stupid mistake. I was arrested for shoplifting. I think I did some community service and the case is now sealed. When submitting my background application, if it says "have you ever been convicted or arrested?", should I say yes or no?	One answer is that you should say "yes", because it is a federal felony (5 years prison term) to say "no", because it is untrue, and you know it is untrue. This assumes that the question simply asks "Have you ever been convicted or arrested; please explain", with no qualifiers like "as an adult". If you are absolutely positive that the record was sealed, an alternative answer is "no", based on a law like RCW 13.50.260(6)(a), which say you can legally "act as if it didn't happen": If the court enters a written order sealing the juvenile court record pursuant to this section, it shall, subject to RCW 13.50.050(13), order sealed the official juvenile court record, the social file, and other records relating to the case as are named in the order. Thereafter, the proceedings in the case shall be treated as if they never occurred, and the subject of the records may reply accordingly to any inquiry about the events, records of which are sealed. California has a similar law. The problem here is that this is state law, so a valid defense for a state charge of lying, but you need to comply with federal law, and states cannot tell the FBI what to do. It is variously rumoured that the FBI does not report sealed records, but it is unwise to count on rumours, and even if it is general discretionary policy for them to delete information about sealed records when reported from the state, it is not guaranteed that the policy is absolutely always followed. You can request an Identity History Summary Check from the FBI. So the safest path is to get an informed opinion, tailored to your facts, from your attorney.	Try the phone or email contacts at Florida Department of Law Enforcement - Home. The state of Florida doesn't appear to maintain a statewide officer registry, but that department should be able to verify someone is or isn't a officer in conjunction with the police department closest to your location. If this neighbor is threatening or attempting to enforce the law while not showing ID that proves he/she is an officer, that's serious, and you should call the local police department. Talking about being a LEO while drinking beer at a BBQ is less serious, but still could be a third degree felony. See Statutes & Constitution - Florida State Statutes: 843.08 False personation.—A person who falsely assumes or pretends to be a firefighter, sheriff, officer of the Florida Highway Patrol, officer of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, fire or arson investigator of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Corrections, correctional probation officer, deputy sheriff, state attorney or assistant state attorney, statewide prosecutor or assistant statewide prosecutor, state attorney investigator, coroner, police officer, lottery special agent or lottery investigator, beverage enforcement agent, or watchman, or any member of the Florida Commission on Offender Review and any administrative aide or supervisor employed by the commission, or any personnel or representative of the Department of Law Enforcement, or a federal law enforcement officer as defined in s. 901.1505, and takes upon himself or herself to act as such, or to require any other person to aid or assist him or her in a matter pertaining to the duty of any such officer, commits a felony of the third degree,	You don't say who is telling you that you need to do these things, and it does matter. Educational institutions are required to maintain a discrimination-free environment, so if a student makes inappropriate remarks to another student, they have to address the matter (if they ignore it, saying "Boys will be boys", they can get sued). They will have previously spelled out procedures for addressing such accusations, which probably include giving a good talking-to to the guilty party, and maybe some harsher sanction like suspension. The school district might then have in mind a parent-teacher conference, with the underlying threat being to turn the matter over to the police: did the letter come from the school district? A minor can commit a crime, such as assault or threatening: in Oklahoma, this includes Ok. Stat §21-1172, which makes it a crime to send a message that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, and a first violation of the law is a misdemeanor. For an adult, the penalty can be a year in prison and $500 fine, but that is unlikely for a minor. There may be a hearing in Juvenile Court with some disposition, and if the charges are proven then the court has wide latitude in meting out punishment. Did the letter come from the juvenile court system? The Oklahome law regarding children and juveniles is here. When the Office of Juvenile Affairs engages in "the intake process", they are investigating the case to make a recommendation to the DA. "Intake" is defined as a mandatory, preadjudicatory interview of the juvenile and, if available, the parents, legal guardian, or other custodian of the juvenile, which is performed by a duly authorized individual to determine whether a juvenile comes within the purview of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code, whether nonadjudicatory alternatives are available and appropriate, and if the filing of a petition is necessary Since "intake" is juvenile justice jargon, I assume this is a legal proceeding, not a parent-teacher conference. An actual criminal charge might result from the hearing, which is brought about by a referral. Because detention is a real possibility, consulting an attorney is wise. Whether or not it is a good idea to have the attorney present for the proceeding is something only your attorney can say (in his professional judgment). There is really no way to know in advance what they already know.	Assuming that the age of criminal responsibility in your jurisdiction is more than five (I don't know any jurisdictions where it isn't), then you can't be arrested for this. It is possible that the therapist will have to report the information, and it will appear on your record if you apply to work with vulnerable people. On the other hand, if your parents put you up for adoption aged five (but kept a sister), they will have had to explain why - and that is likely to have been recorded (unless this is so long ago that record keeping was much more lax in those days). I would recommend finding a different therapist that is more comfortable being told about these things. You might also need to consult a lawyer for a short while (they will often offer a 30 minute free consultation).	You'd have to specify the cases you want. All court transcripts are a matter of public record, though a copy may cost you a fee from the court clerk's office to recieve. It should be pointed out that not all cases got to an evidentiary stage to actually evaluate on the record any evidence. A vast majority were decided on pre-evidentiary rules such as standing or laches (timeliness) and not all cases that were able induced evidence debunked the evidence. Any appellent case would also not induce evidence as all appeals cases are strictly matter of law rather than matter of fact (evidence), so those cases would be asking a higher court to double check non-evidentiary decisions. The fact that the party that brought the suit does not have standing to bring the suit OR that the party that brought the suit brought it too late for the courts to proceed on the matter does not debunk evidence that the fraud happened in the eyes of the law... it simply means the questions of fact were never addressed at all	No. Refusing to tell the address alone is not a reason to detain somebody. But there are situations where the authorities can demand that a person identifies himself or herself, including such details as the address (or lack of a permanent residency). In such a situation, failure to identify yourself can get you locked up. Also, the tone of your posting seems to question the legitimacy of the UK government and legal system as a whole. That is a box you're putting yourself into, and the company you find there is not very pleasant.	If that which you describe in your comment ( Facebook post as only basis for warrantless search) is, and can be shown, to be the only basis for the search, and there was no evidence of a crime in plain view when they arrived.....then yes, it is likely the search and all evidence acquired from the search would be excludable. As to whether the individual could still be prosecuted, that depends if a case could be built independent of the evidence collected during the search.	Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word.
Who gets in trouble if a user uploads pirated content on an open platform? I have made this site similar to Youtube/Instagram where users can upload photos/videos to their profile and share it with others. Recently, some users have started to pirate content (some have started uploading Spongebob Episodes, Minion Movies, Hotel Transylvania Movies, etc). From these uploads, I am worried about being sued for copyright infringement. In my terms however, I state that the platform holds no liability for content uploaded, and I strongly suggest users to hold rights to the media they upload. Even after this, I am still worried that I could get in trouble for the content my users upload. So in the case of uploaded copyright infringement, will the platform also get in trouble? (Servers are in the U.S., users view/upload content from across the world)	The platform will get in trouble for copyright infringement. The disclaimer that you are not liable does not work, legally, since the person suing you hasn't agreed to the TOS on your webpage. You can be sued for "secondary infringement", meaning that not only the uploader but also you the service provider are liable. The solution to this quandry is the "DMCA safe harbor", a set of rules which, if you follow them, you won't be held liable. The specific piece of law is here. The essence of the rules is that you have to have a "designated agent" who receives takedown notices: if a copyright owner finds their stuff on your page, they officially notify you, then you take the material down – expeditiously (no dawdling). You notify the uploader, they either accept the takedown or file a counterclaim, you notify the rights-holder, there's a waiting period, then the rights holder can file a lawsuit, or not. If the rights-holder doesn't file suit, you can put the material back up. You cannot rely solely on the intricate DMCA notice / counter-notice dance, because under para (c)(1)(A)(ii) of §512, you also must not be "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent".	Copyright infringement is a legal issue. The injured party is entitled to seek damages from the alleged infringer: either actual damages or a statutory amount per copy (i.e. per download). Unless the infringer agrees to pay they need to go to court to get the money. Whether this is worthwhile for them depends on how easy it is to prove the infringement, the amount what they expect to gain, their assessment of the infringer's ability to pay without going broke and how much it costs to pursue. "What they expect to gain" may include publicity: if they think that pursuing the infringer sends a message to others they may do it even at a cost. Copyright infringement is also a criminal matter where the state can seek criminal sanctions like fines and jail time. Your friend should hire a lawyer.	I am not a lawyer; I am especially not your lawyer; this is not legal advice; if you want legal advice, hire a lawyer. Idk. But probably not. The YouTube terms of service seem to prohibit this pretty clearly: You agree not to distribute in any medium any part of the Service or the Content without YouTube's prior written authorization, unless YouTube makes available the means for such distribution through functionality offered by the Service (such as the Embeddable Player)... You agree not to access Content through any technology or means other than the video playback pages of the Service itself, the Embeddable Player, or other explicitly authorized means YouTube may designate. Now, were YouTube itself licensing the videos in question under the CC license, they might be prohibited from enforcing that term: You may not offer or impose any additional or different terms or conditions on, or apply any Effective Technological Measures to, the Licensed Material if doing so restricts exercise of the Licensed Rights by any recipient of the Licensed Material. though I'm not sure if the language in question would apply. However, it seems likely that in most cases, YouTube is using the material in question under the license to which users agreed when they created their accounts, and therefore is not bound by the term in question. All that said, it's entirely possible that the clause in the YouTube ToS prohibiting downloading does not apply for whatever reason (unconscionable in a contract of adhesion, browsewrap agreement doesn't form a contract to begin with, it's superseded by either some other agreement (part of the API EULA, etc), it's contrary to some law in your jurisdiction, etc). Just to be very clear, though, there is no COPYRIGHT CONCERN preventing uses like the one you mentioned.	Probably not, because you should be in a position to rely on the Safe Harbor provision of the DMCA. Safe Harbor protects service providers who provide open, non-moderated spaces for users to directly contribute content. Safe Harbor means you do not need an army of moderators to inspect every message posted to the site or system. It is essential for sites like Twitter, Youtube or StackExchange to exist. You are not liable for that content if you provide a means for IP owners to report copyright violations, and promptly take down any content which an IP owner reports as violating. You don't need to get in the middle of whether that's really true; there's a mechanism for the user and IP owner to "duke it out" directly at no risk to you. However you must take the required steps. For instance you must register an agent, and respond timely to DMCA takedown notices, which means you must be reachable as per the law. Your designated agent address must be staffed 9-5. Note that the "Designated Agent" can be the same person as the "Registered Agent" that you already must have when you are an LLC or corporation. And you'll want to be an LLC or corporation by the time you get big enough to worry about copyright lawsuits.	What SE can do is controlled primarily by the Terms of Service. What most matters is the section on Subscriber Content, which says: You agree that any and all content, including without limitation any and all text, graphics, logos, tools, photographs, images, illustrations, software or source code, audio and video, animations, and product feedback (collectively, “Content”) that you provide to the public Network (collectively, “Subscriber Content”), is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC-BY-SA), and you grant Stack Overflow the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to access, use, process, copy, distribute, export, display and to commercially exploit such Subscriber Content, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by you... This means that you cannot revoke permission for Stack Overflow to publish, distribute, store and use such content and to allow others to have derivative rights to publish, distribute, store and use such content. The CC-BY-SA Creative Commons license terms are explained in further detail by Creative Commons, but you should be aware that all Public Content you contribute is available for public copy and redistribution, and all such Public Content must have appropriate attribution. This part has not changed: the purported license is still "CC-BY-SA", and the TOS does not explicitly specify a version. What apparently has changed in the relevant section is one "helpful information" link, which now points to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. So the interesting question arises whether that would constitute an unpermitted post-hoc change in the terms by which SE has license to my older stuff. This matter came up in a reviled Meta question; as I pointed out, the TOS also included a merger clause that This Agreement (including the Privacy Policy), as modified from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between You, the Network and Stack Exchange with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement replaces all prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements, written or oral, regarding the subject matter hereof. Because of that, the TOS is self-contained and stuff found on other web pages are not part of the agreement. This in itself is a bit of a problem because you can't both say "we're not bound by stuff outside of this page" and say "the specific terms of the license are outside this page". That particular clause is gone, but there is an analog in the current TOS: These Public Network Terms represent the entire agreement between you and Stack Overflow and supersede all prior or contemporaneous oral or written communications, proposals, and representations with respect to the public Network or Services or Products contemplated hereunder. Furthermore, the TOS contains the following "we can change it" clause: Stack Overflow reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to modify or replace these Public Network Terms, as our business evolves over time and to better provide Services and Products to the Stack Overflow community, or to change, suspend, or discontinue the public Network and/or any Services or Products at any time by posting a notice on the public Network or by sending you notice via e-mail or by another appropriate means of electronic communication. I assume but do not know for a fact that a similar clause existed in prior versions of the TOS. So I conclude that the change is legal.	It would be copyright infringement. You had the copyright holders permission to make one copy of the song by downloading it. At that time, if you gave me a copy of that song, it could be argued that very, very little damage was caused because I just had downloaded that song myself with practically the same effect. Today, that argument is not valid anymore. So this is definitely copyright infringement. That's your question answered. I doubt that anyone would take action if you gave a copy to someone and it was found out. Making it available to the world for free download is another matter. That could easily get you into trouble; in the USA there could be a fine up to $150,000 without any proof of actual damages needed.	No, it's still copyright infringement. When you modify a copyrighted work in any way, you generate a derivative work which you are not allowed to distribute without the permission of the original copyright holder.	The players behind KAT don't make themselves known. The owners of Pirate Bay were known and were personally legally pursued. That's the place to start. Law enforcement can't criminally charge anyone if they don't know who is responsible. Second is that KAT complies with DCMA takedown rules. They publicly claim to at least. PB was known to have a more f-off attitude. The US Justice Dept does pursue KAT which is why KAT changes domains so often. They do get shut down. Law enforcement has better things to do. The record and movie studios and industry-groups have money and technology to pursue infringers. It's my impression that law enforcement is happy to let the copyright holders do the heavy lifting and the government can come in with criminal charges.
What are the bases for judging whether copyright infringment has taken place for artistic works? I'm wondering, if a TV show based on a historical period exists that was never made in a book format, to what extent can the ideas incorporated in the series be used before it becomes a matter of copyright infringement? For example, using the same historical people is fine, but what about using said historical people in interactions that have no basis in historical documents? Basically, at what point does an artistic work infringe on previous artistic works? I recognize this is ambiguous but I assume that copyright law has several bases on which to make such a judgement call.	The basic principle is that copyright never protects an idea, it only protects the expression of an idea. In the US, that rule is embodied in 17 USC 102(b) which provides that: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. When significant, detailed, and specific plot elements are copied from a prior work, then that may make the new work a derivative work. Creation or distribution of a derivative work requires permission from the owner of the copyright (if any) on the prior work (source work). But the elements used must be significant and must be detailed. If all that is taken could be expressed in a summery contained in a single sentence or paragraph, this will not make the new work derivative. For example, such ideas as: Napoleon meets the Emperor of China and they form an alliance. [My idea] Sherlock Holmes helps to repel the Martian invasion described in The War of the Worlds. Conan Doyle's Professor Challenger is also involved. [Wellman's Sherlock Holmes's War of the Worlds] Aliens crash land on Earth in 1905, creating an alternate timeline. They seek to start WWI early, to stimulate technical development. [Benson's ...And Having Writ] would on their own not be enough to constitute a derivative work and thus infringement. But the more specific detail from the source work is used, the more likely it is that an infringement suit would win. By the way, the rule is the same whether the source work is a book, or a TV show, or an opera, or any other work subject to copyright protection. If the work is old enough, any copyright will have expired, but the format of the original does not matter, as long as it is "fixed in a tangible form" which includes video tape, DVD, computer file, or a script written on paper. About the only things that do not count as fixed would be an impromptu dance, song, speech, or story whch the creator performed or spoke without its ever having been written down or recorded in any way.	There aren't bright line rules in the area of fair use (which is the core issue - you are clearly copying a work that has copyright protected portions, at least - the question is whether fair use provides a defense and whether some portions are not copyright protected). This inquiry is fact specific and driven by general standards. Context such as whether the use would be free or commercial matter as well. For your own notes, anything goes pretty much. This generally wouldn't constitute "publication" of the work and would be for personal educational used by someone who paid for the book anyway. For shared notes - it depends. Also not all kinds of copying is created equal. Some parts of textbooks are themselves in the public domain or not protectable by copyright. For example, even a lengthy quote from a scientific journal article would probably be allowed with attribution. It would also be easier to evaluate based upon the type of textbook. A history textbook can have protection similar to trade non-fiction and can have very original exposition. An algebra textbook, less so. Your question also points to an end run. If the professor is the author of the textbook (many of mine were in something of a racket), you could get permission from the author.	The facts you describe are very likely an infringing derivative work which would provide a basis for a lawsuit against the person operating the website. But, nothing is certain, and these determinations are highly fact specific. It is highly unlikely that the government would enforce a violation of copyright alleged in these circumstances criminally.	You would be in poorly-tested waters under US law. The invented name "Cthulhu" as appearing in a novel is not protected by copyright. A collection of invented names and other words assembled into a dictionary (e.g. of Klingon) might be found to constitute a copyright-protected creative work. In Paramount Pictures v. Axanar Productions (complaint), plaintiffs partially base their claim on infringement of language; defendants sought to dismiss the suit on various grounds ("questions of law" rather than questions of fact), but the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, defendants settled the case. Constructed languages are highly creative expressive works whose elements are deliberately selected for an artistic purpose, and they are not naturally-occurring facts. The copyright office has no position on copyright protection of a constructed language, and any such position would have to come from so-far non-existent (definitive) case law. The dismissal in Paramount v. Axanar doesn't clearly indicate that a constructed language is protected. The primary legal question would be whether the database that you copy into your system is protected. There is a colorable legal argument that a collection of language-like objects. The statutory language in 17 USC 102 does not specifically preclude protection of a wholely-creative database, and the copyright office does not say whether a conlang can be protected because the courts have not ruled one way or the other. The situation in Feist is very different from the case of a work which invents a language from nothing.	Generally, it's illegal. You are creating a derivative work and you are not allowed to do that without the permission of the copyright holder. Some jurisdictions may have exceptions, such as fair use under US law. However, this generally protects uses that are intended to comment on or parody the work. It doesn't sound like that is the purpose of your image modification. NOT including: faceswaps, modifications that would shame or affect negatively the reputation of the actors on the image. That doesn't make it legal. I share it in a way that I don't make any economic profit out of it, and clearly stating that it is a modified image (not sure if inside the image, or in the caption under it) and state who is the legal owner of the original image. That doesn't make it legal, either.	Maybe. It might fall under "fair use", which overrides the general requirement to get permission. The way to find out is to do it, get sued, then try to defend your action by using the fair use defense. If they win in the lawsuit, you can't, if you win, you can. There are four "factors" that have to be "balanced", plus a fifth. The factors are "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes", "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole", "the nature of the copyrighted work" and "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work". The fifth consideration is "transformativeness". W.r.t. purpose of the use, your use would likely be found to be "fair", except for the Youtube monetization problem. The "nature of the copyright work" question is primarily about "artistic works" versus "factual works", so it would depend on what you are taking from. One second might not be substantial, unless that one second is the only reason people pay to watch the copyrighted work. That interacts with the substantiality desideratum: could people get the crucial amusement content of the paid work for free by watching your video? You can read some case law in the links here, and you basically have to get an attorney to analyze your plans to tell you what your risks are.	I've found Google's filtering based on licence to not be very reliable, at least not reliable enough to trust from a practical legal perspective. Using a photo that you don't own the copyright to is a risk. You may be infringing copyright by doing so. The owner may eventually ask you to stop, or they may sue you for damages. Further, some copyright infringement is criminal 17 USC 506. In my opinion, it would be unwise to use a work commercially that you don't affirmatively know you have permission to use.	The significant question is whether such a statement as "no copyright infringement intended" will be viewed by the courts as evidence to suggest innocent infringement or rather as evidence to support willful infringement. This consideration of willful versus innocent is relevant when a copyright holder seeks statutory damages. 17 USC §504(c)(2) says (emphasis mine): In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. Branch v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc. says of willfulness (emphasis mine): Thus, in order to prove willfulness, a plaintiff must show that the defendant knew or should have known that its conduct constituted copyright infringement. Similarly, in order to establish innocent intent, the defendant must prove that it did not know and should not have known that its conduct constituted infringement. One defense to an allegation of willfulness is the defendant's reasonable and good faith belief that its actions do not constitute copyright infringement. The central question, then, seems to be whether the notice "no copyright infringement intended" aids or harms an argument that the infringer "did not know or should not have known" that they were infringing copyright, or else that they had a "reasonable and good faith belief" of non-infringement. I am not aware of any case law that concerns such a notice, but my layman intuition suggests to me that such a notice lends evidential weight that the defendant did indeed know the work in question was under copyright; since the defendant was therefore aware the work was under copyright, it is unlikely that they could successfully claim a reasonable belief that publicly distributing the entirety of (or a substantial portion of) the work without permission was not infringement. Ultimately, I don't think such a notice does anything to aid the defendant's argument that they "should not have known" their use was infringing. Nor do I think it furthers an argument of "reasonable and good faith belief" by the defendant: the reasonableness of such a belief will rest significantly on the facts of the infringement, not only on how loudly they shouted, "I swear this isn't infringement!" Conversely, such a notice may further the idea that the defendant did know that copyright applied to the work, strengthening the plaintiff's argument that the defendant should have known the use was infringing.
Can police actually commandeer a vehicle from a citizen for pursuit? One sees it in films and tv all the time... Officer: "He's getting away! Sir, I'm commandeering this vehicle. Please get out!" Is this actually feasible? Is a private citizen required to relinquish their privately owned vehicle if a police officer requests it, merely so the officer can continue a pursuit? US Law. Assuming the citizen is legally authorized to drive and the officer has no other official reason to stop the driver. And the citizen is doing nothing to otherwise impede any pursuit.	More generally, but subject to the specifics of state law, a person may be required to assist a police officer. For instance in Alabama A person commits the crime of refusing to aid a peace officer if, upon command by a peace officer identified to him as such, he fails or refuses to aid such peace officer in: (1) Effecting or securing a lawful arrest; or (2) Preventing the commission by another person of any offense. In Washington, the obligations is much narrower: A person is guilty of refusing to summon aid for a peace officer if, upon request by a person he or she knows to be a peace officer, he or she unreasonably refuses or fails to summon aid for such peace officer. Washington seems to be in the minority, compared to Alabama.	It may be legal, depending on surrounding circumstances. Under MCL 257.904b(1) When a person is convicted of an offense punishable under section 904(1)(b) or (c) or a local ordinance substantially corresponding to section 904(1)(b) or (c) for operating a motor vehicle while his or her license to operate a motor vehicle is suspended, revoked, or denied, the court shall order the motor vehicle, if it is owned in whole or in part or leased by that person, impounded for not less than a period the court orders but not more than 120 days from the date of judgment Under the assumption that there was a violation of the law, a conviction and license suspension (for the relevant crime), then the vehicle shall be impounded. It would not be legal for the police to spontaneously decide to impound the vehicle without a court order (which the court must issue). The statute does require that the vehicle be owned or leased at least in part by the person who violated the law. You might then argue that this does not allow impoundment for a vehicle borrowed with permission, and if the judge rejects that argument you could try to argue it up to the Michigan Supreme Court.	There are multiple police forces in the US: city, county, state and national, and each is responsible to a relevant executive. Typical "police" are city police, who are responsible to a chief of police, who is appointed at the municipal level. Counties usually have an elected sheriff, and a set of deputies; at the state level, they are usually called state troopers. The typical protocol is that decisions are made at the lowest applicable level, so Seattle police enforce or refuse to enforce laws within Seattle, and King County police enforce or not in remaining unincorporated locations in the county. Individual city officers do not then decide to ignore the chief of police and instead follow orders from the county sheriff or the governor. However, each state grants vast powers to their governor, so it is possible that in the case of a state of emergency, the governor can take command of all law enforcement in the state. Governors "can't" deploy police to oppose federal law enforcement in a shoot-out, except that they might actually do so on some theory that federal law enforcement officers are violating the law. In general, you are not immune to arrest for illegal acts just because you are a law enforcement officer. The governor of Washington could easily (in the legal sense) declare an emergency and order state troopers to prevent federal officers from effecting arrests. Of course, resolving these disputes in court is another option.	united-states "I know is it illegal for authorities to question a suspect when their lawyer isn’t present" This is not really true, at least in the US. The suspect must explicitly ask for a lawyer. Even saying "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" (ie Davis v. U.S. (512 U.S. 453 (1994)) isn't enough, they have to say "I want a lawyer". Until they invoke the right, an officer can question all they want (provided they were informed of these rights, except for certain situations which are relatively complicated. See Miranda Rights). So no, an officer questioning you without a lawyer is neither a crime nor illegal. Once you invoke your Miranda right though, they have to respect that. With or without your lawyer, this is called interrogation. You can filter your responses through a lawyer, or waive your right to a lawyer and answer directly.	Apparently, people are citing these cases for the proposition that there is a right to drive a car without a license (several facebook accounts making this claim have been shut down and a document making this argument is signed with the Biblical name of God). This is frivolous poppycock reserved for conspiracy theory crackpots that also never works. A lawyer who tried to make an argument like this in court would probably be sanctioned by the trial court judge for making a frivolous argument, and might even risk suspension of his license to practice law, unless he made clear that he was arguing for a change in the law that is not supported by any current law. Like all rights, the right to travel, including the right to travel by motor vehicle, is subject to reasonable restrictions which include the requirement that one have a driver's license that is currently valid. No court has ever held that having a traffic code regulating the use of motor vehicles on public roads is unconstitutional, nor has any court every held that the government may not obstruct public roads in a reasonable manner for purposes such as maintenance, parades, and the like. The question in People v. Horton (the correct citation to which is 14 Cal.App.3d 930, 92 Cal.Rptr. 666 and not the one cited that conflates two separate citations in different reporters to the same case), entered by an intermediate appellate court in California on January 29, 1971, is whether a search of an occupant of a motor vehicle requires probable cause under the 4th Amendment as incorporated by the 14th Amendment to apply to the states, and under parallel California constitutional provisions, and it hold that even occupants of motor vehicles have a 4th Amendment expectation of privacy despite the exigent circumstances associated with a motor vehicle. A more complete quotation from the case states: Applying these principles to the instant case, we are impelled to conclude that Officer Winfrey did not have legal cause to stop appellant's automobile. Appellant was driving within the legal speed limits, not erratically, and there were no visible operational defects on the vehicle. Furthermore, although the officer observed two young passengers in the vehicle, he saw no furtive or suspicious movements and he had no information that the youths were being kidnaped, detained or molested in any manner. In fact, the only reason given by Winfrey for stopping appellant was that appellant was driving a vehicle along the streets of Modesto at 1:15 in the morning with two young passengers and that he did not look old enough to be their parent or guardian. Clearly, even if we should assume that what the officer observed constituted unusual activity, and it is difficult to make such an assumption in this modern age, the activity alone did not suggest that it was related to criminality. The Attorney General argues that Officer Winfrey had reasonable cause to stop appellant's vehicle on suspicion that appellant was aiding and abetting his two young passengers to loiter in violation of the municipal ordinance of the City of Modesto. However, driving along city streets, even at 1:15 in the morning, is not “loitering.” (In re Cregler, 56 Cal.2d 308, 312 [14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305]; In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.2d 845, 853 [64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353].) For all that Officer Winfrey knew, appellant could have been driving his two young passengers home from a theater or other authorized place of amusement. We are not insensitive to the numerous problems which face police officers on patrol in a mechanized nation. As we stated in Bramlette v. Superior Court, 273 Cal.App.2d 799, 804 [78 Cal.Rptr. 532], “[t]he use 934 of the automobile in criminal activity has vastly increased the possibility of unlawful conduct, and the likelihood of escape by criminals from the scene of their crimes.” Moreover, we are cognizant of the fact that the great majority of police officers assume the grave responsibility which our society has foisted upon them in a courageous and conscientious manner. Nonetheless, the right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right which must be protected by the courts. Consequently, while we do not censure Officer Winfrey or question his motives, the fact remains that he stopped appellant's vehicle solely because it was occupied by young people. Were we to condone the stopping of vehicles for this reason alone, no matter how altruistic the officer's motive might be, we would lend our approval to the creation of a second class citizenry; we would also contribute to an already deteriorating relationship between the youth of America and law enforcement officials; in a free nation this relationship must be based on mutual confidence and respect. Having decided that Officer Winfrey did not have probable cause to stop appellant's vehicle in the first instance, it follows that the subsequent search was unlawful, even though consented to by appellant, and that all evidence adduced therefrom was the product of an unlawful search. As our Supreme Court said in People v. Haven, 59 Cal.2d 713, 718, 719 [31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381, P.2d 927]: “A search or seizure made pursuant to a valid consent before any illegal police conduct occurs is obviously not a product of illegal conduct. A search and seizure made pursuant to consent secured immediately following an illegal entry or arrest, however, is inextricably bound up with the illegal conduct and cannot be segregated therefrom.” The case of People v. Franklin, 261 Cal.App.2d 703 [68 Cal.Rptr. 231], is squarely in point. There, as here, the officer stopped the defendant's vehicle without probable cause, and afterward defendant consented to the search which ultimately uncovered marijuana. The court in reversing the conviction, at page 707 of the opinion, had this to say: “The stop having been illegal, the search, though by consent of the vehicle owner, does not breathe legality into the resultant find by the officers.” A later California case before the same intermediate appellate court a few years later, also distinguished People v. Horton, holding that while driving in a car as a juvenile as 1:15 a.m. was not "loitering" that similar conduct did violate a municipal curfew ordinance for minors which was validly enacted and not unconstitutional. In re Francis W., 117 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1974). The claim that People v. Horton recognizes a constitutional right to drive without a license was analyzed and rejected in the case of Newman v. Garcia, 2016 WL 8939133, Case No. 3:16-cv-137-J-PDB (M.D. Fl. September 26, 2016) in which a federal trial court ruled on a motion to dismiss a civil rights claim brought by a man alleging that his constitutional rights were violated because he was arrested for driving with a suspended driver's license in which he sought $28 million of damages. The judge in that case held in pages 3-5 of the Slip Opinion that dismissed this claim that: Right to Travel Newman primarily argues Officer Garcia violated his constitutional right to travel by issuing him a citation for driving with a suspended license and stopping him from driving his car. See generally Doc. 2, Doc. 12. He contends he has a protected liberty interest in driving on public highways, he does not need a license to drive, and a driver's license is a contract between the state and a person that is cancelled when the state suspends a license. Doc. 12 at 3–4, 7. In Kent v. Dulles, the United States Supreme Court explained the right to travel—the freedom to move “across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well”—is “part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law.” Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958). It has long been recognized as a basic constitutional right. Att'y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 901 (1986). “A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.” Id. at 903 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A restriction on one method of travel does not violate a person's constitutional rights. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999). There is no constitutional right to the “most convenient form of travel.” City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982). 4 The constitutional right to travel does not include a fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle. Duncan v. Cone, 2000 WL 1828089, at 2 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished); Miller, 176 F.3d at 1206 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has recognized a state's power to “prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles.” Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915). That includes passing legislation requiring drivers to have licenses. Id. Such a regulation is “but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens.” Id. Newman cites many state-court cases he contends support his argument he has a right to drive without a license. See Doc. 12 at 3–4. They do not. See People v. Horton, 92 Cal. Rptr. 666, 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (addressing legality of traffic stop and search; observing, “The right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right which must be protected by the courts” (emphasis added)); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 137–38 (Ariz. 1963) (addressing state law suspending license of uninsured motorist involved in an accident who does not post sufficient security); Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869, 871, 872 (R.I. 1958) (addressing state law suspending license for failure to deposit security with the registrar; observing, “[T]he right to use the public highways for travel by motor vehicles is one which properly can be regulated by the legislature in the valid exercise of the police power of the state”); Payne v. Massey, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495–96 (Tex. 1946) (addressing ordinance regulating operation of taxicabs); Teche Lines, Inc., v. Danforth, 12 So. 2d 784, 785, 787 (Miss. 1943) (addressing state law regulating stopping on certain portion of highway; observing right to travel “may be reasonably regulated by legislative act in pursuance of the police power of the State”); Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583 (Va. 1930) (addressing contention city could not change ordinance to permit revocation of license; observing, “regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part ... by granting, refusing, and revoking ... permits to drive an automobile on its streets”); Swift v. City of Topeka, 23 P. 1075 (Kan. 1890) (addressing ordinance restricting use of bicycles on sidewalks and a bridge).4 Newman does not cite authority to support his contention a driver's license is a contract with the state that is cancelled when the license is suspended, and he does not explain how the existence of a cancelled contract would support his argument that Officer Garcia violated his constitutional rights. See generally Doc. 12. Other courts have rejected similar arguments as meritless or frivolous. See Oliver v. Long, No. CV-06-2429-PCT-LOA, 2007 WL 1098527, at 5 (D. Ariz. Apr. 12, 2007) (unpublished) (argument that by cancelling all contracts with California Department of Motor Vehicles plaintiff could violate traffic laws with impunity “frivolous,” “specious,” and “nonsensical”); North Carolina v. Ellison, 471 S.E. 2d 130, 131 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (argument that by cutting up license and returning it to Division of Motor Vehicles plaintiff had rescinded contract with state and could drive without complying with statutory requirements “without merit”). Absent authority to support the argument that a suspended driver's license is a cancelled contract with the state, and in light of states' authority to regulate the operation of motor vehicles on their roads, the argument is meritless. *5 Though Newman enjoys a constitutional right to travel, he has no fundamental right to drive. A state may regulate the operation of vehicles on its roads, including requiring a license. Officer Garcia informed him of the suspension and informed him of the consequences of driving with a suspended license but did not restrict his right to travel by other means of transportation. The complaint does not plausibly allege Officer Garcia violated Newman's right to travel The other two cases cited, in addition to the flaws noted below, also predate the U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion that a state has the power to “prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles.” Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915), including passing legislation requiring drivers to have licenses. Id. Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779 is an opinion from a Delaware state trial court entered on February 27, 1907 (111 years ago as I write this). It held that at the time, in Delaware, on the public highway in question, both cars and pedestrians had an equal right to use the road and both had a duty of care in the contexts of a lawsuit against the car owner for causing an accident through negligence. It did not reference any fundamental or constitutional right and has no precedential value and has in any case been superseded by statute. Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236 is an opinion from a Delaware state trial court entered on December 13, 1905 also involving liability for an automobile accident. It says in the pertinent part: A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public streets of a city as a vehicle of any kind. In using any parts of the streets all persons are bound to the exercise of, reasonable care to prevent collisions and accidents. Such care must be in proportion to the danger or the peculiar risks in each case. It is the duty of a person operating an automobile, or any other vehicle, upon the public streets of a city, to use ordinary care in its operation, to move it at a reasonable rate of speed, and cause it to slow up or stop if need be, where danger is imminent, and could, by the exercise of reasonable care, be seen or known in time to avoid accident. Greater caution is required at street crossings and in the more thronged streets of a city than in the less obstructed streets in the open or suburban parts. Like Simeone, it predates the adoption of a statutory traffic code in the state of Delaware, has no precedential effect, is no longer good law, and does not purport to establish any fundamental or constitutional right. It merely enunciates the default rules governing the use of public highways by cars and pedestrians in the absence of other laws or regulations.	It isn't clear that the example you give is illegal police action, but let's assume that it is for the sake of this question, since it doesn't affect the analysis. If possession is not compelled, then it is voluntary.	The only really authoritative source of answers is a court interpreting the laws on an as applied basis (and there are many U.S. traffic laws, one in every state and sometimes additional local ones, not a single U.S. traffic law). An answer from a government official or police department is not authoritative, although it may be informative of how the official in question would enforce the law.	Hot Pursuit What you're describing is a hot pursuit, and in the US, common law says that police officers crossing state lines while in hot pursuit is absolutely allowed. An active pursuit is considered an exigent circumstance, which gives police all kinds of temporary powers they don't normally have.
How can a video game like World of Warcraft include lots of pop-culture references? The video game World of Warcraft includes lots of pop culture references (also Warcraft I, II, and III). Did Blizzard have to get licenses from the IP owners to include these references in their games ? This could be a possibility since there is really a lot of such references in WOW. It could be also covered by 'fair use' but very unlikely.	Generally speaking pop-culture references, like literary references, are neither trademark infringement nor copyright infringement. Trademarks Often a referenced item is in fact not a trademark. Most character names, for example, are not protectable as trademarks, because they are not used to identify the product or service, nor to advertise the product or service for sale. Similarly many pop-culture references which are associated with various groups, events, or products are not being used to identify or promote those things, and so are not protectable as trademarks. Even when a reference is (or includes) a trademarked phrase, it is unlikely to be trademark infringement. As long as the user of the trademarked term or phrase is not using it so as to identify the product or service where it is used, is not using it to advertise or promote that product or service, is not using it in such a way as to cause confusion by reasonable people on what the source of the product or service is, and is not using it so as to falsely state or imply that the product ore service is endorsed, sponsore, or approved by the owner of the trademark, then the use is not in fringement. One may use a trademark to identify a related product or service, to indicate compatibility, or to make comparative claims, and that is nominative use (using the mark as the name of the thing marked). Nominative use is specifically not infringement. Copyright Names, taglines, titles, mottos, and other short phrases are not protected by copyright at all. See the US Copyright office Circular 33 -- Works Not Protected by Copyright, where it is stated: Words and short phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans, are uncopyrightable because they contain an insufficient amount of authorship. The Office will not register individual words or brief combinations of words, even if the word or short phrase is novel, , distinctive, or lends itself to a play on words. This circulart includes as exMPLES: The name of a character Catchwords or catchphrases Mottos, slogans, or other short expression As I wrote in https://writing.stackexchange.com/questions/60965/what-are-the-fair-use-rules-in-the-usa-for-short-quotes-from-books-or-song-lyric Literary references, including short quotes, to other works of fiction are commonly allowed as fair use. They are usually appropriately attributed. There are several reasons for this. Such references normally do not serve as a replacement for the original. They normally do not harm the market, actual or potential for the original. And they are often transformative, that is, they re-user has a different purpose and achieves a different effect from the original. All of these factors are important in fair-use decisions, and all lean toward fair use for literary or pop-culture references. In fact, there are few cases to cite on such references, because it is so widely accepted that they would be fair uses that no on ever sues over them.	Only if you ask Valve for permission first, and they agree in writing. I'm not a lawyer, but when I was reading through the Subscriber license you linked, this stuck out to me: You are entitled to use the Content and Services for your own personal use, but you are not entitled to: (i) sell, grant a security interest in or transfer reproductions of the Content and Services to other parties in any way, nor to rent, lease or license the Content and Services to others without the prior written consent of Valve, except to the extent expressly permitted elsewhere in this Agreement (including any Subscription Terms or Rules of Use); (ii) host or provide matchmaking services for the Content and Services or emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Valve in any network feature of the Content and Services, through protocol emulation, tunneling, modifying or adding components to the Content and Services, use of a utility program or any other techniques now known or hereafter developed, for any purpose including, but not limited to network play over the Internet, network play utilizing commercial or non-commercial gaming networks or as part of content aggregation networks, websites or services, without the prior written consent of Valve; or (iii) exploit the Content and Services or any of its parts for any commercial purpose, except as expressly permitted elsewhere in this Agreement (including any Subscription Terms or Rules of Use). The part that I've bolded is probably the part that makes this against the Terms of Service, since in order to post these sorts of automated messages to their service, you'd need to use a "utility program" to "emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Valve in any network feature of the Content and Services, through protocol emulation, tunneling, modifying or adding components to the Content and Services". I doubt that Valve would ever agree, since such a program could very easily be used to create spam bots that works bombard users with unsolicited advertisements, but maybe Valve would be willing to cut deals with AAA video game companies to let them deploy tools to automatically manage their store pages.	The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience.	"...claiming that the license can be revoked at any time." Of course a game company can revoke their license at any time. The company grants you a license to use the product, and a license is not an obligation on their part to provide the product, or a right to use it on your part. There's nothing illegal about a license or TOS that has clauses which stipulate when the license or TOS can be revoked changed or revoked.	No If YT#1 gets a license from artist A, that permits YT#1 to do whatever copying and reuse is stated in the license. It might be narrow or very broad. Usually such a license will only grant permission to the person who asked. Unless the license also grants permission to YT#2, or to some broader group which includes YT#2, YT#2 cannot claim any rights under such a license. Assuming that the license does not include him or her, YT#2 has the same rights as any member of the public would, but no more. In general, pitch raising a piece of music is a way of creating a derivative work. In the US, under 17 USC 106 one needs permission from the copyright owner to create a derivative work. Otherwise doing so is copyright infringement. The laws of other countries, and the Berne Copyright Convention have similar provisions on this point. Creating a derivative work requires permission in all countries that I know about. "Piggybacking" is not a thing in copyright law. A copyright owner can give permission (usually called a license) to any person or group of persons that the owner pleases. The permission does not extend to anyone else. This is true in all countries. I should be clear that YT#2 needs permission from both YT#1, and from A. The way the question is worded I have been assuming that YT#2 had permission from YT#1, but a comment from grovkin made it clear that I needed to be more explicit about this. It is possible for a license to permit a person to pass on the license to others. For example, all CC licenses and all copyleft and most open source licenses do this, and others could. But the license must explicitly grant such permission. The one way in which a person might create a derivative work without permission and without it being infringement is if an exception to copyright applies. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more detail on fair use. Fair use decisions are made on a case by case basis, and generally depend on the detailed facts of the ase. But based on the limited info in the question, this would not qualify. It seems to use the whole piece of music, which tends to weigh against fair use. The new work does not seem to be transformative, that is, it seems to serve the same general purpose as the original. The new work might harm the economic value of the original, or might if many people did this. The original is creative, not factual. All of those weigh against fair use. Different countries have very different exceptions to copyright, and I do not know all of them. But the use described in the question does not seem to fit any that I know of. In any case, an exception to copyright applies to anyone, and does not depend on another person's license. It is thus never a form of "piggybacking". By the way, the question describes pitch raising ads "illegal". Making an unauthorized derivative work gives the copyright owner grounds to sue. If the owner does sue, and wins, s/he might be awarded money damages, and the court might issue an injunction ordering the infringer not to infringe again. But it would not normally be treated as a crime, and law enforcement would not be involved. In the US, only bulk copyright infringement, carried out as a business, is usually prosecuted (for example a factory churning out unauthorized music CDs).	This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be.	The question as worded implies that if something is a parody it is automatically fair use or allowed in US copyright law. This is a myth. First of all, in a copyright context, the term "parody" is somewhat limited. In that sense, a "parody" is a new work which comments on the original (often but not always by mocking or ridiculing the original). A mere alternate version which modifies the form of the original, perhaps humorously, but not to comment on the original or perhaps on much of anything, is not a parody. A new work which modifies the original to comment on something else, but not on the original, is a satire. Of course many works may be both parodies and satires in this sense. See this law.se Q&A for extensive quotes from Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co 268 F.3d 1257 (The case of The Wind Done Gone vs Gone with the Wind) and discussion of what is and is not a parody in US copyright law, and when a parody is fair use. A parody, because it comments on the original, will often be found to be a fair use of the original. But not always. The full four-factor analysis must still be done, and the results are never certain until a court has passed on the specific case. See this law.se Q&A for more on fair use. I can't tell from the question whether the modified song is truly a parody in the sense used in copyright law. If not, it probably isn't fair use, although it might be for other reasons. By the way, a song written for a television show or video to be distributed commercially is a commercial use, even if a non-profit corporation is involved, and even if there is an educational purpose. Note that fair-use is a strictly US legal concept. Even if something is fair use under US law, it may be copyright infringement under the laws of some other country.	"Doing the same thing" is very common. We even have names for certain categories of websites, such as "web shop" and "blog". Such concepts are not protected in general. Obviously, you can't copy the name of existing webshop, or their logo, but things like a "rectangular layout of products for sale" aren't original. There is of course a grey area here, because there's a continuum of similarity. In general, similarities that follow from technical justifications are acceptable (having an upload button is sort of the point for your website), similarities that are cosmetic only (same color choice) might be interpreted as intentional attempts to cause confusion.
What happens at small claims court if two parties present differing copies of a contact? For example this actually happened to me. Psycho landlord prints out unusually drafted lease agreement and send to me as PDF. I read it and am in fact perfectly happy to sign it because it appears to reflect our agreement as discussed and in good faith. I print it in duplicate but neither of the copies are stapled. Digitally sent copy is no longer accessible as we both changed phones. We both sign the final/signature page of each copy and she takes her copy's signature page, but leaves the rest of her copy and the whole of my copy with me saying she just needs the signature anyway. Then let's say I'm illegally evicted and need to prove my tenancy in local county court. The pages are all loose and she goes to court with a contract that says completely different things which she has happened to collate with the other loose signature page. We each claim the other person's version of the "signed" contract is fraudulent. How is this adjudicated?	It’s judged on the evidence You give your version, she gives hers, any other witnesses give theirs. The court then decides who they believe.	Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?	In the event of a dispute, the person resolving the matter, probably an arbitrator in the case of a commission dispute between two realtors and either an arbitrator or a judge and jury depending upon what your listing agreement says about that issue, would hear the testimony from both parties and decide. The intent of the parties is supposed to govern in cases of clerical errors, but a signed document has a lot of weight, especially in such a prominent term. It is a little hard from the way the question is posed to determine who is willing to correct the typo and who insists on enforcing the contract containing the typo.	Generally a signature is binding even if you have not read the document you have signed; as far as the law is concerned you should have and it's too bad for you if you didn't. Of course, this presumes the contract is otherwise valid. In the circumstances you describe you should ask to see the document before signing. If that is not possible, then instead of signing you should write "I do not agree" instead and take the printed statement - only 1 in 100 people will actually check that you did sign. If you have signed and do not wish to be bound, you should contact the company immediately in writing and say that and that they can collect whatever goods they have supplied.	These images were quickly taken down to settle this problem. It doesn't settle the problem, at least under US law, because a former infringer may still owe statutory damages under 17 USC 504 (and I imagine under some analogous Canadian law). Ceasing the infringement does not extinguish the plaintiff's right to those damages, although it may limit the size of the damages. However, the opposition in question continued to try and sue for more, claiming that the information on these properties were taken from them (which is apparently incorrect and lacks proof) Information, in and of itself, is not subject to copyright protection in just about any jurisdiction in the world (see for example 17 USC 102(b)). It has been suggested in the comments of another answer that this may nevertheless be a trade secrets violation, but that would only be the case if the information had been non-public and the site appropriated the information from an unpublished source belonging to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff deliberately caused this information to be published on their own website, then trade secret law certainly does not apply to it. Nevertheless, if the site copied literal text or images from the plaintiff's website, or closely paraphrased it, that is an infringement of copyright. Copyright protects the creative elements of the text, even where the text is serving a primarily utilitarian or functional purpose. but they continue to drag this on in an assumed attempt to try and make the defendant basically spend all their money fighting this off before it gets before a judge. It is unclear what you mean by this. The normal process is for the plaintiff to send the defendant some sort of written demand, the defendant either complies or they don't, and then the plaintiff either files a lawsuit or they don't. If the plaintiff never files a lawsuit, the defendant is under no obligation to continue interacting with the plaintiff, and can simply wash their hands of the matter. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be wise, as settling is often more cost-effective than going to court. Ignoring the plaintiff increases the likelihood of a lawsuit being filed. But if there is no lawsuit, then there is nothing to "fight off" in the first place.	You can't give your landlord a "notice to quit" A "notice to quit" is something a landlord gives to the tenant under s8 or s21. Assuming you want to end the tenancy, you would give them whatever notice is required in accordance with the lease. Why the paranoia? Ending a residential tenancy is routine and would not normally land you anywhere near a court. You give your notice, pay your rent, move out and get your deposit back. Is there something going on that you're not telling us? If so, ask about that thing in a different question. The video would be fine as evidence However, it would only be used if there was a dispute over the service of the notice. While this can happen, its pretty rare and your precautions seem ... elaborate. Your landlord's name and address (and yours) will be a public record forever Courts are public, the names and addresses of the parties are a matter of public record (unless you are children, or sex offenders, or have some other reason the court accepts as to why this shouldn't happen). These records are kept indefinitely.	You have acknowledged that the house was in "new" condition, which establishes a baseline for determining if the present state is normal wear and tear. The lease and California law agree that normal wear and tear is not the responsibility of the tenant. You may then need to sue the landlord in small claims court to get the remainder of the deposit (the above guide will be useful). The thing that is not clear is exactly what constitutes "normal wear and tear". The state guide tends to emphasize extreme forms of damage such as dogs chewing the woodwork, or cigarette burns. If you do ordinary cleaning on the walls, windows, carpets etc. then it is more likely that the judge will find in your favor.	There is no fraud for breach of contract That is, except in highly exceptional circumstances where the guilty party acted deceptively and dishonestly to obtain a benefit or cause harm - the landlord must have knowingly never intended to make good on their promise rather than simply failing to do so. There is a difference between a warranty and a representation The key difference between a representation and a warranty is the remedy available to the receiving party. A Representation is a statement of fact which is relied on by the receiving party and induces them to enter into the contract. It is normally before the contract, but may be repeated in the contract as well. A party may claim misrepresentation where a false representation has been made. They may be entitled to rescind the contract, which means that the contract would be set aside and the receiving party may also be entitled to damages to put them back into the position they would have been had the contract never been entered into. A warranty is a statement of fact contained in the contract. If it is not true the receiving party has a claim for breach of contract. If it is a fundamental breach the receiving party may have the right to terminate the contact in addition to a claim for damages. However, unlike a claim for misrepresentation, the contract is not undone. As tis is expressly both, the tenant has the choice of which remedy to peruse - void the contract and seek damages for misrepresentation or affirm (or attempt to terminate - it’s not clear that this breach is egregious enough to justify that) and seek damages.
Are there examples of State Supreme Courts refusing to follow a change in US Supreme Court jurisprudence? For example, say the Supreme Court moves to a new standard, are there examples where state courts decide not to follow along!? Ultimately, I would love to have a large list of examples—but even just one example is helpful!	State supreme courts are not allowed to defy binding supreme court precedents and are quickly slapped down if they do. But not all U.S. Supreme Court rulings have that character. For example, even if a state has rules of civil procedure which are verbatim identical to the federal rules of civil procedure, it does not have to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of an identical rule. For example, many states have rules of civil procedure 8, 9 and 12 which are verbatim identical to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9 and 12. But, when the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted FRCP 8, 9, and 12 in a new way in cases known as Iqbal and Twombly, not all state courts adopted the new interpretation and this was not a defiance of binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent, because the U.S. Supreme Court's precedents only apply to federal laws and rules. Similarly, many states have state constitutional rights in a bill of rights which are worded with language identical to that of parallel rights under the U.S. Constitution as amended. But, state courts don't always interpret that language in the same way that the U.S. Supreme Court does. If the federal constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court is more protective of a right than the state constitution, then the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation sets a floor of protection (except in the small number of circumstances like the right to a civil jury trial, or the requirement that serious crimes be pre-approved by grand juries, where a federal right is not applicable to state and local governments). But, if the state constitution is interpreted by the State Supreme Court in a manner more protective a right than the U.S. Supreme Court, this is allowed and does not conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of identical language in the United States Constitution.	This would require a constitutional amendment (overriding the First Amendment), which can be done in two ways. Congress can write an amendment and submit it to the states; or the states can call for a convention. None of these methods can be implemented by any number of courts.	Distinguishing a case which was decided by a higher court does not violate the doctrine of stare decisis. If the case can be distinguished, then it is not a controlling precedent. The term "controlling" indicates not only that the decision is binding on lower courts, but also that it applies to (or cannot be distinguished from) the facts of the specific case in question. Whether a precedent is "controlling" or not, in a particular case, could itself be a question for an appellate court. So if a lower court distinguishes a previous decision and therefore declines to follow it, the appellate court could say that was an error, and set aside the lower court's decision for not following a controlling precedent.	Separation of powers means that the judiciary can't pass laws or executive orders. It doesn't mean that the judiciary can't interfere with their passage and enforcement. Quite the opposite -- the checks and balances inherent in the system ensure that the judiciary can interfere in some cases. One of the checks is the concept of judicial review: the courts' power to review each branch's actions for compliance with the constitution -- and more importantly, to strike down actions that are unconstitutional. When a court strikes down part of a law, though, they aren't writing a new law, or even repealing a law. They are overturning parts of the existing law -- basically declaring the unconstitutional parts of it void, to be treated as if they didn't exist. In India's constitution, Article 13 provides the main basis for this power. Article 13.(2) (in Part III) states: (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. This article, aside from making it clear that laws passed by the State can be void, also gives the Supreme Court the inroads it needs to do the overturning. The catch is, the Court can not overturn most laws passed by Parliament, just the ones that Part III can be construed to prohibit. (While the judiciary is not explicitly named, it's the only branch that can officially say whether or not a law is constitutional. It'd be a conflict of interest anyway for Parliament to do it. Parliament, in passing the law, presumably wanted it to be enforced, and thus has an interest in avoiding too much scrutiny.) So the Court can already declare an unconstitutional law void, because it already is...and that's before we even get to Article 142. Let's take a look at the article anyway: (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. Note that (2) explicitly grants the power to issue subpoenas, contempt citations, etc. So we can't claim that's what (1) was intended for, and have to ask what it means. The Court decided that the article gives it the power to order the government not to violate your rights, as such an order is "necessary for doing complete justice". And as the final arbiter of the meaning of the very text that defines it into existence, it has that prerogative. And due process is one of the rights protected. Article 21 (also in Part III): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. "Procedure established by law" is a much weaker phrase than "due process", and technically meant that anything that the government scribbled into law was good enough. But case law has all but removed the distinction. (See Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India.) Basically, any procedure for depriving someone of life or liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. (Otherwise a law declaring you a criminal, to be arrested on sight, would be constitutional.) "Someone filed a complaint" simply wasn't gonna fly.	If no one objects to a leading question, then the judge does nothing. A judge does not generally pro-actively police the rules of evidence at trial. Also, there are circumstances when a judge has discretion to allow a leading question even when it wouldn't ordinarily be allowed to move the trial along on largely undisputed points or to allow in inarticulate witness to testify. The exception to judicial passivity in the absence of an objection at trial is "plain error" that is not "harmless error", which a judge has a duty to prevent or address even if no objection is raised by a party. But, offering a leading question when one is not allowed by the rules of evidence almost never constitutes plain error, and would almost always be considered "harmless error" even if it was objected to and the judge ruled incorrectly, unless the use of improper leading questions was pervasive and there was a contemporaneous objection by counsel. For example, allowing a prospective juror to serve as a juror, despite that juror saying in the jury selection process that he can't be impartial because the defendant committed adultery with his spouse, because neither the prosecution or the defense attorney moves to strike the juror for cause, rather than striking that juror for cause of the court's own accord, is the kind of conduct that would often be considered "plain error" that is not "harmless error."	No The importance of following precedent, and the principle of stare decisis were inherited by the early US legal system from the British Common Law system, and have been taken as part of the natural order of the legal system by US courts ever since. This extends even to a court overruling itself. US Courts are notoriously reluctant to overrule their past decisions, even when current court members agree, However they will do so from time to time. The US Supreme Court in particular will flatly overturn previous decisions, especially on Constitutional issues, when it thinks there is no other way to achieve a proper outcome, although it often prefers to distinguish the prior decision without actually overruling it. I think the fastest and most extreme case where the US Supreme Court overruled itself was that of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the second flag-salute case. (This was also a particularly significant case.) This reversed Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) a case on the exact same issue, only three years previously, and a vote of 8-1 on the first case became a vote of 6-3 the other way, with only one new Justice on the Court. Only Justice Frankfurter, the author of the fist decision, issued a dissenting opinion in the Barnette case, and no other Justice formally joined that opinion.	The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary.	It is binding precedent for lower federal courts in the Ninth Circuit. They are required to follow it. It is persuasive precedent for the other circuits and for state courts. They may be persuaded by the reasoning and will consider the fact that the Ninth Circuit held as it did to be one factor in their decision-making, but they can make a different decision if they want to. Some courts are also more persuasive than others, although this is usually not explicitly acknowledged in written opinions. For example, state courts in the Ninth Circuit are likely to give more weight to a Ninth Circuit opinion than they are to give weight to a decision from another circuit. Cases from the Second Circuit are more likely to be persuasive than cases from other circuits, because of its reputation. Cases from the Southern District of New York are more likely to be persuasive than cases from most other non-local District Courts. There is also a personal reputation function that comes into play when looking at persuasive decisions. Some judges have a better reputation or a better reputation with a particular other judge, and their decisions may be considered more carefully. This is not explicit, but it means a good lawyer will mention the judge's name when a case in support of his position was decided by a well-regarded judge. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's holding would be persuasive precedent for the Supreme Court. You could write law review articles about this, but to dip one toe in: they may be persuaded by the reasoning and it matters to their function of providing unifying law, so especially during the process of applying for a writ of certiorari, they will care what different circuits have held on an issue and which circuits are going which way. But they are not bound by the circuit courts, and will overturn all of the circuits if they think that's the right decision. They did that a while ago with a statute about what it meant to use a firearm while committing a crime, for example.
Would changing your signature bar you from getting a UKVI SAR? I am in the process of trying to submit a SAR (Subject Access Request) to UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI), but, I have read this paragraph: your signature and the date, within the last 6 months – please note your signature as well as your photo identification is used to verify that the person making the request is entitled to do so However, I have radically changed my signature since the last time I had to pass through UK Immigration (which is the last record they have on file of me). Would a DPO (Data Protection Officer) be able to reject my request on the basis that my signature is not at all what they have on file? (My photography is still recognizable from the one on their record though.)	The law, at section 52(4) Data Protection Act 2018 does not expressly require a signature. What is needed is confirmation of one's identity: Where the controller has reasonable doubts about the identity of an individual making a request under section 45, 46 or 47, the controller may— (a) request the provision of additional information to enable the controller to confirm the identity, and (b) delay dealing with the request until the identity is confirmed. One option is to submit the request with an explanation as to why your signature has changed and wait and see if the data controller comes back for additional information. If you can't provide anything more, or they still won't process your request if you do, there's alway the option of appealing to the Information Commissioner's Office	The case that you mentioned isn't an example of what you're talking about. One thing that immediately comes to mind is the Shamima Begum case. She fled her London home to join the Islamic state but now she wants to come back to the UK (after realizing), but UK's Home Office revoked her citizenship, claiming that she could claim Bangladesh citizenship by descent even though she isn't a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. No, they are claiming that Shamima Begum is a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. According to section 5 of Bangladesh's Citizenship Act 1951, a child born abroad to a Bangladeshi citizen father is automatically ("shall be") a Bangladeshi citizen by descent at birth. (Mothers were allowed to pass on citizenship after 2009, but that was after Begum was born.) Note that registration at a Bangladeshi consulate within 1 year of birth is only necessary in the case where the father is a Bangladeshi citizen by descent. I believe Begum's father was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise by descent, in which case no registration or other action is necessary for her to be a Bangladeshi citizen at birth. It doesn't matter that she has never been to Bangladesh nor does it matter that she never claimed to be a Bangladeshi citizen. There were two men of Bangladeshi descent in a separate case who successfully fought their revocation of British citizenship, but the difference between their cases and Begum's case was that they were over 21, which she was under 21 at the time of revocation. Section 14 of Bangladeshi's Citizenship Act provides that someone with dual citizenship automatically loses Bangladeshi citizenship if they don't renounce their other citizenship, but this provision doesn't apply to those under 21. So these two men had Bangladeshi citizenship too, while they were under 21, but they lost it when they turned 21, before their supposed revocation of British citizenship, whereas for Begum, she hadn't lost Bangladeshi citizenship at the time of the revocation of her British citizenship, because she hadn't turned 21. (Perhaps you got the idea of "claiming" of citizenship from some report that one can "claim" Bangladeshi citizenship by descent while under 21, and these men failed to claim it, but Begum can still "claim" it. But if you read the text of the law, that is clearly not the case. For a child born to a father who was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise than by descent, there is no "claim" of citizenship -- it is automatic and involuntary at birth.) As to your question, there are no universal restrictions to how a country can grant or take away citizenship. There is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which countries may voluntarily join, but only a minority of countries of the world are party to the convention. Article 8 of the Convention does prohibit countries that are party to the Convention from depriving someone's citizenship if it would "render him stateless", though there are several exceptions including if the citizenship was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The language seems to require that the person already have another citizenship, not just have the ability to acquire one, though I am not sure how much leeway countries have to interpret this. In the case of the UK, it is a party to the Convention, and it has largely implemented the provisions of the Convention in its domestic law. With respect to deprivation of citizenship, section 40 subsection (4) of the British Nationality Act 1981 prohibits a deprivation order if the Secretary "is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless." (Subsection (4A) has a looser restriction where British citizens by naturalization can be deprived of citizenship if the Secretary believes that the person is able to become the national of another country. I am not sure whether this is compatible with the Convention. In any case, this is not relevant to Begum's case as she was not a British citizen by naturalization.) So if the UK were to try to deprive citizenship of a British citizen otherwise than by naturalization like Begum, not on the basis that the person already has another citizenship but on the basis that they are "eligible" to "claim" one (which as I described above I do not believe is the case for Begum; I am talking hypothetically if such a case were to arise), that can already be challenged as a violation of British law, in British courts, without considering the UK's obligations under the Convention. If it's another country that's a party to the Convention, but their law expressly allows deprivation of citizenship for being "eligible" to acquire another citizenship even though the person doesn't have one (including, perhaps, British citizens by naturalization deprived citizenship under section 40(4A)), and a person in that situation is deprived of citizenship, they don't really have any recourse. A private party cannot "sue" a country over any violations of the Convention in an international court.	The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today.	The data controller is correct: they can take up to three months (approx. 90 days) to process a request, though this is only allowed in exceptional cases. From Art 12(3) GDPR (emphasis mine): The controller shall provide information on action taken on a request under Articles 15 to 22 to the data subject without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request. That period may be extended by two further months where necessary, taking into account the complexity and number of the requests. The controller shall inform the data subject of any such extension within one month of receipt of the request, together with the reasons for the delay. You have not received a response in that timeframe, so the data controller has failed to meet its obligations. The polite thing to do would be to remind them that the time has run out, and that you would like a response ASAP. You can lodge a complaint with your supervisory authority. A letter from the data protection authority tends to speed things up a lot :) In principle, you could sue them to get a response. In practice, this is likely to be too expensive to be worth it.	Am I correct in arguing that the LHD never really had implied consent to begin with? In other words, does the failure to honour the express refusal inform us about the legitimacy of prior claims of implied consent? No. They had implied consent and had not intent at the outset to dishonor it. They have violated the patient's privacy right when consent was expressly withdrawn, and they discovered that they cannot easily comply and therefore did not comply. The fact that they have made it expensive for themselves to comply with their legal obligations going forward does not imply that they lacked implied consent at the outset, so they should have no liability for the time period from when the training materials started to be used until the time when implied consent ended. They are only responsible going forward for their failure to honor the patient's wishes. It is not at all exceptional for a legal obligation to turn out to be more difficult to comply with when it arises than was anticipated when the systems that make the legal obligation difficult to comply with were implemented. Health care companies aren't expected to be prophets who can foresee the complex confluence of factors that has painted them in a corner, particularly when a situation has never come up before the current one. It is likely that no one person was ever even simultaneously aware of all the facts necessary to know that this could happen. Someone in the IT department will often not be intimately familiar with what is going on in the training part of the operation and what the privacy rules that apply are and even if someone was, that someone may have been in no position to do anything about it at the time. Health care providers aren't supposed to be evaluated with 20-20 hindsight. Given that they almost surely did not and could not easily have known that they had made a future express withdrawal of consent very difficult to effectuate, scienter can't be attributed to it. And, honestly, they are in more than enough trouble simply trying to deal with the problem post-express withdrawal of consent when they did start to violate privacy laws.	You are right, the entry and exit photos are only evidence that you were there. This is something they need to prove so the photos may only be for that. Their statement that you didn’t display a valid ticket/permit is, at present an unevidenced assertion. If you contest this, they will provide evidence that you didn’t (e.g. the actual records they refer to) and you would provide evidence that you did and, if it goes to court, the judge will decide what evidence they prefer. As this is not a criminal matter, they need to prove the offence on the balance of probabilities. However, there are almost certainly administrative remedies which will allow you to contest the fine without going to court. This would involve you sending them a copy of the permit and them assessing whether their belief that you didn’t display it is justified or not.	The 2018 Data Protection Act specifically implemented the GDPR EU Regulation in the UK - while the regulation itself was directly binding it required member states to create their own legislation for implementing the details - setting up the required supervisory and accreditation bodies etc. The various 'opening clauses' in the regulation also provided the means for the members states to implement specifics in local legislation (so long as that legislation exceeded the minimums set out in GDPR). At the end of the Brexit transition period the UK was no longer a member state (and it's citizens were no longer EU citizens), keeping the DPA 2018 as was would have actually meant that UK citizens weren't eligible for the very protections it was intended to provide them! Therefore the basis of the law needed updating (as well as certain minor provisions that no longer made sense) hence the "UK GDPR" provided a substitute. The fundamentals are the same and crucially it also codified the necessary basis for the UK's data protection laws to have what is referred to as "adequacy" - which means that the EU considers the UK GDPR/DPA to provide "essentially equivalent" levels of protection and therefore data is allowed to continue to flow between the UK and the EU.	If I have correctly untangled the law, Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act part 3 identifies as a condition where you are not prohibited from revealing personal data: The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. The Animal Welfare Act 25(1) says An inspector may require the holder of a licence to produce for inspection any records which he is required to keep by a condition of the licence I can't tell if you are required to keep customer names, but if you are, it looks like the pieces fit together and you would have to provide the records. Call a solicitor to be sure, though.
Can a witness refuse to answer a question in a civil proceeding if it would incriminate her on a unrelated criminal matter? Basically the title. I saw on a lawyer drama that a witness was compelled to answer because it was not a criminal case. But if the truthful answer uncovers a criminal matter that would incriminate the witness, can she refuse to answer on grounds of Fifth Amendment, even if it is civil case?	In McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, the Supreme Court declared that The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 It can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, [Footnote 10] and it Page 406 U. S. 445 likewise finds that the privilege can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. There may be some confusion over criminal vs. civil cases, so first we should restate the self-incrimination clause: nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself There are many ways that this language can be interpreted, for example it could mean that a person who is a criminal defendant cannot be compelled to testify against themselves in that case; or that the protection applies to a possible, future criminal case against them (when they are the defendant in a criminal trial); or when they are a non-defendant witness in some criminal trial. Instead, the courts interpret the privilege as protection against any being compelled to testify, when that testimony has a tendency to incriminate. The line that exists, w.r.t. civil cases, is that you can be compelled to testify against your civil case interest – you can be compelled to testify that you breached a contract, for example. When testifying in a criminal case, you can be compelled to testify to a breach of contract. It is not about the nature of the case where you are testifying, it is about the nature of the possible case where that testimony could be used against you.	No If she has probable cause, yes. The question is whether "a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts [Bob is a thief] are probably true"? Its likely that the answer to this question is yes. None No Charlotte listens to Alice, Charlotte asks Bob questions which Bob may or may not answer. Charlotte can ask Bob to produce the receipt, Bob doesn't have to. Charlotte can ask to search Bob, Bob doesn't have to consent. If Bob tries to leave, if Charlotte has reasonable suspicion the Bob has committed a crime (which she could certainly justify) she may detain him temporarily without arrest. If Charlotte has probable cause to believe that Bob has committed a crime (which she could probably justify) then she can arrest him.	In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure.	The court clerk was right. A judge is not supposed to interact with a party (at least not in the absence of the adversary) except during court hearings for which the adversary was notified and given an opportunity to attend. Also, there is no need for you to prove the mere fact that you went to court. That in itself is either inconsequential or palpable from the hearing transcripts. When you file in court papers such as a motion or a response to a motion, you may --and should-- bring an extra copy for the clerk to stamp it. That a clerk does with no objections. The stamp reflects the date on which you file your document(s). That stamp incidentally evidences that you or someone on your behalf went to court but, again, that sole fact is inconsequential. There is no such thing as "motion to appeal". A litigant may initiate an appeal, or appellate process, once the judge has decided a case in its entirety or in part. If the ruling to be appealed does not close the case, the upper court might refuse to review the issue(s) appealed until the whole case has been decided (that refusal is known as denial of the appellant's leave to appeal). Your description nowhere indicates that the judge has already made any rulings or that there have been any hearings on your matter. Your mention of prior motions suggests that you should gain acquaintance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and of Appellate Procedure. Those rules cover several aspects of litigation, including motion practice, the allowed methods of service, and the requirements to file an appeal in upper courts.	Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.	There are certain situations where the law may require you to provide some information -- particularly when you've been pulled over for a traffic violation -- but it is typically limited to basic identifying information. Beyond that, it is legally advantageous to refuse to answer questions. If you are doing so, though, you should explicitly invoke your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and your Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Invoking the Fifth prevents the police from using your refusal to answer as evidence, and invoking the Sixth requires the police to stop asking you questions. It may, however, be practically disadvantageous to refuse to answer questions, as there are cops who are just looking for a reason to act like a psychopath.	Since you asked, and it's a perfectly legitimate question, here's why it doesn't violate the Fifth Amendment (from Garner v. US): The Fifth Amendment doesn't say "you can't be made to say anything that hurts you." It says "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The only time Fifth Amendment protection applies is if you are being forced by the government to make a statement that could open you up to an accusation or conviction of a criminal offense. It's fairly broad (if it would help prove any aspect of the charge, you can claim immunity), but it's also restricted (you can't claim it unless it really would tend to incriminate you). That means that you could only argue the Fifth Amendment if your tax return might help prove a criminal case against you (the fact that disclosing income leads to you needing to pay tax does not qualify as "self-incrimination"). But the amount of income is not one of those things that might incriminate you -- you can get income through all sorts of ways. The thing that is incriminating is revealing the source of the income, and you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that. So: The only time you could possibly claim privilege is if you were being forced into a statement that might tend to incriminate you in a criminal proceeding. A statement that makes you liable for tax doesn't mean it might incriminate you. Filing an income tax return isn't inherently incriminating. The fact that you have income not included in any other part of the return (illegal income goes under "other income") doesn't imply you've committed a crime -- lots of people have other income. The amount of income can't be incriminating. The source can be, but you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that if it might incriminate you. And lawful income under "other income" still might give rise to a reasonable fear of prosecution, so the fact that you're justified in claiming Fifth Amendment privilege in source of income doesn't mean you're guilty of a crime. Note that there are cases where you are flat-out exempt from filing tax returns under the Fifth Amendment: Marchetti v. US and Grosso v. US found that registration and tax on gambling could be blocked by a Fifth Amendment claim, which didn't even have to be asserted at time of filing, because merely filing the special return would establish you as a gambler (heavily regulated/often criminalized at the state level). The difference with the normal income tax form is that everyone (just about) files one, and so filing it doesn't mean you're a criminal. If there was a separate line along the lines of "Income from Illegal Drug Sales," that might be one thing (anything other than $0 is inherently incriminating). But all the questions are broad, and have many legal sources of income associated with them.	Yes Impeachment proceedings (as are all activities of Congress) are legal proceedings in that they are enabled by the Constitution. While it is true that they are not judicial proceedings, the activities of the legislature as with the executive (like a police interview) and judiciary (like a trial) are legal processes and the Fifth Amendment rights apply. During the McCarthy “red scare” era, pleading the fifth was commonplace by witnesses to Congressional hearings. However, pleading the fifth does not mean you can avoid testifying. If subpoenaed you would need to turn up and answer the questions, pleading the fifth when the answer could incriminate you in a criminal matter.
What avenues of recourse does one have on a vendor from just their phone number bank details and name? Suppose a goods or services vendor is contacted by phone and paid by faster payments, then does not honour their statutory obligations. How can process be served, or is there no recourse of accountability to trading standards?	Can the address details be found on Companies House? If the seller is non-responsive the buyer must seek help from their bank and/or the authorities. In general a "Faster Payment" cannot be stopped or reversed. Unlike a debit or credit card payment a "Faster Payment" does not have "chargeback" or "section 75 protection". The buyer must contact their bank as soon as possible - there is a process the bank can follow with the recipient's bank but there is no guarantee the money will be returned. Normally the recipient must consent to having the payment reversed. If the buyer thinks they have been the victim of fraud they should contact their bank, which should contact the appropriate authorities. As a practical matter the buyer should be prepared to 'chase' their bank to find out what is happening with their report (because the bank may not be proactive about informing the buyer). Alternatively the buyer can contact Action Fraud. In terms of "buyer's remorse", the buyer must try to establish which legal jurisdiction applies to their contract with the seller. If the buyer and seller are UK-based, the good or service bought after June 2014 via a website, phone, text message or mail order may be covered by the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. Some things e.g. bets, lottery tickets, bus tickets, plots of land are not within the scope of those regulations (but may be covered by other law). If the sale is covered by those regulations, the seller was obliged to provide certain information including their geographical address and contact details and details of the buyer's right to cancel before the sale was completed. The buyer has a right to cancel 14 days after being informed by the seller of the right to cancel (the "14 day cooling off period") - if the seller does not ever inform the buyer of the right to cancel then this right to cancel lasts for 12 months. The buyer is not obliged to provide a reason. There are certain goods and services where this right to cancel and get a refund varies or does not apply. A refund for a service might be reduced by the value of the service the buyer has used so far. Goods or services where there is no right to a refund include tickets to events, personalised items, health or hygiene products where the buyer broke the seal or digital content the buyer downloaded. If the seller is non-responsive the buyer could contact: the citizen's advice service in their region (they can refer the complaint to Trading Standards) their local Trading Standards office - the buyer should look for the office's contact details on their local authority's website the Ombudsman Services if the seller is overseas, the UK International Consumer Centre may be able to help. The buyer should be prepared to provide a description of the circumstances, the available details about the seller, what the buyer has attempted so far, and what the buyer wants to achieve (e.g. a refund). There is lots of guidance online (e.g. the citizen's advice organisations and Which? magazine) about how to complain and what kinds of evidence to collect. The website resolver.co.uk might also be helpful in terms of guidance and keeping a diary. (The buyer might consider contacting a newspaper, magazine or specific journalist about their experience - some well-known media outlets run articles about individual consumers' problems and sometimes help to get a satisfactory resolution.)	Can the subject actually sue me in England, or is it possible to sue only in the EU country I posted the article from, or in the US where the article is actually hosted? Yes. If the online encyclopedia is available in the UK, then you have libelled them in the UK and, indeed, in every country where it is available. They can choose to sue in and under the laws of any country where they were libelled. If the subject can and does sue in England, what happens exactly? This is laid out in the Civil Procedure Rules Am I correct in presuming that I will be notified of this by mail and asked to enter a defence? You will definitely need to be served with the Particulars of Claim, however, this may come by other methods than snail mail. If so, what happens if I ignore the matter? Will a default judgment against me necessarily be entered, or will the court duly consider the plaintiff's case, perform the bare minimum investigation/reasoning necessary to determine which arguments of theirs are (un)sound, and so possibly rule in my favour? A default judgement will be entered providing the Particulars of Claim show a cause of action on its face. The court will not examine any evidence or enquire into the veracity of the statements made on the Particulars of Claim. In short, unless the plaintiff has ballsed something up - you lose. If I do choose to respond, can I hire an England-based lawyer to handle everything remotely, or can I be compelled to physically attend the court in England? You are generally not required to attend court in a civil matter unless you need to testify. Even then, arrangements can be made for remote testimony. If the court rules for the plaintiff and awards damages, can this judgment be enforced in the EU, or would it apply only in the UK? It can be enforced in the EU. As a courtesy or by treaty, domestic jurisdictions will enforce foreign judgements in most cases. If the court rules in my favour, would I recoup my legal fees? You will probably recoup some but not all of your legal fees, say 50-60%. Costs orders are complicated - talk to your lawyer.	Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible.	It's important to be absolutely clear on what is being sold. Using English translations may affect the outcome. Assuming "SoleTraderCompA" is an Einzelunternehmen, the sale would be an asset sale. The company isn't sold, because the company is legally identical to person A! Instead, person A makes an extensive list of all assets he's selling (goods, real estate, intellectual property, etcetera). "SoleTraderCompA" might be a trade mark, in which case the trade mark can be sold. Person B can also be an Einzelunternehmen, and as part of its business operations buys aforementioned assets from person A. But in general, any legal entity can buy the assets of person A, including a GmbH or AG.	You can hire someone to locate the defendant with the information that you have, or you can apply to a court for permission to serve them with process via "substituted service" because their physical address can't be determined. But, in general, better business practice is to not enter into contracts with people with whom you have more than a name that might be false, and an email address, unless you have some means of non-judicial enforcement of your agreement (like the practical ability to shut down access to an internet subscription). If you don't even know if someone's name is real and have done nothing to confirm that then you also have no assurances that they have any assets from which you could collect if you won a breach of contract lawsuit. If you deal with large numbers of people in low value contracts, it may be worth treating the fact that some contracts are effectively unenforceable as a cost of doing business. But, if a contract is important, it was foolish from a business perspective to rely on a contract on that basis alone, even if it is legal to do so.	Why does the name matter? Today, I entered into a contract to buy petrol and, later, beer and a Caesar salad. In neither case did I exchange names with the other party. If you entered into a contract under a false name with the intent to avoid your responsibilities then that would be fraud. But then, so would doing so under your real name.	Yes, there is a reasonableness limit, and this is especially true in consumer transactions. If you were given an estimate and the final bill is a lot more than what you were expecting, you can dispute it. The final price should be ‘reasonable’. The law doesn’t say what counts as reasonable, so you’ll have to agree it between you. You should consider: the estimate you agreed to [if there was one] any changes, and why they happened anything that happened that was beyond the control of the trader, like bad weather or the cost of materials going up https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/consumer/getting-home-improvements-done/problem-with-home-improvements/ When it comes to work itself, the act states that a tradesman or professional has a 'duty of care' towards you and your property. Any standard or price you agree must be honoured. But if it isn't agreed in advance the work must be done to a reasonable standard, at a reasonable cost, and within a reasonable time. So if you haven't fixed a price, you don't have to pay a ridiculously high bill. All you have to pay is what you consider 'reasonable' and invite them to sue you for the rest. Be careful though, in some circumstances when you are withholding payment you may have a claim made against you by a supplier if you are in breach of contract. What's a reasonable amount would be what similar tradesmen would have charged for the job. So get a few quotations. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/1fdlwC9xzyxjCpWMlsCGG3j/supply-of-services NB that article refers to The Supply of Goods & Services Act 1982, which was partially superseded by the Consumer Rights Act 2015.	Is UPS allowed to take my money and business without intention to fulfill its side of the transaction? No. The company's belated change of mind constitutes breach of contract, and its subsequent refusal to give you a refund completes the prima facie elements of fraud and/or unjust enrichment. The company's acceptance of your package & money and its subsequent act of sending your package to NC strike the applicability of its clause on Refusal of Service (see the link provided in the other answer). The blanket term of "among other reasons" is hardly enforceable at that point. In particular, the existence of a lawsuit between the recipient and the company further weakens any merits of the company's belated change of mind. That is because, by virtue of that lawsuit, the company currently has to deliver to that same recipient other packages anyway. Thus, the company cannot allege that delivering your package "is unsafe or economically or operationally impracticable". Also, since you are the one who paid for the service, the company cannot withdraw on grounds of "the person or entity responsible for payment is not in good standing".
name rank and serial... against the police? People who have been in the military will know that if they are interned as combatants and questioned, all they have to answer is their name, rank, and serial number. So for example, if Private Paula is taken captive with his unit of Marines, he will repeat again and again, "I am Private Paula, 111111-P-123456" but cannot be made to answer any other question through bad treatment (though better treatment for answering is ok). Also often answering might violate other orders by their superiors. Now, let's assume for some reason or another, PP ends up captive in the US during a mission that considers the private a hostile combatant - for example during a training exercise that declares the private to be a member of the Moronian military which attacks the training area. However, the captor is the (civil) police, who begin to question them about a crime that simultaneously happened and in which the private might or might not have been involved. In any case: PP doesn't put up resistance, is read their rights and all such, but all they answer is their name, rank, and serial number before being carted to the station. Let's for simplicity assume that the whole thing happened in Nevada. Now, here the rest of Article 5 of the Geneva convention comes into play: No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. - Article 17 Geneva III Convention (1949) The private was arrested in some way or another, but does the private count as interned in such a way that they can rely on the Geneva Convention?	If I understand the question correctly, the captive is a US marine who was participating in a training exercise in the United States and then arrested by civilian police who were not participating in the training exercise. The US marine, possibly believing that the police are in fact part of the exercise, refuses to give any information other than name, rank and serial number. do they count as interned in such a way that they can rely on the Geneva Convention? No. The third Geneva convention applies to prisoners of war. There is no prisoner of war in this scenario. First, there is no war. Second, even if there were a war, the convention only applies to those who have "fallen into the power of the enemy" (Article 4).	That an enemy combatant does not have their weapon on them right now does not render them a non-combatant. If the Axis soldiers had been unconscious, it would have been a different story, but "mildly drunk and gun out of reach" isn't enough. It is forbidden have "no quarter given" as a policy, but that doesn't mean that an enemy has to be given an explicit chance to surrender, that just means that if the enemy does indeed surrender, that surrender can not just be denied. Most casualties in war happen due to artillery anyway, so a requirement to give the opportunity to surrender would be kinda meaningless. Where such a situation gets messy is if some of the Axis soldiers had tried to surrender on the spot. The SAS would then be expected to try and shoot only the non-surrendering soldiers. If everyone surrenders, and the SAS kills them anyway because they don't have the ability to take prisoners, that's a clear warcrime. Sources: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule46 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule47	There are cases out there like Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, State v. Unnamed Defendant, Williams v. Unnamed Defendant; there have been indictments of John Doe who was only identified via a DNA profile. Not knowing the actual name of a person wouldn't pose a problem per se, and it seems that when the name is not known, John or Jane Doe is generally filled in. There was in instance a year ago in the UK where rioters who refused to identify themselves, and prosecution decided to drop the case.	It's exactly the opposite. All arrests are public record under California Government Code 6254(f): Notwithstanding any other provision of this subdivision, state and local law enforcement agencies shall make public the following information, except to the extent that disclosure of a particular item of information would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation: (1) The full name and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency, the individual’s physical description including date of birth, color of eyes and hair, sex, height and weight, the time and date of arrest, the time and date of booking, the location of the arrest, the factual circumstances surrounding the arrest, the amount of bail set, the time and manner of release or the location where the individual is currently being held, and all charges the individual is being held upon, including any outstanding warrants from other jurisdictions and parole or probation holds. Other than the "endanger the safety" exception, which could be applied case-by-case, there is no general exemption for refugees or asylum seekers. Trials are also public, see What does it mean that a trial in a US court is "Public"?. Members of the public cannot be excluded from a trial, and the defendant can't "opt out" of this. This is considered to be a central feature of US justice systems and an important check on possible abuses of the criminal judicial process.	The Geneva Conventions prohibit attacking anyone who has clearly communicated an intent to surrender. Certainly, there is a point at which if perfidy reaches a sufficient level of frequency, then the side committing it will lose the ability to "clearly communicate" an intention to surrender, but it isn't clear just where that point is.	Denver lawyer David Lane has said, “The First Amendment lives in a rough neighborhood and if you can’t stand the neighborhood move to China … or somewhere the First Amendment does not exist.” "One man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Cohen v. Cali. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) At this point, we need to define illegal as used in your question. For instance, do you mean "you can face any form of punishment"? If so, this question is extremely broad and governed by multiple sets of laws. Additionally, one should note that this is a Federal Question. The First Amendment, through the Due Process clause applies to states as well. Therefore, there will be extremely little discrepancy (if any - first impression issues being the main differences probably) between the States,. The FCC can limit profanity on air. Additionally, Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1464, (Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. ) prohibits the utterance of any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio communication. The USPTO can limit Trademarks with "vulgar" meaning. (See EDIT below for update.) In School: High school student's First Amendment rights were not violated in suspension for uttering obscenity, regardless of whether she was merely repeating and returning words originally directed at her, particularly where words were clearly disruptive as they were heard by 90 students in cafeteria and, in opinion of assistant principal, were “fighting words.” Heller v. Hodgin, S.D.Ind.1996, 928 F.Supp. 789. Fighting Words: These seem to be words that would invoke, or are likely to invoke a fight. Fighting words claim upheld: Arrestee's speech when crowd gathered near fallen tree that had blocked traffic constituted unprotected fighting words, so that his arrest under city disorderly conduct ordinance did not violate his First Amendment free speech rights; arrestee's repeated use of the word “bitch,” his accusation of matricide directed toward his sister, his use of the phrase “fucking queer,” his pushing of third party and his raised voice all tended to show that his conduct, under the circumstances, had tendency to provoke physical altercation. Fighting words claim not upheld: Detainee's profane words to police officer as officer conducted Terry stop, “son of a bitch,” while unpleasant and insulting, were not “fighting words,” given officer's confirmation of fact that words did not cause anyone to fight or become angry; thus, words could not constitute violation of disorderly conduct statute and in turn could not supply probable cause for disorderly conduct arrest. In addition to fighting words, true threats and incitement to imminent lawless action are not protected under the First Amendment. Additionally, the government can regulate free speech in public schools (hence Free Speech Zones) and while in their employ (no yelling at your boss if you want to keep your job). It is not part of the main question, but free speech inside the court room. Well, the Judge is pretty much king in a courtroom. What he says goes. (more or less, like nothing toooooo crazy). In a courtroom, if you do something a Judge doesn't like, he can hold you in contempt of court. (You get no jury for contempt cases.) EDIT: Since I wrote this answer, new law came out from the Supreme Court in Matel v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___ (2017). The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the Federal Circuit that the disparagement clause [is] facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Simon Tam, lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this moniker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons. Tam sought federal registration of the mark “THE SLANTS.” The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application under a Lanham Act provision prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam contested the denial of registration through the administrative appeals process, to no avail. He then took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The decision aptly concludes with: "If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social “volatility,” free speech would be endangered."	Sure: No Constitutional rights are totally unencumbered. Even natural rights like the "right to life" are legally "infringed" through various theories (e.g., self-defense, capital punishment, warfare). The Second Amendment has been interpreted as a right to keep and bear weapons that would reasonably be used in self-defense or in military service. You don't have to go to strategic weapons like nukes to find "reasonable infringement" of that right. For example, even though the military and even police routinely use explosives, individuals are absolutely subject to the whims of a federal regulatory agency (the BATFE) as well as state restrictions if they want to keep and bear detonators. Also, I'm not aware of an absolute prohibition on the possession of nuclear devices by non-government entities. E.g., various government regulators oversee private entities that operate commercial and research nuclear reactors and other activities that put them all-but in possession of nuclear arms. If an individual really wanted to legally keep and bear a nuclear weapon it could probably be done with enough money and oversight. (Amendment: Except, as cpast points out in the comments, that there is a law against private possession of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Which just goes back to the broad answer to your general question: In practice there are no unencumbered rights. Constitutional "rights" might better be called things that require "strict scrutiny" and "narrow tailoring" of government infringement.)	If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ("Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.") If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) ("If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.") The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves.
Does public domain give me the right to take old work out of context, such as claimed in this SMBC comic? A humorous comic by SMBC claims that, since an 1884 foreword written by Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens) is out of copyright, anyone can write any book, include that foreword, and add "with a foreword by Mark Twain" on the cover. Creative Commons licences have a clause to ask for attribution to be removed, which authors may want to do if their work is attributed in a context that may imply endorsing something they don't. Mark Twain is long dead (in case it matters) and his work is in public domain, not under a Creative Common licence. Legally, in the United States or other locations, is the situation described in this comic accurate, or is there anything that may limit authors from implying endorsement or taking out-of-copyright quotes out of context? Or could I really take any old enough quote saying "This is great!" (or the same with enough words as to make it unique) and put it — with attribution — on any book cover (or elsewhere)? Source: SMBC Transcript: Panel 1: Fact: in 19984, Mark Twain wrote the foreward to a French edition of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer. (Drawing of a book titled *Les Aventures de Tom Sawyer) Panel 2: Fact: That foreword is now in the public domain. (Drawing of a copyright symbol with a diagonal strike-through) Panel 3: From which it follows: for any book you write, no matter the topic, ally ou have to do is reproduce that foreward and you can do this: (Drawing of a book titled: A guide to fellatio. With a foreword by Mark Twain.)	Yes it does. You can do anything at all with a public domain work, and it is not an infringement of copyright. For the matter of that, one could write a forwards attributes to Justinian or Genghis Khan, who newer wrote any such forward at all, and it would not infringe any copyright, nor any right of publicity. It is possible that such claims would constitute False advertising. But if the claim is "obviously absurd" then such laws usually do not apply. What is "obviously absurd" is a judgement call. I recall seeing books in which a "foreword" is attributed to a fictional character. If such a foreword is attributed to a person who is living, that person might have a right to sue under a publicity right theory. In those jurisdictions where such rights last beyond the author's life, such a suit might be filed by an heir within the time such rights are valid, which varies widely.	This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be.	It's questionable, because if you design your own visual interpretation of the T-Shirt then it isn't necessarily the one from the book and thus your art has it's own copyright. However, if the current Copyright Holder and Possible Trademark owner is selling the shirt it could be an issue because yours is not official but being sold as one. If you're making it for non-sale and just cosplay, than you have a better arguement.	The first copyright law dates from 1710, so it's not true that Chekhov wrote before any copyright laws. Any work from prior to 1924 isn't necessarily safe to use (it depends on when the author died). It is in the US but will complicate things if you publish internationally. Unless you translate with something like Google translate, translation is definitely a creative process. This is especially true (although probably not significant legally) for something like a poem, where its' extra hard if you try to keep the original metre and rhyme scheme. If you publish work in the public domain, you would have some claim to the typography. If the translator has done a copyright assignment to the publisher as part of the publishing agreement, they would hold the rights to the translated version.	If you own the copyright (because you wrote the book), you can do whatever you want with it. If someone else has the copyright, you have to get their permission to do what you propose. That could be the author, the author's estate, or some other party. It then depends on what the interest of the rights-holder is: they could say "No way!", "Sure, for a payment of $100,000", "At $1 per copy, here is how you must keep track of copies", "Okay, as long as you include this notice that prevents further re-distribution" or "Huh, I never thought of that. Sure, I grant you complete license to do whatever you want". A publisher is relevant only when the publisher requires a transfer of copyright to the publishing company, or if the rights-holder has granted them a certain type of license (e.g. an exclusive license). If the author has granted someone else an exclusive perpetual right to distribute, then they cannot also grant you a license to distribute for free. That is really the author's problem, though, since the publisher doesn't hold the copyright so can't sue you, instead the publisher would sue the author for breach of contract.	Quoting content may or may not constitute copyright infringement, depending on the various factors that go into the fair use defense. Short quotes which are made for the purpose of discussion, research and commentary and not for copy would be squarely in the domain of "fair use" under US law. That means that the copyright owner would not succeed in suing you for quoting them: under the statutory mechanism for recognizing his right to his intellectual product, there is a limit on how much control he can exert over your behavior (since the two of you have not worked out some kind of agreement -- copyright law creates rights even when there is no contract). As for Facebook, you have a contract with them, embodied in the terms of service. You have been given permission to access material that they host (permission is required, under copyright law), and their permission is conditional. It says "you may access stuff on our platform only as long as you do X": if that includes a clause "don't be nasty", then that limits your right to speak freely and be as nasty as you'd like. If it says "don't quote even a little", that means you cannot quote even a little, even when you would have the statutory right to quote a little (or, to be nasty). Fair use would mean that you can't be sued for copyright infringement of the stuff that you quoted a little of. You can, however, be expelled from Facebook. You probably cannot be sued for "accessing Facebook without permission". There is a federal law against unauthorized access of computer networks, and there was a failed attempt to construe violation of a TOS as "unauthorized access" – it isn't. But accessing Facebook necessarily involves copying (that's how computers work), and there is no "fair use" defense whereby everybody has a fair use right to access Facebook. Theoretically you could be sued for copyright infringement, for accessing Facebook's intellectual property without permission. Also, Facebook can rescind your permission to access their content (see this case), and once you have been banned, it is a crime to further access their network. This assumes that there is no overriding limit on contracts that would nullify a no-quoting condition. There is no such limit on contracts in the US, so such a contract would be enforceable. There is also nothing illegal (unenforceable) about a TOS which prohibits automated methods of access.	By the terms of the CC license, you cannot "cancel" or "revoke" it. But as the copyright owner, you may separately release under a different license: a less restrictive CC license, or a completely different license such as the GPL or the MIT license. You could even release under a more restrictive CC license, going say from a CC-BY to a CC-BY-ND or a CC-BY-SA. You could remove all mention of the earlier license from any website or app you control. Anyone who had obtained (or later obtains) a copy under the earlier release could use it or give it to others under the terms of that license, but anyone who did not so receive it, but instead gets it from you under the different terms it could only use it under the terms of the later release. By the way, although the CC license describe themselves as irrevocable, there is under US law, a five-year period during which any license grant may be canceled, provided the proper procedures are followed. This is under 17 USC 203, and the period starts 35 years after the license was granted, or 35 years after the work was published.	"Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI.
Is it legal to use a laser to protect privacy vs. CCTV camera? Alice has a garden that is not overlooked by any windows, but is next door to a commercial car park that has a CCTV camera on a pole within a plastic hemisphere that does not allow an observer to see where the camera is pointing. She would like to sunbathe, but is concerned she will be watched by the CCTV operator. To prevent this she sets up a Class IIIa/3R laser pointer located at her sunbed pointing at the camera. Her assumption is that if the camera is not looking at her it will have no effect, but if it is it will blind but not damage it. What is the legality of Alice's actions? Any jurisdiction would be interesting.	It's illegal to (temporarily) break an item The commercial car park owner may not aim the camera at Alice garden. However, even if it does so, breaking the camera or damaging it is still illegal - as one of the various forms of destruction/damaging of property colloquially called vandalism. Do note that the very article and the clasification of laser OP links to points out that *even a low-powered "pet-safe" IIIb/3R laser leaves out burnt-out pixels with a pinkish surrounding. These might not be enough to prevent identification when not aiming the laser into the camera, but they are damage to the sensor. The very article also describes how the camera damage progresses even after exposure, possibly due to the high power lasers. However, even if no such damage occurs, the owner of the camera is (temporarily) deprived of its legal uses while the laser is pointed on it, which is in many jurisdictions enough to count as theft.	It is not decided whether such, in areas, filming can be prohibited. In a "public forum", First Amendment rights are maximally protected, and this includes filing (Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 in particular §A(1) for a summary of the law on this question). In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 the court refined public forum doctrine to distinguish quintessential, limited, and nonpublic fora. In a nonpublic forum, the government may "reserve the forum for its intended purposes": but, such a reservation must be viewpoint-neutral. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 states that "The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time". In a nonpublic forum, demonstrations can be forbidden, especially when demonstrations are incompatible with the purpose of the forum (example: military bases). The particular question you raise has not ended up in court. One may be tempted to reason that First Amendment rights can be arbitrarily curtailed in a non-public forum, but such a restriction would have to have appropriate justification – the restriction would be subject to strict scrutiny. Simply saying "We don't want people filming inside the holding area" is not a valid justification. But, the police are not required to announce their legal argument in advance. If you get busted and film, and they make you stop, you can sue for violation of your First Amendment rights. Your attorney would then need to make a good argument that this restriction is to be subject to strict scrutiny, and that it fails.	The Radiocommunications Agency (now OFCOM) issued some guidance about this in 2001. The specific offence is defined by s5 Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949: Any person who ... uses any wireless telegraphy apparatus with intent to obtain information as to the contents, sender or addressee of any message (whether sent by means of wireless telegraphy or not) of which neither the person using the apparatus nor a person on whose behalf he is acting is an intended recipient ... shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. It's also an offence under s5(1)(b)(ii) to disclose the contents of any such message, so the reception and disclosure of radio messages not sent by or addressed to you are both offences. I don't know if there have been any successful prosecutions specifically for monitoring aircraft communications. I doubt whether a hobbyist listening for his own enjoyment would attract the attention of the authorities, but if he started to publish recordings of the traffic then that might well do it.	Maybe not. The ICO says that The right of access enables individuals to obtain their personal data rather than giving them a right to see copies of documents containing their personal data. It might be valid to interpret the DPA / UKGDPR in a way that the relevant personal data undergoing processing in their system is the existence of the letters, but that you are not entitled to a copy of the letters. This is in line with the purpose of the right to access, that you can check what data they are processing about you and whether it is correct. If that argument holds and the data subject insists on receiving a copy of the letters, it might be legitimate to charge them a fee for these copies. But in practice: The data controller might not make this argument and just hand over the copies. It is worth a try. A right to access founded in data protection might not be the only way to receive a copy of these materials. If the letters are relevant for legal proceedings, they could perhaps be requested during the disclosure process.	You have the right to notify the owner of the car of their vehicular trespass and the consequences of that. You do not have the right to damage the car in giving said notice. You have the right to offer to clean the gum off whatever part of the car you stuck the notice to. If you succeed in cleaning it,the other party will not have a legal cause of action, in all likelihood, since there is no damage (though with a bit of imagination they might come up with some 'missed business opportunity' loss). The court would probably find your choice of sticker to be negligent (put the notice under the wipers? use painter's tape -get some if you don't have any). The rationale 'we had no other choice' holds no water: there are alternatives. 'Criminal Damages' is a concept in UK law, but it relates to willful damage such as vandalism, not accidents. It would be an issue if you had planned to cause damage, but that seems not to be the case here.	In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest.	Because you are on their premises and they get to decide what people can or can't do while on their property. This has nothing to do with if recording is legal or not, it has to do with basic property rights and trespass. Let's assume that recording is perfectly legal: so is eating ice cream. However, if its my shop, I can require that you do not make recordings just as I can require that you do not eat ice cream. If I make this requirement known you have three options: you can comply, you can leave or you can stay and do the thing I have prohibited. The first two are legal, the last one isn't; its trespass which is both a tort for which I can sue you and a crime for which you can be arrested and prosecuted.	Working a mobile car cleaner now, my manager asked me to take some pictures before cleaning and after clearing, privacy issue of the car owner California law creates an expectation of consent for taking photographs of people for purposes of commercial distribution of the image to the public. California Civil Code § 3344. But, absent copyright or design patent issues (which would only very rarely come up since most people don't own the copyrights or patents to the designs of their cars, and the owner of the copyrights generally grants an implied license for the owners of the cars to display the copyrighted or patented designs), there is no parallel requirement of consent for taking photographs of things. Furthermore there is no common law expectation of privacy in anything that someone you do business with must necessarily see with their own eyes. So, if you must see the car to clean it, then taking photographs before and after the work is done does not violate any expectation of privacy to which the customer has not implicitly consented and does not violate any California or federal statute. Better practice would be for the business to explicitly have the customers consent in writing to the photographs, to remove all doubt. But the implied consent to having someone see your car when they are cleaning it would be unreasonable to deny in almost all circumstances. A company might voluntarily have an agreement to keep any photographs taken confidential and to have its employees sign non-disclosure agreements not to reveal what they see while working. If it did, this would create a legally enforceable expectation of privacy for the customer. For some VIP clients, this contractually enforceable discretion might be something that would induce them to pay a higher price for the same services. But those kind of protections are not the default standards of law that apply in the absence of an agreement. And, even then, taking photographs for purposes of internal use only would probably not violate an agreement of this kind. The work still requires that people inside the business, including remote supervisors, be able to see the cars to do their work.
Is it true that a teacher can't engage/attack a shooter from behind during a school shooting that is in progress? I have a cousin who is a teacher and a few years ago we had a long discussion about school shootings and part of this discussion was about what teachers can and cannot do during a school shooting that is in progress. One thing she told me is that teachers are not allowed to engage/attack a shooter when the shooter's back is turned to them. She said that a teacher has to first do something to get the shooter's attention and then after the shooter has turned around to face the teacher, then the teacher is allowed to engage/attack the shooter. When I asked her why they are required to do this, she said that if they were to attack the shooter from behind, such as hitting them over the head with a heavy blunt object and shooter dies from this head injury, or if the teacher were to have a gun and shoots the shooter in the back and the shooter dies from being shot, then the teacher will be charged with murder and is likely to go to prison. I found this very hard to believe and I am thinking that perhaps she was given disinformation about the rules of engagement during a school shooting event. Is it true that a teacher can't engage/attack a shooter from behind during a school shooting that is in progress?	Is it true that a teacher can't engage/attack a shooter from behind during a school shooting that is in progress? No. Any use of force of any kind that only harms or kills the shooter who is actively engaged in a school shooting (and indeed, even if it caused bodily injury that isn't grave or deadly to someone else who is innocent) is always justified. You can't shoot someone who is not an ongoing threat to others if they flee, in order to arrest or punish them (e.g. an unarmed shoplifter), but under the leading constitutional case, Tennessee v. Garner, this limitation doesn't apply to murderers and mass shooters anyway, at least if they continue to pose a future threat.	In the US, detention does not add anything: we can generalize the principle to any time when a student is in the custody of the teacher (classroom, field-trip, sporting event...). One question, for the scenario that you describe, is whether the injury was foreseeable. Suppose the injury is an abdominal aortic aneurysm – this is not foreseeable. The question that the court would ask is whether a person exhibiting reasonable caution and care would know that there is a possibility that the child has some condition. The details regarding this condition "not being easily noticeable" are essential to the outcome of the case. A child coughing up blood should be immediately treated medically, it is not reasonable to assume that a child who sneezes (once) is in imminent danger. The teacher's response is also important, and again this is a very fact-intensive inquiry. A child who has a heart attack should not be told "go talk to the nurse" (let's assume that the teacher correctly notices that this is a heart attack happening), 911 is the correct (minimal) remedy. Perhaps using the auto-defibrillator also part of the reasonable standard of care for a teacher (assuming there is one, and that the teacher has been trained how to use it). Then finally, the teacher is not liable if their actions / inactions don't cause the injury. In the case where a student suddenly dies, the fact that the teacher didn't somehow prevent the death doesn't make the teacher liable. But if the child is bleeding and the teacher decides "We can deal with this when detention is over" and the child bleeds to death in the interim, we would conclude that the teacher's lack of care caused the child's death. The school might also be liable on various grounds, for example if the school has no nurse and has no practical way for the teacher to contact emergency medical services. Some school policy which unreasonably restricts the teachers exercise of reasonable care could make the school liable. At any rate, "the child died" does not cause absolute liability, what confers liability is the actions and inactions of a party.	As the gunman is dead (hence unable to be prosecuted), what is the value in understanding his motives? It is reasonable the LE would want to determine that the gunman "acted alone", but why is it important to understand a dead gunman's motives. Your point on ascertaining whether he acted alone is one good reason. Other reasons are to identify: whether the crime involved enticement or undue influence by others who ought to be prosecuted; patterns of action or of context, upon which intelligence agencies and Law Enforcement can be more effective in preventing similar tragedies; if gunman was mentally ill, whether an entity acted negligently or wantonly in allowing the release of this person; further statistical evidence for the legislator to improve the relevant statutes (or enact new ones if necessary) pursuant to the punishment and prevention of similar conduct. There might be other law-related reasons, but these are the ones I can think of right now.	This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate."	Parents have very wide latitude to make their children do what they are told, especially when the action is mandated by law. Vaccinations for school children are mandatory, and that could include covid vaccinations. A child is not eligible for an exemption on their own (only the parent can request a non-medical exemption). Force can be used on the child to get them to comply with a mandatory vaccination, per RCW 9A.16.100. It is the policy of this state to protect children from assault and abuse and to encourage parents, teachers, and their authorized agents to use methods of correction and restraint of children that are not dangerous to the children. However, the physical discipline of a child is not unlawful when it is reasonable and moderate and is inflicted by a parent, teacher, or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child. Any use of force on a child by any other person is unlawful unless it is reasonable and moderate and is authorized in advance by the child's parent or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child. However, that does not mean that the shot-provider is willing to tie the child down on parental say-so, so it is reasonably likely that a court order would be necessary. If the child has been legally emancipated, they are the ones who would have to consent to a vaccination, so their parents can't make them get shots.	Yes, this would be legal self-defense. But, in practice, mass shooting events are usually too quick to allow anyone to make a booby trap. For example, a mass shooting event in Denver and Lakewood, Colorado this week lasted just 47 minutes and took place at seven distinct locations which no one but the shooter could have predicted in advance, spread over a dozen or so miles, with no more than five or ten minutes of activity in any one place.	There are literally hundreds of such laws. Most of them (perhaps all, if we exclude firearms-related crimes in Title 26) are contained in Title 18 of the US Code, part I. The problem is that your definition of "public insurrection" is too broad, since it would include lying to federal agents (a crime), insofar as the reason for 18 USC 1001 is to prevent impeding federal investigations by giving them false information. Assaulting a federal agent impedes government and is a crime. There is pretty much a federal version of any state-level crime of violence. There is the riot act, and a specific law against insurrection and rebellion. Chapter 115 is probably the most relevant: this is where the various "overthrowing the government" laws are.	They both can be found liable, but not by using the but-for test. Suppose that person A and person B each independently negligently discharge firearms and that each on its own would be sufficient to kill person C. Is it true that, "but for the actions of A, C would still be alive?" No. Is it true that, "but for the actions of B, C would still be alive?" No. Using the but-for test would not be able to assign liability to either A or B. "But for" is not an obvious phrasing for non-native English speakers. It's the same as asking, "If it were not for the actions of A, would C still be alive?". However, courts and juries are not limited to using the but-for test for causation. See Corey v Havener, 182 Mass. 250 (1902): It makes no difference that [...] it is impossible to determine what portion of the injury was caused by each. If each contributed to the injury, that is enough to bind both.
Benefits of registering copyright - Should I register or not? I have a question regarding copyright registration in Canada. From what I read, it is not mandatory to register copyright in Canada. But at the same time, some folks suggest you should register your work as soon as you release it. Do you have any idea about whether I should register it or not? What are the benefits?	Registering your copyright provides official proof of ownership, see Copyright Act, §53ff. It is not mandatory since you can use other means to argue that you own the copyright, but in case you want to sue someone for infringement, it simplifies what you would have to do. Unlike the US, it is not required in order to file an infringement lawsuit.	Copyright is for original pieces of work. What you have made, is essentially a derivative work. Copyright is automatic for all things, unless the author has explicitly waived their rights, normally through a license. What this means, is that you have created a piece of art, that has been derived from that of the original author. You made modifications to the original artwork to produce a new one. Your creation could not, and would not have effectively existed without the original. Your image has the same shape, and the same colour tones as the original, and would likely be considered a derivative work. Since the right to derivative works is an exclusive right to the copyright holder, you would be infringing their copyright.	Beethoven's Piano Sonata is public domain There will be copyright in the performance but as you are specifically hiring the musician to perform the piece for you to record, you would own the copyright in that as a work for hire provided this is stated in the contract.	No, this is not true. Copyright can be enforced selectively. You are confusing copyright with trademark. Company can lose its trademark if they aren't protecting it. All the meanwhile they can choose to ignore some copyright infringement while enforcing their rights on others with no legal problems what-so-ever. In order to illustrate the difference: for example, if someone would make a clone of Super Mario and would call their clone as well "Super Mario" and maybe even would call themselves "Nintendo", even if they have programmed the whole game by themselves from scratch and the art and music would be all different, they wouldn't be infringing the copyright but challenging protected trademarks. In your case, the naming was identical, the art and everything was too similar to the original and therefore the clone was challenging the trademark that needs constant protecting.	You need permission from the copyright holder(s) to make the prints at all unless it falls under some fair use doctrine or is a work in Public Domain. If permission is granted, it would presumably involve you paying money on some negotiated basis. An artist might flatly refuse to give permission to your plan to use their art as a component of your art.	You misunderstand the nature of copyright. Holding copyright allows you to decide how the work can be copied: there is no obligation on you to publish it if you don't want to. After your copyright expires you don't have to publish it either: the only thing that has changed is you can no longer prevent anyone making a copy. The lost works of Aristotle are in the public domain - if you can find them you can make as many copes as you like.	Performers have "performers right" in any recordings of their performance. It is a "related right" (a kind of copyright just like authors rights). This gives them the exclusive right to distribute recordings of their performances. You are prima facie infringing their copyright by distributing recordings of their performances. In the US, the act of recording a performance isn't an infringement. http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=289757#P97_7400 (the US is not a signatory) https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/114 http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/11/24/us-courts-recognise-new-performers-rights/	Under US copyright law, all works are protected by copyright except for US Government works. The concept of "public domain" is not legally well-defined, and is used colloquially to refer to government works, works whose protection has expired, works available to all, and works not copyrightable (such as scientific laws or old software). Under older copyright law, releasing a work without the copyright symbol effectively put the work in the public domain. One can simply say "I dedicate this work to the public domain", and that is typically taken to be enough. CC0 purports to do this (using more words). However, as far as I can tell, author rights under European law are so strong that it is simply impossible. Releasing works into the public law has to be consistent with other aspects of the law. If you grant an perpetual exclusive right to copy and distribute to a publisher, their right does not go away on your death (a right which they would not have with a real public domain work). A problem is that an author who makes such a dedication (a bare license) could revoke the license and reassert their copyright. They could be estopped from making that argument. As property, your heirs would inherit the copyright and could (try to) revoke the license. Presumably the courts would not allow them to pursue ostensive infringers. Nevertheless, your plan is neither trivial nor bullet-proof.
What Are Repercussion For Making Uncensorable Social Media? I'm intending to make and publish an experimental platform where user-generated content (UGC) is uncensorable and permanent. Although tech promotes itself as such, like the omnipotence paradox, man cannot create something that man cannot destroy. Caveat being, I technically have no capacity to moderate UGC, rather it's within the jurisdiction of very complex decentralized infrastructures. Content of this immutable nature is virtually unchallenged. I wish to make this service privacy respecting and transparent. In the hypothetical this is used for illegal activity, what are the repercussions, and what's within authorities' jurisdiction? Can they shut every aspect of it down? If so can I be reimbursed for expenses? Can they charge me for illegal UGC, if I'm not the creator/host or have an ability to delist it? Can they demand I modify/redesign my service model? E.g. to collect user data / to create a backdoor to censor UGC? And adding to those questions, if I moderate UGC via the application/interface/frontend level (which is rather evadable) will the project itself be allowed to operate? And could I be prevented from developing/distributing the original source code?	You can design whatever this system is (leaving aside jurisdictions without First Amendment-like law that lets you design to your hearts content), the problem comes in implementing. The main legal question is whether you are operating a website. A website operator has to comply with various laws that require them to remove content. For example, if you operate a website that allows users to distribute content that they upload, they can distribute copyright-protected content, and you can be held liable for copyright infringement. DMCA in the US provides a way for you to not get sued, but you have to be able to remove putatively infringing content, so you could get sued if you can't remove illegal content. This may also include legal troubles over e.g. defamatory content where a plaintiff gets a court order to remove the content – you can't plead "I can't it down" if the court orders you to do so. Napster was sued for copyright infringement and racketeering for facilitating law-breaking by others ("secondary infringement"), and in MGM v. Grokster the Supreme Court annonced the general principle that One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party action, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the device’s lawful uses Grokster's problems arose because they clearly intended the software to be used to violate copyright law, whereas it is unlikely that Github will get sued because it is possible to use the platform illegally. So it really matters exactly what this "platform" is and what your relationship to the platform is. Describing a system is generally not illegal, realizing and maintaining one can easily be.	There are multiple issues with what you are trying to do, including issues with copyright, personality rights, and data protection. You are trying to use other people's content and likeness for your advertisement. Unless you are certain that you can do this in your relevant jurisdictions, without their consent, this sounds like a very bad idea. At least under GDPR, “but they made it public” is not an excuse. Personal data is personal data regardless of how you acquire it. The GDPR also has a very broad concept of identifiability that goes beyond direct identifiers or PII. If you want to use other people's personal data, you need a legal basis, and must provide them notice about your processing. Consent (informed opt-in) is one legal basis, legitimate interest (opt-out) another. You are suggesting to avoid this by blurring PII, but you may also have to blur other content that is indirectly identifiable. Real anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is a really hard problem. In some cases, a legitimate interest is able to avoid such problems. E.g. if I make a video with commentary about a Tweet, it would likely be OK to show surrounding personal data like the responses including the identities of the various accounts, to the degree that this is relevant to the commentary and/or necessary for proper attribution. However, that commentary likely has strong protections under freedom of expression. At least from an European viewpoint, a tutorial, demo, or advertisement would not have a freedom of expression argument that would shift a GDPR legitimate interest balancing test in your favour. Instead of blurring almost everything in your video or working on GDPR compliance, content licenses, and release forms, you should consider a different solution: create dummy content just for your videos. You can use your own content, and maybe add a dummy profile.	The Art 15 GDPR right to access is pretty absolute. There are only three grounds under which access to a copy of your data can be denied: Art 12(5): the request is “manifestly unfounded”, e.g. clearly just submitted for trolling Art 12(5): the request is “excessive”, e.g. if you repeat the same request very frequently Art 15(4): access to a copy would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others” Thus, I am confident that Twitch would respond to an access request with a copy of all your chat messages. Of course, the chat messages might be useless without context, but providing that context might infringe on the privacy rights of others (see Art 15(4)). There are two caveats to this right. The data need not be machine-readable, unless the more limited Art 20 right to data portability also applies. Twitch is under no explicit obligation to provide access in a self-service manner, e.g. through an app or web interface. It would probably in the best interest of Twitch to provide self-service means, but right now the Twitch privacy policy (permalink) asks you to exercise your rights by emailing [email protected]. Alternatively, their privacy choices page contains an entry to “Obtain access to or a copy of certain personal data we hold about you”, which contains a barely-visible link to a web form where you can request chat data.	Yes, that’s allowed. Under the Stack Exchange terms of service, content you upload is licensed to Stack Exchange Inc. on a non-exclusive basis under CC-BY-SA 4.0. The terms of service do not give Stack Exchange the copyright to your contributions, and a non-exclusive license means you are not promising Stack Exchange that “only Stack Exchange will be allowed to use this content.” That means you can continue to do whatever you want with your own content and do not need to mention Stack Exchange at all. The only restriction is that you can’t stop Stack Exchange from continuing to use your Stack Exchange content under CC-BY-SA 4.0, and since it’s a Creative Commons license you also can’t stop anyone else from using your Stack Exchange content under that license.	A more general version of the question, as far as I can see, is "Is Google Drive legal?". I can create an account and upload files to Google Drive, and I can open them from the cloud using various interfaces. I can directly open only certain files types, others I have to download to the device that I'm using in order to open the file. There are various file storage systems that allow this, most or all of which seem to use some sort of system of password access, file-access permissions and encryption to block access by unauthorized individuals. All systems seems to allow "sharing" of a specified file. Google and colleague escape liability by complying with 17 USC 512 aka the DMCA safe harbor provisions. Basically, they don't know, they don't select uploads, they have a removal procedure, they don't know that the material is infringing, and they "are not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent". There is a chance that you would be sued for inducing copyright infringement, see MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, specifically We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties You describe a situation that is unlikely to be found to constitute inducement to infringing, instead it is "enabling possible infringing", and mere possibilty of doing something bad with a tool does not make you liable for selling a tool, under current US law. An eyebrow would be raised, though, as to why this service only allows ebooks to be deposited.	"...claiming that the license can be revoked at any time." Of course a game company can revoke their license at any time. The company grants you a license to use the product, and a license is not an obligation on their part to provide the product, or a right to use it on your part. There's nothing illegal about a license or TOS that has clauses which stipulate when the license or TOS can be revoked changed or revoked.	You've really got two questions here: 1) "Is it an invasion of privacy to know that I'm using an ad blocker?", and 2) "Is it discrimination to refuse service based on what software I'm running?". Taking them in order: Because of how HTTP/HTML works, there are essentially two ways for a server operator to know what software you are running. Your browser announces that it's running something. This usually takes the form of a modified User-Agent header. I'm not aware of any privacy laws that consider "Person A told me something" to be an invasion of Person A's privacy. They guess it based on the actions your browser takes. For example, if the website gets a request for a page, and the site's ad network does not get a matching request for an ad, the server deduces that the user is running an ad blocker. Since this is based on things that the server operator could reasonably be expected to be informed of, it isn't an invasion of privacy under any law I'm aware of. Is it discrimination? Yes. But not all discrimination is illegal. In general, only discrimination based on protected categories (race, sex, etc.) is prohibited, and I can't imagine a jurisdiction making "choice of browser add-ons" to be one of those categories, not least because it's something the person being discriminated against can easily change.	This paper describes a website created to test the hypothesis that nobody bothers to read the TOS, and it contained a privacy clause saying that "we may share everything, and a clause that by agreeing to these Terms of Service, and in exchange for service, all users of this site agree to immediately assign their first-born child to NameDrop, Inc. If the user does not yet have children, this agreement will be enforceable until the year 2050. All individuals assigned to NameDrop automatically become the property of NameDrop, Inc. No exceptions. Since this was not a real webpage, there was no attempt to enforce. TOS is just another kind of contract, so the question is which kinds of contract conditions are enforceable and which kinds are not. It depends on whose laws you are operating under, which explains the use of expressions like "void where prohibited by law". There are innumerable conditions that could be included in a contract which are unenforceable. A contract requiring a person to commit a crime is unenforceable. Many jurisdictions have laws prohibiting a person from waiving certain rights, for example you cannot sign away your right to be represented by legal counsel in a dispute. There are related "unfair / deceptive" practices laws, which might include meta-conditions that any clause disclaiming liability must be prominently displayed. These are terms that a reasonable person would clearly know in advance are illegal and unenforceable. There is also a concept of "unconscionability", a finding that a certain condition favors the business to the point of "shocking the conscience", which may take a deeper legal analysis to evaluate. A requirement to litigate small disputes in California might be deemed unconscionable for a customer in an East Coast state, but it might not be. A typical characterization of an unconscionable contract is one that "leaves one party with no real, meaningful choice and is unreasonably advantageous to the other party", especially when due to asymmetrical negotiation power. For example, Ellis v. McKinnon , 18 Cal. App. 4th 1796 (employment contract for a salesman, commissions were forfeit if company had not received payment from the customer by the termination of employment). The main case law in the US in this area is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, where a customer bought furniture on credit, with a clause allowing repossession of all of the furniture in case of default by the customer. The doctrine is encoded in UCC 2-302. However, "unconscionable" does not mean "I don't like it". In lieu of statutory price controls, a customer probably cannot avoid paying an agreed on exorbitant price for a product ($100 for a dozen rolls of toilet paper). Here is a bit more legal analysis of unconscionability, which focuses on three factors: one-sidedness, oppressiveness, and likeliness to result in unfair surprise.
Are contracts of adhesion that require you to agree to them before viewing them legally enforcable? I recently was looking to switch plans from one major cell phone carrier to another, which included a promo for a free phone. This was done in the United States. At the point where I was to sign that I would agree to the terms of service for the plan and promo, I asked to see a full copy of the terms. I was told that I would not be allowed to obtain a full copy of the terms until after I signed. This struck me as odd, but I did some research and it turns out this is standard practice for that carrier. Are these sorts of contracts fully binding once I sign them, even though I am not allowed to see what I am signing? Is there any law that would allow me to break the contract if I see problematic or contrary terms once I am allowed to view it?	No While you can be bound to terms you had the opportunity to read and didn’t, you cannot be bound to terms that you did not have the opportunity to read. That doesn’t mean that you don’t have a contract but it will be on different conditions to those in the undisclosed terms. For a contract to be valid, the parties must agree on the essential terms, for a phone contract, what service the phone company is giving and how much the consumer pays. Incidental terms can be left undefined and they will, if needed, be filled in by a court with reasonable terms. However, this only happens to the extent necessary to give effect to the primary purpose of the contract. For example, late fees or termination fees are not strictly necessary (common law principles of damages for breach of contract work just fine) so, if the undisclosed terms include them, they will be unenforceable. Notwithstanding, it’s quite likely that refusing to disclose in the advance violates state or Federal consumer protection laws against misleading or deceptive conduct.	I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed.	I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal.	In general, the express terms of the lease signed supersede all prior negotiations of the parties, except to the extent that the particular language in question in the lease is ambiguous. This is called the parol evidence rule (which is the law in all U.S. jurisdictions although it has been expressly rejected in Israel). The parol evidence rule expressly makes a written agreement supersede a verbal agreement, rather than making them equally valid. Also, even if both agreements had been written, generally speaking, the last and final version of the agreement will supersede earlier versions of the agreement. The best defense would be along the lines of fraud-in-factum or fraudulent inducement, i.e. that this term was slipped into the final draft in a manner expressly intended to mislead the signing party about what was being signed. I've won one case where this happened (where there was extensive email correspondence between business lawyers regarding the changes that would be made in each draft and there the version signed did not correspond to the last version signed electronically in a very long document on paper and there were other indicia of fraud), but by far the more common outcome is to bind the party signing the document (especially in a commercial context) and to consider failing to carefully read all terms of the final draft to be negligent on the part of the party signing the contract. Arguably, there might also be a malpractice claim against the lawyer for the tenant for missing this change in a material term before the contract was signed.	Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.	In all such offers that I have seen, there is an agreement explicitly saying that if the service is not cancelled by the end date of the trial, a recurring charge for the price of the service will be made, and the customer authorizes this. If there was such an agreement, the charges would be authorized, not fraudulent. The question does not say what agreement accompanied the free trial. But any reasonable person would know that credit card info is only provided when a charge is at least possible. Addition: The question now says: Reviewing an example of the vendor's website, it says in big print "Monthly Plan $0.00/mo" and in fine gray print it says "Renews at $5.88/month." In that case it seems to me that the customer agreed to the recurring charge. What was purchased was access to the service, and whether the service was in fact used is not relevant. Unless there is a consumer protection law specifically requiring such terms to be "prominent" or otherwise making this deal unlawful, it seem to me that the customer has agreed, and the charge nis in no way a false claim. But it is possible that a court would rule otherwise. It is my experiences that in such cases the credit card company can and sometimes will act as an agent for the customer, and can often obtain refunds for multiple past charges. No doubt they have mush stronger negotiating power. But such refunds are not a matter of law, I think, rather of business practice and good will.	Yes A software license is just a contract and parties to a contract are free to agree whatever terms they wish under the doctrine of freedom to contract. Government can restrict what terms can be used in a contract either in general (e.g. for being against public policy) or specifically (e.g. by requiring wages be paid in money). None of the terms you mention fall foul of any restrictions I know of.	The entire purpose of the Entire Agreement clause is to say that this contract is the agreement, and anything previously negotiated is not part of the agreement. I don't know why they would fail to include that in the contract.
Sentencing guidelines for Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) I have read into section 49 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) which can demand suspects surrender passwords for encrypted devices, and section 53 makes it an offence not to do so when compelled. I am confused as to why I was unable to find the sentencing guidelines for the above RIPA offences, to better understand how a judge would make a decision as to the sentence, and type of sentence (suspended, community order, immediate custodial etc...). Why do some offences not appear on the sentencing guidelines website?	The statutory requirement for sentencing guidelines are at section 120 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which includes: (2) A sentencing guideline may be general in nature or limited to a particular offence, particular category of offence or particular category of offender. Therefore, not every offence etc requires - or has - its own specific sentencing guideline. (Presumably as there are far too many offences to easily cover, so limited resources might need to be focused on the more common ones.) Note that at the foot of the Sentencing Council's explantory materials is this link: Where there is no guideline for an offence, refer to the General guideline. Which states it is for: sentencing offences for which there is no offence specific sentencing guideline... So this General guideline is the one to be applied when dealing with a s.53 RIPA offence. (I've not reproduced it here to save space)	I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4)	In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe).	Police can get a warrant, if the warrant is supported by "probable cause" to believe that evidence of a crime exists. A separate "probable cause" requirement is that to arrest a person, there must be "probable cause" that they committed a crime. However, the Privacy Protection Act makes it unlawful to search "work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication", unless there is probable cause that the person committed the crime in question. There are similar laws ("shield laws") at the state level. Here is a map which gives you an indication what immunities exist in what states.	You might be misreading the extradition criterion The UK–USA extradition treaty has an example of the clause you're asking about: An offense shall be an extraditable offense if the conduct on which the offense is based is punishable under the laws in both States by deprivation of liberty for a period of one year or more or by a more severe penalty. Similar wording is used in all other treaties that I have reviewed: UK–Algeria ("offences which are punishable under the laws of both Parties by imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty for at least a period of one year") UK–Argentina (no extradition when "the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for less than one year") UK–Bolivia (same as Argentina) UK–Chile (same as Argentina) ... UK–U.A.E. ("offence is based is punishable under the laws of both Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of at least one year") If there is a treaty that requires there to be a mandatory minimum punishment of at least one year, I have not found it. While you say that "[u]sually, the minimum sentence for a crime has to be 12 months for an extradition to be allowed" and "[e]xtraditions are based on minimum sentence in the UK," my review of the treaties makes me doubt that. The rest of this answer explains how to interpret the clauses quoted above. It is enough that the offence gives rise to the "possibility of a term of imprisonment or other form of detention of more than one year." The inquiry is focused on the offence that the conduct is alleged to give rise to and the range of punishment available for that offence generally. E.g. an offence with a minimum punishment of a fine and a maximum punishment of 16 years in prison is an offence that is "punishable... by deprivation of liberty for a period of one year or more." Said another way: it is not necessary that the offence have a mandatory minimum of one year imprisonment. It is enough that the offence gives rise to the "possibility of a term of imprisonment or other form of detention of more than one year." See Canada v. Barrientos, 1995 ABCA 468 (CanLII) at para 103, Hetherington J., dissenting; but appeal allowed, for the reasons of Hetherington J. by the SCC in Canada v. Barrientos, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 531. In Barrientos, the courts were interpretating Article 2 of the Canada–U.S. extradition treaty, with wording substantially similar to the UK extradition treaties I reviewed above: "provided these offenses are punishable by the laws of both Contracting Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year." One remaining question is whether the decision-maker needs to consider the specific facts of defendant's conduct and make a preliminary estimation as to whether in fact a term of imprisonment more than one year is likely. This position has not been adopted in Canada. At the stage where a judge or Minister of Justice is determining the authority to proceed, this is not to become a "sort of sentencing hearing." See USA v. English, 2002 BCSC 1902 at para 23.	Obtaining consent for cookies is not required by the GDPR at all. Instead it is covered by the e-privacy directive, which as a directive rather than a regulation, must be implements by specific legislation in each individual country. The exact requirements vary with the law of each country. An e-privacy regulation has been proposed, which would have scope similar to the GDPR, would replace the Directive, and would not require national implementing legislation. However it has not yet been adopted. Proposed versions have significantly different requirements than the current Directive. Nor does the GDPR require consent for advertising that does not involve the processing of personal information, unlike some other privacy laws such as the California CCPA. However, if the Google package sets cookies without consent that are not strictly necessary for operation of the web site, it might well fail compliance with some of those national laws implementing e-privacy. Also, even necessary cookies must be disclosed to the user, as I understand it, possibly only in general terms. Several national Data Protection agencies have said that cookie compliance is not a major priority, at least not until an e-privacy regulation is in place. But that does not mean that lack of compliance is legal. Unfortunately I see no way for a developer using the Google package to correct this issue within the package. One would either have to implement a different solution, or trust that Google will fix this before enforcement becomes a serious issue. However, the app developer could add a separate general cookie consent banner, and turn off all adds if consent is not given, I believe.	This is a developing area within the law. In the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) governs. However, the law is broadly written. This means creative prosecutors can and do win federal criminal cases by arguing the law should apply. Whether violating a website's terms of service should be considered a federal crime subject to the Act has been a subject of hot debate. In United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012), the 9th Circuit decided violations of use should be considered breaches rather than crimes. However, the district court refused to dismiss some charges against Nosal when the case was returned, and a jury conviction resulted in a prison sentence. At least three different circuits have arrived at other interpretations of the CFAA. Draft legislation (H.R. 2454 and S. 1196) would limit the scope of the CFAA by excluding TOS violations, however, it hasn't been adopted as of this writing. That CAPTCHA breaking violates website terms of service isn't really in question. For example, see U.S. v. Lowson, 10-cr-114, U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey (Newark) in which the judge brought a criminal case to which two defendants plead guilty to wire fraud, one plead guilty to misdemeanor computer crimes, and a fourth went on the lam. But does for-profit CAPTCHA solving violate U.S. law? Given the state of the law, one could make a case either way. Given the industry's reputation, serious questions about intended use, and questionable labor practices, that's a significant risk.	Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies.
Is using empty debit/virtual card to avoid potential cancellation fees a fraud in U.S.? In Travel.SE there are often questions about cancellation fees and how can they be enforced in case of using an empty debit or virtual credit card for the booking. Does this qualify as fraud or other crime / misdemeanor in the U.S.? As I understand, fraud is an attempt to get some goods or services without paying for them (or without paying a full price), but in that scenario, a payment method is chosen to avoid paying cancellation fees in case of no show, so the intent of not paying what is due is present, but no transfer of goods or services will be present.	There's a critical error in your argument but no transfer of goods or services will be present. Actually: No, there is a transfer of service made by booking: resources are put aside by the service provider to be available for the booking person once they arrive. That is a service. These resources are not available to be sold otherwise: a room is booked and thus blocked from being rented to someone else, or a seat on the plane is booked and not offered to others, and so on. As long as the booking person arrives, no damage happens. However, if they no-show, there is damage: the resources go to waste unused: the room stays empty, or the plane flies with one less person. And the cancellation/no-show fees that are contractually obligated to make the damaged party whole (to compensate for the wasted resources) are also not paid. Knowingly using a fake credit card number or empty debit card that can't pay the fees and planning not to show up would be clearly fraud. One such paragraph that might be used to hunt down could be 18 USC §1341 - aka "mail fraud" - or much more likely, 18 USC $1343 - wire fraud. The latter is because any fraud on the internet is wire fraud. Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud [including a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services], or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.	Being as general as possible - refund policies are governed by bank and scheme policies, and so aren't necessarily the domain of law. There may be jurisdiction-specific regulations that limit your liability as a consumer, but there's not usually a legal requirement. This is almost certainly wholly governed by your credit card terms of use.¹ You can report this to your local authorities, but without proof of a crime, it's unlikely to be actionable. The website isn't necessarily to blame, either - if your computer or your connection to the website was somehow compromised, then your details may have been obtained in that way, and the website could have had nothing to do with it. Again, this is almost certainly wholly governed by their scheme agreement.¹ 1. Some off-topic information here, which may or may not be accurate, and which you should not seek clarification for here (check Money SE instead, and first check whether it is on-topic there) - generally, bank policies will refund you for fraudulent transactions below a certain quantity or value. In this case, the bank tends to take a loss and chargeback rights are not exercised. In other cases, the bank will require the merchant to prove that the authorised cardholder did in fact authorise the transaction. The level of proof is governed by the way in which the transaction was conducted and verified at the time of purchase - whether the CVV2 code was verified, whether address verification was completed, whether 3D verification was completed. If the merchant is unable to prove, according to the scheme guidelines, the transaction will be charged back to their account.	No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.	To me this seems analogous to failing to report a bank error in your favour, which amounts to theft in england-and-wales. I wrote an answer about that here. See that answer for the details but briefly there are five elements to establish under section 1(1) the Theft Act 1968: Dishonesty (section 2) Appropriation (section 3) Property (section 4) Belonging to another (section 5) Intention to permenantly deprive (section 6) As pointed out in the comments, there is a separate offence of abstraction of electricty in section 13 which only has the following elements: dishonesty, use of electricity, and lack of due authority. The courts have also held that electricity cannot be considered "property" for the purposes of the Theft Act (Low v Blease [1975] 1 WLUK 325). Arguably this offence is not commited here as you had due authority (permission from the supplier) to consume the electricity, however I will have a look later to see if I can find some case law on this point and edit it in if I find anything. With that said, "property" includes choses in action (section 4(1)). Choses in action are intangible property which can only be recovered by enforcing a right rather than by taking possession. In the case of a bank error, the resulting bank balance is a chose in action and the crime of theft is committed on that basis. In your scenario, the right to be paid for electricity you consume is a chose in action belonging to the supplier. Although I'm not aware of any case law specifically on this point, it seems to me that depriving the supplier from its right to be paid could satisfy the requirement of appropriation of property. The other elements of theft, as in the case of bank errors, are easily established here. Note that you won't be saved by "if and when the company does discover its error, I have no problem with paying the arrears". This is because of section 6(1) of the Act which states: A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal. Even if you eventually pay for the electrity, your intention was not to do so if they didn't notice. Note also that it is not necessary that there is a contractual requirement to notify the supplier of their mistake. Such a requirement can arise under common law (e.g. A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369, elaborated in my other answer). You didn't specify which part of the UK and this answer may not be applicable in Scotland or Northern Ireland.	This is just saying that if they can’t host your event then the only remedy you get is your money back that your paid them (your deposit, advance payments, and of course your don’t owe final payments). It is there to make it clear that they are not responsible of any other money. What else might the client want them to refund? Other lost expenses. Non refundable deposits to the band, the florist, the caterer if this is just for the space. The non refundable airline tickets your relatives bought. Prepaid hotel rooms. They will not pay for any of that. The pandemic is a bit of a red herring because although that is of course the big thing now, it says any occurance whether or not the business caused it. The answers to your specific questions though are pretty trivial. -The business did not cause the pandemic or control the state health office (Irrelevant as noted) -There is nothing they can do about it. The state or county will allow the events when the situation improves. But even if say there was no state order but the venue for their own reasons or because they could not get enough staff cancelled, the answer would be the same.	Until it was found to be unconstitutional, Florida had a law against surcharges for using a credit card (the statute is still on the books, however). That was the only law against "convenience fees" related to making payments. Whether or not a business will accept a particular form of payment (check, credit card, money order, traveler's check, cash) is up to business. Apart from credit cards, there has been no law against charging for accepting a particular form of payment, but that charge would have to be part of the contract – the lease would have to specify in advance what the processing fee is for money orders vs. cash vs. credit card. The residential tenancies law of Florida does not prohibit incorporating fees into the terms of a lease (as some states do), so the lease can specify "$1500 for rent plus $10 for payment-processing, every month".	All fraud is criminal One of the types of fraud in the UK is “making a dishonest representation for your own advantage”. Lying to a prospective landlord in order to secure a lease is fraud.	A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable.
When does US state law apply on the high seas? Closely related: What is the furthest point from land at sea where individual U.S. state laws apply? , but in reference to US territorial waters. It is pretty clear that at least some US federal laws applies to US-flagged ships on the high seas (not territorial waters) as part of the US's claimed Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This means that simply taking a boat a mile outside of the US's territorial waters does not fully relieve those aboard from Federal liability or jurisdiction. To what extent do US states have jurisdiction on acts committed on the high seas? States typically have extraterritoriality when the laws in question inherently allow for some extraterritorial effect (such as the famous "Four Corners Murder" scenario or general hypothetical standing-on-the-border-line shenanigans), or sometimes when they explicitly state so (a controversial area of law, getting new attention in the context of leaving a state to obtain an abortion). Are there other principles that determine when and if a particular state law is applicable on a US-flagged ship on the high seas? As a hypothetical, suppose I buy a used oil tanker, register it in the US, and set it up as a hydroponic farm on the high seas somewhere between Bermuda and the Azores. I grow crops that are legal Federally but banned under all, or essentially all, US states. Is there any precedent that would allow any of them to reach out and slap me with a state charge just for growing them at sea? If so, how is it determined which state(s) have jurisdiction? The state I am a legal resident of? The state I was last present in before leaving the territorial limits of the USA? Whatever state finds me first? Do all 50 of them get their own chance to apply their laws to whatever it is I am doing on the high seas? Another hypothetical could be practicing a state-licensed profession without a license. If the regulation of the profession is solely covered by state laws, is there any way that a state could "get" me if I limited my practice to the Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, requiring my clients to come to me on the high seas for services that aren't currently regulated under Federal law? While the juiciest hypotheticals relate to criminal law, civil law could also be considered. For example, I am a resident of a state that has passed a statute allowing me to sue anyone who does the Hokey Pokey and turns themselves around. This is a novel cause of action and has neither precedent nor an equivalent in Federal law. I'm on a US-flagged cargo ship on the high seas when the captain does the Hokey Pokey and turns themselves around. Does the state have jurisdiction over the captain to subject him to the judgment of the state's court?	California courts have held that state's labor law applicable to mariners on a vessel based in California, and mostly working in local waters, even when the ship's voyage took it into federal or international waters - Gulf Offshore Logistics, LLC v. Superior Court of Ventura County, case no. B298318, 2020. Following a direction from the California Supreme Court, the California Court of Appeal decided that the state's wage and hour regulations apply to maritime workers on the same basis as is used for certain other highly mobile workers. That includes pilots and flight attendants, as in Ward v United Airlines (2020) 9 Cal.5th 732, which held: For interstate transportation workers and others who do not work more than half the time in any one state, we conclude this principle will be satisfied if the worker performs some work here and is based in California, meaning that California serves as the physical location where the worker presents himself or herself to begin work. The ship in the case was based in a port just west of Los Angeles. It travelled from there through California coastal waters, and into the Santa Barbara Channel. That is an anomalous area because California considers it to be part of the state as far as state law, but the federal government does not. The workers lived in various other states, and the company owning the vessel was based in Lousiana - therefore, they had moved for summary dismissal of the California case in favor of Lousiana law. The Court of Appeal said that in addition to the relevant federal labor law (the FLSA), California law would apply when the majority of work done was in California territorial waters. And: We note that [the ship] also sailed outside of California’s boundaries and into international waters. This circumstance does not alter our conclusion. The wage and hour regulations then apply, as with airline workers and truckers, to work done outside California, but by somebody whose work is based there (the ship's home port and the location of the majority of its voyage). That is in addition to federal law.	Short Answer At the level of generality presented in the question, it is impossible to know with any meaningful level of comfort, which state's laws regarding punitive damages caps will apply, even if there are prior precedents addressing a similar issue, since the determination is so dependent upon a rich set of relevant facts. Long Answer Does Federal Or State Law Apply? In a diversity case, under what is known as the Erie doctrine, after the U.S. Supreme Court case that established it, a federal district court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the state in which it is located (including its choice of law rules) and federal procedural law. A variety of subsequent cases have clarified (or at least made more specific) what counts as substantive law, and what counts as procedural law. A 2018 law review article (open access) uses a five page long flow chart to explain the rule. A simplified partial page flowchart regarding whether state or federal law applies can be found here. To cut a long analysis short, punitive damage limitations generally count as substantive law under this test. So, the question of which state's law to apply to punitive damages caps in a diversity case brought in a U.S. District Court in Texas is precisely the same as the question faces by a Texas state court regarding which state's law to apply. Choice Of Law Analysis At The State Level In general, a state court (or a federal court sitting in diversity) applies the law of the state in which it is located unless a party argues that under choice of law principles that another state's law should apply, and that party shows that the law of the state whose law is proposed is different from the law of the state where the case is being tried. Historically, there were rigid rules that provided that in particular kinds of cases, a particular state's law would apply. Some of those historical rules continue to have full force. For example, the substantive real property law of the state where real property is located almost always applies. But, in other cases, a more vague modern rule for choice of law applies. This is the rule that the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the issue to be decided should apply. Different issues in the same case may end up being governed by different laws as a result. Among the factors to be considered in applying a most significant relationship test are: The place where the event giving rise to the claim occurred. The interest of the state where the person who was harmed resides in controlling the amount of compensation that the person harmed received. The interest of the state where the person who caused the harm resides in encouraging or discouraging business activity that may hurt others. The interest of the state where the insurance company paying some or all of the claim is located in not driving up insurance premiums. The inquiry in this multi-factor balancing test is usually extremely fact intensive. The practical effect of the most significant relationship test has been to make the ultimate decision less predictable and to make it more likely that a judge will decide that the forum state's law will apply. Under the historical rule, about two-thirds of requests to apply a non-forum state's law were granted. Under the modern rule, about one-third of such requests are granted. A law review article from 1987 spells out the choice of law rules in Texas at the time which have probably become somewhat looser since that time that it was written. The article is James P. George, Choice of Law Outline for Texas Courts, 18 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 785 (1987). Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/255 A short article looking at the case law for choice of law cases with regard to punitive damages can be found here. It opens by observing that: The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that while states are afforded discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, state law is still subject to "procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). Relying on the Due Process Clause, the Court has provided some basis for determining which state's law applies to the punitive damages question and what conduct is subject to punitive liability. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, for example, the Supreme Court held that "for a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court has also made clear that "[e]lementary notions of fairness" require that a defendant must be given "fair notice" of what conduct is subject to punitive damages, as well as the severity of the penalty that may be imposed. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996). It also observes in an analysis that should be taken with a grain of salt, because it comes from a law firm that defends companies that are usually defendants in product liability cases rather than plaintiffs and is not written by a neutral party: a growing number of courts have begun to recognize that an analysis of the Restatement factors points to the application of defendants' home jurisdictions' laws to the issue of punitive damages. See, e.g., Kirchman v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 8:06- cv-1787-T-24-TBM, 2014 WL 2722483, at 4 (M.D. Fla. June 16, 2014) (applying the law of New Jersey to punitive damages claim because that state "is the place of injury-causing conduct," i.e., the state "where Novartis made its corporate decisions regarding the labeling, packaging and warning of the drugs, which Plaintiff alleges caused Mr. Kirchman's osteonecrosis of the jaw") (citation omitted); Williams v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 761, 768 (S.D. Ohio 2014) ("When a plaintiff seeks punitive damages against a manufacturer in a products liability case based on a 'failure to warn' theory, the focus, for purposes of a choice-of-law analysis, needs to be on the place where the defendant's alleged corporate misconduct occurred."); Braun, 2014 WL 345246, at 5 (California law applied to punitive damages claims against infant sling manufacturer because defendant "designed its products in California" and therefore "all of the actions that would form the basis for punitive damages occurred there"); Dopson-Troutt v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 8:06-CV-1708-T-24-EAJ, 2013 WL 3808205, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2013) ("The Court agrees with the reasoning of the other courts who have found that" the Restatement principles "support applying New Jersey law to the punitive damages issue in this case" because "the basic policy underlying punitive damages is to punish and deter [the defendant], whose conduct occurred in New Jersey . . . .") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For example, in Irby, a Virginia plaintiff alleged that he developed osteonecrosis of the jaw after ingesting the drug Zometa, manufactured by Novartis. Irby, 2011 WL 5835414, at 2. The parties stipulated that Virginia law governed the plaintiff's compensatory claims for failure to warn, defective design, breach of implied warranty, negligence, and consumer fraud. They disagreed, however, on which state's law should govern plaintiff's punitive damages claim. Virginia law caps punitive damages at $350,000, while New Jersey law bars them completely in cases involving FDA-approved drugs. Plaintiff argued Virginia law should apply as the place of injury, while Novartis argued that the law of New Jersey should apply because its principal place of business is located in that state. To some extent, these choice of law principles apply even in cases where there are arguably procedural rules that apply, rather than merely blindly following a federal procedure and state substantive distinction. Wikipedia's entry on the Erie doctrine concludes in part by stating: Erie has gone in a newer and even more complicated direction than the previous controlling cases, and that instead of selecting either federal or state law for a case, the federal court may be required to somehow blend federal and state law, depending on the issue. This is quite frustrating for those who wish to have a black-letter rule that will point them to the answer. However, the possibility of blending in Erie does not open up an infinitude of possibilities. But even in the context here where it is clear that state law rather than federal law applies, the determination of which state's law applies is itself involved and is frustratingly indeterminate.	Why would the EU expect that any of its laws would apply to my business? It doesn't. Unless you choose to do business in the EU (which is possible, thanks to the wonders of the World Wide Web). Then, and only then, do you have to comply with EU law, including the GDPR. From a comment by @BenCollins: I'm talking about non-EU online retail that does allow Europeans (particularly those not actually in the EU at the time of the transaction) to place orders. Basically, GDPR Article 3 says that the GDPR applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union The phrase "in the union" is clearly open to interpretation, but according to the website Security Now, Dr. Michèle Finck says this: Most people seem to agree that the relevant criterion is whether you're based in the EU at the moment data is collected - citizen or not (my emphasis). While Michèle Finck is a well-respected legal scholar, she is not an authoritative legal source, so we need to wait for to case-law to nail this. For what it is worth, (not much I am afraid) I think it would be against common sense to define the territorial scope so broad that brick and mortar stores in the USA risks to be prosecuted in Europe if they sold goods or services to European tourists. However, what most US based businesses that chooses to be open to business for orders that are placed by natural persons who are in the [European] Union need to know that there is this: According to European law, the GDRP does apply to them when they conduct such business. From a comment by @BenCollins: I question the notions that (a) there is a basis by which the law would apply The legal basis is European law, in particular GDPR Article 3. and (b) that it has any enforcement mechanisms outside the EU. As for enforcement, I think a good answer has already been provided by Dale M. but for completeness: The USA has treaties with EU that mean that after a legal case has been decided in a court of law in the EU, it can request that the USA enforce the judgement (typically by collecting the fine the USA-based business incurred when conducting business in Europe). To make this answer more general, here are a breakdown of the the regulation of territorial scope of the GDPR for businesses that are not located in the EU: The scope is clearly spelled out in Article 3, and if you're not "a controller or a processor in the Union", you are only subject to the GDPR if your processing activities are related to: a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. US based companies that engage in business practices that are illegal in Europe know about this, and has already taking steps to protect themselves from the being prosecuted in Europe under the GDPR by using firewalls to block access to their services from the EU. The bottom line is that if you: have no presence in Europe, and don't offer goods or services to people who are in the Union, and you don't collect personal data about European natural persons, then the GDPR does not apply to you. If at least one of the above applies then you need to follow the GDPR if you do not want to be prosecuted in the EU.	Since no jurisdiction is specified, I decided to search in maryland in the united-states As far as I can tell, there is no state or federal law which prohibits a private individual from owning a decommissioned military tank. Most public highways and roads have weight limits, and many tanks would exceed them. Most tanks, or at least most older tanks, are not in any case "street legal" not having required headlights, brake lights, air bags, and other safety devices. Treads must be modified to avoid road damage. None of this would be relevant if the tank was kept on private land and not used on public roads or streets. If somehow the main gun or a mounted machine gun were still in place, and not disabled, permits would be required that are almost impossible to obtain. Specifically: "State Laws and Published Ordinances – Maryland Statutes current through chapter 18 of the 2020 session lists Code section 4-401 which provides that: (c) Machine gun. "Machine gun" means a loaded or unloaded weapon that is capable of automatically discharging more than one shot or bullet from a magazine by a single function of the firing device. Section 4-402: (a) Evidence of possession. The presence of a machine gun in a room, boat, or vehicle is evidence of the possession or use of the machine gun by each person occupying the room, boat, or vehicle. ... (c) Registration of possession. (1) A person who acquires a machine gun shall register the machine gun with the Secretary of State Police: (i) within 24 hours after acquiring the machine gun; and (ii) in each succeeding year during the month of May. Section 4-501 (b) Destructive device. (1) "Destructive device" means explosive material, incendiary material, or toxic material that is: (i) combined with a delivery or detonating apparatus so as to be capable of inflicting injury to persons or damage to property; or (ii) deliberately modified, containerized, or otherwise equipped with a special delivery, activation, or detonation component that gives the material destructive characteristics of a military ordnance. (2) "Destructive device" includes a bomb, grenade, mine, shell, missile, flamethrower, poison gas, Molotov cocktail, pipe bomb, and petroleum-soaked ammonium nitrate Section 4-503 (a) Prohibited. A person may not knowingly: (1) manufacture, transport, possess, control, store, sell, distribute, or use a destructive device; or (2) possess explosive material, incendiary material, or toxic material with intent to create a destructive device.	There are a number of specific limitation on what can be made criminal in US law, derived from constitutional protection. Specific Rights Expressions of free speech, for example, cannot be made criminal, although there can be laws which regulate or impact speech to a degree. Similarly, the establishment clause of the First Amendment prohibits a law requiring people to attend a particular church, and he free Exercise clause prohibits any criminal penalties for any religious practice or lack of practice. Most of the other provisions of the Bill of right would impose similar limitations. The legislature cannot criminalize what people have a constitutional right to do. Thre are also specific limitations not in the bill of rights, such as the prohibition of Ex Post Facto laws, the right to trial by jury, and the constitutional limitation of Treason laws. Rational Basis Beyond that the Due Process clause of the 5th and the parallel clause of the 14th impose limits on criminal law generally. Criminal laws must have (at least) a rational basis. The legislature cannot just prohibit picking up papers because they felt like it, they must have articulated a problem and a plausible reason why a given law would address it. If they don't the law may be overturned as unconstitutional. If a law is challenged as being unconstitutional, it will currently either be subject to rational basis analysis, or to one of the stricter levels. However a law which cannot pass rational basis analysis will not survive intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny either. Laws which appear to invade one of the enumerated rights, or a right that the Court has deemed "fundamental" are normally tested under either strict or intermediate scrutiny. According to the the Wikipedia article: Courts applying rational basis review seek to determine whether a law is "rationally related" to a "legitimate" government interest, whether real or hypothetical. The higher levels of scrutiny are intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. ... laws implicating unenumerated rights that the Supreme Court has not recognized as fundamental receive rational basis review. ... In modern constitutional law, the rational basis test is applied to constitutional challenges of both federal law and state law (via the Fourteenth Amendment). This test also applies to both legislative and executive action whether those actions be of a substantive or procedural nature. The rational basis test prohibits the government from imposing restrictions on liberty that are irrational or arbitrary, or drawing distinctions between persons in a manner that serves no constitutionally legitimate end. ... A court applying rational basis review will virtually always uphold a challenged law unless every conceivable justification for it is a grossly illogical non sequitur. (See Killian, Johnny H., George A. Costello, & Kenneth R. Thomas, co-eds., The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation: Analysis of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 28, 2002, by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Senate Document No. 108-17, 108th Congress, 2d Session) and specifically Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) at 635) Rational Basis analysis became accepted after the demise of "substantive Due Process", mostly in a civil, rather than criminal context. A version of it was suggested in Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in the dissent by Justice Holmes. It was adopted as governing in [Nebbia v. New York In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno 413 U.S. 528 (1973) The Court overturned, on a rational basis scrutiny, a law excluding households consisting of unrelated people from the Federal Food Stamp program, writing: [A] bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. Specific cases In Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) a law that criminalized the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons was overturned on a rational basis review. Similar cases are now generally treated with intermediate scrutiny. In James v. Strange 407 U.S. 128 (1972). a Kansas law reclaiming payments for public defenders was overturens on rational basis review as “an impermissible burden on the right to counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright." In Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986), rational basis analysis was employed to sustain a statute criminalizing homosexual activity. However, this was later overturned.. Vagueness Also under Due Process, vague laws are prohibited. If a reasonable person cannot tell from the law what is or is not illegal, the law can be overturned for vagueness. Procedural protections Then there are procedural limits, also largely derived from the Due Process clause(s). A law cannot automatically convict people without a genuine hearing, in which a person can present a defense to an independent, impartial judge or jury. A law cannot impose duties which are flatly impossible to perform. A law cannot impose punishments which are considered unreasonable for the seriousness of the crime (as evaluated by judges). Other Limits There are other limits as well, it would take a book to list them all in detail. But those are some of the more frequently applied ones.	The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law."	You may want to select a state where you have some sort of presence. According to this article, personal jurisdiction can be waived, but subject matter jurisdiction can not, and "for pragmatic reasons some states deny subject-matter jurisdiction to specific claims, such as those arising in other states". In other words, if nothing about you, the other party, or the case has any relation to the state, the court doesn't necessarily have to listen to the case. And if that happens, the provision about them submitting to the jurisdiction is worthless. Beyond that, are you OK with going to court in the location you select? Do you know whether all your terms and conditions are valid in that location? Do you know whether one place or another has more favorable interpretations of the laws, or more favorable local rules, when it comes to the types of disputes you are likely to have? You probably want a lawyer to help you decide.	It depends Law in international airspace over international waters is the law of the country the plane is registered in - just like a ship is considered land of the registered/owner's country while in international waters. This is, according to the Britannica, also called the quasi-territorial Jurisdiction. So if this were a Lufthansa Flight, technically everything there happens in Germany under the Tokyo Convention and German Law (StGB §4) and the case can be held in Germany. For United Airlines it means, that the act happened in the US and if it was an Air Japan flight, it would be Japan, no matter in which airspace it happens. However, other laws might also make the law of other countries apply and put the people into the jurisdiction by virtue of law applying globally: if the perpetrator or victim were US citizens, any felony that happens between the two on that flight can also be prosecuted in the US, as they claim jurisdiction in those cases. Similarly, the UK and Germany have similar laws, in the latter case for only a subset of crimes (StGB §5, 6-11a). This is the principle of personal jurisdiction. But technically, the quasi-territorial jurisdiction can override that. And that again is overridden once the plane lands and enters the territorial jurisdiction of the harboring country. All involved countries can elect to prosecute or not, and there is no double jeopardy problem as we have separate sovereigns. Who is most likely to prosecute? Depends on the case, but in the least, the country of registration has Jurisdiction and will usually get the first crack at the case. However, extradition treaties and other treaties between two countries can give preference to the country of the nationals. BTW: we had pretty much the same question for murder on a plane.
Can HOA force you to pay for services in addition to dues? My HOA (in CT) is asking owners to get their dryer vents cleaned. They asked last year and I obliged. I got them cleaned 12/18. They sent out an email today saying every unit must get them cleaned. I have used the dryer maybe 4 times since they were cleaned last, so the vents don’t need cleaning again at this time. Can my HOA force me to pay $80+ for unnecessary dryer vent cleaning in addition to the $280+ monthly HOA fee/dues I’m already paying?	It would be up to your HOA agreement. If you signed a contract agreeing to pay for services then yes. If not then no. An HOA agreement is just a contract like any other and you would have to abide by what you agreed to. Also, they may not have an actual contract for you to sign, but by moving to the community you would be agreeing to follow the by laws of the HOA. If you have a disagreement with them that can not be resolved, you can let a judge decide in court, but that could cost more than just getting the service. https://www.wishtv.com/news/local-news/indianapolis-man-battles-homeowners-association-over-solar-panels/ So to sum it up, you can refuse but they have the right to take you to court if they choose. I would assume a judge would rule in your favor since it's an issue of what goes on in your own home, but there is really no way for anyone to say what someone else will do.	Usual disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer. If you are serious about proceeding with this, talk to a lawyer who specialises in this kind of thing. I imagine that you will need to provide proof of the above incidents in order for any legal action to succeed. Accessing a tenant's room without notice or permission, and without a very good reason (e.g. a gas leak) is likely to be classed as harassment; specifically, "acts calculated to interfere with the peace or comfort of the residential occupier". Renting out your room and removing your belongings before the end of a tenancy is likely to be illegal eviction. Both of these are criminal offences under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. Shelter mentions that it's normally local authorities, rather than the police or individuals, who carry out prosecutions under this act (see also: Shelter articles, Landlord Law Blog articles), so you might want to start there. There is also the matter of civil action, including for breach of contract. For that, consider speaking to a lawyer.	You bought the item following the instructions of the landlords, and they are paying for the item (specifically, reimbursement). So, you were acting as an agent for the landlords, and the item is theirs. Of course, you could withhold it until you get paid (unless your agreement specified otherwise).	There is, in general, a rule that all matters connected with a single transaction or event should be included in a single legal case. Different jurisdictions apply this diffidently, and I haven't yet researched this in Maryland specifically. Also, if you agree to pay a part of what the landlord claims, you will quite likely be asked to sign a settlement agreement as part of the transaction. This is likely to include a release of all claims connected with your tenancy at the apartment. If it does, and you sign the agreement, you will be giving up any claim you might otherwise have because of the failure to properly notify you. You may want to consult a lawyer about this. A one-time consultation might not be very expensive. If you sued the landlord, you could do so in small claims court, where legal costs are significantly lower than in other courts.	You inspected the property online and based on that inspection you signed the lease. You have a legally binding contract. Now, it is not at all like the pictures How? I mean, are these pictures of a different house? If that is so then your contract is void for fraud. However, if the pictures are of the actual house and you just imagined from them that the house would be other than it is then tough luck for you. the stairwell in the house is a huge safety hazard for children OK. Does it comply with relevant building codes? If not then the landlord needs to bring it up to standard: you cannot walk away from the contract. Is it in need of repair? If so, the landlord needs to repair it: you cannot walk away from the contract. If it is compliant and in good repair and you think it is a hazard notwithstanding then you need to manage that hazard: this is not the landlords problem. I refused to move into the house That's fine: so long as you keep paying the rent there is no obligation on you to move in. If you stop paying the rent then it would appear that you have repudiated the contract and the landlord can sue you for damages - probably the costs of finding a new tenant and the rent up until that tenant takes over.	Sure, you can sue; but who are you going to sue? You have to prove someone knew about the fact that one condo resident was going to be paying for the other condo's hot water. Mixed up plumbing and electrical systems are fairly common in apartment and condo complexes, especially ones that have been converted. Chances are high it's a mistake and was not done on purpose. If you can find the original general contractor, he's going to say it wasn't him, talk to the plumbing contractor. Who will say I didn't do it, and my work is only guaranteed for five years, so talk to the plumbing inspector. He'll say he didn't see it, and besides, all those inspection records were thrown out ten years ago. The condo association may or may not have had oversight of the construction. Can you prove the neighbor knew about it and didn't tell the condo association? Can you prove the realtor who your dad bought through knew about it? Was there a home/condo inspection done - paid for by your dad or the seller - before the sale that might have spotted it? The police aren't going to care; technically, it is a crime, in a way, but it's not like someone tapped into someone's cable TV or electrical power meter last week. This is a problem from years ago, more than likely from the original construction; so who is really responsible? The police aren't going to run that down. And, what are the damages? A few months of part of a power bill? Is it really worth a lawsuit and a lawyer? Against who? I can't see a lawyer jumping into it. If you want to do something for whatever comes next, yes, collect evidence. Tell the neighbor he/she's on your hot water. Take photos and get a licensed plumber to take a look at it and give you an estimate for separating the water systems. That will document that the two systems are not separate. (Either call your own plumber or ask the condo association for the name of someone). Then, start with the condo association. They may be responsible for the inspections before the sale. At very least, the condo association may have to check off on the repairs. And, they may know more about it (oh, yes, we've heard about that in a few other condos...) You could bring it to everyone's attention at a meeting; it may be a common issue in the complex, and other residents may not know about it. If, in fact, the neighbor doesn't have their own water heater, they may be more on the hook for expensive repairs than your dad. They may have more of a case against the condo association than your dad.	No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.	Of course she is living with you. Clothes, toothbrush, cooking and eating, sleeping, I suppose breakfast as well, that's living with you. And it's not illegal, but it is apparently in breach of your leasing contract. I'd study your contract carefully to see what the consequences are if she is living for you for more than 14 days.
Can I sue my appraiser from when I bought my home in Georgia a few years ago due to an egregious error on the square footage? Both seller and buyer agreed to a purchase price with all the details agreed upon. The financing was not an issue either. The only issue that created a problem was the difference in the square footage. My home appraisal from 2015 listed the property for 300 square feet more than the current appraisal. This has resulted in my appraisal coming in $15K less than needed. I actually agree with the new square footage #, and want to see if the previous appraiser can be held liable for misrepresenting the square footage to me. Can I sue the appraiser for the egregious error?	To be able to sue the appraiser, he would have to have a duty to you. If he was hired by a bank, his duty is to the bank and not to you. Assuming that you directly hired the appraiser, then you would have to check the contract for limits on his liability – a clause that says "you waive your right to sue me for (certain) mistakes". Now supposing that you haven't waived your right to sue, you almost certainly cannot sue for misrepresentation, unless for some reason you can prove that he knew that he was lying to you. Your best bet is arguing that his mistake was negligent. You would have to establish that the first figure was incorrect (a disagreement in figures does not establish which figure is correct). A discrepancy between county records and an appraiser's estimate can be explained by numerous non-negligence related facts (unpermitted modifications of the structure, for example). Suppose that the source of the discrepancy is inclusion of finished basement space in the earlier appraisal, or perhaps measurement error. Then you would have to prove that that error involved a lack of professional care, which implies certain professional standards (not just your feeling that the error is egregious). This article explains the ANSI guidelines. The standard tends to increase square footage because it is measured from the outside. Then you would have to establish that you were damaged by the earlier figure. The law doesn't allow you to sue because someone does something that bugs you, you have to have suffered damage. You don't say how you were harmed – I presume the problem is that the buyer's bank is not willing to lend that much money, where you relied on an earlier incorrect estimate of square footage in advertising the house and setting the price. You may have contributed to the problem by relying on that estimate when you knew or should have known from the government records that the size is something less. There is some possibility of legal recourse, but it's not obvious (so gather all of your facts and talk to your attorney).	You claim for the damage you suffered If you owe me $130 for unpaid wages, I sue for $130. If you wrote off my $130,000 car I sue for $130,000. If you burnt down my $130 million building, I sue for $130 million. If you did (in my estimate) $1.3 billion damage to my reputation I sue for $1.3 billion. Of course, I will have to prove that the damage was suffered - some damages are easier to prove than others. Whether the defendant can pay it is irrelevant to the suit. Of course, if there is a judgement that is more than the defendant’s net worth then any excess is “wasted”. At least commercially. However, commercial return is only one factor involved in deciding to launch a suit. Others include: seeking a precedent making a statement of principle vengeance	I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't.	If a person A, speaking by telephone to an election official B in Georgia, attempts to influence that official to improperly alter an election result in a way that would constitute frauds or otherwise be a violation of Georgia law, then the person A has committed a crime in Georgia. There are various ways to commit a crime in a place without being physically present in that state. Since there is no question what was said on the telephone call in question (because it was recorded) the question to be determined would seem to be whether it constituted a crime under Georgia law, and whether the Georgia officials think it is worth prosecuting. It is true that a trial for a criminal accusation is normally held in the state where the crime was committed (or allegedly committed). But that need not be in a state where the person was ever physically present. If a person living in State C does business is state D, and is requires to file a tax return with the authorities in D, and it is alleged that the return was false, then the person is being accused of a crime in D, committed when the false return was received in D.	Let me start by saying that real estate contracts are some of the most heavily regulated contracts and details vary enormously by jurisdiction. That said ... To vary a contract, the contract must actually contain provisions that allow for it to be varied and variations must be in accordance with those. These sorts of clauses are common in long-term contracts (building, mining, logistics etc) but are less common (but not unknown) in transactional contracts like real estate sales. If the contract does not contain such provisions then it can only be varied by a collateral contract which has the same basic requirements of any contract - in this particular case, were you offered something in return for agreeing to delay settlement? If you weren't you do not have a collateral contract that varies the original contract. Notwithstanding, even though the other party delaying settlement from the 11th to the 18th is a breach of the contract by them, by agreeing to it you would be prevented from enforcing your rights under the contract by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This presumes that they actually settle by the 18th - if they don't all bets are off and you can enforce the rights you have from their breach by failing to settle on or before the 11th - just don't agree to any more extensions. What you remedies are will be detailed in the contract. These would normally include issuing a notice for them to settle by a given date - if they don't do that you can terminate the contract and keep the deposit. You could also sue for damages. Don't do any of this (or anything else) without getting legal advice first. Edit The OP has put in a comment a rather vital piece of information: there is a clause making settlement contingent on the buyer selling their condo. If the delay is in accordance with that clause then the vendor is stuck, even if settlement takes 10 years.	We are tying to determine what an acceptable compensation would be It mostly depends on whether the acts and representations by the broker caused you to pay in excess and/or have made it more expensive for you to restore your previous insurance plan. The gaps in your description prevent us from identifying whether your claim(s) against the broker is (are) meritorious from other standpoints. The broker's advice to buy additional insurance suggests that since 2018 you must have paid more than you used to. In that case, you would be entitled to recover from the broker the excess over the premium paid for the insurance you actually had after the old policy got replaced. In England the statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract is six years. This implies that delaying legal action for another year will reduce the amount to which you are entitle to recover. If insurance similar to the old, "excellent" policy now costs you more than it would had the broker never replaced it, you might be entitled to that difference as well. That is because the broker advised you something and she did the opposite, thereby unjustifiably worsening your position.	The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement).	No An LLC that didn’t exist at the time of the act or omission that caused the loss being sued over is not a valid defendant. They would sue you personally and all of your assets, including the LLC, would be available to the creditor.
Screen capture copyrighted material If someone captures some copyrighted video on their own computer, using screen capture software, is that against the law? Note that the capture would only be used by the person who captured it, it would not be distributed.	It is still making a copy, and thus an infringement of copyright unless an exception, such as fair use or fair dealing, applies. But if in fact it is never distributed, the copyright owner will never hear of it, and thus will never sue. Remember that copyright infringement is, in all but a few extreme cases, a tort and not a crime. The basic law for the united-states is 17 USC 106. This grants to the copyright owner ... the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; subject to various limitations, particularly those in 17 USC 107 where [tag:fair_use] is defined, as much as it is in statute. However, in 37 CFR § 201.40 an exemption to the anti-circumvention provision has been declared by the Librarian of Congress has determined, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(C) and (D), that noninfringing uses by persons who are users of [certain] works are, or are likely to be, adversely affected. This includes Motion pictures (including television shows and videos), as defined in 17 U.S.C. 101, where the motion picture is lawfully made and acquired on a DVD protected by the Content Scramble System, on a Blu-ray disc protected by the Advanced Access Content System, or via a digital transmission protected by a technological measure, and the person engaging in circumvention under paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii)(A) and (B) of this section reasonably believes that non-circumventing alternatives are unable to produce the required level of high-quality content, or the circumvention is undertaken using screen-capture technology that appears to be offered to the public as enabling the reproduction of motion pictures after content has been lawfully acquired and decrypted, where circumvention is undertaken solely in order to make use of short portions of the motion pictures It is not so clear that it includews entire films for personal use.	The "Standard Youtube License" or TOS reads You shall not copy, reproduce, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, or otherwise exploit any Content for any other purposes without the prior written consent of YouTube or the respective licensors of the Content. That stipulates no "free usage" and as such, you cannot use a screenshot ("Content") without permission or license from the copyright owner anywhere in your own work or on a platform such as Wikipedia that requires permissions from the copyright owner. You are legally OK with (preferably written) approval and license from the creator for use of a screenshot on Wikipedia, because such an written agreement will satisfy Wikipedia's requirement of owner approval for the use of another creator's work on Wikipedia and gives you written permission and license to use the work on Wikipedia. Simply contact the copyright owner and ask for permission. If you do not have the owner's permission and still use a screenshot, and are confronted with copyright infringement by the owner or Wikipedia, your use of a screenshot may fall under Fair use. The important qualifier is may. You being able to prevail with a Fair use defense - worst case, if taken to court, or at very least, Wikipedia taking down the screenshot under a DMCA request - is not guaranteed, because a judge would make that decision, based on the evidence of the usage and their determination if, in fact, a screenshot is Fair use. Fair use (Chapter 1 - Circular 92 \| U.S. Copyright Office) stipulates that usage is legally permissible when (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole is not considered to be substantial enough is an infringement of copyright of the whole work. Who determines what is what is "substantial enough"? A court. The court could take into account (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. in determining your usage is Fair use, or damages if the court rules against you. You do risk copyright infringement without clear permission from the copyright owner, and you risk Wikipedia being send a DMCA takedown notice. Whether or not you are the subject of a copyright infringement lawsuit is up to the copyright owner, and if that happens, whether you prevail is up to the court.	when uploading videos to tiktok/youtube, as original content creators what copyright do we transfer to the platform, what is left to the creators? Most of these platforms provide that the creator retains all copyright but grants the platform a non-exclusive and irrevocable license to redistribute and reuse the content. Where can we learn more those "laws" on their platforms? They are found in the terms of service. Do we have any laws that transfer ownership completely, meaning that as soon as we use the platforms to upload content we agree to transfer the owner? Most platforms avoid this, probably because they do not want to alienate potential users. Most people would not upload their videos or other creations to a platform that would sue them for making subsequent use of the uploaded material. For example, from YouTube's terms of service: Rights you Grant You retain all of your ownership rights in your Content. In short, what belongs to you stays yours. However, we do require you to grant certain rights to YouTube and other users of the Service, as described below. Licence to YouTube By providing Content to the Service, you grant to YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, transferable, sublicensable licence to use that Content (including to reproduce, distribute, modify, display and perform it) for the purpose of operating, promoting, and improving the Service. Licence to Other Users You also grant each other user of the Service a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free licence to access your Content through the Service, and to use that Content (including to reproduce, distribute, modify, display, and perform it) only as enabled by a feature of the Service. Duration of Licence The licences granted by you continue until the Content is removed as described below. Once removed, the licences will terminate, except where the operation of the Service, use of Content permitted before your removal, or the law requires otherwise. For example, removal of Content by you does not require YouTube to: (a) recall Content that is being used by other users within any limited offline viewing functionality of the Service; or (b) delete copies we reasonably need to keep for legal purposes.	There's usually at least a little wiggle room for a fair-use argument in copyright law, but as you're describing it, this sounds like a pretty straightforward copyright violation. A copyright holder's exclusive rights include the rights to make copies, create derivative works and publicly perform the work. Whichever way you want to characterize the podcaster's conduct, he's running afoul of at least one of these rights.	You seem to assume that copyrights require paperwork such as registration. This is wrong, copyright is automatic. And it prevents the downloader from making the sort of change that you suggest. In fact, it prevents the downloader from using your template at all. The only reason the downloader can use that template is because you've granted him a specific license to ignore some copyright rules, but the default remains. And you did not grant the right to alter the template to free users.	Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly.	To answer the question in your title: Yes, software licenses are copyrighted. They are written works that involve (significant, expert) creative effort to create. The best solution would be for Grammarly to hire a lawyer and say "we want a new EULA. We think this one covers a number of points our current one doesn't". Most legal documents will be copyright for the same reason (there may be a few that are so stereotypical that there is essentially no creative effort in putting them together).	The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.
What Exemptions are there to the Age Discrimination laws in Ontario? Ontario seems to have a pretty general/all encompassing law that is explained as protecting anyone from discrimination based on age with regard to employment or housing. Ontario Humans Rights Commission > Policy on discrimination against older people because of age But I see government job's listing age requirements constantly. Is the government exempt from anti discrimination legislation, or what is with the huge number of jobs that list "Must be eligible to participate in the Canada Summer Jobs (CSJ) program" as a requirement (with <30 being the top listed requirement).	Is the government exempt from anti discrimination legislation Broadly speaking, the government (in Canada, the executive power vested in Her Majesty the Queen) is not subject to any law unless the legislature binds the Crown explicitly. In this case, Ontario Human Rights Code does bind the government and any agency of the Crown. However, Canada is a federal country, and for certain areas exclusively regulated by the federal government, provincial laws may not apply fully. This is the case for human rights and employment laws; the federal government along with federally regulated industries (banking, telecommunications, airlines etc.) enjoy immunity from provincial human rights codes. But they are still subject to the federal Canada Human Rights Act (which only apply to businesses under the federal jurisdiction), which also prohibit age discrimination. Additionally, government actions are also subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 15 of which prohibits discrimination based on age. what is with the huge number of jobs that list "Must be eligible to participate in the Canada Summer Jobs (CSJ) program" as a requirement (with <30 being the top listed requirement). For example, the Canada Summer Jobs (CSJ) program you referred to in the question is a federal program within the spending power of the Parliament of Canada and are immune from provincial laws that interfere with its application. Ontario laws simply to no apply in this case (but federal law and the Charter does) even if an action physically happens in Ontario. What Exemptions are there to the Age Discrimination laws in Ontario? Anti-discrimination law in general only prohibits "unreasonable" discriminations. If someone can show that they have "good reason" to discriminate, it can be legal. For example, it is legal for a casting director to choose a black man to portray Martin Luther King Jr. instead of a white woman. It is also legal to discriminate against people with certain disabilities if they are in fact unable to carry out tasks required in a job even with reasonable accommodation. It is also legal for an employer (or for the law to require an employer) to give special leaves to women for pregnancy and childbirth, even though otherwise discrimination is not permitted based on sex. Age-based discounts for example are usually not illegal (and even explicitly legal in Ontario's legislation for senior's discounts) if the purpose is genuine (e.g. less spending power for teens and seniors). While age requirements are on its face a discrimination, youth programs usually qualify as affirmative action programs that are designed to ameliorate the conditions of a disadvantaged group. It is the same basis why certain gender-, race- or age-based scholarships and grants are legal. In the employment context, the government considers youths as a disadvantaged group and improving youth employment is a reasonable government objective. The Charter allows affirmative programs by the government: (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. and both federal and Ontario human rights legislations allow special programs: 14 (1) A right under Part I is not infringed by the implementation of a special program designed to relieve hardship or economic disadvantage or to assist disadvantaged persons or groups to achieve or attempt to achieve equal opportunity or that is likely to contribute to the elimination of the infringement of rights under Part I. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 14 (1). 16 (1) It is not a discriminatory practice for a person to adopt or carry out a special program, plan or arrangement designed to prevent disadvantages that are likely to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce disadvantages that are suffered by, any group of individuals when those disadvantages would be based on or related to the prohibited grounds of discrimination, by improving opportunities respecting goods, services, facilities, accommodation or employment in relation to that group. Canadian Human Rights Act	As stated, this is not a reasonable restriction and runs afoul of the Fair Housing Act. You cannot discriminate based on family status, with an exemption for "housing for older persons", and the act "does not limit the applicability of reasonable local, state, or federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling" (let's leave aside HOA restrictions for a moment). The number of occupants can legally be restricted in terms of a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest such as parking availability, safety, noise or securing the property. A restriction based on square footage or number of bedrooms might be reasonable: a blanket rule "no more than 4 people" is not reasonable. This article notes some of the state complication in interpreting "marital status", in terms of "not being married to each other".	Is A or B subject to Canadian employment law? Canada and the relevant province(s) will decide in their courts if Canadian or US law applies. The USA and the relevant state(s) will decide in their courts if Canadian or US law applies. It would be open to the employee to bring an action in any relevant court; the court will then decide what law applies and if they have jurisdiction - that is part of what sovereignty means! A Canadian court can decide a matter using US law and vice-versa. Things that the court would take into consideration are if the company did business (outside this single arrangement) in Canada or was US exclusive, the number of other trans-national interns, if the arrangement was seen as a device for avoiding employment obligations in either jurisdiction. If one is subject to Canadian law then they both are. Will either party get into trouble with the Canadian government? Assuming that the arrangement is subject to Canadian law then the company would be obliged to pay wages and may be subject to fines for not having done so. If so, what enforcement (and/or punishment) mechanisms does the Canadian government have at their disposal to enforce their employment laws against A or B? B - nothing; they have not broken the law. A - an order to pay wages and fines. Enforcement may require a judgement in a US court; either by bringing the case in one the first instance or applying to have a Canadian judgement given effect in the US. Edit The OP has added the proviso that the document states that it subject to US law and jurisdiction. If it just says that, it is prima facie invalid - a contract cannot exclude the jurisdiction of any court and an attempt to do so renders it unlawful. However, if it said that it was subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction and law of, say, Wisconsin, then a Canadian court would consider the parties intent and the relevant Canadian national and provincial law and might decide that the proper forum is a Wisconsin court and refuse to hear the complaint. Things they will consider are that there will be Canadian and provincial laws that cannot be excluded by contract, the hardship changing the forum will have on the plaintiff or defendant, if the result (assuming the facts are proven) would be demonstrably different in a US vs. a Canadian court etc.	This law regulates employers, and New York City only has jurisdiction over employers in New York City, so this law would not protect residents of New York City seeking employment outside of New York City. Generally speaking, the law of a jurisdiction can only apply to someone who has "personally availed themselves" of the benefits of operating in that jurisdiction such that it is foreseeable that they would be subject to the laws of that jurisdiction. An employer not operating in New York City seeking employees at large wouldn't meet that requirement. While this concept is usually applied in the context of the personal jurisdiction of a court, it is also not irrelevant to choice of law questions. As with any law, there are edge cases that could be challenging in which the applicability of the law could be unclear. For example, it isn't clear whether this rule would or would not apply to an employer looking for an employee in its Chicago office (e.g. working for the Chicago Mercantile Exchange) that conducts interviews and makes hiring decisions for the job at a job fair intended for NYU Alumni that is conducted at its New York City campus, even though it doesn't have offices for the conduct of its primary business in New York City and the staff conducting the job fair are based in Chicago. It might. But, suppose that the law did apply to the conduct of the employer at the job fair. Would it also apply to a follow up interview in Chicago, or to employees interviewing for the same job at a similar job fair on the Stanford University campus? In these cases, probably not.	Anti-discrimination laws apply to certain protected classes only. Homelessness (real or assumed) is not one of them, so it is perfectly legal to bar such people from your premises. It is also perfectly legal to bar people with red hair (assuming this is not indirect discrimination against certain racial groups). Nobody is required to serve everybody who comes in; what you are not allowed to do is ban women, homosexuals or other groups set out in the applicable statutes.	The Dept. of Labor makes it easy for you: as they say, it is illegal discrimination. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), Civil Rights Center (CRC), is charged with enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-16, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, as it applies to employees and applicants for employment at DOL. National origin discrimination can involve treating applicants for employment or employees of DOL unfavorably because of their actual or perceived place of birth, country of origin, ancestry, native language, accent, or because they are perceived as looking or sounding "foreign."... National origin discrimination can also include disparate treatment because of a person's accent	Exact wording might matter here, so I looked up the law. It says "a permanent resident complies with the residency obligation with respect to a five-year period if, on each of a total of at least 730 days in that five-year period, they are physically present in Canada". Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 28(2)(a). If you visit the Canadian side of the park, you're "physically present in Canada". It would therefore appear that this would meet the requirement. I am by no means an expert in Canadian immigration law, though.	"Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights" on the website you linked to is very clear that the Charter of Fundamental Rights only means the EU institutions can't discriminate based on age, and that EU law is not allowed to be age discriminatory. It doesn't mean that individual acts of age discrimination are illegal: In contrast, the provision in Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The practice of youth and senior discounts is older than the charter of fundamental rights. The charter will be interpreted in the light of continuity, it definitely wasn't the intention to outlaw price discrimination. There are specific laws that make price discrimination based on certain principles legal, e.g. UK equality act: Age discrimination - when discrimination is allowed in the provision of goods or services
Has a smart contract ever been enforced by a court? Is there any precedent for a so-called "smart contract" ever being enforced in a court of law anywhere in the world? Edit As per @David Siegel, this is not a duplicate with this question: The linked question is not at alla duplicate. No valid answer to it could be a full answer to this question.	Yes. In Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 17-24500-CIV-KING/SIMONTON, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100720 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2018), the plaintiff brought class-action securities claims against the developers of a cryptocurrency app. The defendant sought to force the plaintiff into arbitration instead of litigation, but the court held that the smart contract through which the plaintiff had purchased the defendant's cryptocurrency did not require arbitration.	No, in germany there is no universal requirement as to form (Formfreiheit). This includes associating a signature with a name in block letters. In principle you can enforce a contract in court even if the written contract does not identify the contracting parties by spelled out name, but by signature only. It stands to reason there is no benefit in omitting the full names. The legislature implemented elevated form requirements for certain legal transactions by mandating the use of a notary. Here, again, there is no requirement as to put a plain text name next to your signature. The link between signature and person is established via the notary’s documentation. You could put an alias “Donald Duck” next to your signature, the notarial deed will indicate that in fact Kalle Richter signed the document. As far as I am aware all european-union legal transactions will need to go through their official channels. It is simply not possible, for example, to establish a European Economic Interest Grouping on a scrap of paper. Thus there is no issue and in turn no regulation. One thing is for sure, the european-union does not impose a “minimum framework” on its member states. I recollect there are some directives regarding electronic signatures, but that is a different story now.	It's not legal The terms that you agree when you enter a contract can only be changed if: the contract provides for variation of its terms and then, only in accordance with that procedure. This may allow unilateral changes - these are common in ongoing relationships like telephone and ISP contracts but it appears from the Kickstarter page that this was not the case here. the parties agree to vary the contract either by deed or by another contract. If by deed then the law of making deeds must be followed, if by contract then the laws of contract must be followed. You mention "around $70AUD" which leads me to guess that you are in Australia. If you were there when you entered the contract then the Australian Consumer Law will apply to the transaction and, more generally, to William Painter since they explicitly "do business in" Australia because they ship there. It is illegal to make misleading and deceptive claims under the ACL and the fines can be huge. Perhaps a note pointing this out to them and letting them know that if they waive their fees in you case(s), you wont feel the need to report them to the ACCC.	If two parties agree to the terms of an exchange, then there exists an enforceable contract. A signature is not needed to create a contract. However, an intent to negotiate a contract is not, per se, a contract. Absent some specific and explicit measures (which for major deals may be codified in an MOU or LOI that itself contains contractual terms), if you can't reach an agreement on terms then there is no contract. It's up to the particulars of "the verbal agreement to start the hiring process" whether an agreement on exchange has been reached, or merely proposed. E.g., "You and I agree that I will pay you $X in exchange for Y due Z" is a contract. "You and I agree that we'd like to work together, and we'll hammer out the terms X, Y, and Z by the end of the week" is merely a proposal to contract, not an actual contract. Of course, this doesn't mean you're immune to liability for failing to reach a contract in this hypothetical: you can always be sued!	The main problem is that there is no court with authority to hear this case outside of China. It may be futile to sue in US courts, since China will not enforce US judgments. You can sue a Chinese company in Chinese court, under their Civil Procedure Law, but this pertains to contract breach. The question is whether there is any law under which the government of China can be sued for negligence – it is unlikely that that is possible (perhaps there is an expert in Chinese law here who can address that issue). This lawsuit is filed in US courts. It is based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Supposing that this lawsuit is successful in US courts, then the question is what enforcement actions are possible. Since the defendants are various governments and government agencies in China, execution of the judgment would have to be against those defendants – you can't seize the assets of every person with some connection to China. But given the nature of the Chinese government, it is possible that US courts could find that the assets of Chinese companies are effectively government assets. The short answer is, in fact a lawsuit has been filed, and I expect more. I also don't expect them to succeed in the long run.	The general answer is, no, it is not valid in the US, see this article. Exceptions to laws recognizing e-signatures abound which exclude wills from general laws recognizing electronic signatures. Nevada is the one current exception (conveniently located between Oregon and Arizona). There have been attempts to legalize electronic wills, including in Arizona (SB 1298). Although Tennessee does not recognize e-wills, a gentleman in Tennessee went ahead and did it, and in Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830 the court decided that the will was properly executed and witnessed. Electronic notarization is recognized in Arizona, though apparently for things you file with the government (not things that your heirs will eventually file), whereas in Oregon it is a general-purpose way of getting a document notarized. Since the courts are loathe to completely disregard a person's last will and testament because they didn't narrowly follow requirements, you might be able to "get away with it", but it would not make things easier for the executor.	Children can enter contracts There seems to be this pervading myth that they can’t. This is weird because, if true, it would mean that a child couldn’t buy anything: a chocolate bar, a bus ride, a sandwich, because all sales involve a contract. What is true is that a contract is voidable by a minor. That is, they can walk away from it anytime until they turn 18 and for a reasonable time thereafter. They can’t do that if the contract is for “necessities” (all of the above examples are), if the contract is complete (again, all of the above) or if the contract is clearly for the benefit of the child (e.g. contracts involving the child’s education). Children do not normally need a parent’s permission or approval to enter a contract. So, the contract is binding on Mary and voidable by James. John’s involvement is irrelevant unless he is a party to the contract in some way such as if he is acting as a guarantor.	what if I wanted to specifically write a contract in which the essence was that anyone could sue to enforce it,not just the parties? Intended beneficiaries have standing to sue for a breach of contract that infringes the rights to which the contract entitles them. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §302 et seq. Both of the scenarios you outline convey the existence of intended beneficiaries. Accordingly, the contract only needs to be reasonably clear as to who the intended beneficiaries are. The intended beneficiaries can be identified in terms of persons/entities, classes thereof, or they might be implied from the nature and scope of the contract. By contrast, some jurisdictions are explicit in that incidental beneficiaries lack standing to sue. Two examples are Myers v. Richland County, 429 F.3d 740, 749 (2005) and Boston Executive Helicopters .LLC v. Maguire, 196 F.Supp.3d 134, 142 (2016). See also Hoy v. Incorporated Village of Bayville, 765 F.Supp.2d 158, 173 (2011) ("An intention to assume an obligation of indefinite extension to every member of the public is seen to be the more improbable when we recall the crushing burden that the obligation would impose", citations omitted).
Can the right to self-represent be waived due to conflict of interest? If a plaintiff and defendant have a personal connection, and one (or both) of them represents themselves, won't that pose a conflict of interest between the councillor(s) and the opposing side(s)?	The purpose of the conflict of interest rules is to ensure that attorneys are acting in the interests of the clients they represent in that particular case and not their own interests, the interests of their friends or families, or the interests of their other clients. If a person is representing themselves, it is impossible for them to have a conflict of interest that would prevent them from serving their own interest because any such conflict could only change their interest. Say Alice wants to represent herself in a lawsuit against Bob and Bob hires Charlie to represent him. Even if Charlie is a close friend of Alice, that couldn't cause Alice to act against her own interests out of friendship to Charlie. Necessarily, she would only act in Charlie's interests if it was in her own interest to do so. So there simply cannot be a conflict that would prevent a person from acting in their own interest. They could only put someone else's interest above their own if it was in their own interest to do so, in which case it would not be putting anything above their own interest.	As a adult of sound mind, you are responsible for your actions. Background checks for job applications are common place to determine suitability. The employers have the right (and responsibility) to choose what is in their best interest. If through your previous and present actions, they come to the conclusion that you will become a liability to their interests, they will determine that you are not suitable for the position. Not being suitable for a position is not a discrimination, but a determination of fact. Rights and responsibilities go hand in hand. The same is true for the employers. They too have the obligation to act in their own that of their other employees that of their clients interests. In cases where a judge comes to a conclusion that the rights of others are being impeaded, they will most likely decide for that party. It is unlikely that a judge will assume that an individual is the center of the universe and that everyone else must revolve around that individual.	A lawsuit would be unsuccessful. Prosecutors have discretion to prioritize whichever offenses they think are most important, and they are generally immune from civil liability. This is a political grievance, and it comes with a political remedy; voters can recall the DA or vote for a new one when his term ends.	The purpose is to avoid the possibility that the solicitor will inadvertently end up providing advice to more than one side of the same dispute or transaction, putting the solicitor in a conflict of interest situation. In the simplest case, the solicitor might already represent the landlord that the tenant is seeking to discuss legal rights vis-a-vis. Even if the advice is merely hypothetical, this is not O.K. A solicitor has a very high duty of loyalty to the solicitor's clients. Providing aid of any kind to someone adverse to the solicitor's clients that benefits that person, even if another solicitor would probably say the same thing, is a serious breach of that duty and is forbidden and sanctionable. It could get the solicitor kicked out of the profession in a worst case scenario. The duty of loyalty includes a duty to take reasonable care not to inadvertently or negligently act disloyally. There is also a risk of a more subtle sort of conflict that has to be evaluated since many disputes and transactions are not just two sided. For example, perhaps a solicitor a big commercial tenant client on the brink of a settlement with a particular landlord after lengthy and extensive negotiations (perhaps in a business lease renewal deal), and another prospective tenant client might, for example, have an interest in leasing the same property as your existing client at a higher rate. Representing both tenants/prospective tenants could creating a conflict between your two tenant clients. Screening clients based upon their landlord relationships helps solicitors to identify these conflicts and to prevent them from arising. More generally, the best practice is for a solicitor to make sufficient inquiry prior to providing any legal advice to a prospective new client, to avoid having clients that have a conflict of interest with each other. This regulation (to the extent that it is really as specific as suggested) is simply a codification of this general rule in a specific, commonly recurring situation. In large law firms, every single legal professional in the firm typically spends the first half hour or so of every day reviewing lists of new prospective clients and parties related to them in order to screen for potential conflicts of interest. (I used to have to do that when I worked in a large, international law firm for a while.) There would typically be one or more paralegals or administrators in the firm who do nothing but manage that conflicts of interest screening process. Obviously, however, this requirement is a lot less burdensome if you are solo practicing solicitor who almost entirely represents individual human being and family tenants with isolated residential leases, and works in a large city where few clients have any connections to each other.	Yes. Generally a person may designate any competent adult who is willing to be the executor. It is very common to designate a major beneficiary as executor. There is no rule against a possible conflict of interest, although an executor must treat all legatees fairly. In many jurisdictions one can also designate a legal entity as an executor. When a will is complex adn involves large sums a bank or other financial institution may be designated as executor.	To the extent Constitutionally permitted or as further limited by the state’s own law Constitutionality, a suit may be brought (or a prosecution launched) when the state has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. … a state court may only exert personal jurisdiction over an individual or entity with "sufficient minimal contacts" with the forum state such that the particular suit "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and justice.'" What constitutes sufficient "minimum contacts" has been delineated in numerous cases which followed the International Shoe decision. For example, in Hanson v. Denckla, the Court proclaimed the "unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the nature and quality of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws." For the abortion bill, an organisation that provides funding to Texas residents probably has “minimum contacts”, an out-of-state doctor who treats all-comers probably doesn’t. For employment laws: if the employee is based and work takes place in the state, yes. There is a separate question of which state's law applies which is independent of which state's courts can hear the case. A California court can decide that it can hear a case according to Texas law for example although, in practice, if the California court felt that all of the issues were Texan, they would probably decide they lacked jurisdiction.	If you aren't publicly registering a trade name you are probably engaged in illegal conduct. Among other things, by doing this, you are effectively hiding yourself from any lawsuits arising from the business that accurately name the defendant. You can have a business mascot or trade name, but you have to disclose that this is what it is and provide a means by which a reasonable person who needs to sue you could properly identify you.	It would be dismissed sua sponte on grounds including absolute judicial immunity from civil liability. While conflict of interest rules for judges generally prohibit ruling on lawsuits in which you could potentially have an interest, there are narrow exceptions in cases where all judges are affected. The Colorado Rule, which is similar in all U.S. jurisdictions, states: In limited circumstances, the rule of necessity applies and allows judges to hear a case in which all other judges also would have a disqualifying interest or the case could not otherwise be heard. Colo. Code. Jud. Cond. 2.11(D) ("Disqualification").
May a UK academic employer ask the latest pay slip of my current Canadian job? As a postdoc in a Canadian institution, I have been offered a lecturer position in UK. In the offer email I have received, one clause reads as follows: Please could you provide evidence of your current salary by sending me your most recent pay slip. Is it legally OK to ask this (particularly considering the fact that the job I have been offered is not in the same level of my current job)? Is there any law that supports my potential refusal to provide the desired pay slip?	They can ask, but there is nothing in law - that I can find - which obligates an answer. (There may be some exceptions that require a previous employer to provide a reference which might include this detail, but that does not appear relevant here.) As an aside, there is an ongoing #EndSalaryHistory campaign by the Fawcett Society which is focused on equal pay and sexual equality in the workplace, and they are calling on employers to: stop asking salary history questions...	http://www.healthinfoprivacybc.ca/confidentiality/when-can-and-cant-they-tell-others is a pretty good summary. Different rules apply to private practices than public clinics and hospitals. I will assume that the clinic on campus is private. This is a summary of the summary about who your information can be shared with: Health care professionals can share information within your "circle of care". Specifically, they are allowed to assume your consent to this but you can explicitly withdraw that consent. This would include doctors within the same practice. Admin staff can access your information for administrative purposes. Anyone you have authorised them to share it with e.g. relatives, friends etc. The Medical Services Plan for billing and admin If you are unable to drive If there is suspected of child abuse If you are wounded by a gun or a knife If you are a danger to others For your specific questions: I asked about it and they said it's confidential, but confidential to the clinic. Correct, unless you explicitly revoke this. the counselling department can share information with the doctors This is tricker, these people may be either within your "circle of care" or they may be part of the same organisation. Notwithstanding, councillors are not doctors and are governed by the everyday laws related to confidentiality i.e. information given in confidence is confidential and everything else isn't. If you are told the limits of the confidentiality i.e. they tell the doctor, then those are the limits unless you renegotiate them. he would know I only have one kidney? Well you said "the counselling department can share information with the doctors" and this would require the information going the other way i.e. the doctor sharing with the councillor. Even if this type of sharing was OK in general (and I'm not sure it is, see above); the information shared should only be what is required for the councillor to do their job - the number of kidneys you have is probably irrelevant to this. What laws apply to situations like this where confidential information in one entity (medical office) decides to share it without the consent of the patients to another entity (the counselling dept.)? Well, we are not sure there are 2 entities: legally there may only be 1 - the university. Anyway, the laws are the Personal Information Protection Act and common law (Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 SCR 455)	Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice.	The employer may provide salary information, including a W-2, about an employee to an accountant, whether that accountant is also an employee of the employer, or an independent contractor hired by the employer. Normally a contract (or a company policy) will impose a duty of confidentiality on the accountant. If no such duty is explicitly imposed, there is quite likely an implied duty of confidentiality.	If the employment contract treats base pay as an advance on future commissions when an employee has not earned the minimum number of units, then the company is probably entitled to repayment of advances not earned out. On the other hand, if it treats the base pay as a guaranteed minimum, the company would not be entitled to a refund. The specific wording of the contract will be vial here. There may also be state laws regulating such an arrangement. Under Nebraska Revised Statute 48-1230.01 commissions not earned when an employee leaves must be paid: on the next regular payday following the employer's receipt of payment for the goods or services from the customer from which the commission was generated.	Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word.	I did not write "confidential" on my letter, but I assumed a business proposal is automatically considered as a confidential material. An incorrect assumption unfortunately. Unless you have a confidentiality agreement (NDA) with the first company, they and their agents are not under any legal obligation to keep information you share with them confidential. How is the legal situation here? There is none on your side. You lied about a direct question asked and were caught in the lie. Company A had no obligation to keep what you sent confidential. Even if they did, that may not (depending on how the confidentiality agreement is worded) keep the employee of company A stating that they had received the same proposal. Chalk this one up to a lesson on confidentiality and honesty in business. There are no reasonable assumptions of confidentiality in business unless you specifically state that they are confidential or are provided as part of a confidentiality agreement.	That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure.
Are Putin's constitution amendments legal? Putin is shaking up the constitution and there were reports suggesting that the process, as well as the amendments themselves, are probably unlawful/illegal despite the Constitutional Court's ruling stating otherwise. Speaking strictly from a legal standpoint, what can be said on the issue?	Speaking strictly from a legal standpoint, what can be said on the issue? Strictly speaking, the Constitutional Court is the top authority on the legality of anything. One can speculate as much as they want on whether the Court was biased, pre-determined, corrupt, defiant, flagrantly blatant or ridiculously unjust. These speculations would be pure politics. They do not change the fact that whatever the Court has decided is legal just by definition.	Technically, there is no such thing as an unconstitutional law. There are laws which have been passed, but whose unconstitutionality has not been discovered yet. But once a law is legally deemed to be unconstitutional, it stops being a law. The constitution is a recipe for running the government. If Congress enacts legislature which it has no authority to enact, the courts have the authority to discover this and reveal it in an opinion.	The constitution does not actually forbid "abusing a position for financial gain", and thus it is left to the political process to address any such actions (voting for a different candidate), or the legislative process (defining certain acts as forbidden) – or, the impeachment process. The court system in the US does not have the power to decide on their own what politicians can and can't do, if there is no underlying law. It is within congressional power to define limits on the act of any politician, for example Congress could pass a law requiring the President and Vice-President to have no business interests or stocks during their term of office; they could require that of cabinet members or members of Congress. Such a law would, of course, either require presidential approval or else sufficient support in the houses of congress to override a veto. There are various limits on what government folks can do. 18 USC 202(c) is an example of a limit on the limits: Except as otherwise provided in such sections, the terms “officer” and “employee” in sections 203, 205, 207 through 209, and 218 of this title shall not include the President, the Vice President, a Member of Congress, or a Federal judge It is possible that a president could engage in a criminal act such as theft, and that is not permitted and would be grounds for impeachment. The president does not, however, have the power to e.g. unilaterally send all government hotel business to a certain hotel company, nor can he declare that 10% of all government expenditures must be deposited in his personal bank account, so the mechanisms whereby corrupt rules of certain other nations can get away with that is that those executives have vastly more power in their countries than POTUS does. With congressional support, though, such acts could come about. If it did, it would not be too surprising if SCOTUS ruled based on common law and considerations of justice that such a law / act was illegal, but it would not be a textualist argument.	There may be a purpose to have laws which are impossible to follow. (I'm neither a lawyer nor a politician, following points are what I like to call qualified hearsay - they come from qualified people I know personally but were given as a remark or during a chat over a cup of coffee and therefore are not easily substantiable with rigorous sources. You can treat them as a hypothetical ideas for your thought experiments.) Everybody is implicitly guilty Confident citizens and transparent law is the worst enemy of totalitarian regime. You learn to live with ingrained feeling that there surely is something you are guilty of. Merely being addressed by police makes you nervous and malleable; should you stand up against oppression, it is easy for the state apparat to detain or convict you of one or more default offenses. A good example would be the law present in many, if not all, socialist bloc countries saying that knowing of a comrade having commited an offense or merely planing to and not reporting it to authorities is an offense in itself. Whether you did or did not know would be determined by the authorities. Make your laws very strict with a hope thay they will be followed at least to a degree Not laws in themselves, but standards (technical norms) regarding nuclear power stations in the former Soviet Union were strict to the point where they were technically impossible to follow given the state of the art. For example the standards for manufacture of high pressure pipes would state very low level of material impurities that when the actual manufactured material contained twice the level of impurities the pipe will still be very safe to operate. In a centrally planned economy with ever more ambitious production projections and declared zero need for contingency this was one of several ways how to create a bit of a wiggle room. (Source: I once worked for a nuclear power research institute supporting Soviet technology and was told this by an expert on stainless steel.) So there you have a bit of an illustration what may happen if a law is intentionally impossible to follow. Since you labelled your question 'United States', I believe the follow-up question is why would anyone want to propose such a law.	The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in.	The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court.	Article II of the Constitution does say that "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors". So it is true that a president or a federal judge could be impeached and removed from office, and it has happened to some extent 19 times – in 8 cases it went all the way to removal (as opposed to acquittal or resignation). However, this would not be a very effective way to avert a "crisis". Any judicial ruling is subject to appeal by a higher court, until you get to the Supreme Court. Moreover, impeaching a lower judge does not erase his or her rulings. So ultimately, a matter will be decided by SCOTUS. In anticipation of such a ruling, Congress might decide to get rid of some Supreme Court justice who they think might stand in the way. That was attempted with Samuel Chase, who was acquitted. Such a decision is not subject to judicial review (Nixon v. United States 506 U.S. 224). However, SCOTUS can also overturn that decision though that would be very unusual. It would also be very unusual for Congress to impeach a Supreme Court justice for having a position that they disagree with. At any rate, there is no such thing as a "deadlock" between branches of government. When the court rules, that is the end of the matter from a legal perspective. It is, in fact, entirely possible that a general will rule that the court or the president (or both) are wrong and will declare what the law now is, but that takes us out of the realm of legal discussions.	Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.
What are the constraints on a civil suit (witnesses, evidence, topics) - and are they public I am currently watching the Depp/Heard trial, and there seems to be a lot of stuff that cannot be shown, or said, and a lot of people i would expect to make a statement are absent. My guess is that there are rulings in place that preclude certain witnesses from being called, certain evidence from being shown, and certain topics from being broached - but how, and why? And are those constraints known to the jury? For instance, there was a last minute witness that somehow offered herself up to testify, a very crucial character witness, that i would have thought the plaintiff would spare no expense in finding. There was a photo expert that was somehow prevented from talking about colors, there is a lot of confusion about the existence or non-existence of a wall mounted phone, but both parties have refrained from showing images of the wall that the phone should have hung on - although the existence of such photos is a near certainty, etc. So my questions: How are such no-show-no-tell boundaries established, does the jury get to know them, and is this also in the public record somehow?	How are such no-show-no-tell boundaries established They largely stem from the rules of evidence which are complicated, vary from state to state and knowing which is a big part of what litigation attorneys are paid for. Parties to litigation become aware of all the evidence/topics that their counterparts wish to broach in the courtroom well in advance — during discovery. They will usually disagree whether some bits and pieces can be presented to the jury. In this case the court will hold admissibility hearings — again, well in advance before the trial. Despite all the preparations, some of these disagreements arise during the trial, and then they are resolved in place by way of voiced objections. The attorneys and the judge talk about them using professional jargon of the rules of evidence — having themselves seen all the evidence in advance. does the jury get to know them No, the jury doesn't need to follow the professional talk. In fact, they should hear as little as possible of it — which is the reason why admissibility disagreements are resolved in advance as much as possible. If serious issues arise during the trial, the judge will ask the attorneys to speak to them in chambers — away from the jury. Or they will ask the jury to take a break while the professionals talk. The jury just needs to listen to the evidence that is allowed in, and disregard any evidence the judge say they have to. is this also in the public record somehow? It is in the court record. It may be accessible to the public if the court allows. If someone wishes to see the record they need to apply to the court, provide reasons and a judge will decide if anything can be released.	I believe that you have misinterpreted the case, not least because the Hudgins v I.R.S case involves this only peripherally. The original case Diviaio v Kelly was dealing with a request for the number of photographs taken of the plaintiff and if these had been disseminated outside the CIA. This is in no way shape or form a request for records (the records were found to be legitimately exempt). I see no problem in your FOI request. In fact, I can foresee the response: These, http://www.maine.gov/legis/ros/meconlaw.htm, are the laws we use to justify these actions. In a common law jurisdiction, a person (including the government) does not have to prove they are abiding by the law. The onus is on you to prove they aren't; they do not have to help you make your case.	The situation you describe is extremely unlikely First, you will have been required to give a statement to the police who would have asked you most or all of the questions that you suggest before anyone gets anywhere near a courtroom and likely before any arrest has been made. That statement will be part of your evidence in chief. As in "Is this your statement?" "Yes". "Is this your video recording?" "Yes". After that, your evidence in chief is pretty much done. A witness of fact (rules for expert witnesses are different) can only testify as to what they personally sensed and what their state of mind was. So questions about what you saw, heard, tasted etc. are all perfectly legitimate as are questions about what you thought or felt. You are required to answer these questions honestly - if that means "I don't know" then say "I don't know". All of the hypothetical questions look fine but as I said, they will all have answers in your police statement. The only one that's off-limits is ""Do you feel that a crime has been committed?" - nobody knows if a crime has been committed; that's why we're having a trial.	I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts.	A courtroom is not a podium A court is a forum for resolving a specific dispute. Testimony is restricted for a number of reasons the most all encompassing of which is relevance. For testimony to be admitted it has to go to the issue in dispute. For a person charged under the laws of, say, India, it cannot be in any way relevant what the laws of, say, China have to say about the issue. Similarly, for a person charged with a Federal crime, state law is irrelevant (and vice-versa). There is no free speech issue here because testimony is given only for the purpose of resolving the case. If it’s not relevant to that you can’t introduce it and, if you persist in trying the court can hold you in contempt.	united-states Is a personal text (like a diary), submitted without the consent of the author, admissible evidence? Usually, it is admissible evidence. There is no legal right to keep your diary private. Production of a diary may be compelled by subpoena and admitted into evidence subject only to general considerations regarding whether particular entries in the diary are inadmissible for some other reason (e.g. lack of relevance, they recite the contents of an otherwise privileged discussion, they contain hearsay, they recite the terms of a settlement offer, the recite inadmissible prior act evidence, etc.). If the diary revealed information that could place the diarist at risk of criminal prosecution, the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination could arguably be claimed even in a civil case, but at the risk of an adverse inference to be drawn from that decision in civil matters. I haven't ever seen how that issue is resolved legally.	A witness is not evidence, but what a witness says (their testimony) may be evidence. Or, the body of a person who happened to be a witness is evidence. I suspect that there is a translation problem. It is always physically possible to try pay a person to lie and AFAIK never legal: the person who lies and the person who induces the lie will be punished by law. The witness who testifies will have to swear that their testimony is the truth.	The defendant Fox corporation (there are a variety of affiliated or formerly affiliated companies with very similar names) is organized under the laws of Delaware so lawsuits related to its activities anywhere in the world may be brought in that forum. This choice of venue denied Fox any means of contesting jurisdiction or venue. Also, the Delaware courts have a great level of expertise in handling litigation involving publicly held corporations. While this may not have been very important for a jury trial on the merits itself, this expertise was quite relevant in the pre-trial discovery phase of the trial which alleged widespread misconduct by the inner circle of a publicly held company's employees and officers.
Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? If I purchase merchandise in a physical store, and then (accidentally or not) leave the merchandise at the store after I've paid for it, is the store allowed to resell that merchandise to another customer? How does this scenario differ from leaving personal items at the store that I purchased elsewhere?	If the common law applies (i.e. there is no statute that changes it) then it depends on if the item was lost, mislaid or abandoned. The US has statute law dealing with lost money but that is not the question here. Property is generally deemed to have been lost if it is found in a place where the true owner likely did not intend to set it down, and where it is not likely to be found by the true owner. At common law, the finder of a lost item could claim the right to possess the item against any person except the true owner or any previous possessors. Property is generally deemed to have been mislaid or misplaced if it is found in a place where the true owner likely did intend to set it, but then simply forgot to pick it up again. For example, a wallet found in a shop lying on a counter near a cash register will likely be deemed misplaced rather than lost. Under common law principles, the finder of a misplaced object has a duty to turn it over to the owner of the premises, on the theory that the true owner is likely to return to that location to search for his misplaced item. If the true owner does not return within a reasonable time (which varies considerably depending on the circumstances), the property becomes that of the owner of the premises. Property is generally deemed to have been abandoned if it is found in a place where the true owner likely intended to leave it, but is in such a condition that it is apparent that he or she has no intention of returning to claim it. Abandoned property generally becomes the property of whoever should find it and take possession of it first, although some states have enacted statutes under which certain kinds of abandoned property – usually cars, wrecked ships and wrecked aircraft – escheat, meaning that they become the property of the state. For your specifics: If I purchase merchandise in a physical store, and then (accidentally or not) leave the merchandise at the store after I've paid for it, is the store allowed to resell that merchandise to another customer? This would be mislaid property and if they cannot find you and you do not return to claim it after a reasonable time (which would be different for a Mars bar and a Boeing 747) then it is theirs and they can do what they want with it: including sell it to someone else. How does this scenario differ from leaving personal items at the store that I purchased elsewhere? It doesn't.	If you commit a robbery but then return the money, can you be prosecuted? Yes. Similarly, if you breach copyright and then stop, can you be prosecuted? Yes, however, you will probably not be because: Your offence may not have been noticed by the copyright holder, and/or The damages they would get are probably not worth the effort.	The answer may vary depending on your state. If you're in a state that's a member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement,* there's a designated heirarchy for sourcing sales of digital goods: First, if you're making delivery to the customer at your location, source to the location where you make the sale. If not, source to the location where your customer will receive the product. Neither of those works for you, so you'd continue down the list to the first one you can apply: The purchaser’s address that you maintain in the ordinary course of the your business; The purchaser's address obtained during the consummation of the sale; The address where you first make the product available for transmission or the address from which you provided the service. By my reading, that means that in the absence of an address, you basically come back full circle and source the sale back to your own location. *Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming	You also retain the right to license the work to others. Therefore you can sell similar rights to MusicBook and anyone else, as long as you do not grant an exclusive license (you have already licensed another party to distribute). They do not gain the right to sub-license your work. If you had executed a copyright transfer, you would have no rights to the work whatsoever (leaving out moral rights for jurisdictions that have them and where they are absolute).	As far as I can tell, that would be a criminal act. Georgia law § 16-8-2 - Theft by taking says: A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated. Georgia law § 16-7-21. Criminal trespass says: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she intentionally damages any property of another without consent of that other person and the damage thereto is $500.00 or less or knowingly and maliciously interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without consent of that person. If you know the store is refusing to sell you a product, and you eat that product anyway, that is theft. If you don't eat the food but just open it, that's still criminal trespass. Even if you're leaving them money, you're still taking and/or damaging their property without their consent. Additionally, if they told you to leave, and you refused and instead started opening food items, you might be guilty of trespassing in the more traditional sense: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she knowingly and without authority... Remains upon the land or premises of another person... after receiving notice from the owner, rightful occupant, or, upon proper identification, an authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant to depart. As to whether it was legal to give the candy to your daughter before the disagreement and refusal of service, that may depend on what the standard practice is. It seems to me that in most clothing stores you're supposed to pay before consuming the product - this isn't a sit-down restaurant. But if there's nothing else going on, I think the average store would refrain from calling the police if the person did not try to hide the evidence (for example, by stuffing the empty box on a shelf) and if the merchandise was paid for before the person attempted to leave the store, regardless of whether it's technically illegal.	This a bit dubious. You write "I know you can make a digital copy of a book or CD you own." but that is true only under limited circumstances. Making such a copy for one's own personal use would likely be fair use (in the US). Selling copies would pretty clearly be copyright infringement. Giving away free copies to significant numbers of people would also be infringement. Temporarily lending copies ro a small number of people might be considered fair use or might not. For the board game, you could allow others to play with the copy you own in person. But COVID makes that unsafe. Assuming the game art is under copyright protection (some older games might have protection expired) selling such images or making them widely available would clearly be infringement. Making them available only during the course of play to a limited group, with technical measures to prevent or discourage copying and no fee charged might pass as fair use, and the game company might well not want to pursue the matter in any case. If you create new art which can be used for the same game, it would be somewhat less likely to be considered infringing/ Even then selling access would probably be trademark infringement, and perhaps infringe the copyright on the rules of the game. There would be legal risk in doing this sort of thing.	switzerland This answer is mostly to point out that the situation isn't so obvious, and may greatly differ between jurisdictions. OR Art 7 specifies: 2 The sending of tariffs, price lists and the like does not constitute an offer. 3 By contrast, the display of merchandise with an indication of its price does generally constitute an offer. So the seller is bound to the price tag of an item in a shelf or in a window. If the prices differ, the customer can generally request the lower price, unless the seller can clearly show that there was a significant error. There's a separate law ("Preisbekanntgabeverordnung") that specifies that (under most circumstances) a shop must put price tags on their items. What margin constitutes an error is disputable. The federal court ruled that an offer for an opal ring for 1380 Francs instead of 13800 could be considered an error. But a T-Shirt that is offered for 20 Francs in the shop window but 25 Francs on the shelf is probably not.	It is legal, at least in the US, for a store (or other entity) to refuse to sell any item to any individual for any non-prohibited reason (prohibited reasons are typically things like race or religion). More over, in various US jurisdictions, it is prohibited to "furnish" alcohol to a "minor" (for example, under California's ABC law), which can be interpreted as prohibiting to an adult if they reasonably suspect that adult will pass the alcohol onto the "minor". This is to prevent "straw" sales. Additionally, larger chains generally prefer to have harmonized policies across branches, and where practical, across state lines, so will have policies that can accomodate multiple alcohol control regimes.
Can strategic bankruptcy be used against investors? Can bankruptcy be used as strategy to avoid paying back investors? Are there examples of such behavior? What are the mechanisms in place in US law to prevent people from creating a company to attract investors with the intent of filing for bankruptcy as a strategy to not repay their debt?	Can bankruptcy be used as strategy to avoid paying back investors? Are there examples of such behavior? In the United States, a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is frequently used as a way to cancel equity investments and to reduce or eliminate long term bond debt (especially subordinated bond investments) by senior management, in an effort to keep the business operating as a going concern and keep their elite senior executive jobs, and the jobs of many subordinate employees and contractors of the business. Pretty much every single business bankruptcy reduces the amount of return that investors in the company can receive from it (although there are rare cases when investors can be compensated in full in an orderly disposition of a company's assets but bankruptcy is filed to prevent a fire sale of assets in a disorderly fashion that would hurt investors, or hurt them more than the alternative outcome). A key factor here is the segregation of ownership and management in most big businesses. A large equity owner in a company is in a poor position to defraud other equity owners in bankruptcy, however, and equity owners are behind debt investors in priority in bankruptcy, so it is also hard for the equity owner to use bankruptcy to defraud debt investors without hurting the large equity owner. In some ways, this is a variant on a leveraged buy-out by management, because usually, in a big business bankruptcy, a key step is for management to secure a third-party lender to the bankruptcy debtor (G.E. Capital was the dominant lender in this market for many years), to finance the continued operations of the business until a plan could be put in the place to reorganize the company with less debt and none of its old equity investors. This is almost never a strategy of the company at the outset. It is one that is chosen once it becomes clear that its business model has ceased to be viable with the amount of leverage that the business has. Often, in such a plan, some long term debt that is not subordinated is converted to equity, although that equity is usually worth less than the original equity investment of the investors in the firm. Typically, this strategy is used when a company with a large initial capital investment is in a market where it can still make a profit relative to its variable operating costs from the revenues it can secure in current market conditions, but can no longer afford to service its long term debt that was used to make that large initial capital investment (e.g. in a building or factory) that has decreased in value because the products made with that investment are no longer as valuable as they used to be, or because, for example, patents expired but the long term debt wasn't paid off during the terms of the patents. For example, many U.S. coal mining companies in the U.S. have recently had Chapter 11 bankruptcies. These companies made large investments in coal mining operations that were economically sensible when coal was worth more and alternatives to coal were not economically viable. But, when renewable energy became cheaper with changes in technology, and environmental requirements made coal fired power plants more expensive, the market price for coal collapsed and those companies could no longer support the debt that made it possible to conduct the mining operations that these companies had incurred. In a reorganized fashion, some of these companies could continue to be viable with lower sales volume and lower coal prices since they now only had to pay current operating costs and not obligations to investors in those companies. What are the mechanisms in place in US law to prevent people from creating a company to attract investors with the intent of filing for bankruptcy as a strategy to not repay their debt? This strategy doesn't really make sense as a plan from the issuing company's point of view, it only makes sense if the person promoting the scheme has some way to extract value from the investment made by the investors. The company itself that issued the securities (typically stock or corporate bonds) in which the investor invested also isn't a suitable target of litigation because the company that issued the securities simply doesn't have the assets to pay damages to the investors. If one can show that the company incurred debt with an intent not to repay it, and is followed by transfers out of the company without receiving substantially equivalent value in exchange to some third party behind the scheme, this can be regulated by fraudulent transfer laws. See Section 4(a)(2) in the Uniform Act numbering although individual states adopting the act as state law invariably number the sections differently). This conduct can also be used to seek securities fraud liability or common law fraud liability from the persons other than the company itself (such as its officers or brokers or promoters of some other kind) involved in promoting the company. Footnote Re Importance Of A Formal Bankruptcy The bankruptcy code component of this analysis isn't a particularly important part of the strategy. A limited liability entity can dissolve itself, or make an assignment for the benefit of its creditors of all of its assets, or be placed in a receivership, outside of bankruptcy, with similar effect, since the discharge of debts is not relief associated with a Chapter 7 liquidation of a limited liability entity (although debts can be reduced or eliminated as part of a Chapter 11 plan so long as the creditors are at least as well off as they would be in a Chapter 7 liquidation or otherwise consent to the plan).	If I understand your question correctly, you have some clients who have paid you for services that you have not yet provided and, indeed, they have not yet requested. Is this correct? The accounting term for this is a "prepayment". The correct accounting treatment is to increase an asset account (your bank account) and create a liability account (Prepayments or something similar). You need to talk to your accountant about how to treat these for consumption and income taxes. Legally, these people are now creditors of your business - just like all of your suppliers and employees. There is no legal requirement to escrow or otherwise treat this as trust money. Basically, if your business goes bust they will lose their money. This is something that you should have dealt with in your contract with your customers - if you are running an online business then you should get a lawyer to revise your terms of service to cover things like how they can ask for a refund (and how long you have to get it to them) and how long (or if) they forfeit the funds. As it stands the money effectively becomes yours after whatever time under a statute of limitation applies to transactions of this type and size (under whatever law applies to the contract) since after that time they cannot sue to get it back.	There is a legal dictum, de minimis non curat lex, which might lead to an exasperated court official refusing to issue your lawsuit (with or without providing the $1 out of his own pocket to save everybody's time); I recommend you look it up. But there is no official term for what you suggest, although many lawyers might off the record provide colourful descriptions. If you wish to waste your money on such a claim, then obviously in your view it is worth pursuing. Clients often say "the principle is more important than the money", though they say so more often before they receive the bills than after.	I see that this would put me under heavy US regulation, and I'd like to avoid that, since it would require huge funding to hire lawyers to do something like that. There are many reasons for financial and banking industry regulations; namely, fraud protection, corruption and money laundering preventions, use of crypto to avoid taxes and records, etc. If you're serious about a startup that involves financial transaction, one of the first things you do is find a law firm to advise you on the legal plausibility of an idea. And be prepared to spend thousands and thousands of dollars in legal fees for regulatory approval. Would doing something like this solve my problem? You're really going to trust randos on the web for legal advice?	No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.	Under U.S. law, this is only actionable is you make this statement knowing that it would not "support the continued creation of X" and that instead, you had already completely abandoned that product and you were, for example, planning to change lines of work and become a lumberjack instead. Even in that case, common law fraud is hard to show, because you would need to show how that statement which related to how the profits will be used, rather than what you are actually receiving, could cause you damages in that narrow transaction. But, many states have deceptive trade practices acts that protect consumers by allowing the attorney general, local prosecutor, or a private individual or class of plaintiffs to sue if representations such as these are made when they are known to be false. Typically, these lawsuits provide for minimum statutory damages, attorneys' fees award, and when cases are brought by a public official, injunctive relief (ordering the advertising with that pitch to cease) are authorized. For example, saying this when it is false would be actionable in California and Colorado. A fairly common fact pattern is that someone will sell stuff at an above market price saying that "profits will help me pay for my cancer treatments" when in fact the person doesn't have cancer. This could even constitute criminal wire and mail fraud, for example. Sometimes, competitors can also sue you under the Lanham Act (which primarily governs federal trademarks), for false advertising about something that could unfairly undermine their sales if what you are saying isn't true and is causing their sales to drop. On the other hand, if you sincerely believe that what you are saying is true when you say it, and your belief is not so unreasonable that no reasonable person could believe that under the circumstances, then what you are saying is legal. Usually this is true, and if it is, ultimately, you will be fine. Although nothing can prevent you from being sued on a non-meritorious basis. In between are cases where this is true (you will be supported, but perhaps only get 5% of the profits while the rest are garnished for a lawsuit), but your statements were still misleading at the time you made them and you knew it. Those cases get resolved on a case by case basis. Outside U.S. law, your mileage may vary. Legal regulation of commercial speech varies significantly from one country to another. These statements might not be O.K. for example in a Communist regime on the Chinese or Korean model.	Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy).	Could the victim report this as fraud, theft or some other related crime? They could, but it's unclear whether they would be successful. A criminal conviction would require intent on the part of the company or an employee, and that will probably be difficult to prove. In a big system like this, individuals can usually claim misunderstandings and errors of omission, which makes such a proof difficult. They could try to establish criminal corporate liability, but again this is difficult to prove. So while possible, it's probably not worth it. Would the answer to the previous question differ based on whether the victim was eventually able to recover the money through litigation or by disputing the charge with their bank? Probably not. For a criminal conviction, it's necessary to prove that the company or an employee deliberately took money they knew was not theirs. Whether they later gave it back is not relevant for determining guilt (though it may reduce the sentence). Would the company itself or the specific employees involved be liable? In principle, both could be held liable. Again, this depends on what can be proved in court. Would a binding arbitration clause in the contract have any effect on criminal liability No, arbitration clauses cannot protect from criminal liability, only from civil liability (within limits). Off-topic: The fastest way to resolve such situations is usually to write one stern letter explaining why you are owed the money. If that does not work, sue them - if the situation is clear-cut, you will most likely win, or the company will settle. Many jurisdictions have simplified court proceedings for clear cases like this, for example the Mahnverfahren in Germany.
Can a court uphold a traffic ticket for speeding in school zone if the sign was blocked by a truck and not possible to be seen? I was given a ticket for speeding in a school zone. I was unaware that there was a school zone because as I was traveling in the left lane there was a rolling road block of several trucks that were turning onto a street right after the sign. The sign is a flashing light that says "speed limit 25 when flashing" and I had no knowledge the sign existed because it was impossible to have seen it with the trucks that obstructed it from my view. Is there any case law about this or what would I say to the judge to explain that I am not liable as it was not possible to have known due to the sign being blocked. After I was ticketed I went into the neighborhood and found the trucks (there were several large moving trucks, so I had reason to believe they were still there loading or unloading) and I took a picture showing them and also the street sign was in the picture showing the location. I also had another person in a different vehicle several hundred feet behind me that was able to see the sign and was a witness to the trucks creating a rolling road block. This is in Michigan if it makes a difference. Thanks! Edit: The road I was traveling on the speed limit is 45mph which is what I was doing. There was a single sign that flashes a light only when the school zone is in effect. There was no reason to believe it was not "prudent" to travel at 45. There was also no reason to believe there was a school zone as it was impossible to see the ONLY sign indicating such. I have a witness traveling behind me that can contest to the inability to see such a sign and I went back and took pictures of the moving trucks in the neighborhood to show what it was that prevented me from seeing the sign. The only way for anyone to know there was a school zone in effect was seeing a flashing light which was not visible with the trucks traveling next to me. By rolling road block I did not mean any sort of construction vehicle or anything such that would warn of any changes or anything. It was simply several trucks in the right lane which obstructed my view of a sign on the other side of the trucks. Not like the trucks that have flashing lights behind workers filling potholes or anything. Just a giant vehicle directly to my right that prevented me from seeing the only sign informing me the speed limit had changed.	If the judge is kind, yes However, this is at the discretion of the judge. Even if the judge believes every word you say, you still broke the law. The speed limit in Michigan is “a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper” and that is not “greater than that which will permit a stop within the assured, clear distance ahead.” (MCL 257.627(1)). The posted speed limit is an upper bound on what is “careful and prudent”. Given you description of trucks obstructing your view, it’s arguable that the speed you were travelling at was not “careful and prudent”. The speed limit in school zones may be set at “not more than 20 miles per hour less than the speed limit normally posted but shall be not less than 25 miles per hour.” (MCL 257.627a(2)). And the speed limit on a local street in an area zoned for residential use is 25 mph “unless another speed is fixed and posted.” If you were in a residential street, the school zone speed is no different from the normal speed - the lights just serve to warn drivers that children are about. Finally, you are responsible for knowing the law. You are on that road at that time, it’s your duty to know what the posted limit is as well as determining what speed is “careful and prudent”. It doesn’t matter if it’s hard to know, the law presumes you know it. All that said, if you catch the judge in a good mood, they might give you a break. You don’t have a legal right to one so ask, don’t demand.	In Germany, the noise of playing children is defined as not noise according to §22 BImSchG. Normal industrial/commercial limits do not apply. This aims mostly at playgrounds, kindergartens, etc. The noise of cars, stereos, etc. is not unlimited even before 22:00, but it is considerably harder to get the police to intervene during daytime. You might consult with a lawyer to find out if they are unreasonably noisy, you are unreasonably thin-skinned, or both. Similarly, the driving you describe may be violating traffic regulations, but proving that will be difficult. As to actual damages to your premises, what happens depends on the age of the children and if they had proper supervision by their guardians. Proper supervision does not require the guardians to stand next to the children around the clock. If you have a specific case, and if the "perpetrator" was over 7 years old, you can ask for repayment and then sue if they refuse. This is most likely more hassle than the damage is worth, even if you do get a judgement against a minor, but it could change the tone of the relationship with your neighbours. They would have to explain in court what they did to supervise their children ...	I don't know of any law requiring schools to proactively disclose the results of these sweeps, but if you asked for them, the Michigan Freedom of Information Act would likely require both the police and the school to release records that would give you an accurate picture of what happened. At the very least, I would expect the police department to write up the results of its sweeps in a report to send up the chain of command. I would also expect that those results would be communicated in writing to the school district. The police should also maintain a log of all property they have seized; if they seized anything from the school, it should show up there, as well.	Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer.	Traffic tickets are not equity law. This said, equity has not been done away with. It has merged with law in almost all states, and in some states, equitable defenses are available to legal claims (although in others equitable defenses are only available to equitable claims).	I couldn't find any decisions on CanLII where someone was punished for a fictitious or out-of-province front plate in Alberta, however the Traffic Safety Act states the following: 1(1)(s) “licence plate” means a licence plate that is issued under this Act and includes an object that is recognized under this Act as a licence plate; (9) For the purposes of sections 1(1)(rr) and 11.1 and Part 8, licence plate includes a licence plate issued in another jurisdiction. 53(1) Except as otherwise permitted under this Act, a person shall not do any of the following: (b) display on a motor vehicle or trailer a licence plate other than a licence plate issued or authorized for use on that vehicle; (c) operate or park a motor vehicle or trailer on a highway with an expired licence plate displayed on it; (Part 8) 168(1) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe (a) that a vehicle is displaying licence plates that (i) were not issued for that vehicle . . . the peace officer may seize and take possession of the licence plates displayed on that vehicle. 169(1) A peace officer may arrest a person without warrant if the peace officer, on reasonable grounds, believes . . . (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the following are the provisions for which a person may be arrested without a warrant: (c) section 53(1)(b) relating to the displaying of a licence plate other than one authorized under this Act; While the connection of the extended definition in s.9 to s.53(1) is a little vague, the connection to Part 8 is not, and therefore I can confidently say that the Act clearly states it is a violation to use out-of-province plates on the front of a vehicle. The plates can be seized and you may be arrested. It may further be a violation of the BC Motor Vehicle Act if/when you travel there.	Interesting question! I believe all of the examples can be addressed by the following rules: A vehicle on a roadway has the right-of-way over a vehicle not on a roadway. Therefore, the vehicle leaving a parking lot always yields to a vehicle in a parallel road. Absent another rule, the vehicle on the right always has the right-of-way. So if two vehicles are leaving adjacent parking lots, the left one waits for the right one to go if there is any potential conflict. Of course, not enough people know these rules, so in practice if you can't get the vehicle with the legal right-of-way to take it I teach drivers to be as decisive and cautious as possible: I.e., take the right-of-way, but not so fast that you can't avoid the other vehicle if it decides to go after all, because legally you will be at fault in a collision. (Though it's anyone's guess how police and insurers would settle the tricky scenarios you illustrate.)	I am aware of a view of the California law that if a pedestrian looks like they might want to cross the street, any car must stop, but this is not supported by the law, which is about "yielding". The law incorporates both "yield" and "stop", the former being "and allow the other person to proceed". Ignoring the photo for a moment, the requirement to yield (not stop) allows a car to continue driving when the driver is e.g. 10 ft from the crosswalk and the pedestrian is three lanes over when they enter the crosswalk, remaining in compliance with the law. The pedestrian and the driven can continue with their journey because there is no conflict. The requirement to yield states whose right to proceed is subordinated to the other person's, in case of conflict. Turning to the video which shows what is in front but not behind, it is evident that the vehicle did not actually conflict with the pedestrian, who did not slow down in order to let the vehicle pass. The violation of social conventions is clear, in that the pedestrian enters the crosswalk while the car is 5 or so car lengths back, and can safely slow down so that there would be zero chance of hitting the pedestrian (it starts to slow but only trivially one the pedestrian is visibly 'crossing the street'). As far as I can determine, California case law has not established any numbers that constitute "not yielding". While I would stop in this circumstance, I don't see that there is a conflict between the pedestrian and the vehicle.
In England & Wales, is self-harm a legal defence to possessing a bladed object? Buried in this BBC article is the following paragraph about a girl caught in public possessing a blade which she used to self-harm: [The girl] later appeared in court accused of possession of a bladed weapon and was found not guilty after magistrates accepted the items were used for self-harming. This seems to imply that there is a defence to possessing a bladed object that the intention was for self-harm as a reasonable excuse. However, I find this press report contradictory to this previous report of a sentence by His Honour Judge Jefferies QC who noted his regret that a woman caught with blades for self-harm was 'not really the person [the statute was] aimed at', but nonetheless imposed a sentence on her. So which is it: is self-harm (where proven or accepted as the intent for carrying the blade) a defence to carrying a bladed object? For reference, the offence I am referring to is the one in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 139. That act provides the following defences to the either-way offence: (4). It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had good reason or lawful authority for having the article with him in a public place. (5). Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) above, it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had the article with him— (a)for use at work; (b)for religious reasons; or (c)as part of any national costume. So the question is: is 'self-harm' a 'good reason'?	Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo!	Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.	Why would he not have been charged with "housebreaking"? In england-and-wales neither "house breaking" nor "breaking and entering" are legal terms: the offence is called burglary contrary to s.9 of the Theft Act 1968 which in 1983 was: (1) A person is guilty of burglary if— (a) he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser and with intent to commit any such offence as is mentioned in subsection (2) below; or (b) having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser he steals or attempts to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or attempts to inflict on any person therein any grievous bodily harm. (2) The offences referred to in subsection (1)(a) above are offences of stealing anything in the building or part of a building in question, of inflicting on any person therein any grievous bodily harm or raping any woman therein, and of doing unlawful damage to the building or anything therein. There is no difference between nightime and daytime entry, and there is no requirement for a forced entry. All that's needed is to go in without permission intending or attempting to do one of the relevant offences. I can only surmise that the reason(s) theft, rather than burglary, was charged was a (pre CPS) prosecutorial decision based on the admissible evidence, Fagan's mental state and what was in the public interest because the quoted text seems to meet the criteria for burglary. (ETA subject to the actual circumstances surrounding the alleged theft of the wine, which are not clear from the quoted text.)	Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition.	Murder Which is the unlawful taking of a life with intent to do so. However, the doctrine of self-defence can make killing lawful: A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. if the prosecutor is of the opinion that the force used "is reasonable in the circumstances" they may not lay charges. If they do lay charges the judge may decide that there is no case to answer before going to trial if self-defence applies. If there is a trial this will probably be the strategy the defence employs and they may or may not be successful. If convicted the penalty is life imprisonment. Also, there is no UK law: there is the law of England and Wales, the law of Scotland and the law of Northern Ireland.	Short Answer There is a fairly vague one sentence answer to this question, in the general rule case that does not involve an escalation of conflict by the person provoked with a deadly weapon that wasn't part of the original provocation, with little case law interpretation in the applicable Wisconsin statute. This sentence states: The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. Beyond that, in any remotely close case, it is up to the jury to decide what this sentence means. Long Answer The relevant Wisconsin statute states that: Provocation affects the privilege of self-defense as follows: (a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self-defense, but the person is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely to cause death to the person's assailant unless the person reasonably believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm at the hands of his or her assailant. (b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. (c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.48(2). There are two reported appellate case precedents in Wisconsin that have addressed this question and interpreted this statutory provision. One from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals is State v. Cummings, 451 N.W.2d 463 (Wisc. App. 1989). It held that when a prisoner was charged with assault based on his biting officer who was one of several officers restraining him when he became agitated while in hospital for treatment was not entitled to self-defense instruction in prosecution for battery to correctional officer because the prisoner was engaging in unlawful conduct when he refused to obey officer's direct orders and physically resisted officers as they attempted to restrain him, and prisoner's own testimony was that officer's arm was on his throat for only a few seconds, which constituted brief and legitimate response to resistance that prisoner was putting forth. This primarily addresses part (a), however. The other from the Wisconsin Supreme Court is Ruff v. State, 223 N.W.2d 446 (Wisc. 1974) which held that if a person attacked escalated fight beyond that which would be legally justifiable in view of nature of original provocation, aggressor would regain privilege of self-defense, because victim, by resorting to deadly force which was not a justifiable exercise of right of self-defense, would himself become aggressor. Thus, the right to regain right of self-defense was not available to defendant at moment when he pointed gun at intended victim and stated “This is a stickup,” since at that moment, the right of self-defense was limited to the person at whom defendant's gun was pointed, not on side of defendant commencing a stick-up. This primarily addresses part (c), however. There is no binding case law interpreting part (b) in Wisconsin that is squarely on point. Wisconsin's rule on this point codifies the common law rule, so Wisconsin cases prior to the enactment of this statutory rule, and out of state precedents interpreting that common law rule or codifications of it that are very similar to Wisconsin's statutory rule, would probably be considered persuasive by a court seeking to interpret and apply this statutory rule. In the alternative, the judge might simply have a jury instruction that contains the language of part (b) and simply leave the jury to decide what this means based upon its plain language and the facts before them, where the facts of the case present a colorable withdrawal of provocation issue.	He was jailed for breaching an injunction imposed on the Shard in 2018 which was intended to prevent anyone from climbing it, according to a news report from the Guardian at the time. The actual offence he committed was contempt of court which is a criminal offence. Double jeopardy does not apply here because the crime he was cautioned for was not the same crime he was prosecuted for. It appears there was no precedent set, prior to this private prosecution, about whether or not someone could be jailed for breaching an injunction in this manner, as opposed to merely being fined, etc. Obviously, since he has been jailed, people in the future will be reluctant to copy his behaviour and a deterrent has been set.	england-and-wales There isn't a law that defines 'gaslighting' as an offence. Generally it isn't unlawful to mislead, deceive or lie - of course, there are exceptions such as fraud, misleading advertising, perjury and so on. So the answer to your question must depend on what is meant by 'gaslighting' and the circumstances in which it has been said to have occurred. It seems to me that people understand and use the word differently - for me it pertains to intimate or family relationships (as in its alleged origin, the film Gaslight), some people seem to use it for different serious behaviour and other people use it for relatively trivial behaviour. In the intimate or family relationship context, gaslighting might be part or all of the behaviour alleged to be the controlling or coercive behaviour contrary to s76 Serious Crime Act 2015: 76 Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship (1)A person (A) commits an offence if— (a)A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another person (B) that is controlling or coercive, (b)at the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally connected, (c)the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and (d)A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B. Here is the Crown Prosecution Service guidance for prosecuting s76 Serious Crime Act 2015. Simply lying about one's job or income to have a one-night stand would not constitute the s76 offence. Behaviour that causes psychological injury that amounts to recognisable psychiatric illness could be assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) contrary to s47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (see CPS Guidance for ABH).
Who regulates wireless radio communication in North America and Europe? Wireless technologies, such as Wi-Fi, cellular 4G networks and satellite communication are all radio-based under the hood. Meaning that they all send and receive radio signals, inside of regulated frequency ranges, as their underlying form of communication. For instance, to be "Wi-Fi", the device must send-and-receive radio signals around the 2.4GHz frequency range. For satellite, the signals must be inside the 136-138 MHz frequency range, etc. I'm wondering what internationally-recognized agencies/bodies regulate these radio-based wireless technologies, both in North America as well as in Europe. In the United States, I would imagine it would be either the FCC, the FAA, or both, but I can't tell where there regulatory boundaries are. So I ask: what official bodies regulate radio-based communications in these jurisdictions? I'm mostly interested in US, Canada and UK, but would love to be informed about other European (even Asian) countries as well. Update: Here's a quick useful link for any future-comers that have a similar question: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_telecommunications_regulatory_bodies update 2022-05-24: The wiki page seems to be missing some countries and links need to be updated. We just curated this list fully: https://www.mcxess.com/telecom-authority/ Hope this helps.	In the US, radio communication proper is regulated by the FCC and the NTIA. The FAA has nothing to do with it; they regulate things as they affect airplanes, but the actual radio rules are set by the FCC, and since frequency allocation is a purely radio thing the FAA has nothing official to do with it. The breakdown between FCC and NTIA is that the FCC deals with non-federal communications, while the NTIA deals with federal communications; they split the spectrum. Now, with things like Wi-Fi, many of the rules are set by non-governmental standards organizations. Wi-Fi is not regulated by the FCC; it falls within the frequencies and transmission powers that the FCC has deemed to be not regulated. So, the FCC never set aside 2.4 GHz for wireless Internet; they set it aside for any low-powered transmissions anyone wants to make (subject to interference rules). With LTE and satellite communications, there's more regulatory control; they are high-powered communications, and are licensed to individual operators for a specific frequency range. As Flup said, there is international coordination for obvious reasons (the ITU actually predates the UN by almost a century). The ITU helps coordinate spectrum usage, and also assigns satellite orbital slots in geostationary orbit (where most communication satellites are).	Contract law involves a number of parts, the most relevant here being the formation of a contract, and the enforcement of its terms. There are various rules about formation, such as that you cannot hold a gun to a person’s head to force them to say yes (the courts would then say there was no contract), and then under other conditions a term in a contract might be illegal, for instance the courts will not order a person to commit a crime as one of the conditions of a contract. In the scenario that you propose, no term of the contract involves an illegal action, the only presumed illegality is in the circumstances surrounding formation of the contract. Duress is illegal, because there is no voluntary mutual assent. That’s not the case here. So there is no established legal impediment to finding that a contract was formed. There are ample opportunities to test the theory that an element of illegality in the formation of a contract makes the contract void, for example if a physical instrument used in creating or transmitting the contract was used illegally (the paper was stolen, the paper was used without permission of the owner); the assent was made while trespassing; the contract language infringes copyright. Given the court’s very strong commitment to recognizing and enforcing contracts, it is highly unlikely that the courts would reject a contract over a technicality of this type §97.113 of the FCC rules states the prohibited transmissions, the two relevant clauses being that the prohibited list includes (2) Communications for hire or for material compensation, direct or indirect, paid or promised, except as otherwise provided in these rules; (3) Communications in which the station licensee or control operator has a pecuniary interest, including communications on behalf of an employer, with the following exceptions… (2) is not clearly applicable, since the communication is not for material compensation (e.g. A is not paying B to make a transmission). (3) is more likely applicable, since the parties each have a pecuniary interest in the communication. The exceptions involve being compensated for making a communication, or one can on an irregular basis offer amateur radio apparatus for sale or trade. Since the FCC regulations only provide bare languages and no explanatory texts, and they decline to provide any examples (this seems to be a policy thing), and there is substantial unclarity as to what the restrictions mean, see this analysis. A finding of letter-of-the-law violation in this case cannot be made by the court in which breech of contract would be litigated. Instead, the FCC would have to first make a finding of law-breaking, then a party would have to prove in a separate cause of action that because of illegality in the circumstances surrounding formation of the contract, there never was an agreement.	The US has jurisdiction because the systems that the accused allegedly attacked are in the US. To use an example with older technology, you can't escape criminal liability for defrauding someone in one country simply because you did so through the mail or by telephone from another country. The UK and the US have an extradition treaty. The UK might refuse to extradite the accused; in that case the US would most likely complain loudly. If too many extradition requests are refused on one side, the other side might start limiting cooperation in any of several areas.	In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it.	(EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) is available in 24 languages. It wouldn't be practical for everyone communicating with EU citizens to be obliged to translate to all of them. Article 12 in Chapter 3 section 1 specifies : The controller shall take appropriate measures to provide any information referred to in Articles 13 and 14 and any communication under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 relating to processing to the data subject in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language If your application is available only in Ukranian and only people who understand Ukranian will be able to use it, your policies and responses to customer enquiries should also be in Ukrainian - but in a form that's "concise, transparent and easily accessible".	The territorial scope of the GDPR is defined in Article 3. It covers "personal data of data subjects who are in the Union", whether they are EU citizens or not. So to answer your questions: 1) are EU users, but moved to USA a few years ago, and signed-up on my website? They are not in the EU, so are not covered. You don't need to know if someone is an EU citizen, just if they are currently in the EU. 2) went for holidays in USA, signed-up on my website, and then came back to EU? (note - potentially skipped any Consent questions at sign-up, because IP was from USA) If someone moves into the EU while using your service then they fall under the GDPR for the time they are in the EU. If their home address is in the EU then that is covered, and monitoring of their behaviour while in the EU is also covered. Your other two questions are about VPNs. If a VPN is used to evade IP address geolocation and you have no other clue about where someone is then you can't be blamed for not knowing where they are (although I'm not aware of any actual case law on this topic). But if someone with a USA IP address gives a home address in the EU then you should probably treat them as being in the EU to be on the safe side. Basically, if you don’t know if they are in the EU or not, you should treat them as if they were.	The GDPR roughly applies in the following scenarios: Art 3(1): you have an establishment in Europe Art 3(2): you do not have an european establishment, but Art 3(2)(a): offer goods or services to persons in Europe Art 3(2)(b): monitor the behaviour of people who are in Europe (where Europe means EU/EEA/UK as appropriate). Art 3(1) does not seem to apply for you. Art 3(2)(a) does not apply, since you're not actively targeting people in Europe. At the point in time where you are offering the app to users, those users are in the US. Art 3(2)(b) could apply if you collect some kind of tracking data, in particular (but not limited to) location data. But if you temporarily shut down collection of new data for personalisation while the user is in Europe, that's probably going to be reasonably safe. It might not be necessary to disable ad personalisation if that personalisation is based on data collected outside of Europe. In practice, unless your app is specifically targeted at travellers, no one will care about what your app does outside of the US. For detailed guidelines on the territorial scope of the GDPR, consider reading EDPB guidelines 3/2018 (PDF). The document contains some relevant examples, but since it's official guidance they won't explicitly say that GDPR won't apply in a scenario like yours. The closest is Example 8: An Australian company offers a mobile news and video content service, based on users’ preferences and interest. Users can receive daily or weekly updates. The service is offered exclusively to users located in Australia, who must provide an Australian phone number when subscribing. An Australian subscriber of the service travels to Germany on holiday and continues using the service. Although the Australian subscriber will be using the service while in the EU, the service is not ‘targeting’ individuals in the Union, but targets only individuals in Australia, and so the processing of personal data by the Australian company does not fall within the scope of the GDPR. Also relevant is Example 10, which says that app downloads in the EU might not be subject to GDPR: A U.S. citizen is travelling through Europe during his holidays. While in Europe, he downloads and uses a news app that is offered by a U.S. company. The app is exclusively directed at the U.S. market, evident by the app terms of use and the indication of US Dollar as the sole currency available for payment. The collection of the U.S. tourist's personal data via the app by the U.S. company is not subject to the GDPR.	I think it really is a state-by-state answer. From a web site for doctors getting involved in Telemedicine. Some medical boards such as Alabama, Montana and Oregon offer a special purpose telemedicine license. Other states that regulate telepractice in medicine include Texas, Florida, California and Colorado. The levels of regulation vary greatly by state. For example, California and Florida, similar to New York, require full licensure to perform any function relating to patient care, with some exceptions for consultation in some instances. Other states are exploring the issue of telepractice and in general, how to regulate it. That site has a state-by-state break out of the rules. I see other things about reciprocity among some nearby states. Three states (MD, NY, VA) and Washington DC provide reciprocity to bordering states. Alabama and Pennsylvania have agreements with other states to grant licenses to out-of-state physicians who have licenses in states that reciprocally accept their home state licenses. In Connecticut, an out-of-state physician can obtain an in-state license based on his or her home state standards.
Is it illegal to purposely arouse police suspicion? I ask this strictly as research for a work of fiction A person purposefully acts in a manner to attract police attention and arrest as a form of protest. The goal is to inspire an arrest or use of force without giving a true justification (they are prepared to be killed, but only if their killing is unjust). The act itself is entirely legal and should not cause alarm to a reasonable person, but is designed to make a police officer feel suspicious or endangered should they be hyper-vigilant, and ultimately waste their time. Would an officer merely being bothered in this way constitute a crime unto itself, thus justifying force or prosecution? It's difficult to think of examples (loitering and breach of peace laws are very broad), but some may include: congregating as a group and quietly but obviously observing police on duty. following a police cruiser from a safe distance for a prolonged period of time. prolonged and pointed staring at an officer. exchanging innocuous items in a fashion that might mimic a drug exchange. fleeing from an officer who only notices you at that moment (stopping when commanded). All commands are obeyed once the officer engages, which is ultimately the goal: to be engaged and should the officer over-react, arrested or attacked, without breaking the law. But is pursuing that goal a crime unto itself?	Wasting police time is what your actor sets out to do, and is a crime in many jurisdictions. New Zealand defines your exact plan as a crime, under section 24 of the Summary Offences Act: [A person can be penalised if that person] ... (b) with the intention of causing wasteful deployment, or of diverting deployment, of Police personnel or resources, or being reckless as to that result, ... (ii) behaves in a manner that is likely to give rise to [serious apprehension for his own safety or the safety of any person or property, as described in part (i)], knowing that such apprehension would be groundless. Hong Kong similarly makes this a criminal offence, in section 91 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance: (2) If a person causes any wasteful employment of the police by knowingly making to any person a false report tending to show that an offence has been committed, or to give rise to apprehension for the safety of any person or property, or tending to show that he has information material to any police inquiry he shall be guilty of an offence [and faces penalties described]. Likely the basis of both of the above, the United Kingdom makes it an offence in section 5 of the Criminal Law Act: (2) Where a person causes any wasteful employment of the police by knowingly making to any person a false report tending to show that an offence has been committed, or to give rise to apprehension for the safety of any persons or property, or tending to show that he has information material to any police inquiry, he shall be liable on summary conviction to [penalties described]. But this is not restricted to Commonwealth or common law countries either. Germany has section 145d of the Criminal Code: (1) Whosoever intentionally and knowingly misleads a public authority or an agency competent to receive criminal complaints about the fact that an unlawful act has been committed; or that the commission of one of the unlawful acts under section 126 (1) is imminent, shall be liable to [penalties described] (2) Whosoever intentionally and knowingly attempts to mislead one of the authorities indicated in subsection (1) above about the participants in an unlawful act; or in an imminent unlawful act under section 126 (1) shall incur the same penalty. On a related note, if done to create suspicion of others but not one's self, Canada calls this activity public mischief, and criminalises it in section 140 of the Criminal Code: Every one commits public mischief who, with intent to mislead, causes a peace officer to enter on or continue an investigation by ... (b) doing anything intended to cause some other person to be suspected of having committed an offence that the other person has not committed, or to divert suspicion from himself;	You can be under arrest before you are handcuffed and the police officially read you your rights. The problem from the citizen perspective is that there is no bright line test that tells you whether you are under arrest, and the courts can find that there was no arrest at a point where the suspect was handcuffed and confined to the back of a police car (United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004) – you can be merely "detained" for an investigatory stop while in cuffs. One test that might be used is asking if you are free to go about your business. A reasonable person could decide whether they were under arrest by the nature of what the officer says. For example, if he says "It would help us if you could stand over there" or "...if you could sit down", it is reasonable to conclude that this is an urging but not a command. On the other hand, if he says "Sit down, now!", it is unreasonable to think that that is a mere suggestion or plea, it is an order. There is no specific Arizona law that says when police can order you to do something, nor is there a specific law saying that force may only be used in such-and-such circumstance. There generally are guidelines for police conduct, and the guidelines tend to grant much leeway to officers (until it gets to be a recurring problem and the guidelines are changed). An example is Seattle, whose police manual reduces the question to the statement that "An officer shall use only the force reasonable, necessary, and proportionate to effectively bring an incident or person under control, while protecting the lives of the officer or others". But this does not say whether one must obey police orders. In Oregon v. Ruggles the court sympathetically notes that Whether a particular police order is “lawful” is frequently a complex question involving some of the most vexing and intractable issues in constitutional law. For example, a police order such as “Stop!” can be an unlawful seizure of a person under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, depending on whether the order is accompanied by a sufficient show of authority and the officer who issues the order is subsequently found to have lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot. But Oregon has a statute, ORS 162.247(1)(b), requiring you to obey a lawful order by police. The court found that you don't have to know whether the order is lawful. Arizona has a related statute, ARS 13-2508 where resisting is defined as intentionally preventing or attempting to prevent a person reasonably known to him to be a peace officer, acting under color of such peace officer's official authority, from effecting an arrest including the means of "Engaging in passive resistance" (which is "a nonviolent physical act or failure to act that is intended to impede, hinder or delay the effecting of an arrest"). Arizona law frames the resisting crime in terms of "effecting arrest", which is different from what Oregon law says: (a) Intentionally acts in a manner that prevents, or attempts to prevent, a peace officer or parole and probation officer from performing the lawful duties of the officer with regards to another person; or (b) Refuses to obey a lawful order by the peace officer or parole and probation officer. But even if an individual in Arizona is not chargeable with resisting arrest for failing to sit (because the officers were not effecting an arrest), that does not mean that police cannot order you to sit – it just means that it's not a separate crime to fail to comply.	The circuits all over the place on this one but in short, no, police are not obliged to apprehend a suspect at the earliest opportunity. It is within the discretion of the police to decide whether delaying the arrest of the suspect will help ensnare co-conspirators, as exemplified by this case, will give the police greater understanding of the nature of the criminal enterprise, or merely will allow the suspect enough "rope to hang himself." U.S. V. Garcia 79 F.3d 74 (7th Cir. 1996) See also Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S. 293 (1966) A suspect has no constitutional right to be arrested when the police have probable cause. The police are not required to guess, at their peril, the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.	If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ("Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.") If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) ("If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.") The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves.	A police officer can lie, and lying does not render a statement inadmissible. But there is a separate area of law regarding self-incrimination and the right to a lawyer. The basic principle is that a person can always assert their 5th Amendment rights, whether or not they are under arrest. When a person is under arrest and has asserted their right to an attorney, questioning must stop and anything that results from further questions is inadmissible. There is no single factor that distinguishes ordering asking questions from custodial interrogation. For example if you have been dragged by officers to the police station and held in a locked room for hours in the middle of night, one would reasonably believe that you were taken into custody, and interrogation must stop once you request a lawyer. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, police contacted the defendant whom they suspected was involved in a burglary and they invite him to chat at the station. They lie and say they found his fingerprints at the scene (they did not). He then confesses, they read him his rights, and he confesses again. The confession is admissible, because this was not a custodial interrogation. The relevant question is whether "a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave".	That the cop claims to be your friend is not more illegal than a salesman claiming that he has "the best offer" for you because he likes you (in fact didn't you see any film about the good cop/bad cop routine?) The term you are looking for is Entrapment. The (very simplified) basic idea is that police officers can promote the comission of a crime to catch criminals but cannot "trap" innocent people into it; the difference being that their persuassion should not turn otherwise innocent people into criminals. An extreme example would be if the cop threatens the target into commiting a crime. For the more usual situation when a cop promotes a crime to catch the criminal, I saw it explained (just for illustration purposes, it is not that you are safe when the cop insists a third time) as it follows: Legal: Cop) Oh boy! The place where I work is full of cash and they don't even have alarms or store it in a safe box. If someone helps me, we could go this night and take all of it. Are you interested? Target) I don't know. Cop) Trust me, it will be easy, nobody is there at night and it will be just a couple of hours. Target) Ok, count me in. Illegal Cop) Oh boy! The place where I work is full of cash and they don't even have alarms or store it in a safe box. If someone helps me, we could go this night and take all of it. Are you interested? Target) I am not a thief. Cop) Come on, it will be easy, the place is insured and nobody will be hurt. Target) Not interested. Cop) We can get 5000 US$ each one, just for a night of work. Didn't you told me that you had troubles with your bank? You could solve those overnight! Target) Maybe you are right, but I have no experience with these things... Cop) Do not worry, I will tell you what you need to do. Target) Ok, count me in. Note that it is not only "the cop insisted a lot". For the drug dealer example, if the cop insisted a lot but, when agreed, the boy produced the drug from his pocket, already packaged for sale, it would not be entrapment. OTOH, if the guy had told "I do not know where to buy drugs" and the cop had told him "go talk with X so he sells you the drug", then it could be considered entrampment. In any case, this is generic information only, entrapment is difficult to prove and will depend on the views of the judge/jury so, no matter how enticing that criminal offer is, just don't do it.	Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.	Yes and no. There are numerous cases where criminals, upon breaking in to somewhere, find evidence of a worse crime and notify authorities. This will provide reasonable suspicion enough for entering the scene. Generally, in testimony, Statements against Interest are more believable because a burgler wouldn't admit to breaking and entering if he had a way to explain why he was there in the first place. (Example: Alice breaks into a Warehouse and sees a mutilated body and blood everywhere. Alice immediately stops her theiving ways and calls 911 to let them know about the scene. Whether or not Alice stays, a dead body is enough probable cause to secure the crime scene without warrant. Its in Alice's interests to stay and help as there is trace of her at the scene and she would be pegged as a suspected murderer. If she's picked up and admits to calling the cops, it's good, but staying and helping out after the call will likely get her off on the charges related to the murder.). It could also work if they are persuing one crime and discover evidence of a second unrelated crime. (i.e. Alice robs the factory and gets away. The Factory Foreman calls the cops to investigate the crime scene, which at this point, does not need a warrant. While investigating, the Cops find security footage that Bob, the night guard, killed Chuck, a late night worker, removed his body, and cleaned the scene, all before Alice broke into the factory. The outcome of the case being made against Alice does not affect their need to prosecute Bob, as they obtained that evidence while looking for Alice in a valid investigation, not Bob, thus it is legal). Under these situations a crime that leads to a separate valid crime involving a different party is admissible. There are two possible reasons that the attorney might think this: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: This is the obvious element... the kids committed a crime with the hopes that the cops would use the evidence found by them in their commission of a crime to get the real bad guys. The attorney parent thinks this is stupid because the kids broke in specifically to do this and thus any evidence is now tossed out of court. This isn't usually the case in how this scenario will play. Generally the cops are more than happy to look at evidence obtained by criminals that points to another crime. In fact, this is how a lot of gang enforcement units and drug enforcement units operate... pick up a small fish and cut a deal for evidence against a bigger fish (turning state's in the criminal lingo, as the witness is becoming State's Evidence to another crime). As long as it's given to the cops as part of legitament evidence seeking, the cops can follow the leads where ever they... er... lead... Chain of Custody: This is probably, if properly thinking, what the attorney parent is thinking that's a bit more probable. Lets say these kids found a dead body with a sword in it and take the sword to the police... this could get dicey as the kids have contaminated the evidence in possible ways that the killer's lawyer could get thrown out. One thing CSI doesn't always show (though there are a few episodes where it comes up, but not many) is that when something is taken in as evidence, it is carefully documented, sealed, and tagged with a check in/check out list. Every time the seal is broken, the person breaking the seal notes the time, date, and reason and when does, reseals it with a new seal, and signs the time and date of the seal again. This is so at trial, the attorneys know exactly who opened up the evidence, what they did, and what possible contaminants were introduced. You even have to sign into a crime scene before you go up to the yellow tape. A good defense lawyer would call into question any evidence from anything the kids handled to get the evidence tossed (i.e. Your honor, these Meddling Kids handled the sword without following the chain of evidence. They even let their dog handle it. They had already harrassed my client earlier today by insunuating that he was involved with a hoaxed paranormal activity to scare people away from the factory. Since they claim they found the sword, but did document it at the scene, we don't know anything about it prior to the police's chain of custody. I motion that the evidence be dismissed.) If this is successful, anything from the sword is now no longer admissible as if the sword had never been found (including blood of the victim on the blade and finger prints of the suspect on the hilt)... in effect the evidence was prossessed as best the police could but the veracity of the story of it's discovery is too questionable to be considered. The defense does not have to be right, he just has to show there could be another explanation for the sword and the evidence linking his client to the crime committed by it. In short, without specific details, the attorney parent could be right or could be wrong, or more humorously, right, but for the wrong reasons. Edit: U.S. only. See other answers for other jurisdictions.
Can you be punished for planning a crime and what constitutes "planning"? I just read a different question here on Law.SE that asked something along the lines of "Would it be illegal to do XYZ? I want to do this, but I'm not sure if it's legal." So, that seems like a completely reasonable question and I don't think anyone should be punished for it. On the other hand, I'm pretty sure that I've heard people being arrested (and convicted) for planning to do a crime. Usually it was something big like murder or terrorism or whatever. However, big or small shouldn't really be relevant, I think. So, clearly, there is a line somewhere there between "it's acceptable to think about committing this crime" and "it's not acceptable to think about it this seriously". But what is it? Since this is a rather generic principle, I assume that most countries will have similar rules regarding this. If that's too broad, then I'm OK with narrowing it down to European laws (I'm from Latvia).	Can you be punished for planning a crime and what constitutes "planning"? The intent to commit certain classes of crimes is punishable. That being said, there is a difference between intent and a mere wish. Intent is inferred from statements or circumstances indicating that a person's actions were (or are) devised toward knowingly committing the underlying crime. The Black's Law Dictionary defines intent as "[D]esign, resolve, or determination with which [a] person acts. [...] [M]ental action at its most advanced point [...]. It is the exercise of intelligent will, the mind being fully aware of the nature and consequences of the act which is about to be done" (brackets added). By contrast, a wish that goes no further than fantasizing or expressing "I want to do this" usually is inconsequential from a legal standpoint. One exception to that relates to promoting offenses such as terrorism, murder, and arguably pedophilia. Even if it is proved that the person making those expressions has no propensity or intent to indulge in the criminal conduct he depicts, the expressions themselves might encourage others to do so. That encouragement makes it more difficult for a government to prevent those crimes from being committed and to identify the perpetrator(s).	They could be prosecuted in any state where there was evidence that part of the crime was committed. Realistically, either State A or State B could prosecute for conspiracy to murder as an additional charge, because the conspiracy clearly spanned more than one state, even if they can't prove where the crime was committed, although physical evidence (e.g. traces of camp sites, footprints, testimony about landmarks, evidence of poop with human DNA from the victim in it), would usually make it possible to show that some part of the crime was committed in the state. There is probably also a federal crime that could be implicated such as "murder involving flight across a state line" (hypothetical, but I'm sure that there is something similar on the books). I'm not going to address the further hypothetical as it is too bizzare and law is ultimately very context specific. Find a more plausible fact pattern, perhaps with a different crime, and ask a separate question if you want to really address the issue.	The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law	You have pretty well enumerated when it is legal. On the face of it it appears that the 11 year old acted illegally. So, if he is not being prosecuted, why not? Age of criminal responsibility. Below a certain age (I don't know about Alabama but in NSW it is 12) a person cannot by law be held criminally responsible because they are deemed to lack the emotional and mental maturity to distinguish right from wrong; this is particularly relevant when the same action can be legal or illegal depending on rather nuanced circumstances. Public interest. A DA may consider that prosecution of this child in these circumstances is not in the public interest. Prospect of conviction. A sensible DA may decide that there is very little prospect that a jury will convict notwithstanding that there is adequate evidence to prove guilt. This is a subset of the public interest; it is in no one's interest to spend time and money on a trial that will probably end with an acquittal.	There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense.	I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.	Yes, because the crimes are different instances. Let's remove the guilty plea and the fact that it is murder: can a person assault a person, be tried and imprisoned, then assault the same person later – and get off by declaring "Double jeopardy!". No, it's not the same crime. It's the same type of crime, and involves the same victim, but it is still a different crime. The same with your proposed scenario. (Incidentally, your first line is wrong: the woman wasn't murdered, she was thought to have been murdered).	No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412
What is the law concerning running over wild animals? It is in the news that police are investigating an incident where someone ran over three ducklings as they were crossing the road, with the Wildlife and Countryside Act cited. What is the law concerning how one should behave if a wild animal is in the road you are driving on? When I was learning to drive (many years ago, in an area that frequently has wild animals in the road) I learnt that if a human is in the road you do whatever you can to avoid them, and if that causes a crash then so be it, people in cars are better protected than pedestrians. If a (non-human) animal is in the road you continue on until you have ascertained that it is safe to take avoiding action, as a crash is likely to hurt humans and they are infinity more important than wild animals. This is the behaviour I have adopted, and would like to know if it is legal. This occured in the UK, and that is where I am most interested in answers about. Other jurisdictions could be interesting.	According to the article, the driver ran over the ducklings intentionally, when other drivers had already stopped. From the article: "Police urged animal lovers not to take "matters in your own hands" following the incident.". So the main consequences might not be legal consequences but non-legal consequences. Before you run into animals on the road, you make sure that you stay within the speed limit, that you have unobstructed view, and that you keep your eyes on the road. If there's a dog in the road, there could have been a young child as well. So having a situation where you can't stop safely is very bad. There are lots of people with expensive animals. A dog could easily be £2,000 and there are Frenchies that cost £30,000. Something to consider, so make sure your third party liability insurance is fine. And remember there might be consequences outside the law.	The Kentucky restriction against "hit and run" is KRS 189.580, which says that The operator of any vehicle, whose vehicle…is involved in an accident …shall immediately stop and ascertain the extent of the injury or damage and render reasonable assistance Notice that the legal requirement is for the operator to do something: the law requires nothing of the vehicle itself. Supposing that you are correct that the vehicle was operated by someone who hit and ran, then if the police gain suspicions that such is the case, and if those suspicions are reasonable, then then could obtain a warrant to obtain evidence from the vehicle, which could be used against the operator. The fact that you (might) now own the vehicle would not transfer legal responsibility to you – responsibbility goes with the actor, not the instrument.	Barring any specific statute the relevant law is the tort of negligence. To succeed Alice must prove Bob: had a duty to Alice, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to Alice, and Alice was, in fact, harmed or damaged. She will probably succeed on 1, 3 and 4 where she will struggle is with 2. It seems that Bob did everything a reasonable person could do to avoid the accident. The only possible hope is that not knowing that bridges freeze first might be something a qualified NZ driver should know and that he breached his duty by not knowing if that is something the judge considers reasonable. The traffic warning is irrelevant and untested (and untestable) hearsay and should be excluded from evidence.	It depends. The police and only the police decide what are and are not police matters. However, although it might not be a police matter, you still have lots of options at your disposal. For example, does your jurisdiction (city, town, municipality, etc.) have an animal control division? i.e., City dog catcher. Most do. If so, I would call the animal control division and file a report. They might possibly do a field visit and take the animal into custody if the animal is still roaming loose. If you sustained bodily injuries, you should get checked by a doctor and have those injuries documented in a medical report. If possible, you could drive by the property and take photos of the unchained dog roaming loose. Then, armed with your evidence consisting of: police report medical injury report animal control report and photographs of the scene You could (with the help of a licensed attorney) file a civil suit against the pet owner. You might be able to win an award for damages, pain and suffering and possibly punitive damages as well (check with your attorney). Also, your attorney could advise you if you might have a cause to move for an enforcement action against the dog and/or its owners that might or might not include having the animal removed from the owners custody or in extreme cases of negligence and bad behavior possibly "put to sleep." Your suit might focus on collecting from the homeowner's insurance policy of the pet owner and you could potentially collect a lot of money with the right set of facts and evidence on your side. You might want to look for an attorney who specializes in personal injury. Most PI attorneys work on a contingency. Meaning they don't charge an up front fee and will only get paid if you win your case or settle. In which case their fee is typically about 1/3 of what you get awarded in settlement or judgment.	Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing".	There's the question whether something is lost property or abandoned property. You'd be allowed to keep abandoned property, but keeping lost property without looking for the owner is in many places considered theft. A car on your land is quite likely abandoned by the last driver (people don't usually lose cars). But the question is whether it is abandoned by the owner; if the car looks like it has some value then it is unlikely to be abandoned by the owner and more likely that it has been stolen. I'd report the car to the police; then it's up to them to find the owner or not. If they can find him, and the car was not abandoned, but actually lost (unlikely) or stolen (more likely), you have the satisfaction of being an honest person helping either a very stupid car owner or a crime victim to get their property back. If they can't find him, usually the property will then belong to the finder.	Ark. Code 5-60-120 is very clear that the act of intercepting is a crime. Not just "recording and using", not just "recording", but intercepting in any way. Specifically: It is unlawful for a person to intercept a wire, landline, oral, telephonic communication, or wireless communication, and to record or possess a recording of the communication unless the person is a party to the communication or one (1) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception and recording. Intercepting is illegal, therefore it is not "okay". Perhaps the "sort of a lawyer" was speaking of the probability of getting caught doing it.	I am not a lawyer and I have never even been to the UK. You will not go to prison if your neighbor's dog attacks you and it dies as a result of you defending yourself. You might go to prison and/or owe the owner damages if: You are somewhere you do not technically have a right to be. It can be shown you could have retreated from harm but chose instead to stand your ground. The force you used was deemed excessive - it showed intent to harm the dog more than necessary to protect yourself You contributed to the confrontation in a way that a reasonable person would think might cause trouble You might be able to protect yourself from problems by: taking pictures or videos of the dog behaving badly or aggressively note dates and times when you observe the dog behaving badly or aggressively formally contact the dog's owner with your concerns and/or evidence in which you assert your rights to access the areas you walk through and your right to defend yourself in the event that you are attacked by the dog if possible, change your route or schedule to avoid the problem entirely Good luck
Is there any precedent wherein both parties require a burden of proof? My thinking is with respect to very serious issues wherein getting the correct resolution is very important. Usually the burden seems to be on one party or another, but I wonder if there are cases or situations where both parties are burdened with justifying their positions?	Are there cases or situations where both parties are burdened with justifying their positions? england-and-wales Yes, but different standards are applied. One example is the "reverse burden of proof" placed on the defendant in section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953: Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence... The prosecution have to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the article is actually an offensive weapon and that the named defendant possessed it on a particular date and that s/he was in a public place at the time. Whereas the standard of proof for the defendant to show they had lawful authority or a reasonable excuse for having is the, lower, "balance of probabilities". Similar legislation, for a similar offence, at section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 states that: (4)It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had good reason or lawful authority for having the article with him in a public place. (5)Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) above, it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had the article with him— (a)for use at work; (b)for religious reasons; or (c)as part of any national costume. Which, again, is on the balance of probabilities. See, for example, R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37: If [a legal burden of proof on an accused] is created the matter in question must be taken as proved against the accused unless he satisfies the jury on a balance of probabilities to the contrary...	The validity of the NDA is not an easy question, but a related one is more clear. A lawyer in the U.S. in most states is not permitted to threaten criminal or administrative action (e.g. reporting someone to immigration or tax officials), to gain advantage in a civil case. You can unilaterally bring criminal charges or take administrative action, but it is deemed to be unethical and against public policy to refrain from bringing criminal charges or taking administration action to gain civil advantages. An NDA of the type described arguably violated the same public policy and might be invalidated as a result. Put another way, there is a privilege to make certain reports to public officials without legal consequences and such an NDA might violate that privilege. Some of these privileges found in what are called "whistle blower" statutes specifically prohibit this kind of agreement as to some specific kinds of illegal conduct, but not others. There isn't a general rule. This said, it is not black and white. For example, a private NDA can't prevent someone from testifying under subpoena, but can prevent someone from voluntarily testifying in the absence of a legal compulsion to do so such as a subpoena. Suppose a woman is sexually assaulted at work, and is given an NDA to sign. Can the company legally require her not to disclose the conduct of an illegal activity? I can imagine this example coming out different ways in different jurisdictions. For example, some states have a legal duty (rarely enforced) that requires people to report felonies, and an NDA in this case would contradict that affirmative legal duty, while others do not. Another source of gray in the analysis is that there is a difference between not reporting a sexual assault that actually happened, and, as part of a larger settlement, executing an affidavit stating under penalty of perjury and under oath that a sexual assault didn't happen. The first is potentially an NDA that is void as a matter of public policy. The other, in principle, is a settlement that the person signing the affidavit can only enter into if it is true. There is nothing, in general, wrong, about requiring someone to confirm that certain representations are true as part of a business transaction or contract and allowing the contract to go forwards only if certain facts are true. The gray gets deeper, because whether a sexual assault happened or not is not always a subjectively black and white clear issue of pure fact. (It is subjective because an affidavit or affirmation is made to the best of the declarant or affiants' knowledge and belief, not as a matter of objective fact.) For example, someone may not have perfect memory of what happened, or there could be doubt over the question of whether the perpetrators acted recklessly (the Model Penal Code intent requirement for sexual assault) or merely with criminal negligence (which would not be sexual assault under the Model Penal Code). A statement made under oath about whether a sexual assault happened to the best of your knowledge, thus, might be a mixture of factual issues (A penetrated B at a certain date and time) and legal or not perfectly factually known ones (A acted with X intent regarding consent during that act). So, in a case where there was some room to argue either way about how to characterize what happened and about what actually did happen, there might be some room for a settling party to make a non-perjured statement consistent with the settlement and then to agree not to a true NDA, but instead to not make statements which, if the affidavit is true, would be false. In a plea bargain in a criminal case, one can plead "no contest" without agreeing that the crime factually happened, but that isn't really possibly in the context of an affidavit about what really happened, with an NDA limited to not disclosing the incident since it was already agreed as a matter of sworn fact that there is nothing to disclose that rises the level of a crime.	The FCC addresses this. As a general matter, the standard of proof is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. See, e.g., Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to provide In-Region InterLATA Services in Michigan, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 20543, 20568-69, paras. 45-46, n.87 (1997); Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1429 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The traditional standard required in a civil or administrative proceeding is proof by a preponderance of the evidence [and t]he traditional preponderance standard must be applied unless the type of case and the sanctions or hardship imposed require a higher standard.”) Reasonable doubt is the standard for criminal prosecutions, which are not included in 47 CFR Part 97.	There is no general legal obligations be truthful Such an obligation only arises where specifically called out by law or where there is a relationship of trust between the parties, e.g. they are negotiating a contract, they have a doctor-patient relationship etc. In any event, the President has legal immunity for actions performed as President. Presidents answer for their misdeeds at the ballot box, not the courthouse.	Given that both parties have committed criminal offenses (the 'bad actor' is attempting fraud and the 'victim' has committed unauthorized access to a computer system), no court would hear a civil case between these parties. As a matter of public policy, criminals do not owe a duty of care to each other so no one can win this case.	If Doe and Smith agree with your position that the church will be the arbitrator, they should go unto the church and get their problem resolved, which is in itself significant. If one of them rejects that interpretation, it is possible that one of them will sue in regular court to get the matter resolved. If neither of them accepts that interpretation, that clause will not be part of the legal argument that the court decides on. The court will only touch on this passage if exactly one of the parties agrees with the passage and makes it part of his argument. Then that person will have the burden of arguing that a certain outcome is mandated by the agreement – for example "this is a binding arbitration clause, you must let The Church decide". The courts will have to consider the evidence that this is indeed what the parties agreed to. It then depends on the evidence that the two sides offer for their positions, as to their respective understandings of the contract language. A preponderance of evidence could favor the interpretation that you offer, but that is a fact-intensive question of Biblical interpretation, and not a legal one.	Finding Certainty There is only one way for certain: Do the supposedly unlawful thing Get sued (civil) or prosecuted (criminal) Go to court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose, appeal to the next appellate court in the chain In one of those courts refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal Repeat as necessary until you reach the Supreme Court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose or the Supreme Court refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal. Of course, this whole cycle will take a few years and quite a lot of money. Not certain but persuasive Consult a lawyer: their area of expertise is knowing what the law is and how it will likely apply to your circumstances. Of course, they can be wrong about this because - see above. Why is this so hard? Common law jurisdictions, of which Florida is an example, do not have a "Code of Laws" where you can look things up and see if they are legal or illegal. The Common Law in Florida is partially enacted law (by the US, Florida, County, City and finally your housing corporation) and partially unenacted law (decisions made by courts about both the enacted and unenacted law). In fact, enacted law is usually quite ambiguous until it has a body of unenacted (or case) law that surrounds it and provides guidance on how the courts will interpret it. Part of a lawyers skill is knowing (within their area of expertise) what the relevant case and statute law is with respect to the specific facts of the case, or knowing how to research them. Publish and be damned! You can always take the Duke of Wellingtons approach. In common law jurisdictions, everything is legal unless there is a law (enacted or unenacted) that makes it otherwise. If you do not believe that the action you wish to take is illegal then advise the other party that you will give them 24 hours to come back with a court injunction to prohibit it, otherwise you will proceed. You can't call a bluff harder than this!	As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury.
Find case law for Acts of Parliament I am new to the field of law, focusing on common law (criminal only) in the jurisdiction of England & Wales. I have searched the government legislation website for various acts, in this case the Computer Misuse Act 1990. It gives an overview, sentences (whether summary, either-way, or indictment), amendments etc... With my limited understanding of law, I think that not everything is listed on that webpage, and in common law systems there is a focus on case law, that is prior decisions from judges? How would I find relevant case law for a specific act? If I were a solicitor/barrister, would I also be able to search for more recent court cases where the Computer Misuse Act was applied, and quote from it? For example, "Your Honour, just last month this same Computer Misuse Act was applied in Sunny Street Crown Court, and the judge stated X, Y, and Z which is surely applicable here?" I have done some of my own research. For example, The Law Pages were a good resource for reading about recent cases, pleas, sentences given, and other high level information. There are also sentencing guidelines, which split offences up into categories, to help judges give consistent sentences. I apologise if my question is a little bit all over the place, but I just want to understand the gist of how this works. I ask for self interest, not for any quotable academic purposes.	1. You need to read and utilize law textbooks, the MOST UPDATED editione. Try to access a library of a university that has a law faculty. Failing that, try a local library — but local libraries may not stock (pricey) law textbooks, or their most updated edns. I scanned Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law Text Cases Materials (2020 9 edn), beneath for you. But the NEWEST edn is 2022, 10 edn, as at May 23 2022. Herring updates his book every 2 years. Two other leading textbooks are Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod's Criminal Law (2021 16 edn), and Smith, Hogan, & Ormerod's Text, Cases, & Materials on Criminal Law (2020 13 edn). 2. Look up the Act of Parliament in the Table of Legislation. See scan beneath. 3. Finally, you shall find the cases expatiated in the body, and cited in the footnotes! See scan beneath.	You are confusing a few concepts. One is the distinction between what are known as "common law" jurisdictions derived from the English legal system, and "civil law" jurisdictions derived from one of the continental European legal systems that is ultimately derived from Roman law. Another is the distinction between determining the meaning of ambiguous legislation, which all courts do by definition, and the power of judicial review, which overturns legislation which is invalid for some reason rather than merely trying to interpret an ambiguous provision. Ambiguous means "unclear" or "capable of being interpreted in more than one way" and every time every court encounters unclear legislation it must decide what it means, even if it is not invalidated. In contrast, some judiciaries that have the power of judicial review and those that do not. Judiciaries that can declare a law to be invalid have the power of judicial review. Judiciaries that cannot declare a law to be invalid do not have the power of judicial review. Every state and federal U.S. Court at every level (not just the U.S. Supreme Court) has the power and obligation to declare that a law violated the U.S. Constitution. In many countries, no court, or only a "constitutional court" has the power to make declare legislation to be invalid by exercising judicial review. Every time that a legislature passes a statute on a subject covered by common law (i.e. judge-made law derived from case decisions that serve as precedents), it shrinks the scope of common law relative to statutes. And, in principle, almost all of the common law could be replaced by statutes without all that much difficulty. But, in civil law countries, statutes are frequently comprehensive and are the sole source of legal authority about their subject matter superseding all case law, while in common law countries, statutes are often piecemeal tweaks to a common law background that is assumed by the statute. For example, every civil law country would have a comprehensive statute setting forth the principles of contract law, while a typical common law jurisdiction might have a statute that declares that certain contracts must be in writing but does not comprehensively set forth the law of contracts in all circumstances. There are some features of civil law countries, such as the absence of jury trials, which cannot be constitutionally changed to the civil law system, even in jurisdictions such a Puerto Rico and Louisiana in the United States which have civil law roots prior to joining the U.S. (at least in criminal cases and in the federal courts). The power of judicial review (i.e. the power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional and void) is also inherent in the U.S. Constitutional system of government and could not be removed without a constitutional amendment. There are common law countries, e.g., England, which did not historically have the power of judicial review, which was an innovation for a common law countries such as the United States when it was first invoked. (For what it is worth, India goes one step further; its Supreme Court asserts and exercises the right to declare portions of its own constitution to be unconstitutional.) There are other aspects of civil law legal systems which would probably also be declared unconstitutional in the United States as well, such as the lack of a prohibition on the introduction of hearsay evidence in criminal trials which violates a provision of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights known as the "confrontation clause." It is unclear to me whether the principle that case law precedents have binding legal effect in future cases, which is part of the common law system that is absent in the civil law system, has a constitutional dimension or could be displaced by law. But, most aspects of a civil law legal system could be adopted in the United States if the relevant legislatures so desired. Indeed, many aspects of the U.S. legal system have moved in that direction. For example, only a handful of U.S. states now recognize the concept of a "common law crime". Almost all states now only allow criminal sanctions for crimes codified by statute, which was not the case at the time of the American Revolution, when few crimes were codified. Obviously, with a constitutional amendment, almost any change to the U.S. legal system is possible.	Fraud new-south-wales There are a number of offences that fall under the broad category of fraud. The most relevant for this type of behaviour is in s192E of the Crimes Act 1900: "Obtain financial advantage or cause financial advantage by deception" which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years. In order to understand what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt it is useful to look at the suggested jury direction from the Criminal Bench Book (a crib sheet for judges): [The accused] is charged that [he/she] by a deception dishonestly [obtained a financial advantage for himself/herself] or [kept a financial advantage that he/she had]. The Crown contends that the financial advantage is [set out the financial advantage]. It does not matter whether the financial advantage alleged was permanent or temporary. The deception that the Crown alleges that the accused perpetrated was [set out the deception]. It must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the financial advantage was obtained as a result of that deception and that the accused perpetrated that deception intentionally to obtain the financial advantage or acted recklessly in that regard. Here reckless means foreseeing the possibility that as a result of the deception [he/she] would [obtain a financial advantage] or [retain the financial advantage that he/she had] and carrying on with the deception notwithstanding that possibility. However, the Crown does not need to prove a particular person was deceived. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in [his/her] deceptive conduct. Dishonest in this context means that the accused acted dishonestly according to the standards of ordinary people. You as ordinary members of the community determine what is dishonest conduct in this regard. You must not only find beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in deceiving [the victim] but also that [he/she] knew that [his/her] conduct was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. It is not enough that a person is shithouse at delivering on their contractual obligations: even repeatedly so. That just makes them a bad business person, not a criminal. They must have acted dishonestly and deceived their victims from the get-go with the intention of not fulfilling their bargain or have been reckless as to their ability to do so. If you believe that you have knowledge of criminal fraud, you should report it to the police who have the discretion to investigate and prosecute. As a general rule, police devote fewer resources to non-violent crime than they do to violent crime and less to crimes where the victim has handed over property/money than those where it was taken from them involuntarily so fraud tends to be lower on their radar.	As @cpast says in their comment, these are not equivalent punishments, the fine is for the lower end of the scale where incarceration is not warranted and the maximum gaol term is for the most egregious cases. That said, your supposition is almost certainly correct; statutes tend to be a "set and forget" thing, legislatures have a lot to do and going back to old laws to update fines in line with inflation is probably not high on their list of priorities. In order to overcome this problem all jurisdictions in Australia have adopted the Penalty Unit; fines in statutes are stated as a certain number of penalty units and the value of a penalty unit is set in various ways that usually do not require a vote in parliament.	This is a great question because it's a useful vehicle for understanding a cross-cutting principle of law: baselines and exceptions. I find that thinking of law as a system of baseline rules and exceptions to these rules is a great way to organize and make sense of the mess that is 'the law.' A police officer testifying about what you told them, whether it helps you or hurts you, is hearsay. So, as you correctly pointed out, the baseline assumption is that that testimony can't come in. But, the hearsay rule is famous for having a ton of exceptions to it. Two relevant exceptions here are: (1) statements against interest, and (2) prior inconsistent statements. If what you told the police officer was a direct admission of liability, or a statement that contradicts the theory of the case that you're presenting to the jury, either or both of these exceptions are going to kick in and make that hearsay admissible. These exceptions are not going to kick in, however, for hearsay statements that help you. A humorous, but related, aside, is that there's some jurisdictional differences in how far the 'statements against interest' exception goes. In some jurisdictions it only applies to admissions of liability, but in other jurisdictions it also applies to simply embarrassing statements. My evidence professor illustrated this by, out of the blue, mind you, saying, in class, "I stopped wetting the bed when I got to college," and then explaining that in the latter type of jurisdiction, that statement would be admissible. He then paused after the class had finally stopped laughing and said "that's not true, by the way...I stopped in high school."	There is no particular mention in the OSCOLA guidelines for how to refer to laws of England and Wales. In academic papers it is common to see both "English Law" and "English and Welsh Law", usually depending on whether the particular point relates directly to England, Wales or both. However, in the case of Welsh Measures and Statutory Instruments of Wales then it would be correct to only describe the laws as "Welsh Law".	As your question is concerned on English law, a clear answer is yes but is specific for English law. Barristers from the same chamber may represent opposing sides in a case. This is normal and common practice. Barristers are independent practitioners in the British and many other common law systems who represent clients in court but are not in charge of the case as a whole. As a result, they may be instructed to represent clients whose interests diverge, and each barrister is responsible for deciding whether or not to accept a particular case. While each barrister acts independently and is free to take on any case they choose, chambers are groups of barristers who share resources and facilities. Even if they are representing opposing sides in the same case or different cases, barristers are typically required to adhere to the professional code of ethics and maintain client confidence. It is important to note that ethical rules prohibit lawyers from representing opposing sides in the same case, and the concept of barristers and chambers does not exist in some jurisdictions, such as the United States.	england-and-wales s161 Penalties for causing certain kinds of danger or annoyance, Highways Act 1980 ... (3) If a person plays at football or any other game on a highway to the annoyance of a user of the highway he is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding [F3 level 1 on the standard scale]. ... (See also the s137 offence of wilful obstruction.) Some places may also have their own related bylaws, e.g. No person shall on any land adjoining a street play any game in a manner likely to cause obstruction to any traffic or to cause danger to any person in such a street Made under s235 of the Local Government Act 1972, for the prevention and suppression of nuisances. Traveling further back in time, the Highway Act 1835 provided for penalties on persons who "play at Football or any other Game on any Part of the said Highways, to the Annoyance of any Passenger or Passengers" and, in London, the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 similarly made it an offence to "any Kite or play at any Game to the Annoyance of the Inhabitants or Passengers, or who shall make or use any Slide upon Ice or Snow in any Street or other Thoroughfare, to the common Danger of the Passengers." I find such a claim implausible, considering the large amount of my childhood that was spent playing in the street with no legal problems. It seems possible that the authorities turned a blind eye or your behaviour didn't come to their attention, or your street was designated as a 'play street' (introduced by the Street Playgrounds Act 1938, currently provided for by sections 29 to 31 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 as amended by the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991). Also, many alleged offenders might be younger than the criminal age of responsibility. According to TJ Miller MP (Colchester) in Hansard, speaking in 1860, in 1859 44 of London's children were sent to prison for playing games in the streets, and by April 1860 25 had been sent to prison - apparently Manchester had imprisoned none. In my youth we played in the street although we didn't put up basketball hoops, football goals or other such objects. These stories in the media seem to be rare and involve circumstances where the local authority received too many complaints, particularly when there is damage to homes, cars or flowerbeds - which may amount to criminal damage. Blackpool in 2006 Glenfield area of Leicester, 2007 Newark, Nottinghamshire, 2008 Manchester, 2010 - although this seems to be based on one complaint Hat-tip Pedestrian Liberation for the information about the older legislation and arrests of children.
Double indictment for the same act Say a murder is committed. The DA indicts someone, who is tried, and found not guilty by a jury of his peers. Is it possible that after some more police investigations, the DA can then indict a second suspect? If so, would it still be possible if suspect 1 had been convicted? I'm trying to ascertain the boundaries around something that isn't exactly double jeopardy but looks like it: the idea that you can't have two trials for the same offense. I realize it makes sense to indict two persons for the same murder: if me and my friend kill my wife together, we've both committed murder. But it's not the same thing here: it's not an act that suspects 1 and 2 are alledged to have committed together, it's one and only act that they're separately accused of committing alone. Could the state indict an infinite series of citizens for the same offense? Even if prior indictments resulted in conviction?	england-and-wales Scenario 1: If a person is acquitted of an offence, and evidence later shows that someone else committed it instead then there's nothing in law preventing that second person being prosecuted - assuming all the relevant conditions are met. Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted of an offence, but evidence later shows that someone else may have committed it (independently and in isolation rather than as a co-conspiritor), then in all likelihood the former defendant may have grounds for an appeal on the basis that they have suffered a miscarriage of justice. One option is for their case to be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission who may refer the case back to the court to determine whether the conviction should be quashed in light of new and compelling evidence. Scenario 3: "Infinite" indictments are theoretically possible (in as much as infinity is possible) but only if there is enough evidence against each and every person to justify them being indicted. If prior indictments resulted in convictions, then loop back to Scenario 2.	Bob will be convicted if he is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Now it is a logical fact that he cannot be guilty of both crimes, but it is entirely possible that his first conviction was incorrect and he is guilty of murder. His defense would point out that the first conviction creates reasonable doubt about his guilt in the murder case. The prosecution would have to show how it doesn't, for example by finding a police officer who forged the evidence in the first case. And then the defence would point out that the fact that evidence against Bob was forged once means reasonable doubt for the evidence in the second case. Fact is, the prosecution must show guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the murder, and the fact that Bob was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for a different crime, and that he cannot have committed both crimes, makes the prosecutions task a lot harder. Now what if the prosecution finds a second criminal who is an exact visual match for Bob? On the positive side, this would explain how there are two videos apparently showing Bob committing two crimes in different places. It would put the prosecution into the difficult position to have to prove which one is the murderer. And they can't say "Bob is in jail already, so it must have been Bill", because now Bob's first conviction looks very unsafe.	Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.	At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case.	No. It means the existence of reasonable doubt is in doubt... One cannot conclude the question of guilt in either direction, so one must try again to see if a different jury can answer the meta-question, to then answer the legal question of guilt. ... or is not being addressed If only one person is voting against the consensus, or as many as are allowed by the jurisdiction, they are overruled. That's the allowance made for bias that has somehow reached the jury despite the filtering done beforehand. If more people are voting against the majority so that consensus is not possible, it is potentially because someone has made up their mind on the question of guilt regardless of what (some significant part or the weight of) the evidence indicates, defeating the purpose of the trial and providing all the evidence. A person not accounting for all the evidence can't be said to have reasonable doubt of guilt, since the doubt may be excluded by the remaining evidence. Similarly, guilt beyond reasonable doubt cannot be supported by only partial evidence, as exculpatory evidence may be among the part not accounted for. ... or cannot be addressed by that jury at all. Finally, a jury split on the decision of how to weigh the evidence cannot claim either to have or to have dismissed reasonable doubt, because they cannot agree on what a reasonable doubt is, in the first place.	Murder is Murder Adding all the elements of murder are proven beyond reasonable doubt then the person gets convicted. The fact that they were a sibling would be considered in sentencing as it always is.	The concept is known as lesser included offense. The prosecution believed that they have a chance to prove murder, so they charged murder, but they understood that the judge and jury might not convict on murder. So they said in effect, "and if you won't find him guilty of murder, at least convict for manslaughter."	No. This isn't possible. A judge can only sentence someone after they have pleaded guilty or been found to be guilty, following an indictment or criminal complaint, and multiple advisements of rights.
Is it rape to have sex with a man without disclosing that one is a male-to-female transgender person? A male-to-female transgender person meets a male partner, but does not tell the partner about being transgender. Thus, the male partner believes the transgender woman is a (cis-gender) woman, and they have sex. If the transgender woman hadn't hidden this fact, the male partner would not ever have wanted to have sex. Is this considered rape? Considering the growing ratio of people going through a sex change operation, and living later hiding this fact from the society, the problem will likely become more and more common.	Not disclosing transgender identity is not a crime of any kind, not rape, not fraud, not anything else. There is really no qualification to this statement. There is pretty much no plausible scenario in which concealing a transgender identity leads to liability for fraud of any kind and this never constitutes rape by deception. What is a crime and is regularly prosecuted, is retaliating against the person or property of someone who they discover is transgender while having sex. Incidents like these happen with some frequency and they alway create criminal liability for the person retaliating and never for the transgender individual in the cases where the transgender individual isn't killed (dozens of time each year in the U.S. the transgender individual is killed in a situation like this one).	"Age of consent" is a legal meme that refers indirectly to different criminal statutes, for example in Missouri under MO Rev Stat § 566.034, A person commits the offense of statutory rape in the second degree if being twenty-one years of age or older, he or she has sexual intercourse with another person who is less than seventeen years of age §023 also states that "It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecutions under sections 566.032, 566.034, 566.062, 566.064, and 566.071, that the defendant was married to the victim at the time of the offense". MO Rev Stat §451.090 allows marriage with parental permission to those aged 16 and 17 (by prohibiting licensing of marriage to those younger) No recorder shall issue a license authorizing the marriage of any male or female under sixteen years of age nor shall a license be issued authorizing the marriage of any male or female twenty-one years of age or older to a male or female under eighteen years of age. Combining these legal parts, you get the result that a man may marry and impregnate a woman whom he could not legally have intercourse with (irrespective of pregnancy) were they not married. It just depends on what the specific law says.	As a general rule, countries tend to recognize marriages performed abroad - even if those marriages could not legally be performed in the country. (So a 14 year old couple from North Carolina would be considered "married" in the UK. Note: that doesn't mean they can legally have sex.) There are exceptions: countries which don't permit polygamy often don't recognize polygamous marriages performed where they are legal. There would need to be evidence of the marriage though (as Jerry Hall found to her cost when she "divorced" Mick Jagger, and he successfully claimed that their wedding in Bali was not official).	Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent?	He was indicted on many charges including 1st degree rape. So your question is why the jury returned the specific verdict, and did not convict on all charges. There is no record of the jury deliberations, so the best we can conjecture is that they didn't find the other charges to have been proven, and in lieu of a tell-tale juror, we can't know what evidence persuaded the jury. He was convicted on counts of criminal sexual assault in the first degree and rape in the third degree, but acquitted of two counts of predatory sexual assault, and it is suggested by media who make suggestions that this is because the jury did not believe the testimony of Annabella Sciorra. The crime of third degree rape (the charge involving Jessica Mann) is when a person engages in nonconsensual sex with another person. The crime of first degree rape, a charge that he was acquitted on, is when a person subjects a victim to nonconsensual intercourse through forcible compulsion, or when they are incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless. A person is guilty of a criminal sexual act in the first degree if they engage in oral or anal sex with someone who is incapable of consent, or if they use forcible compulsion. The statutes are here, §130.00 ff.	The modern rule is that individuals in a married couple are almost never considered a single person (ownership of real property in a tenancy by entireties in a few states mostly in the Northeast, is a narrow and rare exception). Historically, considering a married man and woman to be a single person (a legal doctrine called coverture) was common place in the common law, but almost all such rules have been superseded. Lots of the relevant law and legal history is considered in the answer to this question at Law.SE.	If such conversations are reported, it can place the suspect in a dilemma. Consider a man who appears to have overdosed on illegal narcotics. He is taken to the hospital, and the doctor asks what kind of drugs he took, in order to plan his treatment. If the man thinks that what he says could be used to prosecute him, he might lie to the doctor. Then he would not receive proper medical treatment, putting his health at risk. Lawmakers or police authorities might decide that it is better for society for people to always be able to speak freely to their doctors and receive proper treatment, even if it means that it will sometimes be harder to prosecute criminals. That would be one possible rationale for a rule like this.	There is a good answer at the Skeptics StackExchange here. Its three most relevant references are: 42 U.S.C. Chapter 21, especially Subchapter VI (applies only to employers with fifteen or more employees every day in at least 20 calendar weeks in a year) An example case, Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) Katie Manley, The BFOQ Defense: Title VII’s Concession to Gender Discrimination, 16 Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 169-210 (2009) Wilson v Southwest held that being attractive and female is not a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) for being a flight attendant, even when the company marketed themselves using female sexuality: sex does not become a BFOQ merely because an employer chooses to exploit female sexuality as a marketing tool or to better ensure profitability Most scholars believe that the BFOQ exception would not apply to Hooters servers for the same reason. The job is serving food, and the sexualized nature of the service is just the manner in which they do the job, not a requirement of the primary job itself. Hooters has never had a discrimination suit go to trial, however has been sued and settled out of court multiple times. Employment discrimination based on gender has been allowed only in cases where the primary product being sold (not merely the manner of delivery of the primary product) requires a particular gender. One example would be sexual entertainment. This would include strip clubs, modelling agencies, Nevada brothels, etc. I'll say it one other way. Simply offering attractive female service as part of a business strategy is not enough to trigger a BFOQ exception. To allow a BFOQ defence based on an employer's desired manner or means of achieving its primary business purpose would render the statute inoperative, and the BFOQ exception would "swallow the rule" Phillips v. Martin Marietta 400 U.S. 542 (1971). (This paragraph taken from here.)
Defamation due to breach of confidentiality Hypothetical: I say negative stuff about John Doe to my psychologist, stuff which isn't defamation per se. My psychologist doesn't directly act on my statements, but does share my statements with third parties. Due to those statements those third parties cancel contracts with John Doe, stop buying products from John Doe, etc. Could I use as a defense against defamation the fact that I thought my statements to John Doe wouldn't be shared with anyone?	Yes. Making statements in a legally protected confidential context is not publishing them, and in most jurisdictions, defamation must be published to create a cause of action. In such a case the patient might well have a cause of action against the therapist for violation of patient confidentially, and a complaint to the relevant authority could get the therapist's license revoked, or perhaps a censure from the licensing authority, whatever it is the the jurisdiction. Note "published" does not have to mean putting them in print, but does mean making them in such a way that general circulation of them is plausible. In addition, such statements may be coered by a qualified privilege. In Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 135, 387 A.2d 1129 (1978) the Maryland Supreme Court (reviewing a case from the Court of Special Appeals) held (at 135-136) that: ... the common law recognized that a person ought to be shielded against civil liability for defamation where, in good faith, he publishes a statement in furtherance of his own legitimate interests, or those shared in common with the recipient or third parties, ... The Maryland court went on to quote the Restatement (Second) of Torts, (Scope Note preceding § 593 (1977)) which states that if a privilege were not granted: information that should be given or received would not be communicated because of [the] fear of . . . persons capable of giving it that they would be held liable in an action of defamation if their statements were untrue. It would seem that a statement by a person to his or her own therapist, as a part of therapy, and intended to be held in confidence by the therapist, ought to fall under this definition of privilege, although I cannot find any actual case with this exact fact pattern. If the person knew or had reason to know that the therapist was likely to repeat the statement, that would be different. If the person and the therapist were not in a practitioner/patient relationship, with its normal expectations of confidentiality, that also would be different.	Suborning perjury is a criminal offense, at the federal level under 18 USC 1622, and is especially bad for a law firm to do. An attorney has a duty to not allow a client to lie in a legal proceeding, so instructing a client to lie is worse. Legally speaking, you are not compelled to turn them in to the (local US) authorities, unless your country has some odd law requiring citizens to report crimes in foreign countries. Two things can possibly come out of forwarding such an email to the authorities. One is that they will gain access to privileged communication, which they may not be able to use against the client. The other is that they will have evidence of the attorney committing a crime, which is not privileged. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1: There is a privilege protecting communications between attorney and client. The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told. We take no stance on moral questions as to whether you should or should not.	I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.	(Standard disclaimer: I am not your lawyer; I am not here to help you.) Under American common law, the distinction here would relate to the harm to B: either a damages issue or a "special harm" issue. The Restatement elements of defamation are falsity, publication, fault, and inherent actionability or special harm. See Rest. 2d Torts § 558. The last element captures the traditional doctrine that slander (not libel) is only actionable if it falls into one of four or five specific categories ("slander per se"), or if it actually causes economic injury. Your example doesn't seem to fit into any of the special categories. But see Rest. 2d Torts § 573 (imputations affecting business or office). If the statement to C is oral rather than written, and C doesn't believe it or otherwise nothing comes of the statement, B may not be able to prove special harm and therefore fail to recover anything. If D, on the contrary, avoided doing business with B, B may be able to show special harm supporting a claim. Similarly, C's disbelief or D's belief may be relevant to determining the actual damages B suffered and is therefore entitled to recover from A.	Is it unethical to file a claim against an attorney who lied? No. It is actually encouraged if the claimant can submit proof of attorney's misconduct. The grievance is to be filed in the claimant's jurisdiction rather than with the American Bar Association. An attorney's lies may be severe enough to constitute fraud on the court and possibly warrant disbarment. See Matter of LaRosee, 122 N.J. 298, 311 (1991). The real question from a practical standpoint is whether the Disciplinary Review Board and related entities will follow through or be unduly lenient about that attorney's misconduct. What if the Judge ultimately rejected the attorney's claim? That does not reduce the impropriety of the attorney's misconduct. The so-called "zealousness" with which lawyers advance their clients' position does not justify indulging in dishonesty devised to result in miscarriage of justice. Is it wrong to bring it to the attention of the judge or do judges frown on such things (since the attorney is representing the other party)? No. Judges generally are not up-to-date about attorneys' misconduct. Putting them on notice might frustrate a crook's further attempts to mislead the court in that and other cases the judge presides. By not reporting a crook, the public remains exposed to risks from that lawyer's pattern of misconduct.	Generally speaking, no. Assuming your lie did not cause some "legally cognizable harm" -- as in the case of perjury, defamation, fraud -- it is almost certainly protected by the First Amendment. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).	Generally speaking, if a person sends you an email you can publish it. Like if they call you a bunch of nasty names, or threaten you in some way, that information is yours and you can publish it. However, I'll give you three scenarios where you should not publish an email sent to you (and I'll edit to add more if they come up). Private facts. There is a tort called publication of private facts. A plaintiff must establish four elements to hold someone liable for publication of private facts: Public Disclosure: The disclosure of facts must be public. Another way of saying this is that the defendant must "give publicity" to the fact or facts in question. Private Fact: The fact or facts disclosed must be private, and not generally known. Offensive to a Reasonable Person: Publication of the private facts in question must be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Not Newsworthy: The facts disclosed must not be newsworthy. Stated differently, the facts disclosed must not be a matter of legitimate public concern. From Digital Media Law Project Note one thing - the offensive fact does not need to have been completely private for you to be liable, it must not have been generally known. In other words, someone like you who has a really low "public" bar needs to be careful. Also note that your buffer system might not help if the facts you publish are about someone other than the email sender; you are the one who published them. Stolen Information If someone sends you some intellectual property of a third party it is not yours to publish. Trade secrets, copyrighted works, prototype photos, etc. The sender might be breaking the law by sending the stuff to you but you're the one who published it so you can join as co-defendants. Barrett Brown was indicted for sharing a link to some stolen information. A link! He's in prison on other charges. Copyright held by the original sender (ht to @Dave_D) If the sender is the original author of the email, then the sender holds the copyright to the body of the email. Publishing the email violates the copyright. However, you could account for this in your buffer. Maybe. I am not sure is that is explicit enough.	does a reference for a candidate employee have liability for what they say about the candidate? To my understanding lying isn't illegal. Lying is unlawful to the extent that the liar's deliberate intent to mislead other(s) causes or is likely to cause unwarranted harm. This is regardless of whether "the person acting as a reference isn't under obligation not to be a reference". Lies can directly harm the candidate and/or the company, and others indirectly. The harm to the candidate is known as, or comes in the form of, defamation. Depending on the jurisdiction, an intent to mislead might not even be a prerrequisite for liability. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 600.2911(7) allows suits for libel or slander if "the defamatory falsehood concerns the private individual and was published negligently" (emphasis added). The liar's intent to mislead and his knowledge of the falsehood of his statements can only worsen the harm inflicted and his liability therefor. Likewise, the liar can be liable to the company for inducing it to hire a candidate the company would not have hired had it known the truth. Liability ensues when the hired candidate makes the company incur losses which would be prevented by relying on a truthful reference. If the reference is truthful, the chances for liability are significantly narrower. These scenarios typically involve matters of privacy or disclosures that are protected/sanctioned by law.
What is/was "iudex non calculat"? Wikipedia: It originates from the Roman legal concept that obvious calculation errors in a court decision are not harmful to the decision itself and can be corrected at any time. Figuratively it also describes the concept that a judge does not "add up" the number of arguments but instead bases his or her decision on the strength of those arguments. Wiktionary: The principle that a judge should base their decision on the strength of the arguments rather than their quantity. Briefly googling I'm unable to find any more definitive sources/references, which are what I'm looking for.	The form calculat is late Latin, and so we may not find this exact phrasing in our earliest Roman sources. The general principle regarding correction of numerical errors is in the Digest of Justinian (530-533), which deals in 49.8 with decisions which can be rescinded without an appeal. The authority cited is Aemilius Macer, a jurist of the third century, whose work De Appellationibus ("On Appeals") is quoted as saying: si calculi error in sententia esse dicatur, appellare necesse non est: veluti si iudex ita pronuntiaverit: "cum constet titium seio ex illa specie quinquaginta, item ex illa specie viginti quinque debere, idcirco lucium titium seio centum condemno": nam quoniam error computationis est, nec appellare necesse est et citra provocationem corrigitur. sed et si huius quaestionis iudex sententiam centum confirmaverit, si quidem ideo, quod quinquaginta et viginti quinque fieri centum putaverit, adhuc idem error computationis est nec appellare necesse est: si vero ideo, quoniam et alias species viginti quinque fuisse dixerit, appellationi locus est. Translation from Samuel P. Scott, 1932: If an error in the calculation is alleged to exist in the decision, it is not necessary to appeal, for instance, if the judge decides as follows: "As it is proved that Titius owes Seius fifty sesterces for such-and-such an article, and also twenty-five for another; therefore I hold that Lucius Titius shall pay Seius a hundred sesterces;" because, as the mistake is one of computation, it is not necessary to appeal, and it can be corrected without doing so. If, however, the judge of this question should render a decision for a hundred sesterces, for the reason that he thought that fifty and twenty-five made a hundred, still, the same mistake is one of computation, and it is not necessary to appeal. But when the judge decides that there is another sum of twenty-five sesterces due, there will be ground for appeal. Another maxim for this situation is error calculi non nocet, an error in calculation does no harm. In the Corpus Iuris Civilis, 2.5, a similar formulation is attributed to a ruling from the co-Emperors Diocletian and Maximian, so the same rough time as Macer: errorem calculi ... veritati non adferre praeiudicum, an error in calculation does not prejudice the truth. The "non nocet" phrase can be found in much later sources, such as the 14th century commentary by Baldus de Ubaldis on Justinian. I think that this is a more precise and common term than iudex non calculat for that idea. The cited law is that a judge can correct their own calculational error, to make the outcome accord with the just outcome they had intended. The form iudex non calculat matches this idea for saying that the arithmetical working is not primary, but rather something that is deduced from the decision. This is also a feature of modern law systems, wherein obvious mistakes in court orders can be corrected by the court itself, on application. For the secondary meaning, assessing the strength of arguments rather than their quantity, this is so commonplace that it's hard to identify any particular source. It's certainly an idea we find in Cicero's rhetoric. His Orator, for example, has: The stress of an argument does not always, and in every cause, depend upon similar topics. He will, therefore, exercise his judgment; and not only discover what may be said, but thoroughly examine the force of it. ... An Orator, therefore, should carefully examine each, that he may be able to select with propriety. Otherwise, how can he enlarge upon those which are most pertinent, and dwell upon such as more particularly affect his cause? Cicero is suggesting that we should choose and hone our strongest arguments, not just reel off everything we can think of. Inclusion of weak or irrelevant material may make the overall case weaker, as well as trying the patience of the listener. I've heard similar sentiments from contemporary judges, so it's clearly something we've been struggling with for a couple of thousand years and counting. The phrase "iudex non calculat" does not appear to have much current live use: perhaps mainly jurists disclaiming any interest in figures, using the phrase slightly ironically.	Usually, an attack on the validity or prudence of the underlying order is not a defense to court action to enforce it. Usually, the only exception would be when it was impossible, or practically impossible, to perform the court order for some reason. You could seek to modify the order, but that would be prospective in effect only and usually isn't granted unless there has been a change in circumstances since the original order was entered. You could also bring a motion to set aside judgment (usually this has to be done within six months of entry of an order) on the grounds that this provision was included only due to mistake or irregularities in the process or excusable neglect. But, that only would have only prospective effect.	I've never heard the phrase used this way, and it wouldn't make any sense, anyway; "indemnity" is security against a consequence, so the existence of civil and criminal consequences would be a double non-indemnification. Maybe ask the lecturer for a published example of this usage.	Congratulations, intrepid legal enthusiast or learner! What you'll need A legal dictionary, especially if you're just getting started. If you don't own one, you can try Black's Law Dictionary A little bit of patience and time. Or maybe a lot, depending on the particular case and the particular question you're trying to answer. Maybe a normal dictionary, too. Again, if you don't own one, there's plenty online. Onelook is a dictionary search engine, so it'll search a lot of dictionaries at the same time. Okay, I've got those things, now what? Alright, there's a few things you should know. Firstly, decisions of superior courts are binding only on those inferior courts within the same hierarchy. This means that you can appeal to a higher court so long as it has appellate jurisdiction. Generally, a state (meaning a country) will have a supreme or highest court, with appellate jurisdiction over all other courts - in Australia, this is the High Court of Australia, in the United States, this is the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the United Kingdom, this is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Secondly, decisions of a court are generally binding only on the matter in dispute. For example, if in a case, the matter of whether the police owe a duty of care to citizens in detecting crime, a comment on whether the police had correctly parked their vehicle is not binding - it is called obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta). What we're looking for in a judgement is the ratio decidendi (plural rationes decidendi), which is the reason for the decision. This is what is binding, and would be considered in future decisions. The problem? It's not always easy to tell the ratio from the obiter. Finally, often, the only way to know whether our interpretation of a case is right is to see whether it is applied in a future case, or overruled. Examples, examples! Sure. Let's try something easy to start with. Do product manufacturers owe a duty of care to their customers? Yes. The decision in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 found that product manufacturers - in this case, a ginger beer manufacturer - have a duty of care to ensure their products are safe for use or consumption. Lord Atkin said: The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. Okay, so the answer to this question is yes. How do I verify it? Get the source of the judgement. Without this, you're going to be relying on hearsay. The next best thing is a subsequent judgement that applies the one you're looking for, because if the judgement says what it's supposed to, it'll be mentioned in the subsequent judgement. I've found this one. Decide whether the matter in dispute is actually being decided. In our case, it is. But if I was quoting this from a judgement on whether product manufacturers have an obligation to transfer title for goods supplied on a credit agreement, it wouldn't be binding. Find the quote. If you've been given a quote. Otherwise, grab a cup of tea or coffee and get ready to read. A lot. If you can't find something that says, or means, what it's supposed to, it's probably not accurate. Make sure the judgement hasn't been overruled This is tricky, unless the judgement database you're using has a way of searching it. Most do. In any case, it's much like trying to prove a negative. In fact, it's exactly that. But always check whether the judgement has been overturned on appeal. Make sure the judgement hasn't been obsoleted by statute Again, this is tricky. It's proving a negative, again. And trying to find statute might be an answer for another time. Is that it? Pretty much, I think. These are at least the main points. There's a whole laundry list of things you shouldn't do with judgements, but they're more about reasoning than legal principles. It's a skill you can really only develop by using, and I'm constantly practising myself. Many discussions about cases are precisely about what their effect is. Yes, the decisions and orders are usually pretty clear-cut - for example, the decision is that the manufacturer has a duty of care, and the orders are for damages and costs to be paid. But what it means beyond that can be murky. Luckily for us, judges have become better at writing their judgements so that others can understand. Also, for more important cases, where the entire country, or world, is watching, others will interpret it for you - consider Obergefell v Hodges, for example. Not everyone can be trusted, but everyone, taken together, is a much more trustworthy source than just one person. In the end, there's not a mathematical formula for determining what judgements mean. There's some interpretation involved, some judgement. There's not always going to be one judgement that's enough to prove your matter. I'm struggling to end this post neatly so I'll just finish it with a cliff-	Lots of reasons The citing case may be in a higher court than the cited case but might not actually add anything. You always go for the highest authority on record. From time to time, a case makes a big review and consolidation of all the case law on a particular point. It is then easier to cite that case rather than half a dozen cases that it summarised. More recent cases are worth more, all else being equal. A case from 2002 shows the law hasn’t changed since the decision in 1997. Repeated precedents are worth more, all else being equal. By using the citing case you get the weight of two judges (or more for multi-judge appeals) for the price of one. Some judges write better than others. Citing their cases may better clarify the point.	This was asked and answered by KPD on the Politics stackexchange. This issue came up in a decision from an appeals court, with a judge dying before the opinion was released, leading to the following SCOTUS opinion. The short of the answer: that Judge's vote is voided. If the result of negating the deceased Justice's vote is a 4-4 tie, then the usual procedure for a 4-4 tie is invoked, which is addressed in the Q&A you link. Of course this assumes that SCOTUS will apply this to themselves, but the issue appears to be non-controversial, as it was a fairly recent decision with no dissents noted. So this assumption seems safe.	A judge can ask any question of anyone in their courtroom. A judge can make any comments they like in their courtroom. They're a judge! What they can't do is exhibit bias or the apprehension of bias or take irrelevant matters into account in making judicial decisions. The judge may have a wide and deep knowledge of driving conditions in India, however, that is irrelevant to an alleged speeding offence in the United States. If it appears that the judge took this into account in their decision then there are grounds for an appeal. Similarly, if it appears that the fact that you are Indian and the judge displays bias against (or towards) Indians then that is also grounds for an appeal. An appeal court will look at the entire circumstances of the case to determine if the decision should be overturned including what was said, what the judge decided and the reasons for the decision in the written judgement (if any).	Its difficult to tell without seeing the exact paperwork, and the exact meaning of without prejudice varies by jurisdiction (I think UK is the same as here in NZ though). If an agreement is reached through communications marked "without prejudice" it should be valid in court to the extent that it shows an agreement was reached and what the agreement was (but the court will not generally look at the documents marked without prejudice for other reasons – e.g. admissions made – if no agreement is reached). There are a couple of other relevant things to mention – although not strictly part of your question: Lawyers are officers of the court, and have duties to the court, which include acting ethically. So, provided it's a reputable law firm, it is reasonable to (somewhat) trust their solicitors in procedural matters. My understanding is that courts encourage anything that will help settle a matter out of court – hence the whole idea of "without prejudice" letters being valid. I believe that the court will uphold an agreement reached through communication of without prejudice emails as it's in their interests. If you have these kinds of concerns, you can raise them with their solicitor, suggesting that you would prefer the final document to not be without prejudice, even if it only refers to the matter and agreement, without sensitive stuff. I imagine they would be only to happy to oblige, as they can bill their client for another letter!
Dodging police bullet illegal? Would dodging, or otherwise itentionally avoiding, being shot by the police be considered resisting arrest? Mainly regarding U.S. law, but interested if any other law adresses this.	Prior to Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), common law allowed police to use deadly force to effect the arrest of a person suspected of a felony. Even though SCOTUS there held that such a practice violates Fourth Amendment civil rights, I was surprised to find that in some states it is still lawful for police to use deadly force to effect an arrest! Let us examine the most extreme case, which is that the police can legally shoot at you to effect your arrest. As explained here, you are always allowed to resist "excessive force." If you make it to court, these qualifications (e.g., "necessary" and "excessive") are ultimately decided based on what a "reasonable person" would have believed in the situation. So if a cop shoots at you, and you "dodge" the bullet, it is possible for you both to be found not guilty of any crime. I.e., the cop can be found to have acted "reasonably" because he believed you were a violent felon and shooting you was the only way to stop you. And you can be found to have acted "reasonably" because you believed you were being subject to excessive force. While this is an interesting hypothetical, in practice of course by the time a cop is shooting at you you are almost certainly going to be charged with resisting arrest. Or, if the cop fired in self-defense (rather than to effect an arrest) you will be charged with a number of far more serious crimes (starting with felony assault, reckless endangerment, and going on from there...).	How far can one go to defend him/herself from an unreasonable search and seizures, in the same sense of one defending him/herself from an unlawful arrest? Not very far. Basically all you can do is try to talk the officer out of it. He thinks he sees evidence in sight... If the police officer reasonably believes that there is evidence of a crime in plain view, then the officer can proceed to seize the evidence. If the property owner tries to use force to prevent the seizure, then the officer can arrest the property owner. ... the property owner ... highly believes there is no possible way he could have seen the evidence from outside his property. It doesn't matter what the owner believes (unless the owner can somehow convince the officer before the search). What matters is what the court believes. But the owner cannot bring the matter to court before the officer enters the shed. If the officer insists on entering the shed and the owner can establish in court that the officer couldn't see the evidence and that there was no other lawful basis for a warrantless search or seizure, then the evidence will be inadmissible. The owner might also be able to prevail in a civil suit for the violation of civil rights, but the bar for such a suit is very high, so the likelihood is very small.	The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law."	In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?	There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.	There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court.	tl;dr According to the ACLU, who are experts on this… yes, it is perfectly legal for you to refuse to provide documentation or ID to border patrol, and your refusal cannot be used as a basis for reasonable suspicion of an immigration violation. The ACLU has a very helpful guide to your rights when questioned at Border Patrol checkpoints, whether fixed or random. Emphasis in these excerpts is mine: Refusing to answer CBP’s questions may result in the agent persisting with questioning. If this occurs, you should ask if you are being detained. Another way to ask this is to say, “am I free to leave?” If the agent wishes to actually detain you — in other words, you are not free to leave — the agent needs at least reasonable suspicion that you committed an immigration violation to do so. As I understand it from other legal sources, this means that the agent must have a reasonable suspicion that you are: not a US citizen and that you have violated immigration law And furthermore: You do not have to answer questions about your immigration status. You may simply say that you do not wish to answer those questions. If you choose to remain silent, the agent will likely ask you questions for longer, but your silence alone is not enough to support probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest, detain, or search you or your belongings. … As before, when you are at a checkpoint, you can remain silent, inform the agent that you decline to answer their questions or tell the agent you will only answer questions in the presence of an attorney. In the YouTube videos of checkpoint refusals, you'll see lots of folks declining to answer questions or stating that they will only answer questions from law enforcement in the presence of an attorney. If you are held at the checkpoint for more than brief questioning, you can ask the agent if you are free to leave. If they say no, they need reasonable suspicion to continue holding you. Lots of this in the checkpoint refusals too. The drivers ask if they're being detained and/or if they're free to leave. If you watch closely you'll probably see that many of the Border Patrol agents avoid answering these questions — because they know that they don't have sufficient suspicion to detain the drivers. You can ask the agent to tell you their basis for probable cause, and they should be able to articulate their suspicion. This is also seen in some of the videos. There's a very important caveat about when you are required to provide documentation (other than at the border): A limited exception does exist: for people who do have permission to be in the U.S. for a specific reason and for, usually, a limited amount of time (a “nonimmigrant” on a visa, for example), the law does require you to provide information about your immigration status if asked. While you can still choose to remain silent or decline a request to produce your documents, people in this category should be aware that they could face arrest consequences. If you want to know whether you fall into this category, you should consult an attorney. … If an agent asks you for documents, what you need to provide differs depending on your immigration status. U.S. citizens do not have to carry proof of citizenship on their person if they are in the United States. If you have valid immigration documents and are over the age of 18, the law does require you to carry those documents on you. If you are asked by an immigration agent to produce them, it is advisable to show the documents to the agent or you risk being arrested. If you are an immigrant without documents, you can decline the officer’s request. An agent may likely ask you more questions if you decline a request. No matter what category you fall into, never provide false documents to immigration officials. If you are a citizen you have no obligation to provide documents to establish this; it is not illegal for you to refuse. If you are undocumented, you do not have any obligation to provide documents; it is not illegal for you to refuse. If you are a non-citizen and do have valid documents, you are required to provide them — apparently, it is illegal for you not to do so. So if you're a non-citizen who's legally present in the USA for a temporary term (e.g. tourist, student, business trip, etc.) then you are required to show documents proving this. But if you're undocumented you can — and should!! — do what you see in the videos, and refuse to provide documentation. The Arizona ACLU has a helpful printable sheet with additional pithy points: You may be asked where you were born, how you entered the U.S. or how long you’ve been here. You don’t ever have to answer those questions. Your responses may be used to detain and deport you. … NEVER FLEE A CHECKPOINT!	Whether or not a war between political entities can result from some action is completely political and strategic, and not legal. The specific incident is probably legal, given US and international law regarding military action. Unless the order was self-evidently unlawful there is no possibility of arrest and prosecution under US law, however there might be a framework for legal action by Iran, if e.g. a drone operator were to fall into Iranian hands. The specifics of the order are not generally known, though we know that DoD states that this was due to a presidential order. This article discusses targeted killing from a legal perspective. In the context of war, killing is legal though not entirely unregulated. There was a failed attempt to sue the US in the case Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, which involved a targeted killing of a US citizen involved in planning terrorist attacks, a suit which was dismissed. One problem is that the suit "failed to state a 4th Amendment claim", and also failed to state a 5th Amendment due process claim since Al–Aulaqi's deaths was unanticipated. The court notes that a Bivens claim allows damage action against a federal officer for violation of clearly-established constitutional rights. However, No case has discussed precisely whether a plaintiff can proceed on a Bivens action that claims deprivation of life without due process based on the overseas killing by United States officials of a U.S. citizen deemed to be an active enemy. In the discussion, the question arises whether special circumstances counsel hesitation (Doe v. Rumsfeld and citations therein), which the Doe court notes would "require a court to delve into the military's policies", and they will not do that lightly. All of this is about US citizens. Soleimani was not a US citizen.
Is the Scarborough Fair Melody Really in the Public Domain? According to Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Scarborough-Fair-Melody.png the melody to the tune Scarborough Fair (which had been popularized in the 1960s by Simon and Garfunkel) is in the public domain. Is this claim correct; and if so, can someone today write a new set of lyrics to accompany the basis of the said melody, and publish it?	Yes Both melody and lyrics source back to the middle ages, as for instance described here. The difficulty could be to make sure you rely your derived work on a variant that is really in the public domain. E.g. if you use notes or lyrics from the Simon & Garfunkel version and derive from there, you might violate their copyright.	If users were to copy dictionary definitions, for instance Oxford or Cambridge) and make the word lists public, is it a copyright infringement? If the dictionary entries are protected by copyright then your user has infringed that copyright by posting the dictionary entries. Am I responsible for this activity? No. But you may be responsible for removing it if you get a request. Can dictionary owners charge me against copyright issue? If you follow the procedures outlines in the DMCA you can be protected from liability.	A GPS trace of a car's path, on its own, is unlikely to be covered by copyright in the first place. It is primarily made up of facts (the locations of roads and lanes), and there is no creativity involved in its creation. A database of facts may be protected by copyright as a compilation if there is some amount of creativity in how it is assembled, but this does not extend any protection to the individual contents of the database (cf. Feist v. Rural).	Please Note: This was written before the title change of this question and may no longer be applicable According to the Harvard website: In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 US 340 (1991) the United States Supreme Court held that copyright does not extend to a mere compilation of facts. In this case, it was a telephone directory much the same as the one in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the Court also ruled that something more than simple "sweat of the brow" labor was required before copyright protection would ensue, with some modicum of authorial originality necessary. Accordingly, it was held in Feist that copyright did not extend to a telephone directory, no matter how laborious a task its compilation was. The decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) is highly significant, therefore, in that it permits copyright or quasi-copyright protection to be extended to non-copyrightable material through the use of contract. One would have to consider each meta tag independently. For example, the "description" tag could by copyrightable since it is written for more than just the 'facts', such as a subtle advert for the site that is more than an objective description. However the 'og:type' would not be copyrightable since it would just be considered a fact. Now, if you are using it on another website and sourcing it properly, you could probably use it under "Fair Use" Uses That Are Generally Fair Uses Subject to some general limitations discussed later in this article, the following types of uses are usually deemed fair uses: Criticism and comment -- for example, quoting or excerpting a work in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment. News reporting -- for example, summarizing an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report. Research and scholarship -- for example, quoting a short passage in a scholarly, scientific, or technical work for illustration or clarification of the author's observations. Nonprofit educational uses -- for example, photocopying of limited portions of written works by teachers for classroom use. Parody -- that is, a work that ridicules another, usually well-known, work by imitating it in a comic way. A copyright would exist on the image. One would have to know what license currently applies to the image to know for sure, however, the "Fair Use" to copyright would still apply. With Fair Use, the entity type that uses the image is important. There is much more leniency when a non-profit uses copyrighted information than when the information is used in commercial activity. (With, of course, more exceptions.)	Apparently Such Files May be Distributes or Sold Section 5.e of the Google APIs Terms of Service reads: e. Prohibitions on Content Unless expressly permitted by the content owner or by applicable law, you will not, and will not permit your end users or others acting on your behalf to, do the following with content returned from the APIs: Scrape, build databases, or otherwise create permanent copies of such content, or keep cached copies longer than permitted by the cache header; Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of, sell, lease, lend, convey, distribute, publicly display, or sublicense to any third party; Misrepresent the source or ownership; or Remove, obscure, or alter any copyright, trademark, or other proprietary rights notices; or falsify or delete any author attributions, legal notices, or other labels of the origin or source of material It might seem that 5.e.2 prohibits the suggested use. But if the text is in fact in the public domain,"applicable law" (that is, copyright law) permits you, or anyone, to "Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of" or otherwise use the content. Thus 5.e.2 does not apply. Points 3 and 4 would seem to indicate that the source, including title and author information, must be included or preserved in the output files, but seems to be the only relevant restriction that applies. Response to Comment A comment by user Brian Drake questions the theory of this answer, stating: The most you can say is that copyright law does not prohibit certain conduct (and even that is not clear: just because the text is in the public domain does not necessarily mean that the audio is in the public domain); this does not mean that copyright law expressly permits that conduct. US Copyright law does not define what constitutes the public domain. Rather it defines what is protected by copyright, and specifies some cases in whch a work is not protected. (For nexample, 17 USC 105 provides tht works of the US Federal Government are not protected.) Anything not included in the protection of copyright is in the public domain. This has been confirmed by many cour cases and legal writings. Law generally follows the rule "Anything not forbidden is allowed." Audio as Derivitive Work An audio recording of a person reading a text aloud would be a derivative work of that text, and would normally have its own copyright, if created lawfully. (If the recording was of a text protected by copyright, made without permission and outside of fair use, it was not made lawfully and the infringer has no copyright in the recording at all.) But US courts have held that a work created by a mechanical or automatic process, including many computer programs, is not an "original work of authorship" and thus is not protected by copyright at all, and is thus in the Public Domain. The case of the "Monkey Selfie" is on point. ("Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, § 313.2" (PDF). United States Copyright Office. 22 December 2014. p. 22. "To qualify as a work of 'authorship' a work must be created by a human being.... Works that do not satisfy this requirement are not copyrightable. The Office will not register works produced by nature, animals, or plants." Moreover, if the audio were protected by copyright, it would presumably be owned by the person who ran the program, and 17 USC 106 specifically grants the copyright owner permission to distribute copies. Sources The Wikipedia article "Public Domain" reads in relevant part (citations omitted): The public domain consists of all the creative work to which no exclusive intellectual property rights apply. Those rights may have expired,[1] been forfeited, expressly waived, or may be inapplicable. ... As rights vary by country and jurisdiction, a work may be subject to rights in one country and be in the public domain in another. Some rights depend on registrations on a country-by-country basis, and the absence of registration in a particular country, if required, gives rise to public-domain status for a work in that country. ... Definitions of the boundaries of the public domain in relation to copyright, or intellectual property more generally, regard the public domain as a negative space; that is, it consists of works that are no longer in copyright term or were never protected by copyright law. According to James Boyle this definition underlines common usage of the term public domain and equates the public domain to public property and works in copyright to private property. However, the usage of the term public domain can be more granular, including for example uses of works in copyright permitted by copyright exceptions. Such a definition regards work in copyright as private property subject to fair-use rights and limitation on ownership "How Can I Use Copyright-Free Works (in the Public Domain)?" by Nolo Press reads: Copyright law gives creators certain exclusive rights. These rights include the exclusive ability to copy, distribute, and perform the copyrighted work. But copyright is not infinite. Rather, it provides copyright holders with protections for a limited duration. When a work becomes available for use without permission from a copyright owner, it is said to be "in the public domain." Most works enter the public domain because their copyrights have expired. The Legal Information Institute (LII) article "public domain" reads: The public domain includes every creative work that is no longer protected by a copyright, trademark, or patent. Creative works that are no longer protected are owned by the general public rather than the original creator. As such, the work is free to be copied, performed, or otherwise used by anyone. "Copyright and Scholarship: Public Domain" from Boston College Libraries reads in relevant part: "Public domain" works are not protected by copyright. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. An important caveat regarding public domain material is that collections, new editions, and derivative works of public domain material may all be protected by copyright. With collections, an author could collect public domain works in a book or display them on a website, and the collection as a whole could be protected by copyright, even though individual works within it are not. "Welcome to the Public Domain" (Stanford libraries) reads in relevant part: The term “public domain” refers to creative materials that are not protected by intellectual property laws such as copyright, trademark, or patent laws. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. Wikipedia article "Monkey selfie copyright dispute" "A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos" (AP) reads in relevant part: A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos, a federal judge said Wednesday. U.S. District Judge William Orrick said in federal court in San Francisco that "while Congress and the president can extend the protection of law to animals as well as humans, there is no indication that they did so in the Copyright Act." NARUTO, a Crested Macaque, by and through his Next Friends, People forthe Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., v. DAVID JOHN SLATER; BLURB, INC., ; WILDLIFE PERSONALITIES, LTD." (Ninth Circuit full opinion April 23, 2018 No. 16-15469, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-04324-WHO) reads in part: We must determine whether a monkey may sue humans, corporations, and companies for damages and injunctive relief arising from claims of copyright infringement. Our court’s precedent requires us to conclude that the monkey’s claim has standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Nonetheless, we conclude that this monkey—and all animals, since they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court	The burden rests on A to determine that the work is not protected by copyright, and there is no fool-proof registry where you can look up a particular work. One form of proof would be finding a copy of the song published in the 18th century. It might be possible to establish that the work is no longer protected using expert testimony (e.g. a musicologist who could establish that the song existed at some early point in time). As an example, the song "Misirlou" was registered in the US by Nikos Roubanis in 1941, though the song was already in existence in the 1920's, and there was no legal challenge to his copyright. From the legal perspective, that is who has the copyright, except in Greece where copyright is shared with Michalis Patrinos. One might be able to challenge a copyright registration if it is proven that the song could not have been composed by the registrant (establishing via manuscript evidence that it was written 100 years earlier). There is no way to advance-test the legal strength of your evidence that the song was created long enough ago, and if a work is registered, that makes the job even harder.	As the question says the "Fugue in A Major" by Shostakovich is not in the public domain. The work was published in 1950, and so would not be PD under US law, and Shostakovich died in 1975, and so his works would not be PD in countries using a life+50, life+70, or longer term. Therefore, simply "making some changes" would be the creation of a derivative work and would be copyright infringement in and of itself, even if that work was not published or distributed. If a relatively short segment of the fuge was used, it might be considered a "fair use" under US copyright law, or perhaps a "fair dealing " in the laws of those countries that recognize this exception to copyright. But that is a very fact-intensive determination; it depends on the amount used, the manner and purpose for which it is used, and the harm, if any, to the market for the original work. One can never be absolutely sure that a use is a fair use until a court rules that it is. A two minute excerpt is fairly substantial, and might well not be held to be a fair use. Of course, you could seek permission from the Shostakovich estate (or whoever owns the copyright on the fugue). They might or might not grant it, and might or might not demand a fee. (As another answers mentions, there may be some question if the works of Shostakovich are protected by copyright under US law.)	As the quote in your question notes (albeit in contrapositive form), Asimov's fiction may be made legally available for free download on the net with the permission of his estate. It is either that case that Princeton University's physics department (or whatever individual person or agency put up the story online) has obtained permission from Asimov's estate to distribute the story on their website, or they simply distribute it without legal permission, and Asimov's estate has not taken legal action to have it removed, which they may or may not choose to do in the future. Consider also that the Princeton distribution does not appear to have been meant to be in any way public: looking one directory level up (Princeton University Physics 115A and B: Physics for Future Leaders) shows a course overview with syllabus and lecture notes, without any apparent link to the story. Probably, it was put online for use exclusively by students taking that particular class, and the professor(s) just didn't put any controls to stop it from being accessible to anyone who knew the URL. This doesn't really change that fact that its public accessibility is, strictly speaking, copyright infringement, but it may be a favorable factor toward a finding that distribution outside of the class was innocent infringement, which can lessen (or, rarely, nullify) the penalty. (And it may be quite possible that distribution within the class was defensible under fair use/dealing, which considers educational context as a favorable factor.)
Is an 'MP3/MP4 Player' that cannot play .mp4 files, "misdescribed" under the Sales of Goods Act 1979? We recently purchased an mp3 player from argos (908/2218), which is labelled as "Philips SA4VBE08KN/12 GoGear VIBE 8GB MP3/MP4 Player". This item is excluded from their 30-day return policy. We'd like to return it, because it doesn't support the .mp4 file format. Given that it's described as an MP4 player, can we argue that it's been misdescribed? If the shop staff don't agree, what's our recourse? Is it worth pursuing in small claims court?	It says it's an "MP4 player" but it doesn't play MP4s. This seems rather straightforward to me---assuming it really doesn't play any kind of MP4 at all. I would agree you could go back to the shop armed with the appropriate wording from the SoG Act and state your case to the manager. If the front desk staff are unhelpful don't argue with them but rather ask to speak to the duty manager. No doubt the staff will talk about their thirty day return policy, but you are not interested in this; since you are relying on your statutory rights. If that is not successful, write directly to the head office. Keep your letter short, neutral and with no emotion whatsoever. Describe the facts, include proof of purchase, and request your money back. Argos is a large shop, they will pay you off ("as a gesture of good will") rather than fight a pointless claim in the SCC. However taking an action to the SCC is not necessarily free so you might yourselves not feel it worth it.	In the Netherlands, this qualifies as a deceptive trade practice (misleidende handelspraktijk) and is therefore directly illegal. It's likely also an unfair trade practice, (oneerlijke handelspraktijk) as the claim appears intended for end consumers. This means that the seller cannot count on the consumer knowing anythong about stuffase. It is a dutch implementation of EU directive 2005/29/EG, so similar laws apply in other EU countries. But the illegal per se part might vary.	You are asking the wrong question. It should be: When you have downloaded the content and metadata, what are you allowed to do with it and what is forbidden? Somebody owns the copyright to the text and images in the thumbnail. This could be the operator of the third party website, or that site has licensed the content from yet another party. You haven't licensed it from anybody. So you can watch the content in accordance with the TOS, and your computer can evaluate the metadata to do it, but you cannot display it on your own site. Details will differ between jurisdictions, of course. You might also be held responsible for illegal content in the thumb you generate. Follow-up: There seems to be some question of what 'thumbnail' and 'card' mean in this context. This answer assumes a somewhat scaled-down representation of the content of the entire page, not just a collection of actual metadata like content length and expiry.	The first thing that has to be done (in court, or via lawyer-to-lawyer communication) is that The Company has to prove that they own the copyright. If they accomplish that, you can defend yourself by providing proof of a license to download and redistribute. From what I can tell, you cannot directly prove that, since the rights-holder did not give you the license. The issue is that a third party cannot impose a license on a work simply by putting it out there with a file that claims to be a license from the artist. So this brings in the Free Music Archive: they presumably have some evidence that the rights holder did indeed grant the alleged license, and may be able to provide proof. Your argument may be credible, in the sense that you had a good-faith belief that the item was so licensed, and the website would provide a basis for concluding that that belief is reasonable. If the work was licensed, then the some rights holder would know that, but not necessarily the current one. Assume the artist made a recording, transferred the rights to Company A, who later sold the rights to Company B who is now coming after you. Artist may have licensed it when it was his, and forgot to tell A. A may have licensed it when they sold the license to B. Artist may have improperly licensed it after he sold the work to A (under the "I wrote it, I have the right to do whatever I want" non-legal theory). A might have improperly licensed the work after selling the right to B (maybe by mistakenly including it in a package deal, i.e. via bookkeeping error, rather than ignorance of the law). Or, they may simply have forgotten. If this is a DMCA takedown notice, the notice-giver could just be abusing the system. But we don't know how you were contacted, so I'll leave DMCA out of this for now.	It may be illegal under product labelling regulations that apply to that kind of product (or under a general deceptive trade practices act), but even then, only if you are interpreting the numbers, whose meaning is not clearly spelled out, correctly. But, to be actionable as fraud it must, among other things, be a misrepresentation as to a material fact (which if the goods, such as cordless drills, are not perishable it probably isn't) and the recipient of the misrepresentation must have justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation (which is necessary not true in the case of a representation that it was made in December 2018 on a product sold no later than July of 2018). It is also not entirely clear that this is a "made on" date. It could refer, for example, to the the twelfth batch or lot or shipment of products made in 2018, and not to the month of December, or it could refer to a product made in 2018 at factory number 12. @NateEldredge in the comments also makes the plausible observation that it could be a week number which is a common system in manufacturing which would put it in a more reasonable March 2018 time frame. You probably shouldn't do anything, because you haven't been harmed by this cryptic string of numbers embossed on the product, and even if you were, your damages would not be worth the time or money involved to pursue it as anything other than part of a class action lawsuit.	Both. The user made an infringing copy with the upload, the developer did with the download. Further the ToS between the app owner and the user will not protect them from being sued by the owner of the copyright. They don't have any ToS with them.	For your example of items with Marvel characters on them for sale by people and companies not licensed by Marvel, Redbubble clearly states that We ask, rather we beg, that you remember this when you are posting work on Redbubble. If you make sure that all the works you upload consist of your very own, original ideas and are not infringing on the intellectual property or publicity rights of another... (from https://help.redbubble.com/hc/en-us/articles/201579195 ) and further, Redbubble has full contact information for the submission of Notice and Takedown Reports by each real trademark owner. There are many individuals who upload products which use unlicensed artwork in violation of trademarks, and Redbubble acknowledges this and gives recourse to the license holder to inform them so they can remove the items. It's not a perfect system, but Redbubble it seems makes every effort to help police their market. ( Teepublic has a very clear policy statement, too: https://www.teepublic.com/copyright-policy ) Many companies - such as Marvel - employ agents to regularly check such websites and issue takedown demands to the sites; the sites in turn remove the products, and in some instances, ban the individual from using the site again. In the case of Amazon, there can be two types of products sold that use trademarked artwork and characters: items sold by legitimate businesses that have license agreements with the trademark owners and who have the products sold by Amazon itself; and items sold on the Amazon marketplace by individuals who open Amazon Marketplace accounts themselves and don't have licenses. Amazon will be sure to check the products they sell; they will have a takedown notices system for their marketplace vendors. eBay is somewhat the same way; there is a mix of individuals and businesses on eBay, but eBay doesn't operate an umbrella sell/ship by eBay, like Amazon. It's kind of a whack-a-mole situation on the Interwebs. How much time/money does a company spend to chase down trademark infringement? Is it worth going to court for persistent violators? (These are, for the most part, civil cases, not criminal). Violators can always open a new account on sites such as Redbubble and eBay under a different name. And it starts all over again.	Since you bought these online the Consumer Contract Regulations are going to be in effect here (if the price of the goods was over £42 anyway), (legislation) Where your cutting the tags off and wearing them outside for an hour comes into play is that would probably be considered "excessive handling" and they might be able to make a deduction from the amount of the refund. Your business can make a deduction from the value of the goods if you consider the customer has handled the goods excessively. You can’t deduct monies from the refund simply because the goods have been removed from the packaging or because the goods have been tried on or checked. In essence, distance selling purchasers are entitled to handle goods in the same way that they would in a normal retail store. That therefore includes touching the item or trying it on. Since no retail store is going to let you cut the tags from a pair of shoes and walk outside for an hour in them I'd say that test is probably met here. How much can they deduct? As the CCR puts it (emphasis mine): (9) If (in the case of a sales contract) the value of the goods is diminished by any amount as a result of handling of the goods by the consumer beyond what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods, the trader may recover that amount from the consumer, up to the contract price. Which is likely where the "saleable condition" aspect is coming from - if they aren't in a condition where the retailer can sell them on they've essentially lost their full value. If the retailer makes returned goods available for sale on the site at reduced prices (like the "Amazon warehouse" deals) then a deduction of the difference in sale price between that and full retail is more likely.
Is the manufacturer responsible for replacing my faulty purchase after 28 days? I bought electronic goods from an online retailer. A fault appeared after a month-a-half that prevented the goods from working at all. The way I understand the Sales of Goods Act is that the onus is on the retailer to prove the fault or repair/replace the item. The retailer have referred me to the manufacturer because the fault developed outside of 28 days of purchase. 1) Is this correct/legal? 2) If I sent it to the manufacturer for repair/replacement, how would that affect my rights?	No. It's the retailer's responsibility to give you your money back. From s14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: (2) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied term that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality. (2A) For the purposes of this Act, goods are of satisfactory quality if they meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances. (2B) For the purposes of this Act, the quality of goods includes their state and condition and the following (among others) are in appropriate cases aspects of the quality of goods— (a) fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied, (b) appearance and finish, (c) freedom from minor defects, (d) safety, and (e) durability. If your goods are faulty after a month and a half, it would appear that the goods are not of satisfactory quality as they lack durability - s14(2B)(e) above. The Sale of Goods act is very clear that your contract is with the seller. You have the right to terminate that contract, because s14 is always a condition if you're a consumer. Furthermore, the seller cannot exclude liability for breach of any terms regarding the quality of goods, and specifically, they can't exclude themselves from liability under s14 of the Sale of Goods Act. All of this is found in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. So the answer is: you appear to have a reasonable case for returning the goods to the retailer, and they are required, by law, to give you their money back. If you sent the goods back to the manufacturer, those rights shouldn't be affected, on the basis that UCTA states that those rights cannot be excluded. (Disclaimer: this shouldn't be taken as legal advice, merely advice given peer to peer. In your situation, that's what I would argue myself.)	"Lemon laws" are about new cars and manufacturing defects. Used vehicles are sold "as is", except that dealers are obligated to offer a 30 or 60 day warranty that the vehicle will continue to function. Using the term "owner" suggests that this is not a dealership sale. Generally speaking, you are out of luck, except for the verbal add-on to the sales agreement. If there is no written agreement, just a verbal contract and exchange of money for truck, you may be able to enforce the contract in regular court. The prospects decrease if there is a written agreement that does not include the money-back guarantee, and become effectively zero if there is a clause that says "This is the whole agreement, the car is sold as-is". Assuming there is no written agreement, then you and perhaps the third party would testify as to the money-back guarantee, the seller would testify that there was no such guarantee (or that you misunderstood what he said), and the court would decide which version of the story is more believable.	Your main and probably sole legal recourse is a lawsuit. The basis for suing the store would be breach of contract. You pay them some money, they provide some goods. They failed to provide those goods – so far. The contract might say something about when the goods would be delivered, but otherwise the requirement would be "in reasonable time" (they can't wait 10 years to deliver). Especially for custom orders, two months is not unreasonable time. They might have run afoul of the FTC's Mail or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule, §435.2, so read that section to see whether any of those circumstances apply to you.	No Overview There is no general rule requiring a seller to determine the mental condition of a buyer. However, if a seller knows or has good reason to know that a buyer does in fact had dementia or some other mental problem, and is not or may well not be able to understand the nature of the deal or the reasons why it is or is not a good bargain, if the seller took advantage of the buyer's mental condition, then the seller may be liable. Also, if the buyer's condition is such that the buyer is deemed not to be capable of properly entering into a contract, that is the buyer lacks the capacity to contract, then the contract may well be void from teh4 start. The Video The video linked in the question shows a man confronting a salesman who, he alleges, sold two houshold doors to his mother for a total of just under 6,000 pounds UK. The son claims that it was obvious that his mother was impaired. He claims that the only problem was that one door had a broken handle and latch, which could easily be repaired for 50 pounds. He claims that the salesman falsely states that the doors were "not safe" without mentioning that the one with a problem could easily be repaired, and need not be replaced. He also claims that the salesman took checks in payment, in spite of the printed terms on the invoice saying that no payment was due until after installation. He says repeatedly that the salesman "pressured" his mother into making this purchase, and describes it as "robbery". No proof is shown in the video, and no court decision is refereed to. I express no vieo as to whether the claims of the son in the video are accurate. But I do discuss situations where similar claims are accurate. Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (UTR) It sees that a sales agent acting similarly to the one accused in the video might have committed unfair practices and thus offenses under the UTR, specifically "aggressive selling", "misleading statements", and "misleading omissions". Under the UK Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (UTR) regulation 3, specifically 3(3) and 3(4): (3) A commercial practice is unfair if— (a) it contravenes the requirements of professional diligence; and (b) it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to the product. (4) A commercial practice is unfair if— (a) it is a misleading action under the provisions of regulation 5; (b) it is a misleading omission under the provisions of regulation 6; (c) it is aggressive under the provisions of regulation 7; or (d) it is listed in Schedule 1. UTR regulation 5 provides in relevant part: 5.—(1) A commercial practice is a misleading action if it satisfies the conditions in either paragraph (2) or paragraph (3). (2) A commercial practice satisfies the conditions of this paragraph— (a)if it contains false information and is therefore untruthful in relation to any of the matters in paragraph (4) or if it or its overall presentation in any way deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer in relation to any of the matters in that paragraph, even if the information is factually correct; and (b) it causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise UTR Regulation 7 on Aggressive commercial practices provides in relevant part: 7.—(1) A commercial practice is aggressive if, in its factual context, taking account of all of its features and circumstances— (a) it significantly impairs or is likely significantly to impair the average consumer's freedom of choice or conduct in relation to the product concerned through the use of harassment, coercion or undue influence; and (b) it thereby causes or is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise. (2) In determining whether a commercial practice uses harassment, coercion or undue influence account shall be taken of— ... (c) the exploitation by the trader of any specific misfortune or circumstance of such gravity as to impair the consumer's judgment, of which the trader is aware, to influence the consumer's decision with regard to the product; UTR regulation 8 provides in relevant part: 8.—(1) A trader is guilty of an offence if— (a) he knowingly or recklessly engages in a commercial practice which contravenes the requirements of professional diligence under regulation 3(3)(a); and (b) the practice materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to the product under regulation 3(3)(b). UTR schedule 1(12) describes as unfair: Making a materially inaccurate claim concerning the nature and extent of the risk to the personal security of the consumer or his family if the consumer does not purchase the product. UTR regulations 9 through 12 make unfair practices, as described in regulations 3 through 7 and schedule 1, offenses punishable by fine or imprisonment. These might well apply to the practices alleged in the video linked in the question Financial Conduct Authority A Guidance from the UK Financial Conduct Authority is available online. This seems to apply more to sales of financial products (e.g. investments) than physical goods such as doors. It is also a draft, not a final regulation. But it more specifically deals with people vulnerable due to metal issues, and might show the trend of regulation on such issues in the UK. 2.1 In our Approach to Consumers we define a vulnerable consumer as ‘someone who, due to their personal circumstances, is especially susceptible to detriment, particularly when a firm is not acting with appropriate levels of care’ (as presented in our Occasional Paper 8 on Consumer Vulnerability) ... 2.14 (g) Exposure to mis-selling – vulnerable consumers may be more likely to fall victim to pressure selling, or be provided with the wrong information about potential products or services by staff who do not understand their circumstances. People with mental health problems, for example, are more likely to have mistakenly bought a product on credit and 3 in 4 of those felt pressured into doing so. 2.15 We expect the firms we regulate to treat customers, including vulnerable customers, fairly. Our previous work has shown that not all firms treat vulnerable consumers fairly, and those consumers face a significant risk of harm. Vulnerability is, therefore, a key priority for the FCA Conclusion I have not found any UK law or regulation that requires firms or people doing general business to determine if a potential customer suffers from Alzheimer's, dementia, or any similar mental issue. However, taking advantage of people who exhibit symptoms of such problems might be found to be an unfair practice, and so lead to civil or criminal liability	Theoretically speaking, this is not theft. You are correct in that theft requires specific intent: to permanently deprive someone from the use and enjoyment of one of their lawful possessions. In real life, it is a matter of evidence of course. Saying you were only borrowing can be proven otherwise based on your actions. I should also mention that if you "borrow" something an there were obligations attached to that borroeing (e.g. "you can borrow it but you mustnt use it like this, or you must return it in a week") then failing to abide by those obligations can be sufficient to show intention to deprive. Furthermore "borrowing something" and consuming its entire usefulness for yourself counts as the permanent deprivation of the use of the possession from the owner. E.g. "borrowing" concert tickets and returning them after a concert (see s.6 Theft Act 1968) R v Lloyd, Bhuee & Ali [1985] QB 829 also tells us that the condition of something borrowed once returned may be indicative of whether there was an intention to permanently deprive someone of their rights to property.	Neither The contract is completed when each party has totally fulfilled its obligations under the contract. In this case, it is when the purchaser has consumed or otherwise dealt with the banana to their satisfaction. The vendor has ongoing obligations under the contract until this happens. For example, obligations that the banana is of merchantable quality and fit for purpose. If the purchaser peels the banana and discovers that it is "off" or eats the banana and develops food poisoning then the vendor still has obligations and can be sued under the contract. Yes, I realize that no one is going to sue anyone over a rotten banana but let's assume that "banana" is code for 54km of motorway construction and £1 is actually £1 billion. When is the contract formed? This is not a trivial determination and there are literally hundreds of thousands if not millions of lawsuits that have turned on this exact question. Once the contract is formed its binding on both parties; until then, either can walk away (subject to estoppel) The traditional analysis involves offer and acceptance. In your banana scenario, the shop displaying "Banana's: 50p/each" (it's a fruit shop - they always have unnecessary apostrophes) is not an offer - it is an invitation to treat. An offer is made by Ben placing the banana on the counter and proffering the £1, it is accepted by Sam taking the £1. At this point, the sale is binding on both parties. Ben has fulfilled all his obligations under the contract, Sam still has some. In addition to those discussed above, he owes Ben 50p. Strictly speaking, this is not an obligation under the contract but a debt due and payable. Consumer protection law The proceeding is a strict contract law interpretation - many jurisdictions have consumer protection legislation (and food safety laws for bananas) that impose additional protections and may change the contract law position.	Is there any consumer protection against the manufacturer repeatedly replacing items under warranty until the customer simply gives up? There are two implied warranties that people should knno about - fitness for a particular purpose and merchantabilty. You are concerned with merchantability. The implied warranty of merchantability basically says that goods are reasonably fit for the general purpose for which they are sold. If something keeps breaking it is not merchantable (generally). The warranty of merchantability is found in the Uniform Commerical Code and in Texas' Business and Commerce Code. Both at Section 2.314. You can read it, it is not very long, but one important part is, "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." This is an implied warranty, which means it is automatic unless disclaimed. Some states prohibit sellers from disclaiming implied warranties; Texas is not one of them (no surprise there). 2.316 is where we find out how to disclaim the warranty. This is how to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous 2.316 also says Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof." So a buyer needs to see if the seller and the manufacturer both disclaimed the implied warranties. If so the buyer is going to be limited to the expressed warranties. If they did not disclaim then the remedy is to return the item and get the money back. So yeah, this is like a lemon law for stuff. There is a requirement that the seller be a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind." That just means that the buyer didn't buy shoes at a car dealer. That it was the seller's business to sell the thing. A last note on this. Implied warranties differ from state to state as to who they can be applied against. 2-318 offers three options. Texas chose option 3 - which means that the courts decide if the buck stops at the retailer or if it extends to the manufacturer. This chapter does not provide whether anyone other than a buyer may take advantage of an express or implied warranty of quality made to the buyer or whether the buyer or anyone entitled to take advantage of a warranty made to the buyer may sue a third party other than the immediate seller for deficiencies in the quality of the goods. These matters are left to the courts for their determination. In other words, unless the implied warranties were disclaimed by both the retailer and the manufacturer, the buyer can go after either for the refund. And what is cool1 is that a 2013 Texas Supreme Court case found that a buyer of a used engine has a claim against the manufacturer. MAN Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows. This is different because some states require privity of contract - meaning that only the original buyer can exercise the warranty and they can only exercise against the seller. EDIT 2.316(c)(2) says when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him This basically says that if you know about the defect you waive the implied warranty. There are two ways to look at this. The first way is that the first defective item is the "the goods or the sample or model" that you have now inspected, so you now know about the defect, and if you buy another you are buying it with defects revealed which waives the warranty. The other way to look at it is that you do not know that the first one is representative of all the products so it is not until you get the second, or third, that the defect with the goods or the sample or model is representative of all the products, and that it is not until you have this knowledge that the defect is "revealed." In other words, it depends. 1Cool for consumers, not manufacturers.	germany Yes, such clauses are common and useful. § 437 BGB describes the rights of the buyer in case of defects, such as reducing the purchase price, demanding cure, or revoking the contract. But these options only exist “unless otherwise specified”. That means an individual contract can exclude these rights (commonly called a Gewährleistungsausschluss). There are, of course, some limitations to the right to disclaim warranties. The disclaimers are ineffective if the seller keeps a known defect secret. The disclaimers cannot absolve the seller from all liability. While disclaimers can be part of individual contracts, they cannot be part of pre-formulated general terms and conditions (Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen, AGB) since they would disproportionally disadvantage one party. The relevant limits are given in § 309 BGB. Thus, such warranty disclaimers are common in private sales, but not generally possible in a B2C context. There is however some debate how a warranty disclaimer should be phrased properly. Your phrasing “private sale, no warranties or returns” might not be effective e.g. if its pre-formulated nature gives its the character of AGB, or if the unqualified disclaimer of warranties is construed as an invalid attempt to disclaim liabilities that cannot be disclaimed. It might also be worth discussing what a “defect” is in this context. The sold goods have qualities that the parties agreed to, or that follow from the general purpose of the goods. If the goods do not feature these qualities, the goods are defective and (by default) the buyer can ask the seller to fix this, for example by withdrawing from the contract. In retail, it is also common to accept returns of non-defective items. But such returns are entirely a matter of goodwill and do not have to be disclaimed.
Would it be legal to use a brand's name (e,g, Samsung, macOS) in my personal email address? I have my main email as "mer************[email protected]" (censored for safety) Now in the email, it has "Windows" and I'm worried that Microsoft will come for me and say"HEY!, you cant use Microsoft's trademarked services in your email address". Is it okay or should I change my email? (I did see the question Use of trademark in personal email alias but i didn't really understand much of it, maybe my situation is different since I'm not a part of Microsoft or it affiliates)	While not categorically illegal, there is a risk that using a trademark in an email name is something that is being done with a purpose to defraud people into thinking that you are affiliated with that company (and indeed, such emails are frequently used for that purpose as are misleading domain names). So, while it isn't outright forbidden, it is generally unwise.	Bringing fair use into this sounds iffy if you are partnering -- that is a commercial relationship which should be defined. If they did send you a file with their logo for a specific purpose, you can assume that you are allowed to use it for that specific purpose. If they did not send you the file, you can assume that they did not give you permission, or they would have included the file ...	You infringe a trademark when you use it in a way that allows confusion between your goods and services and their goods and services. Trademarks are limited by geography (although global brands are ... global) and industry. You can use the word “apple” to sell, say, apples or plumbing services, but not computers or consumer electronics. You can also use the trademark Apple to identify goods and services made by Apple - because that’s what a trademark is for. You can’t use it in a way that people could be confused that your goods and services are their goods and services or are related to or endorsed by them.	No If they have prior usage then they have the trademark already and are the only ones who can register it. Trademarks arise through use - registration is not required.	Trademarks protect against consumer confusion. Ask yourself if a consumer seeing that image with the "studio" portion removed might think that the altered image represents the same company as the original image. Of course, the answer will be "yes." But in the end it also depends on how the trademark is used. You've used the original image in the question; have you violated the trademark? No. Do you violate Tesco's trademark when you say "I went shopping at Tesco"? No. Do you violate their trademark when you sell food using the name "Tesco"? Yes. A distinctive graphic design such as this will also be protected by copyright, so you will also have to consider whether your intended use infringes copyright.	Just Do It. The preceding sentence is one example of a trademark that consists of common words demonstrating that it can be done. As to the podcast if you were duplicating the name of their podcast it would depend on a number of things including if they had trademarked that name, and how Apple's terms of service are for the iTunes podcasts.	That GDPR Disclaimer is no protection in some jurisdictions: the applicable laws to that situation in germany for example don't care about the GDPR: Cold calling, mailing, or e-mailing private people to advertise services all is handled by the same law: Without the consent it is expressly illegal under §7 of the law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG) and such cases are rather Slam-Dunk if the origin can be made out. The punishment can be a 300.000 € fine. The fact that to email someone you need their e-mail address and that e-mail addresses and private addresses are by default considered personally identifiable information is making it worse for the advertizer: Without either an exception (there is none available to cold-emailing) or special allowance of the person the data belongs to, you violate §4 of the federal data protection law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes BDSG) just by handling their e-mail address. That's a separate crime from the UWG one, adding up to another 300.000 € fine under §43 BDSG - or even up to 2 years in prison under §44 BDSG! Oh, and if the email does not contain a proper sender's address, that's another chance for a huge fine under the UWG... So, GDPR is your least trouble, if you violate the marketing laws of a country, or their own data privacy laws. A disclaimer means nothing as the act of sending the mail, even to an unintended addressee, is what is illegal and the law as written does not give a damn about 'I didn't want to advertise to that person' when in fact you sent them unwanted advertisements. Oh, and the very repository you suggest? It would violate the very same §4 BDSG and be illegal for processing private data if it was not actively asked to do that by the end user. As a result, that database is useless: It does kick back all people not in its database. Its database is incomplete because only few people give their address to that database as people not aware of the database never add their data on their own. So it regularly violates §4 BDSG with every German citizen's e-mail address it gets and kicks back, and claiming those addresses would be OK, it throws the company trying to check the database under the bus because they rely on data that is impossible to be reliable. tl;dr Don't do cold-(e)-mail marketing. You throw yourself into boiling oil with a lit torch in hand. further reading Other laws banning such behavior I had listed here, and I quote myself: The US has the CAN-SPAM-Act, which illegalizes sending unsocialised advertisements. You may NOT send a mail if any of the following is true: it has no opt-out the email was gained by 'harvesting' contains a header not matching the text contains less than one sentence the adressee does not have any relation to you In fact, you are liable for a 5-digit fine per infringing e-mail in the US. The FTC itself suggests to never buy e-mail lists - as E-mail harvesting or generating any possible e-mail adress itself is illegal.	Such a lawsuit will fail The CAN-SPAM act applies to commercial emails. The emails you describe are political emails and outside its jurisdiction. All you can do is tune your junk mail filter.
Can you have a fiduciary duty to your own business? If I am the sole member and manager of an LLC, do I have any fiduciary duty to the LLC? Would there be anything legally wrong with my intentionally wasting the company's money or doing something similarly pointless and harmful to the business, considering I'm the only actual person (as in human, not legal person) who is harmed in any way?	@Rick aptly answers your first question (and I totally agree with his answer including his conclusion that the cited provisions apply to single member LLCs). So, I'll touch on issues associated with your second one. Would there be anything legally wrong with my intentionally wasting the company's money or doing something similarly pointless and harmful to the business, considering I'm the only actual person (as in human, not legal person) who is harmed in any way? If the way you use the money wastefully is considered by a court to be a de facto distribution by the LLC to you, its sole member, and this renders it insolvent (as defined in ORS 63.229 (Limitations on distributions), you could have personal liability for the distribution to the company. See ORS 53.235. Creditors of the company could then garnish that obligation to collect their debts owed to the company from you (a garnishment is technically a right to obtain money or property from someone who owes a debt to a judgment debtor, usually a bank or employer, but not always as in this case). Intentionally wasting the company's money would probably constitute a "fraudulent transfer" on the part of the LLC which could expose you to liability to third-party creditors if those actions left the company unable to pay its debts as they came due, or with assets with a fair market value that was lower than the fair market value of its current and currently anticipated liabilities. This parallel liability would arise under the Oregon Fraudulent Transfers Act and related provisions of Oregon law found at ORS 95.200 to 95.310. If you were anticipating or in the process of divorcing, it could constitute economic waste that could be held against you (treating the wasted assets as if they still existed and were allocated to your in a property division). Likewise, if the waste reduced your income for child support purposes, a court would seriously consider imputing the income you could have had if you had not acting in that matter to the income you actually had, in order to calculate your child support obligation. And, you might be disallowed a deduction for the waste of the company's money, rather than having it treated as an expense, which could increase your income tax and self-employment tax liability. But, to the extent that you are the sole owner of the company, no creditor, spouse or child has rights impaired by your actions, and you don't claim the wasted assets as income tax deductions, there would be no one with standing to complain about your conduct in court.	Note: IANAL Does the placement of a sticker stating, "We accept XYZ credit cards," essentially obligate a business to accept that card? It depends on whether you mean whether they are obligated to provide goods/services to someone who presents the card, or whether, having provided goods/services, they are obligated to accept the card as payment. For the first question, the answer is "no". The credit card brand could theoretically go after them, however, as names of credit networks are trademarks, so claiming to accept a card but not doing so is trademark infringement. For the second, the answer is "pretty much". Since they misrepresented their establishment, there is no mutual assent and therefore no contract. If they try to use "defrauding the innkeeper statutes", those require fraudulent intent. If you fully intended to pay for you meal by a credit card, and it was their choice to refuse payment, then you have no fraudulent intent. The only avenue I can see for them is some sort of equity argument, but that would be problematic, especially if they ask for the retail, rather than wholesale, price, and not worth the hassle of collecting. So, legally, you can just walk out, but in practice if they have a bouncer they might make trouble for you.	Yes Companies can own companies - that’s what subsidiaries are. On a practical level, you know this is true because you actually have an example. Companies House would not have allowed its registration (barring error) if it was illegal. Why can’t it open a bank account? Banks (or any other business) can choose who they will and won’t do business with. Unless it’s discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, it’s not illegal. Since juridical persons don’t have protected characteristics (apart from nationality) it’s virtually impossible to illegally discriminate against them.	Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...".	A business owned by a debtor is not itself liable for the debts of its owners. But, a membership interest in an LLC is one of your assets and is normally not exempt from creditors, so legal process may be used to collect a money judgment obtained by a creditor in a suit against the membership interest owner from this asset. There are several ways of doing this that a creditor can utilize, each of which is discussed below. Charging Orders And Writs of Garnishment The presumptive way for a judgment creditor to collect a judgment from a debtor's LLC membership interest asset to do this is to either garnish any monies the LLC owes to you with a writ of garnishment (so that the LLC would pay the amounts due to the debtor to the creditor instead), or to impose a "charging order" on the LLC interest, which is like a writ of garnishment that remains in force until the full amount of the debt authorizing the charging order is satisfied. The downside of a writ of garnishment or charging order is that the people who control the LLC can often defer distributions to the members indefinitely, which deprives you of the funds that would otherwise have been distributed to you, but doesn't let the creditor have those funds either. Some LLCs require that certain distributions be made to owners and require that the LLC be liquidated under certain circumstances (e.g. the completion of a real estate development project). But, those LLCs are the exception rather than the rule. Normally, an LLC only makes distributions to its members when the people who control that LLC decide to do so by a majority vote of the managers or of the managing-members as the case may be. Writs of Execution Directed To Membership Interests There is a split in authority between states (with many states not having resolved the issue) over whether you can enforce a money judgment against the owner of a membership interest not just by collecting money due to the owner as a result of the membership interest and instead use a writ of execution to seize the membership interest and sell it in a sheriff's sale to whomever bids at the sale (much like someone might seize a parcel of real estate or a car to pay a debtor's debts to a judgment creditor). In most states, even if this is allowed, the buyer at the auction gets the right to distributions from the membership interest seized, but not a vote on how the business of the company is conducted, unless the other members agree to grant the new owner voting rights or the operating agreement of the LLC provides otherwise. All of the remedies so far presume that the asset to be collected out of consists of the ownership interest in the LLC (analogous to shares of stock) rather than the assets of the LLC itself. Reverse Piercing Seizing assets of the LLC itself, rather than merely the ownership interest in the LLC, is called "reverse piercing". Usually, reverse piercing is not allowed. But, there are some circumstances where reverse piercing is sometimes allowed. Almost all jurisdictions allow reverse piercing in some circumstances, but those circumstances vary considerably from state to state based upon both the language of the relevant LLC statute and the relevant case law. There are four main circumstances that justify reverse piercing. Single Member LLCs One is the case of a single member LLC where the creditor obtains ownership of 100% of the LLC. In these circumstances, courts have allowed creditors to dissolve the LLC and reach its assets, because neither the debtor nor any third party other than the creditor has any legitimate ownership interest in the property. Alter Ego Cases Another is the case where the assets of the LLC and the personal assets of the debtor are co-mingled or there is not clear documentation existing prior to the litigation establishing which underlying assets belong to the LLC and which belong to its owner. In these cases, reverse piercing is allowed because the existence of a company identity has been disregarded and there is no de facto distinction between company assets and personal assets. This justification for reverse piercing is sometimes called an "alter ego" theory. Fraudulent Transfers A third case where reverse piercing is allowed is where the contribution of the asset to the capital of the LLC was a "fraudulent transfer" from the individual debtor to the LLC (e.g. if the $1 million parcel of real estate was sold to the LLC for $100 at a time when the debtor was insolvent or rendered insolvent as a result of the transfer). Contributing an asset to the capital of an LLC in exchange for a membership interest with a capital account in the LLC's books set based upon the fair market value of the asset contributed to the LLC is usually not considered a fraudulent transfer, but could be in particular facts and circumstances where it has the intended effect of hindering creditors or concealing an asset. Equitable Reverse Piercing Based Upon Control Of The Entity A fourth case where reverse piercing is sometimes allowed is where the debtor does not own 100% of the LLC but has the ability to dissolve the LLC or force its assets to be distributed in kind to him, without the assent of the other LLC owners, because the debtor controls the LLC. Whether this is allowed or not is another issue upon which there is a split of authority and in many cases simply an absence of authority which would make such a case one of first impression in a state.	The question of whether a person was acting on their own behalf or that of a company would generally be a question of fact, so if such a case came to court it would be for both sides to present evidence and argue for their interpretation of it. In most cases the context makes it clear. You mention having a company email domain and associated email signature; that is certainly good practice and would go a long way towards creating a presumption that you were acting for a company. Also signing yourself with your job title or role (e.g. "Joe Bloggs, Chief Bottlewasher") makes it clear that you are speaking in your role as an employee. The content of the communication also matters; if you use your company email address to order goods from a supplier that the company has used before then the recipient can reasonably assume that you are ordering on behalf of the company and a court is likely to agree. OTOH if you use the company address to send libellous emails then the recipient would have a much higher bar to claim that this was the company view rather than a personal one.	Yes, company A is liable for that; ignorance is not a defence. For this reason, a prudent company A would put an indemnification clause in their contract with company B so that if A is sues then company B pays. This is, of course, completely useless if company B is out of business at the time of the suit.	If you form an LLC, and then someone later obtains a registered trademark in the same name, the registered trademark would be enforceable everywhere except in the markets and places where the LLC developed common law trademark rights prior to their registration. Your LLC formation would also put a bump in the road in their trademark application. You can, of course, do both, although it is unclear to me why you feel such urgency in the likelihood of an infringement, which suggests that there may be relevant facts that aren't revealed by your post.
If a contract doesn't have a severability clause, could it still be severable? Many contracts have a severability clause, which states that even if some part of the contract is thrown out or unenforceable, the remainder of the contract remains in effect. For example, "Contract 1" might say that you cannot do (A), (B), (C), or (D), and Contract 1 also has a severability clause. If a court found that it is illegal to ban people from doing (C), Contract 1 would still prohibit you from doing (A), (B), and (D). But supposing "Contract 2" does not have a severability clause - it just says you can't do (A), (B), (C), or (D), and there is nothing in the contract about what happens if part of the contract is unenforceable. As before, a court finds that you can't ban people from doing (C). Would this result in the whole contract being thrown out or just the (C) part? I'm not sure if this is state-specific, but if I need to specify a state, let's say Oregon. (Note: This is not a duplicate of this because that question only asks about the UK and Germany.)	If a contract doesn't have a severability clause, could it still be severable? Yes. Severability is a question of law determined by the court based upon what the court finds to be the intent of the parties regarding whether the term to be severed is so essential to the deal that enforcing the balance of the contract without the severed term would be unfair. This can be done even if the contract is silent on the issue. A severability clause helps the court to determine the intent of the parties when making this evaluation but isn't controlling in most cases, it is just one more piece of evidence regarding the intent of the parties regarding this issue.	Multipage contracts, like any multipage texts, will likely bear some level of originality and so they will have a copyright owner. Absent a license allowing you to reuse the text, you will not be allowed to do so. The fact that you were a party to a contract represented by the text does not change your position: your contract does not have anything to do with the copyright of its text, therefore you still need to honor the copyright as if you were not a party to the contract. It is not uncommon that the copyright will be owned by the lawyer who drafted the text. Your business partner who supplied it would have employed/contracted one. Or, the lawyer could have provided the text to your business partner together with the copyright (less common). Why wouldn't fair-use be at play here? Don't you already get the permission to copy and modify the contract from the original party when they send it to you? (Is such right only limited to original execution?) The original party, whether it is the copyright owner or just a license holder, can send the text to you for possible copy and modification in the course of executing the contract with that party only. The copy that you receive is provided solely with the express purpose to make you an offer (so that you know the terms of the contract) and give opportunity to suggest modifications i.e. make a counter-offer. To reuse the text with another party you need a permission/license from the copyright owner. Fair-use won't play here because you'd be using the text for the purpose it was created for—executing contracts—as opposed to, say, writing a research paper on language/phrases used in legal documents. Does it at all invalidate the agreement itself if the party that supplied the contract doesn't actually own the copyright to it? After all, if you're not legally allowed to have a copy of the text that specifies the terms of the contract, how would it be possible to adhere to such terms? Most contracts do not even need to be in writing. The text will be just one of the evidences if your contract, not the contract itself. No matter whether you obtained the text legally or not, it still does its job as evidence. Whilst you may well be sued for the copyright infringement, in no way will it affect the validity of your contract, which will still hinge on those well-known 6 elements having nothing to do with the copyright of the text.	The contract is almost certainly not valid. The answer you linked references the 2001 Federal Circuit case Fomby-Denson v. Dept of the Army. The court, in its opinion, quoted from the 1948 Supreme Court case Hurd v. Hodge: [t]he power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all times exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the United States . . . . Where the enforcement of private agreements would be violative of that policy, it is the obligation of courts to refrain from such exertions of judicial power. It is clear that, in the case you propose, the enforcement of such a contract would go against the public interest. Quoting from the 1972 Supreme Court case Branzburg v. Hayes, the Fomby-Denson decision said: it is obvious that agreements to conceal information relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint of public policy. It further notes this clause from the First Restatement of Contracts: [a] bargain in which either a promised performance or the consideration for a promise is concealing or compounding a crime or alleged crime is illegal.	How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.	Unilateral termination clauses are legal and very common They even have a name: termination for convenience. However, a contract is not terminated unless and until it is communicated to the other party. Rights and obligations that have accrued up until termination are enforceable.	I find that Petri Mäntysaari: The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law: Volume II, p. 115-140 can pretty much explain the reasoning for this. It is in chapter 5.3 on Terms non-binding as intended. The contract might not contain all legal requirements for some reason, or a clause might become invalid due to law changes. Sometimes the contract becomes unenforceable for some reason or another in part or full. The salvatorian clause is there to fix the defective clause to become the closest estimate to the written form that is legal and not deficient instead of being just dropped from the contract. This can save a contract from becoming unenforceable or making it void in whole. Especially look at Page 140: If a contract term is invalid because of a mandatory provision of law, it will be replaced by legal background rules(§306(2) BGB). One of the standard ways to address the situation is to use a so-called salvatorian clause. [...] This [reinterpretation/fixing of deficiencies] would not happen without a specific contract term. (See §139 BGB. On the other hand see also §140 BGB. Compare DCFR II.-7:302 and II.-7:303) A caveat though: if the alteration to the clause needed is too big and substantial, the contract as a whole can become void and null, no matter what the salvatorian clause said. It cannot overcome some burdens and there are regularly courts (I know this for Germany) voiding contracts due to such serious deficiencies. Notes BGB is the German "Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch", an english translation exists §139 says "If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part." Example: a sale lacking any payment is not a sale (which starts a legally required warranty) $140 says "If a void legal transaction fulfils the requirements of another legal transaction, then the latter is deemed to have been entered into, if it may be assumed that its validity would be intended if there were knowledge of the invalidity." Example: a sale lacking any payment can be interpreted as a gift if the intent was to do so (and does not grant warranty) DCFR is the EU Draft Common Frame of Reference, so the above rules are to be found in the document as follows II.–7:302: Contracts infringing mandatory rules - p. 565. Paraphrased: "if a clause in a contract violates a law, substitute the law for it, courts shall decide if that alters or voids the contract. They may fix contracts to cure them." II.–7:303: Effects of nullity or avoidance - p. 574. Paraphrased: "void contract (parts) can constitute unjustified enrichment, transfer of items might not have happened, courts may fix contracts to cure." From the DCFR document one can read what happens in absence of a Salvatorian clause, especially for UK law. II.–7:302: I. Contracts contrary to law 1 All European systems deal with contracts which contravene some rule of law, as opposed to contracts which are contrary to fundamental principles of morality or public policy. 5 In ENGLISH, IRISH and SCOTTISH law the standard texts all include chapter headings such as “Illegality”, or “Statutory Invalidity”. See further Enonchong, McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 19.28-19.36, and, for the confused development of Scottish law, Macgregor in Reid & Zimmermann vol. II, chap. 5. II. Effects of infringement 8 The general starting point in most European legal systems is that contracts violating legal rules are void. There is often, however, considerable flexibility in the law. 14 In ENGLISH and SCOTTISH law, while an illegal contract may be void, it is more often presented as “unenforceable”, in that neither specific performance nor damages are available to the parties. Thus a party may withdraw from an illegal contract with impunity. Courts will take notice of illegality of their own motion and dismiss actions accordingly (Chitty on Contracts I27, no. 16-199; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland, § 7.15; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.17-19.27).). Again, however, there is flexibility in the law on contracts infringing statutory provisions. There are several cases in which the courts have considered whether giving effect to the statute requires the nullity of the contract as a supporting sanction (see e.g. St John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 267; Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. v. S Spangletts Ltd. [1961] 2 QB 374, CA). English law is currently under review by the Law Commission: see its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions. The Commission’s provisional proposals were to the effect that courts should have the discretion to decide whether or not illegality should act as a defence to a claim for contractual enforcement. But the discretion should be structured by requiring the court to take account of specific factors: (1) the seriousness of the illegality involved; (2) the knowledge and intention of the party seeking enforcement; (3) whether denying relief will act as a deterrent; (4) whether denial of relief will further the purpose of the rule rendering the contract illegal; and (5) whether denying relief is proportionate to the illegality involved. II.–7:303: Notes 5 In ENGLISH law the general rule is against restitution but it is possible in exceptional cases where the claimant is not in pari delicto with the recipient, or the transaction has not been completely executed, or if the claim can be formulated without reference to the prohibited contract (Treitel, The Law of Contract9 , 490-504). IRISH law is similar (Clark 314-19), and so is SCOTTISH law (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol. 15, paras. 764-765), although in one Scottish case where, by statute, contracts using old Scottish measures were void, restitutionary recovery was allowed in respect of a sale of potatoes by the Scottish acre, on the ground that there was no moral turpitude in such a transaction (Cuthbertson v. Lowes (1870) 8 M 1073; see further Macgregor, (2000) 4 ELR 19-45; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.22-19.26). The English Law Commission in its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions suggested that a court should have discretion to decide whether or not illegality should be recognised as a defence to a claim for restitution, various factors being taken into account. In addition the court should have a discretion to allow a party to withdraw from an illegal contract and to have restitution where this will reduce the likelihood of the completion of an illegal act or purpose, although it must be satisfied that the contract could not be enforced against the claimant, that there is genuine repentance of the illegality, and that it is not too serious.	One of the key fundamentals for the formation of a contract is that the parties demonstrate their intention to be legally bound. There are two ways that websites usually use to show that intent by their users: click wrap and browse wrap. With click wrap terms the user explicitly agrees to the terms and creates a binding contract by ticking a box or pressing a button. As far as I am aware there has never been a case where a user has been successful in claiming there was not a contract. With browse wrap terms: For assent to occur the browse-wrap agreement should be conspicuous, state that there is an agreement, and provide where it can be located. it is certainly arguable (IMO with a good chance of success) that the stack exchange browse wrap, with its tiny link embedded among many others at the bottom of the page, is unenforceable. For the circumstances you describe the site tried for a click wrap but due to technical difficulties got a browse wrap. If it can be demonstrated that the user saw the terms or a prominent link to them and continued this would probably be enforceable. Licenses: if the terms contain the grant of a copyright licence then that can be enforced because copyright exists even if a contract doesn't.	When you get married is possible to have contract renouncing both parties right to a divorce. No. That clause would be redundant, materially indistinguishable from breach of contract, and otherwise unenforceable. It is redundant because the legal definition of Marriage (Black's Law Dictionary) states that it is "A contract, according to the form prescribed by law, by which a man and woman [...] mutually engage with each other to live their whole lives together in the state of union which ought to exist between a husband and a wife". Thus, the perpetuity as expressed in the term whole lives preempts the conceiving of an eventual separation. Insofar as marriage is legally cognizable as a contract (see legal definition), it might specify or imply remedies in the event that one or both spouses decide(s) that substance of marital relationship no longer exists; that is, in the event that a breach of that contract occurs. A court may order to the breaching spouse performance of certain acts (for example, alimony) in accordance to statutory law or common law. However, a prohibition to divorce goes beyond the scope of what is legally permissible. The U.S. Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-618 (1984) helps explaining why a prohibition to divorce would be unenforceable: "In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty." If that is not possible how much can you limit the right to a divorce with a contract or something similar? There is no possible limit or requisite duration of a marriage, as that would inherently infringe a person's fundamental element of personal liberty mentioned in the Roberts case.
Essential cookies - legal responsibilities I'm using Stripe to process payments on my site The only cookies the site uses are set and processed entirely by Stripe The cookies would only apply to users who have 1) created an account, and 2) signed up for a paid subscription When signing up for an account, all users must accept the terms and conditions and privacy policy, which mentions the following: We may use cookies and other tracking technologies to collect and store your information. and under the Personal Information section: Payment Data. We may collect data necessary to process your payment if you make purchases, such as your payment instrument number (such as a credit card number), and the security code associated with your payment instrument. All payment data is store by Stripe. You may find their privacy notice link(s) here: https://stripe.com/privacy I've read in some answers like this one that the cookies are still my responsibility, since it's happening on my site, so I want to be sure I'm legally covered here in terms of GDPR and other cookie laws. This answer and others suggest that only non-essential cookies need to be announced with a banner and have the option to be turned off. My understanding is that for essential cookies, the legal requirement is to just disclose that cookies are used and for what purpose. So with all that in mind, my questions are: Do my Stripe cookies count as essential cookies? If the Stripe cookies count as essential, is it legal to provide no option to turn them off? Have I met my legal requirements in terms of disclosure? The terms and conditions and privacy policy were generated by Termly.	If the GDPR applies, then the e-privacy directive (EPD) (formally Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002) almost surely also applies. However, this being a directive rather than a regulation, the implement6ing laws may vary in different countries. The relevant provision is Article 5 paragraph (3) which reads: Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia [among others] about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user. This governs cookies and any other local data, that is, data stored on or read from the user's equipment. What this means is: A site operator must disclose, in detail, what cookies or other local data the site stores on or reads from the user's device. Even strictly required data (cookies) must be disclosed. A site may not store or read any local data until after consent has been obtained. The user must have the option to consent to or refuse consent to individual data items separately. Giving consent may not be a condition of permission to use the site. Consent must be opt-in, not opt-out, that is the default must be "No consent". Local data (including cookies) that is "strictly necessary" for the operation of the site is exempt from the requirement of consent, but not from the requirement of disclosure, and that means specific disclosure. It must be at least as easy to cancel consent later as it was to give consent initially. Do my Stripe cookies count as essential cookies? If the Stripe cookies count as essential, is it legal to provide no option to turn them off? Have I met my legal requirements in terms of disclosure? The terms and conditions and privacy policy were generated by Termly. I don't know stripe well enough to be sure, but they might. What do they do that is essential for operating the site? Yes. No, not if the disclosures in the question are the only ones you make. As I understand it, you must provide at least a link to a page that shows each specific cookie that you read or set, and what data is stored in that cookie, even for strictly required cookies. Update: I should mention t6hat although the above describes my understanding of the current legal requirements, I have read that enforcement of those requirements does not seem to be a priority for the relevant authorities at this time. Other aspects of data protection, such as proper security to avoid data breaches, and having a proper legal basis for processing, and other GDPR requirements, as opposed to e-Privacy requirements, seem to get more attention and resources from the relevant authorities. Having read the comment by the OP, it does seem that at least some of the stripe cookies are strictly required and need not have consent. The stripe cookie policy linked to is better than many sites currently offer. It does not go into fully specific detail, but it may be that the dashboard does, and that together the two are fully compliant. Linking to this policy (and if possible directly to the stripe cookie dashboard) would seem to me to cover most of the issues here.	Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data	You are responsible for what data is being processed by your website. When you embed third party components on your website (e.g. iframes, scripts), you are at least jointly responsible with the third party providing these components. You are only responsible for what happens on the website (i.e. what processing is under your control), not for what the third party provider does with collected data on their services. However, note that information will be transferred to Google's servers regardless of whether the visitor has a Google account! The Fashion ID case is relevant case law establishing and explaining these points. Since you are (jointly) responsible, you need a legal basis for collecting personal data through the tracking snippet and sharing it with the third party (here Google). For example, the legal basis could be a legitimate interest, or could be consent. A legitimate interest requires that you balance this interests against the interests, rights, and freedoms of the data subject (the site visitor). If the data subject wouldn't reasonably expect this tracking, you cannot rely on a legitimate interest. Consent can always work, except that it is a freely given, informed opt-in – likely unsuitable for conversion tracking. Which legal basis to use is primarily your responsibility. You argue that the tracking snippet does not collect personal data. However, this argument is not well supported. Under the GDPR, personal data does not only include directly identifying information such as an email address, but also any information “relating” to an identifiable person. Identification includes the ability to single out someone, e.g. by a browser fingerprint. For purposes of conversion tracking, Google will clearly try to collect data that allows the visitor to be singled out, thus collecting personal data. Furthermore, specific kinds of information are regulated by the ePrivacy directive. This includes “traffic data” and “information stored on a terminal device”, regardless of whether this information is personal data under the GDPR. Under ePrivacy, such information can only be used as strictly necessary to provide the service requested by the user (and conversion tracking is not strictly necessary), or when the user gives their consent. Depending on what information is collected by the tracking snippet and on whether you are subject to ePrivacy, you would have to collect consent anyway. There is also the issue that Google Ads is an US-based service, and transferring data to the US is largely illegal since the 2020 Schrems II ruling. The US do not provide an adequate level of data protection, so that transfers would require additional safeguards. Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) for Controller to Controller transfers are not sufficient by itself. Of course those extra safeguards are effectively impossible to implement and no one is doing this correctly, but it's worth considering that there is additional legal risk. Explicit consent can provide a legal basis for transfers even to a country with inadequate protections, but that mechanism is intended for occasional transfers. In conclusion: you have wrongly concluded that no personal data would be involved you are jointly responsible with Google for whatever data is processed by the conversion tracking snippet you need a legal basis for sharing this data with Google legitimate interest may be sufficient, depending on what data is involved (consider ePrivacy) and depending on the result of your legitimate interest balancing test alternatively, you may require every visitors consent to track their conversions – unlikely to result in good data additionally, such use of Google Ads may run into issues around international transfers due to the Schrems II ruling this kind of stuff is difficult, and no one is really doing this correctly :/	Belgium enacted an implementing law, the Act of 30th July 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data. This, along with the GDPR, are the key legislative references that relate to your question. On 5th September 2017 the ECHR judged that it "considers that States should ensure that, when an employer takes measures to monitor employees' communications, these measures are accompanied by adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse". This case set a precedent relevant to employee monitoring in Belgium. This is most definitely a data protection or privacy law matter and the DPO should be consulted. If they have to do research, that shouldn't be your concern as that is their job. The company must support the DPO in what they need to do that job, as such is literally written into the GDPR. Furthermore, in this case it would, by my evaluation, be necessary to conduct a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) for the monitoring activity, and if one has been done, it should document the recommendations and requirements or what is already in place. You as an individual may also ask a question of the Data Protection Authority: (NL) https://www.gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit.be/verzoek-klacht-indienen (FR) https://www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/introduire-une-requete-une-plainte You might ask them about your position and liability as an employee, but I would be more concerned, if I were you, with verifying that your actions are above board rather than trying to cover your ass just in case they aren't. Do the right thing, even if that means questioning the direction you've been given. AD logons still identify the person logging on, and may include source IP, which is specifically listed in the GDPR as within the scope of 'personal data'. So while there may be a legitimate need to process such data, it needs to be gone about in the right way. Actions taken by an employee are taken by the organisation in terms of processing personal data, so whatever you are asked or ordered to do, will be done by the company. If you are being offered no legal justification for doing so, you might document the direction you are given and question it respectfully, pointing out that if found to be unlawful, it is the company that would be in trouble, all while knowing that should there be for example an unfair dismissal, you have a record of who asked you to do what, how you challenged or questioned it, and what was the outcome.	If a data controller fails to fulfil your data subject rights, lodge a complaint with your data protection authority. In Hamburg, the appropriate form is here. However, they are not required to investigate your complaint. Independently from a complaint, you could consider suing Wordpress for compliance – Automattic has a subsidiary in Ireland so this might actually be feasible. I'm not quite sure though that Automattic is indeed the data controller for wordpress.org, as opposed to the .com domain – the privacy policy isn't quite GDPR compliant. While your GDPR Art 17 Right to Erasure might not apply in this case, there's a definite GDPR violation because the data controller failed to respond to your request within a month as per Art 12(4). That your posts on the bugtracker were deleted doesn't look like an issue in this context, what does matter is that they didn't respond to emails to the addresses mentioned in their privacy policy. Whether you have a right to erasure depends on the legal basis for storing your data. In general, you have a right to erasure if: the data is no longer necessary; processing is based on consent (because you can always withdraw consent); or processing is based on a legitimate interest and they have no overriding legitimate grounds to continue processing despite your objection (Art 21). The data is still necessary to identify you for your actions on the bugtracker, but depending on your particular situation you may be able to object successfully and force them to anonymize your posts.	The GDPR applies regardless of where and how data is processed. But it is necessary to look at what the processing activities in question are, and who is the controller for these activities by determining their purposes and means. This argument is supported: by the absence of relevant exemptions in the GDPR by the GDPR's broad definition of the data controller by the ECJ's analysis in the Fashion ID case GDPR Exemptions For certain constellations (e.g. controller = natural person, purposes = purely personal or household activities) that processing is exempt from GDPR compliance (see GDPR Art 2(2)). However per GDPR Recital 18, the GDPR would still apply “to controllers or processors which provide the means for processing data for such personal or household activities.” For example, this means that I am able to use WhatsApp to process my friends' contact information for purely personal purposes because I'm exempt from the GDPR with respect to that processing, but Facebook is still subject to the GDPR regarding how they process personal data collected via WhatsApp. Already on the basis of the GDPR providing no exception for processing on someone else's computer, I disagree strongly with the answer you cited (and have already written a competing answer). It seems entirely counterfactual. How to figure out who the controller is. Per GDPR Art 4(7), controller is whoever “alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data”, although other laws might provide more specific criteria for individual purposes or means. We will return to that definition in the next section. The ICO has provided a checklist to figure out if you're a data controller or perhaps a joint controller. Some of the questions are aligned with the above definition, like “We decided what the purpose or outcome of the processing was to be”. Other questions are there as a contrast to the data processor role, e.g. “We have complete autonomy as to how the personal data is processed”. Analysis of the Fashion ID case (ECJ C-40/17) This judgement provides a detailed analysis of who the data controller is, and is therefore relevant to the question. Fashion ID had embedded a Facebook “Like” button on their website, thus causing the visitor's browser to transmit personal data to Facebook. Fashion ID asserted that they were not the data controller, since they had no control over what data was collected by the Like button and how it was subsequently used by Facebook. Fashion ID relied in part of the argument that they weren't the controller because processing happened on the visitor's computer. This ruling was made on the basis of the Data Protection Directive 95/46 which was repealed by the GDPR. However, since the DPD and GDPR have effectively identical definitions of “controller” and “processing”, the court's analysis remains highly relevant. In the following I'll “translate” all DPD references to the GDPR, in analogy to GDPR Art 94(2). The court found that Fashion ID was a data controller for the processing by the Like button, and that it was a joint controller with Facebook for this processing. However, Fashion ID was only a controller for those processing activities in which they played a part, not for subsequent processing of the data that was controlled by Facebook alone. Relevant details from the Judgment (ECLI:EU:C:2019:629): Paragraphs 65–66: The GDPR tries to achieve a high level of data protection through a broad definition of “controller”. Thus, an overly narrow interpretation that counteracts this goal is incompatible with the law. Paragraph 68: An entity is a controller when it exerts influence over the processing for its own purposes, thereby participating in determining the purposes and means of processing. Compare the GDPR Art 4(7) definition of “controller”. case law: C-25/17 Jehovan todistajat, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, paragraph 68: “However, a natural or legal person who exerts influence over the processing of personal data, for his own purposes, and who participates, as a result, in the determination of the purposes and means of that processing, may be regarded as a controller”. Paragraphs 67, 69–70, 82: It is not necessary to have a single controller, there can be multiple joint controllers. The joint controllers can be involved to different degrees. You can be a joint controller without having access to the personal data. case law: C-25/17 Jehovan todistajat, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, paragraph 69: “Furthermore, the joint responsibility of several actors for the same processing, under that provision, does not require each of them to have access to the personal data concerned”. case law: C-210/16 Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein, ECLI:EU:C:2018:388, paragraph: 38: “In any event, [GDPR] does not, where several operators are jointly responsible for the same processing, require each of them to have access to the personal data concerned.” Paragraphs 71–74: Processing can consist of many different individual activities. A controller might only be involved in some of them, and can only be a controller for those activities for which they (jointly) determine purposes and means of processing. Paragraphs 76–79: Fashion ID was able to determine the purposes and means of processing regarding data collection and transmission by the Like button. The act of embedding the button showed that they had decisive influence over the processing: without the embedding, the data processing would not have occurred. To summarize the relevant conclusions: someone is a data controller when they participate in determining the purposes and means of processing for some processing activity for joint controllers, this holds regardless of whether they have access to the data or participate in the processing itself one cannot be a controller for a processing activity for which they cannot determine purposes and means. Conclusion and application to the question This analysis reaffirms my competing answer to the cited answer that it is important to determine who the data controller is. The Fashion ID case shows that is important to perform this analysis on a fairly granular manner, on the level of individual processing activities. For processing on a data subject's computer by a program written by another provider, this means: some processing activities might be solely under the user's control, then they are the sole data controller (or might be exempt from GDPR) for some processing activities, the software developer might decide alone for which purposes and through which means the processing is carried out for other activities, the user and data controller might be joint controllers. This does not require explicit agreement but can result implicitly. This does not require that the software developer has access to the personal data undergoing processing. For example, a spreadsheet application might be used by an end user to process personal data on their own computer (or via a cloud application, with the same conclusions). We can consider different processing activities performed by the software: sorting, transforming, and other processing of the data in the spreadsheet is solely under the end users control, so they are the data controller (if they aren't exempt) collecting usage analytics (where those analytics signals are personal data for which the end user is the data subject) is solely under the software developers control uploading crash reports (where those reports contain personal data from the end user and contain contents from the currently opened spreadsheet) is more complicated. The software developer is definitely a controller. The end user has a dual role here as a data subject and a joint controller (if they aren't exempt) because the crash report processes personal data for which they are the controller.	Your analysis so far seems correct. You must comply with all applicable laws. The GDPR's Art 6(1)(c) legal basis clarifies that having to provide personal data is no excuse: that legal obligation is all the legal basis you need for sharing the personal data in accordance with your obligations. However, that legal basis doesn't generally excuse you from your other data controller obligations. For example, you should still inform the data subjects about the processing as per Art 13(3).	No, you do not need to show a privacy policy just for running a publicly accessible server, as long as any traffic data such as IP addresses is only used as strictly necessary for providing the service requested by the user. The background here is that while GDPR is a very general law, the ePrivacy directive (ePD) provides more details for telecommunication and information society services, which also includes SSH servers. Per ePD Art 6, traffic data may be used (1) for the purpose of the transmission/service or when the data has been anonymized, (2) for billing purposes, or (3) for marketing or value added services, when the user has given their consent. Information about the processing is only required under ePrivacy for cases (2) and (3), but not for processing that is strictly necessary. Now the tricky question is under what circumstances you can log (failed) log-in attempts or use tools like fail2ban. One argument is that such measures are strictly necessary to ensure the security of the communication, but these measures are evidently not necessary for performing the transmission in the sense of ePD. There are a few ways to resolve this: necessity has to be interpreted more broadly, and security measures are indeed necessary. For example, ePD Art 6(5) mentions fraud detection, without authorizing it explicitly. an IP address is effectively anonymized in the sense of the ePD since you do not realistically have means for linking the IP address to any particular person. This is a fairly weak argument, but could be supported by GDPR Recital 26 which defines anonymous data. Counterpoint: IP addresses are online identifiers which are explicitly included in the definition of personal data in GDPR Art 4(1). an IP address is not just traffic data that falls under the ePD, but also personal data that falls under the GDPR. When the IP address is merely used to make a transmission, it is not processed as personal data and only ePD concerns apply. But when we process it to ban the IP, it is processed as personal data under a legitimate interest. This processing does not fall under any of the categories from ePD Art 6, so that only GDPR concerns apply. These include a requirement to inform the data subject about the processing at the time in accordance with GDPR Art 13, which could be satisfied by displaying a link to a privacy policy in the course of the login process. For a legitimate interest argument, it also depends on the expectations of the typical data subject. Since some security measures such as security logs are normal and should be expected, a legitimate interest argument is likely to be strong. I think this is the correct conclusion, even though the “it's not traffic data, or at least doesn't fall under the ePD” argument is quite weak. It hinges on the assumption that security measures are not “value added services”. This fits the intent of the ePD, but not the actual definition of value added services. In any case, you do not need to ask for consent unless you're required to obtain consent e.g. under ePD Art 6(3) or because your processing of personal data relies on consent as the legal basis per GDPR Art 6. It also has to be noted that ePD has no immediate effect, but has to be implemented by each EU member state in national law. These laws can provide more specific guidance.
Could a person be convicted for violating the US Flag Code? If I understand the US Flag Code correctly, it is a federal law which prohibits certain actions, but does not allow any penalty for violations. Could a person technically be convicted under the Flag Code, as long as there was no penalty?	No. The Flag Code is not a criminal law, so the government is not permitted to bring criminal prosecution for violating it, and it therefore cannot secure a proper conviction for such a violation.	You (probably) did not commit a crime in Colorado. The answer to your question though is probably Driving an unsafe vehicle Colorado Revised Statutes Title 42. Vehicles and Traffic § 42-4-202 (1) It is unlawful for any person to drive...on any highway any vehicle...which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such lamps and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this section and sections... The above is not a crime , it is (5) Any person who violates any provision of this section commits a class A traffic infraction. A class A traffic infraction is a civil violation. Note that some driving offenses are crimes: In Colorado, driving more than 25 mph over the posted limit is a class 2 misdemeanor, and doing so in a constriction zone is a class 1 misdemeanor. Also note that I say probably because it is possible that they charged you with something more extreme- reckless driving? violation of noise or pollution ordinances?- but for a fine small enough that you don't say, 2 points, and you did not have to go to court (you could have if you wanted for the ticket, but not required) it is very unlikely.	A judge can only impose sentences as prescribed by law. Suppose, as a random example, that a person is convicted in federal court of fraudulently mutilating coins, in violation of 18 USC 331. That section of the statute states the punishment for such a violation: ...Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. The scale of fines is to be found at 18 USC 3571; for this crime, which is a felony, the maximum fine would be $250,000 (with certain exceptions, which let us suppose do not apply here). So in principle, the judge may sentence the offender to any of the following: Five years in prison and a fine of $250,000 Five years in prison and no fine Three days in prison and a fine of $6.25 No prison and a fine of $5000 You get the idea. (In practice, the judge is likely to follow official sentencing guidelines, but is not legally required to do so.) But the judge may not sentence the offender to any of the following, because the statute does not authorize it: Death A fine of $250,000.01 Five years and one day in prison Wearing a silly hat for a week Slavery I do not know of any federal criminal statute authorizing slavery as a punishment for any crime, so therefore, a federal judge cannot impose this sentence. Congress could in principle create such a law, and if they did it would not violate the Thirteenth Amendment, but they have not done so. (The Eighth Amendment might be a separate question, as slavery might very well be considered a cruel and unusual punishment by today's courts. And as you point out, such a law might also be in violation of treaty obligations.) (I assume here that "slavery" is understood to be something distinct from "imprisonment", although I know some would disagree.)	No In many but not all common law jurisdictions, a person who comitts an "inherently dangerous" crime can be found guilt of "felony murder" (not manslaughter). The Wikipedia article says: In most jurisdictions, to qualify as an underlying offense for a felony murder charge, the underlying offense must present a foreseeable danger to life, and the link between the offense and the death must not be too remote. For example, if the recipient of a forged check has a fatal allergic reaction to the ink, most courts will not hold the forger guilty of murder, as the cause of death is too remote from the criminal act. Floyd was arrested on an accusation that he passed a counterfeit $20 bill. This is not an "inherently dangerous" felony. Nor has it ever been established that he had the criminal intent that would have been required to convict him of a crime. Indeed it has not been proved that he knew the bill was counterfeit. But a finding of criminal intent to commit the underlying felony is essential to invoking teh felony murder rule. MN code 609.632 subdivision 3 requires "intent to defraud" and "having reason to know that the money order, currency, note, or obligation or security is forged, counterfeited, falsely made, altered, or printed". Moreover when the value is under $1,000 the possible penalties are much lighter and may not even be a felony. In any case passing a phoney $20 is not the kind of offense for which the felony murder rule is normally invoked, nor is being killed by an arresting officer a plausible, outcome, althoguh obviously it is possible. Further sources The University of Minnesota's page on "felony Murder" says: When the defendant commits a felony that is inherently dangerous to life, he or she does so knowing that some innocent victim may die. In essence, this awareness is similar to implied malice, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. What is difficult to justify is a conviction for felony murder when the felony is not inherently dangerous to life. Thus most jurisdictions limit the felony murder doctrine to felonies that create a foreseeable risk of violence or death. ... Joaquin, who has just lost his job, decides to burn down his apartment building because he can’t afford to pay the rent. Joaquin carefully soaks his apartment with lighter fluid, exits into the hallway, and throws a lit, lighter-fluid-soaked towel into the apartment. He then runs outside to watch the entire building burn down. Several tenants die of smoke inhalation because of the fire. In jurisdictions that recognize felony murder, Joaquin can probably be charged with and convicted of murder for every one of these deaths. In this example, Joaquin did not intend to kill the tenants. However, he did most likely have the criminal intent necessary for arson. Therefore, felony murder convictions are appropriate. Note that Joaquin exhibited extreme indifference to whether the tenants in the building lived or died, which could also constitute the criminal intent of implied malice or depraved heart. The Minnesota code Section 609.19 MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE says: Subd. 2.Unintentional murders. Whoever does either of the following is guilty of unintentional murder in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40 years: (1) causes the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence or a drive-by shooting; [Paragraph (2) deals with death "while intentionally inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily harm upon the victim" which clearly does not apply in this case.]	The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available.	Whatever crime or infraction you are charged with, it applies to you personally however they spell your name and however you spell your name. Whether or not you should go depends on the alternative that you face (large fine or jail time for failure to appear?). An argument that you didn't commit the offence because they misspelled your name would hold zero water.	Do I correctly understand that Federal employees, notably including the Armed Forces, pledge their duty first to the Constitution of the United States and only secondarily to carry out legal orders? And that they have no legal obligation to execute an illegal order? What process allows a subordinate to defy an illegal order if a superior gives the order? What legal protection does the subordinate have? All officers of the United States government (and for that matter also all officers of state and local governments) including soldiers in the armed forces are sworn to uphold the Constitution. Members of the armed forces are not only allowed to disregard illegal orders, they are obligated to not carry out illegal orders. Operationally, disobeying an order due to the fact that it is unconstitutional is a defense to an effort to fire or discipline a federal government civil service employee who may only be fired for good cause after due process. In the military, the issue would usually present itself in the form of a defense in a court martial for refusing to obey a lawful order of a superior. Of course, it would hardly be unprecedented for someone's firing from a job that was unlawful, or for a wrongful court-martial conviction, to be upheld on appeal. Suppose the Congress holds someone in contempt. The Congress, as I understand it, goes to a court to enforce the contempt charge. The court turns to Federal law enforcement to bring action. What if the President directs Federal law enforcement to ignore the court order? What if law enforcement complies with the President? The U.S. Justice Department is charged with bringing contempt of Congress cases at the request of Congress. But, an attorney retained by Congress could probably bring such an action in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia if the U.S. Justice Department refused to do so. Contempt may be civil or criminal, and unlike ordinary criminal charges (felonies can only be brought based upon grand jury indictments and grand juries are controlled by prosecutors) either civil or criminal contempt charges can be brought by a non-governmental employee attorney. The established practice is to seek contempt sanctions against the lowest level employee who has the authority to take the action requested, or to seek contempt sanctions against everyone from that lowest level employee up through the chain of command to the responsible cabinet officer. The President is generally not named as a party against whom contempt charges are sought. Defiance of the law in the face of a binding and immediately effective court order would be a constitutional crisis and you would need to move to the realm of politics and political realities, and away from the realm of what the law says that people should or should not do, to meaningfully predict how a constitutional crisis turns out. The law assumes that all government officials will obey a lawful court order duly enforced. If government law enforcement officers start defying court orders, then there is a constitutional crisis. On the other hand, the vast majority of law enforcement officers in the United States are civil servants who aren't beholden personally to the President. They were appointed on a merit basis, they are civil servants who can't be fired without good cause and due process, they are in agencies that have an institutional culture of obeying court orders. The civil servants with more seniority (and basically all senior military officers in the U.S. military) have served under multiple Presidents of different political parties. The number of political appointees supervising them is fairly modest. Likewise, most federal judges at any given time were appointed by prior Presidents and even judges appointed by a current President will not infrequently rule against the federal government when the facts and law demand that they do so. There is less politics and there is more unity in interpretation of the law among federal judges and federal law enforcement and legal officials than is generally assumed by more cynical members of the general public. Suppose Congress orders fines. What is to be done if no one will enforce the fines? A court can order that the fines be paid out of the U.S. Treasury. The order itself can have the force of law without the cooperation of any U.S. Treasury official. Sustained defiance of such a court order would lead to a constitutional crisis. Same scenario as 1 but this time it’s impeachment and conviction: the President defies any action to remove him. What if the President simply barricades himself in the White House and orders security and military personnel to protect him? Is there a protocol in the U.S. military hierarchy to deal with this scenario? This has never actually happened, of course, so it is hypothetical. The Treasury Department, General Services Administration and Secretary of State (and all other government officials) should revoke privileges that the President has by virtue of being President and provide them to the new acting President (realistically, in the simple scenario presented, current Vice President Pence). The military should stay out of it, but should immediately start treating acting President Pence, and not the impeached incumbent as the Commander-in-Chief. U.S. military forces are indoctrinated on the Presidential succession and it is unlikely that many military officers would disregard a Presidential impeachment. The Secret Service should stop defending the former President except in an ex-President capacity. In theory, one could imagine acting President Pence bringing an eviction action in the local courts of the District of Columbia just as one would with any holdover tenant. Since the local courts in D.C. are federal, this doesn't present the federalism problems that it would if the same thing were done in a state court with respect to federal real estate, and U.S. marshals would evict him and his family like anyone else. The trickier situation in terms of creating a constitutional crisis, honestly, is really one where the President is clearly and blatantly defying the law and court orders, but the U.S. Senate refuses to convict the President in an impeachment proceeding out of partisan bias. What should common citizens do if any of these scenarios play out? Whatever they want, in a lawful manner. Ultimately, this would be a matter for federal government officials (elected and appointed alike) to figure out.	It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power.
Can a father not have responsibility for child-support? A high school classmate of mine was approached 5 years ago by a lesbian couple to father a child with one of them. They did not involve lawyers at the time. He did the deed with one of them and 9 months later, a little boy was born. Prior to that, they wrote out a document, just in plain language (like I said, no lawyers or even legal templates were used) in which he stipulated he would give up all parental rights, and they would not seek child support. All three signed the document and they also had witnesses attest by signature. Two copies of the document, worded the same, were printed and signed so each party has a copy. All three were making a decent living at the time. Then came COVID and one of the ladies was laid off and has not been able to find work since. The other one was recently also laid off and is now on unemployment. They have contacted the father and told him he has to start paying child support, including all back owed. Can a father abrogate his responsibility of child support at all? Is he now required to pay and also pay what he owes prior? I'm not asking about the parental rights/visitation in this question to keep it more focused.	The first step is for the parents of the child to seek a court order for child support. This would be based on your friend being the actual father, and the non-mother not having adopted the child (extinguishing the obligations of the father). Many states, but not Michigan, have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act which covers assisted reproduction, but even in those states, this does not constitute assisted reproduction. The "agreement" is legally invalid (surrogate parentage contracts are unenforceable), and that, folks, is why you should hire an attorney rather than devising a legal theory on your own. This article summarizes the various paternity laws of Michigan. Under the Paternity Act, this may be a child born out of wedlock, if the child is a child begotten and born to a woman who was not married from the conception to the date of birth of the child, or a child that the court has determined to be a child born or conceived during a marriage but not the issue of that marriage where the meaning of the last expression would have to be determined by the court. Probably the court would say "this child is not the 'issue' of the marriage", given legislative intent. Under the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, unmarried parent can by signing a statement "define" the parentage of a child, but the statute is specifically limited to a man acknowledging paternity, and cannot apply to a lesbian couple. The clearest statement of the law of parentage for lesbian couples in Michigan is Lefever v. Matthews where (just one year ago) the court held that both of two women were parents – but in that case, the eggs came from one of the women and they were implanted into the other woman. An important distinguishing feature is that in this case, the woman at a statutory disadvantage sought parental rights, whereas your question is about a legal parent seeking to avoid a legal obligation to the child. Courts generally do everything possible to protect a child's right to support by the parents. The prospects that an actual father could avoid that obligation are slim.	Employees are only required to work in the sense that refusal to report can result in discipline (like reprimand or firing) and forfeit of whatever money you would have earned had you shown up. This is exactly the same way federal employees (or most employees, for that matter) are always required to work. The fact that they're not being paid on time has nothing to do with whether it's slavery. That's because pay has nothing to do with slavery. Slavery is forced labor and/or ownership of people, and civilian federal employees are just as free to quit as they normally are. Military personnel can't freely quit, but they can never freely quit. Nothing relevant has changed for either group. Not paying employees is potentially a violation of labor law, and the government in fact lost a lawsuit after the last shutdown for violating the FLSA. If that happens this time too, they'll have to pay damages.	From the legal perspective, the most important step is establishing legal paternity. IN Code 16-37-2-2.1 covers the process of establishing paternity via affidavit, which has to be executed in a prescribed and timely manner and with cooperation by both parties. Paternity can also be established by court action (very complex). With legal paternity established, then in terms of parental rights and responsibilities, it is immaterial that you are not married. If you don't live together, then the question of custody and visitation, and child support, would need to be resolved (with a lawyer involved). This article surveys the situation with Indiana Law w.r.t. unwed fathers (see especially section III), though most of it is about the situation where actual paternity is distinct from legal paternity.	Even in a community property state like Washington, a person is not liable for the premarital debts of a spouse (but is responsible for postmarital debts). During the marriage, jointly-owned property is accessible to creditors, but after divorce, there is no risk to the non-debtor. Though, you would be responsible if you were a co-signer on the loan.	Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms.	Abandonment is not the legal concept to be concerned with (though the situation might fall within the ambit of a law that uses the word "abandon"), instead the question should be about the legal obligations of a parent. California Family Code is what you want to look at. Though a look at the criminal act of "child abandonment" can be informative: section 271 and following indicate that there are some penalties for abandonment-like actions for children between 14 and 18, but the acts would have to be "willful" and "without lawful excuse" (which probably includes "inability to perform"). In the Family Code, section 7822 states when proceedings can be brought. For example, if (2) The child has been left by both parents or the sole parent in the care and custody of another person for a period of six months without any provision for the child's support, or without communication from the parent or parents, with the intent on the part of the parent or parents to abandon the child. Section 3900-3901 says that the father and mother of a minor child have an equal responsibility to support their child in the manner suitable to the child's circumstances. The duty of support imposed by Section 3900 continues as to an unmarried child who has attained the age of 18 years, is a full-time high school student, and who is not self-supporting, until the time the child completes the 12th grade or attains the age of 19 years, whichever occurs first. Nothing in this section limits a parent's ability to agree to provide additional support or the court's power to inquire whether an agreement to provide additional support has been made. There seems to be a formula for computing expectations of support: but the law won't require a person to pay money that they do not have. The law also will not compel a third party to take in an guest, nor will it compel the mother to become homeless (i.e. order the third party to take in the child or eject the mother). The courts could easily require the mother to take financial responsibility for the child.	Overview of Notice Requirements To Fathers Prior To Adoption In Illinois The father has some rights, but they are very limited in Illinois under the kind of circumstances set forth in the ER dialog. If the mother wants to put up the child for adoption and doesn't want to reveal anything about the father, perhaps with the specific intent of preventing him from interfering with the adoption, she has the practical ability to do so without penalty. In practice, either an "involved father", or spouse who theoretically could be the father during the course of a marriage, is very likely to receive notice of an adoption and to be required to consent to it, unless parental rights have been terminated or the father raped the mother. But, this isn't the kind of situation present in the ER dialog. But, an "uninvolved father" (even if uninvolved through no fault of his own because he doesn't know that he has gotten the mother pregnant, for example) is entitled only to a registered letter to his last known address and mention in a newspaper legal classified advertisement, generally as provided by the mother if she chooses to cooperate in providing accurate information. He has really no recourse if he isn't given the notice he is entitled to under the statute. His pretty much exclusive remedy is to go through the hoops of the Putative Father Registry and then to file a paternity action in court, on very tight timelines, which he has probably never heard of and is in practice incapable of managing to comply with 95%+ of the time. Unless he was voluntarily and accurately put on the birth certificate by the mother, an "uninvolved father" has a very decent chance of getting no notice at all and not being able to do anything about it even if he later learns of the child's existence, unless the mother is clear that he is the father and acts with more good faith towards him in the notice process than is commonplace. There are criminal penalties for providing false information about the father, but if the petition is brought by someone other than the mother (as is usually the case) the mother faces no penalties for failing to be forthright on the birth certificate or in cooperating with the people who are filing the adoption petition. She generally need only sign a surrender of the child. She may or may not make any statements under oath or penalty of perjury, depending upon the way the relevant statute is interpreted and there are ways she can avoid much exposure to criminal liability in answering vaguely or inaccurately or claiming not to know. So, a mother has a practical ability to put her child up for adoption without the involvement of an "uninvolved father" without any real penalty for doing so, although there is at least a moral expectation that she will be forthright with the people handling the adoption process when they make an effort to get information about the father. Unless the father is informed by someone that the mother is pregnant, and he knows which state the mother will give birth to the child in or move to in order to conduct the adoption in, and he is aware of the tough requirements of the putative father's registry, the father has no real reason to know that he has to do anything to prevent his child from being adopted, unless the mother provides his accurate name and address to the people prepare the adoption papers. He has no real clear and obvious way to learn what he has to do in order to prevent an adoption from going through, and is very likely to think he is entitled to more notice than he actually is, and thus to be less pro-active that he needs to be to preserve his paternity rights. If he's lucky, he could also get notice through a newspaper legal advertisement publications that someone who cares about him (he almost surely doesn't read them) could see - but even if he learns by publication he may have a hard time taking the acts required to give him the right to deny consent to an adoption in time for it to matter legally. The process is also very unforgiving towards fathers who change their minds, even if they change their minds before the legal adoption process is over. Generally speaking, a father has no right to have an attorney appointed for him in a case where he is trying to assert his paternity if he is unable to afford one himself. In addition to the requirements of Illinois law set forth below, there is also generally a requirement to affirmatively state in adoption proceeding if the father is, or might be, a member of a Native American tribe, as that goes to the jurisdictional issue of the applicability of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, which requires notice, at a minimum, to the father's Indian tribe, even if notice cannot be given to the father. The Relevant Laws With regard to Illinois adoption laws there are a couple of statutes that are relevant: A Petition for adoption must state under oath per § 750 ILCS 50/5(f) (line breaks inserted editorially for ease of readability in this online format and not present in the original): The names, if known, and the place of residence, if known, of the parents; and whether such parents are minors, or otherwise under any legal disability. The names and addresses of the parents shall be omitted and they shall not be made parties defendant to the petition if (1) the rights of the parents have been terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (2) the child has been surrendered to an agency, or (3) the parent or parents have been served with the notice provided in Section 12a of this Act and said parent or parents have filed a disclaimer of paternity as therein provided or have failed to file such declaration of paternity or a request for notice as provided in said Section, or (4) the parent is a putative father or legal father of the child who has waived his parental rights by signing a waiver as provided in subsection S of Section 10; . . . Whatever orders, judgments or decrees have heretofore been entered by any court affecting (1) adoption or custody of the child, or (2) the adoptive, custodial or parental rights of either petitioner, including the prior denial of any petition for adoption pertaining to such child, or to the petitioners, or either of them. I've omitted provisions related to children with no living parents which involve notice to guardians and next of kin, and provisions related to "standby adoption" which is also beyond the scope of this question. Surrender to an agency is basically putting a child up for adoption before adoptive parents are lined up, and otherwise involves the same surrender or waiver process. Notice requirements per § 750 ILCS 50/7 are as follows (emphasis and line breaks added): A. All persons named in the petition for adoption or standby adoption, other than the petitioners and any party who has previously either denied being a parent pursuant to Section 12a of this Act or whose rights have been terminated pursuant to Section 12a of this Act, but including the person sought to be adopted, shall be made parties defendant by name, and if the name or names of any such persons are alleged in the petition to be unknown such persons shall be made parties defendant under the name and style of "All whom it may concern". In all such actions petitioner or his attorney shall file, at the office of the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, an affidavit showing that the defendant resides or has gone out of this State, or on due inquiry cannot be found, or is concealed within this State, so that process cannot be served upon him, and stating the place of residence of the defendant, if known, or that upon diligent inquiry his place of residence cannot be ascertained, the clerk shall cause publication to be made in some newspaper published in the county in which the action is pending. . . . In the event there is service on any of the parties by publication, the publication shall contain notice of pendency of the action, the name of the person to be adopted and the name of the parties to be served by publication, and the date on or after which default may be entered against such parties. . . . B. A minor defendant who has been served in accordance with this Section may be defaulted in the same manner as any other defendant. C. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of this or any other law, and in addition to the notice requirements of any law pertaining to persons other than those specified in this subsection, the persons entitled to notice that a petition has been filed under Section 5 of this Act shall include: (a) any person adjudicated by a court in this State to be the father of the child; (b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of the United States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the court order has been filed with the Putative Father Registry under Section 12.1 of this Act; (c) any person who at the time of the filing of the petition is registered in the Putative Father Registry under Section 12.1 of this Act as the putative father of the child; (d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's father; (e) any person who is openly living with the child or the child's mother at the time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the child's father; (f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother in a written, sworn statement, including an Affidavit of Identification as specified under Section 11 of this Act; (g) any person who was married to the child's mother on the date of the child's birth or within 300 days prior to the child's birth. The sole purpose of notice under this Section shall be to enable the person receiving notice to appear in the adoption proceedings to present evidence to the court relevant to whether the consent or surrender of the person to the adoption is required pursuant to Section 8 of this Act. If the court determines that the consent or surrender of the person is not required pursuant to Section 8, then the person shall not be entitled to participate in the proceedings or to any further notice of the proceedings. and § 750 ILCS 50/12a. Notice to putative father Upon the written request to any Clerk of any Circuit Court . . . a notice, the declaration of paternity and the disclaimer of paternity may be served on a putative father in the same manner as Summons is served in other civil proceedings, or, in lieu of personal service, service may be made as follows: . . . The Clerk shall forthwith mail to the putative father, at the address appearing in the Affidavit, the copy of the notice, the declaration of paternity and the disclaimer of paternity, by certified mail, return receipt requested; Consent requirements are as follows (line breaks added editorially, provisions for cases where there is a surrender to an agency and then a later adoption rather than a direct adoption, which are substantially similar, are also omitted): § 750 ILCS 50/8. Consents to adoption and surrenders for purposes of adoption (a) Except as hereinafter provided in this Section consents or surrenders shall be required in all cases, unless the person whose consent or surrender would otherwise be required shall be found by the court: (1) to be an unfit person as defined in Section 1 of this Act, by clear and convincing evidence; or (2) not to be the biological or adoptive father of the child; or (3) to have waived his parental rights to the child under Section 12a or 12.1 or subsection S of Section 10 of this Act; or (4) to be the parent of an adult sought to be adopted; or (5) to be the father of the child as a result of criminal sexual abuse or assault as defined under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012; or (6) to be the father of a child who: (i) is a family member of the mother of the child, and the mother is under the age of 18 at the time of the child's conception; for purposes of this subsection, a "family member" is a parent, step-parent, grandparent, step-grandparent, sibling, or cousin of the first degree, whether by whole blood, half-blood, or adoption, as well as a person age 18 or over at the time of the child's conception who has resided in the household with the mother continuously for at least one year; or (ii) is at least 5 years older than the child's mother, and the mother was under the age of 17 at the time of the child's conception, unless the mother and father voluntarily acknowledge the father's paternity of the child by marrying or by establishing the father's paternity by consent of the parties pursuant to the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 or pursuant to a substantially similar statute in another state. A criminal conviction of any offense pursuant to Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-1.70, 12C-5, 12C-10, 12C-35, 12C-40, 12C-45, 18-6, 19-6, or Article 12 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 is not required. (b) Where consents are required in the case of an adoption of a minor child, the consents of the following persons shall be sufficient: (1) (A) The mother of the minor child; and (B) The father of the minor child, if the father: (i) was married to the mother on the date of birth of the child or within 300 days before the birth of the child, except for a husband or former husband who has been found by a court of competent jurisdiction not to be the biological father of the child; or (ii) is the father of the child under a judgment for adoption, an order of parentage, or an acknowledgment of parentage or paternity pursuant to subsection (a) of Section 5 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 or pursuant to Article 3 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015; or (iii) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents less than 6 months after birth, openly lived with the child, the child's biological mother, or both, and held himself out to be the child's biological father during the first 30 days following the birth of the child; or (iv) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents less than 6 months after birth, made a good faith effort to pay a reasonable amount of the expenses related to the birth of the child and to provide a reasonable amount for the financial support of the child before the expiration of 30 days following the birth of the child, provided that the court may consider in its determination all relevant circumstances, including the financial condition of both biological parents; or (v) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents more than 6 months after birth, has maintained substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child as manifested by: (I) the payment by the father toward the support of the child of a fair and reasonable sum, according to the father's means, and either (II) the father's visiting the child at least monthly when physically and financially able to do so and not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child, or (III) the father's regular communication with the child or with the person or agency having the care or custody of the child, when physically and financially unable to visit the child or prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child. The subjective intent of the father, whether expressed or otherwise unsupported by evidence of acts specified in this sub-paragraph as manifesting such intent, shall not preclude a determination that the father failed to maintain substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child; or (vi) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents more than six months after birth, openly lived with the child for a period of six months within the one year period immediately preceding the placement of the child for adoption and openly held himself out to be the father of the child; or (vii) has timely registered with Putative Father Registry, as provided in Section 12.1 of this Act, and prior to the expiration of 30 days from the date of such registration, commenced legal proceedings to establish paternity under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, under the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, or under the law of the jurisdiction of the child's birth; or . . . (4) Any person or agency having legal custody of a child by court order if the parental rights of the parents have been judicially terminated, and the court having jurisdiction of the guardianship of the child has authorized the consent to the adoption; or (5) The execution and verification of the petition by any petitioner who is also a parent of the child sought to be adopted shall be sufficient evidence of such parent's consent to the adoption. There are rules governing when a parent may consent to adoption: § 750 ILCS 50/9. Time for signing a waiver, consent, or surrender A. A consent or a surrender signed not less than 72 hours after the birth of the child is irrevocable except as provided in Section 11 of this Act. B. No consent or surrender shall be signed within the 72 hour period immediately following the birth of the child. C. A consent or a surrender may be signed by the father prior to the birth of the child. Such consent or surrender shall be revoked if, within 72 hours after the birth of the child, the father who gave such consent or surrender, notifies in writing the person, agency or court representative who acknowledged the surrender or consent or any individual representing or connected with such person, agency or court representative of the revocation of the consent or surrender. D. Any consent or surrender signed in accordance with paragraph C above which is not revoked within 72 hours after the birth of the child is irrevocable except as provided in Section 11 of this Act. . . . F. A waiver as provided in subsection S of Section 10 of this Act may be signed by a putative father or legal father of the child at any time prior to or after the birth of the child. A waiver is irrevocable except as provided in Section 11 of this Act. Consents and waivers have to follow a standard form with warnings in it set forth in Section 10 of the Act. An Affidavit of Identification by the mother has legal effect is she executes it as set forth in the section below, but it is optional and other forms of due diligence are permitted: § 750 ILCS 50/11. Consents, surrenders, waivers, irrevocability (a) A consent to adoption or standby adoption by a parent, including a minor, executed and acknowledged in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 of this Act, or a surrender of a child by a parent, including a minor, to an agency for the purpose of adoption shall be irrevocable unless it shall have been obtained by fraud or duress on the part of the person before whom such consent, surrender, or other document equivalent to a surrender is acknowledged pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of this Act or on the part of the adopting parents or their agents and a court of competent jurisdiction shall so find. No action to void or revoke a consent to or surrender for adoption, including an action based on fraud or duress, may be commenced after 12 months from the date the consent or surrender was executed. The consent or surrender of a parent who is a minor shall not be voidable because of such minority. (a-1) A waiver signed by a putative or legal father, including a minor, executed and acknowledged in accordance with Section 10 of this Act, shall be irrevocable unless it shall have been obtained by fraud or duress on the part of the adopting parents or their agents and a court of competent jurisdiction shall so find. No action to void a waiver may be commenced after 12 months from the date the waiver was executed. The waiver of a putative or legal father who is a minor shall not be voidable because of such minority. (b) The petitioners in an adoption proceeding are entitled to rely upon a sworn statement of the biological mother of the child to be adopted identifying the father of her child. The affidavit shall be conclusive evidence as to the biological mother regarding the facts stated therein, and shall create a rebuttable presumption of truth as to the biological father only. Except as provided in Section 11 of this Act, the biological mother of the child shall be permanently barred from attacking the proceeding thereafter. The biological mother shall execute such affidavit in writing and under oath. The affidavit shall be executed by the biological mother before or at the time of execution of the consent or surrender, and shall be retained by the court and be a part of the Court's files. One could read the language above as requiring an Affidavit of Identification, but there is also a fair reading of it that states that it is only one possible means of many to determine who is entitled to notice. In other words "shall execute" could mean that if you execute it at all, it must be in writing and under oath. The "shall be executed by the biological mother before or at the time of execution of the consent or surrender" language seems more firm, but in practice, even if she does sign it under oath, if she simply says "I don't know" there is really no way that anyone can prove anything different in a way that would stick and criminal perjury convictions, in practice, are almost completely non-existent. The Putative Father registry is subject to the following rules: § 750 ILCS 50/12.1. Putative Father Registry The Department of Children and Family Services shall establish a Putative Father Registry for the purpose of determining the identity and location of a putative father of a minor child who is, or is expected to be, the subject of an adoption proceeding, in order to provide notice of such proceeding to the putative father. . . . (a) The Department shall maintain the following information in the Registry: (1) With respect to the putative father: (i) Name, including any other names by which the putative father may be known and that he may provide to the Registry; (ii)Address at which he may be served with notice of a petition under this Act, including any change of address; (iii) Social Security Number; (iv)Date of birth; and (v) If applicable, a certified copy of an order by a court of this State or of another state or territory of the United States adjudicating the putative father to be the father of the child. (2) With respect to the mother of the child: (i) Name, including all other names known to the putative father by which the mother may be known; (ii) If known to the putative father, her last address; (iii)Social Security Number; and (iv)Date of birth. (3) If known to the putative father, the name, gender, place of birth, and date of birth or anticipated date of birth of the child. (4) The date that the Department received the putative father's registration. . . . (b) A putative father may register with the Department before the birth of the child but shall register no later than 30 days after the birth of the child. All registrations shall be in writing and signed by the putative father. No fee shall be charged for the initial registration. The Department shall have no independent obligation to gather the information to be maintained. (c) An interested party, including persons intending to adopt a child, a child welfare agency with whom the mother has placed or has given written notice of her intention to place a child for adoption, the mother of the child, or an attorney representing an interested party may request that the Department search the Registry to determine whether a putative father is registered in relation to a child who is or may be the subject to an adoption petition. . . . (d) A search of the Registry may be proven by the production of a certified copy of the registration form, or by the certified statement of the administrator of the Registry that after a search, no registration of a putative father in relation to a child who is or may be the subject of an adoption petition could be located. (e) Except as otherwise provided, information contained within the Registry is confidential and shall not be published or open to public inspection. (f) A person who knowingly or intentionally registers false information under this Section commits a Class B misdemeanor. A person who knowingly or intentionally releases confidential information in violation of this Section commits a Class B misdemeanor. (g) Except as provided in subsections (b) or (c) of Section 8 of this Act, a putative father who fails to register with the Putative Father Registry as provided in this Section is barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to assert any interest in the child, unless he proves by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) it was not possible for him to register within the period of time specified in subsection (b) of this Section; and (2) his failure to register was through no fault of his own; and (3) he registered within 10 days after it became possible for him to file. A lack of knowledge of the pregnancy or birth is not an acceptable reason for failure to register. (h) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of Section 8 of this Act, failure to timely register with the Putative Father Registry (i) shall be deemed to be a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of the child, and the consent or surrender of that person to the adoption of the child is not required, and (ii) shall constitute an abandonment of the child and shall be prima facie evidence of sufficient grounds to support termination of such father's parental rights under this Act. (i) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to a child born out of wedlock, if there is no showing that a putative father has executed a consent or surrender or waived his rights regarding the proposed adoption, certification as specified in subsection (d) shall be filed with the court prior to entry of a final judgment order of adoption. (j) The Registry shall not be used to notify a putative father who is the father of a child as a result of criminal sexual abuse or assault as defined under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012. This is limited by two other main provisions: § 750 ILCS 50/20b. Time limit for relief from final judgment or order A petition for relief from a final order or judgment entered in a proceeding under this Act, after 30 days from the entry thereof under the provisions of Sec. 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise, must be filed not later than one year after the entry of the order or judgment. and Illinois Compiled Statutes Rights and Remedies Chapter 750. Families Act 55. Contest of Adoptions Act Current through P.A. 99-0919 (2015-2016) § 750 ILCS 55/1. No attack upon or proceedings contesting the validity of an adoption decree heretofore entered shall be made either directly or collaterally because of the failure to serve notice on or give notice to the reputed father, unless such attack or proceedings shall be instituted within one year after the effective date of this Act. (The effective date was in 1949.)	In the UK, male circumcision is legal, and only requires 2 things: That consent is obtained, if the subject is too young to give informed consent, the parent can give it. The caveat here is that you have to be able to give parental consent. Simply being the biological father is not enough, an unmarried father is not automatically given "parental responsibility" and must be obtained through courts. That the procedure is performed by a "competent person". This is not necessarily a doctor There also needs to be a consent with both parents. One case in the UK involved a Muslim father wanting to circumcise his son. The mother disagreed and the court upheld the refusal of permission to perform the procedure until the child was of age to decide for themselves. For many, this is a matter of faith, such as with Muslim and Jewish communities. In Jewish communities, the circumcision (a ceremony called a "Bris" or b'rit milah) and the circumcision is either performed by the father or his representative, but is almost always performed by somebody trained in the procedure, dictated by the "mohel" and are usually physicians... Either way, written consent is not required, there are no documents to sign, forms to mail in to the government, etc. The only things that need to happen is that parent(s) who have parental responsibility must agree and consent, and that the procedure be performed by a "competent person".
Does attorney client privilege prevent one of your lawyers from disclosing facts to another one of your lawyers without your consent? Suppose I hire a lawyer to represent me on one matter and hire another lawyer to represent me on another matter. Do things I tell one attorney remain privileged from the other attorney? I am not saying this is a great legal strategy, but I am curious if privileged information continues to be privileged even to other attorneys representing the same person.	The issue is more one of what an attorney is ethically authorized to disclose pursuant to professional ethics rules (Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 as enacted locally) more than one of attorney-client privilege. Attorney-client privilege governs what someone can or cannot be compelled to disclose without their consent (usually by subpoena). Attorney confidentiality, in contrast, governs what an attorney can disclosed when not compelled to do so by something like a subpoena. Generally, disclosure of confidential client information is allowed if it is in furtherance of the representation or authorized by the client (there are also other exceptions but those aren't really any different in a two lawyer v. one lawyer situation). Often when two attorneys represent the same person (and the disclosure won't waive the privileged nature of the information vis-a-vis third-parties under a joint defense theory), disclosures from one attorney for a person to another attorney for a person will do that. In practice, however, the analysis could be quite fact specific and there isn't really a bright line rule governing when it would or would not be allowed.	Yes, One Can In the United States, one may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify or otherwise give information that might tend to implicate the speaker in a crime. This is true in any court proceeding, civil or criminal, whether the person asserting the privilege is an accused, a witness, or a party to a civil case. It may be asserted in a Grand Jury or trial proceeding. One may also assert the privilege under police interrogation, or in an administrative proceeding. One may also assert it when testifying before Congress, a state legislature, or any local legislative body. One may also assert it when testifying before a government agency, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission. Asserting the privilege is often informally called "pleading the Fifth", although strictly speaking "pleading" is something that only an accused does (as in "I plead not guilty"). The availability of the privilege in civil cases has been true at least since the Saline Bank case of 1828 (see below). The privilege is not available when no criminal prosecution is legally possible, such as when the statute of limitations has expired, or when the law invoked has been held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, and no other valid law applies. Thus, if an authorized government official (usually a prosecutor) offers a grant of immunity, the privilege is no longer available on matters covered by the grant, and the person asserting it must then testify on such matters. The privilege may be asserted when the person doing so is actually guilty, or when the person is not guilty, but has a reasonable belief that the statements asked for might be used against the speaker in some current or future criminal proceeding. A person who has been tried for a crime nut had the case end in a mistrial, or a dismissal without prejudice, could still be re-tried for that accusation, and so may assert the privilege. Any assertion must be clear, but need not use a specific form of worfs. The standard form advised by many lawyers is I decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me. but less formal wording such as 'I take the Fifth" will also serve to assert the privilege. When the privilege is asserted in a court case, the Judge may question the person asserting it in private, off the record, to determine whether the fear of incrimination is reasonable. Case Law Saline Bank (1828) In the case of United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. 100 (1828) Chief Justice Marshall wrote: It is apparent that, in every step of the suit, the facts required to be discovered in support of this suit would expose the parties to danger. The rule clearly is that a party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to penalties, and this case falls within it. [This case was cited in Murphy, below] Saline Bank was a civil suit by the US treasury in Federal curt against an apparently unincorporated bank, but a Virginia state law of the time made it a crime to operate or participate in a bank without a proper charter. Thus the Marshall Court held that a witness in a civil suit could assert the privilege against the future possibility of a state criminal proceeding. Kastigar (1972) In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) the US Supreme Court wrote (footnotes omitted): It [the privilege against self-incrimination] can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has been zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the privilege [Citing the Miranda case in a footnote]. (Kastigar was a case in which people subpoenaed before a Grand Jury asserted the privilege, were granted immunity, and still refused to testify, alleging that the grant of immunity was not enough to revoke the privialge. They were held in contempt, appealed, and the Court held that the immunity was sufficient to allow the witnesses to be compelled to testify. In the court of its opinion, the Kastigar Court reviewed the history of the privilege and of immunity statutes in some detail.) Murphy (1964) In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) the US Supreme Court wrote: We have held today that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be deemed fully applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. ... Petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor concerning a work stoppage at the Hoboken, New Jersey, piers. After refusing to respond to certain questions about the stoppage on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminated them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey and New York. [Footnote 2] Notwithstanding this grant of immunity, they still refused to respond to the questions on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law, to which the grant of immunity did not purport to extend. [This case was cited in Kastigar above.] McCarthy v. Arndstein (1924) In McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (footnotes omitted, boldface added) The US Supreme Court wrote: The case is now before us on rehearing, granted in order to permit argument of the proposition, not presented by counsel before, that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to an examination of the bankrupt made for the purpose of obtaining possession of property belonging to his estate. ... The contention now is that the privilege against self-incrimination ought to have been disallowed because, under the Constitution, it does not extend to the examination of a bankrupt in a bankruptcy proceeding. The government insists broadly that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in any civil proceeding. The contrary must be accepted as settled. The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. The privilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also a party defendant. It protects likewise the owner of goods which may be forfeited in a penal proceeding. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 142 U. S. 563-564. The government urges more strongly a narrower contention. It claims that the constitutional privilege does not relieve a bankrupt from the duty to give information which is sought for the purpose of discovering his estate. It asserts that, in England, such an exception to the common law privilege prevails, and that the exception had been established there prior to the Declaration of Independence. Whatever may be the rule in England, it is clear that, in America, the constitutional prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination has not been so limited.	Confidential is simply a less "forceful" name than "privilege". If something is "confidential", this means that the recipient won't voluntarily blab it. This covers a multitude of sins. The rubric I was taught in law school is that even the front page headline of the New York Times if it relates to your case, it is confidential, because you don't want to tip off an adversary who may not have read that paper that day for some reason to the disadvantage of your client. If something is privileged, you can't be compelled to do so involuntarily. A "privilege" is a more "forceful" word. In practice, most stuff that you have a legitimate need to keep secret in the face of compulsory evidence gathering tools are privileged, and confidential matters not covered by a privilege are kept that way because it is best practice not to be source of an opponent's discovery of information and not because it can't be found any other way from something that someone has a legitimate reason to keep secret from someone in a lawsuit or criminal case (which is the main circumstance when privileges are invoked).	Yes. Making statements in a legally protected confidential context is not publishing them, and in most jurisdictions, defamation must be published to create a cause of action. In such a case the patient might well have a cause of action against the therapist for violation of patient confidentially, and a complaint to the relevant authority could get the therapist's license revoked, or perhaps a censure from the licensing authority, whatever it is the the jurisdiction. Note "published" does not have to mean putting them in print, but does mean making them in such a way that general circulation of them is plausible. In addition, such statements may be coered by a qualified privilege. In Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 135, 387 A.2d 1129 (1978) the Maryland Supreme Court (reviewing a case from the Court of Special Appeals) held (at 135-136) that: ... the common law recognized that a person ought to be shielded against civil liability for defamation where, in good faith, he publishes a statement in furtherance of his own legitimate interests, or those shared in common with the recipient or third parties, ... The Maryland court went on to quote the Restatement (Second) of Torts, (Scope Note preceding § 593 (1977)) which states that if a privilege were not granted: information that should be given or received would not be communicated because of [the] fear of . . . persons capable of giving it that they would be held liable in an action of defamation if their statements were untrue. It would seem that a statement by a person to his or her own therapist, as a part of therapy, and intended to be held in confidence by the therapist, ought to fall under this definition of privilege, although I cannot find any actual case with this exact fact pattern. If the person knew or had reason to know that the therapist was likely to repeat the statement, that would be different. If the person and the therapist were not in a practitioner/patient relationship, with its normal expectations of confidentiality, that also would be different.	If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically.	What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? A private lawyer's job is to look out for the client's interests before the public interest in these cases. In many states, a private lawyer is not permitted to threaten to seek a criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil action. A private lawyer, myself included, will often deliberately not pursue criminal charges in order to not impair the ability of a client to collect a judgment. A prosecutor has wide discretion to prosecute or not when the prosecutor is aware of a crime that there is probable cause to believe was committed. A complaint by the victim is not required in the U.S., but most prosecutors consider a victim's wishes. A prosecutor may ethically make prosecution dependent upon making a victim whole. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? What is "fair" is beyond the scope of Law.SE which deals in "what is", not in what is "fair". Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict? Not really. Just the good judgment of the individual actors in the system given their respective duties and roles.	It's a bit like talking to the police: anything you say might be used against you, so the conventional wisdom is to say nothing. It is a good rule of thumb. When you are paying a professional to represent you, why make things complicated by speaking on your own behalf about the same issue? As you point out, not everyone follows this rule. In some circumstances there might be benefits to discussing your case publicly, such as fundraising or deterrence. Whether the risk outweighs the benefits will depend on the details of the legal case and your role in it. Lawyers are likely to emphasise the following risks: If you are a witness whose credibility is in issue, any public statement could potentially become a prior inconsistent statement which is used against you in cross-examination. Again, one of the purposes of hiring a lawyer is to be careful about how you communicate your position on a litigious matter and reduce the risk of careless remarks having unexpected consequences. Speaking publicly undermines this goal. In Commonwealth countries, there is a significant risk that public comment on a case before the court could amount to sub judice contempt of court. Attempting to litigate the case in the media can be perceived as undermining the authority of the court. Lawyers are expected to uphold public confidence in the administration of justice and would be reluctant to condone anything that could be regarded as a contempt. This contributes to a culture where discussing active litigation is "not the done thing" and may itself cause problems with a witness's perceived credibility, aside from the risk of a contempt allegation. Speaking publicly about litigation is risky and the consequences are difficult to predict, which is why people often engage lawyers to do it. When the client continues to make their own statements without legal advice, it makes the lawyer's risk management job more difficult, so they are likely to advise against it.	The purpose of the conflict of interest rules is to ensure that attorneys are acting in the interests of the clients they represent in that particular case and not their own interests, the interests of their friends or families, or the interests of their other clients. If a person is representing themselves, it is impossible for them to have a conflict of interest that would prevent them from serving their own interest because any such conflict could only change their interest. Say Alice wants to represent herself in a lawsuit against Bob and Bob hires Charlie to represent him. Even if Charlie is a close friend of Alice, that couldn't cause Alice to act against her own interests out of friendship to Charlie. Necessarily, she would only act in Charlie's interests if it was in her own interest to do so. So there simply cannot be a conflict that would prevent a person from acting in their own interest. They could only put someone else's interest above their own if it was in their own interest to do so, in which case it would not be putting anything above their own interest.
Do NDAs limit disclosure of their own terms I have always been interested in putting up a website where people upload NDAs. They would be properly redacted if applicable and reviewed. I have worked in software for a long time, in many positions, and the variety of NDA silliness is out of this world. I have always wanted to get these in the public domain, ideally associated with the parent company, to provide a forum for discussion on NDA abuse. The succinct question is "Can this be done legally?". I see an NDA as a pseudo-public document, something you need to read in detail before you acknowledge and opt-in to limit rights (discussion of topic/tech). Mainly interested in USA.	The question reads: I see an NDA as a pseudo-public document, something you need to read in detail before you acknowledge and opt-in to limit rights (discussion of topic/tech). Unfortunately for this view, the law normally sees an NDA as a private contract, except when it is alleged that it violates public policy. If an NDA explicitly or implicitly includes itself in the list of things not to be disclosed, then posting it would be a violation of the contract. In such a case the party posting the agreement would be subject to whatever consequence the agreement specifies for violation, unless that person had a valid defense. The operator of a web site where the document might be posted would not normally ne a party to the agreement, and so would not be liable for hosting it, unless some other limitation applies, beyond the NDA itself. An NDA can indeed be a significant limitation on the signer's freedom to discuss certain topics, and a person would be wise to consider it in detail, and perhaps consult a lawyer, before signing one. But that does not mean that the person should post or distribute it publicly, nor that the person is automatically entitled to consult NDAs that others have signed. There are sufficient sample NDA forms available that a person can compare an offered NDA with other possibilities, and get an idea if an offered NDA goes beyond the usual terms.	It depends on what you are selling to the enterprises. You could be selling just a licence to use the program, and retain all the rights on the source code. You could be selling the rights to the source code. For #1, the source code is yours and you can do what it pleases with it1. In fact many programs offer both an open-source licence (which usually forces the user to make its changes to the code publicly available) and a commercial one (which allows the user to keep the modifications of the source code for themselves). For #2, the source code is no longer yours so it is not up to you to decide what to do with it. 1I am assuming no other agreements imposing limits on those; for example that none of your contracts to your customers have a clause forbidding you from making the code available to the public.	are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright.	The inventor or would-be developer can require potential investors to sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) before revealing the details of the idea. In an initial letter a statement such as "This idea is being disclosed in confidence to enable4 you to consider if you wish to invest in the project." That would put the investor on notice, and if the investor discloses it to another or makes use of the idea in a competitive project, there may be grounds for a suit for breach of confidence. If reasonable precautions are taken to disclose the information only to those under a duty of confidence, and to protected it from unauthorized disclosure, it may be protected as a trade secret, and any evasion of those precautions or breach of confidence may give grounds for a lawsuit. In the US the Uniform Trade Secret Act has been adopted by almost every state. In other jurisdictions there are other similar laws. As stated in the Wikipedia article A trade secret is information that is not generally known to the public; confers economic benefit on its holder because the information is not publicly known; and where the holder makes reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.	When you license your IP (like a song) you can specify the terms and conditions of its use by the licensee, including revenue shares from any derived work. However, if, as your comment suggests, you grant an "informal" license, and later decide that you want to "firm things up" with a license having different terms, that's a matter you would have to either negotiate or litigate with your counterparty. If you want a common reference point for negotiation of this sort of license, you might have a look at compulsory license terms.	If you develop a program yourself and it wasn't a work made for hire, then the program is yours to do with as you please. You hold the copyright to it. Many developers choose existing licencing arrangements or they can choose to create a license on their own, or using an attorney. And sometimes they choose to release their programs into the public domain. If you release it into the public domain, you are essentially giving up your copyright. The IDE (Integrated Development Environment) you used to develop your program does not dictate what licenses you can use. There are some existing licenses that others use (which you are free to use or NOT to use) give varying protections to you regarding what you are allowing others to do; right of others to copy, right of others to modify, right of others to distribute, rights to sub-licence, and so on. One of the licensing schemes is the GNU General Public License (GPL). But there are many others, too many to list here.	Apparently Such Files May be Distributes or Sold Section 5.e of the Google APIs Terms of Service reads: e. Prohibitions on Content Unless expressly permitted by the content owner or by applicable law, you will not, and will not permit your end users or others acting on your behalf to, do the following with content returned from the APIs: Scrape, build databases, or otherwise create permanent copies of such content, or keep cached copies longer than permitted by the cache header; Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of, sell, lease, lend, convey, distribute, publicly display, or sublicense to any third party; Misrepresent the source or ownership; or Remove, obscure, or alter any copyright, trademark, or other proprietary rights notices; or falsify or delete any author attributions, legal notices, or other labels of the origin or source of material It might seem that 5.e.2 prohibits the suggested use. But if the text is in fact in the public domain,"applicable law" (that is, copyright law) permits you, or anyone, to "Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of" or otherwise use the content. Thus 5.e.2 does not apply. Points 3 and 4 would seem to indicate that the source, including title and author information, must be included or preserved in the output files, but seems to be the only relevant restriction that applies. Response to Comment A comment by user Brian Drake questions the theory of this answer, stating: The most you can say is that copyright law does not prohibit certain conduct (and even that is not clear: just because the text is in the public domain does not necessarily mean that the audio is in the public domain); this does not mean that copyright law expressly permits that conduct. US Copyright law does not define what constitutes the public domain. Rather it defines what is protected by copyright, and specifies some cases in whch a work is not protected. (For nexample, 17 USC 105 provides tht works of the US Federal Government are not protected.) Anything not included in the protection of copyright is in the public domain. This has been confirmed by many cour cases and legal writings. Law generally follows the rule "Anything not forbidden is allowed." Audio as Derivitive Work An audio recording of a person reading a text aloud would be a derivative work of that text, and would normally have its own copyright, if created lawfully. (If the recording was of a text protected by copyright, made without permission and outside of fair use, it was not made lawfully and the infringer has no copyright in the recording at all.) But US courts have held that a work created by a mechanical or automatic process, including many computer programs, is not an "original work of authorship" and thus is not protected by copyright at all, and is thus in the Public Domain. The case of the "Monkey Selfie" is on point. ("Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, § 313.2" (PDF). United States Copyright Office. 22 December 2014. p. 22. "To qualify as a work of 'authorship' a work must be created by a human being.... Works that do not satisfy this requirement are not copyrightable. The Office will not register works produced by nature, animals, or plants." Moreover, if the audio were protected by copyright, it would presumably be owned by the person who ran the program, and 17 USC 106 specifically grants the copyright owner permission to distribute copies. Sources The Wikipedia article "Public Domain" reads in relevant part (citations omitted): The public domain consists of all the creative work to which no exclusive intellectual property rights apply. Those rights may have expired,[1] been forfeited, expressly waived, or may be inapplicable. ... As rights vary by country and jurisdiction, a work may be subject to rights in one country and be in the public domain in another. Some rights depend on registrations on a country-by-country basis, and the absence of registration in a particular country, if required, gives rise to public-domain status for a work in that country. ... Definitions of the boundaries of the public domain in relation to copyright, or intellectual property more generally, regard the public domain as a negative space; that is, it consists of works that are no longer in copyright term or were never protected by copyright law. According to James Boyle this definition underlines common usage of the term public domain and equates the public domain to public property and works in copyright to private property. However, the usage of the term public domain can be more granular, including for example uses of works in copyright permitted by copyright exceptions. Such a definition regards work in copyright as private property subject to fair-use rights and limitation on ownership "How Can I Use Copyright-Free Works (in the Public Domain)?" by Nolo Press reads: Copyright law gives creators certain exclusive rights. These rights include the exclusive ability to copy, distribute, and perform the copyrighted work. But copyright is not infinite. Rather, it provides copyright holders with protections for a limited duration. When a work becomes available for use without permission from a copyright owner, it is said to be "in the public domain." Most works enter the public domain because their copyrights have expired. The Legal Information Institute (LII) article "public domain" reads: The public domain includes every creative work that is no longer protected by a copyright, trademark, or patent. Creative works that are no longer protected are owned by the general public rather than the original creator. As such, the work is free to be copied, performed, or otherwise used by anyone. "Copyright and Scholarship: Public Domain" from Boston College Libraries reads in relevant part: "Public domain" works are not protected by copyright. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. An important caveat regarding public domain material is that collections, new editions, and derivative works of public domain material may all be protected by copyright. With collections, an author could collect public domain works in a book or display them on a website, and the collection as a whole could be protected by copyright, even though individual works within it are not. "Welcome to the Public Domain" (Stanford libraries) reads in relevant part: The term “public domain” refers to creative materials that are not protected by intellectual property laws such as copyright, trademark, or patent laws. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. Wikipedia article "Monkey selfie copyright dispute" "A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos" (AP) reads in relevant part: A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos, a federal judge said Wednesday. U.S. District Judge William Orrick said in federal court in San Francisco that "while Congress and the president can extend the protection of law to animals as well as humans, there is no indication that they did so in the Copyright Act." NARUTO, a Crested Macaque, by and through his Next Friends, People forthe Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., v. DAVID JOHN SLATER; BLURB, INC., ; WILDLIFE PERSONALITIES, LTD." (Ninth Circuit full opinion April 23, 2018 No. 16-15469, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-04324-WHO) reads in part: We must determine whether a monkey may sue humans, corporations, and companies for damages and injunctive relief arising from claims of copyright infringement. Our court’s precedent requires us to conclude that the monkey’s claim has standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Nonetheless, we conclude that this monkey—and all animals, since they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court	Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test.
Under US law, what happens if it is not possible to gather an impartial jury? In 2017, Martin Shkreli was convicted of securities fraud and sentenced to prison. The transcripts of his jury selection show that there was some difficulty in finding jurors who would admit to being able to judge the case fairly. Here are some examples of the jury selection interviews. So, my question is: Under US law, what happens if it is practically impossible to assemble a jury, either because no-one will admit to being impartial, or for any other reason?	In the U.S., in a criminal case, there is a right to a speedy trial, and if a jury cannot be assembled by that deadline (as extended by available extensions) for reasons that are not the defendant's fault, than the charges must be dismissed. Usually, the issue is not finding enough impartial jurors in high profile cases, which takes time but can be done, but in not finding enough jurors at all, where response rates to jury summonses are low and the municipality is a small one.	There is no answer to the question, as presented. The criminal law differs in various respects in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland: one cannot speak of 'UK law', because criminal procedure is really very different in the three separate jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the rules of criminal procedure are what govern the issue raised in the question, rather than the substantive laws relating to the various charges which might be brought; and while the substantive laws in England and Scotland are often fairly similar, the procedures are usually very dissimilar. In a trial at the Old Bailey, in London, a Jury has no role in the criminal procedure: once empanelled it performs its usual function of deciding the facts of the case, based upon the evidence presented, but it has no role in determining what charges are preferred against the accused (this is decided by a different court at a much earlier procedural stage), and the jury has no power to alter the charges on the indictment. Only the prosecution can decide what charges are made against an accused person. And if an amendment to the indictment is thought to be appropriate, only the prosecuting barrister can make such a change. If the case has come-on for trial, the permission of the Judge must usually be obtained to any alteration in the charges. The Judge might object to an attempt to add a charge carrying a more severe penalty at a late stage in the proceedings (as the case may of course have already taken many months to reach the Old Bailey). He will often be more accommodating to an application to reduce the charges, to a lesser offence, particularly if accompanied by an undertaking not to proceed on a more serious charge - e.g. due to a lack of evidence supporting it. Where several charges are brought in the alternative, then the jury has a function, since it can then convict of a lesser charge if the evidence on a more serious one does not satisfy it. But it cannot ask for the charges to be altered: the jury represents the layman, and jurymen are inevitably not legally qualified (at one time, being legally qualified was an automatic disqualification from serving on a jury). So the jury is assumed to be incapable of understanding the fine distinctions between different offences, and has no role whatsoever in deciding which offences shall be included on the indictment. Even the Barrister representing the accused has no role in determining which charges his client will face: that is purely a function of the Crown Prosecutor's office, and once the trial has come-on at the Bailey only the prosecuting Barrister and the Judge truly have a role in making any necessary amendments. The function of defending Counsel is to strike a plea-bargain, if he can, and where the opportunity arises: which is to say, if he can persuade his client to plead guilty to a minor charge (whether or not on the indictment), and can also persuade the prosecutor not to proceed on the more serious charge(s) on the indictment. A Judge will not usually object to a legally-represented defendant applying, by consent (i.e. through the prosecutor), to amend the indictment in order to enter a plea of guilty. He might refuse, if the accused has no legal representation, but not otherwise. The short answer, therefore, is that in England and Wales a defendant cannot be convicted on a charge that is not listed on the indictment, but a jury can convict of any charge on the indictment if the judge asks the jury to retire and consider a verdict - but the case may not get so far as that, if a plea-bargain is struck. There are rare occasions where a judge might withdraw a charge, if he desires, by directing the jury to acquit on that particular charge, but this only occurs if he considers that any conviction on that charge would be positively unsafe in all the circumstances of the case.	You asked, "could that guy as defendant claim self defense and win?" First let's try to make it clear what is meant by "win". In the Rittenhouse trial, the defendant was charged of the following crimes: First-degree reckless homicide First-degree recklessly endangering safety (x2) First-degree intentional homicide Attempted first-degree intentional homicide Possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18 (dismissed) Failure to comply with an emergency order from state or local government (dismissed) Rather than thinking of the defendant as a "winner", it might be more appropriate to say that he was "acquitted" of these charges. If someone that was involved in the conflict fired first, as you described here: "They encounter each other when each is leaning or reaching or tripping, or whatever it would take for them to unintentionally point their gun at your head. You react and you raise your gun in defense, he spots your move and points his at you. You both fire. You shoot each other and you both are gravely injured. Like, paralyzed", then would they also be acquitted of all of the non-dismissed charges listed above? If everything was as you described ("unintentional", "reactionary", and "in defense"), then likely they would also not be found guilty of those crimes. It's not like they would "win", it's more like they will not be found guilty of committing one of those crimes. The precise outcome will depend on all the facts involved in the case, and the jury's decision based on those facts. So there is no single answer that always applies to every situation, but it sounds like you're wondering about some hypothetical situation that appears to be paradoxical because in this case only one person was charged with crimes: if someone else was the first shooter, the sequence of following events would first of all depend on whether or not they got charged with a crime, and I wouldn't characterize the outcome as a "win" or "lose" but as an "acquittal" or "conviction", and yes it is possible to be acquitted if everything is "accidental" as you described, and presumably not "reckless" (often meaning that a reasonable person in the same situation would have done the same thing). About your more broad question: "Is mutual self defense a thing?" It depends on what crime is being charged against the defendant. In the Rittenhouse case there was only one person that was charged. If you're asking about a hypothetical situation in which two people involved in a 1-on-1 conflict both claim self-defense, I hope I can assume that they were both charged with a crime against which to defend themselves in court in the first place. It is indeed possible for a State to prosecute both parties of a 1-on-1 physical conflict, and for both of them to successfully claim self-defense in order to eventually be both acquitted. It wouldn't be called "mutual self-defense", but each defendant would make their own self-defense case individually.	Is this normal? Pretty much. Witnesses lie in court all the time (in my experience, defendants, law enforcement officers and medical doctors are the most likely to lie). Dealing with a witness who lies in court under oath effectively is one of the most challenging tasks lawyers face. It is an inherently challenging hurdle to proving or defending a case. The facts as presented in court often differ in some material way from reality. It is a pretty tough thing to accurately measure, but my gut estimate would be that this happens in a least 30%-40% of cases that produce contested trials, although not infrequently, a judge or jury will not find the false testimony to be credible. On the other hand, it isn't at all uncommon (probably at least 10% of the time) for a judge or jury to believe the liars to be telling the truth, and to find the people who are telling the truth to be less credible. There is absolute immunity from civil liability for lying in court testimony, although it could, in theory, give rise to contempt of court sanctions from the judge in some circumstances, or to a prosecution for perjury. But, perjury prosecutions are, in practice, very rare, and a good share of them arise from false statements made in documents under oath, rather than from courtroom testimony. There is probably less than 1 perjury prosecution per 1000 provable lies made under oath in courtroom testimony on material issues that end up influencing the outcome in a case. I totally sympathize with how frustrating this situation is having been there in cases that I am litigating many, many times. But, in short, life isn't fair.	Historically (long, long ago to the point that there is no leading case establishing this rule), you could challenge a verdict based upon a failure of a judge to dismiss a juror for cause (or for improperly dismissing a juror for cause) when this was an abuse of discretion. Race is an improper reason to dismiss a juror for cause. Political views often mandate dismissal of a juror for cause if they prevent a juror from being impartial or create an appearance of bias in the jury. More recently, race or sex (but not political opinion) based exercise of peremptory challenges (which are otherwise not for cause) was a ground upon which a verdict could be challenged. The leading case is Batson v. Kentucky (1986). Just last year (2017), in a case out of Colorado, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed a verdict to be overturned because of racially discriminatory (and again, not political) motives a juror expressed for convicting a defendant in the course of jury deliberations. Jury deliberations themselves had previously been sacrosanct and not subject to investigation in the absence of an outsider interference (e.g. a third party bribe presented to a juror).	See jury-nullification. I'm not a legal historian, so I can't say for sure what the laws on jury acquittals were at that time in that jurisdiction. However, when a jury has final discretion to acquit a defendant of a crime that's it: They can effectively ignore laws if they want to acquit someone. Such acquittals do not set a precedent or have any bearing outside of the trial in which they issue their verdict.	Some of the documents are here. As document 61 of the trial, the government motion for bench trial, argues, There is no constitutional right to a jury trial for criminal contempt charges resulting in a sentence of imprisonment of six months or less. Arpaio responds in document 62 that Defendant Arpaio acknowledges that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for defendants charged with “petty” offenses where the maximum sentence does not exceed six months imprisonment, but continues the argument (the point being that there is no question that there is no absolute right to a jury trial, esp. in the instant case). He argues Many of the actions of the referring judge will become an issue in the case, calling into question the objectives and motives of Judge Snow. A public official’s actions and motives should and must be decided by an impartial jury of the elected official’s peers. The court order is document 83. There, The Court finds that this case is appropriate for a bench trial. This case focuses on the application of facts to the law to determine if Defendant intentionally violated a court order. Essentially, since there is no right to a jury trial and no compelling reason to grant a jury trial (e.g. the court found no merit to his argument that there would be the appearance of impropriety), the motion for a bench trial was granted. The order cites case law regarding the "not longer that 6 months" rule from Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454; United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488; United States v. Aldridge, 995 F.2d 233; United States v. Berry, 232 F.3d 897.	The only thing which has a name and sounds somewhat like what you're talking about is "jury nullification". This generally refers to the situation where a jury deliberately sets aside the judges instructions about the law and supplies their own interpretation. For example, Peter Zenger was technically guilty of seditious libel because as a matter of law the material was sedition libel and the only legal question was whether he had published it. The jury found him not guilty, on the grounds that the statements were true, but truth was not an element of the crime. It is the general pattern in the US that the judge is the only person empowered to say to the jury what the law is. By selecting specific instructions (phrased as "If you conclude X, you must find the defendant guilt", that is, stating the "finding-to-verdict" equation), the jury is given a formula for figuring out what the law says. Trial judges are not the ones who decide what the "framers" of the law intended, that comes from higher appeals courts who may study the legislative history. It can happen that a law uses an unclear phrase like "irreconcilable differences" and the jury doesn't know exactly what that means: then the judge may tell them to decide on their own, or give them a dictionary (however, there probably is an instruction for divorce law, and it's unlikely that a jury would be involved in a simple marital dissolution). It is entirely possible that jurors will end up misinterpreting what the law says in some instance, but I doubt that it happens very often. It is more likely that jurors will deviate somewhat, compared to judges in a bench trial, in matters of judgment such as whether an action is "reasonable".
Is self-reported wellness covered by HIPPA? Suppose that a developer creates a website where people can enter daily information on how they feel (energy, back pain, mood, etc.). A person's information would be available to his or her nutritionist, who may or may not have any formal certifications. Would such a website require HIPPA-level protections (in the United States)? Would it if people were also expected to report whether they have any serious medical conditions, such as cancer?	It first depends on whether you are a "covered entity". This is laid out in 45 CFR Part 160. §160.103 defines the various terms such as "covered entity", "business associate", "health plan", "health care clearinghouse", "health care provider", "health care" and so on. It is important to read all of the definitions and terms that they refer to. If you qualify as a "covered entity", then read Part 164 esp. subparts A, E, which say what must be done to comply with the law. It is fairly complicated, and if you don't want to hire an attorney to interpret these parts of the law as applied to your situation, there is no harm in assuming that you are subject to the restrictions. Still, you probably have to at least hire an attorney to figure out what the restrictions are, if you don't already know. But this is where the answer lies.	Your data is not anonymous since from the picture of the face the individual can be identified. It would be anonymous, if the face was blurred and other possible identifiable information was removed. Of course, that would defeat your purpose. Please note that, in any case, Anonymization Techniques are, themselves, a type of personal data processing that requires a legal ground, and achieving real anonymization is not a trivial matter (see Article 29 Working Party's opinion 0829/14/EN WP216 on the subject). 1. The face of a person includes biometric information, which is defined in article 4 (14) among other types of personal information regulated by the GDPR as: "personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data". A facial recognition software's purpose is exactly to perform a specific technical processing based on the facial features of the persons, to achieve a unique identification of a person based on these biometric features. Article 9 of the GDPR includes biometric data among the types of prohibited processing, unless one of the exceptions in § 2 applies. There are 10 types of exceptions among which: consent of the person, employment context, personal data made public by the person, scientific or historical research,... (each exception having its own conditions). You should check that you comply with one of these exceptions stated in article 9 § 2, if your application is about using facial images for unique identification of a person based on these biometric features. 2. In turn, if your processing is not about unique identification of a person based on these biometric features, but only about emotions recognition (which you briefly mentioned at the beginning of your post), it could be considered as not falling under the requirements of Article 9. That would still be a processing of personal information, but it would fall under the normal article 6 requirements.	SCOTUS blog regularly does posts on that kind of topic (see, e.g., their Stat Pack) and if you looked at their sources or the authors of those posts, you could probably easily find more. There are people who do that and make their findings publicly available, but I don't know them off hand.	Assuming the USA, since that's where they appear to be located. Spreading misinformation is not illegal- it is protected by the first amendment. There are exceptions but I can't see how any would apply here. You haven't mentioned any that you think apply. If some of the videos on the site guaranteed results or made medical claims, maybe that could be considered false advertising. However, I see no evidence of this. Users are advertised that paying for access to a bunch of hocum videos will get them access to a bunch of snake oil and this appears to be the case.	CNBC's explanation is simply wrong. The law says that a vaccine manufacturer is immune from suit and liability under Federal and State law with respect to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure if a declaration under subsection (b) has been issued and there was a declaration under subsection (b). This immunity is not conditioned either way by being approved, indeed the declaration states To be a Covered Countermeasure, qualified pandemic or epidemic products or security countermeasures also must be approved or cleared under the FD&C Act; licensed under the PHS Act; or authorized for emergency use under Sections 564, 564A, or 564B of the FD&C Act The liability immunity is not perpetual, the declaration says: Liability immunity for Covered Countermeasures administered and used in accordance with the public health and medical response of the Authority Having Jurisdiction begins with a Declaration and lasts through (1) the final day the emergency Declaration is in effect, or (2) October 1, 2024, whichever occurs first. That doesn't mean that there can't be another declaration in the future. Immunity of a manufacturer to liability is not related to a patient being "covered". There are other ways in which a patient could be "covered". One of them is the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program and the other is the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which presently redirects you to CICP.	A company can mandate getting a flu shot as a condition of employment. The government can do the same (for its employees) – Washington state has done so at least for covid. Some individuals qualify for a disability accommodation, so they would be exceptions (e.g. they could be moved to working away from the public). A sincere religious conviction also gives rise to a religious-accommodation exemption. This guidance addresses the question of what constitutes a sincerely held religious belief.	united-states In the United States, information released through the federal Freedom of Information (FoI) process, or any of the various state-level versions of FoI, is considered public information. The person who receives it may share it at will, or publish it. Indeed many such inquiries are made by news reporters who intend to publish the information, and many others are routinely posted to various web sites. I suspect that the law on this point in the UK is similar, but I have not checked it.	In California, psychologists are regulated under Ch 6.6 within Division 2 (Healing Arts) of the Business and Professions Code. §2902 identifies the essential restriction on the business practice, stating that "A person represents himself or herself to be a psychologist when the person holds himself or herself out to the public by any title or description of services..." using various forms of the word 'psychologist', as well as "when the person holds himself or herself out to be trained, experienced, or an expert in the field of psychology". In order to say that you are a psychologist, you have to hold a professional psychologists's license. Likewise to hold yourself out as a nurse, you need a nurse's license. A consequence of being a licensed psychologist is that under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, you may assess a patient's mental state, and you must keep that information confidential. A life coach cannot make a diagnosis, and cannot prescribe cures for mental conditions. §2908 in particular allows other people to do some of what psychologists do: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent qualified members of other recognized professional groups licensed to practice in the State of California, such as, but not limited to, physicians, clinical social workers, educational psychologists, marriage and family therapists, licensed professional clinical counselors, optometrists, psychiatric technicians, or registered nurses, or attorneys admitted to the State Bar of California, or persons utilizing hypnotic techniques by referral from persons licensed to practice medicine, dentistry, or psychology, or persons utilizing hypnotic techniques which offer avocational or vocational self-improvement and do not offer therapy for emotional or mental disorders, or duly ordained members of the recognized clergy, or duly ordained religious practitioners from doing work of a psychological nature consistent with the laws governing their respective professions, provided they do not hold themselves out to the public by any title or description of services incorporating the words “psychological,” “psychologist,” “psychology,” “psychometrist,” “psychometrics,” or “psychometry,” or that they do not state or imply that they are licensed to practice psychology; except that persons licensed under Chapter 13.5 (commencing with Section 4989.10) of Division 2 may hold themselves out to the public as licensed educational psychologists. Analogously, we can talk about the law here without running afoul of UPL laws, because "talking about the law" is not the same as "practicing law". It is a fairly formalistic distinction, but I or a life coach can talk about what would be good for your soul, as long as I don't claim to be a psychologist dispensing professional advice.
Is taking an injured person to a hospital without their consent kidnapping? I found this definition of "kidnapping" on Google: kidnap, verb. Take (someone) away illegally by force, typically to obtain a ransom. Synonyms: abduct, carry off, capture, seize, snatch, take hostage. "they attempted to kidnap the president's child" But if I am lying on ground bleeding and too weak to move much less fight, and a person I do not know/trust finds me and takes me when I don't want to go with them to his car and drives me off somewhere, even if it's to a hospital, then are they kidnapping me by law of the United States? Especially if they don't call my parents/husband?	Your question is about "Would it be kidnapping if I was injured and someone took me to a hospital without my consent", so I don't understand these other answers which say "it depends on the situation". The key point is what you mean by "without my consent". Good Samaritan laws are also relevant, which offer defenses to people who do things that would otherwise be unlawful when they are doing it with good intentions to help someone who they believe is injured or would become injured without their intervention. The main things to consider are the degree of injury, which is a spectrum ranging from no injury at all to being dead, and whether the injured person is conscious. Are you so injured that you are unconscious? In most jurisdictions, being unconscious is considered as you consenting to any actions which are done with the intent of giving you medical assistance, which is on a spectrum of saying "hey are you ok?" or shaking you in order to wake you up, all the way up to treatment including major surgery. So by being unconscious it is usually automatically consent, but if you are awake and are refusing help or treatment, even if you could die if you didn't receive treatment, it would be easy to argue that you were not consenting and that any treatment/assistance etc was unlawful. This situation sometimes happens, and EMTs are often trained to wait until the person goes unconscious to then give them medical assistance/transport etc, but assisting someone before they go unconscious could still be argued as permissible, if the injured person was so distressed that they were unable to give/refuse consent, or at least if the assistor believed that to be the case. This is why if someone has a major medical problem and is unconscious, hospitals can resuscitate them and even perform surgery without them signing a consent form. By being unconscious, it is considered that they are consenting to any necessary surgery to help them, even including amputation or other negative consequences. Conversely, if someone has a valid Advance healthcare directive on file which forbids measures such as resuscitation, they will be considered not to consent, and will usually be left alone without life-saving assistance. Resuscitating/performing surgery on someone in this case can be cause for damages to the injured person, because it would have been clear that they did not consent to such assistance.	An obvious example would be a contract that gives possession of something to someone else. It's normally legal to use some reasonable amount of force to protect or prevent trespasses against property you own, but if you give possession of that property to someone else you can lose that right. For example, you can use force remove a guest who refuses to leave real property you own, but can't use force to remove a tenant even if they broke the terms of your contract. In most jurisdictions you'd need to get a court order and have the police use force if necessary remove the tenant.	Giving someone drugs without their knowledge or consent, say in food or drink, is a criminal act. At the least it is a form of assault, and possibly a more serious crime could be supported by the facts. Note that people's reactions to drugs vary, and serious harm or even death can result from drugs that do not have serious effects on most people. Very serious criminal charges might then result. The facts should be reported to the police. If this is a case where the people receiving the drugs know about them, and want them, that is a very different matter, although it may still be illegal depending on the nature of the drugs. Note that under US law, an uninvolved witness is not normally required to report a crime, although reporting is strongly encouraged. This rule is different in different countries. That is, in some countries an ordinary citizen may be legally required to report a crime. In at least one state any person is required to report a crime if a victim is in danger of bodily harm (Wisconsin statute 940.34) There may be similar provisions in the laws of other states. People with some sort of duty of care, or who are made "mandated reporters" by statute, such as teachers and health professionals, may be legally required to file reports when they know or have reason to believe that a crime is underway or has taken place. Such statutes vary from state to state, and will be different in non-US countries.	A number of states, as well as the US Federal Government, have laws against "fetal homicide", under which a woman might be prosecuted. The Alabama law, to take one example, defines homicide A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence causes the death of another person and then defines "person" The term, when referring to the victim of a criminal homicide or assault, means a human being, including an unborn child in utero at any stage of development, regardless of viability. The abortion exception is stated thusly: Article 1 or Article 2 shall not apply to the death or injury to an unborn child alleged to be caused by medication or medical care or treatment provided to a pregnant woman when performed by a physician or other licensed health care provider but this exception, which codified a result of Roe v. Wade, could be repealed. There are various reported arrests, prosecutions and convictions of women reported here in cases where the woman did not obtain the abortion through approved medical channels. Generally, there are statutory provisions that preclude prosecution of women and physicians involved in a legal medical abortion, but you would have to carefully scrutinize the wording of those exceptions. If the exception is expressed unqualifiedly as an exception for abortion, then until the law is changed, a woman could not be prosecuting for obtaining an abortion. But if the exception is framed in terms of obtaining a legal abortion, then when abortions become illegal, prosecution of the woman becomes a possibility.	If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear.	We can look at Missouri law as an example. Missouri Statutes §577.029 says A licensed physician, registered nurse, phlebotomist, or trained medical technician, acting at the request and direction of the law enforcement officer under section 577.020, shall, with the consent of the patient or a warrant issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol content of the blood, unless such medical personnel, in his or her good faith medical judgment, believes such procedure would endanger the life or health of the person in custody. Blood may be withdrawn only by such medical personnel, but such restriction shall not apply to the taking of a breath test, a saliva specimen, or a urine specimen. In withdrawing blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol content thereof, only a previously unused and sterile needle and sterile vessel shall be utilized and the withdrawal shall otherwise be in strict accord with accepted medical practices. Upon the request of the person who is tested, full information concerning the test taken at the direction of the law enforcement officer shall be made available to him or her. "Shall" means "must" – if there is a warrant (we assume there is no consent). Then the question is, what happens if the phlebotomist (etc) refuses? First, §577.031 immunizes the medical-person from legal liability when they act in compliance with a request from a LEO (a simple request, not necessarily accompanied by a warrant). §577.033 says that being dead, unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing does not constitute withdrawal of consent (which is implied, by law). No specific penalty is prescribed for refusal to administer a court-ordered blood draw. There is no penalty for complying, there is no prescribed criminal penalty for refusing to comply with a court order (there is the possibility of a finding of contempt of court). Not every state is Missouri: I understand that Utah is different.	Does the person being searched have the right to demand the computer be turned off before it is taken on the grounds that the warrant is only for the computer, not for the activity he is currently involved in? No. A warrant will often specify that both information (which they have a reasonable suspicion is on the computer) and the computer itself (as contraband) are in the scope of the warrant. Even if it only specified specific information as the target, they can seize the computer that it may be on. The seizure takes place as-is. You don't get to tidy anything up. Things that the officers see while seizing the device or upon waking it from hibernation mode would be admissible under the "plain view" doctrine (or even just simply within the scope of the warrant, if what is on the screen is the information they're looking for).	This will probably depend on what you understand as a citizen's arrest and will probably differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Germany the closest thing to citizen's arrest is called Vorläufige Festnahme (Provisional arrest) and probably contains a different set of conditions when it can be used. § 127 Provisional arrest (1) If a person is caught in the act or is being pursued, any person shall be authorised to arrest him provisionally, even without judicial order, if there is reason to suspect flight or if his identity cannot be immediately established. The establishment of the identity of a person by the public prosecution office or by police officers shall be governed by section 163b (1). ... Through the usage of the word jedermann (any person), a child (minor) can also exercise this right. Sources: § 127 Provisional arrest - German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung – StPO)
Do the designs of cakes fall under intellectual property law (e.g. copyright) in the USA? Following on from the question Was Trump's Inauguration Cake plagiarized?: Do the designs of cakes (incorporating factors such size, shape, colour and decoration) fall under intellectual property law (e.g. copyright) in the USA?	Aspects of a cake's design can be protected by copyright. But, there are a few hurdles. First, the design needs to be original. That is, it has to be an exercise of a modicum of creativity. (Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)) Most important though, the aspect of the design that the author seeks to protect via copyright must be separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article. You couldn't protect vertical sides, or a hard, crumble-based bottom. Even in a world where those elements were original (they probably aren't) they are utilitarian aspects, driven by function, and would not be protected by copyright. (US Copyright Office: Useful Articles)1 To the extent that these elements are separable from the ultilitarian purpose of the cake (I concede that this is almost the entire question), a particular choice of shape, color, decorations, graphics, etc. can protected by copyright as a "pictorial, graphic, [or] sculptural work". 17 USC 102(a)(5) This test was most recently clarified in Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands 580 U.S. ____ (2017) (slip opinion): A feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article, and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression—if it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated. Certain elements of cake design may have become scènes à faire, stock elements commonly re-used by many authors in a given context (pillars, successive cylindrical layers, etc.). These elements would not be protected. 1. The separability of copyrightable design from functional design was considered right from the outset of the Copyright Act of 1976, in response to Mazer v Stein. H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 55 (1976): A two-dimensional painting, drawing, or graphic work is still capable of being identified as such when it is printed on or applied to utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, containers, and the like. [...] The test of separability and independence from “the utilitarian aspects of the article” does not depend upon the nature of the design—that is, even if the appearance of an article is determined by esthetic (as opposed to functional) considerations, only elements, if any, which can be identified separately from the useful article as such are copyrightable. And, even if the three-dimensional design contains some such element (for example, a carving on the back of a chair or a floral relief design on silver flatware), copyright protection would extend only to that element, and would not cover the overall configuration of the utilitarian article as such.	This case did not find that Two Live Crew's version was fair use. Rather it held that it could be fair use, contrary to the lower court ruling that its commercial nature precluded a fair use defense based on parody. The court remanded the case to be considered in light of its holding. The two parties settled without getting a final decision on fair use. It was never really contested that this work was parody. The issue was whether the commercial nature rendered it unfair. The Supreme Court told the lower courts to assess the taking under the full four-factor fair use analysis and that commercial use doesn't automatically make a parody unfair. One source of confusion is that you seem to be conflating parody and fair use. Parody is just one purpose (along with criticism, education, and others) that has been generally held to swing the balance in favour of fair use. Last, the "five word plagiarism rule" is not a legal standard.	A basic rule of trademark law is that a trademark is protected only for use in the same industry, or in regard to the same general sort of thing. "Maxwell House" for example, is the name of a brand of Coffee, and no doubt a trademark. If A business used it as the name of a brand of mobile home, it would not infringe the mark of the coffee brand. "Java" as a term for coffee , has been slang for any and all coffee at least as far back as WWII. I doubt that it is a currently active trademark in any case. It is, however, the name of a currently active programming language. Calling a new computer technology "Java" would probably infringe that (although the makers of javascript, a quite different computer language, seem to have gotten away with it). But it is hard to see how a realty company would so infringe. Of course there might be details which would cause this name to be infringing in fact, that I have no way of knowing. You could play safe with Sumatra Realty instead. Evin a quickly dismissed suit for trademark infringement could cost a startup time and money that might be a fatal handicap.	"Doing the same thing" is very common. We even have names for certain categories of websites, such as "web shop" and "blog". Such concepts are not protected in general. Obviously, you can't copy the name of existing webshop, or their logo, but things like a "rectangular layout of products for sale" aren't original. There is of course a grey area here, because there's a continuum of similarity. In general, similarities that follow from technical justifications are acceptable (having an upload button is sort of the point for your website), similarities that are cosmetic only (same color choice) might be interpreted as intentional attempts to cause confusion.	Neither law has precedence - manufacturers have to obey both. The FD&C says that they don't need to list ingredients which are trade secrets; the CFR says they must. If they list the trade secrets they do not break either law. If they don't, they break the CFR. Conclusion: they must list the trade secret ingredients. If the FD&C said it was forbidden to list trade secret ingredients, but the CFR required it, manufacturers would still have to obey both laws - which would mean they couldn't sell anything where one of the ingredients was a trade secret.	What you are missing is that the original copyright holder can give permission to make derivative works with strings attached. There is no automatic right to derive something from a copyrighted work. Those strings could include constraints on what you create in the process of making the derivative work. Yes it is a string limiting what you can do with something you own, but you would have been warned in the license and had the choice to start from scratch. People do create work-alike software with no copyright strings using two teams and a "clean room" design process. It is a lot harder than modifying something another person has developed. Also, law and someone's understanding of morals need not be aligned at all. And, in patent law, just creating something all by yourself from scratch does not give you ownership. If someone else did it first and got a patent you can't make the item you might think you own. IP law is complex and looking for "fundamentals" may not get you anywhere.	Who knows. It doesn't matter. 17 USC 102 lists the kinds of things protectable by copyright under US law. These are: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. A landscape feature is none of these and is not subject to copyright protection under US law, nor I think under the law of any other country. The "copyright notice" has no legal effect. 17 USC 120 Specifically prohibits copyright being used to prevent the taking of pictures of a building from a public place. In many countries Freedom of panorama (FOP) specifically permits publication of photos taken from public places. Se also this article on FOP. FOP is an exception to copyright protection, which applies to copyrighted architectural works and publicly posted works of art, such as sculptures. Since landscape features are not copyrightable at all, FOP does not strictly apply to them, but all the arguments for FOP would apply to them even more strongly. In US Law, particularly under the Fiest vs Rural case, only works with original content, created by a person, are protected by copyright. (Other countries generally have similar limits on copyright.) But a feature of the landscape is not the original creation of any person. (If someone carved the landscape into a designed shape, it might be protect able as a sculpture.) 3 and 4. If it were a building, you could take pictures of it from a public place or a private place where you have a legal right to be, under 17 USC 120 . But since a part of the landscape is not protected by copyright at all, this is not really relevant. No under the US First amendment there is generally a right to say even false things. But if the landowner attempts to enforce this "copyright" it would be considered frivolous and any court proceeding would be promptly tossed out. The sign gives the landowner no rights s/he would not otherwise have.	This kind of quotation, for commentary, criticism, or reference, is generally allowed without obtaining permission. In the US, this falls under fair use (see 17 USC 107. In the UK and most commonwealth countries, it falls under fair dealing. In other countries there are various exceptions to copyright that will probably cover this. Even answers that do not directly quote the rule books often use information from those rulebooks to write an answer. Facts and ideas are never protected by copyright, so this is not going to be an issue. See 17 USC 102(b), which provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. As a comment by user Trish reminds, game rules are facts and are not protected, although their exact wording may be.
How can Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity and Guilty but Mentally Ill exist in the same legal system? I was reading about the two types on insanity pleas, known as 'NGRI' (Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity) and 'GBMI' (Guilty But Mentally Ill). For example, a good excerpt is here on Google Books. However, something very obvious is bothering me: How can you have a legal system where on one hand we consider insane people not guilty of their crimes and on the other say that they can be guilty? Isn't it a contradiction? If insanity is a valid "excuse" to escape responsibility for a crime, then why isn't it always a valid excuse? Why would we allow insane people then to be found guilty? We already acknowledge in our legal system that insane people are not at fault.	There is a clinical difference between insane and mentally ill. An insane person is "so irrational in their behavior, or so unable to control it - so unlike 'us'" that they are not criminally liable (from earlier in the chapter). Mental illness is "substantial disorder of thought or mood that substantially impairs judgement ..." (from near your link). Clearly this is a subtle clinical distinction and will hinge on the expert evidence and the applicable law.	Murder Which is the unlawful taking of a life with intent to do so. However, the doctrine of self-defence can make killing lawful: A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. if the prosecutor is of the opinion that the force used "is reasonable in the circumstances" they may not lay charges. If they do lay charges the judge may decide that there is no case to answer before going to trial if self-defence applies. If there is a trial this will probably be the strategy the defence employs and they may or may not be successful. If convicted the penalty is life imprisonment. Also, there is no UK law: there is the law of England and Wales, the law of Scotland and the law of Northern Ireland.	This is not a true defense. It would only go to the credibility of the defendant's account claiming that he was not the perpetrator. Nothing prevents someone who is homosexual or asexual from sexually assaulting someone of the opposite sex within the meaning of the law. Sexual assault is often motivated by reasons other than sexual attraction in any case. Also, some people who publicly hold themselves out as being homosexual are actually bisexual. It is probably relevant evidence, but ultimately, it is up to the jury to decide who to believe and what happened based upon all of the facts and circumstances.	No Can a Dog admit guilt in court? Can a car have and admit guilt? No. AI is nothing but property and a piece of evidence, just like a dog or car. It is not a person and thus can not admit to anything. Everything the AI says is evidence, not an admission. Very damming evidence, but not the makers saying "I did it."	The standard of proof for a criminal conviction is the same. So they would similarly need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the foreign national of a crime. But deportation is not a criminal proceeding, and has a different standard of proof. (In deportation you also don't have criminal defendant rights like right to an attorney if you can't afford one.) I believe the standard is "clear and convincing evidence".	So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification.	My understanding is that defendants in Britain have to prove statements true by the preponderance of evidence, whereas in the U.S. the standard of evidence is "compelling" (a lower standard). This is not the case. Preponderance of the evidence can still be the burden of proof in the United States (in a civil libel case, although it must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal libel case). But, the difference is in what has to be proved. In Britain, it appears to be necessary to show that the statements are true in order to prevail. In the U.S., it is merely necessary to show in a case like this one (because it involves a matter of public concern) that the statements were made with knowledge that they were false, or with reckless disregard to the truth or falsity of the statements made. A factual basis for believing the statements made to be true is a defense if the basis is at all reasonable, and is a complete defense if the factual basis for making the statement is disclosed and that is true or believed to be true by the speaker. It is not necessary for the statements to actually be true under U.S. law in a case such as this one, although actual truth is also a defense, which is not the case in all circumstances in U.K. law, and was not the case under the historical common law. Historically, defamation claims could be brought for statements critical of the monarch, for statements pointing out the natural infirmities of someone for example by mocking a person with low IQ, or for speaking ill of the dead. Furthermore, the U.S. has a variety of doctrines that make it hard to find that a false statement was made in the first place. For example, statements of opinion are not actionable and many of the alleged falsehoods in the McLibel case would be considered to be statements of opinion in U.S. law rather than statements of fact. Similarly, U.S. law does not require that statements be literally true, and instead recognizes that a defendant may have been engaged in using hyperbole, or may have gotten the gist of the accusation right even though strictly speaking the exact statement made is not technically true (e.g. someone might say that a company paid a "penalty" when it actually paid a settlement amount in a lawsuit seeking a penalty or paid an amount representing compensatory damages only rather than a penalty amount). In the same vein, it must be clear from the context of the statement that the person making it intended it to be received as a truthful account and not a mere parody or satire which was intended to be understood as false. For example, I couldn't sue someone who made a knowingly false statement that I assassinated King George V, who died several decades before I was born, or that I was telepathically controlling my uncle because I had a space alien parasite in my spine. Those claims are so absurd that they would be inferred to intended to be fictional on their face. Certain kinds of falsehoods (e.g. lying about one's military record in a a political campaign) are simply not actionable as a matter of law, no matter what, as the harm is not concrete enough. There is not, however, necessarily a defense under U.S. law to defamation liability if the defendant said many things that were true, but something else that would be defamatory in isolation. For example, even if everything else were true, if the defendant had also stated that the CEO of the Plaintiff was convicted of leading a Nazi concentration camp and killed millions of people, which would have been possible given the CEO's age, knowing perfectly well that the person with a similar name to the CEO who did so was someone else who died an untimely death decades ago, that statement might be defamatory and actionable (at least by the CEO personally and probably by the company if it was alleged that he was hired despite the fact that the company was aware of this circumstance).	Why do you think this is a hypothetical case? The facts almost exactly match R v Rogerson ; R v McNamara (No 57) [2016] NSWSC 1207 (2 September 2016) - 3 men enter a storage unit, 2 men and one dead body leave. Each of the men claims the other committed the murder - the DPP charged both, they were tried together, the jury convicted both and they both received life sentences. For the more general hypothetical: people can be tried together if that serves the interests of justice - defendants can apply to the court for separate trials but that is not always granted (and this may serve as grounds for an appeal ... or not). There is plenty of evidence of a murder, one (at least) of the two people is a murderer - prosecutors would charge both, present the evidence and let the jury decide which, if any, were guilty.

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