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Does throwing eggs at a vehicle violate any law(s)? The People's Convoy egged in Oakland, CA as they protest by Buffy Wicks neighborhood https://youtu.be/P5Wmh2Hu_24?t=238	California Vehicle Code 23100 asserts (a) Any person who throws any substance at a vehicle or any occupant thereof on a highway is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Any person who with intent to do great bodily injury maliciously and willfully throws or projects any rock, brick, bottle, metal or other missile, or projects any other substance capable of doing serious bodily harm at such vehicle or occupant thereof is guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison. So at the minimum this is a misdemeanor offense. It could be a felony if the accused is found to have intended to do great bodily injury, and that an egg (or whatever else they threw) was capable of it. The basic rationale for the law is that any such act creates a distraction to drivers at the minimum, which creates danger (if someone is surprised by the impact they may suddenly swerve and collide with other vehicles or property; their vision may be obscured and can no longer drive as safely as they should; etc.). And this is just for the literal offense of "throwing something at a vehicle (on a highway = public road)". The act may create other offenses, such as violating littering statutes and creating a hazard. And if the act does result in grave bodily harm or damages, even if they did not intend it, the offender can expect to be held to account and liable for that as well. If anyone dies, they'll be on the line for some form of murder/manslaughter charges, for example.	None The First Amendment says: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... Jack has exercised his freedom of speech and has not been fined, imprisoned or otherwise punished by law. Freedom to speak does not ensure freedom from consequences We can use your example of anti-LGBTQ comments or we can substitute any other thing you like: anti-veteran, pro-veteran, anti-Trump, pro-Trump, anti-Ice Hockey, pro-Ice Hockey or, of course, pro-LGBTQ. Jack can say what he likes on any of those subjects and anybody else can take offence to them and act accordingly. In terms of voters in an election - this the ultimately epitome of free speech, they can vote for who they like for whatever reason they like. In terms of people serving on a board, they voluntarily restrict their freedom to speak because of their duty to the organisation they represent. Whatever their views in private, by agreeing to take on the duty they agree that they will act in accordance with the ethics and ethos of the organisation in public. If they don’t, they can be disciplined; usually for the catch-all offence of bringing the organisation into disrepute. Providing the organisation follows its internally mandated procedures and affords natural justice (I.e. it follows due process), no court will overturn its right to act according to its principals.	From what I can determine, there has not been a legal challenge to the practice that reached a high enough level to get on my radar, so it's not clearly prohibited or allowed. Turning to the relevant federal regulations, the implementation of the Fair Housing Act, the law hinges in part on an Aggrieved person includes any person who— (a) Claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (b) Believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur. In order to sue a university because they offer sex-separated halls, floors or rooms, a plaintiff would have to show that they have been harmed by being given such a choice. Reading the prohibitions in §100.50, there is no obvious "Discriminat[ion] in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities", and it does not "otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings". Cases like McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (a case putting an end to the "separate but equal" doctrine) include reference to the fact that appellant was harmed ("The restrictions imposed upon appellant impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession"). Analogously, the relatively rare black-only residences of UC Davis and Cal State LA might be targeted in a discrimination suit, if plaintiffs can make the required legal argument that there is harm.	The real story is that the articles you link to are logically fallacious. The first hedges its assertions by saying a mailbox is "effectively considered" to be federal property. It cites 18 USC 1705, which it correctly notes "puts your mailbox under Federal jurisdiction." But that's not the same as assuming ownership of it. The piece also says that you "effectively lease" your mailbox to the federal government, which is a somewhat exaggerated way of putting it, but even if we accept it at face value it falls far short of a claim that the mailbox is federal property. The second concludes that mailbox tampering is a federal offense because "the mailbox belongs to and is controlled by the USPS." There is no evidence offered to support the assertion of ownership, and there is of course an alternative explanation for the fact that mailbox tampering is a federal offense, which is that there are laws such as the aforementioned 18 USC 1705 that prohibit it. These laws, however, say nothing about ownership. The third is ultimately based on the assertion of a letter carrier who said, "Listen, lady, your friends don’t own these mailboxes. We do." The claim was made in explanation of the prohibition against private individuals putting items into a mailbox. As far as I can see, the article is off the mark in another way: that prohibition has nothing to do with safety and security, but rather with protecting the postal service's revenue: it arises from 18 USC 1725, which explicitly is about avoiding the payment of postage. In any event, it does not establish ownership. In short, the idea that all mailboxes are federal property is a myth, as implied by the USPS page you link to. To what extent do property owners have control over their own mailbox? To a fairly high extent, but they do need to comply with the relevant law. They can't, for example, hang a plastic bottle by the roadside for the purpose of receiving their mail. Can they deface or place non-mail in their own mailbox? 18 USC 1705 actually prohibits willful or malicious injury, tearing down, or destruction of a mailbox, not defacing. So technically, they could, but a prosecution seems highly unlikely. Under section 1725, placing non-mail in the box is only prohibited to the extent that there is intent to avoid paying postage. That would be difficult to establish for someone putting something in their own mailbox. Can they tear it down with no intent to replace it? If they're willing to forego mail delivery, yes. They may be able to arrange to have the mail held for retrieval at the post office. If they do not, their mail will be returned to the sender as undeliverable. This arises from the Domestic Mail Manual, which says (in general) that "customers must provide authorized mail receptacles or door slots" as a condition of city delivery (I could not find a corresponding requirement for rural delivery, but it must exist somewhere). The manual also describes requirements for customer mail receptacles.	They are not considered public places in the way you mean, and in fact, the Ohio revised code specifically prohibits the kind of behavior you're referencing. Bottom line, any kind of party at the polling place itself is out of the question due to the possibility of limiting access or intimidating potential voters.	Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.	Without a witness willing to break their silence, we will probably never be certain. It is possible that this was harassment (current ordinance, not 1999 – version in force at that time not available), defined in Arvada if one has the intent to annoy (etc.) and "Repeatedly insults, taunts, challenges, or makes communications in offensively coarse language to another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response" (the "record" indicates that there was a pattern of such conduct). We don't actually know that he was fined (hearsay...).	The First Amendment states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. It thus protects such videos. An analogous situation is that there is network news coverage of riots, bank robberies, terrorist attacks and assaults. Backpage was seized because it facilitated prostitution, not just reported or even encouraged it. That is basically where the line exists.
How can one find a comprehensive enumeration of all the precedent setting cases that pertain to a particular issue or rulings on a given statute? how can one find a comprehensive enumeration of all the precedent setting cases that pertain to a particular issue or the application of a particular statute?	new-zealand The Law Society provides this research service where specially trained people scour through all relevant databases and return to you what they have found. Though this service is only available to lawyers (and other people associated with the profession), a lawyer can submit a request for you. Find one that charges in 15-min (or less) time chunks (instead of rounding up to hours) and the price will be reasonable. Some of the databases are freely available: NZLII and JDO, but they are far from being comprehensive. Comprehensive databases are available commercially e.g. CaseBase, though subscriptions typically cost several thousand $ per annum.	Google Scholar is not specifically a legal research tool. The search does return many court and legal documents Which court opinions do you include? Currently, Google Scholar allows you to search and read published opinions of US state appellate and supreme court cases since 1950, US federal district, appellate, tax and bankruptcy courts since 1923 and US Supreme Court cases since 1791. In addition, it includes citations for cases cited by indexed opinions or journal articles which allows you to find influential cases (usually older or international) which are not yet online or publicly available. From https://scholar.google.com/intl/en/scholar/help.html#coverage but by reading those inclusions, you can see that it's not as complete as some of the paid commercial services available. The most important criticism of Google Scholar for legal research appears to be the lack of a way to fully Shepardize cases; see Shepard's Citations - Wikipedia Shepardizing determines if cases have been overruled (or reaffirmed, questioned, or cited by later cases). Google Scholar will show case citations; but they are not as complete as commercial services. See https://www.google.com/search?q=google+scholar+shepardize for critical references. If you're going to argue with a lawyer, completely Shepardizing your relevant cases is rather important.	Yes, you can appeal Deciding that an issue is moot is a matter of law. Issues of law are apealable. So, from your example, if the evidence showed that the tenant was still at the premises and, for whatever reason, the court misinterpreted or misunderstood that evidence, then there would clearly have been an appealable error of law in deciding that the issue was moot. However, if the evidence showed the tenant had left the premises and the court decided on that basis the case was moot they would have clearly been right and an appeal would fail.	There have been instances where the US Supreme Court has held over cases to the next term, and instances where they ordered a case re-argued in the next term. Brown vs Board of Education was a particularly well known case that was reargued. I believe that such occasions are rare, and that the court makes a significant effort to decide each case in the same term where certiorari is granted. Once exception is when the Court has a vacancy and is waiting fora new Justice to be confirmed, and the Justices in office are tied. Then cases with 4-4 splits are often held and re-argued. More often, the Justices decide, after granting certiorari, that this was a mistake, and dismiss the case altogether. The phrase used is that the writ is "dismissed as improvidently granted" or "DIGed". This has the same ultimate effect as if certiorari had never been granted -- the lower court decision is left standing, and no Supreme Court precedent is created. This is still fairly rare. To the best of my knowledge there is no rule requiring decision within any specific time, but I have never heard of a case held over for more than one term.	Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.	The Supreme Court of the United States is our apex court. Its decisions on constitutional questions are binding throughout the country. It is not, however, limited to considering constitutional issues, as it may also consider appeals addressing questions of statutory interpretation and rules of procedure. In very limited cases, it may also sit as a trial court in cases where it has original jurisdiction.	If you want to study the basics of law, where should you start? Don't try memorizing individual laws. That would be a waste of energy, in part because --as you rightly point out-- laws change. There are many introductory books. Law 101, by Jay M. Feinman, is an excellent starting point. The next step --broadly speaking-- consists of reading court decisions (aka court opinions). Opinions released by upper (aka reviewing) courts are available online for free. If you are interested in jurisdictions in the US, Leagle.com is one of many very good resources; EU cases are available here; and so forth. Acquainting yourself with court opinions is quite beneficial. First, court opinions [collaterally] teach how to formulate one's legal positions. Rather than merely being formulaic and a copycat, a litigant is to convey that his legal position is more consistent (compared to the adversary) with the laws and underlying doctrines. His points are easier to get across by adapting his presentation thereof to how courts are used to handle the legal principles involved. Second, court opinions identify the statutes that are relevant to the type of disputes that arise between parties. This is indicative of importance that a statute or procedural rule entails in relation to other laws. Third, court opinions reflect how statutes, rules, and doctrines are interpreted. Oftentimes the way how legislation is worded leads "laypeople" to have misconceptions on the interpretation of laws and rules, when in reality these are construed usually in a much narrower way. Law journals are a good source once you have gained some background in law and are interested in a sort of monograph about a topic that is new to you. But, as explained above, court opinions also serve that purpose (perhaps less scholarly). Having a legal dictionary is always a good idea. Courts in the US oftentimes quote definitions from Black's Law Dictionary for crucial terms which statutory law does not define. What is most applicable to real life? Without knowing whether you are interested in a particular field, it is safe to say that contract law is the most applicable. Entering contracts is part of our everyday life even if laypeople don't notice it when they purchase goods & services, reach an agreement, or engage in a course of conduct which reasonably fosters expectations. And good news is that the principles of contract law are largely similar among modern jurisdictions, including the America (the continent, not just the USA), many member states of the EU, and Asian countries. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is a very useful formulation of contract law. Courts in the US very often cite the Restatement for premising their decisions on contract disputes. In countries with a civil law system, the principles of contract law are usually formulated in one or multiple sections of the [countries'] Civil Code. Procedural law (aka rules of criminal or civil procedure) is also highly applicable: Large portions thereof apply to all disputes which are brought to court. To a great extent these rules are very similar across the jurisdictions of one same country, but the litigant ought too ensure his compliance with the rules lest he loses the case for a technicality. Lastly, procedural law can be remarkably boring unless the person anticipates he will be involved in litigation.	As there is no any applicable special definition of "focus" in that context, the plain meaning rule applies: the "focus" of a statute is what the statute is focused on. Any ordinary synonyms apply: concentrated on, revolves around, addresses itself to. What exactly a statute is focused on is determined by way of its interpretation and analysis. This is part of what judges do.
Landlord carrying out full inspection after giving impression that she would only be there to follow up a pipe repair Received this from a friend, and I gave my own answer though not yet fully awake nor completely confident in my answer, but I will share mine below on which I welcome all feedback/critiques as well as better answers in themselves. But in short, what legal remedies or legal implications does this have? My landlord is at my house doing a full inspection of the property without communicating that was her intent. She said she was coming with a worker following up previous communication about fixing a pipe so I was under the impression that was what she was up to. What should i do?	It is usual for a lease to specify for what purposes and on what notice the landlord is entitled to access. Often there is a provision allowing the landlord access on no notice in an "emergency" which is often not specifically defined. Access for purposes of repair, and for purposes of inspection may be on 24 hours notice, or 48 hours, or some other period, or on "reasonable notice" with no specific period specified. Access for a reasonable purpose (such as inspection) on reasonable notice that does not actually inconvenience the tenant, and that is not demanded with unreasonable frequency will probably not constitute such a breach as to justify ending the tenancy, and may well not justify sizable damages in the absence of other breaches. Much will depend on the wording of the lease or rental agreement, and on the practice of the local courts. One might well ask oneself "what actual harm will an inspection with insufficient notice do me" because a court might ask a similar question if an action is brought. If the inspection does cause a problem, then that should be addressed.	What's the legality of this situation? It's unlawful and you should seek support for it. That document you linked to appears to have resources that could help you, such as support lines and counselling centres, etc. Am I being discriminated against by these landlords(companies)? I would say so. It sounds like you're being discriminated against on grounds of race and ethnic origin. It appears to violate the General Equal Treatment Act. However, I do want to stress that there may be completely reasonable factors as to why landlords are rejecting your appointment requests. For example, it would not be discriminatory to refuse housing on the basis that you don't have the appropriate income, or you have a poor credit rating, or you don't have any previous rental references. It can be very difficult to prove discrimination if any of the above factors apply, since the landlord could simply cite one of those reasons instead.	Compliance with acoustic standards does not necessarily mean that you will not hear noise from your neighbors. You have an expert opinion stating that the building complies. It is possible that the expert is wrong - the only way to find out is to have a different expert do their own analysis. This will cost you money and they will either agree with the first expert that it does comply or they won't. If they agree you will at least have the satisfaction of knowing that the developer did what they promised in their contract. You will have to come up with your own solutions as to how to deal with the fact that you find it too noisy. In these circumstances, this is an issue with you, not the apartment. If they don't agree then you have a basis for commencing legal action (in accordance with the dispute resolution clauses of your contract). How that will turn out will depend on which evidence the court/arbitrator/whatever prefers. If you succeed you may get compensation or remedial works (if these are possible) done. If you lose you will likely be paying some hefty legal fees. In the meantime, I would be very careful about what you say about the developer or the complex publicly. If you say things that are not true then you could be sued for defamation. The developer has already indicated that they are not happy with what you are saying - this doesn't mean it is defamatory but the developer may be willing to go to court to find out if it is, are you? If you sell the apartment you are not generally obliged to reveal anything to the buyer but you must answer questions they put truthfully. If they ask about sound insulation you can truthfully answer that it complies with NBN S 01-400-1. You are not required to disclose your personal opinion that its too noisy.	Point three should include "to the best of my knowledge and belief", or be modified to state that none of those "house or the adjacent shop" have informed the affiant of any such delivery, or delivered any such package to the affiant. It might add that the affiant had questioned such persons and they denied receiving such a delivery. The point here, of course, is to prove that the package was never properly delivered, no doubt in support of a claim on the delivery service. The ordinary assumption is that if a person in the "house or the adjacent shop" had accepted a package, it would normally have been given to the addressee at an early opportunity.	there was absolutely nothing in the letter. You could hold it up to the sunlight and see that it was empty. There is no legal reason to do this. Somebody screwed up. Office workers are not infallible. It happens. I've seen government officials with no grudge against my client do it too now and then. Taken together with the spelling errors in your name it reflects general administrative incompetence and not some nefarious plot. The cautious thing to do would be to call them and tell them that you got a misaddressed letter with nothing inside it. A judge might frown at your conduct if you had some inkling they were trying to communicate with you and did nothing. Save the empty envelope to prove that they didn't send you a security deposit letter as they claimed if there is a dispute or litigation down the road.	we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early & unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself.	This is outside the scope of landlord-tenant law and the obligation of the landlord to make the premise habitable. Building codes are not imposed retroactively on existing housing, so while it is true that you cannot legally build a house without service grounding, you do not have to install service grounding when that becomes part of the electrical code (which was decades ago). The law is here; the state could have impose an obligation on landlords to always update plumbing, electrical etc. so that rental housing always conforms to current codes, but it did not. If the electric does not work properly, that has to be repaired, but if there is a functioning but less than ideal electric (knob and tube wiring; ungrounded; no GFI circuits in the bathroom, incorrect receptacle covers, overburdened or improperly placed service panel, too few receptacles), that's not something you can legally force a landlord to change.	Yes, they seem to have broken the law. In California, notice must be given for an eviction. This can be a 30/60/90 day notice with no reason needed (typically because the landlord wants the property for something else) or a 3 day notice with cause- the most typical being not paying the rent. Note that COVID exceptions exist, though I don't believe they apply to you. Even after that time, a landlord cannot physically remove a tenant or attempt to drive them out through the destruction/removal of property, locking them out, or cutting off utilities. They are liable for damages suffered as well as penalties. There are lawful procedures in place for this. The removal and destruction of your belongings could constitute either larceny or vandalism. Either way, by unlawfully removing your possessions, they are liable for the damages caused.
Is responsibility for a child based on genetics? This question Is it true that men are forced to pay child support for children they didn't consent to have? and some related popped up on my side bar and prompted a thought experiment. Suppose a prospective parent stole cells from an unwilling donor and used them to conceive a child. Typically the cells would be eggs or sperm but these could be created by IVG (in vitro gametogenisis). Is the child entitled to support from the genetic parent (who is actually a victim of theft)? Assume no sex was involved. The cells were taken without permission. Maybe in secret during a medical procedure or stolen from a lab where they were intended for use in a different medical procedure. I would have assumed not but the rules are currently only different for sperm and egg donation as part of an "statutorily authorized arrangement" with a willing donor (according to this answer). I guess this would have to be determined by a test-case in a court. But presumably the other biological parent would have to take full responsibility in this case. This is not the main question but if you want to make it even more interesting. What if the cells were 'found' rather than stolen. Say someone scrapes their knee and someone else obtains a tissue sample from the scrape. What if genetic material from multiple people is used? (e.g. https://www.newscientist.com/article/2107219-exclusive-worlds-first-baby-born-with-new-3-parent-technique/) What if the child is produced in an artificial womb (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/health-50056405) While these technologies are not viable yet they are all being worked on. In this case I would presume those deliberately participating in the creation of the child to take full responsibility. This then raises the odd question of a lab team or corporation possibly being assigned the status of parents and thus made liable for child support.	The legal responsibility to support a child arises from "parentage" and not "genetic relatedness", therefore one of two identical twins will not be assigned such responsibility simply because of genetic relatedness. However, genetic facts can enter into a legal proceeding for support, and can be evidence to establish parentage. In the US, the rules for determining parentage are generally established by the Uniform Parentage Act, instantiated for instance in Washington state RCW Chapter 26.26A. RCW 26.26A.100 spells out the full set of rules: A parent-child relationship is established between an individual and a child if: (1) The individual gives birth to the child, except as otherwise provided in RCW 26.26A.700 through 26.26A.785; (2) There is a presumption under RCW 26.26A.115 of the individual's parentage of the child, unless the presumption is overcome in a judicial proceeding or a valid denial of parentage is made under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265; (3) The individual is adjudicated a parent of the child under RCW 26.26A.400 through 26.26A.515; (4) The individual adopts the child; (5) The individual acknowledges parentage of the child under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265, unless the acknowledgment is rescinded under RCW 26.26A.235 or successfully challenged under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265 or 26.26A.400 through 26.26A.515; (6) The individual's parentage of the child is established under RCW 26.26A.600 through 26.26A.635; or (7) The individual's parentage of the child is established under RCW 26.26A.705 through 26.26A.730. §§300-355 govern the use of genetic tests in determining parentage, according to which genetic test results can be evidence of parentage, but §§600 ff specifically address assisted reproduction and surrogacy agreements – RCW 26.26A.610 for example specifically assigns "parentage" to a person who consents to assisted reproduction by a woman with the intent to be a parent of a child, and under §605, a donor is not a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction.	Does "duty to rescue" apply to a child that one has no direct responsibility for? And I am, certainly under English law, guilty of a crime. No, not necessarily, because a failure to act does not automatically create criminal liability in England and Wales. Most offences require a combination of a physical act and the intent to carry it out - often referred to as the coincidence of actus reus and mens rea. If one or both of these elements are missing (or cannot be proved) then there is no offence unless there is a specific Duty of Care imposed by law which obligates a person to prevent, or mitigate the risk of, harm coming to someone or something. There is a simple mnemonic that may assist with identifying whether or not there is such a DUTY Dangerous situation created... In R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161 Miller fell asleep while smoking a cigarette, then woke up to see his matress smouldering. Instead of calling for help or doing anything about it, he went to sleep in another room so was convicted of arson - not for setting the fire but for failing to do anything about it. This would be analogous with someone tampering with the signs to incorrectly say that the deep end of the pool is the shallow end thus causing the child to be out of his depth and drown. Under statute, contract or by public office... In R v Dytham [1979] QB 722 a police officer was convicted of misconduct in a public office because he stood by and did nothing as a man was beaten to death. For the OP: a lifeguard will have a duty of care, under contract, to act in order to rescue the child in the OP. Take it upon oneself... In R v Stone & Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354 the defendants took on the responsibility for caring for a vulnerable person who later died due to their neglect. In the OP's scenario, this might equate to someone announcing they will act as an impromptu lifeguard but then do nothing to save the child from drowning. Young persons... Anyone who has a parental relationship with a child has a legal obligation to look after the health and welfare of that child. In the OP's scenario, if the parent was absent, too drunk etc so could not raise the alarm this may be a breach of this duty of care and make them liable for the death of their child.	Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting, says (at p. 24): The equal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits. That indicates to me that there is probably a majority on the court that thinks same-sex couples should have the same adoption rights and other tangible benefits as opposite-sex couples, but that would have to be tested in court. Regarding level-of-scrutiny, this opinion says nothing on the issue. But, given that Justice Kennedy follows a fundamental rights analysis, it could be argued that it is likely strict scrutiny, or at least a level of scrutiny higher than rational basis. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 631 (1996) (emphasis added, internal punctuation removed): If a legislative classification or distinction neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold it so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.	Disclaimer: I don't know the specific regulations of New Jersey, so this mostly describes the general practise in the United States. However, it seems the rules are roughly similar in all states. During a divorce proceeding the court ordered the father to pay 1xxx a month in child support through the court/state supervision arrangement. This is common in the United States - child support payments are usually not sent directly from one parent to the other, instead the paying parent sends money to a government agency (or has it taken from their wages). This agency is usually called State Disbursement Unit - though in New Jersey the agency responsible is the New Jersey Family Support Payment Center (NJFSPC). So the father was probably ordered to pay via NJFSPC. Will it harm the case if the mother retrieves the money? assuming she notifies the court or her attorney? Or should she refuse the money? No, this should not harm the case. As you write, the mother should definitely inform the court and / or NJFSPC about the payment (the lawyer should know how to handle this). If the court order requires the father to pay via NJFSPC, paying directly to the mother is already a violation - so the father is likely not acting legally. While the accepted payment will likely count against the child support owed, it will not reduce the claim for child support in any other way - in particular it does not invalidate or reduce the court order to pay via NJFSPC.	The husband of the mother of a child is presumed to be that child's parent until that presumption is disestablished. In New York State, when a child is born to a married mother, a court may decline to consider DNA evidence when it is not in the best interests of the child to do so. In substance (although not exactly from a legal perspective), a failure to promptly contest the paternity of a child of a married mother gives rise to a de facto adoption. Article 5 of the New York Family Court Act in its definitions section, § 512, makes clear that it applies only to children born out of wedlock (and it too has an equitable paternity term at § 532). So, the statutory deadline in Article 5 allowing a child with no legally determined father to have a determination made at any time before the child turns age twenty-one does not apply to this case. Instead, this case is governed by New York Family Court Act, Article 4. New York Family Court Act § 418(a), which governs paternity cases where a child is born during a marriage provides that: (a) The court, on its own motion or motion of any party, when paternity is contested, shall order the mother, the child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA marker tests of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal department of health and human services and performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman. The record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test shall be received in evidence, pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules where no timely objection in writing has been made thereto. Any order pursuant to this section shall state in plain language that the results of such test shall be admitted into evidence, pursuant to rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules absent timely objections thereto and that if such timely objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or report of results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate at least a ninety-five percent probability of paternity, the admission of such record or report shall create a rebuttable presumption of paternity, and, if unrebutted, shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this article and article five of this act. If DNA evidence is considered, the biological father will be determined to be the father, but if it is not considered, the husband will continue to be the legal father. A leading case exploring when the best interests of the child test prevails over DNA evidence from New York is In the Matter of Shondel J., v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. July 6, 2006). In a key passage, it states: Equitable estoppel is gender neutral. In Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH. (63 2 859 [1984], affg 95 AD2d 466 [3d Dept 1983]), we affirmed an order of the Appellate Division dismissing a paternity petition in which a mother sought to compel her husband to submit to a blood test as a means of challenging his paternity. We agreed with the Appellate Division that the mother should be estopped. As that court pointed out, the mother expressed no question about her child's paternity until some two and a half years after the child's birth. She had held the child out as her husband's, accepted his support for the child while she and her husband lived together and after they separated, and permitted her husband and child to form strong ties together. Estoppel may also preclude a man who claims to be a child's biological father from asserting his paternity when he acquiesced in the establishment of a strong parent-child bond between the child and another man. The rationale is that the child would be harmed by a determination that someone else is the biological father. For example, in Purificati v Paricos (154 AD2d 360 [2d Dept 1989]), a boy's biological father who did not seek to establish his paternity until more than three years after the child's birth, and who acquiesced as a relationship flourished between the boy and his mother's former husband, was estopped from claiming paternity. The courts "impose equitable estoppel to protect the status interests of a child in an already recognized and operative parent-child relationship" ( In re Baby Boy C., , 84 NY2d 91, 102 n [1994]). Finally, the Appellate Division has repeatedly concluded that a man who has held himself out to be the father of a child, so that a parent-child relationship developed between the two, may be estopped from denying paternity.2 Where a child justifiably relies on the representations of a man that he is her father with the result that she will be harmed by the man's denial of paternity, the man may be estopped from asserting that denial.3 . . . Given the statute recognizing paternity by estoppel, a man who harbors doubts about his biological paternity of a child has a choice to make. He may either put the doubts aside and initiate a parental relationship with the child, or insist on a scientific test of paternity before initiating a parental relationship. A possible result of the first option is paternity by estoppel; the other course creates the risk of damage to the relationship with the woman. It is not an easy choice, but at times, the law intersects with the province of personal relationships and some strain is inevitable. This should not be allowed to distract the Family Court from its principal purpose in paternity and support proceedings -- to serve the best interests of the child. This continues to be good law. See, e.g. In the Matter of Thomas T. v. Luba R., 148 A.D.3d 912 (March 15, 2017) (paternity by estoppel established when child at age four did not know biological father's name and had established a strong father-child-like bond with mother's currently partner citing Shondel). Under the circumstances, if any of the three parties: the mother, the husband, or the biological father, sought to prevent consideration of DNA evidence after ten to fifteen years of marriage during which paternity was not denied, it is very likely that the Court would agree and not change the legal paternity of the child. In this case, the biological father would not gain legal visitation rights and would not owe child support, and neither the husband nor the mother would lose their presumed parent status, nor would they be entitled to child support. If the husband, mother and biological father mutually agreed otherwise, the paternity by estoppel argument might be overcome and any issue of support would be governed by the mutual agreement (although a guardian ad litem for the child might be appointed sua sponte by the Court and have standing to object to the agreement on behalf of the child notwithstanding the mutual agreement of the other three parties). This would terminate husband's status as a parent and entitle biological father to visitation. But, otherwise paternity by estoppel would prevail. Incidentally, this statute and case law position is constitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a man who conceives a child with a married woman does not have a due process right in establishing his paternity of the child, so any right that the biological father may have arises from statute and the common law, rather than from the U.S. Constitution. Michael H. v. Gerald D. (U.S. 1989).	The experimenter actually respects the subjects right of autonomy, and because this is just pretend, there is no imaginable legal action. There is a (maybe not so) hypothetical scenario where A gives an electric shock to B. Variant 1 is that A sneaks up on B and shocks him: that is assault and is legally actionable. Variant 2 is that B consents to the shock. Because of consent, B cannot sue A unless the shock was misrepresented (purportedly 2 volts and 1 milliamp, actually 120 volts at 10 amp). Variant 3 involves strapping B down (with permission). B can at any time withdraw consent. If B withdraws consent and A continues to shock him, this is probably assault, especially if B is restrained. If B lamely says "cuttitout" but makes no effort to leave (being unrestrained) the jury may find that the appearance of withdrawing consent was not sincere, since he could have just gotten off the electric chair, unless the last shock paralyzed him. This is a fact-intensive analysis. In the video, the actions of the "subject" are not credible cases of withdrawing consent, it is just Youtube theater. Here, A and B are just two kids horsing around, in the US. Things get more complicated when you do things under the auspices of an organization required to do a review of such experiments (e.g. the high school or university). The theory is that the institution will have explicit standards and will review the experiment, and somewhere in there there is a part where the subject is told that they can leave at any time and if they have problems, they can contact X (the IRB for the institution). There is generally no legal fallout for the experimenter, but there can be institutional fallout (getting fired / banned). Actually physically restraining a subject is, however, legally actionable: but saying "I really need you to continue the experiment" is not legally actionable, though may well result in IRB sanctions. Suppose the university approves an experiment with restrained subjects and increasing shocks. There is a point at which they cannot approve the procedure, and if they do, they are potentially subject to legal consequences for the institution. Investigating nuances of IRB actions would be better carried out on Academia SE ("has anyone ever had funding suspended for sloppy IRB practices"). This is not a medical experiment: if it were, other laws would be relevant (hence you cannot engage in unauthorized, unreviewed medical experiments on your brother).	No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.	A conviction isn't ever impossible, but it could well be highly unjust. Indeed, there is a current case where a man alleged that he was the murder, though his identical twin brother was convicted. This article indicates that identical twins are not necessarily genetically indistinguishable. Assuming there is a lack of positive evidence such as fingerprints or an alibi which clearly identifies one versus the other, then one would predict no conviction because there would be a highly reasonable doubt. See the case of Orlando Nemnhard, where one of two twins did it but the DA concluded that they couldn't prove which one, so the charges were dropped.
If I copied an agreement and sent it as an email and had someone reply with the fields and "I agree" would it be a valid contract? Have been getting agreements(contracts) signed electronically using Sites like Hello Sign and Docusign, but the problem is people do not always view the agreement, and then it does not get signed. My question is if I took the agreement and pasted the text into an email, and then had the recipient reply to the email with the field data, and "I agree" , would the agreement be a legally binding and enforceable agreement(contract)? We send everyone the same contract. We are a business. Concept Example that would be sent as an email: Agreement to hire Agency will find people The Client will pay for services -- To sign this agreement reply to this email with your Full Name and Company Name Followed by "Agreed"	Yes, that would, or at least could, be a legal contract. The key thing that makes a contract between two parties is the agreement, the intention to enter into a binding contract. The written words are only evidence of their agreement, and the specifics of what is agreed to. An oral (spoken) contract can be valid and binding (although in some cases the law requires a written contract). Electronic contracts do not need to be done through a site such as docusign, although there are advantages to using such a process. A typed signature will be legally binding if it is intended to represent agreement to the contract. The US federal e-sign law says that no specific technology is required to make a valid electronic signature. See What gives e-signatures legal standing/force in the United States? and https://law.stackexchange.com/a/79670/17500 for more details. That the contract words are copied will also not impair the validity of a contract. Many bushiness use form contracts. Many lawyers create new contracts by putting together parts of old contracts that served their purpose. The person sending the offer and proposed contract must make sure that the other party understands that this is to be a binding contract, and agrees to the use of an electronic signature, and agrees to the contract as a whole. It would be a good idea if a bit more detail were included than in your example. Must the agency find people acceptable to the client? Haw soon must it find them? How much must the client pay? How soon must it pay? A good contract will specify such details.	The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.	Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract.	This is actually required by german Law. Specifically § 623 BGB says: Die Beendigung von Arbeitsverhältnissen durch Kündigung oder Auflösungsvertrag bedürfen zu ihrer Wirksamkeit der Schriftform; die elektronische Form ist ausgeschlossen. Translation by me: Resignations and ending-contracts to end an employment are only valid in written form; an electronic form is not possible. The definition of the written form is in § 126 BGB. It basically says, that either a signature is needed or a notary has to vouch for it. So if you are actually employed under german law you have to send them a signed letter. How that letter arrives at the employer is not specified. I would imagine most resignation letters to be personally handed in.	The question is a bit sparse on relevant details, but yes, a EULA is binding, even when you agree in the course of employment. It may not be you who is bound, though. In case 1, you install a program at word to do something, the EULA says "don't copy any of these files", you see a cool file and decide "Neat, I'm taking a copy home. I can do this because I installed the program at work and am not bound by the EULA". Wrong. Case 2: you are installing software on behalf of a customer. It's not you that is bound by the EULA, it's the customer. Case 3: you work for the company that develops the software and holds the copyright, either fixing bugs or testing the security of the system by trying to crack it. In that case, you have special permission from the copyright holder that overrides whatever restrictions would normally from from the EULA. I don't know if that covers the kind of case you are concerned with. To reduce the matter to a simple sentence, just because you agree to something in the course of a job does not mean that the agreement is invalid.	Do you have a contract? It depends on the website’s terms but almost certainly not. It is standard practice in e-commerce terms and conditions that your selecting “buy” and giving the vendor money does not create a contract; you are merely making an offer that the vendor can accept or reject. For example, Amazon’s terms are clear that the contract only comes into existence when they dispatch the goods, until then they are free to cancel your order and return your money. Here the vendor rejected the offer. Is this false advertising? Maybe. It would depend on the specifics of the ad and whether, overall, a reasonable person would be mislead or deceived. It’s possible you misunderstood but that doesn’t necessarily make it misleading or deceptive. I misunderstand a lot of things; that doesn’t mean they were objectively misleading or deceptive. Notwithstanding, a business does not have to make good on false advertising. An incorrect advertised price does not force the business to anccept offers of that price. It may force a correction and may require the item to not be sold until the price is corrected and it may expose the business to fines, but it does not give anyone the right to buy at that price.	Do I have any recourse for invalidating all or part of the contract? No. There is a presumption in contract law that when a contract is reduced to writing then what that writing says is what the parties agreed. Also, if you signed it, then you are legally stating: I read it, I understand it and I agree to it - don't sign things you don't understand. If your lawyer has produced something you don't understand then have them redraft it until you do. Would a successful suit against the lawyer for malpractice or negligence make any difference? No. A suit against you lawyer may get you damages from your lawyer but it will not affect the rights of third-parties. What is best practice for avoiding flawed contracts like this in the first place? Read and understand the contract. Educate yourself enough in the law so that you can do this. Your lawyer is there to give you professional advice; you are there to make your own decisions.	The contract would be binding Many people make the mistake of thinking that the document is the contract - it isn’t. The contract is the binding legal relationship between the parties of which any documents are just evidence for. As this is a simple mistake on the document misidentifying one of the parties, it’s irrelevant. You and the company are clearly the parties to the contract - you because you signed it and they because they sent it to you. Minor errors in one or more of the documents that make up a contract are immaterial.
If one writes a check with no exact amount but with an upper bound by indicating a "Not To Exceed X USD" on the memo line, is it legally binding? Example of a check with no exact amount but with an upper bound by indicating a "Not To Exceed X USD" on the memo line of the check: If the person who cashed out the check goes over the limit, can I successfully dispute it? The above picture comes from Los Angeles County clerk (mirror).	Assuming UCC § 3-407 applies in the the relevant jurisdiction: The recipient of an "incomplete instrument" (i.e., a check without the numbers filled in) cannot fill in those details without permission from the issuer of that check. Such a change would constitute an "unauthorized addition of words or numbers [...] to an incomplete instrument." However, such changes are permitted if the change is authorized (both because it would no longer be unauthorized per 3-407-a and because the change would have "assent" per 3-407-b). In other words, you can use an "NTE" memo on a check, but you'll need to ensure that the recipient of the check is aware that the NTE line constitutes authorization to fill in the value of the check (and what value is authorized). In the case of a county clerk who explicitly instructs issuers to use such a memo line, the use of the memo line likely constitutes authorization for the clerk to fill in the blank values in accordance with the clerk's documented policies. Note that none of this necessarily binds the bank. A bank employee who notices and understands that the NTE line was violated should reject such a check, since the employee has notice of the alteration as described in 3-407-c . However, more often than not the bank will ignore the memo line; I don't believe the bank has any obligation to notice such content.	Are there any legal terms which can make it clear that such questions are about the "outside of reach" rather than "outside of claim of reach" situations? Enforceability Laws that claim but cannot reach lack enforceability. Note that enforceability is case-specific and subjective. The US may or may not be able to reach out to those it deems to be criminals on the other side of the world; those may or may not care.	Judging from your question, you are most likely referring to putting written questions to an expert witness who has given an expert report. (This would be the only time you would be putting written questions to an expert, if an expert is giving oral evidence there would be no written questions involved, your counsel would be asking questions orally). Please clarify if this is the situation. In most circumstances, these written questions are for the purposes of clarification only. If an expert report says one thing on a matter, you cannot (subject to court approval), pose a question in conflict to that fact. For example: if the report says "It is my opinion that the house is valued at 1 million pounds", you cannot say "You're lying, aren't you?" or "The house is actually worth 2 million, isn't it?". You may, however, ask questions such as "how did you come to your conclusion on this point?", "can you clarify the process in which a person values a house?". As for the correct procedure, please see CPR Rule 35.6:	It has to be in writing To prove it exists you can point to it and say “that’s it”. Further, to be valid it must be stated on the record in court or before a Judge Pro Tem, before a court reporter, or any other mediator or settlement conference officer appointed by the court to conduct a settlement conference. They’ll have a copy of it.	This (as always) depends on jurisdiction, but usually - No, just taking the money is not legal.. In most jurisdictions, if you have a claim (the rent, in your case) against a debtor , and the debtor does not pay, you are not allowed to take any enforcement action (taking property, coercing the debtor) yourself. Instead, you must obtain a court or administrative judgement confirming your claim. Even then, often only a court officer or the police may actually enforce payment of the debt. This is mostly to protect the debtor from unwarranted enforcement action (such as taking more than you are owed, or collecting a disputed debt). For example, in Germany, to enforce a debt the creditor must first obtain what is called a Vollstreckungstitel or just Titel (title) - an official document confirming that there is an outstanding claim. This is on top of any contracts already existing. A Titel is obtained either through a regular court judgment, or through an abbreviated, administrative process called Mahnverfahren (essentially, you ask the court to send the debtor a letter about your claim, and if the debtor does not file an objection, you get the Titel). Once you have a Titel, the creditor can enforce it any time they choose (with a Titel, the statute of limiation is extended from the usual three years to 30 years). However, actual enforcement must be performed by an officer of the court (Gerichtsvollzieher). Only they may do things such as collecting the debtors property, force open doors and even imprison uncooperative debtors. I don't know the exact situation in the USA, but I believe it is roughly similar. For example, the equivalent of a Vollstreckungstitel is a Writ of execution.	Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.	In general, no. When the salesperson quoted the price and you accepted it you were each bound to that price by contract. Consideration under a contract must be sufficient (something of value for something of value) but it doesn't have to be fair: you can be obliged to pay $2 million for a cupcake or sell your Picasso for $1. You were and are under no obligation to pay and could successfully sue for the return of your money. To further clarify, it doesn't matter if the store has or has not provided the goods or services when they discover their error: they are obliged to perform their side of the contract without additional payment. Further, if this was a consumer contract then some sort of consumer protection law almost certainly applies. This would probably make what the store did not only a breach of contract but an offence against the state as well.	Contracts do not have to be written and signed on pieces of paper, except in a few cases specified by law. Writing style (ordinary style of talking vs. high-register formulaic language) does not affect the validity or a writing in contract law. You do have something in writing. What matters most is what he actually said (exact words, not your belief of what it must have meant), and how it relates to any existing contractual obligation. For example if the message says "You're fired, turn your badge in at the desk. I'll think about giving you two weeks pay", that's not an enforceable promise. But your existing contract might say "You get 2 weeks severance pay when we fire you", and that can't be walked by by saying "I'll thinking about it". And it also depends on whether there are any laws mandating severance pay (but California does not have any mandatory severance pay law).
Would I be liable for damage caused by a vehicle fault, if a mechanic has told me the fault doesn't exist? Hypothetical situation: I notice my car's brakes are making funny noises, so I take the car to my mechanic to have it checked out. The mechanic inspects the car and informs me that the noise is caused by a buildup of brake dust, and the brakes themselves are still fully functional. While pulling out of the mechanic's driveway, the brakes fail and I rear-end a Bugatti Veyron. Clearly, the mechanic's evaluation of the brakes was incorrect. Who's responsible for the damage to the million-dollar sports car? (If it's relevant, assume the mechanic has any applicable certifications or licenses, and is not just "someone who's good with cars".)	The mechanic could be held liable, indeed this attorney explains what you have to prove in exactly this case (not necessarily involving a million dollar car). The mechanic was negligent in diagnosing and repairing the brakes. You then have to prove that you mad the mechanic service the brakes (receipts / invoices). You need an attorney to figure out exactly why the brakes failed – maybe he messed up reassembling the brakes, maybe the brakes were defective (product liability) and he was negligent in detecting the defect – then the manufacturer is also liable, and it becomes an issue of what percentage of blame goes to each person. This doesn't mean that you are off the hook, because you still might have taken action to avoid the collision (emergency brake? steer to the right? how fast were you driving, how close were you following?).	From Rule 170 of the Highway Code: watch out for pedestrians crossing a road into which you are turning. If they have started to cross they have priority, so give way If this was indeed the case, then it suggests that the OP had right of way, and the driver was at fault. In any case, the driver should have indicated before turning.	All torts have to be proved. In 99.99% of cases the proof is by admission of the tortfeaser. That is, they agree to pay damages with or without admission of liability. Where liability is contested, there are never any “slam dunks”. There are strong cases, even very strong cases, but when someone else is deciding the case, there are no certainties. Remember, if your opponent thought they were going to lose, they’d settle. Looking at your examples, it seems that the tort you are thinking of is negligence. In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of torts, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. Where the issue is not one of evidence, that is, the facts are as you say and are not in dispute, the question is not “what happened”, but “is what happened negligence”. For all the examples, 1, 3, and 4 are probably not in dispute: there was a duty, the conduct caused damage at law and the plaintiff actually suffered harm. The question to be decided is whether the driver failed to conform to the required standard of care. For examples 2 and 3, most courts would conclude they didn’t. For example 1, some courts might decide that the way the driver drove did conform to the required standard and others that they didn’t. The legal argument would not be about “proof”, it would be about the standard the law requires.	As described, this may be a form of illegal bait-and-switch advertising, but not breach of contract. The contract states the specific vehicle to be sold, which does not match the test-driven car. If the dealer had listed the better car's VIN in the contract but supplied a different car, that would be breach of contract. Whether it is illegal advertisement depends on the representations and disclaimers made by the dealer. To the extent that the dealer supplied indications that there was a difference between the test model and the purchase model, or to the extent that the customer should have known that the test car had features not found in the specific model that the customer believed he was buying and paying for, the dealer was being non-deceptive. To the extent that the dealer holds that selling model X instead of model Y is an "honest mistake" on their part, the dealer was being deceptive (or, was plainly in breach of contract). It's hard to see what "honest mistake" the dealer might have made, but perhaps the mistake was "not being clearer to the customer that they had test-driven a fancier model, not the one that they were actually buying". The customer's attorney could pursue this matter and either get the better car, or get a better financial deal, but it really hinges on who said / wrote what (and has a more believable story about what was said).	If the contractor's advice that delay would be safe was reasonable under the circumstances, and other contractors or skilled professionals would have given similar advice, then the contractor will not be liable just because the advice was incorrect. If the advice was negligent, and fell clearly short of what a skilled professional would advise in the circumstances, then the contractor may have liability for the additional damages. That is the detailed facts will be very important in placing liability. The contractor is not an insurer who assumes all risk, but the contractor is responsible for acting in a reasonable, professional manner.	Yes, the police can give you a ticket for not having insurance/registration in the vehicle, even if they know it is registered/insured. The requirement is not just that you must have it, but you must carry proof of it in the vehicle. California Law (CVC §16058) requires that insurance companies electronically report insurance information to the DMV, which the officer has access to and can verify insurance. From the California DMV Page: Financial responsibility (commonly known as insurance) is required on all vehicles operated or parked on California roadways. You must carry evidence of financial responsibility in your vehicle at all times and it must be provided as specified below when: Requested by law enforcement. Renewing vehicle registration. The vehicle is involved in a traffic collision. The reason it must be in your vehicle is that when you are involved in a collision, you have to be able to provide that to the other party. And yes, you can receive the citation even if the vehicle is not yours. It is your responsibility as a driver to abide by the laws and verify that the vehicle is legal to drive. California Vehicle Code (CVC) §4000(a)(1) requires registration: A person shall not drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly, or logging dolly, unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code or registered under the permanent trailer identification program, except that an off-highway motor vehicle which displays an identification plate or device issued by the department pursuant to Section 38010 may be driven, moved, or left standing in an offstreet public parking facility without being registered or paying registration fees. I'm not advocating that you should just "suck it up and pay" this ticket. I would certainly bring proof of registration/insurance at the time of the ticket to your court date and provide that you are not the registered owner of the vehicle (you don't say, but I assume you were borrowing a friends vehicle). The court should look at that evidence and issue a warning or dismiss the ticket.	The question asks for analysis of a specific accident, and I'll leave that to other answers. This answer is focused on conceptual misunderstandings in the question itself. Where does fault lie in the following situation; and what tickets if any should be issued according to Illinois Motor Vehicle Code and why? Again who is at fault or what %'s of fault should be applied and why? Lawsuits v. Traffic Citations It is important to understand that whether tickets could be issued according to the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code, and legal fault in a lawsuit arising from an accident involving a motor vehicle are two very different legal concepts. Also, there isn't necessarily only one person at fault or only one person who has violated the Motor Vehicle Code. Motor Vehicle Code Violations Violations of the Motor Vehicle Code are analyzed one by one in a criminal or quasi-criminal traffic court proceeding where the issue is whether a fine or other punishment should be imposed for violating it. One person being cited does not mean that another person can't be cited as well. These proceedings would be brought by the "People of the State of Illinois" against each defendant by a government official at government expense. The government also has no legal obligation to bring charges for every violation that could in theory be legally supported by the facts. The outcome of the traffic court proceedings would be inadmissible evidence in a lawsuit arising out of the accident. Usually the police report will also be inadmissible evidence unless the police officer who wrote it is brought into court to testify in support of it, or the parties stipulate otherwise. Civil Liability In A Lawsuit In a lawsuit, brought by the private lawyer for a person who has suffered damages from the accident (called a "plaintiff") must show that someone else was negligent, which means that they failed to act with reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent harm to others, that this caused their damages, and must prove their damages. Private lawyers for the defendants whom the Plaintiff seeks to assign fault to are usually paid for by the defendants' insurance companies and argue against their clients having liability. A jury hears all of the evidence and assigns a percentage of fault to each party including the plaintiff. If the person injured is found by a jury to be at least 50% at fault, then there is no recovery. If the person injured is found to be less than 50% at fault, then the other parties at fault have legal liability to the plaintiff based upon their percentage of fault. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1116. Negligence in a lawsuit doesn't necessarily have to involve a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. A jury can find, for example, that someone was driving too fast for the conditions despite not violating the speed limit, or stopped too abruptly, even if those aren't Motor Vehicle Code violations and can find a percentage of fault based upon that conduct. A violation of the Motor Vehicle Code does not automatically translate to fault either. Violations of the Motor Vehicle Code are a basis for a finding of fault, in what is called negligence per se, if the code section violated was intended to prevent the kind of accident that actually happened. Failure to use a turn signal, for example, will rarely constitute negligence per se in an accident where one car rear ends another car. There are very simple cases where one can truly state with absolutely certainty that only one party is at fault for purposes of a negligence lawsuit. For example, comparative fault is hard to argue in a case where a garbage truck hits and damages a building while the driver isn't paying attention and the building owner sues the garbage truck driver and his employer, although even then the issue of what damages should be awarded can be litigated. (Full disclosure: I litigated this case for a building owner until it had to be transferred to new counsel due to a merger of my law firm with another law firm that represented the other side in the case.) But usually (at least in cases that go to trial) there is at least some colorable argument that more than one person involved failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances and if so, the jury must allocate fault percentages on a basis that it feels best allocates responsibility for the harm caused to a particular plaintiff by the accident as it sees fit in their good judgment using common sense. And, this allocation of percentage fault is almost impossible to overturn on appeal if there is any argument based upon any evidence introduced at trial that the people to whom fault were allocated indeed not totally without fault. It is impossible to say, as a matter of law, what percentage of fault should be assigned to each at fault party when more than one party is potentially at fault. This is question purely for the finder of fact (usually a jury, but the judge in a bench trial).	Suppose the shop bills you $2000 and you have a $750 deductible. You pay them $750, your insurance company pays $1250. Now suppose instead that the shop purports to waive the deductible. In order to get the insurance company to pay $1250 they still have to bill $2000. Then they don't collect the $750 from you. Presumably they write it off as bad debt. It smells like insurance fraud to me, on two counts: first, the shop expects to receive $1250 for a service but they produce a bill of $2000 for the insurance company's benefit and then do not seek payment from the insured party for any balance purportedly due beyond $1250. Second, the insured party has a contract with the insurer undertaking to pay the first $750 of the claim but has conspired with the shop to avoid paying that amount through deception. Had the shop played by the rules, they would have billed $1250 and the insurer would have paid $500. The shop isn't waiving your deductible; it's getting it out of the insurance company by fraud, with your collusion. Another way of handling this is that the auto body shop submits an estimate for the cost necessary to restore the car to a certain degree but then restores the car to a lesser degree. If everyone is aware that this is happening then it might be acceptable, depending on the terms of the insurance policy.
Tax law regarding mutual gift giving in USA I have a permaculture "food forest" of a few acres. It is essentially a small arboretum showcasing representatives of most of the tree and shrub species which can produce fruits or nuts in my climate. I would be interested in opening this space to the public and allowing people to freely gather fruits and nuts from this space. If I also have a note which says "If you are moved to leave a monetary gift you are welcome to do so", and a box to collect money, would the money I receive be taxable or considered a gift?	If the space were owned by a charitable organization, the money left by each individual would be a charitable gift reduced by the fair market value of the food taken, and the proceeds would not be taxable income for the organization because it is tax exempt. As an individual, treating it as income subject to a deduction for cost of production (not including your labor), but with the loss not being deductible as there isn't an intention to profit, would probably be the correct treatment as that treatment is what is usually what is applied to a "pay what you can" arrangement that apart from the price, resembles a business transaction. If no money were collected, it would probably be characterized as a gift by you to the persons taking it, which if less than $16,000 per person per year for all gifts made to that person, would be exempt from gift taxation. You could argue for bargain sale treatment, with the value of the produce taken net of the money left as a gift, and that would be a potentially arguable position if the money left is less than the value of the produce taken. But this characterization would probably not hold up if the amount of money left exceeded the out of pocket cost of growing the produce, in which case treating it as a low value sole proprietorship would be much more defensible than treating the money left by people as a gift to you. Generally speaking, when one person makes a gift and another person makes a counter-gift in a related action, treating each donation in isolation as gifts is not an appropriate tax treatment. I'll see if I can find authority, but, of course, cases with such tiny amounts in controversy almost never result in formal appellate decisions or regulatory action, so any binding authority wouldn't be four square on point factually, which matters in the law where reasoning by analogy and logic often doesn't produce the legally correct result.	Suppose you could. Now the proceeds of the sale belong to the shell company. What good does that do you? If you want to use the money to buy stuff for yourself, the shell company has to pay it back to you as a dividend or salary or something, and that payment will be taxable income to you personally. This might even come out worse for you: if you had held the bitcoins for more than a year, and sold them yourself, you could benefit from the lower long-term capital gains tax rate. But if you collect the funds as salary or dividend, you pay the higher ordinary income tax rate.	In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say.	Typically it works like this: Sales Tax: Owed in the state that the sale is made (in your case, New York). This is difficult in the internet age with businesses operated with no physical presence in a state. Technically sales (and local taxes) are due depending on where the item that was sold is delivered, so if you shipped an item made in Texas to New York, New York sales taxes would be due on that item. These taxes would be paid to the state of New York. Same for all 50 states. This is a huge burden on small businesses and is not usually enforced. Most small businesses only collect sales tax on items sold to the state that the business is operating from (in your example, you would only collect Texas state sales tax). Income Tax: This is the corporate tax levied by the state that the business is operating in, in this case it would be Texas. Since Texas does not have a state income tax, there would be no income tax. However Texas does have a Franchise Tax that would be due (this is due from all business organized or operating in Texas) The state that the business is registered in may have its own taxes which would be on the income of the business and would be specific to the state that the business is registered in. These can also be in the form of registration fees, annual fees, franchise fees, etc.	You must distinguish between eCommerce/Internet shops and Gift shipments. Based on you question, you will be sending a Gift shipment. Based on German Customs pages, the rules for eCommerce will change. There is no meantion for any changes for Gift shipments on their site. Paketda, a Consumer portal, states explicitly that Gift shipments are not effected. Paketda Eine gute Nachricht: Die Freigrenze von 45 Euro für Geschenke von Privatpersonen an Privatpersonen bleibt bestehen. Bis zu diesem Betrag werden keine Einfuhrabgaben (Steuern und Zoll) erhoben. Good news: The exemption limit of 45 euros for gifts from private individuals to private individuals remains in place. Up to this amount, no import duties (taxes and customs) are levied. For a Gift shipment up to €45, your friend should not expect to pay any VAT. Sources: Ab Juli entfällt die 22-Euro-Zollfreigrenze / Freibetrag für Geschenkpakete bleibt Zoll online - Änderungen ab dem 1. Juli 2021 Zoll online - Geschenksendungen (Gift shipments) doesn't meantion any changes	The legal question is whether a tax (state or federal) constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the 5th Amendment eminent domain clause. The Courts have always held that a generally applicable tax does not constitute a taking, so the income tax is not a taking. The Court came to this conclusion because the 5th Amendment takings clause was always understood to refer to government exercise of the power of eminent domain, rather than generally applicable taxes or regulations, even though they might have a negative economic effect on someone by causing their property to be taken for public use or by making their property less valuable. The exclusion of taxes from 5th Amendment takings predates the 16th Amendment. There have always been taxes and taxes are always collected for public use. The direct/indirect tax distinction arises not under the 5th Amendment, but under Article I, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the United States Constitution and governs what kinds of taxes Congress is authorized to impose. This has nothing to do with the 5th Amendment.	It looks to me as if "money laundering" is a misunderstanding; though any organization has a duty to prevent this, charities have no special responsibilties. However, charity law does in general terms prevent a charity from giving money to a cause that does not further the charity's aims. The Charity Commission's guidance says "Charities can only spend their money on projects or activities that support the aims stated in their governing document" (and although it goes on to outline exceptions, you still need to obtain the Commission's agreement to return a gift from a source you find objectionable, for example). The rationale is that people gave money to the University to further the cause of education; the researchers have no right to divert that money to Shelter (or another charity like the Roman Catholic Church) without the giver's consent. My experienced but non-expert view is that these payments would be a breach of the law, though they would probably be treated as a de minimis exception; you can't blame the University's legal team for insisting they should not be made.	There is no law in the US that says you must tell the truth on the internet. Some places where one must tell the truth are: When speaking to police, the FBI, and most government agencies When filing your taxes with the IRS In certain business contracts When testifying before Congress But on the internet, you can claim to be the first man on the moon with impunity. If someone is gullible enough to believe you and send you money, that is their fault and responsibility. As far as eating a Pangolin, why should she "admit" it, when it was documented on Instagram? There is no duty to officially apologize for it. You can try to report her to the US Fish and Wildlife Service, which enforces the Endangered Species Act, but as it occurred outside the USA, they will be powerless. Her claims are dubious, and possibly incorrect. Her treatment of an endangered animal is reprehensible. However, you posted this to a law site, asking about "reporting it" (to some sort of authority), and tagged it "criminal law". Her behavior is troubling, but I don't see anything that is remotely illegal or criminal.
Suit for excessive moderarion Assume I run a site similar to stack exchange, namely no meaningful terms of service. In that case there is no restriction on behavior, any moderator can delete anything, up to and including running a automated script that bypasses checks and deletes the entire content on the entire site. There is nothing in the terms of service saying this can't be done. The terms "give unlimited power", they don't take any away, hence the moderators can delete everything on the site. Obviously this would be prosecuted under federal hacking law except it can't, because there's no policy. Again using stack exchange as a example there are no "site policies", there are only scattered questions by individual users, with conflicting answers, and one of them has a green check mark and "becomes" "the site policy". Is anything like this workable? If a mod destroyed the site is he totally free to do so as the "site policy" is nonexistent? Note this actually has happened with real websites and is dealt with much, much harsher than on stack exchange. Facebook or its functionaries have been sued for deleting posts. The mayor of Irvine sued for deleting posts because of discriminatory and irrational behavior, not even by moderators, just even the users deleting content can be sued. If a site like stack exchange was scaled up in any way whatsoever wouldn't it be liable for completely irrational, forgive the term, idiotic behavior by moderators mass deleting arbitrary posts, especially in a litigious state like California?	No. The site would not be liable for irrational and idiotic behavior, because irrationality and idiocy remain quite legal.	Use of SE is subject to the terms and conditions specified here. Section 3 says "You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license." That means that your contributions can be used forever. That means the stuff is there, end of story. Section 11 on Termination says "Stack Exchange may also terminate, block, or suspend any and all Services and access to the Network immediately, without prior notice or liability, in its sole discretion, for any reason or no reason at all, including but not limited to any Subscriber breaches of any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement". That means you can be banned. So, yes, what they did is legal.	Online file converters are legal: there is no law that prohibits a person from making a program available and executing online, including creating output in the form of a file. It is possible that some person may illegally copy copyright-protected material then use a website to modify that material, in which case the question of vicarious liability for copyright infringement could arise, so we appeal to the DMCA safe harbor provisions to see what the website must do. First, the owner of copyright must submit a properly constructed takedown notice to the website. Crucially, the notice must contain sufficient information that the website operator can find and take down the item(s) in question. Assuming that the complainant can supply the "where is it" information, then there is a notice and counter-notice routine where the uploader is informed and can deny the accusation – the website operator doesn't evaluate the merits of the claim, he only sees that the formalities were observed. If the operator follows the rules, he cannot be held vicariously liable. If the link does not expire and if it is somehow promulgated, the technical potential for being a contributor to copyright infringement becomes very real, but it puts the operator in no worse a legal position than Youtube. So the question is not just related to OCILLA, it is entirely covered by that law. Questions of how users or website owners are "supposed to" act don't figure into this. If the website owner does not comply with those provisions, they have no access to the safe harbor provisions, and they can be sued. However, the website itself remains legally "permitted" (there never was a prohibition of such a website).	Generally, terms of service must be prominently displayed. Click-wrapped terms have been found enforceable if the user is required to view them prior to engaging in activities on the website. However, browser-wrapped terms have been found unenforceable if a reasonable user would not be expected to view the terms prior to engaging in a transaction. As an example, when you register an account on the Stack Exchange network, your viewing of legal links, and continuning to use the site after this, is recorded. This could be used as evidence that you agreed to the terms. There are views that the link to the terms should be placed in the upper-left quadrant of the homepage - this will mean the defendant would need to prove that they ignored the link. As for font size, while there are no general requirements per se, it is necessary that they be legible (that is, not excessively small).	No. Absent some collective bargaining agreement to the contrary, you have no recourse because you have not been legally wronged. You have no right to privacy in this regard. You have no right to be free of humiliation based upon truthful statements. If the email is truthful and you were indeed suspended, then the manager is entirely appropriate in sharing that information, and indeed has a need to do so. You would have no recourse in Tennessee, even if your manager gave a national television interview on your suspension and truthfully stated all reasons for the suspension and threw in statements of opinion disparaging you. Humiliation is only actionable if it amounts to "outrageous conduct" beyond mere truthful speech (e.g. throwing your clothes in the toilet or secretly putting some self-disparaging statement on the back of your uniform) and was calculated with a specific intent to cause you extraordinary emotional harm that was not necessary for some legitimate purpose.	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".	What SE can do is controlled primarily by the Terms of Service. What most matters is the section on Subscriber Content, which says: You agree that any and all content, including without limitation any and all text, graphics, logos, tools, photographs, images, illustrations, software or source code, audio and video, animations, and product feedback (collectively, “Content”) that you provide to the public Network (collectively, “Subscriber Content”), is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC-BY-SA), and you grant Stack Overflow the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to access, use, process, copy, distribute, export, display and to commercially exploit such Subscriber Content, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by you... This means that you cannot revoke permission for Stack Overflow to publish, distribute, store and use such content and to allow others to have derivative rights to publish, distribute, store and use such content. The CC-BY-SA Creative Commons license terms are explained in further detail by Creative Commons, but you should be aware that all Public Content you contribute is available for public copy and redistribution, and all such Public Content must have appropriate attribution. This part has not changed: the purported license is still "CC-BY-SA", and the TOS does not explicitly specify a version. What apparently has changed in the relevant section is one "helpful information" link, which now points to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. So the interesting question arises whether that would constitute an unpermitted post-hoc change in the terms by which SE has license to my older stuff. This matter came up in a reviled Meta question; as I pointed out, the TOS also included a merger clause that This Agreement (including the Privacy Policy), as modified from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between You, the Network and Stack Exchange with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement replaces all prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements, written or oral, regarding the subject matter hereof. Because of that, the TOS is self-contained and stuff found on other web pages are not part of the agreement. This in itself is a bit of a problem because you can't both say "we're not bound by stuff outside of this page" and say "the specific terms of the license are outside this page". That particular clause is gone, but there is an analog in the current TOS: These Public Network Terms represent the entire agreement between you and Stack Overflow and supersede all prior or contemporaneous oral or written communications, proposals, and representations with respect to the public Network or Services or Products contemplated hereunder. Furthermore, the TOS contains the following "we can change it" clause: Stack Overflow reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to modify or replace these Public Network Terms, as our business evolves over time and to better provide Services and Products to the Stack Overflow community, or to change, suspend, or discontinue the public Network and/or any Services or Products at any time by posting a notice on the public Network or by sending you notice via e-mail or by another appropriate means of electronic communication. I assume but do not know for a fact that a similar clause existed in prior versions of the TOS. So I conclude that the change is legal.	Yes, you can. An excellent example is this very website - at the bottom of this page you will find a series of links in the footer, one of which is "Terms of Service". I think you will agree that most people using the Law SE are making no money from it or paying no money to use it and yet the terms of service sets out in black and white what a user of this site can do, and what the repercussions can be if they breach the ToS, so it serves a purpose as an excellent example for your question.
What is the legal theory behind the view that government seizing private assets is not an act of violence? I am curious about the origins of the view that seizing private tangible assets does not amount to an act of violence. To see that this is not a universal view, one need not look further than Machiavelli's quote "a man will sooner forget his father's death than the loss of his estate." Indeed most criminal activity revolves around illegal acquisition of property. So it's hardly a far-fetched view that people risk life and limb to gain property. And yet it is common for governments to impose "civil" penalties in the forms of "fees" and "fines" without the type of administrative review that is imposed on most forms incarceration. It hardly needs explaining that loss of property results in a loss of ability to transact and obtain life-sustaining materials. This constitutes delayed harm to physical well-being. Surely this must have been a matter of some public debate before this type of view has become universally adopted. I am not asking about any one particular jurisdiction, but I am curious how this view has come to be in most "modern" countries.	The issue is not whether it is an "act of violence". The fundamental political theory of classically liberal capitalist democracies is that the state has a monopoly on the use of force and violence, or at least, is entitled to assert one if it wishes to do so. But it is recognized as a matter of political theory that the use of force and violence and the credible threat of it, is necessary to secure good order and fairness and justice in society (and from outsiders attacking the society), and to encourage people to act appropriately towards each other. In a classical liberal capitalist democracy, this monopoly on the use of force and violence is regulated and made less abusive by providing that neither liberty or property can be taken by the state without due process of law (except in certain well defined exigent circumstances where due process is provided after the fact). The nuances of what due process is required is what differs. Overall, more due process is required for more serious deprivations, and less is required for less serious deprivations since the consequences of getting it wrong are smaller and don't justify the dead weight loss of more expensive litigation in the same way. Generally, incarceration is deemed to be more serious than a fine or money judgment as explained below, so it needs more due process protections. So, the issue is that interference with personal liberty is taken more seriously than interference with property, and the answer comes from understanding why the former is more serious than the latter. At its heart, this is a widely shared normative view. And, in U.S. constitutional law, this isn't an all or nothing proposition. For example, short deprivations of liberty (incarceration for six months or less) are penalties that a state or local government may take without a jury trial, while longer deprivations of liberty carry with them the right to trial by jury, and moderate to severe deprivations of liberty (typically felonies punishable by three or more years) typically carry with them the right to an evidentiary preliminary hearing before a judge prior to a trial on the merits before a jury that is not available for less serious offenses. Similarly, there is not an absolute right to counsel at state expense in all proceedings in which an indigent defendant might be incarcerated. When the case is prosecuted by a government official, this is the case, but when someone facts potential incarceration for willfully disobeying a court order until that person complies (contempt of court) and the case is prosecuted by a private litigant (possibly pro se), there is not a U.S. Constitutional right to counsel. In the same vein, there are weaker due process protections for someone accused of a pre-trial release rule violation, violation of jail or prison rules, probation violation, parole violations, and requests to be released on parole, when they are already under some form of correctional supervision, even though they can result in longer periods of incarceration, than there are someone living their daily life faces potential criminal punishment. I can't piece together exactly how this came to be, and the legal theory literature is rather thin and not wildly referred to by practitioners. But a couple of key historical points come to mind. One is that due process protections for moderate to serious felony offense criminal defendants were historically important, because certainly as of the 18th century in common law jurisdictions, the death penalty was routinely imposed for offenses that did not cause the death of the victim, such as burglary, robbery, and rape, in part, because the governments of these societies didn't have the economic resources necessary to incarcerate serious criminals for long enough periods of time to protect the public from recidivism and to adequately deter the conduct in the first place. While the line between property and liberty may be debatable, no one would seriously doubt that the historic divide between loss of life and loss of property clearly called for more due process protections against loss of life. A second is that in the late 18th century and early 19th century, a political movement arose to oppose debtor's prisons (and the related civil remedy called "body execution"), as disproportionate and inefficient. Prior to that time, one remedy of a creditor against someone who failed to pay a debt was to have them thrown into a "debtor's prison" or "work house" where they were placed in involuntary servitude until the debt was paid in full. Essentially, the moral argument was that being poor should not be a ground for being incarcerated and simple failure to pay a contactual debt routinely involves merely being poor. In the U.S., Congress outlawed debtors prisons in 1833. The 14th Amendment adopted after the U.S. Civil War, prohibited not just slavery, but involuntary servitude for failure to pay debts, when indentured involuntary servitude to pay costs of an apprenticeship or a passage to the Americas from the Old World, had been common in the colonial period, and into the early 19th century. In 1983 the Supreme Court ruled that in order to jail a person for failure to pay a fine or fee, the judge must first consider if the person was 'willfully' choosing not to pay. Closely related to this, which was a fairly new idea in the 18th century, was the idea of making the discharge of debts that a debtor has no reasonable ability to repay from the debtor's assets or earnings in the short term, routinely available as a matter of right in a court bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, weaker due process protections for monetary debts is backstopped by the fact that the harshness of this is limited by the fact that the debts can often be wiped out in bankruptcy if they are excessive, and that even if they can't be discharged in bankruptcy, that modern limits on the assets and income from which debts can be collected, almost automatically makes such debts survivable for a debtor. So, the risk of doing too much harm with an erroneous judgment is mitigated. Also, keep in mind that most money judgments and fines are compensatory in nature, are a rough justice approximation of compensation, or are proportionate to the seriousness of the harm done in the view of democratically elected legislators, acting collectively, who are presumed to be reasonable. If you deprive someone of property, for example, by failing to repay money loaned, or by destroying their property, taking a like amount of money or property from you seems like simple justice that doesn't call for close scrutiny, whether that comes in the form of a civil money judgment or a criminal restitution award. Similarly, most fines, for things like illegal parking, traffic violations, or minor municipal ordinance violations, are petty. Often they are less than one day's pay for the defendant, and hence, much less serious that depriving someone of liberty for more than a few hours. It is patently less severe. Also, the severity of a money judgment or fine bears a relationship to the ability of someone facing it to pay it. Typically, people who can afford cars can also afford parking tickets and traffic fines. Typically, people who drive cars are required to get insurance to pay meaningful amounts of money to people harmed if they have accidents. Typically, creditors only extend credit to people for whom it is not to burdensome to repay the debt. Typically, homeowners can afford to pay fines for municipal ordinance violations for failing to mow their lawns. In Northern Europe, there is an effort to reconcile the economic impact of incarceration on someone to presumptive prison sentences, with a system of "day-fines" where an offense is deemed to justify a prison sentence of up to X days, and that is converted to a fine equal to one day's wages for the defendant times the number of days (sentences imposed with the full due process protections of criminal defendants). This prevents the state from having to incur great expense to incarcerate someone who has already burden society by breaking its rules, and instead has the opposite economic effect on the state. It also prevents the community ties of the defendant from being disrupted and prevents criminal defendants from being unduly influenced by other offenders who would be incarcerated with that defendant potentially leading all involved to commit more future crimes. And, paying a fine still leaves a defendant with considerable liberty to interact with friends and family, enjoy low cost entertainment options, and move about where he or she desires. Incarceration deprives the offender of income, and also imposes all sorts of limitations on the defendant. One could imagine a system, like the day-fine system, where many fines that are punishment in excess of mere compensation or good approximation of it for the harm done are routinely as several in impact to a defendant as incarceration is to a defendant. But the U.S. does not have such a system. Punitive fines authorized by law are very rarely even remotely as severe as typical sentences of incarceration for the crimes for which those fines are authorized, when committed by natural persons. So, since fines, while they could be more severe than incarceration in a hypothetical legal system, rarely are in most non-day fine legal regimes, affording maximal due process protections in cases of incarceration but not monetary punishment flows naturally from the mere fact that incarceration, in practice, is almost always a more severe punishment, and because a bright line rule is easier to apply even in the rare cases when a fine might be more serious than incarceration. Greater due process in more severe cases makes sense because inaccurate judicial imposition or non-imposition of punishment in minor matters is less of a big deal than in very serious matters. Finally, it is worth noting that incarceration is usually reserved for offenses in which the typical defendant would be utterly incapable of providing money compensation, because the harm done is so great. Criminal offenses punishable by incarceration are designed for instances of "incalculable harm" that can't be made right with the defendant's money, while civil offenses are generally chosen as a policy option in cases where the harm caused in manageable relative to the ability of someone to make it right with a compensatory payment and/or a fine or punitive damages that proportionately compares to the harm done that is not merely economic in some way. The notion that incalculable harms are more serious and hence more important to get right, than those which are measurable and compensable, again, argues for greater due process protections in incarceration cases. (Another area where due process protections are similarly great is in termination of parental rights cases, by the way, which implicate similarly serious and incalculable harm matters.) I know that this lacks citation, but it does go a bit to illustrating the motivating ideas.	It's generally correct in the American system that everything not forbidden is permitted. But the law you're looking at isn't really an exception. You have the legal right to tamper with evidence if tampering is not illegal, but this statute makes it illegal. The language you've highlighted merely says that the law does not apply to those who have some other affirmative grant of authority to do so. So if you stab someone to death in your kitchen, you can't remove the body or other evidence, but the detectives investigating the case can, because they have the legal authority to process the scene and maintain the evidence for trial. So the law is similar to the "speaking in public" hypothetical, but that doesn't make it meaningless. Because of the First Amendment, that law doesn't actually outlaw anything, but the tampering law faces no such legal barriers. You had the right to tamper until the government said you didn't. Now that it says you don't, you can only do it on the government's terms, which require an affirmative grant of authority.	When a person unlawfully kills someone else they have committed a crime against the state (murder, manslaughter etc.) and a civil wrong (a tort) against the victim (specifically, the tort of wrongful death). The state responds with charging the perpetrator with a crime and attempting to prove that they did the deed "beyond reasonable doubt". If convicted the criminal is "punished" by incarceration or death or a fine or community service etc. The victim (through their estate) or other affected people (family, dependents etc.) can respond by suing the perpetrator for compensation (money) for the damage they caused. If the plaintiff proves their case "on the balance of probabilities" the perpetrator will owe the plaintiffs whatever damages the court awards. There are many crime/tort mirrors (many have the same name): theft and conversion, trespass and trespass, fraud and fraud, kidnapping and false imprisonment etc. Because of the different threshold of proof between criminal and civil liability, it is much easier to win a civil case.	On the contrary there are hundreds of federal statutes that sanction civil forfeiture, as well as 18 U.S.C. § 983 (and other subsections inter alia) that governs civil forfeiture. What you seem to be more concerned with is the judicial oversight and regulations around civil forfeiture. The burden of proof varies between, and within, states - in some, prima facie/probable cause is all that is required, in others, a preponderance of evidence, or clear and convincing evidence is required. Just three states require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and civil forfeiture is only illegal in New Mexico. Civil forfeiture is subject to judicial review: a list of notable cases in civil forfeiture is available on Wikipedia. Here's some of the more interestingly-named ones: Marcus v. Search Warrant One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania Marcus v. Search Warrant held that the search and seizure procedures in that case lacked safeguards for due process, freedom of speech, and freedom of press. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania held because the vehicle was searched without a warrant, and the untaxed liquor found thereby was used to invoke the forfeiture, the forfeiture was illegal (the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures). So, what is the legal framework? Broadly speaking, 18 U.S.C 983, as well as state legislation. What recourse is there? Judicial review. However, the procedures vary between jurisdictions.	The money is forfeited to the state This would normally be the case even if Daniel is acquitted. The proceeds of crime may be seized using forfeiture rules which require Daniel to prove that the suspect money is legitimate.	Because your legal fees and contract damages are not "in addition to" your risk; they are your risk. If you pay the retainer and lose, you don't lose anything more than the retainer and damages. If you pay the retainer and win, you don't win anything more than the retainer and damages. The only kind of argument I can see here is that you're incurring some kind of psychic cost by enduring the uncertainty surrounding the litigation, but I can't remember ever seeing a case -- in Florida or elsewhere -- in which the court recognized taking on risk as a compensable harm, especially in a contract case, where damages are much more limited than in other kinds of cases. Risk is just a necessary feature of an adversarial legal system.	As for a member of the Universal Postal Union, what repercussions will occur for country B? None. Are they allowed to keep stealing stuff at the sender insurer's expense? Well, country B isn't stealing stuff. Bad actors in the employe of country B are stealing stuff. This is a matter for law enforcement in country B. If country B is endemically corrupt as seems to be implied, then it is likely that the bad actors will continue to be bad actors. As for the insurer, they are in the business of selling insurance against theft (among other things) and they will take this into account in setting their premiums. Will they face any penalties (e.g. banned from the Union) that would encourage them to hold their customs to account? All member countries of the UN are entitled to be members of the UPU and it seems unlikely that such minor issues could lead to expulsion from the UN - nation-states that have committed genocide are still UN members after all. Since the UPU appears to produce more upsides than downsides, being one of, if not the single most successful and universally adopted international treaty in history this is just one of the minor annoyances.	The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law."
Why are websites like voter's records legal? How is it possible that https://voterrecords.com/ can operate without any problems? They reveal your personal information without your direct consent. Basically, you can find the address of anyone who you want. Well, if you are registered to vote, which most of people are. How can this be allowed to be publicly available? What law does allow this site to show your name and address and many other things (party affiliation)? Note: Can I sue the government or the website if someone who broke into my house or caused damage to my property as part of their crime if they used this portal to obtain my personal information?	There is a law requiring it (in Washington). Per RCW 29a.08.720, "current lists of registered voters are public records and must be made available for public inspection and copying under such reasonable rules and regulations as the county auditor or secretary of state may prescribe". As in all states, there is a law that requires disclosure of "public records", which is in this case limited to first and last name, age, county and zip code (there is no official party affiliation, and phone number or street address are excluded from public records). Ohio law is a bit different, so you can get a street address (in the Ohio section, it also includes putative data from other internet sources, which are often just guesses – it thinks my son lived in Texas). It does not include California, because voter lists are not mandatorily-disclosed public records in California. Under half of the states' records are available.	Each state has its own election laws, so you will get 50 different answers depending on what state you are interested in (perhaps 49, since Washington doesn't have polling places - depends on what you mean by "poll watcher"). This page is a starter list of legal resources. This page starts you on deconstructing this notion of "poll watcher". Colorado is one state that explicitly allows partisan observers, here are the rules. No person is compelled to be an observer, so I don't understand who you think might be abusing a poll watcher. Perhaps you are referring to the possibility that an election official will prevent an observer from doing their job. Or perhaps you are thinking that being a poll watcher abuses the intent of some law. Whatever you have in mind, there are laws in each state that say what is allowed and what is forbidden, so you have to address this at a local level. No state has a requirement that observers must come from or swear allegiance to the majority party of that polling jurisdiction (e.g. county, or precinct). Any attempt by election officials, or anyone else, to block observers from the minority party would be rebuffed by the courts. The courts will not attempt to divine inner motivations for sending an observer. Most states allow partisan observers. Michigan distinguishes "challengers" and "poll watchers", and there are distinct rules and powers for the two sets. A crucial difference is that a watcher cannot legally challenge a claimed right to vote or a precinct board action, but a challenger can. There are rules of conduct imposed on both kinds of observers, one of them being that you cannot challenge a voter for the purpose of annoying or delaying the voter. This is a misdemeanor (a crime) under MCL 168.727, and as a criminal prohibition, the state would have to prove intent beyond reasonable doubt. Blog posts by the observer might provide sufficient evidence, but speculation by the majority party would not.	According to this article, the Malmö Administrative District Court found that the intent of the user is immaterial to whether a camera is being used for surveillance, so even if that is not why you are doing this, it counts legally as "surveillance". The law requires a permit from the länsstyrelse (county? government), according to the Kameraövervakningslag (2013:460) (article 8 states the requirement for permit, art. 16 tells you who to apply to). I believe that a tennis court would be considered a "public place", even if privately owned. Art. 17 tells you what goes into an application (there is probably a form), and art. 18 says that the kommun gets to weigh in. Presumably it would be critical to have a consent form signed before any recording happens, and you would include that in the application.	One way in which it holds legal water is that if you use the website in violation of the terms, then you may forfeit your right to take civil action against the company. Analogous language especially regarding the age of the user may protect the site against actions by third party governmental entities (COPPA-like laws), though nothing patently obvious springs to mind (insofar as this deals with firearms and there is also an age 21 restriction both on the web site and in terms of US firearms law, this is not a totally crazy idea). The citation of 18 USC 1030 non-probatively points to an issue which may be disposed of by SCOTUS in US v. van Buren, that knowingly violating the terms of service is a crime (a proposition rejected by lower courts, see US v. Valle). Facebook v. Power Ventures in particular clarifies how "being put on notice" may make such unauthorized access indeed "unauthorized access" in the statutorily-relevant sense. This does not prevent a legally-authorized law enforcement investigation, pursuant to para (f), but if the "violation of TOS = unauthorized access" theory is upheld, it limits how LEOs can legally access the website (and the limitations extend past LEOs). It is a separate and potentially interesting question whether there actually are any legal limits on the investigative powers of the government – if any law enforcement officer has the liberty to investigate anyone they want, with no supervision or requirement of justification, then this would be a rather gaping loophole in their legal strategy. Web pages involve massive copying of copyright-protected data, and the function of terms of use is in part to conditionally grant access to that copyright-protected content. When a person copies protected material from someone's web page having been explicitly denied permission to copy, they run the risk of an infringement lawsuit.	The level of anonymity or privacy given by the lottery administrator (the state) to the lottery winner depends on the terms and conditions of lottery that are accepted as a binding contract when the buyer buys a lottery ticket. It's all in the small print. If you don't like the terms of the lottery, don't buy a ticket. The lottery terms probably says that the state can use the winner's name in marketing and promotional materials. For a winner to be able to be anonymous, the terms of the lottery would have to specifically state that anonymity is guaranteed, while at the same time, allowing the state to report the winner to the IRS for tax purposes. (Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, North Dakota, Ohio and South Carolina all allow lottery winners to remain anonymous.) The winner will have little recourse against the state due to circumstances - like being robbed or fleeced - which are outside of the state's control because they are actions by individuals, not the state. The state is also not guilty of "recklessly endangering people" because the ticket buyer knowingly bought a ticket, hoping to win, and agreed to terms. And it's quite difficult to sue any form of government; states and the federal government are by law immune to most legal actions. The recourse of the ticket buyer - or group of buyers who were possibly harmed as a result of winning - is to encourage the legislation of laws that provide for the anonymity of winners.	Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive.	I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely.	Yes, so long as you are still a US citizen, it does not matter if you no longer maintain residence in the United States. If you no longer have any sort of residence that can be claimed as a current residence, you simply register at whatever the last residence you used was when you lived in the United States (even if someone else lives there now). You would then have an absentee ballot mailed to you overseas. However, if you don't maintain any sort of residence in the United States, you will only be eligible to vote for federal offices (president, senate, house). You won't be allowed to vote in state or local elections. The keywords you'll need for voting are: UOCAVA, which is a program that allows for easier voting overseas (in some cases the ballot can actually be emailed to you and you are only responsible for printing it out, filling it out, and mailing it back). FPCA, which is the form you fill out. It actually doubles as a registration and an absentee ballot request, so you only have to fill out one form. The absentee request is good for all elections in the calendar year it is submitted, so you only have to fill it out once for both the primary and the general.
21st Amendment defence against drug crimes I think it can be argued that Congress, by making the prohibition of alcohol unconstitutional, intended to remove the problems of prohibition, specifically, organized crime. Would my logic be sound to presume that alcohol is a mode of drug delivery and so it would be that all drugs can be regulated but not prohibited?	Your argument is: The 21st amendment repealed the prohibition of alcohol. Alcoholic drinks deliver one type of drug (alcohol) Therefore, the 21st amendment repealed the prohibition of all drugs. That is an logically invalid argument. It is equivalent to: If A then B If A then C Therefore, if C then B. Further, the court has never held that the government lacks the power to regulate and prohibit drugs. It is hard to prove a negative, but see Gonzales v. Raich 545 U.S. 1 (2005): Congress’ Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law. As this was a constitutional question, had the 21st amendment prevented Congress's prohibition, that would have likely come up in this case.	Ultimately the answer (in the US) is the US Constitution. The courts pretty much have the unlimited power to interpret the law, and the limits on power mainly pertain to what the state can do. The length of the leash on the government depends on what kind of rights are at stake. The weakest and default limit is known as "rational basis", and comes down to asking whether a government action is rationally related to a legitimate government interest (such as stopping terrorist attacks) plus whether there was due process and equal protection. There are more rigorous standards (intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny) in case a law involves a "suspect classification", or in case a fundamental constitutional right is infringed. In the case of strict scrutiny, the government would have to show that it had a compelling interest in the action, the law would have to be "narrowly tailored" (i.e. does that thing and only that thing), and should be the least restrictive way to achieve that result. Roe v. Wade is probably the best-know example of that kind of review, which held that abortion laws "violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy". A court would not order a party to do an impossible act. A court could order a party to do something which the party had argued was impossible, but you can interpret a court's decision to indicate that it rejected the argument. The defendant would not shoulder the burden of proving that the action was impossible, though they would have to counter the government's argument that the act could be performed if they believe it is not possible. (In the Apple case, the argument would probably be some Apple-internal document that says "Yeah, we can do it, but do we want to?"). There is probably an expense-related limit in that the courts would not order Apple to liquidate all of their assets to comply. But: if a case were to end up at the Supreme Court, the court is stricken with mass insanity and arbitrarily orders a defendant to do the impossible, there is only the option of impeachment and Senate trial to remove the offending justices, and that is just not going to happen. There is no higher authority that overturns SCOTUS.	This article is a useful introduction to restrictions on political advertising in the EU, where §3.4 (p 33) covers Italy. Silenzio elettorale is covered by art 9. of Norme per la disciplina della propaganda elettorale. The statutory situation is not entirely clear to me, but the main controlling fact relevant to the internet question is that AGCOM issues rules. An English legal analysis (from an Italian law firm) is here. Their undernourished analysis of the silence period is Finally, Italian legislation prohibits political propaganda on election day and on the day before. Although AGCOM is not competent for ascertaining infringements of said prohibition, it considers important to call everyone to turn the attention on these provisions. Indeed, they are important to guarantee effective protections of the constituents. As such, in the Authority’s opinion, the prohibition applies to all media. Clearly, the law applies to internet platforms. What is not clear is whether the prohibition as applied to web pages is against "adding content", or does it require the elimination of previously-distributed content and scrubbing of links to such content. Perhaps the matter will be clarified in court one day.	All laws (federal, state and local) apply to everybody, unless you have diplomatic immunity. That is, unless e.g. the federal government decides as a matter of policy to ignore certain federal laws. California does not have a law generally prohibiting the use of marijuana, though public consumption is illegal, minor consumption is illegal, and possession over 28.5 grams is illegal. So that is one less law to be concerned with violating. The federal law still exists, and has not been repealed for anyone. However, the federal government by policy is not pursuing marijuana cases in legal contexts in those states that have legalized marijuana. The complication for foreign students is that there are also immigration laws whereby you may be deported for a drug offense (that link is full of technical details on immigration and drug laws, worth reading). The immigration laws basically make it easy to penalize a foreigner (for example you might be deemed "inadmissible" so you cannot be re-admitted to the US if you leave; it just depends on what their grounds are for action). For example, "a noncitizen is inadmissible as of the moment that immigration authorities gain substantial and probative 'reason to believe' the noncitizen has ever participated in drug trafficking," which does not mean a conviction. It is reported that in California, DHS officers have treated minor infractions as "convictions," which means to be safe you have to avoid even infractions. It appears (and hire an immigration attorney if you want to test this) that trouble only arises if there is reason to believe you are trafficking, if you are a drug addict or abuser, if you are "convicted" (not necessarily "tried and found guilty," it also includes certain legal maneuverings), or if you admit to drug use (even in the case of home use under doctor's orders, i.e. a California-legal context). This incidentally includes non-use but working for the marijuana industry. It is possible that you could get stopped on the street by a random immigration search, and if you are in possession, then... it is not guaranteed that possession of a small amount of marijuana, when caught by federal authorities, cannot lead to immigration problems.	Yes, it Could A state can repeal or modify its laws against any particular crime, or just decline, as a matter of policy, to enforce such laws. It is in my view quite unlikely that a state would do this in the case of murder, but legally it could. Such action by a state would not affect the federal murder statute is at 18 USC 1111. But that only applies under a rather limited set of situations. According to "When is murder a federal offense?" it applies when: The murder is of a federal judge or a federal law enforcement official (for example, an agent of the FBI, TSA, or ATF),1 the killing is of an immediate family member of a federal law enforcement official. the murder is of an elected or appointed federal official (for example, the President, a Supreme Court Justice, a member of Congress, or the murder of a federal judge) the killing is committed during a bank robbery [or other Federal crime]. the killing takes place aboard a ship at sea (for example, on a vessel that is engaged in interstate commerce per the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution). the murder was designed to influence a court case. the killing takes place on federal property (for example, on national parks or a Native American reservation). The vast majority of murder cases do not come under the current Federal law.	In general, yes. 1 USC 109 states that: The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. Translated into plain English, this means that if you were to smoke marijuana in a Yellowstone National Park campground today, and Congress were to pass an act saying "28 USC 841 is repealed" tomorrow, you could still be arrested and convicted for possession of a controlled substance next week. However, if the act instead stated "28 USC 841 is repealed and no retroactive prosecutions shall take place", then you can't be convicted. (The other half of 1 USC 109 is basically the same thing, applied to temporary laws: if a temporary law expires, you can still be prosecuted for actions taken while the law was in effect, unless the law states otherwise.)	One can only be certain when a case is decided by SCOTUS, and so far, no law has attempted to ban the publication of manuals for firearms. Jackson v. City of S.F., 746 F.3d 953 gives good reason to think that the court would find such a ban unconstitutional. There is an analogous line of thinking regarding ammunition regulations, where some municipalities took the position that ammunition is not "arms" and therefore is not protected, since the amendment does not explicitly say "and ammunition". The Jackson court comments that A regulation eliminating a person's ability to obtain or use ammunition could thereby make it impossible to use firearms for their core purpose referring to Heller, and SCOTUS's finding that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms and that the city’s total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even when necessary for self-defense, violated that right. The Jackson court conclude[s] that prohibitions on the sale of ammunition do not fall outside “the historical understanding of the scope of the [Second Amendment] right.” The reasoning that brings ammunition within the scope of Second Amendment protection applies equally well to e.g. ammo cases, gun oil, cleaning brushes, and instruction manuals, all of which are necessary to the lawful exercise of one's Second Amendment rights. See also Ezell v. Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 which holds that the right to possess firearms "implies a corresponding right to acquire and maintain proficiency in their use" and thus a ban on firing ranges violates the Second Amendment.	I know of no specific provision of the Constitution that would forbid it. I know of no court case in which it has been found unconstitutional. There's no "irony" clause in the Constitution. Taxation without representation may have been a grievance, but there's no inherent reason why the framers would have had to forbid it. US citizens do still have the "freedom to expatriate" (and avoid taxation) if they renounce their citizenship. There are already other examples of "taxation without representation" in US law (e.g. District of Columbia), which also have not been found unconstitutional in court, as far as I know. In many cases, expatriates can still vote for federal offices, including Congress (e.g. in a state where they used to live, or where a parent used to live). See https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/registration-ballots. The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes" with few limitations. There is certainly no explicit exception for expatriates. As far as I can tell, it would be constitutional if Congress were to impose an income tax on everybody in the world, regardless of residency or citizenship; it would just be hard to enforce.
Would I be liable for damage caused by vehicle failure during a test drive? I recently purchased a vehicle via an online dealer that offers a 7 day test-drive period. While on a test drive, I heard a familiar "Knocking" noise coming from the driver's side front wheel. I happened to know what it was, as I had experienced this once before. The wheel was not attached properly, and the nuts were loose. Another 10 minutes of driving, it would've popped off and rolled down the road. (Again, this has happened to me before and narrowly missed going into someone's windshield - Thankfully that incident resulted only in damage to my wheel and lower arm joint.) I pulled over, tightened the nuts, and drove it the last mile home. I contacted the dealer and told them I would be exercising the 7-day guarantee - I would not be purchasing the vehicle. When it was picked up, I told them on no uncertain terms that the vehicle was not fit to drive until the wheels were inspected by a professional. In addition to this, the company that sold me the car has a "150 point checklist" that specifically claims to have addressed these exact deficient items on the car. My question is, had the wheel come off and caused horrible damage to life and property, who would have been held responsible? The car was not yet registered in my name as it was in a "Test drive period", I did have insurance, and the problem would not have been my fault (as far as I am concerned, at least. . But what does the law think?) Even though this is a hypothetical, it came very close to happening. If it's relevant, this would've taken place in Texas, United States.	Yes Under Texas law (and pretty much everywhere else) the driver of the vehicle is responsible for ensuring that it is roadworthy. This does not mean that someone else cannot also be liable - the mechanic who fixed the wheel and their employer would also be liable. The claim for damages from a motor vehicle accident lies in the tort of negligence and the standards that the driver has to attain to avoid liability is that of a reasonable person. A reasonable person is not an average person who (probably) just gets in a car and drives but a prudent person who considers the risks to themselves and others and takes reasonable steps to mitigate them. Like looking at the wheels of an unfamiliar car. If the defect were obvious to a layperson from a visual inspection, they would be liable if they had not conducted such an inspection. Similarly, continuing to drive when a car is making a "Knocking" noise even if you didn't know what it was is not something a reasonable person would do. If you knew what the noise was and kept driving we are now moving from negligence into recklessness and the realms of criminal liability like manslaughter.	In Austria they have a law about "Kreditschädigung" (website from the Austrian government, "credit damage") translated by Google as: Because of credit damage, a person is liable to prosecution if he or she asserts incorrect facts and thereby harms or endangers the credit, the acquisition or professional advancement of another person. A prison sentence of up to six months or a fine of up to 360 daily rates is provided for the offense of credit damage. If you setup a webpage which lists things which might harm somebody's business, you have to proof that every single claim you make is correct (not just your individual experience). So if you have solid proof for each of your claims of your Q&A, you might win a probable law suite. The way you wrote it, it might be difficult to proof because it seems to be your personal experience. See also here for details. (in German).	is there any legal action I can take against the dealership to enforce their compliance with our contractual agreement? Yes, you can sue for breach of contract. You would probably seek an order for specific performance. You could also claim damages but it is difficult to see exactly what damage you have suffered. Is there a reasonable timeline that they must deliver within if a date is not specified in the contract? Yes, where a contract is silent on a date for performance of an obligation they must be carried out in a reasonable time. From the circumstances 4 months is starting to seem unreasonable but they will no doubt argue that it is reasonable- this is something the court would decide.	Some states allow you to just exchange information and then each party files their own accident report with the police and the DOT within an allowed amount of time, so long as the cars are only minimally damaged and nobody is hurt. If one party wants the police there, it is standard to wait. If both decide it not necessary, it is fine to leave. Either way, leaving or staying does not give rise to the avoidance of a finding of fault against one party or another. The state of Wisconsin is a Tort State (as opposed to a no-fault state). These are insurance related issues as opposed to legal issues, but utterly intertwined. The accident reports filed by each party, any police reports and other relevant data will be submitted to the DMV and the insurance, and the insurance companies will assign fault if the DMV or police haven't, either by agreement or inter-company arbitration. Relating to your question, however, you will see the processes required HERE. In part, it states the following: REPORTING AN ACCIDENT TO THE WISCONSIN DOT In some situations, you must report an accident to the Wisconsin Police. If the police were unable to file an accident report, you must complete and submit a Driver Accident Report within 10 days of an accident, if any of the following apply: The accident caused injury or death. Property damage to at least one person's property amounted to $1,000 or more. Damage to government property, other than vehicles, amounted to $200 or more. If you fail to report an accident to the Wisconsin DOT, you may have your license suspended. In the event that another driver offers to pay for damages and asks you not to report an accident, you are still required to file the report in any of the situations outlined above. Your report must include detailed and current information regarding your insurance coverage. The DOT will cross-check this information with the insurance company shown on the report. If you did not have liability insurance when the accident occurred and were unable to provide restitution for injuries or damages sustained due to your negligence, your driving privileges will be suspended. You will be required to file proof of future financial responsibility (SR-22) in order to have your driving privileges reinstated. Make a copy of the accident report form for your personal records. You can mail the original directly to: Traffic Accident Section, Wisconsin Department Of Transportation, Po Box 7919, Madison, WI 53707-7919 As you can see, from your interpretation/description, you were not technically required to deal with the police, but you were required to exchange information, assess and give aid to the extent possible to the other driver, and so if the other called for emergency intervention it may be the other driver disagreed w/ one of these assessments (damage or injury). If you did exchange information, took photos, etc., you are probably ok. If not, certainly that will be problematic. I know you are saying there was no damage or injury. However, while you are saying this is what the other driver acquiesced to, it may be that it is not the case either afterward or he/she wanted to avoid (potentially dangerous) interaction at the scene. That said, while you can clearly see the situations by which the police are necessitated, you also indicate the other driver called the police. In that case, you probably should have stayed once you were alerted to that fact, as leaving puts you in the precarious position of only the other driver's side being documented by the police, and your absence may lead the officer to find you at fault or with something to hide. The officer will file a report, either way, of which you must get a copy. If he disagrees with your assessment of the damage/injury and feels you left in the face of those situations proscribed, you will know because you will be arrested or summoned for leaving the scene. That is to be determined by the reporting officer. In the future, if there is an accident and one driver explicitly states the police have been called, you should wait. You don't have to say anything at all to the officer, if you don't want to. In most states, all you need to do is give the officer your driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. It always looks worse to leave the scene knowing they are coming, since it may lead to a determination that it was illegal to do so. Whereas, no additional harm can come from remaining present. So far, I cannot find a state statute there whereby it is explicitly illegal to leave once one driver calls for emergency assistance. If I find this I will amend my answer and cite it.	The correct term for this insurance is personal liability insurance - it is neither compulsory nor common in common law jurisdictions. However, some aspects of it may be bundled with other insurances like homeowners, landlords and contents insurance. Liability for damage in common law flows either from a breach of contract or a tort. Of course, if you intentionally cause harm you have crossed the line from civil liability to criminality and no insurance will indemnify you. For your specific examples: [I]f, say, a candle falls over and I burn my flat? If your lease prohibited you from having open flames then this would be a clear breach of contract and you would have to pay for the damage to the flat (and your own property, of course). If your lease was silent on this, then you would be liable if you were negligent and each party would bear their own losses if you weren't (i.e. it was a pure "accident"). What if a flower pot falls from my windowsill and accidentally kills someone? The passerby has no action under contract as they don't have one. They can sue you, or the landlord, or the body corporate (or all three) for negligence - the landlord's and/or body corporate's insurance would respond and if it included a waiver of subrogation (most do), the insurer could not sue any of the other parties for their losses. What if my trolley bumps into an old lady at the supermarket and I break her hip? What if I walk on my friend's glasses and break them? You have no contract with either of these people so they cannot sue you under one. If they can prove negligence then you have to pay for the damage. If it is, instead a pure "accident" then they bear the cost. However, for the old lady, she is way more likely to sue the supermarket as they will have insurance. It is not as useful in the UK as it is in France due to the need for the plaintiff to prove a breach of contract or negligence. In the UK, you are not responsible for accidents you cause - only accidents you cause negligently.	Your personal liability depends on your state law regarding the family car doctrine, so the answer there is "maybe" (Texas is not a state with that doctrine, so simple ownership of the car does not confer liability). You would be liable if your supervision of the child was negligent, which means approximately that you knew or should have known that she was a bad driver and would cause damage. Still, the insurance company is suppose to indemnify you (plural) against such loses, as long as they are legally required to do so. That would include many considerations, such as whether the driver was covered under the policy, whether the car was being used contrary to the terms of the policy (being used commercially), and so on. The insurance company is entitled to make a reasonable determination of whether they are responsible for the loss (and if so, to what extent). If they actually decline to cover the loss, you would need to sue them to make them comply with the terms of the policy (and your lawyer would give you a detailed explanation of why they are not liable, in case they aren't). The plaintiff works with his insurance company to recover his insured losses, and with his lawyer to recover any uninsured losses. His insurance company works with your insurance company, up to a point, and then the lawyers get involved. Your daughter does not work with his insurance company, and your insurance company probably has said something along the line "only talk to us". The insurance that a driver typically has may cover some of their own medical costs, but does not provide a payment for "pain and suffering": that is an uninsured loss. It is not generally required that drivers carry insurance to cover their own medical expenses – it is required that they insure against damages, in general, suffered by other parties (if the defendant is at fault). So there is probably nothing for the plaintiff to work out with his insurance company. In Texas, if the defendant is entirely at fault, defendant will be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 90% at fault, defendant will be liable for 90% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 49% at fault, defendant is not liable. Defendant can, in any event, also sue for damages, so if defendant is 49% at fault, defendant can recover 49% of her damages. The insurance companies might be able to talk it out and reach a clear resolution of the matter, but it could be more in their interest to throw the dice and work it out in court. One can always sue at the very start, and drop the suit if it becomes advantageous.	Look at companies such as Haggerty that insure only classic and low mileage cars. They have no issue giving full coverage on your classic car while at the same time you keep your daily driver with another company. Since this is the business model of an entire group of companies that specialize in specialty vehicles, I would think it would be legal.	Regular maintenance does not include repairs for being broken – I have a contract with a company that (for a monthly payment) provides regular maintenance on the furnace, which does not cover the situation where the motor wears out, or whatever. In the worst case scenario of an oil line breech, the tenant would not be liable for the tens of thousands of dollars of cleanup that would be required. Under Pennsylvania law, there is an implied warranty of habilitability, for example the landlord warrants that it doesn't rain inside the house, there is hot and cold running water, and so on. Safe heat is an example of something that is included in a place being habitable. This warranty is not waivable by lease provision (Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 240). However, the subjective recommendation of a repair guy has little legal cash value: what is needed is an arms-length evaluation of the safety and functionality of the system. If the recommendation is based on inefficient fuel use and long-term likelihood of eventual system failure, that is probably not sufficient to compel a repair. Excess CO on the other hand is a clear danger. The repairman should be able to at least explain the specifics of the improper setup and the consequences of doing nothing. Documentation of actions taken is a good idea.
Can witness from another state be held accountable? If it’s a family law. In some state, for example, Arkansas. Can I call a witness from a different state? Will court accept him? I’m asking because this witness is from a different state, then the court will not be able to hold him accountable since this witness is from a different jurisdiction. So this witness can say whatever and even lie and have no responsibility. Or does court have any strings to pull. Also, can the opposing part object my witness since he is from a different state? (Note: this witness never visited my state, and has always lived in that different state).	Perjury is a crime in every state, and being a resident of a state is not a requirement for criminality. You can't lie in court just because you don't live in a state of the court. Compelling testimony of an out of state resident will require a court from the person's state.	It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial.	In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded.	Can Alice still get child support, or will she be denied because she can not definitively prove which man is the child's biological father? The legal standard is a preponderance of the evidence (i.e. more likely than not) and there is plenty of evidence that can be offered in addition to DNA evidence, such as testimony under oath from people in a position to know who was having sex with whom at the relevant times. Contrary to a common misconception, testimony under oath is still solid evidence that can support a verdict on appeal. Alice had neither a long standing romantic relationship with Bob nor anyone that was a witness to the sexual act, thus making the question of who she slept with difficult to prove. It isn't that hard to prove. Q to Alice's physician: Based upon an ultrasound, when did Alice conceive? A: April 5-8, 2021. Q to DNA expert: Based upon the DNA test, who could the father be? A: Billy or Bob. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Billy between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Bob between April 5-8, 2021? A: Yes. Q to Billy: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Billy: Why not? A: I was at the Shuffleboard World Cup in Tibet, I have time stamped pictures. Q to Bob: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: -- if Yes, judge says he believes Bob and Alice and the case is over. -- if No, the judge decides who among Bob, Billy, and Alice the judge believes based upon other evidence. Ultimately, the judge has to rule between the two based upon non-genetic evidence and resolve credibility disputes just as in any other case that doesn't involve DNA evidence (which is the vast majority of cases). Also, the edge cases are few are far between. Identical twins are rare to start with, and few women have sex with more than one identical twin in the several day period when she could have conceived or didn't know which twin she had sex with. It has happened at least once in history (post-DNA testing), but you can probably count the number of times that it has ever happened on one hand. For example, presumptions from cohabitation, marriage, and claims of paternity often resolve paternity disputes without DNA evidence. Further, to the extent that there is good faith uncertainty (perhaps everyone agrees that the mother has sex with both twins on the only possible day of conception and nobody really knows), the downsides to a mistake in the larger cosmic sense of the overall paternity law system are minimal, as identical twins very rarely become deeply alienated from each other and instead tend to be close and intensely cooperative once they discover each other, and tend to be similar to each other in almost every respect depriving the child of little if the court gets it wrong. Realistically, identical twins are particularly likely to settle out of court so the judge doesn't have to decide. In one of the only two actual cases I could locate that went to trial (in Brazil), both twins were ordered to pay child support because the evidence showed that they actively conspired with each other to confound the mother and the court regarding who the father was, and conspiracies can support joint and several liability. The other case reported in a news story had convincing circumstantial evidence supporting one identical twin over the other that probably establish a presumption of paternity for one twin and not the other. One of the twins, who cannot be named for legal reasons, went to court last summer in the hope of forcing the mother to grant him access to the child. Although his name is not on the birth certificate, he claims he is the only father the boy has known, cared for him every other weekend, provided financial support and was even known to him as 'papa'. But then the man's relationship with his girlfriend broke down and the visits halted. When he began legal proceedings to prove his paternity, the mother made her claim that she had been sleeping with his twin at around the same time. The twins have said they knew they were both having sex with the woman, but argue that only one had sex during the period of conception. Both refused to undergo a DNA test: the complainant refused to pay the £335 charge while his brother, who has since married and fathered children, does not consider himself involved in the dispute. Now, however, Judge Jolin has asked the complainant to take a DNA test by 1 December to ensure he can claim even possible paternity, while his brother may also be tested. (The second case is in Quebec and the cost of the test in pounds is apparently a currency conversion value.) (It is possible in principle to distinguish even identical twins from each other with high coverage whole genome tests that would reveal a few random mutations in each twin out of billions of possible mutations, but it is currently prohibitively expensive to do so.) Can she even get a paternity test given that it would not be definitive proof which man was the father? Yes. This rules out all 4 billion men in the world minus two of them. It has great probative value, narrowing the list of possible fathers down to two.	No In general, there is no need for a plaintiff, defendant, or witness to attend court in person if there is a legitimate impediment to them doing so. Parties can be represented by their lawyers, testimony can be made by affidavit, cross-examination can be conducted over Zoom. During the recent pandemic, entire cases, both criminal and civil have been dealt with without anyone meeting up in person.	It depends on the jurisdiction, but generally speaking, this will not permit you to evade criminal responsibility. In Ohio, for instance, the complicity statute treats the conduct you're describing as equivalent to soliciting another to commit an offense or to aiding and abetting another in committing an offense: No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. The penalty for complicity is the same as for the underlying offense, so you don't really get any kind of break for running your offense through an innocent party; you just get a pissed off witness who can testify against you.	In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.	Yes. This is very common. A persnickety lawyer or judge could insist on an actual "yes," but generally speaking, everyone expects witnesses to talk like normal people.
When is a summons considered served in England if it was sent by second class post? If sent a court summons by one's local council, when is the summons considered served if it was sent by second class post? Background I queried a council tax bill as directed to by the council, but got a (non-favourable) decision. On the same day I received the decision I also received a court summons, which I am able to avoid if I pay the 'outstanding' council tax plus the court costs. The summons was sent by second class post and is dated 26th April, today being the 28th. I thought summons had to be sent first class post, and I can't find any information on when a summons sent by second class post would be deemed served.	When is a summons considered served in England if it was sent by second class post? Three business days after the date of posting. See the 1999 Amendments to Rule 99 of the Magistrates’ Courts Rules 1981 which makes no mention of the class of postage, only the relevant timeframe: (1) [...] a summons requiring a person to appear before a magistrates’ court may be served by— [...] (b) posting it to the person at an address where it is reasonably believed that the person will receive it... [...] (4) A summons served in accordance with paragraph (1) shall be deemed to have been received by the person— [...] (d) [...] three business days after it was posted [...] in accordance with paragraph (1)(b)... [non-relevant details omitted] Note that by picking a random council from Google, Oxford's Council Tax Debt Recovery Procedure which says: The summons will normally be served by second class post. It is entirely likely that this is the national norm, but all other local councils may be found via the dot.gov website, in case one would like to check specific policies for their own locality.	What is the equivalent for “Consideration” (English common law) in Spanish speaking countries? Prestación. Perhaps not all Spanish speaking countries adopt a one-word term, but the notion of consideration definitely exists in civil law. It is quite mistaken to presume that the concept is unique to common law systems. The Civil Code of both Spain (see art. 1257) and México (art. 1793) are in terms of "transmission or transfer of rights", which fits the meaning of consideration. The Civil Code of Spain in its art. 1254 refers to "[consent] to give something or perform [prestar] a service" (brackets added for clarity), whence the term prestación qualifies as consideration in several --if not all-- types of contract. In fact, article 1274 literally mentions "prestación or promise".	I [Bob] have been in the work force for 35+ years and filed / paid taxes many times. Thus, I have not violated relevant tax law and will not agree to pay any penalty. This is not a conclusory statement. It is an irrelevant statement. Example 1: "Bob was not required to file a 2021 tax return. Therefore no offence has been committed.". This is conclusory because it offers a conclusion without explaining how it was reached (why was Bob not required to file a 2021 tax return?). Example 2: "Bob filed his 2020 tax return. Therefore no offence has been committed". This is irrelevant because the alleged offence relates to 2021, not 2020. You can work out the difference by imagining what would happen if Bob substantiated his claims. If Bob submits evidence to show that he has been "in the work force for 35+ years and filed / paid taxes many times", it will make no difference to his case because it is irrelevant (unless he can also show that he filed and paid in relation to 2021 specifically). A conclusory statement on the other hand is capable of being effective if it is backed up by supporting evidence and arguments. In example 1 above, if Bob submits evidence to show that he was not required to file in 2021, then his conclusion will be effective. Note: the phrase "conclusory statement" does not appear to be a commonly used one, returning only 171,000 results on Google. I've personally not come across it (england-and-wales), but perhaps it is more common elsewhere.	It's the seller's responsibility. Note that in the UK you actually get much more than 2 years. The 2 year rule is the minimum required by the EU, but each country is free to implement that as they choose and the UK has much more. In the UK you are protected by the Consumer Rights Act. It states that products must last a "reasonable length of time". What counts as reasonable depends on the goods. For electronics 2 years is usually the absolute minimum, but for things like televisions the courts generally consider it to be 5 years even for cheap models. Under the Act the retailer is responsible. They can either replace the device or refund you, with the refund amount accounting for the 1.5 years use you had from it. As it was part of a phone contract it could be difficult to agree on a value for the speaker, but looking up the replacement cost for the same or a similar device is a good place to start. Which? has a lot more information and advice.	Assume that this happened in a matter that goes to court. In civil court, there is no "innocent until/unless proven guilty". In civil court, the judge hears everyone's story, and decides which story is more likely to be true. So I tell the judge "I sent a letter by registered mail; this is what was in the letter, and the post office reported to me that they delivered the mail, and someone signed for it". And you say "I never received a letter". The judge will believe me and the post office. You say "I received a letter and signed for it, but there was just a birthday card inside". Who does the judge believe? Does he or she believe that you received a letter with the contents I said and you are lying about it, or does she believe that I sent you an unsolicited birthday card by registered mail? Why would I do that? So they believe me. Now if you said "I received a registered letter containing just a birthday court, so I immediately called my secretary and three other people in the office to see this and to verify there was nothing but the birthday card, and here they are as witnesses", then the court might start believing you.	As I understand it, they are required to give notice of an intent to levy. Publication 594 gives their version of what they can do, and how. If you don't want to pay what they claim you owe, you can request a Collection Due Process hearing which means Form 12153. You may receive a CP504 Notice, which seems to be one of two "final notices": it is actually final w.r.t. levying state tax refunds, and is penultimate otherwise. Their page on levying mentions a crucial last stem of sending you a Final Notice of Intent to Levy, which is required according to IRC sections 6330 and 6331 which derives from 26 USC 6330 (most of the notice requirement) and 26 USC 6331. If you get notice CP90 which I think is called Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing, then, dude, you've been served. There is in fact additional process that they have to do before actually taking, but that as far as I know, is the last part involving notification. Take note of the US Code parts, 26 USC 6330, 6331, because unlike IRS advertising, the US Code states what the law is.	Extradition is a special procedure that is tightly governed by statute - currently the Extradition Act 2003. That Act provides that, for extradition from England (as opposed to Scotland, etc.) to the United States (an example of a Category 2 Territory), an initial hearing is to take place before "the appropriate judge". This is, per s.139(1)(a), a designated "District Judge (Magistrates' Courts)". A DJMC sits in a magistrates' court, and is a professional judge as opposed to a layperson like an ordinary Justice of the Peace. The hearing is meant to resemble summary proceedings in the magistrates' court, but it has its own special rules. Those include a special appeals procedure which is different from the ordinary way that criminal cases can be appealed. Some things that could normally happen in a magistrates' court cannot happen here, such as varying an order at a later date (see R (Mann) v Westminster Magistrates Court [2010] EWHC 48 (Admin)). The way that this is phrased means that the jurisdiction is not conferred on the magistrates' court (which happens to have a DJ sitting in it), but on the DJMC themselves. The Criminal Procedure Rules 2014, Rule 17.2(a) are careful to say that when they say "magistrates' court" in this context, they are talking about the court that the judge has convened for the purposes of the Extradition Act. These rules are only applicable because the Act specifically provides for them in its s.210; they don't come in automatically as they would for criminal proceedings in a magistrates' court, because this is a special process with its own law, as expounded in the Explanatory Notes to the rules. In the Assange case, the DJMC was Vanessa Baraitser, including at Woolwich and the Old Bailey. The proceedings were under the Extradition Act as explained above. The court chose to sit in various buildings, other than Westminster Magistrates Court, for practical reasons due to the high level of public interest in the case, and related security considerations. The hearing was booked to last four weeks, which is very unusually long. Proceedings were live-streamed to other court buildings to allow members of the public and media to follow along. All of that does not mean that the proceedings were in a Crown Court or County Court. They were in buildings used by those courts, but took place before the designated DJMC according to the special procedure of the Extradition Act. That procedure, among other things, means that the extradition hearing cannot take place as a hearing of some other court, and there is no jury no matter how much the defendant wants one.	In general, "a signed piece of paper" is not "a contract". It may be a record of a contract, but the contract itself is the meeting of minds where an agreement is reached and doesn't depend on the existence of the piece of paper. (Depending on the jurisdiction, some sorts of contract are required to be in writing, but this doesn't usually apply to employment contracts; it's usually contracts involving land.) What is far more worrying to me is that you don't know how much they are going to pay you. That suggests there hasn't been a meeting of minds, and there is no contract. (It might be that "the going rate" is good enough to form a contract - to determine that would require advice from a local lawyer.) I suggest you don't write up a formal agreement, but nag your boss to decide how much they are actually going to pay you.
Verbose sustain/overrule objection in Depp's case My knowledge of law is shallow and only comes from entertainment sources, mainly movies. I was watching some moments of Johny Depp's trial. I noticed that, when an objection is made, the judge responds: "I will sustain/overrule the objection". Isn't that a bit verbose? In movies, I only hear "Sustained".	It doesn't really matter exactly what the judge says as long as it's clear whether the judge is sustaining or overruling the objection. With that said, in movies you'll rarely see the person asking the question get to respond to the objection, but you'll notice in the trial that happens in most cases. For example, if one party objects that a question calls for hearsay, the examiner may defend their question by pointing out that the statement is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, or that it falls into one of the hearsay exceptions. At that point the judge is responding to both parties and someone else or possibly multiple people have spoken since the objection was originally raised, so she might specify that she's "overruling the objection" as opposed to just saying overruled, so it just makes it clearer on the record what she's ruling about. It's worth noting as well that she might need to specify which objection she's sustaining if more than one objection is raised. In this trial both hearsay and relevance objections have been raised at the same time, and the judge might specify that she's sustaining e.g. only relevance. This can tell the examiner whether they are free to keep going down the same line of questioning with different questions, if the objection sustained was hearsay, or to move to another line of questioning, if the objection sustained was relevance.	This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.	You'd have to specify the cases you want. All court transcripts are a matter of public record, though a copy may cost you a fee from the court clerk's office to recieve. It should be pointed out that not all cases got to an evidentiary stage to actually evaluate on the record any evidence. A vast majority were decided on pre-evidentiary rules such as standing or laches (timeliness) and not all cases that were able induced evidence debunked the evidence. Any appellent case would also not induce evidence as all appeals cases are strictly matter of law rather than matter of fact (evidence), so those cases would be asking a higher court to double check non-evidentiary decisions. The fact that the party that brought the suit does not have standing to bring the suit OR that the party that brought the suit brought it too late for the courts to proceed on the matter does not debunk evidence that the fraud happened in the eyes of the law... it simply means the questions of fact were never addressed at all	You are correct. A judge may only issue a warrant when it is supported by an affidavit, in which the officer seeking the warrant swears under oath to the facts supporting the warrant. Lying on the affidavit would constitute perjury. But judges very frequently just rubber-stamp the warrants without meaningfully reviewing the affidavits, so the primary form of oversight would be the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge asserting that the warrant wasn't supported by probable cause. If a judge does review the warrant application and finds the officer's statements not to be credible, he can refuse to sign the warrant, and he is free to also carry that credibility determination to subsequent warrants sought by the same officer or other officers in his department.	(My expectation is that the proof has to be replicated and the conviction cannot be introduced as evidence). Your expectation is incorrect. The name of the legal doctrine that allows a criminal judgment to have this effect in a civil case is called "collateral estoppel" which is also sometimes called "issue preclusion". See, e.g., A-1 Auto Repair & Detail, Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy, 93 P.3d 598, 600 (Colo. App. 2004) ("Hardy contends Colorado law does not allow courts to apply collateral estoppel, now commonly known as the doctrine of issue preclusion, when the first adjudication is criminal and the subsequent litigation is civil. We disagree.") Similarly, a case out of California stated: To preclude a civil litigant from relitigating an issue previously found against him in a criminal prosecution is less severe than to preclude him from relitigating such an issue in successive civil trials, for there are rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and of a unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record paid for by the state on appeal. Stability of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safeguards. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 606, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962) (citations omitted). To the best of my knowledge, this is the rule in every U.S. jurisdiction (with the possible exceptions of Puerto Rico and Louisiana which are not common law jurisdictions). It is also the historical rule in British common law, although I don't know if this continues to be the case in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Procedurally, the determination that collateral estoppel applies would usually be made on a motion for summary judgment, or in the preparation of jury instructions which state that liability has been established and that the jury is to limit itself to determining causation and damages, rather than as an evidentiary matter. I've used this doctrine once or twice. For example, I used it in a case where someone fraudulently sold ditch company shares worth several hundred thousand dollars (in Colorado, water is gold) that he didn't own (a transaction that could not be unwound because the buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value and the seller had apparent authority as a trustee of a trust owning the shares even though he didn't have the actual authority to sell them under the trust) and then spent the money he received before he was discovered (if I recall correctly, for gambling debts). He was convicted criminally and then my client, the victim, sued for money damages including statutory treble damages for civil theft and attorney's fees based upon collateral estoppel and an affidavit as to damages in a motion for summary judgment. From a practical perspective the four main difficulties are that (1) people convicted of crimes often lack the income or assets to pay judgments, (2) there are double recovery issues involved in reconciling restitution awards in a criminal case (where the measure of damages is narrower) and damage awards in a civil case (where the measure of damages is broader), (3) there are priority issues involved in reconciling criminal awards for fines, restitution and costs, in each case with civil awards for damages, and (4) if the defendant declares bankruptcy, the non-dischargeability of the civil judgment must be affirmatively raised and proved (often this is elementary but there are strict time limits) in the bankruptcy proceeding. Tactically, it is often better to sue first, collect what you can, and to bring a criminal complaint only when it turns out that the perpetrator is judgment-proof.	Regardless of the context of the first solicitation, Officer Jones' second solicitation was made in willful refusal to accept Betty's unambiguous "no" for an answer; this is sexually coercive behavior, specifically postrefusal sexual persistence. If this question is assessed from the perspective of the "average" woman, then after her initial declination, extraction of a "yes" cannot be considered uncoerced. Here's a question: how many times does she have to say no before it starts to count? Before it counts against her finally being exhausted, harassed, or intimidated into capitulating? Because by that logic, he never has to stop; he can continue to harass her until he finally accomplishes his objective (grounds to arrest her) - in which case, why bother with the pretense? If it takes 200 "no's" to wear her down to "whatever", then the first 200 "no's" just didn't matter as much as the first "whatever", so why bother with the formality of pretending like the first mattered when it clearly does not? To demonstrate the significance of her initial "no, thanks" and his subsequent refusal to accept it from another perspective: if Betty and Jones were coworkers in the same office, if he continued to solicit her after being told no the first time, that would be the definition of sexual harassment on his part and it would not matter how genial or friendly or casual he thinks he's being; furthermore, if her workplace failed to intervene on her behalf, they would be engaging in sexually discriminatory behavior by creating a hostile work environment, regardless of how genial / friendly / casual, etc. It's hard to see how this could act as evidence of her having committed a crime in one context while being grounds for termination of his employment in another context. HTH.	Is a response to a N5B section 21 accelerated claim required to be given on the dedicated form N11B? YES. Assuming this refers to an accelerated possession claim on property let on an assured shorthold tenancy in England then Rule 55.14 Civil Procedure Rules applies: A defendant who wishes to – (a) oppose the claim; or (b) seek a postponement of possession in accordance with rule 55.18, must file his defence within 14 days after service of the claim form. (2) The defence should be in the form set out in Practice Direction 55A. Practice Direction 55A, at Rule 1.5, states: [...) The defence must be in form N11, N11B, N11M or N11R, as appropriate. The use of must is well established in British law as meaning a non-optional obligation (unlike should). It is not, as far as I can see, defined by statute so the courts' convention is to use the normal meaning of the word by reference to the Oxford English Dictionary. The recently revised free online version has limited availability but the previous version merged with Dictionary.com which offers these examples: 1 to be obliged or bound to by an imperative requirement 2 to be under the necessity to; need to The use of must in Rule 1.5, by my reading, trumps the use of should in Rule 55.14 but Alice might be able to argue this apparent contradictory terminology as to why her case for her defence is submitted by letter rather than the prescribed form. What happens with this letter when it is received by the court...what happens with the case more generally? Does it get listed for a hearing? Do the contents of her letter reach or get considered by the judge? All that would be a matter for the court to decide and could go either way: a judge has the inherent power to deal with matters in his own court as he sees fit (within the limits of the law etc).	Is this normal? Pretty much. Witnesses lie in court all the time (in my experience, defendants, law enforcement officers and medical doctors are the most likely to lie). Dealing with a witness who lies in court under oath effectively is one of the most challenging tasks lawyers face. It is an inherently challenging hurdle to proving or defending a case. The facts as presented in court often differ in some material way from reality. It is a pretty tough thing to accurately measure, but my gut estimate would be that this happens in a least 30%-40% of cases that produce contested trials, although not infrequently, a judge or jury will not find the false testimony to be credible. On the other hand, it isn't at all uncommon (probably at least 10% of the time) for a judge or jury to believe the liars to be telling the truth, and to find the people who are telling the truth to be less credible. There is absolute immunity from civil liability for lying in court testimony, although it could, in theory, give rise to contempt of court sanctions from the judge in some circumstances, or to a prosecution for perjury. But, perjury prosecutions are, in practice, very rare, and a good share of them arise from false statements made in documents under oath, rather than from courtroom testimony. There is probably less than 1 perjury prosecution per 1000 provable lies made under oath in courtroom testimony on material issues that end up influencing the outcome in a case. I totally sympathize with how frustrating this situation is having been there in cases that I am litigating many, many times. But, in short, life isn't fair.
statute of limitations on injuries in the workplace in israel? A year ago I got hit by a metal bar on my leg. I didn't tell anyone because I have a speech problem and heavy shyness. It hurt me the first day and later the doctor told me it was not broken and gave me medicine. The pain stopped for a while but has returned now and again even after a year. So is there anything I do? Sadly I don't have a witness or anything	Statute of limitations is the least of your problems To answer your headline question is 7 years. However, the problem that you have is I hear (and your employer and the court will hear): "I say I suffered this injury at work but I didn't report it, no one saw it happen, I didn't tell anyone at the time and I didn't see a doctor until 'later'." What are you going to say when they ask you for evidence of your claim?	What's the use of contracts if you can't take a contract violator to court? A clear, thoughtful contract can be a deterrent to misconduct, and Australia is one of many jurisdictions where pro se litigation is allowed. Self-represented litigants certainly have to undergo a steep learning curve and are expected to comply with a code of conduct, procedural law, and so forth, but my point is that hiring a lawyer is not compulsory. Even if for some reason the defrauded party declines to sue the tortfeasor (thereby forfeiting the recovery of the losses), there is a societal obligation to alert others about the tortfeasor's misconduct. Making the contract available to others facilitates alerting them on objective grounds so they don't become the tortfeasor's next victim, and it simultaneously helps for setting the record straight that the damages/losses were not one's own fault. Without a contract, it would be more difficult for others get a sense of whether misconduct occurred at all. Or worst, halfway down the line, you don't have any money left to pay your lawyers, and they leave the case. Hence the importance to litigate in pro per from the start. It is easy for a person retaining a lawyer to postpone (be it due to family obligations, workload, and so forth) his learning of the law. But that postponement only makes the client more vulnerable to his lawyer's subsequent withdrawal when court proceedings are midway: the client would have the dilemma of either finding another lawyer to resume the case --predictably at a higher cost--, or cram the learning curve in trying to keep up with the proceedings.	If they do a treatment which you didn't consent to and harm you they risk being sued. As such, they get you to sign a consent form to prove you agreed to the treatment and were informed about what was going on and any material risks. They had implied verbal consent from you which is enough legally, but there's a risk that if it went wrong you could claim you didn't consent, they lied about what treatment you had, and they illegally did it. As an example, they often drip something into your eye which can sometimes cause blurry vision for a while. If you had blurry vision after and crashed your car you could theoretically sue them because you say you didn't consent to that and they have no proof you did.	So I found information from a law firm in Florida about Hit and Run Cases. You definitely want a lawyer as it is a $500 fine and/or 60 days in jail for your case (property damage, no injury or loss of life). The good news is that if you can argue the case correctly, it's very easy to get a Not Guilty verdict. Under Florida Law, a Hit and Run must meet the following criteria to legally find someone guilty: Disputes as to the identity of the driver; Lack of knowledge that a crash occurred; Lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property; The failure to stop was not willful, but was dictated by circumstances; The defendant stopped as close as possible to the site of the accident; The other driver refused to receive identifying information The other driver became belligerent, necessitating that the defendant leave the scene to call police; The assistance rendered was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the statute. Given that you had no lack of knowledge that a crash occurred (2) AND lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property (3.) AND you would have stopped but for the circumstances of the event prevented you from recieiving knowledge of that the crash had occured (4) you already fail to meet 3 of the 8 criteria. This should be easy to argue in and of itself, but where you need a lawyer to assist is in criteria 7. While you were never fearing the other driver to such a degree that you needed to call the police, his behavior was interpreted by you as "road rage" and you had a reasonable fear to not wish to engage him. It's not rules as written, but it could be that the rules allow for leaving the scene because of the plaintiff's behavior and could be valid in other forms. I'll admit, this will vary wildly on the judge's own interpretation of that rule, BUT it's worth a try. Keep in mind with all of these, the Prosecution will be required to prove all 8 facts against you, while you only have to disprove one, to some level of doubt. As an armchair jury, I have no facts to support your story, but I have no facts to doubt it either. And when doubt happens, you must assume innocence. It would help if you had any hint of the officers attitude at the time. Was he friendly? Dismissive? Distracted? What was the guy who hit you's attitude towards the situation? Was he constantly yelling at you and the officer? Was he quiet and separated? Either way, get a lawyer because 60 days of jail time and a $500 fine is not something you want to fight by yourself. Make calls (the ticketing officer should have a work number or other contact information on the ticket.). Notify the insurance company of the fact that it was cited as hit and run but not proven... it could make the difference of who's company is to pay (It will be his if there was no Hit and Run).	You were on a performance improvement plan, those often require special requirements of the employee. I'm sorry your mother died, but a year seems like a very long time to take, and your company was very kind to give you that long. I am not a lawyer but I sincerely doubt there is anything actionable here.	If you sue a person for a tort X, one of the things you have to prove is that the defendant did do X. A baseless belief that it must have been so-and-so will do you no good. You do not have to have iron-clad evidence of your allegations, for a civil suit, but you have to show with a preponderance of evidence that the claim is true. A combination of "hates me" and "provably did this a number of times in the past" could well suffice. As for damages, it depends on what harm you actually suffered. If you get fired and you show that it was because of a false allegation, you would probably have to take this to the big court, since small claims court handles amounts in the $5,000 range (jurisdiction-specific).	Deadly self-defense is legal in Germany. The self-defense law (in particular Sect. 32 of the Criminal Code) makes no restrictions as far as the type of aggression and the type of defense is concerned. That means that - in principle - you can defend yourself against an attack by any means that is necessary to stop it. The principle behind that is "das Recht muss dem Unrecht nicht weichen", which translates to "the law does not have to yield to the unlawful". That particularily means that: You do not have to run. You do not have to yield. You do not have to wait for help from public authorities (notably the police). You can defend yourself (against any attack on you, be it life, limb or property), no matter if that would mean commiting a crime (even if that crime is killing a person). This is called "Trutzwehr" or "schneidiges Notwehrrecht", which can be translated to "active defense" or "aggressive defense" as opposed to passive defense. However... This regulation is not without pitfalls and limitations. There are quite a few, which means that in practice deadly force could be considered unlawful in self-defense. Books have been written about this subject alone, so it can not be exhaustively handled here. Some examples for corner cases are: Attackers that clearly can not understand the severity of their actions have to be spared from extreme effects of your self-defense. The classical book case is that you can't shoot little children stealing apples from your tree. If there is a massive discrepancy between what you want protect and the damage the attacker has to endure (called "qualitativer Notwehrexzess" - translating to "qualitatively eccessive self-defense"). If someone insults you, shooting him might go to far, since while your honour is attacked (which is protected by Sect. 185 Criminal Code), the attacker's life (protected by Sect. 212 Criminal Code) by far outweighs it. Note that, to ensure the effectiveness of the self-defense laws, the discrepancy must be extreme. And it does not mean you can't defend yourself. You just have to choose a less severe measure. So you might get away with knocking the insulter out. After the attack is over you hit the attacker once too often, which causes his death (called "quantitativer Notwehrexzess" - "quantitatively eccessive self-defense"). The attack was over at the time of the deadly blow, so your right for self-defense had ended. You might get away without punishment, if it was impossible for you to realize that the attack was over. If you only think an attack is happening, but it is not (for example someone attacking you with a rubber knife on Halloween). In this case there is no attack and so technically there is no right for self defense (called "Putativnotwehr"). Similar to the cases of excessive self-defense, it depends on your individual case (notable if you had a chance to realize the attack was false) if you are punished or not. To sum it up: You have the right to defend yourself by any means necessary, but you are held responsible if you go to far (not just a little, but really really to far).	She damaged you - your beef is with her. If she has insurance, the choice of is she wants to claim or not is up to her. She is not obliged to make a claim and probably not obliged to tell her insurer about it. Perhaps she has a $20,000 excess. Perhaps she is a person not covered by the policy (too young or otherwise excluded) Perhaps she is (legitimately) concerned that making claims will increase her premium. Now, her contract may have a clause requiring her to disclose all accidents either ongoing or on renewal. However, the doctrine of privity of contract means that whether she does or not is no one’s business but hers and her insurer.
Collecting statistics from online gaming and GDPR obligations I am looking to to build an interface within a sandbox pc game environment that will allow for the collection of tabletop wargaming game stats in addition to player online ID(steam name). This data will be collated and made available for public viewing for the purpose of drawing comparisons over time. I plan to hold the data for an extended period and build an ongoing data set. I plan to make ID's and accompanying game stats public in relation to tournament/competitive play and anonymize the game data collected from casual games. Would the above fall within the scope of GDPR?	Yes If you are in the EU, or your players are in the EU and your service is targeted at some part of (or all of) the EU, then this pretty clearly falls within the scope of the GDPR. Such a service would be collecting data associated with natural persons. At least some of it would be made public along with an online identifier, and other parts would be processed and stored, even if disclosed only in anonymized form. (By the way it is a non-trivial task to anonymize data well enough that it is no longer persona data under the GDPR. But let's suppose yoru methods are good enough.) Under GDPR Article 6 the DC must have a lawful basis for such processing. If the basis is "consent" then the consent must be freely given, whch means giving consent may not be a condition of using the service. Under GDPR Article 13 a notice must be sent to the Data Subject (DS) when the data is collected from the subject, including some 11 items or categories of information about the collection process, the Data Controller (DC), the purposes of processing, the legal basis of processing (which the DC must define), who will receive the data, the data retention period, and various rights of the DS. Such a service must be prepared to respond to data access and data erasure requests, under articles 15-17, and data restriction requests under article 18. It must provide a method for a DS to easily make such requests. Other GDPR provisions may well apply in addition to these, but that is enough to show that such service is very likely to be within the scope of the GDPR, unless none of the DSs are present in the EU or the related market area.	StackExchange is a processor under GDPR because it processes the data you provide it when you sign up and input personal information. It's determined by an analysis of what function(s) the business is performing. If you are merely processing the data but don't have control over it (e.g. another business is using your software to do something with data that it is providing you) then you are likely to be a data processor. Conversely, if you control the data, you are likely to be a data controller. It is possible to be both a data controller and a data processor at the same time. That specific link in your post goes on to state: Our business customers may qualify as controllers when they purchase certain of our products and services. We act as processors on behalf of such Customers. This is referring to the Teams product that StackExchange offers or whatever the "internal company-only question and answer site" product they offer is called.	Well actually... I think you'll just need to wait a little more. I monitor the situation quite closely and I can tell you that it's just a matter of time. Microsoft was one of the first (if not the first) to communicate openly about the GDPR and the changes that follow. From the blog post: If your organization collects, hosts or analyzes personal data of EU residents, GDPR provisions require you to use third-party data processors who guarantee their ability to implement the technical and organizational requirements of the GDPR. To further earn your trust, we are making contractual commitments available to you that provide key GDPR-related assurances about our services. Our contractual commitments guarantee that you can: Respond to requests to correct, amend or delete personal data. Detect and report personal data breaches. Demonstrate your compliance with the GDPR. Microsoft is the first global cloud services provider to publicly offer you these contractual commitments. We believe privacy is a fundamental right. The GDPR is an important step forward to further clarify and enable individual privacy rights and look forward to sharing additional updates how we can help you comply with this new regulation and, in the process, advance personal privacy protections. Microsoft has set up an informational site on GDPR here. If your eyes are on any other provider, I think the only way to learn more is getting in touch and inquiring about their progress and process. Hope this helps.	The GDPR does not prescribe how exactly consent must be managed, as long as consent was obtained in line with the GDPR's principles. Similarly, the EDPB does not provide concrete recommendations in its guidelines on consent, mainly noting that Controllers are free to develop methods to comply with this provision in a way that is fitting in their daily operations. I would not be too concerned with edge cases like failing HTTP requests, at least not any more than for other HTTP endpoints. If the user indicated consent, and you act on that indication of consent in good faith, that's probably fine. However, remember that you must provide a equally easy way for the user to revoke consent later. If the user changes their mind, they can use the mechanism that you offer to inspect their consent status, and revoke it if they want. But again, how to do that is largely up to you.	The GDPR only require explicit (hard) consent if you use the cookie to store personal data. Given the conditions you cite, the data you store is not personal data, so this cookie does not require consent. In theory, someone having access to both session cookie and "analytics cookie" could relate the two, but that is highly non-trivial. You may have to do DPIA to demonstrate that this is non-trivial, or that you have mitigation in place to mitigate staff abusing such access. But provided things are as you say, the "analytics" cookie does not require consent.	You don't own those games You have a licence to use them in accordance with the terms you agreed The Content and Services are licensed, not sold. Your license confers no title or ownership in the Content and Services. One of those terms (2G) includes: but you are not entitled to: ... (ii) host or provide matchmaking services for the Content and Services or emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Valve in any network feature of the Content and Services, through protocol emulation, tunneling, modifying or adding components to the Content and Services, use of a utility program or any other techniques now known or hereafter developed, for any purpose including, but not limited to network play over the Internet, network play utilizing commercial or non-commercial gaming networks or as part of content aggregation networks, websites or services, without the prior written consent of Valve; So, did you get Valve's prior written consent?	Yes, you could do this be means of the EULA, provided you are not in the EU yourself. You only have to comply with the GDPR if you are offering a product or service to people that are in the EU. If you are making it clear that whatever you offer is not available to Europeans, you make your site exempt from the GDPR.	If you publish a website, you are the data controller for this website. Serving a website necessarily implies processing (but not collection) of personal data. You have chosen to host your website on GitHub Pages. Is GitHub then a joint controller with you, or is GitHub your processor with which you sign a DPA? In 2019, I asked GH customer support about this. Their response: Our Privacy Statement, combined with our Terms of Service, is intended to serve as a data protection agreement for individual accounts — we specifically wrote our Privacy Statement to provide the information required by Article 28 of the GDPR, including a list of our subprocessors. Our Privacy Statement and our Terms of Service serve as our agreements with you, as the controller, instructing us as the processor, and you can always contact us to provide additional instruction. Should we receive a data subject request that relates to data we process on your behalf, we'll always let you know promptly and work with you to comply. — Github, 2019-04-10, private communication At the time, their Privacy Policy described GH Pages as follows: If you create a GitHub Pages website, it is your responsibility to post a privacy statement that accurately describes how you collect, use, and share personal information and other visitor information, and how you comply with applicable data privacy laws, rules, and regulations. Please note that GitHub may collect Technical Information from visitors to your GitHub Pages website, including logs of visitor IP addresses, to maintain the security and integrity of the website and service. (Update 2022: the privacy notice has since changed, and the quoted part is no longer part of the privacy notice.) Under this theory: you are the controller, and GH is your processor the terms of service incl. GH privacy policy form an effective Data Processing Agreement you have instructed GH to collect Technical Information in the sense of the privacy policy, for the purpose of maintaining security and integrity of the website, which can be covered by legitimate interest you have not instructed/allowed GH to process any other data from your site It is your call whether you subscribe to that theory. Note that GH organizations can opt-in to their corporate terms and sign an explicit DPA which will mostly contain the same provisions. Does it matter that you don't have access to the Technical Information? No. Being a controller means that you decide the purposes and means of processing, not that you store data. You as a controller can always decide to point your domain name to a different server if you no longer want to use GH as a processor.
What is considered personal information according to the US law? As a follow up question from this question a person's name, age, address, parties affiliation are considered public data. I'd like to ask then what is considered personal information? So if there is a website breach of data i.e. on Facebook and the hackers get the information mentioned above, Facebook doesn't need to worry because this data is not considered personal information? Note: Since this is state specific then what most of states agree on what is personal information.	Federal and state laws do protect a variety of different types of personal information in particular contexts, but there isn't really any information that is necessarily personal and protected from disclosure in all contexts. For instance, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act generally protects a person's health records from unnecessary disclosure, and the Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act generally protects a student's educational records from unneccessary disclosure. But that doesn't mean that all of an American's health information is protected, or that all of the information that a hospital holds about an American is protected. The hospital can typically disclose the fact that it is treating a specific person, and if that person provides his health records to a government employer, that employer may be required to produce them in response to a request under the Ohio Public Records Act. But Facebook isn't a health-care provider, so it isn't required to protect medical records, and it isn't a school, so it isn't required to protect educational records. At the federal level, I don't know of any privacy laws that require it to maintain the privacy of its users' information, though it may be required to do so under state laws, or as a contractual matter because of its privacy policy. But that doesn't mean it has nothing to worry about. Like any business in the United States, it is prohibited from engaging in deceptive trade practices, so it can't make broad promises to protect users' privacy when it has no intention of honoring them. That's why it ended up paying $5 billion for privacy violations in the past and remains under court orders requiring it to better protect users' data. Further, Facebook has users all over the world, so it is required to comply with the international privacy regulations like GDPR that can be far more stringent.	Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data	GDPR killing genealogy websites? I could see GDPR totally killing genealogy websites if they follow the rules strictly, but would they really want to do that. Seems to me genealogy has an important historical role. Treat living persons with anonymization I assume you don't have data to identify a person or contact the living person. How would you contact to get consent to show personal information if you only have a name, impossible right? GDPR tries to stop abuse of personal data, yes, and your family tree certainly is personal data. However those who come to your website would mostly want to search and edit the non-living, search back in the history, thus the current generation follows the family tree and are not the point of entry. You can provide certain anonymization to those alive by not displaying the first names in full, maybe just the first letter. You may want to hide address, spouse, children for current generation. You could make those available for view/edit first by going through a secondary login, "not a robot". Further you may remove living people from search results and hide from search engines so they do not have ability to index the current generation. That would make it harder to abuse if you're going after an individual, but at the same time doesn't lock out the people providing information.	You tag the question with "criminal law", suggesting that by "illegal" you mean "is it a crime" -- that would depend on jurisdiction, but in the US or my state, it is not a crime. There are crimes that you could commit with such an account, but violating the TOS is not itself a crime. However, it is illegal, a breach of contract, as you can see from the TOS "You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission".	Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A.	a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days.	Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person, even if that person is only identifiable with the help of additional data and/or third parties. Making inferences about a particular person, for example whether that person might have performed unauthorized construction, sounds very much like processing of personal data to me. In this scenario, the information is used to verify the tax assessment for a particular person, so the information clearly relates to a data subject. The owner for a piece of land is certainly identifiable with the help of the land registry, if one exists in the country. Similar registries might also exist with tax authorities or a postal service. Here, it is the tax authority itself doing the processing, so they probably already have tax records about the owners at the address. But just because it's processing of personal data doesn't mean that it is illegal. Satellite data and aerial photography providers can probably rely on a legitimate interest to collect, sell, or otherwise publish their data. Homeowners can reasonably expect that their property will be included in low-res aerial photography. It might not be necessary to notify the data subjects if an exception in Art 14(5) applies. A public authority using aerial photography to find building code violations or to levy correct taxes may be able to base this processing activity on authorization via some law. If the public authority would have the right to inspect the buildings, then it might be possible to argue that the public authority can use aerial photography to decide which inspections/audits to prioritize. Of course, decisions producing significant legal effects must not be based on “AI” alone, due to the Art 22 GDPR right to not be subject to unchecked automated decision making (unless specifically authorized by a suitable law).	My interpretation of the GDPR when it comes to a contact form is as long as your privacy notice states that what data you collect in the contact form and what legal basis that data is used for you are fine. Someone submitting a contact form in my opinion is their consent to reply back to them regarding the data in which they have submitted. Another good clause to have in your privacy policy is to basically state if the user submits information about another natural person that they have consent from that natural person for that data and what it would be used for. The internet is the internet. People have been trolling it for years. People have also submitted false information for years. The best a business can do is simply outline what their site does, what data is collected and what it will be used for. That along with what legal basis it’s processed for and following it makes you GDPR compliant in that regard. As to withdrawing consent and the rights given by the GDPR that’s all specific to what infustructure a business has in place. As a developer I know the headaches of the GDPR. Most of it resides in the fact data is not centralized and thus can’t easily be retrieved, modified, or removed. Once you’ve tackled that aspect providing the user their rights under GDPR isn’t to far off.
Does Bob have a case if he ends up paying child support due to Alice's deceit? This question is inspired by and closely related to that one, but is different. Alice deperately wants to conceive and give birth to a child from Bob, but Bob is adamant. He is very careful to avoid becoming a father for a number of reasons, one of them not willing to pay child support. Alice and Bob are not a couple. They're both single, just see each other from time to time. They have agreed to only have protected sex, specifically Bob always uses condoms (although he wishes he did not have to). He accepts that no contraception is 100% reliable, but is fine to take the risk so long as it is reasonably mitigated and Alice is honest in her willingness to use contraception. One day Alice tells Bob that he does not have to use condoms anymore: she's now got her own contraception (e.g. pills, implant in her arm, IUD, whatever). Bob is hesitant — not because he doubts Alice is saying true, but because he prefers being safe than sorry. But Alice convinces him that her contraception is in place and reliable, and they have consensual sex without a condom. In fact, the is no contraception at all because Alice has blatantly lied — in order to become pregnant from Bob. So she does, and Bob starts paying child support. (Alternative facts: Alice picks up Bob's used condom from the rubbish bin as soon as he leaves, and impregnates herself with the sperm in it). So, while paying child support diligently, Bob finds out that he was fooled. He obtains strong evidence of the Alice's deceit. Can Bob possibly have a case against Alice directly (not against having to pay the child support)? Bob accepts that, as the child now exists, he has to pay their support anyway. However, does that preclude claims against the mother for causing the expenses Bob explicitly was aiming to avoid? Can such a case possibly be quantified based on the child support he now has to pay? Understandably, such a case against Alice would adversely affect the child (if Alice is the one to raise them). However, any payouts to Bob could be delayed until the child becomes adult, or remain stand-by in case Alice inherits large sums of money, wins a lottery etc. (Any jurisdiction that you can answer about).	canada In Canada it all depends on whether it is Bob or Alice who is female. If it is the male who lies about the use of contraception it results in sexual assault (R. v. Hutchinson), and in the case of sexual assault it is possible to sue for damages in civil court. In contrast if it is the female who lies about the use of contraception it does not result in sexual assault (🤦), and thus suing for damages is not possible (PP v. DD, 2019 (this is literally the case you describe)). To understand this legal difference one has to go back to the 1998 case R v. Cuerrier, which was about which lies cause consent to sex be withdrawn. Does lying about your identity count (impersonating your twin)? Does lying about your wealth count? Does lying about your religious believes count? Specifically in that case someone had not disclosed that they had HIV. The court ruled in that case that sexual assault laws should only concern themselves with lies that create a risk of physical harm, and thus 'causing someone else to get you pregant' does not count, whilst 'causing someone else to become pregant' does count. Anyway, an amazing article about this can be found on thewalrus.ca, which discusses exactly these cases. It's definitely worth a read, but here is their description of PP v. DD: THE CONSEQUENCES OF Hutchinson played out earlier this year in PP v. DD, a decision released recently by the Ontario Court of Appeal. In PP, the plaintiff and the defendant were in a brief sexual relationship that resulted in a child. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had lied to him about being on birth control, and that this lie had both robbed him of the ability to choose the timing and circumstances of the birth of his first child, and exposed him to the significant expense of childcare. In PP, the plaintiff chose to seek a remedy in civil court—meaning, essentially, that he wanted damages, not the imposition of criminal liability—arguing that the defendant had defrauded him. The plaintiff’s case in PP failed, mostly for policy reasons. Canadian law, like many other jurisdictions, is extremely reluctant to recognize any cause of action that might allow people to circumvent child-support obligations. But the Court of Appeal also commented on whether the plaintiff could advance a claim for sexual battery—the non-criminal counterpart of sexual assault. Relying on Hutchinson, the Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff’s consent to the sex he had with the defendant had not been cancelled out by her alleged fraud, because a woman who lies about being on birth control does not expose her male partner to any risk of significant bodily harm.	Usually and ideally, a GAL would take an active role in parenting questions, while taking a secondary role in property division and maintenance with the primary concern being that the economic arrangements are sustainable and don't subject the child to hardship when with the other parent (e.g. many divorcing parents fail to realize that maintaining two households will result in more child related expenses than one). I will assume that you are asking from the perspective of a party to the divorce and not from the perspective of a mediator, although the phrasing is not entirely clear. Some basics: Have a good command of the facts about your finances, your ex's finances, and the children's schedules and needs (assuming that there are children). For example, it would be good to have school calendars as far forward as they are available, to know the children's medical providers, and to have a firm command of their extracurricular activities, their friends and the requirements of any childcare providers. Often child support worksheets will be mandatory for a settlement to be approved, so get those worksheets and fill in the facts you know already. Bring a calculator so you can consider new assumptions and evaluate financial proposals accurately. If you think you have received inaccurate disclosures, be prepared to explain in detail what you think is inaccurate and why you think that this is the case. If domestic violence has been an issue, there are restraining orders that are or have been in place, there are abuse or neglect allegations present (including emotional abuse of a spouse or children), or the co-parents have had trouble coordinating and reaching decisions without outside assistance, be prepared to explain these situations in factual detail so you can avoid summarizing the situation in a vague way. Bring anything you might need to refresh your recollection about relevant facts with you to mediation. If you haven't received full disclosure of your spouse's finances, insist on receiving that, ideally before going to mediation and absolutely before reaching a deal. Spend time considering possible resolutions of property, maintenance and parenting matters in advance. Very early on in mediation each of you will be asked what you want and mediation shouldn't be the first time that you have thoughtfully considered the question. Spend time thinking about what you need on a non-negotiable basis to survive - to be able to meet basic needs for food, shelter, clothing, health care, etc. for you and your children, and also about what your ex needs and how your ex can achieve it. Proposing ways to achieve objectives that your ex hasn't considered that are viable is a good way to get a resolution. Ideally, attend a parenting class (mandatory in many jurisdictions before getting a divorce that involves children) before attending mediation. Keep in mind that children are not prizes or bargaining chips and that you need to consider their needs as well as your own. Your kids love both of you even though you can no longer manage to live with each other. Do not utilize the children as sounding boards for mediation stances and do not try to use them as decision makers or conduits for communication between the co-parents. Recognize that in most states, marital fault is irrelevant, and that starting a new relationship is natural and routine, even if it makes your skin crawl that your ex is starting a new relationship. Take an attitude of focusing on what the deal does for you rather than what the deal does for your ex. This is about you getting what you need, not about making your ex worse off. Be prepared to walk away from mediation without a deal if necessary, because your ex won't accept a reasonable deal. Maybe half of mediations end without a settlement. Recognize that it may be possible to reach partial resolution (e.g. splitting up tangible personal property; figuring out how holidays will be handled with the children; agreeing on schools that children will attend; figuring out who, if anyone, will continue to live in a marital residence; stipulating to the value of particular assets; stipulating regarding each party's income; stipulating regarding what is and isn't separate property where you can agree; agreements to disclose information), without resolving all issues. Partial resolutions reduce uncertainty and make it easier to prepare for and conduct a permanent orders hearing on the remaining issues. Even if you can't afford to hire a lawyer to represent you in the entire case, pay for an hour or two of a lawyer's time to evaluate what kind of property division, maintenance award and parenting arrangements are within the range of the possible and likely if you go forward to a permanent orders hearing. Be prepared to put the terms of anything that is agreed to at mediation in writing. Mediators will usually tell you if they need forms signed, payments made, or a "mediation statement" in advance. Do everything required on time. A "mediation statement" is a summary of the key facts and your position on a fair resolution and could be a couple to a dozen pages depending upon the complexity of the case. Be clear in a mediation statement about what is O.K. to share with the other side and what is for the mediator's information only. When a mediator asks for a mediation statement the main reason for doing so is to save time that the mediator is charging you per hour for 50-50. A mediation statement can make getting the mediator up to speed on the facts more efficient and less likely to omit important facts and the mediator needs to learn the key facts to be effective.	I know of no laws at the federal or state level that explicitly extend their protection to poly relationships. However, any law that purports to outlaw a polyamorous relationship among consenting adults should be looked at very skeptically, as it would likely be found unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. While that case dealt with homosexual relationships, it seems unlikely that the courts would conclude that heterosexual couples, throuples, etc., are entitled to less protection. Adultery laws exist in many jurisdictions, and many of them have survived constitutional challenges. But as far as I know, all those challenges relied on legal principles and precedents -- in particular, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) -- that Lawrence explicitly overruled. In this regard, I would not expect anyone in a polyamorous relationship to encourter meaningful legal jeopardy as a result of that relationship, assuming that the relationship(s) were otherwise legal and out in the open. If A is unaware of her spouse's relationship with C, for instance, that could cause problems in a divorce proceeding. I don't know of any legal options specifically designed for this sort of arrangement, but the more interconnected and interdependent these groups are, the more likely it becomes that some sort of written agreement would become worthwhile -- not as a response to legal danger arising from the polyamorous nature of the relationship, just to address the fact that someone is eventually going to fall short, potentially causing problems for the whole group. There are many lawyers who specialize in LGBT issues, and I'd imagine that some of them would be able to provide more detailed advice about how to deal with this type of situation.	Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability.	Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.	My understanding is that if the second husband adopts the two children, he will be on the hook for child support. But suppose he doesn't. Is the second husband then liable for child support? No. The second husband is only liable for child support if he has adopted the children. (Also, many, but not all, states do not allow for stepparent adoption at all, unless the parental rights of a birth parent have been terminated. The question implies that there has not been a termination of parental rights in this case.) In theory, if he sought and been granted significant legally confirmed parenting time of the children (parenting time can be awarded to non-parents who have significant relationships with a child in many states), he could be awarded child support from his ex-wife and their father, but he wouldn't have to pay child support, even then. It is conceivable that the fact that his ex-wife is caring for minor children limits her earning capacity. Her earning capacity could be one factor among many used to determine if alimony will be awarded, and if so, how much, for how long. But, this impact on an alimony award does not mean that it is child support and does not differ in its relevance to an alimony award for many other factors that could impact her earning capacity (e.g. her education, her work experience, any disabilities she has, her age, etc.). It is also possible that temporary family support during the pendency of the divorce case could take into account the ex-wife's need for funds to support her children, even though they are not his children, but again, this is an alimony type decision, which in the temporary while a divorce case is pending category, is driven by actual need in the short term of each spouse while they are reworking their relative finances (much as it might be influenced by the cost an ex-wife incurs to maintain a horse or dog), rather than by the needs of the children in their own right. She might, for example, own the house but have only a small income, but adjusting the situation so that both spouses have sustainable finances after the divorce is what these court cases are all about.	Yes or no, depending. The question is investigated in "The Status of Pregnant Women and Fetuses in US Criminal Law" (JAMA), which collects 23 opinion in US jurisdiction. In Reinesto v. Superior Court, 182 Ariz. 190 where the court ruled that the state cannot prosecute for child abuse a woman who uses heroin during pregnancy and thereafter gives birth to a heroin-addicted child. However, in Whitner v South Carolina, 492 SE 2d 777 the court did find the mother criminally liable for child abuse, based on prenatal drug use. The South Carolina case is the sole example of that type, in the study (published 2003). Charges range from child endangerment/abuse, illegal drug delivery to a minor, or fetal murder/manslaughter. The general finding is that since a fetus is not legally deemed to be a person (in those jurisdictions, at that time), where was no "child abuse". South Carolina, on the other hand, reasoned, here and in prior cases, that We have no difficulty in concluding that a fetus having reached that period of prenatal maturity where it is capable of independent life apart from its mother is a person. A different study ("Criminal Charges for Child Harm from Substance Use in Pregnancy", JAAPL) which included cases up to 2015, found a slightly different distribution but generally concludes that courts do not consider maternal drug use to be a legal question. That article also cites a web page which at the time is purported to say that 18 states allow civil child abuse proceedings. In Chenault v. Huie (Texas), the court found that Texas does not recognize a cause of action in tort for injuries to a child that result from the mother's negligent or grossly negligent conduct while she was pregnant with the child but according to the more current Guttmacher Institute study, about half of the states have such a civil cause of action.	If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent?
Is "No More Mutants" Genocide? It's September 28th 2005. A heartbroken mother who recently lost her twins and their father has a mental breakdown and utters three words. Too bad that she is a quite powerful reality bender and that reality follows her order. The immediate result of this was carnage and a group of people that had about a million members globally, joined by a genetic characteristic, was reduced to a fraction of that. Initial estimates listed 198 individuals and at best "a few thousands". Several of those affected outright died. In total, 986 618 individuals were affected by either having the common genetic characteristic erased or their life cut short. The direct death toll of the event might be in the 4-digit range. This raises the question: Does the act of pretty much eliminating the genetic characteristic from the world count as Genocide and could Wanda Maximov be tried for several thousand cases of murder and almost a million cases of something. I guess the most likely inserts for something might be performing medicine without a license, malpractice by amputating something of a non-consenting person, and a very substantial portion being cases of child abuse cases as many victims were below 18. In any way, let's assume that Wanda Maximov is apprehended by suitable means in the state of New York. Can she be tried for Genocide and where might the case be held?	New York has no law prohibiting genocide, though it does have a law against murder. Since you specifically ask about genocide, at the state level, the answer is "no". At the federal level, 18 USC 1091 does criminalize genocide. But the action fails to meet the definition of genocide. (a) Whoever, whether in time of peace or in time of war and with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such... Mutants fail to satisfy the ordinary conditions for matching people to "national", "ethnic" and "racial" groups (and "religious" is statutorily defined). This is not to say that an aggressive prosecutor could not construct a line of reasoning that people with a certain (undefinable) genetic property fall within the ordinary meaning of "race" or "ethnicity". But, to consider an analogous case, the courts do not consider left-handed people to be a separate "ethnicity", likewise blind, deaf, nor those with Downs syndrome. Specific legislation is (was) necessary to make individuals with genetic conditions be a protected class – it does not flow from a general prohibition against racial discrimination. It is also unclear from your scenario whether defendant has "the specific intent to destroy". In reality, uttering a phrase does not make it so.	Article 8 is pretty clear. The fact that it is recommended to extend the draft to women indicates that there is a conflict needing resolution. A relevant case before the European Court of Human Rights ruled on this and found the law to violate articles 14 and 8 of the ECHR. They identify an exoneration from the tax under the Military-Service Exemption Tax Act sect. 4. Reading the judgment could be helpful (maybe you know the case). What I get from it is that there are a bunch of situation-specific details that could be applied (e.g. you have to first complain formally in-country before going to ECHR), and issues of disability level and the distinction between disability and illness. This gives a model for anyone to attempt to resist the tax, but only a change in the law will get rid of it.	Now after 4 years I still can't get it off my mind and it's consuming me thinking that I was fooled into believing that the rule of law was the norm in this country (not the jungle law) and the beautiful constitution we have is not there just to look pretty, but something we can rely on. So, at this point, do I need legal help? Or mental help or some kind of miracle pill to help me cope with the situation (?) I know that 6' under we can have peace, but can I live a peaceful (bully free) life here too? We do have rule of law as a powerful norm in this country. But, we also live in a very complex society and the exact content of the law will always be the subject of fierce dispute. The solution is, pretty much, to lower your expectations. The vast majority of the time the law works. Your beliefs about exactly how far you are allowed to disobey an order from a law enforcement officer as a matter of practical reality, were miscalibrated. But, you did get out of jail the next day and the punishment you received was very survivable. In much of the world, this wouldn't be true. The rule of law doesn't mean that everyone perfectly obeys the law. It means that when the law is seriously broken in a manner that has big consequences that there is usually a way to legally mitigate the harm or to obtain a remedy. Pushing the limits of the freedoms the law gives you is rarely wise. But, that is no reason to refuse to live your life. It is one thing to learn from experience. But, sometimes, you can overlearn from experience and need to recognize that your anecdotal experience on a single occasion is not all that there is the law.	You have asked about "United Kingdom", but I can only answer about England and Wales; the law in Scotland is very different (rather more different in some respects than the difference between E&W and the State of New York). There is no time limit per se on manslaughter charges; if the police find evidence for a manslaughter charge after 80 years, there is no difficulty (in principle) in bringing a charge against the now-centenarian (provided they are competent to stand trial, and they can get a fair trial, and so on). However, in the case you mentioned I would have thought the major problem would be a defence of autrefois convict - in other words, the defendant can (usually) only be charged once with charges arising from a particular set of facts. It is just possible that the subsequent death constitutes a new fact which allows a new prosecution. On the other hand, the rule for murder used to be that if the victim survived a year and a day then it wasn't murder (even if they then died of their injuries). Finally, the case certainly would not be reopened with a charge of manslaughter. It would be "causing death by dangerous driving", which is a very different offence. Edit My thanks to ohwilleke whose comment about the "year and a day" rule prompted me to do a little research, and discover the Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996. Section 2(2) clearly covers the present case (in both legs), and says that the perpetrator can be re-prosecuted, but only with the permission of the Attorney General. The act is very brief, and I encourage you to read it all. (And incidentally, does not apply to Scotland.)	All Four of them! Double Jeopardy is not in play if a jurisdiction can lay claim to your criminal action, so if you stand on the Four Corners and shoot a man in any of the four states, each state has a right to charge murder. In addition, the Federal Government can have a go at you because you crossed state lines while in comission of a crime. Plus the Navajo Nation, which controls the reservation land the border is on. So that six separate charges. That said, the state the dead body occupied at time of Murder would have the best case for action and the other three would likely let that state try you first. The Feds would only step in if each of the four states failed to convict, though they can step in whenever they want (they are just watching to see if you'll serve time first). Not sure at which point Tribal jurisdiction applies, but given that this is a fairly common Jurisdiction issue, I'm sure it's been worked out.	A problem with the question is that it uses the loaded term "victim". If you change the question to "Are there actions that you can perform involving another person, which are crimes even if the other person consents to participating in the action", then there are very many. Selling alcohol to a minor; selling heroin to anyone; selling sex in most US jurisdictions; selling firearms to a convicted felon. Also, for a physician to assist a person in suicide, in most states. Formerly in the US, various forms of sexual intercourse were acts that consent did not make legal. Whether or not the person is a "victim" in these cases is open to debate. In the case of physician-assisted suicide in Washington, the doctor is allowed to prescribe (oral) drugs that the person ingests: only a doctor is permitted to do this, both under the DWD Act and as a consequence that only a doctor can prescribe the drugs. There seems to be a belief that it is a crime to assist a person in committing suicide, which is probably correct if the assistance is shooting the person in the head, or in general directly causing the death (thus, "I give you permission to shoot me in the head" doesn't cut it). But from what I can tell, it is not generally against the law in Washington to help a person who commits suicide (e.g. supplying the means of self-dispatching). In some countries, suicide and helping with suicide is illegal, e.g. in Kenya Penal Code 225 says Any person who (a) procures another to kill himself; or (b) counsels another to kill himself and thereby induces him to do so; or (c) aids another in killing himself, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for life. No exception is created if the person consents to being aided to kill himself.	Does he have some kind of libel or invasion of privacy case? The description of the "art work" is somewhat inconclusive. I will assume that the red lipstick and blue eye shadow in the fictional poster are suggestive of that soldier's "makeup". If the World War Two soldier were still alive and a straight male, he might have a claim of defamation insofar as the poster portrayed him as having a sexual orientation which is inaccurate, detrimental to his reputation, and tending to dissuade others from associating with the soldier. Policies against sexual discrimination aside, no straight male likes being falsely characterized as to sexual orientation (in part because of the undeniably harmful, lasting impact something like this would have in his environment). The defendant's possible allegation that the "art work" was hyperbole would be unavailing. That is because the suggestive poster is likely to impinge on viewers a detrimental concept of the soldier even if it is obvious to those viewers that the poster was not an actual, color photograph taken of him during the World War II. In most jurisdictions in the US, the defamed soldier would need to file suit within a year from the publication of the poster (an exception is Tennessee: six months) because the statute of limitations for claims of defamation is shorter than most others.	It excludes pain and suffering incidental to lawful capital and corporal punishment Many countries around the world still execute people. As far as is known, no form of capital punishment is totally painless - even lethal injection involves a needle. In any event, the anticipation of capital punishment is likely to cause suffering. Similarly, corporal punishment such as caning is still a lawful sanction in many jurisdictions. This clearly causes pain - that’s the point - but it isn’t torture. It would also exclude lawful corporal punishment of students by teachers where this is still legal. Or of military personnel by their superiors, again, where that is legal. Now, organisations like Amnesty International consider all of those things to be torture. I don’t think they are wrong in taking that position but, under the convention, they aren’t legally torture.
New manager will not accept renewed lease Suppose thsat a tenant in Dallas Texas was sent a lease renewal form via email for the tenant's electronic signature on February 28, 2022. Suppose that the form came from the tenant's previous management team, and the tenant signed and returned the documents senent by the management. Suppose that the tenant also saved one copy. Then on April 25 and a NEW manager (who assumed this position in March tells the tenant that the lease signed in February isn't valid. On being asked "why is that?" she stated that the previous manager didn't EXECUTE the lease, Suppose the manager says that therefor she has came up with her own month to month rent for The tenant. The manager never sent the tenant a written letter asking anything about the lease nor did she present a new lease for this new amount. Has the manager acted lawfully? What recours does the tenant have?	The wording of the original lease and the renewal form are vital here. The Texas Property code, Title 8, chapter 92 is the relevant state law for residential tenancies. It neither forbids nor guarantees a right of renewal. That is left up to the lease agreement. However, it does require a landlord to provide a tenant with a copy of any signed lease promptly. Specifically Sec. 92.024. LANDLORD'S DUTY TO PROVIDE COPY OF LEASE provides that: (a) Not later than the third business day after the date the lease is signed by each party to the lease, a landlord shall provide at least one complete copy of the lease to at least one tenant who is a party to the lease. ... c) A landlord's failure to provide a complete copy of the lease as described by Subsection (a) or (b) does not invalidate the lease or, subject to Subsection (d), prevent the landlord from prosecuting or defending a legal action or proceeding to enforce the lease. (d) A landlord may not continue to prosecute and a court shall abate an action to enforce the lease, other than an action for nonpayment of rent, only until the landlord provides to a tenant a complete copy of the lease if the tenant submits to the court evidence in a plea in abatement or otherwise that the landlord failed to comply with Subsection (a) or (b). (e) A landlord may comply with this section by providing to a tenant a complete copy of the lease: (1) in a paper format; (2) in an electronic format if requested by the tenant; or (3) by e-mail if the parties have communicated by e-mail regarding the lease. Sec. 92.003 provides that: (a) In a lawsuit by a tenant under either a written or oral lease for a dwelling or in a suit to enforce a legal obligation of the owner as landlord of the dwelling, the owner's agent for service of process is determined according to this section. (b) If written notice of the name and business street address of the company that manages the dwelling has been given to the tenant, the management company is the owner's sole agent for service of process. (c) If Subsection (b) does not apply, the owner's management company, on-premise manager, or rent collector serving the dwelling is the owner's authorized agent for service of process unless the owner's name and business street address have been furnished in writing to the tenant. Dallas municipal law prohibits retaliating against a tenant who complains about improper conditions or requests maintenance, but says nothing about lease renewals. Under ordinary contract law, an offer and acceptance makes a contract, unless the parties have previously agreed otherwise. Moreover, demonstrable practice can make or confirm a contract. If the tenant has paid rent for either March or April in reliance on the renewal agreement, and at the specified renewal rate, and that rent has been accepted, that may well constitute ratification (and thus execution) of the renewed lease. This is if the new lease would hav started before the April rent was due. So the tenant may well have the right to enforce the terms specified in the February renewal form. However, this will depend on what those terms are, and also what renewal provisions, if any, were in the original lease. It might be a good idea to send a letter to the landlord and manager, saying that the renewal form that you signed constitutes an acceptance of their offer, and thus a binding contract, and asking for a signed copy as per section 92.024, mentioning the section number. If it were me, I would send such a letter by both email and USPS certified mail, to both the manager and the landlord, if I had both addresses. I would keep a copy of any communications, and make them all in writing from now on (email is writing, legally). In any case the tenant would be wise to continue to pay rent on time in the amount specified on the renewal form, by some traceable means such as a check, money order, or credit card. I would be sure to use a method the original lease listed as acceptable, or that had been used in the past, except for cash. If I used a check, I would write "payment in full for rent of {address} for {month}" on the back The tenant would be wise to consult a local lawyer who specializes in tenant's cases, there seem to be quite a few. There is a local housing crisis center. It offers regular (twice a month) legal clinics with volunteer lawyers, and can be reached at 214-828-4244 or [email protected]. Such a center might be able to recommend local lawyers. Often an initial consultation with a lawyer on such a matter is free or at a low charge. It would probably be a good idea for the tenant to take some action fairly promptly. 15 U.S. Code Chapter 96 (the federal e-sign act) (section 7001) provides that: (a) In general -- Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law (other than this subchapter and subchapter II), with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce— (1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and (2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation. Also the UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999), which has been adopted by Texas, allows but does not require the use of electronic signatures. Thus the tenant;s email response ought to be a vald means of forming a contract.	Has this contract been translated (badly) from another language because the construction of the clause is cumbersome and confusing? Does the contract say that I can have guests over 1 night without charge? Without charge, yes. However "Without Landlord's prior written consent, Tenant has no excuse to accommodate ..." so you need the landlord's permission for overnight guests. If so does it only start charging on nights after the first? No, if a person stays more than 1 night (with the landlords permission) then this triggers the landlord's right to charge. See below for how much they can charge. Is it supposed to be 10% of monthly rent $137 per guest per night? "With temporary commendation, day-based, and additional 10% of rent each person is applied." The term is ambiguous, I can see three ways that this would be interpreted: If you have a guest who stays more than 1 night in a month they can charge 10% for that guest for that month (i.e. 2 to 31 days all for the same price). For 2 people for 2 days this would be $1,400 x 10% x 2 = $280. They can charge 10% of the monthly rent per night that the guest stays. $1,400 x 10% x 2 x 2 = $560 As, 1 except the rent would be pro-rata. $1,400 x 10% x 2 x 2/31 = $18.06 Assuming that the landlord put forward this contract the interpretation adopted in the absence of other evidence would be the one least advantageous to the landlord i.e. 3. However, there is other evidence - the landlord accepts that the rate is pro-rata - he has just failed to account for the 10%, so 3. again. How is overnight defined? Well, is it defined in the contract or by the law where you are? If not, it would take its normal English usage - "for the duration of the night". If they arrive before sunset and leave after sunrise the next day then they have stayed overnight. What if they came over at 9am and slept in the day? It says nothing about requiring your guests to sleep. If they party overnight then they are overnight guests. If they sleep all day but don't stay overnight they are not overnight guests. What about 2 am? If sunrise is after 2am then this is not overnight.	B and C have a contract with A In return for paying 3 months rent, B and C will remove A from the lease. This has all the required elements to be a contract. B and C have fulfilled their obligations and A hasn’t. B & C could sue A for damages. They would need to prove that there was such an agreement and that they agreement was a legally binding contract. Is this agreement written down? Was it witnessed by impartial third parties? What evidence of this agreement do you actually have? If A says they agreed to X, yet B & C say they agreed to Y: what evidence exists to show who is right and who is wrong? Failing to fulfill the obligations of a contract is not fraud. For there to be fraud, B & C would have to prove that A never intended to comply by the terms of the agreement. Given that the terms of the agreement are somewhat ambiguous, this would be very difficult. This seems to be more of a case where [Hanlon's Razor]: "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity." That is, A's actions are more likely to be the result of a misunderstanding (by A, or B & C, or both) than a deliberate plan of deception. The landlord is not involved - they removed A from the lease at the request of A, B & C; they’ve done what they’re required to do.	Can the seller enter a formal agreement with the tenants in which the seller pays a sum of money and in return the tenants vacate the premises before the closing date, and would such agreement hold over the tenants legal right to remain on premises past the closing date? Maybe. It depends on tenancy law in Nova Scotia. Notwithstanding, given that the tenants are “difficult”, what are your plans if they take the cash and don’t move out? What happens if the sale goes though under the assumption that the tenants have left, and in fact the tenants are still occupying the premises? Why would the buyer settle under an “assumption”? At the time of settlement either the tenants have left (so settlement happens) or the haven’t (so the vendor is in breach, settlement doesn’t happen and the buyer decides whether to rescind the contract and claim damages or affirm the contract and claim damages). What guarantees and proofs can the buyer demand as to the vacant status of the property? They take the keys and walk into it. What other questions should the buyer be asking? They should be asking: “Will you be in a position to fulfil your obligations under the contract?”	Your lease is with the LLC in bankruptcy - you should not be paying rent to anyone else. Unless and until the lease is transferred to someone else (in accordance with the terms of the lease or with your agreement) it will remain with the LLC. Contact the bankruptcy trustee to see how they intend to proceed. Providing the LLC keeps fulfilling its obligations under the lease there is no breach.	Your title doesn't quite match your question. "Reneging" would mean saying that a lease would be offered at the reduced rent, and then not offering the lease. Here, they offered the lease, and you accepted. So now the question is not whether they can refuse to offer you the reduced-fee lease, but whether they are owed the back rent. Verbal agreements are indeed binding, but they are rather sticky from an evidential point of view. Also, there are other possible complications. If your original lease stated that verbal agreements are not binding, or that only specific people are authorized to modify the terms and the person you talked to is not such a person, then this is not binding. If after they said you could keep the rent reduction, you signed a lease for the full amount or otherwise indicated acceptance of the full amount, then it may be considered not binding. Even if the agreement is not binding, you have further arguments. If you believed that it was binding, and did so out of good faith, then there was not a meeting of the minds, and they can't go after you for breach of contract. They may have other claims, such as damages if they can show that they could have gotten more money from another prospective client, but them accepting the rent makes that difficult to pursue. Now, again, verbal agreements do have evidentiary problems. If your case were nothing than your word claiming that they agreed, you would not have much of a case. But here, you have: -They were willing to take the lower rent for the initial period -You stated that you would leave unless given a continued discount, and you stayed -They didn't make any attempt to collect the full rent for three months -They are willing to give you the discount if you pay the back rent All of this points rather strongly towards your claim being true. You also say "this situation is not unique to me." It's not clear what they means, but if other tenants also got verbal assurances that the discount would continue, and they testify to that effect, then your case is even stronger.	What does the contract say? I write that so often I should get a stamp made. If the contract is silent, then it is implied that payment in US currency is acceptable, as is any other method of payment the parties agree to. As you have correctly quoted, there is no limit to the number of US coins that are valid for payments, unlike in many other jurisdictions where there is such a limit. Accept the coins, make the tenant wait while you count them one by one and then give them a receipt. Oh, and change your lease when you can to nominate sensible forms of payment like electronic transfer.	I am assuming in this answer that the lease or rental agreement provides the landlord with a right of access for required maintenance. The question is not clear on that point. If there is a specific and reasonable ground for refusing a particular representative or agent of the landlord, you might be able to do so. If, for example, that particular worker had previously insulted you in your apartment, or had attempted to steal from you there, you could probably refuse entrance and request the landlord to send a different worker to do the job. But in general the landlord may choose his or her agents, and if it is a reasonable for an agent to be admitted, you must admit whatever agent the landlord sends. You can probably demand reasonable notice, depending on the terms of the lease. You may be able to demand to be present when the agent is to be in the premises, again depending on the lease. But I fo not think that the tenant can arbitrarily choose which agent the landlord will use.
If someone is busking on a corner and a drug crazed preacher comes along ranting about gospel in slurred speech is there any offence? Suppose the preacher cones along and asks the busker how long they'll be there for to which he replies 6pm, when the preacher then says that he'll also leave at six but then goes up to the next junction/block to blast his megaphone/siren, but then gradually creeps back toward the busker's spot encroaching on his sound and space, and also rendering the initial decent interaction pointless and moot, and responds hostile and inflammatorily to polite reasonable requests to respect each other and stay on the other block until 6:00, is there anything the police might do? Does the needlessly obnoxious and antisocial manner in which they're behaving and clearly drugged intoxication create any kind of charge like disturbing the peace or something like that? Or antisocial behaviour? Many people gathered around the busker to express support and appreciation for him as well as disgust toward the preachers unnecessary disrespect.	"Does the needlessly obnoxious and antisocial manner in which they're behaving and clearly drugged intoxication create any kind of charge like disturbing the peace or something like that?" Probably. But you don't want to take the law into your own hands. Call the police and have them make the judgement. There is a lot of discretion involved; some police officers may simply tell the preacher to move on; others may detain him on public intoxication or being a nuisance, according to local and UK laws, as well as check for permits and licenses for street/public performances. Many people gathered around the busker to express support and appreciation for him as well as disgust toward the preachers unnecessary disrespect. That's well within rights, as long as the behavior doesn't degrade into the same type(s) that the preacher is exhibiting and possibly be a nuisance or worse (i.s., assault) as per the law.	Unless the Youtube Video shows them committing a crime, then no, they couldn't be arrested and tried for a crime. Them saying it, not under oath, is just hearsay that has no evidentiary value unless there is already other evidence they have committed a crime. In that case, its an admission. But there must be other, either circumstantial, or actual physical evidence of a crime. Past intoxication is not a crime, either. Possession of drugs, if caught with them is. But saying you got high is not. People have walked into police stations and confessed to murders. But with no evidence, no body, no name of a missing person, they can't even be held after the holding period for investigatory purposes expires. If the video shows them committing assault, or breaking and entering (there actually are idiots who post this stuff), the video is actual evidence of a crime and it is often used against them. The statements can be used to begin an investigation, but people don't usually confess to anything worth pursuing even an investigation. The fact that someone says they used to do something criminal is not enough. For all you ( meaning anyone ) knows, the statute of limitations has expired because they "pirated games" 10 years ago. Your comment is right on.	In the USA communication between an attorney and their client is "privileged". This makes it illegal for, amongst other things, the police to listen in to conferences between a suspect and their attorney. However in practice there is often little to prevent the police actually doing so.	The explanation in the decision (fn 1) is that That announcement does not moot this case. We have said that such voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not moot a case unless “subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” [citations] The Department has not carried the “heavy burden” of making “absolutely clear” that it could not revert to its policy of excluding religious organizations... “there is no clearly effective barrier that would prevent the [Department] from reinstating [its] policy in the future”	I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions?	"Public place" is not a good description of a bar. "Public accommodation" would be a better description. But it isn't a public accommodation 24-7-365(366). It's only a public accommodation during the hours it is open to the public. Presumably the owner is free to close it to the public and rent it to some private group. During the rental period, it's up to the private group to decide who to admit. (The owner would have a veto for anyone who can't be admitted, for example, because the person isn't old enough to enter a bar.) The private group is not bound by the policies that prohibit unfair discrimination by public accommodations.	An example of where this is not allowed is Seattle, WA. Municipal code SMC 12A.06.025 states It is unlawful for any person to intentionally fight with another person in a public place and thereby create a substantial risk of: Injury to a person who is not actively participating in the fight; or Damage to the property of a person who is not actively participating in the fight. B. In any prosecution under subsection A of this Section 12A.06.025, it is an affirmative defense that: The fight was duly licensed or authorized by law; or The person was acting in self-defense. You can see from adjacent sections that "mutual combat" is not legal. I recognize that there is this meme about Seattle, but this is a distortion of an incident when the police turned a blind eye to a fight. We have police issues, no doubt: there is nothing legal about such fights. Of course, for a licensed event, you can "fight". Of course the potential legality depends on how mutual combat is defined. Illinois v. Austin 133 Ill.2d 118 and citations therein, subsequently Illinois v. Thompson, 821 NE 2d 664 define it thus: Mutual combat is a fight or struggle which both parties enter willingly or where two persons, upon a sudden quarrel and in hot blood, mutually fight upon equal terms and where death results from the combat. Similar death-definitions are found in Donaldson v. State, 289 SE 2d 242, Iowa v. Spates, 779 NW 2d 770. The law looks askance of such behavior. For the sake of clarity, a term other than "mutual combat" would be preferable.	Maybe, but we'll probably never know for sure. Officially, of course, he was not punished for his speech. He was punished for selling explosives without a license, which he admitted to. (He was also charged with illegally storing explosives and illegally mailing 'injurious material," but those charges were dropped in exchange for his guilty plea on the first count.) Whether those charges were a pretext to retaliate is probably unknowable. While it's a well-known fact that law enforcement frequently retaliates against people for exercising their right to free speech, this guy's story doesn't sound very credible. There is precedent for a prosecution for distributing Pest Control Report 2000, including the prosecution of white supremacist Leo Felton, a sad-sack loser who used the same material to build a bomb around to incite a "racial holy war" the same time. And just about a month after Ver's conviction, the man who owned the company that manufactured the product was convicted of violating federal explosives and transportation laws. Several months after that, he and his company entered into a consent decree with the Consumer Product Safety Commission ordering them to stop manufacturing Pest Control Report 2000.
If I cause a crash can I delete my dash cam footage? If I am driving a car and get into a crash that is 100% my fault can I rip my dash cam down and delete the footage or completely refuse to give the footage to anyone or am I legally required to provide that footage?	As an example, under the laws of Colorado, USA, deleting the footage would be a crime. See CRS 18-8-610: A person commits tampering with physical evidence if, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted and acting without legal right or authority, he: (a) Destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes, or alters physical evidence with intent to impair its verity or availability in the pending or prospective official proceeding; If you cause a crash, you should certainly believe that you are going to be sued, and a lawsuit is definitely an official proceeding. And it sounds like your purpose in deleting the footage is to prevent it from being used in that lawsuit. So you'd be clearly guilty under this law. It is a class 6 felony, carrying a sentence of 12-18 months in prison and a fine of $1,000 to $100,000. It may be counterintuitive, but according to a law firm, a digital video would be considered physical evidence: Physical evidence may include electronic records, videos, or audio recordings. This includes emails, text messages, social media messages, image files, video files, and computer files. If you don't delete the video, it is likely to be demanded by the plaintiff during the discovery process so that it can be entered into evidence. Rule 37 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure lists the sanctions that can be imposed if you refuse, such as: charging you for legal fees incurred by the plaintiffs in trying to obtain it assuming that the video proves whatever the plantiffs say it would show (e.g. that you were speeding, driving recklessly, etc) entering a default judgment against you (the plaintiffs automatically win the suit, as if you had refused to show up in court) holding you in contempt of court, which can lead to you being put in jail until you choose to comply, as well as fined.	If we go by Indian case law (as we should), you have to find a way. The relevant case is K.P. Adbul Gafoor v. New India Assurance Ltd, where appellant drove on a motor cycle on a learner's permit without a licensed driver positioned correctly, in violation of Rule 3 of the Rules, and smacked someone. The bulk of the case is about the insurance and liability consequences of violating the rule: the main point here is that the court deemed this to violate the rules.	TITLE XXI Section 263:1-a 263:1-a Allowing an Improper Person. – No person shall knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned or controlled by him to be driven by a person who is not properly licensed or otherwise entitled to drive. Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of a violation, and if the license or driving privilege of the person allowed to drive is under suspension or revocation, the owner or person in control of the vehicle, notwithstanding title LXII, shall be fined not less than $100. I would also hazard that allowing someone to use your vehicle knowing they intend to commit a crime would make you an accessory but I don’t think that’s the answer they’re looking for here.	What is the correct way to handle this situation? Strictly speaking, each driver exceeding the speed limit is in violation of the traffic sign even if everybody else also infringes it. Thus it is completely valid for the police to pull & fine anyone from among those drivers. Statutes like the one you mention are intended for scenarios where a driver departs significantly --and for no apparent [lawful] reason-- from the speed limit, such as driving at 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. Typically a driver would not get pulled over in the scenario you mention (driving at 62 mph where everybody else drives at 65 mph). The exception would be some police department(s) requiring its cops to meet a quota of fines per week, but that would be quite a questionable practice having nothing to do with the legislative intent. Speed limits are supposed to represent normal and reasonable movement of traffic. If informed consensus is that a particular speed limit is inconsistent with that principle (for instance, where limit is artificially low and raising it would not compromise safety), then a request could be submitted to the Oregon Department of Transportation.	You are right that this is probably a private space; you are wrong in thinking it is your private space; it isn't. The space belongs to your employer and they can do whatever they want with their space unless there is a law that says they can't. As to what type of "hidden surveillance" is allowed that depends on your particular circumstances including what state and federal laws apply and the employment contract you are covered by. As a starting point, if this was happening in Australia then: If you gave permission, all would be legal If you did not give permission: it would be illegal to record anything taking place across a public telecommunications system (i.e. phone tapping) it would be legal for anyone to make an audio recording (not phone tapping) of any conversation to which they were a party it would be legal to make a video recording without sound.	Yes, that might be a violation of data protection law such as the DPA 2018 / UKGDPR, but not necessarily so. It depends on the details, for example on the purpose this camera serves. Background on Fairhurst v Woodard and on legitimate interests Fairhurst v Woodard is a significant case discussing implications of use of video surveillance outside of a commercial context, but it is a complex case due to the multitude of cameras involved and due to the somewhat unrelated privacy and harassment issues. Point 135 is about the Driveway Camera, which only surveilled public property and the claimant's property, but did not view any part of the defendants property. People are free to surveil their own property, and would then be covered by the UKGDPR household exception. But for surveillance outside of their own property, defendant would have to comply with the DPA 2018 and the UKGDPR, for which defendant would have needed a legal basis. The defendant argued that they had a legitimate interest (Art 6(1)(f) UKGDPR): 134. […] The Defendant submits that all his data collection and processing was necessary for the purposes of crime prevention at his property and in the car park However, a legitimate interest always require as balancing test. The legitimate interest can be “overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject” (Art 6(1)(f) UKGDPR). It is not necessary here that these interests, rights, and freedoms are explicitly enumerated in statutory law. Here, a right is claimed without supporting legal basis: 134. […] Claimant submits that her right to privacy in and around her home overrides that purpose. However, a possible basis for this claim would be Art 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is part of UK constitutional law: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” The court balances these rights and interests very differently for the different cameras. The Ring Doorbell is mainly focused on people who would ring the defendant's doorbell, and only incidentally captures passer-bys. Here, the legitimate interest was found to be valid. On the other hand, the Driveway Camera was mostly trained on claimant's property. Here, claimant's interests, rights, and freedoms override the claimed legitimate interests. Your scenario If the camera records the people living in the Green House when they go to or from their property, then yes, it seems like their rights would be affected. But in your scenario, the context of the camera is not clear: Why was it installed? If the purpose is crime prevention, is there evidence of such crimes in the neighbourhood, or are the cameras intended to counter a speculative threat? What is its field of view? Is it mainly trained on the Yellow House's doorstep and only captures the street as a background, or does it focus on the street? Is the camera's field of view masked off as far as possible to exclude public spaces? Does the camera record continuously, or is it only activated for certain events like when a doorbell is rung or when someone enters the Yellow House property? Does the camera also record audio? All of this is important because it factors into a legitimate interest balancing test. Maybe the Yellow House camera is more like the Ring Doorbell in the above case where the incidental capture of passer-bys was found to be acceptable, maybe it is more like the Driveway Camera that served no legitimate interest. There is no absolute right to be free of all surveillance. Instead, the interests and rights of the Green and Yellow house residents must be balanced appropriately. Where there is surveillance, it must be limited to what is necessary.	Barring manufacturer negligence (and even this is a dubious theory, given that recovery would be for pure economic loss), there is probably no legal theory that would allow recovery of any loss of resale value. I am assuming that the promise to replace/repair the engine if it fails is part of the contract of sale. This is typical for a warranty that the manufacturer will repair certain failures. Assuming the manufacturer fulfils what it agreed to in the warranty, then the buyer is getting exactly what they contracted for and there is no contractual theory that would support any further recovery: there is no breach. The buyer bought a car that included a warranty to repair. I cannot imagine that they bought a car that included a promise that it would not fail.	Unlikely, but specific facts may change this. The fact a vehicle gets the approval of the NHTSA and/or other safety regulatory bodies will probably mean that it already passed a certain level of safety testing, and any reasons for a recall will only surface after orders of magnitude greater sample and/or testing time. Therefore, the probability of causing endangering participants in traffic and others are negligible. The duty of notice will most likely be on the manufacturer under a product liability theory. Driving continuously and/or repeatedly after notice may be a different matter if it actually results in harming one — theoretically even oneself.
Citation request: US Case on removal of a judge for past confederate affliation Earlier this year I read a case, I think a US Supreme Court case, dealing with section three of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. But I cannot recall the name of the case, and I have not been able to find it using Google searches. The facts as I recall them: A man, in fact a former slave, had been accused and convicted of murder, or perhaps manslaughter, in West Virginia. An appeal was filed on the grounds that the judge who tried the case and imposed sentence had been a Virginia legislator during the Civil War, and had voted for the act of secession and for acts funding the Confederate forces, thereby "engaging in rebellion". The appeal claimed that the judge was therefore subject to removal under section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and his sentence was thereby invalid. Shortly after the Civil War (or perhaps in its latter days) the former legislator had been appointed to be a county judge in the newly organized state of West Virginia. The court ruled that the section was not self-executing, that no process had been brought to remove the judge, and that to collaterally invalidate otherwise valid court judgements would lead to chaos. The case occurred after the ratification of the 14th, and before the passage of the Amnesty Act in 1872. Can anyone provide the name and proper citation for this case?	There is a factually similar impeachment case. But there might be a court case fitting these facts as well. No such case is annotated by West under 14th Amendment, Section 3 either with the note or on its list of citations. It is also not mentioned in a law review article looking a WV civil war era jurisprudence up to 1872 when WV's new constitution was adopted. I suspect that the case you are looking for is a pair of related cases (neither of which involves West Virginia), one tried by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court alone on a habeas corpus petition when riding circuit, and a related decision of the Texas Supreme Court involving the same defendant. Griffin's Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 2 Am. Law T. Rep. U. S. Cts. 93; 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 358; 25 Tex. Supp. 623 ; 2 Balt. Law Trans. 433; 3 Am. Law Rev. 784 (Circuit Court, D. Virginia, May 1, 1869) and In re Caesar Griffin, 25 Tex. Supp. 623 (Tex. April 1869). The official summary of the fact and procedural posture of the main case on point was as follows: Caesar Griffin, a negro, was indicted in the county court of Rockbridge county, for an assault with intent to kill. He removed his case as under the law he had the right to do into the circuit court for that county, and was there tried by a jury which found him guilty and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for two years in the penitentiary. He was accordingly sentenced by the court to that imprisonment While on his way thither, in the custody of the sheriff of Rockbridge county, he sent out this writ which was served on the sheriff. That officer produced the petitioner in the district court then in session in Richmond, and made return to the writ that he held him by virtue of the conviction and sentence of the circuit court for Rockbridge county, making the record of the trial and conviction there a a part of his return. This return the petitioner traversed, denying that there was any court or judge in Rockbridge county as pretended by said pretended record, and that the paper exhibited was any record as alleged. The state of Virginia appearing by the attorney-general, Mr., Judge H. W. Sheffey, the judge of the circuit court for Rockbridge by Bradley T. Johnson, Esq., and the sheriff by James Neeson, Esq. they joined issue on this traverse. The petitioner then proved that Judge Sheffey had been a member of the house of delegates in 1849. That in 1862, he was speaker of the house of delegates, and that his votes were recorded for affording men, money and supplies to support Virginia and the Confederate States, in the war then flagrant with the United States. It was admitted that he was duly appointed on February 22, 1866, by the then government of Virginia, to be judge of the circuit including the county of Rockbridge; that he immediately entered on the duties of that office, and that he has ever since and still is discharging the functions of the same. The cause was argued at great length in the district court, before the district judge in December, 1868, who ordered the discharge of the petitioner, whereupon an appeal was prayed by the sheriff under the habeas corpus act of 1867 [14 StaL 385], to the circuit court, and the petitioner admitted to bail. Before the circuit court could meet other writs of habeas corpus were sued out by other parties convicted of felonies, two of them of murder, on the same ground as in this case, and the petitioners were discharged. A motion was then made by James Lyons, Esq. in the supreme court of the United States for a writ of prohibition against the district judge, to restrain him from further exercise of such power. The supreme court advised on the motion, and never announced any conclusion, but shortly afterward the chief justice opened the circuit court at Richmond, and immediately called up the appeal in Griffin’s Case. This statement is necessary for a full understanding of the pregnancy of the chief justice’s statement that the supreme court agreed with him as to the decision he rendered in this case. In consequence of the failure to oust the state officers disfranchised under the fourteenth amendment by these and similar judicial proceedings, congress in February, 1869, passed a joint resolution directing that all such officers should be removed by the military commanders of military districts into which the late Confederate States had been divided. Thus all the old officers of the state government of Virginia were removed except a very few, and new ones appointed not obnoxious to the denunciation of the federal bar — the supreme court of appeals of Virginia; the judges thereof having been removed by the major general commanding, he appointed as judges in their stead, a colonel of his staff, and two others, who had held or did then hold commissions in the United States army. The president judge of the court performed his functions and drew his pay as colonel and judge advocate on the staff, overlooking the execution of the laws of the military, and at the same time those of presiding judicial officer of the state. The procedural posture of the case and its result match your description even though the state does not, and there is a supreme court connection even though it is not a U.S. Supreme Court decision. The West Virginia association is probably a mental mangling of that case with a somewhat similar case from right time frame, a WV murder conviction overturned due to all white jury requirement by U.S. Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).	The earliest I know of is Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (N.C. Super. 1787), which dealt with a North Carolina statute that confiscated land held by British subjects and required the courts to dismiss any lawsuits attempting to reclaim confiscated property. The North Carolina Superior Court held that because the state constitution conferred a right to a jury on questions of property ownership, the legislature could not require the courts to dismiss lawsuits requesting such a resolution to property disputes: By the Constitution every citizen has a right to a decision in regard to his property by a trial by jury. The act of Assembly, therefore, of 1785, requiring the Court to dismiss on motion the suits brought by persons whose property had been confiscated against the purchasers, on affidavit of the defendants that they were purchasers from the commissioners of confiscated property, is unconstitutional and void. So the British subject was entitled to a trial, but the admission that he was a British subject meant that he was an alien and enemy of the government, and therefore not permitted to hold property.	There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.	I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand.	No The case was dismissed on procedural reasons. Like this. Well, perhaps not so pedantic but there are things that have to happen before the Supreme Court can get involved and they haven’t. For example, the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction in a limited classes of case; if this isn’t one of those (and it isn’t) it has to be heard in a court that does and then get appealed up the chain. When they have, the court will make a decision on the merits.	Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals.	As many parties as have standing. The First Amendment protects the right to petition for redress of grievances, so any limitation on that right would be highly disfavored. When there's a rush of cases like this, though, there are a few option for dealing with them. For instance, a plaintiff may seek class certification, permitting him to stand in for similarly situated parties so they don't need to litigate themselves, or a court may consolidate the cases if they are sufficiently similar.	The first thing to note is that your question is kind of the wrong way around. US states are sovereign and generally have the ability to make any kind of laws they want, unless they violate some specific tenet of federal law or the US Constitution. You suggest, for instance, that arguments which are "culturally founded" have no place in the law, but that's just your opinion, and there isn't generally anything preventing a state from making law based on such things, should its elected legislature see fit to do so. (Indeed, one could argue that nearly all laws are in some sense "culturally founded", since they are based on some notion of what kind of behavior is or is not appropriate, and those tend to be culturally based.) So legally speaking, the states aren't, by default, obligated to give any sort of justification for the laws they made. The burden of proof is on the other side. Someone seeking to overturn those laws would have to convince a court that the laws violated some specific provision of the Constitution (or another superior law). If they couldn't convince a court of this, the law would stand. From what I have read, before the US Supreme Court's 2015 legalization of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, the previous precedent was set in 1971 by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson. The decision itself is quite short and is worthwhile to read. Quoting Wikipedia's summary, the plaintiffs claimed that Minnesota's restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples violated several provisions of the US Constitution: First Amendment (freedom of speech and of association), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), Ninth Amendment (unenumerated right to privacy), and Fourteenth Amendment (fundamental right to marry under the Due Process Clause and sex discrimination contrary to the Equal Protection Clause). The Minnesota court determined that none of the plaintiffs' objections were valid. Again, I'll refer you to the decision for the details, but the court mainly focused on their Fourteenth Amendment arguments (the others may have been addressed by the trial court, whose opinion I can't find online). They wrote: The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, like the due process clause, is not offended by the state's classification of persons authorized to marry. There is no irrational or invidious discrimination. They specifically rejected any analogy to bans on interracial marriage, which had been held unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia: But in commonsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex. Baker appealed to the US Supreme Court, but his appeal was dismissed "for want of a substantial federal question," without any further explanation. (Nobody quite seems to understand what they meant by that, but here is an essay discussing the situation in a little more depth.) The effect of the dismissal was that the Minnesota court's decision became binding precedent upon the whole nation - laws against same-sex marriage didn't violate those provisions of the Constitution. And that was how matters stood for 44 years until Obergefell. (Of course, there was nothing to stop individual states from deciding to allow same-sex marriage, and some in fact did so in the meantime.) You have suggested that laws against same-sex marriage were religiously motivated. This might suggest an argument that they would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs in Baker didn't raise that point, so it wasn't considered in the Minnesota court's opinion. I don't know whether any other courts have considered it; no such argument was mentioned in the opinion in Obergefell.
When is it ok to use tabloid news as evidence in court? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cfLlAVFJZXg When is it ok to use tabloid news as evidence in court? Am I crazy, or this is irrelevant, full of hearsays and speculations therefore these tabloids shouldn't be used as evidence or during questioning? What are the rules on this in the United States? (The linked video shows part of the cross-examination of Johnny Depp in his defamation case against Amber Heard. The opposing lawyer reads the headlines from several newspaper articles critical of Depp and asks Depp if hje has correctly read the headlines of articles published on specific dates in specific publication. Depp replies that the lawyer has read the headlines correctly in each case, but expresses disagreement with the content in various ways, saying things like "as reported" and "but how did he know". The purpose of the questions is not made clear during the linked video, but the lawyer repeatedly emphasizes that these articles were published well before the allegedly defamatory statement.)	It depends on what is of evidence for. Normally, any newspaper, be it "tabloid" or "respected" or even the jurisdiction's "paper of record" would be considered hearsay; instead the source of the newspaper story should be called to testify instead. However, there are a couple of exceptions to this, beyond normal hearsay exceptions, which basically boil down to when a certain thing being published is, in fact, the information being entered into evidence. For example, in certain circumstances, the courts may accept "service by publication" for certain notices. An instance of this publication would be evidence that service by publication was carried out. Another example, your link is to a lawsuit concerning defamation; defamation requires proving that the damaging falsehood was transmitted to a third party. So entering into evidence a tabloid that publishes such a damaging falsehood is evidence that it was transmitted to a third party (namely, the public).	As I understand it, legal procedure in Common Law jurisdictions (e.g. the UK) is primarily based on evidence given by a person. Paperwork exists to verify that someone has not misremembered something, but even when you have paperwork you need to have someone testify that this is the right paperwork and it hasn't been forged. A piece of paper on its own means nothing. In practice of course the two sides will agree to accept routine matters rather than dragging lots of third parties (e.g. the post office employees) into court to no point. In the case of a letter where you need to prove it was received, the sender will testify that they sent the letter and that the copy they have introduced into evidence is a true copy. The proof of delivery merely shows that the item wasn't lost in the post. If one party testifies that they sent a letter and the other testifies that they merely received an empty envelope then someone is lying, which is a crime meriting further investigation.	What are the factors in weighting whether to disclose substantive evidence vs. using it for impeachment at trial? In an adversarial system (such as that in the jurisdictions in the U.S.) the surprise factor is disallowed on trial. I am not knowledgeable on the procedural exceptions, but generally speaking the documentary evidence (including deposition transcripts) has to be filed during the discovery stage of proceedings. A discovery deadline is set up during case scheduling, and extensions of that deadline have to be requested via motion. There is the slightly related concept of sequestration of witnesses whereby inconsistencies may serve to impeach a witness's testimony, but that is different than withholding from the jury any pre-existing evidence that a plaintiff would like to be considered on trial (whether for impeachment or otherwise). Also, it is in the injured party's best interest that the jury get to see the evidence rather than have it merely rely on a witness's reaction of surprise. The wrongdoer's lawyer will try to confuse the jury and thus outweigh the jury's perception of a "surprised witness", but that attempt is likelier to fail if the jury has the evidence with which to compare the witness's testimony at trial.	How much would I be expected to reveal if not directly connected to the case? For example, if I was asked, "What were you doing in the alley at night?," would you be required to reveal the information if it is potentially humiliating (e.g. you were having an affair) or illegal (e.g. you were getting illegal drugs)? The latter case seems to violate the protection against self-incrimination. Or what happens if you just lie about something inconsequential? You have to answer any permissible questions (i.e. consistent with the rules of evidence) asked. If you were doing something illegal you can claim the fifth and not testify unless you are given "transaction immunity" that your testimony will not be used against you in a criminal case against you. Usually perjury prosecutions require that the lie be about a material fact. Suppose you receive a death threat (either verbal or in writing) from the person charged with and who committed the crime. Something along the lines of: if you testify against me, then my friends will kill you after the trial. What legal options do you have? Tell the prosecutor on the case and ask the prosecutor to provide protection to you and to go after the people making the threat. The witness protection program was created for these cases.	This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.	Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side.	Yes. The jurisdiction I am familiar with is England and Wales. Conviction requires evidence (witness testimony is evidence) which proves the case "beyond reasonable doubt". It is open to the jury to find the witness so convincing that they find that they are sure the defendant committed the crime. In general of course, prosecutors prefer to have some supporting evidence (either additional witnesses, or circumstantial evidence - like DNA.)	Truth is a defense to defamation Bob must prove the truth of his statement if Rob sues - there is a reverse onus for this defense. Because this is a civil trial the burden is balance of probabilities. Provided Bob can prove Rob stole his bike he will win. A conviction for doing so is pretty good (but not necessarily conclusive) evidence. Absent that, Bob would need other evidence. Of course, if Bob has said that Rob was convicted of stealing the bike, he’s going to lose.
Are there any circumstances under which a council tenancy of a council flat in a council estate can be sublet? Generally the answer is a clear no, but what exceptions are there to this, if any?	The Citizens Advice Bureau states in Rights of tenants to sublet their home Rights of secure and flexible tenants to sublet Most local authority tenants are secure tenants. You are also likely to be a secure tenant if your landlord is a housing association and your tenancy started before 15 January 1989. Most secure tenancies don’t have an end date. If your tenancy has an end date and you rent from the local authority, your tenancy is a ‘flexible tenancy’. Flexible tenancies are a type of secure tenancy. What rights do secure and flexible tenants have to sublet? You can sublet part of your home with your landlord's written permission. If you sublet part of your home without permission, you are in breach of your tenancy agreement. Your landlord can't unreasonably withhold their consent to a request to sublet part of your home. Also, your landlord can't attach conditions if they allow you to sublet. If your landlord refuses your request to sublet part of your home, they must give you their reasons why. And then, crucially You can't lawfully sublet all of your home. If you do, you lose your status as a secure tenant and your landlord can evict you. For more detail about types of tenancy, please see that page.	No, it was not done properly See here. You cannot, and the landlord cannot agree to remove your name from the joint tenancy. You can cancel the tenancy for both of you, as can your ex. If you do this, the landlord is not under any obligation to offer your ex a lease on the same terms or at all so they would risk becoming homeless. The court has the power under the Family Law Act to make such a substitution so you can apply to them for such an order.	Unless your lease clearly denies the possibility of prorating, the emails are binding (and yes, emails count as in writing). The landlord ought to honor the conditions outlined in the emails, and it is not your fault that the manager was ignorant about his or her employer's/landlord's policies at the time the manager computed the prorated amount. Additionally, if the lease only speaks in terms of 20-day notice, then it implies that prorating may apply. It is possible that the lease contains language in the sense of when the notice becomes "effective". If so, that would require a more detailed review of the language therein, since even in that scenario you might prevail on the basis of the doctrine of contra proferentem. Here the difficult part seems to be that you are not in the US. Because the amount at issue is not high enough, the grievance/complaint would have to be filed in Small Claims court. And, as far as I know, the parties cannot be represented by a lawyer in Small Claims court. You might have to file your grievance once you are back in the US.	The assurance benefits both parties. The tenant cannot be evicted before the minimum term expires, if they have adhered to the terms of the agreement (with some rare exceptions). The landlord can gain possession under the terms of the agreement (subject to a minimum term). The Housing Act 1988 ended the "sitting tenant" trap for new lettings, where the landlord could not sell the house at market value. In practice, since 1997 most ATs are Assured Shorthold Tenancies with a 6-month fixed period which the agent renews. Though there are some ruthless agents who like to move tenants on so that they don't get too settled (and they can charge the landlord a re-letting fee). OTOH some landlords will want to keep a trouble-free tenant. Before 1988 tenancy laws were heavily skewed towards the tenant. Practically the only way a lawful tenant could be evicted, was if the owner needed to live in the property, and owned no other property (i.e. an owner of multiple lettings could not just shuffle around between them, to evict tenants). So although the new style tenancies were called "Assured", basically new tenants lost their "security of tenure" and IMO this eventually created a huge inflation in domestic property value between 1995 and 2007, as residential property became a commodity which individuals were encouraged to invest in: the buy-to-let market.	the landlord has been living there for a week. Is this allowed? Am I still expected to pay rent if he is living there? Generally speaking, no. But you need to verify that your lease contains no language that overrides certain basic assumption about leases. My understanding is that (1) you delivered the property, and (2) the landlord was not entitled to live there during your tenancy. Usually one basic assumption in a lease is that only the tenants and their beneficiaries/guests ("tenants", for brevity) are entitled to use the property. It appears that the landlord is neither. Your delivery of the property enabled the landlord to reassign the tenant's exclusive right whenever the landlord deems it fit. The scenario of you finding someone to replace you in the lease is merely one alternative from which the landlord can make the informed decision to reassign that right. The event of reassignment automatically releases you from subsequent payments related to your early move-out. Accordingly, the landlord's informed and willful reassignment (in this case, to himself) of the aforementioned exclusive right forfeits his entitlement to subsequent payments from you. This renders the [rest of the] lease voidable by you. In this regard, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 151 and 153(a). There is also an issue of fraud and quantum meruit (see also unjust enrichment) insofar as the landlord benefited at your expense (in the form of your father's work on behalf of you) without informing you that reassignment had taken place already. The landlord knowingly and intentionally deprived you of the opportunity to decide whether to keep taking care of property about which you no longer had any obligation. I presume you already are mindful of this but I should still mention it: Make sure you can prove the landlord was actually using the property rather than inspecting/enhancing/managing it.	Shouldn't the village compensate me or him for allowing the sale with wrong measurement or for changing the rule? No. It is very common for local governments to make changes to zoning ordinances, building codes, etc, that have the effect of restricting the way that property can be used. In most cases this is not considered to be a "taking" for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, even if it reduces the value of the property, and the government does not have to compensate the property owner. See for instance Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Roughly speaking, the Takings Clause only applies if the regulations are so restrictive that the land cannot really be used at all. Here you are still perfectly able to use the existing house, and it sounds like you can even build an addition - you just can't build in the exact way that you want. You'll either need to design your addition to comply with the current setback rules, or see if you can get the village to approve a variance.	It's hard to imagine a jurisdiction where this would be legal, assuming that the facts are as you present them. Mainly, it comes down to what the lease actually says. If the lease says something that implies that landlord permission is required, then the tenant has to get permission. You can call it a "dog permit", it just boils down to "landlord permission". Unless the lease also states "permission for a pet can be withdrawn at any time, sor any reason" or something to that effect, then the dog is permitted. At the end of the lease term, the landlord can refuse to renew the lease and/or can instead offer a no-dogs lease. The landlord's only recourse would be to petition the court for breaking the lease, in having a dog without permission, at which point the tenant would present whatever evidence they have that there was permission (hopefully something more substantial than a statement "I asked if I could bring my dog and the landlord said 'hmmmm' with an approving tone"). The courts will not give any credence to "Yeah but I rescinded the permission" unless there is a clause that explicitly allows it.	Ultimately yes, this can and does happen, but there are a few steps necessary before the bailiffs come to your door. In times gone by, the common law recognized a right to "distrain for rent", meaning that a landlord could come round to the tenant and seize some property as security (up to the value of the rent owed). If the rent is not then paid within a certain time, the goods could be sold. Various additional provisions of law covered the circumstances around forcing entry, breaking open locked cupboards, and searching off the premises for goods which the tenant had concealed. There were also special-case rules about what could be seized, such as a statute of the seventeenth century saying (among other things) that landlords could not harvest growing crops, but could take already-cut sheaves. Subsequent reforms for the protection of tenants have made it so that landlords cannot do this at their whim. They first have to go to the County Court for a judgement that there is an unpaid debt. (In fact, this and subsequent steps can happen with any debt.) On that basis, they can apply for a "warrant of control", under which an "enforcement officer", commonly called a bailiff, will take charge of collecting the money owed. There are quite a few steps and rules here, but the basic position is the same in terms of being able to take your stuff. And it is not the landlord walking around making those decisions, but a court-appointed officer. The previous common-law "distress" process is now totally abolished, for most tenants by the Housing Act 1988, and for everybody in 2014, because of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 section 71, which simply states The common law right to distrain for arrears of rent is abolished. Commercial property has its own legal regime since that Act, but previously functioned in the same way. So landlords can no longer seize your property on their own, but they can go through a few hoops and ask a court to do it. They also do not get to keep the specific property, but just get the money. As mentioned above, this is the general avenue for what happens when a court orders you to pay money, and you don't do it. The High Court has its own enforcement officers who are able to deal with larger amounts of money, as well as enforcing evictions. In Scotland, the same basic pattern applies but different words are used, and some of the detailed rules are different. "Attachment" is when a sheriff officer (= a bailiff) comes round to value your possessions and auction them off if you don't pay. There is also "arrestment" which is taking money out of your bank account.
Is it illegal for a store to sell, schedule delivery and then don't have material? I purchased material from a store and set up delivery. They delivered part of it and said the balance was coming the next day. Then they rescheduled delivery date for the third time the next week. The rest of the material never came. Two weeks later they notified me they don't have the material and don't know when they will have it. Isn't this fraud?	Depends on where you are, and likely also on what they knew when. It is entirely normal to order some goods (like perishable food, or custom-fitted furniture) before it is produced. The contract may or may not include advance payment. Most jurisdictions require some sort of intent for fraud, so the non-fulfillment would not be fraud if circumstances beyond the control of the supplier prevent delivery. The question of civil damages and repayment is distinct from criminal fraud charges.	There is no requirement that a service company do customer surveys at all, or that it report the results. If they use customer surveys in advertising and the results are falsified or misleading, that might constitute false advertising, and be subject to government enforcement. But if the report survey data as of a particular date, and mentions that date in the ad, that is probably not misleading enough to be unlawful, even if the company knows that later surveys show different results. If the company just tosses all bad survey results and reports only the good ones, that is probably misleading. But they can report specific "customer testimonials" even if they are not typical, as long as they do not claim that they represent the average customer experience.	In simple terms, the only basis for the complaint is that the defendant did not ship the toys, not that the defendant violated federal law by their actions. No federal law mandates the shipping of toys, whether banned or unbanned.	I make a copy of any important receipt printed on thermal paper, since the terms of many sellers and manufacturers require receipts for disputes. But I'm not aware of any law that says they have to make it convenient to maintain a receipt or other proof of purchase. However, when a company makes their terms unclear, unexpected, or difficult to comply with it seems there is often a lawyer ready to step up and file a class action lawsuit. Here's one archive to give you an idea of what companies will settle. In the United States the FTC is also empowered by law to "protect consumers," which means that if "disappearing" receipts become a widespread problem for consumers they could take action on the government's authority: The Federal Trade Commission Act is the primary statute of the Commission. Under this Act, the Commission is empowered, among other things, to (a) prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; (b) seek monetary redress and other relief for conduct injurious to consumers; (c) prescribe trade regulation rules defining with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or practices; (d) conduct investigations relating to the organization, business, practices, and management of entities engaged in commerce; and (e) make reports and legislative recommendations to Congress. Given the above, I wouldn't be surprised to see either a class-action lawsuit or FTC rule that requires retailers to provide "durable" receipts, or some convenient substitute.	First sale doctrine is about selling something that you bought. You buy X, you pay your money, you have it and you own it. You don't want it anymore, so you sell it to me for money. Now you don't have X anymore, but I have it. That's what First Sale Doctrine is about: That you can buy something, and then you sell everything you have, including all the copies, to someone else. What you are suggesting is absolutely nothing like that. You buy a DVD, you stream it, and after that you still have the DVD. That is absolutely not covered. What would be covered is that you sell the DVD to me, you hand over the DVD for cash, and you hand all the copies that you made over to me as well and destroy any traces that you still have. After the sale, you have my money and nothing else.	I can't speak for the US but in Australia this would not be binding. You entered a contract for the vacuum cleaner the terms of conditions of which were made known to you at the time of purchase – the ticketed price, any store or website displayed terms and whatever was written on the outside of the box. Any alleged terms that were not made known when you entered the contract e.g. because they are inside the box are just that: alleged. In addition, the manufacturer would have committed an offence under Australian Consumer Law by misleading you that such terms were binding. This could lead to a fine in the multiple millions of dollars if the breach is widespread and egregious enough.	Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.	No. You have to ask for specific permission to send marketing emails, and can't make it a condition of making a purchase since marketing emails are clearly not necessary for that. When accepting the terms you need a separate tick box for marketing emails, and it must be unticked by default (opt-in).
Removal from office through the 14th amendment The 14th Amendment, Article 3 of the US Constitution: No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. is currently being invoked to block certain individuals from running for Congress in the 2022 election. However, some of these individuals and others Took an oath of office as a new member of Congress to uphold the Constitution; They then arguably participated in an insurrection, or gave aid or comfort to insurrectionists; They continued to hold office. Why is Article 3 only being used to block their re-election, and not to stop them immediately from continuing to hold their position. Note: The question assumes that Article 3 applies; the question is why the power to remove is not also being used.	Suggestive Precedent Only one person has ever had this section of the 14th amendment used against them since Reconstruction ended: to block Victor Berger from taking his seat in the 1919-1920 House of Representatives; he had previously won a single term in the House in 1910. This disqualification was done in the House of Representatives itself, with a near unanimous vote holding that he was not eligible for the seat on multiple occasions. Based on events leading to his conviction under the Espionage Act, he was held in violation of the 14th amendment clause in question, and was denied his seat. Berger (and others) appealed this conviction to SCOTUS, who overturned it in 1921, holding the judge had an impermissible appearance of bias against the defendants. Berger then went on to win three consecutive House elections from 1922-1926. The curious bit here is that no one seemed to have any problem with his taking the seat at this point, and no vote was ever held to remove the disability the 1919 Congress had asserted (as per the 14th amendment), nor any to deny him the seat yet again. This creates a problematic precedent for anyone looking to deny a seat already won. First is that the enforcement of the 14th amendment provision was done by Congress itself, creating the question of whether that is the only Constitutional way to remove an elected congressperson under this clause. Second is that Congress created an implicit connection between a valid criminal conviction and a 14th amendment disqualification, by simply ignoring his prior disqualification after his conviction's overturning. This is a bit tenuous, but nevertheless a potential obstacle, as the Congressional records for the House proceedings on Berger, a rather fascinating read, are explicit in declaring that they are operating independently of the actual criminal case and judgements. No court has had opportunity to decide these for certain, but they provide a convenient defense for the accused. As such it is handy if you have alternative and additional paths to pursue your case under, so as to differentiate it. In Marjorie Taylor Greene's case, for example, there are explicit state laws for challenging if a candidate meets all valid legal and constitutional requirements. No such process was used, or perhaps available (I haven't tried to check this), in Berger's case. This creates a substantial legal difference, at least in principle, as it concerns disqualifying a candidate from future seats rather than denying a set to an already-sitting (or at least, already-elected, which SCOTUS has held is much the same thing) congressperson, and is utilizing a non-Congressional legal channel. MTG herself is challenging this law's constitutionality, I presume under the argument that in fact only Congress can effect and judge a candidate's compliance with the 14th amendment. The counter defense, presumably, would be that the case is not attempting to interfere with her currently held seat, which may conceivably be solely under Congress's control, but with potential future seats. Time constraints Finally, as a practical matter, the few court cases we've had on denying someone a seat in Congress have all taken about the entire duration of a given Congress (2 years) to resolve. This means the case could become moot before a decision is ever finalized, and even if not the practical result would be a very small loss in the total time the accused Congressperson remains a valid and voting member. So it makes more sense to target all future candidacies instead of the presently held seat, as that will never be formally mooted short of Congressional action pursuant to the 14th amendment.	Yes. US Constitution, at Article two, Section two, provides that the President has the power to nominate the justices and appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate. There is nothing restricting the President from doing this on any particular day from beginning to end of his term, and also no restriction on when the Senate may give their advice and consent.	The basic constitutional underpinning is the Commerce Clause and the 14th amendment (see Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336 § 2(b)(4)). As a general rule, if you do a thing that has potential commercial impact involving another state (such as growing feed for your animals and therefore not buying feed from a farmer out of state), then Congress can pass laws that restrict such actions. ADA was not constructed specifically to address seating on trains: that is just a consequence of the law.	Congress has the power to propose amendments, but not to enact them. Amendments are only enacted once they're ratified by 3/4ths of the state legislatures. And yes, there's no reason to think it would be unconstitutional for 2/3rds of each house of Congress plus 3/4ths of the state legislatures to make fundamental changes to the Constitution like eliminating other branches of government. The only limit on amendments that's still in effect is that states can't be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate without their consent.	This depends on how far along you're waiting for court rulings to set in, and if you count laws of Congress passed under the 13th amendment's enforcement clause. There were quite a lot of things that got ruled as violations of the 13th and 14th amendments (mostly the 14th), but many were not ruled or legislated that way for decades. Some were even ruled to have an essentially opposite effect of what the current (overturning) precedents do. "Separate but equal" was challenged on 13th amendment grounds, but was upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), and wasn't overturned, on 14th amendment grounds, until 58 years later in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Your particular situation sounds like peonage, which was outlawed by Congress in 1867 via the enforcement clause. This law specifically banned "the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise." However, peonage cases continued to make their way into the courts for more than 40 years thereafter, such as Clyatt v. United States (1905)— which ruled that peonage was involuntary servitude— and Bailey v. Alabama (1911). These cases affirmed that the 13th amendment abolished not just chattel slavery but essentially all forms of involuntary or indentured servitude (except as punishment for a crime). Though exactly what qualifies as "involuntary servitude" is still something courts decide on a case-by-case basis; the draft doesn't, nor does mandatory community service to graduate high school.	Separate law? Is a separate law needed to prohibit people to whom Section 3 applies from taking office, or to remove such people from office? Griffin’s Case There is some reason to think so. In 1869 there was Griffin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 2 Am. Law T. Rep. U. S. Cts. 93; 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 358. This was tried by Chief Justice Chase, in his role as a Circuit Justice, not as a Supreme Court case. One Caesar Griffin was accused of shooting with intent to kill, tried before a Virginia state court, convicted, and sentenced to two years in prison. He then filed a writ of Habes Corpus claiming that his imprisonment was unlawful, because the jusge before whom he was tried, Hugh W. Sheffey, (in the words of Justice Chase): in December, 1849, [Sheffey] as a member of the Virginia house of delegates, took an oath to support the constitution of the United States, and also that he was a member of the legislature of Virginia in 1862. during the late Rebellion, and as such voted for measures to sustain the so-called Confederate States in their war against the United States; and it was claimed in behalf of the petitioner, that he thereby became, and was at the time of the trial of the petitioner, disqualified to hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state ... Several other people tried and convicted before Judge Sheffey in the circuit court of Rockbridge county, including some convicted of murder, filed similar Habes Corpus petitions, claiming that Sheffey was prohibited by Section 3 from holding office, and that therefore their convictions were invalid. Judge Sheffey had been appointed to the office of Judge after the end of the US Civil War by the reorganized government of Virginia, the one recognized as valid by the Federal Government. He was appointed before the ratification of the 14th Amendment. There was no dispute that he fit the letter of the group of prohibited persons in Section 3. Justice Chase wrote: The general question to be determined on the appeal from this order is whether or not the sentence of the circuit court of Rock-bridge county must be regarded as a nullity because of the disability to hold any office under the state of Virginia, imposed by the fourteenth amendment, on the person, who, in fact, presided as judge in that court. Justice Chase rejected the suggestion that all official actions by Sheffey and anyone in a similar position were automatically void and of no authority because of sectio0n 3. He wrote that: The proposition maintained in behalf of the petitioner, is, that this prohibition, instantly, on the day of its promulgation, vacated all offices held by persons within the category of prohibition, and made all official acts, performed by them, since that day, null and void. After pointing out that many of the offials of the reconstructed governments of the sothern states were withign the terms of the prohibition of section 3, Chae went on to write: If the construction now contended for be given to the prohibitive section, the effect must be to annul all official acts performed by these officers. No sentence, no judgment, no decree, no acknowledgment of a deed, no record of a deed, no sheriff’s or commissioner’s sale — in short no official act — is of the least validity. It is impossible to méasure the evils which such a construction would add to the calamities which have already fallen upon the people of these states. As a further reason not to construe section 3 as instantly and automatically removing all such officials, Chase wrote: Now it is undoubted that those provisions of the constitution which deny to the legislature power to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or to pass a bill of attainder or an ex post facto, are inconsistent in their spirit and general purpose with a provision which, at once without trial, deprives a whole class of persons of offices held by them, for cause, however grave. It is true that no limit can be imposed on the people when exercising their sovereign power in amending their own constitution of government. But it is a necessary presumption that the people in the exercise of that power, seek to confirm and improve, rather than to weaken and impair the general spirit of the constitution. ... Is there, then, any other reasonable construction? ... The object of the amendment is to exclude from certain offices a certain class of persons. Now, it is obviously impossible to do this by a simple declaration, whether in the constitution or in an act of congress, that all persons included within a particular description shall not hold office. For, in the very nature of things, it must be ascertained what particular individuals are embraced by the definition, before any sentence of exclusion can be made to operate. To accomplish this ascertainment and ensure effective results, proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcements of decisions, more or less formal, are indispensable; and these can only be provided for by congress. ... [I]t seems to put beyond reasonable question the conclusion that the intention of the people of the United States, in adopting the fourteenth amendment, was to create a disability, to be removed in proper cases by a two-thirds vote, and to be made operative in other cases by the legislation of congress in its ordinary course. Chase also note that, 2 months after the conviction of Griffin: in February, 1869, congress adopted a joint resolution entitled “a resolution respecting the provisional governments of Virginia and Texas.” In this resolution it was provided that persons, “holding office in the provisional governments of Virginia and Texas,” but unable to take and subscribe the test oath prescribed by the act of July 2, 1862 [12 Stat. 502], except those relieved from disability, “be removed therefrom;” and that this indicates that such people were regarded by Congress as having remained in office and not beign automatically removed. Griffin's Case seems to establish that some proceeding is needed to establish when a person falls under the exclusion rule of Section 3 of the 14th. In 1869 this was done by military order. In 1870 Congress passed a statute providing for criminal proceedings in such cases. This was repealed at the end of Reconstruction. Currently 18 U.S. Code § 2383 makes "rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof," a crime, and provides that anyone convicted of it "shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States." This is not quite the same as the section 3 disqualification. One the one hand, it does not depend on a prior oath to support the constitution, and on the other it does not appear to ban holding a state or local office. But it shows how a similar law could be drafted by Congress. Legislative declaration Can a Congressional resolution, or a Federal statute declare that specific people have so engaged? This is probably prohibited as a Bill of Attainder, that is, a legislative declaration, without trial, that particular persons are guilty of particular crimes. Other Proceedings What proceedings would be needed to establish that a person had "engaged in insurrection or rebellion"? If a person subject to the section 3 disqualification was elected to either house of Congress, that house could refuse to seat such person, or expel him or her, as the Constitution permits. Most state legislatures have similar powers over the seating and expulsion of their own members. If a person is convicted under 18 USC § 2383 or any similar law, that person would clearly be excluded. Congress could pass a law establishing a special tribunal for determining when a person was subject to Section 3 of the 14th. But it has not done so. See also See also: this leglal blog post This article in Constitution Daily 14th Amendment's Section 3 Gets New Look as Democrats Weigh Measures Against Trump from the National Law Journal	Would such a person be considered a "natural born citizen," for the purpose of qualifying for the presidency, from October 25th 1994? In other words, after having lived in the US for at least 14 years, could such a person run for the office of the president or the vice president? This is an unresolved issue. Some scholars believe that to be a "natural born citizen" you have to be a citizen on the day that you are born. Other scholars believe that a "natural born citizen" is someone who gains citizenship by a means other than naturalization. No binding precedents resolve the issue because the phrase "natural born citizen" is used nowhere else in the law besides qualification to be the President of the United States, and the issue can't be resolved until someone is purportedly elected because there isn't an actual case or controversy until then, and there haven't been an examples that have come up that have tested this issue. My personal guess is that the courts would make every effort to find that someone who has been elected by the citizens of the United States as President, despite the inevitable debate by the public over someone's qualification as a "natural born citizen" during the campaign, is eligible to hold that position, because to do otherwise would seem massively undemocratic. So, I suspect that retroactive citizenship at birth would be held by the courts to make someone a "natural born citizen" and eligible to serve as President. Then again, I could see this issue being resolved by the courts on basically partisan lines too with conservative judges tending to hold that a liberal candidate was ineligible for office, and liberal judges making the opposite conclusions about a liberal candidate. This is one fair reading of what happened in the case of Bush v. Gore. Would the answer depend on whether the person had been naturalized before 1994? The citizenship by naturalization is irrelevant to whether you have another grounds for claiming citizenship that was present at birth or did not arise from naturalization. On October 25th, 1994, the naturalization became redundant.	The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate.
Is political viewpoint a protected class under equality act 2010 and other such laws and if so is it legal to discriminate against nazis? I’m interested in the situation in any jurisdictions that people would have answers for, but will accept an answer about england-and-wales. If one hangs a sign in front of their business declaring “no Nazis allowed,” are they committing unlawful discrimination? Why or why not?	Political party membership may be indirectly protected, insofar as party membership is a manifestation of a philosophical belief, but it is not a protected characteristic in itself. Political beliefs (e.g. in socialism) are capable of being protected characteristics, but not always. Nazism is not protected, because it is destructive of the rights of others and unworthy of respect in a democractic society. Businesses can usually choose who they do business with Assuming there is no other bad conduct going on (harassment, violence, discrimination, etc.), there is nothing to stop a shop or other business from excluding certain customers. This is the starting point. Some businesses have positive legal duties to serve the public in general. Your water company can't cut off your water, regardless of your beliefs. Barristers must follow the "cab-rank rule" and take your case even if you are a horrible person. So let's assume we just have an ordinary private-sector business, such as a shop. The protected characteristic of belief Contrary to the term "protected class", which is from U.S. law, the U.K. uses the words "protected characteristic" to mean those personal characteristics named in the Equality Act 2010. These include age and race. They also include "religion or belief", a characteristic inherited from prior equality law. Any discrimination claim relating to the "No Nazis allowed" sign would have to hang on the "belief" arm. Interpretation of "religion or belief" follows the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9. In relation to a philosophical belief, the applicable test is "the Grainger test" formulated by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in 2009, The belief must be genuinely held. It must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. Careful readers will notice that 2009 is before 2010; the statute law was different but the point was the same. Classic examples of beliefs meeting the test include vegetarianism, humanism, and pacifism. Political beliefs There is no sharp line between a "philosophical" belief and a "political" one. Support of a political party is not covered (Grainger at 35), but there is room for belief based on a political philosophy. In this way, "left-wing democratic socialism" met the test in GMB v Henderson. On this basis, one might be tempted to conclude that "Nazism" or "fascism" would be similar, even if "membership in a Nazi party" was not. However, Article 17 of ECHR does not protect totalitarian or Nazi beliefs. This is consistent in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court, and in U.K. cases on equality. It is the source of the fifth part of the Grainger test, via earlier cases in the House of Lords and before the European Court. For example, in Forstater v CGD Europe, the EAT held: A philosophical belief would only be excluded for failing to satisfy Grainger V if it was the kind of belief the expression of which would be akin to Nazism or totalitarianism and thereby liable to be excluded from the protection of rights under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) by virtue of Article 17 thereof. Employment is more protected In Redfearn v UK [2012], the ECtHR said a bus driver's rights had been violated following his dismissal for being a member of the British National Party. That was in relation to Article 11 (freedom of association) and his Article 9 claim was dismissed. The court noted that the BNP had not been banned in the U.K. and it was also looking at an employment rights issue rather than (as in the question) access to business premises; there is a general set of rights relating to unfair dismissal which were in play. It had not been proved that the driver was actually unfit to do the job. So even though party membership is not protected under the Equality Act, people may still benefit from other legal protections. The case also shows the difficulties of inferring beliefs based on indicators like supporting a political party. If the BNP were banned then it would be another matter, and U.K. law does allow the banning of extremist organisations. (Principally, under the Terrorism Act 2000, part II.) Some extreme-right groups are proscribed in this way, although there is no general restriction of fascism or Nazism.	Indeed, article 3.24 of the Arbeidsomstandighedenbesluit: Toiletten en wastafels In een bedrijf of inrichting zijn in de nabijheid van de ruimten waar de werknemers hun werkzaamheden verrichten een voldoende aantal toiletten aanwezig. In of in de onmiddellijke nabijheid van de ruimten waarin de toiletten zich bevinden zijn voldoende wastafels. De toiletten of het gebruik van de toiletten zijn naar seksen gescheiden. My translation (intentionally less idiomatic than it might be in order to parallel the Dutch word order): Toilets and lavatories In a business or facility there are in the vicinity of the areas where the workers perform their work a sufficient number of toilets present. In, or in the immediate vicinity of, the areas where the toilets are, there are sufficient lavatories. The toilets or the use of the toilets are segregated by sex. It's a very long law, so I haven't read it all, but it doesn't seem to impose a penalty on people who disregard the sex segregation of the toilets. I suspect that it imposes a responsibility on the employer to enforce the segregation, and presumably a penalty could be imposed on the employer for failing to do so. I do not know what mechanisms would be available to the employer to penalize an employee who uses the wrong toilet. I don't know anything about the catering industry, and I cannot infer why you ask about it specifically. If you're asking about toilets provided by such businesses for their customers, however, I suspect it's likely to be governed by another law. (I further suspect that sex-segregated toilets for customers are optional in at least some circumstances, since small bars and restaurants often have only one toilet.)	The key difference is the motivation for denying service. Generally, a business can deny service for almost any reason, or for no reason, and doesn't have to explain its reasons for doing so. However, laws may make it illegal to deny service for certain specific reasons. The federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. So a business may not deny service for those specific reasons. In the Colorado case, there was a similar state law that also forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. If they deny you service because of your political views, or the way you dress, or because they just plain don't like you as a person, that's legal. If they deny you service because of your sex, or race, or on the other bases in the Civil Rights Act, that's illegal. Obviously, since a business doesn't have to say why they're denying service, or could lie about the reason, this could make it hard for a plaintiff to prove that denial was in fact based on (e.g.) race. They might be able to do so by finding out about internal discussions within the business, or by showing a pattern of denial to customers of a particular race. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the baker made it easy by explicitly stating that he was denying service because of the customers' sexual orientation, or at least because of the same-sex nature of the marriage in question. This would appear to violate the Colorado state law. Had he just said no without giving a reason, it would have been harder for the plaintiffs to make their case. (A state commission held that the baker did violate the law, but the US Supreme Court reversed because, they said, the commission had improperly taken the baker's religion into account.) But there is no such law that forbids discrimination on the basis of political views, so Alex Jones can't make a similar case.	The only avenue for tenant liability would be if the tenant is responsible for the damage. The courts have not assigned responsibility for damage resulting from other people's disagreement with a political expression to the person expressing the viewpoint. You are generally free to peacefully express yourself, and as a renter this would be part of your right of "quiet enjoyment of the premise". If there is a lease condition that says "no political signs", then maybe that's a violation of the contract, but that might also be an illegal term in your state or city (under landlord-tenant laws). Since you have the right to express your opinion, the courts must respect that right and not deem that engaging in political expression negates your other rights. In general, if someone commits a crime, the law does not say "but you take the blame if you express your political opinion".	Part 3 of the Equality Act is the Part that applies to the provision of services to the public, which includes "the provision of goods." This Part prohibits service providers from discriminating as to the terms on which a provider provides the goods to the customer. Indirect discrimination is defined at Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010. It establishes that indirect discrimination is a form of discrimination: 19 Indirect Discrimination (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's if— (a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, (c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and (d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (3) The relevant protected characteristics are— age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. In characterizing the "practice" that is being applied, the Court of Appeal has said this word is not a term of art and is not to be construed narrowly or in a limited way (see Ishola v Transport for London, [2020] EWCA Civ 112). A fair way to characterize the "practice" being applied in this circumstance is that the store is "selling Nike Jordan 4128s (women's) at £150 and Nike Jordan 4128s (men's) at £200." (If instead the "pratice" were characterized more narrowly—selling Nike Jordan 4128s (women's) at £150—then the analysis would not even get past 19(2)(b). Likewise, if the "practice" were characterized more broadly—selling both the women's and men's versions at a discount from time to time, not necessarily at the same time—then the analysis will also have difficulty getting past 19(2)(b).) The question is whether the application of this practice indirectly discriminates against "male purchasers." 19(2)(a): does the Nike store apply this practice to male and non-male purchasers? Yes. (This is why we're in an indirect discrimination analysis rather than direct discrimination.) 19(2)(b): does this practice put male purchasers at a disadvantage? Depending on evidence showing that male purchasers are more likely to want to purchase the Nike Jordan 4128s (men's), then yes. (I could also see a tribunal cutting the analysis off at this stage, depending on how much weight they place on choice. I know that Canada avoids inquiring into the "source" of the disadvantage or blaming it on an individual's choice, but I have no idea what the approach in the U.K. is to this aspect.) 19(2)(c): would this practice put a particular male claimant at that disadvantage? Depending on evidence showing that the particular claimant wants to purchase the Nike Jordan 4128s (men's), then yes. 19(2)(d): is it the case that the Nike store cannot show the practice to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? My prediction is that the store would be able to justify the practice as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. One example of a legitimate aim: a charging policy at swimming pools that disproportionately affected "disabled swimmers" was found to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, being part of "an overall financial structure which covers the provision of a wide range of public services" (https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2022/1588.html) Other examples of legitimate aims: "running an efficient service," "requirements of a business," "desire to make a profit." However, Economic reasons alone are not enough to justify discrimination. Someone can’t justify discrimination by saying it’s cheaper to discriminate. But costs can be taken into account as part of the justification if the person can show there are other good enough reasons for the treatment. So, depending on the business rationale, and the proportionality of the discount compared to the business need (e.g. cost of holding extra stock, risk of failing to sell stock as a new model comes in, etc.), the price differential could be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. This will depend on the evidence. I predict most stores would be able to justify a modest and occasional price differential, even in the case that the production costs of each shoe are identical. Summary I see four ways through this analysis, each leading to the conclusion that this would not be indirect discrimination: a narrow characterization of the "practice" as simply selling the women's version at £150 (probably too narrow of a view) a broad characterization of the "practice" as selling all versions at a discount from time to time, albeit not necessarily at the exact same time a view that any disadvantage experienced by men is due to their choice not the price discrepancy (dubious) the price discrepancy is a proportionate means to achieve a legitimate aim (admittedly, a thin analysis requiring more research)	The First Amendment does indeed guarantee the freedom to express any idea or viewpoint, the limitation being incitement to immediate lawless action, recently reaffirmed in Snyder v. Phelps (many free speech cases have been about criminal restrictions on speech, this applied even to a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress). There isn't a clear line that distinguishes "advocating violation of the law" and "inciting to immediate lawlessness". Saying "(You should) shoot The Man whenever you see him" would be protected expression, but "There's a cop, somebody kill him" would be incitement. It also has to be a "credible" incitement, so saying "Kill him now!" to a room full of pacifist nuns would not constitute incitement. Things said to an angry mob would be more along the lines of incitement.	I think you misunderstand some of the relationships between laws, decisions, and justifications, and you're conflating two separate areas of jurisprudence. The linked real-world example you provide is happening in the employment context, but also in a government context (since it is a public school). But all the examples in your list have nothing to do with employment law and would be purely statutory/regulatory prohibitions. I will attempt to answer broadly enough to cover both domains. Laws and regulations can be challenged as discriminatory The things you have listed under "decency law" would be criminal or regulatory matters. A preliminary question would be whether the laws as written even capture the behaviours you've described. To the extent that they result in discrimination, the laws could be challenged as breaches of s. 15 (right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There may be other Charter arguments too, if the laws affect expression or life, liberty, or the security of the person. (Public decency / nudity laws are more frequently challenged on grounds of free expression.) Decisions of school boards are subject to the Charter The Charter almost certainly applies to decisions of public school boards and schools. See Elementary Teachers Federation of Ontario v. York Region District School Board, 2022 ONCA 476, paras. 39-41. These decisions could be challenged by judicial review (i.e. court review of an administrative decision-maker's decisions) and would be analyzed for reasonableness, including whether the decision strikes a proportionate balance between the Charter right and the statutory objectives (Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12). Even if there is an infringement, the government gets a chance to justify it If you're looking for some sort of a "line" it is found in the justification or reasonableness analysis. Where a law or regulation is challenged, and if a breach of s. 15 is established, then the onus is on the government to justify the breach as a reasonable limit as allowed by s. 1 of the Charter. This will depend on the importance of the government objective, whether there is a rational connection between the objective and the law, whether the law is minimally impairing, and whether the impact on the claimant is proportional to the salutary effects of the law. When a court reviews an administrative decision for reasonableness, it is "engaged in balancing somewhat different but related considerations, namely, has the decision-maker disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a Charter right. In both cases, we are looking for whether there is an appropriate balance between rights and objectives, and the purpose of both exercises is to ensure that the rights at issue are not unreasonably limited" (Doré, para. 6). In each of your examples, the judgments would be highly fact-based and it is fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show. Relevance of association with minors You ask whether it would matter "if the person in question was primarily associating with minors." This likely would not matter if a law was challenged, because such challenges are about the validity of the law, not the factors that might render its applicability to a particular person to be more or less justified. But if the law itself had the purpose of protecting children, or if the law itself was targetted solely at those associating with minors or those in positions of authority over minors, this would be a factor weighing in favour of justification of the infringing law (Irwin Toy, R. v. Sharpe). Whether the person in question was primarily associating with minors would matter in the context of an administrative decision, because these decisions are case-specific. Some anti-discrimination statutes provide more protections Ontario's Human Rights Code potentially contains even further protections. Section 5 says that every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of sex, gender identity, gender expression, and other enumerated factors. Section 24 provides for exceptions to that right in educational settings (and some others) where what would otherwise be discrimination is actually a bona fide qualification of the employment and if it cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the employer. These judgments are also highly fact-based and it would be fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show.	Are all interview questions that don't apply to essential functions illegal? No. Not all such questions are illegal, but see one exception from California legislation as pointed out by @GeorgeWhite and others in section 432.7 of the state Labor Code. Other jurisdictions very likely have equivalent prohibitions, but questions like the one you envisioned ("What music do you like") would not infringe statutory provisions. Generally speaking, it is lawful for an employer to assess candidates' personality & non-essential skills under casual and not-so-casual scenarios through the use of questions with no relevance to the job at issue. Only in very specific circumstances certain pattern(s) of questions may lead to a finding of harassment or discrimination. Questions related to categories which the Civil Rights Act protects are risky because a rejected candidate would have at least some grounds for a claim of discrimination. Those categories are [candidate's] race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Questions on those protected categories are not illegal, but the employer will have the burden of proving that its challenged practice (i.e., making seemingly discriminatory questions) "is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity" (see 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)) rather than for purposes of unlawful discrimination.
What is the basis/rationale for the barristers' cab rank rule? Does it only apply to barristers or also solicitors? Why or why not?	What is the basis/rationale for the cab rank rule? The cab rank rule has been a defining feature of the English Bar for several hundred years. It original purpose was to ensure that parties to a case would obtain representation regardless of the predilection of the barrister to take the person as a client. There were periods, such as during the IRA bombing of mainland Britain in the 1970s, when defence counsel were difficult to come by. The cab rank rule was invoked by the Bar to ensure defendants had counsel in court... Source Why not solicitors? Because barristers and solicitors operate under their own, distinct sets of rules. The "cab rank rule", found at rC29 of the Bar Standards Handbook, is specific to barristers called to the Bar. Solicitors do not have a comparable rule or requirement.	I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired.	This appears to be a fairly straightforward construction. Section 9(2) and 18b share a number of requirements, so 18b points back instead of repeating them. But not all requirements are shared. In particular, requirement 3 (covering pensions) does not apply to newly-graduated students. That's not strange since students are not paid wages. Also, they're not subject to the 5 year residence permit requirement. As for "sentences 2 to 6 shall apply accordingly.", this covers waivers to these requirements.	No Chapter 1, Section 10 of the FAA states that a court may vacate an arbitral award only if it finds that one of the following limited grounds applies: (1) the award is a result of corruption or fraud; (2) evident partiality or corruption of an arbitrator; (3) arbitrator misconduct, such as refusing to hear pertinent and material evidence; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award was not made. There is no “the arbitrator screwed up” basis. This is pretty much universal across jurisdictions for arbitration. One of the features (whether you think it’s a good or bad feature is up to you) is that arbitration is, for all practical purposes, final. That’s it, we’re done. The law is written that way because parties to an arbitration freely and voluntarily chose this method of dispute resolution over the courts. In theory, at least. Having made their choice, the courts will not unmake it.	A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable.	That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this.	If this judge is truly biased, won't the litigants be all the more glad to have a jury of their peers? You are proposing to abandon your duty to others. At trial you serve the community, not the judge. Back on scope for Law SE: If you refuse to serve on a jury, that could be a separate offense or general criminal contempt, for which you (this all depends on your jurisdiction) could get 30-90 days in jail. Edit: like several others have pointed out, I would not expect much trouble if you politely told the court that you felt you would be biased b/c of past connections. Even if the judge doesn't dismiss you, one of the litigants is likely to strike you. P.S. In most states, no one except a prosecutor (sometimes another state employee) can "take someone" to a criminal court. Individuals can only take someone to civil trial, where one cannot be sentenced, only ordered to pay a judgement.	Yes it affects them. Judges are pursuing their vocation as a career and there are career paths within the judicial system just as there are in every other career. Screw up too many times and your career ends at your present level. Judges are also professionals and most take professional pride in doing their jobs well. Having a decision overturned is professionally embarrassing. As a matter of public policy, there is no sanction that is directly applied to the judge otherwise judges would be too cautious to make decisions. Anyone who makes professional decisions will get them wrong from time to time - they generally are not punished. That said there are judicial errors that stem from making the wrong judgement (so to say) call and judicial errors that stem from royally screwing up. The former are far less damaging than the latter. For an example of the former, a judge is applying a relatively new statute for which there have been no other decisions and interprets the legislation in a reasonable way but one the appeal court disagrees with. For an example of the latter, deciding the matter on a basis which neither party put before the court and which the judge did not draw to the parties attention during the trial - as a common law country, the New Zealand legal system is adversarial: the court exists to decide the dispute between the parties on the basis the parties argue, not to go on a "frolic of its own". In addition, appeal courts can only overrule a decision if the judge has made an error of law, not if they have made an error of fact. A judge is allowed to be wrong about the facts but not about the law. In practice, the distinction is not trivial. In a jury trial, the jury decides the facts, the judge decides the law - appeals can only be on the basis of what the judge did, not on the basis of what the jury did (barring egregious misconduct by the jury). In a judge only trial the judge decides both but an appeal can only be on matters of law.
Does a loss of income due to libel constitute damage for which the libelous party is liable? Suppose someone makes a false accusation against me. As a result of this false accusation, nobody's going to pay me to perform work for them anymore. If I can prove the amount of money I'd be making right now were it not for this false accusation, and that I lost the opportunity to make that money due to the accusation, does the libelous party now owe me that amount?	Yes Loss of income that is directly attributable to a loss of reputation can be part of the damages in a libel case. However, the plaintiff must prove the connection, must show that had the libel and the resulting loss of reputation not occurred, the income would have been received. This can be hard to establish. Testimony from specific people who say that they would have hired the plaintiff or done business with the plaintiff but for the libel is a common way to establish this kind of damage. Showing a sudden drop of income after the libel can also help such a case. And of course, the plaintiff must establish the other elements of libel: (in the US) a negative factual statement, communicated to others, the falsity of the statement, and a resulting loss of reputation.	There is no general law making it illegal to lie about debts, or anything else. It is illegal to lie to a law enforcement officer in the course of an investigation. (And of course it is illegal to lie in court testimony or when otherwise under oath.) But it is in no way unlawful to decline to answer, unless a proper court order has been obtained, or other lawful means of compelling an answer. I would expect any law office to respond to such a question with something like "Am I/we being investigated? If so, send the appropriate notice and our lawyer will consider what we should tell you. If not, tell us what information you want, and we will consider and provide a written response in due course." If a taxpayer has been found to be delinquent in paying taxes, in some cases a court order may be obtained seizing assets, including unpaid debts. But no IRS agent can make such a claim on the spot, and indeed for a client to make such a payment without such a court order, or the order of an IRS tribunal (or the creditor's written consent) would itself be unlawful and would subject the lawyer to a suit by the PI (Private Investigator). When the lawyer pays a service provider, a 1099 must be filed with the IRS. If the PI is a corporation, a different form is used, but a record of payment is still required. As failure to timely file such a form is a violation of the tax code, an accusation of paying without filing would permit the lawyer to decline to answer under the Fifth amendment. If the lawyer did pay and did file a 1099 or other documentation, the IRS would know what had been payed, and would not need to confront the PI. Also, as the comment by Hilmar points out, a PI would be likely to use the cash accounting method, and so would own no tax on work performed but unpaid (as yet). So unless the IRS agent thinks the PI was paid "off-the books" and is intentionally failing to report the payment, there would be no point to such a question. And if that were he case, the lawyer would be very likely to decline to answer. I find the story quite implausible.	Yes Assuming you were assaulted (with or without battery) and you suffered injury (physical or otherwise) during that assault you are entitled to damages. The injury has to flow from the assault but not necessarily from the assaulter. For example, if you fled across the road and were struck by a car you could sue your attacker. Because assault is an intentional tort, it is not necessary for you to prove that actual financial loss was suffered - this is not negligence. The court can assess economic loss, non-economic loss and exemplary (punitive) damages.	From http://grammarist.com/usage/libel-slander/: (emphasis mine) Libel is the use of false, defamatory claims about someone in written or printed form. Slander likewise denotes false statements that damage a person’s reputation, but it is committed orally or in any other transient form So a false claim satisfying the definition of defamation would be libel if written (including on the Internet, per Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino), and slander if made in a transient form.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.	If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible.	Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual.	When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints.
What content is banned in Germany in WhatsApp profile pictures? There is an image being published in the internets which shows that, allegedly, in German city of Paderborn having the letter Z and the Russian flag in your WhatsApp profile is a violation of section 140 criminal code (rewarding and approving of criminal acts). Is there an official registry where one can see all materials that are illegal under this law in Germany, if "published" in a WhatsApp profile picture? Note: If this image is probably fake, please explain in the comments.	There is no exhaustive list of material banned specifically in WhatsApp profile pictures, but there is an exhaustive list of crimes that § 140 StGB applies to: Whoever rewards or approves of publicly, in a meeting or by disseminating material (section 11 (3)) in a manner which is suitable for causing a disturbance of the public peace one of the unlawful acts referred to in section 138 (1) nos. 2 to 4 and no. 5 last alternative and in section 126 (1) or an unlawful act under section 176 (3), sections 176a and 176b, under section 177 (4) to (8) or section 178 after it has been committed or culpably attempted incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. In turn, sections 138 and 126 enumerate various crimes, whereas the other mentioned sections relate to (child) sexual abuse. Section 138 (1) no. 5 lists: murder under specific aggravating circumstances (section 211) or murder (section 212) or genocide (section 6 of the Code of Crimes against International Law) or a crime against humanity (section 7 of the Code of Crimes against International Law) or a war crime (section 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 of the Code of Crimes against International Law) or a crime of aggression (section 13 of the Code of Crimes against International Law) The last alternative is indeed a “crime of aggression” which is defined in particular as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”. In Germany, there is a clear consensus that Russia is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine. The “Z” symbol is used in a Russian context in support of this invasion. It is therefore understandable that a prosecutor has the reasonable suspicion that publicly posting a Russian flag with the Z symbol is public approval of this crime of aggression. Spiegel Online reported of 140 similar cases across Germany. Thus, the photo could be real. Of course, the accused should not accept this invitation to talk to the police and instead get themselves a criminal defense attorney. A defense strategy would likely argue that the profile picture was not “suitable for causing a disturbance of the public peace” so that the conditions of § 140 StGB were not fulfilled. More realistically, the defendant would not contest a fine.	The picture shown is not fraudulent or problematic. Fraud involves using a false representation (or concealing a fact) in order to obtain a result that would not have been possible to secure without the misstatement or concealment. No one is using the photograph of the exterior of a passport (which is identical for all U.S. passports) to obtain any immigration benefit or for a non-U.S. citizen to obtain citizenship. All that is being done is visually associating international travel (which would usually be done using a passport) with a credit card that can be used internationally. Since a passport is a federal government document, it is also not protected by trademark or copyright laws -- the exterior, generic design of a passport is in the public domain. It can't be used for a purpose to mislead someone about citizenship or immigration benefits, but otherwise, it can be used for any purpose. I suppose that you could be interpreting the photograph (on a Spanish language speaker's facebook feed) as implying that by getting this credit card you will also get a U.S. passport and cool sunglasses, but that would be a patently unreasonable assumption in this context, particularly in light of the clarifying caption at the bottom, and, of course, many people who speak Spanish as a primary language have legitimate U.S. passports (including more or less all passport holders in Puerto Rico). You could also, I suppose, be interpreting the appearance of the passport as some sort of implicit government endorsement of the product when the government does not, in fact, endorse the product, but again, nothing in the advertisement that I can see that can be reasonably interpreted as conveying that message.	https://www.schäffel.ch/allgemein_de.html: "Die Fonts dürfen für private und professionelle Zwecke unbeschränkt verwendet werden. Sie kommen vollständig und mit allen Einbettungsrechten. Es wird gebeten, jegliche Modifikation der Datensätze, den Vertrieb unter anderen Namen, die Verteilung auf anderen Websites als dieser oder die Eingliederung in Font-Pakete zu unterlassen." That is, The fonts may be used without restriction for private and professional purposes. They come complete and with all embed rights. Please refrain from any modification of the data sets, distribution under other names, distribution on websites other than this one or incorporation into font packages.	This article is a useful introduction to restrictions on political advertising in the EU, where §3.4 (p 33) covers Italy. Silenzio elettorale is covered by art 9. of Norme per la disciplina della propaganda elettorale. The statutory situation is not entirely clear to me, but the main controlling fact relevant to the internet question is that AGCOM issues rules. An English legal analysis (from an Italian law firm) is here. Their undernourished analysis of the silence period is Finally, Italian legislation prohibits political propaganda on election day and on the day before. Although AGCOM is not competent for ascertaining infringements of said prohibition, it considers important to call everyone to turn the attention on these provisions. Indeed, they are important to guarantee effective protections of the constituents. As such, in the Authority’s opinion, the prohibition applies to all media. Clearly, the law applies to internet platforms. What is not clear is whether the prohibition as applied to web pages is against "adding content", or does it require the elimination of previously-distributed content and scrubbing of links to such content. Perhaps the matter will be clarified in court one day.	It's illegal under US law. 18 U.S. Code § 478 says: Whoever, within the United States, with intent to defraud, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any bond, certificate, obligation, or other security of any foreign government, purporting to be or in imitation of any such security issued under the authority of such foreign government, or any treasury note, bill, or promise to pay, lawfully issued by such foreign government and intended to circulate as money, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. There are several similar laws for similar crimes: § 479 - Uttering counterfeit foreign obligations or securities § 480 - Possessing counterfeit foreign obligations or securities § 481 - Plates, stones, or analog, digital, or electronic images for counterfeiting foreign obligations or securities § 482 - Foreign bank notes § 483 - Uttering counterfeit foreign bank notes § 488 - Making or possessing counterfeit dies for foreign coins § 502 - Postage and revenue stamps of foreign governments According to version of the South Sudan penal code I was able to find, counterfeiting is illegal. But if I understand section 7 correctly (which I might not), most counterfeiting is not prosecutable under South Sudan law if it is not done in South Sudan. Having a counterfeit revenue stamp, however, would be, as would fraudulently altering a coin. Given that there's not an extradition treaty and that it's already illegal under US law, this probably doesn't matter much, though	I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!	This is the cited article. Thankfully, the interviewee provided a scan of the police letter he received, so the rest of this question is relatively easy to answer. He was specifically charged with Störung der öffentlichen Ordnung (lit. Disturbance of the public order) persuant to § 81(1) of the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz, which reads (after putting it through Google Translate): Who by a behavior that is likely to arouse legitimate annoyance, disturbs public order, commits an administrative offense and is punishable by a fine of up to 500 euros, unless the behavior is justified, in particular by the use of a constitutionally guaranteed right , In the event of aggravating circumstances, instead of a fine, imprisonment can be imprisoned for up to one week, or up to two weeks for repeated offenses. This law is almost certainly constitutional as it specifically allows exercise of constitutional rights. Note this also includes human rights, as Austria has included the European Convention on Human Rights as part of its constitution. Given that, I'm guessing if the interviewee had wanted to, he would have had a decent shot at having this charge dismissed.	Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive.
What requirements, if any, do judges have to render timely decisions? Are there any statutes or rules that compel judges to render timely decisions on matters that they hear? I.e., if a motion or case is brought before a court is there anything preventing a judge from taking months or years to issue an order or verdict? (I am primarily curious about U.S. trial-level courts, both state and federal; but also interested in answers for higher courts or other countries.)	united-states In Colorado (which is an outlier among U.S state court systems), trial court judge in the state court system has a duty to rule on pending motions within three months, and if they do not, a litigant can, after providing certain notices to the judge and appropriate authorities in the court administration office move to have the judge's paycheck suspended until the judge rules. In practice, even most lawyers don't know that this rule exists. Those lawyers who are aware of this rule virtually never utilize it, out of the well founded belief that it only makes sense to do so if you are a client in a very time dependent situation whom you are certain the judge will rule against when the judge actually gets around to ruling and you want to get on to the appellate process quickly for the client. Even then, the prevailing assumption is that the judge will be prejudiced against litigant in all discretionary matters for the rest of the case, and that the lawyer for that litigant will be at a disadvantage before that judge for the rest of his or her legal career. Colorado has no similar duty for municipal court judges or administrative law judges (who are not administrative part of the state judicial branch), or for appellate court judges. Likewise, there is no such duty in federal court. In an extreme circumstance, a state court litigant could file a Colorado Appellate Rule 21 motion (formerly called a writ of mandamus) with the Colorado Supreme Court seeking interlocutory relief from the excessive delay, and a federal court litigant in an Article III federal trial court could seek parallel interlocutory relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Circuit in which the trial court is located. But, either way, the likelihood of the relevant appellate court actually granting interlocutory relief for excessive delay by a trial court in addressing a pending matter is virtually nil, unless the case is one statutorily entitled to priority scheduling such as election law cases, protective order cases, and in Colorado state court, in certain civil cases involving very elderly parties. By way of example, I have had civil cases in which dispositive motions have been fully briefed and awaiting a ruling from a judge in both a general jurisdiction state trial court, and also in a different federal court, in which no ruling was forthcoming for more than a year after the matter was fully briefed. It isn't terribly unusual when appellate court rulings are released, to see that the oldest case ruled upon (often an appeal of a serious criminal conviction) that day was filed five or more years before the opinion is issued, even though once a trial court record is transmitted to the court (which typically takes three to six months), and there are typically only three or four appellate briefs to be filed plus half an hour of oral argument to conduct once the case is fully briefed for the appellate judges to consider before ruling. There are rare cases where proceedings can be even slower due to exigent circumstances. For example, I once had a limited jurisdiction civil case that went to trial over automobile repairs in which the presiding judge who had heard all of the testimony and taken careful notes from it had a serious health incident the evening after the last day of the trial, leaving him hospitalized for seven months, and in which it was discovered that the tape recorder that was supposed to have recorded the trial court proceedings that could have been used to create a transcript for use by another judge to rule on the case was broken and had recorded nothing. A year after the trial was completely and the judge had recovered and returned to work, we got the judge's ruling that he otherwise would have provided within a week (because that would have been his normal practice, not because he was required to do so) had he not been hospitalized. Needless to say, no one can tell the U.S. Supreme Court to speed up ruling on a matter in any binding way. There are some exceptions to this in U.S. criminal law trial practice at both the state and local and at the federal level, where there is a constitutional right to a speedy trial that if abridged results in the dismissal of charges against the defendant, and there are a few other deadlines of a similar character related to the post-conviction process. There is also a very short deadline in criminal cases, once a defendant is arrested, for the defendant to have a first appearance before a judge.	Appellate judges make holdings on matters of law, and generally defer to the fact-finder in a given case (the jury, or sometimes the judge) on factual matters relevant to a case. So in a case that involved certain mathematical arguments, they would generally leave it to the jury to decide whether those arguments were reliable. Put simply, Appeals courts don't make binding decisions on issues of fact, only issues of law.	The jury isn't told what the law allows. They are told to come up with a number and if it exceeds what the law allows, the judge modifies it in response to post-judgment motions.	Not generally. While double jeopardy considerations does not apply in Canada until the final verdict (i.e. all appeal processes have been exhausted by decision or failure to appeal within the time limit), the right to a jury trial for serious offences, both under the Constitution Act, 1982 (or the Charter, its bill of rights Part) and the Criminal Code (section 471, which not only makes the jury trial a right, but also the compulsory mode of trial unless both prosecutor and the accused consent), exist. Under common law principles, the jury's verdict, in the fact-finding role exclusive to the jury, is almost sacrosanct. Even if in Canada an appeal court can set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal or conviction, they may only do so if there is a reviewable legal error (for appeals from the Crown and the accused), or if the verdict of conviction is plainly unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence (or otherwise may constitute a miscarriage of justice). In the first case, the reasoning is that the jury's verdict was defective due to e.g. insufficient or wrongful instructions, seeing evidences that should not have been admitted or failure to see evidences that should have been admitted. In the second case, the appeal court acts as a safeguard, much like in the U.S., for the accused to prevent wrongful convictions however it may occur. Even then, the appeal court cannot in essence conduct a new trial from the appeal records and substitute its own factual findings for those made by a jury, unless it finds that no properly instructed jury can reasonably convict the accused based on the evidences presented (R. v. W.H.). Now going back to what the trial judge can do after a jury's verdict. The proper course of action in case where the Crown's case cannot support a conviction is for the accused to seek a directed verdict before presenting any evidence. If the judge grants the motion, the judge (not the jury) enters a verdict of acquittal, which can be appealed for errors of law. Otherwise, the trial judge has no capacity to usurp the fact finding role of the jury. The judge can, however, in exceptional circumstances, declare a mistrial or stay of the proceedings (i.e. the proceeding is concluded without a verdict, due to e.g. abuse of process by the state or other considerations to preserve the integrity of the justice system) following the jury's verdict. All most all cases on this issue followed a verdict of conviction. In one unusual case (R. v. Burke), a verdict of "acquittal" was involved. The verdict is in quotes because in this case, the court recorded a verdict of acquittal apparently contrary to the jury's intention, as the jury foreman had coughed before pronouncing "guilty as charged" and the judge (along with the court reporter, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer) misheard "not guilty as charged". After seeing the accused in the parking lot, some jury members were confused and returned to the court and reported the error. However, not all jury members could be immediately contacted and the jury had only reconvened in the court with the accused a couple days after the original verdict, and after some newspapers had reported on the situation. The trial judge decided to enter the intended verdict of "guilty". The accused appealed and the Supreme Court decided in this particular case that: the trial judge can nonetheless exercise a limited jurisdiction after the jury's discharge; the judge could enter the intended verdict if it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; in this case, due to the media reports and relatively long delay between the original verdict and the reconvening of the jury, which may have improperly influenced the jury, a mistrial should have been the appropriate remedy instead of entering the intended verdict. On the appropriateness of a mistrial, the Supreme Court said In declaring a mistrial, the trial judge therefore turns his or her mind to the question of whether a mistrial is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This determination will necessarily involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Injustice to the accused is of particular concern, given that the state with all its resources acts as the singular antagonist of the individual accused in a criminal case. This factor should be balanced against other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public and bringing the guilty to justice. It may be fitting to allow the announced verdict to stand where the period the accused has been at liberty and under the mistaken impression that he or she had been acquitted has been lengthy, and where the charge is not so egregious as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As has already been stated, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the circumstances of each individual case and select the most appropriate remedy. This case does not directly apply to a case where the jury intended an acquittal, but the considerations may still be applied in extremely limited circumstances. While no one but the jury is privy to their deliberation process and no judge can overturn a jury's acquittal because they think the jury's verdict is unreasonable, it could be imagined that, for example, if a jury reports an acquittal and a member of jury before being discharged makes a claim of jury intimidation or the Crown presents clear evidence of jury manipulation, the trial judge might still have the authority to declare a mistrial. But this has not been clarified in jurisprudence.	The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form.	You'd have to specify the cases you want. All court transcripts are a matter of public record, though a copy may cost you a fee from the court clerk's office to recieve. It should be pointed out that not all cases got to an evidentiary stage to actually evaluate on the record any evidence. A vast majority were decided on pre-evidentiary rules such as standing or laches (timeliness) and not all cases that were able induced evidence debunked the evidence. Any appellent case would also not induce evidence as all appeals cases are strictly matter of law rather than matter of fact (evidence), so those cases would be asking a higher court to double check non-evidentiary decisions. The fact that the party that brought the suit does not have standing to bring the suit OR that the party that brought the suit brought it too late for the courts to proceed on the matter does not debunk evidence that the fraud happened in the eyes of the law... it simply means the questions of fact were never addressed at all	The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 9th Circuit. The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 7th Circuit. These decisions are not binding precedents, even as to federal law, on state courts, or in any other circuits, although they are persuasive authority in all jurisdictions that don't have a contrary binding precedent. When two circuits reach contrary legal conclusions in binding precedents, this is called a circuit split. Sometimes, circuit splits are resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court (a large share of its docket is devoted to such cases). Sometimes Congress wakes up and enacts a law that resolves the dispute if it involves a non-constitutional issue. Sometimes (arguably, most of the time), circuit splits go unresolved for years or even decades, and the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in one part of the United States is different from the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in another part of the United States. In some other circuit where the legal issue that is the subject of the circuit split is question of first impression with no binding case law decided in that circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, the parties will offer up persuasive authority from the 7th and 9th Circuits that have previously issued binding precedents on the issue and will try to argue that the one that favors them is correct, or that there is a third way to consider the issue that also favors them. Indeed, often the U.S. Supreme Court deliberately refrains from resolving circuit splits until a clear majority has emerged favoring one view or the other. Even simply counting how many circuit splits exist is a surprisingly tricky matter. For example, one database estimates that 29%-41% of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in recent years resolved circuit splits (at the same link) but that was realistically an underestimate. the question is whether geographic or the temporal instancy in opposing decisions makes one over the other binding authority. There is not. There is no procedural rule that resolves a circuit split.	If you want to have some fun and increase the likelihood that you will go to trial soon, you can file a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the Speedy Trial Act. If you have co-defendants they may be the reason for delay. You could then move for a severance. On a slightly different note, since 95% of federal criminal cases result in the imposition of a penalty on the accused, you should start calculating your guidelines.
Are the relative levels of fines and imprisonment disproportionate? Most non-violent crimes are punishable by fine or imprisonment. But the maximum term of imprisonment has often struck me as far out of line with the maximum fine. For example, even if I am a minimum-wage worker I could pay the maximum fine in a small fraction of the time I would spend behind bars if sentenced to the maximum imprisonment. Examples: Florida 775.02 Punishment of common-law offenses: $500 or 1 year. Pennsylvania 15.66 First degree Felony: $25,000 or 10 years. Is there a custom or reason behind these ratios? One explanation I can imagine is that the real ratio of fines-to-imprisonment was initially comparable, but dates back so many generations that inflation has taken them far out of proportion; and, further, whenever a new law is passed the existing penalties are referenced without thinking about the fact that one side has deflated.	As @cpast says in their comment, these are not equivalent punishments, the fine is for the lower end of the scale where incarceration is not warranted and the maximum gaol term is for the most egregious cases. That said, your supposition is almost certainly correct; statutes tend to be a "set and forget" thing, legislatures have a lot to do and going back to old laws to update fines in line with inflation is probably not high on their list of priorities. In order to overcome this problem all jurisdictions in Australia have adopted the Penalty Unit; fines in statutes are stated as a certain number of penalty units and the value of a penalty unit is set in various ways that usually do not require a vote in parliament.	Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.	Ignorantia juris non excusat You can say I didn't know: it won't keep you out of jail. Rather than delving into the specifics of your question, I will keep my answer general. If you break the law, you break the law. It doesn't matter if: you don't know what the law is, you didn't think the law applied to you, you thought what you were doing was in accordance with the law. "Break the law" is an objective fact - there is no subjectivity involved. The state of mind of the person is, in most jurisdictions, irrelevant; the common law doctrine of mens rea or "the guilty mind" has almost universally been done away with. Now specific offences have specific defences. Generally, in underage sex cases genuine ignorance of the age of the person is one such defence. A court may decide that ignorance that the person was underage under US law may qualify for this defence.	Was This An Egregiously Lenient Sentence? Yes. Did he get lighter punishment than he "should have" (in some sense)? Yes. A six month sentence for a non-negligent homicide was virtually unprecedented then and remains extremely low. Even a six month sentence for the rape of an adult woman (which is generally a comparable or less serious offense than manslaughter) by a privileged white offender generates immense controversy today as it did in the case of the sentencing of Brock Turner for that offense in 2016 (something that ultimately cost the judge imposing that sentence his job). There is no way that intentionally hitting someone is negligent homicide. It is at a minimum reckless, and honestly, is hard to see as anything other than intentional conduct. While it wasn't premeditated and hence wouldn't qualify as first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, this would be a fairly straightforward case for a second degree murder charge and a sentence of a decade or more. The intentional part apples to the act of hitting someone, not the result of causing their death. This intent was present here. Where Did The System Fail? in what way did the legal process fail? Or do you think that there was any failure at all in the legal process? Was the substantive law at fault? No. The substantive criminal law in 1963 was very similar to what it is now and would have authorized a much more severe sentence on the crime of conviction and would have made a more serious charge of murder viable. Arguably the substantive law should have had a mandatory minimum sentence for homicide, but since judges very rarely impose such lenient charges for homicide in cases like this one where there was no good reason for leniency, many states don't do that now and it isn't a problem that legislators would reasonably have believed that they had to worry about. Allowing leniency in some extraordinary cases that capture considerations that the law does not expressly mention is often a good thing, rather than a bad one. Did The Appellate Process Fail? No. The defendant's conviction was not wrongfully reversed on appeal, and it is generally not possible for a defendant's sentence to be increased on appeal in these circumstances. Arguably, this is not an ideal rule of law (and it is not the law in most countries in these circumstances). But this was not a major problem with the legal system that was a primary reason causing the outcome in this case to be an exceptional miscarriage of justice. The Judge's Sentence Was An Abuse Of Discretion. The judge imposed a very light sentence within the statutorily allowed range of discretion. While we can't literally read the mind of the judge and the judge doesn't acknowledge this as a basis for the sentence, given a larger pattern of similarly lenient sentences of similarly situated people given light sentences by judges, we can make a very reasonable guess about the most likely and plausible reason for the lenient sentence. The most likely and plausible reason for the sentence is the one identified by Bob Dylan. A high status white man killed a low status black woman, and the judge felt that, as a result, it didn't justify as serious of a sentence. The actual chain of reasoning in the judge's mind consciously may have involved considerations like the view that the victim was an "eggshell" victim, and the likelihood that the defendant was capable of reforming his conduct after a short sentence and thus didn't present a threat to the public. But the courts very rarely grant leniency to someone on the grounds that the victim was "fragile" - usually this justifies a more severe sentence. And the documented fact that the perpetrator routinely assaulted others with his cane casts grave doubt on the extent to which he could be rehabilitated more easily than a typical defendant. Also, even if the charge of conviction was manslaughter, this case would have been considered at the high end of the range in terms of the culpability of the offender who went around assaulting many people at a public gathering seriously enough to cause harm, and to in one case cause a death of a more fragile victim. The sentence should have been at least at the midpoint of what is allowed (currently about five years out of ten possible) in a case like this one. Further, while Maryland is not in the "Deep South" it is a Southern state with a history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, and the judge in this case would have lived under and seen enforced to his benefit, Jim Crow laws in Maryland during his lifetime. The Civil Rights movement had not succeeded to the point that racism was a completely disavowed and unacceptable form of motivation in 1963, particularly in even parts of the South outside of the "Deep South" at that time. As a reference point, President Biden, in nearby Delaware, was starting to make a name for himself in politics at the time as a defender of segregation in the school system and an opponent of busing to desegregate schools. This issue got him elected and re-elected. Biden reformed his views later, but racism was alive and well in Chesapeake Bay area at the time. Was Prosecutorial Discretion An Issue? Possibly To Some Extent. The prosecution's decision to press charges for manslaughter rather than murder was also questionable, but less obviously so. Today, common practice would be to bring both murder and manslaughter charges in a case like this one. The facts would have supported a second degree murder charge. The fact that the prosecution originally brought a murder charge suggests that it knew that the facts supported that charge, and was influenced by some political or tactical consideration, or by judicial pressure, to drop the more serious charge before trial. But without insight into what that reason was (which is much less obvious than the judge's motivations) it is hard to judge whether the prosecutor should have acted differently under the circumstances. The fact that the prosecution pressed charges, took the case to trial, and got a conviction at all also suggests that the prosecutor's conduct was not at the bottom of the barrel compared to more racist prosecutor exercises of discretion in 1963 elsewhere in the U.S. The prosecutor had the full legal ability to decline to press charges at all without facing any legal consequences for failing to do so. Further, while it is certainly plausible that prosecutor's racism figured into this decision, it is also important to note that the prosecutor has to consider the attitudes of a likely jury pool when bringing charges. Even if the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty of murder under the law, the prosecutor has to consider whether the odds of getting a conviction from a local jury that is likely to have considerable racial bias influences what charges are right to bring in order to get a maximum conviction, as opposed to what charges the prosecutor believes are legally justified. Likewise, if the judge indicated the he would be likely to dismiss the murder charge before trial in a preliminary hearing, that would also make a prosecutor's decision to comply with an implicit judicial suggestion to stay in the judge's good graces for the remainder of this case, and for future cases before the same judge, understandable. However, if electoral public pressure, or the defense counsel's pressure or influence, caused the prosecutor to give up on a murder charge that a conviction would probably have been secured upon, this is much more problematic and would suggest racial and status bias on the part of the prosecuting attorney's office. Was Jury Conduct An Issue? No. The conduct of the jury in this case was not an issue, even though the potential of jury nullification that didn't happen was a factor that may have influenced the charge brought by the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant on the most serious charge presented to it.	Generally speaking, the law in almost every common law and civil law jurisdiction does not allow incarceration to be a punishment for a mere breach of contract (when that breach of the contract was not intended at the time the contract was entered into by the parties by one of the parties but not the other). Historically, there was a remedy called "body execution" for non-payment of a debt that would result in the person who breached the contract being sent to debtor's prison, but that remedy was abolished almost everywhere. There are still non-payments of debts that can lead to your incarceration. One common example is a willful failure to pay child support which you have an ability to pay. This can result in incarceration for contempt of court, and is also a separate statutory non-support crime in many states. Failure to pay a municipal fine is sometimes treated similarly. These arise from the status of these debts as court orders. Also, many states have criminal penalties for knowingly issuing a check that will bounce, on the theory that it amounts to fraud, rather than a breach of contract, and sometimes that crime is defined rather broadly. Breaches of contracts that someone intended not to honor at the moment that they were entered into are also considered criminal frauds or thefts. For example, a Ponzi scheme falls in this category. Other relatively minor actions that can result in criminal liability are failing to observe the terms of a trust or escrow, certain copyright and trademark violations, and absconding with property that is collateral for a loan. These crimes arise because the actions are considered violations of property rights (which often have criminal implications) as opposed to violations of contract (which generally cannot have criminal implications). Still, as a general rule, parties to a contract, without state sanction through a court order or a prosecution for a violation of a crime established by statute, cannot provide for imprisonment as a consequence of a breach of the contract.	The 1975 ban by the attorney general prohibited prosecutors from offering to reduce charges, dismiss counts, or request a particular sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. (Ad hoc exceptions were allowed, initially only by the AG, later by the head of each local office. For a while, there was also judicial bargaining). The AG's ban was on quid pro quo arrangements by his office, and the AG has absolutely no power over the plea by an accused, so that is how an accused could still plead guilty. The following quote is from the first page of Rubenstein & White: On July 3, 1975, the Attorney General of Alaska, Avrum Gross, issued written instructions forbidding all district attorneys and their assistants from engaging in plea bargaining. This prohibition extended to all felony and all misdemeanor prosecutions filed as of August 15. They could not offer to reduce charges or dismiss counts in multiple-count complaints, informations, or indictments as a quid pro quo for guilty pleas. Nor could they request the court to impose any stated sentence; they could only recite the facts. I can't locate a copy of the actual memo, but also see this quote, esp. "...negotiations with defendants designed to arrive at an agreement for entry of a plea of guilty in return for a particular sentence...". A guilty plea is much cheaper for a defendant than paying an attorney and getting convicted, so if you're actually guilty and the evidence is good, it could be a wiser move to plead guilty. There is little reason to engage in a futile act. It apparently also caused a change in the prosecutorial standard for charging, from probable cause to beyond a reasonable doubt – consequently, the chances that the accused is actually guilty goes up. The re-evaluation study also found evidence some evidence that sentencing was lighter in the case of a guilty plea, and it would be sufficient for the accused to believe that he could get a lighter sentence as a reward for a guilty plea to nudge a person in the direction of a guilty plea.	Your question is the subject of longstanding and ongoing debate that has generated countless articles and books and dissertations, so you're probably not going to get a fully satisfactory answer here. But here's the short version: Different systems operate on different assumptions. Your question suggests you are not a retributivist, i.e., someone who views sentencing as a means for taking retribution for the criminal's offenses. Some systems (most, I imagine) are built around that idea, but some view criminal sentencing primarily as a means of preventing recidivism, or as a means for achieving rehabilitation, the interests you indicated you see as more important. And even within those systems, there are still different ideas about what you're actually trying to do. Again, you've indicated that you subscribe to an intent-based system (a punishment keyed to what the criminal intended to do), but that approach competes with harm-based sentencing (punishment for the harm the criminal actually caused). While equal punishments make sense from an intent-based approach, they are less justifiable from a harm-based approach. Few would say that attempted murder inflicts the same amount of harm as completed murder, and so that system does not call for the same amount of punishment. Because there are different approaches, sentencing guidelines vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which I would classify as adopting a harm-based retributivism, treat attempts less severely than completed offenses, but other systems treat them equally.	Yes, "The offender will receive a criminal record." But, you ask, "How is this squared with s14(1) of the 2000 Act?" Well, you will note that it states that it "shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any purpose other than the purposes of the proceedings." The key here is "other than the purposes of the proceedings" which means that, although there is no further punishment for your crime, you have still been convicted officially and it will be noted (on your record) as per the proceedings, and may be brought up in any subsequent proceedings ( "and of any subsequent proceedings which may be taken against the offender under section 13 above." ). You will also note section 12(7): "Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a court, on discharging an offender absolutely or conditionally in respect of any offence, from making an order for costs against the offender or imposing any disqualification on him or from making in respect of the offence an order under section 130, 143 or 148 below (compensation orders, deprivation orders and restitution orders)." Which further shows that an absolute discharge is not an absolute pardon, and should not be thought of as such. Rather, "You are very much guilty, but of such a minor crime that the experience of a trial has probably been enough, so we'll let you go without additional punishment."
Can I use lethal force to protect myself and others from an on duty officer if he or she starts shooting up the location? I know that in Colorado we have the castle law for self defense which allows people to protect themselves with lethal force on or inside their property as long as they believe their life and family are in immediate danger. I’m not too keen on other States, but hypothetically, and god forbid, lets say a cop on duty and in uniform decides to commit a mass shooting at a public place. As an innocent bystander who sees no indication of lawful discharge, and witnesses others who did nothing wrong getting shot, if that bystander is armed and afraid of being the next person who gets shot. Could he or she use lethal force to stop the threat without facing legal consequences?	The answer provided by Dale M is half right, but there are a few things that I think are wrong. Firstly, the actual reality of the situation doesn't matter. What matters is that you act in a reasonable manner, performing assessments of the situation as a reasonable person would do. If you misread the situation, and end up killing a police officer that was acting in a lawful manner, it doesn't necessarily mean you were acting unlawfully yourself. Because police officers are generally exposed to situations where they would be forced to use their firearm, that obviously would impact how a reasonable person would see the situation, but the test for reasonableness would not go out the window. In addition, even if you were found to not be acting in a reasonable manner, there is certainly a question if you would be found guilty of a lesser charge of manslaughter rather than murder. It's possible the self-defence claim would be upheld as an imperfect defence.	A police officer (or any other random person) would not be guilty of a crime or subject to civil liability for standing by and watching a suicide occur when it could be prevented, unless the person attempting to commit suicide was in his custody and he failed to take reasonable care to prevent a suicide in which case the officer could be subject to civil liability. It would not be a violation of the law, however, for a police officer (or in most cases, even a private citizen) to intervene to attempt to stop an attempted suicide. Likewise, prisons and prison guards can have civil liability for failing to prevent the suicide of someone in their custody. Of course, a police officer might still receive a negative employment evaluation from his supervisor for such conduct, or might even be fired for it depending on the rules of a particular department, as it would reflect poorly on the police department and show bad judgment on the officers part. In general, an affirmative duty enforceable by a lawsuit to take reasonable efforts to prevent someone from committing suicide applies in circumstances where the person attempting to commit suicide is in someone else's care and custody and has their liberty constrained. So, there could be liability on the part of a hospital or treating medical personnel (I've actually brought such a case that was dismissed due to malpractice in missing a deadline by local co-counsel who was then disciplined for ethical violations by the State of Illinois for his conduct.) In the absence of such a relationship, a legal duty to take affirmative action to prevent a suicide generally does not arise. Certain medical facilities and providers are required to make anonymized incident reports for the purpose of creating national public health statistics on a periodic basis. In certain extreme circumstances, there are duties to report someone who is a threat to others which may also include a risk of suicide, to authorities, but those are quite narrowly interpreted, and actual legal consequences from failing to warn are very rare. There may be other reporting requirements in educational institutions and for mental health professionals, but I am not personally aware of them and I do not believe that they are national in scope. Usually, for criminal liability, there would have to be actual affirmative acts to aid or to attempt to cause a suicide.	That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism.	Some kinds of companies (e.g. freight shipping companies and banks) often do have those policies. The real issue is not whether those policies are permitted, but what the consequences are for breaking them. The fact that a company forbids its employees from exercising a legal right doesn't mean that the employee ceases to have that legal right. It simply means that if the employee exercises that legal right, then the employee has breached the contract and may suffer the consequences for breaching that contract. Violations of those policies are grounds for termination from employment, and this would probably not be void as a matter of public policy. For an employee at will this is really pretty meaningless, although it could conceivably affect unemployment benefit eligibility. But, for a unionized or civil service employee who can only be fired for cause, this is a big deal. But, in theory, a company policy does not impact the tort liability or the criminal liability of the individual engaging in legally privileged self-defense to anyone. This is because two people can't contractually change their legal duties to third parties with whom they are not in privity (i.e. with whom they do not have a contractual relationship). And two people also can't contractually change the terms of a country's penal laws. The policy may be a defense of the company from vicarious liability for the employee's use of force in violation of the policy that gives rise to civil liability for the employee because the grounds for authorizing self-defense were not present. If the employee using force did so wrongfully and was sued for negligence rather than battery, the existence of the company policy might also go to the issue of whether the employee was acting negligently since a reasonable person in the employee's shoes might have been less likely to wrongfully use force in purported self-defense if there was such a policy than if there was not such a policy (and instead there might arguably have been a legal fiduciary duty as an agent to protect the property and workers of the principal in the absence of the policy).	Something pretty close happened in Arvada, Colorado recently. A "good guy with a gun" shot the "bad guy with a gun" who shot a cop. When another cop arrived on the scene, he shot and killed the "good guy with a gun" mistaking him for the "bad guy." The good guy with a gun died, so criminal charges and defenses became moot. But there was no doubt that the "good guy with a gun" was justified in shooting the bad guy, and the authorities investigating the case determined that the cop who shot the "good guy with a gun" was also justified in his actions. The shooting happened on June 21 in Olde Town Arvada. Police also released their timeline of events that can be viewed at the bottom of this article. According to police, Officer Beesley was dispatched to a suspicious person call at about 1:30 in the afternoon. When Officer Beesley was walking in the area of Weber Street, the suspect got a semi-automatic shotgun and ran after Officer Beesley. Arvada Police say that when Officer Beesley stopped to turn, he was shot “immediately” by the suspect. The police timeline then states that the suspect shot out the windows of the officer’s car, returned to his truck and grabbed an AR-15. The suspect went back to Olde Town Square with the AR-15 when he was confronted by the good Samaritan. The good Samaritan was armed with a handgun and shot the suspect. Police say that a responding Arvada officer encountered the good Samaritan ad that the good Samaritan was “holding the suspect’s AR-15.” That’s when the responding officer shot the good Samaritan. Another Colorado case in 2016 that attracted international attention involved a shootout between two biker gangs at a motorcycle show. It wasn't possible to determine who was an aggressor and who was firing in self-defense, and so, ultimately, the only prosecutions were for people who had guns that they weren't allowed to legally possess due to prior felonies or prior domestic violence cases. It is much more common for these situations to be resolved by prosecutors not bringing charges at all than it is for them to be resolved in mutual murder trials where self-defense is asserted in each trial. Also, in both of these cases, the genuinely most criminally culpable people as far as after the fact investigations could tell, were killed (although there is always a temptation to throw the dead guys under the bus).	In California, you may use reasonable force to protect property from imminent harm. The jury instruction on that point is here. The instruction regarding justifiable homicide and defense of property is more restricted, because it only applies to protection of property when the deceased enters a home. If a stranger attacks your dog on a walk, you can use force to defend your dog, but you cannot shoot to kill. If the attack is against a person and not property, then the attack does not have to be in a home in order to be justifiable.	What they teach in self-defense courses is legally irrelevant, though has a practical basis. Under the law, options 1 and 2 are "preferred" because those actions cannot be considered criminal. Shooting a person is potentially a crime (assault or homicide): but it can be legally excused under those circumstances deemed to be "self defense". If shooting a person is justified in self defense, it isn't assault or murder. It is legally "better" to main than to kill, because maiming is less force than killing, and the general rule is that one should use the least force necessary to defend yourself. That is because on the one hand you should not use force against another person, but on the other hand you have a right to live and if a person attempts to deprive you of your life, you are justified to use force to stop them. The degree of force allowed is related to the threat posed. Every legal system encourages putting "shoot to kill" in last place – no jurisdiction favors using maximum possible force in self defense. I think what is confusing you is that as a practical matter, shooting to maim is riskier, and the consequences of erring in favor of less force may be your death. It has nothing to do with killing witnesses (which is illegal), even if that is what they taught you in your self defense class. Brandishing a weapon is also illegal but involves even less force, and is even less effective as a means of self defense.	Bobstro gave the practical answer, that it's a stupid idea for many reason. This is for the US in general, states may have laws that say otherwise. It is not illegal to provoke someone or a government official (police), it's done all the time in protest (not riots). It is not illegal to run from a cop who has not detained you in any way, or has not issued an order to you. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that people not suspected of criminal activity can ignore a police officer who approaches them. Wisconsin has even said, that even after a police officer knocked on your window, you can still leave. However, it may give probable cause, especially with the statement of "Oh shit! The police!" It IS illegal to run from a cop who has detained you or issued a lawful order. The order "STOP" is a lawful order, and from that point on, you are committing a crime if you do not stop. For your case, check out the NYTimes article "Supreme Court Roundup; Flight Can Justify Search By Police, High Court Rules".
Will my landlord fix a leaky faucet? I just got a lease to sign, but I am confused by some of the language. My question in short is: what does "public mains up to the point of entry" mean? More information: It reads: ... Landlord shall make all repairs which, in Landlord's discretion, are necessary to maintain the following, subject to normal wear and tear: A. The exterior and structural walls, excluding glass, structural floors, excluding floor coverings, the foundations, roofs, gutters, and exterior downspouts of the Leased Premises; B. All appurtenances to the Leased Premises, including stairways, sidewalks, driveways, tenant shall be responsible for normal maintenance. Tenant responsible for grass cutting, lawn and yard maintenance. Tenant is responsible for snow removal as may be required from time to time; C. Water, sewage and gas and electrical lines from the public mains up to the point of entry to the Leased Premises; ... Does this mean that they or I will be responsible for plumbing repairs? I am not sure what the term "public mains up to the point of entry" means.	You are responsible The “public mains” are the infrastructure owned by the utility (and are the utility’s maintenance problem). From those, to the point where it enters the building (or your unit for a multi-unit building), they are the landlord’s problem. Within your leasehold they are your problem. Notwithstanding, a leaky tap is probably a worn washer which is caught by the “fair wear and tear” clause anyway.	Short Answer Can an incomplete and unsafe building be rented to a tenant on a commercial lease if the building never received a certificate of occupancy? Yes. Unless your lease says otherwise. Your sole source of legal protections is your lease. Without knowing the detailed provisions of your lease, it is impossible to know. Long Answer The General Rule In commercial leases, to a much greater degree than in residential leases, the principle of buyer beware (a.k.a. caveat emptor) applies. Commercial leases are typically negotiated between sophisticated parties, and if the tenant doesn't want to start paying rent until the certificate of occupancy is issued despite a lease that says otherwise, then that is tough luck and the tenant is bound to the terms of the lease. Commercial leases are generally rented in "as is" condition, sometimes with and sometimes without a tenant finish and improvements allowance from the landlord. Unless otherwise agreed, in a commercial lease, the burden is on the tenant to do "due diligence" including a physical inspection of the property by a professional inspector and independent review of the zoning status of the property to confirm that the tenant's business is allowed to operate at that location, much as a buyer of real estate would. If the tenant identifies an objection during the due diligence period set forth in the lease or contract to enter into a lease with the tenant, then the tenant can choose to get out of the lease obligation. But, there is only a due diligence condition if the tenant bargains for it. The lease allocates responsibility to maintain the building in good repair and may allocated this responsibility to the landlord or the the tenant. In one of the most common types of commercial leases, called a triple net lease, virtually all maintenance obligations are the tenant's responsibility: The triple net absolves the landlord of the most risk of any net lease. Even the costs of structural maintenance and repairs must be paid by the tenant in addition to rent, property taxes and insurance premiums. Some firms, such as WeWork build their entire business model around entering into the "as is", triple net commercial leases with landlords that are the norm, and then subletting the properties to smaller businesses on a furnished, all maintenance and building services provided, gross lease basis. Many states have statutory or common law implied warranties of habitability in the case of residential leases that require that a certificate of occupancy be in place and that other conditions be met by the landlord: An implied warranty of habitability is a warranty implied by law in all residential leases [ed. in states that have such a warranty] that the premises are fit and habitable for human habitation and that the premises will remain fit and habitable throughout the duration of the lease. New Mexico, in particular, has many statutory protections for residential tenants (statutes found here). But, almost none of these protections extend to commercial leases in New Mexico, because commercial leases are not leases of dwelling units, as defined in the relevant statutes. Note that not every state even has an implied warranty of habitability for residential tenancies. Colorado did not have one until the early 2000s, and it had only very weak protections for tenants regarding habitability until the current decade. Before then, in Colorado, a defective or unsafe condition of the premises was not a defense to paying rent under either a commercial or a residential lease in the state. In theory, a county or municipal government could impose a habitability requirement on commercial leases. But, this is very uncommon because, as the examples below illustrate, there are circumstances where it is sensible, even in a fair deal, to place the burden of making property subject to a commercial lease habitable. Examples Of Situations Where This Would Not Be Required In A Fair Deal Most commercial tenants insist upon terms that say that the obligation to pay rent starts when a certificate of occupancy is issued and the tenant is allowed to take possession of the premises. But, there would certainly be some times when a commercial tenant would pay rent on property that does not yet have a certificate of occupancy. For example, in what is called a "pad rental", a business rents a basically vacant lot with only a concrete foundation and utility hookups and zoning approvals in place, and then the tenant builds a shop or office building on the pad. See, e.g., this commercial lease offer on Loopnet, a major internet site for listing property available to be leased by businesses: ABOUT 4900-5100 N WICKHAM RD , MELBOURNE, FL 32940 Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Listing ID: 15146692 Date Created: 2/11/2019 Last Updated: 3/19/2019 1 LOT AVAILABLE - Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Lease Term 20 Years Service Type To Be Determined Date Available Now Space Type Relet Lot Size 0.69 AC DESCRIPTION Pad ready site with all utilities, parking field, ingress/egress, retention, and site lighting IN. Join Goodwill, Einstein's Bagel, Verizon, Twins Car Wash, Wickham Road Music, and Nail Salon in this 100% leased new retail center. HIGHLIGHTS Pad ready site. In a commercial pad lease, typically, a tenant would start paying rent immediately and the length of time needed to get the tenant's shop built and approved for occupancy by local government officials is their problem. But, even then, the terms would depend on what was negotiated between the landlord and the tenant which would depend to a great extent on how hot the local commercial real estate market was and on the other terms. A landlord will usually offer more favorable terms (such as a provision stating that rent is not owed until a certificate of occupancy is issued) in a weak rental market, but may also decide to have very tough lease terms with a somewhat lower monthly or annual rental rate. Also, as in the example above, conditioning rent payment on occupancy or availability for occupancy, is less common in a very long term lease such as the twenty year lease being offered for the pad rental above. Something very similar is done in an existing building that requires tenant finish. At one extreme, the landlord will do tenant finish to the tenant's specifications at the landlord's expense and the tenant will only start to pay rent when the tenant takes occupancy. At the other extreme, the tenant will start paying rent immediately and do the tenant finish at the tenant's sole expense. In between, the tenant may do the tenant's own tenant finish pursuant to landlord approved plans, with the landlord contributing a tenant finish allowance that will often be less than the full anticipated cost of tenant finish work, and the rent will be reduced or waived for a set period of time which may be less than the actual or anticipated time that it takes to complete the tenant finish. This gives the tenant an incentive to not waste tenant finish dollars and to push the contractors doing the work to finish as soon as possible. In yet another example, it wouldn't be terribly uncommon for a landlord to rent a commercial space that is already occupied by squatters, or holdover tenants, to a new tenant on a triple net basis. In a lease like that, the tenant is responsible for evicting the current occupants, rather than the landlord. The promise that the leased property won't be occupied by someone else when the lease commences is called the "covenant of quiet enjoyment" (which is "a covenant that promises that the grantee or tenant of an estate in real property will be able to possess the premises in peace, without disturbance by hostile claimants."). This provision is often, but not always, included in a commercial lease, although often, courts will imply in law a covenant of quiet enjoyment into even a commercial lease, in the absence of express language in the lease stating that the covenant of quiet enjoyment is not intended to be included in the lease. Conclusion It all boils down to the terms of the lease and a reasonable construction of the relevant lease terms. The fact that there is such a thin amount of legal protection from unfair lease terms is one of the reasons that most commercial tenants hire an attorney to help them negotiate the terms of a commercial lease, in addition to, or instead of, a commercial real estate broker. Footnote: Why Is Commercial Lease Law So Harsh? The duties of a commercial tenant are much closer to, and in some cases, almost identical to, those of an owner of real property and are not infrequently for long terms such as twenty, or even ninety-nine years. Why would a landlord and tenant enter into a commercial lease in these situations, rather than having the prospective tenant simply by the property subject to a mortgage? A lot of this is tax driven. Many businesses would purchase their buildings rather than lease them if taxes were not a consideration and the commercial lease is basically a tax favored alternative to a mortgage payment. When the commercial landlord is a mortgage lender in all but name, and a commercial tenant is a building owner in all but name, it makes sense to place the legal maintenance responsibilities of a building owner on the commercial tenant. A business can deduct every dollar paid in rent from its revenues when determining its taxable income, even the portion economically attributable to land value and depreciation in the structure of the building, as it is paid. But, if the business finances the purchase of the property with a mortgage, the business can deduct the interest paid, but not the principal payments. Depreciation of improvements on real estate (for most of recent U.S. tax history, over a straight line 39.5 year depreciation period) can counterbalance some of the principal payments, although often more slowly than the principal payments are actually made. Also, if depreciation deductions wipe out too much of the business's income, those depreciation deductions are disallowed or deferred. Furthermore, the portion of the purchase price of property attributed to land value can't be depreciated at all. In many cases, this quirk of the tax law is addressed with a business structure in which: (1) a non-profit that doesn't care about the tax treatment of its income leases the land to (2) another business that builds a multi-tenant building on the property which it owns even though it doesn't own the land the building is built upon, subject to a mortgage with a long amortization period similar to the depreciation period for the building, which in turn is (3) leased to businesses that actually used the multi-tenant building by the building owner. Second Footnote On Rent Control and Cooperative Apartments Even further afield, in places like New York City that have rent control, residential tenants become more economically equivalent to apartment owners, and residential landlords become more economically equivalent to a combined mortgage lenders and home owner's association. There was a strong demand for rent control in New York City at the time that rent control was adopted, because economic necessity meant that mostly people needed to live in one unit of a multi-unit apartment building, but the legal concept of ownership of one unit within a larger apartment building that is now commonly called a "condominium" in the United States, did not exist. So, there were a lot of renters in New York City who very much wanted to be de facto apartment owners who didn't have the legal tools available at the time to achieve this goal. The other work around which was used in the Northeast before the condominium was invented was a "cooperative apartment", in which all of the residents of a particular apartment building owned the entire building and were jointly and severally liable on the mortgage on the building, but then were allocated a unit within the building in exchange for economic obligations to the cooperative association that managed the building on a not for profit basis for its owners.	From the time that the lease expired and you remained with permission, you had a shorter period of obligation and protection. I assume that the lease ended long ago, and you've been living there month to month. Assuming that we can read "two rental periods" as "two whole months" (if there is something else in the lease that indicates this, such as a rent due-date), then we can interpret the notice requirement as saying that you must give notice before the first of the month 2 months before the intended end of tenancy – that is one meaning of the lease. Another meaning is that you can give notice 58 days in advance. The lease has an ambiguity as to what the notice requirement is. Since you did not write the lease, and they did (well, someone, whose obligations they inherited, did), the ambiguity is construed against the party to wrote it. In the present circumstance, because you want to leave soon, you would not be held to the notice requirement that favors the landlord. It's entirely non-obvious why such wording would be used. In 504B.135, the statutes say (a) A tenancy at will may be terminated by either party by giving notice in writing. The time of the notice must be at least as long as the interval between the time rent is due or three months, whichever is less. (b) If a tenant neglects or refuses to pay rent due on a tenancy at will, the landlord may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant 14 days notice to quit in writing. Once you're past the end of the lease, you are a tenant at will, by the definitions section: "Tenancy at will" means a tenancy in which the tenant holds possession by permission of the landlord but without a fixed ending date. Assuming that you pay rent at the first of the month, then the lesser of a whole calendar month and three months is, obviously, a whole calendar month. The stuff at the end of the statute that you cite – "The notice must be in writing and direct the tenant's attention" – is addressed to the landlord's notice to tenant, where he says "Your tenancy will not auto-renew". This applies to leases of 2 months or longer, not recycled 1 month leases, and requires the landlord to give the tenant appropriate notice (it does not define the tenant's notice requirement).	It means that if one party breaks the lease and the other party chooses not to enforce their rights in relation to the breach, it doesn't mean that they won't enforce their rights the next time that provision is breached unless they agree that in writing thereby changing the agreement. Which may just be the longest coherent sentence I have ever written.	Close family members can stay as long as the tenant wants The tenant is entitled to "quiet enjoyment" of the property which includes living with their close relatives - spouse, de facto and children would all qualify; parents and siblings might as well. It doesn't matter if these people are children or adults. You cannot contract out of this as you are not allowed to discriminate in housing based on family situation. The tenant is also entitled to have non-relative house guests stay for as long as is reasonable. A month or so would be reasonable; longer than that and it starts to look like a sub-lease for which they would need your permission. There is generally a limit under texas law of 3 adults per bedroom but that doesn't seem to be an issue here. I also can't see where having a non-resident's mail delivered to the property is something you have a say about. I'd be very careful if I were you because it seems like you are on the wrong side of the law here.	You want a lawyer who accepts tenant-side landlord tenant cases, usually a solo practitioner or small law firm or legal clinic. Medium to large sized law firms usually don't practice that kind of law at all, or only represent landlords, as a matter of policy. The usual problem, however, is that lawyers are often too expensive relative to the amount in controversy to make sense to hire to fully represent you in a matter like this one. You might want to have a "limited engagement" such as a one time consult with a lawyer, rather than a full retention of a lawyer, over an issue like this one.	As a general rule, legal language is interpreted loosely with respect to singular versus plural, or male versus female (in interpreting pronouns). A clause that uses the word "tenant" can thus be construed as referring to multiple tenants, and "tenants" can also refer to a single tenant. Likewise, "he, him" refers to a third person, regardless of gender. If the intent of an agreement is that only a single person shall reside in a place, then the wording of the contract would have to say that, and you can't derive that from using "tenant" rather than "tenant or tenants". I don't think the issue comes down to "treating y'all as one person", it comes down to whether the obligation is joint, a series of several obligations, or a joint and several obligation. You would look for expressions like "We and each of us agree...", vs. "Each of us agree...", or "We agree..." to sort that out: I assume that the language just says "Tenant agrees...", that is, there is nothing at all in the wording of the lease that resolves the matter. Tenant (whoever that is) has an obligation to Landlord to pay rent. It doesn't matter if Tenant is 1 person or 10: you have to pay the rent. If 5 out of 10 of those people mysteriously disappear, the other 5 still have to pay a now-doubled rent per person. Each person is fully responsible for all of the lease obligations, and if you are the only reliable person in a lease with 10 parties, you could get stuck with the entire obligation. If Tenant needs to go away for some reason, Tenant can normally negotiate with another person to assume their obligations, so Tenant would come up with an arrangement with a new person, and the new person would have an obligation to (old) Tenant – this is basically a private arrangement that doesn't involve the Landlord. However: it is pretty standard that landlords get a say in letting in new tenants, and you have a clause in your agreement that says that. There are two ways for the old tenant to "go away". One is to completely terminate the old agreement, and the landlord signs a new lease with the new person: the old tenant is completely free of any subsequent obligations, and if the new tenant fails to pay rent, the landlord has to go after the new tenant. The other way is by assigning his obligation (as described above): the agreement is between the old tenant and the new tenant (with the landlord's consent). The question now is, what is the meaning of the clause "the assignee shall sign a separate written agreement with Landlord and Tenant"? (Earlier, I missed the significance of "Landlord and Tenant"). The core question is whether the new arrangement is a novation, or is it an assignment? A novation requires agreement between all parties, and that is what seems to be implied here. California landlord law then tells you that this "makes the new tenant (rather than the original tenant) solely responsible to the landlord". In contrast, "Like a sublease, an assignment is a contract between the original tenant and the new tenant (not the landlord)". Since this involves the landlord, the conclusion is inescapable that this is not actually an assignment (despite the use of the word "assignee"). All of the parties to the agreement would have to agree to these new terms, if in fact there is an agreement that substitutes D for C in this agreement with the landlord (a notation). If C remains on the hook and this is just a personal arrangement between C and D (with Landlords consent) – which is not what the clause says – then you don't get a vote in the C-D arrangement.	Is there a law requiring a landlord to respond to rental agencies request for information in regards to previous tenants? No. There is no such law.
Can I, as a contractor, take IP with me to a new company? I am currently working part-time as an independent contractor, software developer, in the United States for a startup my friend founded. I saw it mostly as helping a friend, so we never formalized the agreement (i.e. I have not signed any statement of work or otherwise agreements with the startup), however I am clearly paid with the startup's money. Over the last few months the startup has been having troubles with one of the three founders, and long story short, my friend and one other founder are deciding to leave the company and create a competitor business on their own. The three current founders have equal equity and voting rights, so technically the two leaving could instead push out the third partner, but they are worried that partner would torpedo the company's reputation if they did so they would prefer to just quietly start fresh. So on to the question, my friend would like to take the code I have written with them to their new company. I understand if I were an employee, all my work would inherently be the IP of the original company, however because I am a contractor - and notably have not signed any formal agreements to the current company, could we have any legal claim that I independently own my code and get to chose who I allow to use it? One idea I had was, since I have not yet signed any agreement with the current company, we could enter into a licensing agreement that clearly indicates I own the code and they are simply licensing it from me. At which point the new company could also license my code from me. However I'm not sure if it's legal to enter such an agreement at this stage, given the intent is clearly to take the IP with them. Another consideration I had was that since the two founders have majority voting, and could technically vote / sign whatever they wanted without the third founder's agreement, they could just make the decision before leaving to give me ownership of the code (e.g. "sell" it to me for $1). But here again I'm not sure if that's legal, given they would be clearly acting against the best interest of their current company and could probably be sued by external shareholders. Are there any legal options we can take to move the IP I've developed to the new company? And would I be putting myself at legal risk by agreeing to any of this (e.g. if the founders decided f- it and to just take the code, is it illegal for me to keep working on it)?	Is this work for hire? There is an arguable case to be made that you are an employee for copyright law purposes and, if so, the copyright belongs to the company. The closer an employment relationship comes to regular, salaried employment, the more likely it is that a work created within the scope of that employment will be a work made for hire. But because no precise standard exists for determining whether a work is made for hire under part 1 of the definition in section 101 of the copyright law, consultation with a lawyer may be advisable. Second, if you do own the copyright, there is clearly an implied licence with the company to allow them to use it. It is arguable that the licence is exclusive since the software is bespoke and made specifically for the company. Can you sign an agreement now Yes, but … It is clear that the purpose of signing the agreement is to screw the company over (with the compliance of 2 of the directors). That’s a contract entered into in bad faith and possibly for an illegal purpose and would likely be found invalid. You need to understand that the company is a distinct legal entity from its owners and it has its own rights. People make the mistake of thinking the owners are the company: they aren’t. The two rebel founders are on dangerous legal ground. Assuming they are the directors of the company, they have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company. That is, they must put the company’s interests ahead of their own. It is clearly not in the company’s interest to have a rival business start so they cannot plan to do that while they are directors - they need to resign first. You are not so much at risk - as an employee/contractor your duty is to follow the directions of the company (the company - not a faction within the company). However, if you aid the other two in what might be a crime, you could be in trouble.	The software is "work for hire" and the copyright is owned by the client, not you. This is the default rule when copyrightable work is done on this basis in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. To not be "work for hire" you would have had to have a written agreement to the contrary or would have had to written the software before you were engaged by the client and then sold it to the client as an off the shelf finished product. [After further research I have determined that the language above is not accurate.] While you didn't have a written agreement, you did have an agreement reached without committing it to a final written form signed by both parties that is sufficient to cover all of the material terms of the contract and that is a binding and fully performed agreement. UPDATE: The "work for hire" issue is a bit more complex than I initially stated. Here is an American Bar Association summary of the issue in the independent contractor context (there is also a plausible argument that while the parties characterized you as an independent contractor for tax purposes that you were in fact of de facto temporary employee in which case it would automatically be work for hire, but I'll put that issue aside and take it at face value): Under the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.), a work is a “work made for hire” only if: (1) it is prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment; or (2) it is specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor pursuant to a written agreement and the work falls within one of nine statutorily defined categories. . . . For works created by independent contractors, only the following types of works are eligible to be “works made for hire”: a contribution to a “collective work” (a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole); a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work; a translation; a “supplementary work” (a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes); a “compilation” (a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship); an “instructional text” (a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities); a test; answer material for a test; or an atlas. This software is clearly specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor. I suspect that if you looked at the course of dealings including the client's specification of what work needed to be done (probably in part by email or in some other written form) that it would meet the requirement of a written agreement even though there wasn't a document called a contract signed by both parties. But, this still begs the question of whether it falls in one of the nine statutory categories. This American Bar Association source says that custom software doesn't qualify. The list above does not include many types of works that businesses frequently hire outside personnel to create, such as websites, logos, advertisements, photography, and custom software. For works that do fall within the defined categories, the business must have a written agreement from the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire for it to qualify as such. Although the agreement and course of dealings between a business and an independent contractor may give rise to an implied license for the business to use the works created by the contractor, it is highly preferable to avoid relying on an implied license. Any business that engages a non-employee to create a work and intends to own the copyright to such work should have a written agreement with the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire (if it falls within one of the eligible categories). If the work is not eligible to be a work made for hire, and for good measure even if it is, the written agreement should include a provision assigning the copyrights to the business. An example of such a provision is: “To the extent that the Work Product is not recognized as a ‘work made for hire’ as a matter of law, the Contractor hereby assigns to the Company any and all copyrights in and to the Work Product.” By including such a copyright assignment clause, a business will be able to obtain the copyrights it expects, even if the work does not qualify as a “work made for hire.” The copyright office's official publication on the subject provides a statutory citation (17 USC 101), and doesn't contradict the ABA presentation, although it is less detailed and specific on the legal issues. This section of the United States Code is a series of definitions. The relevant one states: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work made for hire under paragraph (2), neither the amendment contained in section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, nor the deletion of the words added by that amendment— (A) shall be considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or (B) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or disapproval of, or acquiescence in, any judicial determination, by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph (2) shall be interpreted as if both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, were never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness by the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations.	This could be a problem if the consultancy agreement contains a provision that assigns to the client any copyright in any code created by the consultant. That is why there should be no such provision. In the absence of such a provision, the consultant owns the copyright in the code, so it would be impossible for the consultant to infringe that copyright. Even so, copyright protects a particular expression of an idea, not the idea itself. The idea of an "analyze data" class containing a "read data" function is not itself subject to copyright protection. It could potentially be patentable as a "process," but it would fail to meet the criterion of novelty. It would also fail to meet the criterion of non-obviousness. On the other hand, a software developer cannot (without permission) copy source code that is protected by copyright simply by changing the names. Changing the names would constitute the creation of a derivative work, and the right to create derivative works is also protected by copyright.	It's legal to sell your program if it doesn't infringe any law or anyone else's intellectual property. Examples of things that can get you into trouble: statutes: Some countries have export laws that forbid you to distribute certain types of encryption without proper export controls. patents: If you use a design or invention that is under patent protection you could be liable for infringing patent rights. trademark: If you improperly use a trademarked name you could be subject to damages. licensing: If you violate a license to which you have agreed you can be sued for damages. copyright: If you appear to have copied something without license you can be liable for damages. Just because: If someone wants to sue you, they can. Since there's no way to guarantee your business won't run into liability from infringement – or from some other failure – people normally conduct business through entities like LLCs that shield them from personal liability. Depending on their concerns and finances, they may also: Buy liability insurance Consult professionals like IP lawyers to: review their business and products in advance to look for and address glaring infringements, and/or correctly protect their IP using the tools mentioned above.	There's a few good reasons that spring to mind. Firstly, it's possible that Tesla or Microsoft have been themselves licensed something where the license is not sub-licenseable. This would prevent them from subsequently licensing you, but a promise/pledge is not a license and they can go right ahead and make promises. Secondly, a license is broadly an agreement between two parties. A promise doesn't require formal acceptance whereas a license does. To answer your question regarding a covenant not to sue - that's something else entirely. A covenant not to sue is a legal agreement between parties where the party seeking damages agrees not to sue the party it has cause against, whilst still preserving the existence of the cause (and conditions may have been set that must be met for the covenant to stand). For example, Party A still maintains that Party B used work that was not licensed to Party B, but Party A has agreed not to sue on the matter, provided that Party B advertises the fact that the work was used.	Yes, this is a valid concern As written, every piece of IP you produce while employed belongs to the employer. This includes your hypothetical game. It also includes your weekly shopping lists, your Christmas card to your Great-Aunt Nellie, the … a-hm … private video you make of you and your significant other. As written this is overly broad and probably unenforceable. However, it’s always better to have clear and legally enforceable clauses in your agreements because unclear, arguably unenforceable ones lead to disputes. To be fair, the employer has probably lifted some (bad) boilerplate and hasn’t actually thought through what it means. Get it redrafted.	You'll want to read the actual licenses yourself and understand what is required. If you don't understand, then you'll want to consult an attorney. But neither of these licenses are all that complex in my opinion. MIT: Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. Apache 2.0: Redistribution. You may reproduce and distribute copies of the Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or without modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that You meet the following conditions: (a) You must give any other recipients of the Work or Derivative Works a copy of this License; and (b) You must cause any modified files to carry prominent notices stating that You changed the files; and (c) You must retain, in the Source form of any Derivative Works that You distribute, all copyright, patent, trademark, and attribution notices from the Source form of the Work, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works; and (d) If the Work includes a "NOTICE" text file as part of its distribution, then any Derivative Works that You distribute must include a readable copy of the attribution notices contained within such NOTICE file, excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of the Derivative Works, in at least one of the following places: within a NOTICE text file distributed as part of the Derivative Works; within the Source form or documentation, if provided along with the Derivative Works; or, within a display generated by the Derivative Works, if and wherever such third-party notices normally appear. The contents of the NOTICE file are for informational purposes only and do not modify the License. You may add Your own attribution notices within Derivative Works that You distribute, alongside or as an addendum to the NOTICE text from the Work, provided that such additional attribution notices cannot be construed as modifying the License. Nowhere does either license require you to publish your application's source code, even if your application is directly based on the original code.	I've been wondering if it is possible to hire / create a company with someone who would open a restaurant in my place and manage it according to my guidelines. Yes, of course. You can do it just like you described: Create a company, hire employees, (let them) open the restaurant. You, as the owner of the company, could set up whatever guidelines you have in mind, and your employees would be bound by them (limited only by general laws, such as on health and safety). Some caveats, however: You will need money to set this up - for buying / renting space for the restaurant, for paying your employees, obtaining supplies, initial marketing etc. It may take a while until the restaurant earns money (if ever), and you'll need money in the mean time. Someone will need to manage, that is make decisions. You can do that yourself, but then you will work for the restaurant (which you write you do not want to do). Or you can hire someone to do it for you, but that will cost more (in salary), plus you will have to find someone you can trust. That's a tradeoff for you to make. I guess it'd be like an intellectual property. That depends, but usually there will be little in terms of intellectual property. If you have a unique idea for the restaurant, you could patent it, but there are many restrictions on what you can protect, and ways around it, plus this also costs money (a lot if you need a lawyer's advice). Apart from that, you can register a trademark for the restaurant, but that only protects the name / logo, not any ideas. Finally, some of your ideas might be considered trade secrets, but again the protection is limited. In general, there is no blanket "idea protection". If you have a good idea for a restaurant, in most cases other restaurants will be able to copy them, possibly with slight changes - take that into account.
Possible legal repercussions for ignoring reasonable accommodation requests A candidate requests certain accommodations for the job interview, for instance to perform interaction with the interviewer in written. (Speaking is not an essential requirement for the job in question; the candidate can hear and speak, but it's a significant extra effort for them and thus constitutes an undue disadvantage). What are possible legal repercussions for the company if one of the interviewers ignores these requests and keeps on speaking to the candidate?	Note that while a person can request a specific accommodation, an employer or potential employer is not required to grant the specific accommodation requested. Some other accommodation which (the employer claims) will meet the expressed need can be offered instead. Also no accommodation need be offered if it would impose an "undue burden" on the employer. The normal expectation is that there will be a back-and forth until the employee (or applicant) and the employer agree on an appropriate accommodation. Where there is agreement but the agreement is then violated, the normal first response is to make such adjustments as will restore the agreed accommodation. Only if that fails will a legal complaint be heard. There is no automatic penalty for violation of an accommodation agreement, it will depend on the facts ass assessed by the Commission and perhaps later by a court. Possible penalties can include an order to employ or reinstate a complainant, back pay, costs and legal fees, and money damages, which can be up to $75,000 per violation, as the court deems just. The relevant law is 42 U.S. Code § 12112. This provides (in relevant part): No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. The section goes on to define “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” as including any of several acts, including: (b) (5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; ... (7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are the factors that the test purports to measure). 42 U.S. Code § 12111 defines "Reasonable accommodation" and undue hardship” as follows: (9) Reasonable accommodation The term “reasonable accommodation” may include— (9) (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (9) (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. (10) Undue hardship (10) (A) In general The term “undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B). (10) (B) Factors to be considered In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include— (10) (B) (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; (10) (B) (ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (10) (B) (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (10) (B) (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity. Under 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–5 and subsequent sections informal measures are normally first attempted to remedy any violation. If those fail, remadies can include injunctions against continued discrimination, awards of back pay (not relevant when the person was never an employee) orders to employ a person, awards of costs and legal fees, and other damages. No specific remedy is automatic, there is wide discretion.	It is not uncommon for an employer to ask a former employee to assist with something as a courtesy, and sometimes the former employee will choose to do so. If it requires more than a small amount of time, this may be done under a short-term consulting contract for pay. But unless there was a contract of employment requiring such post-employment advice, there is no legal obligation for the former employee to provide such assistance. The most the former employer could do is give a poor reference if asked by potential future employers, and most large corporate employers now only give job title, salary range, and dates of employment to avoid claims of incorrect or defamatory statements in such references.	Your title doesn't quite match your question. "Reneging" would mean saying that a lease would be offered at the reduced rent, and then not offering the lease. Here, they offered the lease, and you accepted. So now the question is not whether they can refuse to offer you the reduced-fee lease, but whether they are owed the back rent. Verbal agreements are indeed binding, but they are rather sticky from an evidential point of view. Also, there are other possible complications. If your original lease stated that verbal agreements are not binding, or that only specific people are authorized to modify the terms and the person you talked to is not such a person, then this is not binding. If after they said you could keep the rent reduction, you signed a lease for the full amount or otherwise indicated acceptance of the full amount, then it may be considered not binding. Even if the agreement is not binding, you have further arguments. If you believed that it was binding, and did so out of good faith, then there was not a meeting of the minds, and they can't go after you for breach of contract. They may have other claims, such as damages if they can show that they could have gotten more money from another prospective client, but them accepting the rent makes that difficult to pursue. Now, again, verbal agreements do have evidentiary problems. If your case were nothing than your word claiming that they agreed, you would not have much of a case. But here, you have: -They were willing to take the lower rent for the initial period -You stated that you would leave unless given a continued discount, and you stayed -They didn't make any attempt to collect the full rent for three months -They are willing to give you the discount if you pay the back rent All of this points rather strongly towards your claim being true. You also say "this situation is not unique to me." It's not clear what they means, but if other tenants also got verbal assurances that the discount would continue, and they testify to that effect, then your case is even stronger.	UK: For all I know you cannot be fired unless you are hired. They must hire you. Once a job offer is made and accepted, they must hire you. If they don't, call a lawyer. I personally know someone who got hired, and when he arrived for his first day's work at the new company, he found that the whole department that he was supposed to join had been laid of. The company had to hire him. PS. "Financial difficulties" means you call a lawyer urgently. Once they are bankrupt your chances of extracting money are not good.	It depends to a large degree on local employment laws. Depending on how the counteroffer was worded, it might have constituted anything from a binding legal contract for employment for some reasonable minimum term, or a totally non-binding suggestion that was worth less than the air breathed while pronouncing it. Some things to consider would include: What are local employment laws like? Do they require that termination be for cause? If so, what are causes for termination? Does termination require any kind of remediation beforehand? Note that in an at-will, right-to-work state in the US, odds are that the employee can be fired for any time and for any reason, supposing the employer hasn't accidentally entered into a contract by extending the counteroffer. What did the counteroffer say? Did it stipulate that the offer was not for a definite term and that the company reserved the right to terminate the employee for any reason, or no reason at all? Odds are any sufficiently serious business in an at- will, right-to-work state would use standard legal language in any offer or counteroffer to ensure that they are on the right side of this, so odds are the counteroffer was accepted with no obligations at all on the company. Does the termination affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? I would say most likely not, as the termination would probably be recorded as being for no reason legally speaking (if they admitted to terminating the employee for seeking other employment, interested government officials could take a dim view of the company's actions). You'd probably have at least some unemployment compensation coming your way. Some professional - not legal - advice. Never accept a counteroffer. Only get another offer in the first place if you are committed to leaving your current employer no matter what. If your company really insists, you should insist on a minimum definite term of employment written into a legal contract which is signed by an executive and notarized. No company will agree to this (unless the term is shorter than you'd want as a full-time W-2 anyway) but if they do, hey, you have some security (if the company agrees to this, have your own lawyer - whom you pay with your own money - review the document). Even then, I would be very, very careful about staying at a company after getting a counteroffer. Don't do it. Ever. Never accept a counteroffer. One comment asks why I recommend never accepting a counteroffer. There are at least two reasons: The reason you are looking for a new job should be that there is something about your current job that isn't completely satisfactory and that you haven't been able to fix. Either you have grown out of the position, don't like the work, feel you're underpaid, don't get along with somebody, etc. If you were unable or unwilling to fix any of these issues without having another job on the table, having another job on the table shouldn't be what makes you willing and able to fix them. Why work somewhere that you'd constantly need to go job hunting to address workplace issues? Unless the company makes firm agreements about how long they're going to keep you around, you have no guarantee that they'll keep you. Presumably, you didn't have one before, and you don't have one at the new job, but the fact that you are currently employed might support the assumption that your employment would be continued at your current employer and the offer might support the assumption the new employer plans to employ you indefinitely. When you put in your notice, it makes the company more aware of the fact that you could leave at any time; while a perfectly rational actor would realize that this doesn't change the situation at all, companies are run by people and people often act irrationally. Perhaps your manager is vindictive, perhaps your manager is scared that you will still leave after accepting the counteroffer. Maybe your manager knows there are layoffs coming but needs you for the busy season. Hiring replacements can be time-consuming and expensive - and employees who are getting offers of employment elsewhere and putting in notice might be seen as risks. I'm not saying that accepting a counteroffer has always turned out badly. Falling coconuts kill 150 people every year. Still, I am not going to add a coconut rider to my insurance policy and I am not going to accept a counteroffer.	If Hooters could prove that you never intended to accept the job, that would establish that you did not suffer any damages. You might also be charged with having abused the process of the court, and perhaps with perjury if you had said under oath that you did intend to take the job. If you already had a better-paying job, that would be evidence casting doubt on your intention to accept the Hooters job. Also, if you had a better-paying job and kept it, it would be hard to establish that you were financially damaged by refusal to hire you at Hooters, even if the Judge and jury believed that you really wanted the job for some reason. Thus any settlement is not likely to be large. If you admitted at the start of the case that you never intended to take the job, I suspect that the case would be summarily dismissed, and you might well be required to pay Hooters lawyers fees and other costs, and perhaps fined as well.	Yes, it also applies. However, an employment implies they agree to having employment related data stored and processed (e.g., to be paid). When there are performance related bonuses in the contract, this will likely (but IANAL) imply they agree to performance data being collected and stored appropriately. Furthermore I would assume most of such data processing (such as knowing who is responsible for a certain change, who created a file, modified it etc.) falls into "legitimate interests" of the employer, as this information may be necessary for operations. I'd assume (still IANAL) that much of the consequence wrt. GDPR is the right to have your data erased. So a company should be prepared to remove such data when an employee leaves the company, e.g., by clearing the responsible person fields upon request. At least for data where there is no legal requirement to have such data provenance. But: consult your lawyer for a proper legal opinion!	You call their employer and impersonate them The onus is on the employer to keep your personal data secure. If they do not take reasonable steps to verify that the caller is indeed you, they fail that duty and can be held to account. So, not a loophole.
What happens if some of the information provided when subscribing a car insurance are incorrect? I recently bought a car in UK and I subscribed a new car insurance. I did my best to answer all the questions with accuracy. However, I cannot remember very well when was my last claim and the previous insurance company (which was abroad) doesn't have that information anymore. I believe my last claim was about 20 years ago, so when subscribing the new insurance I claimed my last claim was 20+ years ago. What happens if in reality it was 19 years ago? Unfortunately, I have no way to verify that. Does that mean in case of an accident, the insurance wouldn't cover? Would that mean the third party would ask me to pay for the damage instead? Also, there were silly questions like if I use the car for social purposes only. I normally use it for social purposes, as I take the train for work. But let's suppose one day there is a train strike and I have to take the car for work. Then let's suppose that day I have an accident... so what happens? Does that mean the insurance doesn't cover? They asked me to install a device on the car to monitor my usage: does that mean that if I use the car for work only once, then they don't cover any other accident even when using the car socially?	The insurer can avoid the claim for a qualifying misrepresentation The remedy that is available depends on whether the qualifying misrepresentation is either (a) deliberate or reckless, or (b) careless. If it is deliberate or reckless, the insurer may avoid the contract, refuse all claims and retain the premium. If the misrepresentation is merely careless, the insurer may only avoid the contract if it can show that it would not have entered into the contract of insurance at all had the insured complied with its section 2(2) duty. In those circumstances the insurer must return the premium. If the insurer would still have entered into the contract but on different terms, or would have charged a higher premium, then proportionate remedies as more commonly encountered under the provisions of the Insurance Act 2015 apply. Your misrepresentation that your last accident was more than 20 years ago when it was 19 years ago is careless and the insurer must prove that they would not have offered you car insurance if you hadn’t made that mistake. They aren’t going to be able to do this and they are unlikely to try. However, if it was last year then that starts to look deliberate or reckless, if so, you have no insurance. You might convince a judge that it was mere carelessness if the claim was minor and you car was off the road only for a day or two. If the insurer can show that it never offers insurance to people who make such a disclosure, then you have no insurance. More likely is that they would have charged you a higher premium or excess or both - you are insured but you owe them the difference. “Social purposes” will be defined in the policy Particularly since it’s a weird term. Most policies would use “private use” or “commercial/business use”. Driving to and from work would normally be “personal use”, driving for work would be commercial. Usually within those definitions there are reasonable exceptions. For example, personal use might include not more than X number of business use per year. Now, this type of situation is unlike the past-crash data because it is a representation of your intentions and no one can accurately predict the future. However, insurance contracts almost alway contain an obligation for the insured to inform the insurer of changed circumstances that increase risk. So, if you start using your car for business, you have to tell the insurer and they may adjust your premium. However, if you had been using it for business and stopped, you don’t have to tell them because the change reduces the risk.	No, not for 1+ years See section 47 of the Motor Vehicle Act 1988: (1) When a motor vehicle registered in one State has been kept in another State, for a period exceeding twelve months, the owner of the vehicle shall, within such period and in such form containing such particulars as may be prescribed by the Central Government, apply to the registering authority, within whose jurisdiction the vehicle then is, for the assignment of a new registration mark and shall present the certificate of registration to that registering authority: [...] Related: 1 2	According to Rule 286 of the Highway Code then the actual legal requirement doesn't mention an exchange of insurance details. If you are involved in a collision which causes damage or injury to any other person, vehicle, animal or property, you MUST ... give your own and the vehicle owner’s name and address, and the registration number of the vehicle, to anyone having reasonable grounds for requiring them While you clearly can't provide the registration number of a bicycle, the other details still appear to be legally required. Note that the section on Rules for cyclists specifically states that These rules are in addition to those in the following sections, which apply to all vehicles (except the motorway section).	Is it legal in the US for a company that rents out car parking spaces, to bundle the renting of a parking space to buying insurance for the content of the parked car? Yes. Honestly, I'm a little surprised that I've never see this practice in real life. All things not prohibited are allowed, and there is nothing, per se illegal about bundling services and requiring them to be purchased as a package deal (there may be some licensing issues for insurance sales involved, but those would probably be easily overcome). Sometimes bundling gives rise to an anti-trust violation, but neither the parking lot operation business nor the car insurance business are so consolidated that this would fairly be viewed as some kind of anti-competitive practice.	Let's be quite brutal here. Inexperienced driver doesn't mean the driver made a mistake. Lots of friends in the car doesn't mean they interferred with his driving. Loud music in the car is totally legal. "Perhaps was distracted" - "perhaps" you were distracted by looking at the passengers of this car instead of yielding? It seems that you drove without due attention. You noticed at the last moment that you had to yield. "Yielding" isn't just stopping right at the last second, you have to drive in a way that it is visible for others that you are going to yield, and you didn't. The other driver was 100% correct to assume that you wouldn't yield. Then you come up with an accusation that a police officer was biased. That's a very, very strong accusation. It's impossible for you to prove. It's the kind of accusation that will cause the judge to believe that you can't accept your own faults, and that you need the maximum possible fine to make you realise your mistakes. That's why you need a lawyer. A lawyer will either make sure that you only say things in court that actually help your case. Or will advise you not to fight this in court at all, if that is better for you. If you go to court on your own, you'll only get yourself into trouble. And if there was bias by a police officer, and a witness lying, and a driver driving without attention, then a lawyer with experience in these things might be able to prove that it court, although that would be a very tough call, but you on your own don't have a chance in hell. You say "the shop owner lied". The shop owner says "no, I didn't". So what's your next step? You don't know. Your lawyer knows. That's why you need a lawyer.	With the additional information in the comment, the approach most likely to give you a good outcome would be to present this as a dispute between the retailler and the manufacturer. Make a note of who said what and when, and try to obtain written confirmation from the retailler. It sounds like the retailler is currently on your side, which makes your position stronger as your legal contract is with them and they will have obligations under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (I'm assuming you bought the item as a private individual and not as a business). Note that you may not have a right to replacement. Consumer protection legislation and warranty terms include several ways the supplier can provide redress (usually repair / refund / replace). Since the preference is replacement, you will not be able to argue an inherent design fault with the product. This may give the manufacturer the opportunity to assert that the retailler, or you, specified an incorrect fitting kit - or that it was incorrectly installed. If the fittings were supplied with the foil, you could argue that it was an issue with these that led to total loss of the rest of the foil. It looks like you currently have grounds to claim this against the retailler. If there's no satisfactory resolution, consulting the Citizens Advice bureau would be a good place to start.	Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough).	The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today.
Is it illegal to turn off someone’s loudspeakers in public? Let’s suppose someone goes to a certain street and plays an audiobook recording about their political program every day on the speakers at loud volume. If someone walks up and switches the recording off so that it stops playing and causing a nuisance to everyone until they walk back down to the end of the street to put it back on, is the person turning it off committing any sort of crime?	Not "illegal", but rather a "civil wrong" instead as this sounds like a (minor) case of Trespass to Chattels, being: ...an intentional interference with another person's lawful possession of a personal property. A "chattel" refers to any personal property, moving or unmoving. Trespass to chattels does not apply to real property or any interest in land. In order to prove trespass to chattels, you are required to show the following elements: Intent to trespass: Merely intending to do the act is enough to show this element of trespass. You don't necessarily need to show intent to harm a specific person. Lack of owner's consent: There must be an unauthorized, unlawful interference, which means the person interfered with or dispossessed the chattel without the owner's permission. Interference of chattels: A person commits a trespass to chattel by (1) dispossessing another of the chattel, (2) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another, or (3) damaging the chattel. Interference does include dispossession of a chattel, but it must be something short of conversion. Whether it would be actionable is another question as de minimis non curat lex Although the above link is from an American site, it mirrors the UK definition and is the best and most succinct explanation I can find	I'm based in England, but I'm sure the principle is similar in Canada. The night club or concert venue is private property. When someone owns or rents private property one of the main things they are buying is the right to control who is present on that property, and generally they can use reasonable force to remove people who are not authorised. Security guards generally act as agents for a property owner, tenant or similar.	The opt-out option is exercised by hanging up the phone. The federal wiretapping law 18 USC 2511 would contain any specific restrictions on recording federal employees, and there are no such restrictions. Each state has their own laws as well, so if either party is in a two-consent state such as Florida, consent from the other party would be required. The federal law only requires one party consent. It is possible that the individual expanded a separate rule that s/he may have heard of, one prohibiting recording of an IRS due process collection hearing that is conducted by telephone, as ruled in Calafati v. Commissioner. In that case, petitioner owed taxes and penalties and there was a process where the IRS was going to take his stuff, which requires a hearing. There is a federal statute 26 USC 7521 allowing the in-person hearing to be recorded, but no mention of recording telephone hearings. The Tax Court has taken the position that if it is not explicitly allowed, the IRS can forbid it: but this is in a very specific context, i.e. a specific legal hearing.	Recording other people without consent is a crime (§ 201 StGB). But so is threatening other people with violence (§ 241 StGB). Secret recordings and other acts can still be legitimate if they are necessary and appropriate to deflect harm (§ 34 StGB), similar to how hurting someone can be legitimate if you're acting in self-defense. If you're prosecuted for this, it will be up to the court to determine if your act was necessary and proportionate. But regardless of what you did, your recording can be used as evidence against the ex-roommate. German criminal law does not generally exclude illegally acquired evidence. The main risk of disclosing this recording is that you are also providing evidence against yourself for possible wiretapping charges (which may or may not be punishable as discussed above).	They are not considered public places in the way you mean, and in fact, the Ohio revised code specifically prohibits the kind of behavior you're referencing. Bottom line, any kind of party at the polling place itself is out of the question due to the possibility of limiting access or intimidating potential voters.	Theoretically speaking, this is not theft. You are correct in that theft requires specific intent: to permanently deprive someone from the use and enjoyment of one of their lawful possessions. In real life, it is a matter of evidence of course. Saying you were only borrowing can be proven otherwise based on your actions. I should also mention that if you "borrow" something an there were obligations attached to that borroeing (e.g. "you can borrow it but you mustnt use it like this, or you must return it in a week") then failing to abide by those obligations can be sufficient to show intention to deprive. Furthermore "borrowing something" and consuming its entire usefulness for yourself counts as the permanent deprivation of the use of the possession from the owner. E.g. "borrowing" concert tickets and returning them after a concert (see s.6 Theft Act 1968) R v Lloyd, Bhuee & Ali [1985] QB 829 also tells us that the condition of something borrowed once returned may be indicative of whether there was an intention to permanently deprive someone of their rights to property.	I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.	No These are derivative works and making them is copyright breach. Doing this as a hobby or even for the entertainment of friends in private is likely fair use. Distribution or performance in public (monitored or not) is likely not fair use and you would need a licence. Here is a summary of the relevant law in australia.
Colorado Injury Attorneys Why we need to hire a personal injury attorneys to cover a personal injury losses? How they are beneficial to cover injury losses?	You don’t need to hire an attorney If you like, you can represent yourself. Just like you can build your own house, repair your own car or amputate your own limb. You only need to be a lawyer if you are representing someone else. However, there is a saying that goes: A person representing themselves has a fool for a client. Your lawyer is a professional, you aren’t. They know what to do when the other side says “Objection, facts not in evidence” or how to correctly fill out, file and serve a pleading; do you?	Most class action litigation involves a whole mass of people who suffered minute injury, whereby it wouldn't be cost effective to bring individual suit. There are exceptions, as with every rule. So, for instance, (I'll use one I was involved in): BARBRI, who established the curriculum, study aids, and taught nearly all of the prep courses for the bar exams in every state, illegally colluded with Kaplan, who ran nearly all of the prep courses for the LSAT (the law school entrance aptitude test) to create unfair trade advantage by price fixing and agreeing not to offer each others' service, thereby creating a monopoly. Because of this, there was no way to cheaply prep for either of these major events – it was use BARBRI or Kaplan, respectively, or study without these invaluable classes/aids. They were expensive but necessary to excelling on these very important tests. It wasn't that they weren't great test prep courses, it was that they created an environment free of any competition where you were forced to pay whatever they were asking. I got notice of class action, didn't opt out, and about 3 years later got a check for nearly $300. Perfect from my perspective. They taught me a ton, I did good on the LSAT and the Bar Exam and the money came at a perfect time. For those exceptions to the rule, opting out may be the best course of action, but as @nomen agentis noted, it does bar you from recovery as part of the class (although that is usually nominal) if you fail to bring private action, miss the statute of limitations, or fail to recover via settlement or trial award. As a further example based on my experience with BARBRI/Kaplan: say you were a person who couldn't afford to take the bar prep course, and because of the price fixing and limit on competition (monopoly) couldn't find any other alternative review course. If you studied on your own, looked for alternative study aides/courses to no avail (there were literally no others) and then failed the bar exam, and you could show that because of this, it was more likely than not that it was the reason you failed, you might have a case individually, arguing that your quarter-million-dollar education was functionally meaningless without a license to practice, and you couldn't get a job that paid enough to repay the loans because you couldn't get a job, etc. This would be the type person to consider opting out. Typically, these (the more injured person) are the people the attorneys search for who end up named as the representing party to the class, but not everyone can be a named plaintiff that suffered more than the nominal injury. Because of this, not everyone who had a more serious injury will be adequately compensated by the class action. These suits are meant to get a lot of people a little justice and to teach a lesson, not to get a few people largely compensated for substantial injury. They are also quite nice for the lawyers who make millions, because they get a percentage of the entire pie. But, if you suffer a serious injury for which a class action suit exists, then it would probably behoove you to opt out, after consulting with a lawyer. It's important to understand that for most people it's more beneficial to be in the class. These are typically the type injuries that on the aggregate equal substantial injury, but individually, no lawyer would take on a contingency and it wouldn't be worth while to pay to litigate, as the recovery would be nowhere near the cost of the litigation/attorneys' fees. If you are (like the example above) the odd individual who suffered a much greater injury than the remainder of the class, then opting out would not be wise. However, you don't automatically get more just because you sue individually, and there is no collateral estoppel or issue preclusion because you are suing on a different theory of damage. If you opt out, you start over. If you waited, you may benefit from any admissions in court, which can be used against them, but not any findings. However, a class suit will typically run much longer than an individual, so you would probably finish your suit before the class action concluded. If you are the person who suffered substantial injury, when you get the class notice you should consult an attorney right away, to see if you have a provable case and if opting out is the right choice for you. Statute of limitations need to be examined, as well as other procedural things. Generally speaking, those other reasons for potentially opting out that are in the question are not typical considerations.	Is there any type of California labor law that would allow for him to ask for compensation for lost wages? Your family member might have a claim of [intentional?] misrepresentation. Simply put, it is unjustifiable for a well-known transportation company to misrepresent for too long the requirements its drivers must satisfy. Assessment of other legal theories such as breach of contract or promissory estoppel requires a detailed knowledge of the interactions and terms between the parties. Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 11 Cal.4th 85, 107 (1995) points out that "courts will generally enforce the breach of a contractual promise through contract law, except when the actions that constitute the breach violate a social policy that merits the imposition of tort remedies". Misleading and belatedly avoiding a hiree who relied on the company's conduct contravenes public policy because of the ensuing disruptions and uncertainty the company could and should have avoided. Accordingly, see Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. .v Dana Corp., 22 Call Rptr. 352, 361 (2004) ("[A] plaintiff advances the public interest in punishing intentional misrepresentations and in deterring such misrepresentations in the future."). Generally speaking, the doctrine known as economic loss rule bars claims of negligent misrepresentation involving no property damage or personal injury. That is in order to preempt a party from sidestepping contract law. However, the extent of the company's conduct as you describe it might forfeit the protections embodied in the doctrine of at-will employment.	He is mistaken. The statute of limitations for suing someone for a car accident, and for enforcing an oral promise, are both far longer than 3-4 months. You could get an estimate of the damages, report it to his insurance company, and, if the insurance company does not cooperate promptly, bring suit in a court of limited jurisdiction or a small claims court. Even if you don't retain a lawyer to take on the case for you fully, if you need to sue, you should hire a lawyer to coach you on the high points of how to represent yourself in this case, particularly with regard to how to fill out the Complaint, how to serve the other driver with process, and what evidence you need to present in what manner a trial.	You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right.	This appears to be a complaint about lawyers using the legal process to achieve what their client wants. Forgive me, but this seems to be like complaining that doctors only want to cure the client's disease, architects only want to design the client's buildings and generals only want to kill the client's enemies. Your lawyer is not your business strategist or your life coach! A civil case is always about the money. If you are pursuing a civil case over a principle then you are going to spend a lot of money and probably lose. The use of a lawyer should always be part of your wider negotiation strategy in the same way that your armed forces are part of your diplomacy; in both cases the threat of use is usually better than the actual use. A civil case always follows a failure to successfully negotiate. Not all by any means, but most, civil cases would be better settled by agreement than litigation by all parties. If you believe that your objectives can best be served by a social media campaign, political pressure, etc. then go for it. Your lawyer can advise you what the risks are wrt to defamation etc. but ultimately how you choose to pursue your goal is up to you. Lawyers, understandably, look for legal solutions. A public relations professional is far better placed than a lawyer to inform your media strategy.	It's a more complicated question to answer than you would think. The relevant rule of professional conduct is Rule 5.5 (which has the same numbering in every U.S. jurisdiction, but not identical substantive language). Generally, one can represent a client based in the state (even if it has offices in many states including one where the lawyer's office is) where a lawyer practices anywhere the lawyer can competently do so. Tribunal admission in tax and patent practice is national, but in Article III federal courts have admission to practice on a court by court basis. Part of the issue is that no fact pattern that I client is in is ever 100% federal or 100% state with some rare exceptions like immigration court or federal tax court or patent cases. Most client situations have both state and federal dimensions that a competent lawyer is aware of and counsels on, even if the client perceives it as a federal law issue and even if the federal law issue may be the most important one. The rule and the official comments in Colorado are as follows: Rule 5.5. Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law (quoted in pertinent part which also contains provisions related to employing disbarred lawyers and paralegals): Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct Law Firms and Associations As amended through Rule Change 2018(6), effective April 12, 2018 (a) A lawyer shall not: (1) practice law in this jurisdiction without a license to practice law issued by the Colorado Supreme Court unless specifically authorized by C.R.C.P. 204 or C.R.C.P. 205 or federal or tribal law; (2) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulations of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; . . . COMMENT [1] The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. In order to protect the public, persons not admitted to practice law in Colorado cannot hold themselves out as lawyers in Colorado or as authorized to practice law in Colorado. Rule 5.5(a)(1) recognizes that C.R.C.P. 204 and C.R.C.P. 205 permit lawyers to practice law in accordance with their terms in Colorado without a license from the Colorado Supreme Court. Lawyers may also be permitted to practice law within the physical boundaries of the State, without such a license, where they do so pursuant to Federal or tribal law. Such practice does not constitute a violation of the general proscription of Rule 5.5(a)(1). . . C.R.C.P. 204 and 205 pertain to the practice of law by law students in clinical courses with suitable sponsors and lawyer supervision. The American Bar Association Model Rule contains an additional subsection not adopted in Colorado (which is adopted in a majority of jurisdictions) which states: (c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that: (1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter; (2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized; (3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or (4) are not within paragraphs (c) (2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.	You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment.
Lease signed but not returned, is it binding? I have had annual lease renewed for over several years. This year I was sent a lease agreement that I signed. The agreement had two copies. I sent back both copies. I did not receive/do not have the signed lease back from the landlord. I thought nothing of it as checks have been cashed. I have learned now that they plan on selling building. Do I have a lease, or am I month-to-month now? Worried that landlord is playing shenanigans with agreements. I ask because I will find new rental now if it is month-to-month before building sold. New York, not NYC.	Generally speaking, you signature and delivery of the lease to the landlord makes it possible for the landlord to enforce. Particularly when, as in the question, the landlord presented the lease to you as an "offer" which you accepted without modification, it is probably binding upon the landlord even if the landlord does not sign it or return a copy with the landlord's signature. In jurisdictions that have a statute of frauds, your part performance by sending checks in the lease period consistent with the lease, and the landlord's part performance by continuing to allow you to occupy the premises without objection, would probably make the statute of frauds (which generally requires a signed writing by the party against whom a lease is enforced) to be inapplicable. On the other hand, if you materially changed a version provided by the landlord, there is a real question over whether there has been an offer and acceptance, or a meeting of the minds, agreeing to the new lease. Materially here meaning changes that are more than updating your contact details and go to the heart of the lease contract.	on behalf means that the party of the agreement is the landlord, not the property manager. The contract both entitles and obliges the landlord, not the property manager. The property manager is not a party of the contract. So the fact that the property manager is fired completely unrelated to the existing contract. Additionally, in most jurisdictions that I know of, even if the property changed ownership (the landlord sold or gifted it, or the landlord died and it was inherited by someone) the contract would still be in force, as the change of situations would not invalidated the rights and obligations of the other parties.	You are likely now a holdover tenant, as you have stated that you continue to pay your original monthly rental payments. Check original lease and investigate what happens at end of lease. P.S. As your original question does not state a rent increase, may want to pay the $50.	A "limited license housing agreement" may be an interesting attempt to get around landlord-tenant laws, typically associated with official student housing (e.g. this from Queens College CUNY). This facility near WMU is not overtly related to the university, but might be subcontracting for the university. At any rate, there is no special provision under Michigan law that exempts landlords from the provisions of the law in case they declare the contract to be an agreement as opposed to a lease. It is possible that this is copy-and-paste law that erroneously relies on provisions in landlord-tenant laws that exempt university housing agreements from provisions of a state's landlord-tenancy law. You do not need to be informed that you should / could consult an attorney before signing a legal document: this knowledge is presupposed. It is also assumed that when you sign a document, you read the document. It is reasonably likely that the lease contained language like the following (from the above contract): I have carefully read, fully understand and voluntarily sign this Housing Agreement. Once fully signed, this is a binding contract and is intended to be enforceable under its terms. I have had the opportunity to seek independent legal advice The disclaimer "This Housing Agreement is not a lease and no tenancy, leasehold, possessory or other property interest in any specific apartment or bedroom is created" has dubious legal status. The rights given by the landlord-tenant act cannot be waived, under the Truth in Renting Act, so saying "this is not a lease" does not make the lease not a lease. In Michigan there is a duty on landlords to mitigate loses when a premise is abandoned. The case Fox v. Roethlisberger, 85 N.W.2d 73 mentions such a possible duty in the context of tenancy is often cited on the web as establishing such a duty, but I disagree. Froling v. Bischoff, 252 N.W.2d 832 however establishes that there is such a general duty for any breach of contract (and even applies it to breach of a rental agreement). So whether or not you call it a lease, there is still a duty to mitigate losses. In the scenario where you abandoned the unit and the landlord waited until the end of the year to file an action for breach of contract, they could have failed in their duty to mitigate their losses (but see Fox v. Roethlisberger, where landlord did make an effort to re-rent, and simply was not able to for 9 months).	Is there a law requiring a landlord to respond to rental agencies request for information in regards to previous tenants? No. There is no such law.	If you began the lease with no mention of additional payment specifically for parking, and were of the understanding that you could use the property to park cars, and have been using the property to park cars with the knowledge of the landlord, and the landlord has not previously mentioned parking as a distinct part of your lease that carries a fee, you have a very strong argument that parking cars on the property was part of your leasing the property. People park cars on their property regularly; it is a reasonable default assumption that unless told otherwise, you could do this at will. The landlord presumably knew you had been doing this and had not notified you that e.g. it was against an explicit part of the lease or was against a legal regulation to park cars on that property without a fee paid. This is a request for additional payment for something you are currently able to do for free, and doing as part of an existing contract. Therefore, your landlord is offering a change to your lease: the rent will go up by thirty dollars or you will be barred from parking cars on the property. In neither case do you receive additional consideration, so it may not be a legitimate change at all. Regardless though, you do not have to accept the false dichotomy: you can choose to continue parking your car on the property and not pay the money for doing this. Do not agree to the change. Do not pay any additional money. See a lawyer that specialises in tenancy law for your jurisdiction and obtain their opinion before replying to the demand for a change in the terms of your lease; you may have access to free legal advice depending on where you live.	Can the seller enter a formal agreement with the tenants in which the seller pays a sum of money and in return the tenants vacate the premises before the closing date, and would such agreement hold over the tenants legal right to remain on premises past the closing date? Maybe. It depends on tenancy law in Nova Scotia. Notwithstanding, given that the tenants are “difficult”, what are your plans if they take the cash and don’t move out? What happens if the sale goes though under the assumption that the tenants have left, and in fact the tenants are still occupying the premises? Why would the buyer settle under an “assumption”? At the time of settlement either the tenants have left (so settlement happens) or the haven’t (so the vendor is in breach, settlement doesn’t happen and the buyer decides whether to rescind the contract and claim damages or affirm the contract and claim damages). What guarantees and proofs can the buyer demand as to the vacant status of the property? They take the keys and walk into it. What other questions should the buyer be asking? They should be asking: “Will you be in a position to fulfil your obligations under the contract?”	Yes, they seem to have broken the law. In California, notice must be given for an eviction. This can be a 30/60/90 day notice with no reason needed (typically because the landlord wants the property for something else) or a 3 day notice with cause- the most typical being not paying the rent. Note that COVID exceptions exist, though I don't believe they apply to you. Even after that time, a landlord cannot physically remove a tenant or attempt to drive them out through the destruction/removal of property, locking them out, or cutting off utilities. They are liable for damages suffered as well as penalties. There are lawful procedures in place for this. The removal and destruction of your belongings could constitute either larceny or vandalism. Either way, by unlawfully removing your possessions, they are liable for the damages caused.
Can you get sued for gossiping about an incompetent tech lead if you believe you're saying the truth? Can one get sued for gossiping about an incompetent tech lead if you believe you're saying the truth? Let's say a person tells one of his or her coworkers that this tech lead isn't qualified for his job and cannot tell whether a junior developer is a senior developer. Can teh speaker get sued for it? I think I had to say it, because the guy literally hired junior developers and tried to gaslight me into believing they were senior when they could not complete a landing page after 4 months and returning their terrible work with constructive feedback and identifying several bugs in an interminable circle of mess where they would generate 2 bugs for every fix they made, which is completely absurd. Would a potential suit have merit, and how would it play out?	Your belief in the truth of a statement is of only limited value in a defamation suit. Saying that a person is incompetent in that person's profession can certainly be defamation, and may even be defamation per se, depending on the jurisdiction. If the person sues and the speaker asserts truth as a defense, the speaker may have to prove that the statement is true. Why would one need to say anything at all in such a situation? Whether such a statement was a factual statement or a statement of opinion would depend very much on the detailed circumstances. But it is at least possible that a suit might be filed and won on this fact pattern. See this answer for more on defamation under US law.	Every software is potentially vulnerable, unless it runs on an air-gapped computer with sealed data ports. How vulnerability fixes are prioritized against other goals is usually a business decision, legitimately made by the management. There are some jurisdictions and issues where the law requires them to act, but again there is usually a judgement call involved. For example, the GDPR talks about due regard to the state of the art. What you describe seems to be a difference in opinion about the importance of the fix. Ask about that at Workplace SE, not here. There are ways for software developers to influence their management, but ultimately the management is responsible for the outcomes and gets to decide. You can inform your superiors, in writing. If you are in a large company, there may be a legal or compliance department. Inform them if you have a reason to distrust your superiors. In most jurisdictions, you cannot simply talk to the press, either now or later. If you believe that your company is acting criminally, talk to a lawyer.	There is no contract between you (the licensee) and the licensor of the software. The creator of the open source software just says "here's the software, you may use it if you like, as long as you fulfil some conditions. ". No contract, no liability. I think the developer would only be liable if they intentionally created software that causes damage. (Which has happened, some open source browser plugins have recently been modified to run bitcoin mining software, or worse. I suppose the miscreants could follow all the GPL rules or whatever license is used).	Raise the question with your employer If you believe that you are an employee and not a contractor then there is presumably something you want from your employer. This may be additional wages and entitlements that you would have or will become entitled to for past or future work respectively. Or you may have been injured and want workers' compensation. Or terminated and you want redundancy pay. Whatever it is, work it out and raise the issue with your employer. You might want to consult an accountant or union to help you. They may acknowledge that you were incorrectly classified and give you what you want. Winner, winner, chicken dinner! Or they may dispute it. If so, you need to follow the dispute resolution processes at your workplace. These typically involve informal discussions, escalating to mediation and then to a workplace tribunal run by the government. You will almost certainly want to consult a lawyer or union to help you - given that you don't know where to start the learning curve is likely to be too steep. In virtually every jurisdiction if people are employees at law they can't choose not to be. in british-columbia the relevant law appears to be the Employment Standards Act although it's not unheard of in edge cases for a person to be an employee under one law (e.g. workers' compensation) and a contractor under another (e.g. income tax). From the linked site: The overriding question is “whose business is it?” Is the person who is doing the work doing it as a person in business for themselves? If you are working "for" your own business you are probably a contractor. If you are working "for" your employer's business you are probably an employee. For example, if you are an accountant with several dozen clients, maintain your own business premises and charge for your advice based on the amount quoted rather than by the hour, you're a contractor. If instead, you have 2 clients, work from their premises at set hours and get paid by the day or week, you're an employee with 2 jobs. In edge cases these are not cut and dried - Google are Uber driver's employees. In Australia: no. In California: yes. In the UK: yes.	That is not at all what USPTO is telling you. Courts do not simply "dismiss" patents - that isn't a terminology you'd ever see used for a patent that was found to be invalid. Timeline of events: United Industries Corporation brought a suit against the owner of the patent, claiming unpatentability. That case went to trial, and the court found the claim to be invalid and that UIC failed to show unpatentability. UIC appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case because both parties agreed to its dismissal (it's possible they reached some external agreement we don't know about). As far as I can tell, at this moment, the patent is active.	The CEO wants to "fool" users You are essentially admitting that the company you are working for is about to deceit its customers and asking whether that is legal. The relevant set of laws is rather sparse and does not give direct answers in regards to oAuth tokens or other details of that level (which is probably making your CEO think he can "handle" the arising questions). Probably the most relevant bit of legislation that applies here is The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to online privacy and data security policies. I am pretty sure that, in practice, if the users take your company to court, it will be held liable because: users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? While the users are still allowing you to read their data it is completely up to the Terms/EULA what you can do with it. However, once you have made the users think that they have withdrawn your access (e.g. they "deleted" oAuth tokens), you are no longer authorized to read the current data (although the Terms may still allow you to use the old data you obtained when you had access). Silently continuing to access their data without their knowledge/approval is definitely a deceit. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database There would be nothing wrong with that if it was in the Terms. But if it is not, that would be a blatant (and easily punishable) breach of privacy. Note that you may also be held personally liable for this wrongdoing (if/when proved so). "Just doing your job" claim will not work.	Online conversations are generally allowed evidence. However, EVERYTHING in the chat should be considered, as well as any later actions. Were there later conversations that said something different? Did the lease you signed have different terms? One line in a WhatsApp does not make your case a "slam dunk". It may only be one piece of evidence in a much larger context.	Generally speaking, you have to disclose that the defendant is a minor in the complaint and their deadline to respond is tolled until the court has appointed a guardian ad litem for them. So, while it is possible, it is arduous. Also, since someone below the age of eighteen can claim minority as a defense to an executory contract (as opposed to a contemporaneous exchange of goods or services for cash), and in some cases, to other contracts, you have a better shot at suing for malperformance and nonperformance of work. Finally, even if you can sue, collecting a judgment from a minor, who is likely to lack both employment and any significant assets, is very challenging. A minor's legal guardians or parents would not be responsible for a judgment entered against a minor in these circumstances. there was no written contract for the job and the only information I have of them is their phone numbers. The lack of a written contract isn't a serious problem in a short job that was performed by both sides. You will need to be able to locate them to physically serve them with process to sue them. If you have their names, approximate ages, and the general vicinity of where they live or work, this isn't an insurmountable burden, but it is a bit of extra work that could turn out to be easy or could turn out to be a major obstacle.
Legality of adding vaccination record to the US CDC Covid card yourself I'm a US resident and got my main Covid vaccinations in the US recorded on the US CDC card. I also got one booster shot abroad and would like to have it added to my US CDC card to have all my shots documented in one place. I talked to various Health Care providers (primary care, vaccination provider, etc) but they all just stare blankly and don't know what to do. Questions: Would it be legal for me to transcribe the booster shot myself? It's not faking anything since the vaccination did actually happen (and I have a record for it). If it's illegal, who can do this legally and how can I get them to actually engage? Is there a different way to (legally) combine Covid vaccination records from different countries into a single record ? Update: The point of having a single record would be to a) have it all in English, and b) optimized for international travel. Many airlines allow uploading vaccination documentation but typically there is only one upload allowed.	The vaccine card doesn't have a specific legal status under US law. There are federal laws against fraud which would encompass vaccine card fraud, but tidying up disparate notices into a single notice is not fraudulent (there is no attempt to deceive), as long as you don't falsify signatures, seals, or specific information. From a practical perspective, though, the official vaccination record from your state is a better and more official way to have a single proof of vaccination. There is probably no practical way to transport vaccinations from a foreign country into the US system, but that is a question best asked on Travel, since it's not about the law, it's about quasi-legal mandates authorized under broad laws that say "in an emergency, the government can stipulate necessary rules".	Law is not science or math or solid logic. However - “The two identical color passport-style photos” makes it clear that for each person in question there are two identical photo documents. External to this passage is the background knowledge of what passport and other identification photos are like. They show an individual. And, the photos are not to prove your relationship, but are a way to connect the people on the documents with the faces of the people in question.	Generating a list of all possible numbers doesn't sound like it would constitute personal data any more than listing all dates for the last hundred years as a "possible date of birth" would. However, the moment anyone linked even one of the numbers with any other personal data - for example a name - they would be bound by GDPR and would need to show a Lawful Basis for processing the data. [If you linked your own name you could presumably argue Consent, but anyone else's would need to have an associated Lawful Basis.]	Article 640 of the Italian Penal Code under the heading "Crimes against property by fraud" begins (via Google Translate): Anyone who, by artifice or deceit, by misleading someone, procures an unfair profit to himself... And the article (cited by the OP in a comment) says the suspect... ...worked in the health sector and had been suspended from his job because he had refused to be vaccinated against COVID-19. The jab is mandatory for all health workers. So, it seems the allegation is that he intended to "profit" by gaining a COVID-19 vaccine certificate and therefore unjust employment after attempting to use the silicone patch to deceive the health worker. Edit following @jkej's comment observing that the alleged unfair profit was never actually procured. The more likely charge - depending on the actual evidence - would seem to fall under Article 56 which begins under the heading Crime Attempted (again via Google Translate): Whoever carries out suitable acts, directed in an unequivocal way to commit a crime, is liable for an attempted crime, if the action is not carried out or the event does not occur.	Yes. A domestic passport is sufficient photo ID for any purpose (other than driving or establishing state residency) and is expressly authorized as sufficient ID for employment on a form I-9 and for banking "know your customer" rules. Indeed, for some purposes, even an expired passport is sufficient ID as it establishes citizenship.	Welcome to LSE. Here are some answers to your question: No! It's not even close, but something like it is. The OSHA standard you cite is for mercury in the air in the workplace. You ask about "injections," which do not involve mercury in the air, so: this standard does not apply to injections. You ask about "injecting your employees with thiomersal." With only a few exceptions (for those helping diabetics, etc, and emergencies), all states require that licensed health care professionals administer injections, and then, only under a prescription. (For example, thiomersal is mostly used in vaccines. All states require licensed health professionals to administer vaccines.) So: Unless you are a licensed health professional with a prescription, you cannot inject your employees with thiomersal. However, OSHA has interpreted its rules and regulations to allow employees to require vaccines in some circumstances, such as a pandemic. To the extent these vaccines contain thiomersal, employers can require employees to get injected with thiomersal by a licensed health professional.	Could the Federal government say that if you are not vaccinated against Covid then you lose your welfare benefits? Would it be constitutional? What I am asking is, would a federal law (passed by congress) requiring people on welfare to be vaccinated be constitutional? For the most part yes. Arguably, a religious exemption might be required. But the federal government absent other countervailing considerations, generally has the power to mandate vaccination and other responses to a contiguous disease in cases where the vaccination would affect interstate commerce. All manner of things can be established as conditions to federal spending and federal programs. In cases where the program is purely federal, that discretion is almost unlimited (except for individual liberty considerations like freedom of religion). In cases where state cooperation is required, as noted in the answer by user6726, this discretion isn't absolutely unbounded if the state objects.	The location of your residence entrance is irrelevant for the law, what matters most is your "street address", i.e. mailing address. That is the address (therefore city) that you use for voter registration, and basically how you identify "where I live". If you lives 5 miles out in the country in an unincorporated area, you'd still use Needles (e.g.) as you mailing address: but you would not be able to vote for a mayor of Needles, just based on your mailing address. Both municipalities might claim jurisdiction based on the physical location of the property, especially for matters of building code. It should not be possible for both municipalities to tax the full value of your property, but they could split the assessment proportionally. The cities themselves are not collecting the tax, the county is (though property straddling a county line raises an interesting question).
Is it illegal if a policy affects one protected class more than everyone else? I heard some residential leases prohibit any open flames including candles. Since many religions use candles, wouldn't this be an illegal form of discrimination of a protected class? Or does that not apply because the rule is applied to everyone equally. IIRC they came out with a gaming console that had a video camera to monitor the user's movement. It didn't register well for people with dark skin (e.g. black). Would this be a form of discrimination or not because it's the same tool being used by everybody? In general does something that applies to everyone but negatively affects a protected class more count as illegal discrimination? Does intent matter? Which acts apply? To my understanding the Human Rights Act always apply, then more specialized acts (such as the Residential Tenancy Act, Labour law) apply depending on the context.	Here I assume from your cases that you are interested in the regulation of private activities (with human rights code etc.) instead of constitutional restraints on the government (under the Charter). The constitution only prohibits discrimination in law (or government policies) based on enumerated or analogous grounds. Which acts apply? To my understanding the Human Rights Act always apply, then more specialized acts (such as the Residential Tenancy Act, Labour law) apply depending on the context. Canada is a federal country with 10 provinces and three territories each having the powers to legislate under the constitution (for the provinces) or under federal devolution acts (for the territories). They all have different laws. And in constrast to the United States which is often thought to be less "centralized", in the domain of properties and civil rights (including human rights, employment and housing etc.), the federal government in Canada cannot legislate over these areas generally but it can regulate these things in domains where otherwise belong to the federal jurisdiction (e.g. airlines, interprovincial railways, banks but not credit unions, telecoms, the postal service, the armed forces). Federal laws regulating human rights and employment like the Canadian Human Rights Code and Canada Labour Code apply only to those under federal jurisdiction. In most situations, provincial laws apply and are different for each province, including the list of protected characteristics (e.g. citizenship or suspended criminal records are not protected, at least not directly, in all provinces). So you will have to look at the law in your province of interest. Generally the human rights Code or Act should be comprehensive, but exceptions may arise in other special laws (e.g. union memberships are often protected in the Labour Code; disability accommodations may have separate laws). In general does something .... count as illegal discrimination? Another point is that discrimination is not generally illegal; you are free to buy Pepsi instead of Coca Cola. Discrimination based on protected characteristics is not necessarily illegal; a gay man can choose to have a man instead of a woman for his partner. In Canada, both federally and in each province, what is generally illegal is when individuals are adversely differentiated due to a protected characteristic in the course of providing a good, service, facility or accommodation available to the general public, or in relation to housing and employment. Even then, discrimination based on protected characteristics can be legal if certain requirements are met. These usually include employment or service requirements in good faith, programs designed to improve the circumstances of socially disadvantaged individuals and groups ("affirmative action"), and "traditional" exceptions (e.g. age-based discounts). Religious organizations can also discriminate based on their sincerely held religious beliefs, at least when they are not carrying out commercial provision of goods and services available to the general public. For example, it is not against the law for an employer to provide gender-separated bathrooms (it may even be a requirement). In many if not all provinces, it is not illegal for businesses to give child or seniors discounts. In some provinces, a landlord who will be living on the same premises with shared bathrooms and kitchens is not subject to human rights laws or have reduced burden to accommodate. Insurance companies also often have greater leeway in their business decisions, since their business model is usually and inherently built on discrimination (of risks which can correlate with protected characteristics). There are also social expectations and conditions that "rank" a hierarchy of grounds and circumstances (justifiably or not) which may lead to more or less scrutiny over different grounds of protection and areas of service (e.g. an insurance policy discriminating on race is socially absolutely not acceptable where discrimination due to age in insurances are acceptable and discrimination due to gender is controversial; addiction-based disability claims may also attract more scrutiny; employment and housing are considered much more important and in detail compared to retail discounts). Public policy overwhelmingly favours or at least more carefully consider claims from the traditionally socially disadvantaged groups. that applies to everyone but negatively affects a protected class more In Canada, the discrimination you are thinking of are often referred to as "adverse effect discrimination", sometimes also called "indirect" discriminations, where a practice neutral on its face adversely impact individuals based on a protected characteristics. It is not necessarily separately or explicitly spelled out, but results from the purpose of human rights legislations. The Code aims at the removal of discrimination. This is to state the obvious. Its main approach, however, is not to punish the discriminator, but rather to provide relief for the victims of discrimination. It is the result or the effect of the action complained of which is significant. If it does, in fact, cause discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one person or group of persons obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the community, it is discriminatory. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 536 But not all policies that cause disproportionate impacts are necessarily illegal. Insurance rates based on postal codes may discriminate against areas where a racial, ethnic, religious, age etc. group concentrates. But it can be justifiable as a reasonable good faith business requirements if the discrimination is based on an objective, reasonable criteria (e.g. flood risks or claim rates). The extent that a protected characteristic is relevant to the impacts must be considered. An arbitrary, artificial, stereotypical policy are more likely to be illegal than a considered, reasoned, well-founded one. Does intent matter? A discriminatory practice is "objective" and a good or neutral intent does not prevent a practice from being illegal discrimination. However, evidences of intent of discrimination are often illegal discrimination in itself and in any case, they can be used as evidences to prove discrimination cases and undermine the on-the-face neutrality of an action in question. Malicious intent or lack of can also be relevant in determining appropriate damages awarded to the complainant. Newfoundland and Labrador for example makes this explicit in their human rights law: Discrimination in contravention of this Act does not require an intention to discriminate. Human Rights Act, 2010, SNL 2010, c H-13.1 But the reasoning has been established by the Supreme Court going back at least to 1985 and apply to the interpretation of all human rights codes in Canada (unless an intent is specifically required): The intent to discriminate is not a governing factor in construing human rights legislation aimed at eliminating discrimination. Rather, it is the result or effect of the alleged discriminatory action that is significant. The aim of the Ontario Human Rights Code is to remove discrimination ‑‑ its main approach is not to punish the discriminator but to provide relief to the victim of discrimination. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 536 However, intent or reasons also matter for the proper course of remedy. If a policy that is neutral on its face causes adverse effects on individuals due to protected grounds, it must be eliminated if there is no rational reason for the policy to exist. A neutral policy that are genuinely established for proper business reasons is also not illegal if upon request reasonable accommodations to the requirements are provided or attempted to the point of undue hardship. In general, human rights laws impose a duty to accommodate upon persons subject to them like service provides, employers or landlords so that actions are taken, if possible, reasonable and not posing an undue hardship to the provider, to to eliminate or reduce the negative impact an individual suffers due to a protected characteristic. I heard some residential leases prohibit any open flames including candles. Since many religions use candles, wouldn't this be an illegal form of discrimination of a protected class? Or does that not apply because the rule is applied to everyone equally. The first step is to determine whether using candles are in fact part of a sincere religious practice, the hindering of which would violate the rights of the believer. Simply liking the scent of candles when they read the Book is likely not enough to establish that the freedom of religion would be violated. Lighting Shabbat candles on the other hand is much more likely to be recognized as a religious practice. If a discrimination practice is established at first view, the landlord would need to justify its decision, e.g. fire safety. It is not exempt just because "the rule is applied to everyone equally". If the reason for the discrimination is justifiable and reasonable accommodation is not possible, it is not illegal. Conformation to e.g. legal requirements like fire or health and safety codes is often a defence for private individuals (though the complainant may raise claims against the government). However, a duty to accommodate (to a reasonable extent) still exists, e.g. the landlord may need to consider the tenant in priority for similar properties under its constrol that allow open flames (if available). IIRC they came out with a gaming console that had a video camera to monitor the user's movement. It didn't register well for people with dark skin (e.g. black). Like said above, adverse effects based on protected grounds can be illegal discrimination and can give rise to a duty of accommodation. But this case is more tricky and I didn't find any clear case law on similar situations. It would depend on if the company did all it commercially reasonably could do to eliminate or reduce the impacts. A physical limitation caused by hardware (e.g. filter lenses) may be more easily justified than a lack of darker-skinned training samples in their statistical learning algorithm. Even if a successful discrimination claim is established, the damages may also be limited in this context (but an automatic system that decides on home mortgages and are discriminatory unjustifiably can lead to significantly more damages).	This is the overview of employment discrimination by the EEOC (no legal reason for them to specifically put this under "youth"). To "discriminate" against someone means to treat that person differently, or less favorably, for some reason... The laws enforced by EEOC protect you from employment discrimination when it involves: Unfair treatment because of your race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, age (age 40 or older), or genetic information. Harassment by managers, co-workers, or others in your workplace, because of your race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, age (age 40 or older), or genetic information. A subtype of harassment is "hostile environment harassment". See the EEOC page on harassment. It is unwelcome conduct that is based on race... Harassment becomes unlawful where 1) enduring the offensive conduct becomes a condition of continued employment, or 2) the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to create a work environment that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive. Also it is illegal to punish a person for complaining about harassment. On the face of it, this could constitute racial harassment. The EEOC suggests that it is illegal here, in their FAQ Are White employees protected from race discrimination even though they are not a minority? Yes. You are protected from different treatment at work on the basis of your race, whether you are White, Black, or some other race. Although this is an advisory from the Dep't of Interior and not the EEOC, it is reasonable to assume that it was at least minimally vetted by competent lawyers who know discrimination law. What is prohibited is Unwelcome conduct, verbal or physical, including intimidation, ridicule, insult, comments, or physical conduct, that is based on an individual’s protected status or protected activities under Personnel Bulletin 18-01, when the behavior can reasonably be considered to adversely affect the work environment, or an employment decision affecting the employee is based upon the employee’s acceptance or rejection of such conduct (where race is a protected status). I don't know of any case law that establishes for certain that what you describe is illegal. The ministerial exception allows a religion to follow the rules of the religion in hiring its ministers, but otherwise doesn't exempt religions from prohibitions against discrimination.	In addition to the points raised by Dale M's answer, it is important to recall the law as clarified by the Supreme Court in Lee v Ashers Baking Co & Ors [2018] UKSC 49 (aka, the 'gay cake case'). This case found that the providers of business services have a right not to be compelled to make speech with which they disagree without proper justification, under the Human Rights Act 1998. To quote from Lady Hale's judgment (emphasis added): [56] Under section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, all legislation is, so far as it is possible to do so, to be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. I have already indicated my doubts about whether this was discrimination against Mr Lee on the grounds of his political opinions, but have acknowledged the possibility that it might be. But in my view, FETO should not be read or given effect in such a way as to compel providers of goods, facilities and services to express a message with which they disagree, unless justification is shown for doing so. (nb: FETO refers to the statutory equalities instrument in Northern Ireland at issue; the analagous statute here is the Equality Act 2010) Given that the RA stocking Ms de Wahls was seen by critics as a communication of endorsement of the artist, there is a strong argument that the RA have the right not to be compelled to express endorsement of Ms de Wahl's views. (Whether or not stocking an artist is expressing their views is an open question, but I think the relevant point here is that the communicated message to some in the art community was of endorsement, meaning that RA was dealing with the semiotics of seeming to endorse). I think Lees provides support that the RA cannot be compelled to agree with Ms de Wahls's beliefs.	You are correct that the federal law does not prohibit sex discrimination in "public accommodations", the category that includes your examples. State laws tend to be more restrictive, see for example Washington's RCW 49.60.215 which declares that It shall be an unfair practice for any person ... to commit an act which ... results in any distinction ... except for conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to all persons, regardless of race, creed... sexual orientation, sex... PROVIDED, That behavior or actions constituting a risk to property or other persons can be grounds for refusal and shall not constitute an unfair practice. The definitions allow for a few exceptions as to what kind of place is so restricted, most notably a facility "which is by its nature distinctly private", nor "any educational facility, columbarium, crematory, mausoleum, or cemetery operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution". Here is a paper that summarizes the situation with women'-only clubs. For example, New Jersey law has the exception that nothing herein contained shall be construed to bar any place of public accommodation which is in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex, and which shall include but not be limited to any summer camp, day camp or resort camp, bathhouse, dressing room, swimming pool, gymnasium, comfort station, dispensary, clinic or hospital, or school or educational institution which is restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex... So it depends on the state, but most states prohibit any sex discrimination in public accommodations.	If Tratatoria has anti-discrimination laws, or provisions in its constitution forbidding discrimination, the Minister's actions might be illegal under them. But if it does not, or if it does not enforce whatever laws it may have, there is no international authority that can enforce any rule against discrimination. People and groups in other countries could denounce such actions as biased and discriminatory, if they chose. There is no legal standard for such announcements. This might bring pressure on Tratatoria. But that would be a diplomatic and political matter, not a legal one. There really is no effective international law on discrimination unless it amounts to genocide, and even then it is essentially a matter of diplomatic pressure or potentially war to enforce regime change, not a true legal process.	This question and many related ones are analysed in detail by Eugene Volokh, in a long paper that is worth reading in its entirety if you are interested in the topic. The [Supreme] Court has offered “speech integral to [illegal] conduct” as one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” excluded from First Amendment protection. But if this exception is indeed to be well defined and narrowly limited, courts need to explain and cabin its scope. This Article — the first, to my knowledge, to consider the exception in depth — aims to help with that task. On threats, he says: Companies are generally barred from firing employees for voting for a union, and unions are generally barred from retaliating against employees for their speech. The Court therefore concluded that speech that threatens unlawful retaliation is itself unlawful. On blackmail, he says: [...] telling black citizens “stop shopping at white-owned stores or we’ll publicize your behavior to your neighbors and fellow church members” is similarly constitutionally protected. On the other hand, “vote for this civil rights bill or I’ll disclose that you cheated on your wife” is likely unprotected. In general the line where the First Amendment protections end and criminal speech begins is surprisingly vague. General advice to avoid self-incrimination by not answering questions from the police is clearly protected. Threatening a witness with violence is clearly not. In between are shades of grey.	The actual law in BC, the Residential Tenancy Act, guaranteed a tenant's rights to the rental unit and the common areas, and restricts the landlord's right to enter the rental unit. Common areas are distinct from the rental unit. A common areas is "any part of residential property the use of which is shared by tenants, or by a landlord and one or more tenants", and a rental unit is a "living accommodation rented or intended to be rented to a tenant". In this case, that would be the room. There is no restriction at all on landlord's access to common areas, and there is no requirement that landlord access to common areas be for specific purposes. Access to the rental unit, on the other hand, must be for a reasonable purpose.	Education level is not an FHA protected category. However, whenever you give one broad group preferential treatment over another, you'll raise eyebrows. Someone might argue, for example, that while your incentive does not explicitly mention a protected category like race or sex, it might disproportionately impact one group in a protected category over another. In fact, the Supreme Court in 2015 addressed this question in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project. They found (albeit by a 5-4 vote) that disparate impact could, under certain circumstances, be the basis for a discrimination claim under FHA. The Wikipedia article on this subject is informative. As for your case, it really depends on what you are trying to accomplish with the policy, and what you reasonably predict it will do. For example, given that in most areas, white people more often have graduate degrees than black people, then if this policy did in fact end up advantaging white tenant over black tenants, someone might claim that you are in effect discriminating on the basis of race. I would not want to be on the defending end of that claim. In general, if you want to be safe from FHA's wrath, you need to evaluate each applicant on their individual merits as a tenant, not their membership in some group. Whenever you treat one person differently from another person, you should have a reason that clearly derives from your business interests as a landlord, and you should write it down. Legal questions aside, it seems like a really bad idea to offer incentives like this. I can't imagine it achieving any legitimate business goal, and I can easily imagine it making tenants or applicants feel cheated and devalued. And when people feel cheated and devalued, even if they haven't legally been wronged, they often seek legal redress. Or slash your tires. The fact that grad degrees would not be required under your policy isn't relevant. In the eyes of the FHA, any disparate treatment on the basis of a protected category is discrimination. The only real question here is whether this is disparate treatment on the basis of a protected category.
Is there any official law that prohibits the use of tritium in France? I remember reading people talking about the fact that the use of tritium is forbidden in France (automatic watches used to have tritium paint to glow in the dark; now they mostly use phosphorescent paint instead), mostly because it is radioactive. I've been trying to find anything official (laws, documents, etc.) online and so far I wasn't able to find anything.	Is there any official law that prohibits the use of tritium in France? Yes: it's the French decree 2002/460 of 4 April 2002. It does not mention tritium by name, but this article explains why it is now prohibited: The French authorities have just published decree 2002/460 of 4 April 2002 concerning general personal protection against the dangers of ionizing radiation. Having as its aim the transposition into French law of European directive 96/29 Euratom of 13 May 1996, which lays down basic standards concerning the health protection of the population and workers against the dangers resulting from ionizing radiation, the decree prohibits any intentional addition of artificial and natural radionuclides in consumer goods, as well as the import and export of such goods. Exceptions may be granted to ensure the safety of consumers (for example for diver's watches). No exceptions are made however for decorative pieces (jewellery and watches in general). It follows from these provisions that the use of tritium and other radioluminescent products of the same type for the hands and pointers of watch dials is now prohibited in France. It is now necessary by law to use other luminescent solutions. Source Dated 23 May 2002	No, it is not illegal to use the symbol of the federal government for your own personal use as it is a public domain symbol. However, the USMC will frown upon it. Marines have a sort of warrior culture ethos to them, when compared to the other branches of the U.S. military and a strong culture among those who served. Among Marine culture "there is no such thing as a former Marine"... that is, once you enter the service, you are a marine even if you retire (a former Marine is usually someone who was dishonorably discharged OR committed an action that would have gotten him/her discharged had they not retired). They do not take kindly to Stolen Valor (pretending or seeming to pretend you served when you did not). While this is legal to do per SCOTUS rule, it's not considered advisable. Most of the US military have dim views of Stolen Valor and will react very negatively. And seeing as how the Marines like to boast in song that they Guard Heaven for God upon Death, these are not enemies you would like to make. Tread extremely cautiously while doing this.	Depends on where you are, and what law would be broken and why. In germany, there is the concept of rechtfertigender Notstand (justifying emergency). If there is a present danger to a Rechtsgut (legally protected interest), one can take necessary and proportional steps against another legally protected interest. Say I walk through a winter landscape and there is a person who has broken through the ice of a lake (a present danger of the loss of life). Nearby is a yard with a ladder leaning on a shed. I would be allowed to enter the yard (normally trespas) and take the ladder (normally theft) in the rescue attempt (life counts for more than a ladder, using a ladder is necessary/appropriate for an ice rescue). The details are, as usual for Law SE, complicated.	Note, Washington State Senate Bill 5061 seeks to block certain "untracable" firearms without a serial number. This relates in part to "3D printable" guns, but the act of milling of a 80% lower (in Washington) could be a violation, if and when it passes. But it appears the bill hasn't been made a law yet... Is Washington specific news this issue what drives the question? Federally, the ATF web site says: Receiver blanks that do not meet the definition of a "firearm" are not subject to regulation under the GCA. The ATF has long held that items such as receiver blanks, "castings" or "machined bodies" in which the fire-control cavity area is completely solid and un-machined have not reached the "stage of manufacture" which would result in the classification of a firearm per the GCA. But this gets a bit technical. For further risk mitigation, the Texan could mitigate any risk related to both Federal and Washington state law by shipping it to a federal firearms licensee (FFL) in Washington as if it were a firearm, per ATM instructions which say (in part): Generally, for a person to lawfully transfer a firearm to an unlicensed person who resides out of State, the firearm must be shipped to a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL) within the recipient’s State of residence. He or she may then receive the firearm from the FFL upon completion of an ATF Form 4473 and a NICS background check. That FFL is then responsible for ensuring the transaction properly conducted in the state of Washington, including federal and state requirements. The FFL I contacted only charged $25.00 (plus collecting the state sales tax). Form 4473 was easy enough; only about one page for me to fill out. Of course, I've got a clean record, so going through channels isn't a problem for me, it took less than an hour. The FFL confirmed for me that it wasn't necessary for something like an antique musket, which legally isn't a firearm by the federal defeinitions. In my case the sender was a nervous "trust" lawyer who wasn't sure, hired yet another lawyer to advise him. The FFL didn't charge me anything for receiving that musket.	People can take their personal cars through the Channel Tunnel from Great Britain to France. They don't actually drive their cars through the tunnel, but going by car is a perfectly normal way to travel between those two countries. That's probably the most well-known place where drivers will switch from driving on one side of the road to the other, but there are many more . If driving with a car with the wheel on the "wrong" side were forbidden, these options would not exist, because at least one direction of travel would not work. Now, of course, that doesn't mean a country like Belgium, which does not have to direct way to Britain, couldn't forbid cars with the steering wheel on the right. But at least for EU states, that seems to be forbidden, as Poland and Lithuania learned when they tried to require cars that were to be registered there to have the steering wheel repositioned to the left Consequently, the Court holds that the position of the driver’s seat, an integral part of the steering equipment of a vehicle, comes within the harmonisation established by Directives 2007/46 and 70/311, so that, in the context of the registration of a new vehicle in their territory, the Member States may not require, for reasons of safety, that the driver’s seat of that vehicle be moved to the side opposite the direction of the traffic. It notes in that regard that the legislation at issue provides for exceptions with regard to the use of vehicles equipped with a steering-wheel on the right by people who reside in other Member States, and travel to Poland and Lithuania for a limited period (for example, tourists). That fact shows, according to the Court, that the contested legislation tolerates the risk involved in such use. So even those countries that tried to ensure that registered cars had the steering wheel on the "right" side made provisions for cars that were just traveling through. And the EU does not consider it a valid law to require wheels to be repositioned.	The article "The Posse Comitatus Act..." analyzes the legal restrictions on use of military power arising from that act. Following US v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, where the act played a role in trials related to Wounded Knee, it was found and subsequently supported in various ruling that the use which is prohibited by the posse comitatus statute is that which is regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory in nature, and causes the citizens to be presently or prospectively subject to regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions imposed by military authority. Mere "involvement" of "deployment" of the military is not contrary to the act. It should also be noted that the act includes a provision for actions expressly authorized by Congress, as was the case of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the related Magnuson Act of 1950. Hypothetically (in extremis), Congress might pass a law requiring the seizure of persons infected with a disease. If Congress expressly authorized USAMRIID to effect such seizures, that would not be in violation of the act. Otherwise, it would be. Since USAMRIID is a research lab and not an enforcement arm of the military, it is both highly unlikely that Congress would authorize such activities or that USAMRIID would get involved in this way. W.r.t. their ordinary operations, scientific research, nothing in what they do that contradicts the Posse Comitatus Act. Since we are dealing in hypotheticals, I should point out that SCOTUS has so far not definitively endorsed the "regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory" test, so that test could be overturned, though it is unlikely to be.	USA: 19 USC §1308 prohibits the import, export, or interstate sale of cat or dog fur: (1) In general It shall be unlawful for any person to— (A) import into, or export from, the United States any dog or cat fur product; or (B) introduce into interstate commerce, manufacture for introduction into interstate commerce, sell, trade, or advertise in interstate commerce, offer to sell, or transport or distribute in interstate commerce in the United States, any dog or cat fur product. A brief summary of state laws can be found this article at the Animal Legal & Historical Center: A handful of states have laws concerning dog and cat fur. Alabama, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia prohibit trade in domestic dog or cat fur. Virginia also prohibits killing a dog or cat for its fur, while Florida prohibits killing a dog or cat with the “sole” intention of either selling or giving away the pelt of the animal. In Oregon, a person cannot buy or sell dog or cat fur that is obtained from “a process that kills or maims the cat or dog.” UK: In the UK, the trade in cat & dog fur was banned by the The Cat and Dog Fur (Control of Import, Export and Placing on the Market) Regulations 2008, which were in turn passed to follow EU Regulation #1523/2007: The placing on the market and the import to, or export from, the Community of cat and dog fur, and products containing such fur shall be prohibited. More information about the legal consequences and enforcement of this law can be found at this review article. Finally, note that Cruella de Vil's actions did not involve trade in dog or cat fur; she acquired most of the puppies via legal means, and was planning to kill and skin them for her own personal use, not to sell the resulting articles to other parties. As such, I believe that her planned course of action would have been legal in the UK and in all US states except Virginia. The only unquestionably illegal act she undertook was directing Jasper & Horace to steal Pongo's and Perdita's puppies.	47 USC 227 forbids anyone to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice...to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call, unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States where an automatic dialing system is equipment which has the capacity— (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers. This prohibition covers voice calls, SMS and MMS, see Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness and Facebook v. Duguid. I assume that the messages are send automatically, not by hiring hundreds of people to enter numbers and send individual texts. Since businesses have been sued for doing this, a lawsuit is one of the consequences.
Can statutory common law be overruled entirely in the U.S. in jurisprudence? Magna Carta chapter 28 (King John’s c 38) basically provides for a plurality of law-worthy, credible and trustworthy witnesses for one to be take into the law of an official or a bailiff — in other words: To subject one to arrest or be ordered before a court in today’s parlance. Some U.S. Supreme Court decisions talk about “common sense” evaluation and not legal analysis being at the heart of deciding whether probable cause exist or not. Can the U.S. Supreme Court outrule then written law in the common law protected under the Fifth Amendment? Sources Here is a little more background — I thought it was more commonly know and I was lagging behind: Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., (1856) 59 U.S. 18 How. 272, 276, 15 L.Ed. 372: The words, "due process of law" were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words "by the law of the land," in Magna Charta. Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words (2 Inst. 50), says they mean due process of law. The Constitutions which had been adopted by the several States before the formation of the federal Constitution, following the language of the great charter more closely, generally contained the words, "but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." (see also Kerry v. Din (2015) 576 U.S. 86, 91 [affirming Murray’s Lessee; meaning of “[d]ue [p]rocess” of U.S. Const., amndt. 5 same; “Due Process Clause has [] origin in Magna Carta”]) And lastly: Wooden v. United States (Mar. 7, 2022, No. 20-5279) [pp. 33-34] providing: “Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, neither the federal government nor the States may deprive individuals of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const., Amdts. 5, 14. Generally, that guarantee requires governments seeking to take a person's freedom or possessions to adhere to "those settled usages and modes of proceeding" found in the common law[; (Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856); N. Chapman & M. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L. J. 1672, 1774-1775 (2012)) [including] ancient rule[s]” As you can see, the Due Process of Law is, in fact, defined by statute in the sense that the Magna Carta was written law and not merely the result of jurisprudence, yet it is regarded common law since it has been inherited from England. And although it has been, except for a few chapters, overruled in England, that didn’t outrule the same things in the U.S.. Thus the question remains: Can courts out-rule the clear language of Magna Carta on what the Due Process of Law means which requires that two law-worthy, credible, trustworthy witnesses statements support a charge or an arrest? This plurality-of-witnesses rule is in the Latin version and each subsequent English translation that remained. The meaning of “Due Process of Law” of the Fifth Amendment is, primarily, chapter 28 of Magna Carta and everything that built on it by judicial decisions.	Current Place of Magna Carta in US law Magna Carta is not now a current statute in any part of the US. I don't think it ever was (not since the US became independent of the UK), but I am not sure of that. Its words influenced the drafters of the US Federal Constitution. In some cases it may thus be helpful in understanding the original intention of the framers, but probably The Federalist and the records of the debates of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention are far more persuasive and more helpful. The major decisions of the Marshall Court are also very relevant. The US Supreme Court can and does change its interpretation of laws passed by Congress and of the Constitution. The words of Magna Carta are not more binding than Supreme Court decisions. In fact they are not binding at all, on any court or official in the US in any way. They are part of our legal history, but they are mnot current law, no more than the Code of Justinian or the Laws of Hammurabi are. The detailed procedural rules of Magna Carta are certainly not in fore in the US in 2022, nor in the UK either. The Ninth Amendment, which protects unenumerated rights of the states and the People does not protect,such procedural details, At least it has never been held to do so, to the best of my knowledge. I don't even know of a case where such a contention was seriously argued. The question states that: The meaning of “Due Process of Law” of the Fifth Amendment is, primarily, chapter 28 of Magna Carta and everything that built on it by judicial decisions. There is a sense in which this is true, but a very weak one. The concept of “Due Process of Law” was to some extent spelled out in Magna Carta, and later court decisions and legal and political philosophers (such as Locke) built on it. But most of the specifics of what constitute "due process" at the time of Magna Carta have since been dropped, and most of the current requirements were added much later. The idea of a hearing before an impartial tribunal, where the accused can present evidence, goes back to MC. Other requirements of due process, such as a right to a lawyer, rights against self-incrimination, rights against double jeopardy, the right of an accused to testify under oath, the right of an accused to issue subpoenas to witnesses, the right to an impartial jury, The right to be free of search, seizure or arrest unless probable cause has been shown under oath, and many others were added long after MC, some not until the 20th century. Such one-time aspects of due process as the right to be tried by members of one's own social class, a vital aspect of MC, are long gone, and never really existed in the US. Two-Witness Rule There was an early debate in a Supreme Court case, a perjury case if I recall correctly, on the need for two witnesses for conviction, but later statues have altered that rule. I don't know of any such rule ever applying to arrests in the US. It surely does not apply now. Coke and Magna Carta Early in the 1600s Lord Justice Edward Coke used the text of Magna Carta (among other things) to argue that Equity courts should not be able to use injunctions to stop cases pending in common-law courts. To do this he gave to Magna Carta a semi-sacred status it did not have when it was originally issued. (Indeed J.C. Holt, in his classic study Magna Carta, arguses that the charter was a victory for King John, and a defeat for the Barons, because the Barons allowed themselves to be bought off by promises that John never intended to keep, and that were not, in fact, kept. He further argues that it was the re-issues over the period 50-100 years later that gave MC what contemporary force it had, but that it was Coke's invocation of it that gave it the modern reputation as a foundation of freedom. I agree.) Coke claimed things for Magna Carta it could not have meant at the time it was issued, as the equity courts did not exist as an institution at that time, and would not for several generations. Charles Rembar, in his excellent non-technical history of Anglo-american law, The Law of the Land: The Evolution of Our Legal System (ISBN: 978-1-5040-1566-0; 1980) wrote (pp. 57-8): Early in the 1600s, Lord Justice Coke declared that neither king nor Parliament could transgress fundamental principles of common law. In time the proposition was true enough for king (also, academic: he himself could make no law, fundamental or trivial), but it has never held for Parliament; no one in office followed Coke along this line, not even Coke himself. Removed from the bench, he entered the House of Commons, and fought the Stuarts there. In the last stage of his long career, Coke asserted the utter supremacy of Parliament, an assertion which by the century’s end had become the constitutional law of England. The equation of "Due Process of Law" with "Law of the land" was part of this argument on Coke's part; it was, in effect, a piece of spin, which not all later scholars have noticed. "Due process" was, at beat, a part of the "law of the land", and it was always subject to modification by Act of Parliament (earlier, by acts of King-in-Council). It is true tht the US Supreme court has taken "Due process" in a procedural sense, to imply in most cases the right to a hearing, before an impartial tribunal, including a right to present witnesses and evidence, and that several of these principles are mentioned in Magna Carta, and come down to us from MC through much legal history. Magna Carta in the Case of Murray's Lessee In the case of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856) The US Supreme Court looked back throigh legal history to consider what is and is not permitted by the US Fifth Amendment, and its "Due process" clause. This is the kind of extensive excursion into legal history that was more common in Court opinions from the fist half of the Nineteenth Century that it is now. (Rembar remarked, on p 170 of The Law of the Land, "the Supreme Court, ... is fond of legal history and often gets it wrong.) But it is important to note how that opinion from the Taney Court (not the previous Marshall Court) used Magna Carta. The court wrote: [59 U. S. 277] We must examine the Constitution itself to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. We apprehend there has been no period since the establishment of the English monarchy when there has not been, by the law of the land, a summary method for the recovery of debts due to the crown, and especially those due from receivers of the revenues. It is difficult, at this day, to trace with precision all the proceedings had for these purposes in the earliest ages of the common law. In short that court is interested in Magna Carta only as it has influenced US state and Federal statutes. It in no way states or implies that the exact procedure of Magna Carta must be that of the current US, or is assumed to be such in the absence of a statute changing that procedure. Rather it looks at how US States adopted procedures derived from MC as a guide to the meaning of the Due process clause. After discussing at 59 U. S. 278 what the procedure for retrieving money from tax officials who had allegedly retained it improperly under the statutes of the Tudors (already long after Magna Carta, although well before Coke) the Court wrote: [59 U. S. 278] This brief sketch of the modes of proceeding to ascertain and enforce payment of balances due from receivers of the revenue in England is sufficient to show that the methods of ascertaining the existence and amount of such debts and compelling their payment have varied widely from the usual course of the common law on other subjects, and that, as respects such debts due from such officers, "the law of the land" authorized the employment of auditors, and an inquisition without notice, and a species of execution bearing a very close resemblance to what is termed a warrant of distress in the act of 1820, now in question. It is certain that this diversity in "the law of the land" between public defaulters and ordinary debtors was understood in this country, and entered into the legislation of the colonies and provinces, and more especially of the States, after the declaration of independence and before the formation of the Constitution of the United States. ... [59 U. S. 279-280] Provisions not distinguishable from these in principle may be found in the acts of Connecticut (Revision of 1784, p. 198), of Pennsylvania, 1782 (2 Laws of Penn. 13); of South Carolina, 1788 (5 Stats. of S.C. 55); New York, 1788 (1 Jones & Varick's Laws, 34); see also 1 Henning's Stats. of Virginia, 319, 343; 12 ibid. 562; Laws of Vermont (1797, 1800), 340. Since the formation of the Constitution of the United States, other States have passed similar laws. This legislative construction of the Constitution, commencing so early in the government when the first occasion for this manner of proceeding arose, continued throughout its existence, and repeatedly acted on by the judiciary and the executive, is entitled to no inconsiderable weight upon the question whether the proceeding adopted by it was "due process of law." *Prigg v. Pennsylvania-, 16 Pet. 621; United States v. Nourse, 9 Pet. 8; Randolph's Case, 2 Brock. 447; Nourse's Case, 4 Cranch C.C.R. 151. Tested by the common and statute law of England prior to the emigration of our ancestors, and by the laws of many of the States at the time of the adoption of this amendment, the proceedings authorized by the act of 1820 cannot be denied to be due process of law when applied to the ascertainment and recovery of balances due to the government from a collector of customs It is to support this last conclusion on what is and is not Due Process under the Fifth Amendment that the Court examined history, including Magna Carta. All the rest of this discussion of history was Obiter Dictum not binding precedent. And of course, not Supreme Court precedent is binding on future Supreme Court rulings. The court can and does overturn its own decisions, and change its interpretations of the Constitution. Wooden v. United States and its citation of Murray's Lessee In Wooden v. United States (Mar. 7, 2022, No. 20-5279), Justice GORSUCH in his opinion concurring in the result, but dissenting from the majority opinion's reasoning, wrote, starting on page 6 of his separate opinion: Consider lenity’s relationship to due process. Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, neither the federal government nor the States may deprive individuals of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" Amdts. 5, 14. Generally, that guarantee requires governments seeking to take a person’s freedom or possessions to adhere to “those settled usages and modes of proceeding” found in the common law. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856); N. Chapman & M. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L. J. 1672, 1774–1775 (2012). And among those “settled usages” is the ancient rule that the law must afford ordinary people fair notice of its demands. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. ___, – (2018) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3– 5). Lenity works to enforce the fair notice requirement by ensuring that an individual’s liberty always prevails over ambiguous law. Early cases confirm the message. In United States v. Wiltberger, a sailor had killed an individual on a river in China. 5 Wheat. 76, 77 (1820). But the federal statute under which he was charged criminalized manslaughter only on the “‘high seas.’” Id., at 93 (quoting Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 12, 1 Stat. 115). Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that other parts of the law might have suggested Congress intended to capture the sailor’s conduct. 5 Wheat., at 105. But he insisted that “penal laws are to be construed strictly” because of “the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals”—and, more specifically, the right of every person to suffer only those punishments dictated by “the plain meaning of words.” ... United States v. Mann tells a similar story. 26 F. Cas. 1153 (No. 15,718) (CC NH 1812). ... As the framers understood, “subjecting . . . men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law . . . ha[s] been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instrumen[t] of tyranny.” The Federalist No. 84, pp. 511–512 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); see also McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931) Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law . . . fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand The first thing to note is that this is not a majority opinion, and so not binding law. Indeed another opinion in this case specifically responds to Justice Gorsuch's views, taking issue with them. The next thing to note is that while the opinion does cite Murray’s Lessee, it never so much as mentions Magna Carta, nor does it quote any of the mentions of Magna Carta in Murray’s Lessee. Justice Gorsuch cites Murray’s Lessee to support two principles. One is the "rule of lenity" whch says theist when there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, it shall be read so as to favor the accused. The other is the "rule of fair notice" which says that a person shall not be convicted of crime unless some law clearly makes the actions charged criminal. Justice Gorsuch derives both of these from the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. To establish this, he cites, not Magna Carta, nor cases from Tudor times, nor US cases from before the Constitution, but US Supreme Court cases written by Justices Marshall and Story (both members of the Marshall Court), and one of the numbers of The Federalist (often considered a good guide to the intentions of the framers). Nothing in this citation implies that the detailed procedures of Magna Carta are now in force, nor that they ever were in the US. It applies only a general rule of law, not a detailed procedure, and that on the basis of US Supreme Court precedent, not because Magna Carta says so. The Great Charter may have been one of the earliest statements of these rules, but it is the reconfirmation of them, in case after US case, that makes them part of US law today.	(My expectation is that the proof has to be replicated and the conviction cannot be introduced as evidence). Your expectation is incorrect. The name of the legal doctrine that allows a criminal judgment to have this effect in a civil case is called "collateral estoppel" which is also sometimes called "issue preclusion". See, e.g., A-1 Auto Repair & Detail, Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy, 93 P.3d 598, 600 (Colo. App. 2004) ("Hardy contends Colorado law does not allow courts to apply collateral estoppel, now commonly known as the doctrine of issue preclusion, when the first adjudication is criminal and the subsequent litigation is civil. We disagree.") Similarly, a case out of California stated: To preclude a civil litigant from relitigating an issue previously found against him in a criminal prosecution is less severe than to preclude him from relitigating such an issue in successive civil trials, for there are rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and of a unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record paid for by the state on appeal. Stability of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safeguards. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 606, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962) (citations omitted). To the best of my knowledge, this is the rule in every U.S. jurisdiction (with the possible exceptions of Puerto Rico and Louisiana which are not common law jurisdictions). It is also the historical rule in British common law, although I don't know if this continues to be the case in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Procedurally, the determination that collateral estoppel applies would usually be made on a motion for summary judgment, or in the preparation of jury instructions which state that liability has been established and that the jury is to limit itself to determining causation and damages, rather than as an evidentiary matter. I've used this doctrine once or twice. For example, I used it in a case where someone fraudulently sold ditch company shares worth several hundred thousand dollars (in Colorado, water is gold) that he didn't own (a transaction that could not be unwound because the buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value and the seller had apparent authority as a trustee of a trust owning the shares even though he didn't have the actual authority to sell them under the trust) and then spent the money he received before he was discovered (if I recall correctly, for gambling debts). He was convicted criminally and then my client, the victim, sued for money damages including statutory treble damages for civil theft and attorney's fees based upon collateral estoppel and an affidavit as to damages in a motion for summary judgment. From a practical perspective the four main difficulties are that (1) people convicted of crimes often lack the income or assets to pay judgments, (2) there are double recovery issues involved in reconciling restitution awards in a criminal case (where the measure of damages is narrower) and damage awards in a civil case (where the measure of damages is broader), (3) there are priority issues involved in reconciling criminal awards for fines, restitution and costs, in each case with civil awards for damages, and (4) if the defendant declares bankruptcy, the non-dischargeability of the civil judgment must be affirmatively raised and proved (often this is elementary but there are strict time limits) in the bankruptcy proceeding. Tactically, it is often better to sue first, collect what you can, and to bring a criminal complaint only when it turns out that the perpetrator is judgment-proof.	Has it ever been formally established that giving any group, X, a priority of credulity in court over any other group, Y, would amount to granting the group X a title of nobility? No. This has never been formally established. In the 100 years between the ratification of the US Constitution and "Coffins v US", were there any laws or court decisions which would give any groups de facto nobility over other groups by demanding that their accusations against some other groups must be assumed (if formally stated) true until proven false? Effectively so. For example, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor works that way and that have been classes of people who have been historically not eligible to serve as witnesses. There are also many procedural circumstances historically (e.g. confessions of judgment) that operate in this manner. Did the argument that this amounted to granting of titles of nobility (which was prohibited) ever come up in any court cases? No.* The core litmus test under the title of nobility prohibition has been that a privilege granted by the government is hereditary and is not simply ordinary property. Without a hereditary component, the title of nobility prohibition does not apply. A lengthy analysis of this jurisprudence can be found in the answer to the Law.SE question "What exactly is a title of nobility?" While this question isn't a true duplicate of that one, the pertinent legal authorities are all discussed in the answers to that question. Obviously, it isn't possible to know every legal argument that was made orally in a trial court or legal brief for all of the United States for all time by everyone and anyone, often leaving no historical record whatsoever. There are no recorded appellate court opinions of which I am aware, however, that engage with this legal argument and rule upon it (which is usually what someone really means when they say "did this argument ever come up in a court case"). Post-Script This post also confounds a "presumption of guilt" with a per se rule regarding credibility determinations, but while both go to the issue of how evidence is evaluated by a tribunal, the two concepts otherwise have nothing in common, and sometimes it isn't clear which is which. For example, in many U.S. jurisdictions, a marriage certificate in existence at the time someone is born, accompanied by the passage of time under a short (often five year) statute of limitations, conclusively prevails on issues of paternity, over a DNA test that is 99.999% certain to be correct as a matter of genetics. You could interpret that as meaning that marriage clerks are always more credible than genetic scientists. But, of course, that isn't really the intent. Instead, this is effectively a substantive rule of law couched as an evidence rule. Similarly, the requirement that real property can only be conveyed in writing could be interpreted as an evidence rule, but it is more realistically viewed as a rule concerning the definition of what a transfer of real property really is that is useful to make a bright line rule. Thus, an oral statement can be a promise to transfer real property, but it doesn't really happen until there is a signed deed or other conveyance. A traffic ticket basically has a presumption of guilt in some jurisdictions, because if you fail to appear you are found guilty in absentia even without evidence, something that is not permitted as a matter of criminal procedure in the U.S. for more serious offenses for which you can be incarcerated. But, on the other hand, if you do appear, the prosecution has the burden of proving that you committed the offense alleged in the ticket. Perhaps the closest example there is to a presumption of guilt (either rebuttable or conclusive, depending upon the statute and facts) is a statutory rape law, which in theory, presumes that someone under a certain age does not have the capacity to consent to intercourse, rendering the offense rape. But, a more straightforward way of understanding those laws is that sex with a minor in the circumstances described is itself illegal without regard to any conclusive presumption of lack of consent. There are also many laws prohibiting certain people from testifying about certain matters in certain circumstances. For example, spouses may not testify against each other in court over a spouse's objection in many kinds of cases. These rights are called "privileges" and are not considered to be titles of nobility. The U.S. Code of Military Justice, intentionally allocates legal rights in these quasi-criminal proceedings in a manner that treats people with different military ranks unequally. Officers have different legal rights than enlisted soldiers, for example. But, since military offices are not hereditary, these rights are not titles of nobility.	Amendments to the US Constitution are part of the US Constitution, and this includes the so-called Bill of Rights. The doctrine of applying parts of the US Constitution to states, known as incorporation, comes from the 14th amendment: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The scope of the doctrine of incorporation is logically limited to amendments because the original articles of the constitution state how the federal government is run, and does not guarantee any rights or privileges to individuals. Amendments 1,2,4,8 are fully incorporated against states, 5 and 6 are partially incorporated, third and 7th are not incorporated, and for 9th and 10th there is no ruling. This arrangement derives from decisions by the Supreme Court, interpreting the 14th Amendment and the concept of "due process". If a state were to passe a law forbidding criticism of the governor (violating the First Amendment), an individual could sue to have the law found unconstitutional. Because, under the 14th Amendment, "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article", Congress can and has passed a law prohibiting violation of civil rights: 42 USC 1983. Since the state in this hypothetical scenario has violated federal law, the federal government (Dept. of Justice) has standing to sue the state for violating federal law.	Rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are legally irrelevant, what "counts" is rights as actually recognized by a particular nation. Article 9 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile") corresponds, to a fair extent, to Due Process rights under US law, whereas article 26 (the education article) does not correspond to anything in the US Constitution, though there may be state constitution correlates. Article 28 ("Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized") isn't enforceable in any meaningful sense. The right to a trial by a jury of one's peers is an example of a right that can be waived – that is a right that you have to option to exercise, each time the question arises. There is no mechanism in the US whereby a person can irrevocably go on record as always waiving that right. Theoretically, Congress could pass a law enabling a person to make some legal choice irrevocably: there are irrevocable financial and contractual decisions, where in the later case you may irrevocably waive your common law right to sue for damages. But the concept of fundamental constitutional rights is so important to the way that US courts think, that I doubt that a law enabling irrevocable waiver of enumerated constitutional rights would pass legal review. A constitutional amendment would be necessary: but that simply means it will be harder, not that it's impossible. Things could be different under a different constitutional framework. It might be possible to waive your Article 30 right to an 8 hour work day or voting rights per Article 66 in North Korea.	We can only guess at what argument he has in mind, but one possible argument is that the standard is unconstitutionally vague, similar to the argument by McDonnell in the recent McDonnell v US (admittedly about a different statute). The vagueness argument was developed in several of the briefs: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/ The unconstitutional vagueness argument has also been made specifically about 18 USC 793 (e). US v Hitselberger 1:12-cr-00231-RC D.D.C. (2014). The defendant made a motion to dismiss based on constitutional vagueness, but this motion was denied. Private Manning raised the same defence, also unsuccessfully: http://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/051012-vague.pdf	Congress can't override substantive rules of constitutional law Marbury v. Madison is a binding interpretation of what the U.S. Constitution permits or denies, and in substance, this law seeks to change that interpretation of the scope of the judicial power, so that interpretation may not be overruled except via a Constitutional amendment. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court, under their appellate jurisdiction, will declare unconstitutional or otherwise adjudicate unconstitutional any law passed by Congress; neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court will hear or otherwise engage in cases or controversies in which one or both parties put into discussion the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress, or ask for a law or a statue passed by Congress to be declared unconstitutional. The language in italics is jurisdiction stripping language, which I discuss below, and which is also discussed in another answer. But, the language in bold is enunciating a substantive rule of law regarding how the judicial branch may resolve a case that is otherwise properly before it. And, Congress does not have the power to change that to make the U.S. Constitution a dead letter under its Article III jurisdiction regulation powers. The language in bold language is a direct attempt to overrule a binding interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and that is beyond the authority of Congress to do, so the statute would be unconstitutional, at least, in part. Jurisdiction stripping Yes, Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to Article III, Section 2 which states: In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under the Regulations as the Congress shall make. But, there are parts of Article III that apply in addition to the power of Congress to create "Exceptions" the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the power to create and modify the "inferior courts" that exist. The first sentence of Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. This is crucial, and interacts with the Exceptions power. The default provision is that all judicial power as defined in Article III, Section 2 is vested in the "supreme Court" unless and until that power is instead vested in an "inferior Court" established under Article III that Congress creates by law. Therefore, Congress does not have the power to deny every court (or even every federal court) both original and appellate jurisdiction over any constitutionally justiciable claim arising under Article III, even if the claim is not within the express original jurisdiction of SCOTUS. If they deny every inferior Article III federal court jurisdiction over something within the constitutionally defined scope of the judicial power, then it reverts to the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court even though it is not expressly made a part of the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. The judicial power of the federal courts collectively is defined in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and extends to all cases arising under the U.S. Constitution which would include a claim to have a provision of federal or state law declared unconstitutional as in violation of the constitution. It says: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; . . . (This analysis is attributed to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story.) Now, this is not to say that Congress couldn't do something to make it harder procedurally to have statutes declared unconstitutional. For example, there would be a much harder claim of unconstitutionality if Congress vested original jurisdiction in all such cases in the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, and then only assigned one judge to that district, and denied the U.S. Courts of Appeal or the U.S. Supreme Court, appellate jurisdiction over those decisions. At some point, however, even this lesser restriction, rather than elimination of a judicial power would still be subject to challenge under the due process protections of the 5th Amendment. Writ jurisdiction Notably, Marbury v. Madison was a case brought in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court under a writ of mandamus, under the All Writs Act, and not in connection with its appellate jurisdiction. So, Congress would also have to repeal or amend the "All Writs Act" to pull off the intent of the proposed statute, because the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends by statute to writs that are not appellate in nature even though this power is very rarely exercised. A writ is a court order directed at a government official directing that government official to do something, or to refrain from doing something. But, there are many ways to back door a seemingly private cause of action, particularly one related to constitutionality, into a writ. And, if a court has jurisdiction over a writ, it has jurisdiction to entertain requests by litigants to have such writs issued. Congress can't remove a state court forum It is worth noting that every single state court from traffic court on up has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to declare that a statute is unconstitutional, and that state courts frequently do declare state statutes to be unconstitutional. Congressional jurisdiction to regulate jurisdiction is largely limited to regulation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It can put a federal question (e.g. copyright enforcement or disputes with the IRS) in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, but there are no cases in which Congress has been permitted to place a federal law in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts while also denying any federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under that law. Otherwise, state court jurisdiction isn't regulated by Congress. And, the Constitution specifically requires all federal, state and local officials to swear to uphold the U.S. Constitution which arguably provides an independent basis for state court jurisdiction over constitutionality claims arising under the U.S. Constitution. This is a really important point. For example, suppose that someone who lives in the same state as you do sues you entirely under state law in a state court, and that state's courts require you to bring any claim you have against that person in state court over which that state court has jurisdiction as a counterclaim or you forfeit that claim forever. If you have federal claims against the person who sued you in state court, and your claims are not one of the handful of issues (e.g. copyright enforcement) that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, you must enforce your federal claims against that person as counterclaims in that state court case, or you will lose them forever. For example, suppose that your employer sues you in state court for conversion (i.e. stealing company property) and you have a right to sue the employer for not paying you the right amount for your overtime work under federal law. Then, you must bring your federal overtime claims in state court as counterclaims to the conversion action, rather than in federal court. Similarly, even though state criminal charges are always brought in state courts, a criminal defendant in a state court criminal case, can raised arguments arising under the U.S. Constitution including a determination that a state criminal law is unconstitutional, in state court as a defense, even though the only federal court recourse a criminal defendant has is through an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court or a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus brought in federal district court after all state direct appellate relief is exhausted, after petitioning to the U.S. Supreme Court, and after all state post-conviction relief (including petitioning the final state order to the U.S. Supreme Court) is exhausted. In practice, this means, criminal defendants have no meaningful access to the federal courts other than two petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court which are discretionary, until they have been incarcerated wrongfully for five or ten years. But, federal defenses can and routinely are raised in the state court trial (and indeed, federal defenses that could be raised in a state trial court may not be raised in a habeas corpus petition in federal court unless they were first raised in or before the original state court trial). N.B.: Federal claims in the exclusive original jurisdiction of state courts The extremes to which jurisdiction stripping is allowed are explored in the handful of claims arising under federal law that are expressly not within the scope of the jurisdiction of any federal trial court or intermediate appellate court, or within the express non-appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. The most notable of these are affirmative private individual civil lawsuits against offenders under the federal robocall and junk fax law (a.k.a. the Telephone Consumer Protection Act a.k.a. the TCPA a.k.a. 47 U.S.C. § 227), which do not not require a writ, which may only be brought in state court, subject to an ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. But, the federal courts have exclusively jurisdiction over litigation many kinds of claims other than private civil actions arising under the TCPA. This law is much less constitutionally concerning than the one proposed in the question, however, because while Congress can't repeal the U.S. Constitution, it doesn't have to pass a law giving private individuals a private cause of action when they receive robocalls or junk faxes at all. It could pass a law that was enforceable by the FCC alone, for example, and in the case of the TCPA, there are persons, including the FCC and regulated persons who want to challenge a regulation issued by the FCC, who are entitled to utilize the federal courts to enforce the TCPA or to dispute it. For example, there is no private cause of action to enforce most federal criminal laws (as such, not just involving the same harm) with a civil lawsuit by the victim against the criminal, in either federal court or state court, but that is not unconstitutional. This is because federal criminal laws can be enforced by government prosecutors and defended against by private individuals, in Article III federal courts. Also, even private causes of action under the TCPA are subject to ultimate U.S. Supreme Court appellate review, and the U.S. Supreme Court is an Article III federal court.	The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.
Is it a crime to sneak into a hotel pool? Suppose a hotel pool is very easy to get into, although there is a sign that it is only for the hotel guests. Is getting caught punishable by law enforcement? This is in Orange County, Florida, USA.	Short Answer: If there are signs prohibiting non-guests then it's more than likely to be misdemeanor in the first degree. Long Answer: The offence is one of trespass contrary to Florida's TITLE XLVI, Chapter 810.09: (1)(a) A person who, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance: 1. As to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011; or 2. [omitted] commits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance. ;(b) [omitted] (2)(a) Except as provided in this subsection, trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.0821 or s. 775.0832. The general power of arrest, at 901.15, requires a warrant for this offence unless certain conditions are met, as explained here: When can an officer in Florida make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor? As a general rule, a warrant is required for a misdemeanor arrest unless: all of the elements of the misdemeanor were committed in the officer’s presence; or the officer has probable cause for the arrest and the misdemeanor is on the list of statutory exceptions found in Section 901.15, F.S.; or the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the subject has violated probation or community control in any material respect (sometimes called the “COP VOP” exception contained in Section 948.06). 1 The more likely punishments, based on a lack of specific detail, seem to be: For a misdemeanor of the first degree, by a definite term of imprisonment not exceeding 1 year 2Or: [not exceeding] $1,000, when the conviction is of a misdemeanor of the first degree Note that these punishments are maximums the court could impose if the hotel wanted to pursue the matter criminally.	I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.	Yes Usually, whoever got their hands on the defendant first would have first crack at it. The second jurisdiction would commonly not prosecute provided that justice was done in the first but they can - double jeopardy is not in play as a bar as they are different legal systems but courts usually apply the spirit that a person shouldn’t be punished twice for the same act.	If I attempt to carry such a product into the country, but then honestly declare it at the border (I would like to declare 10 kg of marijuana, sir), can I be prosecuted for attempted smuggling? This depends on the jurisdiction and its definition of "smuggling." In the US, as an example, smuggling implies fraud or "clandestine" action. Openly bringing a forbidden item and declaring it would not meet the definition of this crime. Or will I simply be faced with the choice of turning around or forfeiting my goods and continue without trouble? Depending on the product in question, probably not. In the marijuana example, even if you are not guilty of smuggling, you are guilty of possessing and transporting a controlled substance (see 21 USC subchapter I). You could also be charged with intent to distribute, which would likely be a more serious crime. You could also be charged under the laws of the state in which the port of entry is located. With regard to the methyl alcohol example, I do not know whether bringing it to the customs desk at a port of entry would constitute a crime.	Yes, in Orange County, CA, in a residential zone or on residentially-developed property, this is a code violation. Specifically you are looking at Title 3, Division 13, Article 1, Sec 3-13-4(11): Sec. 3-13-4. - Prohibited Conduct. Except as provided in section 3-13-6, exemptions, it shall be unlawful for any responsible party having charge or possession of any real property in county territory to:... (11) Keep, store, or maintain upon any premises under his/her control any abandoned, wrecked, dismantled, or inoperative vehicle, or part thereof, except as permitted by Table 3-13-6(c). You may store/work on this vehicle from a building or location that is not visible from the street, but you cannot work on or store the vehicle on the street or driveway. You might also be able to erect a 6' tall opaque fence around the car, provided the fence meets standards. The code making this illegal is a county ordinance for Orange County, CA, which is not applicable to other counties in California (other counties/cities may have their own ordinances). Codes which cover this sort of activity are generally made at the county or city level. They vary dramatically from location to location, and are often different based on the zoning of the property within the county or city.	If the ability to get a Pannini is conditioned on buying paper towels for money, then he isn't really selling paper towels for $2 and the Pannini for free, he is really selling a package consisting of paper towels and a Pannini for $2, so it would probably still be illegal. The phrase lawyers and judges use to talk about attempts to create loopholes like this one is "too clever by half", which means: "Shrewd but flawed by overthinking or excessive complexity, with a resulting tendency to be unreliable or unsuccessful."	They can charge you with anything they think you did. And yes, the circumstances play a large part in the decision to arrest, charge and prosecute. However, circumstances include you: Reputation is everything. If you are a 17 year old male troublemaker with a long juvie rap sheet, including 3 past instances of stealing golf carts, then expect to be charged with the theft. Honestly you would probably be charged with the theft if you had simply stayed away and called the cops to report it abandoned. If you came upon it in your vehicle and it's obviously blocking the road and your apparent motive is to figure out how to move it so you can get by, then you're probably in the clear. If you're a 44 year old owner of a golf cart business, PAL supporter, city councilwoman and know half the cops including one in the car that stopped you, then, they're going to pretty much listen to you as far as what's the deal with the cart. Probably ask you for help moving it safely, might even ask you to get your cart-hauler to take it to impound. You won't hear from the D.A. obviously; nobody will say "Sue Councilwoman stole a golf cart" because it would sound absurd and make the speaker appear to be a politically motivated liar. That's the power of reputation; no one would speak it even if you did steal it. (Of course if you got caught doing it on a Ring camera, well, the hero takes a fall!) Anything in between, they'll deal with it in proportion to both the facts about you and the fact about the situation. You do not have a right to get the same credibility as the councilwoman; that is earned. That's the power of reputation.	No, you are not personally criminally liable for a crime a third party has committed, even if you are their guardian. The conflict is managed by civil action, i. e. the store owner sues the child/guardian for damages. In general, it is not a crime to not report a crime, planned, happening, or finished. There is one section that penalizes failing to report a planned crime, § 138 StGB. However, only very serious crimes such as homicide are eligible. So what about aiding theft, §§ 242 Ⅰ, 27 Ⅰ StGB, e. g. by attending the child: This requires criminal intent, that means knowledge about and deliberate intent to commit a crime. Since the guardian wasn’t aware of anything, he can’t be liable. As a guardian (§ 1626 BGB, or in general any guarantor) you can commit a crime by omitting a behavior, § 13 Ⅰ StGB (Garantenstellung). Theft by omission, §§ 242 Ⅰ, 13 Ⅰ StGB. The purpose of § 13 Ⅰ StGB is that you are forced intervene if an infringement of protected legal interests (e. g. life and limb, property, freedom) is imminent. As a parent you are a guarding guarantor (Beschützergarant). You are supposed to protect your child. However, § 13 Ⅰ StGB only has the extent of protecting legal interests of your patron. The supermarket owner’s property is not a legal interest you are mandated to protect. Hence no crime either. Approving or rewarding a crime, § 140 StGB: Theft is not eligible, only crimes that are deemed suitable to disturb public order. Failure to educate, § 171 StGB: If you grossly fail to educate your child, even go as far as encouraging it in engaging in criminal activities, you commit a crime. However, this is a one time occurrence we’re talking about, so not even remotely criminal. Various “gang crimes”. A family should not be considered a gang (Art. 6 Ⅰ GG), but the DA has an infinite amount of fantasy.
Does "agree to negotiate" mean it has to happen? We are in the process of purchasing some land, and one of the requirements of the contract is The buyers, BUYERS_NAME, agree to negotiate a trade of land with the neighbors, NEIGHBORS_NAME, if requested by the NEIGHBORS_NAME. My concern is with the phrase "negotiate a trade of land". Does that mean that no matter what, we will be required to have a successful negotiation, meaning it ends with land traded? Or does it simply mean that we are required to talk to them about it if they request to talk about it? Thank you!	Agreements to agree are unenforceable The contract requires you to negotiate and, probably, to do so in good faith (or at least, not in bad faith). That means you must come to the table looking to do a reasonable deal. It doesn’t, and cannot, require you to make that hypothetical deal. That would be an agreement to agree and there is a long line of legal precedent that such terms are unenforceable.	we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early & unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself.	Yes From clause 7 of the Ebay agreement: When you enter into a transaction you create a legally binding contract with another user, unless the item is listed in a category under the Non-binding bid policy. You have a contract, if you don't fulfil your obligations under it you can be sued. You can only terminate a contract a) if the contract provides for termination and the relevant circumstances have happened, or b) due to a breach of a condition (but not a warranty) of the contract by the other party or c) some very limited and highly technical circumstances at law. The fact that the other party is rude doesn't fit within b) or c) and, barring some very unusual contract terms, won't fit in a) either. Make good on your legally enforcable promise.	The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement).	There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order.	You have a contract - if you break it, you can be sued. A contract is a legally binding promise that the state (through its courts) will enforce. You promised to pay the deposit - you must pay the deposit. You promised to pay rent on a regular basis for the period of the lease - you must pay that rent. You don't want to live there? Fine, the lease probably doesn't require you to. So long as you keep paying the rent, you don't have to. If you break the lease, then the landlord can sue you for the damage that they suffer - this is typically the value of the rent until they can find a new tenant and if that tenant is paying less than you, the difference between that amount and your rent for the balance of the lease. If you want to renegotiate the contract (for example, to end it early), you will need to ask your landlord but they are under no legal obligation to release you from it. They may be willing to do so out of the goodness of their heart and/or if you pay them.	I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal.	In the event of a dispute, the person resolving the matter, probably an arbitrator in the case of a commission dispute between two realtors and either an arbitrator or a judge and jury depending upon what your listing agreement says about that issue, would hear the testimony from both parties and decide. The intent of the parties is supposed to govern in cases of clerical errors, but a signed document has a lot of weight, especially in such a prominent term. It is a little hard from the way the question is posed to determine who is willing to correct the typo and who insists on enforcing the contract containing the typo.
How can I confirm that an attorney is legit? There's an attorney I can use to jump through MANY hoops to get a good passport. His work he published on his website seems legit according to the translator I used. He's publishing hundreds of documents related to clients and cases won, though he's not promising anything for certain. If he was cheap, this would be a case of too good to be true. But the things he's talking about related to the law are weird (this isn't exactly a developed country so maybe its not weird idk). I found several people (expats like me) who knows of him. Everyone thinks there's something weird here. So none of us wanted to take the risk of working with him. But I want to give it a shot. Here's what I'm thinking. If he's bribing officials or doing something shady, this might come back to bite me in the ass along with all his other clients maybe in 3 years or maybe 15. I think this sort of thing might stay in your record your whole life, making it impossible to get a citizenship, residency and even a visa from all countries. I don't know how this works exactly but this is a possibility, right? So is there a way to figure this out? Should I hire a private investigator to check up on this attorney? Should I hire another attorney to figure this out but what if they're friends? Is there another way? I might be extra cautious here but I think its worth it Edit 1. More info This is not a citizenship by investment program Nothing is 100% clear in this part of the world but the lawyer using some sort of loophole in the legal system. He's quoting the law (a few pages) in his website to explain what he does. This looks weird to me and others. He might be 100% truthful or this might be a cover. He's not promising anything but his references online (on a public forum) are saying that he's the only guy who's doing this and that he discovered the method he's using. This also looks weird to me. Based on my research, other lawyers have higher success rates compared to him. But if you go with them you jump through hoops and in that case you can do it solo without lawyer in most cases assuming you know the language Edit 2. More info Here's what might happen which is my concern. 5 years later their government sorts itself out and one day they discover that this guy bribed officials. Turns out most of the fees are for briberies. So they put him in jail. They also revoke the citizenships this guy got for his clients, or maybe they don't. Then they start cases against clients because they think clients knew what this guy was doing and they were willingly cooperating. So now his clients are also criminals or whatever this is called. Now you're fucked. This is going to come up when someone does a background check on you like Interpol. INTERPOL enables police in our 194 member countries to work together to fight international crime So that means when you apply for a new visa, residency or citizenship, this is going to come up. They're going to see that and reject you.	The short answer is that there are many different ways that different countries regulate lawyers, and thus, many different ways to go about confirming the legitimacy of a lawyer. There is also considerable variation by country and by the type of legal situation involved, regarding the effect of a good faith reliance on inaccurate advice from a lawyer. The fact that there is so much variation in this is one of the reasons that fraud and corruption in international transactions involving people who are, or who claim to be, lawyers is fairly common. My office gets dubious communications involving people who claim to be lawyers (sometimes hijacking the names, photos, and trade dress of legitimate law firms and lawyers with subtly spoofed contact information) several times a week. One option is to proactively seek out firms using recognized and well-established legal directories with multinational operations and ratings of each lawyer's competence and ethics, rather than responding to cold call style advertising or online commentary and essays. Historically, the leading publication in this niche was Martindale Hubbell, but there are now multiple competitors that use this business model. Another option is to rely on word of mouth referrals and/or corroboration from people in a good position to know, such as embassy staff from your country in the country in question, or from professional employees of large multinational businesses in the country in question. Ideally, rely on more than one source for each law firm you consider retaining.	IMHO, your questions reflect several misunderstandings of how the process works. So, with your permission, I will avoid directly answering your questions and instead focus on suggestions how to best help you plot a path forward. Your counterparty has the burden of proof. If your counterparty forged your signature on a contract, then they must prove you signed it or they can not enforce it. In order to enforce the contract, they will need to sue you civilly. Then you can introduce evidence of their forgery at that time. Inform your counterparty you did not sign the contract. Then act accordingly. If your counterparty forged your signature on an extension contract then you should inform them immediately after it has come to your attention. Advise them you have no intention of complying with a contract you never signed. And that if they try to enforce the forged agreement, you will defend yourself "vigorously." Never threaten criminal charges to advance your position in a civil case. This behavior is a crime in itself. It's called extortion. If you want to pursue criminal charges at some point then do it without relating it to the civil case. The police are not your only means of pursuing criminal charges. You can also schedule a meeting with your District Attorney, State's Attorney (whatever that position is called in your state) or your state's Attorney General. In other words, you might want to approach the government's attorney responsible for prosecuting crimes in your jurisdiction. Forget about involving the police. They have given you their position on the matter. Approach the DA or AG office instead. If the DA/AG decides to use the police, she we will make that decision then inform the police how she needs to use their services. Police are wary of being used as leverage in civil disputes. That's probably the reason for their policy decision regardless of whether it's technically justified by the law or not. Your counterparty can't "fix" anything. If they claim you signed a document you did not, they will have to produce that document with your signature on it. This will presumably be your Exhibit A evidence they forged it. Disclaimer: I am a lay person and not an attorney. This writing is no substitute for proper legal advice. If you need help with a specific legal situation please hire an attorney and do not rely on anything I have written here.	From the German lawyer association ("Deutscher Anwaltverein") one can find the following (Google-translation): In the case of a purely preventive identity check, the officers are initially only allowed to determine the identity of the respondent. This means that you can ask for your name, date and place of birth, home address and nationality and have your ID shown - by the way, as a German citizen you don't have to always have your ID with you. "You don't have to answer any questions beyond that," says lawyer Robert Hotstegs from the German Lawyers' Association (DAV). Of course, police officers often try to gather more information with emphatically casual questions. "Well, where do we come from" or: "And where are we going now?" Are typical examples. The police are not allowed to insist on an answer. Anyone who, as a respondent, is voluntarily too willing to provide information can harm themselves and possibly even give rise to concrete suspicions. So they are allowed to ask such things, but you don't need to answer everything. How to handle such situations, again according to the link above: “I recommend answering the survey as briefly and politely as possible. This has a de-escalating effect and helps to end the unpleasant situation as quickly as possible, ”says Attorney Hotstegs. However, you should always answer the questions about yourself. Because if the police cannot determine the identity of a person or only with great effort, they may take further measures to determine the identity. This includes taking it to the police station and, under certain circumstances, a search. Otherwise, these measures are not permitted without a specific reason.	I suspect that this person could get a green card under 8 USC 1259 or 1255a, since it seems that he entered in 1952 or so, which was long before the Reagan amnesty. These sections of the code concern those who entered the US before 1972 and 1982, respectively. You might try asking on Expatriates as there are many people there who are familiar with immigration law. A consultation with an immigration lawyer is probably advisable.	If you're in the United States, another lawyer in a firm you've hired may or may not be your attorney, but it would not be uncommon for him to have some involvement in the case, and he would be expected to treat you as a client in terms of privilege and conflicts of interest. Just the same, this is something you need to be very direct on. "Are you my attorney?" or "Have we established an attorney-client relationship?" are going to be your best options.	You would be amazed at how vanishingly few the number of cases are where a signature is disputed. Signatures are easy, quick and don't require you having inky fingers all the time. They are so useful that to throw them out to deal with infinintesimally small fractions of disputes over their veracity (bearing in mind that 99.999999999% of contracts never have a dispute that gets to a court [or at all]) is ridiculous. When it does happen, handwriting analysis is probably not going to be put into evidence anyway. Testimony like "I saw him sign it" is way more likely to be used.	There are several elements working in your friend's favor. The first is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." In an entrapment case, the police have recordings or documents claiming that the "girl" was underaged. If there is no such smoking gun from the (real) girl, the case (probably) would not be prosecuted in the U.S. He doesn't have to prove that she told him she was 18; "she" (or the police) has to prove that she told him she was "not." The second factor is "remoteness" in time, and distance. Two years after a U.S. state sent me a "nasty letter," I asked my lawyer if the state would ever come after me. He answered, "If they were going to do this, you would have heard further by now." The other factor, distance and cross border, (three countries: Turkey, the U.S., his home country) further militates against prosecution except for highly aggravating circumstances such as drug dealing, gambling, or sex for pay. A third factor is that your friend would not come close to qualifying as a "serious offender." This would be someone like a drug dealer, or the head of a "call girl" ring. The cops concentrate their effects on big "busts" like this that make their careers, not "small fry" like your friend. But of course they use the publicity from the big catches to scare everyone else. While there is no "guarantee" against "the worst possible consequences," the chances of them happening are similar to his getting hit by lightening, and less than his chances of being hit by a car crossing the street. No one stresses out about those chances. He shouldn't either. I am not a lawyer but I have done paralegal work in a law office.	There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court.
Germany - spousal liability for suicide Trigger warning - suicide. This is a throwaway account, because. I have a long term illness that is going to kill me in a nasty way - not in the next 5 to 10 years, but eventually. I live in Germany and I am married to a German. We have laws here requiring you to render assistance. Recently (in the last 5 years) we had a case where people stepped over a 'passed out' homeless person in a bank lobby who died (or was already dead). The court (quite rightly) found them guilty of neglecting their duty of care. They should at least have called the emergency services. This is a basic requirement of law. My question is about how this law applies to a spouse. Eventually, when it is my time to go, I do not want to wait out my disease but would rather pick a time and place of my choosing. Under this law, does my spouse live under the same threat? Do I need to hide this from her, or can I let her know of my intent? If she is there and present to the end, does she risk prosecution if she does nothing to stop it? This is not a question about assisted dying laws in Germany (which I know a bit about), but simply about spousal liability about knowing what is going on. In the spirit of this stack answers about other jurisdictions are welcome, but only answers about Germany are liable to be selected.	There are numerous what-ifs. Society’s moral values and thus laws may change. Or the unlikely death of your wife makes this question moot. (Let’s hope not.) Yes, failure to render assistance is punishable under § 323c Ⅰ StGB. Everyone can commit this crime (Allgemeindelikt). However, this section concerns accidents, contingencies or other unplanned adverse events. In your specific case there is no element of “surprise” though, quite the contrary. Your wife does not even need to be aware of the circumstances; the assessment “is there an accident” is made objectively. Having said that, unfortunately there’s a difference of opinion how courts judge (case law) and how “legal scientists” (at law school) think. Ultimately it depends on what evidence investigators find. Frankly, § 323c Ⅰ StGB is a “minor issue” here. You can get at most “just” a one-year-sentence. And there’s the option to consider one’s own spouse’s death as poena naturalis, thus refrain from imposing any penalty because the grieving widow “won’t learn anything” from that, § 60 1 StGB←§ 153b StPO. I’d worry more about §§ 211 ff. (murder, manslaughter, etc.): To kill someone means, a) any short‑term shortening of lifetime through action, or b) in the case of § 13 StGB, any failure to potentially prolong the lifetime. § 13 StGB, Garantenstellung, also applies to spouses, cf. § 1353 Ⅰ 2 BGB. It could be argued that failure to take, say, a loaded firearm away from you constitutes manslaughter. Or, worse, maybe you’re particularly wealthy and she’ll inherit your assets. This could be construed as greed, an aggravating circumstance. At any rate it’s necessary that the omitted action makes a difference, i. e. prevents or at least inhibits the crime’s success (your death). At some point, with terminally-ill patients, you might say “he’ll die tomorrow anyway”. Then your wife could attend your suicide. Finally, for a legally airtight plan I’d seriously consider to change the jurisdiction though, e. g. by going to Switzerland. Everything happening here is subject to German criminal law, § 3 StGB. PS: Marriage can be viewed as a kind of contract. In principle you are completely free in formulating its terms. However, you cannot make provisions concerning termination of life (nichtdisponibles Rechtsgut).	It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.	A police officer (or any other random person) would not be guilty of a crime or subject to civil liability for standing by and watching a suicide occur when it could be prevented, unless the person attempting to commit suicide was in his custody and he failed to take reasonable care to prevent a suicide in which case the officer could be subject to civil liability. It would not be a violation of the law, however, for a police officer (or in most cases, even a private citizen) to intervene to attempt to stop an attempted suicide. Likewise, prisons and prison guards can have civil liability for failing to prevent the suicide of someone in their custody. Of course, a police officer might still receive a negative employment evaluation from his supervisor for such conduct, or might even be fired for it depending on the rules of a particular department, as it would reflect poorly on the police department and show bad judgment on the officers part. In general, an affirmative duty enforceable by a lawsuit to take reasonable efforts to prevent someone from committing suicide applies in circumstances where the person attempting to commit suicide is in someone else's care and custody and has their liberty constrained. So, there could be liability on the part of a hospital or treating medical personnel (I've actually brought such a case that was dismissed due to malpractice in missing a deadline by local co-counsel who was then disciplined for ethical violations by the State of Illinois for his conduct.) In the absence of such a relationship, a legal duty to take affirmative action to prevent a suicide generally does not arise. Certain medical facilities and providers are required to make anonymized incident reports for the purpose of creating national public health statistics on a periodic basis. In certain extreme circumstances, there are duties to report someone who is a threat to others which may also include a risk of suicide, to authorities, but those are quite narrowly interpreted, and actual legal consequences from failing to warn are very rare. There may be other reporting requirements in educational institutions and for mental health professionals, but I am not personally aware of them and I do not believe that they are national in scope. Usually, for criminal liability, there would have to be actual affirmative acts to aid or to attempt to cause a suicide.	Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.	Yes, but only under very limited circumstances that would not be applicable to most people. Under directive 2004/38/EC, your wife can be deported only if she is a threat to public safety, health, or policy. This is particularly a consequence of Articles 3 (section 1) and 7 (sections 1 and 2). Provisions concerning expulsion are found in Chapter VI. Another possibility that could lead to her expulsion is a finding by the French government that your marriage is not genuine, or was undertaken as a marriage of convenience (Article 35).	General Answer I have not found any law or regulation that specifically says that an immigration applicant or the applicant's sponsor (spouse) must disclose a prenuptial agreement if one exists. But immigration officials have broad discretion in interviews, and might well ask about such agreements. If asked, it is very unwise to lie or evade the question. There is no law forbidding a prenuptial agreement in such a case, or making a would-be immigrant who has signed such an agreement ineligible. However, if the immigration officers believe that the marriage is a "sham" designed largely to evade immigration laws, they might declare the marriage invalid for immigration purposes. This is likely to significantly hinder the application, if not end it. If the agreement makes it appear that the parties contemplate that the marriage will be short-lived, and that an end to the marriage will occur in the near future, that makes it look like a sham marriage. If it appears that the prime reason for the marriage was financial, and particularly if the US party has apparently been paid or subsidized for entering into the marriage, that also makes the marriage look like a sham. If the terms of the agreement support either of these assumptions, that may cause a problem. It will be helpful if the agreement is carefully drafted to make it clear that the marriage is one of affection or love, and is intended to be lasting, with the agreement only present to help deal with issues in the possible case of the marriage not lasting. Affirmation of Support (I-864) Also, it is often requires that the sponsor/spouse sign an Affirmation of Support (I-864). This is an agreement by which the sponsor promises to support the applicant at at least 125% of the US Federal poverty level. The sponsor also shows resources sufficient to provide such support. The obligation under this agreement last6s until the applicant has become a US citizen, or has been credited with 40 quarters (10 years) of Social Security earnings credit. Under federal law and case law, a prenup cannot waive or reduce the obligations under an I-864 agreement. A prenup that purports to do so would probably be a significant negative indication for an immigration official. Parties must Understand a Prenup Also if it appears that the non-US spouse (the applicant) does not understand the nature and effect of a prenup, that might also be a negative indication. This is one reason why it is often a good idea that each party should be represented by a separate lawyer in the drafting of a prenup. Such a lawyer should be able to draft the prenup agreement in such a way as not to raise suspicions with an immigration officer. Disclosing a Prenup We here at Law.SE cannot advise whether an applicant should disclose the existence of a prenup at an immigration interview. Such agreements are not normally registered with any government agency, nor are they normally searchable on any web site. But an applicant should probably assume that a question about such an agreement might be asked at an interview, and be prepared with an answer. Sources and Quotes The page "Can a nuptial (prenup) agreement waive rights under the Form I-864?" states: [F]ederal courts have squarely held that a pre- or post-nuptial agreement cannot waive rights under the Form I-864. Even if a sponsored immigrant has signed a document saying that she forfeits all rights under the I-864, that agreement is meaningless in federal court. It is very common for sponsored immigrants to sign a nuptial agreement. Often this happens before the person completes the immigration process. For example, someone might come to the U.S. on a K-1 visa, then be forced to sign a prenuptial agreement before getting married. Usually these nuptial agreements will contain broad language that the immigrant waives all right to “alimony” or spousal maintenance. But sometimes the agreements will also specifically cross-reference the Form I-864. Federal courts see two main problems with nuptial waivers. First, these agreements undermine the purpose of the I-864. Or at least they try to. Congress created the Form I-864 so that immigrants would be guaranteed basic financial support of they need it. More specifically, the I-864 ensures that a sponsor rather than American taxpayers provides the immigrant with support. If nuptial agreements could waive support, it basically leads to the following situation: the sponsor promises the U.S. government that it will provide support, then turns around and creates a document with the immigrant that says, “but I’m not actually going to provide the support.” It would be a bit crazy if a federal statute could be undermined in that way. Here is how one court in the District of Utah put it: To permit a sponsor to unilaterally terminate the Form I-864’s financial support obligation through a separate agreement with the immigrant would ignore the interests of the U.S. Government and the benefits of taxpayers and charitable donors. It would also defeat the Form I-864’s purpose of preventing admission of an immigrant that is likely to become a public charge at any time. Therefore, nuptial agreements will not terminate a Form I-864’s financial support obligation. The second reason that courts disregard nuptial agreements is the text of the I-864 itself. The I-864 contract lists five “terminating events” that ends a sponsor’s support obligation. These include the immigrant becoming a citizen or being credited 40 quarters of work. (You could count the sponsor’s death as a sixth terminating event). But those terminating events are the only thing that ends a sponsor’s obligation. Signing a private nuptial agreement isn’t on the list of terminating events, so that simply isn’t a thing that can end a sponsor’s obligation. The page "Can a prenup protect me when marrying a non citizen?" from Joleena Louis Law reads: One of the most obvious concerns for people marrying non-citizens is how having a prenup will look to immigration officials. You don’t want to give the impression that the marriage is happening for financial reasons and it does help to show co-mingling of assets. However, legitimate marriages have prenups, and a well-drafted agreement that is fair to both parties and makes sense for the situation won’t necessarily give a bad impression. Another thing to keep in mind is that you may need to sign an Affirmation of Support for your spouse, which in which you are acknowledging that you have the means to financially support your spouse at a minimum level of 125% of the federal poverty threshold and accept legal responsibility for their financial support. A prenup cannot absolve you of this obligation and you are not released from this obligation until your spouse becomes a United States citizen, permanently departs the country, or is credited with forty quarters of coverage via the Social Security Act. The page "Do Prenuptial Agreements Affect Spousal Immigration? from Family Law San Diego reads: Federal immigration law provides for a U.S. citizen to sponsor the immigration of their foreign spouse. The married couple must apply for a family-based immigrant visa allowing a spouse from a foreign country to enter the United States and obtain Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) status—also known as a “green card” holder. Among the various immigration forms that are required to obtain a visa for an immigrant spouse is an Affidavit of Support (Form I-864). By signing and submitting an Affidavit of Support, the U.S. citizen spouse enters into a contractual agreement with the United States acknowledging that they have the means to financially support their spouse at a minimum level of 125% of the federal poverty threshold and accepting legal responsibility for their financial support until their spouse becomes a U.S. citizen or earns credit for 40 [quarters] of work. Importantly, getting a divorce does not relieve the citizen spouse of their obligation to provide the required amount of spousal support to their spouse. Furthermore, the affiant [sponsor] is responsible for reimbursing government agencies for the cost of any “means-tested public benefits” that the immigrant spouse receives. Spouses who have been married for less than two (2) years will receive what is known as “conditional permanent resident” status. This means that the couple must prove that they did not get married for the purpose of avoiding federal immigration laws. If USCIS concludes that a couple entered into the marriage to evade federal immigration laws, their marriage will be deemed invalid for immigration purposes. As a result, the spouse seeking to immigrant to the United States will be denied entry or removed from the United States. The citizen spouse may also be subject to civil or criminal penalties. A prenuptial agreement is a contract into which prospective newlyweds enter, governing their rights and responsibilities as married spouses concerning matters such as spousal support and the distribution of marital assets at the end of their marriage, whether due to divorce or death. The provisions of a prenuptial agreement go into effect when the couple gets married. Although there are few legal requirements to form a valid premarital agreement, the judicial enforcement of its provisions may be questionable depending on the circumstances of each case. Generally, a prenuptial agreement is not enforceable if it was not the product of mutual voluntary assent to its terms. As a result, circumstances that suggest that party did not understand the contract, or would not have reasonably agreed to its terms if they had a meaningful choice, call the enforceability of the agreement into question. Spouses with conditional permanent resident status should be careful about the potential effect of a prenuptial agreement. Evidence indicating that a party did not understand the terms of a contract may endanger the enforcement prospects of its provisions, especially if English is not their first language. Additionally, terms that reduce the immigrant spouse’s property rights may suggest that the couple had a deal to have the citizen spouse sponsor the foreign spouse’s immigration into the U.S. Importantly, provisions purporting to govern the couple’s rights and responsibilities regarding spousal support are effectively superseded by the terms of an Affidavit of Support. This is because a prenuptial agreement is a contract between the spouses, whereas an Affidavit of Support is a contract between the citizen spouse and the U.S. government. The Page "Why Should You Get a Prenuptial Agreement with a Foreign National?" from DiPietro Law Group reads: If your new spouse does not intend to work in the United States, you may need to sign an Affidavit of Support. This contract requires you to maintain a standard of living for your new spouse exceeding 125 percent of the poverty level. You are not released from this obligation until your spouse becomes a United States citizen, permanently departs the country, or is credited with forty quarters of coverage via the Social Security Act. Your prenuptial contract does not automatically absolve you of this support. In a notable 2014 case, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland indicated that prenuptial contracts could not waive Affidavits of Support. Prenuptial contracts can occasionally backfire in green card cases. Immigration officials look for signs that a marriage occurred for financial or citizenship reasons, and not for love. Officers often seek evidence of commingled assets, which may not be available among couples with prenuptial agreements. The pager "How do Prenuptial Agreements Affect Immigration?" by Jared Leung from JCL Immigration Attorneys, reads: A prenuptial agreement is a legal contract that outlines how assets will be divided in the event a marriage ends in divorce. These agreements also discuss the obligations of a spouse to provide financial support for the other party in the event of a divorce. In general, both parties must fully understand all of the terms of a prenuptial agreement in order for the contract to be binding. If a court finds that one party was unaware of what he or she was signing, or if the agreement is so one-sided as to be deemed unfair, the provisions held within can be invalidated. How do prenuptial agreements impact immigration? When a United States citizen sponsors the immigration application of a foreign spouse, the couple needs to file for a family-based immigrant visa, often called a “green card.” Part of this process involves filing an Affidavit of Support, a document that demonstrates that the citizen has the ability to support the other party at a level at least above 125% of the poverty threshold until the applicant becomes a United States citizen. This obligation remains in place in the event of divorce. The provisions of a prenuptial agreement should not give the appearance of a “deal” between parties for the purpose of circumnavigating immigration rules. There can also be challenges if the foreign spouse does not speak English well enough to understand the details of the agreement. However, having a prenuptial agreement does not necessarily casts doubt to the truthfulness of the marriage. Individuals with decent net worth or prior debt may use prenuptial agreements to protect oneself and/or the spouse-to-be. The existence of a prenuptial agreement should be considered with other factors in the marriage to determine whether it would cause problems in an immigration application Case Citations Cases in which Federal courts have held that a prenup does not void an I-864 agreement: [Erler v. Erler 824 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2016). Golipour v. Moghaddam No. 4:19-cv-00035-DN-PK (D. Utah Feb. 7, 2020) (granting and denying in part cross-motions for summary judgment). Anderson v. United States, No. C17-0891RSL (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2019) (dicta). Toure-Davis v. Davis, No. WGC-13-916 (D. Md. March 28, 2014) (memo. op.). Shah v. Shah, 4:12-cv-4648, (RBK/KMW), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4596 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2014) (memo. op.) Cyrousi v. Kashyap, 386 F. Supp. 3d 1278 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (holding that waiver is not an affirmative defense available to sponsors) Liu v. Kell, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1128 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (same).	I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!).	In Austria they have a law about "Kreditschädigung" (website from the Austrian government, "credit damage") translated by Google as: Because of credit damage, a person is liable to prosecution if he or she asserts incorrect facts and thereby harms or endangers the credit, the acquisition or professional advancement of another person. A prison sentence of up to six months or a fine of up to 360 daily rates is provided for the offense of credit damage. If you setup a webpage which lists things which might harm somebody's business, you have to proof that every single claim you make is correct (not just your individual experience). So if you have solid proof for each of your claims of your Q&A, you might win a probable law suite. The way you wrote it, it might be difficult to proof because it seems to be your personal experience. See also here for details. (in German).
What law(s) did Paul Bussetti break when he burnt the model of Grenfell Tower? Paul Bussetti has just been given a 10-week suspended jail sentence for burning a model of Grenfell Tower (The tower in London that caught fire in 2017 killing 72 people). Having read that BBC article and some others (Guardian, LBC) no one has said what law(s) he broke. What law(s) has he broken?	The first sentence of the cited article reads: A man has admitted sharing a grossly offensive video of a cardboard model of Grenfell Tower being burned on a bonfire. Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 seems to be the most relevant offence: (1)A person is guilty of an offence if he— (a)sends by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly offensive... However, there's also similar offence under section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988: (1)Any person who sends to another person— (a)a letter, electronic communication or article of any description which conveys— (i)a message which is indecent or grossly offensive; (b) [...] is guilty of an offence if his purpose, or one of his purposes, in sending it is that it should, so far as falling within paragraph (a) or (b) above, cause distress or anxiety to the recipient or to any other person to whom he intends that it or its contents or nature should be communicated... Both charges seem available on the information provided, so it was up to the Crown Prosecution Service to pick the most likely to succeed.	Assuming that the above can be established by admissible evidence, that sounds like a case for first degree murder, and probably various other crimes as well. In some jurisdictions there is a specific crime of "Murder for hire" which might also apply if available on the jurisdiction where this occurred. A comment mentions a possible insanity defense. That is going to depend on detailed facts not included in the question, but might be possible.	This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough.	Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this.	The English version of the law says By a maximum imprisonment of five years shall be punished for whosoever in public deliberately expresses their feelings or engages in actions that: a. in principle is hostile and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia; b. has the intention that a person should not practice any religion at all that is based on belief in Almighty God. from the Bahasa Indonesia law Dipidana dengan pidana penjara selama-lamanya lima tahun barangsiapa dengan sengaja di muka umum mengeluarkan perasaan atau melakukan perbuatan: a. yang pada pokoknya bersifat permusuhan, penyalahgunaan atau penodaan terhadap suatu agama yang dianut di Indonesia; b. dengan maksud agar supaya orang tidak menganut agama apapun juga, yang bersendikan ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa The law does not define "public", so it would normally mean what it means in ordinary language (and that is not at all easy to figure out: it might be considered "public" if the expression was made to a single person). However, in this case, it was clearly in public (at a speech with about 100 people) that the statement was made. The law does not say that those people who constituted "the public" that heard the statement have to have been offended. Rather, (first) the statement has to be made in public (it was), and second, it is "in principle is hostile and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia". That's a matter for the court to sort out. It appears, for example, that Shi'a teachings are legally blasphemous (case of Tajul Muluk). Unfortunately, there aren't any accessible resources here pertaining to the court decisions, so it's not clear if there are any concrete limits on what could be found to be blasphemous. However, it is established law that deviant teachings are legaly blasphemous, see the 39 case synopsis and the end here.	It says in the article The Metropolitan police said Bray’s equipment had been seized under section 145 of the 2011 Police Reform Social Responsibility Act, which gives the force power to seize items being used for prohibited activities in Parliament Square. That includes operating amplified sound equipment in the controlled area. It even gives the correct section truly outstanding journalism.	None, if the intention is merely trespassing, unlike burglary which requires intent to steal, commit criminal damage, or inflict grevious bodily harm or if the building is a protected site - neither of which isn't evident from the question. Note, for both offences, the actus reus is entry - there is no requirement for any form of "breaking" Further to ohwilleke's comment, unless the lock is damaged or destroyed etc, then there is no offence of criminal damage	This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't
What does Per: Mean on an NDA? I Have received an NDA I need to sign, it seems straight forward enough although there is one part i'm unsure of, on the last page there is the section where your witness signs, and you sign, but above that there is another section that looks like this. (Company Who sent the NDAs name is above) FakeCompany LTD Per:_______________ Name:______________ Title:_____________ I've looked around online and have found some different suggestions although I couldn't find anything specific to this being on an NDA. I think, it's for when you are signing on behalf of someone else but I'm not 100% sure so figured I would ask here.	It is Latin - "through". It means that someone is signing on behalf of the company, and is not generally required but can be printed explicitly as evidence that the person signing purports to be authorised to do so.	Let me be sure that I understand the situation. You set up an account with Big Company, which uses BigCo as a trademark. You want email about that account to reach you with a unique address, so you set up '[email protected]" and gave that as your email when setting up tha account. You don't plan to use that address for any purpose but communications from BigCo to you and from you to them. (Of course these aren't the actual names.) Have I understood the situation correctly? It seems that you ar not using 'BigCo" in trade, nor are you likely to be confused with an official representative of BigCo, so you are not infringing their trademark. However, someone using such an email more generally could perhaps be so confuse, so BigCo has a somewhat legitimate concern, as they cannot know the very limited use you plan to make of this address. The only way that the could force you not to use such an email address would be via a court order as part of a suit for trademark infringement, whcih under the circumstances I doubt they would get. However, unless they have some sort of contract with you to the contrary, they can control who registers on their site. and could refuse to register you using an email address that includes their name or alias. Convincing them to accept your registration, even though it does no harm to them, will almost surely be more trouble than it is worth. Give them "[email protected]" or something else that is not their name, but will suggest their name enough that you will know who it is. This will serve your purpose fully, and avoid a long argument with people who are reading from a script (once you get past the automated process, if you can even do that). This is all assuming that I have understood the situation correctly. I am also largely assuming US law, since you didn't mention a jurisdiction. (EDIT: UK law should not be very different on these points.)	The "Severance Agreement" is a contract between the company and you. It spells out what the company will do and probably what they expect you to do going forward. Simple enough. The statement you referenced merely says that you are not being forced to sign the agreement. That's all. You don't, presumably, have the option of remaining employed at this company but you DO NOT have to sign this agreement. But if you don't, it's likely that any benefits being promised in the agreement will not be delivered to you. So specifically in answer to your questions: It protects them against a claim that they somehow forced you to sign the agreement. Likely anything that the agreement says the company will do such as pay you a certain amount of money and the like. Bottom line is that if you don't like the agreement, don't sign it. If you want the benefits they are promising in the agreement, then sign it and move on.	Possibly If the texts are sufficiently precise that they constitute offer and acceptance then they would create a contract notwithstanding that “some documents” were never provided. First, your offer must have been sufficiently clear that it was open to acceptance by a simple “yes” or “ok”. Given that you had a lease, a simple offer to have another one would be enough as “on the same terms” is implied. Second, she must have accepted your offer unconditionally. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign” is an unconditional acceptance even if the documents never appear. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign first” or “Yes, I’ll put together some documents with the terms” aren’t. The first is a conditional acceptance and the condition wasn’t met. The second is a rejection with an intention to make a counter-offer that never eventuated. Third, real estate is heavily regulated. There may be specific requirements (such as a particular form of contract, or that it be witnessed) that mean there is no binding lease even though there would be a contract at common law.	"Legal requirement" can and in this case simply means "it's what is required in order for us to be reasonably able to offer you this service", noting that it would be unreasonable for such a dangerous business to operate, when one moron slipping and suing them could put them out of business. It's a little surprising that you've never had to sign a waiver before, but there are quite a number of similar waivers out there, such as REI (Seattle), The Edge (Vt), Croc Center (Coeur d'Alene), YMCA (MI) and U. Nebraska. They all have in common the requirement of a signature (indicating that you've waived your right to sue them), birth date, date of signature. This is the bare minimum that's required to have a valid waiver, and more info would be better (to uniquely identify the customer out of the 1000 John Smith's in the state and 500,000 in the US). If you break yourself and try to sue, they will trot out the waiver to put an end to the suit. Name, address, phone number and birth date do a long ways towards proving that the person who signed the waiver is indeed you.	You would be amazed at how vanishingly few the number of cases are where a signature is disputed. Signatures are easy, quick and don't require you having inky fingers all the time. They are so useful that to throw them out to deal with infinintesimally small fractions of disputes over their veracity (bearing in mind that 99.999999999% of contracts never have a dispute that gets to a court [or at all]) is ridiculous. When it does happen, handwriting analysis is probably not going to be put into evidence anyway. Testimony like "I saw him sign it" is way more likely to be used.	Can reading a something mean agree to to a contract? Just reading — no. Reading and acting as if you have agreed — yes. This is called "acceptance through conduct". I had an employer deduct a small fee to process my payment, they argued that they were allowed to because it stated they would on the website I had to use for the job. Does this even form a contract? Yes — because you read and continued to use the website. librarian came up to me and pointed out a sign saying I had to pay before using the computer (which is uncommon where I live). Is there a contract formed by just having a sign? Hypothetically could the library sue me for not paying? Provided that you read the sign and started using the computer — yes. However, because you did not see the sign, the library had failed to communicate the terms of the offer to you, which means there was no contract. However to however, if you continue using the computer even after the librarian tells you that you have to pay, you now accept the offer through conduct. In this case, the library could sue you for damages should you not pay. if there was a sign on the door to a private building saying you have to pay $20 to enter, if you didn't read the sign and entered, could the owner demand $20 from you? If the sign was so conspicuous that no reasonable person would have missed it — yes (because you should have read it and then you entered the building. But you could get away if you convinced the judge that you genuinely did not see/read the sign, for which you would have to have a plausible excuse (e.g. vision impairment).	The law, at section 52(4) Data Protection Act 2018 does not expressly require a signature. What is needed is confirmation of one's identity: Where the controller has reasonable doubts about the identity of an individual making a request under section 45, 46 or 47, the controller may— (a) request the provision of additional information to enable the controller to confirm the identity, and (b) delay dealing with the request until the identity is confirmed. One option is to submit the request with an explanation as to why your signature has changed and wait and see if the data controller comes back for additional information. If you can't provide anything more, or they still won't process your request if you do, there's alway the option of appealing to the Information Commissioner's Office
Where does the burden of proof lie with a Warranty repair When you return an item for repair and are told that it isn't covered by warranty because it has 'accidental physical damage'. Where does the burden of proof lie? I have a device that would no longer charge. I could see inside the port that something wasn't right i.e. the pins had lifted. I know that I haven't misused the device and feel that I did nothing to cause this damage. The company in question have told me that this is a chargeable repair as pins are broken. Is it their right to assume that I broke the device and refuse the repair? The cost to repair is £50 so I am not going to take lengthy legal process against them over this. However would tt be the case that their 'proof' is that a pin can't break/bend by itself so me plugging in the charger was clearly the cause, even though that is using the product as intended? I had a device that was overheating it was repaired without question, even though theoretically the heat could have been caused by it being inside a TV unit with poor airflow. So in the UK are companies allowed to refuse a warranty repair without any proof other than their own assumption? I have heard in the US that there is more burden on manufacturer so also is this also a difference in consumer rights?	Warranty is company policy. It could be considered part of the contract of sale, but it would still be what the company stated it - at time of purchase - to be. Unless the warranty lists accidental damage as being covered, it looks like the company are following their policy and fulfilling the contract. If you were looking for legal redress since accidental damage resulted from using the product as intended, you'd have more chance of success looking at unsatisfactory quality or the product being unsuitable for the intended purpose under Part 1 chapter 2 sections 9 and 10 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. It's worth sticking to objective details (for example that the port broke, and that you had used the device as intended). The company are not assuming you broke it (anyone or anything could have caused the accidental damage), and they are not refusing a warranty repair as it appears that accidental damage is not covered by their warranty policy, so this is not one.	Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on.	None The contractual chain is you <-> warranty company <-> (potentially others you don’t know about) <-> service provider. Should something go wrong, you would sue your warranty company who might (it is up to them) then sue the service provider. Notwithstanding, it’s likely the service company owes you a duty of care and would be directly liable to you for a negligence claim.	The agreement linked in the question seems to be or to purport to be, for a non-final, non-production version of the board. I have seen such agreements used, both for hardware and software, used when beta-test versions of products are being distributed to those who agree to do such testing, often in exchange for a reduced price on the final product, or an early look. I have also seen similar language used when an evaluation version of a product is provided free, or at a much reduced price. In such a use, it would be a reasonable contract, it seem to me, and I see no reason why if it were agreed to by both parties in such a situation, it would not be binding. Often such agreements also include a non-disclosure aspect, but this one does not seem to do so. I cannot see how such an agreement could be made applicable automatically, without both parties having chosen to agree to it, and indicated this by signing, clicking, or in some other positive way. I doubt that it could be made automatically applicable, on an "by using this product you agree" basis. I don't know of any physical consumer product, or appliance, sold with such an agreement in ordinary commerce. I am not sure what would happen if a manufacturer wanted to require all purchasers to sign such an agreement. I don't know if it would be binding. I would think that the purchaser's rights under the First Sale doctrice, could be modified by a valid contract agreed to by the purchaser. I do not think that they could simply be revoked by a contract of adhesion, which the purchaser had no choice to decline before making the purchase. As the OP says this was not signed or agreed to in any way, I can't see how it binds the OP.	When dealing with recalcitrant agencies, governments, businesses or otherwise who move very slowly or refuse to deal with genuine consumer issues - like refunds they have agreed to - one thing to do is carefully up the ante. You need to get them to take you seriously, and one way is to potentially get some third party help. Call the hospital billing department and say if they don't resolve this issue - which they admit exists - you're going to file a complaint with a consumer advocate, like Nevada Consumer Affairs .gov and/or get legal help from a non-profit or pro-bono legal aid firm, like Pro Bono Legal Services - State Bar of Nevada. I say carefully because you don't want to say I'm going to sue! or get angry and threaten anything. Just tell them you're looking at all your options. And that may resolve the matter right there; they don't want to deal with the extra work of a complaint from the state government or a letter from an attorney, and you may have your refund quickly. If it doesn't, look at filing a complaint with the online form at Nevada Consumer Affairs, or call a free or pro bono legal clinic and see about getting help. Sometimes a formal complaint or a letter from a lawyer will quickly resolve things.	All torts have to be proved. In 99.99% of cases the proof is by admission of the tortfeaser. That is, they agree to pay damages with or without admission of liability. Where liability is contested, there are never any “slam dunks”. There are strong cases, even very strong cases, but when someone else is deciding the case, there are no certainties. Remember, if your opponent thought they were going to lose, they’d settle. Looking at your examples, it seems that the tort you are thinking of is negligence. In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of torts, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. Where the issue is not one of evidence, that is, the facts are as you say and are not in dispute, the question is not “what happened”, but “is what happened negligence”. For all the examples, 1, 3, and 4 are probably not in dispute: there was a duty, the conduct caused damage at law and the plaintiff actually suffered harm. The question to be decided is whether the driver failed to conform to the required standard of care. For examples 2 and 3, most courts would conclude they didn’t. For example 1, some courts might decide that the way the driver drove did conform to the required standard and others that they didn’t. The legal argument would not be about “proof”, it would be about the standard the law requires.	They don't actually claim to have a patent. Lots of people license a patent, and then they are using "patented technology". The only effect of this statement is: If you want to copy their product, you better find out what patent they are licensing, otherwise you might be in legal trouble. And their statement means you should have known that your copy of their product is covered by some patent, so you lose some defenses if you are accused of using a patent without license. And of course many customers think if something is patented then it must be good. Which is not true obviously. But logically who owns the patent doesn't make a difference to that, so their statement isn't misleading IMHO.	Short Answer You are legally entitled to the cost of an adequate replacement (possibly a lightly used previously owned computer) reduced by the amount refunded. This is sometimes called a "benefit of the bargain" measure of the relief to which you are entitled. But as a practical matter, there is no cost effective way of enforcing your legal rights under these facts, that doesn't deeply compromise you chances of success. But, trying to litigate the case on the cheap, because it is unlikely to succeed, makes the effort to enforce your rights even less worthwhile. Your best options are those you could take outside the formal legal process (such as social media gripes, or complaining to "the manager" of the person you dealt with first if they refuse to give you what you want or are entitled to under the law). Long Answer Applicable Law The default rules of law, absent an express contractual term to the contrary, are as follows: In every U.S. jurisdiction in an intra-U.S. transaction, this is governed by the following section of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which apart from section and subsection numbering conventions is substantially identical in all of these jurisdictions. It states: § 2-713. Buyer's Damages for Non-delivery or Repudiation. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. (2)Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival. In international transactions between signatory countries, the relevant body of law of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (1980). The primary applicable provisions of that Convention (to which the U.S. is a party) are: Article 45 (1) If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention, the buyer may: (a) exercise the rights provided in articles 46 to 52; (b) claim damages as provided in articles 74 to 77. (2) The buyer is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages by exercising his right to other remedies. (3) No period of grace may be granted to the seller by a court or arbitral tribunal when the buyer resorts to a remedy for breach of contract. Article 46 (1) The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement. . . . Article 47 (1) The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for performance by the seller of his obligations. (2) Unless the buyer has received notice from the seller that he will not perform within the period so fixed, the buyer may not, during that period, resort to any remedy for breach of contract. However, the buyer is not deprived thereby of any right he may have to claim damages for delay in performance. Article 48 (1) Subject to article 49, the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy at his own expense any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so without unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer. However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in this Convention. (2) If the seller requests the buyer to make known whether he will accept performance and the buyer does not comply with the request within a reasonable time, the seller may perform within the time indicated in his request. The buyer may not, during that period of time, resort to any remedy which is inconsistent with performance by the seller. (3) A notice by the seller that he will perform within a specified period of time is assumed to include a request, under the preceding paragraph, that the buyer make known his decision. (4) A request or notice by the seller under paragraph (2) or (3) of this article is not effective unless received by the buyer. Article 49 (1) The buyer may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract; or (b) in case of non-delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within the additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47 or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed. . . . Article 74 Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract. Article 75 If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time after avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replacement or the seller has resold the goods, the party claiming damages may recover the difference between the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74. Article 76 (1) If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the party claiming damages may, if he has not made a purchase or resale under article 75, recover the difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current price at the time of avoidance as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74. If, however, the party claiming damages has avoided the contract after taking over the goods, the current price at the time of such taking over shall be applied instead of the current price at the time of avoidance. (2) For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, the current price is the price prevailing at the place where delivery of the goods should have been made or, if there is no current price at that place, the price at such other place as serves as a reasonable substitute, making due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods. Article 77 A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been mitigated. Your Legal Rights This brings us to the question: What buyer protections are there for this? Will I be able to easily sue the manufacturer for monetary losses if the manufacturer refunds me anyway instead of letting me wait for the item to come back in stock? The buyer is legally entitled to the fair market value of obtaining a replacement (perhaps in the secondary market for used laptops) that is equivalent to what was ordered reduced by the amount of money refunded. Practical Vindication Of Your Legal Rights But it is much easier to get the refund than it is to prevail in a lawsuit for the additional damages to which the buyer is legally entitled, a prevailing buyer will probably not get their attorney fees if they prevail, and there is a good chance that the dispute will be sent to arbitration which is, generally speaking (according to strong empirical evidence) a forum with a strong anti-consumer bias (although consumer arbitration can be fairly inexpensive to litigate in, is somewhat more tolerant of lack of legal expertise by a self-represented party, and sometimes despite everything, you win, or can even get an unfair result that works in your favor rather than that of the seller). If you are fighting over $1,500 to $2,500, and you have a fairly complex case to prove that will require expert testimony (and expert witness fees and court costs would be awarded to a prevailing party in addition to the actual damages to which they are legally entitled even though attorney fees are not recoverable in most cases), it will be very hard to find a lawyer willing to take the case. This is because it will take far more than 5-12 hours of attorney work to take the case to its conclusion, which is your maximum cost effective litigation budget, even if everything you win goes to the attorney and you receive no actual benefit. To get even a 50% recovery, your lawyer needs to get the job done ins 2-6 hours depending on your lawyer's hourly rate, which is close to impossible when your legal argument is as difficult to prove as it is in this case. So, basically, the only cost effective way to litigate the case is without a lawyer in small claims court or consumer arbitration, even though representing yourself without a lawyer greatly reduces your chances of success on the merits. On balance, you would usually be better off accepting a refund and acknowledging that you have been damaged in a manner for which the law provides no reliable and cost effective remedy, because the harm is too small. Bad mouthing the offending company on social media (which sometimes results in a PR driven instead of lawyer driven, favorable resolution) would probably be a more fruitful strategy. Complaining to a manager or writing a letter to the President of the company might also be a more fruitful strategy. Sometimes small disputes can be resolved with class action lawsuits, but this isn't a case where this is an option, since it involves just a single individual or a handful of individuals who are harmed. This is also not the sort of case where a state consumer protection agency or attorney general's office or federal consumer protection agency is likely to get involved, since it doesn't involve a systemic deceptive trade practice, just an unfair to you bad situation. Why have these laws if they are so hard to enforce in consumer cases? As my commercial transactions professor in law school (James J. White, the author of the leading legal treatise on the subject) was fond of saying: all legal issues become more interesting if you add more zeros to the amount in controversy. If the computer system you bought had a price of $150,000 that had since gone up to $300,000, this dispute would absolutely be worth litigating. Furthermore, since you could litigate it adequately on the litigation budget that this amount in controversy would make possible, your prospects of successfully vindicating your rights as a buyer, at only a modest discount for unrecoverable litigation costs, would be much greater. Essentially, our system is designed to get close to justice in the most important disputes, as measured by the amount in controversy, while it tolerates small injustices that are not as damaging (in raw absolute dollar terms) as big disputes. This is unfair, but the source of this unfairness is intrinsic to the nature of the problem (rather than simply being a matter of artificial bias created by the people who designed the civil justice system). Also, this unfair bias comes close to maximizing the aggregate improvement in economic value that the legal system as a whole can provide for a given legal of expenditure on this system. Basically, at a fundamental economic level, the economic costs of justly resolving small wrongs can be greater due to the deadweight loss of litigation expenses for the economy as a whole, than the economic benefits of resolving the wrongs fairly (which provides not only justice to those involved but also provides an incentive to act justly in future transactions before one knows whether a problem or dispute will arise).
What legal trouble could a software developer blogger find themselves in? There is a plethora of software engineers who blog about technology. They could be discussing Microsoft technology, Oracle, the list goes on... Is there a line you could cross where you'd go from stating you opinion to defamation? What about incorrectly stating performance benchmarks? It seems risky to me but SO MANY people do it. Where should one apply caution?	united-states The rules on what constitutes defamation under US law are fairly straightforward. For a statement to be defamatory, it must be: A statement of fact (not opinion); that is False; and Communicated to at least one other person (the law refers to this as "publication" but it does not mean just being in print, any form of communication will do); and Harmful to someone's reputation, so that people think less of the person because of the statement, or are less inclined to do business with or associate with the person. There are some exceptions to point 4, kinds of statements where harm is assumed. Such statements are called "defamation per se". But even in such cases evidence of harm is often included in a defamation suit. The exceptions include: Accusing a person of a crime, particularly a serious crime; accusing a person of dishonest business dealings; accusing a person of incompetence in the person's job, trade, or profession; traditionally, accusing a person of having a sexually transmitted disease (this may no longer apply in some jurisdictions); traditionally, accusing a woman of sexual immorality, that is of having sex before marriage or outside of marriage (this also may no longer apply in some jurisdictions). The plaintiff (person bringing the suit) must at least allege (claim) points 1-3, and point 4 unless the claim is for defamation per se. The plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to confine the court of all but point 2, falsity. In addition, (in US law) if the plaintiff is a public official, or a "public figure" then the plaintiff must also allege and prove "actual malice" (an unfortunate term). This means that the plaintiff must show that the statement was made with knowledge that it was false, or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. Actual malice is usually hard to prove. The actual malice standard derives from the case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Prior to that case there was no federal law of defamation, and no constitutional dimension to US defamation cases. A statement of opinion, such as "I think product A is a better value than product B" can never be defamation in US law. Nor can a provably true statement. Nor can a statement that is essentially true, even if it contains minor errors. (None of these are true in all countries.) Some states still maintain the traditional split between libel and slander, with libel being written (or in some places broadcast) defamation, and slander being spoken. In other states the two have been merged into a single action of defamation. When they are separate, libel tends to carry larger damages, and slander may not recognize defamation per se, but require proof of damage to reputation. Some people are said to be "defamation proof" meaning that their reputation is already so bad that nothing can harm it further. Taking care to research facts, particularly negative statements about people, helps avoid defamation in general, and makes proving actual malice much harder. Keeping written records of such research is also a good practice. It is good if negative statements are supported by multiple reliable sources. It is also good practice to make statements of opinion clearly statements of opinion, not statements of fact, and to make statements of fact only when supported by research with citable reliable sources. Following such practices will make defamation suits less likely, and less likely to succeed if any are brought.	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".	are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright.	A statement cannot be libel unless it actually identifies the plaintiff to defame him. The identification need not be by name, but it must be specific enough that the public would be able to determine who the statement referred to. You can read more about this concept at Prof. Eugene Volokh on Libel Law Therefore, if nobody other than the plaintiff or defendant learned about the connection before the filing of the case or the publication of discovered emails, the original work of fiction was not a libel. And by telling everyone that the connection existed, yes, the plaintiff was impliedly consenting to any further alleged libel and it would be a defense from liability for the plaintiff. Furthermore, there wouldn't be libel unless whatever the fictional character did was untrue (something the real plaintiff didn't do) and the public would think that whatever the character did was actually an assertion that the real plaintiff did it. I could write a satire about a President Brock O'Bama who is actually a lizardman in disguise, and that's my First Amendment right, not a slander of the President. Disclaimer: only describing the common law and majority rules. State laws may differ.	This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta.	The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage.	A creative prosecutor could probably come up with a raft of charges. But you could start with the federal wiretapping statute, 18 USC 2511, and the anti-hacking statute, 18 USC 1030. Here is an indictment brought in 2012 under the anti-hacking statute against someone who distributed and used this kind of software. Depending on the facts and the jurisdiction, this may also constitute the tort of intrusion on privacy or seclusion, a tort recognized by the Restatement (Second) and actionable in many jurisdictions. The most common test is whether the invasion would be "offensive to a reasonable person." And no, contrary to the commenter's view, a "click to accept" license is not a get out of (literal) jail free card here. Courts interpret adhesion contracts liberally to favor the signer, and outrageous terms hidden in small print are not guaranteed to be enforceable, especially if the software is clearly designed to trick people into installing it. The license terms might even hurt you, by providing evidence of your intent to use the software for perving rather than its ostensible use. This is not an exhaustive list, and there may be additional state-level statutes that apply. Bottom line: yes, this is clearly illegal, and the courts will be reluctant to let you trick people into getting away with it.	Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on.
The copyright issue of a movie review on YouTube I want to review one part of a movie (less than 15 min of it) in my channel in YouTube. I will review the part from a different angle, interpret it differently from a psychological and philosophical point of view. Would YouTube make my video demonetized for copyright issues? Should I show the part in smaller size, I mean in screen-split form or picture-in-picture form?	A review is a classic occasion for fair use under US law, for fair dealing under UK law, and for other exceptions to copyright under the laws of a number of other countries, including many of the EU countries. However, such exceptions usually require that no more of the copyrighted work is used than is needed to demonstrate and support the reviewer's points. It is usual in a review of a film or video to show only very brief clips, usually a few seconds or a minute or so at a time. There is no specific limit on how long an excerpt may be used in a review without the review constituting copyright infringement, this is judged on a case-by-case basis. But if the reviewer actually includes a full fifteen-minute clip, that might be held to be too much. Note that the reviewer can, and often will, discuss the entire film. But it is not usual to "show" the entire film. Just a a book review normally quotes only a few paragraphs, even as it discusses the entire book, a film review normally includes only short clips of scenes significant to whatever points the reviewer makes. In US law, a significant issue is whether the review can "function as a substitute for the original" (17 USC 107). That is, whether people are likely to watch the review and come away feeling as if they had seen the entire film, and so need not watch the original. If sop, it is more likely to be considered an infringement. I can only speak to what might be an infringement of copyright under the law of various countries. I cannot speak to YouTube policies or how such policies might be applied. But my understanding is that YouTube only applies "demonetization" to things that it considers clearly copyright infringements, although sometimes it is overly cautions in such decisions.	No, one cannot safely assume that because some people have done a thing without being sued, that it is OK to do a similar thing and no suit is possible. It is possible that people who upload a video, or a section of it, have permission. It is perhaps more likely that the copyright owner does not choose to sue, for whatever reason. But a different owner of a different video might make a different choice. Uploading a video, or even a section of a video, without permission, will be copyright infringement, unless an exception to copyright such as fair use or fair dealing applies. Such an infringement gives the copyright owner valid grounds to bring a suit. But the owner can choose whether or not to sue. An owner can sue in one case of infringement but not in another, for any reason or none. If the expected damages are small, it many not be worth the time, trouble, and costs to sue. In the US, one must register a copyright before bringing suit for infringement of that copyright, and there is a fee for registration. Some owners feel strongly about the use of their work, and will sue on any pretext. Some may prefer to tacitly support uses that they approve of by not bringing suit. One cannot tell the attitude of a particular owner unless that owner has stated what his or her view is. Short films are just as protected as full-length feature films, and suit can be filed for infringing the copyright on a short film. But the more expensive a film was to make, and the more money the owner expects it to earn, the more likely it is that the owner will choose to sue. Many people infringe by uploading short films or videos, gambling that the copyright owners will never learn of this, or will not trouble to sue. Sometimes such infringers are correct, and sometimes they get sued. I do not understand what the OP means by the part of the question that reads "There should be more detail and complex lines over here" What additional detail is wanted? Who does the OP expect to provide it? What sort of "lines" does this refer to?	It probably is infringement, assuming that this is being done by copying parts of a broadcast of the game. It is up to the holder of the copyright on the original broadcast that is being condensed to decide whether to sue or take other action, such as a takedown notice. Perhaps the holder thinks this is good advertising for its business. They have the right to make that decision. Now if a person went to the game, and used a personal camera to film it, and posted excepts of that recording, the legal issues would be very different. The ticket probably includes a provision prohibiting filming and photography, so this would be a breech of contract. But it would not be copyright infringement. (In practice if this were spotted, the person would be required to stop recording or leave, at least.)	Titles can't be copyrighted. Meta-data like #2 aren't copyrighted. Not sure if the MPAA could protect its ratings, but I can't find anywhere that it has asserted restrictions on the use of those. If the list of "Similar works" is not somebody else's intellectual property then there's no problem. (If it is I'm not certain what protection it could be eligible for.)	It is not possible to say that this is generally fair use, although sometimes it would be. A copy for personal use is still a copyright right violation on its face, and fair use does not categorically exclude non-commercial or personal use of copyrighted works. It is a highly fact specific inquiry. The likelihood of anyone discovering that you have done so and deciding to sue over it is slight, but that doesn't mean that there isn't potential copyright infringement liability. Compare this to speeding. People do it all the time, and even driving one mile per hour above the speed limit is still a traffic violation. But it is rare for less serious violations to be ticketed.	I am not a lawyer; I am especially not your lawyer; this is not legal advice; if you want legal advice, hire a lawyer. Idk. But probably not. The YouTube terms of service seem to prohibit this pretty clearly: You agree not to distribute in any medium any part of the Service or the Content without YouTube's prior written authorization, unless YouTube makes available the means for such distribution through functionality offered by the Service (such as the Embeddable Player)... You agree not to access Content through any technology or means other than the video playback pages of the Service itself, the Embeddable Player, or other explicitly authorized means YouTube may designate. Now, were YouTube itself licensing the videos in question under the CC license, they might be prohibited from enforcing that term: You may not offer or impose any additional or different terms or conditions on, or apply any Effective Technological Measures to, the Licensed Material if doing so restricts exercise of the Licensed Rights by any recipient of the Licensed Material. though I'm not sure if the language in question would apply. However, it seems likely that in most cases, YouTube is using the material in question under the license to which users agreed when they created their accounts, and therefore is not bound by the term in question. All that said, it's entirely possible that the clause in the YouTube ToS prohibiting downloading does not apply for whatever reason (unconscionable in a contract of adhesion, browsewrap agreement doesn't form a contract to begin with, it's superseded by either some other agreement (part of the API EULA, etc), it's contrary to some law in your jurisdiction, etc). Just to be very clear, though, there is no COPYRIGHT CONCERN preventing uses like the one you mentioned.	First off, the work is almost certainly not in the public domain in the US. Works are generally copyrighted upon creation or publication, but in this case the work was probably explicitly copyrighted. The fact that a work is out of print generally has no bearing on its copyright status. US copyright law changed several times in the last century. The 1985 copyright year means the board game was probably published then, and it's since it's a Disney copyright it's a corporate work, which would give it a copyright term of 95 years, meaning that it should be covered under copyright until 2080. See this factsheet on copyright from the US Copyright office. Works Created on or after January 1, 1978 For works made for hire and anonymous and pseudonymous works, the duration of copyright is 95 years from first publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter International laws will vary, but many countries adhere to the Berne Convention, which means that international laws will probably be at least similar. Either way, the work isn't very old from an intellectual property perspective. Fair use is an exception to copyright law that allows portions of copyrighted works to be used without permission or compensation in certain circumstances; academic or scholarly use is one of them. Generally, your use of the work has to be the minimum necessary amount to serve your purposes, and cannot harm the commercial value of the work. (The fact that the work is out of print may help with the latter.) The problem with fair use is that it's always determined on a case by case basis. The only way to know for sure if a particular use is fair use is to wait for the copyright holder to sue you and then make a fair use defense in court. I was going to suggest that you discuss this with the editor of your journal, but re-reading your question it looks like you're planning to publish to a personal blog rather than an academic journal. In the end, it's up to you (or your attorney, if you choose to hire one) to analyze the relevant legal concepts and rules and decide if and how much of the work to use.	It's not fair use. Fair use is when you do something that normally only the copyright holder can do. Playing a video game is the ordinary, intended use of the work. In the United States, ordinary use is not protected by copyright. 17 USC 106 sets out the rights protected by copyright. The include copying the work, producing derivative works, distributing the work, and so on. None of these are ordinary use. Someone could perhaps argue that you are creating a derivative work. I doubt that argument would work because you are not taking any protectable elements from the work. But if anyone did argue that, it would make sense to also argue that if that's so, your use would still be covered under fair use because it's transformative, does not substitute for the original work in any way, and takes very little of the work.
Am I allowed to use the term "facebook" as a keyword in the <head> section of my website? I am planning to build a Facebook-related webapp. Judging from Quora: Can I use Facebook word in my domain? and the list of WIPO cases of domains containing "facebook" I'm not allowed to use the word "facebook" or "FB" in the domain name I'll register for this app. But when I launch this app I want to make sure that search engines like Google understand that this web app is about Facebook. To make that happen I plan to use the word "Facebook" in my website description and in the keywords list of my website. My question is: Am I allowed to do this or would I be infringing on the Facebook trademark?	The Quora statement that the word "facebook" cannot be used in a domain name without permission is incorrect, or at least too broad. If a site or app is intended to work with Facebook, it may say so. However it may not use the word "Facebook" whch is trademark, in such a way as to suggest that it is an official Facebook product, or that it is endorsed, authorized, or sponsored by the makers of Facebook, or to cause confusion with the original Facebook. Whether a domain name containing "facebook" does that depends on the details. There are multiple precedents for criticism sites. A domain such as "facebooksucks.com" would not be trademark infringement, and there is caselaw to support this. But that is not what might be wanted here. Perhaps "unofficialfacebookhelper.com" would suffice. But to return to the question asked, use of a word in the hypertext metadata in the "Head" element is a reasonable way of indicating that the site is to be used in connection with Facebook, but there would need to be some additional notice or disclaimer making it very clear to any user that the site is in no way affiliated, endorsed, authorized, or sponsored by the makers of Facebook. The use of a trademark to identify another product with which a given product works is known as nominative use. The law specifically allows it, providing it is not done in such a way as to cause confusion, or to falsely suggest sponsorship, approval, or some relationship that does not exist. However, large corporate trademark owners are known to claim more rights than the law allows them. Such owners may try to suppress nominative use that they hae not approved, although they could not win a trademark lawsuit over such use. US Law 15 U.S. Code § 1125 (c)(3) provides the relevant part: The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: (A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services	without my permission ... is just not true - you granted permission for your posts to be forwarded, subject to the privacy settings you set, when you agreed to Facebook’s terms. Specifically 3.3.	If you are using just the names, there is no issue - you can't copyright a fact. If you are using actual images (you appear to say you are not, but you also asked "Am I allowed to include images of Google Maps) - then the answer is still yes within your usage case - provided you attribute them to Google. If you look at this link it specifies that you are OK to use this in Reports and Presntations, Books which are not guidebooks and which have less then 5000 copies and presentations. If you are using them online, you need to use the imbedded versions (ie you can't just screenshot them - you need to link to them). If you are still unsure, you can contact [email protected] to request specific permission.	Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins? Well, they can, but they have no legal backing to make it happen. Their chances of succeeding are about as good as me requesting a Ferrari, a Yacht and a Mansion. I can make that request. People will laugh. I will not get it. I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related You have no way to know who owns what email address. And it's none of your business. Your only interest should be in whether the address is owned by the person that is creating the account. You probably already do that by sending a confirmation link to the email address when people sign up. I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request The only way you have to comply with such a request is if the owner can prove their identity. As far as I understood, the "Finnish city" was three degrees away from that. They could not provide any proof they are who they said they are, they could not provide a finite list of accounts they claimed to own and they could not even provide proof they own those accounts. They literally just wrote an email with zero legal meaning. I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one The correct way to handle this is have a feature on your website where the account owner can delete their own account. GDPR compliant. Then you make a text template explaining how to use that feature and reply with that template to every request, no matter how stupid (like this case) they are. If they cannot identify themselves to you by proving they have access to their "own" email, they have no business wasting your time. Legally, they could provide you with a different method of identification. In case of a Finnish school, that would probably need to be power of attorney from all children's legal guardians and a specific way to identify the accounts that is consistent with the data given (for example if they entered their full name and address on your website). You would probably in your rights to demand a certified translation if it's all in Finnish. Apart from the fact that you as a private US citizen have no real means to check the validity of all that paperwork, personally, if I saw hundreds of pages of certified translated paperwork, I would probably just comply. Not sure it it were actually enough, but it certainly gets an A+ for effort to delete data from a private website. But a real lawyer might give better advice with a real case on their hands. Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) Indeed. You should not delete people's data because a random punk on the internet sent you an email. You need to identify who the request is from and if they are allowed to make such a request. Whether you have a legal duty to actually keep data, is up to you or your lawyer to find out. It depends on your data and laws. It is perfectly legal to make a website with a textfield that deletes any data you enter after a second. Destruction of data you own is only a problem if you break other laws with it. For example the IRS might not be amused if you destroyed invoices and other proof of taxable income. "Some dude claimed I must in an email" is not going to fly with them. That said, again, please, identify who you deal with, find out if their claim is valid. Don't do stuff because random internet punks write you an email. Because the next mail you get, will be from a Nigerian Prince. Please wisen up before opening that one. People on the internet, through stupidity or malice, might not have your best interests at heart. Don't believe random emails.	My gut response without really analyzing it (which is honestly what a lot of these cases boil down to in the end) is that the proposed name would imply an affiliation with the company that does not exist. A case challenging that name could be expensive and come out either way. Instead, "The [Wife's Name] Toy Museum" with descriptive material in brochures and on a website saying that the exhibits were manufactured by "Toy Company", which is a nominative use that does not imply an affiliation with the Company would be a wiser move.	General Rules The rules on this vary somewhat by country. In some counties the is no trademark protection unless a mark is formally registers. In others use "in trade" offers a degree of protection even in the absence of registration. The US follows the second rule. Some of Europe follows the first. But in pretty much all countries trademarks (aka trade marks) are only protected when they are "used in commerce" and are only protected against other uses "in commerce". This mans that a phrase or design or other possible mark is only protected when it is functioning as a mark, that is it is used by the maker to identify or advertise a product or service (hereafter I use "product" to mean either or both). Moreover a mark is only protected when an alleged infringer uses the mark (or a similar mark) in such a way that people might reasonably be confused into thinking that the infringer's product comes from the same source as the products of the owner of the mark, or is approved, sponsored, or endorsed by the owner of the mark. A simple literary or pop-culture reference is normally not trademark infringement. This is both because a well-known phrase is not usually protectable as a mark at all, and because a reference to it is normally not infringement, even if the mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion is a very important concept in trademark cases. Examples The phrase "Elementary, my dear Watson" Is often used as a reference to the Sherlock Holmes stories and novels. But it was never used to brand or advertise those stories, so its use in a novel or video game now would not be infringement. Even if a game used that phrase as a title, it would not be infringement, because the phrase is not protected. All this would still be true even if the Sherlock Holmes stories were still being published. The tagline "In space, no one can here you scream" was used extensively to advertise the movie Alien. It had some protection as a mark (in the US), and might well have been registered for fuller protection (I haven't checked the US register of trademarks, or any other for this phrase). A game titled with this phrase might well be infringing. A game where a character speaks the phrase at some point probably will not be infringing. Caution All that said, exactly where the limits of infringement lie depend on the detailed factual situation. Before investing sizable amounts of money or time and effort on such a project, it might be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about trademark law in one's particular jurisdiction, and make sure that the risk of suit is not to great for one's tolerance.	Ideally, you would say something like "Compatible with WhatsApp. Not endorsed or affiliated with WhatsApp." If you do that, it would be a valid nominative use of the other company's trademark and would face a very low risk of an infringement action.	It is not required. The companies undoubtedly prefer that you include those designations, and they may even write to say that you should, but that is just them doing their due diligence in policing their brands. In the instances you cited, there is probably some agreement between those companies to include those markers. If you don't have such an agreement, there is no obligation to notify the users of your website that some third party has trademarked a name that you mention.
Why hasn't Vijay Mallya been extradited yet? Vijay Mallya is an Indian businessman at present fighting extradition from the UK. Mallya, who owes 17 Indian banks an estimated Rs 9,000 crore. Mallya inherited UB Spirits, known for the Kingfisher beer brand, from his father and turned it around into India’s biggest spirits maker. He became the chairman of UB Group at the age of 28. However, most other group businesses were not as successful, Kingfisher Airlines being the biggest failure Kingfisher scam So what happened to his trial? Why the UK did not return him finally to India? Why has this case become cold after 2019?	Why the UK did not return him finally to India? ...in October 2020 the Indian government was notified that Mallya could not be currently extradited due to an unspecified "confidential legal matter" Source and here	Is there a way to be legally represented in the UK without being a resident? Pretty much anyone, anywhere in the world, who can afford to hire a lawyer can be legally represented in the U.K. without being a resident. In order to seek most kinds of affirmative relief (other than disputing the jurisdiction of a particular court over a particular party in a particular case in the first instance), however, the non-resident must acknowledge (at least conditionally subject to a right to appeal a resolution of a jurisdictional issue), the jurisdiction of the court over the non-resident and submit to that court's jurisdiction. In one famous recent example, the King of Dubai, Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, who is obviously not a British resident, hired a British lawyer to represent him in a custody dispute with his then-wife Princess Haya, concerning the couple's two children. After two years of litigation, a British senior family court judge, Andrew McFarlane, ruled against him and granted sole custody to his wife in this case on March 24, 2022. And if yes, who is a reputable firm which can deal with banking related issues. Law.StackExchange is not an appropriate place to ask for recommendations to specific law firms or lawyers. More generally, however, the financial industry in the U.K., including its banking industry, is highly geographically concentrated in a financial district in London called the City of London (just "the City" to insiders) which has its own mayor and governing body called City of London Corporation. As a result, most legal professionals (barristers and solicitors alike) with specialized expertise in banking law in the U.K. have offices in or near this financial district.	The article appears to follow an ancient and disreputable tradition; researching one instance where a crime was lightly punished (but ignoring the reasons), finding another where an apparently more trivial crime was heavily punished (again ignoring the reasoning), and claiming that the law punishes the latter more heavily than the former. As long as people are readier to be outraged than to think, this will make money for muckrakers. The legal answer (since this has been transferred to Law.SE) is that common law by definition does not lay down specific penalties for offences. It is possible that Indian common law, being heavily influenced by Hinduism, dictates that killing a cow is a crime outside the Western code, in which it may be a tort but is not a crime unless it involves cruelty. Again by definition, this common law understanding would have nothing to do with the British (or any other) authorities.	The note you have quoted does not accurately summarise the decision, which is available on BAILII. What happened was: IOC agreed to sell 5,000 tons of salt to Mumtazzudin. Atlas paid IOC for the salt on behalf of Mumtazzudin. Because Atlas paid, Atlas received the bills of lading. Thus, the salt was pledged to Atlas to secure the money owed by Mumtazzudin. Atlas endorsed the bills of lading over to Chabbra for value. In other words, Atlas sold Chabbra the right to be repaid by Mumtazzudin, and to take delivery of the salt as security for the debt. Mumtazzudin persuaded the shipowner to hand over the salt without presenting the bill of lading. Chabbra sued the shipowner for conversion (destroying the value of its security). What does “refused to redeem the pledge when the bills of lading were tendered to them by Chabbra” mean? Chabbra, as the pledgee of the bills of lading, was entitled to possession of the salt, until Mumtazzudin “redeemed the pledge” by paying Chabbra the amount originally advanced by Atlas. But Mumtazzudin managed to get the salt without the bills of lading, so it refused to pay Chabbra. Why would a savvy seller even transact with buyers who couldn’t pay for the transaction upfront? The alternative may be that the sale is not made at all. However, that is not what happened in this case – the seller got paid.	There's not any well-defined notion of what a person with a Red Notice is "allowed" to do. The notice doesn't have any legal force of its own. You can read more about Red Notices on Interpol's web site: INTERPOL cannot compel any member country to arrest an individual who is the subject of a Red Notice. Each member country decides for itself what legal value to give a Red Notice within their borders. So it would be up to the US authorities to decide what, if anything, to do about the Red Notice, in compliance with US law. We can only speculate as to why they declined to flag his passport and/or detain him. Without knowing anything about the specific case in question, here are some possibilities: They may have felt there wasn't sufficient evidence against him to justify detaining him. The conduct of which he was accused may not have been a crime under US law. They may have believed the Brazilian arrest warrant was primarily politically motivated. They may have wanted to annoy the Brazilian government, or make a political statement against its actions, by failing to cooperate. They may have decided that it simply wasn't a good use of their funds to pursue the case. They may have been lazy or incompetent or oblivious and simply not known where he was or what he was planning to do. The fact that he was intending to travel to Brazil voluntarily may or may not have been a factor in their inaction.	It would be a violation of 18 USC 1001, which is the law against making false statements to the federal government. Paul Mozer, who was a Salomon Brothers trader, received a four month sentence for doing something along those lines in 1994. Bidding on something implies an intent to pay for the thing, which in this case is a falsehood: in so doing, one "falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact" (that you don't intend to pay for the thing).	In the US, "insider trading" includes both legal and illegal versions. When a corporate employee buys or sells shares of their company, they are insiders and they are trading (there is a requirement to report to the government). The illegal version involves breach of fiduciary duty or confidence. The relevant section of the federal regulations is 17 CFR 240.10b on "Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances", and you will note that the section does not rely on the term "insider" in the law part, instead it directly characterizes what acts are illegal. Thus it would not matter, from a legal perspective, if someone considers you an insider. It is illegal to trade in securities using a “manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance”. This relates to what is commonly known as insider trading via rule 240.10b5-1, by defining as manipulative and deceptive trading on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information (emphasis added to focus on the core requirements). Whether or not you have a "duty of trust or confidence" is determined by common law standards, that is, it depends on how courts have ruled on similar matters. For instance if the CEO of Apple tells you "Our computers explode and it's gonna be on the news tonight, the stock is gonna tank, but it would be illegal for you to act on that information", then it would be illegal, because you are aware that the CEO has a duty to not use that information (thus you "inherit" the duty). This also holds if he doesn't tell you that acting on the information, since it is expected that you know that the CEO of Apple could not legally act on that information (even if in fact you are unaware of the law -- ignorance of the law doesn't get you anywhere good). However, if you are unaware and could not know that the person making the factual disclosure is divulging information that he has a duty to shut up about, then you might not get prosecuted.	The maximum determinate sentence for anything (outside of military law) was 21 years (in 2013 increased to 30 years for serious terrorism offenses). The law on penalties §43 says that In a sentence of detention, a time frame is set which should not normally exceed 15 years and cannot exceed 21 years. Breivik was tried once for the crime of intentional murder, and convicted -- 21 years is the sentence. I believe that Norwegian law does not have the "multiple counts" system that the US has whereby an act can be punished under multiple sections of the law or for each victim. He performed an act of killing with very many victims, so no penalty longer than 21 years is allowed.
Is justifying communal violence not illegal? India, unfortunately, has a history of communal violences mostly between two largest religious communities. Violence due to separatism, casteism, terrorism etc also have similar histories. There are many prejudices and biases which make many people justify such violent acts by not condemning them and saying thinks like — They [other community] also did similar thing that time They're against the nation They need to be punished They are invaders And other similar remarks Isn't this (justification of any violence) illegal in India?	Art. 19 of the Indian Constitution states that (1) All citizens shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression... from which is follows that you may advance any argument that you want in support of an idea. The courts have never questioned this. There is a potential grey area regarding verbal acts that cause the use of violence, but in terms of presenting reasons that such-and-such acts are good (or bad), that form of expression is absolutely protected. The grey area comes from clause 2: Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence whereby a law against inciting to violence might pass constitutional muster. "Justification" of an action is very different from "inciting" to do an act.	Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful.	It is absolutely discrimination - treating one person or group differently from another person or group is the textbook definition of discrimination. Discrimination is only illegal if it is on the basis of a legally protected class. You will need to check the law of each country involved but, in general, price discrimination based on location is not illegal.	The issue is not whether it is an "act of violence". The fundamental political theory of classically liberal capitalist democracies is that the state has a monopoly on the use of force and violence, or at least, is entitled to assert one if it wishes to do so. But it is recognized as a matter of political theory that the use of force and violence and the credible threat of it, is necessary to secure good order and fairness and justice in society (and from outsiders attacking the society), and to encourage people to act appropriately towards each other. In a classical liberal capitalist democracy, this monopoly on the use of force and violence is regulated and made less abusive by providing that neither liberty or property can be taken by the state without due process of law (except in certain well defined exigent circumstances where due process is provided after the fact). The nuances of what due process is required is what differs. Overall, more due process is required for more serious deprivations, and less is required for less serious deprivations since the consequences of getting it wrong are smaller and don't justify the dead weight loss of more expensive litigation in the same way. Generally, incarceration is deemed to be more serious than a fine or money judgment as explained below, so it needs more due process protections. So, the issue is that interference with personal liberty is taken more seriously than interference with property, and the answer comes from understanding why the former is more serious than the latter. At its heart, this is a widely shared normative view. And, in U.S. constitutional law, this isn't an all or nothing proposition. For example, short deprivations of liberty (incarceration for six months or less) are penalties that a state or local government may take without a jury trial, while longer deprivations of liberty carry with them the right to trial by jury, and moderate to severe deprivations of liberty (typically felonies punishable by three or more years) typically carry with them the right to an evidentiary preliminary hearing before a judge prior to a trial on the merits before a jury that is not available for less serious offenses. Similarly, there is not an absolute right to counsel at state expense in all proceedings in which an indigent defendant might be incarcerated. When the case is prosecuted by a government official, this is the case, but when someone facts potential incarceration for willfully disobeying a court order until that person complies (contempt of court) and the case is prosecuted by a private litigant (possibly pro se), there is not a U.S. Constitutional right to counsel. In the same vein, there are weaker due process protections for someone accused of a pre-trial release rule violation, violation of jail or prison rules, probation violation, parole violations, and requests to be released on parole, when they are already under some form of correctional supervision, even though they can result in longer periods of incarceration, than there are someone living their daily life faces potential criminal punishment. I can't piece together exactly how this came to be, and the legal theory literature is rather thin and not wildly referred to by practitioners. But a couple of key historical points come to mind. One is that due process protections for moderate to serious felony offense criminal defendants were historically important, because certainly as of the 18th century in common law jurisdictions, the death penalty was routinely imposed for offenses that did not cause the death of the victim, such as burglary, robbery, and rape, in part, because the governments of these societies didn't have the economic resources necessary to incarcerate serious criminals for long enough periods of time to protect the public from recidivism and to adequately deter the conduct in the first place. While the line between property and liberty may be debatable, no one would seriously doubt that the historic divide between loss of life and loss of property clearly called for more due process protections against loss of life. A second is that in the late 18th century and early 19th century, a political movement arose to oppose debtor's prisons (and the related civil remedy called "body execution"), as disproportionate and inefficient. Prior to that time, one remedy of a creditor against someone who failed to pay a debt was to have them thrown into a "debtor's prison" or "work house" where they were placed in involuntary servitude until the debt was paid in full. Essentially, the moral argument was that being poor should not be a ground for being incarcerated and simple failure to pay a contactual debt routinely involves merely being poor. In the U.S., Congress outlawed debtors prisons in 1833. The 14th Amendment adopted after the U.S. Civil War, prohibited not just slavery, but involuntary servitude for failure to pay debts, when indentured involuntary servitude to pay costs of an apprenticeship or a passage to the Americas from the Old World, had been common in the colonial period, and into the early 19th century. In 1983 the Supreme Court ruled that in order to jail a person for failure to pay a fine or fee, the judge must first consider if the person was 'willfully' choosing not to pay. Closely related to this, which was a fairly new idea in the 18th century, was the idea of making the discharge of debts that a debtor has no reasonable ability to repay from the debtor's assets or earnings in the short term, routinely available as a matter of right in a court bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, weaker due process protections for monetary debts is backstopped by the fact that the harshness of this is limited by the fact that the debts can often be wiped out in bankruptcy if they are excessive, and that even if they can't be discharged in bankruptcy, that modern limits on the assets and income from which debts can be collected, almost automatically makes such debts survivable for a debtor. So, the risk of doing too much harm with an erroneous judgment is mitigated. Also, keep in mind that most money judgments and fines are compensatory in nature, are a rough justice approximation of compensation, or are proportionate to the seriousness of the harm done in the view of democratically elected legislators, acting collectively, who are presumed to be reasonable. If you deprive someone of property, for example, by failing to repay money loaned, or by destroying their property, taking a like amount of money or property from you seems like simple justice that doesn't call for close scrutiny, whether that comes in the form of a civil money judgment or a criminal restitution award. Similarly, most fines, for things like illegal parking, traffic violations, or minor municipal ordinance violations, are petty. Often they are less than one day's pay for the defendant, and hence, much less serious that depriving someone of liberty for more than a few hours. It is patently less severe. Also, the severity of a money judgment or fine bears a relationship to the ability of someone facing it to pay it. Typically, people who can afford cars can also afford parking tickets and traffic fines. Typically, people who drive cars are required to get insurance to pay meaningful amounts of money to people harmed if they have accidents. Typically, creditors only extend credit to people for whom it is not to burdensome to repay the debt. Typically, homeowners can afford to pay fines for municipal ordinance violations for failing to mow their lawns. In Northern Europe, there is an effort to reconcile the economic impact of incarceration on someone to presumptive prison sentences, with a system of "day-fines" where an offense is deemed to justify a prison sentence of up to X days, and that is converted to a fine equal to one day's wages for the defendant times the number of days (sentences imposed with the full due process protections of criminal defendants). This prevents the state from having to incur great expense to incarcerate someone who has already burden society by breaking its rules, and instead has the opposite economic effect on the state. It also prevents the community ties of the defendant from being disrupted and prevents criminal defendants from being unduly influenced by other offenders who would be incarcerated with that defendant potentially leading all involved to commit more future crimes. And, paying a fine still leaves a defendant with considerable liberty to interact with friends and family, enjoy low cost entertainment options, and move about where he or she desires. Incarceration deprives the offender of income, and also imposes all sorts of limitations on the defendant. One could imagine a system, like the day-fine system, where many fines that are punishment in excess of mere compensation or good approximation of it for the harm done are routinely as several in impact to a defendant as incarceration is to a defendant. But the U.S. does not have such a system. Punitive fines authorized by law are very rarely even remotely as severe as typical sentences of incarceration for the crimes for which those fines are authorized, when committed by natural persons. So, since fines, while they could be more severe than incarceration in a hypothetical legal system, rarely are in most non-day fine legal regimes, affording maximal due process protections in cases of incarceration but not monetary punishment flows naturally from the mere fact that incarceration, in practice, is almost always a more severe punishment, and because a bright line rule is easier to apply even in the rare cases when a fine might be more serious than incarceration. Greater due process in more severe cases makes sense because inaccurate judicial imposition or non-imposition of punishment in minor matters is less of a big deal than in very serious matters. Finally, it is worth noting that incarceration is usually reserved for offenses in which the typical defendant would be utterly incapable of providing money compensation, because the harm done is so great. Criminal offenses punishable by incarceration are designed for instances of "incalculable harm" that can't be made right with the defendant's money, while civil offenses are generally chosen as a policy option in cases where the harm caused in manageable relative to the ability of someone to make it right with a compensatory payment and/or a fine or punitive damages that proportionately compares to the harm done that is not merely economic in some way. The notion that incalculable harms are more serious and hence more important to get right, than those which are measurable and compensable, again, argues for greater due process protections in incarceration cases. (Another area where due process protections are similarly great is in termination of parental rights cases, by the way, which implicate similarly serious and incalculable harm matters.) I know that this lacks citation, but it does go a bit to illustrating the motivating ideas.	In many countries (for instance, the US), churches and mosques are private property. In general, the owner of private property can throw anyone off their property; claiming you're doing an extensive period of praying doesn't matter, because they are under no obligation to let people stay as long as needed to pray (they can kick someone off the property for just about any reason). If there's a contract in play things are different, but contracts aren't in play in this situation. That said, nothing stops the church or mosque from letting the homeless stay there; this is actually not that uncommon (charity being a fairly common religious virtue).	Why should they? If a person is accused of a crime, say murder, why should more evidence be needed to convict them if they are a high ranking government official than if they are just an ordinary person? Why should their trial be conducted differently? If convicted, why should their punishment be different? Yes, you can run societies that way and people have and do but it isn’t very fair is it? Equality before the law does not imply any other sort of equality People high up in the government have more power and authority than others but if they are alleged to have broken the law they are treated the same as anybody else.	Yes, because the crimes are different instances. Let's remove the guilty plea and the fact that it is murder: can a person assault a person, be tried and imprisoned, then assault the same person later – and get off by declaring "Double jeopardy!". No, it's not the same crime. It's the same type of crime, and involves the same victim, but it is still a different crime. The same with your proposed scenario. (Incidentally, your first line is wrong: the woman wasn't murdered, she was thought to have been murdered).	Not all discrimination is illegal. For instance, landlords discriminate against those who can't afford to pay the rent. They might discriminate against former tenants who destroyed several walls during their lease period. They discriminate against those with bad credit, and often might discriminate against the unemployed. Landlords often do discriminate against frat students/college students in general. In fact, at least in the US, discrimination is generally allowed unless it's discrimination for one of a few specifically prohibited reasons (such as race). A lease is a negotiation on both sides; it requires both the landlord and the tenant to be satisfied with each other. As for why different places have different laws: Toronto is not actually in the United States. That means it has different people, a different culture, different primary values, and a different legal tradition. It's not surprising that laws are different; if laws were the same everywhere, the world would be a boring place indeed.
What's the legal consequence of leaving the United States without using one's U.S. passport? I read on https://travel.state.gov: U.S. nationals, including dual nationals, must use a U.S. passport to enter and leave the United States. Dual nationals may also be required by the foreign country to use its passport to enter and leave that country. Use of the foreign passport to travel to or from a country other than the United States is not inconsistent with U.S. law. What's the legal consequence of leaving the United States without using one's U.S. passport?	The State Department is mischaracterizing the law, which requires only that the US citizen "bear" a valid US passport, not that the US citizen "use" the passport. This law, 8 USC 1185(b), used to have a fairly stiff penalty, and it used to apply only in time of war. When the wartime element was removed in 1978, so was the penalty. It now reads Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport. If a US citizen attempts to leave the US without a valid US passport, there is a very small chance that the departure could be prevented by a CBP officer, but in the normal course of affairs the traveler would not even encounter a CBP officer, so the possibility is very remote indeed. There is nothing, however, that prevents a US citizen who also holds a passport issued by another country from using the other passport while also carrying a valid US passport. See also What is the penalty for US citizens entering/leaving the US on a foreign passport? at Travel and Can someone be penalized for an "unlawful" act if no penalty is specified? on this site.	As someone with ties to the "foreign" community in the United States, I see these "marriages of convenience" from time to time. In their most "legitimate" form, the couple will move to the same address and "technically" live together, but without consummating the marriage so that it can later be legally annulled. American immigration authorities counter this by asking each spouse about the other's underwear (literally!). Some "marriages of convenience" are legal, insofar as they technically conform to the marriage documents, e.g. regarding "co habitation," even while violating the spirit of the law. Others don't. Your best chance of attacking such "marriages" is not regarding the marriage itself (basically only the couple can decide what constitutes a valid marriage), but rather "compliance" with the marriage documents. That's something any law enforcement officer can understand.	The green card should always be at hand Yeah, he can't do that. He needs a green card in his possession anytime he's not on private property. Obviously for instance leaving it in the gym locker while you're at the gym is ok, but no, you can't dash off to the grocery store without it, on the logic that it's "just in town". Just like I can't make a milk run without my driver's license. So this idea of dashing off on a 400 mile adventure, is Right Out. He should have absolutely refused to travel without the documents in hand. If they say "get off the property or we'll call the cops", then tell the cops "I can't leave without my passport/green card" which the cops will back up, because they know the law and they know how trafficking works. The right to strut around the USA without any ID at all is reserved for US citizens only, and even that is being stripped away by ever-changing laws. Those documents are someone else's property The Green Card is the property of the USA and is not hers to steal. The passport is the property of the Philippine government and is not hers to steal. She didn't take your stuff, she took theirs. So she is guilty of a Federal crime, and the long arm of Philippine law may have an "opinion" on the matter also. Of course, most people don't think of it that way. They think your ID is your property so they think they're only messing with you. I would absolutely, positively report theft of the passport to the Philippine consulate. (Or rather, just report a missing passport, and be free about explaining the circumstances). One might hope that a phone call to consular staff might scare her straight, and get her to send it along. Most likely the green card would be in there also. Or, he could pay the fees to have a replacement passport issued. However the important one is the Green Card, since that establishes your right to be in the USA. On that one, you must consult an immigration lawyer and find out what you need to do. You certainly can get replacement green cards (not cheap), but admitting you don't have yours could cause you problems. People often seize documents for a reason And what makes me think that is, the uncle is a grown adult and the daughter's elder, and I thought that meant something in the Philippines. He is supposed to be more adult and more responsible. As such, he should be responsible for his own documents. Yet, this seems to be in the daughter's hands; this raises red flags. Maybe what she did was a harmless prank. But usually, taking an immigrant's documents is done for an entirely evil reason. Either they are forcing them into indentured servitude (also called "trafficking") - so if he is now in a situation where he is being extorted to do work in a worse situation or worse wage than he'd take willingly, then he is a trafficking victim, and the taking documents is part of the plot. The US has some legal protections for trafficking victims. Or they are "setting him up" for failure in some other way - for instance, out of idle malice, the niece might be planning to call immigration and report him as being illegal, hoping he'd be found with no green card, and deported for not having it.	Immigration and naturalization is pretty far out of my comfort zone, but I'm confident that the answer is yes. Although people often believe that a foreign embassy is considered the territory of that country, I don't know of any law that supports that belief. Instead, through the Vienna Convention, the embassy grounds remain the territory of the host state but are provided a variety of protections and immunities because of their diplomatic status. With the embassy on U.S. soil, the child would therefore satisfy the "born ... in the United States" prong of the 14th Amendment's Citizenship Clause.* But that would not be the end of the analysis, as birthright citizenship also requires not just that the child is born in the United States, but also that the child be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." So if the child were born to an American citizen who had entered the Indian embassy to get a travel visa, the child would be both born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, making it eligible for birthright citizenship. But if the child were born to Indian ambassador or to diplomatic staff, who would generally be able to claim diplomatic immunity, that child would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and would not be able to claim birthright citizenship. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73, (1872) ("The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States."). * I haven't been able to find any cases saying this explicitly, but all the cases involving children born in foreign embassies sort of skip over the question as though they just assume that the child was born in the United States. See, e.g., Raya v. Clinton, 703 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. Va. 2010); Nikoi v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 939 F.2d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1991) These cases also go on to conclude that those children are not citizens of the United States, because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."	The decision will be made by whichever country arrests him first (although a minority of countries allow for the trial of people who break their criminal laws in absentia). Needless to say, if nobody manages to arrest him ever, he will not face any criminal consequences except the issuance of an arrest warrant possibly accompanied by a pre-existing conviction in absentia if arrested in countries that allow for such a proceeding. Normally, in these circumstances, either country would have jurisdiction under its own laws to prosecute and punish the criminal, and many extradition treaties would not require the extradition of someone who committed a crime punished domestically in the state in whose custody the criminal is as part of the same course of events. Many countries will not extradite someone if they could face the death penalty in the receiving country. But, sometimes law enforcement in a country with a less serious penalty will intentionally defer to law enforcement in a country with a more serious penalty that is simultaneously trying to arrest him. Ordinarily, law enforcement is not authorized to use deadly force to arrest someone who is simultaneously being arrested by law enforcement from another country against either the arrestee or the law enforcement from the other country. Indeed, using deadly force against another country's law enforcement officers who are carrying out a lawful arrest in their own country would ordinarily be considered an act of war. U.S. double jeopardy provisions of the constitution do not prohibit a second prosecution of an offender in these circumstances because of a first prosecution by another sovereign, but many prosecutors in many countries would decline to prosecute someone a second time for the offense that they have already been convicted of in exercise of their discretion, and many judges would consider time served in another country for the same offense as a factor in setting their own sentence.	Citizens likely have an absolute right to enter the US. This hasn't been addressed directly by the Supreme Court, but here are some cases that come close. The Fifth Circuit, in William Worthy, Jr. v. US, 328 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1964): We think it is inherent in the concept of citizenship that the citizen, when absent from the country to which he owes allegiance, has a right to return, again to set foot on its soil. The Supreme Court, in Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS 533 U.S. 53 (2001) said that conferring citizenship on a person would give "the absolute right to enter [the US]". This wasn't necessary for the holding in this case, which was about whether the person was a citizen, so this could be considered dicta. Fikre v. FBI, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1268 (D. Or. 2014). (not an appellate case) said: U.S. citizen’s right to reenter the United States entails more than simply the right to step over the border after having arrived there. At some point, governmental actions taken to prevent or impede a citizen from reaching the [border] infringe upon the citizen’s right to reenter the United States. Even if we assume that citizens do not have an absolute right to re-entry, the Equal Protection Clause likely bars a religion-based criteria for citizen re-entry. Citizens are protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. This prohibits the government discriminating based on a suspect classification (race, religion, national origin) unless such law passes strict scrutiny. Without making a prediction about whether such a hypothetical statute could pass strict scrutiny, I'll go as far as I can and strongly guess that the government could not prohibit citizen re-entry to the United States based solely on their declared religion.	Generally a person can leave money to any person or organization that the testator pleases. In some US states, a minimum portion must be left to family (spouse and/or children). Aside from that, there is no requirement and no exclusions. US law prohibits gifts (and other support) to a few specific organizations which the government has officially listed as terrorist, and I suspect the Taliban is one of these. Gifts by will would be covered by this law just as gifts from a living person. But if a living person in the US can lawfully make a gift to an organization, a similar gift may be left by will. Even if a particular bequest was unlawful, that would not make the will as a whole invalid. Edit: It seems that the Afghan Taliban is not on the list of terrorist organizations maintained by the US, and so there would be no bar to a US citizen leaving money to that group. There would be to groups actually on the list. The general principle above holds.	An individual obtains due process rights upon entering into the United States. For a recent write-up on this question, see this piece at Reason. The people Trump is talking about generally aren't being denied admission at an established, legal border crossing; they're coming across wherever they can get through, and only being discovered by federal agents thereafter. Because they're already in the United States, they have due process rights. As for cross-border interactions with ICE or CBP, the extent of due process protections is still an open question. SCOTUS took it up last year, but it kicked the case back to a lower court rather than deciding it.
Is there such a thing as employee owned LLC? There's employee owned companies, but I'm not looking to start anything quite so big. Is there a form of company like an LLC that's straight forward to file that will allow it to be employee owned?	Most limited liability companies (LLCs) are small, closely held firms that are owned entirely or in substantial part by active employee-manager-owners with modest capital contributions. LLCs with large numbers of owners typically have a large share of non-employee investor ownership and are most common in oil and gas firms and in real estate firms that either develop, or buy and hold, real estate. Most large accounting and law firms and many other professional service firms are organized as LLCs or LLP (limited liability partnerships), which are owned by the senior employees whose contributions as employees dwarfs their contributions as investors. (Non-lawyers and non-physicians aren't allowed to have ownership interests in law firms and medical practices, respectively). These are the largest firms in the world with significant employee ownership. Start up tech firms organized as LLCs also often give equity stakes to employees even below the senior-managerial employee level. Rank and file employees are sometimes given an ownership interests in firms, but this is more commonly done through an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) or certain other tax encouraged mechanisms for employee ownership in corporations (e.g., incentive stock options), or in the context of a firm organized as a cooperative (which is taxed essentially like a C-corporation but with an entity level deduction for cooperative dividends paid to members), than it is as an LLCs. One important reason for this is that pass-through taxation (which applies to LLCs not electing to be taxed as corporations) is not workable as a means of imparting ownership to large numbers of rank and file workers, because the compliance paperwork of sending out dozens or hundreds of K-1s to these workers is daunting, and because the prospect of a disconnect between allocated income and loss, and actual distributions (e.g. taxation on "phantom income" of the entity that is not distributed) is problematic.	Patents are not that relevant in this case. Software patents are unenforceable in most parts of the world anyway. What matters here is copyright. Every work contract has a clause that everything an employee creates as part of their employment is copyrighted by the company. So using company-owned code to build an own project would be a copyright violation. There are also other legal tools in some jurisdiction which can be used against employees trying to misuse intellectual company property. But that's a topic for Law Stackexchange. Also, this isn't really related to a BYOD policy. Being able to bring your own device to work and then back home might make data theft more convenient, but isn't required. There are many other ways to steal sourcecode, like USB drives or uploading them to the internet. To prevent the first you would have to design your software development offices like a supermax prison facility with meter-high walls (so nobody can throw a device over it) and strip searches on everyone leaving the building. This is neither feasible nor reasonable for anything below matters of national security. To prevent the second, you would have to completely prevent internet access from developer workstations, which would greatly impede the productivity of any software developer. So most companies do not even try to physically prevent employees from stealing sourcecode. They rather rely on the legal safeguards and on maintaining a mutual trust relationship with their employees. It might seem counter-intuitive to some, but when you do not treat your employees like potential criminals they are in fact less likely to betray you.	You were on a performance improvement plan, those often require special requirements of the employee. I'm sorry your mother died, but a year seems like a very long time to take, and your company was very kind to give you that long. I am not a lawyer but I sincerely doubt there is anything actionable here.	By "unlicensed" you mean that it doesn't state a license for use (MIT, GPL, etc.)? Those licenses are just a codified bundle of terms of use that cover many many edge cases. You have in place a much simpler agreement that covers the primary situation: you using/modifying the code for your own use. It's just like borrowing a car. You will ask a friend "hey, could I borrow your car for a bit?" "sure!". You know there's a possibility that you'll get in an accident or something weird will happen, but you think the chances of that are minimal and you would be able to work it out. If you ask a car rental company, they'll give you a full contract covering every situation that may happen. Similarly, a large company would be hesitant to borrow a car for corporate use without a legal framework surrounding it. So you will likely be in the clear if you are just using it for a small project with minimal legal/financial implications. If you plan on turning your project into a multi-billion dollar empire, you should revisit your agreement.	Raise the question with your employer If you believe that you are an employee and not a contractor then there is presumably something you want from your employer. This may be additional wages and entitlements that you would have or will become entitled to for past or future work respectively. Or you may have been injured and want workers' compensation. Or terminated and you want redundancy pay. Whatever it is, work it out and raise the issue with your employer. You might want to consult an accountant or union to help you. They may acknowledge that you were incorrectly classified and give you what you want. Winner, winner, chicken dinner! Or they may dispute it. If so, you need to follow the dispute resolution processes at your workplace. These typically involve informal discussions, escalating to mediation and then to a workplace tribunal run by the government. You will almost certainly want to consult a lawyer or union to help you - given that you don't know where to start the learning curve is likely to be too steep. In virtually every jurisdiction if people are employees at law they can't choose not to be. in british-columbia the relevant law appears to be the Employment Standards Act although it's not unheard of in edge cases for a person to be an employee under one law (e.g. workers' compensation) and a contractor under another (e.g. income tax). From the linked site: The overriding question is “whose business is it?” Is the person who is doing the work doing it as a person in business for themselves? If you are working "for" your own business you are probably a contractor. If you are working "for" your employer's business you are probably an employee. For example, if you are an accountant with several dozen clients, maintain your own business premises and charge for your advice based on the amount quoted rather than by the hour, you're a contractor. If instead, you have 2 clients, work from their premises at set hours and get paid by the day or week, you're an employee with 2 jobs. In edge cases these are not cut and dried - Google are Uber driver's employees. In Australia: no. In California: yes. In the UK: yes.	Only if the company consents While some jurisdictions have by statute allowed corporations to be bound by pre-incorporation contracts, New York is not one of them and holds to the common law principle that a person cannot enter a contract before that person exists. In your circumstances the company is only bound by the second contract. So, who is bound by the first? Well, corporations can only act through agents and agency law tells us that an agent who purportedly acts for a non-existent principal is actually acting on their own behalf. So, the person(s) who signed for Company X on the first contract are personally bound to the contract. Unless they explicitly told Company Y that they wouldn’t be. It seems that they didn’t so Company Y can require performance of the first contract by them and of the second by Company X. Company Y must, of course, fulfil its obligations under both contracts - it needs to bear this in mind if it is actually impossible to do both, for example, transferring the same property to the signers of the first contract and Company X or becoming a full time employee of both. If so, it might be in Company Y’s best interests to let the first contract “die”.	If the company makes a contract, and as a result of that contract it owes more money than it has, then the company goes bankrupt and the owners and directors can walk away from it. This covers the owners/directors in cases of ordinary business contracts. However if an employee (including an owner or director) does something sufficiently harmful then under the law of torts they can be personally liable as well as the company. Examples are negligence and fraud; if you build someone's new roof while acting as an employee and the roof leaks then its likely to be the company on the hook for damages. However if you misrepresented your qualifications or acted negligently then you might well be personally liable. This is all very general. Details are going to be specific to your jurisdiction. So the answer is that having a company is certainly better than making every contract in your own name, but its not complete cover. You can probably get insurance if this is a concern, but its likely to be expensive.	Do you have permission of the person? In general, product names fall under trademark law, not copyright. And while it's possible to use the name of a non-employee as a trademark, doing so without the permission of that person is rather dangerous. That person may sue you for a number of different reasons, with different demands - chiefly financial compensation or a rename of your product.
Who controls campaign funds when a candidate dies? John is a candidate for Congress. His campaign committee consists of himself and a treasurer (or perhaps only himself). Before the election, he suddenly dies. His campaign has raised but not spent $1 million. John's wife wants to spend that money supporting candidates she likes in other races. John's replacement on the ballot wants to spend the money on his own campaign. John's political party wants to spend the money on party operations. John's treasurer wants to spend the money to pay off campaign debts and establish a nonprofit in the candidate's name. Who gets control of the money?	The Federal Election Committee's Congressional candidates and committees campaign guide (212-page PDF) has lots of information about how campaigns must be run under federal law. All candidates for US Federal offices with over $5000 of donations or expenditures are required to register a campaign committee with the FEC. Campaign donations are generally accepted by the campaign committee (not the candidate himself/herself) and disbursed by same. Within 15 days after an individual becomes a candidate as described in Section 1, he or she must designate a principal campaign committee. This designation is made by filing either a Statement of Candidacy (FEC Form 2) or a letter with the same information. 101.1(a) and 102.12(a). Within 10 days after it has been designated by the candidate, the principal campaign committee must register with the FEC by filing a Statement of Organization (FEC Form 1). 52 U.S.C. §§ 30102(g), 30103(a); 102.1(a). This committee would probably still exist after the candidate's death,* and would be responsible for any decisions regarding the disposition of remaining campaign funds at that time (just as if the candidate had withdrawn from the race.) So by law, the answer is "the campaign committee". The FEC does place restrictions on what a campaign can do with leftover funds, but the options are: Settling debts. Note, in fact, that the campaign committee cannot terminate its operations if it has any outstanding debts or obligations. (p. 137 of the FEC guide) Start a non-profit organization. Convert to a multicandidate committee (this is really just a special type of non-profit, I suppose.) Donate the unused funds to charity. Donate the unused funds to another candidate's committee, subject to a $2000 limit. (p. 19) Donate the unused funds to a party organization (no limit as far as I can tell.) So: The treasurer's idea of paying off the debts is in fact required by law before the committee can wind down its operations. The campaign committee can't send more than $2000 directly to any other federal candidate, so John's wife and John's replacement are constrained in this regard. Beyond that, where the funds end up will depend on who is on the campaign committee and what procedures the committee uses to make decisions. *Technically, it appears to be legal for the candidate to be both treasurer and custodian of records for their own campaign — which are the only two positions on the committee required by law. It is conceivable that a campaign organized in this way could end up with "orphaned" funds, without anyone authorized to dispose of them. I'm not sure what would happen in this case.	What does this paragraph mean? Line by line. I give my Residuary Estate This is a gift, effective when the person writing the Will dies, of everything that is left over after all debts and taxes are paid and after any other gifts already in the Will (e.g. leaving a car or a house or a Monet to someone in particular) have been given. to the said [Full Name] absolutely I'm going give [Full Name] a name so that it is easier to follow this explanation. [Full Name]'s name for purposes of this answer is "Luna". This says to give all that stuff to Luna when the person who wrote the Will dies, if Luna is still alive for whatever the required amount of time is after the person who wrote the Will dies. The required survival time period is either in the boilerplate provisions of the Will, or in the relevant statute if the Will is silent on the question. The Will says "absolutely" because historically, someone who received gifts of property in deed or wills in England only got to keep it for their lifetime, unless it clearly specified otherwise, after which someone else would get it. But in this case, if Luna survives this long, Luna gets all of this stuff with no strings attached. and if [Name] shall fail to obtain a vested interest leaving issue who survive me then such issue shall take by substitution If Luna dies before the person who wrote the Will does, or doesn't stay alive for the required number of days afterwards, then Luna isn't entitled to this stuff. Luna's descendants get it instead (i.e. Luna's descendants "take by substitution" what Luna would have gotten if Luna had lived, instead of Luna's probate estate getting the stuff). and if there shall be more than one of such issue they shall take in equal shares per stirpes but so that no issue shall take whose parent is alive and so capable of taking. If Luna predeceases and has exactly one living descendant who is alive when the person who wrote the Will dies, and that living descendant lives the required number of days after the person who wrote the Will dies, then the sole living descendant of Luna gets all of the stuff that is left over when the person who wrote the Will dies. If Luna has more than one living descendant, the stuff that is left over when the person who wrote the Will dies, then Luna's descendants gets broken up the way described below, which is called per stirpes: Create one share for each child of Luna who is alive and survives Luna by the required amount of time. If Luna has only one living child, that child gets everything even if Luna's child has children of their own. Create one share for each child of Luna who didn't live for long enough after the person who wrote the Will's death, if the predeceased child has descendants who are alive and remain alive after the person who wrote the Will dies by the required amount of time. This share is then broken up into one sub-share for each child of the predeceased child who is alive when the person who wrote the Will dies and is still alive after the person who wrote the Will dies by the required amount of time, and one sub-share for each predeceased child of the predeceased child who has living descendants who remain alive for the requisite number of days. Continue this process until 100% of the the residuary estate has been assigned to someone and give them their share of it once the estate is settled. If someone lives past the minimum number of days to outlive the person who wrote the Will, and then dies, that person's share goes that person's probate estate. For visual learners, a per stirpes distributions of assets looks like this: A per stirpes distribution to descendants is the plain vanilla ordinary way to giving stuff to the descendants of a dead person when you don't know in advance who will outlive you. What if Luna predeceases with no living descendants? Usually, this paragraph of a Will will be followed by another paragraph called the "ultimate contingent beneficiary" which says who gets the stuff that's left over in the residuary estate if Luna predeceases the person who wrote the Will and has no living descendants. Often, the ultimate contingent beneficiary will be one or more distant relatives, a list of friends, or a charity. If there is no ultimately contingent beneficiary in the Will, but Luna and all of Luna's descendants predecease the person who wrote the Will, then it goes to the next of kin (a.k.a. "heirs at law") of the person who wrote the Will, if there are any relatives of the person who wrote the Will who are close enough to qualify to inherit under English inheritances law. If there is no one closely enough related to the person who wrote the Will to qualify under English inheritance law, then the stuff "escheats" (i.e. is inherited by default) by the King (or Queen) of England, as the case may be. There are some circumstances when the Will can be ignored. Everything above explains what this language in the Will means. This isn't always what happens, however. There are several exceptions to the general rule that property goes to the people that the Will says it goes to. I won't list them all here, but it is important when a Will is being written to understand that this is the case. For example, if the person who wrote the Will leaves nothing in the Will to their spouse of thirty years as of the death of the person who wrote the Will, who has no assets of their own, then the Court will partially ignore what the Will says and give some of the residuary estate to the surviving spouse. Also, the Will only controls assets that are in the "probate estate". Some assets pass at death in what are called "non-probate transfers" that are not controlled by what the Will says. And, finally, of course, if the Will was written when the person signing the Will was of unsound mind, the Will can be invalidated in a "Will contest" in the appropriate court if the person contesting the Will's validity can prove that the person signing it was of unsound mind at the time. This is mediocre legal writing This paragraph gets the job done, but it is not very well written by modern legal Will drafting standards. It is adequate and probably meets the standard of care for a lawyer who hasn't committed malpractice. Lawyers in England have been writing paragraphs like this one for three or four hundred years. But it is not "best practices" legal writing in a Will. Good modern legal drafting for a Will would be much easier for a non-lawyer to understand, in addition to being clear and unambiguous.	Who's entitled to financial compensation in this case? Children? Parents? Grandparents? SO's? Friends? Usually, state law in the state where the person who died was domiciled at death specifies who may file a wrongful death lawsuit (and usually it is not the most obvious answer, the probate estate of the deceased person). The Colorado Statue, which is typical, is found at Colorado Revised Statutes, § 13-21-201 et seq. The person or persons entitled to sue for wrongful death are usually basically "next of kin" but the details of how this is defined and operationalized varies moderately from state to state. And how exactly is the payout for each person determined? The total dollar amount is usually determined by a jury based upon evidence provided at trial although there is no fixed formula. The jury simply assigns a value that it believes is fair. If more than one person is allowed to sue for wrongful death, the state wrongful death statute clarifies how the wrongful death settlement is divided among those people.	The legal requirement to hand over the returns is found in 26 U.S. Code § 6103: (f) Disclosure to Committees of Congress (1) Committee on Ways and Means, Committee on Finance, and Joint Committee on Taxation Upon written request from the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate, or the chairman of the Joint Committee on Taxation, the Secretary shall furnish such committee with any return or return information specified in such request, except that any return or return information which can be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer shall be furnished to such committee only when sitting in closed executive session unless such taxpayer otherwise consents in writing to such disclosure. Enforcement is found in 26 U.S. Code § 7214 (a) Unlawful acts of revenue officers or agents Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States— ... (3) who with intent to defeat the application of any provision of this title fails to perform any of the duties of his office or employment; or ... shall be dismissed from office or discharged from employment and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. The court may in its discretion award out of the fine so imposed an amount, not in excess of one-half thereof, for the use of the informer, if any, who shall be ascertained by the judgment of the court. The court also shall render judgment against the said officer or employee for the amount of damages sustained in favor of the party injured, to be collected by execution. These punishments are essentially identical to those in Section 7213, which describe the punishments for those who unlawfully release returns. I've seen that section quoted in some articles as the basis for punishing failure to provide requested returns to the Chair of the House Ways and Means committee, but I'm not really seeing how that section covers non-compliance. Non-compliance seems only covered by Section 7214, which requires the "intent to defeat" (or various other issues, such as not disclosing known violations to the Secretary, etc.). That may be hard to prove in this scenario, and part of the stalling by Mnuchin may in part because they are exploring if they can build a strong case that it wasn't his intent to defeat the title. The quote of his you note is particularly on point on this, as he explicitly says he intends to obey the law; he's just questioning the constitutional issues involved.	The constitution does not actually forbid "abusing a position for financial gain", and thus it is left to the political process to address any such actions (voting for a different candidate), or the legislative process (defining certain acts as forbidden) – or, the impeachment process. The court system in the US does not have the power to decide on their own what politicians can and can't do, if there is no underlying law. It is within congressional power to define limits on the act of any politician, for example Congress could pass a law requiring the President and Vice-President to have no business interests or stocks during their term of office; they could require that of cabinet members or members of Congress. Such a law would, of course, either require presidential approval or else sufficient support in the houses of congress to override a veto. There are various limits on what government folks can do. 18 USC 202(c) is an example of a limit on the limits: Except as otherwise provided in such sections, the terms “officer” and “employee” in sections 203, 205, 207 through 209, and 218 of this title shall not include the President, the Vice President, a Member of Congress, or a Federal judge It is possible that a president could engage in a criminal act such as theft, and that is not permitted and would be grounds for impeachment. The president does not, however, have the power to e.g. unilaterally send all government hotel business to a certain hotel company, nor can he declare that 10% of all government expenditures must be deposited in his personal bank account, so the mechanisms whereby corrupt rules of certain other nations can get away with that is that those executives have vastly more power in their countries than POTUS does. With congressional support, though, such acts could come about. If it did, it would not be too surprising if SCOTUS ruled based on common law and considerations of justice that such a law / act was illegal, but it would not be a textualist argument.	This will depend on the exact wording of the will. If the will is well-drawn, it will provide alternative recipients in case the primary recipient of a bequest dies before the testator (will-maker) does. But as a general rule, if A makes a will leaving particular property to B, but B dies before A does, that bequest is void. If the will specifies an alternate recipient, the property goes to the alternate. If not, or if all specified alternates die before the testator does, the property becomes part of the residual estate of the testator. (The residual estate is that part which is not subject to a specific bequest.) The testator can specify a line of descent for a bequest: "I leave my house to Joan and her heirs". In that case, if Joan died before the testator, the house would go to whatever person or persons inherit from Joan. This was once a somewhat common form of bequest, but now is much less common. A will normally includes language leaving the residual estate to some person (or several people) or some entity (it can be an organization, such as a church or a charity). This is often done with language such as "I leave all the rest of my estate to ..." OR "Everything not include above i leave to..." or "I give all the remainder and residue of my estate to...". The executor does not choose, but rather follows the directions of the will on who gets the residue of the estate. I am not sure what happens if the will does not name a residuary legatee, or if the person so named dies before the testator. That will depend on the specific law of the jurisdiction. In the US, this means state law, and will vary from state to state. The comment by Dale M says that assets not provided for in the will are inherited as if the person was intestate, that is, as if the person had no valid will. The law in each jurisdiction specifies exactly what rules are followed in the case of intestacy. In general this is that property goes first to the teatator's spouse and children, but if there are no living spouse and children, to more distant relatives. Eventually, if no relatives close enough can be found, property escheats, that is, goes to the government. The exact rule varies by jurisdiction -- in the US by state.	Government FAQ on the Electoral College: If a winning Presidential candidate dies or becomes incapacitated between the counting of electoral votes in Congress and the inauguration, the Vice President elect will become President, according to Section 3 of the 20th Amendment. Section 3 of the 20th Amendment: If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. [...]	No. The scope of Medicare is established by statute which must be amended with a statute approved by Congress and signed by the President, or approved after being vetoed by the President with a veto override, to be changed. The age limitation is set forth at 42 U.S.C. 1395c: The insurance program for which entitlement is established by sections 226 and 226A provides basic protection against the costs of hospital, related post-hospital, home health services, and hospice care in accordance with this part for (1) individuals who are age 65 or over and are eligible for retirement benefits under title II of this Act (or would be eligible for such benefits if certain government employment were covered employment under such title) or under the railroad retirement system, (2) individuals under age 65 who have been entitled for not less than 24 months to benefits under title II of this Act (or would have been so entitled to such benefits if certain government employment were covered employment under such title) or under the railroad retirement system on the basis of a disability, and (3) certain individuals who do not meet the conditions specified in either clause (1) or (2) but who are medically determined to have end stage renal disease. Also, money doesn't grow on trees. The only way to provide that greatly expanded single payer health care benefit would be to raise hundreds of millions of dollars or more of new taxes to pay for it. Any new tax would have to be proposed with a bill initiated in the House of Representatives, approved by the Senate, and then passed by the President (or approved over his veto with a veto override). Likewise, the increased appropriation of funds for the benefits would have to be approved by Congress, even though it is an entitlement, because current legislation doesn't authorize spending for that purpose.
Is offering a means to break one's own policy legal? A friend's kid's High School has a strict policy against using social media during school time. My friend agrees, and made sure the kids' access to social media is blocked on all the devices they own. However, the school distributed laptops to kids without any social media blocks. When my friend contacted the school about it, the response was that the kids should be mindful of the school policies, and, if they would use the social media (to which they have access only via the laptops the same school distributed) they will be punished. Is this an example of entrapment? Is this any different than, say, placing an open bottle of vodka in front of a teen who never asked for it, and "expecting" him not to drink it, and holding him responsible if he does?	Entrapment is when a law-enforcement organization, or other parts of a government working with an LEO, entice a person to violate a law, and then prosecute the person for that violation, usually arresting the person first. Note that this definition of "entrapment" is US-specific, and does not apply in all other countries, perhaps not in any other county. But then, the question is tagged for California. As the school presumably does not intend any criminal prosecution, these actions are not legally entrapment, even if they are morally similar. Entrapment is not itself illegal even when it leads to criminal charges. That is to say, the police and prosecutor cannot be charged criminally for engaging in entrapment, nor sued for money damages by the person entrapped. However, entrapment can be a defense. If a person charged with crime can show that the crime only occurred because of entrapment, that will generally be grounds for acquittal. In addition, many people consider entrapment to be morally and ethically wrong. Generally, for a situation to be entrapment legally, a person must not only have an opportunity to break a law, but must be actively persuaded or enticed to do so, and the idea must come from the entrapper. However, the question says that the school "has a strict policy against using social media during school time". If the students retain the laptops outside of school hours (as they may well do) it might be fine with the school to use social media during those times, so perhaps school authorities don't think a blocker is needed. In any case there is no legal requirement for the school to install a social media blocking program, even if use of the school-issued laptops to access social media is against school rules at all times. A parent could install a blocker, unless school rules for use of the laptops prohibit doing so. Of course, in later life, people will almost surely encounter situations where they could do something unlawful or forbidden, but should not. An employer might provide access to computers, but forbid using them to access porn, even though no blocking software is in place. It is also not a bad idea to check school-issued laptops for possible privacy violations. There have been cases where school IT departments or contractors routinely activated built-in web-cams, ostensibly as an anti-theft measure, but in fact observing private situations, including inside the student's home.	First of all, Sally can't charge Bob, or anyone else. She can file a complaint with the police, or with the District Attorney. It may or may not be investigated, and if it is, charges may or may not be brought, and she has no control over any of that, although she may be able to use persuasion or political pressure to influence the decision. In New York, persuading a child to make pornography is a class C felony. Possessing child pornography is a class E felony. Promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child is a class D felony. Disseminating obscene material to a minor is a class E felony, unless the defendant solicits the child to engage in sexual activity, in which case it's a class D felony. All of these have 5-year statutes of limitation. (N.Y. Pen. Law § § 70.00, 80.00, 235.21, 235.22, 263.05, 263.10, 263.11, 263.16.) I can't find any NY law that makes it a crime to ask for a naked image of a child and be refused, although there may well be one. Note that it is not a crime in NY to posses sexual or nude pictures of a person 16 or older, although it is a crime to create them. There are also federal laws against child pornography, but federal policy is not to bring federal cases where the accused are under 18 and a state case could be brought. In fact, the federal authorities generally do not bring cases except against major producers when a state case can be brought instead. But that is a matter of policy, not law. NY has a pre-trial diversion program for teen-ages involved in "sexting". They can agree to take special classes, and avoid a criminal conviction or any jail time. The court must approve candidates individually for this program, but it is widely used. In the given scenario, the statute of limitations would not have expired (if the law I couldn't find makes this a felony, misdemeanor SoL is 2 years). In theory bob could be charged and tried for his solicitation. If charges were levied, the prosecution would need to prove at trial that Bob had made the request, and that it was serious, not a joke. It would also need to persuade a jury to convict when no sexual image had ever been transmitted. In practice I doubt that a case would be pursued after several years. That would depend entirely on the DA, or the relevant assistant DA who handled the case. Nothing would legally prevent such a case that I know of.	I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.	There are various tangential ways in which this could be illegal, for example if your subjects are celebrities, you take a picture of them and commercially exploit it without permission in a product endorsement. Leaving aside such fringe cases, in the US, the legal right to privacy comes about, at the first cut, by premise trespass law. If the proprietor tells you to go away, you have to go away; if the proprietor tells you that you cannot take pictures, you cannot take pictures (your right to enter is conditional). Neither of those circumstances holds in your case. There are other tort-law bases for a right to privacy: numerous privacy laws regarding privacy and financial transactions (not relevant here), the aforementioned right of publicity (commercial exploitation of likeness), false light (like defamation, about creating a false impression – I don't see what false information is conveyed by a photo). There is also public disclosure of private fact, but that cat is out of the bag because the subject has self-disclosed the supposedly offensive fact revealed by the picture by eating in public. Intrusion of solitude and seclusion does not exist in the circumstance, since the subject is eating in public where everybody can see: there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. This page sums us Virginia law. The main take-away from that is that there is no common law action for privacy in Virginia, and only an action for unauthorized used of likeness or name.	So I can block children under 13, but I can't tell them that? You can tell them after they fail, you cannot tell them on the asking screen. Then what is the correct way to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? I agree with you that it is odd that they recommend using a cookie but they do!* So you have a entry page with a simple question, "Please indicate your age" and then block based on the response. That's it. Note that the rule is neutral. This means that you do not need to disguise your purpose or try to trick people into entering their correct age. *I think that what is happening here is that any parent who wants to complain to their legislator can be met with the response, "If your kid is so sneaky that they are using different computers to lie about their age what do you want us to do about it?" The fact is, this scheme keeps innocent kids from seeing stuff they shouldn't; the sneaky ones are going to find a way.	It is legal, at least in the US, for a store (or other entity) to refuse to sell any item to any individual for any non-prohibited reason (prohibited reasons are typically things like race or religion). More over, in various US jurisdictions, it is prohibited to "furnish" alcohol to a "minor" (for example, under California's ABC law), which can be interpreted as prohibiting to an adult if they reasonably suspect that adult will pass the alcohol onto the "minor". This is to prevent "straw" sales. Additionally, larger chains generally prefer to have harmonized policies across branches, and where practical, across state lines, so will have policies that can accomodate multiple alcohol control regimes.	You've really got two questions here: 1) "Is it an invasion of privacy to know that I'm using an ad blocker?", and 2) "Is it discrimination to refuse service based on what software I'm running?". Taking them in order: Because of how HTTP/HTML works, there are essentially two ways for a server operator to know what software you are running. Your browser announces that it's running something. This usually takes the form of a modified User-Agent header. I'm not aware of any privacy laws that consider "Person A told me something" to be an invasion of Person A's privacy. They guess it based on the actions your browser takes. For example, if the website gets a request for a page, and the site's ad network does not get a matching request for an ad, the server deduces that the user is running an ad blocker. Since this is based on things that the server operator could reasonably be expected to be informed of, it isn't an invasion of privacy under any law I'm aware of. Is it discrimination? Yes. But not all discrimination is illegal. In general, only discrimination based on protected categories (race, sex, etc.) is prohibited, and I can't imagine a jurisdiction making "choice of browser add-ons" to be one of those categories, not least because it's something the person being discriminated against can easily change.	In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest.
Looking for a law textbook that defines legal terms Are there law textbooks that define legal terms? I would be very interested in such a book. I am a mathematician who likes terms to be defined precisely. I am sure in law classes, legal terms are defined. If it turns out that pretty much every law textbook defines terms precisely, then I will simply check Google.	Black's Law Dictionary is the leading publication of that type (the online version is based upon the out of copyright second edition, while the current version is the 11th edition from 2019), although not the only one. It is not really a textbook, however, so much as a resource used by both law students and practicing lawyers and judges. The editor of all editions of it since 1996 is Bryan A. Garner, who is also the leading authority on what constitutes good modern legal writing (which in some cases violate outdated elementary school usage rules like never starting a sentence with a conjunction). Law textbooks are subject-matter specific, and there is no one class in which legal terms are taught. In contacts class, law students learn contracts related terms. In property class, law students learn property related terms. In torts class, law students learn torts related terms. I am sure in law classes, legal terms are defined. Not really. Your assumption is more false than true. U.S. legal instruction is typically conducted using the Socratic method and with a review of the leading appellate court cases and the key statutory language in each subject. Rather than having the textbook define a term, it is far more common for students in a class to read four appellate court cases addressing a subject, none of which define a term, and for the professor to ask a student chosen at random what that term means, often probing the student with follow up questions for fifteen or twenty minutes. Usually, the final conclusion is not stated outright either by the professor or the textbook in textbook author provided text, although the cases referenced and statutes referenced will often provide one or more than one definition for a term, not necessarily consistent ones. Law professors in the U.S., collectively, take the attitude that there is no absolute meaning for anything and that it is a waste of time to teach specific legal rules or doctrines which may change over the course of a student's career. Instead, they focus on teaching how to argue over close call gray areas in the law and how to identify legal issues, with the idea that the clear black and white rules of law are easy to learn after you graduate from law school when and if you need to do so. There are books called "legal outlines" and "treatises" which are more direct than law professors and textbooks in providing answers in a particular subject, as are bar exam review materials. But, again, it is important to understand the nature of the beast before you use them. I am a mathematician who likes terms to be defined precisely. I am sure in law classes, legal terms are defined. If it turns out that pretty much every law textbook defines terms precisely, then I will simply check Google. This is a fool's errand (I was an undergraduate math major myself before becoming a lawyer). This is because legal terms don't have a single consistent meaning. The same word or phrase can and often does mean different things in different contexts. Many legal terms defined in Black's Law dictionary have multiple meanings stated and it is not at all uncommon for a statute or contract to define a word in a new and unconventional way. I probably draft contacts with novel definitions for words at least a few times every year. There are a million or so U.S. lawyers, and tens of thousands of federal, state and local legislators out there further complicating affairs each year, in addition to thousands of judges whose decisions may coin new legal terms or new meanings for existing legal terms. This is why these resources need to be updated regularly. For example, there is no one consistent definition of the word "person" which is widely used in a variety of statutes and regulations and contracts. As another example, the term "security" means something very different in the law of securities regulation, where it refers to investments made by passive investors and traded in secondary markets, than it does in the law of secured transactions, where it means collateral for an obligation. Likewise, in bankruptcy law, national defense law, criminal law or tort law, the term security means something entirely different in each separate context. As a third example, the term "equity" can have very different meanings depending upon context. It can mean the value of something net of debt to which it is subject. It can refer the the jurisprudence of courts of chancery before equity jurisprudence and law jurisprudence were merged in the 19th century which is relevant to the constitutional right to a jury trial in federal court and to the kinds of defenses that can be asserted in response to a claim. Or, it can refer to ownership interests in entities as distinct from debt interests in entities, as a third and not comprehensive list of meanings. Common law countries, in particular (i.e. those countries with legal systems derived from those of England) are notorious for their inconsistent use of terminology, which is rather more consistent in civil law countries due to the way that civil codes are drafted. Also keep in mind the famous quote from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. In law, the fact that A implies B and that B implies C does not necessarily mean that A implies C. The law simply isn't that consistent and logical. You can't follow long chains of logical reasoning in the law with any confidence. Generally, only fact specific applications of the law that involve fact patterns similar to your own are reliable, and the law is also sometimes just plain inconsistent even when applied to the same set of facts.	Law doesn't have a monopoly on bad writing. Steven Pinker, in "Sense of Style" and other articles, says that the kind of poor writing you mention is a symptom of the "curse of knowledge". Justice Kagan believes that good legal writing needs to at least be good writing, and law schools aren't doing enough to teach that. All the other Justices expressed similar opinions to that in interviews with Bryan Garner.	would it be interpreted in favor of the person who did not draft the terms? Yes, provided that the interpretation is reasonable. That is known as the doctrine of contra proferentem. Here, the term "deliverables and associated documents" might entail a contradiction if that term [allegedly or literally] encompasses "source code or content". That depends on what definition(s) of "deliverables and associated documents" can be adduced from the contract. The term could refer to items that are not "source code or content", such as the binary files (i.e., executables and DLLs), instructions & documentation on how to operate and troubleshoot the application, and so forth. In that case, there would be no contradiction because there is no overlap between these items and the source code. if term A) is written on line 10 and term B) is written on line 11, is it resonable to assume term B) takes precedence or modifies term A? No. The sequence of clauses/terms itself does not determine which one outweighs or qualifies the other. Instead, the language used in the contract is indicative of the parties' intent and therefore how the terms of that contract relate to each other.	LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision.	1. Are this and similar ordinances constitutionally valid? Yes. Some future court might decide the law is invalid at some future time. But that possibility is hypothetical and speculative. Therefore, as of now, the law is valid unless and until it is challenged and overturned. 2. What defenses could a government make if challenged? It depends on what grounds the law is challenged. Your question about possible defenses is highly dependent on the nature of any challenge — which you have not specified in your question. The U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits laws respecting a number of things such as freedom of the press, speech, religion, peaceful assembly, bearing arms, etc. to list just a few of the most notable ones. But your question does not assert the law in question violates any specific or particular prohibition against it. Although the question mentions "restricting free movement as well as targeting only a specific demographic," it does not specify any part of any constitution that prohibits these things. Therefore, your question is unclear as to what might present a constitutional problem for the law. It is also unclear which constitution you think might contain prohibitive language. Is it a federal constitutional issue that concerns you? Or is it a state constitutional matter? In either case, which issue specifically concerns you? Your question needs to address these specifics in order to analyze it and respond in a meaningful way. Look at it like this... just as it is impossible to prove a negative, so is it impossible for anyone to conclude with absolute certainty that any law is not unconstitutional because no one can predict with certainty every possible future challenge a law might face. There are just too many possibilities to (pre-emptively) exhaust them all with certainty. Also, no one can predict with certainty how any future court might rule on the future challenges (which themselves are unpredictable as previously argued). Therefore, one can only say I think the law is unconstitutional and here are my reasons. Then others can analyze the law and the reasons; then offer an opinion. Further, based on precedent, would they likely be successful? See above answer to question numbered 2. Laws aren't required to be "justified" by the constitution. Constitutional justification for a law is a meaningless phrase. There is no requirement for a law to be "justified" by any constitution other than that the legislature is empowered by the constitution to make laws. That's all the justification any law needs. Beyond that, however, no law can violate the constitution as determined by a Supreme Court (or the last court to rule) if challenged.	It may "seem[] normative" that "a law cannot enumerate any specific persons or companies to be included or excluded from its provisions." But in fact it is not generally the case. There are various kinds of laws that traditionally have named specific people or entities to define their scope. These include: In nineteenth-century England, a divorce could only be granted by a specific law passed by Parliament, naming the persons to be divorced. I am not sure when the practice stopped. In the US during the nineteenth century (and I think the early twentieth century also) a corporation was normally formed by a specific law granting a charter of incorporation to the named company. In the US during the period 1866-1870 there were a number of laws passed permitting former Confederate officers and officials who were presented by the 14th amendment from holding office under the US or any state to hold office again, as the amendment provides for. Eventually Congress passed a more general amnesty. It was once common for the English Parliament to pass bills of attainder. These were legislative declarations that a particular person was guilty of a particular crime, generally without any trial or other process. Sometimes the specific sentence was also imposed by such a bill. This was sufficiently resented that the US Constitution specifically forbids Congress or any state from passing such a bill. It was once common for actual laws to grant payments to specific people for specific purposes. This is no longer common, but there is no legal bar to it in either the UK or the US that I know of. The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 contains a provision enabling Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children to continue to receive royalties for performances and adaptations, publications and broadcast of "Peter Pan" whose author, J. M. Barrie, had given his copyright to the hospital in 1929, later confirmed in his will. This right is to persist even after the expiration of ordinary copyright for the play, but is not a full grant of copyright. Laws or ordinances invoking eminent domain to take the property of particular individuals for particular purposes are common, mostly at the local level. In the US, the Equal Protection Clause generally forbids laws which treat people, or groups of people, differently unless there is some rational basis for the distinction. But in some cases a plausible basis is asserted and such laws are passed.	So my understanding is that the phrase "common law" can refer to either the concept of laws established by court precedent or it can refer to a specific body of laws that have been established that way. Yes. Should I just be inferring that from context? Yes. Is there a single body of "common law"? No. Are there distinct bodies of "U.K. common law" and "U.S. common law" for example? Yes, furthermore there is different common law in England/Wales, Northern Ireland & Scotland and each state of the US. Further, Scotland and Louisiana are not straightforward common law jurisdictions but rather a blend of common and civil law. If so, how are they related? They are related in that they all: have a common source, middle English common law evolve in the same way - judges interpreting the current common law and the statutes of the legislature follow an appeals system through higher levels of courts. They do not all go in the same direction though. Do judges in common law countries cite court decisions in other common law countries? Sometimes; it depends on the "distance" of the other jurisdiction. A judge in New South Wales is quite likely to consider how judges in Queensland and Victoria have considered similar laws, less likely to look at the UK and Canada and extremely unlikely to look at the USA. This has a lot to do with how far back it is since the "last common ancestor" of the law; the longer the corpus of law has been separated the more likely that the principles have diverged, partly this is cultural drift but mostly this is differences in statutes that actively modify the common law. Usually, jurisdictions within the same country are quite close to each other; partly due to common culture but often because of a genuine effort to "harmonise" laws across borders. There are occasions, however, where legislatures "steal" laws from other jurisdictions, in which case they often look to each other for early development of common law on those laws. For example, the Alberta (Canada) Builder's Lien Act 2000 and the NSW (Australia) Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 both address the same "wrong" and both had a common and parallel genesis pre-enactment; early cases in each jurisdiction were watched by the other.	I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't.
Can editorial bias be considered medical advice? In an issue where the scientific community is far from united, could an editorial bias in the media (stories and ads run vs censored or ignored) be considered medical advice and practicing medicine without a license? (Legal definitions and precedents would be nice. Subjective opinions, not so much.)	No. Practicing medicine involves providing medical advice or providing treatment particular to an individual person's situation.	This sounds completely incorrect to me. First, subsequent research is not normally a "derivative work" for the purpose of copyright, since copyright doesn't protect your ideas but only the particular form in which you have expressed those ideas. Second, as the owner of the copyright, you can permit anyone to make any sort of copy or derivative work, or sell, assign, or license the ability to do so to other parties, without regard to whether the work has been published. The real reason that nonpublication of your work would stifle further research is that researchers will not have access to it.	The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience.	I'm not a lawyer or a medical professional, but on Wikipedia's page about DNR, we see the following quote: In the United States the documentation is especially complicated in that each state accepts different forms, and advance directives and living wills are not accepted by EMS as legally valid forms. If a patient has a living will that states the patient wishes to be DNR but does not have an appropriately filled out state sponsored form that is co-signed by a physician, EMS will attempt resuscitation. Based on this, I would hazard the guess that you can't treat anything other than those forms as legally binding, as they even ignore a living will without that state's form.	You could include a notice that the forms are not legal advice, and you make no guarantees on their effects in particular situations, and that readers should use them at their own risk, and that they are provided "as is" with no warranties of any kind. You might also find websites that offer downloadable legal forms, or forms similar to the ones you intend to create, and see what disclaimers or waivers of liability such sites typically include. I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice.	I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire!	California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.	We may soon have a more definitive answer. A Grand Junction, Colorado newspaper is suing a politician for calling it "fake news", and the resolution of that case and the hypothetical that you propose would turn on the same legal principle. It is highly unlikely that such a lawsuit would prevail, because "fake news" probably doesn't constitute libel per se, because the comment could be construed as hyperbole or as a statement of opinion (neither of which are actionable), and even potentially, because a "speech and debate clause" defense under the state constitution might apply (depending upon the context in which the statement was made by the politician). The context of the particular tweet cited generally defines specified organizations as "the FAKE NEWS media" rather than accusing them of any particular instance of making a false statement, so it is probably an opinion or hyperbole. But, if the statement were made knowing it was false or with reckless disregard as to truth or falsity, and if the term "fake news" in the context in which it was used could be legitimately construed the imply a statement of fact which is not true, it wouldn't be impossible for the lawsuit to succeed, and depending upon the context of the statement, it could have such an implication. A suit against Trump could also implicate Presidential immunity doctrines which are more robust than immunity doctrines for other public officials, particularly if the "fake news" comment could be construed as part of the official duties of the President (for which there is absolute immunity) as opposed to his unofficial duties. The immunity question is a closer one than the question on the merits of defamation law about which there is much more case law to flesh out what is and isn't covered.
If I buy a song on Bandcamp, can I then use that song in my audio streaming website project accessible by the public? I want to replicate this site here (note I am not a non-profit like freeCodeCamp): https://coderadio.freecodecamp.org/ I'd like to repurpose it to feature a different genre of music. To accomplish this, I must build a new playlist. Since my site will be accessible to the public, I'd like to use songs that will not violate copyright. From my basic understanding, Bandcamp music is DRM-free when purchased. I'm vaguely familiar with what DRM is, but unsure if that qualifies me to use the purchased songs in my new project or not. https://get.bandcamp.help/hc/en-us/articles/360013673153-Are-Bandcamp-s-download-formats-DRM-free- https://bandcamp.com/#discover If Bandcamp is a no-go, are there alternative music platforms that you could recommend?	DRM-free is not license free. DRM is just an attempt to enforce copyright licenses via software. DRM will theoretically prevent you from playing the music unless you have a license that allows you to play it. The lack of DRM it doesn't mean you can do whatever you want with the recording. It just means that any violation of copyright rules will have to be settled using the legal system. If the copyright holder finds you offering their music for replay without a license to do so, they can take you to court to make you stop. Bandcamp and other distributors have negotiated a contract with the musical artists and other copyright holders to offer their music for replay on their site. If you want to legally offer music to which you don't hold the copyright for replay on your site, you too will have to negotiate a license with the copyright holders.	As far as I can tell, whenever GitHub redistributes code, it adheres to all of the requirements of the GPL/BSD etc. For example, it never gives away code without including the license text, and it doesn't claim to add unpermitted restrictions to the code. The section you're concerned about is this: That means you're giving us the right to do things like reproduce your content (so we can do things like copy it to our database and make backups); display it (so we can do things like show it to you and other users); modify it (so our server can do things like parse it into a search index); distribute it (so we can do things like share it with other users); and perform it (in case your content is something like music or video). That section isn't worded very precisely, but I understand this to mean they want to reproduce your content in full, not just the code without the license text attached. They want to display your content in full, as you provided it. They want to modify it internally (i.e. they are not redistributing this modified form) in order to allow searching. To the extent that they display code-snippets as search results, that is likely defensible as fair use (search engines are frequently cited as examples of successful fair use defenses). GitHub appears to be acting consistently with the GPL when it reproduces, displays, modifies, and distributes code that you upload. If I'm correct about these facts then nothing that GitHub does with the code goes beyond what the many contributors to a GPL project have explicitly permitted, or what is otherwise permitted by fair use law. If you had some code with a more restrictive license, you might not be able to simultaneously comply with that restrictive license and GitHub's License Grant. Consider the scenario where you have some code that is licensed exclusively to you, and you are not given permission to reproduce or distribute it. In that scenario, the code's license prevents you from agreeing to GitHub's request for a license grant.	Yes Playing recorded music in public is unlawful without permission (licence) from the copyright holder. Many jurisdictions allow automatic licensing by signing up with and paying for it through the authorised music organisation.	Using it without permission is copyright infringement and illegal. Legally, you can try offering money to the company for the copyright or for a suitable license. For example offer them $1000 for a copy of the code licensed under the GPL license. If they accept, you are fine.	Any adapted work derived from a work used under a CC-BY-SA licnese must be distributed, if at all, under a compatible license. The question is whether a large work incorporating a much smaller work is said to be "based on" that work. The CC-BY-SA 4.0 legal text does not use "include" or "incorporate" or any similar term to define an adapted work, instead it says: Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image. If including a single work makes your book Adapted Materiel, than you must either release the book under the same license, or else not rely on the CC license. I am not at all sure if such use would make the book Adapted Materiel. If the content could be quoted (perhaps only in part) based on fair use or fair dealing or a similar theory, you would not be relaying on the license. But whether such use is legitimate is always a very fact-bound question, which will depend on various specific facts. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for a summary of US fair use principles. If the materiel you want to use would not qualify under fair use (or whatever similar principle applies in your jurisdiction), and the book would be considered Adapted Material, then you would have to omit it or put the book under the CC license. I see in The CC case law page the statement that: The atlas was a compilation not a derivative work, so did not need to be licensed under the SA term, Which might apply to your book. If it does, you would not need to place the book under a CC license. Update: On reading CC's detailed wiki page on Drauglis v. Kappa Map Group, LLC I find the statement that Use of a whole work is suggestive of a "compilation" rather than a derivative work subject to the ND/SA terms. attributed to the US District court (DC district) that decided this case in 2014. If that decision were followed, it would seem that the book would not be considered a derivative work and while proper attribution must be provided, and the applicable license must be indicated, the book itself need not be released under CC-BY-SA.	It is not "perfectly legal" to transcribe music for personal use. It is pretty likely that you can get away with it. The first thing to understand is that the act of transcribing is the creation of a derivative work (see the definitions part of Title 17). The core protection is section 106, which states that the owner of copyright has the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. So it is not permitted to prepare derivative works, e.g. transcriptions, without permission from the copyright owner. There is a big however: section 107 provides a possible loophole, "fair use". If you were to be sued for violation of copyright in making an unauthorized derivative work, your attorney might well advise you to set forth a fair use defense. This question and answer summarizes the basics of the fair use defense. Probably the most important factor would be the 4th factor, the effect on market -- in the circumstance that you describe, the effect is likely to be low. If you do this as a paid service for others and not just for personal amusement, then a fair use defense becomes a stretch.	What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation.	I know that some of this may be covered by either the Creative Commons license or the OGL it was published under, but it's not clear to me how far those freedoms extend. It was all published as materials under copyright to the original authors, TSR, WotC, &c. and if things had been left like that hszmv's answer would've been completely correct: stay vague and allow users to enter those names and descriptions, talk to WotC's lawyers and sales department about license fees, or just keep it to yourself and your friends. You're right, though: WotC went whole-hog, dumped their partial OGL idea, and relicensed some things as Creative Commons. There are different Creative Commons licenses, though, some restricting commercial use that would still keep your app to yourself and friends without a specific licensing agreement. Go find out exactly what WotC put under CC. If it's only the Player's Handbook, then you can only use names and descriptions that are from the Player's Handbook and you're still facing a cease-&-desist if you start adding in Monster Manual info.If it's everything, it's everything they have but still won't include any older modules that they don't have the right to change the copyright status of. It'll still be under copyright, usually until 70 years after the death of the original creator. For Gary Gygax, that'll be 2078. Expect that length to extend during your lifetime though. US copyright usually extends every time Mickey & friends come close to entering the public domain. [Edit: The comments below suggest it might only have been the Systems Reference Document (I assume for 5e). It's 403 pages of not nothing but it's not much given the universe we're talking about. The spell and monster lists are generic. Bigby is nowhere to be found and the only mention of a beholder is a reminder not to use the name beholder without their written approval.] Go find out exactly which CC WotC used. The article above says "all use" but you need to find out the exact number of the Creative Commons license for each thing you're using and make sure all of your uses fall within its terms. Some are basically free use but still insist you mention the copyright holder prominently or in every use. Go ahead and do that if you have to. [Edit: The comments below say it is probably CC 4.0. The SRD download page says you can use CC 4.0 or their own OGL. In both cases, yes, you must acknowledge WotC by name in a way prominent enough to satisfy the license you choose.] And of course, Don't trust legal advice from internet randos or ChatGPT. If this is a serious thing you're going to be spending a good chunk of your life working on or expect to make significant money from, go talk to an actual lawyer. Bonus points for one specialized in IP with a knowledge of roleplaying and the way it's been (partially) opening up lately.If you start off just by talking to WotC's lawyers, just do that somewhere where you get their explanations and permissions in writing. Then keep that somewhere safe in electronic and hard copy. Then still take that with you when you go talk to your own lawyer.
Is any photo of a toddler without a shirt on child pornography? The mother of my goddaughter's has many times insisted that her girls (3 and 1.5 years old) cover their nipples before she can take a photo of them if they are doing something cute or photo worthy and happen to not have a shirt on (if your familiar with little kids you will know they end up topless semi-often). She has claimed that this would constitute child pornography otherwise. I am highly skeptical of this. The girls have less in way of 'breasts' right now then I do as a grown man, and I'm not worried about being arrested for indecent exposure if I go swimming with just my swimming trunks on (though in my case inflicting any part of my pasty white body on another may count as a crime against humanity). Could any image not taken with the intent to be sexual/provocative which happens to have been taken when a toddler wasn't wearing a shirt, but with diapers/pants on, really qualify as child pornography? The godchildren live in Georgia, though she seems to be concerned about federal laws not state ones.	Context is important. There is no law against taking a picture of a child who is entirely naked or exposing certain body parts. The laws in question such as 18 USC 2251 refer to the fact that the minor "engage[s] in, any sexually explicit conduct". Sexually explicit conduct is defined in 18 USC 2256, and would include "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" (which does not include nipples of anyone). Federal law does not define "lascivious", but the ordinary meaning of the word does not include the situation that you describe. The Justice Department, which goes after child pornographers, provides this guide to federal child porn laws. Georgia's child porn law is only marginally different, referring to "Lewd exhibition" rather than "Lascivious exhibition" , and including the "Condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise physically restrained on the part of a person who is nude" (so a picture of a person holding a naked baby would technically qualify, but is highly unlikely to be prosecuted as production of child porn). These laws pertain to any form of child porn, including "private use only". Dissemination would be an added charge.	You say: the school expects him to create a public Twitter account, with his real information, in order to promote the program & the results of the program. This is a cut-and-dried case of compelled speech. Your son is being required to say certain things in public in order to pass this course. The Supreme Court has decided that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate". This is subject to the legitimate interests of the school, but it is hard to see how compelled speech on Twitter can be defended as a legitimate interest. You also say this is to "promote the program and the results of the program". It sounds like the students are being required to say certain things about the course. If your son were to create the account and then post only material critical of the school, such as complaints about compelled speech, would that result in a passing grade? It sounds like it might be an issue. Compelled speech at school was considered by the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), which is the case about students being required to salute the flag. They found that requiring students to salute the flag was unconstitutional. Public education, according to the Court, should “not strangle the free mind at its source [or] teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” Instead, education should enable students to make informed choices about what to believe. From the judgement itself: the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. That is very much the case here. Your son's refusal to make the required public speech is not causing any difficulty for the school authorities. In conclusion, your son has made a decision not to create a Twitter account under his own name and say certain things within that account. This is entirely his constitutional right. You might consider contacting the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who have a history of engaging in cases like this. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) might also be interested. Edit: Zack Lipton in comments below makes the point that much student work can be considered a kind of compelled speech (e.g. "Write an essay on Hamlet" or "Submit an entry to this poetry competition") and asks how this is different. Its a good question, and I have to say it does suggest that there is a difference of degree rather than kind. However I would argue that posting to an international forum widely used by adults is a different matter to a school assembly, or even a national essay competition. It would also depend a great deal on what has to be posted to get a passing grade.	It depends. If the tip is that there are pictures proving that a minor consumed alcohol 10 years ago, probably not. If the tip is that there's a kidnapped child being tortured inside, more likely. In either event, they would probably seek to build up some independently obtained evidence to enable them to obtain a warrant based on probable cause. An anonymous tip might be enough, depending on how detailed it was and whether there were any objective indicators of reliability, but it's not a sure thing.	TV shows like COPS will have the arrestees/suspects/bystanders/victims sign a waiver to appear on the show, along with anybody else that they film in the process, otherwise the faces will be blurred, or removed from the show entirely. Additionally you can tell the camera crews that they are not allowed in your home. If they do enter your home without permission, you can sue them for trespassing. It should be noted that those shows are often edited for drama, and as such seem much more dramatic than it is. The film crews may spend weeks or more (400 hours of video) just to get enough "good stuff" for a 22 minute episode, and then make it look like it all happens over the course of an evening. As for the moral/social acceptance of a lack of privacy, that question really isn't on-topic here. This should be the same for any other "COPS-like" TV/youtube show, but there are some shows out there that don't take the rules as seriously as others. Those usually operate under the "who we are filming probably can't afford a lawyer" mentality so they keep going until they get sued.	The law of Texas is controlled by federal law, viz. the First Amendment. This item by the ACLU summarizes what that law is. Regarding your concern, public schools are not required to be "religion-free zones". Individuals have the right to hold and express their religious beliefs, or their lack of such beliefs, as long as it is contextually appropriate. That is, you don't get to invoke the First Amendment in the middle of a math lesson in order to engage in a rant. Students are allowed to try to persuade others to believe whatever they want, and students are allowed to be snarky about people who don't share their beliefs. Schools can teach about religion as part of the curriculum, though they cannot teach religion. It is okay to teach the historical fact that some guy decided based on the Bible that the world was created 10,000 years ago, but it not not okay to teach as a scientific fact that the world was created 10,000 years ago. Although I can't name a specific movie about Christmas that would be plainly objectionable to a non-Christian, we could assume that there is some such movie which is plainly advocacy of a religious viewpoint and which mocks Yazidism. A Yazidi student could then be excused from this movie, just as Christian students could be excused from attending an analogous Yazidi-advocating movie.	In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible.	You have pretty well enumerated when it is legal. On the face of it it appears that the 11 year old acted illegally. So, if he is not being prosecuted, why not? Age of criminal responsibility. Below a certain age (I don't know about Alabama but in NSW it is 12) a person cannot by law be held criminally responsible because they are deemed to lack the emotional and mental maturity to distinguish right from wrong; this is particularly relevant when the same action can be legal or illegal depending on rather nuanced circumstances. Public interest. A DA may consider that prosecution of this child in these circumstances is not in the public interest. Prospect of conviction. A sensible DA may decide that there is very little prospect that a jury will convict notwithstanding that there is adequate evidence to prove guilt. This is a subset of the public interest; it is in no one's interest to spend time and money on a trial that will probably end with an acquittal.	There is a federal law, 18 USC 2252, which criminalized distribution and receiving of child porn. One part of the law addresses a person who (1) knowingly transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; The next part addresses one who (2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; The word "knowingly" is crucial here: it may mean that if you don't know, it's not a crime. The wording is not completely clear, in that maybe the law only says that you have to know that you received and don't have to know anything about the item that you received. So it is up the the Supreme Court to say exactly what that means. In US v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, they did. The court held that "knowingly" does not just mean that you know you are receiving or distributing, because that would yield absurd results such as that a retail druggist who returned a roll of film unprocessed would be guilty of distributing child porn, just in case the film contains child porn. As the court says, "We do not assume that Congress, in passing laws, intended such results". There is a general constitutional presumption that any crime has a scienter requirement (Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600): "the standard presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct". The court rejects the narrow interpretation that "knowingly" just applies to the verb, and "This interpretation is supported by the canon that a statute is to be construed where fairly possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions". There are also state laws which are untouched by X-Citement, which may make possession of child porn a strict liability offense. Washington state law is written so that you have to know or intend ("Knowingly develops, duplicates, publishes, prints, disseminates, exchanges, finances, attempts to finance, or sells a visual or printed matter that depicts a minor engaged in an act of sexually explicit conduct as defined in RCW 9.68A.011(4) (a) through (e)" or "Possesses with intent to develop, duplicate, publish, print, disseminate, exchange, or sell any visual or printed matter that depicts a minor engaged in an act of sexually explicit conduct as defined in RCW 9.68A.011(4) (a) through (e)".) The statutory rape law on the other hand has no requirement pertaining to knowledge or intent (1) A person is guilty of rape of a child in the third degree when the person has sexual intercourse with another who is at least fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old and not married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least forty-eight months older than the victim. I don't know whether some state's statute was written without a "knowingly" requirement.
Is "Sabrina" child pornography? Many years ago I recall hearing (can't exactly remember where/when, but I believe it had to do with a then still very young Brooke Shields) that "Child Pornography" laws applied, even if the actor/actress was actually over 18, but the character was NOT. Such that a 19 year old girl playing the part of a 17 year old would violate "Child Pornography" laws if they 'acted out' behaviors that would otherwise violate the law. Am I (potentially, for sure) misremembering, misunderstanding or have the laws changed? I ask this after reading an article regarding the new Netflix show ‘Chilling Adventures of Sabrina’ Which also brings up the possiblity that because it is 'streaming', the law doesn't not apply in this case (then why?).	That definition still applies, at least in federal law. Under 18 USC 2256: “child pornography” means any visual depiction ... indistinguishable from that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct But the First Amendment limits its applicability in cases like Sabrina. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the law violates free speech and was overbroad, with a lengthy discussion of the threats it posed to legitimate artistic works: Under the CPPA, images are prohibited so long as the persons appear to be under 18 years of age. 18 U. S. C. § 2256(1). This is higher than the legal age for marriage in many States, as well as the age at which persons may consent to sexual relations. ... It is, of course, undeniable that some youths engage in sexual activity before the legal age, either on their own inclination or because they are victims of sexual abuse. Both themes-teenage sexual activity and the sexual abuse of children-have inspired countless literary works. William Shakespeare created the most famous pair of teenage lovers, one of whom is just 13 years of age. See Romeo and Juliet, act I, sc. 2, 1. 9 ("She hath not seen the change of fourteen years"). In the drama, Shakespeare portrays the relationship as something splendid and innocent, but not juvenile. The work has inspired no less than 40 motion pictures, some of which suggest that the teenagers consummated their relationship. E. g., Romeo and Juliet (B. Luhrmann director, 1996). Shakespeare may not have written sexually explicit scenes for the Elizabethan audience, but were modern directors to adopt a less conventional approach, that fact alone would not compel the conclusion that the work was obscene. Contemporary movies pursue similar themes. Last year's Academy Awards featured the movie, Traffic, which was nominated for Best Picture. See Predictable and Less So, the Academy Award Contenders, N. Y. Times, Feb. 14, 2001, p. Ell. The film portrays a teenager, identified as a 16year-old, who becomes addicted to drugs. The viewer sees the degradation of her addiction, which in the end leads her to a filthy room to trade sex for drugs. The year before, American Beauty won the Academy Award for Best Picture. See "American Beauty" Tops the Oscars, N. Y. Times, Mar. 27, 2000, p. El. In the course of the movie, a teenage girl engages in sexual relations with her teenage boyfriend, and another yields herself to the gratification of a middle-aged man. The film also contains a scene where, although the movie audience understands the act is not taking place, one character believes he is watching a teenage boy performing a sexual act on an older man. Our society, like other cultures, has empathy and enduring fascination with the lives and destinies of the young. Art and literature express the vital interest we all have in the formative years we ourselves once knew, when wounds can be so grievous, disappointment so profound, and mistaken choices so tragic, but when moral acts and self-fulfillment are still in reach. Whether or not the films we mention violate the CPPA, they explore themes within the wide sweep of the statute's prohibitions. If these films, or hundreds of others of lesser note that explore those subjects, contain a single graphic depiction of sexual activity within the statutory definition, the possessor of the film would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work's redeeming value. This is inconsistent with an essential First Amendment rule: The artistic merit of a work does not depend on the presence of a single explicit scene. See Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass., 383 U. S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he social value of the book can neither be weighed against nor canceled by its prurient appeal or patent offensiveness"). Under Miller, the First Amendment requires that redeeming value be judged by considering the work as a whole. Where the scene is part of the narrative, the work itself does not for this reason become obscene, even though the scene in isolation might be offensive. See Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229, 231 (1972) (per curiam}. For this reason, and the others we have noted, the CPP A cannot be read to prohibit obscenity, because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by the definition of obscenity. If the law were applicable to Sabrina, the fact that it's streamed wouldn't save it. 18 USC 2252A prohibits knowingly receiving, distributing, reproducing, advertising, promoting or presenting child pornography, "by any means, including by computer."	"Age of consent" is a legal meme that refers indirectly to different criminal statutes, for example in Missouri under MO Rev Stat § 566.034, A person commits the offense of statutory rape in the second degree if being twenty-one years of age or older, he or she has sexual intercourse with another person who is less than seventeen years of age §023 also states that "It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecutions under sections 566.032, 566.034, 566.062, 566.064, and 566.071, that the defendant was married to the victim at the time of the offense". MO Rev Stat §451.090 allows marriage with parental permission to those aged 16 and 17 (by prohibiting licensing of marriage to those younger) No recorder shall issue a license authorizing the marriage of any male or female under sixteen years of age nor shall a license be issued authorizing the marriage of any male or female twenty-one years of age or older to a male or female under eighteen years of age. Combining these legal parts, you get the result that a man may marry and impregnate a woman whom he could not legally have intercourse with (irrespective of pregnancy) were they not married. It just depends on what the specific law says.	Most place it isn't illegal, but unless the company has some good reason for asking (such as the ones that Nij outlines) then it might open them up to accusations of ageism. In other words, if they have no good reason for asking they would have difficulty explaining to a court why they wanted that information if it wasn't to facilitate age discrimination.	A teacher could not instruct students in how to build explosives for use in Federal crimes: It shall be unlawful for any person to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction [...] with the intent that the teaching, demonstration, or information be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence (source) This Federal statute creates a law preventing the teaching (in any context, including schools) of bombmaking for the purpose of committing a federal crime. So "bombmaking" is one subject that cannot be taught, although I don't think that there have been any prosecutions of regular K12 teachers under this law.	Copyright almost certainly exists in the images, since presumably someone took those pictures and so they would own the copyright of those images. However, that doesn't mean you don't own the film, you just that don't own the copyright. You can have it developed to see what's there without copying the images. Just tell the developer you only want the film developed and for no prints to be made. If there's child pornography you could end up in a lot of hot water. While you'd be innocent of any crime, if the developer reports the images to the police you'll have to convince them that you had no idea what was on the film. It's extremely unlikely that there's anything untoward on the film however. I'd note however that unless the film is only a couple years old then it's likely the pictures have faded significantly. If it's ten or more years old, there might not be anything recognizable.	"As we know non-adults aren't allow to carry weapons" This is not something that we know or an obvious point. It is also not obvious that a knife would qualify as a weapon for these purposes. This would not be true in most jurisdictions in the world. I have no idea what knife control laws look like in China or Taiwan. A reference to why you think that this is the case would be helpful. Even if there are laws banning possession of knives (i.e. carrying knives) when one is in public for use as a weapon, it would be very surprising to me if teens weren't allowed to possess knives in a kitchen, or a work site where a knife was a necessary tool. It would similarly surprise me if a teen working on a knife design in a craftsman's workshop would be illegal. What makes you think that any of these things are illegal in China or Taiwan? This might have been illegal in Japan in the 1600s when metal blades were highly regulated (this is one of the reasons that most Japanese food is served with portions pre-cut to be bite sized), but I very much doubt that teen possession of knives for practical purposes is illegal in any of those places today. There is also, in general, nothing wrong with factories run by adults making knifes from other people's designs. They do that all the time and it wouldn't be illegal to do so just because the designer wasn't allowed to use the product of the factory in public. I would be surprised if a factory even asked how old the designer was, particularly if he was operating through a company formed for him (something an adult might have to do). The harder question would be whether the teen can enter into an enforceable and valid contract with a factory without having the co-signature of a parent or guardian. Many countries don't allow this so that the teen is not exploited into agreeing to a big contract on unfair terms. Also, many countries make a distinction between criminal acts committed by adults and the same acts committed by minors. A teen, particularly a young teen, may be under the relevant law, capable of only engaging in juvenile delinquency, rather than an adult felony. But, again, I don't know how this is handled in Taiwan or China. In general, the legal system in Taiwan strongly resembles that of the legal systems in Continental Europe not long after World War II (i.e. in the 1940s), with its own local developments since then. But, China's legal system is quite unique and is not very similar to the common law legal systems of England and former or current English colonies, or the civil law legal system of Continental Europe (or for that matter, Islamic law). China's legal system is different at the level of very deep concepts of legal process, of what is and isn't law, and of many core legal concepts. It also has piecemeal bits that are imposed by treaty even though they are not organically natural fits with the rest of the Chinese legal system (e.g. its intellectual property laws).	Defamatory and offensive are not the same “He is a child molester” is defamatory and illegal (unless he is, of course). “She is a two-faced f___ing b___h with the morals of an alley cat and the integrity of a politician” is offensive and legal. Neither is a crime.	People running web servers are generally liable for contributory culpability, when some user breaks the law by putting the material on the server. There are legal mechanisms for relieving the server guy from this burden. The best-known mechanism is "DMCA takedown", where you publish contact information so that an offended person can serve up a proper legal claim that you are distributing material that they own copyright to. If you follow the rules, you may enjoy "safe harbor" protection against contributory liability: one of the requirements is that you have to take infringing material down. The specific requirements can depend on the nature of the liability and jurisdiction, but generally involves a "hands off" involvement where the person has no knowledge of what's going on on his server. So just disclaiming responsibility does not work. There are other more serious violations, such as distribution of child porn or transmission of top secret information. Jurisdiction is not totally central to internet questions, and I could sue you (the server guy) in US courts, or (depending on the offense: copyright infringement of a particular item) in UK courts. Nailing this down specifically to Sweden is harder, but recall that The Pirate Bay had a whopping judgment against them.
Is there any restriction in the GDPR on creating a Whatsapp group? I work with an assistance entity that helps people in situations of social vulnerability (poverty). Surprisingly everyone has a cell phone and uses Whatsapp. Taking this facility into account, I thought of creating a group on Whatsapp and registering each number of these assisted people, to keep them informed of any news about the entity. However, I was warned if this could violate any GDPR terms. It is important to note that this would be a group where participants DO NOT SEND, they only receive our messages. Could anyone tell me if is there any restriction in the GDPR to create a Whatsapp group?	Certainly. A phone number is personal information (and on top of that, WhatsApp may provide some "profile info" from the people you contact). It is not difficult to identify a person by its phone number. So, sharing the phone number of the people affected should take into account the restrictions of GDPR. For instance, the Spanish Data Protection Agency (Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, AEPD) established in its Resolution R/03041/2017 that the Town Hall of Boecillo had violated the GDPR because it had created a WhatsApp group of citizens. Those citizens had provided their phone numbers to be informed about town hall activities, but they had not agreed to share their numbers with the other members of the group. And that was a very generic group. Doing a "patients recovering from cancer" or "drug abusers under treatment" or "people who need food assistence" group would involve sharing personal information that gets the maximum protection (in some specific instancies it could be that your information sharing that information is illegal even if the users gave you full consents). So yes, creating a WhatsApp group could very easily lead to a GDPR violation, and in fact it has been ruled at least once that it has. The fact that people cannot send messages is irrelevant. It would not make the issue any better or worse. After all, if I send a message through WhatsApp I am implicitly giving permission to everyone in the group to read it.	No, it is not legal. Regardless of their location, the only legal options for companies serving to EU residents are to either deny access altogether or to make consent truly optional1 Recital 42 states (emphasis mine): Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement[...] Recital 43 states: Consent is presumed not to be freely given [...] or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. 1 Of course, remember that consent is only one of several means that allow them to process data. For example, if you were getting a trial account for a limited time, it would be considered a legitimate business need to ensure that you are not just opening new trial accounts when the old ones expire. So, if they wanted some data from you to ensure that you are not a previous user and you refused to provide it, then they could deny giving you that trial account without breaking the GDPR.	This very much depends on where you are. Different jurisdictions have wildly different laws about this. Some places are very permissive. You can record a conversation that you aren't even a party to so long as nobody has any reasonable expectation of privacy. In others, affirmative consent is required from every party to a conversation before it's legal to record it. The laws run the entire spectrum. Some places allow you to record anything you're a party to without permission, but you can't record others' conversations. Some places require you to disclose, but not obtain explicit permission. Some allow you to record but restrict who you can disclose it to. Some allow you to record or ban recording only under certain circumstances. It's a really wide gamut of laws. Since you don't say where you are, who you're recording, or why, there's no way to really answer the question. Here's a good rundown on the United States. This Wikipedia article covers lots of different countries, but only with regard to phone calls.	In the question, you write: The GDPR requires consent of the subject for collection or storage of personal data (in this case, IP addresses in a log file). No, it does not. To quote Miss Infogeek: GDPR DOES NOT MAKE CONSENT A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR ALL PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA. Consent (Article 6 (1)a) is indeed one of conditions that can be used to comply with the GDPR requirement that processing must be lawful, but it is not the only condition available to the controller to ensure lawful processing – there are alternatives (before the list of conditions it says that "at least one of the following" must be satisfied). All the conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. One of alternatives are Article 6 (1)f. It says says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) As noted in the question, logging IP addresses for the purpose of security is an extremely widespread practice. It is a legitimate interest to comply with standard security practices. It is the default, and most (all?) web-sites do this. I.e. it is legal to do this without consent (if this is not the case, I am pretty sure the outcry had been heard all over the Internet by now).	There is no clear answer to this question. The GDPR doesn't not apply, but it delegates rules for processing in the context of employment to member states. That means, the laws in your country might override the GDPR here. As the data controller in this situation, the company must protect the personal data it processes, including the personal data of employees. Protection doesn't have to be absolute, just proportional to the risks. It may be fine to treat data in one context more carefully than another. This is always a judgement call of the data controller. There is nothing about holiday rotas where the GDPR would require them to be kept under lock. The company could very well decide that this data isn't very sensitive and that everyone can look at it themselves. For example, the company might argue they have a legitimate interest for this so that employees can see whether their colleagues are unavailable. But until the controller makes such a decision, the rota contains other person's personal data and cannot be disclosed without a legal basis. Here, I see three reasons why the company might be acting that way: They are overly careful with GDPR compliance and are cargo-culting restrictions that are not actually necessary. They have made a conscious decision to restrict access to this data to protect the private life of employees. They want to make it more difficult for employees to take time off.	I believe in this case, your company (OrgX) is a data processor and your customer's organization (OrgY) is the data controller. OrgY is responsible for establishing a lawful basis for sending you (OrgX) the personal data for their employees. Note that consent is just one of six lawful bases outlined in article 6(1). I'm no expert, but I believe OrgY's admin can claim they have a legitimate interest in sending their employee's personal data for training sake. In either case, the data processor is not responsible for establishing the lawful basis for processing. Of course, data processors aren't completely off the hook. GDPR outlines specific requirements for data processors (see chapter 4, particularly article 28).	It is not an either–or. You may have certain rights under both CCPA and GDPR, but they have rather different mechanisms for determining their scope. When does the CCPA apply? CCPA applies to certain businesses and consumers. It covers any business (regardless of legal structure) that that does business in the State of California and has a certain scale. A consumer means a natural person who is a California resident. These aspects are not influenced by your current location. When you as a California resident travel to the EU, you still have all your CCPA rights against businesses that do business in California. You do not have any CCPA rights against businesses that don't do business in California, for example a national rail company in the EU you've bought a train ticket for. When does the GDPR apply? Whereas the location of the user/data subject can be a factor in the GDPR context, their residency or nationality does not. The GDPR applies to all processing activities by data controllers who are established in the EU, including any businesses, non-profits, and individuals. This includes processing activities in the context of an EU establishment of a non-EU company. For example, GDPR would apply with respect to processing of personal data by a hotel you're staying at in the EU. The GDPR also applies to non-EU data controllers in the context of (a) offering goods or services to people who are in the EU, or (b) monitoring behaviour of people who are in the EU. Here, “offering” does not mean “doing business”, but “targeting or marketing”. For example, you might have installed a smartphone app that assists with sightseeing while in Paris. If this app monitors your behaviour while you are in the EU (such as by tracking your GPS position to alert you to nearby points of interest), that would fall under the GDPR while you are in the EU. The app may also fall under the GDPR per case (a) if it is marketed to / targeted at people who are currently in Paris. That the GDPR applies in such cases comes from the offering/monitoring while you are in the EU, not from your continued presence in the EU. You would be able to exercise your GDPR rights relating to this processing even after leaving the EU. Note that some service or processing activity can fall under CCPA and GDPR simultaneously. For example, this app would also fall under CCPA if the company also does business in California, e.g. if it also provides sightseeing information for Los Angeles or San Francisco. And both CCPA and GDPR could apply when an EU company does business in California. Under which privacy law would a deletion request be dealt with? In practice, most companies don't have this sorted out properly and results are unpredictable. Ideally, a company would just comply with both laws simultaneously, thus making it unnecessary to determine which law applies. Information that is only required under on law can be provided with conditional statements, e.g. “If this processing activity is covered by GDPR, you have the right to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority in your country”. As mentioned above, both laws can apply simultaneously. Whether GDPR applies and whether CCPA applies are independent questions. However, the answer to neither of these depends on your current location at the time of making the request. In this answer, any statement about the EU applies equivalently to the UK.	Among other things, GDPR regulates what you may do with the data within your systems. You can use it for the contracted purpose, or in accordance to law, or with informed and revokable consent, or for some other enumerated purposes. Even with consent, you have to take security measures to avoid the misuse of the data. Remember the software shrink-wrap licenses? "By opening the package, you agree to the terms inside." GDPR makes the equivalent in the cloud world impossible. You have to document exactly what you do with the data, and for any use that is not necessary to perform the service the customer can opt out. In the scenario you describe, it is possible that you are not the data controller under GDPR but the data processor, and that you have a duty to keep the data from separate controllers apart. And delete any batch at the end of contract. If you want to do this professionally, you need to consult a lawyer for your specific plans.
Can I enroll my dog in the University of Texas at Arlington? The University of Texas at Alrington makes the following equal-oppertunity statement: In accordance with federal and state law, the University prohibits unlawful discrimination, including harassment, on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, pregnancy, disability, genetic information, and/or veteran status. Could I use the "genetic information" clause to enroll my dog in UTA? He is quite smart, and I want to train Bart for a career in therapy like this dog. While I don't think he would necesarily benefit from an acedemic program, the University of Texas at Arlington provides many workshops, events, and services, which are only available to students, that would help Bart expand his social skill repertoire. Furthermore, since Bart belongs to an extremely underrepresented demographic group, would the Univeristy be required to admit him?	Anti-discrimination laws only apply to people, see here – "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program to which this part applies". Genetic information anti-discrimination laws are limited to employment and insurance, see here. In addition, I'm betting that your dog cannot meet the university admission standards (lack of a transcript is fatal to the plan).	Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity.	1. I want use a friend who has no legal training as my "counsel," do the police have any legal recourse from allowing me to talk to him prior to interrogation? E.g., can they insist that my counsel be a member of the bar in the state where I have been arrested? Yes. If they don't want you to, you cannot talk to a friend, only a lawyer. If you got an OUI, and you're not being a jerk, they will probably let you talk to whomever you want (within reason – it's not social hour). However, they can keep you from speaking to anyone but a lawyer as that person could gain information from you that can corrupt their investigation. (E.g., they arrest you with 10 lbs. of methamphetamine. They know it's "fresh" and likely came from a local lab that they suspect you of running. You cannot be allowed to talk to just anyone, as they could help get the lab broke down, moved, destroyed). In TV shows you see attorneys doing this type of illicit thing, but in reality that is very rare. When you enter the police station to speak with a client, you must present your bar card (license to practice). Friends are not allowed in, even if you value their counsel – they are not counselors! 2. I want to consult a "team" of qualified counselors. Are there legal grounds or regulations to limit the number of individuals I consult prior to interrogation, and who I have present during interrogation? No. You can have your entire legal team with you, while preparing for court, or while being questioned, within reason. They do not need to rent a conference room to fit your 30 person legal team, but if you want 3 or so lawyers in with you, and you can afford paying each $250-$500 per hour, then have at it. Most lawyers would counsel you against this, as it creates an undue impression of limitless (hence likely illegal) funds. (But if you're a hedge fund manager, and you can show your money is legally earned, it's really your choice.) I have had occasion to go in to meet a client with co-counsel numerous times (especially in early years of practice when there is a lead attorney and second chair, so to speak, even for interrogation (which means silence by the client). They can "impede" access to some extent, though they typically don't. They can play games with your lawyer and make them wait and make you wait, but not while they are in with you, and only for so long. Once your lawyer arrives they should leave you alone. (Some courts say once you ask for counsel they need to leave you alone, but this only really matters if they get a confession from you (or any evidence) before you've (and this is what they're hoping for) recant your request for counsel and your right to remain silent.) 3. Can my contact with counsel be proscribed in any way? E.g., can the police limit the duration or schedule of contact with counsel? Can they impede or delay access to me by someone who claims to be my counsel? Once you've called your lawyer, they need to to let him or her meet with you for a reasonable amount of time before questioning. This is typically a quick meeting, just long enough to make sure you will not say a word. Even completely innocent people should keep their mouth shut – innocent people do occasionally get arrested and convicted! No matter what the police say, there is no benefit, ever, from talking to them. Some police, who know it's their last shot to get a confession and know once your lawyer gets there will never talk to you again (and they have enough to go forward without your confession in the event you just start blabbing "you did it" before they can get you to invoke your rights) will keep talking to you and tell you not to comment, just to listen, even while your lawyer sits outside. They can say you're being processed, or there's a security issue, any number of reasons for short delays if they need it. They will then go on and on about "how they can maybe help you out if you talk now, but once your lawyer arrives all bets are off." These are just tricks to get you to recant/revoke your rights and to obtain your confession. You will usually see your lawyer shortly after arrival. Can they impede or delay access to me by someone who claims to be my counsel? Yes, if your lawyer doesn't have adequate ID or cannot verify he is licensed in that state, or in another state and with local counsel. The police do not have a duty to research your lawyer's credentials, and don't have to go online and look your attorney up in the bar directory to make it easier for him or her to get to you. However, if they know the attorney, and he or she forgot his bar card, they would probably lose the confession if you confessed while they make him go get it. Most lawyers carry their bar card in their wallet, so this is not a typical problem. 4. What do police have to do to facilitate my access to my desired counselor(s)? E.g., how long can I be held after requesting an attorney without being allowed to attempt to contact one? You have a right to contact a lawyer. There is no explicit right to a phone call, although some form of contact is implied. Hence, you can usually be held 3 hours before they have to let you "contact" someone, and this is after processing. You can be held until your lawyer gets there or until your arraignment, whatever comes first. If your lawyer doesn't show up, you will be given another opportunity by the court to get your lawyer of choice there for arraignment. If you can't, and you don't want to go forward, a public defender will move to waive your right to a speedy trial and seek a continuance until you can get your counsel of choice there. If this happens, consider getting a new lawyer. What means must I be granted to find and contact the counsel of my choice? This actually differs depending on where you are and what you did. Again, you have a right to counsel but they can determine how you get this done. Sometimes there are local laws that say you get any number, or 3, or 1 completed phone call to reach your counsel of choice. If there is an overriding risk that you will call someone to communicate information that could put the investigation in jeopardy or would be adversely impact their evidentiary value in some way, even when these laws exist the police can refuse you direct contact with anyone and may implement a strict "they call" policy, where they will call the lawyer and tell them, or call your family to let them know, and they can call the lawyer. They cannot hold you for a protracted amount of time without giving you some way to get word to a lawyer; it must be reasonable. There is not a lot of law out there about what is not reasonable, because the police know, and for the most part accept, that once right to counsel has been invoked they are done. There is case law saying that 3 hours is reasonable. What is not reasonable? That is fact dependent.	Not in this case First, we are having an appeals court case that is filed against the dismissal of the real case - there had been no trial. It's a research into if there was a clear error of the court, not who would have won. The Appeals court decided to send it back to the district court with pretty much a direct order to have a trial and solve the issiue, as the very last paragraph of the file shows: We conclude that Schwake stated a Title IX claim against the University because he plausibly alleged gender bias. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the district court’s order and judgment dismissing the claim with prejudice, and remand for further proceedings. Now, back to your quote. As this is an appeal case, the standard is different than in the district court. In this case, it tries to see if there might have been a case, which was dismissed erroneously. Page 15 and 16, where you cite, states (emphasis mine): Schwake’s allegations of a pattern of gender-based decisionmaking against male respondents in sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings make that inference plausible. He alleged that “[m]ale respondents in student disciplinary proceedings involving alleged sexual harassment and misconduct cases at [the University]” “are invariably found guilty, regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” Schwake further alleged that he was “aware of recent [University] disciplinary cases against male respondents in alleged sexual misconduct cases who were all found guilty regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” The district court was not free to ignore this non-conclusory and relevant factual allegation. [your quote] The absence of this level of detail from Schwake’s complaint does not render Schwake’s allegation conclusory or insufficient. There is no heightened pleading standard for Title IX claims. See Austin, 925 F.3d at 1137 n.4. That point is particularly apt here. It may be difficult for a plaintiff to know the full extent of alleged discrimination in decisionmaking before discovery allows a plaintiff to unearth information controlled by the defendant. This sheds much more light upon the situation of the case: Schwacke sued and alleged something. The University alleges the contrary in their reply brief and asks the court to dismiss the claim. The court dismissed in March 2018. This was before any discovery has taken place: nobody was subpoenaed, nobody had to testify in court, nobody had to turn over any documents. We have only statements from either side. As the next step, Schwacke appealed the dismissal, and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, as it found clear error in the handling in dismissal, as one can see in the last paragraphs from each claim's section: Here, we are satisfied that Schwake’s allegations of contemporaneous pressure and gender-based decisionmaking establish background indicia of sex discrimination relevant to his Title IX claim. Considering the combination of Schwake’s allegations of background indicia of sex discrimination along with the allegations concerning his particular disciplinary case, we conclude that sex discrimination is a plausible explanation for the University’s handling of the sexual misconduct disciplinary case against Schwake. This is sufficient for Schwake’s Title IX claim to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage. Now it is up to Schwacke to get into discovery, subpoena the information from the university and go into the courtroom trial... Unless the parties settles. Sidenote By the way, the quote of the university refers to a different case from the 6th Circuit (where Ohio is), which they try to pull up as a model standard. This case is not binding for the 9th Circuit (where Arizona is) but could have been used as a model. Doe v. Miami University, 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) is somewhat similar to Schwacke, as it had been previously dismissed. However, the Title IX was restored by the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit and it was sent back to the lower court to have a trial. Here too, the standard was reasonable expectation or plausibility: Plaintiff “allege[d] facts showing a potential pattern of gender-based decision-making that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal’ circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination.”	What stops a university form doing anything it wants is the contract you entered with the university when you enrolled. (I'm writing from the perspective of a student, not faculty). You and they are bound by the contract, and part of that contract will be a clear outline of academic processes such as ethics, grading, class requirements and test taking, as well as penalties for cheating and plagiarism. That contract will be outlined in your student handbook. That handbook and contract will also clearly outline (or should) the grievance process and remediation for both students and faculty. Since you feel that the university is not being fair, you need to start with investigating that formal grievance process and look into gathering your materials and filing a complaint. The college will have an office that handles such grievances; you need to find it and talk to them. If they are a private college, yes, they do have their "own rules," but some aspects of federal, provincial and local civil and criminal law will still apply. Be aware that the school contract may bind you to arbitration - which means you have to deal with the college on all matters - and you may not be able to go to a public court on a civil matter. A lawyer will be able to tell if you are bound by arbitration and if so, that's the end of the road. If not, a lawyer will tell you if you have a criminal or civil case. In any event, the grievance process at the U will more than likely be your first step. If by chance criminal misconduct is found during the grievance process, then a federal, provincial or local prosecutor would be involved; we would assume the university would be forthcoming if that need appeared.	What's the legality of this situation? It's unlawful and you should seek support for it. That document you linked to appears to have resources that could help you, such as support lines and counselling centres, etc. Am I being discriminated against by these landlords(companies)? I would say so. It sounds like you're being discriminated against on grounds of race and ethnic origin. It appears to violate the General Equal Treatment Act. However, I do want to stress that there may be completely reasonable factors as to why landlords are rejecting your appointment requests. For example, it would not be discriminatory to refuse housing on the basis that you don't have the appropriate income, or you have a poor credit rating, or you don't have any previous rental references. It can be very difficult to prove discrimination if any of the above factors apply, since the landlord could simply cite one of those reasons instead.	A noncompete clause is a section of a contract whereby one party agrees not to compete with another party. These agreements are usually (always) limited as to time, geography, and scope. In other words, if you had a dog-walking business in your neighborhood you might like to hire someone to help walk some dogs. You'd like this person to agree not to compete with you. You charge people $10 per walk and you pay this person $5 per walk so you want to stop them from walking your customers' dogs for $7. In order to get the $5 per walk from you, your employees agree to not go into the dog walking business in your neighborhood for one year. Cat-sitting? Fine. Walking dogs in other neighborhoods? Fine. Walking dogs in your neighborhood 12 months and one day after they stop working for you? Fine. The reason for the limitations is that judges throw out agreements which are too restrictive. You could not require that a person agree to never walk a dog ever again. You could not stop a person from from walking a dog anywhere in the world. You could not stop a person from working any job for any of your customers. The laws about restrictiveness are unique to each state so that's why people recommend that you talk to a lawyer. Judges honor the work you've done to build a customer base and will allow you to protect it, but they're not going to let you keep your people from ever working in the same business again. The non compete describes the limits of the protection. You need to make sure that the code that others create for you in your employment is yours. It's always a good idea to get the specifics in writing just in case something wacky happens where it looks like someone other than you might own work created while working on one of your projects. The water gets pretty muddy when people are working on their own time with their own tools, it could be very easy for them to argue that they created a thing for their own use and provided it to you for your limited use but that they otherwise own it. This is not a noncompete. It's an ownership clause, aka an IP clause.	I would presume that this is legal (without researching the laws in Cali. or Texas). Their contract is an offer to enter into an agreement. You accept that offer by signing. Their pre-requisite for that offer is that you pay the nonrefundable application fee. In other words, they are refusing to make you an offer until you pay a set fee. Now the degree of negotiability, among other factors, would go into determining whether the contract is fully enforceable. I did a little bit of research. (Please note that this is not legal advice. If this applies to a current situation, seek the advice of an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.) There does not seem to be any indication that the landlord needs to provide a sample lease to you before s/he decides that you are an eligible applicant. The application fee is not a contract to rent the premises; it is an application to be considered a tenant. Pro-Business Perspective: Why would I (the landlord) waste my time going over an application with someone and show them a model unit if they are not even eligible to rent from me? I have better things to do. Pro-Consumer Perspective: Why waste my time and money if I refuse non-negotiable terms in a lease? The application fee is capped in California and must be used to cover screening costs or refunded if not used. The likelihood of success in a claim regarding this might be indicated by the California Dept. of Consumer Affairs: "If you don't like the landlord's policy on application screening fees, you may want to look for another rental unit. If you decide to pay the application screening fee, any agreement regarding a refund should be in writing." It is important to note that you can always try to negotiate with the landlord. Personally, every lease I have had I have negotiated to get more favorable terms. You, as a tenant, have every right to try to negotiate, and should use that right.
Am I eligible for unemployment benefits while waiting for a final job offer? I was laid off for 'lack of work' earlier this week. About a day or so later I ended up accepting an employment offer from a large corporation. However, the issue is, I cannot start this job for six or more months due to going through an extensive background check process (aka security clearance). During this time I am not receiving any payment from the corporation. The employment offer letter I accepted states: "We recommend that you not resign from current employment, if applicable, until the background verification is complete. Failure to satisfactorily complete or an unsatisfactory outcome on any of the contingencies may result in withdrawal of this employment offer." Given that my employment with this company is contingent on passing a background verification that is going to last roughly six months, and my current job laid me off - am I eligible to file for unemployment benefits or not? For reference I am located in Pennsylvania.	Yes As far as unemployment is concerned, your "offer" is only a potential job, as it is not yet binding, and in any case for their purposes it does not count until you actually start paid work. However, if you apply for unemployment you will be required to seek other appropriate work, probably a minimum of three contacts or applications per week. Should one of those offer employment, if you do not accept and do not have a good reason for refusing, you may lose your unemployment benefits. Of course, you could always accept such work and resign when and if you pass the background check, but that might look bad on your resume the next time you look for work, if that is any time soon.	Clearly in this case the writing does not reflect your actual agreement. If you were to bill for 1.5x your normal rate for hours over 40/week, relying on the writing, and it came to court, you might win, based on the general rule that matters explicitly covered in the written agreement are treated as final, and evidence of contradictory oral agreements are often not accepted to contradict the contract document. This is known as the parole evidence rule. But you don't plan to issue such a bill, so that won't come up. I don't see that you are at any legal risk. But you could send the client a letter saying that you signed the contract document so as not to hold the job up, but you think there is a mistake in it (pointing out exactly where and what the error is). This would help establish your ethics and good faith, so that if somehow there was a problem over this later (although that seems unlikely) you can't be accused of any improper actions. Keep a copy of any such letter. By the way, if you are an independent contractor, the governmental standard for overtime does not normally apply (in the US). If you are an employee of a consulting company, it may or may not, depending on your salary level and the kind of work you do. An independent contractor can contract for a higher rate for overtime hours, if the client is willing to agree. Many clients will not be willing.	In the US, persons with a disability are entitled to a reasonable accommodation for their disability. There is no requirement to tell an employee everything about their working conditions before a hire, in fact it would be illegal for the employer to ask "Do you have a disability that would prevent you from working underground?". Once hired, you can request an accommodation for your disability.	Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job.	if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? A party ought to timely alert or notify the other counterparty about any disagreements or proposed changes. This is especially recommendable when evidence suggests that the counterparty's expectation that the party only would sign the contract was reasonable. In the example you outline, the employee's unilateral alteration of the compensation/rate in the contract seems unlikely to favor the employee's position. That is because typically employer and employee negotiate compensation prior to formalizing their agreement. In that case, the employee would need stronger evidence with which to overcome the employer's credible argument that he did not knowingly accept the altered rate.	I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney.	Yes I would reach the same conclusion as DaleM, i.e. that the arbitration clause still applies to the dispute in the question, but for a different reason.<1> While the severability principle is indeed a concept in arbitration law, I don't believe that is the relevant doctrine here.<2> Termination Of Employment v. Termination Of An Employment Contract What terminates when a period of employment ends is the employment itself, not the contract of employment. The contract remains effective as to rights and obligations arising during the course of the employment covered by the contract. (This concept would also sometimes be described in terms along the lines of "the right to a remedy for the workplace injury and the right to have disputes related to that resolved in arbitration are vested rights" that are not modified when the contract term of employment ends.) This concept isn't particular to the arbitration obligation. For example, if contract of employment that did not contain an arbitration clause provided that the employee was paid $200 an hour for the first six months and $220 an hour for the second six months of a one year fixed term employment agreement, but the employer failed to adjust paychecks according after the first six months and continued paying the employee at $200 an hour instead (assume to avoid the issue of waiver that this wasn't readily apparent on the face of the paystubs provided to the employee), the employee could bring suit thirteen months after the employee's employment terminated for the $20 an hour not paid as agreed during the last six months of the contract even though the employment period had ended. The contract still remains in force to govern the rights and obligations of the parties arising during the period of employment. Examples Of Termination Of The Contract Itself In contrast, sometimes one contract is replaced, even retroactively, with another contract, in what is called a "novation" of the original contract. This truly does terminate the old contract, so that only the replacement contract remains. So, if, for example, the original employment contract contained an arbitration clause, but this was replaced by a new employment contract without an arbitration clause three months later (in the sample case, before the worker was injured<3>), then the arbitration clause would not apply because the contract, and not just the employment was terminated. Similarly, support that the workplace injury was the second dispute between the employer and employee that had come up. The first was a dispute over the rate of pay received which was resolved by a settlement agreement negotiated by lawyers for the parties before either arbitration or litigation in court was commenced, which expressly terminated all rights, known and unknown, of the parties arising under the contract, and the second was the workplace injury for which the relationship of the injury to work was only discovered later on. In this case, the contract and not just the employment had been expressly terminated, and so the arbitration clause would not apply to the workplace injury dispute (which would be barred by the settlement agreement and which may or may not have had an arbitration clause of its own). End Notes <1> At least assuming that the dispute would have been subject to arbitration if a dispute were litigated while the employee was still employed. There can be circumstances when a workplace injury is not subject to arbitration even if the employer and employee undoubtedly agreed to an arbitration clause that applies to the dispute in question. For example, workplace injuries arising from sexual assault are not subject to arbitration in the United States. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402. <2> The severability principle usually concerns a determination of the enforceability of an arbitration clause in the face of certain kinds of arguments that the entire contract as a whole is voidable. It also does not apply in cases where there is a dispute over whether any contract of any kind was formed in the first place. For example, if someone presented the court with a contract containing an arbitration clause and sought to compel arbitration, and the defense to a motion to compel arbitration was that the defendant had never met or had any connection with or communication with the defendant or anyone related to the alleged contract. <3> The hard case, where the novation takes place after the injury, is complicated by legal doctrines regarding the conditions under which a vested legal right can be waived, which may or may not be met depending upon the circumstances under which the novation was entered into by the parties and presents conceptually distinct legal questions in addition to the legal questions already present in the simple case where the injury takes place after the novation.	IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics.
Is it legal for a child to ask an adult for nudes? I know it’s illegal for a child to send nudes of themselves, as that would constitute child pornography. However, can a child ask a consenting adult for nudes legally?	There is nothing illegal about the child asking for nude images, but, depending on jurisdiction and circumstances, there is quite likely to be a serious legal problem with the adult providing such nudes. The exact laws that might be violated would depend a lot on the jurisdiction. The detailed facts would also be significant. But such a situation is fraught with danger, for the adult. Even if there is no ill-intent, such actions could easily be misinterpreted, and might be technically unlawful regardless of intent. Of course, not all nudes are obscene, or even "inappropriate for children". Which are so classified depends on the laws of the particular jurisdiction.	If I were a DA (District Attorney) looking out "stamp out" statutory rape, I would make the rounds of the hospitals, identify women who gave birth, or were impregnated when underaged, and go from there. But few, if any DAs, do this. No, you wouldn't. First, you have neither the time nor the budget to do this. Second hospitals are not public property, you would need a warrant which the court won't give you because you don't have probable cause to believe a crime has or is being committed. As a DA, I would of course, follow up on any complaints lodged by the victim, or even by her/his parents. And maybe I would prosecute a case where people were "caught in the act, or there were nude pictures, etc. May even an especially egregious PDA (public display of affection). No, you wouldn't. You would follow up on complaints to the extent that you have the time, budget and manpower to do so and you would prosecute cases where you believe that you have a reasonable prospect of getting a conviction and where prosecution is, in your opinion, in the public interest. In the real world, that means where the police hand you a brief of evidence that is a lay-down misere and (for statutory rape) where there is a real power imbalance between the perpetrator and the victim - giving 2 willing 15 year old kids the label of 'sex offender' for life is probably not in the public interest. But suppose there were no complaints or smoking guns. Could someone investigate based on something like a teenager "holding hands" with someone much older? To make the question objective, what has historically caused DAs to prosecute people outside of the above parameters? With some exceptions, it is not the role of the DA to initiate or conduct investigations of criminal actions - that is the role of law enforcement officers, usually for this particular crime, police officers. Notwithstanding, the general rule in western, liberal democracies (which the United States, with a certain generosity of spirit, can still be considered) is that citizens are allowed to get on with their lives without day-to-day interference from the state. That is, law enforcement officers do not 'go fishing' for crimes, they investigate crimes that they have a probable cause to believe have actually happened, either because they themselves saw it happen or someone has reported it to them as having happened. The term for having a law enforcement officer following you around waiting for you to break the law is 'harassment' and may itself be illegal. A law enforcement officer can initiate an investigation based on anything but as no law enforcement agency has unlimited resources, they tend to follow only those investigations that might lead somewhere. For example, it has been known for parents to hold the hands of their children and even to publicly display affection towards them and parents are often "much older" then their children - this would not generally be grounds for initiating a statutory rape investigation.	Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.	It's generally correct in the American system that everything not forbidden is permitted. But the law you're looking at isn't really an exception. You have the legal right to tamper with evidence if tampering is not illegal, but this statute makes it illegal. The language you've highlighted merely says that the law does not apply to those who have some other affirmative grant of authority to do so. So if you stab someone to death in your kitchen, you can't remove the body or other evidence, but the detectives investigating the case can, because they have the legal authority to process the scene and maintain the evidence for trial. So the law is similar to the "speaking in public" hypothetical, but that doesn't make it meaningless. Because of the First Amendment, that law doesn't actually outlaw anything, but the tampering law faces no such legal barriers. You had the right to tamper until the government said you didn't. Now that it says you don't, you can only do it on the government's terms, which require an affirmative grant of authority.	I believe in this case, your company (OrgX) is a data processor and your customer's organization (OrgY) is the data controller. OrgY is responsible for establishing a lawful basis for sending you (OrgX) the personal data for their employees. Note that consent is just one of six lawful bases outlined in article 6(1). I'm no expert, but I believe OrgY's admin can claim they have a legitimate interest in sending their employee's personal data for training sake. In either case, the data processor is not responsible for establishing the lawful basis for processing. Of course, data processors aren't completely off the hook. GDPR outlines specific requirements for data processors (see chapter 4, particularly article 28).	Yes, this is legal in many US states, perhaps most. Search for "adult adoption". For instance, here is the procedure in Colorado. Also, another article on the topic. Before the advent of same-sex marriage, this used to be a technique for a same-sex couple to legally formalize their relationship; one partner would adopt the other. Here is a New York Times Magazine article about the practice. Here is another article, from The Atlantic. They even refer to a case in which the parent was younger than the child.	In the United States, the answer is no. The entire point of guardianship is that the ward is not competent to make legal decisions himself; the court appoints the guardian to consent to things on the ward's behalf. So the parents wouldn't need the child's consent, but they would need to demonstrate to the court that the child is incompetent to make legal decisions and that they are the best people to serve as guardians. To the best of my knowledge, granting guardianship over an adult is almost always limited to cases of serious mental incapacity, such as a vegetative state, mental retardation, Alzheimer's, etc. Is someone is aware of guardianship and researching it online, that is probably a good sign that the person is not a candidate for guardianship.	Surgery is not assault when consent is given. Surgery on an infant requires the consent of a parent, who generally are legally entrusted with the right to give consent on behalf of the child (assuming they haven't have that right taken away by the court). Circumcision on an infant without parental consent is assault, unless it is a medical necessity. Also, "sexual assault" is a legal term of art which depends on jurisdiction -- it isn't necessarily "sexual assault" since it involves no penetration or sexual gratification. We'd have to look at the laws of the jurisdiction that you had in mind to see if e.g. unconsented adult circumcision is deemed sexual assault.
Blockchain based insurance policy brokerage - requirements and restrictions I have some questions regarding the concept and legality of a blockchain based peer-to-peer insurance platform. A little background: The basic idea is for people being given the possibility to "insure" another users private property, whatever that may be in any specific case. The insurer would then have the opportunity to claim profits on a timely schedule, while the insured could claim the collateral provided by the insurer, if the requirements both parties agreed upon were to be met. The insurance contracts themselves would be initialized, maintained and eventually resolved through a series of transparent open sourced smart contracts. Smart contracts are essentially little programs, that run on the blockchain. The can be reviewed by anyone interested. Questions: Is it legally necessary to formally record such a relation between two (or more) private persons? With the crypto space currently being so very unregulated, are there even laws applicable to this matter? How difficult would it be for users of such a service to declare the income generated through anything related to the platform? Would this be regarded as a form of self-employment, would they have to register a company or any of the likes? Would the platform itself, being the service provider, have to be registered in any way? The main aim of the platform would of course be income generation. Legal accountability: Would we need to explicitly declare a disclaimer to prevent being sued if a user considers the rejection of their claim unjust? Since this is a peer-to-peer system, the platform itself will mostly be uninvolved in the decision process. Instead this will be the duty of an independant third party comprised of individual users. Could the platform be held accountable in case of lost user funds? Only if the platform were at fault? (as in, did the platform's source code cause the issue?) Can a strictly blockchain based platform even be sued? Only if it is legally registered? Is there an exact legal counterpart as to the role the platform would assume in this system? It provides the framework upon wich the insurance policies are designed, contracts are established and payouts are issued. It does not directly take part in insurance business. Feel free to let me know, if any further clarification is needed. Edit: Since jurisdictional specification was suggested, let's assume it to be Switzerland and the U.S.A.	Although crypto space may be little regulated, insurance is in most jurisdictions highly regulated. Any such arrangement would need to comply with current laws on insurance, until and unless modified laws to cover this sort of thing are passed, and then it would need to comply with those. Tax authorities generally allow one to declare "other business income" or "other investment income" without forming a legal entity. I cannot say how such income would be classified in any given jurisdiction. Whether the platform, or some legal entity associated with the platform, would need to be registered will depend on the current laws and regulations governing insurance, and on the way in which teh contracts are structured. A disclaimer cannot prevent one from being sued. The contracts would need to carefully and explicitly state who is liable for what. Programs cannot be held accountable for anything. Legal entities, including operators of programs, can be. If negligence in the creation or operation of a program causes a loss, the operator may well be liable. Programs cannot be sued for anything. Legal entities, including operators of programs, can be. It may well be essential to constitute the "platform" as a legal entity of some sort. Otherwise its operator will be liable for its actions. I cannot be sure. I once encountered a somewhat similar system in which insurance was provided by individuals exchanging contracts, so that in a sense each member insured all the others. There was a company that supervised and provided legal and administrative services to the group of individuals, and collected fees for this. That sounds a bit similar to the suggested platform, but I don't know exactly how that company was organized. The system was called "NJ CURE". I don't know if it is still in operation.	You can’t “mislead or deceive” in “trade or commerce” in Australia It is flat out against the law to mislead or deceive - you can’t lie, you can’t conceal salient facts, you can’t tell half truths, you can’t even tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth if that could be misleading. The fines are huge (for example), plus the contracts are unenforceable, plus the reputational damage is extreme. The types of practice that you describe would result in orders to return the premiums, plus fines plus probably revocation of the licence to be an insurer in Australia if they were systemic. This is particularly true of insurance companies - the legislation that applies to them is enumerated here.	What Big Tech is doing is spending a lot of money on lawyers and appeals – doesn't matter if it costs millions if you can make money in the meanwhile. Facebook stores a lot of user data in the US. Initially, this was allowed because the US was recognized as offering an adequate level of data protection under the Safe Harbor and later the Privacy Shield Framework. Then Schrems I and Schrems II happened and the adequacy recognition was ruled to be invalid. Does Facebook pull back their user data? No. The GDPR offers alternative reasons why you might process data in foreign countries, such as “standard contractual clauses” (SCCs) or “binding corporate rules” (BCRs). Now, Facebook claims that they are using SCCs. Is this valid? Almost certainly not due to the issues of US law analyzed in the Schrems II case, but it can take years for the next round of court cases to work its way through the system. And when Facebook's use of SCCs is ruled invalid they will probably try BCRs next, and once that is over a decade will have passed and the US might actually have achieved an adequate privacy level by then. You do not have Facebook-style money to spend on lawyers and endless rounds of appeals, so you should avoid legally risky things such as outsourcing data processing activities to companies in the US (this doesn't mean you can't be compliant if you are a US entity). I mentioned adequacy decision previously. There is a list of countries that the EU considers to be sufficiently safe. Currently, the more notable countries involve Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, in addition to EU/EEA countries of course. If you want to process data in a location that is OK for both the UK and the US, then looking at companies in one of these countries is a good idea. For example, if most of your users are in the US but you would like your servers to be in a country with an EU adequacy decision, then looking at Canada could make sense. Even outside of this list, you can process data if you implement additional safeguards via SCCs. However, this requires a case by case analysis of the legal environment in that country. One problem with the US is that it has national security laws that impose requirements on companies in a manner that is incompatible with SCCs. A company bound by these US laws cannot enter into such a contract where it guarantees the privacy of your user's data. Countries other than the EU have much more tedious data residency laws. The GDPR does not impose any data residency requirements in the sense that data must not leave a particular country – you just have to ensure that the data is properly protected. In contrast, Russia and China have real data residency requirements that are fundamentally incompatible with the GDPR.	You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do.	As was mentioned in a comment, in the United States, businesses are generally registered at the state level. The information collected, and the extent to which or manner in which the public has access to it, varies from state to state. There may still be states where that's a paper-only process, but I'd guess in most of them it's accessible online, at least for basic information. For example, in Michigan the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs has a Business Entity Search tool. If a business deals directly with consumers, it may be a member of the Better Business Bureau. Even if it isn't, but consumers have complained about it, the BBB will make public the information it has about the purported business. If a company is publicly traded (that is, it's corporation that issues stock, and the stock is traded on a stock exchange), it is required by law to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC's EDGAR tool will display the company's filings, which should include annual and quarterly reports. If the company is or wants to be a government contractor, it generally needs to register with the General Services Administration, and certain information about successfully registered entities is publicly viewable in that system. (Conversely, the same system also lists "Excluded Parties" who are prohibited or partially restricted from doing business with the government.) Depending on what the business does, it may also be subject to registration with and regulation by additional state or federal agencies. For a full picture, however, unless you're dealing with the obvious agent of a Fortune 500 company, you'll probably want to get information from a private credit-check service as well; for example, as also mentioned in a comment, Dun & Bradstreet for the business itself, or for a really small business a personal credit report on each of the owners and officers.	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.	This would appear to be a simple application of contract law - the exchange of money for a promise (to sell at a fixed price in the future). Option contracts are only regulated if they relate to options over securities (like company shares) - not if they are over personal property (like baseball cards).	Is it legal in the US for a company that rents out car parking spaces, to bundle the renting of a parking space to buying insurance for the content of the parked car? Yes. Honestly, I'm a little surprised that I've never see this practice in real life. All things not prohibited are allowed, and there is nothing, per se illegal about bundling services and requiring them to be purchased as a package deal (there may be some licensing issues for insurance sales involved, but those would probably be easily overcome). Sometimes bundling gives rise to an anti-trust violation, but neither the parking lot operation business nor the car insurance business are so consolidated that this would fairly be viewed as some kind of anti-competitive practice.
Is Tako to Ama obscene pornography? Tako to Ama, better known as the dream of the fisherman's wife or pearl diver and two octopi, is an 1814 woodblook print by Housukai. It is widely reprinted from its original source for artistic purposes, often cropped. However, the problem is not that it is art it is in part its history, and content matter. It was originally part of a dedicated erotica book called Kinoe no Komatsu ('Young Pines') and accompanied by an erotic tale. It depicts oral intercourse of a nude female with two octopi. This makes me wonder: Does this work get the treatment of an artistic nude or obscene pornography in the US (or for more specific: California), or does this depend on how the picture is framed?	There are federal laws against distributing obscene material to minors, or producing or possessing obscene material depicting minors. Other prohibitions against obscene material include mailing it (§1461), importing it (§1462) and producing it (§1465). Here is the DoJ guideline on laws restricting obscene material. As developed in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, Smith v. US, 431 U.S. 291, and Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, there is a three-pronged test Whether the average person, applying contemporary adult community standards, finds that the matter, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests (i.e., an erotic, lascivious, abnormal, unhealthy, degrading, shameful, or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion); Whether the average person, applying contemporary adult community standards, finds that the matter depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way (i.e., ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, masturbation, excretory functions, lewd exhibition of the genitals, or sado-masochistic sexual abuse); Whether a reasonable person finds that the matter, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. There is no prohibition against pornographic material, so we needn't be concerned with whether the material is pornographic, the pertinent question is whether it is obscene. This has to be determined by consulting "the average person, applying contemporary adult community standards" and whether a "reasonable" person will find that it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. This can only be determined at trial.	I'm going to focus on one part of your question, because I think it is informative to the entire question: "By publishing those data in a copyrighted book are they now in the public domain?" Insofar as copyright is concerned, the "facts" are simply never copyrightable. What is copyrightable is the expression of the fact. So you publish a book and it contains many facts. You retain copyright over how you expressed the facts, meaning the word choice, format of presentation and so on. The discussion of this point always leads people to ask the following two questions: What if the "facts" are closely related to the way they are expressed? For example, a phonebook contains "facts" about phone numbers. The individual numbers are not subject to copyright. But if the way they were organized was clever (i.e. not merely alphabetical) the presentation may be copyrighted. Doesn't that line get blurred? Why doesn't "the presentation order" count as a "fact?" It does get blurred! And courts use nuanced case law and judgment to figure out which side of the line a given thing is. However, one backstop is that if AN EXPRESSION is so closely related to the IDEA BEING EXPRESSED that the IDEA cannot be otherwise expressed, then then the EXPRESSION is not subject to copyright protection. To answer your specific questions: The book is subject to copyright. The facts in the book are not. Someone else could publish a book with the same measurements so long as they are expressing the facts with sufficient difference from the original. I'm not familiar with CUSIP numbers. However, there are two things to say here. (A) it sounds like you are describing a contractual relationship between the people who have the numbers. This is not governed by copyright; it is governed by contract between the parties. If these numbers could be treated as a "trade secret" they might be protected IP in that way. But given that they are likely circulated at least a bit, they don't seem like candidates for "trade secret" protection. To your question, "what is the effect of one person leaking?" If "trade secret" law was doing any "work" here... then yes, the trade secret would be undone once the information was public. But like I said, its likely this is actually all about contracts not intellectual property protection. (B) The "facts" of "which number is associated with which instrument" is likely NOT subject to copyright at any time. The specific numbering code COULD BE copyrighted, but in reality is almost certainly TOO CLOSELY tied to the IDEA being expressed to be copyrighted. Could the number be expressed otherwise? If not, then its likely not protected by copyright. -- Big take away here: You seem to be confused about the concept of "facts" getting into the public domain. That's not exactly what copyright is about. Copyright would protect the expression of facts. An expression can become public domain if it is sufficiently old or if the creator designates it as public domain work. But simply "putting something out there" does nothing to alter the copyright status of the thing.	It is not clear to me how you "use" a mythological entity, and I take no position as to the divine consequences of any unauthorized uses, but you are entitled to incorporate then in your own intellectual creations for two reasons. First, any imaginable copyright on original texts (e.g. the Bhagavad Gita) has long since expired. Not all texts are of such certifiably ancient provenance, so there may be contemporary texts created by a practitioner of Ásatrúarfélagið which is protected. Second, names (Amitāyus, Zaraθuštra, Ngai) are not protected by copyright, so you can use names.	No The artwork is all covered by copyright that, in Japan, lasts for 70 years after the death of the last artist. As employees of Squaresoft, the artists don’t own the copyright, Squaresoft (or it’s heirs or assignees do). So, the copyright currently vests with the successor company Square Enix. They are the only organisation with the right to make or licence derivatives. While they currently don’t want to, they might in 10 or 20 or 40 years and any work you made would damage the profitability of that hypothetical project. So it isn’t fair use. So you can’t do it.	As for plagiarism, that is not a legal concept, so he can define plagiarism however he wants. It certainly isn't, under any definition I have ever seen on Earth and I have seen many (it has to do with "claiming someone else's work as your own"). As for copyright, a set of questions is (potentially) protected by copyright. If they are copied from somebody else's book of questions, then the book author (or publisher) holds copyright. Let's say that QM invented the questions, such as "What is the Turkish word for Janissary?", "What is the most prominent feature of Jannissary garb?" and so on. Then that set of questions, when put down in fixed form, are protected by copyright, and cannot be copied without permission.	Does he have some kind of libel or invasion of privacy case? The description of the "art work" is somewhat inconclusive. I will assume that the red lipstick and blue eye shadow in the fictional poster are suggestive of that soldier's "makeup". If the World War Two soldier were still alive and a straight male, he might have a claim of defamation insofar as the poster portrayed him as having a sexual orientation which is inaccurate, detrimental to his reputation, and tending to dissuade others from associating with the soldier. Policies against sexual discrimination aside, no straight male likes being falsely characterized as to sexual orientation (in part because of the undeniably harmful, lasting impact something like this would have in his environment). The defendant's possible allegation that the "art work" was hyperbole would be unavailing. That is because the suggestive poster is likely to impinge on viewers a detrimental concept of the soldier even if it is obvious to those viewers that the poster was not an actual, color photograph taken of him during the World War II. In most jurisdictions in the US, the defamed soldier would need to file suit within a year from the publication of the poster (an exception is Tennessee: six months) because the statute of limitations for claims of defamation is shorter than most others.	Copyright protection is about certain acts, and not about relationships between products. Copyright law says that the creator of an original work hold the exclusive right to copy and to authorize creation of derivative works. Copyright law does not say that anybody can freely create derivative works as long as they are different to a certain extent. So if you take an original Mario and modify it a teeny bit, that is a violation of copyright; if you take an original Mario and modify it hugely, that is a violation of copyright. Degree of similarity is relevant on some cases when the factual question arises whether the allegedly-infringing work is based on some protected original. This is most obvious in music cases, where all baroque music has some similarity to all other baroque music, all death metal has some similarity to all other death metal, and so on. There is not a legal quasi-statutory standard for measuring substantial similarity in music. The scientific underpinning of such a standard would be based on (weighted) combinatorics and the idea that there are only so many tunes possible (that would be a huge number, until you get to the "within a genre" condition). It seems obvious (by your "admission") that the derived works are based on protected works, so Nintendo's permission is required to legally create such works. However, you do or would hold copyright in your unauthorized derived work. Without a trail of evidence such as a SE question pointing to the connection, the derived images might be hard to connect to the originals. In addition, you may be able to avail yourself of a "fair use" defense, in case you get sued by the original creator. Factors favoring such a defense are the insubstantiality of the copying (a small portion) and the "transformativeness" of your creation.	You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction.
Is generating automatic requests illegal? TL; DR; Is generating automated requests to a government site illegal in some way? There is a government site (EU/Ireland) that provides a WebChat service as a contact option. When the chat is active there is a green button, otherwise, it is grey. It is almost impossible to find the green button (although sometimes it is green) so I decided to test the real availability of this service. My idea was to create a script that accesses the website, checks the status of the button and then logs it. My goal was not to DDoS the server or something similar so I thought a request every minute will suffice for getting some statistics. Could this be considered illegal? I know it might depend on each country's laws but if someone in the field could provide some insight or directions is really appreciated. Even more Details: The website is always up even if the chat is not available, so it is not only testing an HTTP request. What I found is that the HTML is loaded without the "button" (it's not a button tag, it's actually a clickable image), then a javascript script connects to the chat service and depending on the status, it loads the "button" to access the chat or to notify it is unavailable. This is an <img> tag. What I do is read the "alt" property description where the status can be identified. Then I put that in a cron job, log the time and the status. Finally, at the end of the day, I summarise the data into a chart showing the percentage of time the chat was really active. The purpose of this experiment is to prove that the customer service is awful with actual data.	What you are doing is commonly referred to "web scrapers" and they are legal in the EU. What you cannot do is extract personal data. Since the data you are aggregating is non-personal data, whether or not a chat button is available, it should be fine. EDIT As some of the commenters said - it's legal, but many websites detect scrapping. To (try to) avoid being blocked by the server, make it act human. Something like. I check once every 15 minutes with 3 minutes +/- is probably enough. That also is probably what a human would do using the website so it should strengthen your argument the website is unavailable.	These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information.	Can't we get a legal action about AdBlocker as web masters? No. I assume that by "web master" you mean a server admin who contracts with entities which are seeking to advertise their goods and services. An advertiser pays the server to transmit (or send(), in terms of a socket API) certain content to whoever submits a GET or POST request ("the client"). The scope of the contract ends there, and the end consumer or client is not a party to that contract. Any point beyond the server admin's routers, it is perfectly lawful for end users to run some program on the client side where the purpose of that program is to (1) parse any packets received in the client socket, (2) filter out some of it, (3) and forward the rest to a browser. Bringing legal action against AdBlocker would be somewhat akin to suing producers of TV remote controls under the allegation that the mute button functionality blocks advertisement content.	The so called "cookie law" is Article 5(3) of Directive 2002/58/EC: Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user. So this does not only apply to cookies, but to any way to store or retrieve information on/from the equipment of the user. When you use a PHP session, the session ID is stored in a session cookie or URL parameter. If a URL parameter is used, it is also stored on the equipment of the user, so the "cookie law" would also apply to that, but I am not sure about that. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (Art. 29 WP) has written Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption. It considers a session-ID to be exempted from the requirement of informed consent: 3.1 “User-input” cookies The term “user input cookies” can be used as a generic term to describe session cookies that are used to keep track of the user’s input in a series of message exchanges with a service provider in a consistent manner. These would be expected to be first party cookies typically relying on a Session-ID (a random temporary unique number) and expire when the session ends at the latest. First party user input session cookies are typically used to keep track of the user’s input when filling online forms over several pages, or as a shopping cart, to keep track of the items the user has selected by clicking on a button (e.g. “add to my shopping cart”). These cookies are clearly needed to provide an information service explicitly requested by the user. Additionally, they are tied to a user’s action (such as clicking on a button or filling a form). As such these cookies are exempted under CRITERION B. So basically, a PHP session ID cookie does not require consent. However as soon as a session id is used for analytics, it is not exempted: 4.3 First party analytics Analytics are statistical audience measuring tools for websites, which often rely on cookies. These tools are notably used by website owners to estimate the number of unique visitors, to detect the most preeminent search engine keywords that lead to a webpage or to track down website navigation issues. Analytics tools available today use a number of different data collection and analysis models each of which present different data protection risks. A firstparty analytic system based on “first party” cookies clearly presents different risks compared to a third-party analytics system based on “third party” cookies. There are also tools which use “first party” cookies with the analysis performed by another party. This other party will be considered as a joint controller or as a processor depending on whether it uses the data for its own purposes or if it is prohibited to do so through technical or contractual arrangements. While they are often considered as a “strictly necessary” tool for website operators, they are not strictly necessary to provide a functionality explicitly requested by the user (or subscriber). In fact, the user can access all the functionalities provided by the website when such cookies are disabled. As a consequence, these cookies do not fall under the exemption defined in CRITERION A or B. However, the Working Party considers that first party analytics cookies are not likely to create a privacy risk when they are strictly limited to first party aggregated statistical purposes and when they are used by websites that already provide clear information about these cookies in their privacy policy as well as adequate privacy safeguards. Such safeguards are expected to include a user friendly mechanism to opt-out from any data collection and comprehensive anonymization mechanisms that are applied to other collected identifiable information such as IP addresses. In this regard, should article 5.3 of the Directive 2002/58/EC be re-visited in the future, the European legislator might appropriately add a third exemption criterion to consent for cookies that are strictly limited to first party anonymized and aggregated statistical purposes. First party analytics should be clearly distinguished from third party analytics, which use a common third party cookie to collect navigation information related to users across distinct websites, and which pose a substantially greater risk to privacy. So Art. 29 WP does not consider it a privacy risk under the conditions in the last two paragraphs. At least in some EU countries (Like the Netherlands) you would be exempted from the requirement of informed consent because of that. In your question you also mention you use "a soft opt-in on continual use". That is not sufficient to obtain consent.	In general this is protected by the first amendment. It is not in general a problem describing how one can one can do something illegal. But there are special cases to be careful with. You might want to do some research into the limits on free speech. It would be hard to provide an answer that fully covers all your different cases and you would need to be more specific about what illegal activity you want to describe. In describing how to do something illegal, you might accidentally share information that you are not allowed to share. When you post things online, this can be considered as publishing or exporting. Therefore certain export restrictions might apply. Also, It is illegal to publish bomb making manuals, with the knowledge or intent that this information be used to commit a federal crime of violence. See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/842. There are restrictions on publishing material relating to cryptography without having an export license. Granted, this isn't necessarily related to publishing things that are illegal, but just to give an idea about how publishing/exporting knowledge can causes problems. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the_United_States ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) sets restrictions on what you can publish about arms. What you publish can't be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” See for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandenburg_v._Ohio. One might imagine that you could get into trouble if someone interprets what you do as inciting or producing a lawless action. It might sound obvious, but you want to make sure that you have the right to share the information that you have. The information that you are providing might be copyrighted in some way.	You must get opt-in affirmative consent to process personal data, including tracking people's use of your site or providing targeted advertising. The banner on StackExchange is likely in violation of the GDPR. Do not copy it. It does not have an explicit opt-in, only an opt out which is onerous (leave the site, then manually go in and delete any cookies they set, which may be hard to identify if they are from 3rd parties). The sites you mention that have a gateway are a more correct implementation. Consent must be acquired before processing of data begins, and it must be explicit.	can it be construed as a violation of 66F clause 2 if we try to circumvent the rate limit even though the information is on public domain? No, unless the element of intent to threaten [...] or strike terror can be proved. I'm assuming that by "clause 2" you mean the excerpt you posted. Although circumventing the limit of API calls sounds in "exceeding authorised access" and might even lead to DOS, it does not imply an intent to threaten the security/sovereignty/etc. or strike terror. The statute is premised on such intent. The fact that the information(packets) is(are) on public domain is irrelevant. For instance, an intent to strike terror and/or actually causing a DOS can involve [targeting] a public domain.	The "Contribution activity" is extracted from repositories hosted on Github. Looking at the privacy statement, Github considers itself as a hosting service for those repositories. See EU Directive 2000/31/EC Article 14 for the exact definition and conditions: Article 14 Hosting Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information. Article 2(4) GDPR defines that the GDPR does not apply (to Github) in this case This Regulation shall be without prejudice to the application of Directive 2000/31/EC, in particular of the liability rules of intermediary service providers in Articles 12 to 15 of that Directive. Extracting data from the repositories to create a nicely formatted contribution activity list, would still be considered hosting as defined at Directive 2000/31/EC, because Github does not (manually) redact or modify commits. So if you want to hide your contribution activity, you must delete the contributions. And you should not ask Github to do that, but ask the owners of the repositories. And they might have good reasons to deny your request. If an owner of a repository denies your request without a good reason, you can ask Github to do so. But Github would then probably deny that request, because they explain in their privacy statement that modifying the history is not possible: The email address you have supplied via your Git commit settings will always be associated with your commits in the Git system. If you chose to make your email address private, you should also update your Git commit settings. We are unable to change or delete data in the Git commit history — the Git software is designed to maintain a record — but we do enable you to control what information you put in that record. edit To further clarify why Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC applies, see case C-236/08 (Google v. Louis Vuitton) where the European Court of Justice clarifies the meaning of that article (ECLI:EU:C:2010:159): In that regard, it follows from recital 42 in the preamble to Directive 2000/31 that the exemptions from liability established in that directive cover only cases in which the activity of the information society service provider is ‘of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature’, which implies that that service provider ‘has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored’. Accordingly, in order to establish whether the liability of a referencing service provider may be limited under Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, it is necessary to examine whether the role played by that service provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data which it stores. The way Github creates/shows the contribution activity is in my opinion technical, automatic and passive. That means it is not liable, and that implies that the GDPR does not directly apply, unless data is unlawful, and someone notifies Github of that: The restriction on liability set out in Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31 applies to cases ‘[w]here an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service’ and means that the provider of such a service cannot be held liable for the data which it has stored at the request of a recipient of that service unless that service provider, after having become aware, because of information supplied by an injured party or otherwise, of the unlawful nature of those data or of activities of that recipient, fails to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to those data. Surely the GDPR might be the reason data is unlawful. But you need a reason, in particular based on Article 17 ("right to be forgotten"). For example if personal data of a 12 year old child is processed without permission of it's parent. Without such a reason the legitimate interest of the repository owner will probably prevail (who wants to keep the git history complete).
"Pressing charges" - is it needed to bring a charge? In movies, it is often the case that we see police decline to proceed with a case because the victim "refused to press charges". Recently we saw this with the battery of Chris Rock by Will Smith on global TV that the LAPD refused to bring charges on as no complaint was made. In my jurisdiction (Australia) law enforcement will prosecute offences regardless of the victim's views, based on the evidence available and as a "breach of the peace" Is it the case that Police in the US are unable to proceed with a charge if a victim declines to "press charges" and if so, how are murder charges or even more pertinently, domestic violence charges, brought to court?	Is it the case that Police in the US are unable to proceed with a charge if a victim declines to "press charges" and if so, how are murder charges or even more pertinently, domestic violence charges, brought to court? First of all, it is prosecutors and not police officers who actually bring criminal charges in the legal systems in the vast majority of U.S. states (although not quite all, minor offenses in Rhode Island, for example, are an exception). Second, a prosecutor does have the right to bring criminal charges even if the victim or someone affiliated with the victim does not "press charges". Indeed, a prosecutor can almost always bring criminal charges over the objections of a victim, although "victim's rights" protections in some U.S. states require a prosecutor to confer with a victim before doing so. This said, law enforcement and a prosecutor cannot prosecute a criminal case if they have no knowledge that a crime was committed, so if no one brings a crime to the attention of authorities it is unlikely to be prosecuted. And, law enforcement and prosecutors will defer to the wishes of a victim that charges not be pressed in the legal system against an offender in many kinds of cases (although that discretion is limited in many states in domestic violence cases by statute).	There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced.	Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh.	Because the relevant law enforcement decided not to In the US (and indeed in all common law jurisdictions), law enforcement and prosecutors have discretion over when and if to lay charges by considering such things as the wishes of the victim, the prospects of success and whether charges would be just in the circumstances. At best, this allows a measured response to the particular situation. At worst, it enables discrimination and persecution. Either way it solves the problem of allocating limited resources to comparatively unlimited need.	The parties are generally entitled to present their case as they see fit, as long as they stay within the rules of evidence. If they want a straight yes or no, the court will often require the witness to provide one, which keeps lawyers happy, makes the answers clear for the jury, and limits the parties' grounds for appeal. If a yes or no answer is not as accurate as a more qualified answer, the other lawyer would typically have an opportunity to invite the witness to provide a fuller answer on redirect. If a yes or no answer is inappropriate because of assumption embedded in the question -- as in your "beating his wife and kids" example -- the question should quickly elicit an objection from the defense attorney, who would note that the question lacks foundation or assumes facts not in evidence. Assuming there isn't any evidence of domestic violence, the court should sustain the objection, in which case the witness would not need to answer at all.	If I did punch him , would that be okay? No, that would be Assault and Battery. If you did him serious injury you could face a charge of Grievous Bodily Harm. If you killed him, that would be murder. If you are in the UK, Canada or Australia and you were charged with murder you could claim provocation in an attempt to have the charge reduced to Voluntary Manslaughter. If you were in the US you could attempt to argue "extreme emotional or mental distress" if you are in a state that has adopted the Model Penal Code for any of the charges; if successful your sentence would be reduced. I saw people punch one another over this in movies. And I saw aliens invading the Earth in the movies - what happens in the movies if not necessarily true. Kissing my wife is adultery right? No, extramarital sex is adultery. Notwithstanding, adultery is not illegal in common-law countries. I'm pissed and don't know what to do? I sympathise with you but this is not a legal question. Whatever is going on between you, your wife and your neighbour is a social situation; not a legal one.	Etiquette is not "above" the law in the sense that an etiquette rule excuses a violation of law. However, at least in the US, the police are not required to investigate every alleged violation of law, nor is a prosecutor required to proceed against every lawbreaker, and the decision to proceed may be influenced by a perceived etiquette violation. It should also be mentioned that while a third person has no right to prevent you form talking to anyone who is willing to talk to you (unless the 3rd person is the parent of guardian of an underage person you wish to address), it is not in any way illegal to instruct you not to do so, even if the instructions are incorrect as a matter of law. Assaulting you is, of course, a different matter.	The government can’t withdraw The government does not have a right to unilaterally withdraw charges once the case is before the court. All they can do is ask the court to dismiss the case as they have done here. It’s up to the court (judge) to decide whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not. It granted, then the case has gone to completion and the defendant is legally not subject to punishment as they were not convicted of the crime, notwithstanding any previous guilty plea. Now, while it would be unusual for a judge to refuse such a motion it’s not impossible and they might do so if they felt that the interests of justice are better served by completing the trial in the usual way. This is possibly more common in civil litigation where a losing plaintiff might not be permitted to settle if the judge doesn’t feel an innocent defendant is being adequately compensated.
Can I market a legal food product with the name of an illicit drug or other illegal product? Say I've reverse-engineered the Coca-Cola formula, or produced something very similar in taste. Since the recipe is not patented, I can sell my product so long as I don't market it as Coke, Coca-Cola, etc. Say this formula is deemed safe and has been approved by the FDA and any other regulatory body. In particular, it does not include cocaine. Would I be allowed to market this product as "Cocaine cola" or "Cocaine soda?" To sidestep the potential trademark issue, could I name an independently conceived product after a drug? Going a step beyond saying it's "like crack" and instead saying naming a brand of potato chips "edible meth" or similar? Edit: Specifically would there be a problem when marketing food?	Would I be allowed to market this product as "Cocaine cola" or "Cocaine soda?" england-and-wales Possibly not if you were to try and register the name, as this may well fall foul of s.3(3)(a), Trademarks Act 1994 which says: A trade mark shall not be registered if it is— (a) contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of morality... The government's Manual of Trade Marks Practice, at section 5.8, explains that: Marks which may be ‘contrary to public policy’ are those, for example, that make specific references to illegal drugs such as cocaine... (my emphasis)	united-states No, the first-sale doctrine makes this unenforceable Once a product is sold to a retail consumer, it is generally theirs to do with as they wish, including reselling it. The company likely intends this restriction to apply to distributors/retailers with whom it has contracts: it would likely be a violation of their distribution contract to, say, open a 12-pack of Coke and sell the individual cans. An exception to this doctrine is licensed software. Because it is licensed and not sold, there's not a product that the consumer could legally resell; the license is not required to be transferrable. As far as license agreements to prevent this go, it's been tried: Lexmark sold toner cartridges with a patent license agreement banning refilling and reuse. It ended up at the Supreme Court in Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., where Lexmark lost.	Not only can’t you trademark it, you can’t use it The original logo is covered by copyright which belongs, prima facie, to the original artist. It doesn’t matter that they are based in Russia; Russia and the US are both signatories to the Berne Convention which means they protect each other’s copyright. That means you can only use it if it is fair use (it isn’t) or if you have the copyright owner’s permission (you don’t). Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Not if the seller didn’t have permission to make those changes. Creation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights copyright gives. The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. See above. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. They already have copyright. They would need to register it in the US before they could sue but there is no impediment to them doing so. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bounded by any terms of the stock photo website Makes no difference. Just because you didn’t steal the car, that doesn’t make it ok for you to drive it. The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. Not relevant at all. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image. You can’t sell something you don’t own. If the seller had no right to upload the photo (as it seems they didn’t), the terms of the website don’t matter. The true owner never agreed to those terms and isn’t bound by them.	No. A trademark is specific to an industry or type of products or services. And, while it is virtually impossible to get a new trade name with a three letter acronym because almost all of them are taken, three words that start with the same letters as a three letter acronym is not infringement on the acronym. You might very well be infringing if you used "I.B.M." to sell computer equipment. But, "Internal brilliance method", spelled out, would not infringe I.B.M., even in the computer equipment industry, and "I.B.M." in the food service industry, for example, would not be trademark infringement on the International Business Machines" trademark of "I.B.M." for good and services of the type that it offers.	Under US law: It depends, but it is likely legal. Trademark is designed to prevent confusion in consumers, to avoid someone's good work and reputation from being taken advantage of by another, and/or damaged by another's poor work/service. The game's name and character names are (generally) not trademarked, nor are they copyrightable. Even if they were, there is nominative fair use to consider as a defense. There are still some legal issues that might occur (e.g. this does not apply to the novel's name; using the game's logo on cover art might constitute trademark violation if it was so positioned as to be associating a relationship with the game publisher, descriptions of the game's content, especially story content, is a bit hazy), but not with using the game name or character names.	Intellectual property law varies considerably by jurisdiction, and doesn't just involve copyright, but also trademarks, and patents. The first problem you are going to run into is that "Risko!" is probably protected as a commercial trademark rather than copyright. In the US at least, making minor changes to a trademark generally doesn't get you off the hook for unlicensed use. The owner of the "Risko!" trademark could bring suit against you for trademark infringement and it would be up to a judge or possibly a jury to decide whether "Risko" is different enough from "Risko!" that confusion would be unlikely. If they won the suit they could collect damages and their legal costs. There was a protracted and important trademark lawsuit in the US over the names "Monopoly" and "Anti-Monopoly" for board games. An economist, Ralph Anspach, had introduced a game he called "Anti-monopoly". He was sued by the Parker Brothers company for infringing on their trademark for "Monopoly". After 10 years the US Supreme Court ruled in Anspach's favor, finding that "Monopoly" had become a generic term for a type of board game and was no longer a valid trademark. You can't necessarily count on being "small potatoes" so that they'll simply ignore your possible infringement. In US law, failure to enforce their trademark rights can lead to the loss of trademark rights and remedies, so companies are less likely to let minor infringements slide. The situation in Italy may be different. Your artwork and graphical components are another potential problem. Those probably are covered by copyright. Again, the holder of the copyright for the "Risko!" artwork could sue you for violating their copyright on the artwork. A judge or jury would then evaluate whether your artwork was "derivative" of the "Risko!" artwork. If the court finds that your artwork is derivative, you might have to pay damages and legal costs. There are actually a ton of Risk inspired games already available online, but they seem to stay away from names that sounds anything like "Risk" and anything that looks like the Risk artwork.	Reviewing https://stackexchange.com/legal/trademark-guidance shows the following: The logos associated with Stack Exchange Inc. and any Stack Exchange site are a trademark. The purpose of trademark law is to prevent consumers from being misled as to the origin of a product. So if you were making a product, and you used a Stack Exchange name or logo in your product (or in its advertising) in such a way that would mislead someone into thinking that your product was owned by, operated by, endorsed by, or in any way part of Stack Exchange Inc., you would be violating the trademark and this would not be legal. Our logo images and site names are copyrighted. Any content on the Stack Exchange Network not contributed by users is copyrighted. Copyright is different than trademark. Ordinarily you couldn't copy it. But if you were writing a news story or blog post about a Stack Exchange site, reproducing the logo image would almost certainly be considered "fair use" and allowed under trademark law because you were not using it "in trade." So the answer to your question is yes, you would need to seek the permission of the trademark holder.	Yes. There is no requirement that a company name be accurately descriptive. One could call such a company "Horror and Fury Brewing" if one chose to, or "Joe's Eats". Such a name might well reduce book sales, but there is no law against poor business decisions. As long as the name does not violate any existing trademarks, it should be OK unless there is some specific law in the local jurisdiction that regulates company names, which seems unlikely.
Process server attempted to serve me at old address I moved roughly a year ago. My business and my drivers license were both updated to reflect my new address. However, the new occupant of my home told me that on Sunday - someone attempted to serve me and asked where i could be found. Is there any way to find out what is going on?	Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible.	What's the worst that can happen? If you do nothing, it's a bit inconvenient. If you delete all that company's stuff, who knows what they could sue you for. I'm not saying they would be right, but being sued can be expensive, no matter whether you are wrong or right. Send a letter by registered mail, with a witness to the contents, that you are the only one with admin rights to these sites, and asking them how they would like to take over these sites, and informing them that you will delete anything on your personal email after a reasonable time if you don't hear from them. And since anything you do is work for you, you should expect some appropriate compensation. Deleting their property, even if it affects you, is risky.	Massachusetts is a 'two-party' state. So you'd have to have consent from them to record. You could probably travel to a 'one-party' state such as one of the states listed here and call them while recording. In a one-party state, only one of the parties to the conversation needs to know about the recording. In those states you don't even need to inform them. It would be interesting to see if the law applied to where the call center is located. When calling credit card companies these days, the call may be routed to any number of places depending on call loads, and those places might be out of country as well.	This question, along with a number of articles on the Internet, misconstrues what the rule change is about. The rule change does not say that you can get a search warrant, that is to enter premises with/without machineguns etc, solely on the basis that someone is running Tor on that premises. The rule changes actually has nothing to do with search warrants. The rule change is about "remote access" warrants and, specifically, the question of which magistrate you need to get the warrant from. The background is that statute grants the FBI the power to hack into a computer (that is, obtain "remote access") to search for and retrieve evidence in a criminal investigation. One of the preconditions for doing so is that they identify which district the computer is in, and apply to a magistrate in that district. (By way of further background, under the American way of distributing power, it is seen as a bad thing for (for example) a magistrate in California to be able to issue a warrant to an FBI agent to conduct a search in North Carolina.) When the target computer is desired to be hacked because it is running a hidden Tor service, then how does anyone know what district it is in? Where does the poor FBI agent apply for his or her warrant? This rule change resolves this practical problem by saying that, where the use of Tor or a similar system precludes any knowledge of the physical location of the target computer, then the FBI can apply for a warrant with any magistrate. See further http://www.fed-soc.org/blog/detail/amendments-to-federal-criminal-rule-41-address-venue-not-hacking-powers	You would check with the authorities in the state where your parents last lived. Actually, you can write to any congressperson, and they can pay attention to you or ignore you as they like. (This also applies to people who live in the US; if you think a representative other than your own will be more likely to follow your request, you can write to them instead.) The reason it's most common to write to your own representative is that they have a political motivation to consider your request (you are more likely to vote for them if they do what you ask). If you were to vote for a congressperson, that would be in the district where your parents lived (but that is governed by state law).	All residents in Germany need to have a registered address. The reasons for that are numerous: no need for a separate voting registration, it gives a place to deliver legal notices, it helps enforcing tax regulation (though tax law has another definition of "residence"), certain taxes are assigned to the municipality where you are registered, no need to do a utility bill or credit report dance when trying to prove your address to third-parties, it was always done like that. The last is reason enough as far as bureaucracy is concerned. As far as your question goes, there are a few wrong assumptions. First, nobody is trying to limit or deny registrations. Municipalities actually get money for every resident they have registered through tax allocation. Second, if you (semi-)permanently live at some place you are not considered "officially homeless" but as someone has didn't properly register themselves (which could result in a fine). Third, multiple people can be registered at the same address. How else could people register themselves in huge apartment buildings? Or even a family living together? If there is a suspicious amount of people registered they might want to check whether other regulation (such as minimum space per person) is adhered to. Fourth, to register somewhere you need proof that you actually live there. This is where you probably ran into problems. This proof is usually a letter given by the person allowing you live at a place. Note that this is not necessarily the owner of the place but literally the person allowing you to stay (the authorities can check with the owner though). Often subletters won't sign that piece of paper, either because they think they are not allowed to or they don't have permission by the owner to sublet the place to begin with. If that happens you are supposed to tell that to the authorities (§ 19 Abs. 2 BMG) who then can choose to fine the one providing the place for refusing to sign the paper. (The need for proof was recently reintroduced after it was noticed that there was a huge amount of people who registered at an address where they didn't actually live.) Fifth, if you never have been registered before you can't actually properly pay your taxes as you need a tax ID for that. This is automatically assigned when you – surprise – register for the first time. If you are not an EU/EEA/CH citizen you also need to register yourself before they can change anything about the residence permit within Germany. To end with an answer to your question if taken literally: German citizens can register themselves as homeless (ohne festen Wohnsitz) if they really are. For foreigners this is a bit more complicated. EU citizens usually don't have freedom of movement rights if they can't properly support themselves, a living space is supposed to be part of that. Other foreigners likely violate their residence permit.	No You agreed to this: If the change of ownership from Seller to Buyer is not able to be completed (i) due to either party’s fraudulent activity or (ii) for any other reason, Buyer and Seller acknowledge and agree that GoDaddy shall have no liability or responsibility regarding the same. You got your refund - that’s all they owe you.	The primary question is whether you actually committed a crime in signing a credit card receipt, when you are not the cardholder nor are you authorized to sign on behalf of the cardholder: did you commit fraud? It is not possible to accidentally commit fraud, you have to have intended to deceived the other party that you are authorized to sign. For the sake of discussion, I will assume that you had no such intention. Presumably, the person who ordered the stuff will wonder "where is my stuff?", will complain to the vendor, they may then find the signed receipt and some evidence regarding where the goods were delivered. Whether or not they contact you asking for an explanation / return of the goods, the police would have to investigate the situation in light of some allegation that you committed fraud. The police will not just come knocking on the door and nab you (in the US: North Korean law is different). In many jurisdictions, there is a requirement for a warrant supported by probable cause. If the investigation provides sufficient credible evidence proving that you did intentionally falsely sign the receipt, to the point that given those facts you would be convicted of the crime, then there is probable cause for a warrant for your arrest. The fact of signing a receipt is not probable cause to support such an arrest, but other facts could be added to reach that level of evidence.
In Texas, can prosecutors be defense attorneys for free outside the job? In another thread, I was told that DAs and other prosecutors are typically prohibited from engaging in volunteer, pro bono work. However, I've now come across the following Texas Bar statement, which seems to allow public attorneys to engage in pro bono practice. It raises the question, "Do legal aid staff attorneys, public defenders, and prosecutors count their work time as pro bono, since they provide free legal services to the poor?" This is the answer (emphasis added): No. Although the services are free to the clients, the attorneys are paid for their work at salaries they have accepted. However, if these attorneys provide volunteer legal assistance to the poor outside their regular work, they may report those hours as pro bono service. Does this mean that public attorneys can engage in pro bono work in Texas? If so, are there strings attached? For example, would a public attorney be able to represent their friends and family so long as they don't charge for the work?	I was told that DAs and other prosecutors are typically prohibited from engaging in volunteer, pro bono work You have not really understood the linked answer and are oversimplifying its analysis. I'll restate the analysis in a different way in this answer in the hope of providing greater clarity. The key to understanding that question is that the question presented there was: "Are DAs and other prosecutors prohibited from being defense attorneys, such as in a pro bono fashion?" Having a prosecutor do criminal defense work presents conflicts that other types of pro bono work frequently would not. Does this mean that public attorneys can engage in pro bono work in Texas? If so, are there strings attached? For example, would a public attorney be able to represent their friends and family so long as they don't charge for the work? These questions don't have a single global answer and must be analyzed on a case by case basis. It depends upon whether the pro bono work constitutes a conflict of interest with the public attorneys' regular work (i.e. what kind of legal work is done pro bono and for whom) and it depends upon the policies of the lawyer's particular employer. There are two distinct questions presented, neither of which are materially different in Texas than they were in the previous question. One is when doing so would violate the professional ethical obligations of a lawyer, which is what the Texas Bar Association statement is talking about. The other is whether it is permissible in a manner consistent with the contractual employer-employee relationship of any particular Texas attorney working on a full time salaried basis for a particular employer. This is a subject upon which the Texas Bar Association statement is silent. Professional Ethics Considerations As noted above, one question is whether pro bono work by a prosecutor in the specific subject matter of criminal defense would constitute a conflict of interest. The answer to that question is "usually yes" for the reasons explained in the linked question. One can also easily imagine other circumstances where pro bono work could pit a salaried government lawyer against his employer, such as a state attorney general's office lawyer doing pro bono civil rights litigation against the state government. But, not all pro bono legal work constitutes a conflict of interest. For example, a prosecutor doing pro bono work helping low income people prepare documents naming legal guardians for their children in the event that they predecease their children (the very first pro bono case I took on as a Colorado attorney) would be very unlikely to be conflict of interest for the prosecutor, even though a pro bono criminal defense case in the county where the prosecutor practices would be an obvious and direct unethical conflict of interest. Similarly, judges frequently do pro bono work, where authorized to do so by the court systems in which they work, in the areas of legal education for non-lawyers (like High School Mock Trial competitions or lectures to school students) and by providing mediation services to indigent parties outside the judicial district where they practice, that are specifically calculated to avoid conflicts of interests, or appearance of bias or impropriety. Employment Relationship Considerations The second issue is whether "public attorneys can engage in pro bono work in Texas?" in a case with a subject matter that does not otherwise present a conflict of interest. Public sector attorneys are not prohibited from doing so as a matter of professional ethics. But, that isn't the only consideration. The other consideration is whether doing that pro bono work violates the employment policies of a public sector employer of a lawyer in the usual case when a public sector lawyer is employed on a salaried basis for the full efforts or something similar, of the lawyer. This is basically an issue of contract law, not of professional ethics. The way this is usually dealt with in private law practice when a salaried attorney works for a law firm is that the private salaried lawyer needs to obtain law firm permission to do pro bono work and that pro bono work is often structured so that the pro bono client's lawyer is the law firm itself and the lawyer in that firm doing the actual pro bono work is often just one agent of the firm as a whole that actual represents the pro bono client. Frequently, salaried lawyers in private law firms have quotas of billable hours which they have to meet as a condition of employment each year at the law firm, and frequently a private law firm's pro bono program allows the salaried lawyer to count hours working for the law firm's pro bono clients towards that annual billable hour quota. Incidentally, there is nothing magic in the absence of a conflict of interest, about limiting "moonlighting work" to unpaid pro bono work. For example, many U.S. law schools expressly authorize salaried full time law professors who are admitted to the practice of law to have a paid private practice up to a certain number of hours per year as a fringe benefit in addition to the salary, akin to the common practice of allowing professors to retain for themselves textbook royalties for textbooks written while the professors were being paid a salary to do scholarly work including writing textbooks. The pro bono program structure used in private law firms for their salaried employers isn't as workable for a salaried attorney working full time for a governmental employer. This is because allowing a government salaried employee to work for free for a private citizen on something that doesn't involve public business of the government would functionally be an indirect appropriation of legal salary funds from the governmental entity to the pro bono client without receiving authorization from the elected representatives of the government in question. So, in the public sector, a more common arrangement would be to provide that every salaried public sector lawyer working for that government is permitted to do up to X billable hours of pro bono work per year for their own, personal moonlighting private practice clients as a fringe benefit of employment, much like paid time off, if it is permitted at all. And, other public sector employers, which are not so generous, simply prohibit their salaried attorney employees from doing pro bono work at all in order to avoid having to deal with and think about the issue. This doesn't arise very often in the case of lawyers hired by small local governments or on a contract basis by a larger government for a particular specialized task, as they have their own practices and have not agreed to provide substantially all of their professional legal work to their employer the way that a salaried lawyer would. So they are more akin to private sector law firm lawyers who simply have an additional set of conflict of interest considerations as a result of having a particular local government as an employer.	A summary is here: see for example Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: 'in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel'. In the same vein, Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 held that "an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury, and so, likewise, may waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel". In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 it is held that this extends (via the 14th) to state courts. As to the expression "practice law", maybe the meaning of this expression is taken to be self-evident, though clearly it is not. Statutes that prohibit that act for non-lawyers generally specify things such as "for another person" or "holds himself out as entitled to practice law".	Other than the most exceptional cases, no... As a citizen (of any country), you are entitled to consular support but that does not extend to your country hiring a lawyer for you or representing you in court. It covers such things as facilitating communication with your family, attempting to ensure the trial is fair and repatriation at the end of your sentence - usually with you paying for your own transport. In exceptional cases, it is not outside the realm of possibilities that secretaries, ministers or their respective departments of foreign affairs get involved one may receive a representative. …but Citizenship is irrelevant to have the right to representation. In most liberal democracies, you are entitled to legal representation, in most autocratic dictatorships, you aren't, and there are a large number of steps in between. How this works depends on local law and custom but it usually works the same for citizens and non-citizens. In most jurisdictions you find, hire and pay for your own lawyer. Some jurisdictions may provide a lawyer for you without payment by you. How this works varies. For example, if you are accused of a crime in the united-states you are entitled to a lawyer that you pay for or, if you can't afford one, the state will provide one for you. In australia, this extends to civil and administrative matters as well subject to a means test, however, you are not entitled to free legal representation even if you are destitute - you are entitled to a fair trial which, depending on the circumstances, may mean the state pays for a lawyer. In china the state appoints a lawyer for you and you are not entitled to another - defendants rarely win in China. Each country may or may not make a distinction between citizens and non-citizens: the three above don't.	I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983.	Almost certainly the answer to this is no because SB.8 talks of the $10K as being (minimum) statutory damages. (The actual provision 171.208(b)(2) is for damages "not less" than $10K, i.e. the court can award more in the first suit.) If e.g. someone breaks the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by making spurious claims against a group of people, they are each entitled to up to $1,000 statutory damages each (and class action is specifically allowed/mentioned). Generally, you can't avoid paying damages to an injured party by paying them to someone unrelated (before). There's nothing in SB.8 to suggest otherwise, the wording is: a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed Only proof of payment (not even having lost another suit on the same incident in another county) precludes a judge from awarding the statutory damages. (Claimants can file suits in their county of residence per 171.210, which me not knowing the Texas civil procedure too well, seem to allow multiple parallel lawsuits to proceed.) Now SB.8 is special in that limits relief to the first who sues (or maybe the first who wins) while enabling a very large class to claim injured status and sue... which in itself doesn't make a lot of sense when speaking of statutory damages, but it's a novel kind of relief, so who knows what courts may decide. (It would be interesting if a court determined that that first-claimant limit in SB.8 is unconstitutional, under either Texas or federal constitutions. In some other state laws, there is sometimes a limit on the total amount of damages out of a single incident, but it's not awarded on a first-winner basis, instead there's a provision to "allocate to each claimant his equitable share of the total".) Granted a defendant could come with a legal strategy that look something like: when sued in Texas county arrange for a "friendly" organization (members) to immediately sue in another county. Fight the first lawsuit so as to delay judgement, but immediately concede the one from the "friendly" organization members, so that only the "friendlies" get the statutory damages (first), possibly e.g. donating them back to the defendant thereafter. Whether this would work really depends on details in the Texas civil procedure law, which I'm not too familiar with.	The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct govern the issue of the grounds upon which lawyers admitted to practice in Texas may receive professional discipline such as censures, suspension from practice, or disbarment. The appropriate severity of professional discipline for particular kinds of conduct is largely a matter of case law and separate law provides for the procedural framework for administering the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Rules themselves specifically disavow the task of decided what kind if professional discipline is appropriate for any particular kind of conduct of an attorney. Personal ethics and behavior are governed primarily by rules 8.02 (defamatory speech about judges and other legal officials), and 8.04 (various kinds of misconduct including personal misconduct), although there are some stray bits that can come up in connection with other rules. Rule 1.08 involves improper conduct in transactions with clients that do not pertain to the matter in which the client is represented (e.g. unfair business deals with clients). Texas is among a minority of states that does not automatically treat having sex with client that commences only after the attorney-client relationship is formed as a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 8.04 is sometimes called the "officer and a gentleman" clause of attorney professional ethics after an analogous provision, Article 113, of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that applies to members of the United States armed forces. It is a residual misconduct provision that covers lots of misconduct in a lawyer's personal affairs that isn't otherwise regulated by the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 8,04 and its official comments are as follows: Rule 8.04. Misconduct (a) A lawyer shall not: (1) violate these rules, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another, whether or not the violation occurred in the course of a client-lawyer relationship; (2) commit a serious crime or commit any other criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyers honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (3) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (4) engage in conduct constituting obstruction of justice; (5) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official; (6) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; (7) violate any disciplinary or disability order or judgment; (8) fail to timely furnish to the Chief Disciplinary Counsels office or a district grievance committee a response or other information as required by the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, unless he or she in good faith timely asserts a privilege or other legal ground for failure to do so; (9) engage in conduct that constitutes barratry as defined by the law of this state; (10) fail to comply with section 13.01 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure relating to notification of an attorneys cessation of practice; (11) engage in the practice of law when the lawyer is on inactive status, except as permitted by section 81.053 of the Government Code and Article XIII of the State Bar Rules, or when the lawyers right to practice has been suspended or terminated, including, but not limited to, situations where a lawyer’s right to practice has been administratively suspended for failure to timely pay required fees or assessments or for failure to comply with Article XII of the State Bar Rules relating to Mandatory Continuing Legal Education; or (12) violate any other laws of this state relating to the professional conduct of lawyers and to the practice of law. (b) As used in subsection (a)(2) of this Rule, “serious crime” means barratry; any felony involving moral turpitude; any misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement, or fraudulent or reckless misappropriation of money or other property; or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation of another to commit any of the foregoing crimes. Comment: There are four principal sources of professional obligations for lawyers in Texas: these rules, the State Bar Act, the State Bar Rules, and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (TRDP). All lawyers are presumed to know the requirements of these sources. Rule 8.04(a)(1) provides a partial list of conduct that will subject a lawyer to discipline. Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally in this state, the distinction has been drawn in terms of those crimes subjecting a lawyer to compulsory discipline, criminal acts relevant to a lawyer’s fitness for the practice of law, and other offenses. Crimes subject to compulsory discipline are governed by TRDP, Part VIII. In addition, although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for criminal acts that indicate a lack of those characteristics relevant to the lawyer’s fitness for the practice of law. A pattern of repeated criminal acts, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligations that legitimately could call a lawyer’s overall fitness to practice into question. See TRDP, Part VIII; Rule 8.04(a)(2). A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief, openly asserted, that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.02(c) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges to legal regulation of the practice of law. Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer’s abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of attorney. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust. With respect to the portion of the question asking: What personal kinds of personal misconduct might result in such penalties? Some of the most serious violations of the rules that are likely to lead to disbarment include misappropriation of client property, abandonment of a legal practice with active clients, revealing highly prejudicial client confidences with no color of justification for doing so, committing a crime involving fraud or a felony, or failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation. Of those, committing of a crime involving fraud or a felony would be the one most likely to result in disbarment that involves personal conduct, as opposed to professional conduct. Other kinds of personal conduct might result in a lesser sanction, however, as noted in Rule 8.4. Of course, it isn't all that hard to imagine some circumstance "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" (think "George Santos" absent any criminal conduct) that isn't strictly speaking a crime, or "conduct constituting obstruction of justice" in a matter unrelated to client matters (e.g. obstructing an investigation of a family member of the lawyer in connection with an academic institution's investigation) that could rise to this level as well. But, again, the matching of punishment to particular conduct is rooted in case law. Also, a pattern of various kinds of misconduct or repeat offenses are often treatment more seriously than a single instance of misconduct by a first offender would be in isolation. Incidentally, every U.S. jurisdiction has a set of Rules of Professional Conduct with the same numbering system, although the substantive content of different states' rules with the same number is not always the same. So, for example, Rule 8.4 covers the same subject-matter in every U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and every other U.S. territory, even though there may be important substantive differences between the versions of Rule 8.4 adopted in different states.	The State of California is not responsible for injuries committed by private citizens Sorry to hear about your friend. Jamal may have a case (although the scope is narrow and timeframes are strict and tight) if someone employed by the state didn't do what they should have done. There is a whole raft of rules and regulations surrounding child welfare and Jamal would need to demonstrate exactly what they did that they shouldn't have done or what they should have done that they didn't do to have any basis for a claim. You will note that there is an obligation to make assessments -if they didn't make an assessment, they might be liable; if they made the wrong assessment, they aren't. Contested child welfare cases are difficult - caseworkers and social worlkers are presented with a lot of contradictory information and outright lies and the law accepts that if they make a good faith attempt to do their job, they haven't done anything wrong even if they make the wrong call. As for the court "assuming" anything, that is simply not true. The court would have heard the evidence (contested and contradictory no doubt) and made a judgement based on that evidence. It may have been the objectively wrong judgement but it was a perfectly legal one. In any event, you can't sue the court for a wrong judgement, you can only appeal it to a higher court subject to the time limits and your ability to pay. As a practical matter, child protection services are generally chronically underfunded, understaffed and overworked as are the courts that deal with such cases. A typical caseworker might have to deal with 50-100 cases similar to your friend every week - that gives them 5-15 minutes to (partially) read the file and try to decide what's best for the child. Sad to say, your friend is one of the lucky ones - came out the other end with a good relationship with one of his parents, isn't dead, isn't a drug addict and isn't homeless. And no, you can't sue the state for things being the way they are: that's what the voters want because if it isn't they'd elect politicians who would change it.	This is not legal advice, It is not even primarily a legal opinion. It is a legal position. The lawyer, acting on behalf of the agency from which you requested information, is giving the reasons why that agency is declining your request. The lawyer is presumably either an employee of the agency, or has the agency as a client. In any case, this is notice of the position that the agency would be likely to adopt if you took further legal action, such as a suit to compel disclosure. Lawyers provide such position statements ion behalf of clients or employers all the time. Such statements indicate why certain action is taken, what basis the client or employer has for taking or not taking certain action, and often indicate the nature of the defenses or theories that will be used should a lawsuit follow, although the client or employer is free to change the theory at the pleading stage. Not only is it not unethical for the lawyer to respond in this way, the agency is, I am fairly sure, required by the law to provide a valid reason when a request is declined. That is what they have done, provide a reason that they claim is valid, with some legal reasoning about why it is valid. Note that I express no view on whether the reason given is in fact valid, or would be sustained in a suit. That would be a different question.
Is it possible for lawyers defend you in a Civil-legal-system? I have seen solicitors and in turn barristers defend people in Common Law jurisdictions, but from my understanding this should be much harder to do in a Civil-legal-system because it is so rigid. I have friends that have revealed the truth about their careers (most people get off because barristers just confuse people rather than a loop hole in the law). I personally see no way of defending someone in a Civil-legal-system, unless you can perhaps find another Law where the penalty is a little less serious, which likely would not even be necessary as it all seems so easy to follow. Just for clarity - it does not have to be a lawyer as I know each country uses a different word, I am focusing on Criminal Law, and only in major countries.	People are routinely and almost universally defended by lawyers in serious criminal cases in both civil law country and common law country legal systems. The availability of counsel for the indigent in cases involving petty crimes varies, but not in a way systemically related to the common law v. civil law distinction. It has more to do with the available supply of lawyers. The lawyer's job isn't very different, despite the fact that the lawyer has an audience of a panel of judges rather than a judge presiding over a decision making jury, although obviously lots of fine details (e.g. concerning the procedures for presenting evidence) are different. In both cases, defense lawyers call the attention to the facts favorable to the defendant's case, offer up evidence that tends to exonerate the defendant if the lawyer can obtain it, argues to the court regarding how the evidence should be interpreted and what inferences should be drawn from it, and argues regarding any ambiguities in how the law should be applied to these particular facts. Furthermore, in most criminal cases, in both civil law countries and in common law countries, guilt or innocence is not the primary issue. The primary issue for criminal defense counsel in most cases is assisting the judges in determining the right sentencing option on the right charges for a defendant who pleads guilty or is found guilty at trial of some crime, based upon the character of the crime and offender that is presented to the court by the lawyer. This part of the process is very similar indeed in the two systems. Typical issues might include an assault case where the issue is whether there was serious bodily injury, justifying a more serious sentence, or mere ordinary bodily injury, justifying only a less serious sentence, in a case where it isn't clear cut at the guilt and innocence phase, or arguing whether probation and a fine, or incarceration is a better fit to a minor offense, in the sentencing phase. It isn't entirely or primarily about "legal loopholes" in any system, although "legal loopholes" tend to be more important in U.S. criminal law than in many legal systems. There are some places in which civil law courts are more open to consider a defendant's arguments than others (and many civil law countries decide serious criminal cases with a panel that is a mix of legally trained judges and lay jurors), but that can vary wildly from country to country and within a country as well.	The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions "based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'", which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute.	The law does have examples They are called “judgements” Every case decided by a court is an example, in common law jurisdictions at least. When those cases are decided by an superior court they become precedents - binding “examples” on courts in their hierarchy and persuasive “examples” on other courts. When you go to a lawyer for advice, she doesn’t just parrot back the statute, she looks at the precedents and decides whether the case decided by the House of Lords in 1848 or the High Court of Australia in 1912 more closely matches your situation. Also, statute law often has examples written into them Statues exist in hierarchies, Constitution, Acts, Regulations, Departmental Policies etc. and the lower you go the more specific the law is and the more likely it is to have examples. For example, this answer I wrote for another question quotes examples from the new-south-wales Evidence Act.	Law is more like sport than mathematics You don’t know how it will turn out until you play the game. If a case goes to trial it’s because at both sides believe they can win. Both sides probably have good reasons for their belief. At least one of them is wrong.	Its always the simple questions that have complicated answers. In this case its because both Common Law and Civil Law have several different meanings. Civil Law v Criminal Law In this context, civil law means the ability of people to seek redress for wrongs from other people. These people may be individuals (natural persons) or legal persons (corporations, government etc.). When someone sues someone else they are using civil law. In contrast, criminal law is where a government prosecutes (not sues) a person (again natural or legal) who is alleged to have committed an offence. To illustrate the difference, if a person murders another person the government will use criminal law to prosecute the murder and the family of the victim will use civil law to pursue a wrongful death suit. Common Law v Civil Law In this context, common law and civil law refer to two of the major legal systems in use on Earth: By Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa) - Own work, using World map by Canuckguy and others UNESCO World Heritage map by NNW The data sources are:University of Ottawa: JuriGlobe – World Legal Systems Research Group Wikipedia: List of national legal systems European legal systems map by Ain92 and others (which seems to be based on this map by C.Löser and others) World legal systems map by Robinkissac, CC BY-SA 2.5, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=40154967 Common Law is derived from the law of England and is used in areas colonized by the English - the UK, Canada, the USA, Australia and New Zealand. Civil Law is derived from continental European law and ultimately from Roman law. The primary contrast between the two systems is the role of written decisions and precedent. In common law jurisdictions, nearly every case that presents a bona fide disagreement on the law is resolved in a written opinion. In contrast, civil law decisions typically do not include explanatory opinions. In common law systems, a single decided case is binding law to the same extent as statute or regulation, under the principle of stare decisis. In contrast, in civil law systems, individual decisions have only advisory, not binding effect. In civil law systems, case law only acquires weight when a long series of cases use consistent reasoning, called jurisprudence constante. Civil law lawyers consult case law to obtain their best prediction of how a court will rule, but comparatively, civil law judges are less bound to follow it. For that reason, statutes in civil law systems are more comprehensive, detailed, and continuously updated, covering all matters capable of being brought before a court. The United States and 49 of the states are Common Law jurisdictions, the exception is Louisiana which is a Civil Law jurisdiction (specifically the Napoleonic subset of Civil Law) as, unlike the rest of the country, it was initially a French possession. Common Law v Common Law In addition to the way the term is used above, "common law" can be used within a Common Law jurisdiction to distinguish that part of the law which arises from judicial precedent from that part which arises from legislative statute or administrative regulation. Further, within legal argument, the term may be used to distinguish "common law" (or just "law") from equity. Before 1873, England had two parallel court systems: courts of "law" which could only award money damages and recognized only the legal owner of property, and courts of "equity" (courts of chancery) that could issue injunctive relief (that is, a court order to a party to do something, give something to someone, or stop doing something) and recognized trusts of property.	While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court.	In the west, the profession of being a "lawyer" came into existence under the Roman Empire, though there were sorta-lawyers in Ancient Greece (orators, who could not receive a fee for pleading on behalf of another). In Egypt, Sumer, Babylon, Persia and so on, there was nothing like a lawyer – you were to plead your own case if you ended up in a dispute / being accused of a crime. As far as I know, there were no lawyers under Chinese traditional law.	Now after 4 years I still can't get it off my mind and it's consuming me thinking that I was fooled into believing that the rule of law was the norm in this country (not the jungle law) and the beautiful constitution we have is not there just to look pretty, but something we can rely on. So, at this point, do I need legal help? Or mental help or some kind of miracle pill to help me cope with the situation (?) I know that 6' under we can have peace, but can I live a peaceful (bully free) life here too? We do have rule of law as a powerful norm in this country. But, we also live in a very complex society and the exact content of the law will always be the subject of fierce dispute. The solution is, pretty much, to lower your expectations. The vast majority of the time the law works. Your beliefs about exactly how far you are allowed to disobey an order from a law enforcement officer as a matter of practical reality, were miscalibrated. But, you did get out of jail the next day and the punishment you received was very survivable. In much of the world, this wouldn't be true. The rule of law doesn't mean that everyone perfectly obeys the law. It means that when the law is seriously broken in a manner that has big consequences that there is usually a way to legally mitigate the harm or to obtain a remedy. Pushing the limits of the freedoms the law gives you is rarely wise. But, that is no reason to refuse to live your life. It is one thing to learn from experience. But, sometimes, you can overlearn from experience and need to recognize that your anecdotal experience on a single occasion is not all that there is the law.
Does the USA actually have debtors prison or jail after a court order? Okay, I know officially the answer is "no, there is no such thing as debtors jail for civil debts in the USA", however let's explore this. Suppose a person is sued by a creditor for a debt. Normally what happens of course is there is a court date and eventually you go to court to make your case. Suppose after everything the judge rules you owe $x/month to the creditor(s). Suppose however you can't afford the payment plan of $x/month the court ordered. At this point could you go to jail for failure to oblige the court order?	This is a civil case, taking away your freedom is only for criminal offenses. Not paying your bills is not a criminal offense. It is up to the creditor to look for your assets, etc. A court can make you show up and answer questions about your assets and income. While you are in court the judge can make you give your gold watch to your creditor. Outside the parameters of the question there are circumstances like failure to pay child support when you do have the funds that can lead to incarceration. In some places you can be jailed for contempt of court if the court requires your presence to let the creditor have the ability to try to get access to your assets and you do not show up.	Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.)	Ultimately yes, this can and does happen, but there are a few steps necessary before the bailiffs come to your door. In times gone by, the common law recognized a right to "distrain for rent", meaning that a landlord could come round to the tenant and seize some property as security (up to the value of the rent owed). If the rent is not then paid within a certain time, the goods could be sold. Various additional provisions of law covered the circumstances around forcing entry, breaking open locked cupboards, and searching off the premises for goods which the tenant had concealed. There were also special-case rules about what could be seized, such as a statute of the seventeenth century saying (among other things) that landlords could not harvest growing crops, but could take already-cut sheaves. Subsequent reforms for the protection of tenants have made it so that landlords cannot do this at their whim. They first have to go to the County Court for a judgement that there is an unpaid debt. (In fact, this and subsequent steps can happen with any debt.) On that basis, they can apply for a "warrant of control", under which an "enforcement officer", commonly called a bailiff, will take charge of collecting the money owed. There are quite a few steps and rules here, but the basic position is the same in terms of being able to take your stuff. And it is not the landlord walking around making those decisions, but a court-appointed officer. The previous common-law "distress" process is now totally abolished, for most tenants by the Housing Act 1988, and for everybody in 2014, because of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 section 71, which simply states The common law right to distrain for arrears of rent is abolished. Commercial property has its own legal regime since that Act, but previously functioned in the same way. So landlords can no longer seize your property on their own, but they can go through a few hoops and ask a court to do it. They also do not get to keep the specific property, but just get the money. As mentioned above, this is the general avenue for what happens when a court orders you to pay money, and you don't do it. The High Court has its own enforcement officers who are able to deal with larger amounts of money, as well as enforcing evictions. In Scotland, the same basic pattern applies but different words are used, and some of the detailed rules are different. "Attachment" is when a sheriff officer (= a bailiff) comes round to value your possessions and auction them off if you don't pay. There is also "arrestment" which is taking money out of your bank account.	What is going to happen, could I get fined, placed in jail etc? Your summons should have explained the specific violation you're being charged with, and you could look up the relevant sections of the law. Assault is defined in Chapter 12 of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. There are several types, and again, your summons should explain which one you are being charged with. My guess is it will probably be "simple assault", paragraph (a) (right at the beginning). This is defined as a "disorderly persons offense". Upon conviction, a disorderly persons offense is punishable in New Jersey by a term of up to 90 days in jail and probation, (section 2C:43-2 (b) (2)), and a fine of up to $1000 (section 2C:43-3 (c)). This represents the maximum. I do not know what kind of sentence is actually likely. It could depend on common practice in the state, the prosecutor's opinion of the severity of the crime, and the judge's discretion. A lawyer would be best qualified to help you find out how to contest the charge, or to receive a lesser sentence if convicted.	The exact situation depends on where you are. If you are in Washington state, what you get (but did not realize) is a notice to appear in court. By not paying the fine or showing up to court, you could be subject to RCW 46.64.025, so that the department of licensing is notified. You have 15 days to respond to the notice. We assume that you are a resident, because if you are a non-resident (and not resident of another state with a reciprocal agreement), they would have required you to pay a bond at the time of the ticket (though that isn't possible with automated infraction-detection). When the Dept. of Licensing gets the notice of the unpaid ticket, they may suspend or revoke your license. At this point, you will have received notice that your license was suspended (unless you changed your address and mail isn't forwarded, in which case you have a different problem, that you're supposed to apprise DOL of your current address, and didn't do so). At that point (after they send the letter), you have 15 days to respond. One response is to pay the ticket plus the added fines, or, you can request an administrative review (to appeal the suspension). The point of going to court to plead your case would presumably be to modify the judgment against you, for instance to reduce or eliminate the added fine. You would then need to give a good reason for not being punished: RCW 46.64.025 already has you covered, because the suspension process starts with willfully failing to appear. You would then need to show that your failure to appear was not willful. It does not legally matter whether you are a foreigner or have problems understanding the language. Speeding tickets usually say pretty clearly that you must pay the ticket within a specified time frame, or appear in court, but people don't always read tickets. It is entirely plausible that one's grasp of the language is low enough that there really was a misunderstanding. If you can provide credible evidence that your failure was not willful, by law you would only be liable for the ticket. In other states and countries, the situation could be somewhat or quite different (e.g. Norwegian traffic laws are stricter). In New Mexico, it is more serious to fail to appear. NM Statute 66-8-126 states that "It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate his written promise to appear in court, given to an officer upon issuance of a uniform traffic citation, regardless of the disposition of the charge for which the citation was issued". Your license can/will be suspended (it is not clear whether suspension is automatic), but additionally since failure to appear is a misdemeanor, you can be arrested. Unlike Washington law, there is no willfullness requirement for such a penalty. Given the criminal nature of failure to appear, a traffic attorney would need to suggest an appropriate belated response.	In the small claims court cases I've been involved in the judge has dismissed all aspects of the claim related to time wasted, transportation costs, and attending court in the judgement amount itself. However the court costs one incurs should be a part of the amount that is judged in one's favour. Also the costs of enforcing any judgement (court bailiff fees) are usually considered recoverable. My thoughts are that if one is keen to ensure that the other party pays the full costs of time, collation of evidence, photocopying, phone calls, and anything else one believes they are responsible for, one will have much more luck if one is not self-representing. The predominant reason for self-representing is to keep costs, and thus one's financial risk from pursuing the case, minimal. disclaimer: this is only opinion, and not legal advice	Theft is universally a crime in virtually every jurisdiction. Insofar as a state has a criminal code and a functioning judiciary, theft will always be a crime. It is also a basic legal principle that theft is a tort as well (in other words, a civil wrong incurring damages to an individual that can be remedied in a court of law). A key part of the problem in failing to make theft a crime, is that in the absence of a substantive penalty in terms of a fine or imprisonment, theft becomes a low-risk, high-reward activity where the maximum penalty is simply the repayment of stolen goods (with relatively minimal loss). This fails to provide an effective deterrent to this socially frowned-upon activity, and rates of crime would skyrocket. It is appropriate, therefore, to make theft a crime (and all jurisdictions do so), as all pillars of criminal justice immediately apply. Edit: As @/JBentley correctly points out, penalties do in fact exist in civil law. That said, the power of incarceration, perhaps in this case the ultimate deterrent, is largely unavailable in civil cases. The ultimate point - that theft is rendered a more sound and legitimate enterprise based largely on gambling - remains the same. Additionally, not all individuals have the time or effort to file small claims and follow cases to the end. Making theft a tort-only offense would cause extraordinary difficulties in enforcement as many would consider the loss of perhaps a small article relatively insignificant compared to filing in small claims court.	Debts do not just die with debtors. The creditors have legal rights to wet their beaks in whatever monies/valuables are left from the deceased. Expect the $1k CC debt to be deducted from the IRA and/or the account left it her name.
Where is it stated in the GDPR that the GDPR only applies to EU citizens? I recently came to the shocking realization that the GDPR does not apply to natural persons who are not EU citizens. I looked up the GDPR to find the Article or GDPR item that mentions this but could not find it. My question thus is: What part of the GDPR is this mentioned/addressed? Also, I came across Recital 14 of the GDPR which reads: The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence, in relation to the processing of their personal data. This Regulation does not cover the processing of personal data which concerns legal persons and in particular undertakings established as legal persons, including the name and the form of the legal person and the contact details of the legal person. Another question I have is: Who does the GDPR refer to as legal persons?	I recently came to the shocking realization that the GDPR does not apply to natural persons who are not EU citizens. This conclusion is mistaken. Where is it stated in the GDPR that the GDPR only applies to EU citizens? It is not stated anywhere because nationality is irrelevant to the GDPR. The GDPR protects "natural persons" based on their location "in the union," not on their nationality, and it applies to data processors and data controllers that undertake "activities [through] an establishment ... in the union." In addition to the recital quoted in the question, this is specified in article 3, which establishes the regulation's "territorial scope." For a complete discussion of this matter, consider the EDPB's guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR which also provides examples of GDPR protections for people who are not EU citizens. Who does the GDPR refer to as legal persons? "Legal person" generally denotes natural persons, corporations, partnerships, government entities, and so on.	The territorial scope of the GDPR is defined in Article 3. It covers "personal data of data subjects who are in the Union", whether they are EU citizens or not. So to answer your questions: 1) are EU users, but moved to USA a few years ago, and signed-up on my website? They are not in the EU, so are not covered. You don't need to know if someone is an EU citizen, just if they are currently in the EU. 2) went for holidays in USA, signed-up on my website, and then came back to EU? (note - potentially skipped any Consent questions at sign-up, because IP was from USA) If someone moves into the EU while using your service then they fall under the GDPR for the time they are in the EU. If their home address is in the EU then that is covered, and monitoring of their behaviour while in the EU is also covered. Your other two questions are about VPNs. If a VPN is used to evade IP address geolocation and you have no other clue about where someone is then you can't be blamed for not knowing where they are (although I'm not aware of any actual case law on this topic). But if someone with a USA IP address gives a home address in the EU then you should probably treat them as being in the EU to be on the safe side. Basically, if you don’t know if they are in the EU or not, you should treat them as if they were.	The 2018 Data Protection Act specifically implemented the GDPR EU Regulation in the UK - while the regulation itself was directly binding it required member states to create their own legislation for implementing the details - setting up the required supervisory and accreditation bodies etc. The various 'opening clauses' in the regulation also provided the means for the members states to implement specifics in local legislation (so long as that legislation exceeded the minimums set out in GDPR). At the end of the Brexit transition period the UK was no longer a member state (and it's citizens were no longer EU citizens), keeping the DPA 2018 as was would have actually meant that UK citizens weren't eligible for the very protections it was intended to provide them! Therefore the basis of the law needed updating (as well as certain minor provisions that no longer made sense) hence the "UK GDPR" provided a substitute. The fundamentals are the same and crucially it also codified the necessary basis for the UK's data protection laws to have what is referred to as "adequacy" - which means that the EU considers the UK GDPR/DPA to provide "essentially equivalent" levels of protection and therefore data is allowed to continue to flow between the UK and the EU.	Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc.	From Article 4 of the GDPR: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The fact that you can use the ID in your database, along with the value returned by the cookie you set to identify the user makes it personal data. The favorite colour is information relating to an individual. The fact that it is connected to the cookie ID means that it is personal data.	There is nothing in the GDPR requiring you to collect individual personally identifiable information. If the website has no need, and the website owner no desire, to collect such information, there is no requirement to do so. The GDPR requires that if such information is collected, that there is a lawful basis, and that it be handled appropriately and stored securely, and deleted when there is no longer a need to retain it, or on a proper request. If no such information is collected in the first place, all the rules about how to handle it do not apply. It is possible that some law of an individual country in the EU might mandate collection of some particular information, but I have not heard of any such requirement.	Art 13 GDPR is about information to be provided when data is collected directly from the data subject. This information can be provided directly during/before collection. It is not generally necessary or useful to send the data subject an email with this information. Usually, a SaaS website will provide the information under Art 13 as part of their privacy policy, and link it in easy to find places. Also consider the EDPB guidelines on transparency, which suggests a layered approach: in addition to a detailed privacy policy, summarize key information directly when the data is collected, e.g. next to an input form.	Is it GDPR compliant that I can't access the account that I created and the personal data that I shared because "I haven't completed their internal pre-qualification process"? Article 15 defines a “Right of access to the data subject” but it's difficult to see how this could be construed as a right to log into a specific website. Common sense suggests this would be a very bad idea. If they are willing to provide the data through another means (say a report or data dump of some sort), the obligation would seem to be met. In fact, article 15(3) even states that data controllers should merely provide the information in a “commonly used electronic form” (i.e. not necessarily through access to their systems or whatever form they are using internally for the processing). Have you asked for that and would you be satisfied by that resolution? Is it GDPR compliant that their answer to my deletion request is "We will delete the data..." The text of article 17 (right to erasure) explicitly specifies that such a request must be honored without “undue delay”. Article 12, which defines some of the modalities for the rights to access, rectification or erasure by the data subject, also provides that controllers shall “provide information on action taken on a request […] without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request”. You haven't provided any time frame and I don't think there is anything wrong with acknowledging the request by promising they “will” do it but in light of article 12, it seems you would indeed be entitled to know once they have actually taken further action. However, you implied you might want to access the data first and it's not clear to me whether you explicitly invoked the GDPR in earlier communications. So I would clarify and reiterate my request (access or erasure) and ask them for explicit confirmation once it has been satisfied.
Can an "FBI domain seizure" April Fools joke land you in jail? I found this GitHub repository that contains collection of several different intelligence agency domain seizure pages, including FBI domain seizure. It is meant to be used by said agencies for real seized domains, but I figured out one of my April Fools jokes on my own websites would be to include the FBI domain seizure page for just one day and display it to anyone who visits the page on April 1st for the first time. The domain is on a national TLD outside U.S. so it's fairly obvious that FBI couldn't seize that domain (and it's a 3rd level domain, too). However I would still make sure that I won't face any kind of jail for that if I misuse the domain seizure template for a silly April Fools joke. I would add a button to it that will be labeled as something like "Details on this seizure" or something, and clicking it will display an alert box saying "APRIL FOOLS" and redirecting back to the real website homepage. I also figured out that just for the sake of being sure, the page would visibly include a disclaimer stating that that page isn't real and was only installed for the purpose of a one time April Fools joke and does not intend to misinterprets it as a real domain seizure, and that the artwork is licensed under Public Domain as an official U.S. government agency artwork. Am I still in trouble if I go with that route? Is it too overboard?	I can't comment on what the legal situation would be in your home country, but as a matter of U.S. law, the hypothetical scenario you've described is not illegal. First, because you aren't a U.S. citizen and because you aren't operating in the United States, the U.S. government probably has no jurisdiction over you, your website, or your conduct. Even if it did, the most relevant statute, 18 U.S. Code § 1017, would not apply. The statute prohibits the "fraudulent or wrongful" use of the FBI's seal. But "fraudulent" and "wrongful" generally refer only to conduct where one uses deception or other means to obtain money, property, etc. to which they have no lawful entitlement. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399 (1973). Because you aren't using the seal to obtain anyone's property through deception, this use would not fall within the statute's proscriptions. Even if the government sought to prosecute you, you would have a valid First Amendment defense. The First Amendment protects the right to free speech, and it does not allow statements to be criminalized merely because they are false. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). This outcome should be unsurprising to most U.S. observers. I think most people would agree that the U.S. obviously cannot prosecute a Hollywood producer for making a movie dramatizing the FBI's efforts to shut down the Pirate Bay, even if it displayed the FBI's seizure message on a monitor in the course of the movie, and even if it showed the seal being used on a completely fictional website. The hypothetical you're describing is not materially different. In both cases, the seal is being used to falsely create the impression -- for entertainment purposes -- that the FBI has shut down a website. Saying false things for entertainment purposes is not a crime in the United States.	You might be able to use a site like the Internet Archive to preserve the TOC even after the site is shut down. The real liability trap here is if the site does not have the authority to give you this license. If a user uploads a photo that they do not own, and you use it, you are infringing the copyright of the original owner. Innocent infringement is not a defense to liability (although it may reduce damages in some cases.)	...due to the international registration of multiple domains to generate ad revenue by recycling stories across sock puppet networks, giving the impression of multiple, independent companies. None of that is illegal on its face. Internet domains are freely registerable by anyone, anywhere (with the exception of some laws in some nations that restrict such Internet-related activity), and registered privately or publicly, and websites can be hosted anywhere. Writing articles and "spinning" and copying articles (even if that writing is sales gibberish in broken English) among the same copyright owner is legal, and using the same design and layout for a network of sites is legal. The formation of multiple, related companies and shell companies to give the impression that companies are separate and independent is legal (again, with the exception of some business and corporate laws in some nations that restrict such activity). These are all common business practices. Some business practices may appear to be unethical - trying to fool customers in order to make money and get clicks and sell ads. And what you may be feeling is that such activity is unethical. And that's OK. But feeling that they are unethical doesn't make the practices illegal. Many common activities that are considered to be unethical are illegal; but not all. Buyer beware. One way some of that activity may be illegal is if those articles are factually incorrect and promote quack medical treatments, are financial scams requiring payments, are gambling sites or promote other clearly illegal things. But then you get into the complexity of exactly how they are illegal, which jurisdictions are involved, and on and on.	It is, in most jurisdictions, not a crime to download YouTube videos. For criminal law, the answer is that it is not illegal. In many jurisdictions, downloading music or video of any kind from the internet is not a crime. Thus, police has no power to punish you for downloading, and even less power to shutdown such "downloader" websites. YouTube's Terms of Service seem to disallow such downloads so YouTube has the right to terminate the agreement with the downloader. They may prevent you from viewing any more videos, for example. However, I think Google does not even have a technical measure in place to do that. Google is not interested in preventing you from using YouTube (its servers can handle that) and that is pretty much the only punishment it can use. Google could use the Terms of Services to say that the downloader-websites are breaking them and thus should not have access to YouTube. The websites could be sued for breaking the Terms of Services (and the court could order them to stop) and Google can block those websites from accessing YouTube by technical measures. It appears it did so in at least one case. Google could sue you (or the websites) for advertisement revenue loss, but it is unlikely. In theory, Google loses advertisement revenue from the video playbacks you would have done on YouTube but did not play because you downloaded the video and played it offline (contrary to the Terms of Service). Google might attempt to sue a downloader website on this basis and try to make it give it money. It would be difficult for Google to prove that it deserves such money, though. I cannot imagine how it would prove that "you would have played the video online, again, with advertisements, if you didn't download it. Note that when you replay a video from browser cache, advertisements do not replay. Why Google doesn't sue downloader-website more often? It's expensive. Google could pay a lot of money to shut down a website via court order but if it really wants to do so, they can apply a technical measure (such as IP block) instead. It is much cheaper and has the same effect. This may change in the near future. There's a some talk around about European court rulings and directives that may change this. It is quite possible that in the near future, even viewing illegally uploaded music on YouTube will be criminal. I find this doubtful because of the difficulty of proving knowledge ("How was I supposed to know that it wasn't an official clip?"). As for whether downloading to a file (as opposed to downloading to the browser cache) will become criminal, I really doubt that.	Maybe, but probably not The geographic location of the organisation is immaterial: under Article 3.2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: ... (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. Posts anyone (not just EU citizens) make to Reddit (or anywhere else) while they are physically located in the EU or UK engage the GDPR. Pushift.io is therefore captured by the GDPR and any denial of that is just plain wrong. Given the denial, it is likely right out of the gate that they are non-complient. For example, they are unlikely to provided the required information under Article 14. More importantly, it seems that they have not determined the lawful basis for processing the data under Article 6 - they can possibly rely on the public interest basis (preserving deleted publication is arguably a public interest) or a legitimate interest but that requires a balancing of their interest against the data subject's. That said, the right to be forgotten is not absolute, the reasons that might be applicable here are: The data is being used to exercise the right of freedom of expression and information. The data is being used to perform a task that is being carried out in the public interest or when exercising an organization’s official authority. The data represents important information that serves the public interest, scientific research, historical research, or statistical purposes and where erasure of the data would likely to impair or halt progress towards the achievement that was the goal of the processing.	If the "Pokeball" image is copyrighted and/or a trademark of Nintendo/whoever makes the Pokemon games, then whoever put that image out there under CC 3.0 BY is in violation and can be sued and will probably lose, and you would be in violation and can be sued and will probably lose. Your penalty would almost certainly be less since your violation was "innocent", that is, you had no way of knowing that the "Pokeball" imagery was somebody's protected intellectual property. ... Except you kind of maybe should know that, unless whoever made the Pokemon games (Nintendo or other) put the image out there and you can verify that, that maybe this license could be bogus and you should consult with who you imagine the owner of that IP may be or an impartial professional who could tell you for sure. I'm thinking if it were me I would do a little more research - and maybe get a paid opinion - if I was really thinking about using this for any but private purposes.	Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree.	Yes One could certainly put up a site whose only content was a link to another domain. And I can't find any law which this would violate. If the link is a "deep link", and if it bypasses a log-in page, while the other site is so designed that all access is intended to go through the login, I believe (but cannot at the moment verify) that the owner of the other site could claim that this violates their copyright. In any case it is not a good idea.But a link to an appropriate page should have no problem, nor should pointing your domain at an appropriate entry page. Therefor, since simply re-pointing a domain should have the same effect as simply linking, in those cases where it works at all, it should be legal. Doing it with an iframe, which would truly open another site within your site, may not be if the other site forbids such use, as in the ToS. The case law on that is not settled, but many sites object to it, as the answer by @BlueDogRanch points out. I don't see a good reason why one would want to do this, but that isn't the question. Copying the HTML of another site and modifying the URLs while keeping the content the same would pretty clearly be a copyright infringement, besides being a lot of work to little obvious point. It also isn't what the question asked about. Building a one-page site that has only a simple link or a redirect would clearly be legal, and would serve the purpose of causing your domain to lead a user to another site, but it isn't, strictly speaking, what was asked about either.
Does a person have legal recourse if a drone is trespassing? I have a 10 foot privacy fence around my property. There are no trespassing signs on all four sides. One of the neighbors keeps flying a drone over my yard like they are casing the place. Do I have any legal rights concerning such invasions?	Boggs v. Merideth was a pretty big case involving private drones and the privacy of neighbors. Happened in Kentucky, though. I would suggest taking a look at that.	There is no general rule about ownership: one parking lot I know is owned by the city, another is owned by the company that operates the mall, and in a third case it is owned by a third party who doesn't operate the mall. Either way, the owner of the parking lot has the property right to limit how it is used, and their agents (security guards, for example) can request that you refrain from skateboarding. They can evict you; they may not have the legal authority to physically toss you off the property, but they can probably perform a citizen's arrest for trespassing. None of this depends on how many cars are in the parking lot. It is more likely that a governmentally-owned parking lot will have a corresponding law restricting its use (whereas in the case of a private parking lot, restrictions center around general property law and the law of trespass).	No one can tell you how the facts are going to line up if you get sued. The attractive nuisance doctrine is alive and you can be found liable if you have, on your property, a dangerous condition which is attractive to children, especially if the danger is not appreciable to the child. Now, I'm a bit skeptical that a child would climb a fence to kick snow, especially if there is other snow outside the fence for them to kick, but stranger things have happened. What can you do? These are ideas, I don't think they are legal advice. Start with the premise that dangerous stuff happens everyday, and kids aren't getting hurt by most of it. Use a fence with barbed wire. In other words, injured the the child with a lesser injury to reduce your liability. Use an opaque fence. Granted, curiosity might be too great and a child will trespass to discover what you are hiding. Use a shed, just one of those thin aluminum structures. Include proximity sensors to set off alarms and lights and whatever. Get your project away from kids; find space in a commercial area.	Under current New York law, small ("de minimis") encroachments are not considered to infringe on your property rights, therefore, legally there is nothing you can do. A fence, even leaning over, is considered a de minimis encroachment. If you damage the fence, you could face criminal charges for criminal mischief in the 4th Degree which is a class A misdemeanor. Theoretically, you could be charged with 3rd degree criminal mischief, which is felony, but in this case I would be surprised if they did that (usually that only is applied only to actual "criminals"). Your best option is to politely incentivize your neighbor give him a positive reason to work with you on improving the fence.	You can trim bushes at your property line, as you have done. There is little hope for forcing a neighbor to cut more radically on their side. It is possible that a fire ordinance could be an issue, so it the bushes are a credible fire-related threat to property, the fire department might intervene (your belief that the bushes pose a threat is countered by their presumed belief that there is no threat). There may be local plant-height ordinance, but perhaps bushes are restricted by local regulations, so check whether they are in violation there (a rather remote possibility). Finally, there could be view-protecting ordinances or CCRs, but again those are rare.	I'd take the city council's advice and realize that you could be charged with a crime. Their job is to know the local laws and put them into place, as well as know how those laws relate to state law. As for state law, the Revised Statutes of Missouri, RSMo Section 574.115 Making a terrorist threat says: 574.115. Making a terrorist threat, first degree — penalty. — 1. A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree if such person, with the purpose of frightening ten or more people or causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation, knowingly: (1) Communicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (2) Communicates a false report of an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. 2. The offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree is a class D felony. 3. No offense is committed under this section by a person acting in good faith with the purpose to prevent harm. A fake gun turret on a porch in the public view that tracks people who walk by could be interpreted as making a terrorist threat because it (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. And, it's probably safe to assume your turret has the "the purpose of frightening ten or more people." The fact that the gun turret is on private property doesn't mean much; it is in view of the public and your intent is for it to be seen by the public and you want to invoke fear in the public members who walk by. And it's not going to be seen by the council as some sort of security; threats are not security. If you did put up such a turret, and the state didn't take action under 574.115, and there is no local law on the books that applies, the council can easy put one in place at their regular council meeting with a simple motion and vote. Since you already asked the council, they may already be considering such a law. And, depending on the county, the council could invoke a law addressing threats to the public that has more severe penalties that the state law, because Missouri is a home rule (Wikipedia) state.	No. This would not be illegal. You are not trespassing or breaking and entering since you have permission to be on the premises, and you are the rightful owner of the guitar so you are not depriving him of property that belongs to him. If you did this with the assistance of a law enforcement officer, rather than Bob's family, without a court order describing the property to be retrieved, this would be called a "civil assist". If the guitar were collateral for a loan, it would be a self-help "repossession" (a.k.a. "repo") authorized by the Uniform Commercial Code if it could be accomplished without a breach of the peace, and it would not require a court order. If you did this pursuant to a court order the case you brought to retrieve the guitar would be called a "replevin action" and you would also need to obtain a "writ of assistance" to authorize a trespass in the presence of law enforcement to retrieve the guitar. Also, Bob would still be be guilty of the crime of theft of the guitar, even though you got it back, because he took it with an intent to permanently deprive you, its owner, of the property that belongs to you. You could also probably sue him for conversion or "civil theft" in some jurisdictions, but your damages would be nominal except for punitive or statutory damages under a civil theft statute, because you ultimately got the guitar back, and so you suffered only minimal economic harm.	Skykam has provided a summary of UK regulations for 2023: Drone operators must be at least 12 years old to fly independently Drones are not permitted to fly higher than 400 feet (120 meters) Operators must maintain a line of sight with their drone at all times Permission is required before flying in restricted airspace Do not fly your drone within a 5-kilometer radius of airports. A minimum distance of 50 meters must be maintained from uninvolved persons (Drones below 250 grams are permitted to fly closer and over people) Drones weighing 250 grams or more must be operated at least 150 meters away from parks, industrial areas, residential zones, and other built-up locations. If a drone is equipped with a camera, the operator must register for an Operator ID with the CAA. Insurance is mandatory for commercial drone use. Compliance with these regulations is required during both daytime and nighttime operations. So... If your drone has a camera, then Yes, you will need a flyer ID. This isn't a licence as such, and is free, but does involve a theory test. If your drone weighs 250g or more, then you can't use it in a park.
Why did US law go with inadmissibility, and not reactionary punitive action, to prevent illegal evidence collection? As I've understood it, the exclusionary rule is a prophylactic rule aimed to prevent the cultivation of illegal evidence collection by removing the utility of illegally-collected evidence through inadmissibility in court. Another way to prevent illegal evidence collection would be through strong and fear-inducing punitive action. The problem with the inadmissibility route (1) is that in certain cases, good evidence is thrown out. The limitations to the law that I've seen do not include any "if the evidence shows a grave crime, it must be admissible, despite illegal collection". It seems problematic that there can be blatant, undeniable evidence for heinous crimes, yet just because it was illegally attained, a blind eye must be turned and the criminal goes free. One problem with the punitive route (2) is that it, to me, seems to go against the values of the US legal system. The way I see it, one can morally look at illegal actions done by a government official in two ways: (a) they are so important and have a hard job (esp. officers), so they should get more lenient punishments. (b) they are supposed to set an example and they have sworn an oath, when they break the law, it sends a message of hypocrisy and insecurity that breeds government hate and distrust. Going with the (b) view, government officials should at least be given equally strong punishments, or stronger. It seems however, to my foreign and non-lawyer eyes, that the US is more in the (a) camp, meaning government officials should be given more lenient punishments. Given this assumption, route (2) would run contrary to at least one moral notion of the US legal system. Another problem with route (2) is that it might wind up incarcerating or firing a lot of officers and agents, though some may say that is a good thing due to the nature of those officers and agents. The last problem that I can think of is that this system may be easy to exploit. If strong punitive action was taken against illegal evidence collection, yet it is still admissible, that leaves motivation to do it. So, officers may congregate and create a kind of group immunity to punitive action, with everyone swearing to each other to never testify against one another on matters of illegal evidence collection. This could then propel illegal evidence collection, due to there being no practical danger in doing it, since the majority of officers have each others backs. Investigaton would be done by officers or agents, and if they're in on it, then there's no chance. This would then propel illegal evidence collection, and it could maybe lead to graver violations of privacy during the collection, as the informal rules of "no testifying" would probably not include a bunch of clauses for when the privacy/legal violations were too serious to be allowed. To me, the reasons I've given does make route (1) more favorable. However, I don't think I have figured out every reason that went behind the choice of (1) instead of (2). I am also not sure whether the reasons I've given are correct. One of my reasons was also based on an assumption that the US legal system holds the view contained in (b). So, what reasons did I get right/wrong, and what reasons did I miss? EDIT: After reading @Dale M's answer, I realize I forgot to specify I was talking about US jurisdiction, as I've only heard of this law in relation to the US. However, this led to a pretty good answer about whether or not countries in the West generally have an exclusionary rule or not. Interesting to see that, in the West at least, it seems to be pretty limited to the US.	The problem with Solution 2 is that government officials in the United States enjoy qualified immunity with respect to actions that they did while acting under color of law. It's not total immunity, but if they do things by the book, they cannot be prosecuted even if something goes wrong (even when doing things by the book, Police deal in very volatile situations and things can still go wrong because of an X factor to specific for the training manual to cover.). In other cases, it may be because multiple officers are working the scene and Office A lied to Officer B about the situation. Consider Officer A pulls over a suspect and realizes it was someone who was suspected of a crime, but couldn't prove it. He calls for back up and Officer B arrives. Upon arriving on scene, Officer A tells B to search the trunk of the car despite the fact that A had not received consent from the suspect nor has a warrant, nor cause to make a search of a trunk of a vehicle. B makes the search and finds [the bloody knife/the stash of drugs/the smoking gun/the match to a child's shoe that was missing from the kidnapping scene/ insert other incriminating evidence]. Under system (2), since it was Officer B who made the illegal search, B would be liable for it, even though Officer A lied about having legal reason for a search of the trunk space. But what's more... if the evidence is gonna be used anyway, what's to stop the cops doing it again? After all, there is very little recourse for those who are illegally searched to contest this in court (If I'm illegally searched and don't have anything on me, I have to take this to civil court, which is a different animal than Criminal Court and exposes me to broader Discovery... aka gives the cops free reign to search my property for a hell of a lot more illegal things.) or just sit back and count my 4th amendment rights (the section of the constitution protecting against unwarranted search and seizures) as worth less than the paper they're printed on. Oh, and by the way... that second word seizure... that means that they will be taking my property (or myself if they arrest me) and will not be giving it back for some time while they process it... if it's a legal to hold item (like my laptop that I do work on) that's going to make it harder for me to do my job which injures me further in lost business and income. In other cases, it could be they have a warrant for a large item (a stolen big screen tv) and while searching for it, open my sugar bowel and find evidence of a crime unrelated to theft of the television (i.e. opening a baggie of weed). This is actually an illegal search because, unless I am a wizard, a Time Lord, or Mary Poppins, there is no reason why a container smaller than a big screen TV should ever be searched when looking for a Big Screen TV and the cops should logically see this as out of bounds of the search warrant. The nature of this is damaging before the legality of the search can be determined, and because the search may have been out of scope of the warrant that was otherwise justified, the rule of making the evidence of a crime inadmissible was held in order to prevent LEOs from doing this because they could. This rule also started to take formation prior to the Revolutionary War. British Law had ruled against compelled confessions being inadmissible as evidence in 1769, a full six years before the Revolutionary war started (1775) and seven years before the publication of the Declaration of Independence (1776). Now there are some exceptions that can get the evidence brought back in, such as plain view ("The suspect's vehicle is a pick up truck with an open bed, the murder weapon was lying in the bed covered in blood"), inevitable discovery ("We have developed evidence by other means that would have lead us to this evidence legally") and Exigent Circumstances ("We believed someone inside the property was in grave danger if we did not enter the property immediately and that's when we found a cache of stolen Big Screen TVs!) and Good Faith (the Warrant was authorized for the wrong street address of the target but we found the evidence of an unrelated crime in a place the warrant authorized us to search. Everything but the goofed up address was done by the book.).	It's generally correct in the American system that everything not forbidden is permitted. But the law you're looking at isn't really an exception. You have the legal right to tamper with evidence if tampering is not illegal, but this statute makes it illegal. The language you've highlighted merely says that the law does not apply to those who have some other affirmative grant of authority to do so. So if you stab someone to death in your kitchen, you can't remove the body or other evidence, but the detectives investigating the case can, because they have the legal authority to process the scene and maintain the evidence for trial. So the law is similar to the "speaking in public" hypothetical, but that doesn't make it meaningless. Because of the First Amendment, that law doesn't actually outlaw anything, but the tampering law faces no such legal barriers. You had the right to tamper until the government said you didn't. Now that it says you don't, you can only do it on the government's terms, which require an affirmative grant of authority.	Different exclusionary rules have different reasons. Hearsay is frequently inadmissible because it's less reliable for the court to hear Alice saying "Bob told me that Carol hit him" than to hear Bob saying "Carol hit me." Another even more critical problem with hearsay testimony is that the defense cannot cross examine the person who made the statement in court. If Bob is there, the defense can ask questions such as "where did Carol hit you" and "did Carol use her right or left hand" to clarify the testimony or call its veracity into question. Alice, not having been a direct witness to the act, will not be able to respond to many of these questions. united-states Evidence obtained in violation of a constitutional right is inadmissible because admitting it amounts to allowing police or prosecutors to violate people's constitutional rights in order to obtain convictions. Not only does an unconstitutional search itself violate the rights of the person being searched, but so does the use of evidence acquired in such a search. See Fruit of the poisonous tree at Wikipedia and the cases linked therein, especially Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States and Nardone v. United States.	If you comply without protest, this will be taken as consent to a search, and make anything found admissible. One can verbally object. The ACLU suggests the form "I do not consent to searches" to any request to search your car, your house, your person or any other property of yours or under your control. There is no need to give any reason for your refusal. However, one is required to follow any "lawful orders" given by police officer during a traffic or pedestrian stop.[1] Failure to follow lawful orders may well be a separate crime. Even if the lawfulness is suspect, it is usually better to comply and challenge the order later, in court. One might make a second objection, such as "I don't see that you have probable cause for a search, and I do not give consent. Are you ordering me to permit a search?" If the officer clearly orders you to open the trunk, one might place the keys in reach of the officer, while not opening the trunk oneself. That might help establish that there was no consent to the search, and require probable cause to be established before anything found could be used in a trial. One might also repeat, as the officer opens the trunk "I am not consenting to any search." If it is possible for any person present to record video without obstructing the officer(s) that might hrlp to establish the absence of consent and other relevant facts, later. People in general have a right to make such recordings, but not to obstruct or interfere with police activity. Duty to Obey The Washington Post in an opinion article dated July 23, 2015 "Sandra Bland and the ‘lawful order’ problem" wrote: The Bland video brings up an overlooked problem with the law of police-citizen encounters. The police can back up their orders with force because it’s often a crime to disobey a lawful order from a police officer. But from a citizen’s perspective, it’s often impossible to know what is a lawful order. As a result, it’s often impossible for citizens to know what they can and can’t do during a police encounter. The first problem is knowing what counts as an “order.” If an officer approaches you and asks you to do something, that’s normally just a request and not an order. But if there’s a law on the books saying that you have to comply with the officer’s request, then the request is treated as an order. You can’t know what is an “order” unless you study the law first, which you’re unlikely to have done before the officer approached you. In the case of Oregon v Rose Mary ILLIG-RENN, 42 P.3d 62 (2006) The Supreme Court of Oregon held that ORS 162.247(1)(b), a statute that makes it a crime to "refuse[] to obey a lawful order by [a] peace officer." is constructional against challenges under the Oregon and US Federal constitutions. Sources [1]: Virginia Code section 18.2-464. Failure to obey order of conservator of the peace Virginia Code Section § 18.2-463. Refusal to aid officer in execution of his office. Florida Statutes 316.072(3) "OBEDIENCE TO POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.—It is unlawful and a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, for any person willfully to fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law enforcement officer, traffic crash investigation officer as described in s. 316.640, traffic infraction enforcement officer as described in s. 316.640, or member of the fire department at the scene of a fire, rescue operation, or other emergency. " (Oregon) ORS 162.247(1)(b) Interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer A person commits the crime of interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer if the person, knowing that another person is a peace officer or a parole and probation officer ... Refuses to obey a lawful order by the peace officer or parole and probation officer. California Vehicle Code - VEH § 2800 (a) It is unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order, signal, or direction of a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code, when that peace officer is in uniform and is performing duties pursuant to any of the provisions of this code, or to refuse to submit to a lawful inspection pursuant to this code. North Carolina § 20-114.1. Willful failure to obey law-enforcement or traffic-control officer (a) No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law-enforcement officer or traffic-control officer invested by law with authority to direct, control or regulate traffic, which order or direction related to the control of traffic.	The validity of the NDA is not an easy question, but a related one is more clear. A lawyer in the U.S. in most states is not permitted to threaten criminal or administrative action (e.g. reporting someone to immigration or tax officials), to gain advantage in a civil case. You can unilaterally bring criminal charges or take administrative action, but it is deemed to be unethical and against public policy to refrain from bringing criminal charges or taking administration action to gain civil advantages. An NDA of the type described arguably violated the same public policy and might be invalidated as a result. Put another way, there is a privilege to make certain reports to public officials without legal consequences and such an NDA might violate that privilege. Some of these privileges found in what are called "whistle blower" statutes specifically prohibit this kind of agreement as to some specific kinds of illegal conduct, but not others. There isn't a general rule. This said, it is not black and white. For example, a private NDA can't prevent someone from testifying under subpoena, but can prevent someone from voluntarily testifying in the absence of a legal compulsion to do so such as a subpoena. Suppose a woman is sexually assaulted at work, and is given an NDA to sign. Can the company legally require her not to disclose the conduct of an illegal activity? I can imagine this example coming out different ways in different jurisdictions. For example, some states have a legal duty (rarely enforced) that requires people to report felonies, and an NDA in this case would contradict that affirmative legal duty, while others do not. Another source of gray in the analysis is that there is a difference between not reporting a sexual assault that actually happened, and, as part of a larger settlement, executing an affidavit stating under penalty of perjury and under oath that a sexual assault didn't happen. The first is potentially an NDA that is void as a matter of public policy. The other, in principle, is a settlement that the person signing the affidavit can only enter into if it is true. There is nothing, in general, wrong, about requiring someone to confirm that certain representations are true as part of a business transaction or contract and allowing the contract to go forwards only if certain facts are true. The gray gets deeper, because whether a sexual assault happened or not is not always a subjectively black and white clear issue of pure fact. (It is subjective because an affidavit or affirmation is made to the best of the declarant or affiants' knowledge and belief, not as a matter of objective fact.) For example, someone may not have perfect memory of what happened, or there could be doubt over the question of whether the perpetrators acted recklessly (the Model Penal Code intent requirement for sexual assault) or merely with criminal negligence (which would not be sexual assault under the Model Penal Code). A statement made under oath about whether a sexual assault happened to the best of your knowledge, thus, might be a mixture of factual issues (A penetrated B at a certain date and time) and legal or not perfectly factually known ones (A acted with X intent regarding consent during that act). So, in a case where there was some room to argue either way about how to characterize what happened and about what actually did happen, there might be some room for a settling party to make a non-perjured statement consistent with the settlement and then to agree not to a true NDA, but instead to not make statements which, if the affidavit is true, would be false. In a plea bargain in a criminal case, one can plead "no contest" without agreeing that the crime factually happened, but that isn't really possibly in the context of an affidavit about what really happened, with an NDA limited to not disclosing the incident since it was already agreed as a matter of sworn fact that there is nothing to disclose that rises the level of a crime.	From what I can gather, a US citizen could literally commit first-degree murder in another country, and not be held liable in US courts. Yes. From looking at the decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., it seems a corporation could go so far as to commit genocide in another country and not be held accountable in US courts. Yes. Why is US law set up in this way, and why has nothing been done to change it? Extraterritorality The modern nation-state is part of the Westphalian tradition of sovereignty which takes as a core value that the internal laws of each nation-state are a matter for it and it alone. This is baked into international law as part of the UN charter: "nothing ... shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." The basic assumption of criminal law is that it is, by default, territorial. If a US national commits a crime in the Ivory Coast, then that is primarily the Ivory Coast's problem to deal with. There are both practical and political reasons why this is a good idea. The practical matters are that law enforcement and the courts in the Ivory Coast have the on-the-ground resources and knowledge to investigate and prosecute the crime and the US doesn't. US police forces can't collect evidence and interview witnesses in the Ivory Coast unless the Ivory Coast allows it. US courts can't subpoena witnesses. On the flip side, foreign jurisdictions don't have to follow the US Constitution when conducting searches and beating up, I mean, interrogating, suspects. That may make a lot of the evidence collected in foreign jurisdictions inadmissible in US courts. The political reasons are the US (and anyone else) should stay the f&^% out of the internal operations of other countries. The treaty of Westphalia ended 30 years of the most brutal warfare in history, which killed an estimated one-third of Europe's population, which was largely fought because the ruler of country X wanted to tell the ruler of country Y what religion they should have. Extraterritorality in US law Constitutional restrictions can limit exterritoriality. First, the statute must be within Congress' power to enact. Second, neither the statute nor its application may violate due process or any other constitutional right (see above). The presumption is that Federal laws only apply within US territory. To be extraterritorial, Congress must make this clear, ideally explicitly, but the courts can find that some laws are implicitly extraterritorial based on their language. Other nation's approach is different. For example, a French citizen is subject to French as well as local law everywhere in the world.	The 4th Amendment exclusionary rule applies automatically in cases where law enforcement obtains evidence illegally (subject to exceptions not applicable here). In its 1920 decision in Burdeau vs. McDowell, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 4th amendment is not applicable to searches by private parties, even when such searches are clearly illegal. This rule doesn't apply, however, if the private citizens was acting as an agent of the government. A more recent case reaffirming and clarifying Burdeau is United States v. Jacobsen 466 U.S. 109 (1984) in which a private courier finds drugs in a package and shows it to police who test the contents (the search was upheld as valid). If the defendant makes that argument, the defendant seeking to exclude the evidence bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the private citizen acted as an agent of the government. U.S. v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1987). Another case discussed here notes that: As it relates to computer files, states still differ on how broad the application of the Private Search Doctrine runs, but all seem to agree that if a document or photo has been opened by a private party, an officer can review that file or photo without a warrant. In People v. Wilson, 56 Cal. App. 5th 128 (2020), police opened 4 images they received from NCMEC (the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children) who received the images in a CyberTip from Google. Neither NCMEC nor Google had opened these images in this case, but all 4 images had been reviewed by Google in the past and identified previously as child porn by their matching hash values. So here, the officer’s actions—consisting of opening the electronic files submitted to it by NCMEC and viewing the four images attached to Google’s Cybertip—did not exactly replicate Google’s private actions. The Wilson court set out to determine the degree to which the officer’s additional invasion of Wilson’s privacy exceeded the scope of Google’s private search (the search of his emails against known hash values). Before the officer even received Wilson’s photographs, Google had already reviewed identical images in the past; scanned all of Wilson’s electronic communications to search for content with matching hash values; flagged four of Wilson’s images as matching images Google had previously observed; classified the matching images as depictions of prepubescent minors engaged in sexual acts; forwarded all four images to NCMEC as part of a Cybertip report; and terminated Wilson’s account. The Jacobsen case above explained that, “[t]he Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated.” Id. at 117. Because Google’s actions already frustrated any expectation of privacy Wilson possessed in the four photographs at issue, no privacy interest remained in the four images, so no expectation of privacy was violated. Wilson at 219. Because the assigned hash values, or “digital fingerprints,” are representative of the contents depicted in the photographs themselves, the government gained no new material information by viewing the images. The agent merely confirmed Google’s report that Wilson uploaded content constituting apparent child pornography. Id. at 220. When someone who is not law enforcement obtains evidence illegally, the court sometimes engages in a non-constitutional discretionary balancing test to determine if the evidence is admissible. Sometimes it comes in, sometimes it doesn't. I'll find a case setting forth the exact test if I have time. The fact that evidence is "irrefutable" (not that there is any such thing) and widely publicly known is absolutely irrelevant. The fact that a juror knows it would be grounds for excusing the juror for cause and for moving the venue of the trial where they can find enough jurors who aren't familiar with the evidence if they can't manage it in the usual venue.	The Likely Ruling Assuming points 1 and 2 in the question, all the evidence from the trunk would be inadmissible, and if there really is no other evidence against Bob, then Bob would go free. This is highly improbable; the prosecution would find some grounds to dispute the unlawful nature of stop and search, even if ones the court would not accept. A better version might be "The judge rules that the stop and search were unlawful, and is upheld by the appellate court". That is more realistic and has the same result. Inevitable Discovery The only grounds I can see for any other result is "inevitable discovery". If other police were, say, already staking out Bob's house with a warrant to search the car, and Bob was on the way to that house at the time of the stop, then the prosecution could argue that they would inevitably have conducted a legal search of Bob's car and found the same evidence. The conditions for invoking this doctrine rarely occur, but it is possible. After the Trial There is no way that Cal's body can be Bob's property, so it would be released to Cal's next of kin or legal executor. Unless Bob was Cal's next of kin, it is hard to see any way that the body would be handed over to Bob. Cal's clothes are almost surely part of Cal's estate, although it is in theory possible that they are Bob's property. No claim of ownership can be used against Bob in a later trial, because any later trial would be barred by double jeopardy. In any case, while evidence from the trunk would all be inadmissible in a trial of Bob, it might be admissible in a possible later trial of Joe, Bob's alleged accomplice. Therefore the police might well retain all the items (except the body) as possible future evidence. Terminology This is actually about the exclusionary rule itself, not about the "fruit of the poison tree" doctrine. What is the difference? If an unlawful search finds evidence, that evidence is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. If an unlawful search merely finds a lead, evidence later found via the lead is considered as "fruit of the poisoned tree" and is therefore inadmissible. For example, if the murder weapon is found in Bob's car after an unlawful search, the exclusionary rule applies. But if a note saying "stuf at 1234 Elm" is found during the unlawful search, and the police visit 1234 Elm Street, and find the murder weapon there, that is "fruit of the poisoned tree". Why does it matter? Because if the police find a different lead to 1234 Elm, so that the investigation or search at that address is not based solely on the results of the unlawful search, then the evidence found at 1234 Elm may be admissible, while corroboration will not save the evidence actually found by the unlawful search. It is a subtle but sometimes important distinction.
DUI question with keyless ignition I am aware you can get a DUI just sitting impaired in a car with keys in ignition. I have a car with a keyless ignition. I was wondering what the standard for DUI is in this type of car. I do not drink so I may never be subject to a DUI. Just more curious then anything else.	Pennsylvania is one state sometimes cited as having such a law, but the law does not refer to "keys in the ignition", instead, An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol... Similarly in Washington, A person is guilty of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug if the person has actual physical control of a vehicle within this state... California law is narrower, since It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of any alcoholic beverage to drive a vehicle and this does not include being in physical control. See Mercer v. DMV which affirms that the person must have been driving, but it is not necessary to witness the person driving. Keys in the ignition can be evidence that you were driving, likewise a warm engine or tires, car is in gear, you're in the middle of the road. I doubt that any law is stated in terms of "keys in the ignition", more likely it reduces to actual driving, or being in control of the vehicle.	There's a good answer in this thread by Trap_Door_Spiders Assuming the car was really stolen, not "stolen" in the sense my friend borrowed it and never gave it back, you could absolutely recover the car. The reason you could, is because you can't steal your own property. Theft is very specifically the taking of ANOTHER's property. Here the property and the title to it has remained with you, because it was stolen. A thief never gets title in stolen property--it's called a void title. A void title is no rights at all as compared to a voidable title which has no rights against the true owner, unless you are subsequent transferee for value without notice (Bona Fide Purchaser). Now we can even take this slightly further. Imagine our thief stole your car and now sold it to Hapless John and all the remaining facts are the same, can you still take the car? Yes, because title in property tracks from the seller of the property. You can only over transfer as good a title as you have in the property. So thief has a void title. When he sold Hapless John the car he transferred a void title, which is no interest at all. So when you see the car and take it back, Hapless John calls the police and reports it stolen too. As long as you could demonstrate it was stolen first, that's the end of the issue. Hapless John has to go find the thief and get his money from thief. Now obviously this all assumes you see the car on say a street or whatever. If you saw it saw it in a driveway, you could end up being charged with trespass unless your state privileges the recovery of stolen property by peaceable means. You still wouldn't be liable for theft, because of the void title, but you can get the other charges. All that said, you are better off having the police come and assist you. If you are even slightly wrong you get hit with the full force of the consequences. It's better just to have a police officer come and assist from a criminal liability stand point.	Colorado statute 42-6-206 imposes disclosure requirements on the sale of vehicles with salvage titles. That you didn't know it was a salvage does not seem to be of concern to this particular statute. This means that you are potentially entitled to redress against the people who sold you the car as well, provided the sale occurred in Colorado and they failed to disclose it to you (i.e., you didn't just forget about it in the intervening years). Given the presence of a law specifically covering your circumstances, it may be worth consulting with a local attorney to see what your obligations are. There may be mitigating circumstances, but they are not currently obvious to me if they're there. (conventional wisdom in the industry is that all private sales are "as-is" with no implied warranty of merchantibility and no recourse for a buyer who doesn't do due diligence -- I was shocked to find a statute specifically protecting buyers of salvage vehicles)	In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split"	If you buy a large piece of land, closed to the public, then yes. You would need a license for your car to allow drivers to use it without hands on the wheel, or the driver will get arrested. But first you need a license that allows using the car on public roads at all. That’s what all the car manufacturers have to do. Requires for example crash tests, tests how polluting the car is, and so on.	Neither with or without a warrant, if the confession is all there is. For a felony, the question is whether there is probable cause (4th Amendment). This is true whether the police arrest you, or they get a warrant – the difference being that in the latter case the warrant is issued by a guy with much greater knowledge of what constitutes probable cause. The question then would be whether a confession alone constitutes probable cause. There is a venerable rule, the corpus delecti rule (300+ years old) that requires there to be independent evidence of a crime, the point of this rule being to to prevent mentally ill people from being convicted of a crime that never even happened. Under that rule, a confession alone would not be probable cause (but a confession and a bloody glove could be). This article reports that at the federal level and in 10 states, there is a lower bar of mere "corroboration" without the need to argue that there was an actual crime. Exemplifying this relaxing of the traditional rule, in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, the court held that "[a]n accused's extrajudicial admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, made subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions, and corroboration by independent evidence is required". However, "[t]he corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti" and "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth; but those facts plus the other evidence must be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt". In such jurisdictions, courts take a "totality of circumstances" approach focusing on whether the confession is trustworthy.	You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on.	'Have you been drinking?' isn't a question with a strictly defined legal meaning. It's the opening gambit in a conversation intended to assess whether it's worth proceeding to a sobriety test. And that's it. Further linguistic analysis is pointless.
Must I report a car accident to the police? I live in Connecticut, and that's also where I have my car registered. If I get into a car accident in Connecticut, am I required by law to inform the police? https://www.dmv.com/ct/connecticut/auto-accidents says: You are also required by law to inform the police immediately in case of any accident that involves death, injury or property damage. But, I looked at Title 14 of the General Statues of Connecticut and didn't see any law saying that. Where's the law that says that?	I think this is a reference to Section 14-224: (a) Each operator of a motor vehicle who is knowingly involved in an accident which results in the death of any other person shall at once stop and render such assistance as may be needed and shall give such operator’s name, address and operator’s license number and registration number to any officer or witness to the death of any person, and if such operator of the motor vehicle causing the death of any person is unable to give such operator’s name, address and operator’s license number and registration number to any witness or officer, for any reason or cause, such operator shall immediately report such death of any person to a police officer, a constable, a state police officer or an inspector of motor vehicles or at the nearest police precinct or station, and shall state in such report the location and circumstances of the accident causing the death of any person and such operator’s name, address, operator’s license number and registration number. There are subsequent similar paragraphs about accidents resulting in injury or property damage. The wording is a little bit confusing and it appears that you don't strictly have to report to the police, if you instead identify yourself to a witness.	You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on.	You are completely in the wrong. It is against the law to operate a motor vehicle without a license. It is against the law to have a motor vehicle that is not insured. It is against the law to violate the conditions of your probation which almost certainly provide that you are not allowed to operate a motor vehicle until your license is reinstated and you have insurance in force. Your personal belief that you didn't break the law is not a valid reason not to pay a fine on a ticket that is ratified by a court. The cop was right when he told you that you were crazy.	No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412	Most leases have a provision allowing a landlord to make entry without notice in an emergency, but the better course of action, as noted in a comment by @BlueDogRanch, is to call the police and ask them to make a "welfare check." You would ordinarily be permitted to cooperate with police by unlocking doors in furtherance of their welfare check. The police are trained to do this properly in a way that properly balances the need to aid someone who is sick or ill, the need to preserve evidence if there was a death or crime that needs to be understood legally, and to protect the legitimate privacy interests of the tenant. You are not. You could incur liability for failing to prevent death or aggravating injury, could be wrongfully implicated if physical evidence from you contaminates the scene or you destroy evidence showing the true cause, and could be sued for invading the tenant's privacy if it was found that you entry was unreasonable and that it wasn't really an emergency, which is always easier to conclude with 20/20 hindsight. As it is, your biggest potential source of liability is delaying in calling the police seeking a welfare check. They often respond quite quickly to these by the way, although it is not the very highest priority for law enforcement.	I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with.	California Vehicle Code 23100 asserts (a) Any person who throws any substance at a vehicle or any occupant thereof on a highway is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Any person who with intent to do great bodily injury maliciously and willfully throws or projects any rock, brick, bottle, metal or other missile, or projects any other substance capable of doing serious bodily harm at such vehicle or occupant thereof is guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison. So at the minimum this is a misdemeanor offense. It could be a felony if the accused is found to have intended to do great bodily injury, and that an egg (or whatever else they threw) was capable of it. The basic rationale for the law is that any such act creates a distraction to drivers at the minimum, which creates danger (if someone is surprised by the impact they may suddenly swerve and collide with other vehicles or property; their vision may be obscured and can no longer drive as safely as they should; etc.). And this is just for the literal offense of "throwing something at a vehicle (on a highway = public road)". The act may create other offenses, such as violating littering statutes and creating a hazard. And if the act does result in grave bodily harm or damages, even if they did not intend it, the offender can expect to be held to account and liable for that as well. If anyone dies, they'll be on the line for some form of murder/manslaughter charges, for example.	In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest.
Would it be legal according to the laws of war if Ukrainian forces killed Putin in Moscow? We know pretty well where Putin will be on May 9: He will be the guest of honor at the Moscow victory day parade. As president, he is the commander in chief of the Russian armed forces. If the Ukrainian forces got heir hands on, say, a conventional cruise missile or some other means to kill Putin, would that be legal warfare or would that be a war crime or similar violation of the laws of war? As I understand it, the general legal opinion seems to be that acts of war are not restricted to current theaters of engagement (which would all be in Ukraine and Russian border regions as it pertains to the current war between Russia and Ukraine). That is how the U.S. justifies its drone killings. For the sake of the question we'll also assume that all due care has been taken to minimize civilian casualties by using a conventional warhead of the minimal strength sufficient to kill Putin given the precision of the weapon and reconnaissance.	Yes Providing the attack was otherwise made in accordance with the rules of war, enemy civilian leaders who are directly responsible for the prosecution of the conflict (so, the Minister of Defence, yes, the Minister of Housing, no) are combatants under International Humanitarian Law.	Some people seem to believe that just because something happens 'in the internet' it is somehow outside normal jurisdictions. Wrong. In may be harder to investigate and prosecute crimes in the internet, but the laws apply all the same. There are some problems when it is unclear 'where in the world' something did happen -- in the jurisdiction of the perpetrator, the victim, or the service provider? But problems of jurisdiction apply e.g. to international fraud cases in the non-web-world as well. In many jurisdictions, the informed and voluntary consent makes some things legal which would otherwise be illegal. For instance, if two boxers get into the ring, it is understood that each of them did consent to be hit by the other. But usually two fighters could not legally agree to a fight to the death, because even if there are laws on assisted suicide, they do not apply to a fight. Insults, libel, and slander are not on the same level as homicide. There are jurisdictions where they are not prosecuted without the request of the victim. But an insult might also violate other laws, e.g. disturbing the peace. So don't bet on such an app unless you know for sure which jurisdictions are involved.	Maybe, but we'll probably never know for sure. Officially, of course, he was not punished for his speech. He was punished for selling explosives without a license, which he admitted to. (He was also charged with illegally storing explosives and illegally mailing 'injurious material," but those charges were dropped in exchange for his guilty plea on the first count.) Whether those charges were a pretext to retaliate is probably unknowable. While it's a well-known fact that law enforcement frequently retaliates against people for exercising their right to free speech, this guy's story doesn't sound very credible. There is precedent for a prosecution for distributing Pest Control Report 2000, including the prosecution of white supremacist Leo Felton, a sad-sack loser who used the same material to build a bomb around to incite a "racial holy war" the same time. And just about a month after Ver's conviction, the man who owned the company that manufactured the product was convicted of violating federal explosives and transportation laws. Several months after that, he and his company entered into a consent decree with the Consumer Product Safety Commission ordering them to stop manufacturing Pest Control Report 2000.	Russian law in the 19th century was probably derivative of Roman law which is explained at page 594 of this 1903 law review article, because almost all countries in continental Europe at the time ultimately derived their substantive law from Roman law. There was a minor crime at Roman law for offensive statements, without regarding to the truth, and a tort at Roman law for false private statements, to which truth was a defense. Many countries at that time, probably Russia among them, also had special criminal offenses for insults to royalty and aristocrats. The right of publicity is a much later American invention than defamation law and developed in connection with the modern advertising agencies at common law in response to commercial ventures that sought to exploit professional models. It is unlikely that this tort would have existed in 19th century Russia.	In the united-kingdom, the legal basis flows from the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. This allows regulations to be made for particular sanctions regimes, in this case The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and its several amendments, including three revisions this year. Under those regulations, the Secretary of State may designate individuals who are then subject to particular sanctions. A consolidated list is available for all individuals and organizations who have been named under any of the regulations, not just the Russia one. Working backwards from the list, we see such names as Vladimir Putin, who has an asset freeze on the grounds that - Vladimir Vladimirovich PUTIN is the President of the Russian Federation, carrying ultimate authority for the policy of the Russian government and Russian armed forces. In February 2022, PUTIN ordered Russian military forces to launch an invasion of Ukraine, undermining and threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine. Thus, he has been named for the purposes of regulation 11, and the statement of reasons (required by regulation 8) refers to the specific grounds in regulation 6 by which a person can be added to the list. In this case, those grounds are 6(2)(a)(i) as interpreted by 6(3)(a), (2) In this regulation, an "involved person" means a person who — (a) is or has been involved in— (i) destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine ... (3) For the purposes of this regulation, a person is “involved in destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine” if— (a) the person is responsible for, engages in, provides support for, or promotes any policy or action which destabilises Ukraine or undermines or threatens the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine For "oligarchs" who are on the list, the Foreign Secretary has specifically drawn attention to Gennady Timchenko, described as Russia's sixth-richest oligarch. The statement of reasons says: Gennadiy Timchenko, hereafter TIMCHENKO is a major shareholder in Bank "Rossiya". Bank "Rossiya" is a key stakeholder in the National Media Group which supports Russian policy which is destabilising Ukraine. Following the annexation of Crimea, Bank "Rossiya" has expanded its bank branches and provision of insurance and investment throughout Crimea and Sevastopol; and offers support to military activities and the formation of major transport links and cards that allow the public to travel easily around the peninsula. Therefore, Bank "Rossiya" has supported the consolidation of Crimea into the Russian Federation by integrating the financial system following the annexation of Crimea. TIMCHENKO therefore is or has been involved in engaging in, providing support for, or promoting any policy or action which destabilises Ukraine or undermines or threatens the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine. Additionally, TIMCHENKO is associated with a person involved in destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine. These are the same regulation 6 grounds as for Putin, but with additional reasoning to draw the connection (also, a citation under 6(2)(d) for "associated with"). One reason for this text being required is to undercut any suggestion that the listing is because of "guilt by association". In judicial review, for which continue reading below, this kind of statement and the process that gave rise to it is powerful evidence against a suggestion that the Secretary of State was acting other than rationally. We can now look back to the 2018 Act, which authorizes the 2019 Regulations and provides rules about how the Secretary of State can designate people. Detailed provisions in the Regulations trace back to rules in the Act about the shape of a sanctions regime; for example, the "asset freeze" of regulation 11 is within section 3 of the Act on "Financial sanctions". There are also procedural safeguards around the making of regulations, mainly relating to Parliamentary approval, and around the designation of individuals. For example, a designated person can ask the Secretary of State to be removed from the list, and under section 22(3) she must do so if the person doesn't fit the criteria by which they were originally included. That would include if they are no longer an "involved person", or if their designation were no longer deemed appropriate based on the purpose of the sanctions regulations. As with other executive actions, judicial review is available (under Chapter 4 of the Act), which could bring in considerations of whether the Secretary of State acted within her powers, did so "reasonably", etc. Human rights grounds are also possible, in relation to procedural fairness (Article 6) or the right to enjoy property (ECHR Protocol 1, Article 1). Against those stand arguments on the public interest, UK compliance with international obligations, national security, the general integrity of the sanctions system, and so forth. It is plausible that if a claim reached this point, the Secretary of State would be able to show that the designation - as described in the statement of reasons above - was on sound policy grounds, was taken after a sober review of the evidence, and was proportionate in the circumstances. There is not much case law on the 2018 Act, given its recency. One example is R (Youssef) v Secretary of State [2021] EWHC 3188 (Admin) in which an Article 6 claim failed. That was in relation to UN sanctions against Al-Qaida, which is a different position from the one here, but it has some force for understanding the current UK system. The present Act was created partially in response to the judgement in HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2 against a previous version of the sanctions laws, and the 2021 case found that the new version was acceptable. The judicial review avenue and the requirement to give reasons are directly aimed at complying with Article 6. While a court could always potentially find another problem, the current Act and the Regulations are as watertight as the drafters can make them in the light of existing precedent.	Different people have suggested different things as to what constitutes, "the unitary executive theory". The US Supreme Court is not likely to simply adopt such a theory in general terms. It will, instead, rule on a specific case that comes before it, and state the principles behind that ruling. There are a number of Supreme Court rulings saying that a President must abide by laws limiting presidential authority, perhaps the most famous is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) in which the Court rules that the President did not have authority to seize steel mills to put a stop to a labor dispute that was allegedly endangering national security during the Korean War. Congress had passed a law providing a different method of dealing with such situations, and President Truman did not follow the method established by that law. The President has broad power over the operations of executive branch agencies, possibly including the right to order an investigation halted for whatever reasons seem good to the president. If such a case came before the courts and they supported the President, presumably they would hold that the President's actions did not constitute obstruction of justice or any other crime. I find it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule that the President may "act against the rule of law", but they might rule that in particular cases the law implicitly grants the President power to take certain actions that others may not take.	Was International Law Violated? When it used chemical weapons to kill large numbers of civilians in his own country, Assad's regime in Syria was violating its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, an international treaty obligation that the regime acknowledged was binding upon it in 2013 when at U.S. insistence and with Russian supervision, the Assad regime purported to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles. It was also an action violating generally recognized standards of the customary international law of war that have been recognized since they were first clearly articulated in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 that took effect in 1928. This kind of action has also been recognized as a crime against humanity under customary international law, and this principle is why international criminal tribunals set up after crimes against humanity occur are not considered to be applying ex post facto laws. Also, since early on in the Syrian Civil War, during the Obama Administration, the U.S. ceased to recognize Assad's regime as the legitimate government of Syria. According to official U.S. policy, since 2012, the Syrian National Council, and not Assad's regime, has been the legitimate government of Syria. So, rather than being an attack on a sovereign regime, this was an act in defense of a different sometimes allied regime recognized as legitimate, with whom the U.S. is not at war. Moreover, given that fact that the U.S. now has a artillery combat ground troop unit deployed in Northern Syria as of earlier in 2017, in support of a Congressionally authorized military action in the same theater of conflict, the U.S. has a legitimate interest in protecting its own troops, as well as those of allies it supports in the part of the conflict that it is involved in under the 2001 AUMF, from chemical weapons attacks in Syria by preemptively disabling the Assad regime's ability to deploy those weapons, even though they were not directed at somewhat nearby U.S. forces in their most recent utilization this week. So, while there may not be entirely clear international legal authorization for this particular remedy for the Assad regime's clear violation of international law, there is not a clear prohibition on doing so either, and the general rule is that sovereign states have wide discretion to take military action in support of their perceived interests, particular when violations international obligations of the offender targeted for military action provide a justification for the use of military force under international law. This is because the main way of punishing a violation of international war while a conflict is still pending is called a reprisal which the Syrian strike fits to a tee. A reprisal is a limited and deliberate violation of international law to punish another sovereign state that has already broken them. . . . Reprisals refer to acts which are illegal if taken alone, but become legal when adopted by one state in retaliation for the commission of an earlier illegal act by another state. Article XII(3) of the Chemical Weapons Convention authorizes those remedies allowed under customary international law of which reprisal is one. Did The President Have Authority To Make The Strike Under U.S. Law? This said, the harder issue is whether this strike was legal under U.S. law, and not international law, which really has no meaningful binding enforcement mechanism other than politics, diplomacy and domestic law anyway. While the U.S. does not recognize the Assad regime as legitimate, it is not actually at war with that regime because the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) from 2001 that has been the main legal authorization for the "war on terror" against ISIS, pretty clear does not extend to Assad's regime in Syria. ISIS has been declared to be a successor to a branch of the organization the launched the 9-11 attack upon which the AUMF declared war. But, the formerly legitimate government of Syria (Assad's regime) is very difficult to treat as coming within that definition. However, while Congress has not authorized the use of military force by the U.S. against the Assad regime in Syria in this manner, Congress has approved appropriations to fund and support anti-Assad rebels, even though it may have been a bit of a fiasco, which at least provides some tacit evidence of Congressional consent to some sort of involvement in the Syrian civil war by the United States government against Assad's regime. In absence of an authorization of use of military force against the Assad regime, one alternative source of legal authority to make this strike is legislation (whose constitutionality has often been questioned, but has never actually challenged, was determined by the Justice Department to be constitutional in 1980, and which is arguably not justiciable) called the War Powers Act of 1973. This Act, on its face, purports to give the President the authority to make limited use of military force for short periods of time. Specifically (per the link): It provides that the U.S. President can send U.S. Armed Forces into action abroad only by declaration of war by Congress, "statutory authorization," or in case of "a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." The War Powers Resolution requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing armed forces to military action and forbids armed forces from remaining for more than 60 days, with a further 30-day withdrawal period, without a Congressional authorization for use of military force (AUMF) or a declaration of war by the United States. The question of whether this incident is within the scope of the War Powers Act is disputed with U.S. Senator Rand Paul arguing the conditions triggering its use such as an attack on U.S. forces or the United States, have not been met. The issues presented by this incident under the War Powers Act are similar to those presented in the missile strike and follow up airstrikes made by the U.S. in Libya in 2011. There is also legitimate room for dispute regarding where the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution ends, and where the power of Congress to declare war and to enact other legislation pertaining to the U.S. military under Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution begins. Arguably, directing U.S. forces to make an isolated military strike from a location where they are already lawfully deployed in support of an AUMF authorized military mission in the region, in exigent circumstances, against a military force that is not recognized by the United States as the legitimate government of Syria, does not constitute a true act of war and is instead merely day to day management of the operations and discipline of the United States military that is within the Commander in Chief's authority, particularly when Congress has already tentatively recognized the Syria's Assad regime is an enemy of the United States in legislation short of an authorization for use of military force. Moreover, given that President Trump surely has majority support in both houses of Congress for this strike, the possibility that Congress may end up granting forgiveness rather than making much of the fact that he didn't ask for permission, may be mostly a formality in this case. Generally speaking, even if this issue is justiciable (i.e. amenable to resolution through the court system), court action to enforce separation of powers questions must be authorized, at least, by a resolution of a majority of one of the two houses of Congress. Generally speaking, taxpayer standing or just plain U.S. citizen standing, does not exist to enjoin or seek a remedy from a separation of powers violation.	While the point made by user6726 is not wrong with respect to this particular statute, it doesn't address a more basic point about how the supremacy clause works. Federal criminal laws govern punishments for federal crimes in the federal criminal justice system. Federal prosecutors bringing federal criminal charges against criminal defendants in the federal criminal justice system can and do secure death penalty sentences against criminal defendants in states where there is no state death penalty. One recent case where that happened was the Boston Marathon bombing case where a defendant was sentenced to death in federal court for the crime for violation of a federal criminal statute, despite the fact that Massachusetts has no death penalty of its own. This is not a supremacy clause issue. No state law had to be changed or invalidated because of the existence of the federal law. States law governs how the state criminal justice system works, not the federal criminal justice system. When we say that a state has abolished the death penalty, we mean that it has abolished it in the state criminal justice system. This doesn't absolutely foreclose the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed in that state on federal charges, although it does make it far less likely that the death penalty will be imposed. Partially, this is because "blue collar" crime is handled by the states. Partially, this is because out of comity and a concern that juries in states without a death penalty are less likely to vote for a capital sentence, federal prosecutors are less likely to seek the death penalty in a state without capital punishment than in a state with capital punishment. For example, there are 2,902 people on death row as of 2016, in the U.S. Almost 98% of death penalty convictions that have not yet been carried out were obtained in state courts. Only, 62 involve civilian death penalties imposed in federal courts (mostly in states that have the death penalty) and another 6 involve death penalties imposed in military courts (mostly in states that allow the death penalty or abroad). All of the other cases arose in state courts.
What is the justification for supreme courts being able to overrule/overturn their own past decisions? It can’t overturn the constitution in most countries for example which gives the past apparent supremacy over the present. But between different eras of Supreme courts I guess the present takes precedence over the past? What is the rationale for this?	The House of Lords declared themselves able to depart from their own precedents in 1966, stating (emphasis added): Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules. Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this house as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so. In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlement of property, and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law. This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in this House. This applies equally to the Supreme Court, which has replaced the judicial functions of the Lords. The Practice Statement of 1966 itself overturned London Street Tramways v London County Council [1898] AC 375, in which the Lord Chancellor, Lord Halsbury, had said: A decision of this House once given on a point of law is conclusive on this House afterwards. In the modern understanding, it is in the interests of justice for the Supreme Court to always be able to say what the law is, even if that conflicts with the understanding of the past. As it is the final court of appeal, there is no other court which could review or overturn its decisions. Parliament could, and sometimes has, done so, but it is not always easy to express the desired effect in statutory language; and Parliament has many other demands on its time. It was felt that the court itself should be in a position to say that a past judgement was wrongly decided, or should no longer be considered binding for another reason. In the Scottish tradition, this power has long been held to be inherent in that country's highest courts, the Court of Session / High Court of Justiciary. It is allied to the nobile officium, or equitable jurisdiction of those courts to provide a just remedy in the absence of any explicit law. Judicial precedent is not a barrier to justice either. As Lord Kames said (Historical law-tracts, 1758; tract 8), No defect in the constitution of a state deserves greater reproach, than the giving license to wrong without affording redress. Upon this account, it is the province, one should imagine, of the sovereign, and supreme court, to redress wrongs of every kind, where a peculiar remedy is not provided. Those courts have not held themselves to a strict idea of stare decisis with respect to their own decisions, feeling instead that in the interests of justice they should be able to decide what a particular case demands. John Erskine explained (An institute of the law of Scotland, 1773; book 1, title 1, section 47): Decisions therefore though they bind the parties litigating create no obligation on the judges to follow in the same tract if it shall appear to them contrary to law. English courts, at least once in their roughly modern shape following the reforms of the late 19th century, have taken a stricter view of precedent, in the interests of predictability. The reform of 1966 was influenced by differences between English and Scottish practice, and represents something of a course-correction away from the strict position of the prior era. In terms of the present and the past, "precedent" doesn't precisely mean that the past wins out. It would be better to say that a past decision is presumed to be right, up until proved otherwise, or made obsolete by events such as the passage of new statutes. The presumption is binding on lower courts, and merely "very strong" for the highest court. The post-1966 position recognises that it is sometimes appropriate for the Supreme Court itself, seized of a particular case, to point out when a past decision is no longer right.	In most places I imagine the issue would go before a probate judge who would attempt to determine the validity of each presented will, and if both were valid, then they would attempt to reconcile the disparities to the best of their ability. Broadly speaking, the process would look like this (I'm using UK law as an example): You die An individual is chosen to handle your affairs (executor or administrator [or possibly both depending on jurisdiction]) They choose a will to go off of (these steps could be reversed if the wills named different administrators, in which case each administrator would file for the grant of representation and consequently involve the probate judge earlier) Someone challenges and suggests using the other will (probably because they feel they're not getting what's theirs) A probate judge is involved The probate judge decides Appeals would be made to Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court That being said, every jurisdiction is different, and this is more of a template answer for English common law (and derivative courts), than an attempt to describe in detail any specific jurisdiction's procedures.	Congress can't override substantive rules of constitutional law Marbury v. Madison is a binding interpretation of what the U.S. Constitution permits or denies, and in substance, this law seeks to change that interpretation of the scope of the judicial power, so that interpretation may not be overruled except via a Constitutional amendment. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court, under their appellate jurisdiction, will declare unconstitutional or otherwise adjudicate unconstitutional any law passed by Congress; neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court will hear or otherwise engage in cases or controversies in which one or both parties put into discussion the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress, or ask for a law or a statue passed by Congress to be declared unconstitutional. The language in italics is jurisdiction stripping language, which I discuss below, and which is also discussed in another answer. But, the language in bold is enunciating a substantive rule of law regarding how the judicial branch may resolve a case that is otherwise properly before it. And, Congress does not have the power to change that to make the U.S. Constitution a dead letter under its Article III jurisdiction regulation powers. The language in bold language is a direct attempt to overrule a binding interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and that is beyond the authority of Congress to do, so the statute would be unconstitutional, at least, in part. Jurisdiction stripping Yes, Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to Article III, Section 2 which states: In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under the Regulations as the Congress shall make. But, there are parts of Article III that apply in addition to the power of Congress to create "Exceptions" the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the power to create and modify the "inferior courts" that exist. The first sentence of Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. This is crucial, and interacts with the Exceptions power. The default provision is that all judicial power as defined in Article III, Section 2 is vested in the "supreme Court" unless and until that power is instead vested in an "inferior Court" established under Article III that Congress creates by law. Therefore, Congress does not have the power to deny every court (or even every federal court) both original and appellate jurisdiction over any constitutionally justiciable claim arising under Article III, even if the claim is not within the express original jurisdiction of SCOTUS. If they deny every inferior Article III federal court jurisdiction over something within the constitutionally defined scope of the judicial power, then it reverts to the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court even though it is not expressly made a part of the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. The judicial power of the federal courts collectively is defined in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and extends to all cases arising under the U.S. Constitution which would include a claim to have a provision of federal or state law declared unconstitutional as in violation of the constitution. It says: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; . . . (This analysis is attributed to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story.) Now, this is not to say that Congress couldn't do something to make it harder procedurally to have statutes declared unconstitutional. For example, there would be a much harder claim of unconstitutionality if Congress vested original jurisdiction in all such cases in the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, and then only assigned one judge to that district, and denied the U.S. Courts of Appeal or the U.S. Supreme Court, appellate jurisdiction over those decisions. At some point, however, even this lesser restriction, rather than elimination of a judicial power would still be subject to challenge under the due process protections of the 5th Amendment. Writ jurisdiction Notably, Marbury v. Madison was a case brought in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court under a writ of mandamus, under the All Writs Act, and not in connection with its appellate jurisdiction. So, Congress would also have to repeal or amend the "All Writs Act" to pull off the intent of the proposed statute, because the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends by statute to writs that are not appellate in nature even though this power is very rarely exercised. A writ is a court order directed at a government official directing that government official to do something, or to refrain from doing something. But, there are many ways to back door a seemingly private cause of action, particularly one related to constitutionality, into a writ. And, if a court has jurisdiction over a writ, it has jurisdiction to entertain requests by litigants to have such writs issued. Congress can't remove a state court forum It is worth noting that every single state court from traffic court on up has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to declare that a statute is unconstitutional, and that state courts frequently do declare state statutes to be unconstitutional. Congressional jurisdiction to regulate jurisdiction is largely limited to regulation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It can put a federal question (e.g. copyright enforcement or disputes with the IRS) in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, but there are no cases in which Congress has been permitted to place a federal law in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts while also denying any federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under that law. Otherwise, state court jurisdiction isn't regulated by Congress. And, the Constitution specifically requires all federal, state and local officials to swear to uphold the U.S. Constitution which arguably provides an independent basis for state court jurisdiction over constitutionality claims arising under the U.S. Constitution. This is a really important point. For example, suppose that someone who lives in the same state as you do sues you entirely under state law in a state court, and that state's courts require you to bring any claim you have against that person in state court over which that state court has jurisdiction as a counterclaim or you forfeit that claim forever. If you have federal claims against the person who sued you in state court, and your claims are not one of the handful of issues (e.g. copyright enforcement) that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, you must enforce your federal claims against that person as counterclaims in that state court case, or you will lose them forever. For example, suppose that your employer sues you in state court for conversion (i.e. stealing company property) and you have a right to sue the employer for not paying you the right amount for your overtime work under federal law. Then, you must bring your federal overtime claims in state court as counterclaims to the conversion action, rather than in federal court. Similarly, even though state criminal charges are always brought in state courts, a criminal defendant in a state court criminal case, can raised arguments arising under the U.S. Constitution including a determination that a state criminal law is unconstitutional, in state court as a defense, even though the only federal court recourse a criminal defendant has is through an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court or a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus brought in federal district court after all state direct appellate relief is exhausted, after petitioning to the U.S. Supreme Court, and after all state post-conviction relief (including petitioning the final state order to the U.S. Supreme Court) is exhausted. In practice, this means, criminal defendants have no meaningful access to the federal courts other than two petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court which are discretionary, until they have been incarcerated wrongfully for five or ten years. But, federal defenses can and routinely are raised in the state court trial (and indeed, federal defenses that could be raised in a state trial court may not be raised in a habeas corpus petition in federal court unless they were first raised in or before the original state court trial). N.B.: Federal claims in the exclusive original jurisdiction of state courts The extremes to which jurisdiction stripping is allowed are explored in the handful of claims arising under federal law that are expressly not within the scope of the jurisdiction of any federal trial court or intermediate appellate court, or within the express non-appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. The most notable of these are affirmative private individual civil lawsuits against offenders under the federal robocall and junk fax law (a.k.a. the Telephone Consumer Protection Act a.k.a. the TCPA a.k.a. 47 U.S.C. § 227), which do not not require a writ, which may only be brought in state court, subject to an ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. But, the federal courts have exclusively jurisdiction over litigation many kinds of claims other than private civil actions arising under the TCPA. This law is much less constitutionally concerning than the one proposed in the question, however, because while Congress can't repeal the U.S. Constitution, it doesn't have to pass a law giving private individuals a private cause of action when they receive robocalls or junk faxes at all. It could pass a law that was enforceable by the FCC alone, for example, and in the case of the TCPA, there are persons, including the FCC and regulated persons who want to challenge a regulation issued by the FCC, who are entitled to utilize the federal courts to enforce the TCPA or to dispute it. For example, there is no private cause of action to enforce most federal criminal laws (as such, not just involving the same harm) with a civil lawsuit by the victim against the criminal, in either federal court or state court, but that is not unconstitutional. This is because federal criminal laws can be enforced by government prosecutors and defended against by private individuals, in Article III federal courts. Also, even private causes of action under the TCPA are subject to ultimate U.S. Supreme Court appellate review, and the U.S. Supreme Court is an Article III federal court.	The US Supreme Court has made some decisions that legal scholars, other judges, lawyers, and people in general have strongly criticized as mistaken, but none anywhere nearly as wild as the one suggested in the question. Many such, well let me call them "disputed", rulings have been later overturned by the court itself. A well known example is Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which was overruled a few years later by West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Many of the so-called Lochner era economic decisions were also eventually overturned by the Court itself. Some disputed holdings have been altered by changes in the law, State or Federal. Some have been overturned via a constitutional amendment, such as Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), which is now held to have been overruled by the Fourteenth Amendment, although the Court did not come to that conclusion until early in the 20th century. Perhaps the most notorious case is Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) which held that a person of African descent could never become a US citizen, and that Congress was without power to prohibit slavery in any US state or territory. This is perhaps the most denounced decision of the US Supreme Court in its history (See the linked Wikipedia article for a few such comments.) This decision was undone de facto by the outcome of the US Civil War, and de jure by the adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Some cases have later been treated as "bad law" even though not formally overturned. An example is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the Supreme Court upheld the removal of US citizens of Japanese ancestry from the US Pacific coast during WWII, and their confinement in what has been described as a series of concentration camps. This has not been formally overruled, but in Trump v. Hawaii No. 17-965, 585 U.S. ___ (2018), Chief Justice Roberts wrote: The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—'has no place in law under the Constitution.' 323 U. S., at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). [quoting Jackson's dissent in Korematsu] And some cases, although much disputed, still stand as good law. The case of Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), holding that Baseball continued to be exempt from anti-trust laws, federal and state, has been much criticized, but remains in force to this day. (See the section "Subsequent jurisprudence" in the linked Wikipedia article) Congress has not, so far, acted to limit the exemption, as the opinion indicates that it had the power to do. In short, a US Supreme Court decision, however "erroneous" or "absurd" commentators or the public may consider it, remains the law of the land until it is overturned or distinguished by the court, or made obsolete by changes in statute or in the Constitution itself. It the highly unlikely situation described in the question, John Doe would remain in prison until his sentence expired or he received a pardon.	The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact.	Yes it affects them. Judges are pursuing their vocation as a career and there are career paths within the judicial system just as there are in every other career. Screw up too many times and your career ends at your present level. Judges are also professionals and most take professional pride in doing their jobs well. Having a decision overturned is professionally embarrassing. As a matter of public policy, there is no sanction that is directly applied to the judge otherwise judges would be too cautious to make decisions. Anyone who makes professional decisions will get them wrong from time to time - they generally are not punished. That said there are judicial errors that stem from making the wrong judgement (so to say) call and judicial errors that stem from royally screwing up. The former are far less damaging than the latter. For an example of the former, a judge is applying a relatively new statute for which there have been no other decisions and interprets the legislation in a reasonable way but one the appeal court disagrees with. For an example of the latter, deciding the matter on a basis which neither party put before the court and which the judge did not draw to the parties attention during the trial - as a common law country, the New Zealand legal system is adversarial: the court exists to decide the dispute between the parties on the basis the parties argue, not to go on a "frolic of its own". In addition, appeal courts can only overrule a decision if the judge has made an error of law, not if they have made an error of fact. A judge is allowed to be wrong about the facts but not about the law. In practice, the distinction is not trivial. In a jury trial, the jury decides the facts, the judge decides the law - appeals can only be on the basis of what the judge did, not on the basis of what the jury did (barring egregious misconduct by the jury). In a judge only trial the judge decides both but an appeal can only be on matters of law.	I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.	Constitution of the USA, Article IV, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. and the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 3): [The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; SCOTUS has found the former to mean that states that do not allow same-sex marriages in their laws must recognize same-sex marriages registered by other states - Obergefell v. Hodges. Maybe one could argue that driver licenses are not equivalent among states, but I would expect judges (SCOTUS) to require a very well reasoned explanation. For example, maybe Alaska could refuse to recognize licenses from Florida because Florida drivers do not know how to cope with snowed roads. But even in that case Alaska probably would need to produce data showing that these measures aim to serve the public interest (avoid accidents) and that there are no other ways of getting the same result. OTOH the Commerce Clause has been successfully used to avoid states mandating racial segregation of travellers, so it is quite reasonable to see it being used to prevent a state from trying to limit the mobility of citizens from other states (again, in the supposition that the state restricting it cannot show a compelling reason to do so). AFAIK, only the Federal Government could invoke the Commerce Clause; I would expect a lot more people (in your example, the PA government or maybe even any PA driver) would have standing.
Why are religious exemptions to anti-discrimination laws legal? For example, why is a cake maker allowed to refuse to serve people celebrating same sex marriage, due to personal religious beliefs? Why is this exemption allowed? Why is the government allowed to carve out religious exemptions to anti-discrimination laws? Doesn't this violate the Establishment Clause? Government sanctioned religions prayer is already illegal per "Engel v. Vitale". Government sanctioned religiously-motivated discriminated should be doubly illegal?	First of all, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 584 U.S. ___ (2018) (Docket via Justia) was not settled on the merits. The Commission decision against the cake maker was overturned on procedural grounds, and no final decision on the merits has been made to date, to the best of my knowledge. And as Trish points out, the baker claimed that the law was, in effect, forcing him to use his individual artistic talents to make a statement endorsing a view that he deemed religiously wrong. Note that anti-discrimination laws are not an inherent right, they are statutes, created in the US by Congress and the state legislatures, and they prohibit just what the legislators have chosen to prohibit. For most of the history of the US there were no such laws, and Congress could repeal them tomorrow if it chose. So in a sense the only real reason why the laws grant certain religious exemptions is because Congress (or the various state legislatures) has said so. The actual exemption is found in 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–1 (a) which provides that: This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities. Thus it exempts a "religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society" from complying with that part of the anti-discrimination law that refers to employment. That would particularly be 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–2 (a) which provides that: (a) Employer practices -- It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (a) (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (a) (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. There is a further similar but more limited exemption in 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–2 (e) It would pretty obviously violate the free exercise clause to require a religious organization to hire, say, priests, ministers, or other religious leaders regardless of religion. But the exemption goes farther than that. A church may discriminate on religion, or on race or sex, say, in hiring janitors or other people whose functions have nothing to do with religion. Nothing in the US Constitution requires that broad an exemption. But on the other hand, nothing forbids it either. That was the decision of Congress, and was no doubt in part the product of a political compromise. There is a long history in the US of providing churches and other religious organizations a degree of exemption from ordinary laws, and this is in line with that tradition. Beyond that, why this particular exemption and not a somewhat narrower one was chose, is a matter of politics, not law. The question asserts: Government sanctioned religions prayer is already illegal per "Engel v. Vitale". That is an over-broad reading of Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In that case (as the Wikipedia article puts it): the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional for state officials to compose an official school prayer and encourage its recitation in public schools, due to violation of the First Amendment. ... The Court held that the mere promotion of a religion [by the government] is sufficient to establish a violation, even if that promotion is not coercive. The case focused on the fact that the government had composed the text of the prayer in question, and that encouragement to recite it was a matter of official government policy. That is quite different from permitting private individuals or organizations to say voluntary prayers, or make hiring decisions based on religious distinctions.	Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.	In many countries (for instance, the US), churches and mosques are private property. In general, the owner of private property can throw anyone off their property; claiming you're doing an extensive period of praying doesn't matter, because they are under no obligation to let people stay as long as needed to pray (they can kick someone off the property for just about any reason). If there's a contract in play things are different, but contracts aren't in play in this situation. That said, nothing stops the church or mosque from letting the homeless stay there; this is actually not that uncommon (charity being a fairly common religious virtue).	Freedom of Religion Concerns I doubt that this policy would be held to be unlawful on First Amendment freedom of religion grounds. Indeed, such requirements usually exclude church-related service. Also, I don't see how this policy discriminates against your religion specifically. It seems on its face to apply to all religions equally. Even if "Church-related" is read broadly to include both service that benefits a church, and also service that is organized by a church, that doesn't preclude you from coming up with some other kind of service that is neither of these things. Why would you be prevented from coming up with service that is neither of these things when other students do not? Unless you have also undertaken Holy Orders or something, in which case 100% of your time away from school would be devoted to your church, it is hard to see what the problem would be with this requirement for you as opposed to someone else. And, it would probably be improper for a public school to allow you to use religious activities to satisfy a graduation requirement - that would sound like an establishment clause violation. Some of the relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases are: Engel v. Vitale (1962) and Abington School District v. Schempp (1963) This pair of cases shaped the modern understanding of how the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment constrains prayer in public schools. In Engel, the Court struck down a New York State rule that allowed public schools to hold a short, nondenominational prayer at the beginning of the school day. The Court decided that these prayers amounted to an “official stamp of approval” upon one particular kind of prayer and religious service, and said that, since teachers are agents of the federal government, the scheme violated the Establishment Clause. The reasoning in Engel was also applied in Schempp, in which the Court struck down a Pennsylvania policy that required all students to read 10 Bible verses and say the Lord’s Prayer at the beginning of each day. While a student could get an exemption with a parent’s note, the Warren Court decided that this still amounted to an unconstitutional government endorsement of a particular religious tradition. Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) This case adjudicated a different sort of Establishment Clause challenge, where the controversy dealt with a statute providing financial support for teacher salaries and textbooks in parochial schools. The Burger Court unanimously decided that this financial aid scheme violated the Establishment Clause and delineated the governing precedent for Establishment Clause cases known as the Lemon test. Under Lemon, statutes (1) must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) must have primary effects that neither inhibit nor advance religion; and (3) cannot foster an “excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court held that this scheme violated the third prong of the Lemon test. Allowing Church-related community service projects could implicate both the second and third prongs of the Lemon test. In a pertinent ruling, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a state constitutional requirement that no public funds be used to assist religious organizations, even if this prevented a facially neutral voucher program from treating religious and non-religious schools equally. The opinion in this 2015 case reviews some of the relevant law. A critical portion of the analysis is that aid to religious institutions must be limited to institutions that do not discriminate on the basis of religion and that supporting religious institutions at the K-12 level is more of a concern than doing so at the higher educational level. A Church, however, would (and should) discriminate on the basis of religion. In General There has been consideration of whether community service requirements, in general, are constitutional. Generally, courts have upheld the programs. See also here. In particular, Rhode Island is in the 1st Circuit of the federal courts, which has expressly ruled that community service requirements are constitutional. A 1999 law review article in the Duke Law Journal considers the issue from several perspectives. So does a 1997 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review article. A 1916 case called Butler v. Perry is a particularly strong precedent in favor of the proposition that mandatory service is constitutional, despite arguments to the contrary under the 13th Amendment. The issue was discussed in the New York Times in a 2003 article. Both are concerned about the involuntary servitude aspect of the requirement, but given that school attendance may be mandatory, and a community service requirement is one, relatively unconstrained aspect of mandatory educational activity, this isn't a very easy case to make.	The only applicable law is the local trespassing law. If he wants, the proprietor can demand that the patron leave, and if the patron does not leave, he can be arrested for trespassing. It uncontroversial that the First Amendment protects racist declarations.	None. The federal government is allowed to prohibit coffee drinking under its power to regulate interstate commerce. Prohibition would not have required a constitutional amendment under modern constitutional jurisprudence either. By analogy, this would be no different (constitutionally) than a law prohibiting putting lithium in sodas (something that used to be done in 7 Up) or putting cocaine in sodas (something that used to be done in Coca-Cola). Conceivably, the law might have to allow a religious exemption in certain circumstances under the 1st Amendment's free exercise clause, but while many faiths prohibit drinking coffee (most notably, offshoots of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints), none of which I am aware require it as a matter of religious doctrine sincerely espoused.	No, and certainly not for the reason implied (essentially a one spouse per jurisdiction in which one has citizenship rule which doesn't exist anywhere). At least under the law of every U.S. jurisdiction, you cannot be married to more than one person at the same time (anywhere in the world), and it is a crime to do so. Several dozen countries in the world recognize polygamy as legal (mostly in predominantly Muslim countries, not all of which allow polygamy, and in Africa where pre-Christian custom permits it), of course, and this does not violate the laws of those jurisdictions. The U.K. does not generally permit polygamy, but gives some recognition to and does not criminalize, polygamous marriages entered into in a place where it is lawful. But the concept proposed in the question would still not be legal under U.K. law. UPDATE: A California court ruling concurs with this analysis.	united-states Since "lying" is not a clearly-defined legal concept, we need to look at a specific kind of (non)statement. Some lies are plainly illegal, for instance saying in the context of a sale that "this column is made of pressure-treated lumber" when in fact it is make of sand and Elmer's glue is fraud. A receptionist being told to say "Mr. Smith is at a conference in New York" when he is actually drunk in Chicago is a legal lie. Now the question is, who can refuse to tell this lie (without suffering employment consequences), and on what grounds? Generally, in the US you can be ordered to tell such a legal lie as part of your employment duties. If I refuse, I can be fired. If you refuse, you can request a reasonable accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, since you proffer that your religion requires you to tell the truth / forbids you from telling a falsehood. If you make a claim for a religious accommodation, then the issue becomes whether there is a reasonable alternative. Such an accommodation might be that you instead say "Mr. Smith is not available"; or perhaps someone else who does not have a religious objection will be forced to act as receptionist for the day. This is specifically about religion. "I don't want to" or any similar idea does not provide protection against being fired. However, bear in mind that there is no official list of approved religions and their beliefs which the courts will refer to in determining whether your refusal was protected. If you claim "As a Pastafarian, I can't lie", the courts will not accept the premise that declaring yourself to be Pastafarian (a parody "religion") is valid. The available governmental resources on the fine line between general moral code and religious beliefs are quite sparse.
Foul-Mouthed Australian Teen Gets Dose Of His Own Medicine After Threatening An Elderly Man This is a story of an Australian teen (https://hellocare.com.au/foul-mouthed-australian-teen-gets-dose-medicine-threatening-elderly-man/) who yelled at and threatened an elderly man and was grabbed by the throat and pushed into a seat by another man after he had had enough of the disrespect. The highly opinionated article treats the physical violence as being acceptable and says the teen got a dose of his own medicine. Does the law agree with the article? Could the adult face legal consequences for the assault? Is it likely that the adult will in fact face such consequences?	Whether or not one holds the opinion that the adult morally should be prosecuted, there are only two legal questions – can the adult be prosecuted, and must the adult be prosecuted? The easiest question to answer is the "must" one – prosecution by the government is always discretionary. It is settled law that the government can decline to prosecute a crime. The decision to prosecute is entirely political. It seems likely that the government can prosecute, if they conclude that the action was not legally justified under §418 of the Crimes Act 1900, as defense of another against a criminal assault. The government won't prosecute if they conclude that such a defense is likely to succeed.	No Section 18-1-704.5. (1) says that : The general assembly hereby recognizes that the citizens of Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within their own homes. (*emphasis added) Subsections (2), (3), and (4) all refer to "any occupant of a dwelling" as the class authorized to use force by this section. An offie is not a dwelling. Section 18-1-901. Definitions says: (g) "Dwelling" means a building which is used, intended to be used, or usually used by a person for habitation. Section Section 18-1-704 provides that: (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203.of person's authored by this law to use force Under that provision, the use of deadly force does not seem clearly justified. It is highly questionable that "a lesser degree of force is inadequate". Any conclusion that the intruder represents an "imminent use of unlawful physical force" seems dubious, but I can't say what a court might find. This law is fairly recent, there may be no published case law for it.	Probably not. Overview You haven't specified a jurisdiction. I will talk about Australia because that's what I'm familiar with. In Australia the most relevant area of law would be tort, specifically negligence. The university would be liable to pay damages if a court found that it owed a duty of care to your friend, that it breached that duty, and that your friend suffered injury ('injury' including loss of property as well as mental suffering) as a result of that breach. Also potentially relevant would be contract law, if your friend and the university had entered into some kind of agreement relating to his security, or equity, if the university had somehow acted to lead your friend to rely, to his detriment, on the university protecting him (promissory estoppel: Walton Stores v Maher). However, I think this is unlikely unless, for some reason, the university had put up signs saying 'Please come onto our land and we will be responsible for your security'. Negligence You have stated that 'it is their responsibility to make sure all students are safe on campus.' It is not clear whether you mean to state that as a fact or whether you are suggesting it as a possible hypothetical basis of liability. I am not aware of a case that establishes the proposition that universities do have such a duty. The judgments in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 discuss the liability of the occupier of land (such as the university in your example) for injuries inflicted by criminals upon people present on land (such as your friend in your example). In that case, the defendant ran a shopping centre. The plaintiff worked at a shop in the shopping centre. At the end of the plaintiff's shift at 10.30pm, it was dark outside because the shopping centre switched the lights in the car park off at 10pm. The plaintiff was mugged in the shopping centre car park on his way out to his car. The key question there was whether the defendant shopping centre was under a duty to keep the lights on for workers leaving work (along with the question of how the failure to illuminate the area led to the attack i.e. whether the plaintiff still have been mugged if the lights were on). Therefore the question that we are presently interested in, about an occupier's responsibility to protect visitors, is only dealt with as a side issue in that case. But the principle is pretty well-established that, generally, you are not responsible to protect another person from the criminal acts of a third person. The common law has a strong presumption against imposing liability for 'omissions' as distinct from acts, which is another way of saying that the courts don't want people being liable to run out into the street and help people. See paragraphs 27 and 28 and thereabouts in Modbury Triangle. Particular relationships may exist which create such a duty. One is in relation to school children; the school is responsible for taking such care of the child as a parent would. The relevant features of this the school-child relationship include the child's vulnerability as a child and the way the school controls their movements and enviroment during the school day. I presume that your friend is not a child and the university does not control his or her movements. Therefore a court is likely to be looking at the general principle that the university is not responsible for protecting people from the criminal acts of strangers, and then looking (and probably not finding) any special feature of the relationship between your friend and the university that creates an aspect of vulnerability, reliance or control that makes it reasonable to impose a duty of care. Some people think that there is a general principle that if something bad happens to them, some identifiable person with cash must be responsible for paying compensation, whether that is an insurer, the government or a nearby corporation. The common law has not picked up that principle. The common law would slate the responsibility home primarily to the mugger. Sue them. What does the university have to do with it? Conceivably the university might also be liable along with the mugger, but the fact that an injury occurred and nobody else can in practice be held responsible does not in itself make the university liable. As mentioned by Pat W., there may be some other feature that creates a duty, such as if the university had made some change to the environment that allowed made the attack to occur when it wouldn't otherwise have e.g. moving your friend's dormitory so that the only entrance was through a dark alley, or if the attack occurred inside a university building where the university controlled entry (even then not sure that would get your friend over the line).	There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer.	It depends on where you live, but "restrain" doesn't mean telling a person that they have to stay put, it implies either a physical blockage (locking the door) or a threat of force, and neither of those are present or suggested by the sign. We don't know what the consequences are, for example they might report you to your parents or even restrain you if you are a minor (that's who is in most "gym classes"). If you are an adult, the consequence could be some contractual sanction (read the contract) or termination of the contract for breach (read the contract). You can simply ask a supervisor how they intend to enforce this restriction.	The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing	I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly.	Your daughter says of your son: "He hit me." She has made an allegation. Assume that the evidence shows that there is a red mark on her arm, tears and she and her brother were the only two people in the room at the time. This evidence is enough to establish a prima facie case. However, this evidence has not yet been tested. Now, for obvious reasons, we are going to assume that your family operates on an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial model of justice of so it is you who will be doing the testing. You might ask for a statement of the fact from your son. This will almost certainly contradict the evidence of your daughter because ... siblings. Assume that your son says they were arguing over a controller and that your daughter threw it at his head, he ducked and it bounced off the wall and struck her in the arm. So now you might cross-examine both the plaintiff and defendant to try to find any inconsistencies or other reasons to doubt their testimony. Or you might examine the controller for evidence of it being smashed into a thousand very expensive pieces. At the end of this process, you may prefer your daughter's version over your son's: if so, your daughter has met her burden of proof and is entitled to whatever remedy your Solomonic wisdom decrees. However, if you prefer your son's or find them equally plausible then she hasn't and justice requires a remedy in the other direction. This is because it was your daughter who had the burden of proof throughout. However, assume instead you son said: "I hit her but she hit me first". Well now he has admitted to the alleged facts and your daughter's burden is met but he is raising an affirmative defense ("I did it, but ...") rather than a negating defense ("I never did!"). The onus has now shifted to him to demonstrate the required elements of self-defense. Of course, unlike in the public legal system, self-defense is generally not a total defense withing a familial legal system and the best he can hope to do is mitigate the punishment and, vitally important in the interests of justice for children, ensure his sister gets punished too; because vengeance is more important than mercy.
Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? In January 2022 I used an airline to fly from UK to Spain. As soon as I boarded, I made myself comfortable and ready to sleep as I had no opportunity to do so the night before. I took my mask off as I simply can’t sleep with a mask on. As a consequence I was approached 6 times by 3 different flight attendants with their request to wear my mask. I explained that I am exempt and that I don’t need to proof any medical exemption. As they didn’t accept my explanation, they continued telling me to put on my mask. There was no sign of understanding by the flight attendants but instead I was repeatedly asked to put my mask on and furthermore I was threatened in front of half of the passengers that the airplane would need to turn around as I am a bio-terrorist to staff and passengers. They were trying to turn the majority of passengers against me and openly said that I would soon see the reactions AND (physical) actions (aggressions) against me. I repeatedly stated (on the flight) that I don't need to have a medical exemption because there is no doctor or GP in the UK who would provide such an exemption. The UK government website explicitly says that everyone has the right to exempt themselves not necessarily based on any medical conditions! Since when are company's rules above law? Repeating myself but I was clearly harassed, discriminated and threatened by the flight attendants and the captain himself. I am no biohazard to any staff or passengers. General question: The company's T&C (I had agreed to) mentions that I need to provide a medical exemption. As mentioned above there is no such thing available and necessary in the UK. Thus, can the Equality Act 2010 be of any use here to claim compensation? Specific question: Is asking the private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence?	Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it.	Am I correct in arguing that the LHD never really had implied consent to begin with? In other words, does the failure to honour the express refusal inform us about the legitimacy of prior claims of implied consent? No. They had implied consent and had not intent at the outset to dishonor it. They have violated the patient's privacy right when consent was expressly withdrawn, and they discovered that they cannot easily comply and therefore did not comply. The fact that they have made it expensive for themselves to comply with their legal obligations going forward does not imply that they lacked implied consent at the outset, so they should have no liability for the time period from when the training materials started to be used until the time when implied consent ended. They are only responsible going forward for their failure to honor the patient's wishes. It is not at all exceptional for a legal obligation to turn out to be more difficult to comply with when it arises than was anticipated when the systems that make the legal obligation difficult to comply with were implemented. Health care companies aren't expected to be prophets who can foresee the complex confluence of factors that has painted them in a corner, particularly when a situation has never come up before the current one. It is likely that no one person was ever even simultaneously aware of all the facts necessary to know that this could happen. Someone in the IT department will often not be intimately familiar with what is going on in the training part of the operation and what the privacy rules that apply are and even if someone was, that someone may have been in no position to do anything about it at the time. Health care providers aren't supposed to be evaluated with 20-20 hindsight. Given that they almost surely did not and could not easily have known that they had made a future express withdrawal of consent very difficult to effectuate, scienter can't be attributed to it. And, honestly, they are in more than enough trouble simply trying to deal with the problem post-express withdrawal of consent when they did start to violate privacy laws.	I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope).	The U.K. Civil Aviation Authority provides information about making noise complaints to the relevant airport. It also notes that your local planning authority can provide more information about operating hours and noise restrictions. You could also ask at Aviation Stack Exchange for more information about identifying the aircraft and owner. This is also a political issue that Parliament attends to from time to time, so you can talk to your MP about it: Research Briefing: Aviation Noise (2017) Independent Commission on Civil Aviation Noise (2021) At common-law, there might have been causes of action available in trespass, nuisance, or public nuisance, but the Civil Aviation Act 1982 says that "[n]o action shall lie in respect of trespass or in respect of nuisance" as long as aviation regulations and orders are complied with.	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".	In the absence of a contractual agreement saying otherwise, the lawsuit would probably just be subject to normal rules of tort liability. In that case, the contractor would probably lose his case unless he could prove that the one worker infected another through an act of negligence or could otherwise prove that the infected worker knew he was infected and posed a risk to others. In the basic negligence situation, the contractor would likely rely on the general duty we all have to avoid creating unreasonable risks of injury to third parties, and he would need to argue that Worker A somehow breached that duty. Coming to work knowing you're infected would almost certainly satisfy that standard, but it might be enough to simply show that Worker A was at a large gathering of unmasked people whose vaccination status was unknown. From there, he would also need to prove that breaching that duty caused him some injury, presumably by infecting Workers B through M, causing a work slowdown, causing missed deadlines, causing late fees, etc. The contractor might also pursue a claim for reckless, rather than negligent, conduct, if Worker A knew he was infected and came to work just the same. Or he might pursue an intentional tort claim if there was some reason to believe that Worker A was actually trying to get other people sick, as opposed to just ignoring the fact that such a risk existed. As I understand it, several states have also passed laws limiting liability for exposure to COVID in the workplace, so it's possible that none of these claims would be viable, no matter how strong the evidence.	The question of whether a person was acting on their own behalf or that of a company would generally be a question of fact, so if such a case came to court it would be for both sides to present evidence and argue for their interpretation of it. In most cases the context makes it clear. You mention having a company email domain and associated email signature; that is certainly good practice and would go a long way towards creating a presumption that you were acting for a company. Also signing yourself with your job title or role (e.g. "Joe Bloggs, Chief Bottlewasher") makes it clear that you are speaking in your role as an employee. The content of the communication also matters; if you use your company email address to order goods from a supplier that the company has used before then the recipient can reasonably assume that you are ordering on behalf of the company and a court is likely to agree. OTOH if you use the company address to send libellous emails then the recipient would have a much higher bar to claim that this was the company view rather than a personal one.	It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.
Who actually drafts legislation in all its nitty gritty detail in the U.K.? And what is the process like? It seems surprisingly meticulously drafted and most elaborate as to account for every conceivable scenario and counter argument that one might ever encounter or think of. Often it is so meticulous that there are provisions that one can’t make sense of in themselves but once I’ve hears them explained then they actually make perfect sense. So who’s job is it to consider all of these things? Who went down the housing act and picked all the grounds that would be included in section 8, and then decided what length of notice period would go with each? Not just that, but like all the legislation in general. What is the composition process like? Or, who thought up the scheme that immigration would be out of legal aid in laspo for example, unless it implicated HRA art. 3? Innumerable examples abound by the question is basically the same. Not sure what tags to give this but please feel free to add any to think might be suitable.	Parliamentary draftspeople The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel is a group of government lawyers who specialise in drafting legislation. We work closely with departments to translate policy into clear, effective and readable law. Our role will often begin when legislation is first being considered and we will remain involved throughout the Parliamentary process and beyond. I’m afraid you give them too much credit - most legislation is good, some is bad, a small amount is appalling. In the latter case I place the several newly minted laws I've read where there are such large ambiguities that the only way to work out what's legal is to try something, get sued and have the courts decide - good statutes should leave litigants arguing the facts rather than the law as far as possible.	Like a lot of Scottish criminal law, there's no specific legislation, but it is illegal through common law. This was also true in the rest of the UK until the 1800s, when statutes were passed with the aim of making abortion law clearer (generally forbidding it). This didn't extend to Scotland leaving much of its abortion law unclear. The 24 weeks limit that the Scotsman article references is from Section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended). This act did apply to Scotland. The act specifies conditions under which abortion within the first 24 weeks is legal, and that it is always legal when there is grave risk to the woman's health. When the circumstances of the pregnancy fall outside the provisions of the act, the existing Scottish common law prevails. For further information, this UN document provides a good summary of abortion law in the UK.	When do 33D(2) notices actually get used? When, in accordance with section 33D(1), Immigration Act 2014 the conditions at s.32D(2) have been met: The condition is that the Secretary of State has given one or more notices in writing to the landlord which, taken together,— (a)identify the occupier of the premises or (if there is more than one occupier) all of them, and (b)state that the occupier or occupiers are disqualified as a result of their immigration status from occupying premises under a residential tenancy agreement. What operational guidance procedures specify when the home office actually uses this provision? There are no, that I can find, open-source "operational guidance procedures" available. Those that may exist within the Home Office will in all likelihood follow the requirements and conditions stipulated in section 33D of the 2014 Act, section 8 Housing Act 1988, and at the Rules 83.9(5A) and 83.13(2) at Part 83 Civil Procedure Rules and Practice Directions. What can trigger the Home Office's operational procedures to actually send such a notice? When there is sufficient evidence, and it is proportionate and necessary to do so after taking in to account, for example, all the available information about the landlord, the occupiers' immigration status, and the public interest in terminating the agreement. Has the provision entirely fallen out of use? I have not been able to find any publicly available data on this topic, so one option would be to submit a Freedom of Information request for an answer. Also, from a comment: It is almost surely specified/codified in some operational guidance document somewhere, and even if such is non statutory guidance, courts are still semi-bound to lend it some weight in legal contexts. Whether or not to issue of a 33D notice is an operational case-by-case decision based on particular circumstances, so if a court (more likely an Immigration Tribunal) needs to consider the Home Office's internal mechanics, authorisation requirements, quality assurance and other such processes (which, hopefully, should be recorded in detail) then the normal production of evidence / disclosure / discovery rules would apply (with any non-relevant parts properly redacted to prevent unnecessary disclosure).	Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.	You've basically described two of the ends of the pole in theories of jurisprudence (there are dozens of ends). There is no theory of law that relies purely on "spirit" (also no theory that actually relies on the letters uses=d in writing law), instead, everybody interprets the text (the words enacted by the government) and some people supplement their interpretation with consideration of "other factors", such as assumed legislative purpose. Certain scholars and judges are inclined to put most weight on the actual wording of the law, while others are inclined to let purposive considerations dictate the interpretation of a law. Interpreting law by W.N. Eskridge is an informative guide to supplementing a reading of the statute with anciliary considerations. Antonin Scalia is the best-known proponent of the textualist approach.	Regulations - Yes, Acts of Parliament - very rarely In in the united-kingdom diagrams are found in regulations, for example legislation dealing with roadside symbols. There are two kinds of legislation in the UK: Acts of Parliament and Statutory Instruments (normally called Regulations). The procedure by which an Act of Parliament is passed is that it has to be approved by both Houses of the legislature and then receive Royal Assent (Royal Assent is a formality). The procedure in each House is that the main debates occur at the Committee Stage when amendments are proposed and voted on. At the next stage (Third Reading) the House votes again on whether to approve the Bill in its amended form. Statutory Instruments (Regulations) are issued by the government (executive) and are known as delegated legislation because the government only has power to issue a regulation if an Act (called the parent Act) gives it power to do so. As you would expect there are safeguards. First of all the courts can declare invalid (ultra vires) any regulation whose terms go outside the limits of the power delegated by the Parent Act. Sometime the parent Act will provide that Regulations issued by the government under delegated powers become law without further involvement of Parliament but sometimes an Act will provide for some limited further Parliamentary scrutiny. This can be either by the Positive Resolution (the regulation will not become law until Parliament approve it) or by the Negative Resolution procedure (the regulation will become law unless Parliament passes a resolution annulling it). A key point, in the context of the question, is that neither the Positive nor the Negative Resolution procedure allows Parliament to amend the regulation - Parliament only has a binary choice to approve or disapprove. Of course if they disapprove then the government can issue a new amended regulation which then goes through the same process but the Positive/Negative resolution procedure does not allow Parliament itself to amend any regulation. I think this explains why diagrams which are sometimes found in regulations are rarely found in Acts. Constitutional proprieties require any Bill to be amendable and any member of the legislature can propose a amendment. If the Bill included diagrams then there would be huge practical problems because any member who wanted to amend a diagram would have to produce his own amended diagram which he might not be able to do/might not have time to do before parliamentary deadlines. So constitutional proprieties would normally mean that in practice Bills must be solely words. Regulations however cannot be amended by Parliament (see above) so such considerations do not prevent regulations from containing diagrams. Having said that normally Bills will only contain words, there is this example of an Act which includes a diagram of a symbol. That symbol, however, is defined in an international convention so in practice no parliamentarian would want to amend it. I know of no examples in the UK where a Bill (as distinct from regulations) contains an image which a member of the legislature might want to propose an amendment to.	States have a general police power, meaning that they can pass laws about whatever they want unless there's a specific reason they can't. A state does not have to give special justification for why something is in the realm of stuff they can regulate; someone challenging it has to say what specific section of the Constitution it violates. For a time, the Due Process clause of the US Constitution was considered to imply freedom of contract. This time ended in the 1930s. The doctrine of a constitutionally protected freedom of contract is pretty much completely dead. A state can't abridge the freedom of contract for no reason, but that's because just about any law needs some reason to be allowed. The level of review is that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest; this is not a very demanding level of review. Source State bar associations are given power by laws making it illegal to practice law without being a member of the bar and requiring licensed lawyers to comply with bar rules. State bars that control admission to practice are generally government agencies (specifically, agencies of the court system). When the state bar is not a government agency, attorney discipline and licensing is handled by a government agency (lawyers might have to join the bar, but the bar has to accept licensed lawyers as members; the bar's power in these cases is limited to recommendations to the courts).	This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.
Who owns the intellectual property rights relating to a stolen NFT? Bored Ape non-fungible blockchain tokens (NFTs) change hands for tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars. For this money you get two things, A) the technical ability to create transactions involving these NFTs (as one gets with fungible blockchain tokens such as bitcoin) and B) the right to "use, copy, and display the purchased Art" and "creating derivative works" for personal and commercial use. "Ownership of the NFT is mediated entirely by the Smart Contract and the Ethereum Network". These are frequently the target of scams, such that it is reported that they get "stolen". Eg. Businessman Timothy McKimmy is the former owner of Bored Ape #3475, an NFT he purchased in December for 55 ETH (then about $232,000). A security vulnerability allowed an outside party to access his wallet, in order to list and sell Plaintiff's Bored Ape at about $30 and then sell it for a bit over $300,000. While the buyer in this situation undoubtedly gets the technical ability to create transactions involving this NFT, what about the intellectual property rights? I am quite sure the buyer paid the money in the assumption that they were gaining the IP, and the ability to exploit this commercially in the future. The seller did not agree to a contract, so there was no "meeting of minds" that would usually be required for the creation of a contract. The document that appears to assign the IP appears to defer to the blockchain to define ownership (quote above). Any jurisdiction would be interesting, any that differ particularly so. Bored Ape #3475 that was "stolen"	It may be useful to draw a distinction between the NFT and the Art referenced by this NFT. There is no intellectual property in an NFT itself because an NFT is not a creative work, invention, or trade secret. Ownership of the NFT. As far as I'm aware, no laws recognize the Ethereum blockchain as an arbiter of ownership. However, NFTs and other “crypto” assets seem to be recognized as property. Thus, it can be the case that lawful ownership diverges from the ownership records on the blockchain. In the referenced scenario, someone gained control over an NFT but likely did not receive the property rights in that NFT (i.e. stole it). License to use the Art. The “Bored Ape Yacht Club” terms define ownership of the NFT purely in terms of the Ethereum blockchain, and ignore legal ownership: Ownership of the NFT is mediated entirely by the Smart Contract and the Ethereum Network The blockchain-owner of the NFT is then granted a license to use the Art via these terms. This leads to the following conclusions: There are no intellectual property rights in the NFT. Any intellectual property rights in the Art are held by Yuga Labs LLC, the company behind the “Bored Ape Yacht Club”. Nothing in the terms transfers ownership in the Art. Yuga Labs LLC grants the blockchain-owner of the NFT a license to use the Art. Here, this means that the thief held the license, then after the sale the subsequent buyer. Yuga Labs LLC does not grant the legal owner of the NFT any rights, in case the legal owner and the blockchain-owner are distinct. Of course, nothing would prevent Yuga Labs LLC from also granting a license to the legal owner of the LLC. They can still do so retroactively, as their license grant to the blockchain-owner is probably not exclusive. But I would be surprised if they would do so, since it would shatter the “NFT = Art” and “Blockchain = Ownership” illusion that their business model relies on.	How can I find out whom the intellectual property now belongs to? For the patent, is this possible through the patent office? If it is a patent, the patent office; if it is a copyright, the copyright registrar. You could also look at the return from the auction in the bankruptcy court case file, which would control even if the patent office and copyright registrar records haven't yet been updated. You could also call the person who conducted the auction, or the lawyer who arranged for the auction, to ask. Often they would cooperate in telling you this information since a bankruptcy auction is, by definition, a public sale anyway, and cooperation might help them gain positive referrals from you in the future. If the assignee has not been changed in the patent register, is it possible to reassign the patent to myself, since the company has apparently neglected to do so? No. Doing this would be a form of fraud or embezzlement. The intellectual property became the property of the bankruptcy estate. If the bankruptcy estate is determined to have property not disposed of in the case, you would have to petition the bankruptcy court to have the remaining assets sold for the benefit of the creditors of the estate at fair market value. The Follow Up Questions I'm going to decline to answer the follow up question about how to arrange to purchase intellectual property from someone when you would like to own it, once you determine who the owner is. This is a more general question that applies to lots of circumstances and is as much a question of economics as law. There is an Ask Patents.SE forum, which might be a more appropriate place to ask that question.	if I directly purchase this custom content... As a general rule, "intellectual property" is very different from tangible property - arguably, "intellectual property" is a misnomer. Trying to apply concepts from property law (such as "a thing has a single owner, who can do anything not illegal with it as they please") is fraught with danger. You would generally not "purchase content", but rather purchase a license for the content, allowing you to do various things. One of those things might be to "curate/edit this collection of recordings and present it publicly as an art project (probably just online)". Another might be to "to sell or otherwise profit from this". All that depends on what your contract says. In an ideal world(?), contracts would all be detailed enough to leave no uncertainty about what is allowed and what is not. In the real world, a bunch of SMS can form a contract. For instance, the following is a contract: A (version 1): Hey B, could you send me a clip of you waving at the camera? I will pay $10 for it. B: sure ...but it’s not clear what A and B agreed as to what the clip would be used for. Saving and viewing on A’s device, probably yes; putting it in fullscreen in the next blockbuster movie, probably no. Showing it to A’s friends, putting it in an art project? That’s getting dicey. You might have heard about "work for hire" granting full copyright control to whoever pays for the work to be created. In the united-states, the above exchange does not explicitly designate the content as work-for-hire, as would be required by 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("...if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire"). Here’s a better SMS contract: A (version 2): Hey B, could you send me a clip of you waving at the camera? I will use it to make an art project, collating many such clips, and publishing that on the internet. I will pay $10 for it. B: sure Here there’s no question that B agreed with the proposed use. On the other hand, it’s likely than a different use would be deemed a copyright violation - the contract was proposed by A and should be understood as limiting A’s right to use the clip to exactly what they said they would do. If they wanted it to say something else, they could have sent a different SMS (see contra proferentem).	From what I can see on the USPTO registry, "tweet" is still not trademarked for the purposes you're talking about. Twitter has been working to secure that trademark, but I can't find any record of them having actually secured it. Just the same, I'd predict that using it will get you at least a cease-and-desist letter, and possibly a lawsuit. Whether you'd win that case seems to be a very open question, but that presumes you have the resources to litigate.	Does this mean that if the employee leaves the company, and then creates or gain an intellectual property right, does the company own that right ? No. The reference to "the future" pertains only to the IPRs of inventions that ensued in the course of his employment. Even if the employer alleged that the clause also encompasses post-employment creations and/or post-employment acquisitions of IPR, such extension would be unconscionable (and therefore null and void).	The IP was licensed to a company to allow people to put it on their shirts as part of a hobby. It did not license anyone to sell shirts with those prints already applied on them, least of all a third party. That is, Disney licensed a company to sell prints for sewing on shirts, not shirts. When you moved into the shirt market, you are competing with Disney for a different licensed product. Disney may offer a shirt with the same image of Mickey Mouse on it (or may wish to in the future) and you are competing and with copyrighted characters to boot. This wouldn't happen if you were to walk into a Disney Store, buy a shirt, and later sell it on a second hand market as you have legally purchased a shirt with a print on it (as opposed to selling a shirtless print with a shirt on it for profit). Even if the shirt fetches a higher bidding price on EBay because it is a collector's item as Disney is in the market of selling brand new never worn Disney shirts and does not want to be in the market of second hand Disney shirts that some guy may have sweated in. Furthermore, if you are posting the picture wearing the new shirt with the sewing print applied, but not with the intention to sell the shirt, but say, discuss the consumer experience of using Disney's product, then it also wouldn't count as here you are giving an opinion on the quality of Disney's merchandise, which may affect sales, but is not competitively selling a similar product. For example, if I have a blog that reviews movies and I say "Avengers: Infinity War was better than Avengers: Endgame", I'm not selling Endgame, but stating my subjective opinion on the film and that it wasn't the best foot forward compared to a similarly offered product. Product Reviews (in the United States) fall under a specific subset of protection against IP rights claims called Fair Use, which allows for a new product to be produced using copyrighted property so long as the product is material changed (for example, I'm if it was IP theft, I would have to sell the Endgame film in full. But since Disney is selling a movie and I am selling a review of the movie, we are not competing in the same market space). Fair Use is considered an affirmative defense, which means that the defense must meet a burden of proof in its claim. Affirmative Defenses essentially are Defenses where you in part agree with the claim, but the dispute is on the context in which the action took place. Without showing evidence that the circumstances of the action are not such that make it unlawful, such defense would basically be pleading guilty. Suppose then you are accused of taking a cookie for the cookie jar. Ordinarily, the person making the claim would have to show it's not you and could never be someone else, thus your defense would be that maybe Jane stole them. Or the evidence hinges on proving "WHO unlawfully took the Cookies From the Cookie Jar?" In an Affirmative Defense, you would answer the charge by questioning by saying that both you and the complaint against you agree to a statement "You TOOK the cookies from the cookie jar" but have disagreements on his statement that "You UNLAWFULLY took the cookies from the cookie jar." because your mother gave you permission to have a cookie and have evidence to support that. In many copyright cases that could be Fair Use, there is nothing stopping Disney from making the claim, so Disney can still file a suit and hope that their army of lawyers scares people into stopping even if you could have a valid fair use, as that is a burden you must prove. Of the three possible outcomes for the suit, either the matter is settled quietly outside of the courts and does not make case law, Or the courts find in favor of Disney OR Find against Disney. Disney wins in two of these outcomes, including the settlement of complying with a cease and desist notice (which is not a lawsuit, but a threat of a lawsuit should the practice continue) as you are doing what they want and a settlement will still show Disney will sue to other potential violators where as a losing case will create binding law (in common law systems, like the U.S.) that could limit Disney, but even then the victory is Pyrrhic at best as Disney can usually afford legal fees incurred where as you are less likely to be able to afford to see a case all the way through to a favorable outcome. Thus Disney will sue in cases it would likely loses as they gamble that the threat of the financial impact of reaching a decision in a court is something that will scare you into stopping. This is especially true on some websites like Youtube which would be threatened with suits for hosting a third party video and until very recently (2016 or 17) Youtube would give into the copyright holders despite a valid Fair Use claim existing. These practices can be defeated if one can argue in a court that Disney is doing this unfavorable fair use (called and anti-SLAPP) but this relies on the defense having knowledge of the law and the time to press the matter... ceasing is much easier and cost effective.	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.	germany I am reasonably sure that works like this would be Public Domain, i.e. not copyrighted in the first place. In Germany, copyright (or more precisely, Author's Right) can only be held by a natural person, which is a legal term of art that essentially means "human being". There are two groups of natural persons involved here: the programmers and the creators of the works which are part of the training set. However, I can't see how either group could have a reasonable claim of copyright. Note: there have been similar discussions about GitHub Copilot, an AI that writes code for you. It is my understanding that the process used by GitHub Copilot is roughly comparable to the process used here. With GitHub Copilot, there have been instances where significant snippets which are part of the training set have appeared in the output with only minor alterations. In this case, it is likely that the original author will have copyright over that portion of the output. However, IFF a human being were actually involved in selecting specific works, then there is probably a copyright based on the creative decision of selecting this particular work and rejecting all the others. This is similar to the classic textbook example of a driftwood sculpture: the creative process here is not creating the sculpture but choosing to pick up this particular piece of driftwood instead of the hundreds of others on the beach. So, if you simply generate these works and publish all of them, there is no copyright. If you generate a large batch and then select a certain number, then the person who made the selection might hold a copyright.
How can a tenancy be ended in France? I saw a comment by @Woj on another question here: Landlord gives 4 months notice to the rental agency which fails to give notice to the tenants Since everyone is mentioning their country - in France you basically have no way to end a lease (very few exceptions apply) so you just hope for the best when you ask your tenant to leave. I do not even go into the case where they actively refuse (in this case they are practically immovable, add a young child to this and the place is theirs) Which made me wonder about this. How do tenancies work in France and how do they differ from common law jurisdictions like England and Wales?	The official website of the french administration gives details under which conditions a landlord can end a lease in France. As a general rule, the landlord cannot end a lease unless meeting certain conditions. The landlord has to send a letter to all of the tenant (all of them if multiple) named on the lease, and the spouse of the tenant even if not named on the lease. The letter has to be sent at least 6 month before the end of the lease if the residence isn't furnished, or 3 months if the residence is furnished. The letter must contain the reason for the ending of the lease. There are 3 causes the landlord may use to end the lease: The landlord plans to make the residence the primary residence of them, their spouse / partner (of at least 1 year) / PACS partner, or an ascendant or descendant of the landlord or their spouse. The landlord plans to sell the residence. In this case, the tenant has the priority to buy the residence if they wish. If the tenant take the offer, the landlord is obliged to accept the offer. The landlord can also sell the residence with the lease, in which case the lease is transfered to the buyer. Under legitimate and serious cause, including but not limited to not paying rent / regularly paying the rent late, causing trouble to the neighborhood, subleasing the residence... If the tenant contests the cause, the landlord will have to justify to a judge the reason the cause of termination. In this case, the landlord can have ground to end the lease before its end date. Otherwise, the landlord cannot end the lease, and the lease is automatically renewed at the end date without the need of explicit communication. A tenant can be protected if they fall under certain conditions. I don't find anything protecting people with a child, but if the tenant is older than 65yo / taking care of someone older than 65yo and the tenant earns an income lower than a certain limit a given year Then the tenant can be protected from these causes, unless the landlord is also older than 65 or earns an income lower than the same limit as the tenant or offers to help relocate the tenant to another residence close to the first residence which also accomodates to the need of the tenant. Note that, if the ex-tenant found that the cause given by the landlord was fraudulent (for example saying they'll use it as a primary residence but lease it to another tenant), then the tenant can bring the case to court and get indemnized as indicated here.	he is jointly liable for the remaining 3 months, even though he never signed anything. Is this true? That seems unlikely. The lease is between Adam and the landlord. Although the lease might have language making all tenants jointly and severally liable, it would affect Bob only if it can be proved that he was aware of those terms when he moved in. Your description does not elaborate on any agreement(s) between Adam and Bob. But Adam is not allowed to impose on Bob any obligations merely because relations between them broke down. Absent a contract between Adam and Bob, the question of whether Adam is entitled to any recovery from Bob could only be assessed on equitable grounds.	Michigan law say nothing about landlord entry, so whatever it says in the lease is what is allowed. Various sources like this comment on the lack of such statutory regulations. There does not appear to be any relevant case law for Michigan which impose restrictions on a landlord's right to access a rental. Since there is no statutory or case law restriction on landlord's right to access his property, landlord's agent would have the same right to access. That would mean that if the listing agent were authorized by the landlord to enter, then the agent could enter, and it would not be necessary for the landlord to accompany this agent whenever entry was needed. That does not mean that a "listing agent" that happens to work with a landlord has an independent right to enter the landlord's property. The same would go for repairmen. It is actually not clear to me whether there could be blanket permission for any and all with access to the lock box to enter, since pretty much any realtor can enter a house for sale, subject to whatever the stated limitations are, and they don't call the owner for each entry. I suspect that one would not have legal grounds for imposing a particular additional restriction on a landlord's right to access and permit access to the property, since there's no overriding statute, and restrictions on landlord access mainly derive from statutes.	As far as I know, no jurisdiction in the US relieves a person of their contractual lease obligations when they are required by law to leave the country. However, many (perhaps most) states require the landlord to make an effort to re-rent an abandoned unit, which reduces the size of the tenant's liability. Unless the landlord just gives up on the claim for $8K, you would have that liability, which could be collected through legal process. The landlord might do this in her jurisdiction, which would no doubt result in a default judgment (because you won't show up). Theoretically, she could also pursue you in your home country, but that is much more complicated, expensive, and subject to whatever discretionary dim view the local courts have of US immigration law, or other tenant-related laws (the courts would have to conclude that there was a wrong by the standards of that country). A variant of suing you in your home country is suing you in the US and having the judgment enforced in the foreign country, but that against depends on the legal system of that country and treaties between the country and the US. Since visitor visas are a highly discretionary legal entitlement, it's impossible to say "won't" w.r.t. the question of whether a visa application will be denied because of an unpaid monetary judgment. It's also impossible to say "won't" because the law can change at any time. With those caveats, there does not appear to be any concrete reason to believe that a visitor visa will be denied because you skipped out on a lease. A visa can be denied and one can be perma-banned for lying on interview questions, so the hope is that there isn't a question "do you have any money judgments against you in the US".	No All parties must agree to change a contract. On the face of it, the New Tenant has to be “acceptable to both the Landlord and the remaining individual or individuals comprising the Tenant (the Remaining Tenant)”. It goes on to describe what the landlord may consider in making this assessment; there is no such imposition on the Remaining Tenant. However, there is implicit in a contract a requirement that the parties must act reasonably when using discretion. If Remaining Tenant repeatedly rejects every proposed New Tenant then this raises the question of if they are acting reasonably. Have you clearly articulated why the proposed replacements are unacceptable and are those reasonable reasons?	There are two separate issues here. Firstly, the deposit. Any deposit is required by law to either be placed in an approved deposit scheme provider at the start of any tenancy, or be insured with a provider. Either way, the landlord (or their letting agent) is required to issue the tenant with certain prescribed information within a certain period, as well as meet a few other requirements. Failing to do this can result in the landlord having to return the deposit and pay a fine to the tenant - if the tenant is willing to take him to court. If the landlord has done everything by the book, they don't owe you anything. (If they've paid the deposit into a scheme, then they will not receive any interest, as it's kept by the scheme provider to pay for their services.) Secondly, the renewal fee. These are legal and commonplace. However, you're never obliged to renew your tenancy, as if the fixed term expires and you don't leave, then it automatically becomes a statutory periodic tenancy (often called a "rolling tenancy"). With a periodic tenancy, you can leave by giving one month's notice in writing; or your landlord can request that you leave by issuing a section 21 notice, which gives you two months to depart or face legal action. If you tell the landlord that you would like to change to a periodic tenancy when the current fixed term ends, then no-one has to do anything (though the letting agency may charge you an admin fee). The landlord cannot impose a new tenancy agreement, but they can issue a section 21 notice. Or, as you suggest, you can request a longer fixed term. This provides more security for you and the landlord - though it makes it harder to leave early, as you're potentially liable for the rent for the whole term.	I assume you are not legally emancipated. To evict anyone, there is a legal process – nobody can just kick a tenant out, without the appropriate court order. These guys describe the process for evicting an adult child (where the child does not have a lease and is a tenant at will). A custodial parent has a legal obligation to provide, among other things, a place for the child to live. Kicking a child out is contrary to that obligation, and could constitute child abandonment ("neglect" under CRS 19-3-102), and that is a crime. A court would not grant a parent's motion to evict a minor child. If a landlord takes the law into his own hands, as it were, he can be sued under CRS 38-12-510.	I am an Ontario-licensed lawyer. The following is a general information about the law and not specific legal advice. You are not my client and I have not given you advice related to your circumstances. First, even when you ask a generic question, define the jurisdiction of interest. For the purpose of your question, Canada is a collection of different jurisdictions with different rules. My answer relates to Ontario, Canada. Other Canadian jurisdictions have different rules. The Law The applicable Section 109 of Ontario's Residential Tenancies Act http://canlii.ca/t/33p is reproduced below for your convenience. EMPHASES MINE. Receipt for payment 109 (1) A landlord shall provide FREE OF CHARGE to a tenant or former tenant, on request, a receipt for the payment of any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent or any other amount paid to the landlord. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (1). Former tenant (2) Subsection (1) applies to a request by a FORMER TENANT only if the request is made within 12 months after the tenancy terminated. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (2). Regulation Ontario Regulation 516/06 http://canlii.ca/t/sjx dictates minimal form: Receipt A document constitutes a receipt for the purposes of section 109 of the Act if it includes, at a minimum, (a) the address of the rental unit to which the receipt applies; (b) the name of the tenants to whom the receipt applies; (c) the amount and date for each payment received for any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent, or any other amount paid to the landlord and shall specify what the payment was for; (d) the name of the landlord of the rental unit; and (e) the signature of the landlord or the landlord’s authorized agent. O. Reg. 516/06, s. 9. Landlord Compliance A good landlord will provide receipts immediately upon payment, and keep a copy. An very good landlord will provide additionally a summary of payments for the year, in tabulated form, and keep a copy of the yearly receipt instead of the multiple receipts for each payment. An excellent landlord will keep the tabulated information in a computer system and will issue a receipt for the whole tenancy period on termination. Keep a copy. Tenant's Application If your Ontario landlord refuse to comply with the above, file a T2 http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Tenant%20Applications%20&%20Instructions/T2.pdf *A T2 can also be filed online. Remember to ask for cost http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Interpretation%20Guidelines/03%20-%20Costs.html
Is homicide by misadventure illegal? Recently I was looking over the definitions of the different types of homicides and I came across the term “homicide by misadventure.” This is when somebody accidentally kills somebody else while engaged in a legal activity and without any intent to cause harm. Unfortunately, I was unable to find out whether it's illegal. It seems like it shouldn't be (after all, you're not trying to hurt anybody, being neglectful, or doing illegal stuff), but law can be weird sometimes. Is Homicide by Misadventure illegal?	“homicide by misadventure." . . . is when somebody accidentally kills somebody else while engaged in a legal activity and without any intent to cause harm. There is a criminal offense sometimes called negligent homicide, and sometimes called involuntary manslaughter (in some jurisdictions this is limited to, for example, vehicular homicide and homicide caused with a deadly weapon or involving a child or vulnerable adult). Where this offense is present, it requires a level of intent of at least "criminal negligence" which is roughly equivalent to "gross negligence" in civil lawsuits and is almost, but not quite recklessness. But if the conduct causing the death involves merely ordinary negligence at a level providing a basis for a civil action for negligence, or only involves acts which unforeseeably cause death despite the fact that the person carrying out the act used the care of a reasonable person under the circumstances (in which case there is a basis for a civil lawsuit only in the rare circumstances where there is strict liability), this is not a crime. Sometimes, however, the conduct involved may violate some other law (e.g. speeding or hunting after having already reached one's game kill limit) that is a lesser crime, even though it is not a homicide crime.	These charges aren't the same offense. They are three different offenses, all of which arise from the same conduct. Imagine throwing a grenade in a building because you saw a police officer about to discover evidence connecting you to a crime. I think most people would agree that there's no reason you could not be charged with murder, arson, and tampering with evidence under those circumstances. Likewise, Chauvin committed multiple distinct offenses when he kneeled on George Floyd's neck -- for instance, murder charges are based on the act of causing a death, while manslaughter charges are based on the act of creating a risk of death -- and the state is free to seek punishment for all of those offenses. Double jeopardy doesn't have any application to the case at this point. The Double Jeopardy Clause doesn't say you can't face multiple charges for the same conduct; it says you can't face multiple trials for the same charges.	Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.	That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism.	I don't think that simply failing to make a sufficient explanation of the risks would make a death manslaughter. Three would have to have been serious negligence in addition, rather beyond the level needed to find malpractice, as I understand the matter. Law.com says that: Voluntary manslaughter includes killing in heat of passion or while committing a felony. Involuntary manslaughter occurs when a death is caused by a violation of a non-felony [sic], such as reckless driving. The Wikipedia article on Manslaughter says that Involuntary manslaughter is the homicide of a human being without intent of doing so, either expressed or implied. It is distinguished from voluntary manslaughter by the absence of intention. It is normally divided into two categories, constructive manslaughter and criminally negligent manslaughter, both of which involve criminal liability. Constructive manslaughter is also referred to as "unlawful act" manslaughter. It is based on the doctrine of constructive malice, whereby the malicious intent inherent in the commission of a crime is considered to apply to the consequences of that crime. It occurs when someone kills, without intent, in the course of committing an unlawful act. ... Criminally negligent manslaughter is variously referred to as criminally negligent homicide in the United States, and gross negligence manslaughter in England and Wales. In Scotland and some Commonwealth of Nations jurisdictions the offence of culpable homicide might apply. It occurs where death results from serious negligence, or, in some jurisdictions, serious recklessness. A high degree of negligence is required to warrant criminal liability. ... An example is where a doctor fails to notice a patient's oxygen supply has disconnected and the patient dies (R v Adomako). Another example could be leaving a child locked in a car on a hot day	Actually, neither the council nor a private owner are responsible for illegal actions by unauthorised people on their property. This is obvious: if an intruder enters your property and, while there, shoots someone you cannot be held responsible. However ... Since you have made them aware that there are intruders on their property acting illegally and causing a nuisance to the neighbours and they have done nothing they are quite likely negligent, even recklessly negligent. Rather than sue them, consult a lawyer and get them to write a letter that if they do not take action by X date you are going to sue them.	No. This is not possible. You cannot give consent to homicide, and only the state can provide immunity from prosecution. Consent is not a "justification" or "excuse" under Oregon law, as those terms are defined in its penal code (there is nothing even remotely close in the definition of the relevant terms). Assisting suicide under Oregon law is, however, a situation which can reduce a homicide offense from murder to manslaughter: ORS 163.117 (2015) Causing or aiding suicide as defense to charge of murder It is a defense to a charge of murder that the defendant’s conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Nothing contained in this section shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter or any other crime.	Possibly negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter. Really dependson the state where this happens and the exact elements that need to be proven. Lester has asked his wife to do something that he knows might result in her death and does not warn her. He probably has a duty to warn her.
What do statements that “X does not affect your statutory rights” accomplish? Often return policies will say something like none of these terms should be taken to curtail your statutory rights as a consumer”. What would be different if companies didn’t write these lines?	In one sense, nothing. Absence of such language would not cancel any statutory rights. One purpose of such language is that the consumer cannot later claim that the company tried to hide those statutory rights. In some consumer protection statutes, attempting to decisive a consumer into thinking that s/he does not have the rights granted by statute may itself be unlawful and a ground for damages. Also a court may be less likely to void the contract as contrary to the statue, when the contract says that it should be read as subject to the statute and the consumer's rights under it. Also, once such language becomes common, drafters of corporate contract language often imitate it without thinking what actual purpose it serves.	You’ve presented a number of different scenarios, without a lot of specifics, so I’ll start from the top, and from a US perspective. A very generic term that would come up in this situation is material misstatement. one might say that an account or line item is overstated or understated, or a misstatement could arise from the omission of a necessary note, because notes are an integral part of the financial statements. Financial statements are said to be materially misstated if the misstatement would affect the choice of a typical decisionmaker. There’s no explicit standard for what is or isn’t material, but in practice, auditors often choose some small fraction of net income as the threshold. Materiality can also be caused by positive vs. negative earnings, or other thresholds, like financing agreements which might oblige the company to keep its current ratio above a certain level, for example. In the US, the rules to which the statements have to be materially correct are known as GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and they are codified in the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Accounting Standards Codification (FASB ASC). Depending on how the scheme is arranged, issues in the realm of “buying stuff as a “customer” to make the business look good” include: Substance over form: it may not be appropriate to recognize as a sale at all. If the net effect is a transfer of cash from the owner or manager to the business, while the goods find their way back into the company warehouse, that could be considered as paid-in-capital, or even a liability, rather than a sale. Owner bought some product to inject cash, and put the goods back in the inventory? That’s cash from the stockholder, not a customer sale. Somebody in management moved a truckload of product to his storage unit, only to return it after year end? That might be more accurately characterized as a loan, not a sale. I don’t know of any specific terms for this exclusively, but there have certainly been cases where companies moved inventory to undisclosed warehouses in an effort to hide fictitious sales from their independent auditors. Edit: Another term for certain sales without commercial substance is a “roundtrip transaction” or “roundtripping.” Disclosure notes: even if there is commercial substance to the transaction, it may require disclosure notes, such as those for related party transactions, as required by ASC 850. Transactions with related parties must be disclosed even if they are not given accounting recognition (ASC 850-05-5). Examples of related parties are given in ASC 850-05-3, including “an entity and its principal owners, management, or members of their immediate families,” among others. Under the relevant definition, a person does not need a formal title to be considered a member of management (ASC 850-10-20). The related party disclosure is not required in consolidated financial statements, for transactions that are eliminated in the consolidation process (ASC 850-10-50-1). For sales from a public company to a bona-fide external customer, there’s also the major customers disclosure, but the threshold for that is 10% of revenue, which is much more than enough to materially impact the bottom line. Generally, transactions between a parent company and a subsidiary will be eliminated in the preparation of the parent’s (consolidated) financial statements (ASC 810). This means if the parent company A sells goods with a carrying value of $30 to its subsidiary, B, at a price of $50, A doesn’t recognize that $20 gross profit until B sells the goods to an outside party. Internally, B might carry the goods at $50 on B’s books, but A would have to cancel it out so that only $30 of that appears on A’s consolidated balance sheet. The consolidation method is applied when one business has a controlling interest in another, and in summary it means that the parent company reports A+B’s financials as if it was all a single entity. That means B’s assets and liabilities, revenues and expenses, are all reported as part of A. It also means any transactions between B and A are transactions within the entity; you wouldn’t recognize a gain or loss (nor revenue and GP) if your marketing department sold office equipment to your engineering department, and you don’t get to with subsidiaries either. Consolidation requires not only eliminating revenues, cost of goods sold, and excess carrying value of inventories on intra-entity transactions; it's also gains and losses on things like equipment, meaning the same transaction could require a consolidation adjustment twenty years later to eliminate excess depreciation expense. Long story short, ASC 810 deals with consolidation, and those rules apply when you create or purchase a subsidiary to buy your stuff, or use a subsidiary to pass the same $200,000 back and forth. When the parent entity does not have a controlling interest in the investee (the basic threshold is 50% of voting shares, or by some other agreement) but does have significant influence (representation on the board or other factors in ASC 323-10-15-6), then it will be treated as an equity method investment. Instead of adding the line items together, it's a single asset and A's portion of B's earnings are a single line item on the income statement, but the adjustments are similar to those in a consolidation. Another kind of revenue recognition game which companies used to play involved bill-and-hold arrangements, wherein the customer (or the “customer,” or a salesperson without any real input from the supposed customer) would place an order, and the company would send (or at least, prepare and book) an invoice (revenue), but not ship the goods until the customer actually asked for them. These days, the rules on revenue recognition are fairly guarded against these kinds of things, but some other examples of “sales” that aren’t really sales include consignment arrangements, repurchase agreements (could be a sale with right of return, or depending on terms could be effectively a lease or a financing arrangement), and the gross vs net revenue issue for principle/agent situations (airline and hotel booking sites are a popular example. If they’re an agent they’re required to report their commission on a net basis but would likely prefer to look bigger by calling it a $110 sale and $100 cost of goods sold, instead of just $10 revenue). If you’re interested in management schemes to mislead the users of financial statements, check out the SEC’s online archive of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) here. Some of them just deal with individual professionals who should know better, but they can be pretty interesting, whether they involve poor ICFR, or intentional deception on the part of upper management (it's on management either way).	The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission.	Some kinds of companies (e.g. freight shipping companies and banks) often do have those policies. The real issue is not whether those policies are permitted, but what the consequences are for breaking them. The fact that a company forbids its employees from exercising a legal right doesn't mean that the employee ceases to have that legal right. It simply means that if the employee exercises that legal right, then the employee has breached the contract and may suffer the consequences for breaching that contract. Violations of those policies are grounds for termination from employment, and this would probably not be void as a matter of public policy. For an employee at will this is really pretty meaningless, although it could conceivably affect unemployment benefit eligibility. But, for a unionized or civil service employee who can only be fired for cause, this is a big deal. But, in theory, a company policy does not impact the tort liability or the criminal liability of the individual engaging in legally privileged self-defense to anyone. This is because two people can't contractually change their legal duties to third parties with whom they are not in privity (i.e. with whom they do not have a contractual relationship). And two people also can't contractually change the terms of a country's penal laws. The policy may be a defense of the company from vicarious liability for the employee's use of force in violation of the policy that gives rise to civil liability for the employee because the grounds for authorizing self-defense were not present. If the employee using force did so wrongfully and was sued for negligence rather than battery, the existence of the company policy might also go to the issue of whether the employee was acting negligently since a reasonable person in the employee's shoes might have been less likely to wrongfully use force in purported self-defense if there was such a policy than if there was not such a policy (and instead there might arguably have been a legal fiduciary duty as an agent to protect the property and workers of the principal in the absence of the policy).	If someone gave a gift than requested it back is it legal? The request itself is legal, but that does not mean that you have to comply with it. I never promised anything that tied to the tablet. So I'm not sure if it counts as a conditional gift. It does not. An unconditional gift (which initially you did not even want) fails to meet the elements of a cognizable doctrine such as contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, or unjust enrichment. he says he will report the tablet as stolen if I don't return it He might get in trouble if he does that, since he knows or should know that the tablet was never stolen. He gave it away despite your initial refusal(s). As such, he might incur false reporting of a crime.	The issue of who pays directly for the items and/or to contractors is irrelevant. The important thing is to memorialize the agreement/arrangement in writing so as to preempt or solve eventual disputes. A clearly written agreement signed by the parties would supersede any presumption of conditions and rights arising solely from the parties' conduct.	if these questions and answers are found to be legally binding ... They aren’t. Therefore the premise of your question is flawed. It’s like asking “If my dog was a cat ...”. Well, since your dog isn’t a cat we don’t need to hear the rest of the question.	No They will list the price they are charging you. This will normally be greater than what they paid because that’s how business works. The amount they are allowed to charge is what you agreed in your contract with them (which may incorporate a price list) or, if the contract is silent, a reasonable amount. What is reasonable will be related to what the market in your geographical area charges. While this is indirectly related to the input cost of a given item, business can and do charge what the market allows.
How is anti discrimination legislation reconciled with freedom of contract? Let's say a landlord doesn't like someone's personality and chooses not to enter into a contract. In most common law territories this is their right to do businessor not as a private party with whomsoever they may choose. Let's say a racist landlord owns a house and declines to rent it out to someone because they are black, or gay, or a Muslim or Communist. In most places it is accepted that this is illegal. Does one of these principles not have a more foundational/axiomatic position than the other? The second described one definitely came later like in the twentieth century, but how was it integrated, conceptually? Was it reconciled so as to be arguably coherent? Or was it introduced as a newly axiomatically accepted exception to the former principle of freedom of association/Nonassoxiation as a private individual? If it is conceptually reconciled then how was this done?	Freedom of contract has always been subject to current law. A contract to hire a hitman has never been legal. Neither was a contract to invade one of the royal monopolies that the English kings used to grant, nor a contract under which a judge would make a particular decision in return for a bribe. "Freedom of contract" has never been "foundational" or "axiomatic" to the extent that a contract allowed a party to override a law, unless the law specifically allowed for that. (In some cases a law establishes a default rule for a situation, but reads something like: "unless the parties agree to the contrary".) During the so-called "Lochner era" the US Supreme Court on multiple occasions "[struck] down economic regulations adopted by a State based on the Court's own notions of the most appropriate means for the State to implement its considered policies"{1) The "era" was named for the case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) in which the Court struct down state law setting maximum working hours for bakers as a violation of "freedom of contract". The Court held that the law, which prohibited employing a baker or baker's assistant for more than 10 hours per day or 60 hours per week, was an: unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the individual to contract. The Wikipedia article on the era (linked above) states that: The beginning of the era is usually marked earlier, with the Court's decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897), and its end marked forty years later in the case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), which overturned an earlier Lochner-era decision.{2} According to the Wikipedia article: The Lochner era has been criticized from the left for judicial activism, routinely overturning the will of Congress, and also for the Court's failure to allow the political process to redress increasingly unequal distributions of wealth and power.{3} Criticism among conservative scholars has focused on the use of substantive due process as a vehicle for protecting rights not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.{4} Robert Bork called the Court's decision in Lochner v. New York an "abomination" that "lives in the law as a symbol, indeed the quintessence of judicial usurpation of power."{5}{6} The axiomatic rule has long been that any contract is subject to current law, and that "freedom of contract" was limited by wherever valid current laws restricted contracts or their objects. The "Lochner era" in US law was an anomaly in this regard, and has been over for more than 80 years now. This axiomatic rule in no way changed when anti-discrimination laws were passed (by the US Federal government, by most US states, by the UK, and by other jurisdictions). All that changed was what the current law prohibits. Leases, as with other contracts, must yield to any valid laws. Notes {1) Wikipedia article "Lochner Era" quoting, with slight modification Justice Bryer's dissent in SORRELL v. IMS HEALTH INC. ( No. 10-779 ) 630 F. 3d 263 which was in turn quoting the dissent of then Justice Rehnquist in Central Hudson 447 U. S., at 589, in which Rehnquist said that a standard of Heightened Scrutiny would be a: retur[n] to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York , 198 U. S. 45 (1905) , in which it was common practice for this Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by a State based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for the State to implement its considered policies.” {2} quoting Jacobs, Harvey M. (2003). Private Property in the 21st Century: The Future of an American Ideal. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. p. 36. ISBN 978-1-84376-327-7. (page 47) {3} Flagg, Barbara J. (1997). Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Law. New York: New York University Press. p. 75. ISBN 0814726437. {4} Bernstein, David E. (November 2003). "Lochner's Legacy's Legacy". Texas Law Review. 82 (1) {5} Bork, Robert H. (2003). "The Judge's Role in Law and Culture". Ave Maria Law Journal. 19 (21). {6} Bork, Robert H (1990). The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law. Touchstone Books. p. 44. ISBN 978-0-671-73014-7.	It is not possible for someone to forfeit their rights because the GDPR is compulsory law. In the EU, laws can be regulatory or compulsory. In case of an agreement, regulatory laws can be set aside, if both parties agree on that. But compulsory laws cannot be set aside. Of course laws can also be partly compulsory. For example provisions which cannot be changed in disadvantage of a consumer. So there is freedom of contract, but it's freedom is reduced by law for the common good or for example to avoid misuse of bargaining power. In particular consumer related laws are often compulsory because it has little power against the other parties. Companies can have their negotiations done by lawyers, so they can make a well informed an well negotiated decision. As an extreme example, you cannot kill someone, even if that person has given you written permission. See also "Peremptory norm" on wikipedia for international law examples.	Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.	The relevant bit of legislation — Human Rights Act 1993 s22 — protects applicants and employees: Where an applicant for employment or an employee is qualified for work of any description, it shall be unlawful .. to refuse ... offer .. terminate ... retire ... by reason of any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination. So, if you never advertise but always invite people (i.e. offer them job straight away) then there are no applicants (as at no point does anybody apply for the job), and hence no employment discrimination. If you invite them for a "non-discriminatory screening interview" then there is no discrimination by definition of "non-discriminatory" :) behavioural / relational / mental / spiritual I'm pretty sure these criteria would be discriminatory in a advertised position. None of those criteria are prohibited grounds of discrimination (s21). However, it would be a good idea to clearly define them as "a genuine occupational qualification for the position" by drafting a job description and explaining why those traits are crucial for the business.	Possibly If the texts are sufficiently precise that they constitute offer and acceptance then they would create a contract notwithstanding that “some documents” were never provided. First, your offer must have been sufficiently clear that it was open to acceptance by a simple “yes” or “ok”. Given that you had a lease, a simple offer to have another one would be enough as “on the same terms” is implied. Second, she must have accepted your offer unconditionally. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign” is an unconditional acceptance even if the documents never appear. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign first” or “Yes, I’ll put together some documents with the terms” aren’t. The first is a conditional acceptance and the condition wasn’t met. The second is a rejection with an intention to make a counter-offer that never eventuated. Third, real estate is heavily regulated. There may be specific requirements (such as a particular form of contract, or that it be witnessed) that mean there is no binding lease even though there would be a contract at common law.	A business has the right to refuse service, except in the case of unlawful discrimination. "Sued us" is not a protected characteristic. Unless part of the settlement was that the business must serve that customer in future, there is no way this could be considered contempt.	Here I assume from your cases that you are interested in the regulation of private activities (with human rights code etc.) instead of constitutional restraints on the government (under the Charter). The constitution only prohibits discrimination in law (or government policies) based on enumerated or analogous grounds. Which acts apply? To my understanding the Human Rights Act always apply, then more specialized acts (such as the Residential Tenancy Act, Labour law) apply depending on the context. Canada is a federal country with 10 provinces and three territories each having the powers to legislate under the constitution (for the provinces) or under federal devolution acts (for the territories). They all have different laws. And in constrast to the United States which is often thought to be less "centralized", in the domain of properties and civil rights (including human rights, employment and housing etc.), the federal government in Canada cannot legislate over these areas generally but it can regulate these things in domains where otherwise belong to the federal jurisdiction (e.g. airlines, interprovincial railways, banks but not credit unions, telecoms, the postal service, the armed forces). Federal laws regulating human rights and employment like the Canadian Human Rights Code and Canada Labour Code apply only to those under federal jurisdiction. In most situations, provincial laws apply and are different for each province, including the list of protected characteristics (e.g. citizenship or suspended criminal records are not protected, at least not directly, in all provinces). So you will have to look at the law in your province of interest. Generally the human rights Code or Act should be comprehensive, but exceptions may arise in other special laws (e.g. union memberships are often protected in the Labour Code; disability accommodations may have separate laws). In general does something .... count as illegal discrimination? Another point is that discrimination is not generally illegal; you are free to buy Pepsi instead of Coca Cola. Discrimination based on protected characteristics is not necessarily illegal; a gay man can choose to have a man instead of a woman for his partner. In Canada, both federally and in each province, what is generally illegal is when individuals are adversely differentiated due to a protected characteristic in the course of providing a good, service, facility or accommodation available to the general public, or in relation to housing and employment. Even then, discrimination based on protected characteristics can be legal if certain requirements are met. These usually include employment or service requirements in good faith, programs designed to improve the circumstances of socially disadvantaged individuals and groups ("affirmative action"), and "traditional" exceptions (e.g. age-based discounts). Religious organizations can also discriminate based on their sincerely held religious beliefs, at least when they are not carrying out commercial provision of goods and services available to the general public. For example, it is not against the law for an employer to provide gender-separated bathrooms (it may even be a requirement). In many if not all provinces, it is not illegal for businesses to give child or seniors discounts. In some provinces, a landlord who will be living on the same premises with shared bathrooms and kitchens is not subject to human rights laws or have reduced burden to accommodate. Insurance companies also often have greater leeway in their business decisions, since their business model is usually and inherently built on discrimination (of risks which can correlate with protected characteristics). There are also social expectations and conditions that "rank" a hierarchy of grounds and circumstances (justifiably or not) which may lead to more or less scrutiny over different grounds of protection and areas of service (e.g. an insurance policy discriminating on race is socially absolutely not acceptable where discrimination due to age in insurances are acceptable and discrimination due to gender is controversial; addiction-based disability claims may also attract more scrutiny; employment and housing are considered much more important and in detail compared to retail discounts). Public policy overwhelmingly favours or at least more carefully consider claims from the traditionally socially disadvantaged groups. that applies to everyone but negatively affects a protected class more In Canada, the discrimination you are thinking of are often referred to as "adverse effect discrimination", sometimes also called "indirect" discriminations, where a practice neutral on its face adversely impact individuals based on a protected characteristics. It is not necessarily separately or explicitly spelled out, but results from the purpose of human rights legislations. The Code aims at the removal of discrimination. This is to state the obvious. Its main approach, however, is not to punish the discriminator, but rather to provide relief for the victims of discrimination. It is the result or the effect of the action complained of which is significant. If it does, in fact, cause discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one person or group of persons obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the community, it is discriminatory. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 536 But not all policies that cause disproportionate impacts are necessarily illegal. Insurance rates based on postal codes may discriminate against areas where a racial, ethnic, religious, age etc. group concentrates. But it can be justifiable as a reasonable good faith business requirements if the discrimination is based on an objective, reasonable criteria (e.g. flood risks or claim rates). The extent that a protected characteristic is relevant to the impacts must be considered. An arbitrary, artificial, stereotypical policy are more likely to be illegal than a considered, reasoned, well-founded one. Does intent matter? A discriminatory practice is "objective" and a good or neutral intent does not prevent a practice from being illegal discrimination. However, evidences of intent of discrimination are often illegal discrimination in itself and in any case, they can be used as evidences to prove discrimination cases and undermine the on-the-face neutrality of an action in question. Malicious intent or lack of can also be relevant in determining appropriate damages awarded to the complainant. Newfoundland and Labrador for example makes this explicit in their human rights law: Discrimination in contravention of this Act does not require an intention to discriminate. Human Rights Act, 2010, SNL 2010, c H-13.1 But the reasoning has been established by the Supreme Court going back at least to 1985 and apply to the interpretation of all human rights codes in Canada (unless an intent is specifically required): The intent to discriminate is not a governing factor in construing human rights legislation aimed at eliminating discrimination. Rather, it is the result or effect of the alleged discriminatory action that is significant. The aim of the Ontario Human Rights Code is to remove discrimination ‑‑ its main approach is not to punish the discriminator but to provide relief to the victim of discrimination. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 536 However, intent or reasons also matter for the proper course of remedy. If a policy that is neutral on its face causes adverse effects on individuals due to protected grounds, it must be eliminated if there is no rational reason for the policy to exist. A neutral policy that are genuinely established for proper business reasons is also not illegal if upon request reasonable accommodations to the requirements are provided or attempted to the point of undue hardship. In general, human rights laws impose a duty to accommodate upon persons subject to them like service provides, employers or landlords so that actions are taken, if possible, reasonable and not posing an undue hardship to the provider, to to eliminate or reduce the negative impact an individual suffers due to a protected characteristic. I heard some residential leases prohibit any open flames including candles. Since many religions use candles, wouldn't this be an illegal form of discrimination of a protected class? Or does that not apply because the rule is applied to everyone equally. The first step is to determine whether using candles are in fact part of a sincere religious practice, the hindering of which would violate the rights of the believer. Simply liking the scent of candles when they read the Book is likely not enough to establish that the freedom of religion would be violated. Lighting Shabbat candles on the other hand is much more likely to be recognized as a religious practice. If a discrimination practice is established at first view, the landlord would need to justify its decision, e.g. fire safety. It is not exempt just because "the rule is applied to everyone equally". If the reason for the discrimination is justifiable and reasonable accommodation is not possible, it is not illegal. Conformation to e.g. legal requirements like fire or health and safety codes is often a defence for private individuals (though the complainant may raise claims against the government). However, a duty to accommodate (to a reasonable extent) still exists, e.g. the landlord may need to consider the tenant in priority for similar properties under its constrol that allow open flames (if available). IIRC they came out with a gaming console that had a video camera to monitor the user's movement. It didn't register well for people with dark skin (e.g. black). Like said above, adverse effects based on protected grounds can be illegal discrimination and can give rise to a duty of accommodation. But this case is more tricky and I didn't find any clear case law on similar situations. It would depend on if the company did all it commercially reasonably could do to eliminate or reduce the impacts. A physical limitation caused by hardware (e.g. filter lenses) may be more easily justified than a lack of darker-skinned training samples in their statistical learning algorithm. Even if a successful discrimination claim is established, the damages may also be limited in this context (but an automatic system that decides on home mortgages and are discriminatory unjustifiably can lead to significantly more damages).	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".
What legal strategy might be applied to successfully sue private companies over their own mask rules? I asked recently about the mask rules in airports, but in my travels recently I'm more baffled that private companies are requiring masks under threat of refused service, and even permanent refusal into the future. Primarily, I've noticed some airlines advertise their own mask rules that customers must agree to, and the taxi apps (eg Uber, Lyft) make you actually check a box "I am wearing a mask" before you can call a ride. Apparently I broke the rule add the driver pulled up, and he must have alerted the company, who in turn threatened to ban me permanently from their service if I did it again. I personally think these corporate rules are dubious, especially when use of their services is in an area where no such government orders are in place. I figure there must be some limits on "dress codes" or other non-covid justifications they might come up with. Under the circumstances, I understand why, but I've heard many times a judge argue in his jurisprudence that circumstances cannot justify any actions otherwise illegal, so thus laws would have to be changed first. So, I expect eventually someone will sue a company over its mask rules, but what legal argument would they likely give?	None because the principle is Freedom to contract There is a general right of any being (natural like a person or even a company) to contract with anyone. Buying someone's service is a contract. A contract forms when: They offer something You offer something Both sides agree on it. (meeting of the minds) It is totally legal for a company to make wears a mask in our place of business a part of either being admitted onto the property or agreeing to contract with you. Noncompliance means as a result that they don't agree to serve you and don't offer to you. In fact, they explicitly reject to contract with you unless you wear a mask, which is their right unless there is a law that would specifically make that reason illegal. There are laws that reduce the freedom of contract, such as the civil right act (protected classes, such as religion, race, sex and more), the Americans with disabilities act (demanding reasonable accommodation), and labor laws (outlawing labor practices or limiting the amount of work or minimum payment) as well as anti-discrimination laws (establishing further classes). However note, that laws need to be written in such a way that they don't discriminate against the company either! One case where freedom to contract was attacked using an anti-discrimination law was Masterpiece Cakeshop - which was decided on first amendment grounds based on the rights of the owner: the law can't force someone to make a product he would not support the message of. Currently, there might only be some ordinance that bans mask policies in Texas, but it is dubious if that might be even an enforceable order from the Texas governor - Especially since OSHA just made adjustments to standards and mandates on the federal level - which include adjustments to respiratory protection fields.	There are both statutes and customs aimed at preventing "Malicious Prosecution" and "Abuse of Process." (In Pennsylvania, for example, the 1980 Dragonetti Act allows the victim of a frivolous lawsuit to counter-sue for compensatory damages.) One can also buy insurance against this type of risk: Umbrella liability policies will generally provide a defense against civil lawsuits and any damages awarded, as will many business insurance policies. Of course, none of this is to say that a skilled legal team can't avoid all of these countermeasures and, in practice, take up a significant amount of your time and trouble. We do not have a perfect system of justice.	You don't specify what country's law you're interested in, but as you mention precedent, I'll assume you're interested in common-law jurisdictions such as the United States. The short answer is: you won't find any successful lawsuits such as you describe, at least not without some significant additional facts. In order to be subject to liability, a person needs to commit a breach of some duty. In a civil suit, this needs to be a duty to the plaintiff. In order for it to be actionable for the doctor to not answer the phone, the doctor would have to have somehow assumed a duty to answer the phone at that particular time. Giving someone your phone number is not, in and of itself, a promise that you will never take a shower, or go to a movie, or let your battery run down, or for any other reason be unwilling or unable to answer your phone at a moment's notice. In addition, the patient would have to demonstrate that the doctor, by failing to answer the phone, caused some sort of harm. If the patient is having a medical emergency of some sort, the doctor's advice will almost certainly be: "Hang up and dial 911." This is something the patient can do without the doctor's help. Without some more significant and compelling facts, no court is going to impose a duty on a doctor to sit by the phone waiting for a patient's call.	A person that fails to comply with a copyright licence does not have a licence to use the copyrighted material. The owner of the copyright can take all the normal actions for copyright violation including seeking an injunction to stop the breach and/or suing for damages. Additionally, if the breach constitutes criminal activity, then the state can enforce those sanctions. However, suing a Chinese company in a Chinese court is generally a hiding to nothing. I won't say the Chinese legal system is biased towards its citizens but I wont say it isn't either. However, a case can be brought in any jurisdiction where the breach occurs (e.g. the USA) and enforcement action can be taken against any assets located in that jurisdiction.	It is mandatory for the employer to provide sufficient restrooms (“cabinets d'aisance”), as per article R4228-10. Other provisions regulate evacuation, ventilation, heating, disabled access, etc. There is no provision regarding when employees are permitted to use the restrooms. There can't be a single rule that works for every profession: some jobs don't let you leave your post whenever you like (e.g. machine operator, driver, guard, teacher, etc.). The most common dispute regarding restroom use is whether employees should be paid during that time. Some employers want to count restroom use as unpaid pause time. Strictly speaking, that's legal: an employee who is in a restroom is not at the employer's disposal, therefore this doesn't count as work time. However enforcing this is often logistically difficult and wildly unpopular, so in practice it's only done in places where employees must clock out to reach a restroom. I could only find one case with actual jurisprudence. In 1995, an industrial butchering company (Bigard) decided to limit restroom breaks to three fixed times a day. This was, as you might expect, unpopular; the employees went on strike, and eventually the labor court struck down this measure. That's a precedent, but it doesn't seem to have made its way to the appellate court. Your case is also slightly different in that the restrooms would only be inaccessible for an hour, which is shorter than in the Bigard case. So legally speaking, it isn't clear who will win. You'll have a better chance of success by banking on the unpopularity of the measure. Talk with your colleagues and your representatives and shop stewards. Point out that employees who are trying to hold it in are unlikely to be at the top of their productivity.	It is true that in the US, valid Federal law supersedes state law or regulation when there is a conflict. Precisely because of this, state laws and regulations are normally carefully written to avoid such conflicts. It is very unusual for a federal law issue to apply in traffic court. The question does not say what Federal law issue you think will apply to your case. Most issues where Federal law might plausibly affect a state court process, such as a fourth amendment violation on a search and seizure issue, would not apply in traffic court, although they might apply in a criminal court proceeding. Federal law does not generally deal with traffic issues, nor does it preempt state traffic laws, because there is normally no conflict. There is a group of people, who often call themselves "sovereign citizens" who have a habit of making wildly invalid legal claims, and trying to claim that much of the law does not apply to them. Such people often assert elaborate theories about why certain laws do not apply, not infrequently involving the Federal Supremacy Clause. Such claims are invalid, and will not be received well by a court. A claim that one travels by "conveyance" rather than by "car" and thus state laws do not apply is such an invalid claim. The argument made in this answer is such an invalid claim. Chapter 18 of the US code does regulate commercial vehicles to some extent. Therefore in that chapter "motor vehicle" does mean "commercial vehicle" because those federal regulations do not apply to private vehicles. This does not mean that state regulations that apply to private vehicles are preempted or otherwise invalid. If you think a Federal Issue will apply during a traffic court session, it would be wise to consult a lawyer in advance. Many lawyers offer free or low-cost initial consultations. If you think a relevant legal issue is not being addressed, politely, briefly, and clearly explain the issue that you think applies. Do not yell at the judge or other court personnel. Do not try to "make up your own rules". You will be given a chance to indicate your side of the issue. Response to recent edit, and related comments Without a record of the actual court hearing you describe, there is no way to determine if the judge was acting correctly or not. Even with the record there might well be no way to determine what the judge had in mind, or why s/he acted as s/he did. I maintain that any argument that state traffic codes are in fact preempted by federal law, or apply only to commercial vehicles, or that an ordinary personal car is not a "motor vehicle" because of a definition in Blacks or any other dictionary, is legally unsound and frivolous, and could well subject a person who makes it in court to penalties for contempt. A particular judge might not want to bother with the matter, of course. I think i have answered the question as asked, in a way likely to be most helpful to people in general. Others may have other views.	When your company breaks a law, then that's first and foremost a matter between your company and the legal authorities. Your company might have to pay a fine to the government, you might lose some licenses, a couple people might even go to prison, etc.. But none of that benefits your customer in any material way. But when they put your obligations to comply with the law in the contract, then they have a much easier time to hold you liable for any damages they had because your company broke the law.	It is difficult to keep track of the rapidly changing legal variables, but it would be illegal and unconstitutional for state police to set up an unauthorized stop-and-search checkpoint on the road ("due process" means "following the law"). As a prelude, there would have to be some higher authority that empowers them to do this. You would have to scrutinize the emergency powers legislation of every state to be certain, but no governor has the power to mandate blanket body searches in case of a medical emergency. (Martial law shifts enforcement of the law to the military, but doesn't generally create arbitrary decree-writing powers). The legal foundation of such searching would have to be a new law: then the question is what the law requires that could make on-the-road body searches constitutional. Since the right to be free of unreasonable searches is a fundamental constitutional right, this law would be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Searches "just for fun" will not pass such scrutiny, nor will "because it's an emergency" or "keep the public safe". Having the disease is not and cannot be a crime, so this law would have to be founded on a strict no-travel requirement. That brings the matter within the sphere of the "officer safety" exception in the case of an arrest. I'm not suggesting that an absolute travel ban would be upheld as constitutional in the US, but that is the kind of legal foundation that would be required for state police to force people to be Covid-searched.

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