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UK: is it legal to display a flag in front of a store? Country: United Kingdom Is it legal to: leave a free standing flag of a country (Russia) close to an entrance of a store? leave free standing flags: of a country (Russia) with logo/name of a store close to an entrance of the said store? leave free standing flags: of a country (Russia) with logo/name of a store of a president of a foreign country (Vladimir Putin) close to an entrance of the said store? Note that this is someone else's store. One of many belonging to an international company. This is meant as a protest. | Is it illegal to display a flag in front of a store? Maybe - not because it's a flag but because it could be an unlawful obstruction of the highway (which includes the pavement) contrary to section 137(1) of the Highways Act 1980: If a person, without lawful authority or excuse, in any way wilfully obstructs the free passage along a highway he is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. (i.e. £1,000) Many shops fall foul of this if they don't have a licence, especially with 'A' boards and goods displayed for sale. | Federal facilities are required to adhere to the flag code. Non-federal governmental entities are not, and the explanation is more complicated. In theory, the federal government should have very little power over the decision-making of state governments -- this is a principle of federalism and is expressly stated in the 10th Amendment. In practice, however, the federal government has a lot of power over state governments. Congress can condition the allotment of federal monies to states, i.e. block grants, as long as such a condition meets the five point test spelled out in South Dakota v. Dole. The most stringent of these points is that the condition "must not be coercive" so as to apply "irresistible pressure", creating a false choice where accepting money is the only realistic option (thus complying with the conditions). I couldn't find a clause within USC Title 4, Chapter 1 for withholding funds from states in the event of noncompliance, similar to one that exists for the national drinking age. Therefore states (state, county, municipal all treated as an extension of state power under the US Constitution) are not required to to adhere to the flag code. Theoretically, Congress could pass a new law that would condition the receipt of some federal funds on the states' compliance with the flag code. But the new low could face additional hurdles, since the condition must be "directly related to one of the main purposes for which... [the funds] are expended" (quoting from Dole). This restriction is the reason why states were given the right to opt out of the Obamacare medicare expansion without losing their pre-existing Medicaid funding (567 U. S. ____ (2012) at 51), and is also the reason why the recent "Sanctuary Cities Ban" is having legal trouble. It would be unlikely that any law like this would hold up. It's also worth noting that most states have their own flag law, which makes this whole discussion of the federal law's effect on state facilities. As you noted, since US v. Eichman, all criminal penalties for violating any flag code have been unenforceable against individuals. My best guess is that the proper method of enforcement in federal buildings is simply administrative action, since violating the code can provide cause for firing federal employees under Chapter 75 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. | The sea area in question is a Marine Protected Area, which is referred to in the united-kingdom as a Marine Conservation Zone (as per No17 on the 2016 linked list) and lies within the UK's territorial waters. What UK law prohibits this? I have discounted my initial thoughts about s.58(2) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 as I strongly suspect the Greenpeace vessel is neither UK registered nor proceeding to/from a UK port. I have also considered the Criminal Damage Act 1971 which, although potentially viable* and has off-shore jurisdiction, I have discounted in favour of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 which creates the offence of depositing objects in the UK's territorial waters without a licence: s.65 Requirement for a Licence (1) No person may - (a) carry on a licensable marine activity ... except in accordance with a marine licence granted by the appropriate licensing authority. s.66(1) Licensable Marine Activity includes: 1.(a) To deposit any substance or object within the UK marine licensing area, either in the sea or on or under the sea bed, from ... any ... vessel ... s.66(4) states the "UK marine licensing area” consists of the UK Marine Area which is defined by s.42 to include: the area of sea within the seaward limits of the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom What is the penalty? s.85(4) states anyone guilty of a s.65(1) offence is liable: (a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £50,000, (b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both. *relating to the seabed as well as the bottom trawlers. | Google maps (Street View, Google Earth) are all legal, although perhaps they are illegal in North Korea (along with many other things). Permission would be required for them to enter your house and take pictures, but if it can be seen publically, it is legal unless there is a specific law forbidding taking pictures. It is possible that there are legal restrictions on the Street View method of driving around with a camera in some countries, but Earth view shots are obtained by satellite, which is out of the jurisdiction of the objecting country. The Street View gap for Belarus may be due to a legal restriction, or it could just be Google-strategic (there seems to be no public explanation). There have been numerous "legal encounters" involving Street View and the authorities, in the realm of privacy concerns: there is no general rule. Google has the right to make and distribute these photos because there is no (enforceable) law against doing so, unless there is. | You can always get in trouble. Copyright is always protected by the laws of a particular nation, by the courts of that nation. Because of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, I can sue you outside of my country, and will be treated as a person of that country. The conventions don't say who has jurisdiction, that is where you have to sue, so you have to resort to conventional jurisdictional principles. If you are in Europe, under the Brussels Convention, that means I have to sue you in your country of domicile (if you reside in multiple European nations, I get to decide which country to sue you in). The English courts are slightly different in that they generally hold that you sue in the country where the act took place, but (Lucasfilm v Ainsworth) you can sue in UK courts for infringement that occurs in the US. As you can see, this can get complicated. I can't sue you in Mongolian courts (assuming neither of us has any connection at all to Mongolia), but I could sue you (being a hypothetical UK citizen) in UK courts if you did the infringing deed while in Mongolia. Mongolian courts enforce Mongolian copyright law, US courts enforce US copyright law. Therefore you first have to decide what country you plan to sue in (from the plaintiff's perspective). | Yes, it's absolutely legal. It turns out that UK retailers offer replacement out of their own politeness and are not required to do so by law. If they gave you refund then that's all they need to do. | Google england law flying flags First result Flying flags: a plain English guide - GOV.UK ... Some flags require formal consent (permission) from the local planning authority, whereas others like the Union Flag do not. The detailed controls over flag flying are set out in detailed regulations (see links below). ... All flag flying is subject to some standard conditions ... Subject to compliance with the standard conditions, there are 3 categories of flag: (a) flags which can be flown without consent of the local planning authority (b) flags which do not need consent provided they comply with further restrictions (referred to as “deemed consent” in the Regulations) (c) flags which require consent (“express consent”) ... (b) Flags which do not require consent provided they comply with certain restrictions [include for example] ... the Rainbow flag (6 horizontal equal stripes of red, orange, yellow, green, blue and violet). ... The regulations governing the flying of flags in England are set out in the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations 2007 (as amended in 2012 and in 2021). These regulations, including relevant amendments to flying of flags, can be viewed on the government legislation website: Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007 The Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2012 The Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2021 ... | This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't |
Will 28th-year copyright renewal by an assignee be locate-able based on the original registration? I'm attempting to demonstrate that a film registered in 1947 did not have its copyright renewed by the registrant in its 28th year, and thus would have fallen out of copyright and become public domain (because it was published between 1922 and 1964 before the law with respect to renewal changed). The film itself is already present in several public domain archives, so there is good reason to believe this is the case; however, one needs to be certain about these things before publishing a work that incorporates the original. I can pay a firm to do a search of registrations and renewals based on the data present at the Library of Congress (the data is not present in the LOC's online search due to its age), or I can pay them a lot more (4x) to do a more exhaustive search for assignment of the copyright to other entities as well. My question is this: if the production company had assigned or transferred their copyright to another entity prior to the 28th year, and that other entity had renewed the copyright themselves, would we still expect that renewal to be reflected in a search of registrations and renewals for the copyrighted work? Alternatively, is there a better approach to demonstrate that a work is now public domain? (If so, then presumably the less-exhaustive but much-less-expensive search should be adequate to show that the film did not have its copyright renewed in 1975 and therefore became public domain.) | The renewal registrations, published by Project Gutenberg (PG) are available online, at https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11800/pg11800.html The registrations are also available in smaller chunks, 6 months at a time, for example at https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11801/pg11801-images.html The intro says: Produced by Michael Dyck, Charles Franks, pourlean, and the Online Distributed Proofreading team, using page images supplied by the Universal Library Project at Carnegie Mellon University. RENEWAL REGISTRATIONS—LITERATURE, ART, FILM An alphabetical list under title of all works (with the exception of musical compositions) in which the renewal copyright was registered during the period covered by this catalog. Included in the list are cross-references from all essential names associated with the work and from variant forms of these names. Project Gutenberg itself publishes much of its content based on the "lack of renewal" situation. I myself have done searches using these online documents which were accepted (when confirmed by a different volunteer) as sufficient due diligence for PG to publish works not found to have been renewed. The registrations list the original title and author, as well as known (to the US Copyright Office) alternate names and titles. For esample, here is a sample record for a film: ADAM'S RIB, a photoplay in ten reels, by Famous Players-Lasky Corp. © 7Feb23, L18658. R58624, 17Feb50, Paramount Pictures Corp. (PWH) Doing such a search, using these online records, is relatively quick and simple. One thing to note, the law specifing "renewal in the 28th year" actually allows for plus or minus 1 year, so one must check the 27th, 28th, and 29th years after publication. One possible source of false negatives: if there is an alternate author name (pseudonym) and alternate title not known to the copyright office (so that no cross-ref is included) and also not known to the searcher, and he work was registered nd renewed under the alternates, then it would be missed. But the renewals all link back to the original registration, so the alternates would have to have been used in the original registrations. Later assignments will show up under the name of the original author. (For a film that will often be the production company.) The original title will also be listed, as will the original registration number. If you can find the original registration in the copyright office records, that will give the registration number (R-number) which can also be searched on. I should mention that an error could occur because of a transcription error on the part of Distributed Proofreaders (DP). But this is unlikely. I have worked with DP, and the text is first created by an OCR program from the scanned images, and then checked against the original images by six separate volunteers. The result is quite accurate, errors are rare. One could do a self-search first, the cost would be zero, and much easier than using the old card catalogues. The odds are high that if the renewal is present, it will be found. If it is found, the work is not PD, and there is no need to pay anyone. If it is not found, one could then consider paying a private firm, or the LC searchers, to try to find any odd cases. But a search on these files is quite likely sufficient due diligence to establish "innocent infringement" if a false negative occurs. | Almost none. It is a legacy of the era when copyright protection was a function of year of publication. Including it is appropriate, however, to meet the formal requirements for a legal notice of claim of copyright which has some procedural implications if it is omitted. | "that copyright is not automatically conferred and that there is a process that must be followed" No, this is completely backwards. Copyright is automatic (in most places), but there is a formal process if you want. Copyright happens the moment that the work is created. In the US, if you want to sue somebody for copyright infringement, you have to register your copyright, but you still have one regardless of registration. Modifying the video is a derivative work and must be licensed/released from the original author/copyright holder. From copyright.gov: When is my work protected? Your work is under copyright protection the moment it is created and fixed in a tangible form that it is perceptible either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Do I have to register with your office to be protected? No. In general, registration is voluntary. Copyright exists from the moment the work is created. You will have to register, however, if you wish to bring a lawsuit for infringement of a U.S. work. See Circular 1, Copyright Basics, section “Copyright Registration.” | TL;DR: Probably not. Per Wikipedia, under USA law, for any audio recordings published after February 15, 1972, the earliest it it will enter public domain is 2043. CBS Mystery Theater was published from January 6, 1974 through December 31, 1982, per Wikipedia. Therefore, these recordings are not likely to be in the public domain until after 2043. If CBS, or whichever company now owns CBS Mystery Theater were to have made it available under a sufficiently permissive license, it's likely that it would, in practice, be in a very similar status to being in public domain. However with a quick search, I couldn't find any evidence that the owner of CBS Mystery Theater has in fact done so. Of course, my searching is imperfect, and Wikipedia might be wrong. It's possible that it is indeed released under a sufficiently permissive license, though I wouldn't personally bet on it. Finally, I'm not a lawyer, so my reading of the whole situation might be really wrong. | If you're in the USA, this almost certainly falls under fair use, or if you are in another jurisdiction, it almost certainly falls under an analogous exception for educational use. The fact that the excerpt is short contributes to this conclusion. You can also avoid having to rely even on these exceptions by choosing sources that are in the public domain. The specific date before which a work is guaranteed to be in the public domain depends, again, on your jurisdiction, but it's probably sometime in the early 20th century. For example, you're certainly on solid ground if you use Dickens. | Under United States copyright law, according to the Copyright Office, 206.01 Edicts of government. Edicts of government, such as judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal documents are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy. This applies to such works whether they are Federal, State, or local as well as to those of foreign governments. Referencing laws is even clearer: copyright doesn't protect referring to something like "Section 830 of the Penal Code of the State of California." Note that this is assuming that they remain within the US, where copyright law is a federal issue. Other countries don't all have the edict of government rule. If a place were to legally secede and become their own country, they would cease to be bound by US copyright law. They would get to decide if it was legal for them to do it or not; this is just like how it works between the UK and US (the UK claims copyright on its laws, but US courts will not enforce that copyright because it's incompatible with US law). Treaties complicate things, but the Berne Convention allows the edict of government exception. That said, seceding from the US unilaterally is both legally and practically impossible; seceding from a state is likewise generally going to be legally and practically impossible without permission from the state. So, it all depends on the agreements made. EDIT: To specifically address the model codes issue, Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) was a case specifically about what happens when model codes are adopted wholesale into law. The Fifth Circuit (after initially finding that the model codes were protected) reversed en banc, finding that a model code produced for the purpose of being incorporated into law, and which has been incorporated into law, and which is then reproduced as the law of the place that incorporated it into law, is not subject to copyright. Veeck may not apply to cases where the law merely references the model code, or where the thing in question was not made to be incorporated into law (e.g. state laws referencing the Red Book valuation of a car didn't make the Red Book public domain). If both of those are true, it probably doesn't apply; if one holds but not the other, it's unclear. However, if the actual municipal code directly contains the text of the model code, and you reprint it as the law of that municipality (rather than as the model code), there is no copyright in the law. | All Government produced documents in the United States are public domain, as they belong to the people. The company may be asking for license to use their film, which may include several other clips that they put in any order. Their film, specifically, including any explanatory dialog, commentary, or editing choices, are not fair game. However, the clip you are asking about is not copyrighted and is fair for any use. | Here's where you went wrong legally: Suppose I legally obtain some digital image created by somebody else (e.g., by downloading from a public website). That, right there, is copyright infringement- unless the copyright owner has granted permission or the image is public domain you cannot copy it - this breaches "the right to make reproductions". By posting it on the web (assuming that it isn't itself an infringing copy) they have given implied permission for you to look at it in a web browser but not to copy it into a presentation even if that presentation is never presented. If it is presented then that makes the infringement worse - it adds breaches of "the right to communicate to the public" and "the right to use the work as a basis for an audiovisual work". How is this different from the computer wallpaper? It isn't. If you are using the one of the defaults that shipped with the OS then the license gives you permission. If you are using someone else's copyright without permission then it's a breach. There are defenses to copyright infringement but these are quite nationally variable - search this or other sites for "fair dealing" and "fair use". |
Does the Companies Act 2006 trump an individual's right to be forgotten? I once was a contractor and ran a limited company. At the time all my details and my secretary's were published on the Companies House website. edit: This information includes full names and addresses. This limited company was wound up in 2008. Since then CH have removed all information about my company from public view, including director and secretary details. I occasionally still find other websites cribbed my company's details from Companies House back when and are to this day advertising these details if you look for them. They claim they can hold on to this information citing the Companies Act 2006. They may be "nice enough" to hide your details from search bots if you ask them. But does this Companies Act 2006 not fly in the face of article 17 of the GDPR ("right to be forgotten")? Especially after such a long time? Do I have a stronger legal foothold by citing article 17 of the GDPR if I contacted these websites requesting actual removal (not hiding) of all personal data held on me and my previous secretary? | Companies House itself is exempt from certain GDPR provisions, including Article 17, by virtue of the Data Protection Act 2018, Schedule 2, Part 1, paragraph 5. (That's the Act which implements the GDPR in UK law.) The listed GDPR provisions do not apply to personal data consisting of information that the controller is obliged by an enactment to make available to the public, to the extent that the application of those provisions would prevent the controller from complying with that obligation. The list is in paragraph 1 of that Part, and has effect under section 15 of the Act. Because the registrar is obliged by an enactment, the Companies Act 2006, to make information available to the public, it's exempt from being asked not to. When Companies House data is processed by somebody else, they do not have this exemption. They are the "data controller" with respect to what they've retrieved (from the API or by scraping) and have freestanding obligations under the GDPR. They may still have other reasons why they are able to retain and process your data, such as a vital interest or a legitimate interest in protecting themselves or others from fraud, and therefore wanting to maintain a list of people associated with insolvent companies. For Article 17 specifically, there are exceptions relating to the public interest, statistics and research which might be invoked. But random websites cannot claim exemption from Article 17 just because the data comes from Companies House. There is nothing in the Companies Act which says that third parties are obliged to mirror Companies House data. This is explained in greater detail in the Companies House Personal Information Charter, which is where I found the citation above. They go on to say: If you have any concerns about company data on third party products and websites, please contact the organisation directly. We’re not able to advise other organisations on UK GDPR compliance, and we cannot advise you on whether other organisations are complying with the law. | Can a city request deletion of all personal data that uses a certain domain for logins? Well, they can, but they have no legal backing to make it happen. Their chances of succeeding are about as good as me requesting a Ferrari, a Yacht and a Mansion. I can make that request. People will laugh. I will not get it. I'm a little worried that I shouldn't allow certain domains to be used as logins in the first place, especially ones that might be school related You have no way to know who owns what email address. And it's none of your business. Your only interest should be in whether the address is owned by the person that is creating the account. You probably already do that by sending a confirmation link to the email address when people sign up. I'd like to have some idea for future reference if there's any case where the GDPR would require me to comply with such a request The only way you have to comply with such a request is if the owner can prove their identity. As far as I understood, the "Finnish city" was three degrees away from that. They could not provide any proof they are who they said they are, they could not provide a finite list of accounts they claimed to own and they could not even provide proof they own those accounts. They literally just wrote an email with zero legal meaning. I want to figure out the right way to reply to emails like this one The correct way to handle this is have a feature on your website where the account owner can delete their own account. GDPR compliant. Then you make a text template explaining how to use that feature and reply with that template to every request, no matter how stupid (like this case) they are. If they cannot identify themselves to you by proving they have access to their "own" email, they have no business wasting your time. Legally, they could provide you with a different method of identification. In case of a Finnish school, that would probably need to be power of attorney from all children's legal guardians and a specific way to identify the accounts that is consistent with the data given (for example if they entered their full name and address on your website). You would probably in your rights to demand a certified translation if it's all in Finnish. Apart from the fact that you as a private US citizen have no real means to check the validity of all that paperwork, personally, if I saw hundreds of pages of certified translated paperwork, I would probably just comply. Not sure it it were actually enough, but it certainly gets an A+ for effort to delete data from a private website. But a real lawyer might give better advice with a real case on their hands. Is deleting the data actually more of a legal liability than not deleting it in some cases? (People shouldn't be able to delete other people's accounts.) Indeed. You should not delete people's data because a random punk on the internet sent you an email. You need to identify who the request is from and if they are allowed to make such a request. Whether you have a legal duty to actually keep data, is up to you or your lawyer to find out. It depends on your data and laws. It is perfectly legal to make a website with a textfield that deletes any data you enter after a second. Destruction of data you own is only a problem if you break other laws with it. For example the IRS might not be amused if you destroyed invoices and other proof of taxable income. "Some dude claimed I must in an email" is not going to fly with them. That said, again, please, identify who you deal with, find out if their claim is valid. Don't do stuff because random internet punks write you an email. Because the next mail you get, will be from a Nigerian Prince. Please wisen up before opening that one. People on the internet, through stupidity or malice, might not have your best interests at heart. Don't believe random emails. | That is private. Who you work for is not information that is disclosed publicly by any state actor in Germany, just like your taxes. In fact, that or who you are employed at is often regarded as personal and private information. Nigh impossible through agencies Public agencies like the Fiskus (tax), Agentur für Arbeit, and immigration are not allowed to give any information about a person to anyone but that person or another agency that has the right to that information. Yes, (generally speaking) the tax office may not even say that a person exists (or doesn't) and what their tax number is to anyone but the person in question. | As a general rule, if a business, like a bank, is legally required to keep information confidential, and an employee breeches confidentiality, then your recourse is to sue the business for damages. See for example ch. 35 of Title 12. The bank cannot claim "It's not our fault, an employee did it" (the Latin for this is "respondeat superior", whereby a part is also responsible for the acts of their agents). As far as I know, there is no law against asking for information that can't be given. This does assume, however, that your mother does not have a legal right to the information (which could arise from some form of co-signing). Also, would assume that they have a normal privacy policy, and not one where they say "We will tell your mother if she asks" (they would have informed you of that, so read the privacy policy). This is a question best answered by your own attorney, to whom you would reveal all of the details. | Anything that helps you with your business and that you keep secret is a trade secret. The "keeping it secret" is an important part. Competitors are free to discover the same information themselves and use it, but stealing it from you is illegal. If a contractor needs to learn this information to do their job, you make them sign a non-disclosure agreement or confidentiality agreement which forbids them to pass that information on. That way, it remains a trade secret. If the contractor gives your trade secrets away, that is breach of contract and you can sue for damages. If a competitor pays your contractor to give them your trade secrets, that's not just illegal, it's criminal. On the other hand, if the contractor puts the information on his blog for example where everyone can read it, without having been enticed by someone to do this, then I believe your trade secret is gone and competitors can use it. Same as if you left documents on a park bench and your competitor finds them and reads them. You have to keep a trade secret a secret; if you fail to do so you lose. Asked about patents: If there is a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement in place, then nobody can apply for a patent. The whole idea of a patent is that you get legal protection in exchange for disclosing your invention. Applying for a patent would mean violation of the non-disclosure agreement. | Per Art 3(2), GDPR only applies to non-European companies when their processing activities relate to the offering of goods or services to people in Europe, or when the processing activities relate to monitoring people in Europe. However, the word “offer” of this targeting criterion requires some level of intent. It is not enough for GDPR to apply that they're marketing to someone who happens to be in Europe, but GDPR would apply if they are intentionally marketing to people who are in Europe. I don't know what they are marketing, so I don't know if that would be the case here. Even if GDPR were to apply, it would not be the most appropriate law. Yes, there's the GDPR right to erasure, which applies under some conditions (though there's a pretty absolute right to opt-out from marketing). The EU's ePrivacy Directive provides more specific rules though, in particular that every such marketing email must offer a way to unsubscribe. Other countries have comparable anti-spam laws, potentially also the home country for this online service. | This is a good question, as it raises an issue which places the controller's interest in providing a smoothly functioning customer sign up process against customers' right not to have their data leaked. Note that it is not necessary to consider "enumeration" here. Even just being able to check whether one person has a registered account raises the issue. The relevant provisions of the EU GDPR (or in the UK, the UK GDPR as defined in sections 3(1) and 205(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018) are (emphasis added): Article 4(2): 'processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction So, disclosure of the fact that a user has a registered account amounts to "processing". Article 6(1): Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of these, only (a) and (f) are likely to be of any relevance: (a) is not too useful since it isn't feasible to design a sign-up system that depends on the user's consent (which they may not give). That leaves us with (f). As noted by the Information Commissioner's Office, "Legitimate interests is the most flexible lawful basis for processing, but you cannot assume it will always be the most appropriate. It is likely to be most appropriate where you use people’s data in ways they would reasonably expect and which have a minimal privacy impact, or where there is a compelling justification for the processing.". The legitimate interest here would be that you need a sign up system which prevents duplicate registrations. Remember though that the processing has to be "necessary" for the purposes of the legitimate interest. One might argue that it is not since you could design the system to give the appearance of accepting the duplicate registration followed by sending an email to the account holder to inform them. On the other hand this will result in a less user friendly experience which could itself be a legitimate interest. Ultimately this is a balancing exercise and it is hard to say whether you have struck the right balance until someone complains to the ICO or the court and a decision is issued. The fact that the practice is widespread among well-resourced and large companies would tend to indicate that it is lawful albeit this is not conclusive in the absence of a court decision. I'm not aware of any cases involving this particular issue but would be interested to hear from others on this point. If the processing is unlawful then Article 18 is applicable: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller restriction of processing where one of the following applies: [...] (b) the processing is unlawful and the data subject opposes the erasure of the personal data and requests the restriction of their use instead Where processing has been restricted under paragraph 1, such personal data shall, with the exception of storage, only be processed with the data subject’s consent or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or for the protection of the rights of another natural or legal person or for reasons of important public interest of the Union or of a Member State. In other words, the data subject could ask you not to disclose their registration status via the sign up page, and you would be obliged to comply with the request. Separately from the above points, in order to be lawful you must provide the data subject with certain prescribed information at the time when the data is collected. Of particular relevance here are the following items: Article 13(1): Where personal data relating to a data subject are collected from the data subject, the controller shall, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with all of the following information: [...] (c) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing; (d) where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party; So even if you conclude that the processing will be lawful you will have to give some consideration to the basis so that you can comply with the above provision. | That would require a change in the law. Names and salaries of public employees have been held to not be highly personal information exempt from the public records law. See Attorney General v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, Hastings & Sons Publishing Co. v. City Treasurer of Lynn, 374 Mass. 812. This is part of the "diminished expectation of privacy in matters relating to their public employment" attaching to public employment. |
Does the GDPR cover reference to court proceedings? On this site many good answers are referenced by real court cases, usually in the form Surname vs. Surname [date] <link to further details>. There also exist documents (example is US so as not to breach GDPR) that collect multiple court cases that share features, and publish them together. The UK Data Protection Act 2018 specifies additional rules about processing criminal offence data that are quite strict, and would seem to include posting court proceedings on stackexchange: What is criminal offence data? This covers a wide range of information about offenders or suspected offenders in the context of: criminal activity; allegations; investigations; and proceedings. you can only process criminal offence data if the processing is either: under the control of official authority; or authorised by domestic law. This means you need to meet one of the conditions in Schedule 1 of the DPA 2018. What is the law here? Is posting references to court cases in the UK/EU processing data? Is there an exception that allows this? Are we all breaking the law? What about stackexchange, who collects many of these references and makes them available to the public in a searchable form? | Privacy against publication of criminal convictions has been considered in the High Court in NT1 & NT2 v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB), if I may run the risk of posting a legal citation myself. But note that the claimaints there are anonymized, as often happens in criminal trials as well. In some cases, the court may give an injunction against disclosing names or details, and can hand down both a public and a private judgement, with the latter being a restricted document that does have the identifying details. So this question could only apply to mentions of criminal process where the accused is actually identified. (And I think just saying "R v Smith" is not enough - the posted or linked text would have to give some identifying detail about which Smith it is, the nature of the crime, etc.) I have no qualms at all about talking about NT1 and NT2. The claimants brought a case against Google for making available information about their long-spent convictions, including on GDPR grounds although it took place just before the implementation of GDPR in UK law. Dealing with that argument under the prior legislation, the judge found that of the various exemptions claimed by Google, the condition The information contained in the personal data has been made public as a result of steps deliberately taken by the data subject. (found in the Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 3, paragraph 5, implementing the Data Protection Directive that preceded GDPR) applied, because of a longstanding principle for criminal conduct. The idea is that (paragraph 111): A person who deliberately conducts himself in a criminal fashion runs the risk of apprehension, prosecution, trial, conviction, and sentence. Publicity for what happens at a trial is the ordinary consequence of the open justice principle [...] The same must be true of the details of the offending, and other information disclosed in open court, including information about himself which a criminal reveals at a trial or in the course of an application. The core principles are the same as the carve-out from defamation law for the fair and accurate reporting of criminal proceedings (paras 44-49). That "made public" condition can now be found in a slightly different context in the Data Protection Act 2018, Schedule 1, Part 3, paragraph 32, which mirrors Article 9(2)(e) of the GDPR for the purpose of Article 10: This condition is met if the processing relates to personal data which is manifestly made public by the data subject. Since this is virtually the same condition of European provenance, in the same context of surrounding rules, I think the precedent is a good guide. For courts themselves, law reports, and journalism or scholarship, there are other specific grounds to rely on. Individual Stack Exchange posters are surely covered under the general exemption for posting on social media in a private capacity, GDPR 2(2)(c) as interpreted through its Recital 18. For the site itself, as in the case of NT1 and NT2, there could well be a legal claim made about the inclusion of criminal conviction information in a posted answer. (In general, such a post, being free text, could contain all sorts of defamatory statements or other objectionable content.) The court would have to look at the competing interests and the level of harm. NT1 was not successful but NT2 was. The example scenario, where we are talking about a very brief mention of a criminal case, cited because it illustrates a legal point rather than because there's anything relevant about the person mentioned, is quite far from the grounds complained of by NT2. For NT2, there was a newspaper article in which he was "quite inappropriately, portrayed as one of a rogues' gallery of serious criminals" (para 188), eight years after the end of his sentence, and it was this that he wanted removed from search results. In particular, the academic exemption (para 13) seems strong, in the same way that it would be for a publisher of legal academic content. The test of "substantial public interest" does not apply, because this exemption comes through paragraph 36 in the case of criminal convictions; it's enough to show a reasonable belief that publication would be in the public interest. Google was not able to rely on the "journalism" version of this exemption (again, under the prior law) because they are a totally generic search engine for all kinds of data and purposes (para 100 of the 2018 judgement). The public interest test, and the accompanying "legitimate interest" for the data controller, do not seem too difficult in this example. | This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer. | Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite. | There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement. | You premise is correct. The processor is someone that processes data on your behalf, and since the GDPR definition of processing is extremely broad, that is about every third party subcontractor that you use for data processing, including various cloud providers. I'm afraid it will soon become a huge mess with a gazillion contracts to sign. I disagree. Yes, the GDPR says that a contract between the controller and processor must exist, but Article 28 of the GDPR does not say anything about how the controller shall document these instructions. Basically, in cases like the one you describe where John Doe relies on a web agency for having a contact form on the web, there will be a standardized (by the web agency) service agreement between the John Doe (controller) and the web agency (processor). There is nothing stopping the parties from agreeing that this service agreement that John Doe accepted as part of the onboarding procedure is also the DPA as required by the GDPR. Putting something like the following in the service agreement would do it: The parties agree that this Service Agreement between You (controller) and Us (processor) set out Your complete and final instructions to Us in relation to the processing of Personal Data and that processing outside the scope of these instructions (if any) shall require prior written agreement between You and Us. You also agree that We may engage Sub-processors to process Personal Data on Your behalf. The Sub-processors currently engaged by Us and authorized by You are listed in Annex A. I think we will se a lot of amendments in service contracts as the GDPR gets better understood, but I don't really see a flood of DPAs in addition to these amended service contracts. | If the lawyer has legitimate concerns, his first port of call would be the ICO https://ico.org.uk/. Before the ICO will take his complaint further he'll have had write to you expressing his concerns and received a written response that presumably he is unhappy with, and wants to take the issue further. Most companies have a data compliance team who will have policies and procedures to log breaches like this and decide what course of action to take in response. Not every breach needs to be brought to the attention of the ICO, and they have a handy self assessment tool to see if you should report the breach. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/report-a-breach/ In your situation, I don't think this constitutes a serious breach which will require investigating. It's simply an admin error. If it is unlikely to pose a risk to any of the individuals they will say something like: You should keep an internal record of the breach as detailed in Article 33 (5) of the GDPR, including what happened, the effects of the breach and remedial actions taken. The definition of risk according to the ICO is: "This risk exists when the breach may lead to physical, material or non-material damage for the individuals whose data have been breached". So in this case I'd assume a simple apology (Bcc'd :) ) and a record of what happened, how it happened, and the action taken to prevent it happening again should suffice. | I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on! | The data processor is not responsible for complying with the GDPR. You are ultimately responsible, since you are the data controller. The data processor is merely required to assist you, but it's unclear what that means in the presented scenario. Per Art 28(3)(e) GDPR, the DPA must require the data processor to provide reasonable assistance: That contract or other legal act shall stipulate, in particular, that the processor: […] taking into account the nature of the processing, assists the controller by appropriate technical and organisational measures, insofar as this is possible, for the fulfilment of the controller’s obligation to respond to requests for exercising the data subject’s rights laid down in Chapter III; However, per Art 28(1) you can only engage processors that you deem sufficient to protect the data subject's rights: the controller shall use only processors providing sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject. Here, it seems that your company failed to ensure that the processor provides the features you need for compliance. Many companies claim to be GDPR-compliant, but that doesn't mean that your use of their services will be GDPR-compliant as well. Depending on how the Art 28(3)(e) requirement was implemented in the DPA you may have a right to assistance even if the processor doesn't implement necessary features in their software, but enforcing this contract could require a lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction (but that's par for the course for international B2B contracts). It is worth noting that the GDPR right to erasure doesn't always apply. In a processing activity where no erasure right is likely to arise, it would be perfectly fine to use a data processor that doesn't offer any possibility for erasure. Similarly, it can sometimes be legal to use technologies like Blockchain or Git that make erasure difficult or impossible. However, it is the responsibility of the data controller to analyze the impact of such a choice up front, before commencing the processing activities. In some cases, this could require a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA). Note that transfers of personal data into the US are illegal or at least questionable in the wake of the 2020 Schrems II ruling. The Privacy Shield is no longer a legal basis for such transfers. Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) are technically allowed, but only “on condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are available” (cf Art 46). The ECJ's judgement calls this into question. This could be a further incentive to migrate to a more GDPR-compliant service. |
What can an Air company do if they get constant, but false alarm threats? In past week or two, there has been 3 flights from Belgrade (Serbia), to Moscow, who got anonymously tipped via Email, that there is a bomb planted on that aircraft. Every plane immediately made a turn, and landed on the closest airport, so the passengers and stuff can be evacuated, and the plane can be examined. Each alarm was false. So my question is, what can an Air company actually do in those situations? I mean, someone can send those threats on daily basis and cancel many flights by doing so? Note: I'm really not sure what Tags to put. | The "Air Company"-airline can't really do a whole lot other than sue for damages. If they do internal investigation, they can provide all the evidence to the appropriate authority (if the airline is based in Serbia, this is the Military Intelligence Authority "AOV"). Otherwise the airline would work with the appropriate authority in their country of registration and that of the accused (if known). After they are found they can (again, depending on the country of the airline and that of the accused) file a civil case for compensation. | Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual. | First off, you cannot booby trap your property, period. It is both illegal and tortious. But, as you noted, there are already questions/answers that deal with this issue. Sure enough, if the police get a no-knock search warrant, that in and of itself is the Court order allowing entry by any means necessary. When the officers, there by right of law, breach the outer perimeter and stop at the warnings, they will not be seeking any other court orders to have you allow them "safe entry". Their warrant gives them all the right they need, as probable cause of crime and violent intent or intent to destroy evidence was already presented to a judge. If, in real life, you actually put up signage or state explicitly that they're being forewarned that you intend to harm, trap, maim, or otherwise make it unsafe to enter; or that doing so will result in an attempt to destroy evidence, that is something they have already assumed (hence the seeking and granting of the no-knock vs. a regular search warrant). However, the signs in and of themselves are not protected speech, but rather overt threats, and that would put you in a very precarious position indeed. If the police get a "no knock" warrant (the most invasive, difficult to get warrants, whereby there is a grave risk of destruction of evidence or injury to persons), the police will ensure they have safe passage – they've come prepared for dangerous entry long before your signs, but once they see them, you could rest assured they will take them as they are intended: as a direct threat to their safety, and they will deploy a SWAT or other heavily armed entry team (who is usually there anyway for these dangerous entries). You could expect things like smoke/out canister and teargas, flash bangs, and heavily armed and well armored officers attempting to force you from your dwelling. Presumably, if you need to disarm traps to escape the situation, they can enter. Assuming you're home when they invade with chemical weapons, whether you come out or not, they will force you to disarm whatever booby trapping you may have in place that may destroy evidence, likely walking you in as their human shield in the event you're lying about any dangerous ones. That is probably your best case scenario. They may just decide to throw you through the perimeter once they get their hands on you, just to see what happens! If you don't exit and are home or if you are lucky enough to be out, the bomb squad, ATF, and SWAT will converge on your property in less than typical means. Because from your warning they can assume some incendiary or explosive device exists, bringing it into the jurisdiction of other agencies. If they cannot disarm the trap, they would send a robot in first to set it off, or cut through your roof, or knock down a wall – whatever it takes to get in without using a typical means of ingress/egress, so as not to chance your trap. Regardless, you can rest assured that they will get in, and you will pay for the trap you set for law enforcement. Further, to whatever charges you'd have been faced with from evidence flowing from the original warrant will now be added additional charges like attempted murder of a peace officer; if you have any roommates or known associates: conspiracy to do those things; attempted destruction of evidence, criminal interference with a police investigation ... all at a minimum. If anyone is actually harmed, your signage offers you no shield from criminal or tort liability, and you will be lucky to live through the experience once they get their hands on you. Police tend to not like being the targets of intentional maiming, dismemberment or death. You have to understand that, according to this hypothetical, you are intentionally trying to harm law enforcement, or destroy evidence of your dangerous criminal activity. These are not invaders, or intruders according to the law; they are the people whose job it is to enforce the laws, collect the evidence (if you weren't getting arrested pursuant to the fruits of the warrant, you certainly would be at that point). The signs themselves would make excellent exhibits in the coming case of State v. you. BTW: The only reason they have left John Joe Gray alone is that he knows the Henderson County Sheriff Ronny Brownlow, who has been told that the ATF, FBI, and State SWAT, would all be happy to enter and get or kill Mr. Gray if need be. Since the Sheriff never filed any federal charges, and has determined that he doesn't want to breach (and it's in his jurisdiction to determine this), the Sheriff, aware that Gray's entire family is holed up in the "compound", decided it's not worth going in. It's as well known as it is anomalous. When the police want in, and have the right to get in, they will get in. That Sheriff just decided it's not worthwhile. | There is a line in airports between the secure zone and the public zone. TSA has broad authority over the secure zone (a post 9-11 fact), and has mandated wearing a mask in its zones of authority. Because federal law supercedes state law, TSA rules override what the state or city may say. This is in fact an implementation of an executive order by Biden. Outside the secure zone, there is a CDC order requiring masks "at transportation hubs". Again, since airports are part of the interstate transport system and the federal government regulates anything that is interstate, the federal rules override any local rules. These things are "orders". Mandate is a popular term. A regulation is a rule constructed by an executive agency to implement some act of Congress. The act of Congress is popularly how people see "the law", though the details of implementation as specified in a rule (regulation) are also "law" at least in the view of legal scholars. Typically, POTUS gives a general order which results in some action by a federal agency, which may in turn issue its own orders. | Answering my own question after some more research (which I should have done in the first place). Yes, it's illegal both in the US and in the EU Many airlines do it anyway because they are desperate for cash and hoping that no government agency will enforce it. A trade group is actually lobbying to change the laws Airlines will do what they can to make you accept a voucher. Some create an incentive, some make it just extremely difficult to get refund or they will simply deny it. If you accept a voucher, you waive the right for a refund. Only realistic option is a charge back through the credit card but I haven't found any successful examples yet. Good overview articles: https://onemileatatime.com/flight-cancelled-refund/ https://viewfromthewing.com/airlines-are-breaking-the-law-by-refusing-refunds-for-cancelled-flights/ | there was absolutely nothing in the letter. You could hold it up to the sunlight and see that it was empty. There is no legal reason to do this. Somebody screwed up. Office workers are not infallible. It happens. I've seen government officials with no grudge against my client do it too now and then. Taken together with the spelling errors in your name it reflects general administrative incompetence and not some nefarious plot. The cautious thing to do would be to call them and tell them that you got a misaddressed letter with nothing inside it. A judge might frown at your conduct if you had some inkling they were trying to communicate with you and did nothing. Save the empty envelope to prove that they didn't send you a security deposit letter as they claimed if there is a dispute or litigation down the road. | They can't simply keep the money; that's against the law. But in a situation like this, it's easy to get lost in the bureaucracy. The company may be in violation of different laws, re: For Your Information | United States Department of Labor, so you can try pointing this out in another email or letter. The threat of the Feds or other enforcement agency looking into the matter may make something happen. Or, try this: find the CEO (or a similarly high-ranked executive) on LinkedIn; many have open messaging in interest of good PR. Message/email them and carefully (and nicely) explain the situation. (A CEO will likely have an assistant monitoring their LinkedIn account. But, there are many stories of Steve Jobs, Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos personally responding to emails.) Someone will make it happen and the employees who have not been helpful will be in hot water. | You could, but how should the companies that want to handle your data know this? If they have no affirmation from you that you allow them to process your data in any way, other than those they are already allowed to because of the exceptions, they have to - under GDPR - assume you don't want them to process your data, and thus have to ask you. |
Are google Reviews consider to be proof against owners of business? I Want to be honest international students are treated very badly in Germany, I was learning in educational institutions and I was treated badly very rude staff and doesn't answer emails if you want to share opinions and truth online you will get threats from these institutions and such. and if you want to talk to them they will only talk with you alone so they can deny any statement later on. I thought I was the only one until many many other international students from different places said the same. So in an attempt to collect proof against my place I archived and screenshot many negative reviews before they are forced to be deleted, and all of them have replies from these institutions which is proof this review and statements were made by real students in my college for example, the most common thing these students complain about is why they never got their deposit back and how the director is taking advantage of them so are these online reviews consider a proof of any kind? | Any google review would be hearsay. That means, it would be proof that someone posted a review, and what was written in the review, but it wouldn't be proof that any facts claimed in the review were true. As it is proof of posting, anyone who feels slandered could sue for slander and be successful (depending on circumstances). But trying to claim that the contents of a review is a true fact will fail. You can of course try to contact the person writing a review, and they might be willing to appear in court as a witness. That would make it a statement by a witness which would be taken seriously, and not just hearsay. Since lying in a court as a witness is a serious matter, someone posting a false review will very likely not be willing to appear in court for you. | I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on! | I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope). | No, the result of an exam is not actionable. The court could only make a decision whether legal proceedings were met. However, the grader’s decision whether a particular answer (and thus the overall exam’s result) was correct or incorrect is not legal in nature. There is no German law saying “1 + 1 = 2”. Therefore, the court could not make a ruling on that, nor is it really their task to do so. Similarly, it is not the court’s (or the legal system’s) responsibility to ensure a certain share of students pass the exam. […] 93% not passing is just absurd. Welcome to Germany. Such exams did and do exist. I refer you to the local student’s body (specifically the Fachschaft). They will advocate for (future) students, especially if there are “design flaws” with the class to be found. Unfortunately, if it’s the “examiner’s fault”, there are no other options than finding an amicable solution. Sometimes, students change universities just to pass a certain module. | Defamation laws do not distinguish between charitable organizations and others: however, in the US there are special considerations for "public figures" (they are not afforded as much protection). The medium does not matter -- texting, blogging, letter-writing, whatever. The defamatory statement need not have been received by a wide audience – it suffices that the message was received by one person other than the person being defamed. A single defamatory act is all it takes: there is no requirement of there being an established and repeated practice of defaming. One way to defend against a charge of defamation is to show that the statement is true. An alternative is to show that the statement is incapable of being proven true or false (e.g. calling someone a "jerk" doesn't assert a factual proposition). A careful scrutiny of the actual statement, performed by an attorney specializing in such matters, is really the only way to know whether words like "may", "possibly" would make a statement an expression of opinion rather than a statement of fact. A person suing for defamation would have to have suffered a loss, but there is a category of false statements, per se defamation, considered to be so injurious that damage need not be proven. That included allegations of criminal activity and allegations of professional incompetence, either of which could be applicable in the context you are describing. The First Amendment provides much protection against such suits, which may not exist in other countries. Because of this, a law was recently passed in the US, 28 USC 111, which says that domestic courts will not enforce a foreign defamation judgment that is inconsistent with the First Amendment. [Addendum] This part is crucial: "The only people I've expressed my concerns to, aside from the organization itself, is my parents and my wife's parents. However, they have shared with a few friends...". If you alleged illegal behavior to your parents, that's a problem. If you only said e.g. "I have concerns", that's not a problem. It would also matter in what way you tried "to disclose to a U.S. based organization details of the foreign organization they are supporting that indicate it might not be on the up and up". | Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway. | You seem to have a solid understanding of the ePrivacy implications, but lack a fundamental insight: your organization does not have a right to achieve its mission or a right to disseminate unwanted marketing. But other people do have a right to not be subject to excessive marketing. Of course, reality is more complex, so it's probably not entirely impossible to do marketing. In your point 1, you note that some EU/EEA/UK countries distinguish ePrivacy protections between consumer and business subscribers. You can research the exact rules in the potential customer's country. This may allow you to email corporate/business accounts. I would strongly advise against messaging via Linkedin if there is a chance that the person is using that account for personal purposes like networking or hunting jobs, not just for conducting official company business. ePrivacy has markedly different rules for email marketing vs phone marketing. Whereas there are pretty strict rules for electronic messages and robocalls, manual cold calling can be OK from an ePrivacy perspective. However, many EU/EEA/UK countries have rules that go beyond ePrivacy, and may have a kind of do-not-call registry that you must respect. Of course manual calls take more effort than spamming emails, but recall the above point that you don't have a right to spam other people. Phone calls are probably the most appropriate approach when the company lists individuals' phone numbers on its website. This will at least give you a few seconds of attention with a real human, more than you can expect from an email that is likely to be caught by spam filters. Marketing via physical mail tends to have very lax rules. Note that every company/business that has a website will have to disclose its contact details including an address there, so this information is easy to acquire. However, chances are low that anyone would seriously engage with that marketing. You can consider alternatives to direct marketing, so that interested companies eventually come to you. Things like press releases, writing guest articles in industry publications, speaking at relevant conferences, working on search engine optimization, buying ads. On the GPDR aspects: GDPR and ePrivacy overlap, and it is necessary to comply with both sets of rules (GDPR likely applies here via Art 3(2)(a)). But where they potentially contradict each other, ePrivacy as the more specific law has precedence. For example, ePrivacy overrides the default GDPR legal basis rules when it comes to email marketing to existing customers (opt-out basis, no consent needed) or to using cookies (needs consent unless strictly necessary). Information that relates to corporations is not personal data, but information that relates to individual employees or to sole proprietors would typically be personal data. Since you are unlikely to obtain consent for using this data, you would need an alternative GDPR legal basis such as a "legitimate interest". Relying on a legitimate interest requires that you conduct a balancing test, weighing your interests like marketing against the recipient's interests, rights, and freedoms. Core question in this context is whether the data subject can reasonably expect their personal data to be used like this, taking into account the nature of their relationship with you. Since there is no pre-existing relationship, claims of a legitimate interest are weak to start with. However, it may be possible to argue that when a company makes employee contact details available via its website (not LinkedIn!) then relevant marketing can be reasonably expected. I would rather not rely on such arguments, though. | Is this actually true? Not really although there may be figments of truth woven in. First, the GDPR does not prevent tax authorities from determining layers of corporate ownership or investigating tax fraud. Second, your substantive tax liability depends upon the tax laws of the countries in question. If you owe taxes under a country's tax laws but the country can't find it, that makes you a tax criminal, and doesn't mean you don't owe the tax. Third, the exact rules on what triggers tax liability in mixed country fact patterns are highly technical and not fully uniform. If you actually do business abroad within the meaning of a country's tax laws in a way that is not subject to its taxes, then it is legal. But this scheme probably doesn't meet that standard under most country's tax laws. So you hire two local directors, as contractors, from country B. On the contract signed, they oversee the day to day operations and work for you as advisor since you're the only shareholder. So their existence, the contract and the structure show that the company is managed in country B, run in country B and has economic substance in country B. This way the offshore company isn't taxed in country A. This allows you to get dividends from the company tax free (after paying corporate taxes in country B) to your account in country A. A few thoughts on this specific example. If you truly are nothing but a passive source of funding for a company, then owning shares in this company is no different from owning shares in a public held company (e.g. BMW). The notion that dividends from the company are tax free in county A in that situation is very likely incorrect. Usually, dividends and other intangible income is taxable income in the country where they are received. Most likely, the dividends are income subject to taxation in country A. There is a concept in tax law which U.S. tax lawyers call the "Economic Substance Rule" which is also true, but with different names (most of these countries don't have English language tax terminology anyway) which means that when someone is going through the motions of conducting a transaction in a tax favored form when in substance, something different is really going on, the tax authorities can choose to tax the substance rather than the form of the transaction. So, if the really valuable work is being done by the shareholder without visible compensation, rather than by the local directors and managers, you the shareholder might be taxed on "imputed income" representing the fair market value of the services rendered, or treated as the true manager of the company in country B. Similar issues can arise when valuable intellectual property is transferred to the company without being duly reflected in a fair market value purchase of equity interests, a sale at fair market value, or a licensing agreement for royalty payments. Tax officials aren't limited to looking at paperwork. They can and do interview the human beings involved in interviews that those human beings are legally obligated to attend and cooperate with and to provide truthful information in with legal consequences for lying in those interviews. Even if no official documentation or public statements would tip off tax officials, a significant share of tax evasion cases are driven by whistleblowing by disgruntled former employees, ex-spouses, jilted significant others, mistreated business partners, and revengeful angry children who feel that they have been mistreated by their parents. Nothing in the GDPR prevents whistleblowing to tax authorities. Background In E.U. countries, closely held company ownership must be declared and recorded in a notary public's "public records" or a corporate register (unlike, for example, the United States, where, this information was only contained in the internal records of the company in most cases, although a new law called the Corporate Transparency Act effective January 1, 2022, or later if initial regulations aren't adopted, changes this status quo). E.U. directives expressly requires much more public disclosure by private companies than the U.S. more generally. For example, a recent Dutch overhaul of its rules for disclosing beneficial ownership of companies is a model of contemporary modern European legislation on the subject. This affords access to this information as follows (UBO is the Universal Beneficial Ownership registry and FIO is the Fiscal Intelligence Agency, an anti-money laundering agency): The public can only access the publicly accessible UBO-information with a valid registration and in exchange for a fixed fee. The identity of those persons that access the UBO-register will be registered with the Dutch Chamber of Commerce and UBOs may inquire as to how often their information has been consulted. The Chamber of Commerce may register the Citizen Service Number (Burgerservicenummer) of persons who access the register. The FIU and other competent authorities will, upon request, have access to that information. The FIU and other competent authorities may perform a search in the UBO-register based on the name of an individual, thus listing all connections of that individual, while the public will only be able to search the UBO-register for the UBO(s) of a specific entity (and not for the name of an individual). Even though this limitation to search options was presented as a measure to protect the privacy of UBOs, it is generally expected that commercial platforms that register company information will enable searches based on the name of individuals. The FIU and competent authorities have access to both the publicly and not publicly accessible UBO-information. In the Netherlands, the following institutions are, amongst others, qualified as competent authorities with unlimited access to the UBO-information: the Dutch Central Bank; the Authority for the Financial Markets; the Financial Supervision Office; the Dutch Gaming Authority; the Tax & Customs Authorities; the National Police; the Public Prosecutor’s Office; the Dutch intelligence agencies; and the Tax Intelligence Agency. As this example illustrates, taxing authorities are given express statutory authority to gather information pertinent to tax collection. The Dutch situation, prior to the recent reform, collected essentially similar information, but at a decentralized basis in the offices of the notary handling the incorporation of the entity in question, with similar parties having access to the information. The E.U.'s General Data Protection Regulation generally, affirmatively extends to the provision of a good or service to an E.U. person subject to the regulation, something that would not include tax collection. See Article 3(2). Also, mutual assistance treaty obligations between E.U. countries to share information, which would include many tax treaties between E.U. countries, and criminal investigations (which would include criminal tax fraud cases) are expressly exempted from its scope. |
Licensing confusion with Github and Stack Exchange I posted code on Github with an Apache2 license but left the part "Copyright {yyyy} {name of copyright owner}" instead of adding the year and my name. Then I copied the code from Github and posted it on StackExchange w/o the license. Which of the following statements is correct? The original license is invalid and the code is now governed by the creative commons license as specified by stack exchange. The original license is valid and posting the code on StackExchange without it was a violation of that license. The code is now governed by either the Creative commons license or Apache2 depending where you get it from. Other | Basically, statement 3 above is correct. The owner of the copyright in a work may release that work unmder different, even incompatible, licenses, as many times as s/he chooses to do. None of these releases cancels or invalidates any other. A person who obtains a work from a site where it is listed under a particular license, may rely on that license grant. The owner may (if the site allows) modify the license or remove the posted work, but this does not invalidate the license granted to those who obtained the work before any modification or removal. An incorrect or incomplete copyright notice does not, under current law. invalidate the copyright, and to the best of my understanding will not invalidate either of the license mentioen in the question. | See https://stackoverflow.com/legal/terms-of-service and https://law.stackexchange.com/help/licensing. As with most social media sites, your contribution of content does not transfer ownership of any copyright in the content; rather, you grant to the platform a non-exclusive license. Because the license is not exclusive, you can grant similar or different licenses to other parties, which generally happens when you post the same content on other sites. (Of course, you can only grant licenses when you own the copyright or have a license that allows you to grant a further license, so posting content created by others can be complicated; this seems to be beyond the scope of the question, though, so I mention it only in passing.) To answer with respect to a specific site, of course, you have to look at the site's terms of service. | Both the displayed site (including all text and images) and the html, css, javascript and other code that generates the display are protected by copyright. This is true in pretty much every country. You would not be able to reuse them lawfully without permission, unless an exception to copyright applies. If no exception applies, and you have not obtained permission, this is copyright infringement. In most cases copyright infringement is treated as a tort (a civil matter), not as a crime. This means that law enforcement generally will take no action and have no interest in such a situation. The copyright owner could sue for infringement, and possibly collect money damages. In the US, statutory damages can be as high as $30,000, or up to $150,000 for "wilful" infringement, or as low as $750 (per work infringed). Or actual damages can be collected instead. In other countries, actual damages plus costs of suit are more likely, but the rule can be different in each country. The possible exceptions to copyright vary significantly in different countries. In the US the major exception is Fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and I have a question about copyright. What should I read before I ask it? for more information In general short snippets of code can probably be used under fair use, but substantial parts of the code or the displayed site are less likely to qualify as fair use. And if it is illegal then why are there so many legal open source or paid software and applications for cloning of website like httrack, cyotek, webcopy etc? Most of these tools have legitimate uses, including learning how a site is constructed without distributing copied content; and cloning or partial cloning of a site with permission. Even if the tools were mostly used for unlawful copying, that might well not be a high priority for law enforcement, and cross-border law enforcement (which this in many cases would involve) is often much harder for the police and other authorities. | What happened is that you created a legal mess. You are obviously on the hook for copyright infringement. The maintainers of the project will scramble to replace your code with newly written code. They will likely ask your company which code they are complaining about - that puts your company into the problematic situation that they shouldn't identify code that isn't theirs, that it will be hard to sue for infringing code when they didn't give the project maintainers a chance to fix it, and that everything they identify will be replaced. Since it is your actions that caused the trouble, anyone suffering damages from your actions can sue you. | It depends on what you are selling to the enterprises. You could be selling just a licence to use the program, and retain all the rights on the source code. You could be selling the rights to the source code. For #1, the source code is yours and you can do what it pleases with it1. In fact many programs offer both an open-source licence (which usually forces the user to make its changes to the code publicly available) and a commercial one (which allows the user to keep the modifications of the source code for themselves). For #2, the source code is no longer yours so it is not up to you to decide what to do with it. 1I am assuming no other agreements imposing limits on those; for example that none of your contracts to your customers have a clause forbidding you from making the code available to the public. | According to US law, the GPL is a license, not a contract. This means it is valid without consideration, it also means if you are in violation of the license, then you are committing copyright infringement, instead of being in breach of a contract. In Germany, the GPL is a contract. And that's fine, because German law doesn't require consideration for a contract to be valid. It's interesting in that the GPL license doesn't require you to state whether you agree to the license/contract or not. But if you don't agree to the contract then there is no contract, and you have no right to use the software. | It's hard to say, under the Twitter TOS. They do not claim that copyright is transferred to them: "You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. What’s yours is yours — you own your Content (and your photos and videos are part of the Content)". But you do license the content: By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. You agree that this license includes the right for Twitter to provide, promote, and improve the Services and to make Content submitted to or through the Services available to other companies, organizations or individuals for the syndication, broadcast, distribution, promotion or publication of such Content on other media and services, subject to our terms and conditions for such Content use. Such additional uses by Twitter, or other companies, organizations or individuals, may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services. The totality of conditions, including the Twitter Rules, is ever-evolving and not apparently contained in a single link. From what I can tell, there is no condition that prohibits a user from copying tweets into a book. There are numerous statements about "respecting copyright" which refer to taking material that is not licensed to Twitter and redistributing: nothing about redistributing licensed material.A plain reading of the first bold sentence says that you can make your content available to the world, not restricted to "retweeting". | It seems that you don’t understand what parody is. If you do understand, please explain how it’s even possible to parody computer code. What you can do with “open source” code depends on the licence the copyright holder(s) release it under. For some very permissive licences you can do what you suggest, for most, you can’t. |
Possession of cannabis in UK What are the risks for the following in the UK: Possession of cannabis (~2g) Consumption of cannabis For example, If i'm smoking cannabis in front of a police officer, under what obligations can they justify an arrest? | england-and-wales Usually, and assuming the smoker is aged 18 or over and there are no aggravating features, an arrest is not always necessary as what's referred to as "simple possession" is dealt with proportionately either by a: Cannabis Warning Which is: a non-statutory disposal. It can be used as a proportionate response to dealing with offenders found in possession of small amounts of cannabis. It is an informal warning, administered by a police officer, to adults found in possession of small amounts of Cannabis, consistent with personal use. ... First offence, no aggravating factors - Cannabis Warning; Second offence, no aggravating factors – PND (see below); Third offence – arrest. Or, a: Penalty Notices for Disorder (PND): You’ll be asked to sign the penalty notice ticket. You won’t get a criminal conviction if you pay the penalty (usually £60, but may be £90) You can ask for a trial if you disagree with the penalty notice. You’ll get a bigger fine if you don’t ask for a trial but don’t pay the fine. | Yes When you enter the jurisdiction of a country, you are subject to its laws. You are not, in general, subject to punishment for things you did before you entered its jurisdiction but if possession of bitcoin (or anything else) is illegal in that country, then possessing that thing makes you subject to prosecution. | england-and-wales Is this illegal? YES, NO, MAYBE Context is everything, and it depends on whether this was just playful (for want of a much better word) or sexual touching. Assuming that the "grandma" is actually her grandmother, the likely offence - if there is one at all - would be sexual activity with a child family member contrary to s.25 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003: A person (A) [i.e. grandma] commits an offence if — (a) [s]he intentionally touches another person (B) [i.e. the child], (b) the touching is sexual, (c) the relation of A to B is within section 27 [which includes grandparents], ... (e) — ... (ii) B is under 13. Touching is defined at s.79(8): (8) Touching includes touching — (a) with any part of the body, ... (c) through anything [e.g. panties] ... Sexual is defined at s.78 as: penetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that — (a) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature sexual, or (b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual. A key point to prove is whether s.25(1)(b) is met or not, so again: context is everything. Is it legal only for women to do? NO - Both males and females (over the age of criminal responsibility of 10) can commit any sexual offence apart from rape which is purely male-specific for anatomical reasons. | Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me. | It is illegal to break into the house even if you don't steal anything. It is illegal to steal the drugs even though the owner of the drugs possessed them unlawfully. So that's at least two crimes. On top of that, the thief will be committing the crime of illegal possession of a controlled substance after the theft. | It is possible that there is such a booklet in some jurisdiction, and that local police are required to carry that booklet and show it to persons on demand. This link (apparently) publicly provides the police manual for the city of Seattle, except it is 5 years and a major lawsuit out of date. No provision seems to exist that requires showing authority to detain, when requested. There is no general requirement for all police and all laws, in the US, and the full set of state, county and city codes would be impractical to lug around. If required by law to carry and display some such document, then by law a person can demand to see a police officer's authority to detain. Even without such a law, you have a First Amendment right to challenge the detention, but that does not also enable you to resist arrest. A detention is not invalidated by the fact that the detainee is unsatisfied that the detention is legal. | Prompted by this recent similar question, I've revisited this question and deleted my original answer as it was completely off the mark. This is its replacement. It is illegal, and it turns out to be an international standard in the Berne Convention. Article 16 in full: (1) Infringing copies of a work shall be liable to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to reproductions coming from a country where the work is not protected, or has ceased to be protected. (3) The seizure shall take place in accordance with the legislation of each country. Your scenario falls squarely within point (2) and the imported George Orwell book is to be treated as an infringing copy within the UK. The implementing UK legislation for (2) can be found in Section 27(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. | england-and-wales No. The only1 requirement is for the officer serving the warrant to show the occupier the original and provide a copy or, if there's no one in, to leave it in a prominent position as per section 15 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: ... (5)Where the occupier of premises which are to be entered and searched is present at the time when a constable seeks to execute a warrant to enter and search them, the constable— (a)shall identify himself to the occupier and, if not in uniform, shall produce to him documentary evidence that he is a constable; (b)shall produce the warrant to him; and (c)shall supply him with a copy of it. (6)Where— (a)the occupier of such premises is not present at the time when a constable seeks to execute such a warrant; but (b)some other person who appears to the constable to be in charge of the premises is present,subsection (5) above shall have effect as if any reference to the occupier were a reference to that other person. (7)If there is no person who appears to the constable to be in charge of the premises, he shall leave a copy of the warrant in a prominent place on the premises. Delaying entry in order to read out the entire warrant could result with evidence being lost or destroyed, or suspects absconding. 1 there's also going to be some other paperwork depending on the particular circumstances. |
Can a parent kick out their underage kid's kids? Say you have a 14 year old daughter that has recently birthed a child. Obviously, you cannot kick your own kid out, but what about the kid's kid? | north-carolina A parent is responsible for supporting their minor child, therefore they cannot "kick out" their child (they can arrange for someone else to take care of the child but they are financially responsible for this arrangement). This is true even if the parent is a minor. In that case, the grandparents and the parent (who is herself a minor child) are both responsible for the grandchild. We can turn to NCGS § 50-13.4(b) which states the hierarchy of responsibilities: In the absence of pleading and proof that the circumstances otherwise warrant, parents of a minor, unemancipated child who is the custodial or noncustodial parent of a child shall share this primary liability for their grandchild's support with the minor parent, the court determining the proper share, until the minor parent reaches the age of 18 or becomes emancipated. If both the parents of the child requiring support were unemancipated minors at the time of the child's conception, the parents of both minor parents share primary liability for their grandchild's support until both minor parents reach the age of 18 or become emancipated. The details could be different in another jurisdiction. | The child does not have a legal right to determine how Iowa's compulsory education law is obeyed. The first section of the law says that the custodian of a child who is of compulsory attendance age shall cause the child to attend some public school or an accredited nonpublic school, or place the child under competent private instruction or independent private instruction and no other provision gives the child veto power. However, on the upper end, a child "under sixteen years of age by September 15 is of compulsory attendance age", with thus turning 16 during the school year being subject to compulsory education until the end of the school year". Let's say that the child turned 16 on Labor Day, then the compulsory education law does not apply. Still, until the age of majority, parents have the custodial right to make decisions in the best interests of the child. That right can be terminated, see Chapter 600a. Under certain circumstances, a child can petition the court for emancipation, which means that they will be treated as an adult under the law, and can therefore exercise their own judgment and live with the consequences. You would look at 600A.8 to see the grounds for termination – an objection "I don't like their choice of school" will not qualify. | Public schools are open to all residents. There is no citizenship requirement and no "tax payer" requirement. Unless excepted for home schooling or attending a recognized private school, in most locations it would not only be allowed, but mandatory between certain ages. | No, the minor cannot be in violation either being on the property of residence or the sidewalk in front of that property. Montgomery County Curfew Law: Section 1-2 (Offenses): (a) A minor commits an offense if he remains in any public place or on the premises of any establishment within the unincorporated areas of the county during curfew hours. Section 1-3 (Defenses): (a) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 1-2 that the minor was: (1) Accompanied by the minor’s parent or guardian; (2) On an errand at the direction of the minor’s parent or guardian, without any detour or stop; (3) In a motor vehicle involved in interstate travel; (4) Engaged in an employment activity, or going to or returning home from an employment >activity, without any detour or stop; (5) Involved in an emergency; (6) On the sidewalk abutting the minor’s residence or abutting the residence of a next-door neighbor if the neighbor did not complain to the police department about the minor’s presence; (7) Attending an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by Montgomery County, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor, or going to or returning home from, without any detour or stop, an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by Montgomery County, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor; (8) Exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution, such >as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the right of assembly; and (9) Married, had been married, or had disabilities of minority removed in accordance with Chapter 31 of the Texas Family Code. (b) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 1-2 (c) that the owner, operator, or employee of an establishment promptly notified the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department, or the appropriate Constable’s office, that a minor was present on the premises of the establishment during curfew hours and refused to leave. Your property is not public, so you cannot be in offense of this ordinance being on your private property. You also cannot be in violation being on your sidewalk (or a neighbors sidewalk if that neighbor has not called police on the offender). | They cannot force a contract on you after the fact. You should leave these numbskulls alone, they are clearly up to something that makes them likely to be sued. I am adding the following: it's not illegal as far as I know to declare anything you want to a person as long as it isn't a threat. "You are now beholden to give me your firstborn makle child." lol, no. | Ignorantia juris non excusat You can say I didn't know: it won't keep you out of jail. Rather than delving into the specifics of your question, I will keep my answer general. If you break the law, you break the law. It doesn't matter if: you don't know what the law is, you didn't think the law applied to you, you thought what you were doing was in accordance with the law. "Break the law" is an objective fact - there is no subjectivity involved. The state of mind of the person is, in most jurisdictions, irrelevant; the common law doctrine of mens rea or "the guilty mind" has almost universally been done away with. Now specific offences have specific defences. Generally, in underage sex cases genuine ignorance of the age of the person is one such defence. A court may decide that ignorance that the person was underage under US law may qualify for this defence. | Why would this be a concern? The adults have some duty in an elementary school setting to monitor the children in the restroom in any case. Separate restrooms are an employee perk, not a liability driven decision. | Findlaw has an article headlined Strip Club Laws and the Regulation of Sexually Oriented Business. Among othe things, it says Below are some of the more common types of adult entertainment and strip club laws affecting the "manner" in which sexually-oriented establishments may operate (in addition to alcohol, which is discussed above): Age Requirements - Most ordinances require patrons and employees to be 18 and older; 21 if alcohol is served ... I'm not going to look for the exceptions implied by the word "most," but I doubt any of them allow patrons under the age of 18. Regardless, if the child has reached the prescribed minimum age then it is permissible under the laws regulating sexually oriented businesses for a parent to take the child to such a business. If the child is still a minor, child protection laws may also have something to say on the matter. |
If land I own sinks into the ocean, do I own the corresponding part of the ocean? Let's say I buy a plot of land by the ocean, but then due to sea level rising a section of my land is now below sea level. Do I now own the corresponding part of the sea? This question seems to say that I cannot actually own land by the ocean or a part of the ocean itself. The most I can own is up to the high tide mark. However, if the sea level rises then the amount of land I own would also decrease, in which case do I get compensation? | In england-and-wales and scotland, no. At common law, with a hefty influence from Roman writers such as Gaius who tackled the topic, gradual changes in a natural boundary are distinguished from others. This is usually encountered in the case of a river, whose course may change slightly from year to year. New deposits are laid down and other parts are eroded, generally imperceptibly. These processes are called alluvion and diluvion, and distinguished from avulsion where a chunk of identifiable land is washed downriver. Deliberately-induced changes are also different. For those slow and natural changes, the position is that where ownership of the land is defined with reference to the natural boundary, the extent of ownership also changes when the boundary moves. This is a sensible rule in the absence of modern surveying methods, and generally matches what people expect - I own the land on the south bank, you own it on the north, and it doesn't make sense for me to gain a sliver of land on the other side if the river should happen to meander a bit. It is possible to override that assumption by agreement between the landowners (or else litigate it) but that is the starting point. The sea works in the same way, except that the "landowner" on the other side is the Crown. (Quotation marks because it is not the same kind of ownership that ordinary people exercise.) The intermediate area, the foreshore, has its own rules, so in fact there are multiple boundaries to think about - the mean high water mark, the mean low water mark - but it's the same idea. The foreshore might be owned by the Crown, as the sea is, but maybe by somebody else. Perhaps what was my land is now underwater at high tide, but exposed at low tide; and some other bit of land used to be foreshore and now is totally submerged. Everyday tidal changes do not affect ownership, nor do unusually large tides either way. But if I own land next to the sea, I may gain some land, or lose it, by natural action. Gradually rising sea levels move the tide lines and the property rights follow. Some riverbeds are also owned by the Crown, so the same principle is at work there too for the motion of Crown boundaries. The rationale for why the Crown owns these places is not clear: there are several possible explanations to do with it being for the common good, or alternatively just an old feudal rule. That might affect adjudication of rights in some cases, such as for access to the "new foreshore" for particular activities: see R (Newhaven Port and Properties Ltd) v East Sussex CC [2015] UKSC 7 for an investigation of the public right to swim on an English beach. Even in the case of Udal law in Orkney and Shetland, ownership does not extend to the sea beyond the low-tide mark, since the Crown has sovereign rights (Shetland Salmon Farmers Association v Crown Estate Commissioners 1991 SLT 166). In land registration, a boundary marked on a cadastral map is not taken as authoritative when the underlying geographical feature moves. That's in the Land Registration Act 2002, section 61(1) for England and Wales, and the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2002, sections 66 and 73(2)(i) in Scotland. Courts have inferred that a boundary coinciding with such a feature is "meant" to be this way, even if it wasn't defined like that in words - see for example Southern Centre of Theosophy Incorporated v The State of South Australia (Australia) [1981] UKPC 41 in the Privy Council. So, even if the map shows my coastal property apparently extending into the large blue area, that is not the real situation - it just means that the registries are not required to keep those maps up to date when the waters shift. | No, lowering the value of a asset does not constitute a "taking" of the property. The investors can still exercise their property and mineral rights, they are merely restricted from performing fracking. You mentioned drilling; as far as I am aware, the ordinance only prevents fracking, which I believe is a practice of inserting water in a well to force oil to the surface. There are several older techniques such as drilling and pumping that where developed centuries ago that could be used, that as I recall are not banned. For another example: Say you had a car that got low gas mileage, but was desirable because despite this it had low running and maintenance costs. If the government (federal, state or local) passes a sufficiently high excise tax on gasoline, the running costs of the car may exceed it's competitors, causing it to lose value: this would not be considered "taking" your car either, since you own the same exact vehicle. | The situation you describe is ordinary condemnation not inverse condemnation. If the government is actively taking legal/transactional effort to acquire the lot it is a condemnation. An inverse condemnation is when the government takes property without court process or trying to pay for it, and you sue for compensation for the property that was taken. If the government just bulldozed a sidewalk in someone's front yard without asking, and the owner sued the government for compensation, that would be an inverse condemnation case. The short answer is that the government has every right to condemn property adjacent to a highway for use as a sidewalk. This is a classic public purpose. Generally, the government must first attempt to acquire the property out of court by making an offer for the land, and, if it is unsuccessful in getting the owner to accept its offer, it will bring an eminent domain action to seize the land for public purposes. In the eminent domain case, the government will win on its right to condemn the land and to take immediate possession of it pending a determination of its value, because the government has the right to seize land to build sidewalks. Then, the rest of the eminent domain case will be over the fair market value of the land taken. | If you buy a house and your wife signs a quitclaim deed to you, that transfers to you whatever rights she has in the house. Similarly, if you and your wife sign an agreement that anything deposited in a particular bank account in your name would be your separate property, that would override the pre-nup as far as that account was concerned. Such an agreement could include a dollar limit per month or per year, or an explicit purpose, such as savings for a down payment. (It could be thought of as a gift to you of her share of any funds deposited.) Giving property to your parents or others with the understanding that it will be returned on your request might be seen as an attempt to evade the pre-nup, and a court might hold that the property was actually shared, if you ever do divorce. There might also be gift tax issues if the value is high enough. Whether asking your wife to agree to a quitclaim or any sort of agreement to modify the pre-nup would help or harm your marriage I cannot know, nor did you ask that. But I would think that for most people being open would work better than going behind a spouse's back. None of this should be taken as legal advice. I am not a lawyer. | Yes, this is illegal. If by "across the state" you mean some distance away but in the same state then the exact law will depend on which state you are in, but as a rule any "conversion" of property to the use of another counts as theft. In this case your aunt has "converted" the property to the use of your Nan (funny legal phrase). The fact that the people doing this are your relatives makes no difference. (When asking about the law here you should always say which state you are in.) Although theft is a crime, you could also start a civil case to get your property back without involving the police. The details depend on where you are, but try googling "(your state) small claims court". Many states have a process for collecting low-value debts or other property without needing lawyers. You need to have a firm conversation with your aunt about this. Tell her that you want your property back, and don't back down. Also call your Nan and explain this to her as well; she may not have realised that she is in possession of stolen property, which is usually a separate crime. If you want more advice on how to get your property back without starting a family row then you might ask on the Interpersonal Skills SE, but it might be better to start with "When are you planning to return my property?" and leave "You are a thief" as a last resort. Edit: As Eric Nolan points out in the comments, you may be a minor. If you are under 18 then your aunt has authority over you that she wouldn't have if you were older. For instance, if she is concerned about your use of video games impacting school-work then confiscating your console and putting it out of your reach would be perfectly legal. | It occurred to me after that the fence would have been at the edge of the Canadian landowners property and the land between the fence and the border was a road allowance on crown land. This is one possibility, others are: The border post is in the wrong place The fence is in the wrong place Both are in the wrong place The US rancher owns land in Canada as well as the US Obviously the Montana Rancher is using Canadian land, but where is his fence supposed to be? Well, its not so obvious but anyway: Who says he has to have one? I am not aware of a law that requires a person to fence their property. Should it be right on the border? Assuming that is the edge of his land (which it might not be, see above) and assuming he wants to put a fence up (which he might not want to do) and assuming that he wants to put it on the edge of his property (because he could put it inside if he wants to) then yes. Or is there a strip of land there which is national land reserved for border patrol purposes? You don't know, I don't know - if you are really keen land ownership is public information; check with the governments of Alberta and Montana. | The notice has a lot to do with legacy requirements in the United States to claim the copyright to a work. Up until 1989, the copyright notice was required. Today, the statements are mainly maintained to protect against "innocent infringement" which might reduce what a content owner can get in court. What exactly do those terms entail? That the owner stated owns all rights and you may do nothing with the content. My biggest concern is this: by writing that, is the company claiming to own everything on the website, even potentially copyrighted user-submitted material? That's exactly what they are doing. Depending on the terms of the specific site, content contributors generally either assign copyright to the site owner or license the content in a way that allows the site owner to do exactly what they want with it. Site creators with the smarts or money to do it right/get someone to do it right usually state something like: Copyright [Site Owner] and contributors. Other sites (like this one) state specifically what they hold the copyright to: site design / logo © 2015 Stack Exchange Inc THIS IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE. CONSULT AN ATTORNEY REGARDING YOUR SPECIFIC SITUATION. | Would capital gains taxes come into play given that the house is his daughters primary residence, but not his? Yes. He sold something that was his property, i.e., his [long term] asset. The fact that it was not his primary residence is irrelevant in this regard. The issue of primary vs. non-primary residence might be relevant only for purposes of computing the applicable credits and/or deductions, but that is very jurisdiction-specific. |
Life insurance already paid out I have two step children in California and my wife died. We had a company paid free life insurance that I went ahead and claimed. I was the only beneficiary on the policy. The claim was approved and a check was sent to me. Now the children's dad is saying I need to give the kids half or more even though they were not on the policy. Do they have any legal claim here or is it all mine to give as I want? | What he means is you ought to give him the money. If it's not in the policy, the kids have no claim to the life insurance. You probably have to keep looking after them by law (as a decent person would anyway), and that's where the life insurance money will help you. Any money you give to the kids, the father may have rights to that, so you don't do that. You pay their food, their clothing, their holidays, their school, their university, anything where he can't get his hands on the money. PS. Life insurances handle large amounts of money every day. They have a copy of the policy. If your children had any rights to money, the life insurance company wouldn't have paid to you. | In the US it's very simple: How does the party that makes the lawsuit get the money in this scenario? They don't. Winning a lawsuit against a person is a legal confirmation that they really do owe you the money. It also gives you the ability to do certain things to try to collect: you could seize their assets or garnish their wages. If they don't have any assets or any income then you are out of luck. You can't take what doesn't exist. As the saying goes, "you can't squeeze blood from a turnip". A bit of legal jargon sometimes used here is to say that such a defendant is judgment proof. Even if you win a lawsuit against them, it won't do you any good, because they just don't have any money. If the person cannot pay it off, does it transfer over to their relatives? No. People are not responsible for the debts of their relatives. | The Will Itself The two main points that are exceptional in this case would be: (1) to name a legal guardian for the child, and (2) possibly, depending upon the size of your estate, to name a conservator for the child (like a guardian but for a child's property), or a custodian of property inherited by the child (basically a trustee of a small, simplified trust) or a trustee of a protective trust for the benefit of the child. You might want to name a "trust protector" of the protective trust as well as a trustee, so that there is a designated person to supervise the trustee's conduct during the child's minority who isn't your ex-spouse. A protective trust will have provisions related to age and conditions and purposes of distributions. For example, it might say distributions according to need for health, education, maintenance and support until age 25, then distribute a third outright, then distribute half of what's left at age 35 outright then distribute the balance at age 45, and it might specify "safe harbor" acceptable purposes like higher education, apprenticeships, weddings, and investing in businesses with a reasonable prospect of success. You should also probably provide for any family pets. Many lawyers have standard clauses for that. You may want to identify specific items of tangible personal property that should be reserved for the child's future use at your death (e.g. an heirloom wedding dress), even though it won't be immediately useful. The guardian wouldn't supersede the parental rights of the other parent, but would have priority together with anyone named by your ex, to serve as guardian if your ex is incapacitated as well. There really isn't too much else that you can do in a will as there is a deliberate desire to prevent dead hand control of a child. Non-Legal Economic Options You should consider buying life insurance and making a trust for the benefit of the child the beneficiary of it to fund a trust for the child if you die. Talk to a financial planner or life insurance agent about it. Non-Legal Sentimental Options Of course, there are classic non-legal steps such as writing birthday letters or recording birthday audio/video tapes for the child, if you know that death is imminent and finding someone who will take responsibility for doling them out. Another thing that is sometimes done is to find a trustworthy person to entrust with secrets (e.g. your legal father isn't your biological father). One way to handle such matters is to have a safe deposit box with this kind of stuff in it and to entrust to trustee to deliver these items at appropriate times. | What §670 BGB basically says is that the default is that companies have to reimburse you for expenses that you incurred for interviewing with them. If they don't want to reimburse you, they have to tell you so in writing before you incur any costs. That way it's your decision if you still want to go if you have to pay for expenses yourself. It does not mean your expenses have to be paid, it means you should know beforehand whether they will be paid. So what I take from your story is that you never actually asked the company for reimbursement, expecting the Agentur für Arbeit to pay that for you. Well, no company is going to pay your expenses if you don't ask for it. And that's not a crime. You also never told the Agentur für Arbeit that you were not informed beforehand that your expenses would not be paid. They asked for proof, you delivered proof. It's not their job to find out how or when you got handed this written statement and if that constitutes a violation of §670. And as a little reality check: paying your expenses (probably something along the lines of a cab fare or bus ticket?) is way more cost effective for the AA than suing a small company for the same amount. Just the time of the lawyer filing the suit will probably cost more than your public transportation ticket for the next year. | The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture. | Insurance doesn't work the way you think it does Insurance indemnifies Bob from any liability he has towards Mary up to the value of the insurance. So, if a court finds that Bob must pay Mary $200k then Bob must pay Mary $200k. Bob can then turn to his insurer to indemnify him and, under the terms of the policy, they will pay out $100k for personal liability leaving Bob to find the other $100k wherever he can. The insurance company would not be a party to the litigation (although it would handle the defence on behalf of the insured) so a court cannot order it to do anything. Further there are many, many cases where the insured is found liable for something which the policy (allegedly) doesn’t cover - this often leads to litigation between the insured and the insurer. In parallel, the policy will cover the property damage in accordance with its terms. Assuming the house is adequately insured then the insurer will pay for the demolition, design & reconstruction. It is possible that by agreement or at the insurer's discretion that the insurance can cut Bob a check and leave him to do what he likes with the money: rebuild the home, go on a holiday, or pay a debt he might owe to someone. If the house is not adequately insured then Bob is a co-insurer and the cost of rebuilding is split. For example, if the cost of rebuilding is actually $150k and the total damage amounts to $90k then the insurer will pay $60k and Bob will have to pay the remaining $30k. Co-insurance terms usually have an error factor built in. | Wills typically handle this by specifying a survivorship period. Such a clause may say, in effect, "I leave all my assets to my spouse, provided they survive me by at least 30 days, and otherwise to beneficiaries X,Y,Z." That way, if your spouse dies shortly after you, your assets go to X,Y,Z, rather than going to your spouse and then to their beneficiaries. Another issue this avoids: suppose you are in an accident together, and by the time rescuers arrive, you are both dead. Without a survivorship period requirement, courts might have to try to determine whether one of you survived a few seconds longer than the other, in order to decide whose beneficiaries get the assets. That could be difficult and error-prone, not to mention gruesome and upsetting to loved ones. But with such a requirement, it's not necessary. The linked article notes that in many jurisdictions, if you don't specify a survivorship period, there may be a statutory period that applies automatically. | That really sucks. I've had similar experiences when handling the probate proceedings of lawyers who were not good about returning original wills to clients. I am providing an answer under general principles without researching Oregon specific accounting, record retention and probate laws, to at least give you a start although I recognize that a better answer would research these questions. The accounts/clients from her business were sold to another woman. Is it legal for us to transfer everything to her possession? Probably yes. There should be a government agency in Oregon that regulates accountants that has rules regarding that question. The linked rule seems to govern this situation. It says in Rule 801-030-0015(d) that: (d) Custody and disposition of working papers. (A) A licensee may not sell, transfer or bequeath working papers described in this rule to anyone other than one or more surviving partners or stockholders, or new partners or stockholders of the licensee, or any combined or merged organization or successor in interest to the licensee, without the prior written consent of the client or the client’s personal representative or assignee. (B) A licensee is not prohibited from making a temporary transfer of working papers or other material necessary to the conduct of peer reviews or for the disclosure of information as provided by section (1)(b) of this rule. (C) A licensee shall implement reasonable procedures for the safe custody of working papers and shall retain working papers for a period sufficient to meet the needs of the licensee’s practice and to satisfy applicable professional standards and pertinent legal requirements for record retention. (D) A licensee shall retain working papers during the pendency of any Board investigation, disciplinary action, or other legal action involving the licensee. Licensees shall not dispose of such working papers until notified in writing by the Board of the closure of the investigation or until final disposition of the legal action or proceeding if no Board investigation is pending. So, a transfer to a successor firm appears to be permitted. What if she refuses to take the documents? Her probate estate could retain them and stay open, they could be returned to clients, or there could be a rule established by the Oregon body that regulates accountants that authorizes a central depository of such records. In Colorado, for example, in the case of law practices with no successors, original wills and estate planning documents can be deposited in the records of the court with probate jurisdiction that has jurisdiction over the territory where the decedent's practice was located. But, I could not locate any provision of this kind in Oregon law. Is it legal for us to destroy/shred/etc. the documents? In many cases, yes. Some states, by statute or regulation, and others by custom, allow business records to be destroyed as a matter of course, normally one year after the longest statute of limitations that could apply to a dispute where the records would be relevant (often seven years since the longest normally applicable tax statute of limitations is six years). Destroying tax returns is usually not a big concern because a transcript of the old tax returns can be ordered from the tax collection agency where they were filed. But, business records related to purchases of property and capital improvements and depreciation, and related to divorces, can be relevant for decades after they were created, so the more honorable course of action would be to make at least a cursory effort (such as a postcard sent to a last known address of each client with a deadline for requesting a return of their file) to return the files of clients that include original business records as opposed to mere copies of tax returns. Oregon has a seven year retention rule for most purposes pursuant to Rule 801-030-0015(e) which is linked above: (e) Retention of attest and audit working papers. (A) Licensees must maintain, for a period of at least seven years, the working papers for any attest or compilation services performed by the licensee together with any other supporting information, in sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached in such services. (B) The seven-year retention period described in paragraph (A) of this subsection is extended if a longer period is required for purposes of a Board investigation as provided in paragraph (d)(D) of this rule and OAR 801-010-0115(3). The referenced rule in that rule states: (3) Requirements upon resignation. Upon resignation, a former licensee is required to: (a) Surrender the CPA certificate or PA license to the Board; (b) Take all reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable harm to any client, including but not limited to providing written notice of resignation under this section to all clients and inform all clients of where client records and work papers will be stored and of the clients’ right to secure copies of all such records and work papers at no cost to the client; (c) Maintain client records for a period of at least six years, or return such records to the client; and (d) Continue to comply with the requirements of OAR Chapter 801 Division 030 pertaining to confidential information and client records. (e) For the purpose of subsection (b) above and unless otherwise required by the Board, a resigning licensee of a registered firm is required to give written notice to only those firm clients for which the resigning licensee was the sole or primary CPA on an engagement, an engagement leader, or the client relationship manager. In practice, the consequences of destroying a record that shouldn't have been destroyed are likely to be minimal, because any recovery would be limited to the assets of the estate and there is a time limit for making claims against estates which is quite strict, and your grandma has no license to revoke. But, again, the honorable thing to do in order to honor her legacy and do right by her former clients would be to either transfer the records to a successor firm or to attempt to return them, as she would be required to do if she had surrendered a license during life. |
Housing benefit and tenant in prison Presume that Alice rents out property in the UK, and the tenant Bob claims housing benefit, which gets paid directly to Alice's bank account by the government. Now Bob has recently been sentenced to 2 and a half years in prison. The housing benefit hasn't stopped yet and Alice is still getting paid directly. My main question is: Is Alice still entitled to being paid the housing benefit on Bob's behalf and is Alice obligated to notify the government of the sentence Bob got? Growing from that, if Alice isn't entitled to the payments and if the payment of the benefits doesn't stop, would she have to pay it back? | I assume this is "Managed Payment to Landlord" (MPTL) for the tenant's Universal Credit and/or Discretionary Housing Payment, as opposed to for "Housing Benefit" per se, since most people are now on UC instead of HB. But in any case the period of imprisonment is long enough to affect Bob's eligibility. Under the Universal Credit Regulations 2013, Schedule 3, Bob is no longer occupying the property since their absence is expected to be for more than six months; in fact, they lose UC entirely and are meant to reapply when they get out. If this is Housing Benefit then the entitlement ends for being expected to be in prison for 13 weeks or more; see the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, regulation 7. That's a generic rule for absence, whereas there's a 52-week allowance for pre-trial custody, and some variations for release on probation. DHP top-ups from the local authority follow the same rules. In any event, 2.5 years, even taking into account the anticipated release at the halfway point, is more than any of those thresholds. The claimant is meant to report changes of this kind, but since Alice are receiving the money directly, she is also responsible for informing the government of any relevant changes. See guidance at 10.2, Whilst a MPTL is in place the landlord must notify the department of any changes which a landlord can be reasonably expected to know which might affect the claimant’s entitlement to Universal Credit and the amount awarded. For example, the claimant changes address. When a claimant changes address the MPTL APA will cease from the end of the assessment period before the claimant changed address. If your tenant moves home and you need to end a MPTL, please contact the service centre immediately on 0800 328 5644. As noted below, and following the Social Security Administration Act 1992, sections 71 and 75, If the MPTL is overpaid due to a change that has not been reported by either the claimant or the landlord, the landlord may be asked to repay the overpaid benefit. Universal Credit payments are made every calendar month and take account of changes during that month. It may be that Bob has already done their side of things but the system hasn't caught up yet. In any case, Alice is not entitled to continuing payments and the government has various means to get the money back. Sections 111A and 112 of the 1992 Act (which applies to UC as well) make it a criminal offence for Alice to fail to notify the government about a change of circumstances that affects her right to receive payments. (Simplifying the statutory language a little - Alice is "the recipient" in the context of the full text and Bob is "the claimant", and there are various other conditions about your state of knowledge and intention.) This is not to say that it would necessarily be pursued as a criminal matter, but that possibility exists in principle. | As Paul Johnson says, this is a planning permission thing. The parking places your landlord has leased you are real; they exist. They just don't have planning permission for all of them. It's no different to if the landlord got planning permission for a building of four flats, and built a block of six flats. Building those two additional flats would illegal, and the planning authority could take enforcement action against the landlord for it; however, letting those two additional flats out is perfectly legal. Similarly letting those parking places is legal; it's just that the planning authority may take action against the landlord to force two of the parking places to be removed. At that point the landlord would have to break the contract with the tenants of the parking places, and would be liable for damages. In practise, unless there are some activist neighbours, the planning authority won't take any enforcement action (spending money on legal action for two parking places is not high on their list of priorities). Even if there are some activist neighbours, they probably won't bother. Finally, any development becomes lawful after ten years, and if the development is used as dwellings, after four years. It is not clear to me whether the parking spaces would be considered as a separate development to the flats (and hence have a ten year limit), or whether they are ancillary to the dwellings (and hence have a four year limit). My suspicion is that the landlord was asked to sign an application for a Lawful Development Certificate (which essentially just certifies that the development is out of time for planning enforcement). If so, that means that ... the development is out of time for planning enforcement, so you have no need to worry. Incidentally, if I am right, your friend doesn't have any need to worry either, and is probably being put off the purchase by an overly cautious conveyancer. (Note: I am not a lawyer, and in particular, I am not your friend's lawyer.) | If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money. | When the fixed term ends, you have two options if you want to stay. The first option is that you and the landlord can sign a new tenancy agreement, with a new fixed term. This new agreement replaces the old one at the end of the current fixed term, so the landlord is free to make changes, including proposing any number for the rent - and you are free to reject it. Alternatively, when the fixed term ends, if you don't sign a new agreement, and you don't leave, the tenancy automatically* becomes a Statutory Periodic Tenancy - often called a rolling contract. This has no fixed term, which means that if you want to leave, you have to give 1 month's notice, while if the landlord wants you to leave, they must give 2 months' notice. Apart from that, the terms of the existing contract, including the rent review clause mentioned in the question, remain in force. The rent review clause suggests that the landlord can unilaterally impose a rent increase after the fixed term ends, but only up to the amount specified. Hence, without signing a new agreement, any increase beyond that would not be allowed. Also, it doesn't appear to make any mention of future rent increases, which suggests that the default rules for rolling contracts will apply, in that the landlord can propose a rent increase, which you can accept or reject. Failing that, the landlord can impose one via a Section 13 Notice, but only once a year. If you feel the requested rent is unreasonable, you can challenge this, and a tribunal will make a ruling based on the state of the property and the rents for similar properties in the area. (* If the tenancy has any provisions relating to what happens once the fixed term ends, then the tenancy may become a Contractual Periodic Tenancy. However, unless those provisions relate to rent, then they may not be relevant here.) | The Immigration Act 2016 introduced the so-called 'right to rent' provisions under which a landlord can be prosecuted for renting accommodation to someone who is not legally in the UK. Everyone in the UK, Brits included, is subject to the Act. This gives the landlord the right to examine your work permit and to see if your visa is valid. The landlord will make a copy of the information. This makes the landlord a data controller which imposes restrictions on how the information can be used. Because this became controversial, the Information Commissioner published a brochure on the things a landlord can do with your data. All things considered and based upon what you wrote, if the landlord did not get your permission to use the data, then it's likely he is in breach. But this does not mean it's actionable or that it would be advisable to make a formal complaint to the Commissioner. If you want to pursue it, you can use the Commissioner's "Report a Concern" page as a starting point. Alternatively, you can lodge a formal complaint with your landlord and he will have to respond to it. What does the law say? The act giving the landlord the right to access your data is in the 2016 act linked above. Everything else is in the Data Protection Act 1998. The ILPA Information Sheet is at "Right to Rent". "The information sheet was updated on 01 November 2016 to take account of the second commencement order issued by the government, on 31 October 2016, bringing further provisions into force." The information sheet is recommended reading for anyone in the UK on a work permit. Disclaimer: I'm a member. | If the tenant and the landlord dispute the amount to be repaid, the amount repaid is arbitrated by the TDS used. This is what is currently happening. Deductions can be made for costs incurred to the landlord by the actions of the tenant, such as: Unpaid utilities or rent Damage to the property caused directly by the tenant or indirectly by the tenant's poor maintenance Damage to furniture owned by the landlord Cleaning of the property Storage and removal of items left on the property by the tenant Deductions cannot be made for items that are the landlord's responsibility to maintain. This includes essential appliances and fittings, as well as the exterior of the property. At this point, your best source of advice is the Citizen's Advice Bureau. They will have more information about how best to handle this dispute. | I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed. | In Virginia there is a distinction between a tenant and an authorized occupant. An authorized occupant is a person entitled to occupy a dwelling unit with the consent of the landlord, but who has not signed the rental agreement and therefore does not have the financial obligations as a tenant under the rental agreement. A tenant is a person entitled only under the terms of a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others and shall include roomer. There is a third category, guest or invitee which means a person, other than the tenant or person authorized by the landlord to occupy the premises, who has the permission of the tenant to visit but not to occupy the premises. Such people who live there would not be invitees. Clearly, you can have others living with you who are not on the lease, if the landlord agrees. The landlord's main concern regarding credit rating is probably financial responsibility, and if you qualify, having people live with you who have low or no credit rating is unlikely to make any difference. There may be other concerns, such as background checks or increases utility costs). Virginia law does not specifically allow "unauthorized occupants", i.e. occupants not approved by the landlord, nor does it specifically disallow such occupants. Leases often include a provision that addresses this matter, prohibiting unauthorized occupants. Supposing that the lease is silent on the matter (not likely) and the landlord wanted to compel the other occupants to leave, the procedure would be to tell the tenant that the unauthorized occupants must leave. Then if you do not comply (do not get them to move out), the landlord could start the procedure of evicting the lot of you, and the question would be whether the court would find that you have a right to let unauthorized other people live with you. I can't find any applicable case law, but it is unlikely that the court would find such a right. Tenants have special statutory rights, as do authorized occupants under the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. A court would not find that the rights of an authorized occupant extend to an unauthorized occupant, which means that the landlord's rights as property owner are dispositive of the matter. |
Where is the line between defending a city and using human shields? The Geneva Convention prohibits the use of human sheilds. From the Red Cross: The prohibition of using human shields in the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I and the Statute of the International Criminal Court are couched in terms of using the presence (or movements) of civilians or other protected persons to render certain points or areas (or military forces) immune from military operations. Most examples given in military manuals, or which have been the object of condemnations, have been cases where persons were actually taken to military objectives in order to shield those objectives from attacks. There have recently been claims that the opposite can constitute a war crime, where the placing of weapons within cities has been interpreted as breech of this law. Examples include this page blaming Ukrainian forces for putting military equipment within residential areas of Kharkiv and this page blaming Hamas for operating in built-up residential areas. Ukraine: Ukrainian Armed Forces place 122mm D-30 howitzers in residential areas Soldiers from the 92nd brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces hiding behind the backs of Kharkiv civilians Gaza: Palestinian fighters are clearly operating in built-up residential areas and have positioned tunnels, rocket launchers and command and control infrastructure in close proximity to schools, mosques and homes. Obviously these conflicts are vastly different, but they share features. In both cases we have a relatively weak force largely restricted to urban areas facing an opponent using a vastly superior air and artillery force. While in both cases the military equipment could be placed in the open outside of the cities, if they were the equipment would be expected to be destroyed quickly. I cannot think of a conflict where this was done, whereas the converse seems universal. Is there anything that clarifies international law in this area? Have there been cases where a party was found to have breached this by moving weapons to residential areas, or found not guilty when facing such a charge? Is there anything else that could guide interpretation? | I think you'll find the definition of "human shields" used in practice in Western courts narrower than what Russia claims (it is), e.g. In the Review of the Indictments in the Karadžić and Mladić case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia qualified physically securing or otherwise holding peacekeeping forces against their will at potential NATO air targets, including ammunition bunkers, a radar site and a communications centre, as using “human shields”. Having said this, turning your own civilians into "incidental targets" for enemy fire (or "collateral damage" as it's more popularly known) when said fire is (legitimately) targeting armed forces, is usually not particularly smart. But there's a line between that and war crime. | I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty"). | The international laws of war are generally much easier to apply in the context of a group of people claiming to be a state, than in the context of a group of people who do not claim to be a state. For example, one of the critical questions for classifying an individual under the laws of war is whether the enemy combatant is publicly identified as a soldier of the entity against which a country has declared war. In the context of an entity that claims to be a state, like Daesh, the distinction between identified soldiers, civilians, and covert combatants is relatively workable to apply. There are actually tens of thousands of people who personally identify themselves as regular soldiers loyal to a particular Islamic State with a defined territory, chain of command and political leaders, and there are millions of people who personally identify themselves as civilian subjects of Daesh who are not soldiers, and there are probably even people who personally identify themselves as covert combatants for Daesh - like some of the European terror incident perpetrators we've seen over the last couple of years. People applying the laws of war still need to do their best to accurately determine who fits in which category, but the categories in question are bona fide meaningful categories that are mutually socially agreed to by everyone involved that are reasonably well defined. Recognition of something as a "state" for law of war purposes is also something quite different from recognition of something as a state for diplomatic purposes. Inherent in the laws of war is the understanding that one side may believe that the other side is an usurper or illegitimate government. In contrast, in conflicts with many organized groups that are clearly non-state actors in the eyes of all involved, the distinction between publicly identified soldiers of a state and covert combatants is often ill defined. Calling people citizens or subjects of that non-state group is likewise hard to analogize to the kinds of situations contemplated when the laws of war were devised. Does one have to be a "member" of the organization to qualify as a subject? Does one have to provide "material support" or conspire to carry out some specific acts? Or, does subjective support or a bare public statement of allegiance on a facebook page or bumper sticker suffice that did nothing material to aid the cause suffice? This matters because, under the laws of war, subjects of an enemy can be interned humanely even if they are not combatants, and the lawful treatment of public and covert combatants is very different under the laws of war. | TL;DR: It's controversial, but it looks like it also protects the rights for the individual. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. While the exact explanation is a matter of opinion, it reads like it's a subject, a reason and a right to the subject. Your question is essentially whether or not the subject is a group, an individual or both. The definition of "Militia" can be multiple things though, due to the age of the 2nd Amendment it changed over time and wasn't very exact to begin with. "the Militia ... civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion." "the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense." "And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." In a militia, the character of the laborer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of a soldier." "the militia system ... implied the general obligation of all adult male inhabitants to possess arms." . This site explains it quite well in my opinion. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." The first two phrases are related to each other. The fact that the third phrase is separated from the verbal phrase by a comma indicates that the verbal phrase has more than the third phrase as its subject. The abbreviated grammatical construction actually renders the meaning of the Second Amendment as: "Neither a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, nor the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall be infringed." So what does the Supreme Court think about the explanation? Current Supreme Court case law defines the Second Amendment (second part) as protecting from infringement by the federal and state governments, the right of the individual to keep and to bear a weapon which is part of the ordinary military equipment or which use could contribute to the common defense. Three cases are cited: U.S. v. Planned Parenthood v Casey (120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992)) U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez (108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990)) U.S. v. Miller (83 L. Ed. 1207 (1939)) According to the SAF the Justice Department includes individuals to be protected by the 2nd Amendment. The Justice Department’s enlightened interpretation of the Second Amendment as an individual right was hailed today by the firearms civil rights organization that has supported a key Texas case that led to a federal appeals court ruling upholding the individual rights concept. And: “Today’s constitutional scholars, including Prof. Laurence Tribe, confirm that the Second Amendment is an individual right,” LaCourse continued. “For years, our own Justice Department has been deaf and blind to such scholarship, and the Fifth Circuit ruling forced the government to face the facts. Solicitor General Olson and Attorney General John Ashcroft deserve credit for their courageous reversal of four decades of constitutional denial.” While the above is biased, it does state the opinion of non-trivial parties. | Enemy combatants do not have a right to a speedy trial and do not have the same rights as criminal defendants, but Senator Graham is incorrect in asserting that they may be held without trial "for as long as the government deems necessary." Instead, they may only be held so long as the "enemy" with whom the detainee is affiliated is still an "enemy" in the context of a Congressionally authorized use of military force. Detention of an enemy combatant is a close cousin of detention of a prisoner of war. It is a basis for detention based upon the detainee's status, for which the military only has to justify the military detention by showing that the detainee is a combatant member of a group which is an "enemy", such as a soldier, covert operative, or terrorist for that group. The term "enemy" is a term of art which means a country or non-military armed group with which Congress has declared war, or has authorized the use of military force against. For example, since the U.S. does not have Congressionally declared wars or authorizations for use of military force in place at this time against Russia and China, members of the militaries of Russia and China are not "enemy combatants" even though a large share of the U.S. military budget is devoted to preparing for war with these countries. Detention of enemy combatants is authorized to continue until the U.S. is no longer at war with, or no longer authorizes the use of military force against, the combatant force that the detainee is a part of (i.e. "for the duration"). This has happened in a recent case where the U.S. made a peace treaty with a particular group connected with the Afghan War discussed below. If the Authorization For Use of Military Force (2001) were repealed and not replaced by Congress today, all enemy combatant detainees in the U.S. would have a legal right to be released except the five that are currently facing separate quasi-criminal charges for specific wrongful conduct before a military commission, discussed below, rather than merely being combatants affiliated with a U.S. military enemy. The main due process protection is the right to bring a habeas corpus petition challenging your classification as an enemy combatant. In addition, the military evaluates whether the detention of an enemy combatant is lawful because the person is an enemy combatant, and whether this detention continues to be lawful in a Combatant Status Review Tribunal, rather than in a quasi-criminal court-like military commission. Since it is not a criminal offense/charge (instead, it is a military tactic), it is not subject to the speedy trial act requirement. As the Lawfare blog explains: On Oct. 19, Judge Amit Mehta of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia did something we have not seen in many a year: He granted a Guantanamo detainee’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ordering the man’s release. The man in question is Asadullah Haroon Gul (aka Haroon al-Afghani), an Afghan citizen who was captured alongside six other men in an operation by Afghan government forces in early 2007. All the men, it appears, were members of the armed group known as Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commanded by former Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Though not formally part of the Taliban, Hekmatyar’s political movement and its armed expression, HIG, were aligned theologically and politically with the Taliban. And after the fall of the Taliban, HIG became one of the armed groups fighting against the new Afghan government, U.S. forces and other allied forces. In short, HIG for many years was a paradigm example of an “associated force” engaged in hostilities against the United States in connection with the larger conflict with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Indeed, in 2011, a U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit opinion authored by now-Attorney General Merrick Garland expressly affirmed as much in Khan v. Obama. But here’s the thing about military detention authority: The scope of that authority will grow or shrink in accordance with the scope of the underlying armed conflict on which the claim of military detention authority is based. And thus it mattered a great deal when, in fall 2016, the then-government of Afghanistan reached a peace agreement with HIG. Thus, even without the eventual U.S. decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and end the fight against the Taliban too, the legal foundation for military detention in cases predicated solely on membership in HIG appeared to be going or already gone by late 2016. . . . In 2018, the Justice Department responded by abandoning its claim of authority to detain based on HIG membership alone. It argued that Gul still could be held, however, based on the distinct claim that Gul separately had been involved with al-Qaeda itself. Gul denies that argument on factual grounds, and for a time that was the central issue in the case. Then, with the recent full withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan, Gul appears to have expanded his argument to include a much broader claim about the expiration of the legal grounds for detention. That claim, if accepted by the court, could have sweeping implications for other Guantanamo detainees. Courts have generally declined to enforce speedy trial protections for people detained as enemy combatants who are then transferred to civilian criminal courts such as Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (who initially faced military commission charges discussed below) and Jose Padilla, the only U.S. citizen detained in the United States for conduct in the United States as an enemy combatant. Padilla was subsequently transferred from military custody to civilian federal criminal justice system pre-trial detention and tried and convicted there of a federal crime, while he was appealing his detention as an enemy combatant to the U.S. Supreme Court. This made the case moot, but left the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals precedents made earlier in his case, which had upheld his detention as an enemy combatant in these circumstances, on the books as a binding precedent that the U.S. government could invoke in a future case. The leading modern case on the topic is Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) which addresses the authority to detain an enemy combatant, and the scope of the habeas corpus remedy in the case of a U.S. citizen who is alleged to be an enemy combatant. The official syllabus summarizes the case as follows: After Congress passed a resolution–the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)–empowering the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or persons” that he determines “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” in the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda terrorist attacks, the President ordered the Armed Forces to Afghanistan to subdue al Qaeda and quell the supporting Taliban regime. Petitioner Hamdi, an American citizen whom the Government has classified as an “enemy combatant” for allegedly taking up arms with the Taliban during the conflict, was captured in Afghanistan and presently is detained at a naval brig in Charleston, S. C. Hamdi’s father filed this habeas petition on his behalf under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 alleging, among other things, that the Government holds his son in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the petition did not elaborate on the factual circumstances of Hamdi’s capture and detention, his father has asserted in other documents in the record that Hamdi went to Afghanistan to do “relief work” less than two months before September 11 and could not have received military training. The Government attached to its response to the petition a declaration from Michael Mobbs (Mobbs Declaration), a Defense Department official. The Mobbs Declaration alleges various details regarding Hamdi’s trip to Afghanistan, his affiliation there with a Taliban unit during a time when the Taliban was battling U. S allies, and his subsequent surrender of an assault rifle. The District Court found that the Mobbs Declaration, standing alone, did not support Hamdi’s detention and ordered the Government to turn over numerous materials for in camera review. The Fourth Circuit reversed, stressing that, because it was undisputed that Hamdi was captured in an active combat zone, no factual inquiry or evidentiary hearing allowing Hamdi to be heard or to rebut the Government’s assertions was necessary or proper. Concluding that the factual averments in the Mobbs Declaration, if accurate, provided a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the President had constitutionally detained Hamdi, the court ordered the habeas petition dismissed. The appeals court held that, assuming that express congressional authorization of the detention was required by 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)–which provides that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress”– the AUMF’s “necessary and appropriate force” language provided the authorization for Hamdi’s detention. It also concluded that Hamdi is entitled only to a limited judicial inquiry into his detention’s legality under the war powers of the political branches, and not to a searching review of the factual determinations underlying his seizure. Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded. Justice O’Connor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, concluded that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged in this case, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision-maker. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concluded that Hamdi’s detention is unauthorized, but joined with the plurality to conclude that on remand Hamdi should have a meaningful opportunity to offer evidence that he is not an enemy combatant. Military Commissions Compared A Military Commission trial is different from detention as an enemy combatant. On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order governing the “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.” The Military Order effectively established the novel military commissions at Guantanamo Bay, which began in 2004 with charges against four Guantanamo detainees. In 2006, the Supreme Court struck down the military commissions (in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld), determining that the commissions violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In response, and in order to permit the commissions to go forward, Congress passed the 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA). Congress significantly amended the MCA in 2009. In 2019, exercising authority granted to him under the MCA, the Secretary of Defense published an updated Manual for Military Commissions, which sets forth the current procedures that govern the commissions. The enemy combatant detainees who face military commission trials are a small subset of the total number of detainees: Of the 779 men detained at Guantanamo at some point since the prison opened on January 11, 2002, thirty two total have been charged in the military commissions. Charges were dismissed in 12 of those cases, and stayed in another. The U.S. government has procured eight convictions total, six of which were achieved through plea agreements with the defendants. U.S. federal courts have overturned several of the eight convictions in whole or in part. There are five cases are currently ongoing in the commissions—and another two pending appeal—including United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, et al.—the prosecution of the detainees alleged to be most responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks. None of those five cases has yet gone to trial. Only one military commission case to date produced a conviction following a military commission trial, and that conviction was vacated on appeal in Hamdan v. United States (D.C. Cir. 2012). Another military commission defendant had his case transferred to a civilian criminal court where he was convicted following a civilian criminal trial (Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani) where he was convicted and is currently serving a life sentence in a federal prison. He is the only person originally charged by a military commission who is still incarcerated by the U.S., and again, in that case, outside the military commission process. Two of the six military commission guilty pleas were subsequently vacated in the cases of David Hicks, who was then deported to Australia, and Noor Muhammed, who was deported to Sudan. Five military commission cases remain outstanding. Footnote: Enemy Non-Combatants The parallel case law for civilians who are not combatant is Korematsu v. United States, 323 US 214 (1944), which while deeply criticized, has never been overruled as applied to non-citizens. This case held that the U.S. may detain a non-combatant civilian, even as U.S. citizen, who has ancestry from an "enemy" (with "enemy" defined in the same ways as in connection with "enemy combatant") in an interment camp for the duration of a military conflict with that "enemy." In that particular case, the "enemy" was the Japanese Empire upon which Congress declared war after the December 7, 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor, and the non-combatant civilians who were interred were ancestrally Japanese or families of people who were ancestrally Japanese. While this precedent has never been formally overruled as as applied to non-citizens, it has received heavy criticism in legal scholarship and is no longer good law as applied to U.S. citizen who were merely born citizens of an "enemy" or shared the ethnicity of an "enemy". The portion of the Korematsu holding that upheld this detention in the case of U.S. citizens was abrogated by a majority opinion of conservative justices in U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018), which stated (in a case upholding the legality of Trump's Muslim ban as modified from its original version): Finally, the dissent invokes Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944). Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission. The entry suspension is an act that is well within executive authority and could have been taken by any other President—the only question is evaluating the actions of this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid Proclamation. The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—“has no place in law under the Constitution.” 323 U.S., at 248, 65 S.Ct. 193 (Jackson, J., dissenting). But, it might very well continue to be good law as applied to non-citizens in the U.S. who were nationals of an "enemy". | united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority. | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. | Edits added below to outline Florida's laws based on OP's comment Jurisdiction does matter but here is a general answer regarding "stand your ground" laws. States that have so-called "stand your ground laws" each have their own language concerning the law. "Stand your ground laws" are often misunderstood but, generally, just mean that a person has no duty to retreat when using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or the defense of others. Your examples are more akin to "castle doctrine" laws which I touch on below. Note that all of these laws vary by jurisdiction. I've provided partial examples from Arizona, New York and California. Using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or defense of others is complex law and even a complete example from any particular jurisdiction will not be able to cover all circumstances. Each case will be determined by a judge or jury based on the facts of that particular case. Arizona's "stand your ground" statute, as an example, states: B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act. "Stand your ground" simply means that a person doesn't have to first attempt to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force. Arizona's statute regarding justification for self-defense states (emphasis mine): A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. B. The threat or use of physical force against another is not justified: In response to verbal provocation alone; or To resist an arrest that the person knows or should know is being made by a peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that allowed by law; or If the person provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely withdraw from the encounter; and (b) The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person. Note the phrase, "extent a reasonable person." This means that the actions of a person using deadly force will be measured against what a "reasonable person" would do in similar circumstances. Some states have a duty to retreat, particularly when in a public place, before using deadly force. New York, as an example, has a "duty to retreat" before using deadly force except in specific circumstances (emphasis mine): A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is: (i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or (ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter`s direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30; or (b) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery; or (c) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20. Castle Doctrine Laws typically refer to what one may do in their own home when it comes to the use of deadly force. Some states have extended the "castle doctrine" to include personal automobiles as well. California's "castle doctrine" statute, as an example, states that if one is in their own home and someone "unlawfully and forcibly" enters the home one can presume that the person in his or her residence "held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury": Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury. In California's statute both the resident and the person using force to gain entry have to know or have reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. If a person simply entered an unlocked home then the resident would have to have some other reasonable reason to believe that they were in imminent peril of death or great bodily injury. Wikipedia has a reasonable entry on the adoption of "stand your ground" and "castle doctrine" statutes and gives a state-by-state breakdown of both. Note that these laws have seen a lot of change recently and any particular entry for a state may not be accurate. Florida's self-defense laws Florida's "Use or threatened use of force in defense of person" states: 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.— (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Florida outlines the cases where use, or threatened use, of force is justified. Notice that in the law Florida specifically states that the person threatened does not have a duty to retreat. Florida also specifically states that a person has a "right to stand his or her ground" if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be and is not engaged in criminal activity. Florida statute also specifically outlines the right to use self-defense within one's home and vehicle. Florida has a "castle doctrine" similar to what was outlined above and similar in nature to New York's and California's laws: The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; Florida has a longer list of exemptions related to who may have used force to enter a home including ownership interest in the property or vehicle, children and grandchildren, the person who engaged defensive force was involved in criminal activity and law enforcement officers. Florida's Justifiable Use Of Force is chapter 776 discusses when force can be used. There was an attempt by the Florida legislature in 2019 to change the standard by which use of force could be justified from "reasonably believes" force is necessary to "a reasonably cautious and prudent person in the same circumstances would objectively believe" force was necessary. The bill was withdrawn in May, 2019. |
Was Derek Chauvin protected by Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)? (1) Was Derek Chauvin protected by Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)1? (2) If Chauvin had not touched Floyd at all, would Chauvin be protected by Castle Rock v. Gonzales? Meaning no attempt at arrest, no confrontation, nothing. Just let Floyd leave with his cigarettes. (3) Given the apparent huge disparity in the risk-reward calculation of a police officer taking action versus just sitting in the car, why don't all police just sit in their car all day? 1a court decision that says that a person cannot sue the police (in the US) for failing to enforce a law, and that the police have no duty to enforce any particular law in any particular case. | Was Derek Chauvin protected by Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)? No. Derek Chauvin, the police officer whose affirmative physical acts caused the death of George Floyd is not protected by this precedent. Castle Rock v. Gonzales holds that the police do not have a duty to enforce the law that may be enforced by a private party in a civil action. Police instead have broad discretion regarding whether they will or will not take action to enforce a law. But, when a police officer does take action affirmatively, this case does not apply. Instead, the question then, is whether the affirmative use of force by the officer was justified by the applicable substantive criminal law. If Chauvin had not touched Floyd at all, would Chauvin be protected by Castle Rock v. Gonzales? Meaning no attempt at arrest, no confrontation, nothing. Just let Floyd leave with his cigarettes. Yes. (A much more complicated analysis applied if a fellow officer did what he did and he stood back and did nothing, but that is beyond the scope of this question as I understand it and would call for a separate question.) Given the apparent huge disparity in the risk-reward calculation of a police officer taking action versus just sitting in the car, why don't all police just sit in their car all day? Police officers who do that are routinely fired and given bad recommendation by their superiors when applying for a new law enforcement position. Law enforcement supervisors routinely punish police officers for inaction construing that as being a "coward" but are much less likely to punish a police officer for being unlawfully overzealous without strong pressure from civilians in the relevant government agency or local government. Empirically, sitting in their car all day is not how police act. They are much more likely to be overzealous than to be docile. This said, there is some statistical evidence that has been construed to show that following the announcement of the Chauvin prosecution and related protests before and after that was done, that police took a less active role in policing that led to higher crime. | I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions? | In the US, police do not put a person under house arrest, instead, the courts do, as an alternative to standard imprisonment (either awaiting trial, or serving their sentence). The police are not involved at all; the courts cannot be sued for lenient sentencing. If a person leaves their house (even to buy a bottle of milk), they will have violated the terms of their more lenient sentence, and will be arrested and sent to regular jail. Generally, police are not liable for damages, especially when they fail to be omnipotent in their efforts to prevent others from doing wrong. | He is probably guilty of negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter, at most (a minor felony), and is possibly not guilty of a crime at all. The primary distinction between classes of homicide is mens rea (i.e. intent). The only affirmative act he took was to move the pillow. He did so both without intending to or knowing that he would kill Jane (the intent necessary for murder), and also, without clear actual knowledge that he would be creating a risk that Jane would die (a reckless state of mind that would support a conviction for manslaughter). Also, note that Walter himself, at this time, is not engaged in a felony, so he is not guilty of felony murder. We can presume he is present with the consent previously given of the owner of the property and did not mean anyone any harm. Likewise, this is not what is meant by "extreme indifference" for purposes of a murder statute, the paradigm of which is shooting randomly into a crowd knowing that someone will almost certainly be killed without knowing or intending that any particular person will die. The mental state necessary for negligent homicide is the equivalent of "gross negligence" in a civil case and is called "criminal negligence" in a criminal case. To be criminally negligent a person must fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a certain result will occur, and the risk must be of such a nature that the defendant's failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from a reasonable person's standard of care. If a jury found that a reasonable person ought should clearly know that moving a pillow put Jane at risk of dying, then he might be guilty of criminal negligence. But, if a jury found that a reasonable person would not know that moving the pillow put Jane at grave risk of death, his action would not be criminally negligent. There are also at least three questions of causation which is not entirely independent of the question of negligence. First, generally an act is only considered a cause of a consequence if it is a foreseeable result of the action. If Jane's vomit caused death is not a foreseeable result of moving the pillow, then her death might not be legally caused by moving the pillow. Second, how likely is it that she would have died even if Walter had never entered the room. There are lots of ways that the pillow could have been jostled during the night leading to the same result. If it likely would have happened anyway, Walter's involvement might not be the legal cause of the death. Third, how much fault should be attributed to Jane? This is closely related to the second question. If her death was primarily caused by her getting dangerously high and placing herself in a vulnerable position, perhaps Walter's involvement is not a meaningful cause of the death. A New Mexico court has held that the defense that the victim was negligent has value only if it establishes that the victim's negligence was the sole cause of the accident. State v. Maddox, 99 N.M. 490, 660 P.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1983). But, what about Jesse's negligence? Under a relevant standard criminal jury instruction in New Mexico: The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's act was a significant cause of the death of __________________ (name of victim). Evidence has been presented that the negligence of a person other than the defendant may have contributed to the cause of death. Such contributing negligence does not relieve the defendant of responsibility for an act that significantly contributed to the cause of the death so long as the death was a foreseeable result of the defendant's actions. However, if you find the negligence of a person other than the defendant was the only significant cause of death, then the defendant is not guilty of the offense of __________________ (name of offense). Caveat: A number of states impose strict criminal liability on drug dealers, often for murder, if someone died from using a drug sold by them, but often it has to be a child, and often the drug has to be the proximate cause of death, e.g. due to an overdose or impurity in the drug. I would presume that Jesse and not Walter supplied the drugs to Jane, that Jane is an adult, and it is not obvious that the drug itself (as opposed to the vomiting due to the manner in which the drugs were used) was the proximate cause of death, so a statute like this might not apply in any case. This brings us to the hard part of the question: Without the pillow Jane rotates on her back and starts to vomit and cough, still sleeping. At first Walter tries to react, running to the other side of the bed to help her, but then he stops and decides to do nothing as she dies. Note that if Walter had moved the pillow without knowing that he was creating a risk, left the room ignorant, and then this happened, surely Walter would have no legal liability for Jane's death. If Walter develops the necessary intent for criminal liability, this probably doesn't happen until he observes that she is starting to choke on her vomit and might die. Even then, he does not intend for Jane to die and probably doesn't even know for certain that she will die from his inaction, so he is probably, at most reckless, if he has a duty to rescue for criminal law purposes. Generally, under both civil and criminal law, there is no duty to rescue, even if you can do so without any risk of harm to yourself. But, there is an exception, at least in civil liability, for a duty to rescue that arises from the fact that you put the person at risk of peril through your affirmative actions. Does this apply here, at all, or in a criminal case? The first question is the exact language of the homicide statute. Some homicide offenses require affirmative acts, while others can arise from acts or omissions where there is a legal duty to act. Every crime requires some voluntary act or omission, and the voluntary act itself was not a crime and perhaps was not even a tort, at the moment it was taken, because Walter did not realize that his act created a risk of harm. He create a peril, but he did so innocently. A pretty standard formulation is that an omission is only a crime when the law creates a legal duty to act, but this is, of course, a question begging standard as it doesn't clarify whether there is a legal duty to act, which is at issue here. As the previous link notes, creation of a peril can give rise to a legal duty to act, but only sometimes. (4) Duty arising from creation of peril. If a person acts culpably to imperil another, he or she has a legal duty to rescue the victim. The cases are split on whether a duty to rescue arises if someone innocently or accidentally imperils another. This case would fall in the category of someone who innocently or accidentally imperils another, in which the cases are split, which which the linked article cites the following authority: Compare Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 24-25, 141 N.E. 510, 511 (1923) (defendant under duty to try to extinguish a fire that he accidentally set to his house and thus was guilty of arson when he did not) with King v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 654, 659, 148 S.W.2d 1044, 1047 (1941) (defendant who, in lawful defense of a third person, shot and wounded an attacker was under no duty to seek medical attention for the wounded assailant). A commentary that is part of a California standard jury instruction (for involuntary manslaughter, not murder for which this kind of liability is presumably not available) makes the following observation: A legal duty to act may also exist where the defendant's behavior created or substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim, either by creating the dangerous situation or by preventing others from rendering aid. (People v. Oliver (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 147-148 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138] [defendant had duty to act where she drove victim to her home knowing he was drunk, knowingly allowed him to use her bathroom to ingest additional drugs, and watched him collapse on the floor]; Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681] [defendant had duty to prevent horses from running onto adjacent freeway creating risk].) These examples would suggest that an innocently or accidentally created risk is sufficient to create a duty sufficient to support involuntary manslaughter liability for an omission under California law, and would probably lead to involuntary manslaughter liability in the case in the question as well, under California law. New Mexico, unlike California, does not have a standard criminal jury instruction or really definitive section of its criminal code that clearly resolves this question, although the fact that California which uses a murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter distinction in the same way that New Mexico does, limits criminal liability for omissions to involuntary manslaughter suggests that New Mexico would as well. The New Mexico case State v. Greenwood, 2012 -NMCA- 017, 271 P.3d 753 (N.M. App. 2011), touches on the issue, suggesting that there may be liability only for involuntary manslaughter (or certain specialized crimes based upon a relationship such as that of a nursing home to a resident of a nursing home) based upon an omission, and that the liability for an omission can only arise when there is a legal duty, but almost implies that only contactual duties are sufficient. It does so at paragraph 35 which says: Importantly, even if the LINKS contract relating to Jared were to have been renewed and to have been in force at the time of Jared's death, we are not convinced that it would be the sole basis or even a controlling factor in determining Defendant's legal responsibility under the Act. Defendant's criminal liability must exist solely based on an omission— a failure to act when she had a legal responsibility to act. See Deborah A. Goodall, Penal Code Section 22.04: A Duty to Care for the Elderly, 35 Baylor L.Rev. 589, 594 (1983) (stating that " authorities have long agreed that before an omission can constitute an offense[,] there must first be a duty to act" ); see also People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1907) (" The law recognizes that under some circumstances the omission of a duty owed by one individual to another, where such omission results in the death of the one to whom the duty is owing, will make the other chargeable with manslaughter. This rule of law is always based upon the proposition that the duty neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral obligation. It must be a duty imposed by law or by contract, and the omission to perform the duty must be the immediate and direct cause of death." (citation omitted)). But, this could be dicta because it was a case where any legal duty would arise under contract rather than for another reason, and as is the case in many smaller states, there is simply no case that has ever been decided in New Mexico which is squarely on point. Under British criminal law, in similar circumstances, a homicide conviction was vacated: R v Khan & Khan (1998) CLR 830, confirmed that there is no separate category of manslaughter by omission unless the omission constitutes a breach of duty to act. The defendants supplied a 15-year-old prostitute with twice the amount of heroin likely to be taken by a regular user. The defendants left her unconscious in the flat, returning the next day to find that she had died of the overdose. Had medical assistance been called, the girl would probably not have died. The unlawful act was supplying the drug but the death was caused by the quantity injected by the victim. The trial judge invited jury to consider liability on the basis of the defendants' failure to summon medical assistance. On appeal, the conviction was quashed because the brothers had not accepted a duty to act before she took the heroin. A dissertation on when criminal liability is imposed for omissions in Scottish law can be found here. New Mexico, whose laws really should govern, has just two homicide statutes: § 30-2-1. Murder A. Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused: (1) by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; (2) in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony; or (3) by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life. Whoever commits murder in the first degree is guilty of a capital felony. B. Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, a person who kills another human being without lawful justification or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another. Murder in the second degree is a lesser included offense of the crime of murder in the first degree. Whoever commits murder in the second degree is guilty of a second degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. Walter doesn't qualify for any of these prongs of the statute. § 30-2-3. Manslaughter Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. A. Voluntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. Whoever commits voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. B. Involuntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection. Whoever commits involuntary manslaughter is guilty of a fourth degree felony. Clearly, Walter also does not qualify as guilty of voluntary manslaughter. There is no quarrel or heat of passion. So, either Walter is guilty in New Mexico of involuntary manslaughter, or he is not guilty of homicide at all. New Mexico also has an unusual, and rather merciful "excusable homicide" provision at New Mexico Statutes § 30-2-5, that should also be considered: Homicide is excusable in the following cases: A. when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act, by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent; or B. when committed by accident or misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, if no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used and the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner. Arguably, Walter falls under "excusable homicide" part A, as moving the pillow was a lawful act done without unlawful intent and that is what caused the death. | In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment "standing"1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term "standing" in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis. | It is possible that there is such a booklet in some jurisdiction, and that local police are required to carry that booklet and show it to persons on demand. This link (apparently) publicly provides the police manual for the city of Seattle, except it is 5 years and a major lawsuit out of date. No provision seems to exist that requires showing authority to detain, when requested. There is no general requirement for all police and all laws, in the US, and the full set of state, county and city codes would be impractical to lug around. If required by law to carry and display some such document, then by law a person can demand to see a police officer's authority to detain. Even without such a law, you have a First Amendment right to challenge the detention, but that does not also enable you to resist arrest. A detention is not invalidated by the fact that the detainee is unsatisfied that the detention is legal. | There will be a local rule regarding what police have to do with a person in custody. Here are the rules for Seattle. The main relevant rule is that they must take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of the detainee. They must use seat belts, unless the vehicle does not have seat belts in the detainee area. Additionally, they are not to respond to routine calls while transporting a detainee, but they may may respond to a threat to life safety. Typically, high speed response indicates a threat and not a noisy dog complaint. There is no obligation to refrain from responding, nor is there a requirement to release detainees. I don't think there is a clear and bright line: it comes down to what an officer would (in light of department instructions) judge to be reasonable. The officer may be wrong and the department may be wrong in what is legally "reasonable", and this could come out as a result of lawsuits and Dept. of Justice investigations. You can file a complaint with the Civil Rights division of the DoJ, see here. | Some kinds of companies (e.g. freight shipping companies and banks) often do have those policies. The real issue is not whether those policies are permitted, but what the consequences are for breaking them. The fact that a company forbids its employees from exercising a legal right doesn't mean that the employee ceases to have that legal right. It simply means that if the employee exercises that legal right, then the employee has breached the contract and may suffer the consequences for breaching that contract. Violations of those policies are grounds for termination from employment, and this would probably not be void as a matter of public policy. For an employee at will this is really pretty meaningless, although it could conceivably affect unemployment benefit eligibility. But, for a unionized or civil service employee who can only be fired for cause, this is a big deal. But, in theory, a company policy does not impact the tort liability or the criminal liability of the individual engaging in legally privileged self-defense to anyone. This is because two people can't contractually change their legal duties to third parties with whom they are not in privity (i.e. with whom they do not have a contractual relationship). And two people also can't contractually change the terms of a country's penal laws. The policy may be a defense of the company from vicarious liability for the employee's use of force in violation of the policy that gives rise to civil liability for the employee because the grounds for authorizing self-defense were not present. If the employee using force did so wrongfully and was sued for negligence rather than battery, the existence of the company policy might also go to the issue of whether the employee was acting negligently since a reasonable person in the employee's shoes might have been less likely to wrongfully use force in purported self-defense if there was such a policy than if there was not such a policy (and instead there might arguably have been a legal fiduciary duty as an agent to protect the property and workers of the principal in the absence of the policy). |
Getting benefit from someone else's property In a situation where one party receives incidental benefit from another party's efforts, if the other party suddenly changes course and causes the first one a harm, are there common laws or policies that would apply? A little more specifically: One neighbor has a backyard fence that forms a common barrier with the next neighbor. That common barrier lets the neighbors both put their dogs outside securely. The fence owner is not obligated to have the fence at all by municipal or neighborhood rules. One day, the fence-owner suddenly decides to remove it without any advance notice, and the other neighbor's dog can't securely use the backyard anymore (or the dog even escapes!) Does the fence owner have any duty to at least provide advance notice to his neighbor, "Hey, I'm going to remove the fence, it might affect your dog"? Or are they truly free to take down the fence on a moment's notice, regardless of who might be negatively impacted? (this is not a real situation. This is loosely based on a real, but much more complex situation. I didn't want to post the full details, because I'm not asking for specific advice, and because the full complexity of the real situation is a lot bigger. I'm interested in the basic concepts in this hypothetical case) | It depends; Permission may be Required This depends on both the facts on the ground, and the laws of the relevant jurisdiction. Residential fences are often governed by specific local laws at the municipal or county level in the US, so no generally applicable answer is possible, short of a book giving laws for each locality. Common-Law Rules Under the common law, followed by many but far from all US jurisdictions, the key question is whether a fence is a "partition fence" or not. A partition fence is one built on or near the property line that is owned jointly by the owners of the properties it divides. A fence near the property line is probably a partition fence if: The two property owners jointly built or paid for the building of the fence; Parts of the fence are on each side of the property line; The owners have agreed that the fence is common property; or Both owners "use" the fence, as by connecting it to another fence running in a different direction, or by relying on it to contain domestic animals. A Fence is probably not a partition fence if: It is entirely clear of the property line; Only the owner on whose property it rests maintains it; and Only the owner on whose property it rests uses it. The owner of one of the properties may not remove, demolish, or modify a partition fence without permission from the other. Removing or modifying a partition fence without the permission of the owner of the adjacent property is a tort, and can lead to damages for the value of the fence begin awarded. The owners must each maintain a partition fence, often each caring for his or her side. Failing to do so may be a tort. If a fence is not a partition fence, the owner of the land is also the sole owner of the fence, and may modify or remove it without permission from, or notice to, the owner of any adjacent or nearby property. However, the above common-law rules may be modified by local laws, and one would be wise to check, or consult a lawyer who knows how to check, before making any demands. Sources The page "Removal or Destruction of Fences" from US legal reads: A fence is an enclosure creating an adequate blockade around a particular land for the purpose of prohibiting intrusions from outside. A landowner can remove a fence, separating his/her land from that of his/her neighbor, when such fence is located wholly upon his/her own land. However, a landowner is not empowered to remove a partition fence without the adjacent landowner’s consent. A partition fence is the joint property of adjacent landowners. A fence erected on the line between the lands of adjoining owners generally belongs to the parties as tenants in common. Generally, a partition fence is built equally on both sides of the line. Until the contrary is shown, the partition fence is presumed to be the common property of both owners. An owner of adjoining land can remove a partition fence upon formal notice to adjacent landowners. For an improper removal of a partition fence, an aggrieved party can bring an action for damages. The standard for measuring damages for such removal or destruction is its value at the time. The value is determined by replacement costs minus depreciation for age and use. Moreover, when someone builds a fence on another person’s land without any authority to do so, the landowner can remove or destroy such fence. A person is liable for removing, destroying, or injuring a fence belonging to another person just as one who commits such acts against any kind of property belonging to another is liable[i]. Such person is considered a tortfeasor. However, an individual cannot remove or destroy a fence on another individual’s land without his/her consent. The page "Property Line and Fence Laws in Maryland" from FindLaw reads, in relevant part: Maryland doesn't have specific rules dealing with fences. Instead, the state follows the common law practice that a fence built along a boundary line is owned in common by both property owners when both use the fence, unless otherwise agreed. A property owner is said to use a fence when they "hook-up" to the fence with another row of fence, or keep animals in the enclosure created by the fence. A fence built and used only by the builder is that person's sole property. When you purchase a new home, you take a property with an existing fence built and used by prior owners. Simply put, if you buy a property with a co-owned fence, you likely need to continue your maintenance of the fence. The page "Is it legal for the neighbor to remove a fence on our shared property line?" from Justia's "Ask a Lawyer" feature reads: If both landowners paid to install a fence directly on a property line in the past, then yes, they need your permission to remove or replace the fence. Many fences are not built on a property line, but are instead just on one property or the other. If you have had your land surveyed, you may be able to determine your exact property line. You or your neighbor are free to build new fences without permission as long as neither the fence nor any construction or excavation encroaches on the other's property. Fences are a common property dispute, and can have long term effects. If a fence encroaches significantly on someone else's land for many years, this can actually become the new legal property line in some cases. According to the "Fences" section of the page "Disputes between your neighbours" from th New Zealand Law Society: In New Zealand this is regulated by the Fencing Act 1978. Except where modified by individual agreements: Fences must be on the boundary line, though there is provision for give and take where the true boundary is difficult to fence. The cost of building or repairing a fence is borne equally between adjoining owners, unless one owner damages it, in which case the cost of repairs will fall on that owner. You can compel your neighbour to contribute to the cost of the fence bordering your two properties by following the procedures set out in the Fencing Act ... Developers of new subdivisions usually exempt themselves from contributing to the cost of a fence. Under the Property Law Act 2007, it is possible to apply to a District Court for an order to remove or alter a fence that is detrimentally affecting land or obstructing a view. Usually the cost of any removal falls on the person applying for the order. The Booklet "Fences and the Law from the Legal Services Commission, South Australia states, on page 2: Fences should be regarded as a joint asset between neighbours. Even if your neighbour has not paid for the fence they are still a joint owner. This is because a fence on the boundary is legally considered to be part of the land on each side. If you intend to remove or alter an existing fence, you should have your neighbour’s permission or a court order. If you want to put up a fence where there has not been one before, your neighbour has a right to object. It makes no difference if you intend to pay the total cost | Most leases have a provision allowing a landlord to make entry without notice in an emergency, but the better course of action, as noted in a comment by @BlueDogRanch, is to call the police and ask them to make a "welfare check." You would ordinarily be permitted to cooperate with police by unlocking doors in furtherance of their welfare check. The police are trained to do this properly in a way that properly balances the need to aid someone who is sick or ill, the need to preserve evidence if there was a death or crime that needs to be understood legally, and to protect the legitimate privacy interests of the tenant. You are not. You could incur liability for failing to prevent death or aggravating injury, could be wrongfully implicated if physical evidence from you contaminates the scene or you destroy evidence showing the true cause, and could be sued for invading the tenant's privacy if it was found that you entry was unreasonable and that it wasn't really an emergency, which is always easier to conclude with 20/20 hindsight. As it is, your biggest potential source of liability is delaying in calling the police seeking a welfare check. They often respond quite quickly to these by the way, although it is not the very highest priority for law enforcement. | You would need to be able to prove that he encroached on your land (or your tenancy to land) with his pesticide/herbicide. You should speak to him and let him know that you feel his herbicide made its way (it could've come with the wind if its just on the borders) to the land, and as a result your animals were harmed. It's always better to see if you can handle this by appealing to his sense of responsibility. Just ask him to not spray the border, or not spray on a day with any breeze if he insists on spraying the entirety of his land. If he denies spraying the border (or at all), you can try to catch him in the act and film it, or find neighboring witnesses, such that you can file a complaint for trespass. It is probably not illegal in the true sense of the word, but it may subject him to damages. You may try contacting your department of agriculture. If he is a commercial applicator there are likely regulations that dictate the necessity of following label instructions or specific regulations or laws in your community that may also subject him to liability under common law, if the pesticide drift enters the properties of others (like yours) and causes damage. While pesticide particles carried by air may cause harm to people, your type of damage or damage to another's agricultural crops is the typical claim made and the typical measure of damages. More-so when they drift to organic crops. Generally, plaintiff(s) must show that defendant(s) breached either the label instruction or a regulatory provision to succeed in recovering damages outside of common law. Typically, there are labeling instructions or regulatory provisions that limit spray drift. Is he spraying whole fields such that you think he is purchasing commercial amounts? If he is just spraying his small field or plot of land, you will have to establish a claim for trespass in order to recover damages. You also must be able to prove damages – e.g., veterinarian bills, loss of use of the animals for plowing or whatever. You have to have show the act (spraying), causation (the cause and effect) and damages (the actual effect to you that brought about specific damages) to make a claim. So far, you don't seem to have actual evidence of the act, although if you can acquire that, causation seems to be met, as well as the potential to show specific damages. Unfortunately, the pain and suffering of animals does not have the same impact or carry any of the same rights as people incurring some sort of physical harm. It must be some actual quantifiable damage to you. Only you can determine what this is. In neighborly disputes, the measure of damages is often not worth the cost of litigation. Sad but true. As a plaintiff (if it comes to that), you'll need to establish trespass or another common law cause of action as a basis for the recovery. Or you could seek equitable relief (ask the court to order he stop the practice). These claims prove challenging for plaintiffs to establish because of the common usage of pesticides. Also, strict liability is generally not available as a cause of action. You may have a claim in nuisance, but you still must show those three elements of proof. There are typically laws that preempt negligence claims concerning labeling (like in the US), and remaining negligence claims tend to be difficult to prove, for the very reason you stated (you didn't see him do it but you know he did). This means that in order to show you (or your chattel) were injured by spray drift you will probably have to file a claim in trespass. However, chemical spray drift is so intangible it is difficult for plaintiffs to meet the requirements for a trespass claim. States’ approaches to trespass for securing damages resulting from spray drift vary, and this can mean that a plaintiff must carefully plead interference with exclusive possession (your right to the land) together with injury meaning substantial property damages or damage that is physical, to establish their cause of action in trespass. | The term "The Property" does not intrinsically include or exclude a garage in this situation, so the answer has to come from other considerations. The lease is unclear, so the courts will need to look at other factors (such as the picture) to decide which interpretation is correct. Insofar as the landlord wrote the contract and could have included a clause explicitly excluding the garage, but didn't, the courts may rule in your favor under the doctrine contra proferentem. The physical arrangement does support the conclusion that the garage is part of The Property, in particular the access to the part constituting your yard. This assumes that there actually is access to your yard from the garage. Scouring the entire contract, there may be some subtle indication of how the garage is to be treated, such as a clause presupposing that you have access to the garage ("shall clean the garage..."). Then we come to the matter of the key. You say the landlord changed the key: does that mean you used to have a key that gave you access to the garage? If you used to have access to the garage, using a key provided by the landlord, that would support the conclusion that the garage was not a separate item governed by its own contract. If you have never had and were not given access to the garage (no key), that would support the contention that the garage is separate. Similar questions would be raised about the actual use of the garage: has the landlord been using it to store equipment? That would support his contention. Had you been using the garage previously and now months later the landlord wants to charge rent for the garage? That runs counter to his claim that you didn't rent the garage. In other words, since the wording does not answer the question, the full set of circumstances would have to considered. | An obvious example would be a contract that gives possession of something to someone else. It's normally legal to use some reasonable amount of force to protect or prevent trespasses against property you own, but if you give possession of that property to someone else you can lose that right. For example, you can use force remove a guest who refuses to leave real property you own, but can't use force to remove a tenant even if they broke the terms of your contract. In most jurisdictions you'd need to get a court order and have the police use force if necessary remove the tenant. | As the article suggests, this is called adverse possession. This seems to have occurred because the original owner did not make use of the property, nor monitored for adverse possession. The reason this method of acquiring title exists is for a number of reasons, including the prudent use of land, as well as being analogous to a limitation on the time period during which a claim can be brought. It would be reasonably easily avoided if the original owner had made use of the property, or monitored it and took action to eject the adverse possessor prior to their fulfilment of the necessary conditions. | In general, a properly signed lease is binding. But there are exceptions, and they vary depending on the jurisdiction: country, state/province, and even city or county in many places. You mention a claim that the property should not be leased "because the owner needs it". In some jurisdictions, there is a special exception if the owner personally, or a member of the owner's immediate family, intended to live in the property. It is not clear form the question if such an exception would apply. it might well be that a person in the position described in the question has a valid and enforceable lease, and could simply remain in the property, paying rent, and the owner would have no valid grounds for eviction. But this kind of case will depend on the exact wording of the rental agreement, and on the exact provisions of the applicable laws, which vary widely depending on the location of the property. A person in this kind of situation would b wise to consult a local lawyer who will know local property law, and how the provisions of the agreement and other claims will be treated by local courts. There may also be local tenant assistance organizations, run by the government or by non-profit groups, who will know local law and can assist in such cases. A general answer cannot be gotten from a forum such as this which an individual should rely upon in such a case, particularly when the question does not even state what country, let alone what specific locality, is involved. | The liability shield is the big one, and it can't be achieved with a contract. Just because the contract says you're not liable, that doesn't make it true. If I sign a contract with my friend that says "Nate Eldredge is hereby the King of France", that won't make me the king, nor will it force anyone except maybe my friend to acknowledge me as the king. By its nature, a contract can only bind the parties to the contract, and has no effect on the rights of anyone else. Suppose, then, that Alice and Bob agree to start a pizza delivery business, using a contract like you suggest. Their delivery car crashes, injuring Carol, a bystander, who incurs medical bills that exceed the assets of the business. Carol decides to sue Alice and Bob personally. Sure, Alice and Bob have a contract, and maybe it prevents them from suing each other, but it certainly doesn't prevent Carol from suing them; Carol never signed it. So Carol can still go after Alice and Bob's personal assets. Thus contract law cannot give them a liability shield. However, the government can, since it makes the laws about who can sue whom under what circumstances. And it has made laws saying that Alice and Bob can be protected from such suits, but only if they form a company according to the process that the law sets forth. So that's what they have to do. |
Can employer legally stop paying time & 1/2 to exempt employee after stating in the offer that they would do so? Late July I got a job as a computer programmer on a 6 month contract with the agency that recruited me (although I actually work for another company). The job is W-2, paid hourly, but as I'm a computer programmer making over $30/hr I'm overtime-exempt. However, when the agency told me the offer over the phone, they told me that I would be paid time & 1/2 for overtime and the written offer that I accepted explicitly said exactly what I'd be paid for overtime and it was time and 1/2. Moreover, when I accepted this offer they were trying to pressure me into taking it and tried to make me decide within 2 hours of receiving the offer because they knew I had another very competitive offer. Had their offer not included overtime pay, the other offer would have been much better in comparison and I probably would have chosen that one. Lastly, the job description they sent me before they even sent the offer stated that my target hours are 45 hours a week, so they knew I'd be working overtime as well. Yesterday, the agency called me and said that because I was classified as exempt, they weren't supposed to be paying me overtime and wouldn't be doing so going forward. They even tried to frame it as them doing me a favor by allowing me to keep the money that I'd already been "wrongfully paid". I pushed back though and will be discussing it with them again later today. My first question is, being overtime-exempt means they're not required to pay me time & 1/2 for overtime, but they're not prohibited from doing so correct? Like, they're not breaking any laws by paying me extra for overtime? Secondly, since the offer said in writing that I'd be paid time & 1/2 for overtime and I was told that verbally, are they required to keep paying me that as part of the contract or can they just stop whenever they'd like since I'm exempt? | being overtime-exempt means they're not required to pay me time & 1/2 for overtime, but they're not prohibited from doing so correct? No, the employer is not prohibited from paying you time & 1/2 for overtime. Nor is the employer doing you a favor with respect to the overtime you have been paid already. The employer looks foolish by telling you "I'm doing you a favor by breaching our contract only for future payments but not for past ones". are they required to keep paying me that as part of the contract or can they just stop whenever they'd like since I'm exempt? Yes, the employer is required to keep paying you under the terms of your contract: 1.5 times the normal rate in case of overtime. Your clarification reflects that the notion of "overtime-exempt" is not contemplated in the contract at all, and the employer just brought it up belatedly. Even if the contract were ambiguous or contradicted itself in this regard, the doctrine of contra proferentem would entitle you to the reasonable interpretation that favors your position (that is because the employer is the party who drafted the contract). | Is a text message legally binding? Yes, but the terms of the message need to be clear enough to ascertain the parties' intent at the formation of that contract or agreement. A contract does not even need to be in writing. There are also oral contracts and implied contracts, the latter referring to contracts which are inferred from the parties' conduct. A contract such as the agreement you describe here is binding regardless of its form. It is just easier to prove the existence of a contract if it is in writing. You did not specify your jurisdiction. If it is in the US, the price tag --rather than the downpayment-- of the object of the contract (i.e., the puppy you intend to buy) determines whether your complaint would need to be filed in Small Claims court. Generally speaking, parties to a dispute in Small Claims court have to represent themselves. Two remarks are pertinent. First, developing writing skills is utmost important not only for litigating a dispute, but also during the process of formulating the terms and conditions of a contract/agreement. Your post indicates that you seriously need to work on that. Second, the end of your post reflects that one of your managers violated labor law(s), which to most of us would be more worrisome than the controversy about the puppy. Legislation in most or all jurisdictions outlaws the act of withholding an employee's compensation regardless of its form (salary, commissions, and so forth). You might want to gain acquaintance with the labor laws of your jurisdiction so you can assess whether or how to proceed (does legislation require the employee to "exhaust administrative remedies" prior to filing in court? are administrative remedies optional? do these exist at all?), even if only to ascertain whether the deadline for filing the corresponding claim has elapsed. | In general, "a signed piece of paper" is not "a contract". It may be a record of a contract, but the contract itself is the meeting of minds where an agreement is reached and doesn't depend on the existence of the piece of paper. (Depending on the jurisdiction, some sorts of contract are required to be in writing, but this doesn't usually apply to employment contracts; it's usually contracts involving land.) What is far more worrying to me is that you don't know how much they are going to pay you. That suggests there hasn't been a meeting of minds, and there is no contract. (It might be that "the going rate" is good enough to form a contract - to determine that would require advice from a local lawyer.) I suggest you don't write up a formal agreement, but nag your boss to decide how much they are actually going to pay you. | In general: If the contract specifies some term (or "duration"), then it can only be modified in accordance with its own terms. When the employment contract expires any future employment term is subject to negotiation, and benefits could certainly be modified at that time. There are exceptions to this in labor law, but those vary by jurisdiction and won't be addressed here. Generally "vested" benefits like accrued vacation time or pension balances are treated like the property of the employee: They cannot be unilaterally reduced by the employer. One notable exception would be bankruptcy of the employer. I don't know where employee claims rank in Canadian bankruptcy law, but they are one of the debts that might not be paid in full. | There are basically two kinds of conduct that you identify. One is backing away from what you believe were oral promises made by the employer and lawyer regarding payment. Whatever the status of the promises made by the employer, the oral statements made by the lawyer would probably be viewed by a court or ethics board as settlement offers or proposals rather than actual binding agreements, and this is unlikely to be considered an ethical lapse. For purposes of ethics questions and fraud lawsuits, lies about what kind of deal you are willing to make with an adversary don't count as lies. This isn't a terribly logical rule, but is is a well established one. Given that: I was told (by employer), verbally and in text/email messages that I "would be paid when the deals closed." It is going to be very hard for the employer to take back those written statements and text and email messages are usually given the effect of signed writings in a court of law. This is going to be taken as a confession of the employer regarding the probably unwritten agreement of the parties regarding your right to be paid on these deals, so you would be well advised to stick to your guns on this issue. The percentages will be another point that is hard for the employer to fight if there is a course of dealings between the parties in which you receive a consistent percentage or there was a written agreement concerning your commission percentage. Also, even if the lawyer did make a promise and breached it, this would still only be a breach by the employer of a contract made on the employer's behalf by his lawyer. It is not an ethical lapse to breach a contract about future conduct, and a lawyer is not personally responsible for contracts he makes as a disclosed agent of your former employer. The second is making a false statement of fact about whom the lawyer has discussed the matter with. Lawyers do have an ethical duty to be truthful and failing to do so is an ethical lapse. But, this duty is generally interpreted to apply only to statements of fact which are material. If a lawyer lies to you about how old he is, or whether he's ever had an affair, in the context of a pre-litigation negotiation like this one, the ethical officials won't care. If a lawyer lies to you about something material to the transaction (e.g. claiming that the employer has money in the bank to pay a settlement when in fact it is overdrawn on all of its accounts and has no money coming in and the lawyer knows those facts), this is a serious ethical breach. It is hard to see how this information would be material, even though it casts doubt on his credibility. Ethically, he owes any duty of confidentiality to his client and not to you, so it isn't your complaint to make from a confidentiality point of view. Also, unless he discusses confidential advice that he provided to his client when no one else was present to you, he has not waived the attorney-client privilege, contrary to the answer by @IñakiViggers on that issue. Of course, proving that the lawyer said anything in an oral conversation at which no one else was present comes down to a credibility fight between your sworn statement and his if the lawyer testifies inaccurately about the discussion. A sworn statement from you is proof and would meet the "burden of production" to provide proof in support of your case at a trial, but wouldn't necessarily prevail easily at trial since the judge might not be convinced regarding who is accurate in their account of the discussion (I have avoided the word "lying" because there are a variety of reasons that people inaccurately recall discussions). What would be the sensible way to use this information to my advantage while trying to resolve these matters with having to bring suit and go to court? Is there anything that this lawyer should fear, if his unethical behavior was brought to light, either in court or to a bar association? The conduct you describe on the part of the lawyer will provide you with little or no leverage in your negotiations and is likely to not even be considered admissible evidence in court since it may be considered a form of settlement negotiations. Your strongest leverage will be the written statements from the employer. But, depending upon the amount in dispute, it may still make sense to compromise given the time and expense and uncertainty of going to court. Even in the clearest case, you probably only have a 90% chance of winning a contested case, and you wouldn't cross the street if you knew you had a 10% chance of being hit by a car as you crossed, even if you knew that the collision wouldn't be fatal. Unless your state has a wage claims act that covers you, you may have little or not prospect of an attorneys' fee award if you prevail, and representing yourself when the employer has a lawyer will always put you at a disadvantage in a court setting. If the amount in dispute is great (e.g. $50,000+), hiring a lawyer is probably worth it. If the amount in dispute is small (e.g. $5,000) you may want to file a suit in small claims court and only hire a lawyer for a couple hours of pre-hearing coaching. | Contracts can say all sorts of unenforceable things, you provided an example of one of them. A person cannot be compelled to stay and work somewhere they no longer wish to work. At the risk of getting my wrist slapped for straying too far into the land of opinion, a clause like this is likely intended to take advantage of naive teenagers who will provide free employment referrals because they think they have to. | In the UK, you would need a new contract, because the old company will not be able to pay you and will possibly cease to exist, but that contract must not put you at any disadvantage. Basically, all terms would have to be the same, and the time at the previous company would have to count as continuous employment. | It probably depends on whether the employer is covered by a relevant non-discrimination statute. Most employers in the United States are covered, but some are small enough to be exempt. Federal law exempts employers with under 15 employees and religious organizations. There might also be a relevant state law. It also would depend upon whether the EEOC or a court found that "be blessed" was a compelled religious statement in violation of a worker's beliefs, and whether allowing the worker not to say it would be a "reasonable accommodation." This is a strong case, and I suspect that the worker would win on both counts but it isn't a completely open and shut case. There is arguably a secular meaning to the word "blessed" and a court could conceivably find that there is a legitimate and indispensible business purpose for insisting that every single person in the worker's position need to make this statement, although I doubt that a court would do so. |
Is failure to comply with Brady Rules cause for a mistrial? The Legal Information Institute defines the Brady Rule as follows. Brady Rule Primary tabs The Brady Rule, named after Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), requires prosecutors to disclose materially exculpatory evidence in the government's possession to the defense. A "Brady material" or evidence the prosecutor is required to disclose under this rule includes any evidence favorable to the accused--evidence that goes towards negating a defendant's guilt, that would reduce a defendant's potential sentence, or evidence going to the credibility of a witness. In regards to the issue of a credibility check of a witness. I f the government withholds information that is pertinent to the credibility of a witness is that cause for a mistrial? Does whether the government knowingly or unknowingly withheld this information influence whether a mistrial will be granted? | If the government withholds information that is pertinent to the credibility of a witness is that cause for a mistrial? Only if the error is not harmless under the standard applicable to evaluating harmless error in criminal cases (there is a voluminous case law on that point). Basically, it means that a new trial may be held and a conviction vacated on a charge against a particular defendant if there is a reasonable possibility that the withheld evidence, when considered in light of the total picture of evidence presented at trial, might have changed the outcome on guilt or innocence. Does whether the government knowingly or unknowingly withheld this information influence whether a mistrial will be granted? Not really. Knowledge is imputed. If someone in the prosecution team including the police knows, then it is known to the entire team for Brady purposes. If no one knew that it had the information (e.g. a key exculpatory document in possession of the prosecution was misfiled in one of dozens of bankers boxes of documents that it seized in a search and no one reviewed those particular boxes knowing to look for a document like that one or attuned to its potential significance, since it wasn't supposed to be in the place where it was filed), then it hasn't been withheld in the Brady sense unless someone specifically asked for the information in question with enough specificity that it could have been located if they looked at what they already had. The knowledge that must be disclosed is what the prosecutor's office or the police the prosecutor's office is working with knows. So, if a beat cop hides exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor's office, that is a Brady violation, but if the cops do a sloppy investigation that fails to reveal exculpatory evidence that is out there to be found, it isn't a Brady violation. Likewise, if a cop in another department halfway across the state knows something that impacts the credibility of a witness and the prosecutor is totally unaware of the existence of that information as are all the cops working on the case, then that isn't a Brady violation. What If It Isn't A Brady Violation? Exculpatory evidence discovered after the trial that isn't a Brady violation not to disclose may still be grounds for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence in a motion for post-trial relief. But, the standard to get the court to grant a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence that was not withheld in a Brady violation is much more stringent than the mere harmless error standard. Instead: With a single exception, criminal defendants in the United States seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are required to establish only that the new evidence makes it more likely than not that, in a new trial, they would be acquitted. Ohio requires clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. There's a lot of case law on what constitutes newly discovered evidence which is "new, material evidence that was unavailable at the time of the original trial[.]" If evidence was available, but not used at trial, it can't be presented in a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Often this means that it can't be considered even if the salience of the evidence previously available is only clear later in the light of other evidence that is genuinely newly discovered, or the defense attorney's failure to use that evidence in the first trial was negligent to a level constituting legal malpractice. | Your question is essentially this: consider a defamation lawsuit in which A alleges that B falsely stated that A did X (and it is not contested that B made the statement) also consider that B has done X in the past is it of any relevance to A's defamation suit that B has done X in the past canada Evidence must be relevant to a live, material issue In order for evidence to be admissible it must be "relevant to a live, material issue in the case" (this is from a dissent, but there is no disagreement about this point). Stage 1: Did B make a defamatory statement about A that was published - no relevance to this issue Defamation is prima facie proven if B's statement was published and if it tended to lower the reputation of A. The fact that B has done X in the past is irrelevant to this aspect of the analysis, especially when the defendant is not alleging that they did not say "A did X." Stage 2: Defences - there is a very narrow path for relevance on this issue Once defamation is prima facie proven, the burden flips to the defendant to establish a defence. Of all the possible defences, the only one in which I could see B having done X in the past being relevant is the defence of fair comment: (a) the comment must be on a matter of public interest; (b) the comment must be based on fact; (c) the comment, though it can include inferences of fact, must be recognisable as comment; (d) the comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any [person] honestly express that opinion on the proved facts? (e) even though the comment satisfies the objective test the defence can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant was [subjectively] actuated by express malice. The fact the B has done X in the past could be relevant to this defence if B were to use that familiarity with the activity X as part of the commentary on why they believe that A has done X. It could also be relevant (not on its own, but along with much more context) for an allegation of malice on B's part. Conclusion: Evidence that B did X in the past would likely not be relevant I see it very unlikely that B having done X in the past would be relevant. It would likely be treated as a collateral issue, unless B's credibility somehow became absolutely central to the litigation and if the judge was convinced that such acts relate to credibility. On the facts as described, and even for a fair comment defence, I don't see that being the case. | The first thing to keep in mind is that, before appearing on the stand, an expert witness will have given a sworn deposition and delivered a written report of his or her findings. They could expect to be questioned about anything they say under oath that contradicts something else they said under oath. It’s not illegal for an expert to admit they were wrong before, or that there are other facts that support a different conclusion—indeed, a witness on the stand might be obligated to—but it might not do their professional reputation and their credibility with the jury any good, either. In the U.S., the opposing counsel is generally allowed to contact a witness, and take a statement, but may not ask the witness to testify falsely or offer any inducement prohibited by law. (See Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 173/Model Rule (MR) 3.4.) It would certainly be illegal for a witness to take money from both parties in the case without informing them or the court, or to swear that whatever the highest bidder pays them to say is their expert opinion. If this happened under direct examination, the lawyer would probably cut their losses by asking no further questions and getting the witness off the stand. Putting the witness on the stand would give the other side an opportunity to cross-examine them. Grilling your own expert as a hostile witness, even if the judge allowed it, would only make your position seem tendentious. Nothing stops an expert witness from giving testimony that is more helpful to the other side. They are witnesses, not lawyers, and their duty is to tell the truth, not to zealously advocate on behalf of some client. | Generally speaking, witnesses are not legally represented at trial, unless they are also parties. While a witness may choose to seek legal advice about a request or order they have received to give evidence, they would generally be expected to take this opportunity before they actually show up at trial. A witness examination would not normally be adjourned because a witness said something damaging to their own credibility or to one party’s case, and would like to pause and obtain legal advice. One goal of cross-examination is to expose unreliable evidence by obtaining this kind of tactical advantage over a witness. It is up to the party whose case was damaged to try to fix the problem in re-examination or reply evidence. That party may not be particularly interested in protecting the witness’s personal interests. There may be exceptions in specific factual situations, when it becomes clear that a witness does not understand their right to object to giving evidence on the grounds of self-incrimination or some other privilege. A judge may choose to halt further questioning of the witness if there is a real risk of a mistrial or some other procedural unfairness, which can be addressed without unfairly depriving the cross-examiner of their opportunity to challenge the evidence. | There are instances when the testimony may still be admitted. For example, a deposition may be admitted at trial either for impeaching or when a witness cannot attend, which involves the circumstance of death (FRCP 32(a)(4)(a)). Additionally, regarding hearsay, there are numerous exceptions. My Evidence professor said in class "If you cannot find a way to get evidence around a hearsay objection, you are not trying hard enough." One such hearsay exception states in the committee notes: Accordingly, the committee has amended rule 803(8) to refer to the provision of [proposed] rule 804(b)(5) [deleted], which allows the admission of such reports, records or other statements where the police officer or other law enforcement officer is unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process. | What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? A private lawyer's job is to look out for the client's interests before the public interest in these cases. In many states, a private lawyer is not permitted to threaten to seek a criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil action. A private lawyer, myself included, will often deliberately not pursue criminal charges in order to not impair the ability of a client to collect a judgment. A prosecutor has wide discretion to prosecute or not when the prosecutor is aware of a crime that there is probable cause to believe was committed. A complaint by the victim is not required in the U.S., but most prosecutors consider a victim's wishes. A prosecutor may ethically make prosecution dependent upon making a victim whole. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? What is "fair" is beyond the scope of Law.SE which deals in "what is", not in what is "fair". Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict? Not really. Just the good judgment of the individual actors in the system given their respective duties and roles. | The answer by @A.fm. isn't wrong, but it also is unduly optimistic. In my experience, in real life, people are more likely to lie when they are under oath than when they are not under oath, and law enforcement officers tend to be particularly good at lying on the stand because they testify frequently in court cases. In almost all places in the United States (and most foreign jurisdictions), in a pure battle of credibility in the eyes of a judge or jury between a law enforcement officer and an individual citizen charged with a crime, the law enforcement officer's account is going to be found to be more credible (beyond a reasonable doubt) about 90% of the time or more, unless you have a majority-minority jury or an outlier extremely liberal judge or the law enforcement officer has a personal involvement in the case (e.g. it involves a family member of the officer). The likelihood that it will be resolved one way or the other does depend significantly on race and social class, however. The credibility imbalance is still great and favors law enforcement, but not as extreme, when it is between an unrelated third-party witness and a law enforcement officer. In the absence of hard evidence or a law enforcement insider witness willing to testify in your favor, it is almost impossible to win a credibility contest in a case like the ones you suggest. One important step an attorney can take, however, is to seek discovery on any prior instance in which the testifying officer has been disciplined for untruthfulness or had his testimony in court found to be untruthful. This will usually be fruitless, but levels the playing field to closer to 50-50 if you get lucky and received such evidence. Such a request also provides a means of collateral attack on a conviction if the law enforcement officer has a history of untruthfulness that wasn't disclosed by the prosecution after such a request is made by a defense lawyer. So, what does protect you? Mostly the desire of the bosses of law enforcement officers (who are ultimately politicians, mostly local politicians in the United States) to see the law enforced in a non-corrupt manner and the fear of a law enforcement officer that he or she might be found to have lied using physical evidence unknown to him at the time (like a secret recording of an interaction). Law enforcement officers usually don't have much to gain from lying (although this equation changes a law when police department can receive assets seized in civil forfeitures that they are involved in) and usually they want people who are "bad guys" to be in jail to protect "good guys" although they aren't always very concerned about the means by which they achieve these ends. Of course, "usually" is a weasel word here and there are many exceptions that crop up in real life (e.g. when police have engaged in misconduct and want to protect themselves from the consequences of that misconduct). The other obvious solution (so common that in certain eras of U.S. history there were travel guides targeted at African-American motorists to help they carry out this approach) is to avoid places with police who have historically been corrupt. The United States has a uniquely bottom heavy law enforcement structure. Something on the order of 95% of law enforcement officers are employed by local governments or are otherwise tightly constricted geographically (e.g. rangers in national or state parks). And, even the small number of state law enforcement officers are heavily concentrated doing traffic enforcement on major state and federal highways. Similarly, lots of federal law enforcement agencies are broken up into geographic divisions some of which are known to be more corrupt than others (e.g. there is more corruption in the border patrol on parts of the border with Mexico than on most of the border with Canada). So, if you want to avoid the risk of encountering bad cops, stay away from places that are known to have bad cops. The solution may seem like a "cop out" (sorry, pun intended), but it is actually a pretty unique feature of the American law enforcement system. Most countries (e.g. the U.K., South Korea, Russia, Japan, Spain, Mexico, France) have a much more centralized law enforcement bureaucracy, which is fine when the people are the top are scrupulously non-corrupt, but which also makes it much easier for the rot of corruption to become geographically widespread and hence unavoidable from the point of view of an individual citizen. In contrast, in the U.S., even in the most corrupt of times (e.g. the Prohibition era), there are almost always many jurisdictions where law enforcement is not corrupt and corrupting the entirely system is much more difficult than in most countries. | Police reports are treated as "Business Records" and are therefore not excluded by the hearsay rule, regardless of the availability of the declarant. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803: Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay Business Records Exception The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. I suppose a valid defense in this case would be to bring into question the "trustworthiness of the preparation" (via 803(8)(B)), but it is still admissible. Admissibility of Police Reports A number of courts have held that a police report otherwise excluded by Rule 803(8) is admissible under the hearsay exception for recorded recollection in Rule 803(5). On the other hand... At least one court has held that the recorded recollection exception does not allow the admission of a police report that is excluded by Rule 803(8). Offering another reason for the exclusion, the court observed that such reports, particularly when they concern on-the-scene investigations, are considered less reliable than records prepared by other public officials because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases and the likelihood of the report’s use in litigation. See United States v. Pena-Gutierrez, 222 F.3d 1080, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2000); see also State v. Harper, 96 N.C. App. 36, 40–41(1989) (recognizing this rationale in finding police report inadmissible under Rule 803(8); court did not address admissibility under other rules). Recognizes the conflict of interest police have when recording evidence against a defendant, so it may be possible to argue admissibility in that way, but it seems most courts do not follow this line of thinking. |
Do child support payments apply in the case of a paid sexual encounter? In the UK and/or Ireland, is child support payable by someone who fathers a child with a paid escort? Assume the scenario where the condom broke, and the escort assured the "customer" that she was on birth control but she became pregnant anyway and a subsequent paternity test shows the resultant baby is the "customer's". I was under the impression that child support could only be sought in normal relationships and not from escort relationships. What does the law say on this matter? | In the UK, the law applicable to liability for child maintenance does not restrict it to children conceived in 'normal', conventional, or ongoing relationships. A biological parent has specific legal rights, AND a duty of ‘parental responsibility’ to look after the child. Mothers automatically have parental responsibility. A father has parental responsibility if he is married to the child’s mother, or is named on the birth certificate. Unmarried fathers do not have automatic parental responsibility, and neither do step-parents or grandparents. A proven biological father may not have parental responsibility, but will certainly have financial responsibility. In most cases fathers will have parental responsibility or can easily acquire it by way of an agreement or a court order. Unless there are compelling reasons, the courts are unlikely to refuse it. If a DNA test shows that the child is yours, then you are liable for the usual contribution to care at CSA rate of 15% of take home pay. When the baby is born the mother can apply to the CSA for maintenance naming you as the father. You will have a limited time within which to ask for (and pay for) a DNA test if you wish to challenge the issue. The cost is repaid if the child is not yours. Financial liability applies whether or not money has changed hands in return for the sex that led to the child's conception. The issue of casual sex leading to parenthood is a perennial one, and this page is as good as any: Dating site babies (Leiper Gupta Family Lawyers) Also in the UK, if you donate sperm through a Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) licensed clinic, you will not: be the legal parent of any child born have any legal obligation to any child born have any rights over how the child will be brought up be asked to support the child financially be named on the birth certificate If you use an unlicensed clinic to donate sperm, or an informal method, you will be the legal father of any child born from your donation under UK law. Legal rights for egg and sperm donors (UK Government) | Standing requirements are different in state and federal courts, and from one state to the next. A random individual would not have standing to object to a stranger's abortion in federal court, and likely not in any state court, under normal circumstances, as they are not injured in any meaningful way by the abortion. I don't know what the normal rules of standing are in Texas, but it is likely perfectly acceptable for the Legislature to wave its wand to grant standing to whomever it wants regarding any violation of the law it sees for. That seems to be what is happening here. | Is it lawful to offer smaller portions only to children below a certain age..? Yes Part 3 of the Equality Act 2010 covers "Services and Public Functions" and at section 29 states: Provision of services, etc. (1)A person (a “service-provider”) concerned with the provision of a service to the public or a section of the public (for payment or not) must not discriminate against a person requiring the service by not providing the person with the service. This is the only definition of "service-provider" in the Act, but the Equality and Human Rights Commission confirms a restaurant falls with the scope of Part 3: Equality law applies to any business that provides goods, facilities or services to members of the public. This includes a wide range of different businesses and services. These include: [...] restaurants [...] However all that is moot (but posted here for context) as Part 3 of the Act opens with caveats at section 28 which establishes that: (1)This Part does not apply to the protected characteristic of— (a)age, so far as relating to persons who have not attained the age of 18; [...] | Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? This is a hard question to answer that doesn't have a neat resolution. Very little pertaining to the authority of a parent over a child is codified in statutory law and there is not a clear cut age at which a child has "freedom of conscience" vis-a-vis a parent. Most of the law related to children concerns allocation of parenting time and parental decision making between divorced, separated or unmarried parents; abuse and neglect; and juvenile delinquency. There is also usually a snippet of criminal law stating that certain kinds of uses of force to discipline children do not constitute crimes. But, part of why it doesn't come up very much is that older children are usually socialized in a manner that causes them to show a certain amount of respect for the wishes of their parents. It also doesn't come up much for children who aren't in their late teens, because the complete economic dependence of children on their parents or guardians gives the parents considerable power of their children that doesn't require the exercise of physical force. Also, it is quite dependent upon how the issue presents itself. No law enforcement agency is going to aid a parent in forcibly dragging a kid to church against their will. But, no social services agency is going to remove a kid from a home because his birthday party will be cancelled if he doesn't go to the church of his parents' choice the Sunday before his birthday. There are also some subtle but important distinctions between states on the issue of emancipation. In Colorado, emancipation is a statement about the empirical reality. If a child is self-supporting and lives apart from parents or guardians then the child is an emancipated minor. It is not a status granted by a court, it is a status acknowledged by courts when evaluating other issues. In California, a child is not emancipated unless a court grants a child that status and a child who is de facto emancipated without the leave of a court is guilty of a "status offense" (the New York State term for someone in this state is PINS for "person in need of supervision"). Basically, if a parent can force a child to go to church by means that don't constitute abuse or neglect and don't exceed the level of force authorize for child discipline in the criminal code, then they can do it, and if they can't manage that, then they can't do it. Many states have a "status offense" that allows government intervention with the cooperation of a parent or guardian in cases where an "uncontrollable" child is defiant and simply will not give any heed to the parent or guardian's instructions. In practice, the older a child is, the less likely someone viewing a parent's conduct forcing a child to do something is to be viewed as acceptable or legally justified. The legal rights of children in a school setting are also age dependent under the case law, although not always in a really well defined way. Controls on student expression that would be uncontroversial for elementary school students may be looked upon by the law with disfavor for high school students and clearly prohibited for adults. Perhaps one useful way to conceptualize it is that trying to make a child attend a particular kind of religious service is not considered an improper purposes for a parent of any minor to utilize the resources available to the parent to do so, but the range of resources available to a parent with regard to an adult child is much narrower. | It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted. | Yes, maybe australia In Australia, child abuse material is classified as the sexualised depiction of persons under 16 (or in some cases 18). This applies under both State and Commonwealth laws. Common charges in NSW will be possessing, disseminating or producing child abuse material under s 91(H) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Further Commonwealth offences can be found in circumstances where a communications carrier has been used for the purposes of delivering child abuse material. Within this field, there are subtle variations in circumstances. The court would need to decide if the pictures were a “sexualised depiction”. Context matters. I don’t know of any cases on point but convictions have been secured for sexualised cartoons of children and pictures of fully-clothed children in sexual poses. | I'm answering your title question and assuming that you meant to present a circumstance that would actually trigger criminal liability, but based on the ages you've actually used in your hypothetical, you may not have done so. I'll ignore that complication and just present what the law is. Yes, there are some U.S. laws that people can be found to violate while in another country. The Department of Justice has a "citizen's guide" explaining extraterritorial sexual exploitation of children. The main offences are: 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a): Transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity 18 U.S.C. § 2423(d): Travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c): Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places For § 2423(a), there must be the intent to engage in "any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense." For § 2423(b) and (c), "illicit sexual conduct" means, among a few other things: "a sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Chapter 109A includes § 2243(a): Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any Federal department or agency, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who (a) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and (b) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. | Any parent may leave a child in the care of another responsible person. There is no special license required. The parent may use sound judgement in selecting the caretaker. Nor does a caretaker even have to be an adult -- teens are often used as baby sitters. If a reasonable parent would have known that a particular person was not a safe caretaker, then selecting that person might be negligence or child endangerment. Nor is there any legal requirement in most US states that a child be under anyone's direct supervision at all times. See "Free range parenting". Again, if in particular circumstances a reasonable parent should know that supervision is needed, failure to provide it might be child neglect or endangerment. Some US states set minimum ages for children to be unsupervised. NJ is not one, to the best of my understanding. |
Placebo doping in sport It is illegal in most sports to take any of a list of banned performance-enhancing substances. There are governing bodies across sport to enforce these restrictions. If an athlete were to honestly believe that they were taking such a substance, surreptitiously and in order to obtain an unfair advantage, but no such substance was present -- for example because an unscrupulous trainer believed the placebo effect would give them an advantage, or perhaps because their dealer is crooked -- would this fall foul of the regulations? The reason I ask is that the violations which you here about concern the fact of consumption not the intent, which is clearly sufficient to sanction an athlete. Is this because intent doesn't enter into the fact of the offence, or because either the fact or the intent are sufficient? | In the united-kingdom it is a breach of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules for an athlete to have a "Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers" in their sample. No mention is made, as far as I can see, that the intent to use a placebo as described by the OP would fall foul of these Rules. The only relevant mention of intent seems to be when the substances etc are present: It is each Athlete’s personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters their body. An Athlete is responsible for any Prohibited Substance or any of its Metabolites or Markers found to be present in their Sample. Accordingly, it is not necessary to demonstrate intent, Fault, negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part in order to establish an Article 2.1 Anti-Doping Rule Violation; nor is the Athlete's lack of intent, Fault, negligence or knowledge a valid defence to an assertion that an Article 2.1 Anti-Doping Rule Violation has been committed. | It probably is infringement, assuming that this is being done by copying parts of a broadcast of the game. It is up to the holder of the copyright on the original broadcast that is being condensed to decide whether to sue or take other action, such as a takedown notice. Perhaps the holder thinks this is good advertising for its business. They have the right to make that decision. Now if a person went to the game, and used a personal camera to film it, and posted excepts of that recording, the legal issues would be very different. The ticket probably includes a provision prohibiting filming and photography, so this would be a breech of contract. But it would not be copyright infringement. (In practice if this were spotted, the person would be required to stop recording or leave, at least.) | Well, moral obligations are not laws, nor sometimes even moral obligations. Some laws are based on what some courts and legislatures think are moral obligations. We think cannibals have a moral obligation not to eat people; cannibals think non-cannibals are fools for passing up a good BBQ. As for a leader's moral responsibility for millions of lives, we can take as extreme examples Mao, Hilter, Stalin, Pol Pot, etc., that there are no obligations. The law that could apply in the case of a POTUS who does not "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States..." (oath of office for POTUS) is that of "High Crimes and Misdemeanors", the grounds for most impeachments. But "faithfully executing the Office of President" has no moral obligation; it has legal implications, that's all. High crimes or misdemeanor are legal definitions, not moral, and depend on previous cases of what a crime or misdemeanor is. Insobriety can be illegal; there are laws on the books concerning public drunkenness. But in the contest of POTUS (one who is hopefully not passed out on the sidewalk in front of the WH), it remains to be seen if insobriety is a high crime or misdemeanor. That would be up to the House Judiciary Committee and US House of Representatives, which by Constitutional powers handles impeachment proceedings. The Twenty-fifth Amendment outlines who succeeds the president due to "Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office," but it does not state who has the power to declare a President incapacitated. It's possible that a POTUS who incapacitates himself with alcohol is guilty of a "high crime or misdemeanor." But how drunk do you have to be to be incapacitated? Drunk enough to think a Game Boy is the nuclear football? Again, that's up to the House. Some past presidents have arguably been functional alcoholics (or functional recovered alcoholics.) But incapacitated? That can be subjective when it comes to the application of the law. And morals have little to do with it, unless those morals have a basis in that same law. Update 12/04/16: Some federal judges have been impeached due to drunkenness: http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html and http://www.crf-usa.org/impeachment/high-crimes-and-misdemeanors.html | Yes, that would be fraud. From the Fraud Act 2006: 2: Fraud by false representation 1) A person is in breach of this section if he— (a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and (b) intends, by making the representation— (i) to make a gain for himself [...] By saying that you had got a position with a competitor you would be dishonestly (i.e. you knew it was a lie) making a false representation. Your purpose was to obtain gardening leave, which is a gain for yourself. | england-and-wales From your first link: "A leading Premier League footballer arrested on suspicion of rape has been further arrested on suspicion of two incidents of rape against a different woman." As he was arrested that means there are now 'active' 'criminal proceedings' against him within the meaning of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (as amended). Therefore reporting is now subject to the 'strict liability rule': "it is a contempt of court to publish anything to the public which creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced, even if there is no intent to cause such prejudice." Reporting Restrictions in the Criminal Courts April 2015 (Revised May 2016), Judicial College Per the Contempt of Court Act there are four defences: s3(1) "A person is not guilty of contempt of court under the strict liability rule as the publisher of any matter to which that rule applies if at the time of publication (having taken all reasonable care) he does not know and has no reason to suspect that relevant proceedings are active. s3(2) "A person is not guilty of contempt of court under the strict liability rule as the distributor of a publication containing any such matter if at the time of distribution (having taken all reasonable care) he does not know that it contains such matter and has no reason to suspect that it is likely to do so. s4(1) "a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith" s5 "A publication made as or as part of a discussion in good faith of public affairs or other matters of general public interest is not to be treated as a contempt of court under the strict liability rule if the risk of impediment or prejudice to particular legal proceedings is merely incidental to the discussion." Really the publication is mitigating its legal risk at the present time and it will no doubt report the name of the footballer if he is tried or does not proceed to trial. | IANAL, and I don't live in America, but some of this depends on their intent. If they gave the drugs away by mistake, they probably have not broken any laws. If they were given away deliberately (and you would need to prove this – which might be hard) then yes, he has broken laws. Either way, I expect you have a right to compensation (i.e. $900) from the physician to "make you whole again." If required necessary you could file for that in your local small claims court: The physician will either come to the party pretty quickly and sort it out, or the court will award you the money you need to buy the replacement meds. (But you will need to evidence the replacement cost, for a start....) | The Florida Supreme Court has held in State v. Williams, 623 So. 2d 462 Fla. that if a law enforcement agency manufactures drugs for use in a reverse-sting operation, then this constitutes governmental misconduct and is a violation of the Florida Constitution due process clause and that a conviction in these circumstances should be reversed. That is, the manufacturing of a controlled substance may be grounds for reversing a conviction which relies on that substance. However, based on this judgement, the circumstance you describe would not be a violation of due process. From the judgement, at 466: Section 893.02(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), defines "manufacture" as: the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, cultivating, growing, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance either directly or indirectly, by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container.... Further, the judgement distinguishes State v Bass 451 So.2d 986 (1984) wherein law enforcement officials delivered marijuana obtained from federal agents to defendants as part of a reverse-sting operation. At Appeal, it was held that law enforcement officials do not need statutory authority to "engage in reverse-sting deliveries of controlled substances". That is, simply using drugs from a pharmacy without modification, repackaging or otherwise relabelling, does not constitute conduct so outrageous as to violate Florida's due process clause, and on the facts that you have presented, there is no evidence that a due process defence would be held. | It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial. |
Is it illegal to enter a website with an account that is not yours? I worked as a developer in a company and I had some of the employees' passwords. They are saved in my Google account. What are the consequences of using these passwords to enter as another person? Assuming that I entered them in a program that I created. | I infer from the use of the past tense "worked" that you no longer work for the company in question. Also, from the fact that you are wondering whether there might be negative consequences, I infer that you do not have permission to use the systems in question. The specific consequences will depend on where the company and its computers are located, as well as on the nature of the systems you log in to and on what you do with those systems, but it's certainly possible to receive a penalty of several years' imprisonment. The fact that you created the system in question makes no difference. | There is no requirement to name the parties to a contract I just bought a cup of coffee. I did not give my name to the other party to that contract and while I know the name of the shop, I do not actually know the legal entity I contracted with. Nevertheless, we have a binding contract and, for example, if that coffee gave me food poisoning, I would have legal recourse under that contract. Similarly, there is no difficulty signing a contract under a pseudonym - it still creates a legally binding relationship. The practical difficulties While there is no legal problem, there is an evidentiary one - if someone enters a contract and later disclaims doing so, how do you prove that they did? Or vice-versa, if someone alleges that it was you that entered the contract, how do you prove that you didn’t. What you need is some way of definitively but anonymously tying the person to the contract. I can think of lots - a fingerprint, DNA, public key cryptography, a trusted third-party intermediary to name just a few. This is essentially a technical problem rather than a legal one. | What would be the legal validity of this behaviour? Your changes to the browser source of the website contract or license of Terms of Service (TOS) - essentially a "click-wrap" license - before agreeing to it means nothing in a legal sense, other than to void the contract. The other party (the website) can't possibly agree to those contract changes without them being submitted as contractual changes and agreeing to them, if they did agree to them. That's basic contract law. That website TOS probably has a clause that says that if you don't agree to the TOS in full, as written, without modifications, you can't use the website. And the TOS may also say that they reserve the right to prevent you from using the site by closing your account or even blocking your access. Your "witness" to the contract changes is meaningless, as your witness is not a party to the contract. And any witness to the fact that you have changed the terms of the TOS before agreeing to it would work against you in a civil proceeding as proof of your attempt at modifying the contract. | Yes (in most jurisdictions), but why should you? There might be some interests in publishing the 1,000 most common passwords, e.g. to support security awareness lectures (or to build rainbow tables for nefarious purposes), but anybody who wants to hash them with a specific algorithm can do so easily. It is probably easier to type the passwords from a printed book and to hash them on the computer than it is to type the hashed passwords -- bad passwords would tend to be easy to type. That being said, computer crime laws are generally lagging behind the state of the art, or they are overly broad, so it might be illegal in some places as a "hacking tool" ... | Since the Steam ID contains or may contain enough information for it to be possible to link your account to you as a physical person, it would definitely be considered "personal data" according to Article 4 of the GDPR. However, by agreeing to the DOTA2 terms of service, you have given consent for them to show your information to other players (or at least that is included in most terms of service I have read for other games. I have not read the one for DOTA2 specifically). Replays are an interesting corner case. If download of replays are only possible for other players or if the wording of the ToS says that you consent to displaying your user ID to anybody, that would mean that they would have covered their bases. As long as they comply with other parts of GDPR, like "the right to erasure" (Article 17) that is. If the API is accessible to anyone and not covered by the ToS you might have a case. If you only want to remove the traceability between you and the replays, you can always evoke Article 17 and delete your account. | Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A. | You have several issues. Breach of Contract When you sign up with each of those services you are entering a legally binding contract and must comply with the terms of that contract. For example, this is taken from Facebook's terms: Here are some commitments you make to us relating to registering and maintaining the security of your account: You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission. You will not create more than one personal account. I haven't checked but its a fair bet that the other services have similar terms. Unless you have permission, what you are doing breaches these terms of service. If what you do causes damage to Facebook et al then they can sue you and your employer for damages. Even if it doesn't they can probably bar you from having an account for as long as they like. Improper use of images This is jurisdictional but it is generally required to have the permission of the subject of a photograph where that photograph is used for commercial gain. There are exceptions where the person is not the primary subject (e.g. crowd shots, or images primarily of something else where the person happens to be in the shot) but the type of photos you would use for these services are not going to be exempt. The sanctions for breaching this will be dependent on jurisdiction. Breach of Copyright Somebody owns the copyright in those photographs. If you do not have a licence to use them in the way you propose then you are breaching their copyright. The copyright holder can sue for damages (if any) and any profits you make. Vicarious Liability An employer is strictly liable for the actions of their employees, jointly and severally with the employee. That means a plaintiff can go after either the employer, the employee or both. An employee may have some statutory or contractual indemnity but this is by no means common. | I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B). |
Do I need to take any legal precautions for my stock prediction app? Suppose that a developer (D) creates an app that lets users enter a ticker and get an estimate for its future price. No other advice on whether to buy or sell will be displayed; only the forecasted price and some sort of error bounds will be shown to the user. D plans on initially releasing the app for free. In the future D may have a free version (with ads) and a paid version (one-time fee) that gives a user extra filters, but the base functionality will remain the same. Does any of this sound like "financial advice" that D needs some sort of license for? Suppose that D is based in the UK. Related question | Here be dragons Financial services regulation is very complicated. Non-compliance can have severe consequences. Professional legal counsel could assist in navigating the complex web of law, regulation, and precedent. It may seem unfair that things are so difficult - that's a result of financial services being inherently complicated topics, ones which are fought over by wealthy people/firms, and where there has been a long history of dodgy dealings of many kinds. As an example of the difficulties involved, the law in general would like to distinguish between Investment advice given to a specific individual, taking all their personal circumstances and wishes into account, and Newspaper reports giving dispassionate information to the general public about the movement of share prices, but not telling them what to do in response; or completely generic advice like "it's good when the wiggly line goes up". The second is "meant" to be basically OK and not the concern of the regulators; the first one is where all kinds of legal duties and protections come into play, since people might be disadvantaged by advisors who are inept or unscrupulous. Intuitively, D's app is somewhere between these, because it's not as if users are sitting down with a financial advisor and making trades, but they're also not just consuming generic data like a stock ticker. There is an element of prediction, expressing a range of envisaged outcomes, and potentially with "extra filters" that add some more personalization. So what does the law say about this? Just looking at the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, Part II Chapter 12 and its form after two decades of tweaking tells us that there is a lot of complicated detail just in this regulation. We don't have to read or understand the words to see that there are a lot more of them, taking the apparently simple distinction above and trying to capture or carve out a range of activities not originally envisaged. If we do start looking at the actual words, we can see several concepts that become relevant - "advice on the merits", "leading or enabling persons to buy or sell", and so on. These, and their predecessor words in older laws, have been thrashed out in the courts in ways that are not completely obvious. A recent case in the Court of Appeal, Adams v Options Personal Pensions UK LLP [2021] EWCA Civ 474, looks at some of this territory in paragraphs 69-82. We see here some phrases about whether the context of the information presented includes elements of comparison, evaluation, or persuasion; influencing the decision of the recipient as a result of a value judgement; giving purely factual information as opposed to matters such as a characterization of risk; and others. But, as quoted here from another decision, Rubenstein v HSBC Bank plc [2011] EWHC 2304 (QB), "To attempt any greater definition of the giving of advice in an investment context would be unwise and is probably impossible", which tells us that it's not easy to decide whether developer D's app is in or out. You say "the app won't instruct users whether to buy or not" but courts have found a concept of "implied advice", where the context of the giving of information means that the customer will take it as advice. In Australia, the Federal Court recently found an implied recommendation, amounting to personal advice, had been given in a certain situation when customers were told supposedly general advice - even though there was an up-front disclaimer (ASIC v Westpac [2019] FCAFC 187). The specific law and facts are not the same as in this question, but the observation holds that disclaimers may not help if the surrounding marketing is communicating something else. Similar remarks apply to the predictive model, where there is also plenty of regulation. In the FCA's Conduct of Business Sourcebook 4.5A.14, for example, there are binding rules about information on future performance. Whether these rules apply to what D is doing, and how they can comply, are hard questions. There is an entire publication, the Perimeter Guidance Manual, about how to know whether someone is covered by the regulator, but even that is full of maybes. Aside from concerns with the regulators themselves, users may be very upset with D from time to time, and their anger might spill over into a legal claim. There is, again, a large body of law to do with such topics as negligence in giving investment advice. All of the above is evidence that the question of compliance for a particular app or business is not completely simple. Professional advice can look at the whole context, as well as relevant law, and assist D in understanding their options. | The simple way is to post a picture of you and the widget to a site like Flickr. A more expensive way (but with rather more weight) is to get a Notary to certify they saw you and the widget on January 9th. Both the above provide evidence you had access to the widget before January 10th, but neither prove you owned it. For that, you would need a dated (possibly even notarized) bill of sale or similar - but if you acquired the widget via a gift, that won't work. A signed witness statement from the giver would probably serve (and the statement could legitimately be created when you are prosecuted). None of the above are unforgeable - but you don't need that. Depending on how the law is written, you will only need to show ownership on the balance of probabilities, or you might only need to show reasonable doubt that you didn't own it on 9th January. | This is not "unfair competition". You are allowed to ask people for their views and take them into account in designing software, even with the specific intent that it compete successfully with existing software. In the US you have a protected right to do that under the First Amendment. If the chat site where you asked is run by the developer or owners of the app, they can ask you to avoid such question there, and even ban you from the site if they choose, because it is their site. But if you went onto a public site (like Stack Exchange, say, or Quora) the app owners would have no right to insist that you not ask for such opinions. The degree to which the design or interface of an app or other software may be protected against imitation is a complex one, and depends on the country involved. But widely known and used features such as a 'like' button, message threading, or a comment section are almost surely not protectable. Listening to users of existing simile products and getting their ideas on what works well and what is lacking is generally a good idea, and is in no way "unfair". | Update (12/2/16) - Just received the following confirmation from Apple Export Compliance: The [redacted] app presently uploaded into your account CAN BE legally released to US and Canada only, it will not be necessary to go through Export Regulations. They have also rephrased the question "Does your app qualify for any of the exemptions...?" to the following: Does your app meet any of the following: (a) Qualifies for one or more exemptions provided under category 5 part 2, (b) Use of encryption is limited to encryption within the operating system (iOS or macOS), (c) Only makes call(s) over HTTPS, (d) App is made available only in the U.S. and/or Canada. Update (12/1/16) - In addition to the research below, a list of "Sample Scenarios" are given in iTunes Connect Resources and Help, one of which states: A developer chooses to release his app in the U.S. and Canada only. -- No U.S. CCATS or ERN is required. No France Import Declaration is required. The following statement (mentioned earlier in the same page) should also be taken into consideration regarding exemptions: All liabilities associated with misinterpretation of the export regulations or claiming exemption inaccurately are borne by owners and developers of the apps. So it appears the correct answer is likely not: N.B. to Note 3 (Cryptography Note): You must submit a classification request or self classification report to BIS for mass market encryption commodities and software eligible for the Cryptography Note employing a key length greater than 64 bits for the symmetric algorithm ... in accordance with the requirements of § 740.17(b) of the EAR in order to be released from the “EI” and “NS” controls of ECCN 5A002 or 5D002. Furthermore, under Note 4: Category 5 - Part 2 does not apply to items incorporating or using "cryptography" and meeting all of the following: a. The primary function or set of functions is not any of the following: “Information security”; A computer, including operating systems, parts and components therefor; Sending, receiving or storing information (except in support of entertainment, mass commercial broadcasts, digital rights management or medical records management); or Networking (includes operation, administration, management and provisioning); b. The cryptographic functionality is limited to supporting their primary function or set of functions; and c. When necessary, details of the items are accessible and will be provided, upon request, to the appropriate authority in the exporter's country in order to ascertain compliance with conditions described in paragraphs a. and b. above. I suppose there could be clarification under this note, but if I understand it correctly, an iOS app having the sole purpose of performing symmetric encryption with keys greater than 56 bits would have the primary function of: "Information security" Being "a computer" Barring clarification on these points that would qualify for exemption, NLR, etc. self-classification would likely be [any of the following]: 5D002.a.1.a (software) - Designed or modified to use "cryptography" employing digital techniques performing any cryptographic function other than authentication, digital signature, or execution of copy-protected "software," and having ... A "symmetric algorithm" employing a key length in excess of 56-bits Encryption registration may have also been required prior to September 20, 2016 (see linked reference). "Companies no longer are required to submit an encryption registration to BIS before self-classifying and exporting certain encryption items..." (Wiley Rein LLP) References: Commerce Control List: Category 5 Part 2 (Cryptographic "Information Security") - BIS Export Compliance - f5 License Exception ENC (740.17) - BIS Information Security Updates (September 20, 2016) BIS Publishes New Encryption Rule - Wiley Rein LLP | Yes If you are in the EU, or your players are in the EU and your service is targeted at some part of (or all of) the EU, then this pretty clearly falls within the scope of the GDPR. Such a service would be collecting data associated with natural persons. At least some of it would be made public along with an online identifier, and other parts would be processed and stored, even if disclosed only in anonymized form. (By the way it is a non-trivial task to anonymize data well enough that it is no longer persona data under the GDPR. But let's suppose yoru methods are good enough.) Under GDPR Article 6 the DC must have a lawful basis for such processing. If the basis is "consent" then the consent must be freely given, whch means giving consent may not be a condition of using the service. Under GDPR Article 13 a notice must be sent to the Data Subject (DS) when the data is collected from the subject, including some 11 items or categories of information about the collection process, the Data Controller (DC), the purposes of processing, the legal basis of processing (which the DC must define), who will receive the data, the data retention period, and various rights of the DS. Such a service must be prepared to respond to data access and data erasure requests, under articles 15-17, and data restriction requests under article 18. It must provide a method for a DS to easily make such requests. Other GDPR provisions may well apply in addition to these, but that is enough to show that such service is very likely to be within the scope of the GDPR, unless none of the DSs are present in the EU or the related market area. | The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem. | Probably not. There are potential problems on the levels of copyright, data protection, and the Youtube terms of service. You should assume that comments are typically covered by copyright. You do not have a license to these comments, only YouTube does. Therefore, YouTube can show the comments but you can't copy them – just like YouTube can stream your videos but others can't download them and host them on their own websites. To cover the copyright angle, you'd either need to obtain a license from the commenters, or get a sub-license from YouTube, or identify a suitable copyright exception. The comments are personal data within the meaning of the GDPR, so that your processing of these comments (including mere storage) would be subject to GDPR as well. You need a legal basis for processing personal data. Which legal basis is suitable would depend on the purpose of processing, and on your relationship with the commenters. Potentially applicable legal bases in this context: you have a contract with the commenters that requires you to show the comments on your website. For example, I could see such a contract if there were a “featured comment” perk for a Patreon subscription. But this is not going to fly with random commenters. you have a legitimate interest (LI) that allows the processing. A LI requires that you conduct a balancing test where you weigh this interest against the commenter's rights. This is very specific to the purposes for which you want to show the comments. However, a LI will generally only apply if you have an existing relationship with the commenters, making it possible for them to expect that this processing will occur – unlikely if you'll be scraping comments from YouTube. you have obtained consent from the data subject. Consent must be specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous – you can't obtain consent by writing “by commenting under this video you consent to XXX” in the video description. Regardless of legal basis, you would have to inform the commenters under Art 14 GDPR when you scrape their comments from the platform. Finally, consider the platform terms of service. I have not read the YouTube ToS recently, so I don't know what their specific conditions are. But in general, such ToS will not allow you to scrape content from their platform in order to host it somewhere else. The ToS might allow certain actions like embedding a link/iframe to such videos on other sites, without allowing other actions such as copying other user's content to your site. | Having done a bit of brief research, I find that "legit" is a synonym for "good". So, no. The header announcing a "principal amount" serves no purpose and could be misinterpreted as indicating that there is a loan. There is no reason to indicate the date twice, which gives rise to two different values of "date". The phrase "For value received" can be interpreted in at least two ways, one being "in exchange for some unspecified value to be received at some future date by Promisor", and "in exchange for a specific value already received by Promisor". Under the later interpretation, Promis(s)ee probably could not breach but under the former, Promis(s)ee could. So it makes a difference. You can just pay to the Promis(s)ee, and not imply that you are creating a pay-to-order instrument such as a check. That still leaves you the option to pay with a check. Or was the intent to say "pay on demand"? The expression "the sum of £500 shall the Promisor fail to meet his target" is not grammatical in US English, and I'll leave it to a UK speaker to judge if this is, over there. I assume that this is supposed to express conditionality, in which case "if" is a useful term. Then the meat of the contract, I guess, is that if the Promisor fails to meet somebody's target of 47.5 work hours per week, then Promisor has to pay Promissee £500 (and not otherwise). It's really not clear how anyone would know whether "meet a target of 47.5 work hours per week" has come to pass. Does that mean "work at least 47.5 hours per week"? Does that mean "for each of the three weeks within the time period" (or did you mean "work 47.5 hours within some one week, within the 3 week period"). Being explicit that the work obligation extends for 3 weeks would be legit (vide supra). Supposing that the second clause means "Promisor will pay £500 by 5:00pm 2 July 2016", you should put it that way. Or if you mean "Promisor will pay £500 by 5:00pm 3 July 2016", say that. Deadlines for performance should be stated very directly and clearly, and require no calculation and interpretation. And I'd suggest including a clause stating that "Promissor" and "Promisor" are used interchangeably in this contract. Or else be consistent in spelling. Note that almost any contract can be given some interpretation. From the perspective of creating a contract, the first concern should be over clearly expressing the intentions of the two parties in written form. After all, you don't have a contract if there is no meeting of the minds. |
How to legally deal with British police officers? How can I legally deal with British police officers if they suspect the following: I am carrying a weapon I match the profile of someone they're looking for. I understand that if I'm not carrying a weapon, nor have I done anything wrong then I should comply with their requests. However, the insecurity and anxiety of a power stopping you under suspicion doesn't sound right to me. What rights do I have to investigate the reasoning of a police officer under the claim that I've been stopped under discrimination, or unlawful methods? | england-and-wales Initially, one should comply with the officer's instructions as he has the power under statutory Stop & Search powers to detain someone for the purpose of the search (discussed here). Failure to do so may be an offence. If, subsequently, one considers the search and detention was unlawful, the first port of call is to lodge a complaint with the relevant police force who - depending on the circumstances - may escalate the complaint to the Independent Office for Police Conduct IOPC. You can complain directly to the police/other organisation (see ‘Who can I complain about?’ below for a list of the other organisations) or via the IOPC. If you complain via the IOPC, your complaint will be sent direct to the organisation involved. They will assess your complaint and contact you about how it will be handled. The IOPC will not be involved with this initial assessment of your complaint. If the complaint is found to be valid, then any offence committed by not complying with the office would (in all probability) be overturned on appeal. As well as any compensation awarded by the court, the Chief Constable may consider making an ex gratia payment (mentioned here). Note that there is no obligation to do anything if the interaction falls within the Stop & Account provisions. | Generally, no Police cannot enter private property subject to a number of exemptions: they have a search warrant, or when in close pursuit of someone the police believe has committed, or attempted to commit, a serious crime, or to sort out a disturbance, or if they hear cries for help or of distress, or to enforce an arrest warrant, or if invited in freely by the occupant, or under various statutes which give the police powers of entry (not necessarily by force) into a number of different kinds of premises. | This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate." | In all common law countries, this would be the tort of battery (thus, illegal). The police might lawfully lay hands on the person, under certain conditions. First, the police would have to be legally arresting the person; second, the person would have to be (unlawfully) resisting that arrest. If the person acts in a way that a police officer "has reason to believe to be so mentally ill as to be incapable of taking care of himself", he may arrest the person (Mental Health Act 1987 art. 23). Part III (art. 20 ff) provides the legal background for the second path for arrest, via involuntary commitment. Under the circumstances you describe, a court would have to first order the person taken into custody (leading to an arrest, and possibly being subdued). The police would not be authorized to administer a sedative, so they would have to use physical restraint (handcuffs, hammer-lock and so on). The process is either initiated by a psychiatric professional, or by a relative (art. 20), then the court determines whether the person is to be so detained. | The problem with Solution 2 is that government officials in the United States enjoy qualified immunity with respect to actions that they did while acting under color of law. It's not total immunity, but if they do things by the book, they cannot be prosecuted even if something goes wrong (even when doing things by the book, Police deal in very volatile situations and things can still go wrong because of an X factor to specific for the training manual to cover.). In other cases, it may be because multiple officers are working the scene and Office A lied to Officer B about the situation. Consider Officer A pulls over a suspect and realizes it was someone who was suspected of a crime, but couldn't prove it. He calls for back up and Officer B arrives. Upon arriving on scene, Officer A tells B to search the trunk of the car despite the fact that A had not received consent from the suspect nor has a warrant, nor cause to make a search of a trunk of a vehicle. B makes the search and finds [the bloody knife/the stash of drugs/the smoking gun/the match to a child's shoe that was missing from the kidnapping scene/ insert other incriminating evidence]. Under system (2), since it was Officer B who made the illegal search, B would be liable for it, even though Officer A lied about having legal reason for a search of the trunk space. But what's more... if the evidence is gonna be used anyway, what's to stop the cops doing it again? After all, there is very little recourse for those who are illegally searched to contest this in court (If I'm illegally searched and don't have anything on me, I have to take this to civil court, which is a different animal than Criminal Court and exposes me to broader Discovery... aka gives the cops free reign to search my property for a hell of a lot more illegal things.) or just sit back and count my 4th amendment rights (the section of the constitution protecting against unwarranted search and seizures) as worth less than the paper they're printed on. Oh, and by the way... that second word seizure... that means that they will be taking my property (or myself if they arrest me) and will not be giving it back for some time while they process it... if it's a legal to hold item (like my laptop that I do work on) that's going to make it harder for me to do my job which injures me further in lost business and income. In other cases, it could be they have a warrant for a large item (a stolen big screen tv) and while searching for it, open my sugar bowel and find evidence of a crime unrelated to theft of the television (i.e. opening a baggie of weed). This is actually an illegal search because, unless I am a wizard, a Time Lord, or Mary Poppins, there is no reason why a container smaller than a big screen TV should ever be searched when looking for a Big Screen TV and the cops should logically see this as out of bounds of the search warrant. The nature of this is damaging before the legality of the search can be determined, and because the search may have been out of scope of the warrant that was otherwise justified, the rule of making the evidence of a crime inadmissible was held in order to prevent LEOs from doing this because they could. This rule also started to take formation prior to the Revolutionary War. British Law had ruled against compelled confessions being inadmissible as evidence in 1769, a full six years before the Revolutionary war started (1775) and seven years before the publication of the Declaration of Independence (1776). Now there are some exceptions that can get the evidence brought back in, such as plain view ("The suspect's vehicle is a pick up truck with an open bed, the murder weapon was lying in the bed covered in blood"), inevitable discovery ("We have developed evidence by other means that would have lead us to this evidence legally") and Exigent Circumstances ("We believed someone inside the property was in grave danger if we did not enter the property immediately and that's when we found a cache of stolen Big Screen TVs!) and Good Faith (the Warrant was authorized for the wrong street address of the target but we found the evidence of an unrelated crime in a place the warrant authorized us to search. Everything but the goofed up address was done by the book.). | Police can get a warrant, if the warrant is supported by "probable cause" to believe that evidence of a crime exists. A separate "probable cause" requirement is that to arrest a person, there must be "probable cause" that they committed a crime. However, the Privacy Protection Act makes it unlawful to search "work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication", unless there is probable cause that the person committed the crime in question. There are similar laws ("shield laws") at the state level. Here is a map which gives you an indication what immunities exist in what states. | The police are never permitted to break the law. However, the law that gives them their powers may make other laws not applicable to them in the course of their duties. If a law is not applicable to them; how can they break it? | A police officer can lie, and lying does not render a statement inadmissible. But there is a separate area of law regarding self-incrimination and the right to a lawyer. The basic principle is that a person can always assert their 5th Amendment rights, whether or not they are under arrest. When a person is under arrest and has asserted their right to an attorney, questioning must stop and anything that results from further questions is inadmissible. There is no single factor that distinguishes ordering asking questions from custodial interrogation. For example if you have been dragged by officers to the police station and held in a locked room for hours in the middle of night, one would reasonably believe that you were taken into custody, and interrogation must stop once you request a lawyer. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, police contacted the defendant whom they suspected was involved in a burglary and they invite him to chat at the station. They lie and say they found his fingerprints at the scene (they did not). He then confesses, they read him his rights, and he confesses again. The confession is admissible, because this was not a custodial interrogation. The relevant question is whether "a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave". |
Are students from Government Aided schools eligible for the 7.5% reservation in NEET? TamilNadu government recently passed a bill that provides a 7.5% reservation for government school students in the NEET medical entrance exam. In TamilNadu, usually government and aided schools are treated in the same manner while concerning government schemes e.g)Nutrion meals, laptops schemes, etc... My question is that, Is this reservation applicable for students studying in Government Aided schools too? I couldn't find any information related to this. | At the time of writing, students studying in Government Aided schools are not eligible for the 7.5% percent reservation in NEET exams. Petitions have been filed in courts challenging this. References: Why exclude govt-aided students from 7.5% quota? | Indian Express Plea challenges exclusion of government-aided school students from 7.5% medical admission quota | The Hindu | Anti-discrimination laws only apply to people, see here – "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program to which this part applies". Genetic information anti-discrimination laws are limited to employment and insurance, see here. In addition, I'm betting that your dog cannot meet the university admission standards (lack of a transcript is fatal to the plan). | In South Africa. the duty of care in regards to children and the schools they attend only begins when the child enters the classroom for the first time. All parents are advised that, in the case of primary school children, it is not sufficient to drop young kids of at school. Parents must take them to their specific classroom. The duty to care officially ends when the school day ends. For primary school children that is 13-15 and for highschool children that is 13-45. Teachers are expected to work until 16-00, but the legal obligation for children to attend school ends when the school day ends. A lot of schools don't transport children anymore and have blanket policies of parents being responsible to take children to any extra mural events outside the school. It has just become increasingly harder to ensure children's safety, and many schools are uncomfortable with the liability it creates. The duty of care can be extended to schools who have hostels. In this case, hostel parents take up the role of parents. | Although the constitution doesn't explicitly require your vote to be equal in strength, surely the founders intended with the word 'vote' that you at least get to choose who you vote for. Quite the contrary. The founders specifically intended that smaller states should have disproportionate strength - they knew exactly what they were doing. This was one of the major design goals of the Constitution and is reflected in several other areas (e.g. the structure of the Senate); the smaller states wouldn't have agreed to join the Union if such concessions hadn't been made. There's a general principle in law that "the specific overrides the general". You're not going to get anywhere by trying to read into the word "vote" when there is explicit text saying something different. If the founders intended the word "vote" to imply "equal power for everyone", then why would they have specified, in great detail, a system which does exactly the opposite? For that matter, the founders didn't particularly intend that the people be able to vote for president at all! Article II, Section 1 says only that "each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors..." There is no requirement that the state should hold an election to determine the appointment of the electors. According to Wikipedia, five states initially had the electors chosen by the state legislature, without having the people vote at all, and South Carolina continued to use this system until 1860. The 14th Amendment, section 2, appears to require that all eligible voters (male and 21 at the time, since modified by the 19th and 26th Amendments) be allowed to vote for their electors, but even there the wording is "any election" which appears to leave open the possibility of having no election at all. (It hasn't been tested as far as I know.) I think that your proposed lawsuit would be quickly dismissed, possibly as "frivolous". | Is the government exempt from anti discrimination legislation Broadly speaking, the government (in Canada, the executive power vested in Her Majesty the Queen) is not subject to any law unless the legislature binds the Crown explicitly. In this case, Ontario Human Rights Code does bind the government and any agency of the Crown. However, Canada is a federal country, and for certain areas exclusively regulated by the federal government, provincial laws may not apply fully. This is the case for human rights and employment laws; the federal government along with federally regulated industries (banking, telecommunications, airlines etc.) enjoy immunity from provincial human rights codes. But they are still subject to the federal Canada Human Rights Act (which only apply to businesses under the federal jurisdiction), which also prohibit age discrimination. Additionally, government actions are also subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 15 of which prohibits discrimination based on age. what is with the huge number of jobs that list "Must be eligible to participate in the Canada Summer Jobs (CSJ) program" as a requirement (with <30 being the top listed requirement). For example, the Canada Summer Jobs (CSJ) program you referred to in the question is a federal program within the spending power of the Parliament of Canada and are immune from provincial laws that interfere with its application. Ontario laws simply to no apply in this case (but federal law and the Charter does) even if an action physically happens in Ontario. What Exemptions are there to the Age Discrimination laws in Ontario? Anti-discrimination law in general only prohibits "unreasonable" discriminations. If someone can show that they have "good reason" to discriminate, it can be legal. For example, it is legal for a casting director to choose a black man to portray Martin Luther King Jr. instead of a white woman. It is also legal to discriminate against people with certain disabilities if they are in fact unable to carry out tasks required in a job even with reasonable accommodation. It is also legal for an employer (or for the law to require an employer) to give special leaves to women for pregnancy and childbirth, even though otherwise discrimination is not permitted based on sex. Age-based discounts for example are usually not illegal (and even explicitly legal in Ontario's legislation for senior's discounts) if the purpose is genuine (e.g. less spending power for teens and seniors). While age requirements are on its face a discrimination, youth programs usually qualify as affirmative action programs that are designed to ameliorate the conditions of a disadvantaged group. It is the same basis why certain gender-, race- or age-based scholarships and grants are legal. In the employment context, the government considers youths as a disadvantaged group and improving youth employment is a reasonable government objective. The Charter allows affirmative programs by the government: (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. and both federal and Ontario human rights legislations allow special programs: 14 (1) A right under Part I is not infringed by the implementation of a special program designed to relieve hardship or economic disadvantage or to assist disadvantaged persons or groups to achieve or attempt to achieve equal opportunity or that is likely to contribute to the elimination of the infringement of rights under Part I. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 14 (1). 16 (1) It is not a discriminatory practice for a person to adopt or carry out a special program, plan or arrangement designed to prevent disadvantages that are likely to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce disadvantages that are suffered by, any group of individuals when those disadvantages would be based on or related to the prohibited grounds of discrimination, by improving opportunities respecting goods, services, facilities, accommodation or employment in relation to that group. Canadian Human Rights Act | The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in. | For starters you might want to read fundamental rights in India. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS General Definition. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights. Right to Equality Equality before law. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Abolition of Untouchability. Abolition of titles. Right to Freedom Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. Protection in respect of conviction for offences. Protection of life and personal liberty. 21A. Right to education. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. Right against Exploitation Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour. Prohibition of employment of children in factories, etc. Right to Freedom of Religion Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion. Freedom to manage religious affairs. Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion. Freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or religious worship in certain educational institutions. Cultural and Educational Rights Protection of interests of minorities. Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. [Repealed.] Saving of Certain Laws 31A. Saving of Laws providing for acquisition of estates, etc. 31B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations. 31C. Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles. 31D. [Repealed.] Right to Constitutional Remedies Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part. 32A. [Repealed.] Power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred by this Part in their application to Forces, etc. Restriction on rights conferred by this Part while martial law is in force in any area. Legislation to give effect to the provisions of this Part. Then read this PDF for above mentioned topics. The eight fundamental rights recognised by the Indian constitution are: 1. Right to equality: Which includes equality before law, prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, gender or place of birth, and equality of opportunity in matters of employment, abolition of untouchability and abolition of titles. 2. Right to freedom: Which includes speech and expression, assembly, association or union or cooperatives, movement, residence, and right to practice any profession or occupation (some of these rights are subject to security of the State, friendly relations with foreign countries, public order, decency or morality), right to life and liberty, right to education, protection in respect to conviction in offences and protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. 3. Right against exploitation: Which prohibits all forms of forced labour, child labour and traffic of human beings 4. Right to freedom of religion: Which includes freedom of conscience and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion, freedom to manage religious affairs, freedom from certain taxes and freedom from religious instructions in certain educational institutes. 5. Cultural and Educational rights: Preserve the right of any section of citizens to conserve their culture, language or script, and right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. 6. Right to constitutional remedies: Which is present for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. 7. Right to life: Which gives the right to live with human dignity. This includes rights such as right to education, health, shelter and basic amenities that the state shall provide. 8. Right to education: It is the latest addition to the fundamentals rights. 9. Right to Information:RTI stands for Right To Information and has been given the status of a fundamental right under Article 19(1) of the Constitution. Remember - you will have to keep updating your knowledge on Laws India's parliament and state governments pass. One such place is PRSIndia. Read this question on Quora. Google search "Police laws and acts, india" - you will get lucky. About beating and mistreating, any body can do that. You do not have to be in police for doing so. You do not have to be weak, old or poor for getting beaten. Examples: Poor people beat their kids and wives. Frustrated wives beat their husbands. Salman Khan slapped Aishwarya Rai. And so on. All you can do is read about the law, gain information and use it. Edit: Adding an image (for visual stimulation) None of this constitutes a legal advice. These are opinions. | The English version of the taxman's web page does not indicate any specific exemption or reduction of taxation due to being under 18, however provision 102.3 says that The monthly taxable income of disabled people of I and II groups (except for veterans of war), persons under age of 18 with limited levels of health from any type employment shall be reduced by the amount of 200 manats. Provision 106.2, about exempt income says that Income tax rate for production enterprises owned by public organizations of disabled people, or children with limited levels of health shall be reduced by 50 percent if not less than 50 percent of employees at such enterprises are disabled people, or persons under age of 18 with limited levels of health. These provisions imply that it is legal for people under 18 to work. The Azerbaijan Labor Code section 42(3) says A person who has reached the age of fifteen may be a party to an employment contract. and 58(6) says that Employees under age of 18 may be allowed to hold multiple jobs if their total daily working hours do not exceed the reduced work hours provided for them in Section 91 hereof. which again implies that those under 18 may work for money. There are a number of other provisions that address employees under age 18. A freelancer is not an employee, so the labor code is technically not applicable to you, but it suggests that it is legal to freelance if you are under 18. Usually, restrictions are placed on people working for others and it is assumed that people can be self-employed relatively freely. One would have to hire a lawyer to be sure, though. |
Can I sue an airline in the small claims court in the UK? Suppose that a person A booked a flight to the middle east from the UK. The Airline's Covid site advice was that PCR tests had to be done 72 hours prior to the flight. Suppose that A took this advice as accurate, had the tests, but at check-in A was refused boarding. The rule was 48 hours. The web site was wrong. A flew the following day at an extra flight cost of £1048. Then there was the extra costs of the PCR tests plus two extra taxi journeys. A complained but the airline have said it is up to passengers to ensure travel documents are correct. Suppose further that prior to online check in A received an email advising A to check on the airline's web site the Covid rules. Also, when one calls them the auto messages give the same advice. This would be fine if the airline's advice had been correct, but at the time it was not. Suppose that A has screen shot evidence of the incorrect page. A now wishes to take them to the small claims court. I A has so-far failed to obtain a UK corporate address. Could A use their HQ address in a different country? Can A sue in the UK? If so, does A have to use a UK address for the airline? Is there any point in my pursuing this or do international companies that are based abroad have a blanket get of jail card? | Of course Unless you waived your right to go to court in the contract. For example, if the contract contains an arbitration clause, disputes must be arbitrated, you cannot use the courts. It is also possible that an English court may not have jurisdiction. For example, if the contract had a choice of forum clause requiring disputes to be resolved in the courts of the UAE, then an English court would possibly defer to that and refuse to hear the case. Whether you will succeed depends on the terms of the contract and whether the airline had a duty to provide you with accurate information. It is quite likely that the contract contains disclaimers as to the accuracy of information given. These may succeed in defeating your suit. | No, you cannot sue When you signed up to Uber you agreed to their Terms and Conditions. In Section 6, you agreed that disputes should be settled first by Mediation and, if that fails, by binding Arbitration - both under the respective International Chamber of Commerce Rules. These will be have their seat in Amsterdam and be conducted under Dutch law. This does not mean that you will need to travel to Amsterdam - you will be able to participate remotely. Notwithstanding, the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) cannot be excluded by contract or choice of law clauses and will still apply. Of direct relevance here is the consumer guarantee (Part 3-2) that services will be provided with "reasonable skill and care" and that this is a 'consumer contract' and subject to the unfair contract provisions of Part 2-3. The dispute resolution clause 6 is not unfair - Australian law supports alternative dispute resolution and a term is not unfair if it is allowed by law. The Disclaimers; Limitation of Liability; Indemnity Clause 5 is problematical for Uber as, while limitation of liability clauses are not ipso facto 'unfair', when the seek to limit liability for a breach of a consumer guarantee, they must be limited to what can be excluded by s64A. As written, these are far broader and, notwithstanding the savings clause about 'applicable law' they would probably be held to be misleading. A misleading term is ipso facto unfair. You may be able to approach the court to have Clause 5 declared an unfair term under s250 before proceeding to arbitration - the court may defer that decision to the arbitrator of course. You can, of course, sue the driver. Uber maintains that their drivers are contractors and not employees (which may or may not be true). If Uber is right, you have no contract with the driver and are free to bring a negligence suit. | Websites are not ships that can choose a flag of convenience to govern which country's laws govern them. Generally speaking an analysis of which jurisdiction's law applies (which is strictly speaking a "choice of law" question as much as it is a jurisdiction question) isn't undertaken on a website by website, or business by business basis. Instead, jurisdiction and choice of law are evaluated on a claim by claim basis. The owners of a website may be subject to some claims in India, to some in Bhutan, and to others in the United States, depending upon the claim. Without knowing who is trying to sue for what, you can't know. Generally speaking, a business that operates in multiple jurisdictions, like a website, will be subject to the laws of all of the jurisdictions in which it does business in regard to claims with a connection to those jurisdictions. Of course, as a practical matter, only claims that can be enforced against the owners of the website are relevant, which usually means that only claims brought where the owners reside or own assets are relevant. If the website owners own property or have amounts payable to them in India, there is a very good chance that India can, as a practical matter, assert jurisdiction over them. And, it is likely, as a practical matter, that Saudi Arabia or China would not be able to assert jurisdiction over them in a meaningful way. The fact that businesses can be conducted through legal entities further complicates the analysis. But, at any rate, the place to begin is to realize that the question "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall?" is basically a category error. You need to ask "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall when it is sued or prosecuted for X kind of matter by someone who lives in Y?" So, really, this one question is actually dozens or hundreds of questions that each have to be analyzed individually. | My story: UK passport holder, resident in Switzerland, driving from Houston to San Antonio and stopped doing 105mph in a 60mph section of highway. I was given the citation and instructions, etc., but told the officer I was leaving in 2 days and may not be able to tend to it in time. On my return to Switzerland, I called the court and asked how I could pay. I was told I could get a money order from the post office, to which I replied, "Really, the Swiss Post office will issue U.S. money orders?" After a further 15 minutes of conversation about how I was willing but unable to pay, the officer said, "Well, I guess that we ain't commin' to Switzerland to get you so just ignore it!" I asked if I could have that in writing and he asked me to write to the court and explain my situation. 3 weeks later and I received a reply saying all was forgiven and I should have no problem re-entering the U.S. or the State of Texas. So my advice would be to call them, and act willing to pay. Things may have changed and you may be able to pay with a credit card, but if you act willing and they are unable to accept your payment, then as long as you have a paper trail, you should be fine. I have entered the U.S. dozens of times since and have even sponsored visas for others. | UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence. | There is no clear answer, and I suspect an argument could be made either way. The relevant regulations in this case are The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020. In particular, regulation 6(1) states that: 6.—(1) During the emergency period, no person may leave the place where they are living without reasonable excuse. In this case, you would be relying on the reasonable excuse given in regulation 6(2)(b): (2) For the purposes of paragraph (1), a reasonable excuse includes the need—[...] (b) to take exercise either alone or with other members of their household; The regulations do not explicitly state: how far you may travel for the purposes of exercise, how long you may exercise for even, in contrast with government advice, how many times a day you may leave your house for exercise. It would require the interpretation of the courts to decide whether travelling for long distances was reasonable in order to take exercise, and whether exercising for many hours is reasonable. Michael Gove stated in an interview that: I would have thought that for most people, a walk of up to an hour, or a run of 30 minutes or a cycle ride of between that, depending on their level of fitness is appropriate. This is of course not law, but opinion; yet it is worth keeping in mind that the courts may take a similar view to this. A strong argument could be made to say that this scenario is not in fact necessary exercise, but leisure, which is not considered a reasonable excuse in the regulations. Equally, it could be argued that the regulations do support travel for exercise in any form. I don't think anyone could answer with certainty whether this is legal or not, until the law is tested on this point. | 1) Why would an Orthodontia provider want to receive this payment at all in the first place? I was thinking maybe tax reasons. Less cynically, medical providers request that insurance payments be sent directly to them (and you routinely agree to allow them to do so in the fine print of your insurance contract and the paperwork you will out with the provider), every time that they request payment through insurance, because it is extremely uncommon for someone to pay in full and then come up with insurance through which a claim can be submitted. It is set up this way, in part, because medical providers have a lien on insurance payments made to compensate any not previously paid for services that they provided. So, anyway, bureaucratic inertia causes it to happen this way in your quirky case where it really doesn't make sense. Also, insurance companies routinely see claims failed by providers and handle them uncritically, while rarely seeing claims filed by insured for services that have already been rendered and paid for, and so look at those claims more critically, so it was probably in your interest to have the provider make the claim for you on your behalf. More cynically, even if the medical providers doesn't get to keep the money, holding onto it helps their cash flow. It may allow them to borrow less money for operations, or to invest it and earn a return on it. Having money has value even if it is temporary. 2) If they never end up sending me the claim refund, do I have any legal power to fight against this? I have all of the original receipts and an EOP report. Yes. You could write a demand letter, including copies of your evidence, and if they refused to comply within a reasonable time, you could sue, either with a lawyer, or in small claims court. You would have an extremely strong chance of prevailing and in all likelihood they would refund the money before the case went to trial rather than fighting a losing case in court. You have solid evidence that they were paid twice for the same thing. You don't need to bring the insurance company into it (which would make the case much more complicated). You just need to show that your local medical provider got a double recovery and didn't provide a refund. Six to eight weeks is unreasonable when they have already been paid twice. But, given the cost, aggravation and delay associated with suing, you might want to give them some time to provide a refund, although the next monthly billing cycle for them ought to be more than generous accommodation from you. | The US has jurisdiction because the systems that the accused allegedly attacked are in the US. To use an example with older technology, you can't escape criminal liability for defrauding someone in one country simply because you did so through the mail or by telephone from another country. The UK and the US have an extradition treaty. The UK might refuse to extradite the accused; in that case the US would most likely complain loudly. If too many extradition requests are refused on one side, the other side might start limiting cooperation in any of several areas. |
Selling Beer From A Vending Machine I'm a member of a college fraternity that has a vending machine their basement that sells cans Miller High Life. It's not accessible to the public and it doesn't accept cash, only fraternity members have ID cards that can buy from it. When a fraternity issued ID card is swiped, the machine records the id number and at the end of the month a bill is issued with a charge $0.75 per vending machine purchase. We are in the United States and some of our fraternity members aren't 21 years old. I assume this is a problem since you can't sell alcohol to minors and the machine is recording an ID number of the sale proving that booze was sold to someone under 21. Who in the fraternity would be prosecuted if this became an issue? Would the machine be safer if it just accepted cash (so that no electronic paper trail was created), with a big warning sign WINK WINK that anyone under the age of 21 was strictly prohibited from purchasing from it? | Who in the fraternity would be prosecuted if this became an issue? A lot of people could be held liable for this, including people who are not even in the fraternity. Anyone who has knowledge of the machine or the fact that it was possible for minors to access alcohol through it could technically be held liable if a prosecutor wanted to make that case. Presumably the building is owned by someone else and just leased out to fraternity members, and they very well could be held liable for sale to minors also. Would the machine be safer if it just accepted cash (so that no electronic paper trail was created), with a big warning sign WINK WINK that anyone under the age of 21 was strictly prohibited from purchasing from it? No. Payment method is irrelevant here. There are a number of states that legally allow vending machines to sell alcohol, but vendors are required to verify the age of any person accessing them and ensure that those cards aren't being used by people not authorized. What you describe is an extremely relaxed environment where admittedly no one is attempting to verify identities. The "accepting cash" scenario is no different than a liquor store selling alcohol to anyone that comes in just because they're willing to pay with cash instead of a credit card. Sales to minors laws are not "as long as you warn them, you're safe" laws. They require vendors to actively check IDs and ensure that alcohol is not landing in the hands of minors. Accepting cash just to erase the evidence doesn't meet that burden. There are a lot of legal troubles with the situation that could get a lot of people charged with multiple offenses. That you have underage fraternity members living there suggests you should not have alcohol readily accessible in the house at all, as most state laws expressly forbid providing access to alcohol, not just serving or selling. Them being there provides access to it, even if it's just a case in the fridge with a note on it. Not to mention, you technically cannot sell alcohol, as I highly doubt your fraternity has a liquor license to be able to do so. There's a big difference between asking everyone to pitch in to buy the case versus actively selling individual cans through a vending machine. The vending machine itself is violating liquor laws in your state merely by existing. | One way in which it holds legal water is that if you use the website in violation of the terms, then you may forfeit your right to take civil action against the company. Analogous language especially regarding the age of the user may protect the site against actions by third party governmental entities (COPPA-like laws), though nothing patently obvious springs to mind (insofar as this deals with firearms and there is also an age 21 restriction both on the web site and in terms of US firearms law, this is not a totally crazy idea). The citation of 18 USC 1030 non-probatively points to an issue which may be disposed of by SCOTUS in US v. van Buren, that knowingly violating the terms of service is a crime (a proposition rejected by lower courts, see US v. Valle). Facebook v. Power Ventures in particular clarifies how "being put on notice" may make such unauthorized access indeed "unauthorized access" in the statutorily-relevant sense. This does not prevent a legally-authorized law enforcement investigation, pursuant to para (f), but if the "violation of TOS = unauthorized access" theory is upheld, it limits how LEOs can legally access the website (and the limitations extend past LEOs). It is a separate and potentially interesting question whether there actually are any legal limits on the investigative powers of the government – if any law enforcement officer has the liberty to investigate anyone they want, with no supervision or requirement of justification, then this would be a rather gaping loophole in their legal strategy. Web pages involve massive copying of copyright-protected data, and the function of terms of use is in part to conditionally grant access to that copyright-protected content. When a person copies protected material from someone's web page having been explicitly denied permission to copy, they run the risk of an infringement lawsuit. | "Public place" is not a good description of a bar. "Public accommodation" would be a better description. But it isn't a public accommodation 24-7-365(366). It's only a public accommodation during the hours it is open to the public. Presumably the owner is free to close it to the public and rent it to some private group. During the rental period, it's up to the private group to decide who to admit. (The owner would have a veto for anyone who can't be admitted, for example, because the person isn't old enough to enter a bar.) The private group is not bound by the policies that prohibit unfair discrimination by public accommodations. | The only issue relevant to your age is the (ir)revocability of the license. GPLv3 purports to be an irrevocable license. To be really irrevocable, the license would need to grant certain rights in exchange for something of value, that is, you need a license that passes muster as a contract. Copyright licenses are typically treated as contracts, but it is not clearly established in law that licenses are contracts or are not contracts. Out of the goodness of your heart, you can grant permission to use your property, but you can also withdraw that permission. If you have a contract granting perpetual permission to use your property in exchange for something of value, then you can't later withdraw that permission. In the case of Jacobsen v. Kratzer, the sides advances opposing theories that the license was a "bare license" vs. was a contract. (The matter was ultimately settled out of court). This article puts together the legal factors surrounding the notion of license as contract, see p. 21 ff, and esp. §IV for arguments that licenses should be contracts, to be fully enforceable. A contract for non-essentials formed with a minor is not enforceable, until you are 18. You could therefore revoke the license, until you are 18. Anyone who uses the software does so at their peril. However, if the license is not a contract, no existing legal doctrine (in the US) whereby the permission is irrevocable. In other words, yes you can, at their peril. The whole license-as-contract issue is very complicated, and I'm only focusing on the revocability issue. There is a separate question whether one can sue a user for both copyright infringement and breach of contract. The case of Artifex v. Hancom, see also this analysis, found that (in the particular case), plaintiff can pursue the matter as both infringement and contract breach. | Barela was convicted of robbery affecting interstate commerce and faces a sentence of up to 20 years and $250,000 in fines. I assume your issue is that you think this is too high (although I don't see what it has to do with the 14th or 6th Amendments). Fortunately, it's also almost completely unrelated to the actual sentence. The number that was quoted is the statutory maximum for robbery or extortion affecting interstate commerce. It represents the maximum amount that any defendant under any circumstances could receive for one count of that crime. A career criminal who threatened to kill an armored car guard in order to steal $10,000,000 would face the same 20-year statutory maximum as someone with no record who threatened to give COVID to a store clerk in order to steal $90. In some situations, things like the amount stolen or the defendant's criminal record affect the actual crime the defendant is convicted of. At the federal level, that's mostly not the case. Robbery affecting interstate commerce doesn't have degrees or statutory enhancements. Instead, a judge decides what sentence is appropriate. The judge can, in theory, pick anything between the statutory minimum (here there is none) and the statutory maximum (here it's 20 years). 18 U.S. Code § 3553 lays out the factors for the court to consider. In practice, federal courts generally sentence within the range given in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. While the statute itself doesn't distinguish between stealing $90 by threatening to cough and stealing millions by threatening to shoot, the Guidelines do. Courts don't have to follow the Guidelines range but typically do. If they don't, it's much more likely their sentence will be overturned as unreasonable on appeal. Popehat has a good blog post on the Guidelines, how they work, and why press releases quoting statutory maximums are basically straight-up lies. Sentencing.us has an unofficial calculator you can use to estimate the Guidelines range for a particular crime. If you plug in 18 U.S. Code § 1951 (which translates to the "Robbery" guideline) and enter in $90 stolen, no weapon used, no threat of death, and no criminal record, then you get a range of 33-41 months and/or a fine of $7,500 to $75,000. This is basically the lowest Guidelines range possible for robbery. For comparison, under California state law robbery is punishable by two, three, or five years in state prison. Robbery is a serious and violent crime, so a sentence of multiple years would not be considered unreasonable. But it takes a lot for the Guidelines range to approach the statutory maximum of 20 years. | There seems to be no current applicable prohibition state law in Iowa in Iowa Code 39A, the Election Misconduct and Penalties Act. It is also not at all clear that precinct caucuses count as "elections" as applicable to the sections with criminal prohibitions (the precinct caucus does not appear to constitute a "primary election" under Iowa law). | Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing. | Let’s say I go to a cash machine, ask for £100, and the machine gives me £10,000. I use my banking app and see that £100 left my account, not £10,000. At this point I haven’t done anything illegal. If I asked for another £100 and got £10,000 again, that might be illegal. But the extra £9,900 are not mine. They are the bank’s money. If I try to keep it, that is simply theft. |
Is it legal for officers of one sex to strip-search detainees of a different sex? I believe there is a law that states strip searches are performed by officers of the same sex as the detainee, and not by officers of a different sex. However this did not occur in the following cases. Woman Says Strip Search After DUI Arrest Went Too Far Fully Nude Strip Search by Cops: Male Police Stripping Woman Completely Naked Is there any law broken in these cases? Under what circumstances would male or female officers strip female or male detainees, respectively, forcibly? | There is no hard rule that a strip search cannot be performed by a different-gendered officer. The hard rule is that the search must be reasonable (as required by the 4th Amendment) , which means that there have to be sufficient reasons for the search. Depending on the circumstances, a search of a male by a female, or in view of a female, could be reasonable – and in other circumstances it could be unreasonable. As the court in Cookish v. Powell, 945 F. 2d 441 said, In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted There are trends in the law which speak in favor of inmates right to privacy from cross-gender strip searches. Byrd v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors is a recent decision where given the circumstances, a cross-gender search was found to be unreasonable. Cookish v. Powell is one where it wasn't unreasonable. This resource file assembles numerous court rulings, classifying them for judicial circuit, gender of staff vs. gender of inmate, sorting according to who prevails. The "rule" would be that the more intrusive the staff conduct is, the less reasonable the search is: but the more of an emergency there is, the more reasonable the search is. | If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ("Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.") If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) ("If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.") The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves. | This is a broad question about the powers of the police in England and Wales. I have been unable to find any UK legislation which directly addresses 'do not cross' tape (also known as police tape, crime scene tape or barricade tape). However, the police have broad statutory and common law powers, and ignoring 'do not cross' tape could be an offence in the same way as ignoring other police orders. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Morrison [2003] EWHC 683 (Admin), the High Court decided that at common law, the police have the power to cordon off a crime scene. Police had cordoned off an area to preserve evidence using tape labelled "Police: Do not Cross" [9]. The prosecution's case against the respondent was that, having been told not to enter the cordoned area, he challenged the police right to prohibit him from entering the area [10]. There was a dispute as to whether the respondent did cross the tape and other issues, but police ultimately arrested him for disorderly conduct [29]. The respondent was convicted in the Magistrates' Court of disorderly conduct under s 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 and wilful obstruction of a police constable under s 89(2) of the Police Act 1996 [1]. His conviction was set aside on appeal to the Crown Court, which found that the only statutory authority for setting up a cordon is in the Terrorism Act 2000, and the cordon had been established without the consent of the land owner or a warrant [17]. The relevant question for the High Court was: Was the Wood Green Crown Court wrong in law to hold that the Metropolitan Police on the evidence in this case had no lawful power or authority to close the public right of way over private premises by a cordon and forcibly prohibit the Defendant from using that right of way on foot against his will [4]? The answer is yes. The police have the power to cordon off a crime scene, but they must act reasonably: [W]hen seeking to investigate crime police officers do not have an unfettered right to restrict movements on private land ... but ... [a]s Lord Denning said [in Ghani v Jones [1970] 1 QB 693] "the police should be able to do whatever is necessary and reasonable to preserve the evidence of the crime" ... provided [the police] do not go beyond what is reasonable in the circumstances, routine scenes of crime searches may assume the owner's consent ... In the present case the police were entitled to assume consent ... we believe that consent could not lawfully be withheld [22]–[23]. So the police have the power to restrict movements on private land and can use this power to cordon off a crime scene. The police can arrest someone who unlawfully enters a crime scene, which may amount to the offence of wilful obstruction. It is harder to answer the hypothetical question where there is nobody around to enforce the cordon. This is a broader question about land rights; the answer would depend on who was trying to enforce the cordon and why. | There are essentially no such limits on the use of such evidence. The police are free to use evidence from one case in whatever other cases it may be helpful, and criminals have no right to turn over evidence to the police on the condition that it not be used against them. The Exclusionary Rule has no application here, because it only governs evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because the defendant here consented to producing the evidence, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Nor does the Fifth Amendment prohibit the use of this evidence. The right against self-incrimination only applies to compelled self-incrimination; if a defendant wants to voluntarily confess or turn over inculpatory evidence, he is free to do so. | Others have mentioned Title IX, the federal law that generally prohibits sex discrimination at federally funded educational institutions, 20 US 1681 et seq. However, there is specific permission for single-sex housing in 20 USC 1686: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this chapter, nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit any educational institution receiving funds under this Act, from maintaining separate living facilities for the different sexes. As to your "in this day and age", this particular section of the law has not been amended since it was first passed in 1972. If you think it should be, you can certainly write to your members of Congress and tell them so. However, you say you attend a "Christian" college. Religious schools get an even broader exemption from Title IX, as Michael Seifert also mentioned. 20 USC 1681 (a) (3): This section shall not apply to an educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of this subsection would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization; So even if 20 USC 1686 were repealed, if your college determined that mixed-gender housing was "inconsistent with its religious tenets", they would probably be allowed to continue having single-gender housing anyway. | In short, no, that cant be a pardon for those police officers who would be now influenced to take more violent actions towards those they detain. Pardons are only applicable to past actions. You may be pardoned before charges are filed, but the actions must have already occured. Though I less certain about this, simply because Ive never heard such a thing proposed, I would also note that it is highly improbable that the actual statement he made - generic and during a speech - could everbe interpreted as an affirmative act intending to grant pardons to anyone who may act in that manner in the future. | We need to assume that the stop was legal (not a high hurdle to clear), that is, there was some reason to stop you. Even so, following Utah v. Strieff, police don't actually have to have a reasonable suspicion to stop you and if in the course of an ID check they discover that you have a warrant out for your arrest, the arrest is still legal. So if the police stop you, RCW 46.61.020(1) says: It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person to refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer or to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his or her certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his or her insurance identification card, or his or her vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof or to refuse to permit the examination of any equipment of such vehicle or the weighing of such vehicle or to refuse or neglect to produce the certificate of license registration of such vehicle, insurance card, or his or her vehicle driver's license when requested by any court. Any police officer shall on request produce evidence of his or her authorization as such. There is no law that says "you have to provide ID only if accused of a crime", or "police can pull you over only if you are suspected of a crime". Various traffic infractions will get you pulled over but are not crimes; random sobriety checks are legal. However, note that the requirement to provide ID applies to the operator. There is no law requiring citizens to carry identification papers (but there is a law requiring a vehicle operator to carry a specific form of ID). In some states there are "stop and identify" laws which allow police to demand ID from a person suspected of a crime, but Washington does not have such a law. | Yes, they're able to discriminate as long as its not illegal discrimination; and there's currently no law protecting people with these views. Both at a physical or digital store, they can be refused service and told to leave. |
Using someone else's registered trademark This seems like a very textbook and common question, but I can't find it anywhere. Here's an example of the situation: A card game called Cards Against Humanity sometimes uses other company's names or slogans. For example, it might say something like: But before I kill you, Mr. Bond, I must show you... Although James Bond is now in the public domain, let's say it wasn't yet. Would Cards Against Humanity be required to use the ® symbol like this or at all? But before I kill you, Mr. Bond ®, I must show you... | Say I wrote a spy novel, in which some character refers to my protagonist as "Mr Bond" suggesting that he thinks of himself as a "master spy" like the movie character. Would that infringe a trademark on "James Bond" (assuming, for the moment that that name is trademarked)? No it would not. Or suppose my main character mentions having met Bond years ago during training, or on a previous mission. Would that infringe? Again, No. Or suppose I write a brief, one-paragraph walk-on scene in which the James Bond character appears? Infringement? Again, no. Or suppose my spy character is waiting for a meeting, and stops for a meal, and i mention that he has a Coke. Would that infringe the trademark on Cocacola? No it would not. All of these are forms of nominative use, and none of them are "uses in commerce", so there is no trademark liability. (Interestingly, there was a series of stories set in an alternate world, written by Randall Garrett in the 1960s-90s. Some of these are spy stories, and his major spy character is "Sir James le Lien" Now a "lien" is a French-derived legal term for a secured debt. The most common English-derived term for a (slightly differently) secured debt is "bond". No one ever tried to sue Garrett for trademark infringement.) The game "Cards Against Humanity" includes, as I understand, many brief references to real-world and fictional things and characters, some of which are trademarked. But none of these uses are "in commerce" and no reasonable person would be confused into thinking that the game was sponsored or endorsed by any of the trademark holders, nor are these trademarks being used to promote or advertise anything. So, No infringement. Now if the game were advertised as "The only card game to feature super-spy James Bond", that might well be infringement. at least a case could be made for infringement then. But as it stands? I don't think so. Also, use of the R-in-a-circle symbol is totally optional when one makes nominative use of someone else's trademark. It can help, along with a disclaimer, to make the point that the user is not claiming ownership. Something like: {X}® and {Y}TM are trademarks of {Z-corp}. They are used here to refer to {Z-corp}'s products. The use here is in no way approved of by Z-corp, nor does Z-corp endorse, sponsor, or recommend this product. No ownership of these trademarks is claimed. However such a disclaimer is not in any way required, any more than the ® symbol is. One exception, if a trademark is used with permission, the owner may make use of the ® symbol a condition of the permission. | I suspect contract law will affect the ability to do this. Terms like "USB" and the associated logos etc are intellectual property (trademarks, copyrights, etc) owned by the USB Consortium. If you don't comply with their terms, you probably cannot describe your product as a USB product. THE USB-IF LOGOS MAY BE USED ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH PRODUCTS WHICH HAVE PASSED USB-IF COMPLIANCE TESTING AND ARE CURRENTLY ON THE INTEGRATORS LIST. THIS REQUIRES THAT THE COMPANY BE ASSIGNED A USB VENDOR ID NUMBER. | Making the game free makes very little if any difference to the position here. There are two kinds of IP issues that could possibly be involved: copyright and trademark. Note: both copyright and trademark are civil, not criminal issues (except in very limited circumstances which do not apply to the situation described in the question). You will not "face charges" but might possibly be sued. If you are asked to take down such a game and comply, this might end the matter, but if an IP holder claimed that damages had occurred before the game was taken down a suite might possibly still be brought against the developer. Copyright Names, like titles and other short phrases, cannot be protected by copyright. As long as no other text from anyone else, and no images are copied or imitated, copyright is not infringed. This means that there are no copyright issues. Game mechanics and rules cannot be copyrighted, although the words of game rules can be. Therefore, fair use which is a strictly US copyright legal concept, is not involved here. Neither is fair dealing, a somewhat similar legal concept from the UK and some commonwealth and European countries. Trademark Here is the main issue for this situation. The names of individual Pokémon characters are probably (almost surely) protected as trademarks. That means you cannot use them to identify your game, or any other product or service, and you cannot use them to advertise or market your game. This is true even if the "selling price" is $0. The use here does not seem to be nominative use, as you are not intending to refer to Pokémon or any of its variants. You are just reusing the names. As long as you make it very clear that your game is not made by, nor in any way authorized or endorsed by the makers of Pokémon, this is probably not trademark infringement. But if the makers of Pokémon become aware of your game, they might well send you a cease and desist letter, and they might file a trademark infringement suit. Even if you were to win such a suit, as I think you might well do, it might be costly to defend. Could you alter the names to ones you invent form yourself? That might save a lot of trouble and hassle. What is the value to you in reusing the well-known Pokémon names? | If you are utilizing the name of the characters just so users can rate them (by rate - I mean rank, review, critique) you should be fine. Copyrights are subject to "fair use" by the public. For purposes such as review, criticism, and comment - this is generally considered to be fair use. Is the site commercial or for-profit? That could impact the analysis, but only if you are making money flowing from the use of the actual copyrighted material(s), rather than advertising (like Adsense) or something similar (this should not suggest that those type sites cannot violate copyright, but it's part of the analysis). If it is something you are investing money into creating, you may want to get a formal legal opinion. But if the site if for fun, or hobby, you are likely fine if what's described is the only use. http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/copyright-fair-use-and-how-it-works-for-online-images/ This link is to a great, easy to read and understand article on fair use, what it is and what it allows. Keep in mind each case is fact intensive, however, from what you are describing this seems fine. | I know that some of this may be covered by either the Creative Commons license or the OGL it was published under, but it's not clear to me how far those freedoms extend. It was all published as materials under copyright to the original authors, TSR, WotC, &c. and if things had been left like that hszmv's answer would've been completely correct: stay vague and allow users to enter those names and descriptions, talk to WotC's lawyers and sales department about license fees, or just keep it to yourself and your friends. You're right, though: WotC went whole-hog, dumped their partial OGL idea, and relicensed some things as Creative Commons. There are different Creative Commons licenses, though, some restricting commercial use that would still keep your app to yourself and friends without a specific licensing agreement. Go find out exactly what WotC put under CC. If it's only the Player's Handbook, then you can only use names and descriptions that are from the Player's Handbook and you're still facing a cease-&-desist if you start adding in Monster Manual info.If it's everything, it's everything they have but still won't include any older modules that they don't have the right to change the copyright status of. It'll still be under copyright, usually until 70 years after the death of the original creator. For Gary Gygax, that'll be 2078. Expect that length to extend during your lifetime though. US copyright usually extends every time Mickey & friends come close to entering the public domain. [Edit: The comments below suggest it might only have been the Systems Reference Document (I assume for 5e). It's 403 pages of not nothing but it's not much given the universe we're talking about. The spell and monster lists are generic. Bigby is nowhere to be found and the only mention of a beholder is a reminder not to use the name beholder without their written approval.] Go find out exactly which CC WotC used. The article above says "all use" but you need to find out the exact number of the Creative Commons license for each thing you're using and make sure all of your uses fall within its terms. Some are basically free use but still insist you mention the copyright holder prominently or in every use. Go ahead and do that if you have to. [Edit: The comments below say it is probably CC 4.0. The SRD download page says you can use CC 4.0 or their own OGL. In both cases, yes, you must acknowledge WotC by name in a way prominent enough to satisfy the license you choose.] And of course, Don't trust legal advice from internet randos or ChatGPT. If this is a serious thing you're going to be spending a good chunk of your life working on or expect to make significant money from, go talk to an actual lawyer. Bonus points for one specialized in IP with a knowledge of roleplaying and the way it's been (partially) opening up lately.If you start off just by talking to WotC's lawyers, just do that somewhere where you get their explanations and permissions in writing. Then keep that somewhere safe in electronic and hard copy. Then still take that with you when you go talk to your own lawyer. | "Pastiche" is a literary, not a legal term, and as a professional coder, I would not use it to describe code that to some extent imitated other code. The legal question here is: is your code a derivative work of the code it is based on, and if it is, did you have permission to make that work. Copyright, in an Berne Convention country, which includes the EU, does not protect ideas and concepts, it protects expression. It protects the choices of words and symbols, and other forms of expression. If all you did was study example code, presented for educational purposes, and then write code that performs a similar function, using the same general techniques, then I don't think you have infringed copyright. That, after all, is why people post code to Stack Overflow and similar sites, to allow them to learn how to use specific coding techniques, including in commercial projects. I have used techniques posted to SO to do coding as part of my paid job. The usual test for copying under US law is "substantial similarity". This takes into account cases where there is essentially only one way to say or code something. I don't know the exact tests under the various laws of various EU countries, and they will not all be the same. But I suspect that on this point they are, well, substantially similar :). I can't advise on your specific situation. But if it is as described, I don't think you have a problem. | The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use. | Yes, that's true Common words are not trademarkable, as is a descriptive phrase, because a trademark needs to be distinctive. As the Netherland Trademark Office tells you, your mark can't fit in any of these categories: literal - Your tradename or logo must not literal describe or depict your goods or services. promotion - The trademark must amount to more than a value judgment alone. misleading They even have an FAQ about that! The trademark is descriptive - which is the most common reason. A trademark is descriptive when it describes the properties of the product or service or promotes these. For example: the words 'super fast bike' for the product category 'bicycles'. Please note: the wording here is not always in common usage. The trademark 'medi' is not listed in the dictionary as a common abbreviation for 'medical'. All the same, it is a common designation that consumers will understand right away in the discriptive sense. So, this type of trademark could also be descriptive and hence declined. Computerrepair is a literal description of what the business does, just like Biomild on a mild biological yogurt just describes it. |
Penalties for requesting GDPR data you are not entitled to Looking at Accessing public CCTV footage about you I could see a scenario where a stalker might request GDPR data & footage on a person they are stalking who has passed the camera. So, imagine actress A regularly walks past Millionaire M's house which is plastered with CCTV directed at both the house and the surrounding streets. Stalker S (pretending to be A) makes a GDPR request to M for all footage of A, giving an approximate time & date of one sighting of A. What are the legal penalties to S for making this request or in successfully getting the footage? Is this just standard fraud or are there specific GPDR penalties involved and has anyone ever been prosecuted? | There are no direct penalties per GDPR. The data controller must make sure that the person making the request is the data subject, or at least authorized by the data subject. If the controller has reasonable doubts about the identity, they should request additional information for identification purposes. The controller must find a middle ground between violating the GDPR by rejecting a potentially valid request and violating the GDPR by disclosing data to potentially unauthorized recipients. Having reasonable technical and organization measures that prevent unauthorized disclosure is part of the controller's responsibilities per Art 24. What the data controller can do is to block future requests from the alleged stalker. When a request is “manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character”, then the controller can charge a reasonable fee or refuse to act on the request (Art 12(5) GDPR). But it's up to the controller to prove that the requests are unfounded or excessive, it is not possible to reject potentially valid requests on sight. Depending on what the alleged stalker does with the obtained data, they would fall within the scope of the GDPR themselves and would probably be violating it because there is no sufficient legal basis. Also, the alleged stalker, as a data controller, would be required to inform the data subject about subsequent processing of the data per Art 14 GDPR. Attempting to obtain another person's personal data through an access request would have to be punishable by other laws. For starters, such attempts would likely involve identity theft, and successfully obtaining the data would probably be a kind of fraud. | There is nothing in the GDPR requiring you to collect individual personally identifiable information. If the website has no need, and the website owner no desire, to collect such information, there is no requirement to do so. The GDPR requires that if such information is collected, that there is a lawful basis, and that it be handled appropriately and stored securely, and deleted when there is no longer a need to retain it, or on a proper request. If no such information is collected in the first place, all the rules about how to handle it do not apply. It is possible that some law of an individual country in the EU might mandate collection of some particular information, but I have not heard of any such requirement. | I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy. | Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite. | Since the Steam ID contains or may contain enough information for it to be possible to link your account to you as a physical person, it would definitely be considered "personal data" according to Article 4 of the GDPR. However, by agreeing to the DOTA2 terms of service, you have given consent for them to show your information to other players (or at least that is included in most terms of service I have read for other games. I have not read the one for DOTA2 specifically). Replays are an interesting corner case. If download of replays are only possible for other players or if the wording of the ToS says that you consent to displaying your user ID to anybody, that would mean that they would have covered their bases. As long as they comply with other parts of GDPR, like "the right to erasure" (Article 17) that is. If the API is accessible to anyone and not covered by the ToS you might have a case. If you only want to remove the traceability between you and the replays, you can always evoke Article 17 and delete your account. | An app(lication program) is software run on the end-users machine. That does not fall under the GDPR. Any processing (including storage) you do on user data has to be compliant with the GDPR. Allows a user to authenticate via e.g. Facebook and stores some basic data (optional) Authentication via Facebook leaves GDPR compliance to Facebook (AFAIK). It would be a good idea to provide alternative authentication methods, such as Google and an "own account" user name and password so that the user doesn't have to share information with a multinational company in order to use your service. The "basic data" will need to be processed according to the GDPR. As long as the "optional" part is "opt in" (i.e. the user needs to at least click on something) then this means you have permission to process that data. Providing this "basic data" as a JSON or CSV file should meet data portability requirements. Allows a user to upload a GPX file (a route or some other activity) Stores the above file to Google's database Allows the user to analyze that file. Since the user is actively choosing to upload each file you have permission to do this. You should make it clear in your privacy policy that the data will be held by Google. Doing so should not be a problem as Google has set up the legal framework to do this under the GDPR. You don't have to store the information encrypted, but you should use encryption (e.g. HTTPS) for any data transmission. Allowing the user to analyse the file is not an issue; either the user is doing it on their own machine (GDPR irrelevant) or you are doing it under user instruction (meaning you have consent). Since the user has uploaded GPX files they already have data portability on those files. You should tell your users that while you will employ best endeavours you don't promise to keep their files accessible and they should maintain their own private copies. That way if your entire database gets corrupted they can't blame you for loss of data. Finally, make sure there is a "Close my account and delete all my data" option. | As per this question & answer, in the US there is no expectation of privacy in public places (not to be confused with private places where public is allowed e.g. supermarkets). Photos taken in public belong to the photo taker and he/she is free to use them in whatever way. No privacy is violated here. The fact that the person whose photo was taken was a celebrity does not change anything. It would have been completely their fault to expect privacy in a public place and behave rashly. | To preface my answer, this aspect of UK law is unclear at best and I try to set out general principles where available. If you are acting in a private sphere, then the recording of conversations are unregulated, however this is only for personal use – i.e., should you desire to make notes on what was said for your reference at a later date. Should you wish to share it with a third party, then you would need consent from all participants or be able to demonstrate that it would be in the public interest. If you are acting as an employee or a company, then the situation changes. Firstly, you need to check your contract, whilst this does not constitute a crime, it may be against the terms of your employment. Secondly, a company can only make recordings without knowledge under statutory conditions, such as to establish facts, ensure regulatory compliance or demonstrate standards that are achieved or need to be achieved by training. It is a general principle that conversations recorded without consent are inadmissible in court, particularly in terms of a criminal proceedings. In civil matters, it similarly follows the concept that a claimant should come to court with clean hands. However, judges are usually more pragmatic in civil cases and if parties are aware of the existence of the recording, then it often be subject to usual rules of disclosure, though this may open the creator of the recording to subsequent litigation regarding the illegality of the recording under Data Protection Act or others. |
Is it legal for parents in Iowa not to allow 16 year old to attend high school Imagine that a 16 year old in Iowa is not attending any high school because their parents do not want them to. However, they do want to attend high school. Is it legal for the parents to stop them from attending, or do they have a legal right to education regardless of what the parents say? | The child does not have a legal right to determine how Iowa's compulsory education law is obeyed. The first section of the law says that the custodian of a child who is of compulsory attendance age shall cause the child to attend some public school or an accredited nonpublic school, or place the child under competent private instruction or independent private instruction and no other provision gives the child veto power. However, on the upper end, a child "under sixteen years of age by September 15 is of compulsory attendance age", with thus turning 16 during the school year being subject to compulsory education until the end of the school year". Let's say that the child turned 16 on Labor Day, then the compulsory education law does not apply. Still, until the age of majority, parents have the custodial right to make decisions in the best interests of the child. That right can be terminated, see Chapter 600a. Under certain circumstances, a child can petition the court for emancipation, which means that they will be treated as an adult under the law, and can therefore exercise their own judgment and live with the consequences. You would look at 600A.8 to see the grounds for termination – an objection "I don't like their choice of school" will not qualify. | Yes The child owns what they own - it would be illegal for the parent to take the item and dispose of it or otherwise permanently keep if from the child (once they became an adult). However, parents are their children’s legal guardians and are responsible for the raising of their children including matters of discipline. It is both legal and appropriate for a parent to limit access of a child to their possessions. | Under Fed. R. Civ. P. One can be served according to the state law or: (2) doing any of the following: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized None of those would apply to your facts. Thus you would have to find some jurisdiction that would allow service of process under your fact. I dare say that none will and that due process would come into play. In NJ, due process applies and service may be made (1) Upon a competent individual of the age of 14 or over, by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at the individual's dwelling place or usual place of abode with a competent member of the household of the age of 14 or over then residing therein, or by delivering a copy thereof to a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on the individual's behalf; It has to be the current place of abode. | Various elements could be legal, or not. For example, it is legal to require students to do things in order to pass a class. It is legal to require a student to write a program for a course (entirely, or in part). It is legal for a teacher to give a "group grade". It is not clear whether it is legal to require the student to assign copyright or license to the teacher / school – it may be legal to require a student to pay for their class, and copyright transfer might be valuable consideration for such a contract (assuming that there is a contractual relation at all as opposed to a statutory mandate – e.g. "high school"). If this is a public school, you can't make students pay for a mandatory class, therefore you cannot require assignment of copyright. It is very probably illegal for the student to access the educational records of other students, but the app could be developed with dummy data. | Who in the fraternity would be prosecuted if this became an issue? A lot of people could be held liable for this, including people who are not even in the fraternity. Anyone who has knowledge of the machine or the fact that it was possible for minors to access alcohol through it could technically be held liable if a prosecutor wanted to make that case. Presumably the building is owned by someone else and just leased out to fraternity members, and they very well could be held liable for sale to minors also. Would the machine be safer if it just accepted cash (so that no electronic paper trail was created), with a big warning sign WINK WINK that anyone under the age of 21 was strictly prohibited from purchasing from it? No. Payment method is irrelevant here. There are a number of states that legally allow vending machines to sell alcohol, but vendors are required to verify the age of any person accessing them and ensure that those cards aren't being used by people not authorized. What you describe is an extremely relaxed environment where admittedly no one is attempting to verify identities. The "accepting cash" scenario is no different than a liquor store selling alcohol to anyone that comes in just because they're willing to pay with cash instead of a credit card. Sales to minors laws are not "as long as you warn them, you're safe" laws. They require vendors to actively check IDs and ensure that alcohol is not landing in the hands of minors. Accepting cash just to erase the evidence doesn't meet that burden. There are a lot of legal troubles with the situation that could get a lot of people charged with multiple offenses. That you have underage fraternity members living there suggests you should not have alcohol readily accessible in the house at all, as most state laws expressly forbid providing access to alcohol, not just serving or selling. Them being there provides access to it, even if it's just a case in the fridge with a note on it. Not to mention, you technically cannot sell alcohol, as I highly doubt your fraternity has a liquor license to be able to do so. There's a big difference between asking everyone to pitch in to buy the case versus actively selling individual cans through a vending machine. The vending machine itself is violating liquor laws in your state merely by existing. | So, in England and Wales your son assaulted Mario. (From Wikipedia: "Assault is committed if one intentionally or recklessly causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence". I expect Mario expected your son was going to thump him, and that would certainly be unlawful.) You were both trespassers on the property; however it sounds like there was nobody there who could require you to leave, so that probably doesn't matter. Both of these would be true whatever the age of your daughter. Finally, in England and Wales, if you had forced your 16-year old daughter to come with you against her will, you would both have been guilty of kidnapping. (16 is the age at which children become independent in terms of deciding where to go.) She can choose to leave home and live with her boyfriend, and there is nothing you can do to stop her. Edit: The question did not originally mention a jurisdiction. This is an area where the legal situation is likely to be very jurisdiction dependent. | It would largely depend on their "or else" leverage, and whether this is a government vs. private school. A government school has more limited ability to tell you what to do (being an agent of the government), and there has to be some statutory underpinning for any restrictions they would impose on your liberty. They may require you to have some form of medical insurance and may require you to seek treatment under certain circumstances: depending on the nature of the incident that this is a response to (in particular, what kind of disruption may have arisen). A private school can require pretty much whatever it wants, as long as the act is generally legal (they cannot compel you to steal). They cannot unilaterally change the terms of their contract with you, but you'd have to do some digging to figure out what contract if any you have with them. In either event, if they can legally expel you, they can impose conditions on what you have to do in order for them to not expel you. | Most place it isn't illegal, but unless the company has some good reason for asking (such as the ones that Nij outlines) then it might open them up to accusations of ageism. In other words, if they have no good reason for asking they would have difficulty explaining to a court why they wanted that information if it wasn't to facilitate age discrimination. |
How does the personal/household activity exemption not apply to domestic CCTV pointed to the street? I am surprised to learn that, in the UK, private/domestic CCTV cameras pointed to the public street make the owner GDPR controller — with all the consequences like having to respond to data requests from all those strangers who were filmed. In Czech Republic though, the personal/household activity exemption applies (edit: no, it does not, my bad). Was/is it correct for the courts to not apply the exemption? How is filming the street with personal CCTV substantially different from filming it with a phone? (other than for the operator not being visible to the strangers — which makes the first impression for them that nothing is being filmed). | Why do you expect different courts to determine different laws in the same way? The Czech and UK laws that implement the GDPR are necessary different because they are the products of different legislative and legal traditions and are written in different languages. The differences may be minor but they will exist. Particular cases will have different factual and legal nuances and be interpreted by different courts with very different judicial traditions. Czech courts set no precedents in UK courts and vice-versa. It’s no surprise that there will be different outcomes. Even jurisdictions with much closer legal traditions like US Federal Circuit Courts and Australian states often have divergent precedents on similar (or the same) legislation. | the statute only applies to EU residents Wrong. GDPR applies to everyone in the EU (Art. 3). This means tourists are also covered. Residence status is completely irrelevant (Recital 14(1)): The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence There is no provision for data processors/controllers to demand proof from data subjects of them being located in the EU. You can challenge them, but if they refuse to provide proof you will still be liable to fulfill their GDPR request should they indeed be present in the EU. | The goal of the GDPR is to ensure a single market for personal data processing throughout the EU. Since all EU/EEA member states now have equivalent levels of data protection, it doesn't matter in which member state data is stored or processed. Member states cannot generally limit this single market via national laws. Furthermore, secure processing may be possible outside of the EU/EEA as discussed in Chapter 5 of the GDPR. Some countries such as Japan have been asserted an adequate level of data protection so that no special safety measures are necessary. For other countries, a transfer of personal data may be possible under so-called Standard Contractual Clauses which detail the responsibilities of the data exporter/importer. However, the recent Schrems II ruling has invalidated the (partial) adequacy decision for the United States, and has strongly hinted that SCCs only work if the parties are actually able to honor their responsibilities under the SCC (which is not the case with some surveillance laws). Data protection is likely not ensured for processing in the US or by US-controlled companies (even if the processing usually takes place within the EU). Given the sensitivity of health data, this means you should likely avoid using the typical public cloud providers (regardless of availability region). Depending on where your company is based, you might also be disqualified as a data processor by EU data controllers. So the GDPR has no data residency requirements that limit the processing/storage to Germany, but some data residency requirements to keep the data in the EU. However, there may be non-GDPR obligations that mandate how the data can be processed, but I'm not familiar with those (the German regulatory landscape for tele-health is very uneven, differs between German states, but is also improving a lot recently). Since you're processing health data, you should pay special attention to Art 9(3) GDPR which is expanded in German law by §22 BDSG to list a catalogue of possible safety measures you should consider, but none of them are related to data residency. §78 BDSG has further details on transfers into non-EU countries, such as emphasizing that human rights must be guaranteed in the target country. | There are a number of misconceptions in this question. Firstly, the regulatory environment did not drastically change when the GDPR came into force in 2018. Previously, each EU member state had its own laws implementing the 95/46/EC Data Protection Directive. The GDPR harmonizes these laws, and replaces them with a single EU-wide law. However, the GDPR is largely identical with the DPD. In particular, both laws have the same definition of a controller. Secondly, the data controller is not a position to be designated, like a Data Protection Officer would be. A controller is whoever – alone or jointly with others – determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data. Whether someone can decide the purposes of processing is a matter of fact, not a matter of formalities. There can be more than one controller. Most likely, the institution hosting the research group is the controller. For individual researchers, the important aspect would be to demonstrate that they've fully complied with their institution's procedures at all times – that they acted as agents of the controller, not as controllers of their own. The institution might have a more difficult time mounting the defense if its technical and organizational measures were inadequate. For example, keeping an unattended server running for five years without security updates borders on gross negligence – so there should have been a procedure so that each system has a clear point of contact who is responsible for administrating the system. The controller should also have inventoried its systems and processing activities at the latest in preparation of GDPR, e.g. for an Art 30 record of processing activities. Your question suggests that no one could be at fault because no one did anything, but inaction and failure to fulfil responsibilities can also be a violation of law. If the institution wasn't convinced that this server was GDPR-compliant, the correct approach would have been to shut the server down, not to continue the processing of personal data. Of course, the controller may be able to demonstrate that this breach of GDPR was very minor, for example because the personal data was pseudonymized and because other technical measures (like firewalls) would have prevented unauthorized access. | Video surveillance is not necessarily illegal, but you do need a very solid legal basis. You should not install a camera in your lab without going through your department's usual processes, likely involving the data protection officer and the Betriebsrat/Personalrat which MUST sign off on such workplace surveillance measures. I don't quite see how a vote among colleagues could authorize this surveillance. Your organization's data protection officer should be able to help you to place the video surveillance on safer footing, or to find better alternatives. Implementing video surveillance could first require a written data protection impact assessment (Datenschutz-Folgeabschätzung). Some pointers below. GDPR/DSGVO compliance starts with three questions: What is the purpose for which personal data is being processed? What is the legal basis for this processing? What means can be used to achieve the purpose, collecting the minimal amount of data necessary? You need to think further about the purpose for which surveillance is necessary. In particular, a camera does not prevent accidents and there might be less invasive ways to prevent intrusion (such as locking the door). Cameras are a fairly extreme measure, and are typically only used as a deterrent to crime, e.g. to deter robbers at a bank counter. The legal basis (GDPR Art 6) you choose is quite relevant because consent (opt-in, Einwilligung) is not generally possible in an employment context, and legitimate interest(berechtigtes Interesse) is not available to public authorities. While companies could use a legitimate interest, this interest must be compelling enough to outweigh the rights and freedoms of the affected data subjects even if they object (try to opt-out). In its guidelines to video devices, the EDPB (EDSA) has also mentioned that the legitimate interest must be non-speculative. The mere concern that equipment could be damaged by an anonymous co-worker is not enough, but past incidents could make this interest legitimate – the amount of surveillance must be proportionate to the actual risks. The disgruntled co-worker could escalate by contacting the data protection officer, lodging a complaint with your state's supervisory authority, or by suing your employer. It is not guaranteed that they would succeed, but it doesn't seem like this instance of surveillance is entirely proper. I would deactivate the cameras until you are sure that the camera surveillance is being performed legally. | Note: I am not familiar with Washington law, but I can make an educated guess as to what is happening here. I am guessing that the couple in question are the joint registered owners of the motor vehicle. In many jurisdictions, motor vehicles are treated differently from "normal" things, they are treated as inherently dangerous and thus ownership carries a certain set of responsibilities. (Similar to e.g. owning a firearm, which carries with it certain restrictions on how it can be stored, for example.) One of those responsibilities is to keep track of who is operating the motor vehicle. Therefore, unless the operator of the motor vehicle can clearly be identified without incurring unreasonable cost, tickets for traffic violations are generally addressed to the registered owner, who can then forward them to the responsible operator. (Note that "unreasonable cost" does not have to be monetary. It could also be an invasion of privacy: it is less invasive to just ask the owner to identify the operator than to e.g. surveil the owner's property to find out who is using the vehicle or run facial recognition against the owner's family, friends, and colleagues.) In many jurisdictions, there is a form attached to the ticket (or downloadable from some website) which will look something like this: I accept the ticket: [ ] I do not accept the ticket [ ] because … I was operating the vehicle, but I did not run the red light [ ] I was not operating the vehicle [ ] … the vehicle was operated by: name ___, address ___ … I do not know who was operating the vehicle at that time [ ] If you claim not to know who was operating the vehicle at the time in question, that might have other consequences. In some jurisdictions, you can then be ordered to keep a logbook, for example. If the vehicle then gets caught again and you again claim to now know who was operating it, or you cannot produce the logbook, you might get fined for violating the court order to keep a logbook. | In the U.S. this is a notoriously perilous area of the law, particularly because the laws regarding recording vary so much between the states. A good source for this question is the RCFP. To give you an example: In Pennsylvania it is a felony to record "oral communication" in any circumstance in which the speaker would be justified in expecting it to not be recorded. Legally, as soon as you turn on an audio recorder in PA, you had better make sure nobody unaware that you're recording wanders within range of your microphone! | There is no requirement about "data" in the GDPR, so provided this is just "data", no. An empty form with fields for personal data contains no personal data. On the other hand, if the form is filled in by the user with personal data (as defined in GDPR article 4), and you receive a copy of the filled in form and process these personal data (as defined in GDPR article 4) - then the answer is: Yes. However, if you do not process the personal data (i.e. the form is just printed out on paper and filled in with a pen, and nobody except the data subject has access to the piece of paper with the filled in form - then the answer again is "no"). |
Own a duplex in Georgia, tenant on one side believes tenant on other dealing drugs due to traffic I own a duplex in Georgia. The tenant in one side has notified me she believes that the tenant in the other side is dealing drugs based on the amount of foot and car traffic coming to the location. She said she has confronted them and asked them to stop standing in front of and blocking or parking on her parking pad. Previously the accusing tenant only notified me of her parking pad being used. I notified other tenant to stop that behaviour. Legally, what do I do now that the accusing tenant has stated she believes there is drug use or sales occurring? | You are in a tough spot. The main risk is "civil forfeiture" of the duplex if you have sufficient knowledge that it is being used for purposes of drug dealing and take no action. See, e.g., a case from October 1, 2021 when a house was seized on this basis. But the tenant has property rights under a lease that you can't abridge unless you can prove that there is a violation of the law. And, it isn't obvious if you know enough to trigger civil forfeiture exposure based merely on uncorroborated statements from another tenant that observe only conduct often associated with drug dealing and not deals themselves. Still, the knowledge you do have might trigger a duty to inquire if you want to escape civil forfeiture liability. Under the statute, to defeat a civil forfeiture action (assuming it has been used for drug dealing), you must show: (e)(1) A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section if the owner of such interest or interest holder establishes that the owner or interest holder: (A) Is not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, did not consent to it, and did not know and could not reasonably have known of the conduct or that it was likely to occur; (B) Had not acquired and did not stand to acquire substantial proceeds from the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture other than as an interest holder in an arm's length commercial transaction; (C) With respect to conveyances for transportation only, did not hold the property jointly, in common, or in community with a person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture; (D) Does not hold the property for the benefit of or as nominee for any person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture, and, if the owner or interest holder acquired the interest through any such person, the owner or interest holder acquired it as a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction; and (E) Acquired the interest: (i) Before the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, and the person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture did not have the authority to convey the interest to a bona fide purchaser for value at the time of the conduct; or (ii) After the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture: (I) As a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction; (II) Before the filing of a lien on it and before the effective date of a notice of pending forfeiture relating to it and without notice of its seizure for forfeiture under this article; and (III) At the time the interest was acquired, was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture or likely to become subject to forfeiture under this article. (2) A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section for a violation involving only one gram or less of a mixture containing cocaine or four ounces or less of marijuana unless said property was used to facilitate a transaction in or a purchase of or sale of a controlled substance or marijuana. The language in bold is the most threatening part that effectively establishes a duty of inquiry and a duty to take action if your inquiry establishes that drug dealing is going on. If you can't establish that you were ignorant of wrongdoing, and reasonably so, under the circumstances of being told by one of your tenants that something is going on, you are at great risk of losing the duplex to civil forfeiture if the DA can prove that drug dealing is taking place by far less than a reasonable doubt standard. You might want to hire a private investigator to look into the situation carefully, and to try to evict the allegedly drug dealing tenant if the private investigator corroborates the fellow tenant's claims. | There are no squatters Neither Bob nor Sue are squatters: Bob was there with the owner's permission and Sue was there with Bob's. Adverse possession requires possession that is, well, adverse: against the wishes of the true owner. Bob was almost certainly a tenant, paying rent in services rather than cash. Clearly, the terms of that tenancy are unclear and may not be legal but that is more likely to rebound against the landlord rather than the tenant. So long as the rent (whatever it is) continues to be paid the estate’s tenancy should continue. However, the landlord could start procedures to end the tenancy (probably requiring 1 months notice) at any time. | From the time that the lease expired and you remained with permission, you had a shorter period of obligation and protection. I assume that the lease ended long ago, and you've been living there month to month. Assuming that we can read "two rental periods" as "two whole months" (if there is something else in the lease that indicates this, such as a rent due-date), then we can interpret the notice requirement as saying that you must give notice before the first of the month 2 months before the intended end of tenancy – that is one meaning of the lease. Another meaning is that you can give notice 58 days in advance. The lease has an ambiguity as to what the notice requirement is. Since you did not write the lease, and they did (well, someone, whose obligations they inherited, did), the ambiguity is construed against the party to wrote it. In the present circumstance, because you want to leave soon, you would not be held to the notice requirement that favors the landlord. It's entirely non-obvious why such wording would be used. In 504B.135, the statutes say (a) A tenancy at will may be terminated by either party by giving notice in writing. The time of the notice must be at least as long as the interval between the time rent is due or three months, whichever is less. (b) If a tenant neglects or refuses to pay rent due on a tenancy at will, the landlord may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant 14 days notice to quit in writing. Once you're past the end of the lease, you are a tenant at will, by the definitions section: "Tenancy at will" means a tenancy in which the tenant holds possession by permission of the landlord but without a fixed ending date. Assuming that you pay rent at the first of the month, then the lesser of a whole calendar month and three months is, obviously, a whole calendar month. The stuff at the end of the statute that you cite – "The notice must be in writing and direct the tenant's attention" – is addressed to the landlord's notice to tenant, where he says "Your tenancy will not auto-renew". This applies to leases of 2 months or longer, not recycled 1 month leases, and requires the landlord to give the tenant appropriate notice (it does not define the tenant's notice requirement). | My questions are, where does this put me legally and what are my options? . . . Also, if I want to keep the tenants, how should I proceed? And if I don't want to keep them, do I have that option? Your Rights With Respect To The Tenants If the agency is telling the truth and the agreement made with the agent was for four tenants but their records and document only listed three by accident, you probably can't insist on additional rent or evicting the fourth tenant because if your agent does something on your behalf, that is binding on you just as much as if you had signed them up personally in that manner. This is true even if the agent didn't actually have the authority to rent the place to four people based upon your communications with the agent, because the agent has "apparent authority" to bind you in your agent's dealings with the prospective tenants. You probably have the right to insist that the fourth tenant sign the lease to conform to the actual agreement that was reached (four tenants in exchange for the rent stated in the lease). If the fourth tenant refuses to do so, that would be a repudiation of the lease/contract and would prevent him from claiming that he is a valid tenant of the property pursuant to the agreement reached with landlord through his agent. If the fourth tenant refused to sign, you could therefore insist that the fourth tenant pay additional rent or be evicted if you wanted to. On the other hand, if the agent is not accurately relating the facts, and there was never any agreement to have more than three tenants (as your communications with them and the written lease suggest), then you would have the right to evict the fourth tenant or insist on additional rent from that tenant. But, it might be hard to prove that the agent is not being accurate because it sounds like the agent and the tenants will testify consistently with each other and there were probably no other witnesses to the discussions between them. The Fourth Tenant Might Have Liability Anyway Also, at common law, you could sue the fourth person for unpaid rent during the period that the tenant was actually there anyway, since the fourth tenant was in "privity of estate" with you. (If someone actually signs the lease then they are in "privity of contract" with you.) England abolished the doctrine of privity of estate in most circumstances for residential tenancies in 1995. But, it is possible that this fact pattern is one of the situations in which the privity of estate doctrine remains in force since the 1995 reforms largely apply to assignments of leases by people who are tenants on the original lease, rather than occupants of a rented property who never signed a lease and never received a formal assignment. I don't have the legal research tools to confirm that accurately. But, none of the U.K. Landlord and Tenant Acts currently in force that I could locate addressed that issue, so the common law rule may still apply in this situation. If the doctrine of privity of estate does allow a suit against the fourth tenant based on occupancy without signing a lease, the incentive to even try to get the fourth tenant to sign a lease is very small indeed - you get no benefit at all from it other than slightly easier proof in an unpaid rent collection lawsuit if the agent's story is believed. If it doesn't the considerations earlier in this answer still apply. Practical Considerations All of this being said, there is also a practical consideration to consider. It you try to kick out the fourth tenant or impose additional rent on the fourth tenant, if the fourth tenant refuses to sign the lease, or if you believe that the original agreement did not include the fourth tenant, you still have to weigh the pros and cons of bringing an eviction or unpaid rent lawsuit. The lawsuit will cost you money (requiring you to advance money even if you are awarded attorneys' fees which may be impossible to collect from the tenants). You won't get your attorneys' fees for the lawsuit if you lose and will also have to pay their attorneys' fees if you lose. Tenants whom you are suing are unlikely to be cooperative on any other matter upon which you want their cooperation, and may bad mouth you, for example, in online consumer reviews. Unlike a typical eviction where the rent is not paid, it is very likely that the eviction will be contested, and if it is, the court could order the fourth tenant to sign the lease, but provide you with no other remedy if the court believes the story put forward by the tenant and the agent. If you don't sue, you won't incur attorneys' fees, you can still evict everyone if the rent isn't paid, you can still try to collect unpaid rent from three other people, and you are much less likely to have a dispute with or non-cooperation from the tenants. The only benefit you get from having a fourth person on the lease if that was the original deal (or if you can't prove that it wasn't the original deal) is that you have one more person you can sue for back rent if the rent isn't paid. If I decide to break my agreement with the agency, do I have grounds to do that? Terminating The Agent Often you can terminate an agreement with an agency without cause. If the agency agreement says that you can, you are free to do so and probably should because at a minimum they are sloppy and poor communicators. Generally speaking, even if you can't terminate the agreement without cause, you can terminate the agreement for cause, and the contradiction between their prior communications with you and their current communications with you probably constitute good cause to terminate the agreement both if they are telling the truth not, and if they are not accurately recounting the facts now. But, to be clear, terminating the agent won't affect the rights of the tenant. Suing The Agent If you clearly do lose money because the three tenants on the lease don't pay rent and for example, you get a judgment against them which can't be collected due to bankruptcy or them moving abroad to a place where it is not economical to collect a money judgment from them, or just not having any assets or income (or some combination thereof), and it turns out that the law does not allow you to sue the fourth tenant, and the fourth tenant was not judgment proof, you would probably have a right to sue the agent for the lost rent caused by the agent's negligence in failing to get all four tenants to sign the lease. But, the cost of proving that in a typical case would not be worth the money since this would be much harder to prove than simply proving that someone signed a lease agreeing to pay rent and didn't pay rent as agreed. If the agent didn't agree to pay for your losses voluntarily it might not be worth the time, trouble and risk of not prevailing in that lawsuit to pursue, even if you could get attorneys' fees for your suit against the agent if you won (which you probably could in England). The risks of doing that include paying the agent's attorneys' fees is you lose. | The official website of the french administration gives details under which conditions a landlord can end a lease in France. As a general rule, the landlord cannot end a lease unless meeting certain conditions. The landlord has to send a letter to all of the tenant (all of them if multiple) named on the lease, and the spouse of the tenant even if not named on the lease. The letter has to be sent at least 6 month before the end of the lease if the residence isn't furnished, or 3 months if the residence is furnished. The letter must contain the reason for the ending of the lease. There are 3 causes the landlord may use to end the lease: The landlord plans to make the residence the primary residence of them, their spouse / partner (of at least 1 year) / PACS partner, or an ascendant or descendant of the landlord or their spouse. The landlord plans to sell the residence. In this case, the tenant has the priority to buy the residence if they wish. If the tenant take the offer, the landlord is obliged to accept the offer. The landlord can also sell the residence with the lease, in which case the lease is transfered to the buyer. Under legitimate and serious cause, including but not limited to not paying rent / regularly paying the rent late, causing trouble to the neighborhood, subleasing the residence... If the tenant contests the cause, the landlord will have to justify to a judge the reason the cause of termination. In this case, the landlord can have ground to end the lease before its end date. Otherwise, the landlord cannot end the lease, and the lease is automatically renewed at the end date without the need of explicit communication. A tenant can be protected if they fall under certain conditions. I don't find anything protecting people with a child, but if the tenant is older than 65yo / taking care of someone older than 65yo and the tenant earns an income lower than a certain limit a given year Then the tenant can be protected from these causes, unless the landlord is also older than 65 or earns an income lower than the same limit as the tenant or offers to help relocate the tenant to another residence close to the first residence which also accomodates to the need of the tenant. Note that, if the ex-tenant found that the cause given by the landlord was fraudulent (for example saying they'll use it as a primary residence but lease it to another tenant), then the tenant can bring the case to court and get indemnized as indicated here. | However, he wants a new security deposit and a month's rent for the time we will use it in March, claiming that the sale process makes us new tenants. What are the legal rights and legal obligations of an estate in a month-to-month rental situation? The estate is just starting the probate process, and I am unclear on whether the landlord is a "traditional" creditor or in a unique situation since the money he is owed for rent continues to accrue after death. The decedent's security deposit, less valid deductions, is property of the estate, so if the landlord takes a second security deposit he is double dipping. Generally speaking, after someone dies, money judgments that have not been reduced to judgment liens, and unsecured debts (i.e. debts not supported by collateral) only have a right to be paid via submission of a claim to the probate estate in the probate process with claims made paid according to a priority schedule set forth in the probate code. But, generally speaking, death does not impair the property rights of third parties, so the fact that a debtor's estate is in probate is usually not a basis upon which a foreclosure or repossession of collateral for a default on a secured debt, or an eviction due to the termination of a lease, may be postponed while the probate case runs its course. Probate does not have the equivalent of the "automatic stay" in bankruptcy that prevents any creditors, secured or unsecured, from engaging in any collection activity against an estate, and probate estates are not allowed to file for bankruptcy either. If you really wanted to play hardball and only needed the apartment for a few days in March, the estate could simply continue to occupy it for that period of time and they pay the landlord the extra month's rent but not the additional security deposit when it was done. The landlord can't begin a foreclosure proceeding until there is a default which can't happen sooner than the last day of February. Even if the landlord is really on his toes, the landlord will be hard pressed to get a notice to vacate served on the estate and then to prepare and serve an eviction lawsuit on the estate and get that case in front of a judge before the estate will be ready to move out anyway. The estate might incur some attorneys' fees in the process if it did that, but the attorneys' fees would be an unsecured claim of the landlord that would have to be collected through the claims process in the probate proceeding which is usually a fairly favorable forum for the estate, instead of the usual court where small landlord-tenant disputes are handled. The probate estate could simply deny his claim for attorneys' fees and then, if the landlord wanted them after making a claim, the landlord would have to bring a lawsuit on fairly tight deadlines in the probate court to have the disallowance of the claim overturned. If you wanted to be even more aggressive, rather than paying the last month's rent, the estate could just holdover into March without paying rent or a new security deposit (vacating before the eviction process can run its course), effectively forcing the landlord to use the security deposit for March rent, and then forcing the landlord to use the probate claims process for both damages to the property claimed and for an attorneys' fees. If the estate is insolvent, or if the claim wasn't filed by the landlord (who may not even know that it is necessary to file a claim in probate) within the short deadline for probate claims arising after death, those expenses just wouldn't get paid at all. | The landlord might be able to sue the tenant for actual damages arising from the double occupancy, if utilities are paid by the landlord. Two people tend to use more water than one person. Establishing that there has been any loss would be tricky, but let's assume that there is evidence pointing to some dollar figure. Then the landlord might sue the tenant for causing this damage. | Unless your lease clearly denies the possibility of prorating, the emails are binding (and yes, emails count as in writing). The landlord ought to honor the conditions outlined in the emails, and it is not your fault that the manager was ignorant about his or her employer's/landlord's policies at the time the manager computed the prorated amount. Additionally, if the lease only speaks in terms of 20-day notice, then it implies that prorating may apply. It is possible that the lease contains language in the sense of when the notice becomes "effective". If so, that would require a more detailed review of the language therein, since even in that scenario you might prevail on the basis of the doctrine of contra proferentem. Here the difficult part seems to be that you are not in the US. Because the amount at issue is not high enough, the grievance/complaint would have to be filed in Small Claims court. And, as far as I know, the parties cannot be represented by a lawyer in Small Claims court. You might have to file your grievance once you are back in the US. |
Are there any provisions in Britain which render improperly obtained criminal evidence judicially inadmissible? If evidence of wrongdoing is uncovered through improper investigative measures, what protections are there for the subjects of these improper investigations in U.K. law? Must one still answer for evidence of any wrongdoing no matter how it is obtained or are there any mitigations for this based on investigative impropriety? | There isn't an automatic exclusion rule for all forms of improperly acquired evidence in the UK. I can't find the exact quote but there was a judgement from a senior court that said in terms: "it's not the court's job to discipline the police but to see that justice is done." However, judges have the discretion to disallow individual pieces of evidence if they think the interests of justice require it. Section 78 (1) of PACE (1984) has: In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. Senior judges have been reluctant to lay down general guidelines, holding the trial judge best placed to make these decisions (although of course, subject to appeal). The foundational principle is the accused's right to a fair trial, so in principle one could appeal to the ECtHR under Article 6. However it generally takes a similar line to courts in the UK: It is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence - for example, unlawfully obtained evidence - may be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. PACE Section 78(2) is: Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence. The general principle in 78 (1) does not override specific prohibitions: for instance, intercept evidence is never admissable under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. | If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent? | Disclosure to police of an illegal recording is permitted by s. 193(2)(e), and in court by s. 193(2)(a). The recording could be excluded if the person who made the recording did so on behalf of police (to sidestep their obligation to obtain a warrant), but even then its importance as evidence may outweigh other Charter considerations. | The relevant Maryland statute is MD. Criminal Law Code Ann. § 9-307 (2021), subsection (a): A person may not destroy, alter, conceal, or remove physical evidence that the person believes may be used in a pending or future official proceeding with the intent to impair the verity or availability of the physical evidence in the official proceeding. Note "that the person believes" and "with the intent to." If you have no reason to think it might be necessary in an official proceeding, you aren't violating this section. If you delete the data unintentionally or for some other reason, then you also probably are not violating the section. (I say "probably" because I'm sure there's some sort of provision for negligence or willful disregard for the evidential value of something you should know has evidential value.) As a practical matter, no copyright lawsuit or criminal trial (and criminal trials over copyright infringement are very rare) is going to depend on the browser history of the defendant's friend. What if my computer has major software issues and the only viable solution is delete everything and reinstall from scratch; am I stuck with a worthless broken computer because reinstalling things from scratch would delete evidence of a crime? If you know of evidence on the hard drive that would be destroyed, you can copy it somewhere else before deleting and reinstalling. Federal law is similar: it requires knowledge and intent. 18 USC 1519: Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. | I don't believe it is contradictory. Some kinds of injury are inherently difficult to calculate (e.g. damage to reputation caused by slander) but the judge or jury, as the case may be, will review the evidence and do the best they can. Lord Reed says as much in paragraph 38 of his judgment. ... and as a practical matter, it appears the damages, in this case, were both calculable and supported by evidence. The Court's primary focus was not whether damages could be calculated but rather the measure of damages (i.e. the method of calculation). | Does the law or judge ever make exceptions for events such as this? From a legal standpoint, your friend is at high risk of being found in contempt and thus be sentenced to imprisonment. Your friend should have called 911 rather than violate the protection order under pretext of consoling her. Asking from the standpoint of whether judges ever do this or that is pointless. The answer would be "yes, they make exceptions" even in scenarios which are plain aberrant. However, a judge's departure of the law quite often is not a reliable standpoint for understanding the law, but the result of his/her ineptitude and unfitness for judicial office. | Because the relevant law enforcement decided not to In the US (and indeed in all common law jurisdictions), law enforcement and prosecutors have discretion over when and if to lay charges by considering such things as the wishes of the victim, the prospects of success and whether charges would be just in the circumstances. At best, this allows a measured response to the particular situation. At worst, it enables discrimination and persecution. Either way it solves the problem of allocating limited resources to comparatively unlimited need. | Yes. The jurisdiction I am familiar with is England and Wales. Conviction requires evidence (witness testimony is evidence) which proves the case "beyond reasonable doubt". It is open to the jury to find the witness so convincing that they find that they are sure the defendant committed the crime. In general of course, prosecutors prefer to have some supporting evidence (either additional witnesses, or circumstantial evidence - like DNA.) |
Can I request my comment be deleted from a forum if I made that post when I was 12? Basically what the title says. I'm very ignorant when it comes to these sorts of laws and rules so please be kind. I made a post on an “audition forum” when I was 12 years old. The post included my full name, race, age and gender. I am 17 now. Do I have the right to have this information removed? This is an American website by One Source Talent, who have had some very problematic reviews… I’ve tried sending emails but their email under their DMCA policy is fake. I’ve ran the domain search in who.is/ICANN but it lacks the contact information. | Various Privacy Laws may Apply If you live in the EU, the site may be required to delete this information under the GDPR. If you live in the UK, you may have the right to deletion under the UK-GDPR. In each case the procedure for enforcing such a right if the business does not respond depends on the law of your country, and would involve a suit in the courts of that country. Even if a judgement including a court order is obtained, enforcing this on a US firm may not be easy. If you live in California, you may have a right to the deletion of the info under the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) (soon to be replaced by a modified version, the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA)). If you live in Virginia, you may have rights under the Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (VCDPA). All these right are subject to various exceptions. Several other states, including Colorado, have passed similar laws, but they have not yet gone into effect. See also "Consumers’ “Right to Delete” under US State Privacy Laws" published by Consumer Privacy World and written by By Glenn A. Brown on March 3, 2021. Since the information was collected (posted) when you were less than 12, your parents may have the right to request deletion under the Federal Children's Online privacy Protection Act (COPPA) The DMCA deals with alleged copyright violations, not with personal privacy issues. CCPA / CPRA The CCPA right to delete applies only to information supplied by the Data Subject (DS). The CCPA right to delete is given by California Civil Code section 1798.105 The Buisness has 10 days to acknowledge a request, and 45 days to respond, which may be extended for an additional 45 days. Note also that the CCPA requires various notices to be delivered to the consumer, and normally requires a privacy policy to be posted. This must include notification of the consumer's rights. Under the CCPA a consumer may not sue a firm directly to enforce the right to delete. Instead a complaint may be made to the California Attorney General, who is empowered to take enforcement action. Only in cases of a data breach ca a consumer sue a firm directly. Note that he CCPA appliws only to firms that: are for-profit businesses that do business in California and Have a gross annual revenue of over $25 million; or Buy, receive, or sell the personal information of 50,000 or more California residents, households, or devices; or Derive 50% or more of their annual revenue from selling California residents’ personal information. See also the official page "California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)" VCDPA Section 59.1-573 (A) provides that (A) A consumer may invoke the consumer rights authorized pursuant to this subsection at any time by submitting a request to a controller specifying the consumer rights the consumer wishes to invoke. A known child's parent or legal guardian may invoke such consumer rights on behalf of the child regarding processing personal data belonging to the known child. A controller shall comply with an authenticated consumer request to exercise the right: ... (A) 3. To delete personal data provided by or obtained about the consumer; (A) 4. To obtain a copy of the consumer's personal data that the consumer previously provided to the controller in a portable and, to the extent technically feasible, readily usable format that allows the consumer to transmit the data to another controller without hindrance, where the processing is carried out by automated means; and (A) 5. To opt out of the processing of the personal data for purposes of (i) targeted advertising, (ii) the sale of personal data, or (iii) profiling in furtherance of decisions that produce legal or similarly significant effects concerning the consumer. Under subsection B the controller (firm) has 45 days to respond, which may be extended for up to an additional 45 days Under 59.1-574 (A) a controller has verious obligations including to: Limit the collection of personal data to what is adequate, relevant, and reasonably necessary ... and to: Not process sensitive data concerning a consumer without obtaining the consumer's consent, or, in the case of the processing of sensitive data concerning a known child, without processing such data in accordance with the federal Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (15 U.S.C. з 6501 et seq.). Under subsectiuon (B) the rights may not be waived by contract. Under subsection (c) the controller must provide: a reasonably accessible, clear, and meaningful privacy notice and this notice must contain: one or more secure and reliable means for consumers to submit a request to exercise their consumer rights under this chapter. Such means shall take into account the ways in which consumers normally interact with the controller, the need for secure and reliable communication of such requests, and the ability of the controller to authenticate the identity of the consumer making the request. Controllers shall not require a consumer to create a new account in order to exercise consumer rights pursuant to з 59.1-573 but may require a consumer to use an existing account. various exemptions are provided for in the VCDPA. As with the CCPA, the previsions may only be enforced by the state Attorney General, not by private lawsuit. The VCDPA only applies to: persons that conduct business in the Commonwealth or produce products or services that are targeted to residents of the Commonwealth and that (i) during a calendar year, control or process personal data of at least 100,000 consumers or (ii) control or process personal data of at least 25,000 consumers and derive over 50 percent of gross revenue from the sale of personal data. In many ways it is quite similar to the CCPA. COPPA COPPA is a federal law that applies to services, including websites, that collect personal information about children under age 13. It imposes various responsibilities and restrictions on such providers, and give the parents of such children various rights. According to the FTC pagw "Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step Compliance Plan for Your Business"" Even if parents have agreed that you may collect information from their kids, parents have ongoing rights — and you have continuing obligations. If a parent asks, you must: give them a way to review the personal information collected from their child; give them a way to revoke their consent and refuse the further use or collection of personal information from their child; and delete their child’s personal information. The FTC's FAQ on COPPA states: The primary goal of COPPA is to place parents in control over what information is collected from their young children online. The Rule was designed to protect children under age 13, while accounting for the dynamic nature of the Internet. The Rule applies to operators of commercial websites and online services (including mobile apps and IoT devices, such as smart toys) directed to children under 13 that collect, use, or disclose personal information from children, or on whose behalf such information is collected or maintained (such as when personal information is collected by an ad network to serve targeted advertising). The Rule also applies to operators of general audience websites or online services with actual knowledge that they are collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children under 13, and to websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information directly from users of another website or online service directed to children. Operators covered by the Rule must: ... Provide parents access to their child's personal information to review and/or have the information deleted; ... Maintain the confidentiality, security, and integrity of information they collect from children, including by taking reasonable steps to release such information only to parties capable of maintaining its confidentiality and security; Retain personal information collected online from a child for only as long as is necessary to fulfill the purpose for which it was collected and delete the information using reasonable measures to protect against its unauthorized access or use; The same page says that COPPA: applies to operators of commercial websites and online services (including mobile apps and IoT devices) directed to children under 13 that collect, use, or disclose personal information from children. It also applies to operators of general audience websites or online services with actual knowledge that they are collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children under 13. The Rule also applies to websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information directly from users of another website or online service directed to children. The FTC, some other federal agencies, and US states may enforce the COPPA Rule. | Probably not Now, some US constitutional rights do get interpreted very broadly, and it's possible this might be the case here too. But fundamentally, this situation is not equivalent to the security contractors example you mentioned. The crux is that Facebook already has every right to delete your posts for whatever reason they want. A security contractor does not have any intrinsic right to conduct searches (warrantless or otherwise) on your person, residence or effects. Facebook can choose, at their sole discretion, to delete all your posts, delete none of your posts, or delete some of your posts according to whatever metric they came up with. In this case, the metric is 'did the government flag this as misinformation'. The government isn't censoring you - Facebook is, and Facebook is allowed to do that (they happen in this case to be following the government's advice on what specifically needs censoring, but where they choose to get their advice is also purely their business). A security contractor, by contrast, can't do much of anything to you, except when they have been specifically deputized by the government to do so by some legal process. If this happens, then they are said to be acting 'under color of law', and suddenly First (and Eighth, etc) Amendment restrictions do begin to constrain their actions. Facebook is not getting any kind of state power delegated to them, and thus they aren't considered to be acting 'under color of law'. They aren't doing anything they were not already allowed to do. | You tag the question with "criminal law", suggesting that by "illegal" you mean "is it a crime" -- that would depend on jurisdiction, but in the US or my state, it is not a crime. There are crimes that you could commit with such an account, but violating the TOS is not itself a crime. However, it is illegal, a breach of contract, as you can see from the TOS "You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission". | Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination. | From what I can see on the USPTO registry, "tweet" is still not trademarked for the purposes you're talking about. Twitter has been working to secure that trademark, but I can't find any record of them having actually secured it. Just the same, I'd predict that using it will get you at least a cease-and-desist letter, and possibly a lawsuit. Whether you'd win that case seems to be a very open question, but that presumes you have the resources to litigate. | You are mistaken: they deny you on your act When you use Tor, your browser is not sending a lot of information. That makes Tor browsers hilariously easy to detect: nobody knows where the real browser is, but it is hilariously easy to block all Tor users for using Tor, or at least those that the server knows are Tor IPs. Using Tor is an action, not how you look. The closest Brick and mortar equivalent would be "Show me your ID please" and you show them a paper cutout of something that has Sample stamped over it. "No shirt, no shoes, no service" in the united-states Yes, most places can deny service based on how you dress or your state of hygine. These two would in most cases not extend to the protections under the Civil Rights Act, which protects some characteristics like race and sex, but not visual factors like "being dressed" or "smelling of cow". There can be a fine line where religious dress code is concerned, but in general and broad strokes, the restaurant can deny you for wearing the wrong clothes. Actually, the slogan is much broader than it appears: as long as an establishment's dress code is not violating discrimination law (like the CRA), they can enforce it under their freedom to contract. | In the general case, it seems unlikely, based on the wording (which is convoluted). In certain cases, if the president of Russia posts "My name is Vladimir Putin", that post is personal data. On the other hand, you might, based on my writing, conclude that I am from the US, and you might even conclude that I'm in Washington state, but that doesn't distinguish me from 7.5 million others, so on those grounds that is not personal data. Eventually, though, you might identify me specifically from other things that I may have said on SE. The definition depends on two parts. First, personal data is "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". Any "information" provided by a natural person is "related to" that person (as is any "information" that is about such a person). The second part defines "identifiable natural person", that is, who is an "identifiable person"? Every person can, in principle, be identified by reference to some label or description of fact about them, so every person is an identifiable person, under this definition. This means that every piece of text that refers to an individual (not even text which can identify the person) is "personal data". Obviously, any individual can be uniquely identified by some collection of identifiers; the problem is that the wording of the law does not explicitly say "using that supposed personal data". If I mention that I have a relative named Knudt, that would technically be personal data: I've given information that relates to a person, though you have no idea (and could not possibly figure out) who that person is. Another term that the regulation defines and uses in a few places is "pseudonymization", which is defined as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person The point of interest here is that this says that "personal data" which cannot be attributed to an individual is, nevertheless, still personal data. I think the most important part of the regulation is art. 6, which defines lawfulness of processing, especially para 4., which allows consideration to be given to safeguards such as pseudonymization. | A statement cannot be libel unless it actually identifies the plaintiff to defame him. The identification need not be by name, but it must be specific enough that the public would be able to determine who the statement referred to. You can read more about this concept at Prof. Eugene Volokh on Libel Law Therefore, if nobody other than the plaintiff or defendant learned about the connection before the filing of the case or the publication of discovered emails, the original work of fiction was not a libel. And by telling everyone that the connection existed, yes, the plaintiff was impliedly consenting to any further alleged libel and it would be a defense from liability for the plaintiff. Furthermore, there wouldn't be libel unless whatever the fictional character did was untrue (something the real plaintiff didn't do) and the public would think that whatever the character did was actually an assertion that the real plaintiff did it. I could write a satire about a President Brock O'Bama who is actually a lizardman in disguise, and that's my First Amendment right, not a slander of the President. Disclaimer: only describing the common law and majority rules. State laws may differ. |
How willing is the US Supreme Court to declare itself wrong? In comments on this answer User Suprcat wrote (in part) I think a big problem is that Marbury v. Madison has been applied in a way that ignores a major caveat: a court's job is to say what the law is, which means that if the court is properly doing its job what the Court says and what the law is will be one and the same, but that will be because a Court that is doing its job will write a decision consistent with the law, not because the law magically changes to match what the Court says. Courts seem to feel a sense of duty to pretend that all previous decisions have been correct, no matter how insanely twisted the law would have to be to fit all past decisions. Much better would be to recognize that Supreme Court decisions might occasionally be wrong, but that would not prevent them from being binding upon the parties involved, or in some cases providing some level of protection from those would rely upon them. Historically, how willing has the US Supreme Court been to say that its previous decisions were wrong? How willing are US courts to say that previous discussions are right, even if they are inconsistent with current decision? How much of this attitude comes from the Marbury v. Madison case, in which for the first time the US Supreme Court held an act of Congress void as being without Constitutional authority? How does this compare with this attitudes of courts in other common-law countries? | As for SCOTUS being willing to overrule itself, here is a table of such cases, starting with Hudson v. Guestier 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 281 (1810) which overturned Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 241 (1808) up to Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020) which overturned Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion) and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). This is 234 cases since 1798, slightly above once a year. No idea what the rate is for the UK or Canada. | There is no higher court which can overturn a SCOTUS decision, so in theory (or, imaginarily) they can rule any way they please. The ruling could then be overturned by a later court, as happened in these cases. However, justices of the Supreme Court can be impeached (impeachment is not subject to judicial review), so the individuals responsible for such a ruling could be impeached. Or, if the sitting president is favorable and the enabling legislation has been passed, additional members of the Supreme could be added, as was unsuccessfully attempted during the Roosevelt administration. The court could not write specific enforceable statutes defining the crime and imposing a penalty. They could rule that there is such-and-such right which is protected by the Cconstitution, and that that right must be protected by the states (for instance, a state may not pass a law that prohibits practicing the Pastafarian religion). It would be unprecedented, though, for SCOTUS to order a legislature to pass particular legislation. That would not mean that a ruling could not be written which mandated that, but it would be a huge break from tradition and a clear breach of the separation of powers. Legislatures could respond "they have made their decision; now let them enforce it". Decades ago, existing state death penalty laws were declared unconstitutional as defective with respect to the 8th Amendment, meaning that there was no death penalty in many states for some time. Homicide statutes could likewise be struck down en masse, perhaps as an Equal Rights violation, which would means that either homicide is now legal, or the Equal Rights violation in those statutes must be eliminated. All that SCOTUS would have to do is rule that a fetus is a person. Recall Roe v. Wade: If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. A model for how this might take place is McCleary v.Washington, where the Washington Supreme Court ordered the legislature to act to fund public education, on constitutional grounds that the legislature has an obligation to do certain things. The leverage imposed by the court was a large daily contempt fine that went up to over $100 million. However this was symbolic (lifted when the legislation was passed), and it took 3 years to implement the order. | The US Supreme Court has made some decisions that legal scholars, other judges, lawyers, and people in general have strongly criticized as mistaken, but none anywhere nearly as wild as the one suggested in the question. Many such, well let me call them "disputed", rulings have been later overturned by the court itself. A well known example is Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which was overruled a few years later by West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Many of the so-called Lochner era economic decisions were also eventually overturned by the Court itself. Some disputed holdings have been altered by changes in the law, State or Federal. Some have been overturned via a constitutional amendment, such as Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), which is now held to have been overruled by the Fourteenth Amendment, although the Court did not come to that conclusion until early in the 20th century. Perhaps the most notorious case is Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) which held that a person of African descent could never become a US citizen, and that Congress was without power to prohibit slavery in any US state or territory. This is perhaps the most denounced decision of the US Supreme Court in its history (See the linked Wikipedia article for a few such comments.) This decision was undone de facto by the outcome of the US Civil War, and de jure by the adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Some cases have later been treated as "bad law" even though not formally overturned. An example is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the Supreme Court upheld the removal of US citizens of Japanese ancestry from the US Pacific coast during WWII, and their confinement in what has been described as a series of concentration camps. This has not been formally overruled, but in Trump v. Hawaii No. 17-965, 585 U.S. ___ (2018), Chief Justice Roberts wrote: The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—'has no place in law under the Constitution.' 323 U. S., at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). [quoting Jackson's dissent in Korematsu] And some cases, although much disputed, still stand as good law. The case of Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), holding that Baseball continued to be exempt from anti-trust laws, federal and state, has been much criticized, but remains in force to this day. (See the section "Subsequent jurisprudence" in the linked Wikipedia article) Congress has not, so far, acted to limit the exemption, as the opinion indicates that it had the power to do. In short, a US Supreme Court decision, however "erroneous" or "absurd" commentators or the public may consider it, remains the law of the land until it is overturned or distinguished by the court, or made obsolete by changes in statute or in the Constitution itself. It the highly unlikely situation described in the question, John Doe would remain in prison until his sentence expired or he received a pardon. | The invalidity of laws that are inconsistent with the Charter is by virtue of section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which came into force with the bulk of the Charter. It states that: The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. This might be read as immediately applying by its own force to render laws inconsistent with the Charter to be void. And language to this effect has been even used by the Court, saying that a provision inconsistent with the Constitution is "invalid from the moment it is enacted" (e.g. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Laseur, 2003 SCC 54). But for Section 52 to have effect "requires the exercise of judicial power to declare the law to be unconstitutional" (R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 at para. 54). That a law is inconsistent with the Constitution is "revealed through litigation, specifically the judgment that declares the inoperability of the impugned law" (Sullivan at para. 55). Section 52 has no practical effect aside from Courts or other decision-makers declining to apply law that is inconsistent with the Constitution. Whether a law was void as soon as the Charter was enacted is not really a meaningful question nor even detectable until a Court declares the law to be invalid. The Court has also clarified that declarations of invalidity are not necessarily retroactive to the moment of enactment (internal citations removed): [60] ... Mr. Sullivan points to the idea that an unconstitutional law is invalid from the moment it is enacted. But the strict enforcement of such a principle “cannot easily be reconciled with modern constitutional law”. Instead, it is subject to a number of exceptions and s. 52(1) must be read “in light of all constitutional principles”. In Albashir, my colleague Karakatsanis J. explained that declarations of unconstitutionality are generally retrospective, consistent with the notion that a law is unconstitutional from its enactment. However, other constitutional principles may require a purely prospective declaration of unconstitutionality or a suspended declaration. Similarly, the legal effect of a s. 52(1) declaration by a superior court must be defined with reference to constitutional supremacy, the rule of law, and federalism. I'll say this one more way: while it's true that some laws were immediately inconsistent with the Charter, s. 52(1) did not have any observable effect until a court declared such laws to be invalid. | Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so. | Is it possible for a witness to backtrack and claim that their previous statements were wrong because they misremembered? ... Is the witness now allowed to say something along the lines: "Huh. That's odd. I clearly remember it differently. But it's such a small detail and it was so long ago..."? Yes. Or is it now considered a deliberate lie? A judge's assessment of a witness's credibility and reliability is much more nuanced. See "How is a judge to evaluate a witness's credibility?" | The Constitution does not state your opinion of SCOTUS's job, instead it just says that there shall be one supreme court with judicial power, and it says what kind of cases are within the jurisdiction of that court. Thus The Constitution does not mandate whether rulings will adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis, will be based only on a narrowly literal interpretation of The Constitution, or will be based on a general sense of justice. The Constitution also does not say anything about the rules of that Supreme Court, therefore the court is free to set its own rules, and to allow or to not allow amicus briefs. Many points raised in amicus briefs fall on deaf ears, sometimes because they are based on non-shared legal assumptions. You can read a very brief summary of the over 140 amicus briefs in this case here. If you read various SCOTUS opinions over the past 225+ years, you will see that the court does make reference to fact, not just statements of the law and constitution. This brings it well within the scope of "potentially relevant" to determine some fact. The lawyers get to argue how facts relate to legal conclusions, but the basic fodder for any legal decision is some set of facts. The specific briefs you mentioned are: Pro-Life Obstetricians and College of Obstetricians. The latter's argument is self-summarized as Amici’s position is that laws regulating abortion should be evidence-based, supported by a valid medical or scientific justification, and designed to improve—not harm—women’s health Pro-Life Obsetricians' position is self-summarized as support for a law that rationally furthers Mississippi’s interest in protecting women’s health from risks posed by later- term abortions, which are now well established in the literature These statements refer to interpretive doctrines previously established by SCOTUS, but not literally expressed in The Constitution. In US v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 introduced concepts of constitutionality (not literally stated in The Constitution) whereby cases could be reviewed either with "strict scrutiny" for protection of Constitutional rights or else discernment of a "rational interest" in government taking a certain action. Either of these kinds of judicial review require a comparison of law to "the facts". Hence "the facts" can be legally relevant. | The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies only in criminal trials, but it permits a witness to refuse to answer a question in either criminal or civil cases, including in a deposition. If he had committed crimes or thought that his answers might have incriminated him, he should have declined to answer. I'm not terribly familiar with this case, but it occurs to me that a lot of the allegations against Cosby go pretty far back; it could be that he was talking about something so far back that he wasn't exposed to any criminal liability. In a case like that, it may even be that a judge had already ordered him to answer the question. Assuming that he voluntarily answered the question, he has waived his right against self-incrimination and the testimony is generally admissible. |
Is there a term for a contract where the parties make identical commitments? Most contracts involve one person promising one thing and another person promising another thing. For example, in a tennancy agreement the landlord's obligations to the tenant are different from the tenant's obligations to the landlord. Historically, marriage has been viewed in a similar way. The obligations of the husband to the wife are not the same as the obligations of the wife to the husband. The vows made by the husband differ from those made by the wife. In the traditional English marriage service (Book of Common Prayer) the groom's promise is to love, comfort, honour and keep the bride, whereas she promises to obey, serve, love, honour and keep him. There is also an explanation of the differing duties. More recently marriage has been thought of as a relationship in which the duties of husband to wife are identical to the duties of wife to husband. In the modern alternative Church of England marriage service each promises to love, comfort, honour and protect the other. There is no difference. Is there a legal term or phrase for a contract where the commitments of each party are identical, as opposed to being different. I am not looking for a word like "equal" implying the status of the parties, or "symmetrical" implying, I gather, their relative bargaining strength. I hope for a word or term that means the commitments are identical. | One would often talk about "reciprocal" obligations. In law, a reciprocal obligation, also known as a reciprocal agreement is a duty owed by one individual to another and vice versa. It is a type of agreement that bears upon or binds two parties in an equal manner. (Wikipedia Source). | My rules of agreement making First rule of making agreements: the less trust there is in the relationship the more detail needs to be in the agreement. Second rule of making agreements: enforcing an agreement on a recalcitrant participant when simple negotiation is ineffective is rarely worth the cost and aggravation. Third rule of making agreements: Consequences for failing to comply should be spelled out in the agreement. The "or else ..." clauses all need to be detailed. Otherwise you are going to court to find out what happens. Forth rule of making agreements: Long term agreements need to be changeable and flexible. This conflicts with rules one and three - no one said this was easy. Your examples both parents shall maintain adequate housing with a separate room for each child. ... and if they can't because they lose their job? .. and what is "adequate" anyway? parents shall maintain civil relationship if both are attending the same event Good luck - by definition people with an acrimonious relationship will have difficulty being civil. neither parent will move more than 15 miles from current locations This would be a void clause - no one can tell you where you can and can't live. neither parent will have a non-blood relative member of the opposite sex spend the night while the child is present. This would also be a void clause - no one can tell you who you can and can't have as a house guest. TL;DR Your relationship with your spouse is over - get used to the fact that you will have no control on what they do and who they do it with. With that as a starting point you need to sit down like grown-ups and work out what is best for your children that fits with each of your lifestyle choices and you will need to do this again and again until the children are old enough to make their own decisions. A lawyer can't really help you with this. Edit A comment suggested that the examples were not untenable. For clarity - they are not untenable; they are unenforceable. People are free to agree to anything they want, even illegal things, and they can follow that agreement as long as they want, however, if they don't follow it and the other party turns to the courts, if the terms of the agreement are illegal then the court will not enforce them. A further comment asked for an illustration of my "third rule": neither parent will move more than 15 miles from current locations without providing at least 3 months notice. During the notice period the parents will meet and attempt to agree on revised custody arrangements. Should agreement not be possible or the notice period not be met then the revised arrangements shall be X, Y & Z. | The earliest mention of the principle that I can find is in Rolston v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [1975] NI 195, where the matter of compensation for the widow of a police officer murdered in Northern Ireland arose. I am sure there are earlier cases that express the same principle in different terms, however. It is a broad principle that applies to most areas of civil law, and I cannot find an original source for it. I imagine that it is simply "received wisdom" that has been repeated long enough to become a cornerstone of the law of restitution in England and Wales. There is currently no statutory basis for the principle so I cannot cite any relevant Acts of Parliament either. | The site that you provide is explaining basics of contract law, and that quote attempts to explicate (and they refer to) the Latin maxim consensus ad idem, generally explained in modern language as "meeting of the minds". Here is a brief overview of that legal concept. The basis idea is that the parties are talking about the same thing. An example of a lack of meeting of the minds is here, where a complainant agreed to withdraw a complaint in exchange for a service pin plus "any/all straight time compensation" lost. It was later established that the complainant believed that this included time off from work on sick leave, but the agency held that this had already been compensated – thus the parties did not agree to what was "compensation lost". The "agreement" was thus found to be void, because the parties did not in fact agree on the meaning of the terms. Your purported example would not indicate a lack of meeting of the minds, though it might indicate fraud. A lack of meeting of the minds could arise if the seller intended objects A, C to be items on offer but the buyer believed objects A, B, D to be the offer. It should be noted that the law does not let a person get out of a contract simply by declaring "I thought that...", the courts will look at the objective evidence as to what the parties did believe. | Common Law Contracts Contracts do not have to be signed. They do not even have to be written down. In fact, the overwhelming majority of contracts entered into are not written – when did you last sign a contract to buy a cup of coffee? See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? A contract is an enforceable agreement. It exists from the moment that agreement was reached irrespective of who signed what. Putting a signature on a contract is evidence of the contract: it is not the contract. Real Estate Having said this, real estate law is an area where legislators can't leave the common law alone and is generally subject to specific regulation. For example, it is quite common that real estate contracts must be in writing and are unenforceable if they are not. However, while the contract may not be enforceable, the promise might be. Promissory Estoppel The common law as we know it today is actually derived from two different stands of English law: the actual common law as decided by the magistrates, and equity law as decided by the King/Queen in the courts of Chancellery. In the absence of a contract there is nothing the common law can enforce. However, principles of equity law are grounded in notions of fairness (or equity – see how that works?). If I were to make a promise to you (that was not a contract) and you took action on the strength of my promise that would be to your detriment and I knew you were doing that: promissory estoppel would prevent me from breaking my promise or allow you to recover damages (more or less – in practice a promissory estoppel suit is usually an act of desperation). Your lease When was the contract formed? If the agreement had been reached and the written lease simply documented that agreement without adding anything new, then the contract is already on foot and both Aaron and Bob are bound. If agreement has not been reached or there were additional terms in the document (which there almost certainly would be) then by putting forward the document Aaron is making an offer to Bob. By extending the offer, Aaron knows that he cannot lease the premises to someone else until the offer has been rejected or he withdraws the offer: this is true irrespective of whether Aaron has signed or not. If Bob accepts that offer without changing it, then the contract exists from the moment of Bob's acceptance irrespective of whether he has signed. If Bob makes changes (other than inconsequential ones) then he has made a counteroffer: the ball is now in Aaron's court and the original offer is dead. Promissory estoppel can arise if, for example, the negotiations ends with Bob saying, "I'm looking at several places but yours would be the one I want if you were to change the carpets," Aaron send Bob carpet samples, Bob picks one, Aaron makes the change, and Bob then walks away. | The only one I can find so far relates to a Brazilian citizen getting married abroad, called a: Consular Declaration of Civil Status These are issued by the Consular Authority to: Brazilian citizens who intend to marry before a foreign authority within their jurisdiction. The document is issued in English. Source: gov.br (I have yet to find if a comparable certificate is available in-country, for marriage or otherwise, but none of the official guidance sites I have trawled though mention it) | Where the primary part of two acts in the same year would be the same, commonly a secondary phrase is added in brackets indicating the narrow subject of the act to avoid this happening. For example, the Supply and Appropriation (Anticipation and Adjustments) Act 2016 was followed later in the year by the Supply and Appropriation (Main Estimates) Act 2016. However, where such a secondary phrase would be inappropriate, especially where the later act replaces the earlier act, the main part of the short title of the second act is appended with "(No. 2)". One such example occurred in 2009, where the Appropriation Act 2009 was replaced by the Appropriation Act (No. 2) 2009. So in your hypothetical case, the later act would likely have "Parliament Act (No. 2) 1911" as its short title. I should note though that this is governed by custom, so there is no guarantee that a particular act must follow this approach. | The court said in Obergefell (emphasis mine): Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right. If same-sex couples are to be given in marriage the "same legal treatment" as opposite-sex couples, the divorce process must also be the same. |
Not guilty defense nomenclature A Deputy fired after putting knee on Black man's neck.. The news article reports: A relative of the man was arrested when she tried to intervene, according to the news report. Let us assume that kneeling on the neck is criminal: In the unlikely event that state prosecutes said relative, what principle / defense would her counsel engage to support a plea of not guilty? | Most people would refer to this as "defense of others." In North Carolina, though, the relevant statute, G.S. 14-51.3, formally refers to this as "Use of force in defense of person." The statute allows a defense against criminal and civil liability for non-deadly force used "against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other's imminent use of unlawful force." Note, however, that the statute does not allow you to invoke the defense when the victim "is a law enforcement officer ... was lawfully acting in the performance of his or her official duties and ... identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law." This raises the question of whether the officer in this case was "lawfully acting in the performance of his official duties" when the relative intervened. If he was, the defense would likely be unavailable. | england-and-wales Alice's defence will be that she had an honest belief, given the circumstances, that force was necessary and the force she used was reasonable in defence of John (and possibly Alice). John's consent is irrelevant unless it had some bearing on that. Why did John oppose the use of force? Did John tell Alice not to shoot because he would rather die than cause a death? Irrelevant. Did John tell Alice not to shoot because he believed Bob was not a real threat due to circumstances X, Y and/or Z that he wanted Alice to heed? Relevant. | Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals. | Federal Civil Rights Liability Qualified immunity is a doctrine that applies to lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking compensation for an intentional violation of constitutional rights under color of state law. The qualified immunity inquiry is not reached in the first place if the prima facie case is not established because the conduct allegedly violating a constitutional right under color of state law, even if it is a well established constitutional right (i.e. one memorialized in a reported and controlling appellate court decision that is factually similar), if the action was merely negligent rather than intentional. Thus, most likely, there is no federal civil remedy to the victim, unless even the use of the taser would have been a violation of a well established constitutional right under color of state law. Non-deadly force, like a taser, is subject to a lower threshold of justification than deadly force, like a firearm. Of course, under general Fourth Amendment principles applicable to the states, an attempted arrest which appears to be what the OP describes, must be supported by probable cause that a crime was committed for which an arrest would be authorized. So, if this is the violation of rights alleged, there may be a federal civil rights remedy. But, further examination of the facts show that there was apparently a warrant for the arrest of the person shot outstanding. So the officer probably has a legal basis to use non-deadly force to make an arrest pursuant to the outstanding warrant, but probably did not have a legal basis to use deadly force to make an arrest. Federal Criminal Liability The most common charge under federal criminal law for excessive use of force by a police officer, is a criminal violation of civil rights. But this, like the civil remedy, requires a showing of an intentional violation of civil rights which the OP tends to suggest is absent unless the officer lacked probable cause to make an arrest. State Law Civil Liability At the state level, law enforcement officers acting under color of state law are immune from civil liability except as authorized by state law in an exception to sovereign immunity. Generally, there is no exception to sovereign immunity for a negligent use of force by a police officer. So, the police officer probably can't be sued successfully by the victim's estate under state law. State Criminal Law Considerations For criminal law purposes, whether or not the law enforcement officer's actions were a crime under state law would dependent upon both the elements of the offense: probably manslaughter or negligent homicide in this case, and the scope of force authorized under state law in the case of a law enforcement officer seeking to arrest a fleeing suspect. Usually, under state law, the use of reasonable force to make an arrest supported by probable cause is allowed and the use of deadly force to make an arrest support by probable cause is allowed only if there is a threat to the public based upon probable cause to believe that a particularly serious violent felony was committed. Qualified immunity is not applicable to state criminal law liability, although express statutory defenses in a state criminal statute might be similar in some cases. Caveat Of course, all of that analysis assumes that the story of the officer's motive and intentions was truthful. There is very good reason to be skeptical of this fact and to believe that the use of a firearm was not a negligent mistake, and that race was a motivating factor. Simply saying that one's motives were good is not a free pass and a jury doesn't have to believe the law enforcement officer. | Murder Which is the unlawful taking of a life with intent to do so. However, the doctrine of self-defence can make killing lawful: A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. if the prosecutor is of the opinion that the force used "is reasonable in the circumstances" they may not lay charges. If they do lay charges the judge may decide that there is no case to answer before going to trial if self-defence applies. If there is a trial this will probably be the strategy the defence employs and they may or may not be successful. If convicted the penalty is life imprisonment. Also, there is no UK law: there is the law of England and Wales, the law of Scotland and the law of Northern Ireland. | A not guilty plea is not part of the case of a defendant or a defense attorney. A "case" refers to evidence and argument made at trial (or conceivably in a pre-trial hearing). The rule in question specifically contemplates a defense attorney entering a not guilty plea for a client who has confessed to the lawyer that the client is guilty of the crime (emphasis added). If at any time before or during a defended trial a client makes a clear confession of guilt to his or her defence lawyer, the lawyer may continue to act only if the plea is changed to guilty OR the lawyer— (a) does not put forward a case inconsistent with the confession; and (b) continues to put the prosecution to proof and, if appropriate, asserts that the prosecution evidence is inadequate to justify a verdict of guilty; and (c) does not raise any matter that suggests the client has an affirmative defence such as an alibi, but may proceed with a defence based on a special case such as insanity, if such a course appears in the lawyer’s professional opinion to be available. The attorney can argue that the defendant should be released from custody prior to trial, and over what terms of pre-trial release are appropriate. The attorney can advise the client not to do anything else that would make it easier for the prosecution to prove the client committed the crime (e.g. advising the client not to brag about having committed the crime on social media). The attorney can advise the client on how to behave in the courtroom so as to avoid contempt of court sanctions, and how to dress and behave appropriately and in a manner that the court will find to be sympathetic (e.g. wearing a suit to court, acting respectfully, not speaking ill of the victim). There are a variety of defenses not inconsistent with guilt that are available: One can argue that the statute of limitations has run. One can argue that the court that the case is being tried before does not have jurisdiction over the offense. One can argue that the crime was committed prior to the effective date of the law, or after it was repealed (if relevant). One can argue that the law in invalid under human rights treaties or similar grounds for invalidity. One can argue that the defendant has immunity from prosecution (e.g. due to diplomatic immunity, or because the defendant was acting pursuant to lawful military or court orders, or because of an agreement reached with a prosecutor previously perhaps in exchange for testimony in another case, or because the defendant acted based upon assurances from an authority upon whom he was entitled to rely that his actions would not be punished) One can argue that evidence is inadmissible for some legally recognized reason (e.g. lack of authentication or doctor-patient privilege or a marital privilege). One can argue that the facts presented by the prosecution don't establish the elements of the crime charged (e.g. no evidence has been presented that permission to use the property was not granted in a trespass case). One can argue that the facts presented don't establish the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt even if some evidence is presented (but subject to limitations on what kinds of doubts may be suggested). One can make an insanity defense, or a lack of capacity to commit a crime defense. One can argue that a justification (e.g. self-defense) excuses the crime. In the U.S., an attorney could implicitly or even expressly make a jury nullification argument, but I do not know if this would be permitted in New Zealand or not. But one cannot argue, for example, that a different individual than your client committed the crime, or that the crime didn't happen at all. This ethical limitation, by the way, is much more restrictive than the limitation under U.S. law, which prohibits an attorney from introducing evidence or testimony known to be false or fraudulent, but does not generally prohibit making arguments based upon possible inferences from the true facts that the attorney knows to be false inferences (i.e. the facts are true, but the conclusions that the lawyer asks the court to draw from the facts are not consistent with what really happened). For example, a U.S. attorney could argue in a case with several co-defendants, that the victim might have been assaulted by one of the co-defendants rather than his client, based upon the evidence available, while a New Zealand attorney whose client had confessed to having assaulted the victim, couldn't ethically make that argument. A defense lawyer in either the U.S. or New Zealand could find a forensic science article showing that the technique used to link the bullet to the gun by police investigators is unreliable and use it to cross-examine a prosecution forensic expert. But, a New Zealand lawyer, unlike a U.S. lawyer, could probably not argue that there is alibi evidence putting your client on the other side of town at the time that the coroner erroneously believes the time of death to have occurred. Of course, any counsel or advocacy provided by defense counsel in connection with a sentencing phase of the proceeding would also not be inconsistent with this ethical rule and, in practice, much of the value that a defense attorney adds to the process for a defendant comes at that stage of the case. | So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense. | To provide an initial answer, without getting to the specific of the 51 statutory standards for self-defense in U.S. states and the exact Canadian standard, as applied to your examples, I'll make some general observations: Self-defense is a justification for doing something that would otherwise be illegal (intentionally using force against someone else). Self-defense justifications include a sense of proportionality. It isn't proper to use more force than is reasonably necessary to achieve the defensive objective. There are basically two levels of self-defensive force: Deadly Force and Non-Deadly Force. Preventing some crimes and harms is statutorily justified to do using deadly force (e.g. to prevent a murder). To prevent other crimes and harms statutes only justify the use of non-deadly force (e.g. to prevent shoplifting). The exact list of crimes in each category varies somewhat. Historically, for example, there have been some U.S. states that have authorized the use of deadly force to prevent a rape that does not put the life of the victim at risk, and others that have not authorized the use of deadly force for that purpose (I don't know if that is still the case). Typically, law enforcement officers are also authorized to use deadly force in some circumstances in which a non-deputized civilian could not. As a practical matter, a use of force that causes death is presumptively considered to be deadly force, even if the means used are not inherently deadly in all circumstances. Meanwhile, a use of force involving the use of a "deadly weapon" such as a firearm, is presumptively considered to be deadly force, even if it doesn't actually kill someone. But both of these "presumptions" (and I am using that term loosely in this answer, rather than with its precise legal meaning), can be overcome with relevant evidence. Mildly shoving someone with hemophilia (or tossing a dish full of peanuts in the face of someone with a severe peanut allergy), without knowing that this person suffers from this condition, is not a use of deadly force within the meaning of laws justifying self-defense, even if it actually ends up causing their death. Similarly, proving that you intended to and did, shoot out the tires of someone's car, or shot their foot, instead of shooting to kill, would not always constitute a use of deadly force for purposes of statutes justifying the use of force in self-defense. Getting to the specifics of the question, the majority rule would be that the use of deadly force is justified in most circumstances to prevent a home invasion burglar from harming you or other people in the residence, and to repel the home invasion burglar from the residence, although some jurisdictions would qualify this in one respect or another. The case that the use of deadly force is justified would be stronger if the home invasion burglar was armed than if he was not, and would be stronger if the homeowner was not physically competent enough to be confident of an ability to dispatch the invader in a non-deadly manner. If deadly force was justified in that circumstance, it wouldn't really matter how you killed him, nor would it matter that you intended to kill him to defense your home and the people in your home. If the law only authorized the use of non-deadly force in the circumstances, for example, because the burglar had seized an envelope full of cash and was fleeing the house, so you were really only using force to protect your property, rather than to protect your home or the safety of the people in it, at that point, then the analysis would get tougher. If you intended to kill the fleeing thief in circumstances when only non-deadly force was authorized, the weapon you used wouldn't matter. You intended to use deadly force, the force you used caused the intended death, and you did those things even though the law didn't authorize you to do so in those circumstances. If you didn't intend to kill the fleeing thief in circumstances when only non-deadly force was authorized, but you ended up killing him anyway (so that you didn't have a prohibited intent behind your actions), then the question would be whether your intent and belief that your actions would not kill him was reasonable under the circumstances. If you caused his death with your bare hands, or with a less lethal weapon (in truth, there is no such thing as a non-lethal weapon), your belief that the thief wouldn't die from your use of force would be more likely to be seen as reasonable. If you caused his death with a lethal weapon, your belief that the thief wouldn't die from your use of force would be less likely to be seen as reasonable. If the jury (or a judge in bench trial) didn't believe you were reasonable in your use of force which you didn't intend to be deadly, then the jury (or judge as the case might be) would not allow a self-defense argument to prevent them from convicting you of some kind of homicide crime. So you would probably be convicted of some form of homicide (perhaps heat of passion manslaughter), although you might still not have the requisite intent for first degree murder in circumstances like that (so that your self-defense argument might end up providing you with an incomplete defense). |
Why was a dead body found in the back yard not enough evidence to hold Dorothea Puente? In the case of Dorothea Puente, who murdered at least 7 people that were tenants at her house so she could continue collecting their social security benefits, why was the discovery of a dead body buried in her backyard not enough to arrest or detain her? Alerted by the social worker, a detective went to her house to search for a missing person. After getting permission, the detective started digging in the backyard and found human remains. He calls in other police and they begin digging as well. In this NYPost Article, it says Dorothea Puente was allowed to go meet her nephew for coffee down the street because they had no evidence to hold her. They had already found 1 dead body in her backyard. Due to there being no evidence to link her to the body, she was allowed to leave – but managed to flee all the way to Los Angeles, where she was found five days later when a man in a bar recognized her from TV. She was on parole at the time the detectives found the dead body. Why was a dead body insufficient evidence to arrest or hold her and what evidence would have allowed them to arrest her after finding the body? EDIT The question is why is a dead body not sufficient evidence and what would have to change to make it sufficient? For example, would a bloody shovel be enough (no bloody shovel was found)? Would finding a missing person's ID be sufficient? | A dead body alone does not tell who did it A cop can only arrest someone if it is clear that they either committed a criminal act the cop witnessed or for which there is clear and compelling evidence or if they have a warrant. Finding a dead body on someone's land does on itself not give enough clear and convincing evidence to tell who did it. It might have been the old lady, it might have been the previous owner, someone random on the street or even a tenant who placed the corpse there. It needs further evidence for the warrant, for example, "We found the body and the coroner says, the corpse is a year old and the owner was the only person that had access to the backyard in the last year." | Yes, but that doesn't make the theft not theft At the time of the crime, Joe committed theft. The state can prosecute Joe for that theft. Alice's subsequent gift does not change this although it would prevent her from suing for recovery. As a practical matter, if Alice was willing to lie and say that the gift preceded the theft or she had given permission for the item to be taken, this would almost surely create reasonable doubt in any prosecution. However, on a pure "these are the facts" basis, the theft is a theft. | Not all illegal things are crimes. Lack of evidence. They are asked to testify, and they say "what I said in my book was a lie". There is no general law against lying, except when under oath. Statute of limitations. Saying "10 years ago I did smoke drugs" means that any offence is no longer prosecutable. Lack of details. Which jurisdiction were they in? When did they commit the act, how many acts? You cannot be arrested for being a "bank robber" or a "murderer". You are charged with "robbing Bank X on 123 Fake Street the Thursday 25 April 2018" or "murdering Jim Thio in January 2017". Otherwise the defendant would have a hard time defending himself (how to prove that you have not killed anyone at any time?) All of the above combined with prosecutorial discretion in the form that any possible prosecutor will most likely determine that bringing charges would be just a waste of time and resources. UPDATE February 2018: Just for the sake of completeness, a reference to the situation of Jacques Cassandri, who did boast about a serious crime(a robbery in a Societe Generale vault in 1976) in a book. Unfortunately for him, he made some kind of mistake/miscalculation and the crime had not yet expired, so he has become an example of someone being prosecuted by confessing a crime in a book. | Police can get a warrant, if the warrant is supported by "probable cause" to believe that evidence of a crime exists. A separate "probable cause" requirement is that to arrest a person, there must be "probable cause" that they committed a crime. However, the Privacy Protection Act makes it unlawful to search "work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication", unless there is probable cause that the person committed the crime in question. There are similar laws ("shield laws") at the state level. Here is a map which gives you an indication what immunities exist in what states. | This appears to be covered by the Norway Criminal Procedures Code, of which an English version can be found here. Chapter 10 deals with witnesses. Here are some relevant sections: § 108. Unless otherwise provided by statute, every person summoned to attend as a witness is bound to do so and to give evidence before the court. There follow a number of exceptions (spousal privilege, attorney-client privilege, state secrets, etc). None of them seem to apply to your example. § 115. The court may decide that a witness who fails to attend or who leaves the place of sitting without a valid reason shall be brought before the same or a subsequent sitting of the court. In special cases the court may decide that a witness shall be detained in custody until he can be examined. § 128. Before the examination the president of the court shall admonish the witnesses to tell the whole truth without concealing anything. He shall inform the witnesses of the liability consequent on giving false evidence or making a false affirmation. § 137. If a witness refuses to give evidence after being ordered to do so by a legally enforceable court order, the court may by a new order decide that the witness shall be kept in custody until he fulfils his obligation. Nevertheless a witness may not be kept in custody for more than three months altogether in the same case or in another case relating to the same matter. So effectively, if the witness fails to show up voluntarily, he can be brought in forcibly. He can be ordered to testify, and if he refuses, he can be held in custody (probably a jail) for up to three months. However, the authority to compel testimony is limited to courts; the police cannot compel statements from witnesses. § 230. The police may take statements from suspected persons, witnesses and experts but may not order any person to make a statement. So in your example, it appears that the witnesses would be free to refuse to speak to the police. However, if the case came to trial, they could be ordered to testify, and could be held in custody if they refused. | The legal standard for an indictment is "probable cause". This is the same as the standard for an arrest, an arrest warrant, a wiretap, or a search warrant. A conviction, of course, is subject to the much more demanding, proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Access logs along could provide probable cause for an indictment, even though they would probably not, standing alone, constitute sufficient evidence to convict. Also, the existence of the search warrant shows that a judge already found that there was probable cause that a crime was committed before the access logs were even reviewed, so there has to be some other evidence beyond the access logs out there and the access logs are corroborating the probable cause that was already found to exist against someone. It bears noting that federal grand juries almost without fail indict, although in some local state court systems, especially in rural areas (mostly in the Southeast U.S. since the West rarely uses grand juries and the North has higher standards of professionalism, especially in urban areas), where the quality of the law enforcement and prosecutorial work is lower, near automatic indictments are not a reality. | All Four of them! Double Jeopardy is not in play if a jurisdiction can lay claim to your criminal action, so if you stand on the Four Corners and shoot a man in any of the four states, each state has a right to charge murder. In addition, the Federal Government can have a go at you because you crossed state lines while in comission of a crime. Plus the Navajo Nation, which controls the reservation land the border is on. So that six separate charges. That said, the state the dead body occupied at time of Murder would have the best case for action and the other three would likely let that state try you first. The Feds would only step in if each of the four states failed to convict, though they can step in whenever they want (they are just watching to see if you'll serve time first). Not sure at which point Tribal jurisdiction applies, but given that this is a fairly common Jurisdiction issue, I'm sure it's been worked out. | Assuming that the above can be established by admissible evidence, that sounds like a case for first degree murder, and probably various other crimes as well. In some jurisdictions there is a specific crime of "Murder for hire" which might also apply if available on the jurisdiction where this occurred. A comment mentions a possible insanity defense. That is going to depend on detailed facts not included in the question, but might be possible. |
Does International Law only apply to countries that ratify treaties and accept the law? As far as I understand there are certain laws that compose a body of law called International Law. These laws arise from treaties and political bodies. To provide an answer on this network aside from other controversial questions of politics and law when people make statements like the following, And of course, there is no such thing as a "banned weapon". There are treaties that state signatory states aren't supposed to use certain weapons, but those are only valid if the country is a signatory and has ratified that treaty. – jwenting And this, Has Israel ratified any treaties which ban the use of DIME, AP bombs or WP? If not, then there's no "international law" for them to follow. BOTTOM LINE: the term "international law" is highly misleading. [...] - RonJohn And this, Well, you keep using the phrase international law, like it's a thing. If it's not the UN, then it is de-facto some random group of countries, and if Israel isn't a party to that group, it doesn't apply. If the UN (or some UN org) has actually made a law which is supposed to apply to all member nations outlawing DIME, AP and WP, then maybe Israel is beholden to follow it. My suspicion is there are no such "international laws". – CGCampbell Is specifically the part in bold correct or not? It is my understanding that those that ratify these treaties do not merely accept them on behalf of themselves, but accept the responsibility to impose the law against others regardless of acceptance. Would someone that has not ratified the Geneva Convention be immune to charges that the convention describes? | Law, as such, is not a moral or a philosophical construct. It can be based on moral constructs and often it is. And, of course, the process of writing laws is often informed by philosophy. But law as such is neither one of those. Law is a set of behaviors which are known to be acceptable to the powers "that be." This maybe an unsettling idea. But it is true nonetheless. The phrase that summarizes this is "any law is only as good as its enforcement mechanism." What makes it seem untrue is that in the modern tradition laws are written down. And, when there is a need to resolve doubt as to whether something is illegal or not, they are carefully considered through a deductive process. Within countries, there is little question who "the powers that be" happen to be. But when it comes to laws governing actions between nations, it is more complicated. Yes, treaties make it clear, ahead of time, what types of expectations exist. Predictability (even in war) allows for long-term planning. And even laws of war are usually followed because wars are fought with the expectation that at some point they will end. And predictability allows to set end-goal conditions. Notably, entities which have no clear end-goals in sight are the ones least likely to follow any laws. The idea of any group of countries sitting in court of another group of countries is mostly a political theater. There is no possibility of predictable outcomes from entities which have not made commitments to those outcomes. So whether some countries have to follow "laws" set out for them by other countries (or non-government entities) is largely a result of those countries or entities being in positions of power to dictate their will. This is not the same as international laws being strictly de facto. Agreed-upon restrictions and restrictions which have been dictated from the top-down, by those with more power, are de jure because they create predictable boundaries on behavior. De facto restrictions are the ones which have come to be the case without any prior agreement or fiat. | Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged. | The U.S. law rule is that treaties and laws are co-equal and that one does not supersede the other. In the U.S., the rule is that the last passed law or treaty prevails, over earlier passed laws or treaties if they conflict. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, "Treaties as laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes" 80 Indiana Law Journal 319 (2005) citing cases including Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). But, this is not self-evident, Indeed, it is a minority rule of law to the point of pretty much being an outlier. In the vast majority of countries other than the U.S., domestic laws are subordinate to treaties, and there is some hint in the structure of the U.S. Constitution and the discussions of the Founders regarding the treaty power, that this how the Founders assumed that conflicts between treaties and domestic statutes would be interpreted, even though the U.S. Supreme Court ended up interpreting the constitution differently. Few countries in the world give so little legal effect to international treaties and international law, more generally, as the U.S. does. In contrast, in Europe, many human rights protections arise from international treaty obligations that override domestic laws, rather than from their own domestic constitutional law. Also, while this rule seems simple and mechanical, it rarely presents in the fashion, because there are a variety of tools, such as interpreting treaties and statutes in a manner that avoids a conflict (particularly with respect to questions such as whether a treaty should be considered "self-executing" or not, and a rule of construction that one enactment that does not expressly overrule another should not be deemed to do so implicitly unless there is no interpretation that can resolve the conflict otherwise), that muddy the waters. As Ku, explains in the law review article linked above: Although the Constitution declares that treaties are the "supreme Law of the Land,"the status of treaties in the American legal system is plagued by uncertainty. A court considering a private individual's claim under a treaty must first consider a number of complex questions such as whether the treaty is "self-executing," whether the treaty's effect is otherwise nullified by conditions placed on it during ratification, whether the treaty exceeds constitutional limitations on the exercise of the treaty power, and whether the treaty conflicts with inconsistent federal and state law.... For instance, in recent years the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has twice found that U.S. domestic law limiting habeas corpus appeals violated U.S. treaty obligations to guarantee consular notification rights to foreign nationals charged with capital crimes.' The ICJ found a conflict between the treaty and U.S. law even though the U.S. government offered a plausible alternative interpretation of the treaty that avoided conflict with domestic law. (Despite these findings, the U.S. did not enforce the alleged treaty obligation.) A good example of this is the case of Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. ___ (2014) (note that it is important to provide a year when discussing the Bond case, because the U.S. Supreme Court made two successive rulings in this case and also established an important precedent in an unrelated case with the same name). Wikipedia's summary of the case explains how the case avoided having to resolve constitutional issues in the case (references to Holland are to State of Missouri v. Holland, linked and discussed below): Carol Anne Bond is a microbiologist from Lansdale, Pennsylvania. In 2006, her best friend became pregnant. When Bond discovered that her husband was the child's father, she attempted to poison her former friend by putting organoarsenic and potassium dichromate on the woman's door knob. Bond was caught, and was convicted under the Chemical Weapons Act. In her appeal, she argued that applying the chemical weapons treaty to her had violated the Tenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals ruled that Bond lacked standing to make a Tenth Amendment claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed by stating that individuals can bring Tenth Amendment claims. The Court then remanded the case for the Third Circuit to decide the case on the merits. On remand, the Third Circuit found that "because the Convention is an international agreement with a subject matter that lies at the core of the Treaty Power and because Holland instructs that 'there can be no dispute about the validity of [a] statute' that implements a valid treaty, we will affirm Bond's conviction." Bond again appealed to the Supreme Court, asking the court to overrule Holland or to find that her actions were not covered by the CWA. The case attracted a great deal of attention, with US Solicitor General Donald Verrilli arguing for the government and former Solicitor General Paul Clement arguing for Bond. Senator Ted Cruz wrote an essay for the blog of the Harvard Law Review, urging the Court to overturn Bond's conviction. Chief Justice Roberts opened his opinion by vividly describing John Singer Sargent's life-sized painting of mustard gas victims. Roberts closed by noting, "There are no life-sized paintings of Bond's rival washing her thumb." In its judgment, the Court unanimously concluded that the convention was not meant to cover local activities such as Bond's poisoning attempt. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts declined to define the scope of Treaty Clause powers, invoking constitutional avoidance. Because the Chemical Weapons Convention is not self-executing and because it requires implementation by a signatory to be "in accordance with its constitutional processes," Roberts focused his attention on statutory interpretation of the federal criminal code. According to Roberts, one of the key "background principles of construction" is federalism; there must be a "clear indication" by Congress if it intends to "dramatically intrude upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction." The Court concluded that there was no such clear indication in the text of the criminal statute. Roberts rejected the Solicitor General's interpretation of the statute, noting that the government's reading would make it a federal offense to poison children's goldfish and that state authorities are fully capable of punishing burrito poisoners. Finally, Roberts briefly responds to Justice Scalia's interpretation by noting that adopting "the most sweeping reading of the statute would fundamentally upset the Constitution's balance." A well-known line from his opinion is at the end: "The global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard, or to treat a local assault with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon." Thus, rather than ruling that a law implementing a valid treaty was unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the law implementing the treaty in a manner that did not mean something that would potentially make the law unconstitutional. The question states: Obviously, the Constitution supersedes both laws and treaties This is mostly correct under U.S. law (although it took many decades before that rule was established in precedent), but it was not obvious under U.S. law, it is not true in every country, and it is not entirely settled law in the U.S. even today. A plurality of the justices Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), which enforced the Fifth and Sixth Amendments against a contradictory treaty, stated: There is nothing in this language which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. A plurality decision, however, is not controlling authority that must be followed by lower courts. But, in State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) had previously reached an arguably contrary conclusion. The official syllabus to that decision noted that: Protection of its quasi-sovereign right to regulate the taking of game is a sufficient jurisdictional basis, apart from any pecuniary interest, for a bill by a State to enjoin enforcement of federal regulations over the subject alleged to be unconstitutional. The Treaty of August 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, with Great Britain, providing for the protection, by close seasons and in other ways, of migratory birds in the United States and Canada, and binding each power to take and propose to their lawmaking bodies the necessary measures for carrying it out, is within the treaty-making power conferred by Art. II, § 2, of the Constitution; the Act of July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755, which prohibits the killing, capturing or selling any of the migratory birds included in the terms of the treaty, except as permitted by regulations compatible with those terms to be made by the Secretary of Agriculture, is valid under Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution, as a necessary and proper means of effectuating the treaty, and the treaty and statute, by bringing such birds within the paramount protection and regulation of the Government do not infringe property rights or sovereign powers respecting such birds reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. With respect to right reserved to the State, the treaty-making power is not limited to what may be done by an unaided act of Congress. Many legal scholars expected that Bond (2014) would resolve the tension between Reid and Holland, but instead, the U.S. Supreme Court punted, and declined to reach that issue in that case. Arguably, Reid and Holland are not truly in conflict, because Holland addresses the scope of the treaty power in light of federalism concerns, which isn't necessarily identical to the scope power of Congress to enact domestic laws pursuant to U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8 in light of federalism concerns, while Reid concerns constitutional provisions which have been interpreted to flatly prohibit the government from abridging certain individual rights at all. U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 8 limits the authority of Congress to enact domestic laws to certain enumerated subjects (with all other powers reserved to the states), while the treaty power is not limited to any particular subject-matter (in part, because states are not permitted under the constitution to enter into international treaties, so the federal government needs to handle treaties involving both national and state level concerns, while states have plenary power to enact domestic laws in all circumstances where they are not expressly prohibited from doing so). | US troops deployed to Germany would be covered by the Status of Forces Agreement, which governs jurisdiction. Your question also ignores the nature of the prosecution services in Germany, which do not allow a rogue junior official to file charges at a whim. You would have to assume that at least a state government, if not the federal government, actively pushes the case. (And the federal government could probably take the case away from any state which had such ideas.) If you look for precedents of legal jeopardy, look at the case of Anwar Raslan, a Syrian official convicted of torture in Germany. It is also a closer parallel to the Pinochet case. Finally, the principles underlying such prosecutions were established in Germany but not by Germany. I'm talking of the Nuremberg trials. If German courts were to find the US Army to be a criminal organization, then individual members would be at risk. But as a political scenario, that is absurd. | The main treaty here is the Outer Space Treaty and its implementation in US law. For your purposes, the relevant sections of the treaty are Article II: Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. Article VI: States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities...The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty... and Article VIII: A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such an object, and over any personnel thereof... Article II means that setting up your colony doesn't give you ownership over the land it sits on (and Article XII permits anyone to stop by for a visit at any time), but it doesn't outlaw setting up a permanent base. And I hope your "all the resources" includes a small army of lawyers. Between them, Article VI and Article VIII make the United States government responsible for anything you do in space, so there's a lot of paperwork involved in getting permission to do anything above the Karman line. | The term "enemy" in the U.S. Constitution's definition of treason is generally considered to be a term of art that means a party against whom Congress has authorized the use of military force or a declared war. The only such country in existence at this time, to the best of my knowledge, is North Korea. Terrorist organizations which had affiliated involved in the 9-11 attacks (including ISIS and Boko Haram) are also covered. Russia is not an "enemy" of the United States, within the meaning of the constitutional definition of treason. Neither are any individuals or corporations in Russia, unless they are affiliated with a 9-11 terrorist organization. An important statutory definition of "enemy" might also be considered informative to a court presented with this question, which is slightly broader (as it requires "hostilities" but does not require a full fledged war and does not require Congressional action): According to 50 USCS § 2204 [Title 50. War and National Defense; Chapter 39. Spoils of War], enemy of the United States means any country, government, group, or person that has been engaged in hostilities, whether or not lawfully authorized, with the United States; (3) the term "person" means (A) any natural person; (B) any corporation, partnership, or other legal entity; and (C) any organization, association, or group. In this context, "hostilities" would generally mean physical warfare acts like shooting Americans, or blowing up American property, in a warlike manner. | According to the detractors, the Humans are using the POWs as Human Shields (or Meat Shields), claiming this is no different from placing POWs around a SAM battery emplacement (and that even forcing a captured enemy combatant to open a bio-metric lock is a war crime). Everything I can find talking about Human Shields only talk about civilians and use examples of placing said civilians next to military assets to stop the enemy from attacking the assets. The question in this case is really an unresolved open question. First of all, there is not moral consensus on whether sentient aliens are entitled to "human rights". Secondly, the POWs are not really being used as human shields. There is no contemplation that their presence will prevent the opponents from attacking in order to show mercy on their compatriots. Instead, the POWs are being used to deceive the enemy's automated systems that the attacking force is friendly despite the implausibility of that given their actions. It is really more analogous to forcing a prisoner to write a misleading letter or make a misleading phone call, while under duress. While the use of fraud and deception in warfare may be dishonorable, usually actual war crimes involving POWs entail mistreatment of a POW or putting a POW in harm's way (even if presenting only a risk of death or injury). Also, of course, much of the Geneva Convention's requirements regarding the treatment of POWs is a treaty imposed obligation, binding morally because both combatants at one point consented to it, rather than necessarily being a universal and mandatorily applicable component of customary international law. The fact that the Geneva Convention might be violated in some detail, if true, doesn't automatically make it a war crime in this context. In the same vein, the Geneva Conventions make a distinction between the treatment of uniformed and non-uniformed combatants, but this distinction, established by a treaty agreed to by many nations, is not necessarily inherently relevant to determining if something is a war crime in a war with a non-signatory. It is a provision that relies of cultural meaning that is shared by the treaty signatories, but may not make sense vis-a-vis non-human sentient aliens. In the same vein, one wouldn't think that in a war with intelligent dragons, the fact that the dragons were or were not wearing uniforms, when dragons customarily fight naked, was significant, unless the dragon nation agreed to the Geneva Conventions in a duly ratified treaty. | Not all weapons are protected by the Second Amendment. There is a "dangerous and unusual weapons" exclusionary clause established by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, which excludes pretty much anything that's incredibly dangerous (obviously we wouldn't want our people to have the right to keep bombs in their house) or not considered a normal weapon (encryption/cryptography would probably fall under this). One case currently being considered under this exclusion is the stun gun, which is going to the Supreme Court to determine whether it qualifies as an unusual weapon and whether it is protected by the Second Amendment. |
Accessing public CCTV footage about you Near me there is a private property which has CCTV aimed away from their property and towards public walkways. I walk past these cameras on a daily basis and they're literally inches away from my face. What are the UK rights for accessing all the footage captured of me on these cameras? Also, what happens if the owners reject my request, or lie such as 'these CCTV cameras are not working' despite stationing signs in the area indicating they're in use? | You have a right to access per Art 15 GDPR. You can make a request to the data controller (the person managing those cameras) free of charge. In your request, you should mention the approximate time periods during which you might appear, and you should make it possible to identify you in the footage. How the data controller may respond The data controller has one month to respond. The response should include the following items: the purpose of these cameras the retention period for the footage a reminder that you may have a right to request erasure of your data a reminder that you have a right to lodge a complaint with the ICO a copy of the footage, if any exists If the data controller denies your request, they should describe their reasons for doing so. Here, they could at most argue that your request was excessively broad (cf. Art 12(5) GDPR). In principle, they could also argue that your right to access is restricted by an exemption in Schedule 1 Part 2 of the Data Protection Act 2018, however none of those will fit. The data controller cannot deny your request with the argument that the CCTV surveillance is a “purely personal or household activity” (Art 2(2)(c) GDPR) since the cameras seem to cover a public space. The ICO also writes: If your CCTV captures images beyond your property boundary, such as your neighbours’ property or public streets and footpaths, then your use of the system is subject to the data protection laws. If the data controller has no footage (because the cameras are dummies, are switched off, don't make persistent recordings, or footage was deleted prior to your request) then of course you can't get a copy of your data. The other elements of the response should still be provided, in particular an explanation of the purpose of processing and the retention periods. Remedies If you are not satisfied with the data controller's response to your request, you have the following remedies: you can lodge a complaint with the ICO you can sue the data controller directly Legality of residential CCTV surveillance also covering public spaces It is possible that the CCTV cameras as currently set up are actually unlawful. A basic GDPR principle (Art 5(1)(b)) is that data shall be collected only for “specified, explicit and legitimate purposes”. If there is no pressing purpose for using the camera, it violates the GDPR. In particular, cameras that are directed away from the controller's property and primarily cover a public space are unlikely to serve a legitimate purpose. Additionally, the GDPR requires all such collection to be transparent. As soon as public spaces are involved, there must be a privacy notice per Art 13 GDPR. The ICO asks controllers to Let people know you are using CCTV by putting up signs saying that recording is taking place, and why. A great resource in this context is the Fairhurst v Woodard case from 2021. A neighbour had mounted multiple cameras, all of which were covering public spaces to some degree. The neigbour claimed that some of these cameras were dummies. The court considered the lawfulness of each camera separately. While a Ring doorbell camera that primarily covered the owner's property but would also incidentally record passer-bys was considered legitimate, a camera that was primarily directed at a public space or other homes was not. Further reading ICO guidance on domestic CCTV systems Fairhurst v Woodard: PDF of the judgement, summary facts on the placement of the 4 cameras given in paragraphs 100–106 conclusions about the legitimacy in paragraphs 131–138 | This is a broad question about the powers of the police in England and Wales. I have been unable to find any UK legislation which directly addresses 'do not cross' tape (also known as police tape, crime scene tape or barricade tape). However, the police have broad statutory and common law powers, and ignoring 'do not cross' tape could be an offence in the same way as ignoring other police orders. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Morrison [2003] EWHC 683 (Admin), the High Court decided that at common law, the police have the power to cordon off a crime scene. Police had cordoned off an area to preserve evidence using tape labelled "Police: Do not Cross" [9]. The prosecution's case against the respondent was that, having been told not to enter the cordoned area, he challenged the police right to prohibit him from entering the area [10]. There was a dispute as to whether the respondent did cross the tape and other issues, but police ultimately arrested him for disorderly conduct [29]. The respondent was convicted in the Magistrates' Court of disorderly conduct under s 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 and wilful obstruction of a police constable under s 89(2) of the Police Act 1996 [1]. His conviction was set aside on appeal to the Crown Court, which found that the only statutory authority for setting up a cordon is in the Terrorism Act 2000, and the cordon had been established without the consent of the land owner or a warrant [17]. The relevant question for the High Court was: Was the Wood Green Crown Court wrong in law to hold that the Metropolitan Police on the evidence in this case had no lawful power or authority to close the public right of way over private premises by a cordon and forcibly prohibit the Defendant from using that right of way on foot against his will [4]? The answer is yes. The police have the power to cordon off a crime scene, but they must act reasonably: [W]hen seeking to investigate crime police officers do not have an unfettered right to restrict movements on private land ... but ... [a]s Lord Denning said [in Ghani v Jones [1970] 1 QB 693] "the police should be able to do whatever is necessary and reasonable to preserve the evidence of the crime" ... provided [the police] do not go beyond what is reasonable in the circumstances, routine scenes of crime searches may assume the owner's consent ... In the present case the police were entitled to assume consent ... we believe that consent could not lawfully be withheld [22]–[23]. So the police have the power to restrict movements on private land and can use this power to cordon off a crime scene. The police can arrest someone who unlawfully enters a crime scene, which may amount to the offence of wilful obstruction. It is harder to answer the hypothetical question where there is nobody around to enforce the cordon. This is a broader question about land rights; the answer would depend on who was trying to enforce the cordon and why. | To preface my answer, this aspect of UK law is unclear at best and I try to set out general principles where available. If you are acting in a private sphere, then the recording of conversations are unregulated, however this is only for personal use – i.e., should you desire to make notes on what was said for your reference at a later date. Should you wish to share it with a third party, then you would need consent from all participants or be able to demonstrate that it would be in the public interest. If you are acting as an employee or a company, then the situation changes. Firstly, you need to check your contract, whilst this does not constitute a crime, it may be against the terms of your employment. Secondly, a company can only make recordings without knowledge under statutory conditions, such as to establish facts, ensure regulatory compliance or demonstrate standards that are achieved or need to be achieved by training. It is a general principle that conversations recorded without consent are inadmissible in court, particularly in terms of a criminal proceedings. In civil matters, it similarly follows the concept that a claimant should come to court with clean hands. However, judges are usually more pragmatic in civil cases and if parties are aware of the existence of the recording, then it often be subject to usual rules of disclosure, though this may open the creator of the recording to subsequent litigation regarding the illegality of the recording under Data Protection Act or others. | You inspected the property online and based on that inspection you signed the lease. You have a legally binding contract. Now, it is not at all like the pictures How? I mean, are these pictures of a different house? If that is so then your contract is void for fraud. However, if the pictures are of the actual house and you just imagined from them that the house would be other than it is then tough luck for you. the stairwell in the house is a huge safety hazard for children OK. Does it comply with relevant building codes? If not then the landlord needs to bring it up to standard: you cannot walk away from the contract. Is it in need of repair? If so, the landlord needs to repair it: you cannot walk away from the contract. If it is compliant and in good repair and you think it is a hazard notwithstanding then you need to manage that hazard: this is not the landlords problem. I refused to move into the house That's fine: so long as you keep paying the rent there is no obligation on you to move in. If you stop paying the rent then it would appear that you have repudiated the contract and the landlord can sue you for damages - probably the costs of finding a new tenant and the rent up until that tenant takes over. | Per your comment responses, Maryland is a two party consent state which means that the other party must consent to your recording IF there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. In one's own home is generally considered a place where one has this expectation and thus these recordings are problematic. Depending what you intend to do with them, I would first contact a lawyer to get legal advice as to how to handle this before you publish them. If you are looking to file a criminal complaint (and assuming statute of limitations hasn't run out) the prosecutor may be willing to not prosecute you for violating 2 party consent law because you were trying to gather evidence of someone else's crime, but it's not a guarantee (though this will look bad on the prosecutor come election season). If you are suing your parents it might not be admissible as evidence but I can't specifically say that either. If you are using it to show other people in the same situation what to look for it's probably best to find another set of recordings as these ones carry a lot of legal issues that will come back to bite you if you release them. Finally, while not legal, your parents may not want to pursue the criminal recording side of this matter if they are aware of the "Barbra Streisand effect," wherein actions taken to ensure something isn't viewed by the public cause that something to gain wider viewership than if they never bothered trying to censor it. | The law says you need to be covered by a TV Licence to: watch or record programmes as they’re being shown on TV, on any channel watch or stream programmes live on an online TV service (such as ITV Hub, All 4, YouTube, Amazon Prime Video, Now TV, Sky Go, etc.) download or watch any BBC programmes on iPlayer. This applies to any device you use, including a TV, desktop computer, laptop, mobile phone, tablet, games console, digital box or DVD/VHS recorder. And What is live TV and when do I need a licence for it? Live TV means any programme you watch or record as it’s being shown on TV or live on any online TV service. It’s not just live events like sport, news and music. It covers all programmes on any channel, including soaps, series, documentaries and even movies. If you’re watching live TV, you need to be covered by a TV Licence: if you’re watching on TV or on an online TV service for all channels, not just the BBC if you record a programme and watch it later if you watch a programme on a delay to watch or record repeats to watch or record programmes on +1, +2 and +24 channels to watch live programmes on Red Button services even if you already pay for cable, satellite or other TV services From the TV Licensing body. Basically, if its playing solely because you hit the play button, its not “live TV” and you dont need a license to view it. If it would be playing at the same time for everyone on a schedule rather than on demand, its live TV. This includes sports on streaming services. So, a Youtube video you can view at any time is not live TV, but a Youtube video you have to see at a certain time is. A subsequent recording of a live stream that you did not make is not live TV for the purposes of licensing. A Twitch or Facebook livestream would also require a TV license to view. | If there is a trade mark and if Polaroid owns it and if you infringed it then yes they can force you to remove it. In addition, they could sue you for either damages (i.e. what they lost because of your infringement) or an account of profits (i.e. what you made because of your infringement). That is what trade mark law is for! If the trade mark is registered then this is trivially easy for them to demonstrate. If it is unregistered then it becomes a question of if the mark is clearly recognisable as Polaroid's; IMO they could probably show that it is - those particular border dimensions were distinctive of Polaroid instant cameras for many years. If you want to republish the app, you could probably avoid trade mark issues by allowing users to set the dimensions of the photograph and border, the colour of the border and the location of the caption. | You can take pictures of any buildings if you are in a public place, and can freely use such photographs without consent of a owner or designer of that building. [Japan Copyright Act, art. 46] BTW, external appearance of buildings in U.S. Armed Forces facilities are NOT confidential under US-Japan Security Treaty and related statutes enacted in Japan. |
Are defendants legally obliged to provide all culpatory evidence to prosecution? There is a similar question that doesn't address this one. The question here is whether or not all evidence requested by prosecution must be provided by the defense? If the defense plans on only using the evidence of the prosecution, does the prosecution get to demand evidence the defense would rather not release? This is the specific situation to which the question applies. For a concrete example, suppose the prosecution has police testimony, police body camera footage, and transcripts of communication, but the defense has video before and during the incident. Does the defense ever, sometimes, or never have a right to withhold this video evidence? I know it's generally illegal to force a confession, and sometimes it's unlawful to require the defense to incriminate himself by compelling testimony as in criminal proceedings. I'm also curious about secondary questions. Does the answer depend on the whether or not the case is criminal or civil? Is there consistency on this or is it at the discretion of the judge? Is there punishment for non-compliance? Is it an unlawful request that must nonetheless be followed similar to how an obviously unlawful arrest generally may not legally be resisted? Judges and the prosecution have absolute immunity (can generally break the law with impunity while performing their duties with no personal consequence) but does the victim nonetheless sometimes have a legal remedy when a judge unlawfully demands the defense provide culpatory evidence? | Are defendants legally obliged to provide all culpatory evidence to prosecution? The question here is whether or not all evidence requested by prosecution must be provided by the defense? If the defense plans on only using the evidence of the prosecution, does the prosecution get to demand evidence the defense would rather not release? No. Usually only specific kinds of evidence related to specific kinds of claims such as alibi evidence, an insanity claim, or expert testimony must be disclosed prior to trial by a defendant in a criminal case. A defendant in a criminal case does not have to disclose evidence harmful to the defendant's case prior to trial as a general rule. Sometimes there is a requirement to disclose witnesses anticipated to be called, or exhibits to be possibly used very shortly prior to trial, but that is more the exception than the rule. Does the answer depend on the whether or not the case is criminal or civil? Yes. A plaintiff in a civil case can compel disclosure prior to trial of all evidence in the custody, control, or possession of the defendant that is relevant or is reasonably calculated to be relevant to a disputed issue identified in the complaint, answer, and other pleadings (e.g. counterclaims, replies to counterclaims, third-party complaints, cross-claims, etc.). The scope of discovery is slightly different in jurisdictions that don't follow the federal model. This can include pre-trial depositions of the parties, although a defendant can claim the 5th Amendment at the risk of being exposed to an adverse inference communicated to the jury at trial if the defendant does so. Furthermore, most jurisdictions require the pre-trial disclosure of expert testimony that will be used at trial, of exhibits that will or may be used at trial, of witnesses who will or may be called a trial, of all documents that are relevant to a disputed issue identified in the complaint, answer, and other pleadings, of all insurance coverage that could cover the claim, of all persons with knowledge of the disputed facts, and of an expected damages calculation. In the federal system, however, one need pro-actively disclose only witnesses and documents that support your case without being asked. Is there consistency on this or is it at the discretion of the judge? The rules of procedure applicable to a case govern the scope of discovery, but judges have considerable discretion to determine that requests are excessive relative to what is at stake in the case, are irrelevant, or unduly burden some other legitimate interest of the person subject to discovery. Is there punishment for non-compliance? Yes. First of all, a failure to disclose when there is a duty to do so is a ground to exclude presentation of that evidence at trial. Secondly, in civil cases, attorney fees incurred to obtain the discovery can be awarded, facts that might have been disclosed can be declared to be true as a matter of judicial sanction where there is not disclosure, claims can be dismissed, etc. The main relevant federal rule in civil cases is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. It is an unlawful request that must nonetheless be followed with only a hypothetical remedy left to the defendant as is the case in most of these united states to comply with an obviously unlawful arrest that doesn't present an immediate threat to life? I don't understand this long and convoluted sentence. The part about an unlawful arrest seems divorced from the issues in the rest of the the question. It isn't clear what kind of unlawful request is involved either. | united-states Yes and no, that is, the courts have extensive powers to compel testimony, but there are rules about doing so. This article addresses the question of expert testimony. Suppose you want an expert to testify, then Rule 26(a)(2)(B) applies, requiring disclosure of the information to be disclosed, along with a written report. It could be nearly impossible to provide the required information without the cooperation of the expert. Furthermore, under Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(ii), a subpoena can be quashed, which the article summarizes in terms of the objections that Testimony about an expert’s findings may impact or limit an expert’s ability to conduct research Testimony about an expert’s work may be unethical, if the work is not completed, peer reviewed, or otherwise in a “publishable” format The subpoena and resultant testimony could put the expert at a competitive disadvantage Work required to adequately prepare for such testimony is overly burdensome The subpoena and subsequent testimony may put the unwilling expert in a controversial or otherwise uncomfortable position In a specific instance of subpoenaing an involuntary witness, the court in In Re: World Trade Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litigation addressed a motion to compel expert testimony. The opinion lays out various powers of the court to compel a "non-retained" expert witness, including the "substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship". There is a complex weighing of factors here, which is resolved at the finding that "Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Non-Retained Experts' testimony is unique" so the petition to compel testimony was denied, but the affiliated research center was compelled to disclose the underlying data. So it depends on the circumstances, see Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811. | If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically. | Assuming that privilege applies, no Not all communications with your lawyer trigger privilege and if it doesn’t then the lawyer is not your lawyer and is under the same obligation to report as any other member of the public. If privilege does apply then they must keep your secrets. If they are defending you and you confess to the crime then they can: represent you if you plead guilty withdraw unless that would prejudice your defence continue to act providing that they do not: suggest someone else committed the offence set up a defence inconsistent with the confession they can: argue the prosecution has not made their case, that you are not guilty of the offence charged by reason of law, or argue for any other (non prohibited) reason that you should not be convicted. | Yes The Prosecutor for the local jurisdiction could formally file charges. No complaint by Rock is legally required, and given the video evidence available, Rock's testimony might not be as essential as a victim's testimony often is. But if Rock were to testify that the fight was staged, and no real assault occurred, the case would probably fall apart. That would not be good for the prosecutor's reputation, and might well be a reason not to proceed without a clear statement from Rock. See also: "Pressing charges" - is it needed to bring a charge? | In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment "standing"1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term "standing" in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis. | Some of this will vary by Jurisdiction, that is by country, and by state in the US, or by province in some other countries. This answer will be focused on the US. Other answers may address other countries. Why did they only arrest the attacker and not the victim? There is not enough information here to say, but stories from participants or witnesses could have made it clear who the attacker was. If the police believed that one party was only defending himself, they might well arrest only the attacker. Can the victim be subpoenaed to court? Yes, the victim can be subpoenaed just as any witness can be. In some areas a victim is routinely subpoenaed even if s/he si expected to attend voluntarily. Could they have actually done anything without the victim present? Yes, if there is enough evidence. The victim rarely takes the stand in murder cases, after all. However, in some cases there is simply not enough evidence aside from the testimony of the victim, so that becomes vital to the case. But if there were many other credible witnesses, the prosecutor might choose not to call the victim. The prosecutor has wide latitude on what witnesses to call and what evidence to presnent, and what charges to bring. Would the attacker have been put in a holding cell? S/he might have, that would depend on the policy of the local police, and the facilities the police had available. Could he have requested to see the victim? This seems like the "one phone call" thing to me, but is that possible here? S/he could ask, but the police would not be required to grant any such request. Indeed permitting this would be a bit unusual, but not unheard of. Usually a visitor would not see a person in a cell, but in some sort of room for the purpose. Details vary. (Edit Comment suggest this is even less plausible than I had thought, unless this is set several decades or more ago. It probably dosen't change the plot much if the attacker was brought to some sort of conference room or visitor's room instead.) Is the victim's testimony enough to actually reduce the sentence down to aggravated assault? Is six months too short of a time? If the judge or jury believed the testimony that there was no intent to kill, then a conviction of aggravated assault would be possible, as a lesser included offense. But this would depend on the totality of the evidence, and the way in which the finder of fact (judge or jury) interpreted it, and whether all the elements of aggravated assault had been proved, and whether any elements of attempted murder had not been proved. In those jurisdictions that I know about, intent to kill is an element of attempted murder. As for the sentence, 6 months is not, I think, outside the range of plausibility for aggravated assault, depending on the facts and the view taken by the judge. The Judge has wide discretion to choose a sentence up to the maximum allowed by law, or much lower. The "usual sentence" varies by jurisdiction, and does not bind the judge anyway. Would the attacker just go back to normal after his release? Would there be any further punishments or restrictions? The court could impose an additional term of probation, with various restrictions, depending on the local law, and the choice of the Judge. These might include staying employed, not getting into other fights, not owning a firearm, taking anger management courses, or other possibilities. Failure to comply with such conditions might lead to a person being sent back to jail/prison. The Judge does not have to impose any such restrictions however. Could the victim change his testimony afterward and reopen the case? Or would that be unreliable? It can happen, but reopening the case is far from automatic. Generally a court has to order the case reopened, and courts generally are reluctant to do so. How many years would the attacker have been facing for the original attempted murder? Probably quite a few, but this varies a good deal by jurisdiction. And the Judge would have considerable discretion up to the maximum sentence permitted by the law in that jurisdiction. Why did it take so long for the case to start? The question does not say how long it took, but it is not uncommon for major cases to take several years before the start of the trial, partly because of the time taken to investigate, and partly because of backlogs in the court system. There are cases on record where the trial took place decades after the crime. That is unusual. | canada Evidence of offences other than the one for which the accused is being sentenced is admissable at a sentencing hearing, even evidence of untried offences. R. v. Edwards, 2001 CanLII 24105 (Ont. C.A.): [39] There are statutory provisions that do permit the use of evidence about the offender, even though that evidence also discloses the commission of other crimes. First, s. 718(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code set out as two of the objectives of sentencing: (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; [40] Neither of these objectives can be fairly achieved through sentencing without knowing something, and perhaps quite a bit, about the background and character of the offender. The Crown, in this case, in effect put its case for admission of this evidence on the need to separate this respondent from society. The sentencing judge can consider such evidence of untried offences. (R. v. Jordan, 1991 CanLII 203 (B.C.C.A.)) When there is a dispute about any fact that might aggravate the sentence, the Crown (prosecution) must establish that fact by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Criminal Code, s. 724(3)(e). See also R. v. Roopchand, 2016 MBCA 105: The first ground [of appeal] is whether the sentencing judge erred by taking into account the accused’s pending charge for an untried offence when imposing sentence. The use to be made of evidence will be informed by the purpose for which it is to be admitted. With respect to what use can be made of evidence of untried offences at a sentencing hearing, the case law is clear: while such evidence cannot be used for the purpose of punishing the accused, it is admissible when its purpose is limited to shedding light upon some aspect of the accused’s character and background which is relevant to the objectives of sentencing being considered by the judge R. v. Angelillo, 2006 SCC 55: The fact that Mr. Angelillo had been charged with two new counts of fraud, both of which were allegedly committed while he was waiting to be sentenced, was obviously relevant to the assessment of the danger his release would represent for the community. In Angelillo, the judge could even have "postponed the sentencing hearing to a date after the interim release hearing regarding the new charges in order to be better informed of the risk resulting from the subsequent act." |
If police collected evidence based off of a call they suspected, but couldn't prove, was fraudulant would the evidence be upheld? I'm asking this hypothetical situation mostly as I was considering writing a story with the premise and want the story to be legally accurate, but also because I'm frankly curious how the law would handle such a situation. Let's say someone (call him Bob) got sick of police being unable to act against individuals everyone 'knows' to be committing a crime due to lack of sufficient evidence to get a warrant. One day he decides to take matters into his own hands and he calls into 911 with a made up claim that he witnessed a crime take place and a gunman drag someone into a known crack house. As I understand it when the police arrive they will have sufficient justification to enter the crack house without a warrant to intervene with a crime believed to be in progress. They won't find evidence of the original, made up, crime, but once they have entered the house they will likely see evidence of other crimes. Since they were there in good faith the evidence of other crimes within 'plain sight' in the house would be fair game and could be used to make arrests and/or get a warrant to search the rest of the house for more evidence. Despite the fraudulent nature of the original claim arrests could be made since Bob was not an agent of the police. So far this is covering legal concepts I think I understand. Now lets say that the police were never able to trace the original fraudulent call to Bob, and Bob gets it in his head to act as a the world's least interesting vigilante. He starts regularly making fraudulent calls claiming to witness a crime in progress to the police to give them justification to enter locations that are commonly believed to have illegal activity within them in a hopes of helping the police to collect enough evidence to make arrests. While Bob changes the number he is calling from and as much of his MO as he can each time the police would noticed a pattern of fraudulent claims and have reached the point that they can usually guess when a call is a fraudulent one made by Bob, but they can never be certain it's him or that a crime isn't actually happen. Assume the police have actively stated they do not support or condone Bob's actions, have made a public plea for him to stop, and are trying (but failing) to find and arrest Bob as well. I assume the police would continue to respond to the claims in case the call is real and a crime is actively in progress. Is there a point where they would no longer possess sufficient cause to enter a premise to investigate a believed crime in progress due to their suspicion the crime may not be legitimate? If they do have justification to continue to enter the premises then at what point, if ever, would evidence witnessed as a result of responding to the potentially fraudulent calls not be admissible? | Calls to 911 are treated as genuine at all times until the complaint is dealt with. This is because most people only call 911 for legitimate reasons and even some criminals call 911 because they want them to know the situation (Bomb scares are an extreme version of this as they cause a lot of disruption; they cannot be ignored because if the cops were to call bullshit and it was proven not to be bullshit, it's gonna be a lot worse than if they treat it as real and find out it's an alarm clock.). From the point of view of the first responders, whether cops, fire, or EMS, the call is always real and to be treated as such. Entering without warrant is legit if they have a probable cause of a crime or a person in distress, such as a hostage or a person in medical need; the emergency call is almost certainly sufficient. As you correctly said, at this point any evidence of a crime in plain sight is good reason to pursue the criminal acts unrelated to the original call. 911 calls are recorded so they can prove to the courts they got a tip and were following up. However, tying up emergency services with fake crimes is still not a proper use of 911 and there are ways to find people making bogus calls. 911 also traces phone calls in case of prank callers or even generally locating people in distress (if the dispatcher has to tell someone who is hiding from robbers in her house to be quiet, they can still dispatch officers to the general area by pinging the phone's metadata) so a string of burners will be noticed. Burner numbers can be traced to point of sale and most stores that carry them will have cameras (staff that remembers, not so much). If using pay phones, in this day and age, again there is likely cameras because the frequency of the latter and the infrequency of the former. Phone Booths haven't been a thing for far longer, so much so that the Christopher Reeves Superman film had a famous gag about how Phone Booths were phased out, when Clark Kent, needing to switch to his iconic Persona, runs to a bank of payphones (all without booths) and desperately looks for a new place to shed his clothes... in the 1970s. Either way, cops would be looking for nearby cameras to identify you and without many pay phones reliably lying around it won't take long. The more dangerous aspect of this is that drugs and organized crime are pretty much hand in hand. It could be the crack house you just called in is well known to the cops, but they're trying to use it to find out who the supplier is. The vigilante could be ruining their sting by calling in a true threat. If he does this too much, the local gang members will be looking out for him and may try to find him too; and whereas the police have rules, the gangs do not. | can really anyone in Germany call the police on others without proof of anything? Anyone anywhere can call the police without proof of anything as long as they have a phone. The question is, what will the police do about it. Police in Germany are more professional and less corrupt than in many countries in the world (e.g. they are much less corrupt than police in much of the United States or police in Southern Italy or Mexico, or in much of the "third-world"). Most German police are unlikely to exercise their power unless they are genuinely deceived into thinking that you committed an actual crime. But, German cops are human too. Some German cops are bad cops and even good cops aren't perfect truth detectors or bias free. and if so what are my rights? There has to be some evidence to arrest you or prosecute you, but testimony from people who claim to be eye witnesses is a form of evidence and proof. People are routinely convicted of crimes (everywhere in the world) based solely upon the testimony of other people with no additional proof. This is usually a good rule. As a society we don't want the criminal justice system to let people who commit crimes that are witnessed by lots of truthful witnesses and testified to, to go free just because there is no non-testimonial evidence. But because people lie (or are simply mistaken about the truth) sometimes, it isn't a perfect way of determining who is guilty and who is innocent. You also have the right to lodge a complaint of criminal defamation with the police in Germany and in Germany hundreds of thousands of such cases are prosecuted by police every year. Making false accusations against you (or even just insulting you in an extremely offense manner) as they did is a minor crime in Germany. and the person I mentioned had 2 of his employees with him but I am sure and I know for a fact they are on his side and I had no witnesses with me so how can I prove I am innocent? if they agreed on making up a story against me? The possibility that people will be wrongfully arrested and wrongfully convicted of crimes because people lie and authorities believe the people who are lying is a constant risk. The best you can do is to tell your story consistently and honestly and hope that you are believed. But it is impossible to eliminate the risk that people will lie and be believed and that you will suffer the consequences, even if you are doing everything right. In the long run, you may want to avoid people who you think would lie and make false accusations around you, and to have the presence of either friendly witnesses and/or audio/visual recording at times when you are in their presence. You may also, as a long run strategy try to figure out if there was anything you could have done to prevent them from being out to get you so badly that they would make false accusations against you. While I don't want to blame the victim, and often enough, especially for example, if you are a foreigner or otherwise different in a homogeneous community some people are doing to hate you for no reason, sometimes their real motivation may be a failure to follow social norms that are not actually illegal, or a misunderstand that could be cleared up. | This is going to depend on what you think or know is on the phone, why you want to keep it undisclosed, and why the officer says s/he wants it. If one knows or has good reason to think that there is evidence of a crime on the phone, then destroying or hiding that evidence may be criminal. If one gets a court order, such as a warrant or subpoena, to turn over evidence, destroying the evidence or otherwise failing to comply may well be criminal contempt of court, or another criminal offense. In most circumstances an officer must have probable cause, and usually a warrant, to conduct a lawful search. But border searches are different. That searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (sustaining search of incoming mail). See also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (opening by customs inspector of locked container shipped from abroad). The Congressional Research Service wrote: in the March 2021 report "Searches and Seizures at the Border and the Fourth Amendment" (pdf): The Supreme Court has recognized that searches at the border are “qualitatively different” from those occurring in the interior of the United States, because persons entering the country have less robust expectations of privacy, given the federal government’s broad power to safeguard the nation by examining persons seeking to enter its territory. While law enforcement searches and seizures within the interior of the United States typically require a judicial warrant supported by probable cause, federal officers may conduct routine inspections and searches of persons attempting to cross the international border without a warrant or any particularized suspicion of unlawful activity. But a border search that extends beyond a routine search and inspection may require at least reasonable suspicion. ... Recent years have seen legal challenges to border searches of electronic devices such as cell phones and computers, which often contain more personal and sensitive information than other items frequently searched at the border, such as a wallet or briefcase. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue. Lower courts have generally held that government officers may conduct relatively limited, manual searches of such devices without a warrant or any particularized suspicion. The courts, however, are split over whether more intrusive, forensic searches require at least reasonable suspicion. ... Federal statutes and implementing regulations confer designated law enforcement officers with broad authority to conduct searches and seizures at the border and surrounding areas without a warrant. These searches commonly occur at designated ports of entry along the border, such as border crossing points.[1] But searches may also occur in other places along or near the border.[2] To enforce U.S. customs laws, federal law enforcement officers may inspect and search individuals, merchandise, vehicles, and vessels arriving at the border, as well as further into the interior of the United States and within U.S. waters. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1496, a customs officer may examine “the baggage of any person arriving in the United States in order to ascertain what articles are contained therein” and whether those items are subject to taxes or otherwise prohibited. Similarly, 19 U.S.C. §1467 allows customs officers to inspect and search the persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving by vessel from a foreign port (including U.S. territories). If there is nothing that could be evidence on a phone, erasing it should not be criminal destruction of evidence, but this will be hard to prove after the fact, and border officials have authority to insist on a search with no warrant or particular suspicion. Notes [1]: See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 961–62 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing a “border search” as one that occurs at ports of entry where there is an actual or attempted border crossing);see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, Border Security: At Ports of Entry (last modified Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/ports-entry (describing U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s functions at ports of entry). [2]: See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983) (recognizing the government’s interest in patrolling inland or coastal waters “where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is great”); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973) (noting that the Border Patrol conducts inland surveillance activities “all in the asserted interest of detecting the illegal importation of aliens.”); See also U.S. Customs & Border Prot., "Border Security: Along U.S. Borders" (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders (describing the Border Patrol’s responsibilities along the border | You have raised two broad questions. The question about reasonable suspicion asks: when is evidence illegally obtained? That's difficult to answer, because it depends on the nature of the evidence and any statute which controlled the way in which it should have been collected. However, the focus of your question seems to be the second issue: what use can the government make of illegally obtained evidence? This is the subject of the exclusionary rule. The short answer is this: The exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy created for the purpose of deterring future unlawful conduct. The rule prohibits both direct and indirect use of illegally obtained evidence ("fruit of the poisonous tree") in a criminal prosecution, but will only be applied where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. To give more insight into how the courts have applied this balancing test, I will summarise its history and rationale. I will then set out the modern formulation of the rule, and try to answer some of your specific hypothetical questions. History and rationale of the exclusionary rule The exclusionary rule originated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The government searched Weeks' house without a warrant, seized letters and other property, and charged him with operating an illegal lottery. Weeks applied for the return of the property, but the district court held that "the letters having come into the control of the court, it would not inquire into the manner in which they were obtained, but if competent would keep them and permit their use in evidence." Weeks was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution ... The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the doctrine was extended to prevent indirect use of information derived from illegally obtained evidence, unless the information comes from an independent source. The government illegally searched Silverthorne's offices, and copied the records seized before the district court ordered their return. The district court also impounded the copies, so the government issued a regular subpoena to produce the original documents. The district court held Silverthorne in contempt for failure to comply with the subpoena. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed. The Court acknowledged the 'complexities' of this distinction in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). This case introduced the term 'fruit of the poisonous tree,' and an exception to the doctrine where the connection between the illegality and the evidence presented is 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' Nardone had been convicted of defrauding the revenue twice. The first conviction was based on evidence obtained from an illegal wiretap, and was reversed by the Supreme Court. Nardone was convicted again after a retrial, and argued that the conviction should be set aside because he was not permitted to "examine the prosecution as to the uses to which it had put the [illegally obtained] information." Frankfurter J, delivering the opinion of the Court, quoted the above passage from Silverthorne and said: In practice this generalized statement may conceal concrete complexities. Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint ... The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wire-tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that is established—as was plainly done here—the trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court that its proof had an independent origin. Development of modern limits to the exclusionary rule The Court clarified the purpose of the doctrine in United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), declining to extend it to grand jury proceedings. The Court held that Calandra was required to answer questions put to him by a grand jury, even though the questions had been informed by the fruits of an illegal search. The Court said: The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim ... Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures ... In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons ... the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The Supreme Court endorsed a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Drugs were found in a search of Leon's house and car pursuant to a facially valid search warrant, but on review the district court found that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant. Therefore, the search was illegal although the officers executing it had acted in good faith. After reviewing the cases in which the Court had declined to apply the rule, the Court held that the evidence against Leon should not have been excluded: The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern ... We have now reexamined the purposes of the exclusionary rule and the propriety of its application in cases where officers have relied on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. Our conclusion is that the rule's purposes will only rarely be served by applying it in such circumstances. In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. In Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998), the Court cited Leon and explicitly endorsed the use of a balancing test in declining to extend the rule to State parole proceedings: [B]ecause the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial social costs" ... A federal requirement that parole boards apply the exclusionary rule ... would severely disrupt the traditionally informal, administrative process of parole revocation. The marginal deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures is insufficient to justify such an intrusion. We therefore hold that parole boards are not required by federal law to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court endorsed an even more circumspect approach to the rule in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). The police executed a valid search warrant and found guns and drugs in Hudson's house, but the search was unlawful because the police did not knock and announce before entering. The Court declined to exclude the evidence obtained in the search, holding that: Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our first impulse. The exclusionary rule generates "substantial social costs", which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. We have therefore been "cautio[us] against expanding" it, and "have repeatedly emphasized that the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application." We have rejected "[i]ndiscriminate application" of the rule, and have held it to be applicable only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,"—that is, "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs.'" (citations omitted) Current state of the law As of June 2017, the last word on the rule is the Supreme Court's decision in Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 (2016). Again, the Court reversed a State court's decision to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence in a criminal trial. The Court identified three exceptions to the exclusionary rule: First, the independent source doctrine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source. Second, the inevitable discovery doctrine allows for the admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source. Third, and at issue here, is the attenuation doctrine: Evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that "the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained." (citations omitted) Strieff was illegally stopped and asked for ID after leaving a house under surveillance by narcotics police. After discovering an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation, the police lawfully arrested and searched Strieff and found him in possession of methamphetamine. The Court found that the exclusionary rule did not apply because of the attenuation doctrine: The three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), guide our analysis. First, we look to the "temporal proximity" between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search. Second, we consider "the presence of intervening circumstances." Third, and "particularly" significant, we examine "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." (citations omitted) [W]e hold that the evidence discovered on Strieff's person was admissible because the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the pre-existing arrest warrant. Although the illegal stop was close in time to Strieff's arrest, that consideration is outweighed by two factors supporting the State. The outstanding arrest warrant for Strieff's arrest is a critical intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of the illegal stop. The discovery of that warrant broke the causal chain between the unconstitutional stop and the discovery of evidence by compelling Officer Fackrell to arrest Strieff. And, it is especially significant that there is no evidence that Officer Fackrell's illegal stop reflected flagrantly unlawful police misconduct. Specific scenarios Can the past arrests serve as a basis for reasonable suspicion to stop a person? As a basis for inclusion of the person on an informal watch list? As mentioned in the introduction, this question is not really about "fruit of the poisonous tree." It is an anterior question about whether or not a police stop was unlawful. The court asks: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Officers are permitted to consider criminal history, as the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613 (1997): A prior criminal record "is not, alone, sufficient to create reasonable suspicion." Nevertheless, an officer can couple knowledge of prior criminal involvement with more concrete factors in reaching a reasonable suspicion of current criminal activity. (citations omitted) As probable cause for a future search warrant or arrest warrant or wiretap? As basis for active surveillance without a stop or arrest or search warrant? What if law enforcement set up a sting operation targeted at this individual? As with reasonable suspicion, evidence of the suspect's reputation and criminal history can be taken into account in establishing probable cause for an arrest or search warrant. However, a history of past arrests would probably not suffice in itself to "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed": Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). Could the suppressed evidence be used to counter an entrapment defense (which requires a showing that the defendant didn't have a propensity to commit the crime)? Could the suppressed evidence be used to impeach testimony in a criminal case that the defendant had never used drugs before? If the evidence is suppressed then by definition it cannot be used adversely to the defendant. However, if the evidence is shown to have been obtained illegally, it will only be excluded where the deterrence benefits of exclusion outweigh its substantial social costs: Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott. The evidence is more likely to be admitted if it falls into one of the three exceptions set out in Utah v. Strieff: independent source, inevitable discovery or attenuation. In considering attenuation, the court will pay particular attention to 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.' Clearly, it is impossible to say, in general, whether unlawfully obtained evidence could be admitted to counter an entrapment defence or attack the defendant's character and credibility. Not only will the application of the exclusionary rule depend on a wide range of considerations, other rules of evidence may need to be applied (such as the rules against character evidence and extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter). Nevertheless, the cases cited above should give some insight into how the court will approach the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. | “Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all. | It is probably illegal, just not pursued. In the case of something like bank robbery, you'd have a victim that filed a police report. A murder would need to be discovered somehow - either a missing person report or a dead body. If the porn shoot happened somewhere that a member of the public saw it and subsequently filed a police report, the video could be used as evidence. Absent a report, the police simply have no reason to look into it (unless the police catches them in the act, but we probably don't see those videos posted online). Why would these public offenses go unreported? Perhaps nobody sees it. Perhaps the bystanders in the video are paid extras. Maybe they're filming in what appears to be public but is actually private property. Perhaps they have a permit to use a public space for this purpose. Perhaps they just got lucky. Again, there might be some confirmation bias here - you're not going to see as many videos of folks they catch breaking the law, since they will either be interrupted and stopped or (maybe) have their videos ordered taken down. | Assuming that the police have a warrant to seize your cell phone, the scope of what can be seized is specified in the warrant. It is not automatic that seizing a phone entails seizure of some or all online accounts (e.g. automatic backups, collections of passwords in a Google account) and it does not automatically "freeze" or block a person's access to their accounts including phone accounts. It's not that it is impossible to seize an account, it's that it is not automatic: it has to be in the scope of the warrant. Here is a collection of petition templates, asking the court to allow the seizure of various things for various reasons (mostly electronic), including access to bank accounts. If the police suspect that information might be available online after it has been deleted from a phone, they would need to include online accounts in the scope of the petition(s). There is even a template for "give me everything", called "Frankenstein". | The answer by @A.fm. isn't wrong, but it also is unduly optimistic. In my experience, in real life, people are more likely to lie when they are under oath than when they are not under oath, and law enforcement officers tend to be particularly good at lying on the stand because they testify frequently in court cases. In almost all places in the United States (and most foreign jurisdictions), in a pure battle of credibility in the eyes of a judge or jury between a law enforcement officer and an individual citizen charged with a crime, the law enforcement officer's account is going to be found to be more credible (beyond a reasonable doubt) about 90% of the time or more, unless you have a majority-minority jury or an outlier extremely liberal judge or the law enforcement officer has a personal involvement in the case (e.g. it involves a family member of the officer). The likelihood that it will be resolved one way or the other does depend significantly on race and social class, however. The credibility imbalance is still great and favors law enforcement, but not as extreme, when it is between an unrelated third-party witness and a law enforcement officer. In the absence of hard evidence or a law enforcement insider witness willing to testify in your favor, it is almost impossible to win a credibility contest in a case like the ones you suggest. One important step an attorney can take, however, is to seek discovery on any prior instance in which the testifying officer has been disciplined for untruthfulness or had his testimony in court found to be untruthful. This will usually be fruitless, but levels the playing field to closer to 50-50 if you get lucky and received such evidence. Such a request also provides a means of collateral attack on a conviction if the law enforcement officer has a history of untruthfulness that wasn't disclosed by the prosecution after such a request is made by a defense lawyer. So, what does protect you? Mostly the desire of the bosses of law enforcement officers (who are ultimately politicians, mostly local politicians in the United States) to see the law enforced in a non-corrupt manner and the fear of a law enforcement officer that he or she might be found to have lied using physical evidence unknown to him at the time (like a secret recording of an interaction). Law enforcement officers usually don't have much to gain from lying (although this equation changes a law when police department can receive assets seized in civil forfeitures that they are involved in) and usually they want people who are "bad guys" to be in jail to protect "good guys" although they aren't always very concerned about the means by which they achieve these ends. Of course, "usually" is a weasel word here and there are many exceptions that crop up in real life (e.g. when police have engaged in misconduct and want to protect themselves from the consequences of that misconduct). The other obvious solution (so common that in certain eras of U.S. history there were travel guides targeted at African-American motorists to help they carry out this approach) is to avoid places with police who have historically been corrupt. The United States has a uniquely bottom heavy law enforcement structure. Something on the order of 95% of law enforcement officers are employed by local governments or are otherwise tightly constricted geographically (e.g. rangers in national or state parks). And, even the small number of state law enforcement officers are heavily concentrated doing traffic enforcement on major state and federal highways. Similarly, lots of federal law enforcement agencies are broken up into geographic divisions some of which are known to be more corrupt than others (e.g. there is more corruption in the border patrol on parts of the border with Mexico than on most of the border with Canada). So, if you want to avoid the risk of encountering bad cops, stay away from places that are known to have bad cops. The solution may seem like a "cop out" (sorry, pun intended), but it is actually a pretty unique feature of the American law enforcement system. Most countries (e.g. the U.K., South Korea, Russia, Japan, Spain, Mexico, France) have a much more centralized law enforcement bureaucracy, which is fine when the people are the top are scrupulously non-corrupt, but which also makes it much easier for the rot of corruption to become geographically widespread and hence unavoidable from the point of view of an individual citizen. In contrast, in the U.S., even in the most corrupt of times (e.g. the Prohibition era), there are almost always many jurisdictions where law enforcement is not corrupt and corrupting the entirely system is much more difficult than in most countries. |
Can a software license validly restrict place of use, or impose restrictions on the type or purpose of use This question is inspired in part by Open Source License restrictions and recent sanctions against Russia and in particular by this answer Can a software license impose restrictions on the place where the software is to be used, so that a court would enforce those restrictions. Fopr example, could the license include text such as: This software is licensed for use only in the state of Texas? Similarly, can a license impose limitations on the purpose of use, such as: This software is licensed for non-commercial use only; This software is licensed for non-law-enforcement use only; This license does not authorize use by any government or governmental agency; This software is licensed for use only by individuals or corms with gross revenues of $5,000,000 or less. Assume that the would-be user has acquired a copy of the software lawfully, and only subsequently decides to use it in a way that the license purports to forbid. Assume further that the dev who created the software still holds the copyright, and sues the would-be user to enforce such a condition. Would courts enforce such a license restriction? I understand thsat such a restriction would make the software not "open source" as the OSI uses that term, nor 'free" as the FSF uses that term. Indeed the software might be clearly proprietary. I am only interested (for this question) in whether such terms can be enforced in any software license. I would strongly prefer answers that cite case law, statute law, or other authoritative sources (in that order). I am most interested in answers for US, UK, or EU law (in that order), but I am interested in answers for any jurisdiction for which reliable sources are available. | Yes A software license is just a contract and parties to a contract are free to agree whatever terms they wish under the doctrine of freedom to contract. Government can restrict what terms can be used in a contract either in general (e.g. for being against public policy) or specifically (e.g. by requiring wages be paid in money). None of the terms you mention fall foul of any restrictions I know of. | That licence does not allow you to do what you want It’s a non-commercial licence and your usage is commercial (making money). You don’t need a licence to perform commentary or review of a book Providing that you use as little material as necessary from the original work, commentary and review is one of the exceptions to copyright carved out by fair dealing in most English speaking jurisdictions. In the USA, the fair use exemption is not so clear as it involves a four factor balancing test. Your planned use is in favour of being fair use, your commercialisation is against. | What licence should I display in the footer of my website? None unless you want people to copy and reuse the content. The content (except for mere facts) will be protected by copyright regardless. When you expect people to want to copy and reuse it, it makes sense to tell them in advance under what conditions they can do it (instead of being bothered by their questions). This is what displaying a licence is for. If you were a visual designer then a licence would make sense as visuals are likely to be wanted to be copied and used. But a CV, list of projects and comments from customers are probably not likely to be wanted for reuse and distribution, though it is ultimately for you to decide. If you think someone will want to copy and further distribute your content, you'll need to figure out under what conditions you want to allow it, and then search for a licence that fits. If none found, just create your own. | it would violate law? It would be very dependent of what your jurisdiction is and what the software does. I would expect most software that would be lawful to install at your home would be lawful to install at your company, but there may be exceptions. To put an hyperbolic example, if you work at the CIA and you install some remote access software that allows you to access your workstation from a non-secure PC through non-secure methods, I am pretty sure that would be illegal, even if you had the best of intentions. A recent scenario taken from real life involves some members an organization who are required to use official e-mail servers for FOIA purposes setting up their own private mail servers. Of course, YMMV. can I purchase it for myself, and then use at workplace Even if the software is legal it does not mean that it is ok to use it at the workplace. Most business have rules about what software may be installed in the PCs, who may install it and how to manage it. Your software could introduce security vulnerabilities that your IT team may need to be aware of, or incompatibilities with other software. It may introduce legal liabilities (you install a "home edition" licence in a corporate environment where that licence is invalid). Your company may discipline you if you breaking those guidelines and install software without authorization, even if there is no harm for them for this action. On top of that, if your actions cause some damage to the company, it can sue you to get you to pay for those damages. Before taking any action you should inquiry about your company's IT policy and, if your company does not have one or if the policy is not clear about allowing you to install the software, ask the people in charge (preferably in writting). | Use of SE is subject to the terms and conditions specified here. Section 3 says "You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license." That means that your contributions can be used forever. That means the stuff is there, end of story. Section 11 on Termination says "Stack Exchange may also terminate, block, or suspend any and all Services and access to the Network immediately, without prior notice or liability, in its sole discretion, for any reason or no reason at all, including but not limited to any Subscriber breaches of any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement". That means you can be banned. So, yes, what they did is legal. | Just assuming for the sake of this particular answer that everything happens in the U.S.: I'm not sure about the particular example of Open ZFS. The registration in the USPTO Records is in Oracle's name. Using OpenZFS for distributing the same kind of software as the now closed-source ZFS would seem to be infringing to me absent a license. Maybe Oracle just tolerates the use of the "ZFS" component by third-parties since they decided at some point to license the software under an open source license. In that case, they may have a dilution (http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/TrademarkDilution.aspx) problem and the mark may be invalid. If the mark is invalid, anybody can pretty much do whatever they want with it. That said, assuming for sake of discussion that the mark is valid, there is indeed such a thing that is similar to the copyright fair use in trademarks (in the U.S. at least). It's called "nominative fair use". You can read more about it here: http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/FairUse.aspx Bottom line is that under the nominative fair use doctrine it's generally ok for party A to use party B's trademark to refer to whatever party B is doing, even to sell products and services related to whatever party B is doing. As per the INTA document I just linked above, its for example ok to "use “iPhone” in non-stylized form on packaging for phone cases to indicate that it is usable with iPhone 6." Having a website (even with third-party ads) that discuss ZFS-related matters is similar to the iPhone example in my mind. Having a domain name that contains the mark seems riskier, but it's not necessarily downright forbidden. See: http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Toyota_Motor_Sales,_U.S.A._v._Tabari | This is permitted so long as it doesn't violate a valid trademark or service mark (or a few equivalent rights in names that are comparable such as collective rights to market beef under the name "Waygu" only if it is produced in a certain area of Japan under Japanese law) that covers goods or services of the same type in the same economic market. A trademark arises either when a term acquires a "secondary meaning" associating its use in connection with a particular kind of good or services in a particular market with a particular provider of that good or that service, or by registration of the trademark or service mark. "Tresh" and "Cassiopeia" are not terms that inherently are related to software, so they are permissible to use as trademarks for software unless someone else already has established trademark protection for them. | Using it without permission is copyright infringement and illegal. Legally, you can try offering money to the company for the copyright or for a suitable license. For example offer them $1000 for a copy of the code licensed under the GPL license. If they accept, you are fine. |
Asking Judge What He's/She's Thinking What is the legal term for when one wants to ask the judge what he/she is thinking? Such as just before a judgement is about to be handed down? Would be helpful to know so would use the correct legal term when/if we want to make such an inquiry. "Your Honor, we'd like to make a _______." For example, if we are not sure which way the judge is leaning and we want to know if he/she is leaning in favor of the other party so we can determine if need to make any further arguments or not. | If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position. | We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered. | This determination is largely a facts and circumstances specific test to be evaluated with little additional legal guidance by the judge or jury faced with evaluating the question (usually a judge in the way that the issue usually presents itself). Like many fairly vague legal standards, it leaves open the possibility that there will be inconsistent rulings on this question in circumstances presenting similar facts. | If the question is: "Did she call you and talk about two business contracts? " then this is not hearsay. We have a witness, standing in court, saying that exactly these things happened - that she called, and that she talked about those deals. If the question is: "Did the company sign two business deals that day? " then it is hearsay. We know that she said two deals were signed, because we have a witness for that, but that doesn't mean she said the truth. She could have lied about that. We don't have a witness standing in court saying that the deals were signed. We have a witness in court saying that he heard someone say the deals were signed. In a libel case where Jim sues Joe for libel, a witness says "Joe told me that Jim is a lying thief". That's absolutely not hearsay in a libel case about Joe spreading false rumours. The exact same statement by the exact same witness would be hearsay if someone tried to convict Jim for theft. | Can the judge flat out tell the jury that they cannot vote to nullify the verdict? He can but this kind of "jury nullification" makes little sense and is obvious that is not possible. A verdict is rendered by the jury. Once the verdict is rendered, there is no further vote. It would also make little sense for a jury to render a guilty verdict and later have another vote to nullify the previous verdict. From now one I will refer to jury nullification as we usually refer to it: the jury returns a not guilty verdict, although the jury believes the accused is guilty of the crime (rather than returning a guilty verdict and later nullify it, which is what you are implying here) A different question would be "can the judge ask the jury to not engage in jury nullification"? Yes he/she can. A judge can respond that jury nullification is not possible. If the jury convicts, this false information by the judge is generally deemed a harmless error on appeal, and the conviction is upheld If the judge did so and the jury chooses to nullify the verdict anyways would the fact that the judge forbade them to do so have any impact on what happens from that point forward? No. Jury nullification is part and parcel of common law, and it could well be part of the "jury trial" granted by the Constitution. Would the jury risk repercussions for nullifying a verdict against the judges orders? Only for jury nullification no. They can face repercussions if they lie in voir dire and say that they will follow the law as given to them no matter what, for example. Finally is there any situation where jury trying to nullify a verdict could phrase their objection incorrectly such that the judge could rule it as a guilty verdict (ie if they say "we think you proved the plaintiff did this thing, but we don't believe he should be punished" can the judge rule that they said he was guilty and just ignore the second half?) Juries return a guilty/not guilty verdict. They don't return their thoughts to the court ("we think that...."). They simply say "guilty" or "not guilty". If for some unknown reason they should choose to tell the judge more than what is required from them, jury nullification is still an option of the jury and something that the jury can do, have the right to do, so the judge will not be able to override the jury. But this is something that should not happen. If the jury wants to engage in jury nullification, they have to tell the judge "not guilty" and nothing more. The jury doesn't have to explain its decision to acquit. | To what cases is the judge referring to here? None: neither the quoted article (2023-06-02 05:57: Prozess gegen Lina E.: Stadt Leipzig verbietet Solidaritäts-Demonstration) given in the english version of Wikipedia nor the german Wikipedia version (Dresdner Linksextremismusprozess – Wikipedia uses the quote given in the english version. In the article itself, the name 'Hans Schlueter-Staats' is used only once: The arrest warrant against them will be suspended against conditions, said Hans Schlueter-Staats, presiding judge of the State Protection Chamber at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, on Wednesday evening at the end of the verdict. She only has to serve the remainder of the sentence if the verdict becomes final. Assume that, for whatever reason, someone added a fabricated quote, in the Wikipedia page, that is not contained in the given source hoping that nobody would notice (either because the reader can't read German or simply wouldn't look). It would be very strange for a judge whos primary duty, in a civil law system, is to read the law as written, to give a personal opinion about previous rulings (which was the reason I looked: to read the exact German text). Whoever fabricated that quote was obviously unaware of this or didn't care hoping that others would simply assume it to be correct due the given source of a newspaper that has a reputation as being a reliable source. | To paraphrase the Princess Bride: "I don't think those words mean what you think they do". The "truther-activist", "sovereign citizen", and "Citizen vs. Human Being" concepts will only hurt you. It has never succeeded, to my knowledge; It has failed multiple times. Let me tell you a little about myself to illustrate what I mean: I am a software developer (and it seems from your profile, you are at least somewhat computer inclined, so this will hopeful make sense to you). The business side of the company I work for think that myself and my team write "magic code", and having the system do whatever they ask for is just a matter of pressing enough buttons in the correct order. It totally insane, and it completely analogous to what you are propose. The court is a carefully designed system, and you don't have the power to make arbitrary changes to it. Certainly not through the "arbitrary button presses" of "legal fiction". Some things to note Legal fictions are never summoned. People are. Organizations are. See initial paraphrase with regards to "legal fiction". Your legal fiction has not been summoned, you have. You will be appearing as yourself, not a straw man. I'm sorry to break it to you, but whomever you have heard this from is wrong, and in the most best case scenario, they are confusing what they want to be true for reality. If they have received any money from you in relation to this opinion, then they are almost certainly a scammer and a liar. If you insist on going further with this nonsense, then you WILL lose, regardless of what actual facts you have. My condolences. Now, to answer the question you asked: Yes, you can file a monition for discovery before first appearance (but not before pleading). You can file by mail, and in some jurisdictions, online. Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/goingtocourt/caseBasics.shtml. | There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney. |
To what extent is Walt Disney World exempt from the laws of Florida and the United States? Many years ago, I overheard in casual conversation that Walt Disney World was essentially a country within a country, a privately-owned nation in which the laws of the U.S. don't apply. I've never been there (or any Disney property), nor have I ever been a big "Disney person," so I have no firsthand experience with any of this. But now I'm adult with some understanding of the law, and it strikes me that I've never in all the intervening years stumbled across any information contradicting that statement. Walt Disney World is located within a special jurisdiction (created for Disney) called the Reedy Creek Improvement District. Per Wikpedia, this is an area of ~40 mi2, within which the Disney company has "almost total autonomy," granted to it by The Florida State Legislature. Within the District, the Disney company appears to be the sole provider of law enforcement, EMS, fire-fighting, utilities & sewage, and the like. Disney also controls building codes and zoning within the District. The local government seems to consist of a Board of five people, all high-ranking employees of the Disney company, "elected" by the other residents (all Disney employees themselves; Wikipedia suggests there are only a couple dozen such residents). It appears to me that a for-profit entertainment company has the legal authority to dictate the form and members of the local government, the laws that apply to everyone within the District (residents and visitors), and to exercise complete control over the enforcement of those laws (through its literal ownership of the police). Just to be clear: this is not a question about copyright or other intellectual property law. I'm thinking about questions like: Are people within the District protected from unreasonable search and seizure? (And is the definition of "unreasonable" importantly different than in the rest of the U.S.?) Are Miranda warnings required when District police arrest someone? Do people arrested by Disney police actually have any rights? Could a Disney official who lives in the District own slaves? Could a brothel operate within the District? What about an opium den, or a meth lab? Would it be illegal for a visitor to bribe a Disney official to tolerate (or even facilitate) a hub for human trafficking? If authorities in Gainesville suspected that members of Disney EMS were sexually exploiting female patients, could the District obstruct the investigation by destroying evidence and medical records, and refusing to provide Gainesville police access to the suspects? What's to stop a high-ranking Disney executive from murdering someone within the District and then wielding their position within the company, which appears tantamount to legal authority, to effect a cover-up? | It is not the case that Walt Disney World [is] essentially a country within a country, a privately-owned nation in which the laws of the U.S. don't apply. It is true that the Florid legislature has essentially created a local government controlled by Disney, and granted it exemptions from or modifications of a number of state laws. In many ways Disney World is similar to a classic "Company Town". But this is not in any way an exemption from federal laws, nor can the state grant individual exemption from state laws: the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids any state to do that. Note that according to the same Wikipedia article cited in the question: Officers from Orange County, Osceola County and the Florida Highway Patrol are contracted to police the district. While the Disney Corporation no doubt has significant influence in these police departments, it does not directly control the hiring, training, and discipline of these contracted police officers. It surely does not "own the police". In any suits for civil rights violations (particularly section 1983 suits) the departments and the counties and the state would be defendants, and so have an incentive to abide by the rule of law and respect civil rights. Let us look at the items suggested in the question: Are people within the District protected from unreasonable search and seizure? (And is the definition of "unreasonable" importantly different than in the rest of the U.S.?) Yes they are. This right is granted by the US Fourth Amendment, and imposed on the states, and all local governments, via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth. The standards for what is "unreasonable" and all other search and seizure law, come from US Supreme Court decisions, and Disney's police are not exempt. Nor are Florida state police operating inside Disney's district. Are Miranda warnings required when District police arrest someone? Do people arrested by Disney police actually have any rights? Yes, Miranda warnings and other constitutional rights in regard to the police are also imposed by the Federal Fourteenth Amendment, and apply fully in the Disney District, just as they do in all other parts of the US. So do any rights granted by the Florida Stare constitution, and by general Florida laws. Could a Disney official who lives in the District own slaves? No. 18 USC Chapter 77 - PEONAGE, SLAVERY, AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS specifically prohibits this. Also Florida has state-wide laws against Human Trafficking (as all US States now do) and has not granted any exemption to this for the Disney District or its residents. Of course it happens far too often all across the US, but not because of any legal exemption. Could a brothel operate within the District? What about an opium den, or a meth lab? Florida could grant exceptions to its anti-prostitution laws, as Nevada has done, but to the best of my understanding it has not done so. Opium and Meth are both illegal under Federal law. Florida could (but has not) grant exemptions to the state drug laws, but could not affect the federal laws. Would it be illegal for a visitor to bribe a Disney official to tolerate (or even facilitate) a hub for human trafficking? Yes. Again this is prohibited by Federal as well as state law. Bribes to law enforcement to overlook crime do happen, but such bribes are themselves illegal. If authorities in Gainesville suspected that members of Disney EMS were sexually exploiting female patients, could the District obstruct the investigation by destroying evidence and medical records, and refusing to provide Gainesville police access to the suspects? Not lawfully. Local officials and police can and do obstruct and hinder state and even federal investigations in some cases, but doing so is itself a crime, and Disney officials are not exempt from such. Whether they could exert political and/or economic influence to obstruct a state investigation is hard to say, but doing so would not be lawful. What's to stop a high-ranking Disney executive from murdering someone within the District and then wielding their position within the company, which appears tantamount to legal authority, to effect a cover-up? Powerful local officials, members of law enforcement, and politically and/or economically powerful private individuals have engaged in cover-ups of various crimes in the past, and no doubt will do o in the future. The powers granted to the Disney District might facilitate such coverups, but that would not make such cover-ups lawful. They would not be lawful, although the law might be less well-enforced than in some other places. In short Disney is powerful, and has been granted some unusual legal powers and authorities, making it in effect a local government. But it is still bound by the same laws that bind all local governments, aside from any specific exemptions, and all Federal laws still apply in full. | I can't comment on what the legal situation would be in your home country, but as a matter of U.S. law, the hypothetical scenario you've described is not illegal. First, because you aren't a U.S. citizen and because you aren't operating in the United States, the U.S. government probably has no jurisdiction over you, your website, or your conduct. Even if it did, the most relevant statute, 18 U.S. Code § 1017, would not apply. The statute prohibits the "fraudulent or wrongful" use of the FBI's seal. But "fraudulent" and "wrongful" generally refer only to conduct where one uses deception or other means to obtain money, property, etc. to which they have no lawful entitlement. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399 (1973). Because you aren't using the seal to obtain anyone's property through deception, this use would not fall within the statute's proscriptions. Even if the government sought to prosecute you, you would have a valid First Amendment defense. The First Amendment protects the right to free speech, and it does not allow statements to be criminalized merely because they are false. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). This outcome should be unsurprising to most U.S. observers. I think most people would agree that the U.S. obviously cannot prosecute a Hollywood producer for making a movie dramatizing the FBI's efforts to shut down the Pirate Bay, even if it displayed the FBI's seizure message on a monitor in the course of the movie, and even if it showed the seal being used on a completely fictional website. The hypothetical you're describing is not materially different. In both cases, the seal is being used to falsely create the impression -- for entertainment purposes -- that the FBI has shut down a website. Saying false things for entertainment purposes is not a crime in the United States. | First of all, cruise ships are not lawless zones. At all times, the law of their country of registration applies. In addition, if they are in sovereign waters, that country's law applies. Also, many countries impose their law on ships that depart from their ports until they dock in another country's port. And finally, international maritime law applies (IML). In many ways, ships are some of the most heavily legalised places on Earth. Actions can be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction and that court will decide which law to apply. For example, a UK ship en route from Sydney to Noumea is governed by IML, UK law and NSW/Australian law while in NSW/International waters and will also be governed by New Caledonian law when it enters New Caledonian waters. Second, cruise ships do have a brig where people can and will be confined. The normal practice when someone commits a crime (like boarding without paying) and or breaks their contract with the cruise company is that that person is confined to the brig or their cabin and put off the ship at the next port of call. If there was a crime involved, they would be handed over to local law enforcement for investigation, prosecution and possibly extradition. If not then they would just be left on the dock - they would need to find their own way home. Usually, the cruise company would hand them a bill for the cost of their confinement, food etc.; if they pursue this debt or not is a different matter. A person without valid travel documents may find themselves in trouble with local immigration as well. Finally, boarding a cruise ship at sea without the cooperation of the ship would be damn near impossible. Even small cruise ships have 10 or more decks with the places where the ship can be accessed 2 or more decks (say 6-8m) above the waterline. If the ship was stationary it might be possible to throw up a rope I guess but if it was cruising at 12 knots, forget about it. | Article 175 of the Criminal Code says: A person who distributes, sells or displays in public an obscene document, drawing or other objects shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than 2 years, a fine of not more than 2,500,000 yen or a petty fine. The same shall apply to a person who possesses the same for the purpose of sale. This has been interpreted to require pixelization, blurring, censorship bars, or other means of obscuring genitalia. See the 2013 guilty plea by publishers of Core Magazine for an example prosecution under art. 175 for insufficient censorship. The law apparently does not reach material that is produced and edited and sold outside of Japan (even if filmed in Japan). See e.g. the discussion of Realm (1976) in Kirsten Fischer, The Art of Censorship in Postwar Japan, p. 198-199: [the film] was not prosecutable because of Ōshima’s innovative production strategy ... He had imported the film stock from France, shot the film in Kyoto, and then exported the undeveloped film back to France, where he developed and edited it and finally distributed it internationally, including importing it back to Japan. A "heavily cut form [was] eventually screened in Japan." | The powers given to law enforcement professionals will be detailed in the relevant law that establishes them. I would suspect that the decision to cordon off an area would fall within the purview of the officer on the scene; the idea that a police officer would need to seek permission before cordoning off a motor vehicle accident or chemical spill is unworkable. I would also suspect that other emergency personnel (e.g. ambulance and fire-fighters) would have similar powers. However, such cordoning off would be a temporary measure and if it was maintained for an unreasonable period it would be open to challenge through an administrative or judicial process. If the police decided that a feature was a permanent hazard then they could seek a court order on the owner of the property to provide some measure to adequately protect the public, by either removing the hazard or providing some permanent barrier, under whatever laws seemed most appropriate. | There will be a local rule regarding what police have to do with a person in custody. Here are the rules for Seattle. The main relevant rule is that they must take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of the detainee. They must use seat belts, unless the vehicle does not have seat belts in the detainee area. Additionally, they are not to respond to routine calls while transporting a detainee, but they may may respond to a threat to life safety. Typically, high speed response indicates a threat and not a noisy dog complaint. There is no obligation to refrain from responding, nor is there a requirement to release detainees. I don't think there is a clear and bright line: it comes down to what an officer would (in light of department instructions) judge to be reasonable. The officer may be wrong and the department may be wrong in what is legally "reasonable", and this could come out as a result of lawsuits and Dept. of Justice investigations. You can file a complaint with the Civil Rights division of the DoJ, see here. | Do flight attendants have an unlimited leeway of forcing the passengers to listen to their gibberish that are completely unrelated to their duties? Pretty much, I'd say. It may not be a good customer experience, but the flight attendant certainly isn't doing anything illegal. You don't have a legal right not to hear speeches that offend your IP sensibilities. I don't think it's legally any different than if they were showing an in-flight movie that you didn't like. If you try to forcibly stop him, you are likely to be found in violation of 49 USC 46504, which prohibits "assaulting or intimidating a flight crew member or flight attendant of the aircraft, interferes with the performance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessens the ability of the member or attendant to perform those duties". Even if making speeches about Mickey Mouse is not part of his duties, anything physical you did to try to stop him would likely tend to also lessen his ability to perform his actual duties. Violation of 49 USC 46504 is a felony and carries a prison term of up to 20 years. If you try to shout him down, you might be charged with disorderly conduct under state or local law, like this guy. You could probably push your call button to summon another flight attendant, and politely state that you object to the loquacious crew member's behavior, and could they please ask him to stop. Alternatively, you can put on your noise-cancelling headphones and turn up the volume on your music. Anything beyond that and you're in a bad legal position. Of course, you can certainly file a complaint with the airline after the fact. There's a fair chance you'll get an apology, maybe some extra air miles, and the flight attendant might be disciplined or fired. But that's an internal customer service or personnel matter; nothing to do with law. | Firstly, yours is not a valid argument. What is meant by "generally accessible" is public places like plazas, stretches of green by the road, parks, parking lots, etc. The definition is kind of a negative and could be more easily phrased as: "You may camp at A) designated camping areas or B) private places where you are entitled to camp". This means you either have to find a camping area where you pay a fee for a period of time, or you may camp on private grounds that either belong to you, or you have been given explicit permission to camp, say in a private garden or field. Of course this is practically impossible if you don't know anyone in there. But, the screenshot explicitly restricts this rule with the leading prase "Im Gemeindegebiet" which means if you leave the legal boundaries of Werfen, Salzburg county law applies (Which may or may not be similar). Disclaimer: While I don't have legal background, I can tell from personal experience that local governments are touchy on this and striking up camp somewhere where you are not allowed to will at least (if detected) require you to leave the premises immediately and the police may charge you with trespassing. |
What are you guilty of if you convince someone else to commit murder? Asking about the law in America... What crimes is a person guilty of if they convince or sweet-talk someone else into committing a murder for them? Are they an accessory or guilty of murder? Cases in point, who gets more serious charges if a wife convince her boyfriend to murder her husband? And why was Charles Manson found guilty of 7 counts of 1st degree, when everyone agrees he wasn't even present at four of those? | The laws on this will vary somewhat from state to state in the US. But in general, a person who convinces another to commit a murder might be convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, or accessory to murder. Being an accessory often carries the same penalties as being in principal, and in some jurisdictions there is no legal difference. In addition such a person might be charged with a violation of Federal law, specifically 18 USC 373 - Solicitation to commit a crime of violence. Subsection (a) provides that: (a) Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, solicits, commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such conduct, shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) fined not more than one-half of the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the crime solicited, or both; or if the crime solicited is punishable by life imprisonment or death, shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty years. In US law charges of "incitement" are limited by the "imminent lawless action" test laid down in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) The court opion in that case states: the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. This case held that a person may not be convicted of crime for speech advocating violence unless the advocacy is for immediate, present violence, or at least violence in the very near future, and there there must be significant likelihood of the violence actually occurring. This test has mostly been used in cases of public advocacy of violence to groups or crowds, but nothing prevents it from begin used in cases of one-on-one advocacy. See also the Wikipedia article "Incitement". I have not researched the specific charges in the Manson case. | Normally, making a poison is not in and of itself a crime. If a third party took the poison from the person who manufactured it without their knowledge, the manufacturer would generally not have criminal liability, at least in the absence of "gross criminal negligence" such as leaving the poison manufacturing location totally unsecured and letting people know that there was poison there for the taking. In a civil case, someone might sue the poison manufacturer for negligently securing their facility, but again, that would be a real stretch if even ordinary precautions (e.g. standard locks on doors and cabinets) were in place, or if it was an inside job theft. In the same way, a gun store owner is not usually liable criminally or civilly if someone steals a gun from his store and shoots someone with it. The police could certainly charge Person A with capital murder mistakenly believing him to have intended to kill and did kill someone with the poison, which would make the critical factual point establishing that Person B gave it to someone without Person A's knowledge. Person A might still be guilty of attempted murder if he intended to kill someone (not necessarily the person who was killed) with the poison but had not fully carried out the plot when the poison was stolen. Some places probably require a permit of some kind to make poisons, and if Person A didn't have a permit, he could probably also be charged with making poisons without a permit. | I am aware that American law has a concept of each member of a group being jointly responsible for the actions of other members of the group This is much too broadly stated to be accurate. There is no general law of group responsibility in the US. Under US law, when a group of people agree to do something jointly that is illegal, or using illegal means, they can all be charged with conspiracy, and the acts of one used in the trial of another. But it must be proven that an accused knowingly jointed in the conspiracy to convict that accused person. See 18 U.S. Code § 371 When one person assists another to commit a crime, in any of various ways, a charge of "accessory" or of "aiding and abetting" or of "being an accomplice" can be brought. But this will again involve proof that the accused knew that the conduct involved was criminal. Where a person commits or tries to commit a felony, alone or as part of a group, and a death results, the person can be charged with felony murder. A classic example is where an armed bank robbery occurs and one of the robbers is shot and killed by a guard. Each of the robbers may be charged with felony murder, even if none if them knew or intended that anyone be harmed or killed. But the felony must be one of a limited list provided by statute. The federal statute is 18 U.S. Code § 1111 which limits the crimes that can trigger the rule to "arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery". The DC code § 22–2101 limits the rule to arson, as defined in § 22-301 or § 22-302, first degree sexual abuse, first degree child sexual abuse, first degree cruelty to children, mayhem, robbery, or kidnaping, ... any housebreaking while armed with or using a dangerous weapon, or ... a felony involving a controlled substance Only a person who could be shown to have been committing or attempting one of the listed felonies could be charged with felony murder. Merely "being part of the crowd around the capital" would not provide grounds to charge anyone with felony murder, and to charge someone as accomplice to murder it would need to be shown that the accused intended someone to be killed. It might be that some few of the intruders could be charged with felony murder, depending on the exact facts, but probably most could not. See also What are the legal violations and criminal penalties likely to be for the protesters that entered the Capitol on January 6, 2021? | So, as you say, these witnesses who try to help their buddy out may be committing perjury. Also, D himself, by lining this up, is probably on the hook for conspiracy to commit perjury and being complicit in perjury. Aside from that, I think your question is: would getting people to testify in a way that implies they did the crime lead to an acquittal for the murderer? The answer is: maybe. The jury will either vote to acquit or to convict. If the jury votes to acquit, then it's over. Double jeopardy protects D from being tried for murder again. But, if the jury votes to convict, the fact that D had his friends testifying in the way you suggest isn't going to get the conviction overturned on appeal because "a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts." People v. Young, 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 (Cal. 2005). I haven't done a trial yet, but it strikes me that that might not be the greatest trial strategy. I think generally defense lawyers would prefer to make their client look the furthest thing from gang affiliated as possible. Don't lie to a court or ask anyone to lie to a court for you. | It depends on the jurisdiction, but generally speaking, this will not permit you to evade criminal responsibility. In Ohio, for instance, the complicity statute treats the conduct you're describing as equivalent to soliciting another to commit an offense or to aiding and abetting another in committing an offense: No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. The penalty for complicity is the same as for the underlying offense, so you don't really get any kind of break for running your offense through an innocent party; you just get a pissed off witness who can testify against you. | Yes, because the crimes are different instances. Let's remove the guilty plea and the fact that it is murder: can a person assault a person, be tried and imprisoned, then assault the same person later – and get off by declaring "Double jeopardy!". No, it's not the same crime. It's the same type of crime, and involves the same victim, but it is still a different crime. The same with your proposed scenario. (Incidentally, your first line is wrong: the woman wasn't murdered, she was thought to have been murdered). | Firstly, there is no jurisdiction in the US where rape is a potentially capital crime, and murder is not - so you are discussing a hypothetical (and rather implausible) jurisdiction. Given your jurisdiction is hypothetical, you can make the law be what you would like. Secondly, duress is accepted in almost all jurisdictions as a defence to a charge of anything except homicide (and some jurisdictions allow it to reduce the severity of a homicide charge). Courts can be reluctant to accept a charge of duress, but a bullet wound would probably be persuasive. I don't know if someone who had just been shot would be physically able to perform though. The precise crimes the perpetrator is guilty of would depend on your specific jurisdiction, but I would expect at least: rape (because they organized it) kidnap shooting the brother | Laws vary by state, of course. In Wisconsin, according to the 1993 case State v. Neumann: the offense of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse does not require proof of intent and therefore someone who claimed to be too drunk to know what he was doing was still guilty. Although that was a case involving adults and therefore a different statute, I think the statutes are similar enough to produce a similar result in a case involving a minor. But even though intent isn't required, according to the 2007 case State v. Lackershire she's still be not guilty in Wisconsin. It flat out says that: If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. Additionally, in your case, there was a gun to her head. Under Wisconsin law, the woman could not be guilty of statutory rape, because of this law: 939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. The paper you link to mentions several possible defenses like coercion, and how each defense is not applicable in some states. I don't think it ever clearly establishes that there is a state where there is no defense. The example you (and the paper) give occurred in Florida. I couldn't find an applicable statute in Florida law, but that appears to be because it's in common law instead of a statute. According to the 1981 Florida case Wright v. State: Florida has recognized the common law defense of duress as a defense to crimes other than homicide so I don't think the woman would have been guilty under Florida law, either. The paper states that she was in fear for her life and that of her daughters, and it is extremely apparent in hindsight that her fear was reasonable. I imagine that if the author was able to find an actual case where a victim was prosecuted under similar circumstances (or even one where the victim clearly could have been prosecuted under the law of that state) he would have used that case as his example instead. It seems that he couldn't... and that might tell you something. He probably used this example because it was sensational, but it doesn't seem that the woman was guilty under applicable law. |
Who creates uniform trial court & supplementary rules? States and counties in the U.S.A. can have court rules, such as: New York State's Administrative Rules of the Unified Court System & Uniform Rules of the Trial Courts Oregon's Uniform Trial Court Rules and Supplementary Local Rules Georgia's Court Rules (including uniform rules) Louisiana's Court Rules Who sets these rules? If it's not the legislature, by what authority? | In most US states such rules are set by the state's highest court, often but not always known as the State Supreme Court. The legislature could set such rules, but normally does not. It may authorize the court to do so. Mote that the Oregon rules (on a page easy to reach for the one linked above) say: Proposed changes to the Uniform Trial Court Rules (UTCR) and Supplementary Local Rules (SLR) are reviewed annually by the UTCR Committee. The committee makes recommendations to approve, disapprove or modify these proposals. After considering these recommendations, the Chief Justice or the entire Supreme Court, reaches a final decision on whether to approve or disapprove a proposed change. The Georgia rules state: **Rule 1. PREAMBLE **- Pursuant to the inherent powers of the Court and Article VI, Section IX, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, and in order to provide for the speedy, efficient and inexpensive resolution of disputes and prosecutions, these rules are promulgated. Rule 1.6 The Council of Superior Court Judges shall have a permanent committee to recommend to the Supreme Court such changes and additions to these rules as may from time to time appear necessary or desirable. [Emphasis added] Many other states have somewhat similar procedures. Others including NY and California, set more of the rules by statute. On the Federal level, the various Federal Rules of Procedure (Civil, Criminal, and Supreme Court, perhaps others) are set by the Supreme Court, although they are usually drafted by an ABA committee Court appointed advisory committee and submitted to the Court for approval, I understand. Many (but not all) state rules closely imitate the Federal rules, down to the numbering and wording in many cases. | If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected. | Someone has pulled a sample motion of this type off of PACER (the public access Internet portal to civil filings in federal court). The example is more formal and structured than a lot of state court motion practice would be, however (e.g. few state court's require or encourage motions with a table of contents and a table of authorities). This example is 36 pages long, and many states don't even allow motions to run for more than 10-15 pages without leave of the court to do so in advance. There is a New Jersey federal court example here which is also on the formal and fussy side (although, in part, because the motion isn't just an arbitration motion and is also raising several additional unrelated issues which if omitted would cut it in half). See also one here. Another example, from a California state court, is closer to the mark for a typical state court filing. A court that handles residential landlord-tenant matters is probably even more "casual" and probably expects motions to get to the point more quickly. The core content is probably solid, although it would have to be customized to reference the state law statutory and procedural rules rather than the federal rules of civil procedure, and to analyze and set forth the facts of your case rather than those of some random person whose pleading is linked. This would also have to be adopted to state court practice standard, which typically uses different formatting for captions, signature blocks, whether or not line numbering is required, etc., and is often subject to other requirements. Some require that a certificate of service be filed as a separate document, while others routinely incorporate it in the main document. Many state courts require that a proposed order be submitted with a motion as a matter of state or local court rules, a few states require a cover sheet to be filed with motions, many states require you to confer with the other side in the case and to recite their position opposing or supporting the motion, or something in between, before filing it, and some courts require you to notify them once the deadline for a response has passed, regarding whether an opposition has been filed to the motion's request for relief or not. Similarly, some states courts require that motions be "verified" (i.e. have their allegations confirmed under oath) or supported by an affidavit setting forth the factual matters alleged in them. New York State structures a lot of motions as "orders to show cause" in which the court preliminarily reviews the relief requested and issues an order telling the other side that it will do something if they don't file an objection showing good cause for the court not to rule in that way by a given day, which must be formally delivered (i.e. "served") upon the other side by a deadline. I don't know if New Jersey local motion practice is similar. Many court systems also charge a "new case" filing fee for motions to compel arbitration that does not apply to other kinds of motions. Ideally, you'd want to review some motions (about pretty much anything) to get a feel for how this is usually done in New Jersey. | There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney. | While the answer by Jen does a good job explaining why some possible alternative structures for US courts of appeal (circuit courts) would be unworkable, the real reason why we have such courts is their historical origin. In the United states, Justices of the Supreme Court regularly traveled through the country. They would stop at particular locations, and hold court together with the local judge of a district court as a two-judge court. Appeals from district court decisions were heard. Some were passed along to the full Supreme Court, particularly ones in which the Justice did not agree with the judge. Each Justice had a route, or "circuit" which that Justice covered once or twice a year on horseback (or by carriage) spending half or more of his time "riding circuit". The process was quite onerous, and was by far the larger part of the work of a Justice. It allowed decisions to be reviewed by a Supreme Court member at places physically closer to the original trials, and served as a filter on cases to be decided by the full court. This practice was derived from the older English practice of having Justices in Iter (later known as circuit judges) who traveled through the country, judging cases that had been held awaiting their arrival. (The word "Iter" is related to "Itinerary", the list of places one is scheduled to visit.) The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 by G. Edward White (ISBN 978-0195070590) includes a detailed description of the process of circuit riding during the period of 1815-1835, and the way in which proceeding in the circuit courts influenced constitutional jurisprudence and how cases came to the Supreme Court. I recommend this extensive book for better understanding of the origins of many features of the US Judicial system. Some years after the US Civil war the Circuit Courts officially became the Courts of Appeals and Supreme Court justices stopped "riding circuit", but the geographical divisions continued to be called "circuits", and each circuit is still supervised by a single Justice, who rules on "emergency" applications, often for stays of judgement, or for injunctions. The division of the US court system into circuits thus is due as much to historical inertia as to careful design, although an alternate design that was an improvement would not be easy to create. | There is no such law mandating this layout, nor is there any law permitting the defendant to demand a change to it. The arrangement seems most likely to have been driven by security concerns when courts began removing "the dock" and letting the defendant past the bar to sit with his attorneys. One court has also concluded that it was meant to assist the government "because it bears the burden of proof." It's of course impossible to prove a negative like this, but I'll note that Kenneth Lay's attorneys raised the issue in the Enron case, and they were unable to cite a single case saying that the defendant has the option to sit closer to the jury. If they couldn't find it, it probably doesn't exist. Meanwhile, the government was able to find several cases saying that the defendant does not have the right to demand a change, though it did not have any cases saying that the layout is mandatory. Instead, it described itself as "traditionally" having a right to the table. In that case, the judge ended up splitting the baby. Saying that there was "no law" to inform his decision, he sat the government next to the jury during its case, and it sat the defense next to the jury during its case. That was quite a bit more generous than the Seventh Circuit, which has rejected the jury-proximity argument as frivolous. So there are some cases addressing the issue, but I don't know of any case where a court has actually looked at the issue and given any real consideration to the due-process implications of the substantial empirical evidence suggesting that the party closest to the jury enjoys an advantage. | No The importance of following precedent, and the principle of stare decisis were inherited by the early US legal system from the British Common Law system, and have been taken as part of the natural order of the legal system by US courts ever since. This extends even to a court overruling itself. US Courts are notoriously reluctant to overrule their past decisions, even when current court members agree, However they will do so from time to time. The US Supreme Court in particular will flatly overturn previous decisions, especially on Constitutional issues, when it thinks there is no other way to achieve a proper outcome, although it often prefers to distinguish the prior decision without actually overruling it. I think the fastest and most extreme case where the US Supreme Court overruled itself was that of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the second flag-salute case. (This was also a particularly significant case.) This reversed Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) a case on the exact same issue, only three years previously, and a vote of 8-1 on the first case became a vote of 6-3 the other way, with only one new Justice on the Court. Only Justice Frankfurter, the author of the fist decision, issued a dissenting opinion in the Barnette case, and no other Justice formally joined that opinion. | united-states In Colorado (which is an outlier among U.S state court systems), trial court judge in the state court system has a duty to rule on pending motions within three months, and if they do not, a litigant can, after providing certain notices to the judge and appropriate authorities in the court administration office move to have the judge's paycheck suspended until the judge rules. In practice, even most lawyers don't know that this rule exists. Those lawyers who are aware of this rule virtually never utilize it, out of the well founded belief that it only makes sense to do so if you are a client in a very time dependent situation whom you are certain the judge will rule against when the judge actually gets around to ruling and you want to get on to the appellate process quickly for the client. Even then, the prevailing assumption is that the judge will be prejudiced against litigant in all discretionary matters for the rest of the case, and that the lawyer for that litigant will be at a disadvantage before that judge for the rest of his or her legal career. Colorado has no similar duty for municipal court judges or administrative law judges (who are not administrative part of the state judicial branch), or for appellate court judges. Likewise, there is no such duty in federal court. In an extreme circumstance, a state court litigant could file a Colorado Appellate Rule 21 motion (formerly called a writ of mandamus) with the Colorado Supreme Court seeking interlocutory relief from the excessive delay, and a federal court litigant in an Article III federal trial court could seek parallel interlocutory relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Circuit in which the trial court is located. But, either way, the likelihood of the relevant appellate court actually granting interlocutory relief for excessive delay by a trial court in addressing a pending matter is virtually nil, unless the case is one statutorily entitled to priority scheduling such as election law cases, protective order cases, and in Colorado state court, in certain civil cases involving very elderly parties. By way of example, I have had civil cases in which dispositive motions have been fully briefed and awaiting a ruling from a judge in both a general jurisdiction state trial court, and also in a different federal court, in which no ruling was forthcoming for more than a year after the matter was fully briefed. It isn't terribly unusual when appellate court rulings are released, to see that the oldest case ruled upon (often an appeal of a serious criminal conviction) that day was filed five or more years before the opinion is issued, even though once a trial court record is transmitted to the court (which typically takes three to six months), and there are typically only three or four appellate briefs to be filed plus half an hour of oral argument to conduct once the case is fully briefed for the appellate judges to consider before ruling. There are rare cases where proceedings can be even slower due to exigent circumstances. For example, I once had a limited jurisdiction civil case that went to trial over automobile repairs in which the presiding judge who had heard all of the testimony and taken careful notes from it had a serious health incident the evening after the last day of the trial, leaving him hospitalized for seven months, and in which it was discovered that the tape recorder that was supposed to have recorded the trial court proceedings that could have been used to create a transcript for use by another judge to rule on the case was broken and had recorded nothing. A year after the trial was completely and the judge had recovered and returned to work, we got the judge's ruling that he otherwise would have provided within a week (because that would have been his normal practice, not because he was required to do so) had he not been hospitalized. Needless to say, no one can tell the U.S. Supreme Court to speed up ruling on a matter in any binding way. There are some exceptions to this in U.S. criminal law trial practice at both the state and local and at the federal level, where there is a constitutional right to a speedy trial that if abridged results in the dismissal of charges against the defendant, and there are a few other deadlines of a similar character related to the post-conviction process. There is also a very short deadline in criminal cases, once a defendant is arrested, for the defendant to have a first appearance before a judge. |
Deed poll name changes alter egos If deed polls are a legal way to change your name in the UK, then what will prevent deed polls from being used to legally create alter egos for yourself, and you to enter into contracts with one of your own alter egos? | A change of name is just that - it's a change; not the creation of an alter ego. From How to make your own deed poll: Use the following wording: “I [old name] of [your address] have given up my name [old name] and have adopted for all purposes the name [new name]. And from the Form LOC19 guidance document: I ABSOLUTELY and entirely renounce relinquish and abandon the use of my old name and assume adopt and determine to take and use from the date of this Deed my new name in substitution for my old name. | UK, Identity Documents Act 2010, false identity documents etc: Possession of false identity documents etc with improper intention (1) It is an offence for a person (“P”) with an improper intention to have in P's possession or under P's control— (a) an identity document that is false and that P knows or believes to be false, (b) an identity document that was improperly obtained and that P knows or believes to have been improperly obtained, or (c) an identity document that relates to someone else. Each of the following is an improper intention— (a) the intention of using the document for establishing personal information about P; (b) the intention of allowing or inducing another to use it for establishing, ascertaining or verifying personal information about P or anyone else. ... Possession of false identity documents etc without reasonable excuse (1) It is an offence for a person (“P”), without reasonable excuse, to have in P's possession or under P's control— (a) an identity document that is false, (b) an identity document that was improperly obtained, ... Such an identity document could be an "an immigration document", "a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation" or "a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport" (e.g. a European country's identity card). | Can I sign legal documents with a smiley face? Yes, that is lawful. A person's signature does not necessarily have to include the person's name or initials. What matters is that the signature reliably and unequivocally identifies the person who produces it, which apparently you have been able to prove by showing your driver's license. The Black's Law Dictionary (4th Edition) states in its entry for signature that "whatever mark, symbol, or device one may choose to employ as representative of himself is sufficient". It directs to the entry for sign, which likewise speaks in terms of "any mark, as upon a document, in token of knowledge, approval, acceptance or obligation". Accordingly, your signature qualifies as mark or symbol that fits these purposes. Your history of signing other legally binding documents that way further reinforces the authenticity of your signature. If it is legal, is it a bad idea? It is a bad idea to the extent (if any) that (1) others can easily forge your signature (notwithstanding that forgery or identity theft might be proved circumstantially); and (2) verifying your identity may cause hassle or annoyance to you and/or third parties. But this paragraph obviously is applicable to any and all signatures, not just those which at first glance may seem to be a joke. | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | From the German lawyer association ("Deutscher Anwaltverein") one can find the following (Google-translation): In the case of a purely preventive identity check, the officers are initially only allowed to determine the identity of the respondent. This means that you can ask for your name, date and place of birth, home address and nationality and have your ID shown - by the way, as a German citizen you don't have to always have your ID with you. "You don't have to answer any questions beyond that," says lawyer Robert Hotstegs from the German Lawyers' Association (DAV). Of course, police officers often try to gather more information with emphatically casual questions. "Well, where do we come from" or: "And where are we going now?" Are typical examples. The police are not allowed to insist on an answer. Anyone who, as a respondent, is voluntarily too willing to provide information can harm themselves and possibly even give rise to concrete suspicions. So they are allowed to ask such things, but you don't need to answer everything. How to handle such situations, again according to the link above: “I recommend answering the survey as briefly and politely as possible. This has a de-escalating effect and helps to end the unpleasant situation as quickly as possible, ”says Attorney Hotstegs. However, you should always answer the questions about yourself. Because if the police cannot determine the identity of a person or only with great effort, they may take further measures to determine the identity. This includes taking it to the police station and, under certain circumstances, a search. Otherwise, these measures are not permitted without a specific reason. | If you form an LLC, and then someone later obtains a registered trademark in the same name, the registered trademark would be enforceable everywhere except in the markets and places where the LLC developed common law trademark rights prior to their registration. Your LLC formation would also put a bump in the road in their trademark application. You can, of course, do both, although it is unclear to me why you feel such urgency in the likelihood of an infringement, which suggests that there may be relevant facts that aren't revealed by your post. | In england-and-wales there is no legal requirement, in the private sector, to advertise vacancies and employers can recruit whoever they choose as long as they do not commit unlawful direct or indirect discrimination and follow their own internal HR policies. Re: In the western hemisphere is it quite legal for employers to do things like... Exclude close family/marital relations of existing employees? YES Exclude internal applicants from consideration for jobs for which they have relevant qualifications? YES Hire non-local (here defined as those who can commute to work from their existing home) candidates in preference to local ones similarly qualified? YES Hire foreigners where they have suitable work permits? YES Summarily hire members of the business owner's family? YES as long as they are not "phantom" employees only put on the books soley to evade tax liabilities by, for example, paying a salary when they don't do any actual work. | The recognition of other country’s passports is a courtesy Each nation is sovereign over its own borders. So who they allow in (and out) is a matter for them. For example, many Arab countries will ban your entry if you have an Israeli stamp in your passport no matter what nationality it is. So, yes, any country can decide not to record sex in a passport and, yes, there may be consequences in other nations. |
What is the legal basis for terminating contracts with Russian residents? This question is not about politics, it's purely about law. Recently, a number of companies announced that they will be terminating contracts with anyone who has Russian registration. One example is IONOS web and domain hosting: Ukraine Conflict – Cancellation of Your Account Dear XXX, As you may already be aware from IONOS's public statements, IONOS has made the difficult decision to no longer provide services to Russian and Belarusian customers. While we understand that you may not personally support the war in Ukraine or the policies which led up to the war, it's important that IONOS make clear our support for the people and country of Ukraine. With that in mind, your account will be terminated effective 16/03/22, so please transfer all of your data, domain names, and any related email addresses to another provider no later than the termination date. After the termination date, any domains which are not transferred will resolve to an error page until the domain expiry date, and any data associated with your account will be deleted. If you believe your website provides information services that are critical to the defense of Ukraine or which assist in ensuring the safety and well-being of the Ukrainian people, please reach out to us directly and an IONOS representative will review your site as a possible exception to the company's general policy on terminations. Please note that IONOS will make any such determination in its sole and unfettered discretion, without any obligation to you. In case you need support, please contact our Customer Service team at: 1-484-254-5555. We stand with Ukraine! Here's what seems to be their Terms&Conditions: https://www.ionos.com/terms-gtc/general-terms-and-conditions/ I read through it, and I find these clauses remotely relevant: IONOS may terminate this Agreement at any time for any reason, with or without cause, upon thirty days' written notice In my understanding, this doesn't apply, because they're giving only 8 days of prior notice. You represent and warrant that you are not a national or resident of Burma/Myanmar, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Serbia, Sudan, and Syria or any other country subject to U.S. Treasury Department embargo restrictions To my knowledge, Russia is not embargoed. In the event of "force majeure" (as defined below), IONOS may terminate this Agreement without liability to you. For purposes of the Agreement, "force majeure" shall mean circumstances or occurrences beyond IONOS’s reasonable control, whether or not foreseeable at the time of entering into the Agreement, in consequence of which IONOS cannot reasonably be required to perform its obligations hereunder or otherwise perform its obligations under the Agreement. IONOS is an internet service, which to my knowledge is rendered outside of Russian soil. Therefore I don't see a way to declare that IONOS is "cannot reasonably be required to perform its obligations" in such situation. Also, by the time of their decision, there is no war on Russian soil. | The "letter" you quote says more than what Ionos says publicly, the latter not mentioning any date. The most obvious possibility is Treasury Department sanctions against Russia: while the sanctions don't necessarily prohibit servicing and any all Russian nationals or residents, Russia is subject to sanctions and that's what the TOS says. A problem is that the TOS refers to a "country subject to U.S. Treasury Department embargo restrictions", which is not legally defined. Here is the Treasury Department's explanation of that point (which is that there are very many types of restrictions: there is no legal category of "embargo restrictions"). One could then argue, in one's breach of contract arbitration hearing, that the clause cannot reasonably be interpreted the way the company (possibly) intends it to be. The force majeure clause does not seem relevant unless they see some way in which the invasion of Ukraine makes it impossible for the company to fulfill the contract with Russians. | Don't do it. It is of course breach of contract when you signed a contract with no intention to fulfil it. However, you are talking about Germany. German employers take a very dim view of this. While a UK employer would say "good riddance" and do nothing, many German employers would see that as a personal insult. It's something that you just don't do in Germany. There's a good chance that they will do what they can to make you miserable if you do this. For example, inform authorities that you just cancelled your contract which may get a visa cancelled. Or tell the company that you want to start with, which will also take a very dim view of this. Or sue you for damages, not because they want to get the money, but to make you miserable. On the other hand, if they send you a contract, and you sign it, you have a contract. | [I'm not so well-versed on US and Russian law, thus I will limit my answer to EU law.] Your specific use of a user identifier, as I understood from your question, can be classified as personal data, so in your case, the GDPR seems to apply. This means that you need to have a) legitimate purposes to process that personal data (e.g. crash reporting) and b) a legal justification for each purpose of processing: it could be based on consent or another legitimate purpose (inc. your own legitimate interests). Consent might not be the best option for you, but it's up to you to decide. In any case, you need to assess the risks to the data subjects (your users) before you decide. How likely is it that you will get breached, and what potential harm will that cause to your users? These are some guidelines; my recommendation is that you read the law and the guidelines by the Article 29 Working Group and European Data Protection Board, or hire some good experts on this. There is no easy answer, or one size fits all solution. The GDPR isn't so hard to understand or implement, but it does require some change in mindset. With the new law, processing personal data carries a higher risk of penalties, so you should do it only when it's absolutely necessary, and with respect to the rights of your users. | Given a large database of email addresses that you can't prove have given consent to receive email, the only legal thing to do with it, is to (securely) delete it. (I am going to switch your question about a larger company to a bank: in the UK, big pharma is forbidden from advertising to individuals.) In principle the rules are the same for a huge bank and everything down to a self-employed plumber. In practice the plumber will be told "don't do that again" rather than fined. This case was treated under the Data Protection Act, which has a maximum fine of £500,000 – so a big bank would probably have been fined more, but not necessarily much more. Under GDPR, fines are related to turnover, so the fine would be a lot bigger for a large bank. The incident is a year old now. Details here. | Much of your ability to sue the email company for damages depends on local and Estonian laws, but the most important aspect is the TOS and user agreement you agreed to when you originally signed up for the service. Read it (though if the portal is now off-line, it may not be accessible). You may have agreed to hold the company not liable for any damages from loss or stolen data, and you may have also agreed to arbitration and to not pursue them in court. It all depends on what is (was) in that agreement, so find a copy of it; though it's possible that some local or Estonian laws may supersede any contractual agreement with the company. And FYI, the email you received concerning the video and demanding payment in Bitcoin is a common scam right now, and the threat may indeed be meaningless. | does the email chain above set out a legally binding contract, would it stand up to the test in a court Generally speaking, yes, unless you signed a "more formal" contract thereafter. The more formal contract would supersede the email chain. Furthermore, the subsequent conduct by both parties evidences the existence of a contract. The fact that you have been provided with the service and that you have been charged for these ~12 months evidences the formation and existence of a contract. is the breach of contract sufficient to give us grounds to terminate the contract? Yes. To substantiate a claim of breach of contract, you will need to provide evidence that the "24/7/365 support line" is missing or unacceptably subpar in that it has caused you losses (such as downtime and consequent impact on your operations), or that such pattern of service disruptions would subject your company to imminent risk of losses if you were forced to stay in the contract for the remaining ~24 months (obviously, you will need to establish that this item or feature is not just incidental to the contract). | ...due to the international registration of multiple domains to generate ad revenue by recycling stories across sock puppet networks, giving the impression of multiple, independent companies. None of that is illegal on its face. Internet domains are freely registerable by anyone, anywhere (with the exception of some laws in some nations that restrict such Internet-related activity), and registered privately or publicly, and websites can be hosted anywhere. Writing articles and "spinning" and copying articles (even if that writing is sales gibberish in broken English) among the same copyright owner is legal, and using the same design and layout for a network of sites is legal. The formation of multiple, related companies and shell companies to give the impression that companies are separate and independent is legal (again, with the exception of some business and corporate laws in some nations that restrict such activity). These are all common business practices. Some business practices may appear to be unethical - trying to fool customers in order to make money and get clicks and sell ads. And what you may be feeling is that such activity is unethical. And that's OK. But feeling that they are unethical doesn't make the practices illegal. Many common activities that are considered to be unethical are illegal; but not all. Buyer beware. One way some of that activity may be illegal is if those articles are factually incorrect and promote quack medical treatments, are financial scams requiring payments, are gambling sites or promote other clearly illegal things. But then you get into the complexity of exactly how they are illegal, which jurisdictions are involved, and on and on. | This is an interesting hypothetical. In this scenario, Country Z does not have jurisdiction to enforce such a law on foreign nationals, unless Country Z has an extradition treaty with Country A. Generally, however, these types of laws would never be enforced as they are egregious abuses of government, and could possibly be elevated to the International Court of Justice if Country Z actually charges any individuals with such a crime. In these instances, however, war is a very unlikely scenario, since this would often be expensive and any escalation would most likely be small skirmishes that would lead to an eventual ceasefire, with the encouragement of the international community, without the involvement of UN Peacekeeping troops. |
What is agreement in the same sense? I'm looking at this site which writes to state The parties to the agreement must have agreed about the subject matter of the agreement in the same sense and at the same time There are simplistic instances online such as the one about an object being purchased from an antique store by a customer for it's aesthetics - and then being discovered to be a fake whereby an action for breach of contract is not applicable because the customer apparently made the purchase for it's aesthetics. I don't understand this because it seems to me the purchase being made in an antique shop would mandate a fake immediately becomes a breach of contract. How is the 'same sense and same time' worded into a contract? | The site that you provide is explaining basics of contract law, and that quote attempts to explicate (and they refer to) the Latin maxim consensus ad idem, generally explained in modern language as "meeting of the minds". Here is a brief overview of that legal concept. The basis idea is that the parties are talking about the same thing. An example of a lack of meeting of the minds is here, where a complainant agreed to withdraw a complaint in exchange for a service pin plus "any/all straight time compensation" lost. It was later established that the complainant believed that this included time off from work on sick leave, but the agency held that this had already been compensated – thus the parties did not agree to what was "compensation lost". The "agreement" was thus found to be void, because the parties did not in fact agree on the meaning of the terms. Your purported example would not indicate a lack of meeting of the minds, though it might indicate fraud. A lack of meeting of the minds could arise if the seller intended objects A, C to be items on offer but the buyer believed objects A, B, D to be the offer. It should be noted that the law does not let a person get out of a contract simply by declaring "I thought that...", the courts will look at the objective evidence as to what the parties did believe. | You are entitled to at least see, and probably get a copy of, any document you sign. If you insist, they will have to show you or give you a copy. It may well be that they are supposed to give you a copy even if you do not ask. But if you are going to insist, allow a bit of extra time at such appointments. If they describe the document, even in rather general terms, your signature is probably binding, unless they have significantly misrepresented the document. If they tell you it is consent to be treated and it is actually an agreement to purchase a timeshare, that would be fraud and the document would not be valid, but that would be very unlikely. There might be some provision that you do not like, but such agreements are usually fairly standard, and also usually not very negotiable if you want service at that office. Still, it is better practice to at least look over and get a copy of any document you agree to. | What credit agreement? A credit agreement involves someone advancing you money which you agree to pay back with interest - there is nothing like this here. You entered a contract for the course the terms of which were that, at your election, you could either pay upfront or pay by monthly instalments. That's not a credit agreement, it's a straightforward contract for services with alternative payment terms. One of the other terms was that if you withdrew then the full amount would be immediately payable. Under normal contract law principles, this is all fine. Consumer Law Under UK consumer law, you have a right to cancel a contract for services formed off-premises if you do so within 14 days. "... around 1 week and then around another week ..." might be within 14 days; if it is, you are entitled to a full refund; if it isn't, you owe the money. There are also rules about what information they needed to give you. If they haven't then they have committed an offence and the contract may also be void. | You mean like this? Of course, a website can charge you to access its pages; many do. And yes, clicking on an "I agree" button can form a valid contract (just visiting the website can't). Historically, the law has adopted the position that if you sign it (including by clicking "I agree") you read it, you understood it and you agreed to it. It's hard to imaging how it could be otherwise because allowing people to get out of contracts by saying "I never read it" is problematical as well. However, there are two things that mitigate against the type of term you suggest; one practical and one legal. Practical: How do they get your money? They can ask for your credits card details and, if they do and you give them a court will probably come to the conclusion that you knowingly and willingly agreed to pay for the service. However, if they don't have any method of getting money from you, they would have to take you to court to do so. There are a number of practical problems with this like: who are you? where are you? Which court can they sue you in etc. Legal: At common law, there exists the doctrine of unconscionability that describes terms that are so extremely unjust, or overwhelmingly one-sided in favour of the party who has the superior bargaining power, that they are contrary to good conscience. Such terms are legally unenforcable. Further, in many jurisdictions, consumer protection law often give additional protections up to and including not enforcing terms that are merely unfair not just unconscionable. | I think you will find that "sign" here means "mark" and includes a word, a phrase, or a logo, or a combination of any of these. Indeed section 6 of the act defines this: "sign" includes the following or any combination of the following, namely, any letter, word, name, signature, numeral, device, brand, heading, label, ticket, aspect of packaging, shape, colour, sound or scent. The main test is whether the two marks are "confusingly similar" or whether prospective customers are likely to be confused into thinking that one seller is actually the other, or into attributing to one the goodwill or reputation of the other. (This standard is much the same under US law or the laws of a good many other countries.) This is a very fact-intensive determination, and is to some extent a judgement call. But a difference in one letter only, with little or no difference in sound, might well be sufficiently similar to cause confusion. Note that section 10 of the law defines this: For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion, and thus this might well be a case of infringement. Note that for infringement to be found, in addition to the marks being "deceptively similar", the goods or services must also be similar or in the same category, (or goods "closely related" to protected services or vice versa) unless the mark being infringed on is "well known". | In other words, you are asking if the contract is exclusive. My own opinion is that there is more than one fair reading of the contract language in isolation. One possible reading is that "for repairs to the property motorcycles" has an implied meaning "for repairs to all of the property motorcycles of Blue" and the other is that it has an implied mean "for repairs to all of the property motorcycles of Blue that it directs us to do work upon." My first step to resolve that ambiguity would be to look at the definition of "property motorcycles" in the contract, and also to any other terms of the contract that would suggest that it is an "exclusive" contract as opposed to a master "supply" contract with an indefinite amount of work. For example, if the price were a fixed one every month, not dependent upon how much work was done, that would tend to suggest an exclusive contract. Similarly, if the contract also contained a geographic scope or a non-competition term that would suggest that it was an exclusive contract. On the other hand, if the arrangement were a fee for service payment and the mechanics under the contract of arranging for maintenance were such that this was really up to Blue, it might be read differently. If the entire language of the contract read together left the ambiguity in place, it would be appropriate to look to extrinsic evidence such as the course of dealings of the parties and the discussions that went into negotiating the contract in order to determine the intent of the parties at the time that the contract was entered into in order to resolve that ambiguity. It isn't at all uncommon for the meaning of a contract term in isolation to have more than one possible reading when taken in isolation. Often, it is necessary to refer to a greater context to describe its meaning. Sometimes, the overall context will even demand that a term in a contract be given the reading that is less plausible when it is read in isolation because the overall context of the contract manifests an intent and scheme that makes the more obvious reading a poor fit to the overall scheme of the agreement. | A salvage title does not negate the value of a vehicle. If there was no fraud (lying about the title) on the owner's part, and if there was actual offer and acceptance (not "negotiations in progress") then the agreement should be binding – but you would have to read the agreement to see if there are any escape clauses that would allow either party to escape the consequences of the agreement. | Since the contingency is in the contract and has not been removed, if the purchase falls through due to not selling the existing property, they will get their earnest money back. That was the whole point of putting the contingency in the contract in the first place. |
Is it ever legally permitted for a landlord to withold/seize a tenant's posessions in exchange for owed rent arrears? From everything I've seen online, it seems not, but I've heard a few credible individuals claim that they are allowed to do that. I think there must be some kernel of truth in it, or I wouldn't have heard multiple credible people say that. If it's never legally permitted for a landlord to do this in the UK, was it ever? When did it stop being the case? If it is allowed, what circumstances is it allowed under? | Ultimately yes, this can and does happen, but there are a few steps necessary before the bailiffs come to your door. In times gone by, the common law recognized a right to "distrain for rent", meaning that a landlord could come round to the tenant and seize some property as security (up to the value of the rent owed). If the rent is not then paid within a certain time, the goods could be sold. Various additional provisions of law covered the circumstances around forcing entry, breaking open locked cupboards, and searching off the premises for goods which the tenant had concealed. There were also special-case rules about what could be seized, such as a statute of the seventeenth century saying (among other things) that landlords could not harvest growing crops, but could take already-cut sheaves. Subsequent reforms for the protection of tenants have made it so that landlords cannot do this at their whim. They first have to go to the County Court for a judgement that there is an unpaid debt. (In fact, this and subsequent steps can happen with any debt.) On that basis, they can apply for a "warrant of control", under which an "enforcement officer", commonly called a bailiff, will take charge of collecting the money owed. There are quite a few steps and rules here, but the basic position is the same in terms of being able to take your stuff. And it is not the landlord walking around making those decisions, but a court-appointed officer. The previous common-law "distress" process is now totally abolished, for most tenants by the Housing Act 1988, and for everybody in 2014, because of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 section 71, which simply states The common law right to distrain for arrears of rent is abolished. Commercial property has its own legal regime since that Act, but previously functioned in the same way. So landlords can no longer seize your property on their own, but they can go through a few hoops and ask a court to do it. They also do not get to keep the specific property, but just get the money. As mentioned above, this is the general avenue for what happens when a court orders you to pay money, and you don't do it. The High Court has its own enforcement officers who are able to deal with larger amounts of money, as well as enforcing evictions. In Scotland, the same basic pattern applies but different words are used, and some of the detailed rules are different. "Attachment" is when a sheriff officer (= a bailiff) comes round to value your possessions and auction them off if you don't pay. There is also "arrestment" which is taking money out of your bank account. | This is not theft, this is a contract dispute. You gave them money, they promised to do certain things, the contract says what that is. I surmise that they wanted a deposit to cover their costs in further dealing with you (moving is more complicated and costly than buying a loaf of bread), so in walking away from the deal, you've economically damaged them to some amount. The deposit is "liquidated damages". Your recourse is to sue them for that amount, because... Perhaps you didn't understand why you were giving them this deposit (an act that constitute some level of agreement), but any time you hand over a deposit, there is a circumstance under which you will not get that money back, and you have to understand what that circumstance is. | You can be held liable for rent after you are off a lease. Rewriting a lease only affects future obligations, and doesn't extinguish past obligations. However, you appear to have released X from all obligations via paragraph 2. If you plan to sue for past rent, the court will have to interpret the statement that "The landlord, Y, and Z agree to relinquish X from any obligation regarding the lease as mentioned above", which is non-standard English. It is extremely likely that the court will interpret this to mean "release". You might argue, using earlier emails, that all parties had a clear understanding that this means "from all future obligations, but not past obligations", but that is not what the written agreement says, and the parol evidence rule, which is codified as explicit law in California, says execution of a contract in writing... supersedes all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument That clause lets X off the hook, in exchange for his claim on the security deposit and for relinquishing his tenant rights to the unit. You cannot sue X for any rent. | No The criteria for adverse possession is that you have to be in possession without permission. A tenant, even one that pays no rent (or stops paying rent), has permission. | In general, and in particular in New Jersey, a new owner takes possession subject to existing rental agreements, and in particular subject to existing leases, unless there is a provision in the lease to the contrary. This happens automatically, by law. Thus any lease is as enforceable against the new owner as it would have been against the old. But how enforceable is this arbitration agreement? How enforceable would it have been against the old owner O? The basic fact about a month-to-month tenancy is that either party may end it on one month's notice, for any reason or none. Moreover, when a new owner intds to occupy the premises personally, or use them for his or her family, the requirement to honor a previous lease is, in general, not applicable. T might be able to force N to go through arbitration, depending on the wording of the agreement, and on whether the written lease applies at all after the end of the first year (which it may well not). But on the facts as stated in the question, T would lose in arbitration as well as in court, and if there is any increased expense because of the arbitration, T would be obliged tom pay it. Let us look at the actual NJ law N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 provides that: any lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance, or for a part of a year, or for one or more years, of any houses, buildings, lands or tenements, ... may be removed from such premises by the Superior Court, Law Division, Special Civil Part in an action in the following cases: a. Where such person holds over and continues in possession of all or any part of the demised premises after the expiration of his term, and after demand made and written notice given by the landlord or his agent, for delivery of possession thereof. The notice shall be served either personally upon the tenant or such person in possession by giving him a copy thereof or by leaving a copy of the same at his usual place of abode with a member of his family above the age of 14 years. [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-56 provides that: No judgment for possession in cases specified in paragraph "a." of section 2A:18-53 of this Title shall be ordered unless: a. The tenancy, if a tenancy at will or from year to year, has been terminated by the giving of 3 months' notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or ? b. The tenancy, if a tenancy from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of 1 month's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-57 provides that: If no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary when the action comes on for trial, the court shall issue its warrant to any officer of the court, commanding him to remove all persons from the premises, and to put the claimant into full possession thereof, and to levy and make the costs out of the goods and chattels of the person in possession. No warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession, except as provided for in chapter 42 of this Title. Section 2A:18-61.1 provides that: No lessee or tenant or the assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives of such lessee or tenant may be removed by the Superior Court from any house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or tenement leased for residential purposes, other than (1) owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units or a hotel, motel or other guesthouse or part thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal tenant; ... except upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause ... [emphasis in original] h. The owner seeks to retire permanently the residential building or the mobile home park from residential use or use as a mobile home park But note that good cause is not required for an owner-occupied dwelling with no more than two rental units. T would be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about landlord/tenant law in NJ before attempting to contest the notice or eviction. | I am assuming in this answer that the lease or rental agreement provides the landlord with a right of access for required maintenance. The question is not clear on that point. If there is a specific and reasonable ground for refusing a particular representative or agent of the landlord, you might be able to do so. If, for example, that particular worker had previously insulted you in your apartment, or had attempted to steal from you there, you could probably refuse entrance and request the landlord to send a different worker to do the job. But in general the landlord may choose his or her agents, and if it is a reasonable for an agent to be admitted, you must admit whatever agent the landlord sends. You can probably demand reasonable notice, depending on the terms of the lease. You may be able to demand to be present when the agent is to be in the premises, again depending on the lease. But I fo not think that the tenant can arbitrarily choose which agent the landlord will use. | It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst. | You could sue them for commercially exploiting your image without permission, so the waiver is necessary. It is entirely legal to require of tenants (even if weird) that they be part of an advertising campaign, in a specified way: it's also your right to refuse to sign. There is a minuscule chance that there is a local ordinance prohibiting such a clause. |
If one requests bodycam footage of a police encounter involving another person, would they be notified of the request? If party A calls the police on party B and they attend, then party B is entitled to request the bodycam footage of the encounter under the GDPR. If party B performs such a request, and party A appears in the footage, would party A be notified of party B's request? | Law enforcement activities are out of scope of the GDPR, though there is a similar right to access in section 45 of the Data Protection Act 2018. Access to police bodycam footage can be denied or restricted on various grounds, including to protect the rights and freedoms of others. A separate right to access information held by public authorities is part of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, but it exempts the applicant's own personal data and refers to the DPA 2018 for further restrictions of this right – FOIA is just a fallback in case access is not regulated otherwise. If necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of party A, the footage released to B could be redacted in order to protect A. However, since A and B were both present the footage would not disclose information that B didn't already have. Therefore, redaction might not be appropriate. Given that there is no clear legal guidance and that all of this is context-dependent, I'd expect this to come down to the internal policies of the police department handling the access request. I see no grounds that would require A to be alerted when footage is released to B. A could also make a request to access their data, and should receive information about “the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the personal data has been disclosed”, but this might be limited to protect B. | You are missing something. The fact that you have a tick box and its state is saved in the database is enough. The burden of proof is only "on a balance of probabilities", so someone arguing that they didn't consent would have to demonstrate that you falsified the database entry somehow. In terms of GDPR requirements in general you don't need a greater level of proof than this, the key thing is that you have a robust system in place to obtain proof (such as not allowing data into the database without a tick in the box). | In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest. | Because you are on their premises and they get to decide what people can or can't do while on their property. This has nothing to do with if recording is legal or not, it has to do with basic property rights and trespass. Let's assume that recording is perfectly legal: so is eating ice cream. However, if its my shop, I can require that you do not make recordings just as I can require that you do not eat ice cream. If I make this requirement known you have three options: you can comply, you can leave or you can stay and do the thing I have prohibited. The first two are legal, the last one isn't; its trespass which is both a tort for which I can sue you and a crime for which you can be arrested and prosecuted. | The key issue here is the unauthorized collection of video thumbnails, not the use of cloud services. Under GDPR, every personal data processing activity has one or more controllers who are responsible for the activity, and every such activity needs a “legal basis”. With such cameras, the operator will typically be a controller, since they determine the purposes for which this camera is used. In this scenario, the operators – as part of their responsibility to conduct the data processing activity in a GDPR-compliant manner – had disabled any cloud features provided by the camera manufacturer. Despite this configuration, the camera manufacturer collected thumbnails and uploaded them to servers under their control. So, we likely have two distinct issues at hand: the camera manufacturer misled its customers about the privacy settings of the cameras. This is not necessarily a GDPR issue by itself. the manufacturer performed data processing activities in contravention of various aspects of the GDPR. Relevant aspects of the GDPR that might have been violated: the manufacturer did not have an Art 6 GDPR legal basis for this processing activity, such as a “legitimate interest” the manufacturer did not provide information per Art 13 GDPR to the people being monitored this way even if the cloud-based thumbnail processing were intended, this could be a violation against the Art 25 obligation to ensure “data protection by design and by default” depending on how the cloud storage services were configured, there might be violations against the Art 28 responsibility to contractually bind such vendors as data processors, or against the Chapter V rules on international data transfers Different actors might have different remedies against this violations: buyers of the camera might have remedies under consumer protection and product liability laws against the manufacturer data subjects of the illegal processing activity have remedies under the GDPR they can exercise their data subject rights against the data controllers, such as erasure of the thumbnails. However, this will be difficult to exercise in practice since the manufacturer will not have identifying information, and would then be free from having to fulfil certain data subject requests per Art 11 GDPR. they can lodge a complaint with a responsible supervisory authority, which would be the data protection agency in their EU/EEA member state (or the ICO in the UK). The EDPS is irrelevant here, since it is only the internal supervision authority for EU institutions. The competent supervisory authorities can levy fines. they can sue the data controllers, both for compliance (e.g. deleting unauthorized thumbnails) and for damages, if any were suffered. However, immaterial damages awarded for GDPR violations are typically fairly low, if they are recognized by the court at all. the right to judicial remedy (sue the controllers in court) and to lodge a complaint are independent. They largely pursue different remedies. Both can be used to seek compliance, but only supervisory authorities can impose fines, and only direct lawsuits by the data subjects can seek damages. | Since your consent is not required in Texas, revocation is irrelevant. Restrictions of use of recordings flow from the legal nature of the recording itself, so there is no provision saying, for example, that only one party needs to consent for just recording, but all parties must consent to make any use of the recording. Since these laws were devised to regulate the practice of wearing a wire and collecting evidence of crimes, requiring consent from all parties would be counterproductive to the purposes of the law. You could try drafting a contract where you pay people to not record you (anybody who doesn't sign, you shouldn't talk to them), but enforcement could be tricky, so I would not try a DIY contract: get a lawyer. You would have to show that you were harmed by them making an unconsented recording. It should be in the form of a contract where you give something of value in exchange for something of value, which is a thing typically enforced by the courts. Also bear in mind that even in an all-party state, if you know that you are being recorded, you cannot just say "I do not consent", you have to stop talking. Continuing to talk when notified that there is or may be a recording constitutes implied consent, which is why on the phone companies often announce via recording that the conversation may be monitored, and they do not ask "Do you consent". By not hanging up, you consented. | Recording other people without consent is a crime (§ 201 StGB). But so is threatening other people with violence (§ 241 StGB). Secret recordings and other acts can still be legitimate if they are necessary and appropriate to deflect harm (§ 34 StGB), similar to how hurting someone can be legitimate if you're acting in self-defense. If you're prosecuted for this, it will be up to the court to determine if your act was necessary and proportionate. But regardless of what you did, your recording can be used as evidence against the ex-roommate. German criminal law does not generally exclude illegally acquired evidence. The main risk of disclosing this recording is that you are also providing evidence against yourself for possible wiretapping charges (which may or may not be punishable as discussed above). | england-and-wales Initially, one should comply with the officer's instructions as he has the power under statutory Stop & Search powers to detain someone for the purpose of the search (discussed here). Failure to do so may be an offence. If, subsequently, one considers the search and detention was unlawful, the first port of call is to lodge a complaint with the relevant police force who - depending on the circumstances - may escalate the complaint to the Independent Office for Police Conduct IOPC. You can complain directly to the police/other organisation (see ‘Who can I complain about?’ below for a list of the other organisations) or via the IOPC. If you complain via the IOPC, your complaint will be sent direct to the organisation involved. They will assess your complaint and contact you about how it will be handled. The IOPC will not be involved with this initial assessment of your complaint. If the complaint is found to be valid, then any offence committed by not complying with the office would (in all probability) be overturned on appeal. As well as any compensation awarded by the court, the Chief Constable may consider making an ex gratia payment (mentioned here). Note that there is no obligation to do anything if the interaction falls within the Stop & Account provisions. |
Does the 'Don't Say Gay' bill run afoul of the First Amendment or any other speech rights? Florida has passed a bill: The bill would limit what classrooms can teach about sexual orientation and gender identity. Under this legislation, these lessons "may not occur in kindergarten through grade 3 or in a manner that is not age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate for students in accordance with state standards." Does said bill possibly run afoul of the First Amendment or any other speech rights? or can states impose speech restrictions as it sees fit? | The various news stories are somewhat unclear about what this bill actually does, so let us look at the text of the bill. The bill would (in addition to other changes not specifically connected with sexual identity or orientation) create section 1001.42 (8)(c)(3), reading: A school district may not encourage classroom discussion about sexual orientation or gender identity in primary grade levels or in a manner that is not age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate for students. Exactly what it means for "A school district" to "encourage classroom discussion" is less than clear. If such discussion is not on the syllabus, nor suggested by the administration, but a teacher starts it, would this law ban it? Note that no penalty is specified for violation, although parental suits against a school district are authorized by the new subsaection 1001.42 (8)(c)(4). On its face the bill appears to prohibit the district from "encouraging" any such discussion in the primary grades (K-3 it seems), and from encouraging it if such discussion is not "age-appropriate" in other grades. As to the question of whether this bill, if it becomes law (as seems likely) would violate anyone's constitutional rights, that is a bit tricky. Teachers and students both have First Admendment rights even during school (see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) for the key case) but this bill does not purport to prohibit a teacher from making any particular statement. The state does have considerable authority to regulate the curriculum of schools, particularly public schools, and what shall occur there. How this provision would be enforced, and what sort of speech, if any, was actually prohibited under it would probably be important in any lawsuit over its constitutionality. A law that prohibited any mention of sexual identity in school would probably be unconstitutional, but this bill does not claim to do that. If it does that in practice, that would probably weigh against it. | In US Law, banning speech based on its content is called "Content-based" speech regulation (shocking, I know), as opposed to "Content-neutral" speech regulation like requiring all protests to end before a specific time. Content-based speech regulation can be constitutional if it passes strict scrutiny, but in the case of banning swastikas, it would fall under an even narrower subset of content-based speech regulation called "viewpoint regulation." I haven't found a case where the swastika or Nazi flag was banned in particular, but we can find reasoning that appears to safely protect the peaceful display of the Nazi flag and ideology from government restriction in Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), a case in which Chicago banned picketing within 150 feet of a school except in the case of labor disputes related to the school. The Supreme Court found that this amounted to viewpoint-based discrimination, writing in the majority opinion: But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone. As with all rights restrictions, a particular restriction may be Constitutional if it passes "strict scrutiny," namely, it: is necessary to a "compelling state interest"; is "narrowly tailored" to achieving this compelling purpose; and uses the "least restrictive means" to achieve the purpose. In general, a ban on the peaceful display of Nazi imagery or promotion of Nazi ideas would fail the first test, as the government does not have a compelling interest to suppress ideas which might be distasteful to some or even the majority of people. I have seen an argument that because the Nazi regime's stated goal included genocide, that promoting that ideology amounts to advocating violence. Speech which advocates violence or criminality may be criminalized, but only under a specific "imminent lawless action" test expressed in Brandenburg v. Ohio: Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. This case was brought against a KKK member who advocated various violent acts at a rally. The main distinction is that his speech did not call for specific violence, but merely advocated for it in general. This almost exactly mirrors the rationale for banning the Nazi ideology based on its advocacy of violence, and shows that a ban on such grounds would be unconstitutional. "Imminent" was clarified in Hess v. Indiana to mean that the action must be intended to produce actual lawless action at a specific point in the future, not simply advocate for it in general. Hess was a protester who was being forced off a street by police, said "We'll take the fucking street later" and was convicted of disorderly conduct for it, which the court reversed as his statement "amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time" and was therefore protected by the First Amendment. | Yes, this is legal, unless Richardson, TX has a specific local law making it illegal. In the US, discrimination is legal, unless it discriminates against one or more specific enumerated classes. Under federal law, and as far as I am aware, Texas law, students are NOT a protected class. As such discrimination against them is legal, unless Richardson, TX or its incorporating county have a specific law or regulation prohibiting it. Incidentally, age is generally not a protected class, and when it is a protected class, it is generally only illegal to discriminate against people above a specified age, not below. Note that discrimination happens all the time, over a variety of factors, that many people don't even consider discrimination. For example, many colleges and universities discriminate on the basis of GPAs for acceptance to various programs; this is legal. In the past, many colleges and universities discriminated against potential students on the basis of sex or race, which is now illegal. | Banning you from the museum raises questions about your due process, equal protection, and First Amendment rights. Generally speaking, a person banned like this would be unlikely to collect any damages, but may be able to obtain injunctive relief to prevent the museum from enforcing its ban. Of course, it would depend on the reason for the ban and the procedures the museum went through in imposing the ban and permitting you to challenge it. In your case, though, the ban has already been lifted, so there's probably not much room for any kind of legal action. EDIT: Since there are several people contesting -- with no law to support them -- the validity of this answer, here's a case discussing the First Amendment implications of access to museums: As a limited public forum, there are certain First Amendment activities permitted on [National Civil War Museum] grounds and others that are not. For example, lectures or programs on a Civil War topic authorized by the museum and the public's attendance at these activities would be permitted uses, but activities concerning other topics (including the immorality of homosexual activity) would not. Diener v. Reed, 232 F. Supp. 2d 362, 385 (M.D. Pa. 2002), aff'd, 77 F. App'x 601 (3d Cir. 2003). | I think you misunderstand some of the relationships between laws, decisions, and justifications, and you're conflating two separate areas of jurisprudence. The linked real-world example you provide is happening in the employment context, but also in a government context (since it is a public school). But all the examples in your list have nothing to do with employment law and would be purely statutory/regulatory prohibitions. I will attempt to answer broadly enough to cover both domains. Laws and regulations can be challenged as discriminatory The things you have listed under "decency law" would be criminal or regulatory matters. A preliminary question would be whether the laws as written even capture the behaviours you've described. To the extent that they result in discrimination, the laws could be challenged as breaches of s. 15 (right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There may be other Charter arguments too, if the laws affect expression or life, liberty, or the security of the person. (Public decency / nudity laws are more frequently challenged on grounds of free expression.) Decisions of school boards are subject to the Charter The Charter almost certainly applies to decisions of public school boards and schools. See Elementary Teachers Federation of Ontario v. York Region District School Board, 2022 ONCA 476, paras. 39-41. These decisions could be challenged by judicial review (i.e. court review of an administrative decision-maker's decisions) and would be analyzed for reasonableness, including whether the decision strikes a proportionate balance between the Charter right and the statutory objectives (Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12). Even if there is an infringement, the government gets a chance to justify it If you're looking for some sort of a "line" it is found in the justification or reasonableness analysis. Where a law or regulation is challenged, and if a breach of s. 15 is established, then the onus is on the government to justify the breach as a reasonable limit as allowed by s. 1 of the Charter. This will depend on the importance of the government objective, whether there is a rational connection between the objective and the law, whether the law is minimally impairing, and whether the impact on the claimant is proportional to the salutary effects of the law. When a court reviews an administrative decision for reasonableness, it is "engaged in balancing somewhat different but related considerations, namely, has the decision-maker disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a Charter right. In both cases, we are looking for whether there is an appropriate balance between rights and objectives, and the purpose of both exercises is to ensure that the rights at issue are not unreasonably limited" (Doré, para. 6). In each of your examples, the judgments would be highly fact-based and it is fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show. Relevance of association with minors You ask whether it would matter "if the person in question was primarily associating with minors." This likely would not matter if a law was challenged, because such challenges are about the validity of the law, not the factors that might render its applicability to a particular person to be more or less justified. But if the law itself had the purpose of protecting children, or if the law itself was targetted solely at those associating with minors or those in positions of authority over minors, this would be a factor weighing in favour of justification of the infringing law (Irwin Toy, R. v. Sharpe). Whether the person in question was primarily associating with minors would matter in the context of an administrative decision, because these decisions are case-specific. Some anti-discrimination statutes provide more protections Ontario's Human Rights Code potentially contains even further protections. Section 5 says that every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of sex, gender identity, gender expression, and other enumerated factors. Section 24 provides for exceptions to that right in educational settings (and some others) where what would otherwise be discrimination is actually a bona fide qualification of the employment and if it cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the employer. These judgments are also highly fact-based and it would be fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show. | The First Amendment forbids the government from abridging your freedom of speech. There is no (federal) law against your private employer doing so. A good summary is https://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_andsociety/15/winter-2015/chill-around-the-water-cooler.html | I don't see the contradiction. The ACLU article you link to explains that the Supreme Court found against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in principle in the 2018 ruling. Instead they found that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had taken a dismissive attitude to the religion of the bakery's owners, and that in itself was religious discrimation and a violation of their First Amendment rights. I would say the 2018 ruling paved the way for the more recent one, which is why the article you link is titled: "In Masterpiece, the Bakery Wins the Battle but Loses the War" | 34 CFR Subpart D covers this topic ("Under what conditions is prior consent not required to disclose information?"). This includes The disclosure is to other school officials, including teachers, within the agency or institution whom the agency or institution has determined to have legitimate educational interests so that raises the question of whether there is a legitimate educational interest. Additionally, the question is raised as to the status of an SRO (they are not teachers). Disclosure is allowed to A contractor, consultant, volunteer, or other party to whom an agency or institution has outsourced institutional services or functions may be considered a school official under this paragraph provided... the conditions being that the person Performs an institutional service or function for which the agency or institution would otherwise use employees; Is under the direct control of the agency or institution with respect to the use and maintenance of education records; and Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a) governing the use and redisclosure of personally identifiable information from education records I would take this model memorandum as the most likely agreement, though your district may have a totally different memo where SROs are purely security guards. An SRO is to advance the program objective which include "Education of children regarding the role of laws, courts, and Police in society", which is the hook into "legitimate educational interest". This nothwitstanding the part that says that they "are police officers and not school teachers, school administrators, nor school counselors. The officers will assist teachers with classroom presentations on relative topics when requested and able" (there is no principle that only teachers, administrators, or counselors can have a legitimate educational interest). This model memo does not say anything that indicates that the conditions "Is under the direct control" and "Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a)" are true, but those conditions could be satisfied external to the MOU. There are some additional exceptions of the "if required by law" type, such as a state law "adopted before November 19, 1974, if the allowed reporting or disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve the student whose records are released"; or, after that date, is "subject to the requirements of §99.38" which refers you to §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). If that is confusing, here are the two self-referring sections: §99.38(a) If reporting or disclosure allowed by State statute concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve, prior to adjudication, the student whose records are released, an educational agency or institution may disclose education records under §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). The disclosure is to State and local officials or authorities to whom this information is specifically...Allowed to be reported or disclosed pursuant to State statute adopted after November 19, 1974, subject to the requirements of §99.38. So state law is one possibility; "legitimate educational interest" is a remote possiblity. Massachussetts law does include governmental third party disclosures: 603 CMR 23.07(4)(c) A school may release information regarding a student upon receipt of a request from the Department of Social Services, a probation officer, a justice of any court, or the Department of Youth Services under the provisions of M.G.L. c. 119, sections 51B, 57, 69 and 69A respectively. That does not directly apply to local police, but it is possible that a police officer is operating as a probation officer or an agent of the Department of Youth Services. Under paragraph (e), A school may disclose information regarding a student to appropriate parties in connection with a health or safety emergency if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals. This includes, but is not limited to, disclosures to the local police department Mass. law allows the possibility of treating a police officer as "authorized school personnel" if they are "providing services to the student under an agreement between the school committee and a service provider, and who are working directly with the student in an administrative, teaching counseling, and/or diagnostic capacity" – which is not completely out of the question but is a bit of a stretch (especially in the context of a blanket statement "we share records", not "we may share yours, if you get special counseling"). Tne law also says "Any such personnel who are not employed directly by the school committee shall have access only to the student record information that is required for them to perform their duties", so sharing of all records would not be allowed. |
Punishment for getting intoxicated in public Recently I traveled to Germany with friends and got a bit too much drunk. While walking to my hotel I fell down and damaged my foot. Police approached me, checked my ID (I am from the EU), asked if I took drugs (I said no and I didn't), helped me to book a taxi and I left. They didn't arrest me or anything of the sort, nor did they issue a ticket. Now I am super scared... I am afraid that they will send me the fine by mail and report to my work... What could be the punishment for that? I did a research and found the following in German criminal code: Section 323a Intoxication (1) Whoever intentionally or negligently puts themselves into a state of intoxication by consuming alcoholic drinks or other intoxicating substances incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine if they commit an unlawful act whilst in this state and cannot be punished on account thereof because they lacked criminal responsibility due to the intoxication or if this cannot be ruled out. (2) The penalty may not be more severe than the penalty provided for the offence which was committed in a state of intoxication. (3) The offence is prosecuted only upon request, upon authorisation or request by a foreign state if the act which was committed in a state of intoxication can be prosecuted only upon request, authorisation or request by a foreign state. | also, what is "cannot be punished on account thereof because they lacked criminal responsibility due to the intoxication or if this cannot be ruled out"? I can not understand This means that if a person, while drunk, does soemthign that would otherwise be a crime, but the person cannot be charged because s/he was too drunk to know that s/he was committing a crime, such a person can insted be charged with having become intoxicated, and given up to the same punishment that would have been given for conviction for doign the unlawful act. For example, if a person damaged property while under the influence of alcohol (drunk), it might be impossible under German law to prosecute for the crime of intentionally damaging property, because one could not prove that the person knew what s/he was doing, and knew that it was criminal. In such a case the person could be charged with having intentionally or carelessly become drunk, but the penalty can't be more than the penalty for having damaged property would have been, nor can it be more than five years. As a practical matter, I think it very unlikely that the police would seek to impose a fine if they didn't issue any ticket or other paperwork at the scene, nor mention any such intention. However, they might be legally able to do so. | Is there something in the language of the act that makes sexual harassment a civil rather than a criminal offence? Yes. Laws that create criminal offenses have to have language to the effect of "violation of this law is punishable by up to X years of imprisonment or a fine of up to $Y", or "violation of this law is a Class Z felony." Sometimes it is not entirely clear if violation of a law can form a basis of a private civil lawsuit, or if it can only be enforced by government officials, from the language of the statute alone. When it is unclear the courts have to resolve that ambiguity. In rare instances, it may be clear that some parts of a statute have criminal penalties, but due to unclear wording and punctuation in the statute, it is hard to tell precisely which parts of the statute these criminal penalties apply to, and in those cases, courts also have to resolve that ambiguity. There is also some conduct that it is constitutional to punish with a civil penalty, but not as a crime that can result in incarceration. For example, it is unconstitutional in most states to incarcerate someone for failing to pay a debt, but there can be a civil penalty for failing to pay a debt. Courts decide if these constitutional limitations are violated. Similarly, while Congress can enact both crimes and civil penalties, there are some governmental bodies, like school districts or water boards, that have the power to enact certain civil penalties, but do not have the authority to create new crimes. Was that up to the lawmakers to decide, or is that just something that evolved out of the ways the courts and prosecutors responded to sexual harassment claims? And who decides such things in general? Generally, this is decided by lawmakers. Obviously, however, anyone can lobby legislators to take one position or another. Also, the fact that something has a civil penalty does not necessarily mean that prosecutors aren't the people who enforce the law. Sometimes violations of the law prosecuted by prosecutors have civil rather than criminal penalties. For example, many tax law violations are prosecuted by government lawyers with civil penalties, but only a small minority of tax law violations are prosecuted criminally. Further, it isn't uncommon for a type of offense, like securities fraud, to have both civil penalties and criminal charges available as remedies that can be enforced by prosecutors. And, when that happens, prosecutors get to decide which tool to use. For example, even if exactly the same conduct could be prosecuted with either a civil penalty or a criminal charge, prosecutors might prefer a civil penalty because the burden of proof is much lower, the 5th Amendment protection against self-incrimination does not apply (you can refuse to testify but that fact can be used against you in a civil penalty case), and a defendant in a civil penalty case doesn't have a right to a lawyer at government expense. Also, enforcing a civil penalty generates net revenue for the government most of the time, while criminal punishments normally cost the government more money to carry out than any revenue the government may receive from the person found guilty for fines and court costs. On the other hand, trying to enforce a significant enough civil penalty to discourage misconduct against someone who has no money or property may be a futile effort, while criminal sanctions could discourage misconduct from other similarly situated people in the future. | They can’t But they aren’t This is the law (as amended). Section 9 contains the penalties. In any event the police don’t fine people they issue an infringement notice which is an allegation of an offense - police can issue these even if they reasonably believe they took place - they are entitled to be wrong. The person given the notice can admit the offense by paying the fine or contest the allegation by going to court. | He was jailed for breaching an injunction imposed on the Shard in 2018 which was intended to prevent anyone from climbing it, according to a news report from the Guardian at the time. The actual offence he committed was contempt of court which is a criminal offence. Double jeopardy does not apply here because the crime he was cautioned for was not the same crime he was prosecuted for. It appears there was no precedent set, prior to this private prosecution, about whether or not someone could be jailed for breaching an injunction in this manner, as opposed to merely being fined, etc. Obviously, since he has been jailed, people in the future will be reluctant to copy his behaviour and a deterrent has been set. | It depends on the jurisdiction but, very broadly speaking, the person might be ill such that: they did not know what they were doing or that what they were doing was wrong (insanity) their ability to understand their actions or make a reasoned decision or self control was highly impaired but not to the degree of insanity (diminished responsibility or perhaps provocation) they were unconscious when they acted (automatism - e.g. an offence committed while 'sleep walking') Clearly they lack the same culpability as a person with "good mental health", who consciously committed a criminal offence, knowing it was wrong. That does not mean the ill person can 'get away with it'. Claiming diminished responsibility as a defence to a murder charge may mean the person will instead be tried for manslaughter, which is also punishable by imprisonment. Depending on the circumstances a court (and subsequent people in authority) might be persuaded that the person is so dangerous they must be indefinitely detained and treated without their consent. Doesn't this sort of allow psychiatrists to make up the law, because they can decide if something is considered a mental condition? Just because a psychiatrist comes along doesn't mean the court will do what the psychiatrist says is best - the court will hear both sides of the argument, establish the facts, interpret the law and deliver a verdict. Some people would argue that someone who would commit such crimes (such as rape) couldn't possibly be in their right mind. Certainly, but so far as I'm aware that defence is very rarely used and never successful. | Prohibitions against dancing, especially drinking and dancing in the same venue, have a long history in the United States. It was not until 2017 that New York City repealed its Cabaret Law, which forbade dancing at establishments that served food and liquor without said license. So the purpose is to not get fined if people dance at your bar, club, or restaurant. If you're asking if it serves a purpose in terms of public interest, that's a question for Politics SE. | If I attempt to carry such a product into the country, but then honestly declare it at the border (I would like to declare 10 kg of marijuana, sir), can I be prosecuted for attempted smuggling? This depends on the jurisdiction and its definition of "smuggling." In the US, as an example, smuggling implies fraud or "clandestine" action. Openly bringing a forbidden item and declaring it would not meet the definition of this crime. Or will I simply be faced with the choice of turning around or forfeiting my goods and continue without trouble? Depending on the product in question, probably not. In the marijuana example, even if you are not guilty of smuggling, you are guilty of possessing and transporting a controlled substance (see 21 USC subchapter I). You could also be charged with intent to distribute, which would likely be a more serious crime. You could also be charged under the laws of the state in which the port of entry is located. With regard to the methyl alcohol example, I do not know whether bringing it to the customs desk at a port of entry would constitute a crime. | UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence. |
Is it true that it's not illegal for a parent to sell their 13-year-old child to a drug dealer? My question is prompted by an episode of the TV show Law & Order, specifically the 6th-season episode titled "Slave". In the episode, a couple of the lawyers state as fact that it is not illegal for a parent to sell their child. That seems clearly false, but I'm skeptical that the writers would write something that's obviously wrong. It makes me wonder if there's something I'm missing. The prime suspect for a shooting in New York City is a 13-year-old boy. The truth is that his mother, an impoverished crack addict, has "sold" her son to her drug dealer to settle a debt of $865, and to gain credit to acquire more drugs. The boy is guilty of the shooting, which he performed under direct orders from the dealer. Once the prosecutors figure this out, they present their theory of the case to the boy and his attorney, hoping to deal for his testimony. He refuses to deal, and then his lawyer says: Selling your kid may be despicable, but it's not illegal. In the next scene, District Attorney Adam Schiff concurs: She's right. No statute against selling your kid. My question: is that accurate? More precisely, were those statements consistent with the law in New York City in April 1996 (when this episode aired)? In case it matters, here's the bulk of what is revealed about the arrangement, elicited when McCoy examines the boy (Lonnie) on the witness stand. Of course, there's no formal legal agreement. None of the people I quoted earlier had this information when they made the quoted statements. McCoy: Lonnie, tell these people why you didn't run away [from the whole situation with the dealer]. Lonnie: Because of my mom. She said I had to stay with Ross [the dealer] and do what he said. McCoy: Why? Lonnie: She owed him money and he was going to hurt her. McCoy: How long were you with him before you were arrested? Lonnie: I'm not sure. It was a lot of weeks. ...questions about his activities with the dealer... McCoy: Did he pay you? Lonnie: No, sir. ... questions about bad treatment McCoy: How long were you supposed to stay with him? Lonnie: I don't know. McCoy: As long as your mother needed drugs? Lonnie: I don't know. I'm not sure whether it's appropriate to tag this with contract-law, property, employment, or even us-constitution (e.g. 13th Amendment). | This is totally, flat out wrong. Quite frankly, it is immoral, although not illegal, for the producers to even cause some viewers to believe it is true. The United States criminal code (Title 18) in Chapter 77, prohibits all forms of slavery (except as punishment for a crime which New York State does not authorize) including the one described. It is not legal. This statute implements the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (abolishing slavery except as punishment for a crime) and was enacted under the enforcement authority provided by that statute. Those statutes have been in force for more than a century. For example, 18 USC § 1590 states: (a)Whoever knowingly recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, any person for labor or services in violation of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. (b)Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, shall be subject to the penalties under subsection (a). Similarly, 15 U.S.C. § 1584 is squarely on point: (a)Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. (b)Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, shall be subject to the penalties described in subsection (a). It also would constitute criminal child endangerment, child abandonment, use of a child to commit a controlled substances offense, conspiracy to commit criminal coercion, conspiracy to have a child engaged in illegal child labor, etc. Possession of controlled substances by the mother is also a crime, although that crime was committed before the mother tried to sell her child to pay her drug debt. (I originally also included crimes like sex trafficking and pimping a child, but from the question it does not appear that the facts implicated those offenses.) It would also constitute grounds to civilly terminate the parental rights of the mother for child abuse and/or neglect, because it violated laws in addition to criminal laws. If the child had a living father whose parental rights had not been terminated (one can't tell from the question, but perhaps the full episode made it clearer), it would violate the father's right to custody of his child. The child, though a guardian or as an adult, could sue the mother for intentional inflection of emotional distress/outrageous conduct, false imprisonment, failure to provide support, etc. | In NSW Australia this is covered by Division 15A of the Crimes Act 1900 which deals with Child Abuse Material. Under Section 91FA a "child" means a person who is under the age of 16 years - the situation you describe would be between consenting adults in NSW. “Child abuse material” can be text or images that are sexually explicit and would be “offensive” to a normal person (which means offensive to the particular jury) Assuming Jane is 15 or less, however, prima facie the image would be child abuse material and under Section 91H "A person who produces, disseminates or possesses child abuse material is guilty of an offence." The punishment is up to 10 years in jail. Section 91H provides a number of defences, the most relevant to the circumstances you describe being: that the defendant did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to have known, that he or she produced, disseminated or possessed (as the case requires) child abuse material. that the material concerned came into the defendant’s possession unsolicited and the defendant, as soon as he or she became aware of its nature, took reasonable steps to get rid of it. (for possession only) If, considering all the circumstances of the relationship, Joe doesn't know and could not reasonably be expected to know Jane's age then he can use the defence under S91H(1). If he did not request the picture and as soon as he was aware of Jane's age, deleted it, then he can use the defence under S91H(2). The outcome is not so rosy for Jane: she is guilty of both production and dissemination of child abuse material and (assuming she knows how old she is) faces up to 10 years in jail (14 if she is under 14) and registration on the Sex Offenders List for life. It is admittedly unlikely in the circumstances that the state would prosecute her and, if they did, it is very likely that the judge would rule that no conviction be recorded. | Content Warning: this post mentions rape / non-consensual sex and discusses (in some non-explicit detail) coercion of minors. As of Tuesday, March 1st, 2016, according to the Indonesian Penal Code (translated version; I cannot read Indonesian), Indonesia's age of consent is 16 years old (18 for homosexual acts). Indonesia also does not have close-in-age exemptions (for example, in Canada, the age of consent is 16 years old, but a 14-year-old can consent to a partner less than 5 years older, and a 12-year-old can consent within 2 years). I cannot verify this source but according to Wikipedia, which cites this PDF, the age of consent could be raised to 18 years under the Child Protection Act arguing that sexual acts can cause bodily or mental harm and "child" is defined as anyone under 18 years of age. As an example, according to Wikipedia, a court case in 2009 (Sydney Morning Herald) saw this used to convict an Australian man. There is nothing weird about this law. I left this as a comment, but let me elaborate in an answer. Your misconception is that persuasion is an innocent and ethical thing. The harsh reality is that children are, on average, more ignorant than adults and lack judgement, foresight, and rationality at times, and there are disgusting individuals that will exploit this fact to get children to do things they otherwise wouldn't such as sex, or drugs. Additionally, age comes with a power imbalance - think a teacher using their power over a student to convince or coerce them into having sex with them. That is not strictly violence, nor telling lies, or "forcing" in the strict sense, nor trickery, but a reasonable individual would still consider that to be not real consent. The fact is that children can only consent if it is entirely of their own accord and judgement and there is no extrinsic pressure forcing or persuading them to. In fact, I argue that adults are subject to this too and persuading or coercing an adult into having sex is also disgusting (but doing this to children is far more abhorrent). But since children are considered by law to lack the judgement to protect themselves against coercion and realize they should reject and get away from their persuader, the law instead protects them. Persuading someone is not necessarily non-consensual. It holds a high chance of being non-consensual, and consent is only considered real when it is a) not coerced, and b) the subject is legally capable; that is, not intoxicated, not a minor (by whatever the age of cosnent is), etc. If all obscene acts with a girl under 18 are illegal, why doesn't the law simply say don't do obscene acts with a girl under 18? Because sex with people between 16 and 18 is legal (in Indonesia) under the right conditions. Although I must say, since you word it as "obscene acts", then of course they're illegal. Obscene acts are, by definition, morally reprehensible and/or legally incriminating, so illegal things are illegal, is basically what you're saying. Just say "having sex" if you mean "having sex". Why does the law prohibit persuading girls to do obscene acts but does not prohibit the actual doing of the obscene act itself? Kind of weird. This makes no sense at all, and hopefully after reading my answer you understand why this makes absolutely no sense. How in the earth anyone can have sex with someone without persuading? He walks the street and accidentally plug his penis in? ... Rape? There are many ways to have sex with someone without persuading them that I don't think I have to list. Your main mistake is still conflating persuaded / coerced consent as real consent. In summary, persuasion is not some innocent matter of convincing someone in a friendly manner to have sex. It includes coercion, abusing one's power, exploiting a child's ignorance and limited judgement or foresight, and other reprehensible factors. Consent cannot be given if the individual is too young, impaired, unable to legally give consent, or coerced into it. | It is not entrapment because entrapment must be done by officers of the State (police usually). A member of the public inducing another to commit a crime is not entrapment and not a defense to having committed it. Entrapment is a "thing" in Ireland as it is in all common law jurisdictions, however, the specific limits on what police can and cannot do vary by jurisdiction. Police posing as underage children to catch pedophiles is legal throughout Australia (i.e., not entrapment). Police are more restricted in Canada and the USA but I believe that online "trawling" by police is legal in those jurisdictions too, however, they must remain more "passive" than Australian police. Yes, there is a crime being committed, the crime of attempting to engage in underage sex. It doesn't matter that the actual crime attempted is impossible to commit because the "victim" is not actually underage. Evidence is evidence – it doesn't matter who collects it. However, amateurs in the handling of evidence are more likely to botch it up in a way that would allow the defense to have it ruled inadmissible than professionals (although even they can botch it up). | So I can block children under 13, but I can't tell them that? You can tell them after they fail, you cannot tell them on the asking screen. Then what is the correct way to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? I agree with you that it is odd that they recommend using a cookie but they do!* So you have a entry page with a simple question, "Please indicate your age" and then block based on the response. That's it. Note that the rule is neutral. This means that you do not need to disguise your purpose or try to trick people into entering their correct age. *I think that what is happening here is that any parent who wants to complain to their legislator can be met with the response, "If your kid is so sneaky that they are using different computers to lie about their age what do you want us to do about it?" The fact is, this scheme keeps innocent kids from seeing stuff they shouldn't; the sneaky ones are going to find a way. | If you were an adult, the risk would be a lot higher. You can get away with things when you are 13. And since you are not an adult, the purchase contract is voidable so your parents can void your purchase. Don't do this ever again. It's not a "prank". You say you have no money and your parents have no money. The money on that card could be the last bit of money that the card owner had. Worst case someone has become homeless, had a bit of money in his card account, and you took the last of their savings. Does that make you feel bad? It should. | At a minimum, what the theater did was not a crime. When you are in a movie theater you have what is called a "license" from the theater to be present, which is revocable at will without due process (possibly subject to breach of contract damages) and not a property right to be in the theater the way that a tenant who must be evicted does. As a practical matter, given that the amount in controversy is, at most, $25 or so, and this is not a situation where the prevailing party would get their attorneys' fees, this is not cost effective to litigate, regardless of who is correct, even in small claims court without an attorney. Whether or not the theater breached its contract isn't perfectly clear, because usually, the contract between a movie goer and a movie theater is not spelled out in any writing provided to the movie goer, incorporated by reference in something disclosed to the movie goer, or signed by either of the parties, or even with an oral offer and acceptance setting forth all of the terms of the agreement. (Of course, if a written terms of service is actually provided to the movie goer, or a reference to where it can be found is provided to the movie goer, those terms will control and the contract will almost certainly be written to allow the movie theater to do what it did in this case.) In the frequent case where this is not done, the contract between a movie goer an a movie theater is usually a contract implied in fact whose terms at the edges aren't terribly well defined and there is little case law to tell us what the terms of the contract is, because the cases aren't worth litigating up to an appellate court where binding precedents are made. Indeed, one reason that movie theaters may have declined to put their implied in fact contracts with movie goers in writing is to leave the situation ambiguous so as to discourage someone whose case would be clear even if for a small dollar amount, if the terms of the contact were clear, from suing them over issues like this one. When the stakes are small and the outcome is always uncertain, it almost never makes sense to sue. There is certainly a colorable argument that you breached the contract by being present without an adult at an R-rating movie when the public statements about an R rating made available to the movie goers says that rated R means only admitted with a person over the age of 17, contrary to the theater's policies on that issue, although it isn't perfectly clear if this is a suggestion or a binding term of the agreement. Another fair interpretation of the contract between a movie goer and the movie theater is that a movie goer can be removed from any movie whenever, if in the reasonable opinion of the movie theater management, good cause exists to do so, and that its discretion should be upheld so long as it acts in good faith and in a non-discriminatory manner. I don't agree, however, that the question of whether or not you breached a contract was unambiguously clear, because the terms of the agreement are not well defined. I would give you at least a 20% chance of prevailing if you took the issue to court although I would agree that it is more likely than not that you would not prevail if you took the issue to court. | I think your confusion stems from assuming there is a universal definition of "minor" across laws, jurisdictions, and rights. 18 is the age of majority for the purpose of voting (26th Amendment), the death penalty, labor law (although age 14 is the minimum age for employment), and many other laws. But, 21 is the age required to buy alcohol in all states (by their own choice in order to receive highway funding). Nothing requires the age of majority to be consistent across different sections of code or statute or between jurisdictions (except when constitutionally prescribed, like voting age, or minimum age for certain elected offices). There are many counties that prohibit purchase of alcohol at any age. The age of consent varies between 14 and 18 across US states. Age 65 is a threshold for certain tax credits. You need to be 25 in order to be a member of the US House of Representatives, 30 to be a Senator, 35 to be President. You are only protected from age discrimination if you are 40 or older. Here is a rough list of various age-based thresholds for various rights, privileges, or responsibilities in the US. (I havn't vetted this whole list, and some are clearly satire, but the ones I know about are consistent with my understanding.) |
Is it allowed to share propaganda materials for educational purposes? Materials that incite violence and justify killing of certain people? I have found and fully subtitled a pro-war propaganda video from a Russian TV channel. The channel is banned in most of the world. The video is aimed at school children and justifies the war and extermination of nazis in Ukraine. Whether there are nazis in Ukraine does not matter, justifying the extermination of a certain group of people is illegal, right? By United Nations and most individual countries? The "nazi" definition provided in the video is quite broad, and based on the criteria provided, could easily be applied to millions of people in Ukraine. Some of the criteria from the video: interpreting Holodomor as genocide justifying the Orange revolution I have uploaded this video on my YouTube channel. Is there a way for me to argue that having this video on my YouTube channel is beneficial for the whole human civilization? Since it provides perspective on the state-controlled media in Russia? I know that technically I have broken the copyright of the video creator. But if they ever decide to sue me over the video (which is highly unlikely), is there an argument I could make to protect myself? Similar examples of the situation I described above: Nazi propaganda videos during the Second World War that justify the killing of jews and gypsies. Propaganda videos from the Islamic state that justify the killing of Yazidi people. Videos that justify and promote Rohingya genocide in Myanmar, etc Also, my question is about sharing the videos when the war promoted in them is ongoing. | united-states In the US it is not unlawful to produce and display a video arguing for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, whether the intent is to support that invasion or to document the claims of those who do support it, and argue that they are invalid. Such a video would be protected by copyright, and copying it and redistributing it with subtitles might well be an infringement of that copyright, if done without permission. On the other hand, doing so with the intent of educating others about Russian claims might constitute fair use. If so, it would not be copyright infringement under US law. Aside from the copyright issue (which would be up to the copyright holder to take action on) US law does not really care what the motivation for posting such a sub-titled video might be. Whether or not it is "beneficial for the whole human civilization" is not relevant to US law. It is protected by the First Amendment against government suppression. That would not affect YouTube, as a private actor,, determining not to host it on their site. | First of all, taking a video made by someone else, making alterations and then distributing the resulting work is probably already a copyright violation. There are exemptions like fair use (check the comments for an example), but just taking a whole video, mirroring it and reposting it without any own contribution very likely does not constitute fair use. The people who do that don't avoid copyright infingement. They just try to avoid getting caught by any automatic system YouTube has in place to detect copyright infringements. But avoiding automatic filters does not mean to avoid DMCA takedown notices, cease&desist letters or lawsuits from real humans who find a mirrored version of their video and feel that their copyright was violated. However, alterations to a creative work can be a creative work in itself. So regardless of the fact that one violated copyright in creating a derivative work, that derivative work might still be eligible for copyright in its own right. That means someone who reposts a video originally made by party A and then altered by party B would violate the copyright of both A and B at once and thus expose themselves to potential legal actions from either party. But the question is if simply mirroring a video constitutes the necessary threshold of originality to make the resulting work eligible for copyright. In most courts, it probably would not. | Go to court and find out There is no doubt that humming a tune and recording it (or performing it in public) is a derivative work - a right reserved to the copyright owner. Whether it is fair use depends on the specifics of the case. From the tweet, we simply don’t have enough information, however, at a guess, it is probably not fair use. Fair use in law is Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include: the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Most people miss “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,” - if you aren’t doing one of those things then you start behind the 8-ball when yo move to the 4 factor test. Note that the “criticism, comment, news reporting,” etc. must be about the copyrighted work - I can’t use your copyrighted work to, for example, parody a politician unless you are that politician. Many people have completely the wrong idea about what copyright infringement and fair use actually are, in part because the use of music on YouTube is allowed, not because it’s fair use but, because YouTube was smart enough to negotiate and pay for a permissive licence with music producers. For a full explanation, see this video. | The third Geneva convention says in its second article (emphasis added): the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. The violence in Ukraine qualifies for at least two reasons: it is an armed conflict between two high contracting parties, and it is a case of partial occupation of the territory of a high contracting party. "Members of the armed forces" of Russia who have "fallen into the power of [Ukraine]" are therefore protected by the provisions of the convention as prisoners of war as defined in the convention's fourth article. It follows from this that the parenthetical commentary in the question's third bullet point is incorrect: refusing to call this "military action" a "war" does not in fact "unilaterally waive the protection of law of war for Russian forces." As to the allegation in the second point, even a prisoner of war who is suspected of committing a war crime is entitled to the convention's protections. Any punishment for the war crime is to be imposed by due process of law. The fact that war crimes may have been committed by other elements of Russia's armed forces is even less of a justification to deny the convention's protections to prisoners who are not individually suspected of war crimes. | Sometimes In general, intentionally false speech gets less protection than other speech, and in some cases it is unprotected. The classic example of speech that is unprotected is "Falsely shouting FIRE in a crowded theater". Note that this is both intentionally false and highly likely to be seriously harmful to multiple uninvolved people. On the other hand, the classic case of New York Times vs Sullivan said that, at least when the subjects were public officials (later broadened to public figures) it was not enough to prove simple falsehood in a defamation case, one must prove "actual malice" (an unfortunate term) which in this context means statements that are either knowingly false or are made with reckless disregard for the truth. The court in that case said, in effect, that if a newspaper had to be sure that its every statement could be proved true in every detail, it would be unwilling to vigorously report on matters of significant public concern (this is a paraphrase, I'll add a quote later). Opinions are considered legally not to be either false or true. "President Jone is the worst leader the US has ever had" Is a statement of opinion, and so is not defamation. Moreover, in political contexts, attempts to punish false statements of fact that are not defamatory have been held unconstitutional. One example was the "Stolen Valor" act, which punished falsely claiming to have been awarded a medal by the US armed forces. This was held to be against the First Amendment. In general, regulation of speech (which here includes writing and other forms of communication) must be fairly narrowly drawn and must have good reasons behind them to survive a court challenge. How much so depends on the nature of the law, and particularly whether it is "content-neutral" or not. Details and cites to come when i have a little more time. | The First Amendment states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. It thus protects such videos. An analogous situation is that there is network news coverage of riots, bank robberies, terrorist attacks and assaults. Backpage was seized because it facilitated prostitution, not just reported or even encouraged it. That is basically where the line exists. | The video in some ways belongs to YouTube. Although it's a royalty free one, they have rights to the video, and you ARE using THEIR service, this means that you have to follow their terms of use. It's best to get an offline copy from the content creator. Source: YouTube Terms of use section 6C For clarity, you retain all of your ownership rights in your Content. However, by submitting Content to YouTube, you hereby grant YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, sublicenseable and transferable license to use, reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform the Content in connection with the Service and YouTube's (and its successors' and affiliates') business, including without limitation for promoting and redistributing part or all of the Service (and derivative works thereof) in any media formats and through any media channels. You also hereby grant each user of the Service a non-exclusive license to access your Content through the Service, and to use, reproduce, distribute, display and perform such Content as permitted through the functionality of the Service and under these Terms of Service. The above licenses granted by you in video Content you submit to the Service terminate within a commercially reasonable time after you remove or delete your videos from the Service. You understand and agree, however, that YouTube may retain, but not display, distribute, or perform, server copies of your videos that have been removed or deleted. The above licenses granted by you in user comments you submit are perpetual and irrevocable. | This is wire fraud and punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. It is not relevant that the victims of this fraud are people who support a cause that the US government opposes. Nor is it relevant what your friend chooses to do with the ill-gotten money. It is still just as illegal. Whether your friend would be prosecuted would be at the discretion of federal prosecutors, and political motivations could come into play. That is beyond the scope of Law.SE to address. What is certain is that he could be prosecuted. Giving information to the FBI probably won't help, as from your description, the victims of this fraud aren't doing anything illegal. "Donating money to support Russia", while vague, does not sound like it violates any of the current sanctions. |
Does the jurisdiction of a LEO end at an easement? I'm curious about this video (TYRANT ALERT PHOTOG ATTACKED BY FEDERAL AGENTS - MICHAEL HODSON U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL) of a federal LEO (law enforcement officer) who is egregiously assaulting/battering a citizen without even a legal pretense. He did so both on the federally managed grounds and on the ME easement. My questions regard the legal limitations and boundaries of a LEO's jurisdiction and how criminal conduct color the rules for jurisdiction. When the LEO violently assaulted the citizen on the easement is he out of his jurisdiction? Suppose for the sake of argument, the LEO has jurisdiction limited to the property with the easement in question. Under the general question of where or not jurisdiction ends in an easement a few specific questions come to mind: If a LEO acts entirely on the easement, due to events that happened entirely on the easement, does that have any impact on the legal authority of the LEO? Is there any immediate or long term legal consequence for an officer committing crimes or doing so egregiously (with or without qualified immunity) while out of his jurisdiction as opposed to doing so in his jurisdiction? For instance, could a civilian defend himself against violent assaults from an officer while out of the LEO's jurisdiction that he could not legally defend himself from while the LEO were fully in his jurisdiction? Are other officers bound by law to arrest or stop other officers committing crimes outside of the jurisdiction when they are normally allowed discretion to allow fellow officers to flout the law? Does an officer loose the qualified immunity defense or other legal defense when doing illegal things out of his jurisdiction? Are there any important nuances to jurisdiction and law enforcement by LEOs that a first amendment auditor should be aware of? *** VIDEO CONTEXT The video show a first amendment auditor and legal activist taking video of a federal facility, U.S. customs and border patrol. Before he can enter the facility or say a word to anyone he is threatened by his soon-to-be asailaint, a federal LEO. I know this is illegal for the LEO to do, and so does the first amendment auditor. This is a matter of clearly established law. At this point it is likely only a civil matter because the officer has given prior restraint to limit the auditor's clearly established legal rights. The auditor says "Don't touch me!", then the belligerent LEO repeatedly shoves, slaps, and threatens with frightening words. While the assaults/batteries happen the auditor is trying to explain the law and give notice of the DHS memo that verifies the auditor's right to record and then he threatens legal action with phrases like 'You're going to get fired/loose qualified immunity/etc for this!' I'm taking it for granted that the cop knowingly broke the law even before the easement. Certainly, he should have known. It seems like a civil matter at this point, before the easement, because cops are given special privileges while on duty that allow them to commit certain crimes without obstruction from civilians. *I'm not merely saying cops are legally allowed to do things that civilians cannot legally do. * I'm also suggesting that cops effectively can break the laws even they are under, as there are often laws against resisting an unlawful arrest even if this is a privilege to temporarily break the law it is nonetheless permission to break the law in often egregious ways at least while acting under the color of law. As other officers witnessing the crimes of fellow LEOs often have discretion, this is effectively a license to commit crime at least for a while. I'm not debating the merits of this, but merely stating what I believe to be relevant facts leading up the question of whether or not civilians can ever restrain criminally acting violent LEOs in any lawful way in the context of easement law. The LEO went beyond what is his normal lawful jurisdiction for protecting against criminals not just by committing crimes himself, but by going into the easement of the property and into the public street. He pushed the auditor into the public street or highway - I can't tell which. He then threw the auditors equipment into the street. The auditor claimed this easement was not his lawful jurisdiction. So now I'm interested to know if any LEO is ever restricted in jurisdiction by an easement in any way and if federal LEOs like this one, who are normally restricted to enforcing laws on a property, are restricted in any way by easement laws. As a concrete example related to the video content, could this LEO observe a person peacefully walking along the easement and then shove him into traffic while having the full protection of laws that prohibit obstruction of unlawful officer action or could the auditor or civilian observers legally have defended the auditor in this simplified example by responding in kind by for instance restraining the belligerent LEO? For the sake of understanding the law, let's consider just the example of an auditor that was on the easement of the property the LEO has jurisdiction on but not ever beyond that. DISCLAIMERS: I'm not asking about the violent assault while within his jurisdiction except to contrast to the assault within his jurisdiction. I'm not asking what is prudent for either an average citizen or a seasoned first amendment auditor and legal activist to do in this situation. These are rather questions of de jure law. I'm not asking about the jurisdiction for a citizen to effect a legal citizens arrest. | When the LEO violently assaulted the citizen on the easement is he out of his jurisdiction? No. Federal law enforcement officers' jurisdiction generally* includes the entire US. Federal and state jurisdiction are said to be concurrent with one another. If the federal law enforcement officer has a lawful basis to effect an arrest, the arrest can be effected on a state† highway easement. Is there any immediate or long term consequence for an officer committing crimes or doing so egregiously (with or without qualified immunity) out of his jurisdiction as opposed to doing so in his jurisdiction? If the officer were outside his jurisdiction (which isn't the case here) then the officer is generally treated as any other private individual. In this case, "outside his jurisdiction" means "in another country," which brings up all sorts of additional complications that aren't really in scope here, largely because the laws and legal systems of other countries are different from those in the US. Are there any nuances to jurisdiction and law enforcement by LEOs that a first amendment auditor should be aware of? There are plenty, but perhaps the most prominent one, if the internet is any guide, is that an officer is not required to articulate the basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause at the time of a Terry stop or an arrest. The time for this is much later, after a judge is involved. Arguing with an officer on this score is just going to make things worse. Instead, one should cooperate while stating one's objections clearly and calmly, especially making it clear that cooperation does not imply consent. * Some categories of officers do have more limited jurisdiction: thanks to cpast for the example of park rangers, whose jurisdiction is essentially restricted to national parks. The officers in this case are CBP field officers. There is a wide misconception that CBP officers' jurisdiction is limited to within 100 miles of the border, but that 100-mile limit only applies to their power to board and search vessels and vehicles without a warrant in order to prevent illegal entry into the US. Their power to make warrantless arrests "for any offence against the United States" committed in their presence is not geographically restricted. † The original video was filmed in South Portland, Maine, and the roadway is a municipal street, Gannett Drive, to be precise. The point remains, however, that it is a public right-of-way, and federal officers are not "out of their jurisdiction" simply because they've left a federal facility and entered a public place. | There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense. | You don't know. You can't know. And you can't force the officer to tell you. Detention Status As a practical matter, you have no way of knowing if you are compelled to follow an officer's order because you are being detained unless the officer volunteers that information (your detention status) which they are not compelled to disclose and have every incentive not to disclose. Consider the situation when the officer does not have reasonable suspicion do detain you. If the officer instantly informs you that you are "free to go" then you are likely to leave and end the encounter immediately. However, if the officer says nothing, then you might stay and inadvertently say or do something that would give the officer reasonable suspicion to detain you from that point forward. Your behavior during that detention could lead to probable cause, arrest, etc. Every officer knows they have nothing to gain by being quick to tell you you are free to go. Deceptive Conduct To compound the issue, police encounters are particularly problematic because police officers have a lawful right to engage in deceptive conduct during an investigation including but not limited to lying. You, on the other hand, can be prosecuted for lying to the police conducting an investigation. (See this article for more information.) Hobson's Choice Therefore, all things considered, police encounters present a Hobson's Choice. Either comply with every order in an effort to end the encounter quickly. Or try to press the officer to determine whether you are "being detained" or "free to go." The former course of action voluntarily cedes some of your rights. The latter risks "provoking" the officer into making your encounter more difficult, painful or costly than it otherwise might be. Never Consent to Searches That said, you are never under any obligation to consent to a warrantless search of your home or vehicle. Typically, saying, "I do not consent to searches." is usually sufficient if asked. Evidence obtained from warrantless searches is barred from being used at trial unless you waive this right by consenting to the search. See this question (and answers) if you are concerned about the officer falsely claiming you gave consent if you didn't. Never Talk to the Police As a legal matter, talking to the police can never help your case in court. Anything you say to the police that might help your case (i.e., exculpatory) is not admissible as evidence because it's hearsay. On the other hand, anything you say to the police can and will be used against you. In fact, even if you are completely innocent of all crimes AND you are completely 100% truthful to the police, you can still give the police all they legally need to convict you of a crime simply by talking to them. Whereas, without your statement, they would not have had sufficient evidence to convict. See this Youtube video for more details and examples of how this can and does happen every day. Practical Matters The above analysis presents the reader with some practical concerns. You don’t want to risk being harmed by an officer in fear for his safety. You don’t want to be handcuffed and taken to the police station if you can avoid it. You must obey all unconditional commands of a peace officer. It does no harm to inform the officer that you are willing to comply with all unconditional legal commands and ask him or her if a given command is, in fact, unconditional. Some attorneys go in the opposite direction from the "never talk to the police" rule and advise that, say in the case of a domestic violence dispute, the best course of action is to answer police questions matter-of-factly, never lie and never admit guilt. That course of behavior can avoid a potential trip to the police station in handcuffs in the back of a police car even if you are never ultimately arrested. TL;DR: Police encounters are tricky. It's difficult to know what to do. The best course of action is to educate yourself about your rights and the law and apply judgment and common sense to guide your behavior to achieve the best outcome. I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. This answer is not legal advice. Please consult an attorney to obtain proper legal advice. | The US has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in the US. Canada has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in Canada. As added complications, if you are a Mexican citizen then Mexico has jurisdiction and if your victim is Chinese then China has jurisdiction. If you get arrested on an Interpol warrant in Spain then Spain has jurisdiction. And so on ... Your implicit assumption is that jurisdiction is exclusive, it isn't. Any country (or sub-national jurisdiction) that claims jurisdiction has jurisdiction, at least to the extent of testing that claim. Whether any given polity has jurisdiction depends on the particular law involved, some laws are only applicable within that countries borders others are extra-territorial, some are applicable to citizens but not non-citizens or vice-versa, etc. | To be determined. Warren Decision [t]he duty to provide public services is owed to the public at large, and, absent a special relationship between the police and an individual, no specific legal duty exists [emphasis added] Castle Rock and Warren denied the existence of a legal duty to specific individuals of performance of law enforcement activity given the specific fact pattern in those cases. These rulings have been generalized into what's been called the No Duty to Rescue Doctrine (NDRD). It's possible a future court could uphold those principles and apply the NDRD to the Parkland case. Or not. Depends on the arguments of fact and law made in court to that effect. The primary argument against applying the NDRD might be as you described, i.e., the specific nature of Peterson's duty assignment to Parkland. One interesting angle on this question is if Peterson owed a duty to act, then who rightfully owned the debt of his obligation? One could argue the Sherrif's department that employed Peterson was the sole lawful holder of his duty to perform and not the school or the victims. In short, it's all very complex and the specific facts at play (which are still surfacing) will be determinative as no applicable statutes or case law yet exist that extend beyond the cited references. | It looks to me like this is authorized under New York State's Executive Law Section 24. The text is long, but I think it addresses most of the points in your question. The law allows the chief executive of a local government (e.g. mayor of a city) to declare a local state of emergency "in the event of a disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency". Under such a state of emergency, the executive can promulgate local emergency orders, that can include provisions like travel bans, curfews, mandatory evacuation, etc. Violating such an order is a Class B misdemeanor (see paragraph 5). I didn't see any explicit requirement for the executive to weigh safety benefits against restriction of personal liberties. The executive just has to "find" (i.e. decide) that a disaster exists and imperils public safety. However, there are some safeguards. The local state of emergency is limited to 30 days (some orders can be extended for an additional 30 days); see paragraph 1. And the state legislature has the authority to terminate the state of emergency by a concurrent resolution (paragraph 8). Further good reading is a primer (PDF) written by the legal counsel of New York's Office of Emergency Management, giving a guide in layman's language for local chief executives on how to handle state of emergency declarations. I'm slightly puzzled as to why, in this case, the order was given by the governor, when it looks from the law like it should be the mayor's role to do so. It could be that the mayor took the appropriate legal action and just let the governor make the public announcement. Also, Executive Law Article 2-B (Sections 20-29) have many other provisions regarding emergencies. Section 28 gives the governor the power to declare a "disaster emergency", though it's not clear from that section whether this includes the power to issue similar emergency orders. | It is premature to judge the particular case because the facts are not all available. But we can address the general principles. The Model Penal Code 3.04(2)(a) sets out the general principles clearly. A person has the right to self-defense against unlawful force. But, the use of force is not justifiable to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful. But more specifically under (b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat However, there is a further condition that force is not justifiable if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take Then finally, §3.05 says that this goes for people using force in defense of others. The short version is that the common law right to resist illegal arrest has been supplanted by a statutory requirement to submit to police authority, for example in California and New York. In Ewumi v. Georgia, defendant was illegally arrested and physically defended himself, which resulted in a battery charge and conviction. The battery charge was overturned because the arrest was illegal ab initio. If one resisting an authorized arrest, where an officer's force is likely to result in unjustifiable great bodily harm, the question is whether a reasonable person would find it necessary to resist in self-defense. It is unusual for the courts to find that to be the case. Minnesota law says that reasonable force may be used upon or toward the person of another without the other's consent when the following circumstances exist or the actor reasonably believes them to exist: (1) when used by a public officer or one assisting a public officer under the public officer's direction: (a) in effecting a lawful arrest Other sections say that a person who is not a public officer may use force to effect an arrest, or, "(3) when used by any person in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person". Being arrested by the police is not an offense, and none of the other justifications for use of force apply. | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. |
Passwords stolen from web portal Recently a website which provides e-mail service, kind of like gmail, but a smaller Estonian version of it got breached. The hackers got access to my e-mail and therefore all the accounts I have connected with this portal. They most likely stored the passwords in plain text, since I got some threat e-mails and they included my passwords in the threat e-mail to prove they have access to it. They claim to have some video recorded from my laptop camera, and ask for bitcoin payment to not leak it. I call it a bluff and most likely they don't have anything. Can I demand some compensation or even sue the company for having such a bad security layer on their portal? Or should I just accept it and move on? | Much of your ability to sue the email company for damages depends on local and Estonian laws, but the most important aspect is the TOS and user agreement you agreed to when you originally signed up for the service. Read it (though if the portal is now off-line, it may not be accessible). You may have agreed to hold the company not liable for any damages from loss or stolen data, and you may have also agreed to arbitration and to not pursue them in court. It all depends on what is (was) in that agreement, so find a copy of it; though it's possible that some local or Estonian laws may supersede any contractual agreement with the company. And FYI, the email you received concerning the video and demanding payment in Bitcoin is a common scam right now, and the threat may indeed be meaningless. | You violated Facebook's Terms of Service, and it's entirely within your contractual agreement with them for them to close your account. You agreed to abide by the contract you "clicked through" when you signed up and opened a Facebook account. They didn't break any laws when you broke your contract with them. You clearly broke the contract by violating the TOS. They are not breaking any laws by not restoring your account. What you see as the value of your personal or business data doesn't really mean anything; it was your choice to use Facebook in the first place, and your mistake to break the TOS. You could try hiring a lawyer to make a case that you see a difference between the personal data you want to retrieve and the business data that caused the violation, but that's up to you; Facebook is under no legal obligation (this could be different, according to your jurisdiction and national laws) to restore any or all access to your account or data, but it's possible they could be persuaded. | The words "proprietary format" are important. Are you sure the format is proprietary? If it is, then it's likely protected in which case they might have grounds to sue (but that does not mean they would definetly win). If the format is not proprietary, and so long as you don't share data which is proprietary then I believe you fine. I'm not a lawyer - but I cite GIF files as an example. They were still protected by the US and some other countries until at least the late 90s and there were various threats to open source linux companies who shared code that used the file format. I'm not aware of anything other than threats and never heard of any company being sued, let alone winning or losing. Another example that comes to mind is the RedHat ISO format. My understanding is RedHat could not stop anyone from sharing open source, but they could prevent folks from sharing the format they assembled and shared the open source. Again, I am not sure if it was ever tested in any court of law anywhere. | Yes One could certainly put up a site whose only content was a link to another domain. And I can't find any law which this would violate. If the link is a "deep link", and if it bypasses a log-in page, while the other site is so designed that all access is intended to go through the login, I believe (but cannot at the moment verify) that the owner of the other site could claim that this violates their copyright. In any case it is not a good idea.But a link to an appropriate page should have no problem, nor should pointing your domain at an appropriate entry page. Therefor, since simply re-pointing a domain should have the same effect as simply linking, in those cases where it works at all, it should be legal. Doing it with an iframe, which would truly open another site within your site, may not be if the other site forbids such use, as in the ToS. The case law on that is not settled, but many sites object to it, as the answer by @BlueDogRanch points out. I don't see a good reason why one would want to do this, but that isn't the question. Copying the HTML of another site and modifying the URLs while keeping the content the same would pretty clearly be a copyright infringement, besides being a lot of work to little obvious point. It also isn't what the question asked about. Building a one-page site that has only a simple link or a redirect would clearly be legal, and would serve the purpose of causing your domain to lead a user to another site, but it isn't, strictly speaking, what was asked about either. | You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do. | A creative prosecutor could probably come up with a raft of charges. But you could start with the federal wiretapping statute, 18 USC 2511, and the anti-hacking statute, 18 USC 1030. Here is an indictment brought in 2012 under the anti-hacking statute against someone who distributed and used this kind of software. Depending on the facts and the jurisdiction, this may also constitute the tort of intrusion on privacy or seclusion, a tort recognized by the Restatement (Second) and actionable in many jurisdictions. The most common test is whether the invasion would be "offensive to a reasonable person." And no, contrary to the commenter's view, a "click to accept" license is not a get out of (literal) jail free card here. Courts interpret adhesion contracts liberally to favor the signer, and outrageous terms hidden in small print are not guaranteed to be enforceable, especially if the software is clearly designed to trick people into installing it. The license terms might even hurt you, by providing evidence of your intent to use the software for perving rather than its ostensible use. This is not an exhaustive list, and there may be additional state-level statutes that apply. Bottom line: yes, this is clearly illegal, and the courts will be reluctant to let you trick people into getting away with it. | You ask permission, preferably with legal counsel to handle the details. It really is that simple. Unsurprisingly, most companies don't want to give their code away- especially to a competitor. If you even get a response, they will expect something in return i.e. money. Realistically though, it's unlikely they will respond, much less deal with you. | The most minimal elements of theft are: An unauthorised taking or use of another's property; and An intent to permanently deprive that person of that property or its use You've authorised the fee as per the terms of service that you agreed to. If you didn't read the terms of service, you are deemed to have read it. As the first element is not satisifed, no, it's not theft. As to what that fee is for, it's not really a question of law, but because they're a business and they are entitled to recover the costs of providing products or services and make a profit when you use their products or services, I fairly confidently would say that they're charging you to recover the costs of providing you their products and services as well as to make a profit from your use of their products and services. But again, not a question of law. |
Does “co-habitation” include people residing in the same house? Standard visitation guideline for divorced parents states: NON-COHABITATION: Neither party shall co-habit with any other person unless related by blood or marriage in the presence of the minor child(ren), nor shall they allow any third parties to -co-habit in their presence or place of lodging while the child(ren) is/are present I divorced my husband. My child stays with my ex-husband who has a 100% custody. I live in my friend’s house (a 40 year old woman) I have a separate room. She is just a friend. Does this considered to be a “cohabitation”? May I take my child to stay overnight in my friend’s house? | If the non-custodial parent lives in a room in a shared house it is arguably reasonable for the child to visit there. The term "co-habitation" does not always mean just "living together as sexual or romantic partners", and the way in which this quoted section of the agreement (if it is part of an actual agreement applicable to the specific parent) is worded makes it possible that the agreement is intended to cover more than that. However, the most usual meaning of cohabitation is "living together in a way similar to marriage" and it generally implies both a sexual and a financial relationship (sharing expenses as a typical married couple does). Statutory definitions, where they exist, vary by state. This is shown by several available definitions: US Legal -- Cohabitation is generally defined as two people living together as if a married couple. State laws vary in defining cohabitation. The Free Dictionary:Cohabit -- persons living together as husband and wife, whether or not legally married. The Free Dictionary:Cohabitation -- A living arrangement in which an unmarried couple lives together in a long-term relationship that resembles a marriage. LII -- Cohabitation is used primarily to denote the arrangement between two individuals who live together, either as spouses or unmarried partners. Reuters Practical law -- A living arrangement whereby a couple who is not married or a couple who is in a civil partnership live together in the same household. Wikipedia -- Cohabitation is an arrangement where two people are not married but live together. They are often involved in a romantic or sexually intimate relationship on a long-term or permanent basis. Lexis PSL -- [too long to quote here] It might be argued that if the parent has a separate room, under a rental agreement, a person not sharing that room is not cohabiting with the parent. It certainly can be argued, based on the definitions above, that where there is no financial sharing, and no sexual or romantic relationship, there is no cohabitation. One very relevant question is the purpose of the provision. One possible purpose is to prevent access to the child by adults not known to the custodial parent, in fear of abuse, neglect, or other improper actions. If that is the issue, it should be possible for the custodial parent to approve the housemate as a proper person to be present during a visitation. Another possible purpose is to avoid exposing the child to an out-of-marriage sexual relationship as a "bad example". This is sometimes called a "morals clause", and was once common. This is largely obsolete, and if this is the reason, the agreement should probably be changed, but it in any case should not apply in the situation described by the question. It might be a good idea to reach out to the custodial parent, or that parent's lawyer, and ask why the provision is in the agreement, and whether it is intended to apply in this situation. That will allow proceeding on a more informed basis. | No Such a contract would be an attempt to evade the court order mandating a given level of support, and would not be enforceable. However it is not the case that no contract can deal with Child Custody or Child Support. A couple could surely make a contract to pay more than a court had ordered, that in no way violates the order. A contract could specify a default or initial amount of support, to be paid until and unless a court orders a different amount. Similarly a contract could specify initial custody, pending any court decision to the contrary, but it cannot preclude the court from making an order in accordance with the best interests of the child. | Short Answer Usually, a divorce decree doesn't leave former spouses as co-owners of the former marital residence, but sometimes this happens anyway. To oversimplify, if the divorce decree leaves a couple a co-owners, either of them can usually force the sale of the property and a division of the proceeds left after paying off the mortgage, in a special kind of lawsuit called a partition action. The rights of mortgage lenders and lienholders against both former spouses cannot be changed without paying off the loan in most cases. If a spouse who lives there isn't able to pay off the old loan and refinance it in their name alone, this usually means that the house will be sold to a third party with the net proceeds of the sale split. The net proceeds from the sale of the house are divided in proportion to their ownership interests in the co-owned property that can sometimes be tricky to calculate. Often the ability of either party to force a sale of the house in a partition action leads the parties to reach a settlement in the shadow of the possible outcome. Long Answer Caveats This answer sets forth the general rules that apply the vast majority of the time. There are some rare and obscure exceptions to these rules that can apply buried in dark corners of Texas law, and this answer doesn't not comprehensively ferret out every single such exception to the general rules. This answer also doesn't discuss ways in which outcomes that shouldn't be allowed by these rules can be made possible by one party or another's procedural mistakes in the court system, which is fact specific and can arise in certain situations. What Is A Divorce Decree? The only way a divorce case can end is for the divorce to be called off (either by mutual agreement or because one or both of the divorcing spouses die before the case is over), or for a divorce decree to be entered by the court, ending the marriage and establishing the rights of the parties after the divorce with respect to each other and their property. A divorce decree can be entered either by mutual agreement of the spouses in a divorce case, but if they can't agree, the judge in the divorce case will impose a divorce decree dividing property and handling other issues in the divorce as the divorce judge sees fit consistent with Texas law. Either way, it isn't official until it is signed by the judge. Sometimes a divorce decree will be very short, but will incorporate by reference one or more other documents like a mutually agreed separation agreement, or a parenting plan, or a schedule of who gets what property in the divorce. The Role of A Divorce Decree Almost anything can be done by mutual agreement (although all decisions related to children must be approved by the judge with a finding that the agreement is in the best interests of the children). A judge has far more limitations on what the judge can do in a divorce decree to establish the post-divorce property rights of the ex-spouses, but the judge still has great discretion in how the judge may make those decisions. Usually, the ownership of a house is handled in a way that leaves only one spouse owning the house in connection with a divorce proceeding. For example, ex-husband may be ordered to transfer the house to ex-wife, and ex-wife may be ordered to transfer her pension to ex-husband in exchange, if that is what the divorce decree says. One of the grounds for appealing a judge's divorce decree decision to a higher court is that the judge didn't adequately separate the spouses financially. But that doesn't mean that a divorce decree can never leave ex-spouses as co-owners of property. Once the divorce case is over, if nothing in the divorce decree separates ownership of the house, then the ex-husband and ex-wife have the same rights with respect to each other that a house co-owned by two people who were never married would have (unless the divorce decree states otherwise). Some divorce decrees, however, prohibit the sale or transfer of the house without the mutual consent of the former husband and former wife (for former husband and former husband, or former wife and former wife, in a same sex marriage), either indefinitely, or for some time period defined in the divorce decree. In rare cases, the divorcing spouses could agree to do something that leaves neither of them owning their house, like agreeing to sell it, or agreeing to give it to charity, or putting it in the trust for their children. The Rights Of Unmarried Co-Owners Of Property When A Divorce Decree Doesn't Provide Otherwise A lawsuit to terminate co-ownership of real estate without the consent of all of the owners of the real estate is called a partition action. In the case of a house that cannot feasibly be divided in kind the way that, for example, farmland could be, what a partition action does is force the house to be sold, with the proceeds divided. Conceivably, one spouse or the other could be both one of the two sellers, and one of the buyers at the partition sale if the spouse that is both selling and buying is the highest bidder in a sale that is open to the general public. In this case, the partition sale is functionally equivalent to cashing out the equity of a spouse who is not the highest bidder at a partition sale. Frequently, given the inevitability of an ultimate partition sale in these cases, the parties will instead reach a mutual agreement to either have one party cash out the other for an agreed valuation of the house and allocation of the equity in the house. Alternatively, another common form of settlement is that the co-owners will agree to sell the house for an agreed price to a third-party and then to divide the net proceeds either according to a pre-agreed formula or in litigation over net proceeds from the agreed sale held in a court controlled bank pending a judicial determination of each spouse's share of the proceeds. Partition actions aren't the most expensive kind of court case, but usually, at least one of the parties needs to have a lawyer for it to go smoothly and the legal fees aren't usually negligible either. Critically, the fact that "mom pays mortgage and lives in the house" doesn't matter much in a partition action after the divorce is over. Paying the mortgage and living in the house are frequently considered to cancel out, rather than changing the share of the equity to which each former spouse is entitled. An ex-wife cannot just get an ex-husband off of the title without being the highest bidder at a partition sale. If ex-husband is the highest bidder, he will stay on the title and she will be off the title and will have to move out or pay him rent. If the third-party is the highest bidden, she will have to move out or pay rent to the third-party, and neither of them will be on the title anymore. The Rights Of Mortgage And Lien Creditors The fact that both ex-spouses are responsible to the mortgage company (and any lienholders who have rights identical to mortgage companies for the purposes of this question) if they were both on the mortgage before the divorce can't be changed without the mortgage lenders consent (which is almost never given), unless the mortgage is paid off in full and (if necessary) refinanced. If there is a partition sale, the mortgage debt must be paid off before either spouse gets any of the proceeds from the partition sale. The Impact of Community Property Laws In Texas One complicating factor in this analysis is that Texas is a community property state. So, to determine what share of the equity in a house belongs to each spouse (if any) you have to apply community property rules that are deceptively simply, but are quite complicated to apply in practice. The general rule of community property in Texas is that property acquired before the marriage or by gift or inheritance by a single spouse, or allocated to a spouse in divorce decree, is separate property. All other property of the couple of community property. Any property for which separate property status can't be proven, or for which there is too much co-mingling of community and separate property, is community property. A spouse is entitled to 100% of the that spouse's separate property, and in addition, to 50% of the community property of the couple, upon divorce. Also, at death, a decedent can't leave the surviving spouse's separate property to someone else, can't leave the 50% of the property that is community property immediately prior to death, that is owned by the surviving spouse, to anyone other than the surviving spouse, without the surviving spouse's consent. Ideally, the divorce decree will spell out what percentage of each piece of land or other property that is owned by each former spouse once they are divorced. But, sometimes a divorce decree entered by mutual agreement, or by a judge, is sloppy and doesn't make that point clear. If the divorce decree doesn't clarify what percentage of the property is owed by each ex-spouse, this has to be cleared up later when the house is sold in a partition action, if there is no mutual agreement to the contrary. A valid pre-nuptial agreement, or a valid post-nuptial agreement, however, can modify the community property rules of Texas that would otherwise apply. The application of community property rules is also particularly complicated in cases where the couple spends part of their marriage in Texas, and part of their marriage either in a state that is not a community property state or that has very different community property laws on some key issues. The Impact Of Post-Divorce Economic Activity Related To The House Also, the amounts spent by the co-owners of the house after the divorce, and the question of whether one of the co-owner has been excluded from the co-owned house by the other, could change the share of each co-owner in the equity in the house after the divorce. The exact rules for how these adjustments are made are complicated, and are often subject to a judge's discretionary decision about this issue should be resolved in a partition action. Footnote Re Gender All of the rules discussed above, even if I haven't worded my explanations that way, are gender neutral. The rules are the same for ex-husbands as they are for ex-wives (and vice versa) in opposite sex marriages, for ex-husbands in same sex marriages, and for ex-wives in same sex marriages. | IANAL. I am not your lawyer. Assuming that they bought the house together, and are both on the title, your step-father would, as a surviving owner, take sole possession of the house (and it wound not enter your mother's estate). If she bought the house before they married and he moved in, and he is not on the title, it would theoretically enter her estate, but there may be additional rules as it is his residence. As your mother lived in NY, NY law governs her estate. If the estate is worth less than $50,000, you would get nothing. If the estate is worth more than $50,000, he would get $50,000 plus half of the remainder, with the other half of the remainder being split between your mother's children. You don't mention any siblings, so I would assume you don't have any, in which case you should receive: (Estate_Value - $50,000)/2. Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/WhenSomeoneDies/intestacy.shtml | This is a very difficult situation. Discrimination is not the right frame within which to view this as your roommate doesn't have authority over you the way that an employer or landlord would. The basic legal issue would be whether your roommate is constructively evicting you from you residence without valid justification for doing so. And, the answer might very well be yes. But, even if that is the case, since the roommate is not an agent of the landlord, your roommate's actions probably don't relieve you from your duties under the lease. So, your relief might be to vacate the premises and then to sue the roommate for the rent you have to pay without receiving anything in return. This is expensive relative to the likely returns, and there is no certainty that you would win or that you would get your attorneys' fees if you prevailed. This would also be a slow solution taking several months at a minimum. Or, in the alternative, you could leave and cease paying the rent, forcing the roommates who remain to pay it if they don't want to be evicted as they are probably jointly and severally liable for the rent. (If they sued you for your share of the rent, constructive eviction by one of them would probably be a good defense.) The landlord could sue all of the roommates if they don't pay, causing them to be evicted and you to be on the hook for any rent or other amounts that they owe, including the landlord's attorneys' fees (and hurting your credit). You could probably cross-claim for indemnification of any amounts you were required to pay in that lawsuit against your roommate. But, this too would be an expensive, complex and slow solution if the remaining roommates don't decide to simply keep paying the rent. It would be very hard for you to evict your problem roommate for breaching the lease by denying you your equal rights to the premises, since you are not the landlord, although it isn't impossible that a court would allow this relief and it would be relatively quick. It would also leave open the question of who was responsible for the evicted roommate's rent. The remaining roommates would be liable vis-a-vis the landlord, and would face eviction if they don't pay, and probably couldn't get a new roommate without the landlord's permission. And, the evicted tenant would probably remain on the hook vis-a-vis the landlord, but might not have a duty to indemnify the roommates who stayed. Also, in any lawsuit where you sue the roommate, the roommate would likely counterclaim against you for non-disclosure of HSV2, and while that would probably not prevail in the end, it would make the legal process hellish for you. The trouble is that there are really no good solutions that you could easily impose on them. A mutual agreement between the landlord and the other tenants to release you from the lease so you could find somewhere else, or to release the problem tenant from the lease so that you and your other roommate could replace that person, is probably the best solution, but that takes mutual agreement of multiple parties. | This question makes me sad. I think the answer will likely not be a legal one but, rather, an emotional one. Courts have many reasons to be reluctant to impose a duty of visitation upon a recalcitrant parent; so courts typically will not. I think the best course of action is for mom (or maybe a helpful third party, but coming from mom first would be best) to call and make an emotional appeal to dad something along the following lines: Despite what happened between us, your son loves you very much. I know that despite what happened, you are a good man. (Even if nobody else actually believes that, be sure dad believes it. So it will be helpful to say this.) I know you love your son too. Your son wants to be closer to you. I would be happy to change the visitation order to whatever you like. (Like above, even if not totally true, it's very helpful to say. It opens hearts, minds and communication channels. If he wants to take her up on this. She should listen and be open to it.) Please visit your son. He wants and needs a relationship with you. Be proactive and appeal to dad's emotions while lowering the overall level of acrimony. Since I'm commenting, I'll also add this in parting. As a practical matter, so many legal actions have unintended adverse consequences and therefore just because we can do them it doesn't mean we should do them in order to get the best outcome. Visitation orders and jail time to enforce child support are good examples of this. Sometimes the acrimony involved in taking away or reducing the amount of time a parent is entitled to spend with their children can cause the parent to spend even less time with the child and ultimately hurt the child. Whose interests and wellbeing should be everyone's top concern. Similarly to the point, putting parents behind bars for not paying child support can make it even more difficult for them the earn the money with which to pay the support they are required to pay. It's a crazy world. | Joint tenancy (as opposed to tenancy in common) would accomplish all of these goals. Joint tenancy gives each individual the absolute right to occupy the property (each person owns the whole property). If one dies the property automatically passes to the other joint tenant(s), which is known legally as the right of survivorship. The child(ren) could never force the parent(s) (other joint tenants) to vacate the property; on the inverse, however, the parent(s) could not deny the child(ren) the ability to also possess the property during their lives, if they so chose to do this. I am assuming if the children ran into hard times and needed to live there, it wouldn't be a problem, but this should be specifically addressed with the client. For a valid joint tenancy to be created, you would simply need to have: a. Unity of title: whereby the joint tenants must hold title to the property under one document (i.e., the title deeds); b. Unity of time: the joint tenancy must start and end on the same date for all the joint tenants (end date being the death of the final joint tenant, who will/should have passed through will/trust to an heir the title interest; c. Unity of possession: all joint tenants have equal rights to possess the whole property (as mentioned above, the children could occupy); d. and finally, Unity of interest: joint tenants must have equal interests in the whole of the property. This is the simplest way to do this while meeting all objectives. | Short Answer: The mother may have to apply to the court in cambodia for a maintenance order, but it could be difficult to enforce. Long Answer: It depends whether or not there is a child maintenance order in place, as: Parents cannot enforce an arrangement made informally between them, it must be made legally binding first [...] if no (REMO, see below) agreement exists then, the receiving parent would have to apply via local courts and a payment may be much harder to enforce. Source If there is a child maintenance order in place, then the relevant legislation is the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972 ( REMO). REMO has two gateways to enforce such an order: either with "Reciprocal Countries" designated by s.1 of the Act, or with "Convention Countries" scheduled in the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance (Convention Countries) Order 1975 Unfortunately, cambodia does not appear on either list although, oddly, it is a signatory to the 1956 Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance but for some reason the UK Parliament decided against its inclusion in the 1975 Order. |
Do any published cases exist grant a mistrial or new trial because of internet issues, computer issues, or other technical troubles? FRCP Rule 52: Harmless and Plain Error: (a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded. Are there any published case from any US jurisdiction where the court wrestles with this idea and applies FRCP 52 to a fact pattern where someone on a video call either lost connection or couldn't be heard? | One such case is People in interests of EB, 2022COA8 (Colo. App. 2022). The official syllabus of the case states: In this dependency and neglect proceeding, father appeals the juvenile court judgment terminating his parent-child legal relationship with his child. Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a continuance after it learned that he was having technical difficulties participating in the termination hearing, which was being conducted via Webex videoconference due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. A division of the court of appeals concludes that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the requested continuance. Accordingly, the division reverses the termination judgment and remands the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to the case are substantially identical to the parallel Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the same number. Harmless error analysis is fairly similar in criminal cases and civil cases, although not quite identical. In theory, the standard in a criminal case to ignore harmless error is stronger than in a civil case. In practice, lots of seemingly significant matters in criminal cases are discounted as harmless error anyway. The court doesn't explicitly make a harmless error or lack thereof determination, but its analysis makes clear that the error was not harmless. Issues related to a remote hearing are also discussed in People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4 (Colo. App. 2021), which is cited in this case. The official syllabus to that case tangentially discusses the issue: In this dependency and neglect proceeding, mother appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationship following a remote termination hearing via Webex. She claims that the court should have granted her a continuance so an in-person hearing could have been held, and the remote hearing didn’t afford her due process or equal protection of the law. The division concludes that the court didn’t abuse its discretion in denying the continuance. The court’s need to conduct the termination hearing via Webex didn’t establish good cause to continue the hearing when a judge presiding over a hearing held via Webex can address any technical difficulties with sound, video feed, or broadband issues as they arise; any delay in making an objection can be redressed by the court disregarding improperly admitted evidence; the court had extensively tested the virtual lobby and didn’t allow a sequestered witness to hear any of the proceeding; Webex, as a real-time videoconference platform in which all participants may view one another, allows the court and all counsel to observe a witness’s demeanor, determine if the witness is relying on documents or other information, and view admitted exhibits as well as other documents that may be used for impeachment; and the court ensured that an official record of the hearing was made in the same manner as during an in-person hearing. The division also rejects mother’s assertions that the remote hearing procedure failed to afford her due process and equal protection of the law. The division concludes that the juvenile court ensured that mother was provided substantially similar and fundamentally fair procedures as would have been available at an in-person termination hearing. So conducting the termination hearing via Webex afforded mother due process. The division didn’t consider mother’s equal protection claim because it is merely a bald assertion without argument or development. It is worth mentioning that many cases applying the harmless error standard don't expressly reference Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52. Not infrequently, cases don't even mention the buzzwords "harmless error", even though the case makes an analysis that implicitly addresses the issue. Probably the best place to look for relevant case law would be under annotations to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 which governs motions for new trials. | The underlying assumption in this question seems to be that because A received defective professional advice from V, F may be free of blame. I believe that assumption is wrong. The gist of the question is this: Suppose a fraudster's deception causes a person to take a course of action they wouldn't have otherwise taken. As part of that, they suffer losses due to a second person's tort. Is that loss recoverable from the fraudster as well? In the scenario given, there are clearly two parties that are to blame for the loss: The fraudster, who perpetrated the fraud. The professional attorney, who gave defective advice. The fact that there also exists a second party that may have contributed to the loss does not in any way absolve the first party from blame or from being liable for his actions. In a tort case, it is always the person that caused the loss in the first place (the tortfeasor) the victim (A) should seek relief from first. So F is in no way “safe from litigaton”. In the event that the tortfeasor is not being able make full restitution (e.g. he is already bankrupt), A may sue V for professional negligence to recover his loss. However, to prevail, A vould must be able to prove that V has made critical errors that no “reasonable attorney” would have made. That is sometimes pretty hard to prove (it obviously depends on how clever F's deception was, and whether the number of hours A allowed V to use for due diligence should have been sufficient to uncover the deception). As for legal precedent, I am not aware of a single case where a fraudster has not been held liable because the victim of the fraud has sought professional advice (but it is of course not easy to locate precedent for something has not occured). | In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible. | The concept of prima facie is common also in civil proceedings (and, impliedly, administrative ones). See the results from this query, most of which are civil cases. For instance, this memorandum opinion begins by acknowledging that the plaintiff-appellees "have met their burden of establishing a prima facie case for defamation". In theory, the purpose of prima facie elements is to establish "high-level" uniformity as to what items a plaintiff or prosecutor, as the case may be, will need to prove in order to prevail in a case. That uniformity is necessary for --and consistent with-- the so-called "equal protection of the laws". From a standpoint of equal protection, there is no reason why a case being criminal vs. civil should make a difference regarding the applicability of the concept of prima facie elements. | Bob has to sue in a court of competent jurisdiction To enliven jurisdiction, there has to be some connection between the parties or the event and the jurisdiction. Since Bob, the manufacturer and (presumably) the harmful incident all took place in County X, of State Y or Country A then they are the only jurisdictions that might be competent. The courts of County Z, State M or Country B are all going to say "not my problem". For the USA, there are only State courts and Federal courts. States may have courts that are called county courts but they are enlivened by the state sovereign - counties and cites are self-governing administrative districts, not sovereign states. Federal courts have jurisdiction where the subject matter is about a Federal Statute, the Constitution or a treaty. This dispute would appear to be based on tort or contract law which is a state matter. Federal courts can have jurisdiction if the parties are in different states and the amount in dispute is more than $75,000. This would not appear to be the case. So, as a state matter, the plaintiff can bring the case to any competent court. The defendant can apply to have it moved to a more convenient court. Arguments will be heard and, at some cost, you'll probably end up where you should have started. | There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake. | If your lawyer repeatedly makes mistakes or other actions that tend to benefit the other side (this was not a one time thing), even if it stemmed from incompetence, could that constitute malpractice, or some related charge such as breach of fiduciary duty? Incompetence is the principal reason for a malpractice lawsuit, which is a subset of the ubiquitous ground for tort lawsuits which is "negligence", although mere carelessness is also often a ground for a malpractice lawsuit. For example, in one professional malpractice lawsuit I am aware of, a lawyer failed to have a mortgage securing a debt owed to his client recorded in the real property records as required for it to be effective against third-parties, and so the client lost the benefit of the mortgage, even though this was merely the kind of carelessness an otherwise competent lawyer could commit. Of course, often carelessness reflects incompetence in the form of failure to competently put in place good systems to guard against careless mistakes. The legal standard is that the attorney failed to act with the reasonable care of an attorney in a manner that caused harm to the client. This breach of a standard of care is usually established and opposed with expert testimony from an another attorney regarding what a reasonable attorney would have done. A single act of negligence is sufficient (and indeed, usually easier to prove than a series of missteps in most cases). Breaches of fiduciary duty typically involve breaches of a duty of loyalty (including conflicts of interest that don't involve otherwise negligent work product), misappropriation of client funds, or unauthorized disclosures of client secrets that are damaging outside the context of litigation simply by virtue of the emotional harm associated with their disclosure. Generally speaking, incompetence can only be pursued in an action for professional negligence and not in an action for breach of fiduciary duty. Sometimes forfeiture of fees paid, or fees owed, is a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty even in the absence of other evidence of damages caused by the breach of a fiduciary duty. How would this change if your lawyer accepted work from the other party shortly after he concluded your case to your detriment? And suppose "discovery" showed that on at least one occasion, the lawyer represented a small company, A, against a much larger company, B, and then a year later helped B take over A? In the U.S. this is governed by Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 governing duties to a former client. Rules of professional conduct have the same numbering system and are variants on the same American Bar Association set of Model Rules in every U.S. jurisdiction, although there are minor, but important, differences in wording between them. Generally speaking the rule is that a lawyer can't represent a new client against a former client if it is in a matter in which the former client was previously represented, or in a matter in which the new client gains some advantage from the confidences shared by the former client in the representation of the new client. Often, the former client would move to disqualify the attorney from representing the new client in the case in question once learning of the representation. | There are a few problems with your line of reasoning, but the main one is that if the government can't locate a defendant, California's Rules of Civil Procedure provide a variety of alternative means of service. When all else fails, the government can serve the defendant "by publication," meaning that they simply publish a notice of the lawsuit in a newspaper. If the defendant fails to appear to defend the suit after service by publication, the court will enter default judgment, the government will seize the property, sell it, and use the resulting revenue to continue operating. |
What rights would be violated by laws restricting your gestures in US? What rights would be violated by laws restricting your gestures in the US? Examples: A law forbidding the US Military salute A law forbidding "dabbing" (making "a gesture in which a person drops their head into the bent crook of a slanted, upwardly angled arm, while raising the opposite arm out straight in a parallel direction") | In the United States, the First Amendment generally protects your right to communicate using gestures. Probably the most common example of efforts to outlaw specific gestures involves the "middle finger," which is a symbolic "fuck you" to its target. The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943), that symbolic gestures can be "a form of utterance" protected by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, and it addressed the middle finger specifically in a decision last year. In Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021), a school suspended a student from its cheerleading team because she posted a picture to social media showing her and a friend "with middle fingers raised" (and bearing the caption "Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything."). But the Supreme Court held that this violated her right to free speech, as her post "did not involve features that would place it outside the First Amendment’s ordinary protection. That decision aligned neatly with decades of lower-court decisions holding the same. E.g., Bad Frog Brewery v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1998); Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1255 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Sandul's action was not fighting words and therefore was speech protected by the First Amendment."). Of course, First Amendment protectiosn are not absolute, so although the government almost certainly could not criminalize dabbing itself, it would be easier for a governmental body to prohibit it during its public meetings, easier still for a government employer to justify disciplining a working for dabbing, and easier still for a public school to justify disciplining a student for dabbing. | Everything is allowed unless the law says it isn’t Common law systems like the USA are ‘exceptions based’ - the law permits everything except what it prohibits. So, your question is backwards - rather than looking for laws that allow it, you need to look for laws that prohibit, restrict or regulate it. There are laws that regulate this but none that prohibit it. | Most people would refer to this as "defense of others." In North Carolina, though, the relevant statute, G.S. 14-51.3, formally refers to this as "Use of force in defense of person." The statute allows a defense against criminal and civil liability for non-deadly force used "against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other's imminent use of unlawful force." Note, however, that the statute does not allow you to invoke the defense when the victim "is a law enforcement officer ... was lawfully acting in the performance of his or her official duties and ... identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law." This raises the question of whether the officer in this case was "lawfully acting in the performance of his official duties" when the relative intervened. If he was, the defense would likely be unavailable. | It's less that the first amendment does not apply to minors and more that the first amendment does not apply to the parents' conduct. The first amendment to the U.S. constitution reads (emphasis added): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Thus the first amendment applies to the conduct of the federal government (and has its reach extended to state governments through Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)). The parents' conduct, while perhaps objectionable morally, does not violate the children's rights under the first amendment, as they are neither the state nor the federal government. | Law The origin of the phrase is from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). It specifically rules on the limitation of freedom of speech (first amendment): The original ruling is this: The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. As pointed out by @phoog, this does not saying anything about the lawfullness of shouting "fire", it says that if your speech creates a clear and present danger, the first amendment will not protect you, even if the danger does not result in actual harm. Commentary If these instances are correct then it would seem clear that Freedom of Speech is being honored as it's the result of speech, not the speech itself, that could be an offense. You seem to think that it should be illegal, but only if it results in a panic that endangers people. If people ignore you, you think it should be protected by your first amendment rights. That's not how the law works. The law tries, among other things. To establish norms for human behaviour. For example, you will be punished for driving an automobile while intoxicated, even of this does not result in you running over somebody. In the words of the supreme court: If your actions "are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger", the congress has the right to prevent you from doing so, despite the first amendment. | A law which punishes a specific person – a "bill of attainder" – is unconstitutional. Private laws, which benefit an individual, are legal. An example is Private Law 112-1, which says Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.), Sopuruchi Chukwueke shall be deemed to have been lawfully admitted to, and remained in, the United States, and shall be eligible for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1255) upon filing an application for such adjustment of status. Nothing prevents such a bill from being made law, where the benefit is a grant of citizenship. Of course, it has to be signed by the president, or else congress must override his veto. | The First Amendment forbids the government from abridging your freedom of speech. There is no (federal) law against your private employer doing so. A good summary is https://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_andsociety/15/winter-2015/chill-around-the-water-cooler.html | In general this is protected by the first amendment. It is not in general a problem describing how one can one can do something illegal. But there are special cases to be careful with. You might want to do some research into the limits on free speech. It would be hard to provide an answer that fully covers all your different cases and you would need to be more specific about what illegal activity you want to describe. In describing how to do something illegal, you might accidentally share information that you are not allowed to share. When you post things online, this can be considered as publishing or exporting. Therefore certain export restrictions might apply. Also, It is illegal to publish bomb making manuals, with the knowledge or intent that this information be used to commit a federal crime of violence. See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/842. There are restrictions on publishing material relating to cryptography without having an export license. Granted, this isn't necessarily related to publishing things that are illegal, but just to give an idea about how publishing/exporting knowledge can causes problems. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the_United_States ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) sets restrictions on what you can publish about arms. What you publish can't be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” See for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandenburg_v._Ohio. One might imagine that you could get into trouble if someone interprets what you do as inciting or producing a lawless action. It might sound obvious, but you want to make sure that you have the right to share the information that you have. The information that you are providing might be copyrighted in some way. |
I don't know if I have an SSN but applied for a passport anyways I was born in the U.S. to non-american parents. We moved out of the country a year later and never returned to the U.S. About 20 years later, I applied for a new passport from the consulate in my country and told them I have no Social Security Number (SSN) and swore under oath. A few weeks later I got my passport. Now I am scared because my parents might have gotten me an SSN when I was born but they don't remember. I just found out now that I can give my info to the Federal Benefits Unit (FBU) serving my country (this happens to be in the embassy of another country for my case) and figure out if I ever had one. I also need to get a SSN to open a bank account (even in my country), get a job, etc. But I'm scared either option might get me into trouble if I did indeed have a Social Security Number. | You have not committed a crime or a violation of non-criminal law when you swear something under oath believing in good faith that what you are saying is true, and you are mistaken. The law does not expect omniscience. Also, making a false statement under oath is only sanctionable if you make a false statement of a "material fact." Whether or not you have a Social Security number is not a "material fact" in the context of a passport application where the material facts are that you are the same person as the person described in your birth certificate, that the parents there are to the best of your knowledge your parents, that the birth certificate is authentic, and that you have not renounced U.S. citizenship. The question about a Social Security number is there for administrative convenience, not to make any determination about your right to a passport. You should apply for a Social Security number. If you already have one, your actions consistent with not having one will only corroborate the fact that you were ignorant of that fact when you applied for a passport, and you will have your existing Social Security number provided to you. As a practical matter it is unlikely that you have one. There are no forms that your non-U.S. parents would have to be filled out that would have required one, and you know that you haven't applied for one in the past. Before Social Security numbers of dependents were required on U.S. tax forms, most people didn't get Social Security numbers until they got their first job. | You haven't suffered a legally cognizable harm because you got your money back, before you even had a chance to complain, so you have no basis for a lawsuit. For what it is worth, pretty much every adult in the United States was affected by the Equifax breach. Also, usually Equifax wouldn't have had access to full bank account numbers in the first place, so that is an unlikely source of the problem. You could open a new account and close the old one (as suggested by @mkennedy in the comments) because then if anyone had access to your bank account number and was abusing it, they could no longer do so. The fact that it only happened once rather than involving many transactions, which is what you commonly see when there is a true identity theft, however, suggests a more benign possibility. There is a pretty good chance that this errant transaction which was reversed was simply a clerical error involving an inaccurate typing in of an account number that got your number instead of the intended one and was reversed when the money didn't leave the intended account (in contrast, identity theft incidents are almost never reversed without a complaint from the account holder). In other words, this may have simply been the banking equivalent of dialing the wrong number by mistake. If this happens again, you should definitely shut down the account, but so far, it seems more likely that this was a one off clerical error. Humans are just not built to input scores of fifteen digit numbers on a daily basis in a 100% accurate fashion. As long as this job is in the hands of humans rather than computers or robots, the humans are going to make mistakes. | Can I just go to the United States and marry him anyway, and still live in Canada? Basically, yes. But, if you tell the border patrol that you are engaged or headed to your wedding when crossing the border to attend your wedding, you may be denied entry, because you no longer qualify for a tourist visa or student visa, and now need a fiancee visa to enter the U.S. This can prevent you from crossing the border for a long time while a financee visa is processed. (I've seen this happen in real life more than once when I lived in Ann Arbor, Michigan which is near the Canadian border.) Once you are married, it is perfectly legal to live in Canada, although this may lead to tough questions from U.S. or Canadian immigration officials about whether you had a bona fide marriage if you later seek to gain U.S. citizenship, or he seeks to gain Canadian citizenship based upon being married, since not living together is circumstantial evidence that you have a sham marriage. This said, immigration officials tend to be more suspicious of sham marriages when one spouse from a poor country seeks citizenship in a rich country than they are in U.S.-Canadian marriages in either direction. Immigration officials are more suspicious if you do not have children together and are less suspicious if you have children together. Do I have to report this to anyone? You need a marriage license from the state or local government as applicable where the marriage takes place and it must be returned with signatures from the officiant and a couple of witnesses within the time set forth in the license. If you change your name upon marriage, you need to change it for purposes of all of your identification documents including your passport, usually by submitting your marriage license to the appropriate officials. If you are asked by a border crossing official if you are married or engaged to be married you are required to answer truthfully, but you do not have to volunteer the information. If either of you applies for a permanent residence visa or citizenship in the other country the immigration officials of that country must be informed on the application for the visa or citizenship. | In the U.S., at least through the end of the twentieth century, there were SCI clearances for which personnel were required to notify the relevant program agency in advance of any foreign travel. I think this may still apply to people in the PRP. (More than once I heard a joke was that this was so that if a transport they were on was hijacked the U.S. could shoot it down to prevent them being taken hostage and tortured for the information.) In a similar vein: I was told (but can't confirm) that some information was considered so sensitive to national security that any individual "read in" had to have a minder present during any medical procedure in which they would be sedated to prevent them from inadvertently divulging secrets while impaired by anesthetics. Plenty of U.S. security clearance contracts require signers to keep classified data they encounter secret for the rest of their life (or until it is properly declassified), not just while on the job or while the program is funded. When people are entrusted with information that in the wrong hands would easily compromise multi-billion-dollar weapons or intelligence systems, or put the lives of other people in imminent jeopardy, the general policy of the U.S. government is to take all reasonable measures to ensure that information is kept safe. Nobody is forced to acquire such sensitive information: Those clearance contracts are signed voluntarily. | You would check with the authorities in the state where your parents last lived. Actually, you can write to any congressperson, and they can pay attention to you or ignore you as they like. (This also applies to people who live in the US; if you think a representative other than your own will be more likely to follow your request, you can write to them instead.) The reason it's most common to write to your own representative is that they have a political motivation to consider your request (you are more likely to vote for them if they do what you ask). If you were to vote for a congressperson, that would be in the district where your parents lived (but that is governed by state law). | You do not have to prove that you are an EU citizen, because EU citizenship is entirely irrelevant to the GDPR. Have a look at Article 3, which basically says that GDPR applies if you are in the EU or if the company is in the EU. If the company is in the EU, therefore, you do not need to send them anything or prove anything about yourself to invoke GDPR. If the company is outside the EU, you can send proof of address or other evidence that you are in the EU, which might be something that they already have, like your IP address. | Wikipedia explains this well enough: Particular numbers can be trade secrets, and their reproduction and dissemination may be particularly proscribed, e.g., by the U.S. DCMA. As a coarse analogy: Your social security number is not "illegal." But if somebody entrusted with it shared it in violation of law or contract then their communication of the number in a context that allowed potential identity thieves to associate it with you would be illegal. To answer follow-up questions in the comments: Sure, "mere possession" of a number can land one in jail for all sorts of crimes, just like "mere possession" of stolen property can. For example, if you possess a bank account number, credit card number, or PIN, and you "conspire, confederate, or combine with another" person who actually commits fraud or theft using that number, then you can be convicted of the same crime. This is so common that a search for "conspiracy to commit wire fraud" or "credit card fraud" provides ample reading. | That is private. Who you work for is not information that is disclosed publicly by any state actor in Germany, just like your taxes. In fact, that or who you are employed at is often regarded as personal and private information. Nigh impossible through agencies Public agencies like the Fiskus (tax), Agentur für Arbeit, and immigration are not allowed to give any information about a person to anyone but that person or another agency that has the right to that information. Yes, (generally speaking) the tax office may not even say that a person exists (or doesn't) and what their tax number is to anyone but the person in question. |
How is it legal that my college does not have any "co-ed" dorms on campus and they only allow "male-only" and "female-only" dorms? I go to a Private, Christian college in Arkansas, and I feel as the college should not require students to be separated strictly by gender. I understand visitation rules and such, but I feel like there should be something that says that the college can not forcefully separate males and females in this day and age. I feel as if this type of housing should only be an option for those that request it, or overflow housing for those who are transferring in or did not register in time. | Others have mentioned Title IX, the federal law that generally prohibits sex discrimination at federally funded educational institutions, 20 US 1681 et seq. However, there is specific permission for single-sex housing in 20 USC 1686: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this chapter, nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit any educational institution receiving funds under this Act, from maintaining separate living facilities for the different sexes. As to your "in this day and age", this particular section of the law has not been amended since it was first passed in 1972. If you think it should be, you can certainly write to your members of Congress and tell them so. However, you say you attend a "Christian" college. Religious schools get an even broader exemption from Title IX, as Michael Seifert also mentioned. 20 USC 1681 (a) (3): This section shall not apply to an educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of this subsection would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization; So even if 20 USC 1686 were repealed, if your college determined that mixed-gender housing was "inconsistent with its religious tenets", they would probably be allowed to continue having single-gender housing anyway. | Under U.S. federal law, and under the few state laws of which I am aware, it is not unlawful to expand a pool of applicants based on a protected class such as race, age, sex, etc., but it is unlawful to select an applicant for employment based on a protected class. An advertisement could lawfully encourage applications by persons having certain protected attributes (e.g., born and raised in South America; Native American; Veteran; transgender) in order to diversify the workforce, but it could not lawfully suggest that hiring preference would be given to applicants with those protected attributes. That's a fine line, and it's easy for an employer to cross it, either willfully or inadvertantly. It's best--from both a practical and a legal perspective--to determine the hiring criteria and process before seeking applicants; and to separate that screening process from the advertising process. The advertising process could, for example, target underrepresented groups as long as it did not preclude other persons/groups from learning about or applying for the opportunities. | From TransEquality.org: People who were assigned female at birth are not required to register with the Selective Service regardless of their current gender or transition status. When applying for federal financial aid, grants, and loans as a man, however, you may be asked to prove that you are exempt. To request a Status Information Letter (SIL) that shows you are exempt, you can either download an SIL request form from the Selective Service website (http://www.sss.gov/PDFs/SilForm_Instructions.pdf) or call them at 1-888-655-1825. This service is free and the exemption letter you will receive does not specify why you are exempt so it will not force you to out yourself in any other application process. The Selective Service does, however, require a copy of your birth certificate showing your birth-assigned sex. If the sex on your birth certificate has been changed, attach any documentation you have to that affect. Once you receive your Status Information Letter, keep it in your files. For those FTM people who transition before their eighteenth birthdays and change their birth certificates, it is also possible to register with the service. However, no one may register after their twenty-sixth birthday. Also, please note that although Selective Service materials refer to transgender people as “people who have had a sex change,” their policies apply to those who have transitioned regardless of surgical history. The referenced form has a section where you can declare your gender assigned at birth, and you must attach a copy of your birth certificate. It would appear that having your gender assigned as female at birth does in fact exempt you from the requirement to register with selective service, and as a result you should not be penalized for any purpose related to your not having registered. | The answer is a clear maybe. See https://www.gov.uk/discrimination-your-rights/types-of-discrimination Discriminating on the basis of sex is illegal, however, applying different rules on uniforms is probably not discrimination under the law. To be discriminatory it must put the class of person at an unfair disadvantage, be harassment or victimisation. You would have to demonstrate that refusing to allow females to wear trousers puts them at an unfair disadvantage (and vice versa because these are separate discriminations) - victimisation is not an issue here, harassment might be but it would have to be actually happening. You should look at things like comfort, practicality, sports, play etc.; the problem is that the better your argument for girls the worse it is for boys.😓 The steps you can take are spelled out in the link, starting with communicating with the organisation. So marshal your arguments and write them a letter and then move on to mediation. At the very least you should get an insight into why they oppose your position. If you deal constructively with their concerns you may get what you want. | I was swimming in a college owned pool... That's one of the important details; you're either college students or visitors on a campus, and you are bound by the student conduct code or other safety laws set in place by the college that dictate behavior on the college campus. Check with the college about the rules that involved the pool. Campus laws and regulations can differ greatly, depending on if the college is private or a public institution. The other detail is that the lifeguard has been given authority to control behavior in the pool as an agent of the owner of the facility (the college) with all authority that the college has to regulate the pool. Be using the pool, you have entered into an agreement with the owners of the pool (the college) and that the lifeguard has authority in that area. Look around for a sign near the pool or in the locker rooms that outlines the rules and regulations of using the pool. | Most Likely Yes to both. It really depends on the nature of your agreement, oral agreements are as legally binding as written ones, but as a matter of evidence in court written contracts are of course better. So looking at your agreement: did you agree to pay the full amount, in return for a place to study? Or did you specifically agree to pay on a rolling basis, where you pay for however long you actually study? I would believe that you had agreed to the first type of agreement, since that is what most study contracts are. And if that's the case: You pay to be allowed to attend, whether you actually attend or not isn't important. And even if you pay on a rolling basis, I would think in a lawsuit the court would find that - judging on previous payments - you'd have agreed to pay on a per semester basis, meaning that the incomplete semester would round up and you would still have to pay for it. I would lean yes to the 2nd question (but im not sure so anyone with more info please chime in). This answer can be more useful if you be specific about the terms and conditions of your study | No. The repeal of pro-LGBT legislation is not sufficient. To be a refugee you must have a real and imminent fear of persecution which is generally defined to include matters like bodily harm or arbitrary detention or seizure of property on account of your status. The generalized protections existing under the law from private violence and civil rights violations in the U.S., while imperfect, is not going to suffice as a general matter to establish refugee status, particularly because many of those protections arise under federal law. A generalized fear of a "civil war" someday, and a general dissatisfaction with the amount of corruption present in the government and the bad policies of the government, in the United States, is not sufficient. Also, the United States is a free immigration zone, which means that people can freely travel and relocate to other parts of the United States, and while some places in the United States might be quite unfriendly to LGBT individuals, there are other places in the United States that are much more welcoming both in theory, based upon enacted laws, and in practice. For example, in Colorado, there are state anti-discrimination laws, one of the leading candidates for Governor is a gay man who is currently one of our Congressmen, we have had lesbian speakers of the state house, a high official in Denver's school district is a gay man who was a former state legislator, and a DA in a fairly conservative suburb of Denver vigorously prosecuted and obtained a conviction against a man who murdered a transwoman on account of her trans-status including a hate crime count, and a transman serves in the U.S. military in one of the state's federal military bases. When I walk the halls of my children's high school in Denver, the walls are full of official administration proclamations of support for LGBT students that is backed up by action and reflected in how my children's many LGBT friends were treated in their school. Denver's clerk's office proudly proclaims that it marries hundreds, if not thousands, of same sex couples every year. This doesn't mean life is perfect in Colorado, but it isn't official persecution of the kind that would rise to refugee status either. And, since anyone in the U.S. can move to Colorado or other relatively LGBT friendly states, there would not be any ground to claim refugee status. Canada, for example, would not admit someone as a refugee based upon persecution for LGBT status if that person did not demonstrate that they could not escape persecution by moving to metropolitan Denver or San Francisco or New York City. The U.S. is not necessarily the very best place in the world to be LGBT, but it is certainly near the top, despite the fact that the struggle for LGBT rights is ongoing and will be indefinitely and it isn't perfect. | Being disabled has nothing to do with it. If he is harassing students then after there is a complaint and investigation, then he can be banned from campus, and arrested for trespassing if he returns. But there would have to be a formal complaint made to the authorities first. |
What is the longest known time between the commission of an offence and conviction in English legal history? In England & Wales, the former Labour peer Lord Ahmed was recently jailed for sexual offences he was convicted of dating from the early 1970s. This 50+ year gap seems quite long, although obviously for serious sexual offences there is no limitation on prosecution. What is the longest known time between the commission of an offence and the conviction of the perpetrator in England & Wales ? Is Lord Ahmed's the longest? | At least 56 years Anthony Sawoniuk was convicted in 1999 of 2 murders committed while he was a member of the SS. I cannot find the exact date of the offenses but they were before he deserted in November 1944. There may be longer ones but on seeing your question, Nazi war crimes popped into my head as something easy to check. If the actual answer is some obscure crime from the 19th century, I don’t know how you’d find it. | Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing". | Its worth actually reading through the law again - they're meant for different categories of drugs - and its worth looking up the relevant laws as a whole. You can't cherrypick which law you charge them under in this case. It depends on what the suspect has in posession, and if you have more serious charges, they're probably going to be preferred unless the prosecution decides to throw the entire library at the suspect and charge them with everything they can, or a larger subset. A quick search on the internet - which shouldn't be taken as legal advice, brings up this link. Category 1 drugs are addictive and seen as therapeutically useless - you shouldn't have any realistic reason to have quantities of it in your posession. Category 3 is drugs with therapeutic use - stuff like codine. You could get a prescription for that, but there's potential for abuse. They're aimed at different classes of drugs - and the confusion is over a misinterpretation of what the law is about. As an aside, this is why you need to usually read more than just a specific statute or law to get what its about. | No. This isn't possible. A judge can only sentence someone after they have pleaded guilty or been found to be guilty, following an indictment or criminal complaint, and multiple advisements of rights. | In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe). | Could the acceptance of the pardon then have any bearing on the case in the other jurisdiction? Possibly, but not much. There is very, very little case law on this point since: (1) pardons are rare (especially federal ones), (2) people who are pardoned generally do so because everyone in the criminal justice process in the prior case agrees that the person is reformed and they are usually correct, (3) the statute of limitations has often run on a new prosecution, and (4) many cases where these issues arise, are probably not appealed (either because the neither parties attempts to, or because a defendant is acquitted and there is no appeal), but an appeal is necessary to give rise to binding precedents. Can the admission of guilt be used in the new case? The criminal collateral estoppel effects of a pardon flow from the adjudication on the merits which is vacated. Also, comity between sovereigns and public policy mitigate such a rule. The pardon power would not be very interesting if it routinely resulted in a new prosecution that was conducted on a summary basis via a preclusion doctrine such as collateral estoppel. In many cases, the statute of limitations will have run on the original crime or there will be no parallel state law crime, but this is not always the case. Also, I would disagree with the statement that a pardon always implies an admission of guilt to the crime for which a pardon was granted, even though that statement is often used rhetorically. For example, one important use of the pardon power is to commute the sentence of someone who asserts that they are factually innocent but have been convicted of a crime, potentially in a manner that is not subject to further judicial review, and treating that as an admission of guilt doesn't make sense. As the Wikipedia entry on Burdick notes in the pertinent part: Legal scholars have questioned whether that portion of Burdick [ed. about admission of guilt] is meaningful or merely dicta. President Ford made reference to the Burdick decision in his post-pardon written statement furnished to the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives on October 17, 1974. However, said reference related only to the portion of Burdick that supported the proposition that the Constitution does not limit the pardon power to cases of convicted offenders or even indicted offenders. I would read this as dicta, as this portion of the holding was not necessary for the court to reach its conclusion and the fact pattern in Burdick was a typical fact pattern where guilt was not disputed. It didn't raise the concerns present when a pardon is requested based upon a claim of innocence, and granted following a conviction. Instead, the holding of Burdick was that there was no pardon because the pardon was rejected (in a manner very similar to a common law disclaimer of a gift), so its holding didn't need to reach the effect of a pardon that is accepted to resolve the case. Can it be used as "reasonable cause" for various actions? This is a bit too vague to know what you are getting at. I suppose that a pardon could constitute reasonable cause for some things favorable to a defendant who is pardoned (e.g., potentially in a motion seeking to reopen a termination of parental rights entered on the basis of the conviction). I suppose it could also be used in a manner potentially unfavorable to a defendant (e.g. showing a pattern of past conduct that demonstrates modus operandi in connection with a prosecution for a new crime). I don't think it could be used as grounds to deny an occupational or business license for bad character. Still, without more clear context it is harder to know what you are really looking for in this regard and I'm not confident that my examples address that. Does the defendant lose their right to refuse to testify in the new case? I haven't reviewed the case law, but my intuition is that if it has never been waived before, it wouldn't be waived by the pardon, but that if it was waived in a previous proceeding resulting in a conviction that was then pardoned, that the prior sworn testimony might be admissible evidence in the new action since it is not hearsay and isn't itself evidence of a prior conviction. The context of the prior testimony might have to be concealed from the jury. As noted by @Putvi, the defendant could not claim risk of conviction for the federal crime as a ground for invoking the 5th Amendment if a pardon is accepted (something that is implied in Burdick), but if there was an overlapping state law crime, risk of conviction for the state crime could constitute a grounds upon which to invoke the 5th Amendment. Burdick does stand for the proposition that a pardon not solicited by the defendant, that is rejected, cannot provide a basis for removing the 5th Amendment protection with respect to a risk of conviction for federal crime. I would also be inclined to think that matters disclosed in an application for a pardon might be admissible evidence as a non-hearsay statement of a party-opponent, if the statement was stripped of the pardon application context (which would be unduly prejudicial since it would imply a prior conviction which otherwise wouldn't be admissible). | Yes Deciding a case on a basis the parties have not raised is a denial of natural justice (or procedural fairness) and invalid. The reason is very simple, the parties have not had the opportunity to produce evidence or make submissions about C or D that might have changed the judge’s mind about them. Notwithstanding, to successfully appeal, the aggrieved party must show there were arguments that could have been raised which could reasonably have altered the outcome. That said, it’s the judge’s courtroom and they can say “That’s interesting but what about C and D?” and then the parties can make submissions about them. They do have to be circumspect and make sure that they do not become one party’s advocate - one party might be well aware of C and D and don’t want them brought up because they damage their case and they are hoping the other party misses that - and then the bloody judge come charging in with his bloody duty to wider interests of justice. Non-judicial decision makers like arbitrators, adjudicators and other tribunals need to be even more circumspect because they generally don’t have a duty to anyone but the parties. Unlike in civil law systems, the role of the judge is to decide the dispute between the parties as a referee, not to determine some objective”truth” as an investigator. To keep things simple: if the plaintiff contends that the light was red and the defendant contends the light was green then, assuming there is no evidence opening the possibility, it is not open to the judge to find that the light was amber. Similarly, if the parties agree that red means go and green means stop, it is not the judge's role to tell the parties they are wrong (I'm sure questions would be asked but if the parties are adamant ...): since there is no dispute over this issue the judge would be wrong to agitate one. Now, a judge is free to apply the law that was argued as a whole - if arguments centred on Section 14 of the Relevant Act 1875 but Section 15 is applicable and germane the judge is not wrong for applying Section 15. However, they are on shakier ground if the bring in Other Slightly Relevant Act 1956. | I skimmed the text of the act and didn't see anything about expiration, so that suggests that it doesn't expire. Normally such a provision would be prominent near the beginning or end. |
I agreed on 1 year rent term while signing for 3 years and now landlord wants me to leave A year ago I started a room renting contract, where landlord asked me to stay there for 1 year maximum and I agreed. This was only accepted by my words and in written email but not signed. The written contract itself states that it lasts for 3 years, so legally I can live there for 2 more years I think. Now landlord is asking me to leave the room because we agreed on 1 year length (the reason being, every year he is legally allowed to increase a price by little bit). I actually kind of like the room and would love to stay for at least half more year, but I think it's unethical from my point of view, but again he gave me 3 year written contract, so that's what matters, or is it possible that my email confirmation on 1 year is more important? Would it be ethical/fine to keep living there? I know this isn't really finance related question, but I think it's fits this board most. It's in The Netherlands by the way. | If it were me, I would leave. Who wants to rent a room in a home where you are not wanted? However, there should be concessions. I would ask for 1.5 months rent refunded, but would happily settle for one month. I am sure there are many nice rooms, close by, where you are welcomed. Given additional information commented by the OP, the landlord is looking to increase his rents. Evidentially this municipality has strict rent controls. In this case, I would enter negotiations with the landlord. I would offer him a percentage of his anticipated rent increase and probably start at 50%. If the OP has been a good tenant (always paid on time, and low maintenance) the landlord might see this as a bargain. No need to find a new tenant and no need to vet one that might pay poorly. The better the tenant has been, and the more strict the renter protection laws the more appeal this offer will have to the landlord. The benefit for the OP is they don't have to move, or find a new place with its associated costs and inconvenience. If the landlord is just a mindless corporate drone with no decision making power, this will not work. | http://www.tenantslegalcenter.com/html/eviction_notices.html 3 DAY NOTICE TO CURE BREACH (sometimes called PERFORM COVENANT) OR QUIT is used to notify a tenant that he/she has 3 days to do or stop doing something as per the rental agreement or the law. The tenant can comply with the notice or vacate within the 3 days. If the tenant vacates within the 3 days, he/she is NOT relieved from the rent obligation under the lease or rental agreement. So, the notice must be based on a law and/or the lease agreement. Presumably, the law and/or lease provision must be cited in the notice. The City of San Diego has a GOOD CAUSE law (Right to Know Ordinance) protecting certain tenants in a residential tenancy of at least TWO years and that good cause must be written in the notice. You state that you've been there seven years, so this law applies. To count the days of a notice, you begin on the next day after service as the first day. Weekends and holidays are counted but the last day of a notice to act generally may not land on a weekend or holiday. If it does, and if applicable to that notice, the "last day" can carry over to the next business day. For example, if a 3 day notice to pay rent is served on a Thursday, we count Friday as the first day Sunday is the third day. Since the last day of this type of notice cannot be a Sunday, the "third day" is then Monday (giving the tenant four days instead of three) to pay the rent. If that Monday was a legal holiday, then Tuesday would then be the "third" day (giving the tenant five days instead of three) to pay the rent. http://www.rogerfranklin.org/Instructions_for_Landlords_2017.pdf B. SERVE THE THREE-DAY NOTICE 1. After the Three-Day Notice has been filled out and signed, you must serve it on the tenant. The Three-Day Notice may be served either: (a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, or (b) If the tenant is absent from is place of residence and from his usual place of business, by leaving a copy with some person over the age of eighteen (18) years at either place, AND mailing a copy of the Three-Day Notice addressed to the tenant, postage prepaid, first-class mail, to his place of residence; or (c) If such place of residence and business cannot be ascertained and a person over the age of eighteen cannot be found at the tenant’s residence, then by affixing a copy of the Three-Day Notice in a conspicuous place on the property, AND mailing a copy of the Three Day Notice to the tenant at his residence. So if the notice was just left at your apartment, and was not delivered personally or mailed, then the service is invalid. | Presumably the lease contains an automatic renewal provision that says unless you give notice 60 days in advance, you commit to another month (otherwise, you can just leave at the end of the month). The landlord may have made a math error, or they may be misinterpreting what the agreement says. Most likely it says that the duration of the lease is a month, meaning a whole month, which can have between 28 and 31 days. Unless otherwise stated in the agreement, that means "to the last day in any given month". A 60 day notice provision states the minimum number of days to stop automatic renewal, not the maximum or exact number of days. The language of the agreement will most likely say something to the effect that the duration of the lease is a month, and that is what the courts will enforce. | The law regarding landlords and tenants is Iowa Code Ch. 562A. Part 2 (§562A.27 et seq.) states the legal remedies available to a landlord. §562A.27 specifically spells out the remedies for material non-compliance with lease terms. The gist of that and related sections is that if a person is in violation of a lease, there is a legal process that has to be followed, and if successful, the sheriff will forcibly evict the tenant (though §562A.27A, the clear and present danger section, shortens the process – still, it's not immediate and it does require legal notice etc.). Under the law, you (apparently) have become a landlord and have an unwritten tenancy agreement with the tenant. I assume based on your description of the facts you have a long-term written agreement with the property owner. By allowing this person to live with you, you have entered into a landlord-tenant relationship, which limits your rights. The police will not respond to this situation – a legal squabble – whereas if someone broke into your residence and was trespassing (and you complain in a timely manner, not allowing the person to trespass), the police would respond and not require a court order. §562A.9(5) states that in lieu of a specific term of tenancy, in the case of a roomer paying weekly rent the tenanct period is a week, otherwise it is a month. §562A.6 defines "roomer": basically, if you are a "roomer", so is your sub-lessor. By agreeing to let the person stay with you, you have become a landlord and sub-lessor, thereby subject to the restrictions on landlord actions. That means you have to take the person to court to get rid of them. Failure to pay agreed-on rent is certainly sufficient legal cause, and any monthly lease can be terminated by the landlord after giving legal notice (30 days advance notice). | What does "PROVIDED FURTHER" here mean? The term keeps two provisions separate, and hence independent of each other (unconditional). The former provision addresses landlord's initiative [to terminate the lease] whereas the latter addresses tenant's initiative. The latter pertains to early termination of lease and is not to be confused with tenant's default/non-payment. If rent is to be paid on the 1st of each month and the landlord wants the tenant to move out by August 13, the landlord needs to give a written notice at least thirty days prior to August 1 because the 1st of August is "the next rent payment date". This is regardless of tenant's timely payment of rent. Tenant's initiative to prematurely terminate the lease forfeits his security deposit regardless of having hitherto/always paid rent on time. | Michigan law say nothing about landlord entry, so whatever it says in the lease is what is allowed. Various sources like this comment on the lack of such statutory regulations. There does not appear to be any relevant case law for Michigan which impose restrictions on a landlord's right to access a rental. Since there is no statutory or case law restriction on landlord's right to access his property, landlord's agent would have the same right to access. That would mean that if the listing agent were authorized by the landlord to enter, then the agent could enter, and it would not be necessary for the landlord to accompany this agent whenever entry was needed. That does not mean that a "listing agent" that happens to work with a landlord has an independent right to enter the landlord's property. The same would go for repairmen. It is actually not clear to me whether there could be blanket permission for any and all with access to the lock box to enter, since pretty much any realtor can enter a house for sale, subject to whatever the stated limitations are, and they don't call the owner for each entry. I suspect that one would not have legal grounds for imposing a particular additional restriction on a landlord's right to access and permit access to the property, since there's no overriding statute, and restrictions on landlord access mainly derive from statutes. | If you want to get out, and are willing to lose $270, you can not sign the lease and demand a return of your security deposit. You could ask for a return of the other fees as well, but you are less likely to be successful. They would probably have trouble enforcing a security deposit against you if you didn't have a lease with them, and would probably have trouble demanding you sign a lease when they changed the unit. You should probably get it all back, because you applied for it, but it probably isn't worth litigating over. I would also encourage you to turn to social media sites if they have one, or to sites like Yelp, if they do not. Many businesses are sensitive to this and if you are truthful if could provide you with some leverage. | What "reasonable accommodation" were you requesting? That they lower the bar of determining your ability to pay your bills on time? I don't think that will qualify. A business setting a minimum bar for financial viability isn't a burden tied to a handicap. It's one thing to request a ramp, contracts in braille, etc., but it's another thing to request that they accept a highly-probable financial risk. What would you expect of them the next time "life" got in the way and you couldn't pay your rent? Another accommodation? I think what they were saying is that since you didn't pass the financial background check, and as such were not accepted as a resident, you aren't in a position to make an accommodation request. |
Is cheese legal in Florida? I recently found out that Tyramine is a Schedule I controlled substance in Florida. It is also a significant component of well-aged cheese. Even though I think of this as a merely theoretical issue, but given a German citizen comes to visit some friends in Florida to gift them a nice block of well-aged German cheese, if said German gets confronted by an evil-meaning police officer, what would happen? Is this drug trafficking? | A good question that arises from stupid lawmaking. As Wikipedia notes: United States Tyramine is not scheduled at the federal level in the United States and is therefore legal to buy, sell, or possess. Status in Florida Tyramine is a Schedule I controlled substance, categorized as a hallucinogen, making it illegal to buy, sell, or possess in the state of Florida without a license at any purity level or any form whatsoever. The language in the Florida statute says tyramine is illegal in "any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of [tyramine] or that contains any of [its] salts, isomers, including optical, positional, or geometric isomers, and salts of isomers, if the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation." This ban is likely the product of lawmakers overly eager to ban substituted phenethylamines, which tyramine is, in the mistaken belief that ring-substituted phenethylamines are hallucinogenic drugs like the 2C series of psychedelic substituted phenethylamines. The further banning of tyramine's optical isomers, positional isomers, or geometric isomers, and salts of isomers where they exist, means that meta-tyramine and phenylethanolamine, a substance found in every living human body, and other common, non-hallucinogenic substances are also illegal to buy, sell, or possess in Florida. Given that tyramine occurs naturally in many foods and drinks (most commonly as a by-product of bacterial fermentation), e.g. wine, cheese, and chocolate, Florida's total ban on the substance may prove difficult to enforce. But lawmakers, in principle, are allowed to pass stupid laws, and an evil-meaning police officer confronting a German citizen with a technically correct interpretation of a duly enacted law, even if it makes no sense, is hardly a fanciful scenario. The mostly likely result would be that a judge would interpret the Controlled Substance designation to apply only to synthetic and meaningfully concentrated version of the chemical in order to avoid absurdity, even if this is not the most plain reading of the statute, in order to reflect legislative intent. Also, while the statute doesn't have an express de minimis exception, one can look by analogy to the fact that no one is prosecuted because the currency they receive as change from a restaurant has trace amounts of cocaine (which 80% of dollar bills in circulation do). Another potential challenge under the federal constitution would be based upon the dormant commerce clause (as in impediment to interstate and international commerce in ordinary trade goods), under a "rational basis test" argument under the Equal Protection Clause (to highlight the lack of any positive reason to enact the law read broadly), or under a "void for vagueness" analysis that assuming the law wasn't intended to have absurd consequences it isn't clear how far it was intended to go. Lack of knowledge that one is in possession of the substance due to lack of advanced chemical knowledge not shared by most members of the legislature would also be a defense in many cases, because many controlled substances offenses require you to have knowledge that you are in possession of a controlled substance. | According to Florida law 454.23: Any person not licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law in this state who practices law in this state or holds himself or herself out to the public as qualified to practice law in this state, or who willfully pretends to be, or willfully takes or uses any name, title, addition, or description implying that he or she is qualified, or recognized by law as qualified, to practice law in this state, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. What you propose therefore seems to be a felony. And according to a 2015 survey from the American Bar Association, Florida had the highest budget in the nation for prosecuting unauthorized practice of law - $1.8 million. So this seems like a very bad idea. | My understanding is that this isn't a contractual term, but rather a warning that the items don't satisfy legal requirements for individual sale. The seller and manufacturer likely don't care whether you resell the items, but the government does. In the US, at least, regulations of the Food and Drug Administration require that (with certain exceptions) food items sold at retail must be marked with a Nutrition Facts label, showing calorie counts, fat and sugar content, and so on. The FDA has information on this requirement, including citations to the relevant sections of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). For example, if you buy a big multipack of tiny ("fun size") candy bars, the manufacturer usually won't have printed Nutrition Facts on each candy bar's wrapper (because it's too small). There will instead be a label on the outer bag. As such, you can't legally resell the candy bars individually, because they don't meet labeling requirements. In fact, in the FDA page I linked above, you can see that manufacturers are required to print "This unit not labeled for retail sale" on individual items if they don't have Nutrition Facts labels. See the 12th item in the table of exemptions. | Your landlord has an obligation to allow "quiet enjoyment" of the premises. Essentially this means that, unless they are damaging his or her property, the tenants are entited to act as though it were their own property. Many people take drugs at home. Between the tenants and the landlord this is not something the landlord is allowed to get involved in. If you believe there is criminal activity going on, you can but are not obliged to report it to the police. | Following you around with the intent of harassing you is stalking. I don't know whether there's going to be a law actually requiring social distancing in Florida. In other states, I've seen laws set up to make it a crime to violate an order of the Director of Public Health or something like that. I don't know whether Florida actually has an order requiring social distancing by the general public. | The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing | The most important rule for an extradition from Germany is this: If the role of the countries were reversed, would the person be convicted in Germany according to German law? You say the link claims that he couldn't be convicted now, because he would have been convicted twice for the same crime. So he wouldn't be convicted in Germany if the roles of the countries were reversed, therefore no extradition. (The next important rule is this: There must be enough evidence that the person would be prosecuted in Germany, not necessarily convicted. You also need to convince the court that the accused will get a fair trial when extradited, that there will be no cruel or unusual punishment, including death sentence, and lastly there is no extradition for small crimes when the extradition plus having to appear in a foreign court can be considered worse punishment than the actual punishment for the crime. All these irrelevant in this case, I think). "Auslieferung unstatthaft" just means "extradition inadmissible" or "extradition illegal". PS. Ludl asked "shouldn't there be some law that if someone cannot be extradited from Germany because of extradition law, they can still be prosecuted in Germany". That would be completely unnecessary. Let's say one US citizen murders another one in Germany, the USA asks for extradition (they wouldn't, because it is a German matter, but they could ask of course), and Germany rightfully refuses. Then since it is a murder on German ground, it will be prosecuted in Germany. It would be absurd to think that a failed extradition request could protect a murderer. | Growing marijuana is very often legally classed as "manufacture of a controlled substance." In criminal law, "manufacture" tends to be explicitly defined to include cultivation, but this is in fact a reasonably common use of the term (it doesn't have to mean producing with machinery). And so it's extremely unlikely that anyone will be convinced that you even might have thought the agreement didn't cover growing marijuana. The intent of the parties is fairly clear there. |
What is meant by direct Taxes in Article 1 Section 2 in the US Constitution? I am new when it comes to understanding the US Constitution and I am not comfortable with Section 2, Paragraph 3 of Article 1! [Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons.]* The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner, as they shall by Law direct. The The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three. What is meant by "direct taxes" in Article 1 Section 2 Paragraph 3? Note: I have done research on Law SE but found nothing which relates to the answer I'm looking for. Some relevant link: https://constitutioncenter.org/media/files/constitution.pdf https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CONAN-1992/pdf/GPO-CONAN-1992-6.pdf https://www.senate.gov/civics/resources/pdf/US_Constitution-Senate_Publication_103-21.pdf | Direct taxes were understood at that time as taxes directly on individuals such as a flat-per-person head tax (poll tax,aka a capitation) or an ad valorem (by value) property tax. Taxes on imports and exports, and excise or "use" taxes, such as a tax on the manufacture and sale of whiskey, were not considered to be direct taxes. In 2007 a US Court of Appeals said, in Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service and United States, (case no. 05-5139, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) that: "Only three taxes are definitely known to be direct: (1) a capitation [ . . . ], (2) a tax upon real property, and (3) a tax upon personal property." In section 17 of Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company (link below) the Supreme Court wrote: Ordinarily, all taxes paid primarily by persons who can shift the burden upon some one else, or who are under no legal compulsion to pay them, are considered indirect taxes; but a tax upon property holders in respect of their estates, whether real or personal, or of the income yielded by such estates, and the payment of which cannot be avoided, are direct taxes. This opinion goes into great detail on the history of the apportionment clause, and of direct and indirect taxes. See also The Wikipedia article on Direct Tax. After a na6tional income tax was imposed in 1894, it was held (in 1895) to be unconstitutional under this provision. This was in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, 157 US 429 (1895). An earlier income tax was passed in 1861, and repealed about 10 years later without challenge. The 16th amendment was passed (ratified in 1913) to declare income taxes not to be subject to this provision. See History of the US Income Tax and the LII page on Income Tax. To the best of my understanding, no current federal tax is considered a direct tax subject to apportionment under this provision. Indeed the apportionment requirement, which was copied from the previous articles of Confederation, was so awkward that taxes which would be subject to it were never or almost never imposed, but ways were found to make any desired taxes not "direct". This provision is, accordingly, obsolete as far as taxes go. | Analysis. This question has never been squarely resolved by case law. An analysis would look to the U.S. Constitution (the pertinent parts of which are restated below) and case law under it, to determine if Congress has the authority to enact such a law or not including whether laws currently on the books affect it. Caucuses and primaries are used by political parties as part of their process for determining their Presidential nominees, and the only constitutional acknowledgement that they exist, or are subject to federal regulation is in the 24th Amendment. Political parties also have a 1st Amendment freedom of association interest in choosing their nominees as they see fit, subject to reasonable regulation in an area of law that is not well spelled out in case law. On the the other hand, caucuses and primaries are government regulated, mostly at the state level, because their results have an officially recognized role in Presidential elections under state laws regulating elections for Presidential electors, and primaries are generally conducted at state expense by state and local government officials, rather than by political parties acting autonomously. And, states have wide expressly granted discretion regarding how they conduct Presidential elector elections subject to the authority of Congress to prohibit various kinds of discrimination in the conduct of elections and to set the date of Presidential elections (a right that Congress has chosen not to strictly enforce allowing early voting, for example). New Hampshire does have the authority to say what a political party must do to have its nominee recognized on its general election Presidential ballot, and when it will conduct its state primaries. But, it does not necessarily have the power to determine whether or to what extent a national political party will consider the results of that primary in the process of selecting its nominee for President. The Democratic party, for example, would probably be within its rights to award no delegates to its national convention based upon New Hampshire's primary election participants based upon the New Hampshire primary election, and to instead award New Hampshire delegates solely as "superdelegates" who serve ex-officio, or based solely upon an entirely privately funded and operated Presidential caucus it held in New Hampshire at a date of its choosing. The flip side is that New Hampshire might be within its rights, probably, to decline to put a Democratic party national convention chosen nominee on its Presidential elector ballots, a retaliation, although arguably that would deny the rights of its citizens to vote in the Presidential election over which the federal government has more regulatory authority. The exact details of any situation leading to litigation would matter a lot, and it isn't possible to predict with any great certainty how a challenge would come out, although it is possible to articulate what provisions of the U.S. Constitution (and with more research, what court cases (maybe a dozen or two are arguably pertinent), federal statutes and state statutes) would be pertinent to the decision. It is possible to advocate for an outcome within the range of legally relevant authority, but, in practice, a negotiated compromise that would not push up against the hard constitutional limits of the constitution, relevant statutes and cases would almost surely be reached before it came to that point. For example, while New Hampshire might arguably have the right to refuse to put the Democratic nominee on the ballot because it didn't consider the results of its first in the nation primary in choosing its nominee, I very much doubt that New Hampshire officials would actually go that far, if push came to shove. On the other hand, if Congress passed a law stating that the District of Columbia shall hold the first in the nation primary, as it is probably expressly authorized to do under the 23rd Amendment, that federal law would probably pre-empt New Hampshire's law on the point. Relevant Provisions Of The U.S. Constitution As Amended Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution might be relevant. It states: The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution might be pertinent, it states in the pertinent part that: The Congress shall have power . . . To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. Even more directly, Article II, Section 1 which states, in part, that: The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected, as follows: Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. . . The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the United States. Article VI states in the pertinent part that: This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. The 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. The 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. Sections 1, 2, and 5 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. These sections state: Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . . Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. . . . Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. The 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 23rd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Section 1. The District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a state, but in no event more than the least populous state; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the states, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a state; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 24th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which is the only one expressly recognizing the existence of primary elections, might apply. It states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 26th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. Collectively, these sections of the U.S. Constitution give the federal government considerable legislative authority to regulate state elections for federal offices. | The amendment restricts when a change in law takes effect. The amendment does not restrict all laws, just those "varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives". A law could be passed this session automatically increasing (or decreasing) congressional pay by 5% per annum, and could take effect after the 2022 elections have taken place in November. Like all constitutional amendments, we do not get an authoritative interpretation of the meaning of the words until someone sues someone else and SCOTUS says what it means. Shaffer v. Clinton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1014 is a case almost on point, precisely over whether COLAs violate the 27th Amendment. The Executive branch (defendants) sought dismissal and certain Congressmen and citizens (plaintiffs) sought summary judgment, "asserting there is no genuine issue as to any material fact remaining in dispute and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law". The case was dismissed with prejudice without much mention of the merits the annual COLAs provided by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 are not independent laws under the Twenty-seventh Amendment and that Adjustments to congressional salaries under the Ethics Reform Act are not discretionary acts of Congress. The adjustments are calculations performed by nonlegislative administrative staff, following a specific formula provided by Congress in the Act This provides a good basis for thinking that a future court would reach the same "failure to state a claim" dead end, but in lieu of something above the level of U.S. District Court, Colorado would be necessary to make the conclusion "a matter of settled law". What you propose does not require making more than one law, and then a bunch of administrative calculations that does not involve Congress. | There is no money being offered or given to the voter. There is a long-running traditional bipartisan expenditure in Pennsylvania known variously as street money and get out the vote money that is legally used to reimburse volunteers for expenses to drive voters to the polls. The second article linked asserts this is a first amendment protected right. This seems in line with such historical expenditures. | Generally speaking the "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble to the US Constitution is not relied on for anything. It does not grant additional power to Congress or the Federal government as a whole, neither does it restrict the Federal government beyond the restrictions already included in the body of the Constitution. Congress often accepts hearsay when it takes testimony before a committee. Such testimony need not comply with the rules of evidence that apply in court. I am not clear what you mean by "to pretext privacy and the right to try", please clarify this. I am not aware of any "right to try" under the Federal or State governments. The word "pretext" is not usually used as a verb in this way. Edit The link on "right to try" goes to a Quora question about laws passed by Congress later being held to be unconstitutional. That does happen. but I have never herd it called "the right to try". The link on "pretext" goes to a security.se question about a "convict internet". I don't see what that has to to with the preamble to the Constitution. 2nd Edit The "blessings of liberty" phrase from the preamble has nothing to do with laws against discrimination, neither authorizing nor restricting such laws. | The Declaration of Independence is often cited (along with the Federalist Papers) when the court is attempting to justify a particular interpretation of The Constitution by looking at the intent of the drafters. For example, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 576 U.S. ____ (2015), in establishing that the people have ultimate sovereignty quoted the Declaration of Independence: Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed... Following that (after also quoting some text from the Constitution), Justice Ginsberg concludes: In this light, it would be perverse to interpret the term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause so as to exclude lawmaking by the people, particularly where such lawmaking is intended to check legislators’ ability to choose the district lines they run in... As a second example, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. ___ (2015), refers to the Declaration of Independence: This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves. | The method of proposing an amendment by way of Convention has never been used. Thus, procedural aspects such as how members of such a convention would be chosen have also not been settled: In the modern era, scholars have debated various issues, including: (1) how delegates to the convention should be chosen; (2) whether Congress, state legislatures, or the delegates should set rules of procedure for the convention; (3) the vote threshold would be required to propose an amendment in convention; and (4) how voting rights on a proposed amendment should be apportioned among the states. (Constitution Annotated, "ArtV.3.3 Proposals of Amendments by Convention") | Probably not. There is an unenumerated constitutional "right to travel" (which has been recognized in case law, and has not yet been judicially overruled) and there is also a concept called the "dormant commerce clause" which prohibits legislation by a state that interferes with the ability of people to engage in interstate commerce even if Congress has passed no relevant legislation. There could also be a privileges and immunities clause argument arising under the original 1789 constitution and not the 14th Amendment to that document privileges and immunities clause, which affords people from outside a state the same rights as people in a state. Also, citizens of a state are defined as its residents, so a state only has jurisdiction over someone as a citizen for so long as they reside there. I was born in Georgia, for example, but haven't lived there since I was six years old, so I am not a citizen of Georgia. The proposed Texas law bears some similarity to the Mann Act of 1910 which prohibits transporting people across state lines for the purposes of prostitution (to slightly oversimplify). But the Mann Act is a federal law, not a state law. The proposed Texas law also bears some similarity to the infamous Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 which required free states to respect the slave status of people treated as slaves in a slave state under the slave state's law by returning fugitive slaves to their out of state masters, when the slave escaped across state lines. But, this was also a federal law and reflect the greater extraterritorial force of contracts and property rights created under state law compared to the extraterritorial force of the police powers of a state government. There are constitutional provisions requiring states to honor each other's rulings as well, most notably the requirement to extradite felons, and the full faith and credit clause that requires states to honor the court judgments and government determinations of status (e.g. marriage certificates) of other states in most circumstances. But, I don't think that you get there in a case regulating the conduct of a state resident outside the state, or in a case where you want to criminalize assisting someone in the state to leave the state for a particular purpose. Neither of these examples, however, involve state laws. Generally, penalties for doing something across state lines need to be established by federal, rather than state, laws. This said, the issue has not been litigated in this particular context yet, and the legal theories implicated and structure of those lines in fine particulars could matter. States have only rarely tried to regulate the conduct of their residents outside their own states and have even less frequently been successful in doing so. |
What does the Rome Statute have to do with the ongoing war in Ukraine? What does the Rome Statute have to do with the ongoing war in Ukraine? Neither Russia nor Ukraine ratified it, but the proceedings have commenced | From Wikipedia: The court has jurisdiction over crimes only if they are committed in the territory of a state party or if they are committed by a national of a state party; an exception to this rule is that the ICC may also have jurisdiction over crimes if its jurisdiction is authorized by the United Nations Security Council. Perhaps it is a political move to force Russia to veto a resolution authorizing jurisdiction in the hope that most of the world would view as being tantamount to an admission of the impropriety of its invasion of Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine has granted the court "ad hoc jurisdiction." See Ukraine fights Russia on the ground and in the courts: The court is limited to investigating the crime of aggression to members of the court. Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute, which created the court in 2002, while Ukraine has granted the court only ad hoc jurisdiction since 2014. On that basis, the court completed an initial investigation into Russia’s activities in Eastern Ukraine and its 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula, concluding six years later that there was “a reasonable basis at this time to believe that a broad range of conduct constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity.” | Technically you could stake such a claim in accordance with general principles of public international law, but every country has discretion about whether to recognize you as a sovereign state. Established states would likely have no interest in dealing with you until you have a certain amount of influence and resources. You might have to defend your claimed land and property by force at times from pirates, imperialists, states claiming authority by international agreement, etc. There are a number of microstates and micronations with varying degrees of recognition. | There is no exception arising from the Espionage Act, indeed in Gorin v. US, 312 U.S. 19, one of the holdings is that "In a prosecution under §§ 1(b) and 2 of the Espionage Act, the jury determines whether the acts of the defendants were connected with or related to the national defense under proper tests laid down by the instructions". This does not mean that the prosecution will not be eager to avoid the possibility of jury nullification and may hope for a bench trial. Here is the transcript of the jury verdict in the trial of the Rosenbergs, and another report of an espionage conviction in a trial by jury. There is no evidence that Assange "would not be afforded a trial by jury" if he requested it. | There may be a purpose to have laws which are impossible to follow. (I'm neither a lawyer nor a politician, following points are what I like to call qualified hearsay - they come from qualified people I know personally but were given as a remark or during a chat over a cup of coffee and therefore are not easily substantiable with rigorous sources. You can treat them as a hypothetical ideas for your thought experiments.) Everybody is implicitly guilty Confident citizens and transparent law is the worst enemy of totalitarian regime. You learn to live with ingrained feeling that there surely is something you are guilty of. Merely being addressed by police makes you nervous and malleable; should you stand up against oppression, it is easy for the state apparat to detain or convict you of one or more default offenses. A good example would be the law present in many, if not all, socialist bloc countries saying that knowing of a comrade having commited an offense or merely planing to and not reporting it to authorities is an offense in itself. Whether you did or did not know would be determined by the authorities. Make your laws very strict with a hope thay they will be followed at least to a degree Not laws in themselves, but standards (technical norms) regarding nuclear power stations in the former Soviet Union were strict to the point where they were technically impossible to follow given the state of the art. For example the standards for manufacture of high pressure pipes would state very low level of material impurities that when the actual manufactured material contained twice the level of impurities the pipe will still be very safe to operate. In a centrally planned economy with ever more ambitious production projections and declared zero need for contingency this was one of several ways how to create a bit of a wiggle room. (Source: I once worked for a nuclear power research institute supporting Soviet technology and was told this by an expert on stainless steel.) So there you have a bit of an illustration what may happen if a law is intentionally impossible to follow. Since you labelled your question 'United States', I believe the follow-up question is why would anyone want to propose such a law. | No Even if there were any evidence that any member of the US government were involved (there isn’t), that is a matter for the US justice system. The US is not a member of the International Criminal Court so no Supra-National body has jurisdiction. | It’s legal under Ukrainian law for foreign nationals to join their defense forces Indeed, this is so common it may be considered the default position internationally: the US, UK, France, and Australia just to name a few all allow this. Generally, it’s usually legal for a citizen to join the army of a foreign state. It is usually not legal to fight for a non-state actor this is where fighters for ISIS are in trouble. Where issues arise is if they take up arms against the country of their citizenship. That’s called treason and it usually attracts the most severe punishment available: death or life imprisonment typically. So, as long as you aren’t Russian and are not from one of the few countries that prohibits foreign military service, there are no legal issues. | This is an interesting hypothetical. In this scenario, Country Z does not have jurisdiction to enforce such a law on foreign nationals, unless Country Z has an extradition treaty with Country A. Generally, however, these types of laws would never be enforced as they are egregious abuses of government, and could possibly be elevated to the International Court of Justice if Country Z actually charges any individuals with such a crime. In these instances, however, war is a very unlikely scenario, since this would often be expensive and any escalation would most likely be small skirmishes that would lead to an eventual ceasefire, with the encouragement of the international community, without the involvement of UN Peacekeeping troops. | Actual hostilities suffice to conclude that there is a war. Per Art. 2 of the Geneva Convention 1949, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. |
Legal remedies if a lower court ignores stare decisis? Let's say hypothetically that lower courts en masse decide to ignore Supreme Court decisions. What legal alternatives are available to citizens if lower courts "Go rogue" and decides to ignore a Supreme Court precedent? Is there any punishment higher courts can hand down to lower courts for ignoring their decisions? | The alternative is the same whether just one lower court or many lower courts ignore SCOTUS precedent. An aggrieved parts will appeal the lower court ruling, and the matter will work its way up the ladder until SCOTUS directly rules on this application of the law. This sort of happens all the time, when lower courts don't apply the ostensive "final ruling" because they find that there is some other overriding consideration ("that rule only applies to businesses employing more than 50 people"). Where the case to be remanded to lower courts for further proceedings consistent with SCOTUS opinion and still the lower courts refuse to comply, i.e open rebellion, SCOTUS could rule that non-compliance by lower courts constitutes contempt, and an order could be issued for the removal (in some form) of offending parties (we may presume, the justices of the lower court). The statute outlining court power allows on order of imprisonment for "disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command". Federal marshals would then arrest non-compliant judges, unless the marshals too are in open rebellion. If the judges in question were federal judges, the marshals would have to decide whether to obey the order of SCOTUS vs. the order of the district or circuit court. Since under the US Constitution states that "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish", it is objectively established that SCOTUS rulings are superior, so provided that the marshals elect to uphold their oath of office, they will enforce the SCOTUS ruling. However, citizen action becomes irrelevant once SCOTUS has made its ruling, and the matter has moved from legal determination of fact to enforcement of established fact. | Actually this is the only SCOTUS ruling on Impeachment because of what it legally means with respect to SCOTUS and impeachment. Namely, Impeachment is a congressional power and not a judicial one that has no punishment beyond the removal from office upon conviction and that therefor it is not a matter that is Judicial. That is a fancy way to say that SCOTUS or any lower court may not hear appeals rising from the outcome of Impeachment. Because of this, it's unlikely to hear any SCOTUS case as to the matter of impeachment and the only outstanding question they could likely hear is "Who can hear an Impeachment Trial for the Vice President?" but thus far none of the 19 impeachment trials have heard involved a vice president. Nixon v. United States basically held that in matters of impeachment it is the court's position that it is likely to respond to this hypothetical with the legal ruling of "not my monkeys, not my circus" (note: not legal jargon). With that said, this makes the U.S. senate the highest court in the land when it comes to precedents set by impeachment cases. The very first person ever impeached was a U.S. Senator, who was expelled by the Senate the same day the House voted on Articles of Impeachment. The decision not to have the trial did establish some notable precedents: first, Impeachment and conviction are all about removing an officer from office and if at anytime before conviction the officer is removed by other means, the process is stopped as it is moot. Second, and more important, is that members of Congress are not "impeachable" officers as both houses have methods that allow them to expel members by vote. This means that the only people who can be impeached are executive officers (the person who is currently president, vice president, and cabinet secretaries, any other office that is appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate, and federal judges) and that a conviction of impeachment does not bar one from holding another federal office unless the senate enacts an additional punishment after the conviction barring that person from federal office. They cannot bar one from state office. Finally, House and Senate Rules have instructions for procedures in their part in impeachment. The commonality between both is that impeachment takes precidents over all regular buisness so once articles are put to the floor, there speaker must hold the vote with in a certain window of time (three days, I think) and the Senate must hold the trial as soon as possible, though will honor reasonable delays as per the impeached officer's right to delay. As a final note, and because it wasn't clear in the question Nixon v. United States is often confused with another case (United States v. Nixon). The latter one did indirectly relate to impeachment in that it was related to President Nixon handing over evidence to the comittee investigating possible impeachment articles against Nixon, and because of that ruling, Nixon handed over the evidence and later resigned to avoid the Impeachment. The former one not only didn't involve anything related Watergate, it also wasn't related to President Nixon at all, but a (former) Federal Judge Walter Nixon, and specifically was heard because Judge Nixon happened to be the first Judge impeached by a Senate commitee as the jury rather than the full Senate, following a rule change that only held full senate as jury for the President and Vice President and a committee for anyone else. The final rule is that only the President is constitutionally mandated to have the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court act as the judge in an Impeachment trial, while the presiding officer for all other cases is either the Vice President (acting in his role as President of the Senate) or the President pro Tempore of the Senate (acting in his role of "Guy Keeping the Vice President's Seat in the Senate Rotunda Warm" (not technical Jargon)). Which is why the question of "who is the judge in impeachment of the Vice President?" a noodle baking question, and the answer differs from the Chief Justice to the Senate pr Tempore to the rarely serious argument of the Vice President himself. The best answer is that "It has never come up." | If this judge is truly biased, won't the litigants be all the more glad to have a jury of their peers? You are proposing to abandon your duty to others. At trial you serve the community, not the judge. Back on scope for Law SE: If you refuse to serve on a jury, that could be a separate offense or general criminal contempt, for which you (this all depends on your jurisdiction) could get 30-90 days in jail. Edit: like several others have pointed out, I would not expect much trouble if you politely told the court that you felt you would be biased b/c of past connections. Even if the judge doesn't dismiss you, one of the litigants is likely to strike you. P.S. In most states, no one except a prosecutor (sometimes another state employee) can "take someone" to a criminal court. Individuals can only take someone to civil trial, where one cannot be sentenced, only ordered to pay a judgement. | The relevant statute, 28 USC 455 simply states what shall be, and does not suggest that the law could be enforced by any particular means. There have been cases where there was a suggestion of a hint of impropriety at SCOTUS and yet things proceeded. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 Rehnquist did not recuse himself despite being a White House lawyer and having expressed an opinion on the legality of certain arrests, and that was the end of that matter. | How deterministic is the legal system? It depends. And less than we might wish. It depends on the case. How complex is the fact pattern? How strong is the evidence? How clear is the law? How compelling are the legal precedents? Questions of that nature. The only generalization I might make would be that "lower level" cases seem more deterministic than "higher level" cases. By higher level, I mean those heard by a supreme court making constitutional decisions. Here is a web site that has created a prediction market out of supreme court cases. Many have written on this topic. Read this answer. It is an excellent treatise on the subjectivity of the legal system. Written by a real attorney. Read this answer too. My advice: If you seek a deterministic system, don't look to the legal one. | Usually, an attack on the validity or prudence of the underlying order is not a defense to court action to enforce it. Usually, the only exception would be when it was impossible, or practically impossible, to perform the court order for some reason. You could seek to modify the order, but that would be prospective in effect only and usually isn't granted unless there has been a change in circumstances since the original order was entered. You could also bring a motion to set aside judgment (usually this has to be done within six months of entry of an order) on the grounds that this provision was included only due to mistake or irregularities in the process or excusable neglect. But, that only would have only prospective effect. | Every court in the United States from municipal traffic court to a state court to a U.S. District Court has both the right and the obligation to consider claims of unconstitutionality just like any other legal question that a case presents. Contrary to popular misconception, constitutional law issues are not the exclusive province of the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, constitutional issues are only ruled upon in the first instance in the U.S. Supreme Court (or even in a direct appeal from a trial court to the U.S. Supreme Court) in rare and isolated cases. Usually, at least one trial court judge and at least three appellate court judges, and often more appellate court judges, have ruled upon a constitutional issue before the U.S. Supreme Court considers it. This is just as true in Louisiana and Puerto Rico, which have legal systems based upon the civil law legal system, as it is in other U.S. jurisdictions, which have a common law legal system. There is usually only one difference between a case in which the constitutionality of a statute is called into question and one in which it is not. When the constitutionality of a statute is called into question, many state and federal rules of civil procedure require or permit the attorney general of the state whose statute's constitutionality (or the U.S. attorney general when a federal law's constitutionality is at issue) to be joined as a party for the purpose of litigating that issue. This allows the court to receive arguments on the constitutional issue from the public's perspective as well as the perspectives of the parties. A few states also provide that appeals from trial court decisions finding that a statute is unconstitutional are directly to the state supreme court, rather than to the intermediate court of appeals as they would usually be in those states. Notably, the distinct treatment of constitutional issues in many civil law systems is not inherently a part of the civil law system. Constitutional courts are mostly a post-World War II constitutional innovation in the countries where they are found. For example, the "law-screen" doctrine and the existence of a constitutional court in France, is much younger than core of the rest of the civil law system in France, which invented the civil law system in its modern form more than two hundred years ago. Neither France, at the time Louisiana adopted its civil law legal system through the time of the Louisiana Purchase, nor Spain at the time that Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States after the Spanish-American war, had constitutional courts. Footnote Regarding Treaties Also, it is worth remarking that in Europe and much of the rest of the world, the function of protecting individual rights against government authority in a way that is entrenched so that it is not easily overcome by domestic legislation of a current political regime is accomplished through international treaties, rather than only through entrenched rights in a constitution as they are in the United States. Although even then, in many European countries, ordinary courts apply only domestic law and the country in question has to adopt domestic law to conform to the treaties. This treaty mechanism is not very effective in the U.S., because in the U.S., unlike most countries, an ordinary domestic law can override an earlier adopted and ratified international treaty. | united-states Minimum sentencing laws do not prescribe any punishment for a judge that simply refuses to obey them. See 18 U.S. Code § 3553 as an example that explains how sentencing must be enforced, yet no mention of punishments for violating these laws. It also makes mention of how minimum sentencing can be avoided by a judge lawfully as well. Judges do not risk jail time or fines for breaking these laws, as they have judicial discretion, which is literally a power defined by what it means to be a judge, to hand out whatever sentence they think is appropriate. (Note: there may be exceptions, but I couldn't find any. If any such examples exist, they are likely rare) If a judge refuses to hand out an appropriate sentence by these laws, there are options available. The two main choices are by review, and by appeal. The review board has a few options. They can accept the lower sentence, they can reject the sentence to have the judge resentence, or they can assign the sentencing to a different judge. By way of appeal, the prosecutors can choose to appeal to a higher court. Eventually, either the sentence will become fixed at the reduced level, or it will be corrected by someone else in the system, if not the judge, then either an associate or superior. Either way, the odds are stacked against a rebel judge. However, at least one documented example of this exists, the story of Judge John Coughenour (linked below). He sentenced the same person three times for the same crime, and while he eventually did get a "victory," the story goes to demonstrate that (a) judges can rebel and get some effect, and (b) even as hard as he fought, he wasn't punished, but he also didn't get nearly the effect he was hoping for, despite a promise from the government to reduce the criminal's sentence in exchange for cooperation. While judges can be censured, reprimanded, removed from office, voted out (at least, at lower levels), and impeached, most of these punishments are reserved for situations of corruption, bribery, etc, rather than simply executing their judiciary discretion, which is one of the core powers granted to them by the judicial branch. Further Reading: One judge makes the case for judgment 18 U.S. Code § 3553 - Imposition of a sentence |
Stateless in EU deported in US I was wondering for a long time if a stateless person is found in the EU under 18 with no documents at all, claim to be born in the US can be deported to the US ? I searched in US laws and conventions but I can't find anything on this particular position ! If this stateless person (under 18) is born and lived in the US for is entire life is found by the EU (local police of the country like France, Germany...) authorities can be automatically or ask to be deported to the US with no documents/proof that this person is born (and normaly a US citizen), will be deported to US soil or US ambassy/consulate ? Can the US denied acces to the child to go "home" or he has to stay in the EU country (even if he don't want to stay in the EU) ? I'm at my first year in foreign laws college in France and that would really help me if someone can respond to this particular case. | Your scenario as written is impossible. If one is born in the US, then they cannot lose their citizenship before they turn 18 (and it is rather difficult to lose it accidentally; in order to lose jus soli citizenship in the US, one must "intentionally revoke it"; generally speaking, you have to go to a US consulate (in another country) and formally renounce your citizenship. Additionally, the US will not accept the resignation your citizenship if you do not have a different one (i.e. if accepting the resignation will render you stateless). | Constitutionally, a person is only required to be granted U.S. citizenship if they are born in the United States. Any other form of citizenship is as provided by statute. So, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 makes some people citizens who would not otherwise be citizens in its absence. In that sense, it grants citizenship. Meanwhile, 8 U.S.C. § 1409(g) supports the proposition, which is a legal fiction in some cases, that someone is a "natural born citizen" of the United States, and hence eligible to run for President someday, and is retroactively considered to have been a citizen in the meantime for myriad other purposes, despite the fact that in the case of an unmarried non-citizen mother and a citizen father, this right is not vested and could never come into being if the required actions aren't taken after the fact. Incidentally, this statute has been upheld against constitutional challenges. Miller v. Albright, 520 U.S. 420 (1997). So, while you would like to clearly distinguish between someone having citizenship granted and having citizenship revoked, Congress, in its wisdom, has not been so accommodating and has declined to clearly distinguish between the two interpretations. This statute is a bit like the question of Schrödinger's cat, who is indeterminately alive and dead at the same time until there is a measurement of its state, in quantum physics. A person with an unmarried non-citizen mother and a citizen father is both a U.S. citizen from birth and always has been, and has never been a citizen of the U.S., until the situation is resolved with an actual determination of the question in accordance with the requirements of the statute. | There are a couple of flaws in your hypothetical. Nobody, certainly not the state, represents the birth records as inerrant or complete. Birth records frequently have to be corrected. In fact the point of many paternity suits is to correct the official birth record. Sometimes the father, or even the mother will be listed as "unknown" on the birth record, so the absence of a birth record naming a person as a father is not dispositive. No government official would ever issue a legal document declaring that the man is not any child's legal father because the records don't establish that. At best they could issue a document stating that the man was not the father of record for any child in the state. Anyway, the exercise would be pointless. The only birth record the court would be interested in would be that for the child before them. None of the other birth records would be relevant to the case at hand. The court in a paternity case would ask for evidence, such as birth certificates, or statements acknowledging paternity. If the two parties continued to dispute paternity, the court would order a paternity test. Older blood typing tests sometimes left paternity ambiguous, but modern DNA paternity testing is can achieve 99.99% certainty, baring fraud or laboratory error. | Exact wording might matter here, so I looked up the law. It says "a permanent resident complies with the residency obligation with respect to a five-year period if, on each of a total of at least 730 days in that five-year period, they are physically present in Canada". Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 28(2)(a). If you visit the Canadian side of the park, you're "physically present in Canada". It would therefore appear that this would meet the requirement. I am by no means an expert in Canadian immigration law, though. | You don't need to "report" it to anyone in the US or do anything else. The US doesn't have any national registry of marriage. Any marriage or divorce conducted anywhere in the world is automatically recognized anywhere in the US (with some exceptions like polygamous marriages); the same is true in many other countries. How does the U.S. find out, for tax or insurance purposes? Obviously there's a little box that says [] Married but how would they know if I lied if I'm not registered in the United States? They don't, and don't need to. (The same is true for marriages in the US -- they don't directly "know".) You are required to use an appropriate filing status for your marriage status at the end of the year for each year's tax returns. If you don't, you are committing fraud. There are lots of things that you can intentionally lie about on tax returns, and they may not immediately "find out"; but when they do, you are in big trouble. Am I legally required to report it when I return? No. Would the Canadian/provincial government inform the U.S./state government? No. | To narrow this down to a specific country, you can read about the Syria sanctions here. Sanctions under US law are against a country, and against named individuals: there are no sanctions against "Syrians". A person cannot engage in transactions in (certain) goods of Syrian origin, and you cannot invest in (businesses in) Syria. A Syrian citizen who is resident of a non-sanctioned country is not subject the the limitations that exist on Syrian citizens who are resident in Syria. However, this legal fact is not universally know, so your question does reflect an existing belief. It is entirely possible that a person who believes that there is a law of attainder against Syrian people might cause problems, but if they get advice from their legal department, they will find that also being a Syrian citizen is not an impediment to legally investing. | Would such a person be considered a "natural born citizen," for the purpose of qualifying for the presidency, from October 25th 1994? In other words, after having lived in the US for at least 14 years, could such a person run for the office of the president or the vice president? This is an unresolved issue. Some scholars believe that to be a "natural born citizen" you have to be a citizen on the day that you are born. Other scholars believe that a "natural born citizen" is someone who gains citizenship by a means other than naturalization. No binding precedents resolve the issue because the phrase "natural born citizen" is used nowhere else in the law besides qualification to be the President of the United States, and the issue can't be resolved until someone is purportedly elected because there isn't an actual case or controversy until then, and there haven't been an examples that have come up that have tested this issue. My personal guess is that the courts would make every effort to find that someone who has been elected by the citizens of the United States as President, despite the inevitable debate by the public over someone's qualification as a "natural born citizen" during the campaign, is eligible to hold that position, because to do otherwise would seem massively undemocratic. So, I suspect that retroactive citizenship at birth would be held by the courts to make someone a "natural born citizen" and eligible to serve as President. Then again, I could see this issue being resolved by the courts on basically partisan lines too with conservative judges tending to hold that a liberal candidate was ineligible for office, and liberal judges making the opposite conclusions about a liberal candidate. This is one fair reading of what happened in the case of Bush v. Gore. Would the answer depend on whether the person had been naturalized before 1994? The citizenship by naturalization is irrelevant to whether you have another grounds for claiming citizenship that was present at birth or did not arise from naturalization. On October 25th, 1994, the naturalization became redundant. | US law generally doesn't permit trials in absentia (see Can a country put a foreign criminal on trial, without catching them?), so Sheppard would have to be physically brought to the US before a trial could begin, let alone any sort of testimony or sentencing. This could happen if he voluntarily travels to the US, or if he is extradited from the UK via their legal processes for doing so. He could be represented by a lawyer at trial if he chooses, just like any other criminal defendant. If convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, he would presumably serve the sentence in a US prison just like anyone else, unless the US government decides on some other arrangement. |
Can I cut down a neighbor's tilted fence that overhangs my yard? I have a hypothetical question about property rights and structures overhanging the property. In New York state, let's say I have a neighbor with a wooden fence built slightly back from the border between our two properties. The base of the fence and the posts are on his side. The many years old fence is now leaning over at an angle, and leaning into my property. Let's assume that of a six foot fence, about four feet or so overhangs my property. My understanding is that I have the right to trim a tree or bush or similar up to the property line. Does the same hold true with fences? If so, could I just cut it down, or would I need to give notice so he has a chance to fix it first? | Under current New York law, small ("de minimis") encroachments are not considered to infringe on your property rights, therefore, legally there is nothing you can do. A fence, even leaning over, is considered a de minimis encroachment. If you damage the fence, you could face criminal charges for criminal mischief in the 4th Degree which is a class A misdemeanor. Theoretically, you could be charged with 3rd degree criminal mischief, which is felony, but in this case I would be surprised if they did that (usually that only is applied only to actual "criminals"). Your best option is to politely incentivize your neighbor give him a positive reason to work with you on improving the fence. | You inspected the property online and based on that inspection you signed the lease. You have a legally binding contract. Now, it is not at all like the pictures How? I mean, are these pictures of a different house? If that is so then your contract is void for fraud. However, if the pictures are of the actual house and you just imagined from them that the house would be other than it is then tough luck for you. the stairwell in the house is a huge safety hazard for children OK. Does it comply with relevant building codes? If not then the landlord needs to bring it up to standard: you cannot walk away from the contract. Is it in need of repair? If so, the landlord needs to repair it: you cannot walk away from the contract. If it is compliant and in good repair and you think it is a hazard notwithstanding then you need to manage that hazard: this is not the landlords problem. I refused to move into the house That's fine: so long as you keep paying the rent there is no obligation on you to move in. If you stop paying the rent then it would appear that you have repudiated the contract and the landlord can sue you for damages - probably the costs of finding a new tenant and the rent up until that tenant takes over. | No A tenant cannot acquire adverse possession. As describe in the LII Article on "Adverse Possesion", one of the requirements for establishing adverse possession is that possession must be: Hostile--In this context, "hostile" does not mean "unfriendly." Rather, it means that the possession infringes on the rights of the true owner. If the true owner consents or gives license to the adverse possessor's use of the property, possession is not hostile and it is not really adverse possession. Renters cannot be adverse possessors of the rented property, regardless of how long they possess it. (My emphasis) This is the classic common law rule. The Justia article on the topic says: The occupation must be hostile and adverse to the interests of the true owner. If a landowner has given a person permission to use the property, the possession is not considered hostile. However, a landowner is not required to have actual knowledge of the occupation, so long as the occupation is adverse to the owner's property interests. For example, a landowner may be unaware that his neighbor's fence extends several feet over his property line. The occupation is sufficiently hostile, however, because the landowner has not given his neighbor permission to encroach upon his property in this manner. The Nolo article on this topic says: Adverse Possession Requires a Hostile Claim The word "hostile" doesn't mean that the trespasser rides in on a horse with six-shooters blazing. Instead, courts follow one of three legal definitions of "hostile" when it comes to adverse possession. Simple occupation. This rule (followed by most states today) defines "hostile" as the mere occupation of the land. The trespasser doesn't have to know that the land belongs to someone else. Awareness of trespassing. This rule requires that the trespasser be cognizant that his or her use of the property amounts to trespassing (meaning the trespasser has no legal right to be on the property). Good faith mistake. A few states follow this rule, which requires the trespasser to have made an innocent good faith mistake in occupying the property in the first place, such as by relying on an invalid or incorrect deed. The Wikipedia article says: In general, a property owner has the right to recover possession of their property from unauthorised possessors through legal action such as ejectment. However, in the English common law tradition, courts have long ruled that when someone occupies a piece of property without permission and the property's owner does not exercise their right to recover their property for a significant period of time, not only is the original owner prevented from exercising their right to exclude, but an entirely new title to the property "springs up" in the adverse possessor. In effect, the adverse possessor becomes the property's new owner. .... Although the elements of an adverse possession action are different in every jurisdiction, a person claiming adverse possession is usually required to prove non-permissive use of the property that is actual, open and notorious, exclusive, adverse and continuous for the statutory period .... Renters, hunters or others who enter the land with permission are not taking possession that is hostile to the title owner's rights. | Unfortunately, there is the law answer, and there is the family answer. The law answer is fairly straightforward - she deeds the land to you, and you leave it your husband if you precede him in death. The family answer is different. Many families have been torn asunder by inheritance issues. Your siblings seem to think they deserve a share, which is problematic if you are building there. Your choices are to split the land but buy your siblings out, establish a long-term structure lease on the land, or take the land and deal with sibling fallout. There may be other options an estate lawyer can recommend. Note that if your siblings are co-owners, then soon there will be many more as their children inherit. You need a local lawyer to do any of the above. | If it doesn’t cause substantial interference to the easement rights You need to look at the specific terms of the easement i.e. what right it gives to your neighbour. If you can build your chicken coop in such a way that it doesn’t materially affect those rights, then that’s ok However, for this type of easement, any ground level structure is likely to interfere with the use of the easement. | While the elements of criminal trespass vary from one U.S. state to another, the majority rule is that a good faith belief that you have a claim of a legal right to be present on property (even if you are ultimately found to be incorrect on the merits) prevents you from having the intent necessary to commit criminal trespass. The majority rule is that there is strict civil liability for trespass without regard to intent, but the minority rule that civil trespass is an intentional tort isn't terribly uncommon either, in which case criminal and civil liability for trespass would often be the same. Given the legitimate possibility on reasonable grounds that someone inside some given building is not actually supposed to be there, how might this apply to the law about it being mandatory to leave? What if you claimed you either did not think they were really in charge, or that you simply had no way of verifying? This is irrelevant. The burden is on you not to go into property where you are not allowed to be, and not on someone else to tell you to leave. If you know you have no right to be on the property, the fact that you believe someone else may also not have the authority to control who is on the property is not a defense to criminal trespass. You can be guilty of criminal trespass in most jurisdictions even if no one asks you to leave, if you know that you do not have permission to be on the property. Lack of permission is the default in the absence of someone with apparent authority to do so telling you otherwise. | user662852 has a good point -- whoever own the property has the right to make the rules. Is the property, land+construction in fact your's or does it belong to the HOA who just grant you access as a lease holder? Different states has different rules, but in my state it is illegal to maroon a property and there must be a access to public streets even when this necessitate passing over somebody else land. However that is irrelevant if the HOA owns the land your house is build on. I think you will have to look at your HOA agreement and see what it says. | Can someone be compelled to prove they are complying with a contract? In this context, yes, since its apparent breach is evident. The other answer rightly explains the notion of preponderance of evidence, which pertains to the procedural aspect. Here, I will mainly address the substantive standpoint as per the situation you describe. The HOA rule most likely is intended to serve one or more purposes, such as preserving the prestige of the neighborhood, and to avoid safety hazards. The prolonged presence of an abandoned vehicle --just like any piece of junk--- tends to contravene those purposes. Regardless of the vehicle's true state, the effect of its apparent abandonment is visibly detrimental to the neighborhood, and it frustrates the ultimate purposes of the HOA rule: to preserve safety conditions in the neighborhood as well as the value of the properties. Also, the presumption that an abandoned vehicle is inoperable seems reasonable. The most straight-forward way to disprove the board's allegations of inoperability is to actually move the vehicle at least once in a while. Accordingly, the owner's inexplicable reluctance to take that simple step reinforces the supported suspicion that the vehicle is indeed inoperable, and thus in breach of the HOA rule. |
Can the States be taxed by the Federal Government in the US Article 1 section 2 paragraph 3 states that representatives and taxes may be assigned to each state based on their population. So this might be the answer to my question. But there are several examples of case law involving the 10th amendment where states sue because some of their activities are taxed. Would a federal tax plan that simply took the amount required to run the government and divided that amount across the states based on population and directly charged the states likely to survive a legal challenge? I have tried to find examples of direct taxation of the states and can't find any so I would also be interested in knowing if this was ever attempted and if so why the practice was abandoned. | Short Answer Would a federal tax plan that simply took the amount required to run the government and divided that amount across the states based on population and directly charged the states likely to survive a legal challenge? A federal tax plan along these lines is expressly authorized by Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution, but the federal government has never actually imposed taxes on this basis. But, this has never actually been done because there is no practical way to enforce an obligation of a state to pay a capitation tax. It has also not been done because it is politically unpopular with members of Congress from states that have a lower per capita income whose support would be necessary to pass such a tax. This is because a tax effectively imposes a higher tax rate relative to ability to pay on poor states than it does on more affluent states and there has always been a significant disparity between more affluent and less affluent states in the United States). For example, Massachusetts, the U.S. state with the highest per capita GDP ($65,545 in 2018) has more than twice the per capita GDP of Mississippi ($31,881), but would pay the same tax per capita, and, the District of Columbia, which would owe nothing under an Article I, Section 9 capitation tax had a per capita GDP of $160,472 in 2018. Instead, until the income tax was expressly authorized constitutionally in 1913, the federal government was financed mostly with customs duties and to a lesser extent some select excise taxes (also here and here), with several exceptions, some direct property taxes from 1789 to 1802; a short lived Civil War era income tax on the very affluent (1861-1872), which was reimposed briefly from 1894-1895 before being declared unconstitutional; and some estate taxes, either on the theory that they were excise taxes, or in parallel to the income taxes, until the 16th Amendment's authorization of the federal income tax was found to extend to authorization for federal gift and estate taxation. As noted here from 1789 to 1860: Customs duties as set by tariff rates up to 1860 were usually about 80–95% of all federal revenue. Thus, customs duties were as dominant a source of revenue for the federal government for roughly the first third of the history of the United States, as income and payroll taxes are today. I have tried to find examples of direct taxation of the states[.] While what you mean is clear, to avoid confusion, it is important to understand that the phrase "direct taxes" is used in the U.S. Constitution to mean taxes that are imposed directly upon individuals, businesses and private property. The "direct taxation of the states" to which you refer is a form of indirect taxation. Long Answer Sources Most of the discussion in this answer which are not specifically referenced with links or citations to the United States Constitution, is based upon a political science textbook entitled "Congress" that I used in college, an introductory federal income taxation textbook I used as a law school student, and an estate taxation textbook that I used to teach estate taxation when I was a professor for a financial planning program for master's degree students. All are hard copies for which no internet link to the materials themselves is available. Applicable Constitutional Law The United States Constitution (which took effect in 1789) has several provisions related to the federal government's power and the power of the states, respectively to impose taxes: Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 states: The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; Imposts and duties are taxes on imports into the United States, while excises are “taxes on the manufacture, sale, or consumption of goods, or upon licenses to pursue certain occupations, or upon corporate privileges[.]" Among the taxes that aren't "imposts, duties or excises" are income taxes, payroll taxes, gift taxes, estate taxes. For constitutional purposes, payroll taxes, gift taxes, and estate taxes are considered forms of income taxes. It isn't entirely clear if a general sales tax of the kind adopted by most U.S. states, or a value added tax, is a constitutional excise tax or income tax, as this question has never been tested (such taxes, when collected in the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands by "local governments" fall under the power of the federal government to govern federal territory rather than the taxation power of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 and the 16th Amendment). Until 1802 (i.e. for the first 13 years of the current constitution), Congress imposed what amounted to property taxes of various kinds under its excise tax power, but the constitutional validity of these taxes has never been established definitively before they were repealed and those taxes have never been reinstated. Imposes, duties and excises could be imposed directly by the federal government on private citizens, so long as they were uniform, while "taxes" prior to 1913, were subject to Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 discussed below. Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution which was in effect until 1808 when importing slaves was banned stated that a customs duty could be imposed on imported slaves: The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution states that: No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken. The only "tax" other than imposts, duties and excises that could be imposed by the federal government at uniform national rates prior to 1913, was a "capitation" tax imposed directly upon state governments, in proportion to the most recent census. But, no such such capitation tax was ever imposed upon the states. Congress clearly had and still does have the power to impose such a tax, but it didn't and it still doesn't, for political reasons and for reasons of the enforceability of such a tax. Wikipedia notes that: The United States government levied direct taxes from time to time during the 18th and early 19th centuries. It levied direct taxes on the owners of houses, land, slaves and estates in the late 1790s but cancelled the taxes in 1802. And, none of these direct taxes were capitation taxes. The main reason that this wasn't done is that even though these kinds of taxes were mandatory under the Constitution of the United States adopted in 1789, unlike the 1776 Articles of Confederation which did not have any enforcement mechanism to make states pay their share, enforcement of a capitation tax on states was still impractical in reality. This is because state governments do not have income or property that is amenable to being seized for payment of taxes in a manner that prevents mass chaos from breaking out (e.g. if the federal government tried to seize a state capitol building or court house for failing to pay its federal capitation tax). Instead, the premise of a capitation tax is that states will use their taxation power to impose taxes upon their citizens, businesses and the private property in their jurisdiction and then would hand over some of those tax receipts to the federal government until the state's quota for the year, set by Congress, was met. But, since there is no really viable democratic way for a federal court to direct a state legislature to impose and collect any particular kind of taxes to raise those funds, this nominally mandatory tax obligation of the states was economically and legally impotent, and was still mandatory in name only. The other problem with a capitation tax is that for almost all of the time period prior to 1913, there was a great disparity between the per capita GDP of the various U.S. states. For the vast majority of that time period, the commerce and industry of the north (powered to a great extent by hydro power prior to the widespread adoption of coal as a fossil fuel) produced much higher GDP per capita than the agricultural economies of the South, particularly because the infamous "three-fifths compromise" that gave the South Congressional representation based in part upon the number of slaves who lived there (30% or more of the population of many states) did not apply to capitation taxes. After the Civil War, what little commerce, industry and infrastructure that the South had had going in the war was massively degraded, and the population of able bodied men of prime working age was greatly reduced, rendering the South even more poor relative to the North. Even in the heyday of Reconstruction, capitation taxes were not imposed because it was obvious that the South could not afford to pay any significant share of its obligations on that basis. Thus, the South was mostly poorer per capita to start with, and had a higher share of capitation taxes than it did of Congressional seats and electoral votes, which was not a recipe for building Congressional support for a major new tax. Because some Southern political support was necessary to impose new taxes for most of U.S. history and because capitation taxes demanded more taxes relative to ability to pay from Southern states than from Northern one (as customs taxes already did to a lesser extent), these taxes never had the political support needed to be adopted by Congress. Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution states that: No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. So custom's duties can be imposed on imports of goods to the United States, but not on exports of goods from the United States. This isn't a big deal today, where only a tiny portion of federal revenues come from customs duties, but it was a big deal prior to the U.S. Civil War. Historically, this limitation was enacted mostly to prevent the North from burdening the export oriented cash crop agriculture (mostly tobacco and cotton) of the Southern states. Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution states that: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress. Many people are surprised to learn that states have a right to impose both import and export duties. But, since they can collect no more than the cost of carrying out their inspection laws and must turn the balance of any such revenues over to the federal government, there is no incentive for states to have significant taxes of this type. The "weigh stations" found on major highways for large trucks, which are mostly used to gather data used to allocate registration fees for trucks among the states based upon economic reality, are the main practical residuary impact of this constitutional provision. The 16th Amendment to the United States Constitution ratified in 1913 states that: The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration. The power of Congress to impose federal income and payroll taxes encompasses employees of state and local governments, as well as private sector employees, even though this means that state and local governments have to file federal withholding tax returns on a regular basis. But, state and local governments are not taxed on their own income (just like other non-profits) and state and local governments are allowed to establish state and/or local employee retirement systems in lieu of FICA taxation on its employees for employees who participate in those programs. State and local governments are also not subject to FUTA (federal unemployment taxes). FUTA taxes are in any case de minimis because state unemployment taxes are a credit against federal unemployment taxes dollar for dollar except for a very small minimum per employee FUTA tax (0.6% of the first $7,000 per year of wages for each employee, for a maximum FUTA tax of $42 per year per employee in most cases), because state unemployment taxes are almost always higher than federal FUTA taxes. Historically, some tax policy makers believed that it was unconstitutional to tax interest from municipal bonds (a.k.a. bonds issues by state and local governments) for federalism reasons. But, case law starting in the late 20th century established that the exclusion of municipal bond interest from taxation is strictly a statutory feature of the Internal Revenue Code and does not have a constitutional dimension. In other words, it is constitutional for the federal government to tax all income derived from municipal bonds, even though it declines to do so for municipal bonds that meet a variety of federal tax law tests. The History of U.S. Taxation From 1789 until 1860, the tax revenue of the United States government (as opposed to the states) came predominantly from customs duties on imports and from some select excise taxes (e.g. on alcohol), and in into the mid-1800s with revenues from federal property such as grazing rights and mineral rights, and federal enterprises (mostly the U.S. Postal Service and profits from manufacturing coins and currency). During the U.S. Civil War, the scope of federal government activities grew dramatically and these were ultimately paid for with an income tax and an estate tax were imposed briefly over constitutional objections but were repealed shortly thereafter, with increased customs duties and excise tax rates, and with confiscation of Confederate property. (The timing was financed with Treasury bonds issued to support the war.) After the Civil War the scope of U.S. federal government activity returned to pre-war levels, and only started to ramp up again with the Progressive era in the early 1900s followed by World War I, which were financed with the newly authorized federal income tax and an estate tax, at quite low rates by modern standards. Per the same Wikipedia link referenced above: Until a United States Supreme Court decision in 1895, all income taxes were deemed to be excises (i.e., indirect taxes). The Revenue Act of 1861 established the first income tax in the United States, to pay for the cost of the American Civil War. This income tax was abolished after the war, in 1872. Another income tax statute in 1894 was overturned in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. in 1895, where the Supreme Court held that income taxes on income from property, such as rent income, interest income, and dividend income (however excepting income taxes on income from "occupations and labor" if only for the reason of not having been challenged in the case, "We have considered the act only in respect of the tax on income derived from real estate, and from invested personal property") were to be treated as direct taxes. Because the statute in question had not apportioned income taxes on income from property by population, the statute was ruled unconstitutional. So, income taxes had been adjudicated by the Courts to be unconstitutional from 1895 to 1913. Federal income tax withholding taxes are younger than the federal income tax which initially applied with any bite only to very high income individuals (rhetorically, if not mathematically, the equivalent of today's "one percenters"), although the income tax base had widened greatly by the end of the New Deal through World War II and its aftermath. The U.S. federal government didn't begin to approach its modern scale of activity until the New Deal following the Great Depression in the 1930s, which was financed with very high income taxes and estate taxes, high customs duties such as the Smooth-Hawley tariffs imposed not long after the crash of 1929 (which were so high that they reduced customs revenue rather than increasing it), and newly imposed payroll taxes. Information tax return reporting (the infamous Form 1099), which dramatically improved income tax collection rates beyond mere wage and salary withholding, was a late 20th century innovation that was adopted based upon the recommendation of free market economist Milton Friedman. Since the 16th Amendment was adopted, the federal income tax (and later federal payroll taxes on certain kinds of income) became the dominant source of income in short order, with customs duties and excise taxes and other forms of government rents and enterprise income (including income from the Federal Reserve also created before the New Deal in the early 1900s) came to be comparatively insignificant sources of income for the federal government. One notable exception was that the excise tax on gasoline and other petroleum based fuels, established as a de facto users fee and significant source of revenue to finance the Interstate State Highway system starting in the Eisenhower Administration, did create a significant source of new excise tax revenues. Federally owned oil and gas mineral interests also became a much more important source of federal revenues after World War II. The automobile had been invented and entered mass production in the early 1900s, but just as the internal combustion engine started to prevail over electric cars at that time and mass production took hold with Ford's Model T bringing some cars and trucks into upper middle class households and into use by businesses and farms, the Great Depression and World War II dramatically reduced private personal consumption, so for the two decades from about 1929 until the several years after World War II that it took to convert factories from war production to civilian peacetime production, the automobile industry's private sector sales were greatly suppressed, domestic civilian road and bridge construction came to a near halt during World War II as government funds were diverted to the war effort, and domestic oil consumption was likewise suppressed. Footnote On Collecting Debts From State And Local Governments In General The same issue comes up at the state level when a court awards a money judgment against a state or local government with taxing power, or holds that a state government has insufficiently funded education as required by a state constitution. Generally, in those cases, a legislative body has to authorize the appropriation "voluntarily" from whatever source of funds it choses to impose, and usually, when push comes to shove, state and local governments do pay the judgments they owe (there are limited federal bankruptcy options for municipalities and states), although there are instances of state governments stubbornly refusing to take the actions necessary to comply with court orders directing that public schools be funded for many, many years. For the most part, however, because enforcing debts against state governments is so difficult, transactions are structured as much as possible to prevent the need to enforce debts in that way through (1) legal limitations on governmental liability, (2) legislative budget rules requiring interest on debt and currently due principal payments to be made first, (3) third-party bonding of state and local governmental construction projects, (4) the creation of publicly owned corporations whose debts can only be collected out of the corporation's assets and revenues, and (5) avoidance of trade credit obligations by paying bills in cash. In connection with the legal limitations on liability, it is also worth noting that, as a general rule, state governments cannot be sued for money damages in any federal court other than the U.S. Supreme Court without their permission, and cannot be sued in the U.S. Supreme Court except by the United States government or another state government or perhaps by another country. So, when a money judgment is entered against a state government (which does not include local governments for this purpose) this happens only with multiple layers of state government consent to the process and the exact source and timing of the appropriation to pay it. When push comes to shove, as they did in California a few years back when it couldn't make payroll, it forced its employees and creditors to accept IOUs in lieu of cash payments, and while they may not have the legal right to do so, they have the economic power to force people to ignore that right. | The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in. | This is an open question in Colorado, where there's an ongoing challenge to the state's supermajority requirement in Kerr v. Hickenlooper. The state requires a supermajority for tax or spending increases, and several lawmakers challenged the law as violating the Guarantee Clause, which guarantees each state a republican form of government. The case has been going on for a long time. It's about seven years old now, and they're still arguing about who has standing to bring the lawsuit. The latest development is that no one had standing, but that decision is currently being appealed in the Tenth Circuit. A bigger problem than standing, though, may be justiciability. In Huddleston v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court of Oregon, rejected a challenge to supermajority requirements for reducing citizen-approved sentences for crimes, and in Lefkovits v. State Board of Elections, the Northern District of Illinois did the same with respect to judicial retention votes. Both courts concluded that supermajority requirements were a political issue, not a legal one. The justiciability concerns should be tempered by two considerations. First, there's an argument in Kerr that because taxes and spending are such core legislative functions, that it should be harder to uphold restrictions on the legislature's ability to vote on them. Second, there's U.S. Supreme Court precedent in New York v. U.S. suggesting -- but not deciding -- that the questions about justiciability are overblown: The view that the Guarantee Clause implicates only nonjusticiable political questions has its origin in Luther v. Borden, in which the Court was asked to decide, in the wake of Dorr's Rebellion, which of two rival governments was the legitimate government of Rhode Island. The Court held that “it rests with Congress,” not the judiciary, “to decide what government is the established one in a State.” ... Over the following century, this limited holding metamorphosed into the sweeping assertion that “[v]iolation of the great guaranty of a republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the courts.” This view has not always been accepted. In a group of cases decided before the holding of Luther was elevated into a general rule of nonjusticiability, the Court addressed the merits of claims founded on the Guarantee Clause without any suggestion that the claims were not justiciable. More recently, the Court has suggested that perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions. ... We need not resolve this difficult question today. My money says that the question is not authoritatively answered in my lifetime. | Yes and No. The Federal U.S. Government as well as each individual state and territory claim Soverign Immunity to a limited degree. In the case of Federal Government, they claim Soverign Immunity to a near limitless degree (more on this in a moment), while States and Territories claim "State Soverign Immunity" which grants them immunity with respect to all soverign powers granted under the U.S. Constitution. To clarify, each U.S. State is seperately soverign in all matters not explicitly allocated to the Federal Government by the U.S. Constitution and all constitutionally written laws. Where the Constitution does not in writing claim a power for the federal government nor reserver a power for the state government, the power is assumed to be state government. So a State can claim immunity for a police situation but not a law it makes regarding immigration or foriegn policy, since that is the exclusive wheelhouse of the Feds. Per the 11th amendment, states can only be sued in state court by citizens of the state, while non-state citizens wishing to sue a state must sue in the Federal Court (Which for the purposes of the trial may adopt the defendant State's laws and regulations for the purposes of questions of fact and law brought up in the suit). All U.S. States and the Federal Goverment additionally wave Soverign Immunity under specific conditions outlined in laws. In the case of the Federal Government, the laws governing when this immunity is waived are governed by the Federal Torts Claims Act (1946) and the Tucker Act (1887). The FTCA covers intentional torts by the Federal Government, while the Tucker Act typically covers matters related to contractual obligations or monitary interactions with the federal government. Things that may be sued for include but are not limited too: Intentional Torts committed by Government Agents in their Official Capacity (i.e. When the FBI violates your rights or maliciously investigates you). Contractual disputes where the Government is a party to the Contract, either in written or implied terms. Constitutional Claims (i.e. The Government may have violated the Constitution. These tend to be for non-monitary relief such as mandemuses, though the 5th Amendment's Taking Clause can be invoked of the government took property and does not justly compensate.). Individual Agencies of the Government when the monitary claim is not drawn from the U.S. Treasury (the agencies own allocated budget is used to pay). Refund for taxes paid In all cases, a Judge will determin if the Government, under the laws, can be sued. If in the example of a government employee being sued, the Justice Department will first make a determination if the employee was acting as an agent of the government when they committed the tortious act, and then will declare themselves Respondent Superior through the agency of employement. From there, the case becomes a suit against the Federal Government and FTCA immunity waiver is determined by a Judge. For example, lets say you (Mr. Rapt) sue Special Agent Jimmy Jones of an intentional tort that he committed in the course of his duty as an FBI agent. The DOJ will first declare that they are Respondent Superior in the case of Rapt v. Jones, thus turning the case to Rapt v. United States Government, Department of Justice, Federal Beura of Investigations, and Jones (Rapt v. United States, et. al.). From here, the Judge who gets the case then determins if the U.S. Government under FTCA can be sued by Rapt, based on Rapt's citizenship status (usually permanent legal residents are covered as citizens for this point, but I can say for certain in this particular law), ripeness (the suit must be filed within 2 years of the incident or first knowledge), and immunity waiver under FTCA. In the case of the State Government, they should have similar laws, but I'm not going to identify all 50 individual laws here. Additionally, the 11th Amendment permits U.S. Congress to waive a State's immunity to suit in certain cases (mostly comes up with the Due Process Clause in the 14th Amendment.). As a fun point, in all cases where a government appears as a defendant in a suit, it is automatically a Bench Trial, as the government usually include a waiver of their right as defendant to a jury trial. The thinking here is that, as a country that was founded by rebelling against the government, a jury of 12 of the government's citizens aren't going to give them any slack at trial, where as a judge (who they pay) is much more likely. TL;DR: Both questions are yes. The immunity is waived under federal law for certain cases, but it is a judge who will make the ruling if the specific case meets the aformentioned waived immunity. | Nothing will happen. Wait for the 2030 census and January 3rd 2033. Representatives are only recalculated after each census. The last census and recalculation was 2020. So no ordinary recalculation will happen till 2030. It's unclear if there could be an extra census, which then might lead to redistricting - the only rules (in the constitution) I can find are, that a census has to happen every 10 years. Current laws are, that it happens every 10 years. It's up to politics to introduce laws to allow an extra census, but to make it that obvious that it is needed, there needs to be an exodus/death toll of the scale of the black death in Europe (one in 4 dies/moves) or a total depopulation of an area like New York City. Which has 8 million inhabitants, something like 10 districts, and is growing. Back in 1918 H1N1 killed between 2% and 10% of those that got it and in total about 675,000 (of 103.2 million) in the US, mainly in cities that did lag in their reaction to the fall/winter wave in 1918. As three (not fully) random examples: Philadelphia lost 16000 for something around 941 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (the town had about 1.7 million inhabitants at the time), LA had a death toll of only 494 per 100,000, all of Nebraska lost between 2800 and 7500 people on a population of 1.3 million - for - for between 200 and 580 deaths per 100,000. Yet despite this very disparate impact it barely impacted the 1920 census. Not even the hurricane Katrina, which pretty much wiped out New Orleans, did not result in an extra census and restructuring - so it is very unlikely to happen. On the other hand, there is a formula for assigning representatives. We use the same setup since the 1940 census. Legal basis? 2 USC §2b dictates each state gets at least one: Each State shall be entitled, in the Seventy-eighth and in each Congress thereafter until the taking effect of a reapportionment under a subsequent statute or section 2a of this title, to the number of Representatives shown in the statement transmitted to the Congress on January 8, 1941, based upon the method known as the method of equal proportions, no State to receive less than one Member. 2 USC §2c dictates how many representative districts exist and how many representatives it will have: In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress [1969] or in any subsequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative (except that a State which is entitled to more than one Representative and which has in all previous elections elected its Representatives at Large may elect its Representatives at Large to the Ninety-first Congress). The Redistricting is State-Law - and there are roughly 5 types how it's done. So, one representative per district. One district per representative. District borders are to be redrawn based on the decennial census as demanded in Art. 1 §2 - where it is called Enumeration: The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; [provisional numbers] When will redistricting take effect? Redistricting lags one term behind, and it will not fire or remove a representative from office, whose district is scheduled to vanish - or elect new people. That's because redistricting on the state level can only happen after the reapportionment of the seats has been handed out by the clerk of the House of representatives. Reapportionment has a deadline of 25th January the year after the census. That's after the house term starts. Since at that moment the districts are still in existence, the term of the current holder first needs to run out before the new districts take effect. So the district ceases to exist the same day they leave office on January 3rd. A good example would be New York: The 45th district was redistricted from the 43rd District and elected first for in 1944, and was redistricted back into the 43rd District after the 1950 census. It was last voted for in 1950, well before the results of the census were handed out and redistricting happened. So the district ceased to be the same day Daniel A. Reed left the office on January 3rd of 1953. The 28th Congressional District was established in 1823 and eliminated on January 3rd 2013 as a result of the 2010 census. The last election for its seat was - obviously - in 2010. As a result, any changes to the district map stemming from the 2020 census will take effect only on January 3rd 2023, and a massive depopulation showing in the 2030 census will have an effect only in the elections for the house that begins its term on January 3rd 2033. | Only with the approval of Congress. An agreement between states is called an "interstate compact" (a variety of existing compacts are listed in the link). The federal government can also unilaterally create an independent agency with authority in some states, but not others such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Appalachian Regional Commission. The relevant parts of the Constitution are Article I, Section 10, which states: 1: No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 2: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. 3: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. Also relevant are Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1: New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. and Article V: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. | No The Texas suit alleges that significant changes were made to the election rules in the various defendant states, and that these were not approved by the legislatures of those states, but were made by administrative or court decisions. It also claims that differences in local practice and polices made absentee or mail-in voting easier, or invalid votes less likely to be detected, in some counties than in others, meaning that voters in some parts of those states were treated differently than voters in other parts. Note that this theory has not yet been accepted, or in any way passed on, by SCOTUS. But even assuming that the theory were to be accepted, it would require, at most, strict adherence to the election statutes of each state, and that changes or variances be approved by the state legislature. It would have nothing to say about the actual content of the various state laws, unless those laws treated different parts of a state differently, in which case there would be an equal protection violation. The Electors clause, cited in this suit, gives to the legislature of each state the power to "direct" how electors are to be appointed. This is done through laws, statutes. The suit cites this clause as a source of authority, and nothing in it could be taken as suggesting a requirement of national uniformity in election law. I have not yet seen the response to this suit, if indeed one has been filed. It may be that a response would argue that the changes were, in fact, authorized by provisions of the various state laws granting authority to officials. No one knows how the Court will respond to this suit. But even if it were to rule for the plaintiff Texas, that would not impose a national standard, nor permit one state to challenge the provisions of the law of another. It might permit one state to challenge how well another state had applied its own law. | Paying taxes need not have any legal connection to citizenship or potential citizenship. There is no constitutional provision, or law, which limits taxation to citizens or those on a path to citizenship. Legal immigrants, those on visas, and indeed tourists, must all pay various taxes, including hotel taxes and sales taxes. Lawful immigrants who work in the US must pay federal and (in most states) state income tax, and I believe some undocumented immigrants pay Federal income tax as well. Many countries tax people who are not citizens, nor immigrants in line for citizenship, and this has been true far back in history. Indeed the Romans taxed pretty much every inhabitant of and visitor to the Roman Empire, most of whom were not Roman Citizens. Things haven't changed that much since. It might be argued on philosophical grounds that such people should not be required to pay taxes, or should not be required to pay certain specific taxes. But that is not the law at this time, and this forum is not for debating what the law should be. |
Do favors by friends and family create a monetary debt? If someone has a business and has a favor done to help out with the business, by a spouse, other relative, or just a friend. Can the favor-doer later-on sue the business owner for money for it? I'm not referring to a case where there was some explicit implicit debt. This doesn't sound right, so I'll explain - I'm not referring to a case where the business owner says something like "I'll compensate you for it" or even "this is going to be good for you" or the like. (If the answer is yes, my next question would be what does the business owner need to do to prevent this. A written contract? A simple letter by the favor doer? But I guess that should be a separate question later if the answer is yes.) | In General Generally speaking, applying common law principles, no. In the case of a relative or friend or neighbor or someone like that, doing a favor for a business does not create a legally enforceable right against a business or business owner. Contract Claims The question assumes that there is not true express contract, or even really a contract to pay compensation in some amount or by reference to some schedule of rates, that was implied in fact. Unjust Enrichment Claims One can still recover for service or benefit rendered under a claim of "unjust enrichment" in the absence of a contract. But, in contexts applicable here (also called "quantum meruit") there must be an expectation of payment communicated in a way clear to an objective observer of the situation to recover, as opposed to a gratuitous provision of service. One classic case of unjust enrichment is when someone paints your house by accident, when they are actually under contract to paint your next door neighbor's house, and you know that they made the mistake but allow them to go forward expecting to be paid anyway. Another classic case is one where services must be provided by a doctor or repairman or lawyer on an emergency basis and everyone knows that they were hired with an intent that you pay them, but the price could not be agreed upon because it was urgent to do the work immediately before working out the details of a contract to provide services. In these circumstances, the service provider is entitled to payment of the fair value of the services provided despite the lack of an express agreement regarding the amount. In this example, however, there is not a clear expectation of payment that an objective outside observer would have been able to discern at that time the services were provided, so by default, the help provided was gratuitous, and not enforceable legally. Special Considerations For Spouses This general analysis also applies to a spouse, but not quite so strictly. While the spouse couldn't sue for compensation or having a legally enforceable right to compensation, the extent of the help provided would be one factor among many that could be considered in determining an equitable division of property (in states that are not community property states) and an appropriate and equitable amount of alimony in states that do not have a fixed formula for determining this amount. De minimis assistance would "come with the territory" and be part of a spouse's general right to an equitable division of property under a partnership theory of marriage. But, more extreme labors not compensated in money during the marriage, such as personally building a barn on a farm, or working full time in a spouse's business for a prolonged time period without express money compensation, might have a value assigned to it that is considered in balancing each side's share in an equitable division, if one spouse is reaping the benefit of the other spouse's unpaid labor by receiving, for example, a working farm or business. Similarly, in a fraudulent transfer case, it is possible that a payment to a spouse for extreme labors in the past of this kind would have a status similar to a payment for a pre-existing and not substantially contemporaneous debt. A spouse would be an insider. But, the transfer for no contemporaneous consideration might be considered safe from a fraudulent transfer attack after one year rather than the usual four year statute of limitations on fraudulent transfers. Concluding Observation: Questions Of Proof. Of course, all of this would be based when litigated on oral discussions and context limited by people's memories. This might make proof of a claim like this on the merits hard to win on at trial. But, it also makes disproving a claim prior to trial, when what happened is disputed, difficult. Caveat For Intellectual Property Claims I do not address the issue raised by a comment of designing a logo which raises legal issues specific to who owns intellectual property. Sometimes the person who comes up with an idea is the default owner of the intellectual property rights associated with that idea, unless there is a written agreement to the contrary. This default rule usually applies even if the intellectual property was created with the intent that it be used by someone else. | Is it legal for me to send a letter asking for compensation in return of not suing nor pressing charges? Yes, provided that by compensation you mean the equivalent (or close thereto) of what he stole. Your mention that the letter is on behalf of the company is crucial. Although definitions of extortion make reference to "[acting] under color of office", U.S. v. Harris, 916 F.3d 948, 955-956 (2019) notes that states as well as Congress adopted an extended definition so as to include [extortion by] private individuals. One incurs extortion also when seeking to obtain more than is due. See, for instance Black's Law Dictionary (4th edition) just prior to the entry for "Extortion". Thus, a surcharge on administrative grounds would be reasonable, but the company ought to ensure that the surcharge does not land it in the "more than is due" zone. The same applies in the event that stealing the property caused provable losses. See also conversion. | I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly. | Can he/lawyer try to use the payment to me as leverage, for example, offer to give me that payment only if I agree to sign a non-compete or other document? The employer ultimately ought to comply with the written agreements between you two. The employer is not allowed to belatedly impose conditions that alter (to your detriment) the contract(s), let alone when you are no longer his employee. The clause "You will be paid on X and Y when/if they close" does not reflect whatsoever that payment is contingent on your acceptance of a non-compete agreement. Your description does not reflect any legal merits that would justify your employer to further withhold the compensation to which you are entitled pursuant to the deal/sale that got closed. The employer and his lawyer are just being vexatious. | Do I have standing to sue a credit bureau or lender after being approved for a loan but being prevented from signing due to their error? Unfortunately, no. The email you got from the loan agency reflects that no contract was formed yet. The email merely is the loan agency's expression of interest to proceed toward the formation of that contract. Absent that formation of the contract, even if for reasons beyond your control, you are not entitled to the benefits or consideration(s) the contract would provide. Nor would the lender be entitled to your compliance with the terms of that contract, terms which might not even be informed --let alone known-- to you. There is no legal obligation from one party to the other. Lastly, the agency's or bureau's faulty process/questionnaire is not actionable either. Lender's reluctance to employ an alternative method is within his freedom of contract. | Does this still count as consideration, even though there was never any possibility of B getting anything out of it? Yes. The sole fact that the promisee and the beneficiary are different and unrelated entities does not invalidate a contract. In terms of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 302(1)(b), what matters is that "the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance". | Choice of jurisdiction: You’re pretty much free to choose your jurisdiction. You don’t have to contract under German law. The German state will intervene though if you’re doing criminal stuff. Legally, the best is of course to draft a written agreement. You’re completely free in the terms (unless it becomes immoral, § 138 BGB), but a loan, § 488 BGB (Darlehensvertrag), with a 0% interest rate (if it’s meant as a short-term aid) is standard. The next level is to collateralize your loan, specifically with a pledge, §§ 1204 ff. BGB, i. e. your friend gives you a valuable item which you may (and actually have to) sell for profit if he doesn’t return the loan. However, unlike contract law, in property law you are not completely free regarding the terms (numerus clausus of property law, Typenzwang des Sachenrechts). Here it becomes too difficult though for the layman, so I wouldn’t recommend that unless you know what you’re doing. Ultimately, I/we think it’s nice of you to consider helping out your friend, but as Nike Dattani already portrayed it can get really nasty if you intend to legally enforce such matters. Trish mentioned the saying: Friendship ends where business begins. I, too, suggest to refer your friend to a pawnshop, research (third-party) microloan opportunities, and help him without directly giving him cash, dine together and offer company (i. e. address the psychological dimension financial troubles entail). PS: § 9 SGB Ⅰ: Germany is (to some degree) a welfare state. Maybe your friend is eligible for some kind of assistance. However, and probably typical of Germany, if you want to get money, you have to fill in forms. | It is not necessarily a crime to do this, but the gift to you and from you to Betty would be disregarded and treated as if gift directly from Alice to Betty, if the IRS knew all of the facts. A gift implies a donative intent directed at you. When there is an understanding that you are acting at Alice's direction, you aren't receiving a gift, you are acting as Alice's agent. This said, this scheme, or the alternative it seeks to prevent, has no impact on Betty, because gift taxes are imposed on the donor rather than the recipient of the gift. And, in most cases, a gift in excess of the $14,000 per person per year gift tax exemption will have only a minimal impact. This is because each person is entitled to make a combination of gifts in excess of the exemption during life and transfers to non-spouses and non-charities at death of $11,200,000 per lifetime (adjusted annually for inflation). Usually, all that is necessary if the limit is exceeded is for the donor to file form 706 (a federal gift tax return) at the same time as the donor's income tax return, and this form is very simple if the only gifts given are cash gifts. Transfers to a U.S. citizen spouse are gift and estate tax free, as are gifts to foreign and domestic charities. Spouses who file a Form 709 in a year may treat gifts given by one spouse as actually given half by each spouse. If someone dies not having used their entire $11,200,000 (adjusted for inflation) lifetime exemption, their surviving spouse, if any, inherits that unused portion and can use it at their death in addition to their own lifetime exemption. So, Alice and Betty are trying to evade a tax law that is easy and trouble free to comply with, and may provide future benefits by documenting the intent of the parties with respect to a large gift (so that someone doesn't later try to characterize it as a loan or contribution to a trust estate, for example). While it isn't a crime, it is ill advised and won't benefit them materially in the end. |
Can judicial branch modify the law without showing that the law is not constitutional? Jurisdiction is Indonesia. However, for comparison, I would love to know if this works in other countries too. I have learned that there are 2 main laws in the world. Civil and common. In both cases, legislative make laws most of the time. Judicial branch however, can modify the laws. As far as I know. For example, US, that practices common laws, regularly make laws. I've heard this bills and that bills. In US, that practices common laws, judges can modify, interpret, or even delete the laws. However, the judges, as far as I know, must say that the law is not constitutional or something. I am not sure I am correct here. Indonesia that practices civil laws also make laws. However, sometimes the laws are modified by the judicial branch. For example, Indonesian narcotic laws give 4 years minimum sentences for anyone possessing ganja or MDMA. Any person which is not entitled or against the law to plant, maintain, own, keep, control, or provide Narcotics Group I not in form of plant shall be sentenced for imprisonment minimum 4 (four) years and maximum 12 (twelve) years and penalty minimum Rp. 800,000,000.00 (eight hundred million rupiah) and maximum Rp. 8,000,000,000.00 (eight billion rupiah). Notice the law has no minimum amount but have minimum jail terms of 4 years. This law is used by cops to demand bribes from many users. This law is also used to send many users to jail. The thing is virtually all narcotic users must have stored, control, and/or buy narcotic. So many people that are caught with say .2 gram of meth spend a minimum of 4 years in jail. In practice, rich people just pay cops or use some loopholes. The law is also pretty peculiar that it requires physical evidence. However, this law is heavily modified by Indonesian supreme court. https://dfcsurabaya.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/sema_04_2010-narkotika.pdf This put some minimum amount of substances possessed before article 112 can be applied. Basically if physical evidence for say, LSD is below 2 grams, then the user is sent to rehabilitation instead of jail. For example, under the original law, anyone caught with 0.1 gram LSD will have to go to jail for a minimum of 4 years. Under that SEMA, a person has to be caught with 2 grams of LSD first before that can happen. How can a judicial branch change the law like that? Or am I missing something? Is this still within "interpreting" the law instead of modifying the laws? How does it work? Did the supreme court simply give "guidance" on how to enforce the law instead of nullifying the laws? I mean in US some laws are simply not enforced right. So is this like okay, we're not enforcing this law if physical evidence is small? Or are the supreme court judges simply modify the law? Is it common practice that judicial branch modify the laws without having to show that the original law is unconstitutional or anything. Does the judicial branch in Indonesia have power to do so? | The question seems to somewhat misunderstand the role of courts in the united-states The United States uses a common-law system, ultimately derived from the law of Great Britain as it was at the time of the US Revolution, and thus incorporating its history largely derived from the practices of English Courts. There was a period in this history where much new law was made by judges, although a great deal of it was also made by statutes, that is by Parliament. In theory such judge-made laws merely "discovered" what the law "had always been" but in practice judges made much new law. Since then the incidence of judge made law has greatly declined in the UK, and has declined even more in the US. I think that it is fair to say that Judges in the US do not now make new law with any frequency. There is, however, a major exception to this. In the US, the Federal Constitution is the "supreme law of the land", and no federal or state statute, regulation or practice may stand if it does not conform to relevant requirements of the federal Constitution. (Nor may any local ordinance, regulation or practice.) But the federal constitution is written mostly in rather broad and general terms, requiring for example that "due process of law" be provided, but but not spelling out in detail what that means. It is therefore up to judges, and particularly to the judges of Federal appellate courts, and most particularly the US Supreme Court, to say when a law, regulation, or practice is in violation of some constitutional requirement, and what must be done to avoid such conflict. One example is the Miranda decision (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) holding that when admissions or confessions by criminal suspects questioned while under arrest were admitted into criminal trials, this violated the defendants' rights against compelled self-incrimination unless they had been advised of their rights under the law, including the right to remain silent and the right to legal counsel. This introduced a new substantive rule of law as a way to enforce a long-existing constitutional provision. The Wikipedia article says: Miranda was viewed by many as a radical change in American criminal law, since the Fifth Amendment was traditionally understood only to protect Americans against formal types of compulsion to confess, such as threats of contempt of court. It has had a significant impact on law enforcement in the United States, by making what became known as the Miranda warning part of routine police procedure to ensure that suspects were informed of their rights. But the concept of "Miranda warnings" quickly caught on across American law enforcement agencies, who came to call the practice "Mirandizing". A more recent example is the case of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) in which the US Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment together guaranteed a right to same-sex couples to marry. This again was a new substantive rule, significantly different from the previous practice for most of US history, as a way of defining and enforcing long-existing constitutional provisions. Related to these are cases where a law, or a provision of a law, is held to be unconstitutional, and thus not a valid law at all. An unconstitutional law may not validly be enforced. Such a case was West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) which held that laws requiring students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance (flag salute) in schools were unconstitutional. These sorts of actions do not occur in those common-law countries which do not have a formal written constitution that is superior to laws passed by the legislature. That is the case in the UK, for example. Aside from that sort of case, where constitutional rights are being asserted or constitutional requirements are being enforced, the main power of US judges over the law is to interpret the law (both statute and regulation) when it is unclear or ambiguous, and to decide exactly what it will mean and how it will be applied. These interpretations can be changed or completely reversed by later legislative action, that is by new laws passed by Congress or by a State legislature. This sort of interpretation occurs in all common-law countries, and also in civil-law countries, although to a somewhat lesser degree in civil-law countries. In general, civil-law countries tend to spell out their law in more specific detail in laws passed by the legislature, leaving somewhat less room for interpretation by courts and judges. By the way, my understanding is that Indonesia is not strictly a civil-law country, but uses a mixture of systems. The Wikipedia article "Law of Indonesia " says: Law of Indonesia is based on a civil law system, intermixed with customary law and the Roman Dutch law. Before the Dutch colonisation in the sixteenth century, indigenous kingdoms ruled the archipelago independently with their own custom laws, known as adat. Foreign influences from India, China and Arabia have not only affected the culture, but also weighed in the customary adat laws. I cannot speak to the specifics of how the courts of Indonesia have interpreted the law on drugs in that country. | The law is known to everyone in theory. But as various people are said to have said, In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not. Starting from zero and actually finding out what law is applicable to your circumstances is not a trivial matter. To have an answer you can rely on you need to do the following: Find out what law calls it. Sometimes this is obvious, but not always. Go and find the law in question. Over the last 10 years this has got much easier. It used to mean going to your city library and looking up the relevant law. These days we have Google (other search engines are available). Find any other laws which might have bearing on the matter. This can be a long way from obvious (see below). Find any relevant appeal court cases in which something like your circumstances have arisen, and figure out how they relate to your actual situation. You may find that some of the laws which you read in Stage 3 have been ruled unconstitutional, or that the standard of evidence required to prove or disprove something about it has been set impossibly high, or that the penalties or damages have been set absurdly high or absurdly low. If you are in the US then maybe some of those precedents were set in other circuits, in which case you need to figure out what your local circuit is likely to do about it should the occasion arise. Make a calm, dispassionate decision about what to do about your situation. Many people find this extremely difficult. The answer might be life-changing. Under these circumstances making a good decision is very hard. Just to give you an idea about (3), suppose you are planning on importing something for your business. Here is a list of areas of the law you might fall foul of, off the top of my head and I've probably missed some: Tax. Trade in endangered species. Drug prohibition. Environmental protection. Biosecurity. Health and safety. Consumer protection. And that is just the criminal laws. Theories of civil liability can get really complicated. But OK, lets suppose you figure out the law, but despite your best efforts you find yourself in court (criminal or civil). Now in addition to all the law you find yourself enmeshed in a complicated bureaucratic set of rules, depending on the type of court and where you are (e.g. US rules of civil procedure). At this point you need to learn not just the rules but how to play the game they describe. Think of it like playing chess; learning how the pieces move is only the first step on the long road to becoming a competent chess player. And the legal system is like chess in another way; there are no do-overs if you make the wrong move. (Incidentally, anyone who says "Well lets just get rid of all the complicated rules and laws" is committing the fallacy of Chesterton's Fence. Just because you can't see why the rules are there doesn't mean there isn't a good reason). Or you could just hire a lawyer. | As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them. | In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure. | Yes, it's illegal new-south-wales s118 of the Crimes Act says: Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. QED | In Kuwait, Shari`a law only applies to family law for Muslim residents. However, if there were a hand-chopping penalty for theft, it would derive from Shari`ah. Article 31 of the constitution says "No person shall be subjected to torture or to ignominious treatment", which at least suggests that hand-chopping is not allowed. This also suggests that corporal punishment is not allowed outside the home, and this suggests that "Article 219 of the criminal states the punishment as being up to 2 years of jail time or/and a fee of up to 2000 Rupees". Even resident Muslims would not be subject to legal hand-chopping. In Kuwait. | First of all, as noted in the comments, Babylon Bee is SATIRE. It's not intended to be news, just entertainment. But the real question is whether or not a President COULD do such a thing. Or perhaps better, could a President attempt to do something like this. If a President did attempt to do this, it would be totally without precedent and also without any constitutional authority. Since the US Constitution enumerates the powers between the branches and gives the President only the authority to appoint, with the advice of the Senate, a SCOTUS justice, trying to change things by giving an existing justice 2 votes would almost certainly be immediately challenged by the Senate. It also seems unlikely that such an action would be upheld as constitutional. Of course this is all speculative since nothing of this nature has happened. | Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all "completely illegal" regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a "criminal conviction"). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been "decriminalised" - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority. |
Why do boxing fights need to be sanctioned by state authorities? Why does boxing (and perhaps MMA) need to be sanctioned by state authorities like the Nevada Athletic Commission or New York State athletic commission? Other sports like baseball require no such state license, nor does a contact sport like football or even a sport that includes actual physical fighting like hockey. Why isn't engaging in a boxing match a form of protected free speech that the state cannot obstruct? | Boxing doesn't have to be regulated by a government agency, but it generally is regulated in this way (1) because states are concerned about regulating fighting with an intent to do physical harm to the other player (which is strictly speaking against the rules even in contact sports like hockey), which would otherwise violate criminal laws unless there was a statutory exception, and (2) because they want to regulate gambling associated with the events (which, again, they wouldn't have to do, but in practice, all states completely ban gambling subject to specific regulated gambling systems, or de minimis exceptions). Historically, many boxing "leagues" were corrupt and manipulated both to punish people disliked by organized crime by forcing people to participate to cleanse what would otherwise be illegal gang vigilante activities and to cheat people betting on matches by fixing the results of fights. Dueling was also historically a major social problem among the political and economic elites in parts of the country. States have the power to ban boxing, football, wrestling, judo, lacrosse, hockey, rugby, fencing, and any other contract sport if they wish to do so, under the U.S. Constitution. States allow contact sports because they choose to do so as a matter of policy, not because the right to engage in contact sports is protected by the First Amendment. There is a constitutional right to have sex with other consenting adults under the U.S. Supreme Court's Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) decision (which is not based primarily on the First Amendment right to free speech), but there is no constitutional right for consenting adults to authorize physical harm to each other in an agreed form of combat. Free speech does not protect contract sports such as boxing because the protected conduct does not primarily exist to communicate ideas, and also because the state has a compelling state interest in preventing people from physically harming each other that goes back to the oldest political theory justifications for the existence of the state in the first place by scholars such as Locke and Hobbes. | It probably is infringement, assuming that this is being done by copying parts of a broadcast of the game. It is up to the holder of the copyright on the original broadcast that is being condensed to decide whether to sue or take other action, such as a takedown notice. Perhaps the holder thinks this is good advertising for its business. They have the right to make that decision. Now if a person went to the game, and used a personal camera to film it, and posted excepts of that recording, the legal issues would be very different. The ticket probably includes a provision prohibiting filming and photography, so this would be a breech of contract. But it would not be copyright infringement. (In practice if this were spotted, the person would be required to stop recording or leave, at least.) | From the holdings of May 14, 2018 in NJ. v. NCAA, As the Tenth Amendment confirms, all legislative power not conferred on Congress by the Constitution is reserved for the States. Absent from the list of conferred powers is the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States. The federal law in question forbids legislatures from passing certain laws, but PASPA’s anti-authorization provision unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do. The distinction between compelling a State to enact legislation and prohibiting a State from enacting new laws is an empty one. The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in either event. The anti-authorization provision does not constitute a valid preemption provision. To preempt state law, it must satisfy two requirements. It must represent the exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution. And, since the Constitution “confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States,” New York, supra, at 177, it must be best read as one that regulates private actors. There is no way that the PASPA anti-authorization provision can be understood as a regulation of private actors. It does not confer any federal rights on private actors interested in conducting sports gambling operations or impose any federal restrictions on private actors. The Commerce Clause does not enter into the majority opinion, though in Thomas' concurring opinion, he indicates he is not entirely happy with purely in-state applications of the Commerce Clause. But, at present, interstate gambling does not differ. | There is no such law in the US, although there many laws prohibiting specific forms of harm, for example laws against murder, theft, assault, arson. All laws are predicated on the idea that an illegal act causes harm, but I don't get to deem, for example, that you are harming society by opposing Satan. There are no laws prohibiting any belief in the US, and such a law would be unconstitutional (in violation of the First Amendment). So being a Satanist could not possibly be illegal. | There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order. | The religious freedom argument has no legs following Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons. With respect to the "involuntary servitude", this was dealt with in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The engagement of Federal power relied on the interstate commerce clause but the current case, as a state law matter, does not need to do this. Basically, by voluntarily providing the goods/service to the public, they agree that they will provide it in accordance with the law governing that kind of commerce. They are free to not provide it to anyone but if they choose to supply it they must supply it to everyone (subject ti normal rules of commerce like the customer actually paying etc.). | The prosecutor always has an advocate The prosecutor in a criminal matter is the State. Since the State is an artificial entity it has to act through agent(s) who advocate for it. In Commonwealth countries the State is synonymous with the Crown - I suppose HRH Queen Elizabeth II could prosecute every case personally but she’s a very old lady with a lot of other things to do (this is a joke - the person is not the office). | X can be convicted of murder in all jurisdiction in the United States (and probably the other common law jurisdictions). The issue here is two-fold. Contracts that involve illegal actions are not enforceable. In fact, the contract killing example you gave is a classic illegal agreement/contract. See the Wikipedia articles on illegal agreements and contract killings. Most criminal prosecutions involving bodily injury or death proceed regardless of the victim's wishes. This is because the prosecution represents the State's interests and can prosecute a case where the victims want it dismissed. Consider and example where the "battered spouse" doesn't want to testify against his/her abuser. The prosecution can still bring changes where the victim is not cooperative. It just makes proving their case more difficult. Check out this article from the DOJ that discusses how victims do not have a right to veto a plea agreement or other prosecutorial decisions. http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/6439-input-into-plea-agreement One could make an argument that the affirmative defense of consent could apply; however, most states have consent statutes like Colorado's that would not apply to murder. See C.R.S. § 18-1-505(2), which states: When conduct is charged is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that conduct or to the infliction of that injury is a defense only if the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious, or the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport, or the consent establishes a justification under sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-707. This statutes basically says consent doesn't apply where someone received serious bodily injury (murder would meet this standard), unless they are in a lawful athletic sport, such as boxing. |
Forced to present ID to Police in the United States You are walking down the sidewalk or any publicly accessible location where you are allowed to walk freely. As you are doing this, you begin to take pictures and/or video. It happens to be near some secure location "Power Plant", "Police Station", "Government Building", etc which you also take pictures and/or video of anything you can see from a public location. A security guard observes you and thinks that this is suspicion behavior. He decides to call the Police to investigate. When the Police show up, they demand ID. Your location is not in a "Stop & ID" state. You are currently still on a publicly accessible walkway. You haven't committed any crime. Even if the Police comes up with a "creative" reason why he is asking for ID. What legal standing does the Police have to force you to present your ID when no crime has occurred? | The standard for stopping someone and requesting their ID under the limitations in the U.S. Constitution is "reasonable suspicion." For example, if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that you are taking pictures for the purpose of a secure location for purposes of espionage, or to case the location for a future crime, reasonable suspicion is probably present and you can probably legitimately be asked for you ID. A creative and intelligent officer can almost always conjure up some reasonable suspicion in the situation that you identify to question you and demand ID. For example, she could state that no one else has taken a picture of that location in weeks and that is is very unusual behavior, that your demeanor or the time of day you were present doesn't seem to be that of someone taking a picture for artistic or journalistic purposes, that you seemed nervous, that a previous criminal engaged in similar behavior before committing a crime fourteen years ago, that a confidential informant (e.g. a nosy neighbor) advised him that there was someone engaged in suspicious behavior at that location, that she read in a police anti-terrorism bulletin that terrorist favor that model of camera, etc. The nature of the suspicion doesn't have to be shared with you until you challenge it in court. A dumb cop won't come up with any colorable reason, demands ID for a stated reason ("before you have to do whatever I say") that is inaccurate, admits he has no reason to stop you in a conversation captured by a body camera, and doesn't come up with pretext after the fact before going to the court. In that case, the stop is a de minimis violation of your civil rights justifying a nominal damages award of $1 to you and your attorneys' fees and costs and maybe a consent decree ordering the agency not to do that in the future. | It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on. | I overdosed on an illegal drug and called an ambulance. I was honest and told them what I took. [emphasis added] You stated that you had possession, and had recently used a notable amount, of an illegal substance. That is reasonable cause (or "probable cause" in some jurisdictions) for a search, regardless of a warrant, and they do not need permission. For example, as FindLaw.com explains, in the USA. [p]olice may use firsthand information, or tips from an informant to justify the need to search your property. If an informant's information is used, police must prove that the information is reliable under the circumstances. | If I were a DA (District Attorney) looking out "stamp out" statutory rape, I would make the rounds of the hospitals, identify women who gave birth, or were impregnated when underaged, and go from there. But few, if any DAs, do this. No, you wouldn't. First, you have neither the time nor the budget to do this. Second hospitals are not public property, you would need a warrant which the court won't give you because you don't have probable cause to believe a crime has or is being committed. As a DA, I would of course, follow up on any complaints lodged by the victim, or even by her/his parents. And maybe I would prosecute a case where people were "caught in the act, or there were nude pictures, etc. May even an especially egregious PDA (public display of affection). No, you wouldn't. You would follow up on complaints to the extent that you have the time, budget and manpower to do so and you would prosecute cases where you believe that you have a reasonable prospect of getting a conviction and where prosecution is, in your opinion, in the public interest. In the real world, that means where the police hand you a brief of evidence that is a lay-down misere and (for statutory rape) where there is a real power imbalance between the perpetrator and the victim - giving 2 willing 15 year old kids the label of 'sex offender' for life is probably not in the public interest. But suppose there were no complaints or smoking guns. Could someone investigate based on something like a teenager "holding hands" with someone much older? To make the question objective, what has historically caused DAs to prosecute people outside of the above parameters? With some exceptions, it is not the role of the DA to initiate or conduct investigations of criminal actions - that is the role of law enforcement officers, usually for this particular crime, police officers. Notwithstanding, the general rule in western, liberal democracies (which the United States, with a certain generosity of spirit, can still be considered) is that citizens are allowed to get on with their lives without day-to-day interference from the state. That is, law enforcement officers do not 'go fishing' for crimes, they investigate crimes that they have a probable cause to believe have actually happened, either because they themselves saw it happen or someone has reported it to them as having happened. The term for having a law enforcement officer following you around waiting for you to break the law is 'harassment' and may itself be illegal. A law enforcement officer can initiate an investigation based on anything but as no law enforcement agency has unlimited resources, they tend to follow only those investigations that might lead somewhere. For example, it has been known for parents to hold the hands of their children and even to publicly display affection towards them and parents are often "much older" then their children - this would not generally be grounds for initiating a statutory rape investigation. | Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out. | Publishing government records is pretty classic First Amendment-protected activity. Keeping in mind that one can find a lawyer to sue for anything, I think that person would likely be operating well within the law. One thing in particular that I'd recommend staying aware of is how one might attempt to monetize this endeavor. There have been a lot of sites publishing arrest records, court records, and mugshots, and then charging people to have them removed to keep them from popping up in a Google search for those people's names. That is -- rightly -- regarded as sketchy behavior; while several states have passed laws prohibiting that business model, I don't believe any such law exists in Washington State at this point. | According to the ACLU, in the U.S.: Taking photographs and video of things that are plainly visible in public spaces is a constitutional right—and that includes police and other government officials carrying out their duties. I.e., a law enforcement officer can never lawfully demand that you turn off a recording device. However the ACLU itself acknowledges that this right continues to be broadly infringed by government agencies and agents. The ACLU and other watchdog groups try to document and fight infringements of this right. Infringement is still so widespread that, in practice, there are many areas and circumstances in which you could expect to be detained, harassed, arrested, and even charged with various crimes for recording police, or for refusing police demands to stop recording. (The charges will not be for recording police, since that is not a crime, but will typically be "contempt of cop" type charges like obstruction, failure to obey, assault, resisting arrest, etc.) | Indecent exposure is a misdemeanor under Maryland law (11-107). There is no statutory definition of indecent exposure, since it's been a long-standing offense and part of common law. Messina v. Maryland cites various definitions of indecent exposure, noting Ordinarily, the place where the exposure is made must be public. What constitutes a public place within the meaning of this offense depends on the circumstances of the case. The place where the offense is committed is a public one if the exposure be such that it is likely to be seen by a number of casual observers In that instance, the question was whether the law required multiple victims to constitute a crime, and the court said that it did not. What you propose does seem to fit the characterization "likely to be seen by a number of casual observers". There have been a number of upheld convictions of people exposing themselves on their own property but in a manner that can be seen from the street, so the defense "I was on my property" doesn't go anywhere. Accidentally being seen while inside and naked would not be a crime because, as Messina said, "Indecent exposure, to amount to a crime, must have been done intentionally". The question is whether you know that you will be seen: "An exposure becomes indecent, and a crime, when defendant exposes himself at such a time and place that, as a reasonable man, he knows or should know his act will be open to the observation of others". It's not absolutely guaranteed that you would be prosecuted, but it's pretty clear that what you propose does constitute indecent exposure. |
My roommate keeps putting their stuff on my nightstand without my permission. Is this legal or illegal? I regularly come home to find that my roommate left her stuff on my nightstand without my permission. Is this non-consensual use of my nightstand prohibited by law? Like maybe theft (depriving me of use of my own property)? | Trespass to chattels — which is "intentionally… dispossessing another of the chattel, or using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another." But don't hold your breath re having a valid case. An attempt to sue would likely be dismissed as de minimis. This is just a trivial interpersonal issue. | No they can't. The lease says the premises need to be cleaned without going into details how. You cleaned them yourself before moving out. If the landlord was not happy with that, they should have raised their concerns and discussed options. The security deposit that the landlord holds is only supposed to be used when something goes wrong. When something goes wrong, the landlord is supposed to talk, not to silently chop off a slice of the deposit as they please (unless the lease allows it, which it does not here). If the landlord refuses to refund, read the manual and go to small claims court to tell them where to get off. | First off, I wouldn't assume that this is always a prank. This is a rather infamous tactic used by bike thieves. These thieves add a second lock to "discourage" the owner from taking their bicycle, wait a few days, and then remove both locks, thus stealing your bike. Don't wait, get your bike out right away. As long as this is your own bike, you don't have much to worry about. It would generally be helpful to call the police, so that they might make a note of it. They might not be able to help you cut the lock, but they will make a note of the incident. It might also be a good idea to register your bike. Getting into the law part... If you were to ever be charged with a property-related offence (which I doubt would happen), you probably wouldn't be able to be found guilty. In Canada, the relevant section would be §35 of the Criminal Code. To summarize that, it basically means that you can't be guilty of an offence if you believe that another person is about to render your bike inoperative (through addition of the second lock), and that your act that constituted the offence would be preventing or stopping that. Don't forget, the bike has to be yours as well. | This likely comes down to contract law (note: I'm not a lawyer; this isn't legal advice). If his rental contract is not with you, you'll need to refer this to the property owner's representative. I don't see why just sharing the house would give tenants any eviction rights over other tenants. Even if you are the owner (cf “my house”), it would be unusual for independent tenants to be party to each other’s rental contracts. The other tenants are irrelevant to any eviction attempt, except perhaps as witnesses in court. | That means that a person cannot put a new cover or binding on a book, and then resell it or lend it, unless permission is obtained from the publisher. This has the effect of prohibiting libraries, which need to rebind most books, from carrying the book without the publisher's permission. This condition did not apply in the US, because under the US Law's First Sale Doctrine, the seller cannot impose such conditions on the buyer. The very standardize wording was, I think, once part of the Net book Agreement (NBA) used by Penguin and other UK-based publishers on sales in the UK and the Commonwealth. You will find it on many used books from such publishers. I believe the main aim was to prohibit discount resellers of used books, and to prohibit sale of "stripped books" (reported to the publisher as "unsold and destroyed"). I believe that this is no longer in effect, but I am not sure. The NBA was dissolved in 1995. | Take a look at https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_room_design From that it appears that you are just following the specifications of the algorithm made by a third party. You're not copying the algorithm, you are re-implementing it based on certain specifications you saw online. I would say unless you agree to some contract like you will not implement this, it should be legal. Furthermore, there is distinction between legality and breaching contracts. It is not illegal to breach a contract. You could just be sued for damages and injunctive relief. Failure to abide by a judicial order, such as an injunction is illegal. DISCLAIMER: I AM NOT A LAWYER. THIS IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE. | No If you breach the contract that may allow the rental company to terminate it (among other things), however, termination would need to be communicated to the customer. Only if they kept it after that, with the intention of permanently depriving the company of it, are they stealing it. | No it is not legal; it is trespassing. the common law definition of trespassing is to enter someone's land or property without their permission. By locking the door they have denied permission to everyone except those to whom they have given a key. If someone finds a key that happens to fit the lock, there is no longer a physical restriction but as they do not have permission, the legal restriction is still in force. |
Free, conditional permission/service: contract or not? This can be seen as another "is a free licence a contract?" question (inspired by this and this), but it focuses on the very basics of the underlying relation between parties. Alice and Bob do not know each other but sit on adjacent seats on a plane flying internationally. The flight attendant hands over immigration/customs cards. Alice digs out her pen and fills in her form. Bob carries on with his meal in not so tidy way: his hands clearly become fat smeared. Alice finishes with her form, and Bob finishes with his meal. Now Bob wants to fill in his form but he hasn't got a pen. He asks Alice to borrow hers. Alice doesn't want her pen to be held by Bob's fatty hands but she doesn't want to appear rude either. She says that she will let him use her pen provided that he first goes to the lavatory and washes his hands with soap. Setting aside the apparent absence of intention to create legal relations, and the obvious de minimis, does this situation otherwise satisfy the legal requirements for a contract? Is the act that Bob washes his hands valid consideration on his side? If the answer to the above is Yes, is there any line dividing contract and mere permission to use things subject to certain conditions? Answers for any jurisdictions are welcome, though mostly interested in common law ones. | Consideration Consideration is essential on both sides of every simple common law contract (civil law is different). It is the quid pro quo or "something for something" that is the essence of a contract - it's what turns an unenforcable agreement into a contract. A formal contract supported by a deed does not need consideration. The rules of consideration are that it: must move from the promisee, but need not move to the promissor. For example, you promising me to wash someone else's car is good consideration. may be 'executed' (something for something now) or 'executory' (something for something in the future) but it cannot be 'past' (something that has already occurred before the contract came into existence - noting that that exact moment might be somewhat nebulous). need not be adequate. If I agree to sell you my home for $1 this is clearly not adequate (in most circumstances) but the $1 is good consideration. must be sufficient. This is not the same as adequate. Insufficient consideration falls under the following headings performance of a duty imposed by law performance of a duty already imposed by another contract moral obligations uncertain or indefinite promises. Possible to perform - both legally and practically. What is promised does not need to have intrinsic value and can be a promise to do something or to refrain from doing something. Condition "Condition" has several meanings in contract law. Condition of a Contract A condition in a contract is an essential term the breach of which entitles the innocent party to either: affirm the contract and sue for damages, or treat itself as no longer under an obligation to perform the contract - but rights which had accrued up until that time continue. A term that is not a condition is a warranty. Breach of a warranty allows suing for damages but does not allow the innocent party to escape their obligations. Whether a term is a condition or a warranty depends on how essential it is - if it was so essential that the innocent party would not have entered the contract without it, it's a condition. The egregiousness of the breach can affect this as well - a term requiring payment on the 1st of each month is likely to be a warranty if payments are consistently made on the 3rd but a condition if they are constantly 2 months late. Condition Precedent A condition precedent is one which must be satisfied before a contract becomes binding. A condition precedent to the formation or existence of a contract. There are no enforcable rights on either party until the condition is fulfilled. Usually, this condition depends on a third-party. For example, an offer to buy real estate "subject to finance" is not a contract if the finance is not forthcoming. A condition which is precedent (a pre-requisite) to the obligation of a party to perform its part of the contract. For example, a requirement that delivery must be before 9.00 am on Wednesday or there is no binding contract. This can alternatively be thought of as the parties providing within the contract a mechanism for its discharge. Condition Subsequent Is a condition terminating the contract (either automatically or on the election of one of the parties) when it occurs. For example, a contract for the supply of iron ore while the price is above $X/ton - if the price drops lower the contract ends. Other uses Outside of contract law, the word "condition" is used a lot; most usually in its common English construction of "If [condition] then [consequence]". For example, "if I put the basketball through the hoop, my team gets 2 (or 3 or 1) points" - that's a condition of getting the points but it's not a contractual obligation. Bob and Alice Bob washing his hands It moves from Bob - that is, Bob has to do something. It doesn't move to Alice (apart from her not having to sensorily experience Bob's greasy fat-smeared hands anymore). It is executory - Bob may have washed his hands in the past (we can hope) but this particular contract requires him to wash them in the future. It doesn't have to be adequate although in the context of this contract it probably is anyway. It is sufficient - Bob is under no legal or moral obligation to wash his hands. It's possible to perform - it is neither illegal nor physically impossible for Bob to wash his hands. Alice lending the pen It moves from Alice and it this case, to Bob. It is executory - Alice will lend the pen in the future. It doesn't have to be adequate although in the context of this contract it probably is anyway. It is sufficient - Alice is under no legal or moral obligation to lend Bob her pen. It's possible to perform - it is neither illegal nor physically impossible for Alice to lend the pen. Bob washing his hands is also a condition of the contract - if Bob does not wash his hands, Alice can either affirm the contract and sue for (admittedly small) damages or terminate the contract and keep whatever benefits she has accrued (none). And, it's a condition subsequent, until Bob washes his hands, Alice has no obligations under the contract. | Am I correct in arguing that the LHD never really had implied consent to begin with? In other words, does the failure to honour the express refusal inform us about the legitimacy of prior claims of implied consent? No. They had implied consent and had not intent at the outset to dishonor it. They have violated the patient's privacy right when consent was expressly withdrawn, and they discovered that they cannot easily comply and therefore did not comply. The fact that they have made it expensive for themselves to comply with their legal obligations going forward does not imply that they lacked implied consent at the outset, so they should have no liability for the time period from when the training materials started to be used until the time when implied consent ended. They are only responsible going forward for their failure to honor the patient's wishes. It is not at all exceptional for a legal obligation to turn out to be more difficult to comply with when it arises than was anticipated when the systems that make the legal obligation difficult to comply with were implemented. Health care companies aren't expected to be prophets who can foresee the complex confluence of factors that has painted them in a corner, particularly when a situation has never come up before the current one. It is likely that no one person was ever even simultaneously aware of all the facts necessary to know that this could happen. Someone in the IT department will often not be intimately familiar with what is going on in the training part of the operation and what the privacy rules that apply are and even if someone was, that someone may have been in no position to do anything about it at the time. Health care providers aren't supposed to be evaluated with 20-20 hindsight. Given that they almost surely did not and could not easily have known that they had made a future express withdrawal of consent very difficult to effectuate, scienter can't be attributed to it. And, honestly, they are in more than enough trouble simply trying to deal with the problem post-express withdrawal of consent when they did start to violate privacy laws. | Are my assumptions correct? Yes, this is precisely the sort of thing that would fall under the purview of "the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party", as it fundamentally enables you to deliver the service to the data subject, and its also difficult to argue that "such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject" given its a fundamental part of delivering the service before any consent can be given. Its not the intention of the GDPR to solely require a direct relationship between the data controller and data subject, its intention is to allow the data subject to control more of the relationship than they did previously - in some cases, that control remains with the data controller, which is why not all of the lawful basis for processing rest on consent. So long as you ensure that the CDN provider has a relevant privacy policy and is identified as a data processor in your privacy and data policy then you are good to go. In my mind, this is similar to the issue of how the data subjects packets get to you from their computer - we aren't including all of the network providers who carry the packets between the data subject and the processor (despite the fact that those providers will have access to much of the same information as the CDN, such as IP address, source, destination etc), even though in many cases we don't know that information (for example which route it will take over the internet). The only difference here is that as the data controller, you know about the CDN and can include it in your policies, so you should. | In general, you cannot contract to do anything illegal. However, ... An argument could be made that permission has been granted to, for example, enter property and remove the item. If permission has been granted, entering property and taking an item is not a crime. | Permission is not a physical thing that disappears when a piece of paper evidencing that permission is lost or handed to another party. When someone gives you permission as part of an agreement having the necessary characteristics of a contract, then the revocation of that permission is governed by the terms of the contract itself and your jurisdiction's contract-law. You may not need any permission to use the photos you paid to have taken. (For example, in the U.S. if they were taken in a public place and you are not displaying them for profit.) Or, you might need permission due to various rules or laws protecting minors – only an IP lawyer familiar with your jurisdiction can confirm this is the case – and, unless it was drafted by a competent lawyer, it is quite possible that your "permission statement" was legally insufficient or defective. Or, you might have legally secured necessary permission and still have that permission even though you handed the "permission statement" back to the parents of the subject. In practice: Only a lawyer in your jurisdiction can offer an opinion on which of these scenarios is in fact the case. And only via litigation can you establish further confidence that legal opinion is correct. | Working a mobile car cleaner now, my manager asked me to take some pictures before cleaning and after clearing, privacy issue of the car owner California law creates an expectation of consent for taking photographs of people for purposes of commercial distribution of the image to the public. California Civil Code § 3344. But, absent copyright or design patent issues (which would only very rarely come up since most people don't own the copyrights or patents to the designs of their cars, and the owner of the copyrights generally grants an implied license for the owners of the cars to display the copyrighted or patented designs), there is no parallel requirement of consent for taking photographs of things. Furthermore there is no common law expectation of privacy in anything that someone you do business with must necessarily see with their own eyes. So, if you must see the car to clean it, then taking photographs before and after the work is done does not violate any expectation of privacy to which the customer has not implicitly consented and does not violate any California or federal statute. Better practice would be for the business to explicitly have the customers consent in writing to the photographs, to remove all doubt. But the implied consent to having someone see your car when they are cleaning it would be unreasonable to deny in almost all circumstances. A company might voluntarily have an agreement to keep any photographs taken confidential and to have its employees sign non-disclosure agreements not to reveal what they see while working. If it did, this would create a legally enforceable expectation of privacy for the customer. For some VIP clients, this contractually enforceable discretion might be something that would induce them to pay a higher price for the same services. But those kind of protections are not the default standards of law that apply in the absence of an agreement. And, even then, taking photographs for purposes of internal use only would probably not violate an agreement of this kind. The work still requires that people inside the business, including remote supervisors, be able to see the cars to do their work. | The "contract" (sometimes called a charitable pledge or a pledge to make a donation) is not enforceable under contact law because there is no consideration. From a contract law perspective, it isn't really a contract at all. This fact pattern is literally the "standard" example of a "contract" that is unenforceable for lack of consideration. The promises made in the charitable pledge might be enforceable under an equitable doctrine called promissory estoppel, if someone detrimentally relies upon the promise made in the contract and it is not inequitable to do so. As a practical matter, however, donees almost never sue to enforce a pledge to make a donation. A donative pledge should also be distinguished from a transfer document, which is also not a contract. In a transfer document, the donor is unilaterally giving something to someone, and the recipient is signing merely to affirm that they accept the transfer being made to them, rather than rejecting the donation and disclaiming it. | Law does not have an all-encompassing syntax and structure that, if not followed, makes it null and void. If a reasonable person could determine that (in the example of the sign you have) you are required to get written permission from any or all of the Paulding County Commissioners, then the sign is enforceable. I honestly don't see anything wrong with the sign you are displaying, it is reasonably clear. If, for example the notice contains an ambiguity or unclear phrase, the "spirit" of the law or sign is upheld. If the sign had said something to the effect of "No trespassing without permission". It doesn't say who you need permission from, but you can reasonably ascertain that you must have permission from somebody in control of the land. There is no line in the sand here. Often when a dispute in a contract comes up where it could be interpreted more than one way, it is often interpreted in favor of the person who did not write the contract. "Offer ends October 30 or while supplies last" Isn't really "ill-phrased" either. I assure you that those statements are vetted by highly paid lawyers from many jurisdictions. I'm not sure what "nonsense" you would be referring to in there. If the vendor runs out of promotional materials the promotion ends... If they had said "free hats to the first 100 customers on December 31st", you can't show up as the 101st customer and demand a hat, nor could you show up on January 1st (even if there were not 100 customers the previous day) and demand one either. |
Trying to get my money back from an attorney Does it cost clients to fire their attorney? My ex filed and was taking me to court to get back some of the child support he Paid me . That he has just dropped it but has not filed with the court to close the case. Now my attorney will not give me my money that's left from my retaining fee to me, because it is an open case so I have to pay to file the case or fire her In order to get my money. Is that a common thing that attorneys do? | It isn't 100% clear from the question if a case has been filed in court, or someone was just planning on filing a lawsuit, which is an important fact. It seems like the ex filed a court case and you hired attorneys who responded. If there is a court case filed, that can't just be abandoned until all the i's are dotted and t's are crossed in the eyes of the court. The lawyers can't quit unless the court gives them permission to do so. Usually, lawyers are entitled to be paid for all of the work they do and out of pocket charges they incur in a case, until it is wrapped up, even if some wrap up work happens after the event that determines the final outcome of the case like your ex deciding to abandon his arguments. But, otherwise, if there isn't a pending court case, you normally have the power to tell your lawyers to stop everything and give you the moment left (if any) in your retainer. At first read, it almost sounded as if your lawyers are willing to do that, but are warning you that your ex might continue to be a problem after the lawyers quit and that if that happens, it will be more costly and time consuming to start all over dealing with the threatened lawsuit that your ex made, than it would be to get it over and done with now. But, upon closer inspection, it seems that there is a pending lawsuit and that this is the issue. | I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney. | I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? You have probably waived your claim if you proceed with the deal knowing about the Realtor's conduct. What would your damages be? Could you have mitigated them by not agreeing to the deal? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this? Lawyers aren't that specialized. I would not recognize a "personal" attorney as something necessarily different from a "Real estate attorney" and the questions involved are not so complex that a general practice attorney couldn't handle them. Familiarity with real estate issues would be desirable (e.g. you wouldn't want to hire someone whose practice was exclusively as a criminal defense attorney or a personal injury lawyer, or a patent lawyer, for this task), but a great many lawyers who describe their practices differently would have the relevant experience and knowledge. | When people talk about the "American rule," they usually mean a system where every party pays their own legal costs, and the winner is not compensated in any way for the costs of litigation. Using that as your basis, the American system itself is actually a "hybrid." The details change a bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. But in general: The loser in many American civil cases is required to pay the actual court costs. These are not as substantial as the attorney's fees, but they can easily run into hundreds or thousands of dollars. These costs are for things like filing fees, process servers, witness fees, court recorders and transcripts, and other costs that, generally speaking, are going to be the same no matter how much your lawyer charges. (Again, what specifically is included in costs depends on your jurisdiction). This imposes a non-trivial expense on the loser of a lawsuit, without allowing the other side to run up the costs to an outrageous figure by hiring huge teams of expensive lawyer, as is possible under the pure English system. While the "American rule" is the default rule in most or all American jurisdictions, there are generally rules that allow the Court to shift part or all of a prevailing party's legal fees to the other side under certain circumstances. For example: in many courts, if you bring a frivolous motion, or a motion designed primarily to inflate the costs of the suit, the court can require you to immediately pay any attorneys' fees expended in responding to that motion, even if you eventually win the lawsuit as a whole. This is a more specific and targeted penalty for misconduct than the English rule. Similarly, if the Court finds that the entire lawsuit you brought – or the defense you presented – was frivolous, or presented in bad faith, or under certain other circumstances, the Court can include attorney's fees in the final damage award, just as would have been done under the English rule. The result is a hybrid system. The benefit of this hybrid system, at least in theory, is that frivolous lawsuits are discouraged, but lawsuits that have some merit – even if they are ultimately unsuccessful – do not have to worry about the imposition of massive costs. However, the disincentive is not as much as it might be, since the standards courts use to judge a motion or lawsuit "frivolous" are generally quite stringent. | This is illegal, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, assuming you are not an "exempt" employee, which is primarily a salaried employee (your pay isn't based on how many hours you work). There are details about the complaint process here. It is useful to know that retaliation against an employee filing a legal complaint is also illegal. | You can't normally ask the court to "recuse" an attorney, because "recusal" is normally restricted to the judge leaving the case. The more common term is moving to disqualify opposing counsel. | The lawyer referred to in that article is suing in his capacity as the recipient of spam emails under California's anti-spam law. Not every jurisdiction has a law like this. I'm from Australia. In Australia, when we make laws prohibiting something, the law usually appoints a government agency to administer the law and bring prosecutions under it, and fines are paid to the government. In contrast, America has a lot of these laws where affected individuals can sue and collect the fines personally. So under the Californian law, you can get $1,000 per email for particular kinds of spam even if you haven't actually suffered any real damage: California Business and Professions Code s 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii). How? You need to work out who sent the spam, get evidence to prove it, and file a claim in a Californian court. Apparently you can sue in small claims court, which saves you on filing fees. It helps if you have many email accounts, because then you will receive many emails and therefore can collect many fines. One of that lawyer's wins was in Balsam v Trancos (2012) in the Californian Court of Appeal. Another example of a judgment discussing the Californian anti-spam law is Bontrager v Showmark Media. | There is no significance to using the words "I" or "we", nor does it matter that you didn't sign the surrender paper (after al, you did not have possession of the vehicle and it is not yours to surrender). You will have gotten a notice, at the beginning of this process (when the loan was taken out) that provides information like this, in particular The creditor can collect this debt from you without first trying to collect from the borrower. The creditor can use the same collection methods against you that can be used against the borrower, including suing you or garnishing your wages. If this debt is ever in default, that fact may become a part of your credit record. When you are a loan co-signer, that means the creditor can go after you and you alone to get the money. Since it seems the creditors are pursuing you both, that beats the alternative that you have to sue her to get anything. Since there is no question that money is owed, the point of the trial is to decide who pays it: it will be one or both of you, and it won't be that the bank has to take a loss. Your attorney's job is to argue that it should not be you (her attorney's job is to argue that it should be you). Your concern should be that it's too difficult to get the money from her, and easy to get the money from you, which is why you need to hire a good attorney. |
Is it legal for Comcast to (apparently) require my SSN to obtain service? I went to sign up for a new Comcast account online. They asked me for some basic billing info, but also asked for my DOB and SSN, which I'd rather not give to them out of concern about identity theft. The claim is that they need it to run a credit check (ok, fair enough): But then wait! There is an alternative - I can pay a $50 deposit instead. Or so I thought: They still ask for my SSN! I thought that perhaps it was now an optional field, but as you can see from the validation message: So, it would seem that they are not giving me a choice here. Is this legal? Are they allowed to require my SSN just to set up service? | Comcast, and many other utility companies, will ask you for your SSN and will insist on it giving you many times with false answers. I recommend you ask them if they have an alternative, which they most probably will say no because the person you are speaking with is not used to, and/or not trained to give alternatives. The reason they ask for your SSN is for doing a credit check on you to make sure you are able to to pay your bills - and n case you don't - to ruin your life by ruining your credit score. From their "Comcast Customer Privacy Notice": What kind of personally identifiable information and CPNI does Comcast collect? Comcast collects information from you at several different points when you request, turn on, and use our services under an account we create for you. Some of this information is personally identifiable information, but much of it is not. We collect certain personally identifiable information that our subscribers furnish to us in connection with the provision of cable service or other services. In order to provide reliable, high quality service to you, we keep regular business records containing information about you that may constitute personally identifiable information. These account records include some, but typically not all, of the following information... However, legally speaking, they cannot bind their services to your credit worthiness. They do provide an alternative when asked about it. Most probably they will ask some sort of a monetary deposit in order to open the account. This deposit may, or may not, be spread across several billing cycles. The deposit is their financial guarantee in case you fall behind on your payments. What should you do: Ask them what is the deposit amount. Can the deposit be spread across multiple bulling cycles What is the time period that that after it they will return you the deposit. | Social Security numbers are called Social Security numbers because were invented to implement the Social Security Act of 1935, which was one of the important programs adopted by Congress as part of the New Deal during the Great Depression. These individual identifying numbers made it easier for the government to compile and collate information about the payroll taxes on the wages and salaries of workers potentially entitled to Social Security benefits which was (and is) collected by employers to pay for Social Security benefits. Compiling this data was necessary because under the Act one's lifetime history of Social Security payroll taxation history is used to determine if you, or your dependents, are eligible for Social Security benefits at all, and if so, to determine how big the benefit check should be according to formulas adopted by the government agency administering the program. This agency is now called the Social Security Administration. But, this agency has been relocated in the federal government bureaucracy now and then since the Act was passed in 1935 as part of general reorganizations of the federal government bureaucracy. Keep in mind that all of this data collection and collation was done by hand. Computers adequate to assist government agencies in administering government programs wouldn't come into being for another thirty years. The "security" referenced is the economic security that the Social Security Act of 1935 provided to elderly people, widows, and orphans. Before the Social Security Act was adopted, the elderly, widows, and orphans, who often lacked the ability to earn a living wage in the economic marketplace, routinely faced extremely high poverty rates, and employer survivor's and disability benefits were uncommon. In time, Social Security numbers began to be used as a tool for the government to identify people for purposes other than administering the Social Security Act, such as for purposes of administering state and federal income taxes. But, by then, the name "Social Security number" for these identifying numbers originally used to administer the Social Security program was already firmly established. | The first issue is to understand that opening up an account with a utility to provide natural gas services is considered an extension of credit. This matters because the FTC requires, under the fair credit reporting act and its general power to issue regulations targeted at preventing fraud, that people who open up new credit accounts to verify the identity of the applicant in an effort to prevent identity theft by fake applicants in some cases. Potential creditors must use “reasonable policies and procedures” to verify the identity of an applicant before issuing credit in the consumer's name. This regulatory stance is supported by Fair Credit Reporting Act § 605A(h)(1)(B) a.k.a. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1 (h)(1)(B). The pertinent part of the statute states: (B) Limitation on users (i) In general No prospective user of a consumer report that includes an initial fraud alert or an active duty alert in accordance with this section may establish a new credit plan or extension of credit, other than under an open-end credit plan (as defined in section 1602(i) 1 of this title), in the name of the consumer, or issue an additional card on an existing credit account requested by a consumer, or grant any increase in credit limit on an existing credit account requested by a consumer, unless the user utilizes reasonable policies and procedures to form a reasonable belief that the user knows the identity of the person making the request. (ii) Verification If a consumer requesting the alert has specified a telephone number to be used for identity verification purposes, before authorizing any new credit plan or extension described in clause (i) in the name of such consumer, a user of such consumer report shall contact the consumer using that telephone number or take reasonable steps to verify the consumer’s identity and confirm that the application for a new credit plan is not the result of identity theft. The FTC in issuing its regulations and the utility company, as a matter of policy and expediency, have decided that it the utility company must do credit checks on all prospective customers and will speed up the application process for people who have "fraud alerts" or "active duty alerts" on their credit reports by requiring verification from everyone instead of finding out that they can't get a credit report for a particular customer without verification and then having to go back to the customer to get it. | There is no requirement to name the parties to a contract I just bought a cup of coffee. I did not give my name to the other party to that contract and while I know the name of the shop, I do not actually know the legal entity I contracted with. Nevertheless, we have a binding contract and, for example, if that coffee gave me food poisoning, I would have legal recourse under that contract. Similarly, there is no difficulty signing a contract under a pseudonym - it still creates a legally binding relationship. The practical difficulties While there is no legal problem, there is an evidentiary one - if someone enters a contract and later disclaims doing so, how do you prove that they did? Or vice-versa, if someone alleges that it was you that entered the contract, how do you prove that you didn’t. What you need is some way of definitively but anonymously tying the person to the contract. I can think of lots - a fingerprint, DNA, public key cryptography, a trusted third-party intermediary to name just a few. This is essentially a technical problem rather than a legal one. | Legal Services Society is a non-profit organization created by the BC Legislative Assembly through this act, created in order to serve the legal needs of certain classes of society, defined vaguely with reference to "a reasonable person of modest means". Accordingly, they have rules regarding who they can and cannot serve. and they are constrained financially. With vast demands on their resources and little by way of resources, prudent triage is called for. That is, when you show up, you shouldn't expect to talk to a senior attorney (or an attorney). From what I can determine, you cannot expect to get your problem solved right away. It is also not clear that your problem is within the scope of what they do (criminal, incarceration, serious family matters, immigration). "Giving legal advice" is something that only a few people are legally allowed to do – lawyers, who have you as their client. If the person were an attorney, they still couldn't give you legal advice until the appropriate relationship is created (and they have the relevant facts). The person you met with may be a paralegal or a law student. Under the law (sect. 8 of the act), you cannot sue them for damages because of their actions, except if carried out in bad faith. The waiver might be a bit redundant, but it is a wise idea to tell people that you can't sue them. If you want to know what you can expect from the lawyer, this publication will be helpful, though it is generic and not specific as to your particular issue. | Some jurisdictions do that. Others don't (see, for example, the Dutch national identity card). My New York driver's license is in all caps, and I rather suspect that it's a holdover from the days in which licenses were processed using a computer system that had only upper-case characters. But that's just a guess. The real answer is that the premise of the question is incorrect. | Yes, but ... It doesn’t protect you. Let’s imagine you put such a clause in and a person in Europe used your service notwithstanding: they’ve broken the contract but you’ve broken the law. You get the fine and they get ... nothing. Because you can’t contract outside the law you never had a valid contract with them so you have no basis to sue. Further, because you are purporting to something you can’t legally do, you are probably on the wrong side of misleading and deceptive consumer protection law: which is another fine. If you can ensure that you don’t breach local law - like by not operating over the internet - then you can choose not to deal with e.g. Europeans. If you can’t guarantee that, then you’re stuffed. | Let me be sure that I understand the situation. You set up an account with Big Company, which uses BigCo as a trademark. You want email about that account to reach you with a unique address, so you set up '[email protected]" and gave that as your email when setting up tha account. You don't plan to use that address for any purpose but communications from BigCo to you and from you to them. (Of course these aren't the actual names.) Have I understood the situation correctly? It seems that you ar not using 'BigCo" in trade, nor are you likely to be confused with an official representative of BigCo, so you are not infringing their trademark. However, someone using such an email more generally could perhaps be so confuse, so BigCo has a somewhat legitimate concern, as they cannot know the very limited use you plan to make of this address. The only way that the could force you not to use such an email address would be via a court order as part of a suit for trademark infringement, whcih under the circumstances I doubt they would get. However, unless they have some sort of contract with you to the contrary, they can control who registers on their site. and could refuse to register you using an email address that includes their name or alias. Convincing them to accept your registration, even though it does no harm to them, will almost surely be more trouble than it is worth. Give them "[email protected]" or something else that is not their name, but will suggest their name enough that you will know who it is. This will serve your purpose fully, and avoid a long argument with people who are reading from a script (once you get past the automated process, if you can even do that). This is all assuming that I have understood the situation correctly. I am also largely assuming US law, since you didn't mention a jurisdiction. (EDIT: UK law should not be very different on these points.) |
US Jurisdiction, can a foreigner register a trademark in the US? Pretty much self-explanatory. I am not an American, I live outside the US and, so far, my only relationship with the US is going there for holidays from time to time. I have a software product with a specific name which is trademarked in my country. I have a lot of clients from the US (but I do not have a business presence there), so I would like to claim ownership of my trademark there as well. I know part of the answer is "hire an attorney that specializes on IP to do this for you", which I will at some point; but broadly speaking, I would like to know first if this is possible and under what conditions (if any). Also, if you could also throw in a ballpark estimate of how much does this cost, that'd be awesome. Thanks! | Yes 15 USC 1501, which is part of the Lanham Act, the basic US trademark law, provides in subsection (a)(2) that: (2) The application [for registration of a trademark] shall include specification of the applicant’s domicile and citizenship, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark in commerce, the goods in connection with which the mark is used, and a drawing of the mark. This clearly implies that the applicant may have a citizenship other than US, or else ther ewould be nbo point in specifying the citizenship in the application. subsection (e) of the same section provides, in relevant part: If the applicant is not domiciled in the United States the applicant may designate, by a document filed in the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the name and address of a person resident in the United States on whom may be served notices or process in proceedings affecting the mark. This makes it cleat that an applicant need not be resident in the US., 15 USC 1141a provides that: (a) In general The owner of a basic application pending before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, or the owner of a basic registration granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office may file an international application by submitting to the United States Patent and Trademark Office a written application in such form, together with such fees, as may be prescribed by the Director. (b) Qualified owners: A qualified owner, under subsection (a), shall— (b)(1) be a national of the United States; (b)(2) be domiciled in the United States; or (b)(3) have a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment in the United States. 1141a (b2) and (b)(3) make it clear that an applicant need not be a national (citizen) of the US. The USPTO's page "Trademark FAQs" lists under the heading "General - Trademark Help - Getting Started - Other" the following Q&A: Must I be a U.S. citizen to obtain a federal registration? No. However, your citizenship must be provided in the application. If you have dual citizenship, then you must indicate which citizenship will be printed on the certificate of registration. | The band's logo can be protected by both copyright and trademark. The band's name is probably only protected as a trademark. Trademark would not apply to your personal use, because to infringe a trademark, you need to "use" the mark, and "use" in trademark law generally means selling an item that has the mark on it. As far as trademark law is concerned, no sale means no infringement. Copyright protects the exclusive right of the owner to copy a "work" (it's much more complex than that, but we don't need to get into the details here). Copyright probably applies because you would "copy" the logo, which under copyright law is something only the copyright owner can do (absent authorization from the copyright owner). You would therefore theoretically be infringing copyright by copying the bands logo on a shirt or something you want to wear yourself. That said, while I agree with the first answer that fair use may apply in theory, there would never ever be such a complex discussion about fair use in this case... because in fact there's absolutely no chance an individual would get fined or sued for having copied a band's logo and name on something he/she wants to wear his/herself. Getting sued by the band The band will not notice. If you're lucky enough to meet the band (or somebody close to the band) in person while you are wearing your garment, they would either not notice or not care. At worst, they'll ask you where you bought it in case they suspect you bought it from someone who illegally sells fake merch. Even then, all of this seems very unlikely. If you are extremely unlikely and the band notices it and sues you (and finds a lawyer to take a case like that to court), my inclination is to think the judge would be extremely mad with the band (and its lawyer) for losing the court's time with such a trivial matter. No judge would allow lawyers to waste the court's time pleading such a complex thing as fair use in a case like that. Getting fined The police would not notice either, because the only time the police cares about copyright is when somebody makes a complaint (nobody would make a complaint about you), except when they seize containers full of copyright infringing stuff (that is destined to be illegally sold for profit) in a port or at a border somewhere. The only possible scenario where I could imagine that there would be legal consequences is if you wear a t-shirt with the bands logo in a YouTube video (or in a picture) where the only thing that you see basically is the bands logo on your t-shirt. Even this scenario is extremely far fetched, but let's say the video becomes popular and the band notices. Well, the likeliest scenario is that they would file a DMCA notice and get YouTube to take down the video, with very little chances that there would be more important consequences to you. Have fun! | I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server. | As to #1, the US Patent and Trademark Office has a patent practitioner search where you can verify if someone is a registered patent practitioner. If so, it means they passed a [registration process] that evaluates their "legal, scientific, and technical qualifications, as well as good moral character and reputation", as well as a multiple-choice exam. I looked up a few of the attorneys listed on the firm's About Us page and they show up as registered. So this seems like a good indication that they are a "real law firm". This does not address whether they are "credible" (I'm not sure what that means), or how to evaluate the firm's quality, and I will leave it to someone else to answer that. | copyright will cover the names and graphics of games The names of games are not protected by copyright, nor by patent. The names could be protected by trademark. Note that trademarks are specific to a country: what is trademarked in one country may well not be in another. Almost all countries have a way to search their trademark registries, often online. However in some countries, including the US, use of a name in commerce will confer some protection even without registration. What will be considered a "mechanic"? for example MTG have specific mana system, if someone will be creating a game with same idea but will refer to it with other names such as "Ember" instead of "Fire" will it violate the patent? Game mechanics are not protected by copyright. This includes all the procedures and rules of the game. The text used to express those rules may be protected, but often it is not if it is the most obvious way to describe the mechanics. For example, in chess there are different pieces with different moves. That could not be protected by copyright, even if chess were a new game. In bridge the winner of each trick leads to the next. That could not be protected by copyright either, even if bridge were a new game (and contact bridge is just new enough that it could in theory be under copyright still). How do i know if certain patents are applied and when they expire? Most games are not protected by patent, but some are. Patents, like trademarks, are specific to a country. Each country has a way to search its list of active patents. Note that patents have a strict tiem limit, and they normally cannot be extended or renewed. I believe that the limit of a patent is currently 20 years in most countries. (It used to be 17 years in the US.) If a game is patented in Country X and someone is printing the same game but with different art and names in country Y, will the one who print in country Y could be exposed to a lawsuit? Unless the game is also patented in country Y, there will be no grounds for an infringement lawsuit inn Y. But importing the game into X may be patent infringement, and could expose the importer to a suit. | 20th Century Fox have a trademark on "Simpsons." They have trademarks on "Bart Simpson", on "D'oh", on "Duff Beer". I would assume that they take their trademarks seriously. What you can't do is to use someone else's trademark to make people believe your commercial product is related to theirs. It's quite reasonable to assume that someone seeing your book in a store would think it is written by the makers of The Simpsons show and therefore buy it. Even if you say that isn't your intention, it is what would happen. I'd try coming up with some different titles, maybe "How to write animated TV shows" with "Example: The Simpsons" (well, you are the writer so you should come up with something better), and take them to a lawyer. And then contact the makers of the show (again asking the lawyer for advice how to do this) because even if your lawyer says the title is fine, that doesn't mean you can't be sued. | First, even if your competitor is operating outside the jurisdiction of your patents, you also have protection from the use and import of the infringing products, not just the manufacture and sale. For example, if you have a US patent, your patent would allow you to sue airlines using your product in the US (e.g., flying into, out of, and/or within the US), even if they bought the product from a foreign competitor. Suing potential customers isn't as attractive as suing your competitors, but at least you would have that option. Further, it is possible to apply for a patent in multiple countries (e.g., through the PCT process), although it can get expensive to try to obtain protection in a large number of countries. You can try to target the main jurisdictions in which your product would be made, sold, or used. For example, you could apply in the US, China, and various European countries (through the EPO). | "LearnIT" and "Learn it" are both descriptive, and thus are generally weak trademarks. It is not unlikely that a challenge would result in cancellation of any trademark on either, or in allowing a similar trademark in an unrelated category of business. For the matter of that, you don't seem to have determined whether the other company is making any trademark claims. In some countries there is no trademark protection unless a mark is registered. In others, including the US, use without registration can create some protection for a mark. It will also be relevant where the other company is doing business, and where you plan to. Trademark protection is always specific to a particular country, and generally requires proof of use in commerce in each such country (or of a plan to start such use in the near future). Domain registration is a different thing, and is not necessarily tied to a trademark (although registering a domain that infringes an existing trademark will often be disallowed). It appears that "learnit.net" is listed as available. That does not mean that a dispute filed by the other company would not be successful. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) states in section 2 that: By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to maintain or renew a domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that (a) the statements that you made in your Registration Agreement are complete and accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the registration of the domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not registering the domain name for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not knowingly use the domain name in violation of any applicable laws or regulations. It is your responsibility to determine whether your domain name registration infringes or violates someone else's rights. If you register a domain name, and another person or firm complains that the name is "confusingly similar" to an existing name or to a valid trademark, you might be required to participate in an arbitration proceeding under the UDRP, or else forfeit the registration. Note that nothing happens if no one complains. Section 4(s) of the policy reads: You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts ... that (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. In the administrative proceeding, the complainant must prove that each of these three elements are present. "Bad faith" can be shown by evidence that you obtained the domain for purposes of selling or renting it, not for use; that you intended to prevent a valid trademark owner from obtaining the name, and have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; that your purpose was to disrupt the business of the other; that you intended to attract users who were looking for the other site. The page "What Are 'Look-Alike' Domain Names?" states: An essential element of any domain name dispute is whether the domain name bears some important resemblance to a relevant trademark. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) refers to this as the “identical or confusingly similar” test. In many cases, a disputed domain name actually contains the trademark, and in other cases it may contain a typographical variation of the trademark (such as by omitting a single letter; transposing two letters; or substituting one letter for another, often adjacent to it on a keyboard). Yet in other cases, a disputed domain name may simply look like the trademark at issue, even if the domain name doesn’t contain the trademark or fall into any of the popular cybersquatting tricks described above. I refer to these simply as “look-alike domain names.” You may wish to determine if the operator of the learnit.com site has in fact obtained a trademark on "learn it". Most national trademark systems provide a means to search the trademark registers. This will not be conclusive, but may give a reasonable idea. One option is to consult a lawyer skilled in trademark law. Another might be to reach out to the exposition firm and ask if they would have any objection to your proposed blog. If they don't object, the will be no problem. Another option is to choose a domain that is not as similar to that of the existing site. One technique that can help avoid an accusation of bad faith is to provide an notice where someone first opening the blog site will see it, something like: This is XY.net. You may have been looking for XX.com,which is about {short description} If co, click here. with a link to the other site. Such a notice might help establish that you were not using the domain to improperly attract traffic looking for the other site. |
City responsibility for vehicle damage due to road condition? If I don't maintain the sidewalk in front of my house, and someone falls and gets hurt, they can sue me. Seems reasonable to me. If the street has a big pothole, and it damages my vehicle, is the city responsible for paying for my tow and repairs? I'm in NY, but I'm interested in any jurisdiction. | According to iDriveSafely, in NYC, the city authorities would have to know the existence of the pothole 15 days in advance of your mishap, in order to reimburse you. The New York City Department of Transportation has to know of the pothole’s existence at least 15 days before you had your accident. That’s right – if the city didn’t know, in writing, that a pothole existed, they will not reimburse you. And Drivers whose vehicles sustained pothole damage must file a claim within 90 days of the incident. You can file a property damage claim with the city either manually or electronically via the eClaim system used by the New York City Comptroller’s office. They aren't citing any code details though. But they do have these (rather confusing) stats: New York City paid out $138 million over the past several years to settle pothole claims, so some drivers are reimbursed. [...] From 2009 to 2015, drivers filed 12,286 pothole claims against the city, of which 1,549 were settled. The city reimbursed those drivers a total of $1.5 million. As for the rest of the state: If your vehicle was damaged on a New York state road, you’re probably out of luck. That’s because the New York State Department of Transportation will not reimburse drivers who experience a close encounter with a pothole during so-called “pothole season.” That runs from Nov. 15 to May 1, when cold weather makes potholes far more likely. Even if your pothole interaction occurred out of season, New York state limits the amount of damage payable to just $5,000. For the latter, they do provide a law citation--HAY § 58. | I took my car to the mechanic to have a squeaky brake looked at. I was told it would cost $30. The mechanic fixed whatever the problem was. When I was checking out, they could not find a $30 brake-work item in their computer so they billed it as Tire Balancing $30. Or some such thing. Meh, accounting. This is not how the law works. The prosecution needs to prove every element of the crime you are charged with. They need to prove you did not signal. The way this usually works is the cop takes the stand and testifies, and you can cross examine him. Then you can testify if you want to, and can be cross-examined. There might be other evidence against you also, like a dash cam. Assuming there is no other evidence, and that the officer did not prove every element of failing to signal, you do not need to testify. You can tell the judge that the prosecution failed to make the case and ask to have the charge dismissed. Of course, if the judge thinks they did make their case, then you lose. On the other hand, you could take the stand and testify, and subject yourself to cross examination. Just a word of warning, if it's your word against a cop's word, you will lose. Your best bet is to get discovery, get the dash cam, and show that you did signal. Be aware, if you get too saucy, the prosecution can add charges. So they could add the speeding charge, but of course, (see above), they then need to prove it. | All of these sound like violations of the Criminal Damage Act of 1971. The courts seem to construe "damage" fairly broadly, to include damage that affects an object's value or usefulness, so I'd imagine that removing signs or cameras or anything else would satisfy that definition. | This varies greatly by state, but the pedestrians "right of way" is quite a common misconception. Pedestrians do not always have the right of way, but you're also not allowed to just run them over if they're in the middle of the street. That's why states have jaywalking laws, and a lot of people don't realize that they can be ticketed for it - because it's a huge safety concern for a pedestrian to walk in the street outside the designated areas. The NCSL provides a Pedestrian Crossing 50 State Summary that outlines the laws regarding pedestrian crossing. Particularly, there are two lines that frequently repeat throughout all the states: Pedestrians may not suddenly leave the curb and enter a crosswalk into the path of a moving vehicle that is so close to constitute an immediate hazard. Pedestrians must yield the right-of-way to vehicles when crossing outside of a marked crosswalk or an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection. Bottom line: if there is a pedestrian randomly in the middle of the street somewhere, you are fully obligated to attempt to not hit them with your vehicle. Feel free to curse them out (if that's your thing) because in most states they are themselves breaking a law. If an accident can't be prevented due to a pedestrian's actions, then the pedestrian is fully at fault and you will not be held responsible in any way. | A traffic accident is often not a crime even when someone is injured. So suing the police is unlikely to get you anywhere. You can get a lawyer and ask what your chances are to sue the driver who is the person who actually caused the injury, not the police. | It is legal, unless it is a violation of the rental agreement. Generally, a property owner can have a vehicle towed from their property, although there may be a requirement in the state to post a towing notice. If the lease agreement says that cars must always be street-legal, that is the end of the discussion. If the agreement says that cars without tags or plates can be stored in a person's spot, towing it would be a violation of the agreement. If the agreement doesn't say anything, then the property owner's rights would be the default deciding factor. Since your roommate seeks to override the park owner's ordinary control over the surrounding spaces, there needs to be an explicit provision for that in the lease. | You are not reading a law book here and you should not interpret a driving test so literally. It's quite clear that the question implies you should follow all of their instructions regarding how to proceed through traffic. Sometimes those instructions do involve "breaking laws" such as driving on the wrong side of the road or proceeding through a traffic signal that was not turned off. The B option clearly does not mean they have the power to disobey all laws in existence, only those concerning traffic as evidenced by the examples given. You are not Sheldon Cooper and you should know how to interpret a vague question correctly. You are also not a gopher, and you can correctly deduce that crashing into another car or driving off the cliff into the water is not in your best interests, and that calling the police to report someone abusing their position is probably a good idea. If you're concerned by the wording, try contacting the California DMV to have them clarify the wording. | California Vehicle Code, division 3, chapter 1, article 1, section 4000: A person shall not drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly, or logging dolly, unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code or registered under the permanent trailer identification program, except that an off-highway motor vehicle which displays an identification plate or device issued by the department pursuant to Section 38010 may be driven, moved, or left standing in an offstreet public parking facility without being registered or paying registration fees. (Section 38010 defines "off-highway vehicles", essentially agricultural, construction, and other vehicles that are never driven on state roads) Article 2, section 4156: (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, and except as provided in subdivision (b), the department in its discretion may issue a temporary permit to operate a vehicle when a payment of fees has been accepted in an amount to be determined by, and paid to the department, by the owner or other person in lawful possession of the vehicle. The permit shall be subject to the terms and conditions, and shall be valid for the period of time, that the department shall deem appropriate under the circumstances. Article 7, section 4850: The department, upon registering a vehicle, shall issue to the owner two partially or fully reflectorized license plates or devices for a motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle, and one partially or fully reflectorized license plate or device for all other vehicles required to be registered under this code. The plates or devices shall identify the vehicles for which they are issued for the period of their validity. Article 9, section 5202: A license plate issued by this state or any other jurisdiction within or without the United States shall be attached upon receipt and remain attached during the period of its validity to the vehicle for which it is issued while being operated within this state or during the time the vehicle is being held for sale in this state, or until the time that a vehicle with special or identification plates is no longer entitled to those plates; and a person shall not operate, and an owner shall not knowingly permit to be operated, upon any highway, a vehicle unless the license plate is so attached. A special permit issued in lieu of plates shall be attached and displayed on the vehicle for which the permit was issued during the period of the permit’s validity. Divsion 17, article 1, chapter 1, section 40000.1: Except as otherwise provided in this article, it is unlawful and constitutes an infraction for any person to violate, or fail to comply with any provision of this code, or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to this code. In short, yes, you need a license plate or equivalent temporary registration permit to drive on the highways; California is a bit unusual in that it requires license plates for parked vehicles as well. |
Is Ikea required by Russian law to pay employees for the next 3 months, despite suspending all operations (sales, production) in Russia? Ikea announced they'll still be paying their 15,000 Russian employees their salaries for the next 3 months, even though they've suspended all operations in Russia, sales and production (17 stores and 3 factories). I'm curious if them still paying employees for the next 3 months is required by Russian law, or if Ikea went over and above that requirement. | The legal requirement in Russia is to pay or to continue to employ workers for two months following the notice of a layoff. The three month period was probably chosen to put to rest questions about how to treat a mid-month announcement and any questions over the effective date of the notice which may have post-dated the de facto shutdown of operations. | This depends on your employment agreement, if any, with the organization, and on the company's contract with the organization. You can quit your job with the organization, giving whatever notice your contract provides. The company can end its contract on whatever terms that contract permits. Most service contracts specify a fixed term, with renewal possible or in some cases automatic if notice to end the contract is not given by some specified date before the renewal date. But many other arrangements are possible. If no term is specified in the contract, and there is no provision for how much notice is required, then the company should give "reasonable" notice, which will probably be in line with the norms and customs of the industry involved in the relevant country. The specific law of that country may or may not provide a required minimum notice period. The contract between the company and the organization might provide that they would not hire any employees or recent ex-employees of the organization without consent for some period, perhaps a year. If there is such a provision it must be complied with unless it is not enforceable under the law of the jurisdiction. Different jurisdictions have very different attitudes toward such contract provisions. If such a provision were violated, and it was enforceable in the jurisdiction, the company would be liable for damages if the organization choose to enforce its contract. The contract between you and the organization might include a provision that you not leave to become employed (within some time limit) by one of the organization's customers, or perhaps by one you had worked with. If there is such a provision, it might or might not be enforceable in your jurisdiction. If it is enforceable, you must comply or be liable for damages. Even if there are no contract provisions preventing such employment of you by the company, you must not without permission take with you and use for the company's benefit any confidential information that is the property of the organization and is not already known to the company through legitimate means. If you do, both you and the company might be liable for damages under trade secret law. In the absence of any enforceable contractual provisions, and if no confidential information is taken by you, there should be no legal problems. The moral issues I am in no position to offer an opinion on, and are off-topic here anyway. If you were to quit, and the company were to then seek to break its contract because, in your absence the organization could not provide proper service, and you were then to accept employment with they company, and if further the company had known of your plans, both you and the company might be liable for damages to the organization, depending non the details of the law in your jurisdiction. This could be a tort of "interference with a contractual relation" or something of the sort. You should be very careful in agreeing to any such procedure. If there is a question as to whether a provision of a contract between the organization and either you or the company in enforceable, or whether a provision prohibits you leaving the organization to be employed by the company, that would need to be addressed by a lawyer who knows this area of the law in your jurisdiction, and the specifics of the contract, or eventually by a court. It is out of scope for this forum. Nothing in this situation will be a problem if the organization agrees to whatever is done. All possible problems occur only if it does not agree, and claims to have a legal right to prevent it or seek damages. | Provincial jurisdiction may need to be specified. But in general, assuming you are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, you can be terminated for any reason or even no reason, as long as the contract is followed, the actual or apparent reason is not discriminatory or otherwise illegal and the termination procedure meets the provincial employment standards. The labour law usually provide requirements for notice periods or severance pay (or both), unless there exists a just cause (e.g. extreme disregard of duty, theft, repeated insubordination, etc.; lack of funds on the part of the employer is not a just cause). shouldn't the employer be fully responsible for the salary coverage of his employee in the course of his contract? Yes, but the contract is saying it can be terminated under certain conditions, after which time you are no longer "in the course" of your contract. Termination due to lack of funds is usually not considered discriminatory or otherwise illegal. You remain entitled to wages for any period you have worked. Additionally, the employer needs to respect the required notice period or severance pay under the provincial employment standards related to termination with or without cause, regardless of the funding situation. | The expression "Russian person" appears in Article 11 of the original, which says No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by: (a) entities referred to in points (b) or (c) of Article 5, or listed in Annex III; (b) any other Russian person, entity or body; (c) any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a) or (b) of this paragraph The "Whereas" clause first introduces the word "person" saying Those measures comprise the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain natural and legal persons, entities and bodies and restrictions on certain investments, as a response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol Article 2 then gives various prohibitions, which are broader that the March prohibitions against certain transactions "to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia". Since the regulation applies to things that are not human and cannot be citizens, it does not mean "citizen". It does include "a human", as well as artificial persons such as corporations, or government bodies. A Russian citizen who lives and works entirely in e.g. Germany is not in the prohibited set if they are not shipping prohibited goods to Russia. The Syrian Commander-in-Chief of the PLA (who is not a resident of Russia) is, however, prohibited from obtaining "dual use goods" to be taken to and used in Russia. Article 11 is different in wording from other articles stating various prohibitions, which repeat that long expression with "in Russia or for use in Russia". Art. 11 says that under certain circumstances, contract claims shall not be satisfied if the claims are made by (a) entities referred to in points (b) or (c) of Article 5, or listed in Annex III; (b) any other Russian person, entity or body; Apart from the explicit list in Annex III, (b-c) or Art. 5 is (b) a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union whose proprietary rights are owned for more than 50 %by an entity listed in Annex III; or (c) a legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of an entity referred to in point (b) of this paragraph or listed in Annex III. Therefore, the expression "any other Russian person, entity or body" refers to something much more expansive. On the face of it, it has to mean that no "Russian person" in any sense can sue for non-performance arising from this regulation. | Where your office is, is your designated workspace. You get the public holidays wherever your official office address is. If you live and work in Hessia, then you get the 11 public holidays there. If you live in Hessia but work right over the border in Bavaria, you get 14 public holidays, even if you live in Hessia. Now, where do you work in case of remote work? That depends on what your official work address is. Do you connect remotely to an office in Bavaria where you are located on paper or do you have no such office? If you have an office you work at officially, then that is your agreed-upon, designated workplace, and in our example, if that's in Bavaria you get the 14 public holidays. If you don't are designated to work in an office in Bavaria and may log in remotely there, then your agreed-upon, designated workplace is your home address, and if that is in Hessia, you get the 11 public holidays there. Where your company's central is... Now, let's assume the company is seated in Brandenburg, which has 12 public holidays. That doesn't matter at all: the Feieratagsrecht of the place you work (officially) dictates your public holidays. So either the laws of your designated location apply: either Hessia's 11 public holidays if your home is the designated workplace, or Bavaria's 14 if the office you connect to is the designated workplace but you remote-connect to it. It would by the way matter if you are designated to be in a location for that exact day: you could be designated to work in a location that has no public holiday on that day, then you don't get that day. However, the Brandenburg company can decide to say "You get our extra holidays in addition. Have fun with the extra free day" - that'd be extra in the contract, not the legal requirement. | Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable. | They can't simply keep the money; that's against the law. But in a situation like this, it's easy to get lost in the bureaucracy. The company may be in violation of different laws, re: For Your Information | United States Department of Labor, so you can try pointing this out in another email or letter. The threat of the Feds or other enforcement agency looking into the matter may make something happen. Or, try this: find the CEO (or a similarly high-ranked executive) on LinkedIn; many have open messaging in interest of good PR. Message/email them and carefully (and nicely) explain the situation. (A CEO will likely have an assistant monitoring their LinkedIn account. But, there are many stories of Steve Jobs, Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos personally responding to emails.) Someone will make it happen and the employees who have not been helpful will be in hot water. | There is a general EU anti-discrimination directive 2000/43 which in Article 3(1)(h) which applies the standards to housing. This document analyzes Czech anti-discrimination law. If you were discriminated against on the basis of being English, that could support legal action. There is no current EU or Czech legislation that guarantees a right to operate in the language of your choice. There have been calls to create some such legislation. Such legislation would be the implementation of Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which says that Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. There is under Article 9 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages a right to use regional or minority languages in judicial proceedings, but there is no generic "right to use your own language". There are occasional cases where governments are sued because their actions linguistically discriminate. As observed here, there was a case in Belgium where the government was sued for not subsidizing French education in non-French territories, but the court said that "Art. 14 cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing children or parents a right to obtain instruction in a language of his choice". |
Legality of penalising Russian Oligarchs What is the legal basis for penalising individual Russian Oligarchs? Having ill-gotten wealth and dubious friends is hardly unique to Russia, and whilst I can understand with the desire of the Western / European powers to been seen to be doing something I can't see the legal basis of confiscating their assets. If they really are just a bunch of crooks why have they been swanning around the free-world for the last 25 years? What have they done in the last nine-days which suddenly justifies personal sanctions against them? As far as I know most of them don't hold any current positions of power/authority in Russia (not officially anyhow). Whilst I broadly accept the consensus that they're Putin's cronies who owe much of their current success to their past associations with him, and whilst I'd personally be delighted to see their money go to support Ukrainian refugees I can't actually see a good legal argument for sanctions other than 'guilt by association' - which probably wouldn't stand up in court. | In the united-kingdom, the legal basis flows from the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. This allows regulations to be made for particular sanctions regimes, in this case The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and its several amendments, including three revisions this year. Under those regulations, the Secretary of State may designate individuals who are then subject to particular sanctions. A consolidated list is available for all individuals and organizations who have been named under any of the regulations, not just the Russia one. Working backwards from the list, we see such names as Vladimir Putin, who has an asset freeze on the grounds that - Vladimir Vladimirovich PUTIN is the President of the Russian Federation, carrying ultimate authority for the policy of the Russian government and Russian armed forces. In February 2022, PUTIN ordered Russian military forces to launch an invasion of Ukraine, undermining and threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine. Thus, he has been named for the purposes of regulation 11, and the statement of reasons (required by regulation 8) refers to the specific grounds in regulation 6 by which a person can be added to the list. In this case, those grounds are 6(2)(a)(i) as interpreted by 6(3)(a), (2) In this regulation, an "involved person" means a person who — (a) is or has been involved in— (i) destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine ... (3) For the purposes of this regulation, a person is “involved in destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine” if— (a) the person is responsible for, engages in, provides support for, or promotes any policy or action which destabilises Ukraine or undermines or threatens the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine For "oligarchs" who are on the list, the Foreign Secretary has specifically drawn attention to Gennady Timchenko, described as Russia's sixth-richest oligarch. The statement of reasons says: Gennadiy Timchenko, hereafter TIMCHENKO is a major shareholder in Bank "Rossiya". Bank "Rossiya" is a key stakeholder in the National Media Group which supports Russian policy which is destabilising Ukraine. Following the annexation of Crimea, Bank "Rossiya" has expanded its bank branches and provision of insurance and investment throughout Crimea and Sevastopol; and offers support to military activities and the formation of major transport links and cards that allow the public to travel easily around the peninsula. Therefore, Bank "Rossiya" has supported the consolidation of Crimea into the Russian Federation by integrating the financial system following the annexation of Crimea. TIMCHENKO therefore is or has been involved in engaging in, providing support for, or promoting any policy or action which destabilises Ukraine or undermines or threatens the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine. Additionally, TIMCHENKO is associated with a person involved in destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine. These are the same regulation 6 grounds as for Putin, but with additional reasoning to draw the connection (also, a citation under 6(2)(d) for "associated with"). One reason for this text being required is to undercut any suggestion that the listing is because of "guilt by association". In judicial review, for which continue reading below, this kind of statement and the process that gave rise to it is powerful evidence against a suggestion that the Secretary of State was acting other than rationally. We can now look back to the 2018 Act, which authorizes the 2019 Regulations and provides rules about how the Secretary of State can designate people. Detailed provisions in the Regulations trace back to rules in the Act about the shape of a sanctions regime; for example, the "asset freeze" of regulation 11 is within section 3 of the Act on "Financial sanctions". There are also procedural safeguards around the making of regulations, mainly relating to Parliamentary approval, and around the designation of individuals. For example, a designated person can ask the Secretary of State to be removed from the list, and under section 22(3) she must do so if the person doesn't fit the criteria by which they were originally included. That would include if they are no longer an "involved person", or if their designation were no longer deemed appropriate based on the purpose of the sanctions regulations. As with other executive actions, judicial review is available (under Chapter 4 of the Act), which could bring in considerations of whether the Secretary of State acted within her powers, did so "reasonably", etc. Human rights grounds are also possible, in relation to procedural fairness (Article 6) or the right to enjoy property (ECHR Protocol 1, Article 1). Against those stand arguments on the public interest, UK compliance with international obligations, national security, the general integrity of the sanctions system, and so forth. It is plausible that if a claim reached this point, the Secretary of State would be able to show that the designation - as described in the statement of reasons above - was on sound policy grounds, was taken after a sober review of the evidence, and was proportionate in the circumstances. There is not much case law on the 2018 Act, given its recency. One example is R (Youssef) v Secretary of State [2021] EWHC 3188 (Admin) in which an Article 6 claim failed. That was in relation to UN sanctions against Al-Qaida, which is a different position from the one here, but it has some force for understanding the current UK system. The present Act was created partially in response to the judgement in HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2 against a previous version of the sanctions laws, and the 2021 case found that the new version was acceptable. The judicial review avenue and the requirement to give reasons are directly aimed at complying with Article 6. While a court could always potentially find another problem, the current Act and the Regulations are as watertight as the drafters can make them in the light of existing precedent. | The linked Bloomberg story quotes the rule as: The recipient is allowed to keep the funds if they [the funds] discharge a valid debt, the recipient made no misrepresentations to induce the payment, and the recipient did not have notice of the mistake. If the recipient, or somone acting on behalf of the recipient, hacked the sender to induce the payment, that sounds like a form of misrepresentation to me. If the hacker is unconnected with the recipient there seems no way that the hacker benefits financially, although I suppose a hacker might simply want to cause an amusing disruption. As I understand it this rule only applies when the sender in fact owes a debt to the recipient that the transfer pays off. If the hacker were working for one of a large group of recipients, most of whom are innocent, and subsequent analysis establishes that there was a hacker, but not who the hacker was or which of the many recipients the hacker was working for, I suspect, but cannot prove, that the doctrine would not apply, because the transfer was not a valid but incorrect act by the sender, but was a fraudulent intervention in the sender's procedures. | The ultimate question is whether an obviously joke enterprise constitutes a real offering of securities or just performance art (a Ponzi scheme is one of many types of securities fraud). An unregistered offering of securities that does not fall within an exception is per se unlawful under federal law, but a security is generally defined as something offered with at least a prospect of making a potential profit for the investor which is not something that is true of this offering. (And if less than $1,000,000 are sold it might even be within an exemption to securities laws). State securities laws are divided into two categories. Most allow any offering of securities so long as proper disclosures are made and the offer is restricted to the right kind of investors. A minority impose substantive quality standards on offerings and this offering might violate the law in those states (although this still would present the question of whether a known money losing opportunity is really a security since there is no evidence of an intent to potentially make a profit from the investment). I do not believe that California imposes substantive quality of investment standards on public or private offerings of securities. Any deal whether or not it is a security is actionable if it is fraudulent. Normally an element of any claim for fraud is justified reliance upon a representation or upon a failure to disclose information. But, in this case, it is hard to see how anyone could say that they were justified in relying on any representation in making a purchase because they were told that they were being cheated. So, it is hard to see how a fraud claim would be sustained here either. I'm not sure that this cleanly falls into the category of gambling either, even though there is money at stake and the outcome isn't entirely certain. This doesn't really seem like a game of chance to me. Indeed, viewed as performance art, this scheme might even be entitled to First Amendment protection. Ultimately, I would not prioritize a civil or criminal action against this enterprise either from the perspective of a private lawyer representing an investor, or from the perspective of a government enforcement authority. And, while I would be a little nervous about running this enterprise, I wouldn't be quaking in my boots. In a civil lawsuit, any award would probably be minimal, and in a criminal case there would probably be an extremely generous plea offered. | No Always assuming that the government has operated within the limits of its powers or, at least, that if they have exceeded those powers the excess was in good faith. First, there is the issue of sovereign immunity. Basically, a government can be held liable only when it consents to be held liable. Most governments never waive this with respect to their lawmaking powers because they have to be able to make laws in what they see as the public interest without fear of litigation. See, for example, cases on plain paper packaging of cigarettes. Second, most governments have the power to regulate commerce and to deal with public emergencies. There is an issue which comes up in Federations about which government has the power but even if a law is invalid, it does not follow that compensation is payable. It certainly isn’t if the law is valid. | Law, as such, is not a moral or a philosophical construct. It can be based on moral constructs and often it is. And, of course, the process of writing laws is often informed by philosophy. But law as such is neither one of those. Law is a set of behaviors which are known to be acceptable to the powers "that be." This maybe an unsettling idea. But it is true nonetheless. The phrase that summarizes this is "any law is only as good as its enforcement mechanism." What makes it seem untrue is that in the modern tradition laws are written down. And, when there is a need to resolve doubt as to whether something is illegal or not, they are carefully considered through a deductive process. Within countries, there is little question who "the powers that be" happen to be. But when it comes to laws governing actions between nations, it is more complicated. Yes, treaties make it clear, ahead of time, what types of expectations exist. Predictability (even in war) allows for long-term planning. And even laws of war are usually followed because wars are fought with the expectation that at some point they will end. And predictability allows to set end-goal conditions. Notably, entities which have no clear end-goals in sight are the ones least likely to follow any laws. The idea of any group of countries sitting in court of another group of countries is mostly a political theater. There is no possibility of predictable outcomes from entities which have not made commitments to those outcomes. So whether some countries have to follow "laws" set out for them by other countries (or non-government entities) is largely a result of those countries or entities being in positions of power to dictate their will. This is not the same as international laws being strictly de facto. Agreed-upon restrictions and restrictions which have been dictated from the top-down, by those with more power, are de jure because they create predictable boundaries on behavior. De facto restrictions are the ones which have come to be the case without any prior agreement or fiat. | In general it is illegal to gamble on life. However, you might not even need to go to a bookmaker: A contract that pays money upon the death of a specific person is known commercially as "life insurance." In order to avoid the moral hazard (or reality) of creating a contract killing market, it has long been illegal to trade life insurance with any person or entity who does not have an "insurable interest" in the insured. (See also: The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance, by Peter Swisher, who also has a good review of laws and regulations surrounding exceptions to the rule like viaticals and STOLI. Further reading on the subject here.) I don't know if it has been tested, but I think anyone could argue that they would face a significant financial loss if the U.S. President were killed or died in office: the stock markets plunged on JFK's assassination. Therefore, it could be both legal and possible for anyone to buy life insurance on the U.S. President. (Note that, in the U.S., the disputes about third-party life insurance have revolved for generations around the tax benefits associated with insurance premiums and benefits. See corporate-owned life insurance (COLI), a.k.a. "janitor's insurance.") | Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all "completely illegal" regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a "criminal conviction"). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been "decriminalised" - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority. | While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court. |
Is arbitration possible for war damages? Let’s say I am citizen of country A and own a company there worth one billion USD. Neighbouring country B invades country A in violation of international law. In the course of the war, large parts of my company (buildings, vehicles, ...) are destroyed by the armed forces of country B. Can I pursue arbitration against country B for my damages? | Yes. Arbitration is a private, voluntary process, so two parties can agree to arbitrate virtually any dispute. However, because it is voluntary, Country B generally has no obligation to participate in the process once you've inititated it. | Yes, the correct forum is the Local Court in the relevant state (in some states these are called Magistrate's Courts). The amount is too large ($10,000) to qualify as a small claim . If you want to do it yourself the court websites are very informative and in NSW, at least, the process can be initiated online including your paying for the Sheriff to serve the summons (they will not find the person, you have to give them an address). After being served they have 28 days to file a defence or you can get a default judgement and begin recovery. If they do file a defence then things will get more expensive. Of course, you may want to hire a local lawyer. | The law that New York passed does not create any cause of action, it overrides existing rules regarding time-barring of civil claims, so the quick answer to the question "does this law apply in that kind of case" is "that law is irrelevant". There is a general legal question about the jurisdictional limits of a court. For example, a foreign insurance company will be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in a US federal court over a claim under a cargo insurance policy for a shipment to the US. The case Daimler AG v. Bauman seems to be similar to the type of case you are asking about. This case involves the Dirty War of Argentina, and the question of whether Daimler's business connection to Mercedes-Benz Argentina gives plaintiffs standing to sue in US courts over actions in Argentina. SCOTUS held in that case that Daimler is not amenable to suit in California for injuries allegedly caused by conduct of MB Argentina that took place entirely outside the United States The court first notes that For a time, this Court held that a tribunal’s jurisdiction over persons was necessarily limited by the geographic bounds of the forum but this has been modified to recognition of two personal jurisdiction categories: One category, today called “specific jurisdiction”...[which] encompasses cases in which the suit 'arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum' [and] distinguished exercises of specific, case-based jurisdiction from a category today known as 'general jurisdiction,' exercisable when a foreign corporation’s 'continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.' The court observes that "general jurisdiction has not been stretched beyond limits traditionally recognized". As I understand the hypothetical, the proposed wrong does not derive because of the defendant's connection with the jurisdiction, and the connection to New York (or any other state) would be that it might be forum convenient for the plaintiff to litigate in. This would fall under the category of "general jurisdiction" (assuming that New York is not the company's corporate home nor is it their primary place of business), and the state's courts would not normally have jurisdiction in that case (lacking any specific statute creating a cause of action and explicitly declaring extraterritorial jurisdiction). The underlying constitutional rationale is the Due Process consideration that a person (including a corporation) should not be be forced to defend themselves in courts in states where they have no real connection. The question that would be asked is whether the corporation had sufficient connection to the state that the state courts would have jurisdiction. We should also turn to three SCOTUS cases, Nestle v. Doe et al, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., where questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction are considered. The Nestle court's analysis of the underlying principle starts by observing and citing from RJR Nabisco that First, we presume that a statute applies only domestically, and we ask "whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication" that rebuts this presumption. In Kiobel, the court states – reaching further back to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that [w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none, a principle which "serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord) (EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co). The relevant statute under which these suits were initiated is the Alien Tort Stature, 28 USC 1350, which allows an alien to sue in US courts under certain circumstances, and states only that "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States". ATS would clearly not be applicable to the case of a US person suing a foreign corporation, but the other cases have articulated a principle that transcends the specifics of the ATS – there would have to be a statute giving a state extraterritorial jurisdiction over the matter. | Maybe, Hence the Lawsuits In the absence of clear statute law these all circle around tort law. For the scooter companies, trespass to chattels, and for the affected landowners (who hire the removalists) trespass to land and nuisance seem applicable. In essence, I can’t take your stuff (trespass to chattels) but you can’t leave your stuff on my property (trespass to land) or impeding access to it (nuisance). If you do, I am entitled to the reasonable costs of dealing with it. Note that, as owner, you remain responsible for you stuff even if you rented it to someone else. Both sides are pushing hard into unexplored areas of law so we await the judgement with interest. Then we’ll know. | General case - legal or not? It is hard to prove a negative - however, as far as I can see: It is not illegal to state your opinion that the existence of the state of Israel is unjustified, or that the state should be dissolved. Such a position would be considered outrageous by most Germans, in particular it is against the stated position of pretty much all political parties, except for the extreme right or left, and of most other organizations. It is not, however, illegal. In general, the dissolution of a state is not in itself illegal according to national or international law, as long as it happens voluntarily. There are some precedents: For example, during the German Reunification of 1989, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) under the (old) Article 23 of the Grundgesetz. One could argue that the German Democratic Republic effectively dissolved itself by that accession. What would probably be illegal would be to call for a violent end of the state of Israel, or even for a war. The relevant laws: §130 Strafgesetzbuch -- Volksverhetzung (incitement to hatred) §13 Völkerstrafgesetzbuch -- Angriffskrieg (war of aggression) and, only applicable to the state: Art. 26 Grundgesetz -- Angriffskrieg (war of aggression) Special case - civil servants Civil servants are citizens, too, so mostly the same laws apply to them. However, for civil servants specifically there are higher requirements when it comes to respect for the German constitution, specifically for the "freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung" (literally: "basic free and democratic order"). That means that opinions which are "extremist" but not illegal may not be tolerated. Applicable laws/regulations: §7 Beamtenstatusgesetz §9 Richtergesetz §3 of the Tarifvertrag der Länder (TV-L) As far as I can see, the rules for whether something violates these rules would be similar as above. Note that there are even some Israelis who think that the state of Israel should not exist, at least not in its present form, so such a position is not totally unthinkable. The Wikipedia articles Right to exist and Existenzrecht Israels (German) give a good overview. | A clause states "If the contract is breached you accept that you must pay for damages. We shall determine the amount." Will this hold up in court? A court is going to want to look for context and an interpretation that would make this provision make sense before invalidating it (which it might). For example, if there was a schedule of the amount of damages for various violations attached to the contract, a court might interpret this language to mean that the drafting, non-breaching party will invoice you for damages in amount that it determines in good faith to be the correct amount with reference to the schedule or some formula set forth in the contract (e.g. an interest rate on an open account loan), in much the same way that a landlord might dock your security deposit and send you a letter telling you what was deducted in what amounts and why, or that a credit card company might charge you interest and late fees on a monthly basis. A court would, of course, be unlikely to interpret the clause as affording final and binding legal authority to decide what is owed. In the face of a clause like this one, the other party could bring a lawsuit to dispute the amount determined to be owed by the drafting, non-breaching party (unless the contract is a third-party arbitration clause and simply doesn't read like one because it is out of context). | Yes. The term for this situation is a "civil dispute." It can be resolved via a civil claim. In New Jersey, for claims under $3000, you can use the Small Claims courts. The process is designed to be followed without the assistance of counsel. Let the internet be your guide. | Are there any legal terms which can make it clear that such questions are about the "outside of reach" rather than "outside of claim of reach" situations? Enforceability Laws that claim but cannot reach lack enforceability. Note that enforceability is case-specific and subjective. The US may or may not be able to reach out to those it deems to be criminals on the other side of the world; those may or may not care. |
Can an arbitration award be vacated for manifest disregard of the evidence? A AAA arbitration over a credit card billing dispute between a consumer and a bank concluded recently. The consumer "won", in the sense that he obtained equitable relief, but lost, in the sense that he failed to recover damages. A key question of fact was whether the bank made billing statements available online. In his award, the arbitrator stated "[consumer] presented no evidence that his Ink account statements were not available ... [bank] presented evidence that such statements were available on the [website]. So, there was no showing of failure on the part of [bank] to provide access to statements". However, the bank presented no such evidence at the hearing. They called a single witness, who had no personal knowledge relating to online statement access, and even testified quite plainly under questioning from the arbitrator himself that the bank had no evidence, e.g.: ARBITRATOR: [M]y question to [witness] is, does [bank] have any way to show whether or not the statements were actually posted to one of those username accounts that could be accessed online at the time? WITNESS: No. There wouldn't be anything in [the evidentiary record] that would reflect that. ARBITRATOR: Okay, all right. When you say that, are you suggesting that there could be evidence somewhere else? WITNESS: Not that I'm aware of, no. ARBITRATOR: Well, how do you deal with the allegation that [consumer] is making that he would go to the account ... and not see any statements? Can you prove or disprove that? WITNESS: I cannot prove or disprove that, no. Is this grounds to vacate the award? | No Chapter 1, Section 10 of the FAA states that a court may vacate an arbitral award only if it finds that one of the following limited grounds applies: (1) the award is a result of corruption or fraud; (2) evident partiality or corruption of an arbitrator; (3) arbitrator misconduct, such as refusing to hear pertinent and material evidence; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award was not made. There is no “the arbitrator screwed up” basis. This is pretty much universal across jurisdictions for arbitration. One of the features (whether you think it’s a good or bad feature is up to you) is that arbitration is, for all practical purposes, final. That’s it, we’re done. The law is written that way because parties to an arbitration freely and voluntarily chose this method of dispute resolution over the courts. In theory, at least. Having made their choice, the courts will not unmake it. | How exactly would the court determine this to be the cause of divorce? 99.99% of the time, this would be purely a "he said she said" situation, for how can someone prove refusal to engage? You can prove the opposite if there are children born to both parents, but how can one prove a negative? Or is the statement by the divorce initiator considered sufficient for the judge? Testimony under oath is evidence. Judges resolve "he said she said" situations every day on a routine basis with witness testimony alone by judging the credibility of each witness before them. See also an answer by @Jen about the subject of how things are proved in court in general. In the appropriate case, testimony under oath with no other corroborating evidence can even support a murder conviction as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It can certainly suffice to prove marital fault in a civil lawsuit for a divorce. If the judge finds that witness testimony under oath between more than one witness is irreconcilably different, and each witness is equally credible, and that it is impossible to tell which person is telling the truth, then the person seeking relief from the court has failed to meet their burden of proof to obtain relief from the court. But, this is rare. Usually, when witnesses are both testifying under oath and disagree about what happened, the judge will find that one witness is more credible than the other. And, in truth, while people certainly do lie in open court under oath, and probably are more likely to lie in that situation than when speaking to someone not under oath outside of a courtroom, most of the time, people don't lie and the testimony of all of the witnesses are consistent with each other subject to limitations based upon what they could perceive from their perspective and the limitations of imperfect memories. This could come down to demeanor in court, hesitation in answering, "tells", inconsistencies in their testimony, corroboration from other evidence and other witnesses (e.g. what someone said to a friend or wrote in a diary at the time), evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime of deceit in the past, use of language that suggests coaching about their testimony, or common sense judgments about whose story seems more plausible under the circumstances of the parties in front of the judge. | A motion to dismiss sets no precedent Whether it succeeds or not, it does not result in a judgement on the merits, it is simply an analysis on whether the case as pleaded shows the defendant has a case to answer. The case would have to go to trial, have a judgement issued (i.e. not settle), and await the result of final appeals (if any) before it would be considered precedent. As to your final question Is it considered intellectual property theft to capitalize on synthetic datasets produced by OpenAI's LLMs? No one knows. Hence the lawsuit. | Usually web site owners will prefer arbitration and people who would potentially sue web site owners will prefer a court forum, but this is only a typical situation and not a die hard rule for all circumstances. Features of arbitration: Binding arbitration is not subject to appeal so it tends to favor repeat, low stakes litigators over one-time high stakes litigators. Binding arbitration precludes class action lawsuits and punitive damages in most cases. Binding arbitration creates an institutional bias in favor of the contract drafter because the arbitrator needs to rule in their favor to get future business from the party selecting arbitration v. non-arbitration. Binding arbitration has much higher filing fees than ordinary court and is usually faster than ordinary court, but litigation costs for the parties tend to be similar to ordinary court. Binding arbitration has a reputation for "baby-splitting results" rather than all-or-nothing decisions in favor of one side or another. Binding arbitration can escape biases (e.g. anti-gay, anti-religious minority, anti-marijuana, pro-local citizen) that might exist in a local court system. Binding arbitration generally allows for much more irrelevant evidence to be admitted, and binding arbitration decisions cannot generally be overruled on the grounds that the arbitrator failed to follow the law or completely screwed up in understanding the facts. There is a much weaker likelihood of getting a fair result. Binding arbitration is generally not public, so the proceedings are generally secret, avoiding publicity and disclosure of secrets discussed in the proceedings. Arbitration often considers written documents like letters and witness statements in circumstances where courts in the U.S. would require in-person testimony (this is less of a consideration outside the U.S. where the hearsay rule is much less strict or is non-existent). Arbitrators are more often subject area specialists in the matter that is disputed. Arbitrators are less likely to reinterpret language in a TOS in terms of policy considerations or judicial precedent glosses (i.e., they are more likely to read contracts literally). Arbitration awards are not immediately enforceable and must be filed with a court in a summary proceeding to be enforced which makes them inconvenient for cases that are mostly uncontested. Arbitration awards don't create precedents that can be used in future cases. Arbitration can more often be decided without an in person hearing than court cases, even in situations where there are factual disputed between the parties. Features of court: Filing fees in court cases are cheap. Judges in courts tend to be far more impartial than arbitrators. Court decisions are immediately enforceable without a collateral enforcement action. This is particularly important when preliminary relief like a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is desired. Court decisions that are incorrect under the law or not supported by the facts can be appealed. They are much more likely to follow the law. Less irrelevant information is considered in a court decision. Court decisions can serve as precedents in future cases. Jury trials and class actions are often available in court cases. Court decisions are more likely to clearly rule in favor of the party in the right and against the party in the wrong without "baby splitting." Judges and juries in courts are "generalists" who are less subject to institutional capture than arbitrators (especially specialist arbitrators). Court is a more favorable forum for one-time, high-stakes litigation. Courts can have jurisdiction over people who aren't parties to an arbitration agreement but who may be necessary to grant full relief or who have a stake in the outcome. Punitive damages are often available in court cases when they wouldn't be available in arbitration forums. | Could the victim report this as fraud, theft or some other related crime? They could, but it's unclear whether they would be successful. A criminal conviction would require intent on the part of the company or an employee, and that will probably be difficult to prove. In a big system like this, individuals can usually claim misunderstandings and errors of omission, which makes such a proof difficult. They could try to establish criminal corporate liability, but again this is difficult to prove. So while possible, it's probably not worth it. Would the answer to the previous question differ based on whether the victim was eventually able to recover the money through litigation or by disputing the charge with their bank? Probably not. For a criminal conviction, it's necessary to prove that the company or an employee deliberately took money they knew was not theirs. Whether they later gave it back is not relevant for determining guilt (though it may reduce the sentence). Would the company itself or the specific employees involved be liable? In principle, both could be held liable. Again, this depends on what can be proved in court. Would a binding arbitration clause in the contract have any effect on criminal liability No, arbitration clauses cannot protect from criminal liability, only from civil liability (within limits). Off-topic: The fastest way to resolve such situations is usually to write one stern letter explaining why you are owed the money. If that does not work, sue them - if the situation is clear-cut, you will most likely win, or the company will settle. Many jurisdictions have simplified court proceedings for clear cases like this, for example the Mahnverfahren in Germany. | The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se. | If video filmed by (say) a smartphone is used as evidence, does the person who filmed it have to submit an affidavit saying "I filmed that at location X at time Y"? Or can the video be used as evidence without that? Short Answer Someone must testify to authenticate video evidence but it doesn't necessarily have to be the person who filmed it and an affidavit would frequently not be sufficient to do so. Long Answer There are two main kinds of evidence: exhibits and testimony. Videos are a form of exhibit even though they may sometimes record testimony (and videos of depositions and trial testimony are often treated as testimony rather than exhibits for many purposes). Video evidence (like all other exhibits) must be authenticated to be admitted in court and considered to resolve disputes presented to a court (at least in common law court systems like England, the U.S., Australia, etc.) Authentication means to provide context to show what the evidence is and how it came to be and that it is what it purports to be. Some of the evidence provided to authenticate an exhibit is also called "foundation." The burden of proof to authenticate a document is a fairly low bar. Generally, if a party can provide prima facie evidence sufficient if believed to be true to authenticate an exhibit and another party disputes its authenticity, the exhibit is admitted and the question of authenticity at that point becomes one for a judge or jury as a finder of fact to weigh based upon all of the evidence, and not a question regarding whether or not the evidence can be admitted for consideration at trial. There are multiple ways that evidence can be authenticated, and this is not limited to testimony from the person who took the video. Someone who was present when the video was taken, for example, could also authenticate it. A chain of custody is often part of proof of authentication. Any way to prove that the evidence is what it purports to be and to establish what it purports to be that logic and reason supports is allowed. There are a few kinds of exhibits that are self-authenticating (e.g. government documents under seal), but video evidence rarely qualifies as self-authenticating (in part because it can be manipulated and someone needs to testify that it was not manipulated). There are other kinds of evidence which may be authenticated by affidavit under safe harbor provisions of rules of evidence, such as certain evidence provided in response to a subpoena duces tecum (i.e. a subpoena to produce documents) in some jurisdictions. But the general rule is that an affidavit is not sufficient and that exhibits including video evidence must be authenticated with the live testimony of a witness under oath who has personal knowledge of the facts to be established which is subject to cross-examination. | Yes, one should not publish evidence until a verdict is reached. This includes any possible appeals. In common law, doing so has long been one of the contempt of court offences called sub judice, or "publishing information that interferes with a fair trial". The main point is that the jury should not be influenced by any information other than what they hear in the courtroom. In New Zealand, the offence was recently codified. |
Changing the name of one of the United States Does the law have anything clear to say about changing the name of a state in the United States? What I know is: Maybe a couple of decades ago there was discussion in North Dakota of changing the name of the state to Dakota, which before 1889 was the name of the territory that in that year was split into two states. I think it was in 1780 that the name of the state called Massachusetts Bay was changed to Massachusetts by means of the adoption of a new constitution of the state. This was before the Constitution of the U.S. was written, and before the Articles of Confederation went into effect. But when the Constitution was drafted in 1787, it still calls that state "Massachusetts Bay". The federal statute admitting the state of Vermont to the Union in 1791 says it is to be called the State of Vermont, which is exactly what the petition for admission called it. Under the present constitution, Would a state statute suffice? Would a state constitutional amendment suffice? Would a federal statute suffice without a state statute or a state referendum? Would a federal constitutional amendment be needed? Might a federal statute be needed for some states (e.g. Vermont, because of what is noted above) but not for others, because of differences in the federal statutes that admitted the state, or because of the lack of any need for admission by Congress in the case of the original thirteen states? Are there any consequences of the fact that the Constitution of Massachusetts and the Constitution of the United States use two different names for that state? (In Canada a constitutional amendment changed the name of a province in 2001, but since it affected only that one province, that was the only one that needed to ratify it. Of course, it doesn't work that way in the U.S.) Update: Since the time when this was posted, the name of the state of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations was changed to the abbreviated form Rhode Island (so that's no longer an abbreviated form) by a referendum changing the state's constitution. | Under the present constitution . . . Are there any consequences of the fact that the Constitution of Massachusetts and the Constitution of the United States use two different names for that state? No. Lots of the language in the United States Constitution is no longer in place or in common usage or is invalid due to subsequent amendments, and that language is still effective as originally intended. The U.S. Constitution has never been "amended and restated" and can't be understood properly without annotations to its raw text. Might a federal statute be needed for some states (e.g. Vermont, because of what is noted above) but not for others, because of differences in the federal statutes that admitted the state, or because of the lack of any need for admission by Congress in the case of the original thirteen states? Not really. Every state's name is embedded in myriad federal laws and regulations in addition to the statute that admitted the state to the United States, e.g. laws assigning names to post offices, laws allocating judgeships, laws purchasing property, laws appropriating funds, laws assigning states to various districts for purposes of executive branch departments and the judiciary, tax laws (e.g. the Obamacare tax credit), etc. Would a state statute suffice? Would a state constitutional amendment suffice? Would a federal statute suffice without a state statute or a state referendum? Would a federal constitutional amendment be needed? A federal constitutional amendment would not be needed. The Constitution vests Congress with the authority to admit states and to change their boundaries with the permission of the affected states. This would be within the power over states that could be inferred from those powers. A state and the federal government could each pass a statute to call itself something different for various purposes. For example, the official name of the state of Rhode Island is "State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations" but various state and federal statutes authorize the use of the short form of the "State of Rhode Island" for most purposes. As a practical matter a state constitutional amendment would probably be desirable on general principles to officially change the name of a state, whether or not it was strictly required, in part, because a state constitution usually sets forth an official name of a state in its body text. It would be possible for a state to change its constitution and statutes and change its name in a move that the federal government did not accept, and if that happened, the federal government and its officials would probably continue to use the old name and the state government and its officials would probably use the new name. I think it is as a practical matter, unlikely that a standoff like this would persist, but I think that this is the most likely outcome. A federal government move to change a state's name without its consent proactively, however, would probably be struck down as violating federalism concerns. Of course, all of this is speculative, because there are really no precedents for disputes over the changing of a state's name. Context would influence the outcome of any such case. | One can argue both ways. On one side, yes, zero representation in the Senate for all states is equal suffrage in the Senate. On the other side, no, depriving all states of all representation in the Senate deprives them of their suffrage in the Senate (without needing to consider the question of whether the suffrage is equal). Since this question has never been considered by a court, we can't do much more than speculate how one might rule. There has never been an amendment proposed to modify the composition of the Senate -- at least not one that was seriously considered. The spirit of the law works in favor of the second interpretation. Furthermore, a strict application of abstract logical reasoning was probably not the intention of the framers. A strategy that might seem more likely to succeed would be to introduce amendments reducing the Senate's power in the legislative process, similar to the evolution of the House of Lords in the UK. If the goal were to sideline one state, this might work, but if the goal is to address the complaint that the Senate is undemocratic because people in smaller states have proportionally more influence there, there's no way the amendment would pass 3/4 of the states' legislatures. The number of states with one or two representatives is 13, by itself a sufficient number to block the adoption of an amendment. | US Law Combining the traditionally separate common-law torts of libel and slander would probably be a matter not for the court system, but for the legislature, and these are matters of sate law in the US, and vary from one state to another. Many states have not codified the law of defamation by statute, and one must check court cases in each state to find the particular rules that apply in that state. As Nolo's page on "Defamation Law Made Simple" says: "Defamation of character" is a catch-all term for any statement that hurts someone's reputation. Written defamation is called "libel," while spoken defamation is called "slander." To the best of my knowledge, there is no US state that has three separate torts, "libel", "slander", and "defamation". Some states, such as Illinois, have combined libel and slander into a single tort of defamation, others have not. Traditionally, in a slander case the plaintiff must prove actual damages, whereas damage could be presumed in a libel case. (see the LII page on "Slander" for confirmation of this.) States that have preserved the distinction retain this difference in many cases. That is one reason why some states have not combined them. Another is legislative inertia: if the existing laws are working well enough, why go to the effort of rewriting them? When the law of defamation has not been codified, the traditional reluctance of common law courts to change form where there is no significant change of substance also works against combining the torts. See also the Wikipedia page on "United States defamation law" Specific State Laws California: Cal. Civ. Code §§ 44, 45a, and 46. Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. §51-5-4. Illinois: 740 ILCS 165/1 Pensylvania 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8341-8345 See "State Law: Defamation" from the Digital Media law Project for case citations in many US states. Non-US Law In some other common-law countries, the difference has also been preserved, probably for similar reasons. Again it will be a matter for the individual legislatures, not the courts, to combine them or leave them separate. See also the Wikipedia article on "Defamation" | No because clause 1 of section 3 originally said: The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote. The legislature could have required a vote (of the legislature) and that could have been regulated. However, if the legislature decided that a committee could appoint senators that couldn’t have been, for example. | If a libelous statement is posted online, and the victim and offender are from different states, which state would be more pertinent to the defamation case? I.e. which state's defamation laws, statue of limitations, etc. are relevant? First of all, a basic point. Defamation claims arise under state law, even though state law is required to conform to the limits imposed by the U.S. Constitution. Also, there are two distinct issue to consider. One is which state's courts have jurisdiction to hear such a case, and the other is which state's law should be applied to each particular issue in the case which is called "choice of law". In practice, the two issues often overlap. But this isn't always true. For example, you can always sue a defendant where they reside (or in the case of a business entity, where its headquarters are located) on a claim arising anywhere in the world. The courts of this state have "general jurisdiction" over this defendant. But, suppose for example, that the defendant resides in Maine, but the defamatory statement was made in New York State by the defendant when the defendant was located there to people who were predominantly in New York State, and the statement was about someone who lived in New York State and things that that person supposedly did in New York State. In that case, if a lawsuit were filed in Maine against the defendant (since Maine would have "general jurisdiction" over the defendant), the courts of Maine might very well apply the law of New York State to most or all of the non-court procedure related legal issues in the case. The law of the place where the statement is made can apply, and the law of a place where the statement was intended to be directed (e.g. a state where a known subject to defamation resides) can be applied to a defamation case. But, the law of a place were people merely incidentally receives knowledge of a defamatory statement is not a proper law to chose or forum in which a lawsuit can be brought, if (1) the person making the statement was not directing the statement at someone in that state and (2) the person making the statement did not intend that the person to whom the statement is directed suffer reputational harm in that state. The default choice of law rules (in the absence of a contrary statute) apply the law of the place with the "most significant connection" to the legal issue being applied and the same state's law is not necessarily applied to all issues in the case. In the absence of a showing that another state's law differs from that of the state where the lawsuit is filed and that it has a more significant connection to the relevant legal issue in the case, the law of the state where the case is being tried will be applied. Many states have specific statutes regarding the application of a statute of limitations from another state than the one where the lawsuit is filed in order to discourage efforts to apply the law of whichever state has the longest statute of limitations, and to discourage filing case in a state just because it has a long statute of limitations. In practice, a lot of the substantive law of defamation is limited by federal constitutional First Amendment limitations and by a common English common law source for defamation law. So, the substantive law of defamation other than the statute of limitations isn't that different from state to state. But, in recent years, the biggest difference has been that some states have enacted Anti-SLAPP statutes (SLAPP is an acronym for "strategic lawsuits against public participation") that disfavor many kinds of defamation actions procedurally. The existence or lack of an anti-SLAPP statute in a state may make choice of law important in a defamation case. A recent case illustrates that it is hard to decide which states's law applies (via this blog around April of 2022). Former California Congressman Devin Nunes sues Georgia-headquartered, Delaware-incorporated CNN in Virginia for allegedly defamatory claims made in New York about Nunes' conduct in Austria. The case is transferred to New York, but still governed by Virginia choice of law, and the New York court determines that, under Virginia law, California law governs the claims. The California Congressman objects that Virginia law would have applied New York law. Second Circuit: Virginia law would have applied California law. Dissent: Virginia law would have applied New York law. Or maybe D.C. law. A comparative international analysis of the choice of law rules that would apply in the same fact pattern can be found here. See also a Florida federal court case applying these tests in 2019. Can a lawyer licensed from any state handle such cases? Usually a lawyer must be licensed to practice law in the state where a lawsuit is filed (but not in a state whose law is applied by an out of state court). A lawyer from outside a state where a lawsuit is commenced can seek admission to the bar of the state where the lawsuit is pending pro hac vice which is an admission for a single lawsuit. But, usually a lawyer admitted pro hac vice in a state court must be affiliated with a lawyer admitted to practice in the state where the case is filed as co-counsel for that case in order to do so. | Constitution of the USA, Article IV, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. and the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 3): [The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; SCOTUS has found the former to mean that states that do not allow same-sex marriages in their laws must recognize same-sex marriages registered by other states - Obergefell v. Hodges. Maybe one could argue that driver licenses are not equivalent among states, but I would expect judges (SCOTUS) to require a very well reasoned explanation. For example, maybe Alaska could refuse to recognize licenses from Florida because Florida drivers do not know how to cope with snowed roads. But even in that case Alaska probably would need to produce data showing that these measures aim to serve the public interest (avoid accidents) and that there are no other ways of getting the same result. OTOH the Commerce Clause has been successfully used to avoid states mandating racial segregation of travellers, so it is quite reasonable to see it being used to prevent a state from trying to limit the mobility of citizens from other states (again, in the supposition that the state restricting it cannot show a compelling reason to do so). AFAIK, only the Federal Government could invoke the Commerce Clause; I would expect a lot more people (in your example, the PA government or maybe even any PA driver) would have standing. | Since electors are in fact free to vote for whoever they want (though don't usually deviate from their assignment), the branch of federal government that would be most involved is Congress. A constitutional amendment would be required, to repeal Article II Section 1 Clauses 2 and 4 and the 12th Amendment (i.e. eliminate electors entirely), and substitute a different method. Most of the work would be done by the states, in ratifying the amendment. [Addendum] It is true that it is constitutional to require a pledge of faithfulness (Ray v. Blair 343 U.S. 214). A bit over half of the states have laws requiring 'faithful voting', though the laws have not been enforced. Washington RCW 29A.56.320 may be typical, in that the law simply says "thou shall" with no mechanism for enforcement. Even with strict enforcement such as class X felony penalties, this cannot implement IRV. The number of electors is not proportional to population (there is the "plus 2 for senators" factor), and various other reasons why state-based electors cannot be morphed into an IRV-like system. | Eventually. This was a state matter prior to the enactment of the Constitution. Without the Copyright Clause, it would have been up to each state to enact such a law (apparently Delaware did not bother). This would have quickly led to inter-state disputes (a New York author being infringed by a New Jersey party), therefore the matter would have been heard by the federal courts. The current understanding of the Commerce Clause easily allows Congress to enact a copyright law, because copyright is quite commercial and potentially crosses state lines. It took a while for that clause to be interpreted by the courts the way it is now. This is a brief summary of historically shifting views on the Commerce Clause. |
How do I know if a game I made is copyrighted? I am using the unreal engine that supports c++ language. Now I don't know anything about copyright and I don't know how to know anything about it. I live in Egypt. I worked on a game for 8 months. The problem is that I used the Ben10 character and I do not know if this is legal or not. I am afraid that something bad will happen to me | If I lock you in a room without access to anything and tell you "Write a novel" and you write a novel with characters, you have copyright in the work. But it's not absolute: If you use your own characters, you own all the copyright in the work, but not in the idea, as ideas are not copyrightable, see Feist v Rural. If you use someone else's characters extensively (as in more than a short hommage/cameo), you very likely make a derivate. You own a copyright in your part, as in the expression of the story or pictures you created, but you do not gain property interest in the existing characters' expression. Since the copyright to the characters lies with the owner of their IP, you need their OK to release (and also to even make) your work - as with the owner of a copyright is the sole right to decide on distribution and creation of derivates under 17 USC § 106 (2). Also remember that making an unlicensed derivate work risks having nothing you can sue for in case the original copyright owner lifts your ideas and scenes-a-faire parts and adapts them for their own derivate, see Anderson v Stallone The strange case of fanfiction chains... Now, there is a strange situation when a work is based on a work which is based on a work... Then, publishers and editors start with red ink and the result is, that what people know as Twilight now has nothing to do with the fanfiction it started as (It wasn't Vampires in the original draft), and 50 Shades of Grey ended up striking any and all supernatural from it, despite it having been a Twilight fanfiction originally. By making own characters and own expression of the world, there could be no copyright infringement. US law vs Egypt law? Both Egypt and the US have signed the Berne convention, meaning that copyright is very very similar in the broad strokes that the right to allow or disallow derivates is with the copyright holder. Also, since Ben10's copyright owners are to the best of my knowledge in the US (Cartoon Network Studios & Men of Action Studios), they will sue in a US federal court. | You should probably look up the Open Gaming Liscense (OGL) and what you can or cannot do with respect to it. Generally, classic fantasy monsters (Dragons, Manticores, Sasquatch, Vampires). Are fair use. OGL also allows for creatures that are similar to D&D exclusive monsters to exist so long as the name is changed sufficently. Most "monsters" are in what's called Public Domain and are free to use and modify. Additionally "powers" of a monster (or superhero) aren't generally copyrighted but the totatllity of their use in a work can be (does your superhero fly? Is super-strong? Is invulerable? Can be fine. Is he named Clark Kent? That's a problem). Fair Use also allows for some parody but again, it's a defense to copyright infringment and not a liscenses to take someone elses work wholesale. It also doesn't stop them from suing you, as you have to claim fair use as your defense if and when each suit arises. I'd recomend looking at National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc. for an example of an intellectual property dispute that is close to yours. Note that Fawcett won at trial but lost on appeal and rather than take the matter before SCOTUS decided to settle out of court. | Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement. | I'm assuming that you are not seeking to change the license, and so it will remain GPLv3. As long as you've built on the original software, that license still applies. You also need to keep the previous copyright notices, including the names of the original people. Assuming that, everything you're doing is legal, which is what's on topic here. There is some etiquette around forks (which is what you're doing), which would be on topic at the Open Source Stack Exchange. I'm puzzled by your desire to have a different license text. You can't change the license from GPLv3, so that has to stay the same. (If the original has GPLv3 "or, at your option, any later version", you can drop the any other version text if you like.) | If you do not have permission to make and distribute reproductions of the work, then it is illegal to make and distribute reproductions of the work. US copyright law Indian copyright law | To answer the question in your title: Yes, software licenses are copyrighted. They are written works that involve (significant, expert) creative effort to create. The best solution would be for Grammarly to hire a lawyer and say "we want a new EULA. We think this one covers a number of points our current one doesn't". Most legal documents will be copyright for the same reason (there may be a few that are so stereotypical that there is essentially no creative effort in putting them together). | Using it without permission is copyright infringement and illegal. Legally, you can try offering money to the company for the copyright or for a suitable license. For example offer them $1000 for a copy of the code licensed under the GPL license. If they accept, you are fine. | The code is copyrighted. You are not given any permission to use or copy any part of it, nor to create a derivative work based on it. There is no way for you to "make the copyright null". The code was copyrighted in 2005, and the copyright will not expire until 70 years after the death of the author, under US law. The period would vary in some other countries, but in no country that I know of will it expire in the next few years. That the author is dead, or the publisher out of business, does not change this legally. Someone, probably the author's heir, or perhaps whoever bought the remains of the publisher's business, will own the copyright. However, the ideas and programming techniques shown and discussed in the book are not protected, and you may use them freely to write programs, commercial or non-commercial. You need not even acknowledge the book as a source of ideas, although to do so would be nice. Of course, since the author is dead and the publisher not active, if you were to infringe the copyright by copying code from thsi book, there is a reasonable chance that no one would notice, but if someone did notice, the current owner of the copyright could sue you for infringement, and could perhaps win sizable damages. It would be safer to write your own original code using only the general ideas from the book. In future, do not ever assume that you can just take someone else's code (or other creative work, such as a book) and reuse it without permission, unless it is in the public domain, for example because it was published before 1923. |
Can it be illegal to press f12 in a web browser? There is a case in the news where a journalist identified a security issue in the web site of the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education that exposed 100,000 social security numbers. He did this by viewing the source of the page, using the f12 hotkey or right-click and selecting "Inspect" or "View page source" depending on your browser. When he made this discovery he disclosed the vulnerability to the DESE, and delayed publishing an article on the discovery until the department removed the vulnerability and worked to find if any other related sites and applications contained similar vulnerabilities. The response of the Missouri Governor Mike Parson was to accuse the reporter of hacking under Section 569.095, RSMo. While the County Prosecutor has announced no charges would be filed this has involved four months of harm to the individual and their family and the Governor maintains that Renaud had unlawfully hacked the school website. A somewhat similar case is the 2017 case of the Hungarian teenager who identified a bug in the Budapest Transport Authority (BKK) website that allowed anyone to set the price of a ticket. He demonstrated the flaw by buying a ticket, and told the BKK by email. He was arrested. He lived outside of Budapest and could not use the purchased BKK pass. There are four aspects that seem to me could give rise to legal risks, but I have no idea if any could reasonably give rise to successful charges in cases such as this: Use of developer tools on third party web sites The developer tools in modern browsers are very powerful tools. One illustration of this is to select the "Debugger", and the "Pause on any URL". This gives one a view of the activity of many web sites that is not intended by the developer, particularly those using the cloudflare tools. It also produces a human readable version of minified javascript, which is produced to be machine readable. This is not decompilation as javascript is not a compiled language, however functionally it is like applying a java decompiler to a java web start application for example. I think it has been claimed that the DMCA can criminalise decompilation, could such a law be used in this case? Decoding the data within the web site As I understand it the SSN's were encoded in Base64, whereas the rest of the website was another encoding (ascii?). This may have involved a separate tool to be identifiable as an SSN, but may well not as javascript includes the functionality (the function atob()) and many developers can do a rough job in their heads. Is it possible that one can commit a crime by inappropriately decoding strings in common formats, perhaps even in your head? Handling of potentially erroneously exposed PII If one comes across personally identifiable information (PII) on the internet I would assume there are things you can do that are illegal. I am not sure what they are, but I do know that the accepted way to handle security issues in software is to inform the organisation responsible and wait an appropriate time before publishing the issue. This is roughly what the reporter did in this case, but are there any specific legal measures that one can take in such situations to ensure one is not breaking any laws? Fraudulently gaining something If one actually exploited a software error to get a material benefit, such as cheap transport, it seems that one could be committing fraud. If one makes a purchase to demonstrate a flaw and tell the organisation about it without making use of the purchase can this be illegal, or does one need to intend to actually gain a benefit? Any jurisdiction would be interesting, particularly any that has actual case law of such actions being found to be illegal. | The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal. | I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B). | One way in which it holds legal water is that if you use the website in violation of the terms, then you may forfeit your right to take civil action against the company. Analogous language especially regarding the age of the user may protect the site against actions by third party governmental entities (COPPA-like laws), though nothing patently obvious springs to mind (insofar as this deals with firearms and there is also an age 21 restriction both on the web site and in terms of US firearms law, this is not a totally crazy idea). The citation of 18 USC 1030 non-probatively points to an issue which may be disposed of by SCOTUS in US v. van Buren, that knowingly violating the terms of service is a crime (a proposition rejected by lower courts, see US v. Valle). Facebook v. Power Ventures in particular clarifies how "being put on notice" may make such unauthorized access indeed "unauthorized access" in the statutorily-relevant sense. This does not prevent a legally-authorized law enforcement investigation, pursuant to para (f), but if the "violation of TOS = unauthorized access" theory is upheld, it limits how LEOs can legally access the website (and the limitations extend past LEOs). It is a separate and potentially interesting question whether there actually are any legal limits on the investigative powers of the government – if any law enforcement officer has the liberty to investigate anyone they want, with no supervision or requirement of justification, then this would be a rather gaping loophole in their legal strategy. Web pages involve massive copying of copyright-protected data, and the function of terms of use is in part to conditionally grant access to that copyright-protected content. When a person copies protected material from someone's web page having been explicitly denied permission to copy, they run the risk of an infringement lawsuit. | What you're talking about is called black-box reverse engineering. It can be done, and as long as you are meticulous in your record keeping the fact that it has been done should be an appropriate defence against copyright infringement. But that doesn't help against patent claims - while in copyright cases the fact that code has or has not been directly copied is critical, in patent cases it its irrelevant: if you use a patented method, it's a violation. You therefore will need to be careful about any patents that may have been issued to the original author, as well as avoiding copying. | It is probably illegal under Indonesian law for you to launch a cyber-attack on a website that you believe violates Indonesian law, just as it is illegal for you to shoot a person for fraud. The Indonesian government reserves the right to judge guilt or innocence, and to mete out punishment, within Indonesia. It is definitely illegal under US law, also UK law and so on, to launch a cyber-attack on a website for some reason, so you can be prosecuted under the laws of that nation. You should then be concerned with the Law on Extradition (1979), noting that there might be a treaty but also Indonesian law allows extradition on the basis of the interest of Indonesia (as judged by government officials). Indonesian nationals do not enjoy immunity from extradition (as is the case in some countries). There is no extradition treaty between Indonesia and the US; there was one between the UK and Indonesia but I cannot determine whether it is still in force. | It is reasonable to interpret the statement in their Github repository README.md as a "public domain" license for anything contained there. However, their "usage guidelines" backpedals a bit ("generally are not copyrighted", the misleading implication that content used commercially is subject to restrictions that educational and personal uses are not subject to). Although it is true that works "created by the US government" are not protected by copyright, not everything associated with a government agency is created by the US government. An agency might have a policy that they will not post material that is not copyright-free, there is no practical means of knowing if an item is an actual government work, versus a government-supported or government-hosted work (where copyright is held by someone else). If you trust their implication that all of those items in the repository are indeed government works, then they are free of copyright. I don't know any reason to not believe them, although sometimes the government is wrong and they end up liable big-time for infringement. However... NASA Open Source Agreement Version 1.3 (another copy on a NASA web page) on first glance seems to contradict the "government work" theory. Here, they claim to grant certain rights to users and also impose impose restrictions (including obligatory registration). This does not make any sense for a work that is in the public domain. The license is legally defective in that it fails to fill in relevant blanks (agency name, title of work, URL for obligatory registration). Also notice that the license is only for software. The scope of that license therefore has to be something narrower – it applies only to software, and presumably software that is not "a government work". I have no idea what software NASA could legally give away and is not a government work which is therefore not protected by copyright. | In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any. | This could be a violation of 18 USC 1030 (and a crime). A number of things go into requirements for conviction under this law. First, it has to be a computer, which is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device Any printer that I have encountered in the past 40 years counts as "a computer". Second, (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—...(C) information from any protected computer; It is highly likely that the person printing has to receive some information from the printer, and respond accordingly so you have your "obtains information" element. Maybe not useful information, but information nevertheless. It also has to be a protected computer, (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States Well, a computer connected to the internet is a protected computer, see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918. Also, the access must be "without authorization or exceeds authorized access". The law doesn't explain with "without authorization" means, but the latter is defined as to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter If the law were stated in terms of "prohibited access", meaning "express denial of permission", and if the computer owner had set the computer to "prohibited access" by default (password protected), there would be no issue -- accessing the computer is prohibited. "Unauthorized" can also mean "has not been explicitly authorized", i.e. lacking any indication one way or the other. Every computer access is initially unauthorized, until authorization is granted; and re-trying a login after mis-typing a user name (and being denied access) is not a violation of this law. There does not appear to be case law that addresses the status of computers just left open to the public, and whether using a computer that is so exposed constitutes "unauthorized access". Also, it is not clear that the defendant in this case has "obtained information", since with printing, information flows into the computer. There is also a clause about recklessly causing damage, but I don't see what damage would result ("damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information"), and how printing would be "reckless". It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be deemed to be a crime, though if you experiment, you could be on the cutting edge of new case law. |
Can I issue my own 'fines' Can a private individual collect his own 'fines' (or demand compensation) if he has evidence of wrongdoing, or does he have to pass that evidence to the authorities? Scenario 1 - Lets say I own a small shop and I have clear, irrefutable video evidence of someone shoplifting. Lets pretend I know the shoplifter and I say to him 'pay me for the item, and pay me compensation or I give the video to the police' Maybe the shoplifter is just a 'good kid making a mistake' in which case he (or his parents) might welcome the chance to settle the matter privately without a police record to sully his character. Alternatively the shoplifter might be an incorrigible crook who knows he'll only get a slap on wrist and another line added to the bottom of a long criminal record. On the one hand this is just a shopkeeper looking for just compensation, but on the other hand could this be seen as blackmail or demanding money with menaces? Scenario 2 - Lets say I live in house next to a busy road with a 30mph speed limit. Let's pretend I'm kept awake all night by drivers speeding past at 60mph. I decide to install a speed camera (for the sake argument, lets assume it's the same type used by the police, professionally calibrated and installed on my own land). What would the legal position be if I wrote to the speeding drivers saying "compensate me for keeping me awake, or I pass my evidence of your offence to the police" On the one hand these scenarios could be seen as a victim demanding compensation - but on the other hand it might be seen as blackmail, "give me money, or I give my evidence to the police". In both cases there is legitimate evidence of an offence, and in both cases the other person has a simple take-it-or-leave it choice. For many drivers a modest demand for private compensation might be preferable to points/large fine/banning/increased insurance costs etc etc. How would the law look on these situations? honest victim legitimately asking for compensation? or smart crook blackmailing other crooks? | An individual has no authority or legal basis to demand a personal "fine" for a perceived offense. The actions in the two scenarios would both be blackmail. although whether they would be prosecuted is quite another question. It would be reasonable for the shopkeeper to demand compensation for the lost merchandise. The offender (or the offender's parents) might offer to pay, either because they thought it the right thing, or in hopes to induce the shopkeeper not to call in the police. But if they specifically made "no police" a condition of payment, that would be bribery or attempted bribery. The resident in scenario 2 could demand compensation for an alleged civil wrong of excessive noise, whether or not the passer-by was speeding. ote that the amount of noise made would not be directly related to the speed of any driver (although no doubt there would be some relation) and no one driver would be responsible for keeping the resident up. I doubt that a civil suit, if pressed that far, would prevail, although it would depend on the factual details. The specific law of the local jurisdiction would also matter. But the moment there is a threat to bring evidence of a possible crime to the police, and a request for money instead, that is blackmail. | The need to prove a negative arises only from the way you've phrased the problem. In the UK, theft is defined as— dishonestly appropriating property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving its legitimate owner of it. All five elements must be proved in order to secure a conviction for theft. In the case of an item removed from a store, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that— the defendant had a dishonest intent; the defendant appropriated the item (treated it as his own); the item was 'property' (straightforward in this case); the item belonged to someone else (ditto); and the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of it. Clearly proving that the defendant left the shop without paying would be an important element in proving (2) and (5) above. Note that the prosecution must prove that he left without paying, not that he did not pay. In this example, the prosecution might adduce CCTV or witness evidence of defendant leaving without paying. If the defendant did pay for the item but doesn't have a receipt, he can still give witness testimony in his own defence. The prosecution is unlikely to have strong evidence to the contrary if payment was in fact made. The totality of evidence, put before a jury or summary court, will be considered in the round when establishing guilt. | Do criminals really "have no recourse" if their ill-gotten property is stolen by a third party? Basically yes. At sentencing, they can argue that restitution or fines should be limited because the money was in turn stolen from them and they don't have it. For example, I once had a client who was the sole heir to the estate of someone who had a substantial amount of illegal drugs in their possession at the time of the decedent's death (worth perhaps $100,000 USD), but the illegal drugs were stolen after the death of the decedent by someone known to my client. There was no legal way for my client to gain possession that stolen property or its worth. | No, filing a police report in good faith does not expose you to liability Of course, making false allegations or allegations where you are recklessly indifferent to the truth to police is both a serious crime in itself and defamation. Of course, breaking a contract is not a crime and the police are unlikely to take any action. If you borrow money from the bank and don’t pay it back, that’s not stealing or fraud unless it can be proven that you had no intention of paying it back when you borrowed it. This is a civil matter for the bank, not a criminal matter for the police. | Generally speaking, the police will not return property known to be stolen to someone other than the owner of the property, even if it is illegally seized in a search that violates the 4th Amendment. While stolen property is not strictly speaking, contraband, it also isn't something that the person who would seek its return would be entitled to reclaim. This is particularly true when, in a circumstance like this where the motorcycle's ownership can be confirmed with a VIN number on file with a government agency linking the VIN number to the true owner of the vehicle, so the fact that it is stolen can be confirmed with great certainty. If the police do not return the property voluntarily, which they would not do, the person in possession of it would have to bring a suit for possession against the police who are in possession of it. In the face of a civil lawsuit to regain custody of the property from the police after they failed to return it, the police could insist that the true owner be joined to the action and could also raise the issue of unclean hands or similar defenses. A court filing claiming property known to be stolen by someone who is not the true owner would also provide evidence of the stolen property charge that would probably not be tainted "fruit of the poisonous tree" and instead, would be treated as an independent confession to the crime that was dismissed for lack of evidence after the original seizure under the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule. | At this point, since it's been more than four weeks since the order was issued, you are able to enforce the order. The delay is just to allow appeals or corrections. It is up to you to arrange enforcement, so at a high level your choices are to do nothing, or to proceed. If you do nothing then you will not get any money. If you proceed then you will spend more money, which you may or may not get back, as with the original sum. The Scottish procedure is conceptually similar to the English one that is more normally described in online resources, but the words are different. To decode things a bit, You are now trying to proceed with "diligence", which means enforcing the court order. The court itself is not involved, having moved on to other things. There are several ways the money could come to you, such as "arrestment", "attachment" and "inhibition". Or, X might give you the money voluntarily. The next steps must be taken by a "sheriff officer" on your instruction. Despite the name being similar to "sheriff" as in "Sheriff Court", these officers are private practitioners who are licensed by the courts to pursue debtors. You can use https://smaso.org.uk to find a sheriff officer you like. Most likely you will be able to give them all the information online. Then, they will go ahead with the first step, formally serving a "charge for payment" on X. Then, X has 14 days to come up with the money; if they don't, then the sheriff officer can proceed with more drastic steps. They will be able to advise based on the particular circumstances, but some broad possibilities are "arrestment" of X's money directly from their bank, or "attachment", which is seizure of X's property to be auctioned off. If X is an employed person (rather than a business, say) then you might also arrange "arrestment of earnings" whereby the employer diverts a sum from X's pay to you, for whatever necessary period of time. All these come with their own rules and timescales, including processes if X's bank or employer does not comply. The sheriff officer will have to be paid for all this. The usual way is that you pay them up-front, and then that fee can be added to the diligence. All officers charge the same rates, but the fee schedule is a bit complicated depending on exactly which services are involved, how long it takes the officer to do the work, and their travel time. It is up to you to make the decisions about how much you want to spend in pursuit of the money, also taking into account the likelihood that you will actually get it. For the sheriff officer, since this is a completely routine part of the job, they will be able to give you their impression of the range of outcomes based on the specifics of X's situation. | Although your question didn't ask about the criminal side of this, it's important to consider the offence of driving without insurance in the UK. Section 143 Road Traffic Act 1998 provides that— (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act— (a) a person must not use a motor vehicle on a road or other public place unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as complies with the requirements of this Part of this Act ... (2) If a person acts in contravention of subsection (1) above he is guilty of an offence. (3) A person charged with using a motor vehicle in contravention of this section shall not be convicted if he proves— ... (c) that he neither knew nor had reason to believe that there was not in force in relation to the vehicle such a policy of insurance or security as is mentioned in subsection (1) above. If it's not too late, it may be worth challenging the matter in court on the basis of a s143(1)(c) defence (i.e. you didn't have reason to believe that your policy was not in force). You should speak to a solicitor immediately if you want to consider this. As mentioned in the previous answer, you may have a claim against the insurer if you can provide that you were misled into believing that your policy had been renewed automatically. You should read the terms and conditions carefully to discover whether they were entitled to communicate on matters of renewal solely by email. Again, you should speak to a solicitor to establish whether you have a realistic prospect of success. (in case you're curious, the 'security' mentioned in s143 refers to a sum of £500,000 which, if deposited with the Courts Funds Office, exempts an individual or corporation from the insurance requirement) | It will be fact-specific, but potentially not unlocking your phone for such a reason could be a "reasonable excuse". However, you will need to provide evidence for such an excuse. The prosecution will still have to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the excuse is not "reasonable". It is entirely possible that the court would determine any such excuse based on privacy to not be reasonable, partly because it grants a very broad shield to defendants which would frustrate the purpose of the law, but partly because they can point to precedent that privacy is not an absolute right and that privacy infringement can be justified in the circumstances (the same way the police can search your phone). I have not been able to find any relevant case law on the matter, but I will keep investigating and update my answer if I find any. As an aside, it does appear possible for any warrant obtained by TV Licensing officials to include a Section 49 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 notice which would compel you to unlock the phone regardless of any "reasonable excuse". Failure to do so would result in a conviction under Section 53 of the Act. |
What is the official resignation date when the registered post was delivered on time, but when to a collection point I quit on 25th February and sent a letter (tracking with signature) to the HR department since my contract says that the resignation should be in written format. The letter could not be delivered but the recipient was notified to collect it from a nearby post office. But the HR denies receiving it on 28th of February, saying I do not have your letter on my table and today is already 1st of March and we will consider resignation from the 1st of March instead of February. The end date for resigning in March compared to February will be one month longer, since the notice period starts the month after my official resignation. I have sent it on February end and if the HR has not received it on time even after notifying then how is it my mistake? Why should I serve a longer notice period? Please throw some light on this on how it can be dealt with or is it legally accepted I also have snapshot of the DHL tracking says the recipient is notified on 28th Feb. Does the notice to the recipient to pick up the post count as delivered? I had to send it on Friday since I received my next company offer letter on 25th and wanted to review the letter before resigning. Yes, I know it could be very tricky to be delivered the next day but my luck it was notified to pickup on Monday. I had to send by post because the HR sits in a different state and can be sent only by post. I have a chance to negotiate with my manager but wanted to get some Insights before I could do it. | A declaration of intent among absent people becomes effective as soon as it reaches the recipient, § 130 Ⅰ 1 BGB. To reach the recipient means the declaration of intent must under normal circumstances (e. g. not on statutory holidays), get into the “territory” of the recipient (for example a mailbox), and be physically available and intelligible (e. g. readable script [no water/rain damage]). Note, it is not necessary that the recipient actually reads your letter, but it must be possible. Generally, it is presumed you check your mailbox at least once a day, so mail is considered to be delivered the next (business) day unless it arrived/was opened earlier. Ultimately, if it matters, you’ll need to prove when your declaration of intent reached the recipient. I have sent it on February end and if the HR has not received it on time even after notifying then how is it my mistake? It is your risk who you entrust with delivery. It is not the recipient’s fault if you chose an untrustworthy or too slow carrier. Why should I serve a longer notice period? Because you signed the employment contract. Seriously, your employer has a protected interest to trust in you fulfilling your part of the agreement. Business needs a certain level of predictability, so they can organize a replacement employee. If they don’t need or “don’t like” you, you can still ask to be dismissed earlier via a mutual Aufhebungsvertrag, § 311 Ⅰ BGB. Does the notice to the recipient to pick up the post count as delivered? No, a notification about registered mail being available for pickup is not a substitute for your declaration of intent. Again, it must be possible for the recipient to identify the message. | The German law mandates minimum notice periods for work contracts. But there is no restriction on maximum notice periods, as long as the employee does not have a longer notice period than the employer (§622 BGB de|en). So yes, in theory you could negotiate that the company is not allowed to fire you in the first 4 years. But I would find it unlikely that they would agree to that. When the stock options are really your only reason why you want to avoid getting terminated in the first 4 years, then they are more likely to be open to negotiations about the stock option clause than about the termination clause. | Fax or email At this time in common law, faxes and email are considered to have been accepted when actually communicated to the other party. This means that if I sign a contract and send it to you, I acceptance of the offer is not actually effected until you read it. Post However, the postal acceptance rule can play havoc with this. Under this rule, and specifically for post, as long as there is some indication that we contemplated acceptance by post, my acceptance of the offer is effected the moment I put it in the mailbox, regardless of when or whether it actually reaches you. Your scenario A has signed a contract and faxes it to B B doesn't reply A or B tries to claim that they never agreed to this or signed this B has read the contract and was the offeree If B claims not to have read it, A must prove that they have, or that acceptance was otherwise communicated to them. This is unless the postal acceptance rule applies, in which case it does not matter whether or not it was read. Proving that it was posted is a different matter. B hasn't read the contract or was not the offeree A was the offeree (A sent B a signed contract) In this case, A must prove that they actually communicate a revocation of the offer. If B has not accepted the offer, then A can communicate this in any reasonable way. If B has accepted the offer, then A must prove that the revocation was effected prior to their acceptance. Otherwise, A is bound by the contract. A and B drafted this contract together (offer and acceptance is unclear but there is clearly agreement at some point) In this case, it's a bit murkier but it is likely that A would not be bound by the contract. | The first question would be whether you are an employee, or an independent contractor. There is more to that determination than how the company labels you, but that is a starting point. Based on the minimal autonomy that you imply that you have, you would probably be found to be an employee. Then there are limits on the number of hours that you can work in a week or day, which they are complying with. The employer is required to record the hours that you worked, and it is a crime to keep false records. It is also required that an employer pay for the time you work. Therefore the employer cannot legally refuse to pay you for your labor, and they cannot legally falsify records. The employer can limit your pay to 15 hours per week, if you work just 15 hours per week. They can also set ridiculous performance standards, whereby at the end of the week you will not have done what they wanted you to do. Their only recourse is to dismiss you. In response, you can file a complaint, but note that the concept of "wrongful dismissal" under the act is about entitlement to termination or severance pay. The arbitrator may find that the employer contravened the act, and can order them to rescind the termination. Or, before you get fired, you can complain and the arbitrator could order the employer to either modify their work requirements or else to pay you for the time worked. The difficult point (for you) in this case is that the act does not address employer performance expectations, and employers are generally allowed to set their own performance standards. If you have a written employment contract, there might be provisions regarding termination which could help you. Without a written contact, there is no statutory provision that prevents an employer for terminating you, but they may have to give you notice and pay for doing so, as long as you are not terminated for "just cause". Hoang v. Mann, 2014 ONSC 3762 is an Ontario case where an employee was terminated for just case based on insubordination, job performance, inability to get along with co-workers and so on. On the front of job performance, the courts have found that an employer must clearly communicate standards to employees, and give employees an opportunity to meet those standards. But they do not generally decide e.g. how many units per hour an assembly-line worker can reasonably be expected to complete. | A company had me sign two conflicting documents about two years apart. Which one would apply? Possibly both because actually there is no conflict. What you describe does not reflect that these documents are incompatible or inconsistent. There is no indication that the second document impliedly or explicitly replaces the first one. The second document seems just redundant so far. Employees could likewise be required to sign a third document that only says "no drugs or alcohol on the job site on Wednesdays", and that does not mean that any previous documents they signed expire. | You need, at least, to let the person receive 2 reminders which have to name a reasonable period (after the first exceeds, you can send the second) and if the last deadline exceeds, you have the possibility of escalating further. Although often repeated, this is not correct which makes most of your argument moot. By German law (specifically § 286 BGB) these are the exact conditions for a default of payments: (1)If the obligor, following a warning notice from the obligee that is made after performance is due, fails to perform, he is in default as a result of the warning notice. Bringing an action for performance and serving a demand for payment in summary debt proceedings for recovery of debt have the same effect as a warning notice. (2)There is no need for a warning notice if a period of time according to the calendar has been specified, performance must be preceded by an event and a reasonable period of time for performance has been specified in such a way that it can be calculated, starting from the event, according to the calendar, the obligor seriously and definitively refuses performance, for special reasons, weighing the interests of both parties, the immediate commencement of default is justified. (3)The obligor of a claim for payment is in default at the latest if he does not perform within thirty days after the due date and receipt of an invoice or equivalent statement of payment; this applies to an obligor who is a consumer only if these consequences are specifically referred to in the invoice or statement of payment. If the time at which the invoice or payment statement is received by the obligor is uncertain, an obligor who is not a consumer is in default at the latest thirty days after the due date and receipt of the consideration. (4)The obligor is not in default for as long as performance is not made as the result of a circumstance for which he is not responsible. Depending on what was contractually agreed on the default happened even before the first warning. For example that is the case if a specific payment due date was agreed to. Even if a warning would be required it is only one and you can see that no requirements on the specific wording or form on that warning is given. I don't know how you assume an "official reminder" should look like. According to the law a specific and explicit demand to fulfill an obligation is enough. Also, the warning does not need to contain a specific date. If it doesn't the default is effective immediately. | Is this something that an employer can just do? That is very unlikely, although strictly speaking there is not enough information to answer either yes or no. Section 2810.5(a)(1)(C) of the California Labor Code provides that "[a]t the time of hiring, an employer shall provide to each employee a written notice [...] containing the following information: [...] The regular payday designated by the employer in accordance with the requirements of this code". This implies that the employer is required by law to issue the paychecks in accordance with the timing that pursuant to Section 2810.5 the employer should have informed your girlfriend. The fact that your girlfriend does not know when exactly her salary is due suggests that the employer did not even comply with this statute. | The legal requirement in Russia is to pay or to continue to employ workers for two months following the notice of a layoff. The three month period was probably chosen to put to rest questions about how to treat a mid-month announcement and any questions over the effective date of the notice which may have post-dated the de facto shutdown of operations. |
What is the difference, if any at all, between having a warrant for your arrest and being circulated as wanted in the UK? What does it mean to have a warrant out for one's arrest? How must a warrant be issued? What institutions within society are able to issue a warrant? What does it mean to be circulated to police bodies as 'wanted'? Is it completely synonymous as having an open warrant for one's arrest? What other types of compareable notices can be issued upon one's name and DoB across police systems? What does missing bail reporting events result in? How many types of bail are there in the UK? | england-and-wales A warrant for arrest, also referred to as a bench warrant, is issued by a judge or magistrate to ensure a defendant (and sometimes a witness) appears before them. "Being circulated" means a suspect is liable for arrest for an offence (without a warrant) and their details are put on PNC with sufficient information to justify being arrested if they come in to contact with the police - assuming PNC is checked that is. | a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself. | I'm not a lawyer, but I am an NHS employee, and can more concretely answer your questions. Has any crime been committed, and if so, is there any point in pursuing this with the police? If so, how do I go about it? Yes, in-fact, several crimes have been committed. Firstly, NHS employees are prohibited from viewing patient's personal information that they are not specifically treating. In opening your letter from the NHS, the nurse in question violated this practice. It's a breach of both privacy and trust. This is taught at the NHS and the nurse would be aware of this. Secondly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse has committed workplace fraud. They have impersonated a patient, and in doing so, cost the NHS money and time it won't get back by cancelling your appointment. Again, this is also taught within the NHS, and the nurse would be aware of this too. Thirdly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse may have put a life in danger in doing so, which is effectively gross negligence at a minimum. Although this can be reported to the police, it'll be more effective to report it to the appropriate NHS bodies. Even if a crime has not been committed, I would think that at the very least, opening someone's mail and then impersonating them and cancelling the surgery would at least be viewed as unprofessional, especially for someone employed in the NHS. Is there a procedure for making a complaint against an NHS worker? There are several different approaches, given the various breaches of trust. As BlueDogRanch mentioned, you can file a compliant to NHS England, which includes via email. Be sure to get appropriate information like the nurse's name, address, and if possible any details (like appointment reference numbers) to aid the investigation. Secondly, because of the cost incurred via the malicious cancellation of an appointment, costing time and money (and running the risk of opening the NHS to litigation), you can also report the fraudulent aspects to the NHS Counter Fraud Authority. | Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect. | There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement. | In theory its only a crime if you know, or reasonably suspect, that it is stolen. The fact that you have to ask means that you have some level of suspicion, so that's not good to start with. In practice merely being investgated by the police will bring you a world of hurt long before it gets to trial. How much can you afford to spend on legal fees, and will you be able to make bail? | Brief detentions and reasonable suspicion You can be briefly detained by police if they have reasonable suspicion that you committed a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) What reasonable suspicion "means" can only be fully understood by reference to subsequent case law (which I will expand this answer to do), but as a basis, the court said in Terry that: the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion This standard has been reiterated as recently as in Heien v. North Carolina 574 U. S. ____ (2014), where they say "All parties agree that to justify this type of seizure [a traffic stop, in the case of Heien], officers need only reasonable suspicion — that is, a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of breaking the law" (internal quotation marks omitted). The reasonable suspicion standard was also used recently in Navarette v. California 572 U. S. ____ (2014). They reiterated that reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990). A mere "hunch" does not create reasonable suspicion, but the level of suspicion required by the reasonable suspicion standard is "obviously less than is necessary for probable cause". Arrests and probable cause To be arrested, police require probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) In more detail, probable cause exists (from Brinegar v. U.S.): where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed Also: The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. As in the case of reasonable suspicion, the probable cause analysis is case-by-case and fact-intensive, so to understand the contours of probable cause will require reference to much subsequent case law. In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) the question before the court was entirely "whether or not the record in the case before us can support a finding of probable cause for the petitioner's arrest". In that case, it turned out that the information they had received about the arrestee was not sufficient for probable cause, but regardless, the test the court applied was whether the police had probable cause for the arrest. Notes While I am confident in the correctness of this answer, what each of these standards means will take hours of work to flesh out, which I plan to do. The courts have repeatedly reiterated and referred to these decisions/standards, but the analysis is very fact-intensive and is done case-by-case. Also, I realize the presentation is a little scattershot, as I'm first just looking to include relevant cases and statements the court has made about these standards, but I'll re-make it into a coherent story every once in a while. | These are different terms for initiating documents. What one court or jurisdiction calls a petition, another might call an application. "Complaint" may not have a technical meaning in some contexts or jurisdictions, but often it is used to refer to the initiating document at a specialist tribunal. There are other names for initiating documents: notice of civil claim, notice of action, etc. There is no way to know which terms have a technical meaning and what those meanings are without looking to the rules and practice in a particular jurisdiction. "Indictment" is an initiating document in a criminal prosecution. But there are also "informations" (generally implying lesser charges). |
Is it legal to install hidden cameras in a public place within the UK? In recent years, fly-tipping (dumping domestic/business waste) has become quite prevalent in a number of spots around my area. The local authority has erected numerous very visible signs, warning fly-tippers that cameras are in operation in the area, however they either don't care or know there likely are no actual cameras; since the signs were installed there has been tens of large rubbish loads left in the same locations. I'd estimate we are approaching the 30th load by now. I'm planning to install cameras of my own in one of the hot-spots which is a confluence between a public road, a public bridleway and privately owned farm land (the road turns into a bridleway and is flanked on each side by the farmland). The cameras themselves would be carefully concealed at two or three points on the road. My intention is to collect video evidence according to the proper standards and then pass that onto the local authority and the police. Would the installation of these cameras be legal? Considering that there are numerous very high visibility signs telling people that CCTV is in operation in the area due to fly-tipping - including one right at the start of the dead end lane which leads to the hotspot. One key point is that I didn't put up the sings myself, and the local authority will have no knowledge of what I'm doing until I pass the footage onto them. | Do you own the land? Placing your stuff on property you don’t own without permission is … illegal dumping. | germany In Germany, taking pictures - and publishing them - is legal, if they're taken from public areas, from the general perspective of a passer-by, and if the picture doesn't make individual persons recognizable. (There are some restrictions about making persons recognizable; if you take a picture of a monument or other building that would typically be photographed by tourists, and if the topic of the picture is clearly the monument, not a random bystander, then it's OK to publish even if the bystander's face is visible. But that doesn't work for individual's houses). Still, Street View got into trouble because their cameras are mounted on roofs of a car, in a height of 2.5-3 meters, so they violated the "perspective of a passer-by" rule. To return to the example of "bathroom", the camera could well be able to see you nude when a passer-by would only be able to see a small portion of the ceiling next to the window. Because of this, and because many Germans were uneasy with seeing their houses on the internet, as a condition to permit Street View at all, the German government insisted on allowing people to request their house to be removed; in 2010, approximately 250000 people made use of that (source: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-11595495). Because of the high resistance against Street View in Germany, Google published what they had in 2011, but stopped collecting more images. This is explained in https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/germany-street-view/, which also explains some of the reasons why Germans are so heavily biased for privacy. | Social media platforms are not publishers under UK law (at present), as such, they are not legally responsible for the content they host providing that there is a mechanism for alerting them to infringing material and that, when alerted, they remove it. As to "why", that is a political question. | Technically, yes, GDPR might apply. Filming other people does involve the processing of personal data, and GDPR will apply unless this is for “purely personal or household purposes”. But exactly that will be the case for most holiday snapshots or short clips for your personal social media. As far as I understand, you do not have to worry about purely personal activities. Even if GDPR would apply, this doesn't mean it would be illegal. It means you'd need a “legal basis”, such as a “legitimate interest”. If there are just a couple of people in the background of a video, it's possible that their rights might weigh less important than your interest in shooting the video – but that would need a case by case analysis. Your legitimate interest would almost certainly prevail if you need to record a crime to which you are victim. Regardless of GDPR concerns, note that this is just a small aspect of legal concerns. Instead, also consider personality rights copyright (if art or architectural works are visible) / freedom of panorama customs and reasonable expectations of other people These issues will depend largely on the specific country or area you are travelling to. Europe is not homogenous in its perception of privacy issues. For example, consider the issue of dashcams in a car. These are considered to be quite normal in some European countries, but effectively illegal in others. | Offer them a cup of tea In England and Wales, people have extensive rights to access private land so long as they don't interfere with the owner's lawful use of that land. You have the right to access some land for walking or certain other leisure activities. You can: use public roads and pavements or public rights of way, for example footpaths or bridleways use your right to roam on open access land including mountains, moors, heaths, downs, common land and some land around the England Coast Path If neither of these apply, you may still be able to access private land if: the land was used as a public right of way in the past - check old maps and documents the land was accessed by the public for at least 20 years and nobody has asked them to stop the landowner has given permission (‘permissive access’) It is a very rare piece of rural land to which at least one of these doesn't apply in England and Wales. Obviously, this is not going to be applicable to most urban and suburban land and your solicitor should have checked that an ancient highway doesn't run through your living room before you bought the place. If it does, then you have to let people walk through your living room - you can ask them to wipe their feet first. If they are actually trespassing then unless they damage your property you have no right to damages. If they commit a crime such as aggravated trespass or burgulary, you can call the police. You can also take them to court to get an order requiring them to leave and, if you are wise, prohibiting them from returning. Or, you can just take the opportunity for a cup of tea and a chat. | There are limits to what you are allowed to modify on your car. Federal safety regulations require certain features to be installed by the manufacturer, and to be maintained by the owner in a state that they remain functional. Besides obvious things like brakes, you need working headlights, turn signals, bumpers, wipers, etc. Heated seats is an option. A luxury convenience feature. Most cars don't have heated seats. If you had heated seats, but left them off or the switch broke and they weren't working, there would be no reason for the State Patrol to care one bit that your rump was a bit chilly. So, the state doesn't care enough make it illegal to have heated seats or not. It is entirely your choice. The question then becomes, does the state have any reason to care whether you have a manual switch to turn them on or off, or use a special software code to enable the feature? Logic dictates that if they don't care whether or not you have the feature, and don't care if you are using it or not, they would have not reason to care about the particular method you use to turn it on or off... Therefore the only real question is does BMW care? They might, if you came up with a method of enabling heat without a subscription and it became known to them. Especially if you made money publishing a how-to guide that cost them potential revenue. But that would be a civil, rather than a criminal matter. To me this action would be equivalent to buying a burger at a place that charges $.25 for a packet of ketchup, and instead using your own ketchup. It's your burger, and your ketchup, do what you want! ADDENDUM: Based on discussion on the other answer, as well as a suggestion in comments, I would like to briefly address (my opinion) on the applicability of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DCMA) of 1998. I actually just looked up this act, and have only a layman's understanding of copyright law, but there is a basic element that needs to be met for a violation to occur: The copyrighted material must be reproduced, altered, repurposed, and distributed in some manner. Private avoidance or selective non-use of a digital feature would not seem to rise to that level. I touched on this above when I alluded to publishing a written hack. It would probably also apply if you offered code that would bypass a feature, or to a car tuner offering to enable the feature for a fee. If there is a commercial benefit, there is a potential "victim", and a copyright issue. However, even code is questionable... There are many examples of companies offering aftermarket Engine Control Module code to enhance performance or improve gas mileage. Of course a manufacturer could always challenge a commercial competitor, but lawsuits cause money and create publicity - positive and negative. About the only "free" enforcement tool a manufacturer has is to not honor the warranty on any owner altered parts. Of note is the fact that seat heating elements are not digital, copyrighted, or otherwise protected work. The digital intellectual property that MIGHT potentially be at the center of a copyright controversy is the function of the pay system and the processing of an access code that unlocks a relay. What that relay sends electrical current to is really immaterial. It could be your stereo, it could be the airbag... One person snipping and splicing wire to avoid the IP "brain" and install a simple on/off switch or rheostat for personal use of seat heat should not be violation of any digital copyright law. | There is no mailbox-specific law. You can take pictures in public, and you can put a camera to take pictures on your property. Whether you can install a camera in a particular place depends on who owns that place. Of course, you also can't aim it to peer into a nearby residence; and it has to be a video-only camera (unattended recording of audio is illegal without the consent of the thief). In some cases, mega-boxes are owned by the USPS so you would need USPS permission. There is a widespread false narrative that the USPS owns all mailboxes, but the USPS does not say that nor does the US Code. USPS describes two kinds of cluster-boxes, private and USPS-owned. The USPS offers no statements on permission or its denial to install a cameras inside a USPS-owned box, so you would have to ask the local post office in case your box is USPS-owned. | No they didn't break any British traffic regulations. As can be seen in the video, the road is closed to regular traffic. This is done by British police motorcycles according to British traffic laws. On this temporarily closed road regular traffic regulations no longer apply. Bidens motorcade can use whatever light they feel like. This is the same principle that happens in say a political demonstration. Police block the road for regular traffic. Afterwards trucks with all kinds of decorations are allowed to drive inside a crowd of walking people. This would not be legal according to British traffic regulations but it is fine in this situation because the road is blocked for regular traffic. |
Is a website using behind the scenes software X a "copy" or "substantial portion" of software X? The MIT license says: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. Bob finds a nice piece of MIT-licensed software called X. However, this software is way too geeky for the general public to use. Practically, only IT-savvy persons can use it. Bob builds a website allowing any person to use the software by way of a few clicks. The software is not included in the code that is delivered to the user's web browser. Rather, it runs deep in the woods on the server side on-demand. Bob starts charging money for the service. Is Bob required to include X's copyright notice on the website? Is the website a "copy" or "substantial portion" of software X? If the answer is "Yes" and Bob ignores it, how much money the copyright holders could potentially win by taking Bob to the court? Related: Do I need to include the full text of the MIT license in the UI of my app? | The web site appears to be interacting with a copy of the MIT-licensed code, which I will call "M". Neither the site nor the code that displays the site is a copy, but if a copy of M is on Bob's server, it might be considered to be a part of the code that supports or "powers" the site. In general, calling a separate program does not make that program part of the calling program. Bob must make sure that the local copy of M contains the required copyright notice and "as-is" notice. As Bob is "using" and not "distributing" M, that ends his obligations. It would be good practice and courteous of Bob to include on his web page where M can be invoked "Powered in part by M, written by {M-author}" or some similar notice, but the MIT license does not impose any such requirement. A license could impose such a requirement, but MIT does not. | Strictly speaking, yes, Microsoft owns the copyright for all that stuff. But they grant users a license. So it's a matter of knowing what they let us do with it. I grabbed the EULA for Excel 2013. You'll want to check your version. My reading of this is that you can do the thing that you want to do. M. ADDITIONAL LICENSING REQUIREMENTS AND/OR USE RIGHTS ... Media Elements. Microsoft grants you a license to copy, distribute, perform and display media elements (images, clip art, animations, sounds, music, video clips, templates and other forms of content) included with the software in projects and documents, except that you may not: (i) sell, license or distribute copies of any media elements by themselves or as a product if the primary value of the product is the media elements; (ii) grant your customers rights to further license or distribute the media elements; (iii) license or distribute for commercial purposes media elements that include the representation of identifiable individuals, governments, logos, trademarks, or emblems or use these types of images in ways that could imply an endorsement or association with your product, entity or activity; or (iv) create obscene or scandalous works using the media elements. Other media elements, which are accessible on Office.com or on other websites through features of the software, are governed by the terms on those websites. | The lack of a copyright notice is irrelevant, what matters is whether permission is granted. The material cannot be copied, except if the copyright holder grants you permission to copy. However, you might be able to create something legal and satisfactory on your own, because the underlying ideas are not protected. By way of analogy, you cannot copy the Turbo Pascal Numeric Methods library without permission, but you can study the logic of a module and write your own FFT routine. The status of something as "declaring code" is entirely irrelevant to the court's decision in Google v. Oracle. What is relevant to the court's finding of fair use is that the content constituted 0.4 percent of the entire API, and the fact that the copied lines of code are inextricably bound to other lines of code that are accessed by programmers, allowing programmers to bring their skills to a new environment. The court found that he amount of copying was tethered to a valid, and transformative, purpose. | It is not critical, however, it can help and it can't hurt. You own the copyright and if you were to take legal action you would need to prove this - the notice is evidence you can use to do so. Note that some jurisdictions (including the US) require registration of copyright before commencing legal action and that damages only accrue from the date of registration. A more significant issue is: what rights does the website owner have? They may believe that their contract with you involved a transfer of the copyright to them: did it or didn't it or doesn't it say? | You are in general correct, KBurchfiel. A code snippet such as import math; or For i := 1 to 10 print i; has no originality, and is not protected by copyright. A post eplaining the meaning an usage of such a snippet might well be original enough to be protected by US copyright, indeed it probably would. But the code on its own would not be. Anyone could read such a post, and if s/he understood it, use the code snippet and not be in violation of copyright, not compelled to place the entire program in which such a snippet was used under a CC-=BY-SA license. The creative commons people would prefer that a CC license not be applied to a publication that is not protected by copyright, and if it is so applied it is legally meaningless. But they have no legal way to enforce such a preference. A stack exchange post that consisted of nothing but such an uncopyrightable code snippet, with no explanation r discussion, might well be downvoted or even deleted. But that is a matter of site policy on what is a useful answer, not a matter of copyright. Using an excerpt from a copyrighted work so small that the excerpt alone would be uncopyrightable, would probably be fair use under US law, and might well be fair dealing in UK law. Something that is fair use does not compel the reuser to abide by the terms of a CC license, because those terms apply only when the content could not be reused without the CC license's permission. However, a code snippet does not need to be very much more original than the above examples before it becomes copyrightable. Whether it can be used via fair use rather than via the CC-BY-SA license is a very fact-based decision (the usual four-factor analysis is spelled out in 17 USC 107).. But if the snippet can be rewritten to express the same concepts but in a different expression, then there is no copyright issue, and again the CC license will not apply. If the snippet is complex and original enough to be copyrightable (a fairly low bar) and it is re-used unchanged, under conditions where fair use does not apply, then the CC-BY-SA license's terms must be complied with for the use to be legal. That is several "IFs" however. The exact details of a specific case will matter in such cases, there is not one rule for all snippets, all posts, or all programs. | Distribution on YouTube implicates, at least, US copyright law. Shropshire v. Canning 809 F.Supp.2d 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2011), Subafilms v. MGM 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) Are you infringing? Is the original work eligible for copyright? "It is undisputed that computer programs— defined in the Copyright Act as a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result, can be subject to copyright protection as literary works." 17 USC 102, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). Are you making a copy or displaying the work publicly? (17 USC 106) You concede that you are doing this in the hypothetical, so we can skip this step. Do you have permission to do this? Some work is licensed to allow your proposed use. If you have permission, then this entire answer is moot. Are you taking what amounts to a substantial taking of the original? Presumably, you will not need to show the entire source file to present the naming conventions and techniques that other developers have used. But, what you do show will be an exact reproduction of the original. In the case of computer programs, all US districts use the abstraction-filtration-comparison test. Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). The abstraction stage of this test is irrelevant in this hypothetical because the reproduction is exact. Filtration excludes any uncopyrightable elements of the original from consideration (due to scènes à faire, merger, lack of originality). The comparison stage compares what remains after the filtration stage, to determine if the new work takes substantially from the original. Fair use defense If your use is found to be infringing based on the above analysis, the affirmative defense of fair use is available. I can't tell you whether a fair use defense would be applicable or successful in your particular case. However, you can search the US Copyright Office's Fair Use Index for many examples successful fair use defenses when a literary work was reproduced in part or whole for educational purposes. There are also other affirmative defenses available (implied license, for example), or defenses that directly attack the elements of copyright infringement. Some confusion exists regarding "idea/expression merger" as a defense after a prima facie case of copyright infringement has been made. This isn't completely correct. Where idea/expression merger enters the analysis differs from circuit to circuit. In the 6th circuit, merger enters in the copyrightability analysis (paragraph 1. above). But, the 2nd and 9th circuits treat merger as part of the infringement analysis (paragraph 4. above) and in the 9th circuit, merger is an affirmative defense. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) The idea/expression merger doctrine is not implicated just because "the idea one that is expressing is 'this is the code they used.'" When you need to cite/show the original work for purposes of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching", that is a direct implication of fair use. Using using this justification triggers the full four-factor fair use analysis. (17 USC 107). You don't get to reproduce a work just because you want to say "this is the work they created." | You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license. | You are clearly seeking legal advice. Answers on this site come from anonymous people on the internet and are not legal advice. You should not act based on information from this site. I am unaware of any lawsuit where one would be sued for merely storing and reading HTML for personal use. Downloading a webpage is probably not a copyright violation. Most things you create, including HTML source code, are protected by copyright and copyright includes the exclusive right to choose who can read what you created. I couldn't find any actual reference to this but I would hazard a guess that displaying an HTML webpage online is implicitly allowing others to read that code. I believe this guess is correct because all modern web browsers have the capability to view source that nobody considers illegal and browsers also include the capability to save webpages to disk. These browsers are made by companies with large legal departments, I doubt Internet Explorer would include this function if using it was a copyright violation. Here begins speculation: However, your expanded question says that not only you wish to read the HTML code but you also wish to process it, extract information from it and use what you learn this way. This could, I think, be prevented by the copyright holder. Still, what you are describing is commonly done in the world. Services such as Google, Bing or the Wayback Machine go far beyond what you are doing. In theory, I can see this as being a copyright violation but again, the fact that these big companies - without any kind of contract with the website owners - keep doing it is big evidence in favor of legality of storing webpages. You should be careful about how you use the stored data, though. For example, computer programs often have a stipulation in EULA that prevents you from reverse engineering the code. I could see that the use of some websites could be protected in such manner. Further (not authoritative) internet pages on this topic: https://stackoverflow.com/q/22819287/1580088 https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20120621055815AAvJPvN |
Is it legal under Czech and EU legal system to punish people with prison sentences for publicly expressing their political views? This site claims that (my emphasis): The Czech Republic's chief prosecutor has warned that expressing support for Russia’s attack on Ukraine could be a criminal offence, punishable by imprisonment. [...] Publicly backing the Russian invasion of Ukraine might be subject to custodial sentences of up to three years, Czechia’s Supreme State Attorney Igor Striz said in a statement on Saturday. [...] Striz’s statement cited sections 365 and 405 of the Czech Criminal Code, which state that whoever publicly approves a crime or publicly praises the perpetrator can be imprisoned for up to a year, and that anyone who “publicly denies, questions, approves or seeks to justify Nazi, communist, or other genocide” can face a jail sentence of up to three years. Is there anything in the Czech (e. g. its constitution) or the European legal system that would make such regulations (publicly expressing certain political views being punished with prison sentences) illegal? | For a challenge under the European Convention on Human Rights (to which Czechia is a signatory) the relevant articles are 10 and 17. Article 10, on the right to free expression, has the caveat that it: may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. This is analogous to Article 17(4) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of Czechia (which has constitutional force by virtue of Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution): The freedom of expression and the right to seek and disseminate information may be limited by law in the case of measures essential in a democratic society for protecting the rights and freedoms of others, the security of the State, public security, public health, and morality. The Strasbourg court has often had to consider this exception in the case of hate speech, promotion of terrorism, and display of prohibited symbols. In extreme cases, ECHR Article 17 kicks in: Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention. This has been held to limit the possibility of an Article 10 claim when the speech related to incitement to terrorism, Holocaust denial, political ideas incompatible with democracy, and other examples. For example, in Roj TV A/S v Denmark [2018], no. 24683/14, urging viewers to join the PKK and take part in guerrilla action was held to be over the line of Article 17. On the other hand, in Orban v France [2009] no. 20985/05, the banning of a book describing the author's participation in war crimes and lack of regret did not meet the standard, because the objective of the book was held to be contributing to a historical debate. Paragraph 35 of the Orban judgement does admit that if there were an unequivocal goal of justifying war crimes such as torture or summary execution, then the result could have been different: Il n'est pas douteux que des propos ayant sans équivoque pour but de justifier des crimes de guerre tels que la torture ou des exécutions sommaires sont pareillement caractéristiques d'un détournement de l'article 10 de sa vocation. In a specific example of a prosecution and human rights claim based on the question, this is the kind of distinction which might be drawn, looking at the context of the prohibited speech. Results would depend on the speaker (journalist? politician? random person yelling in the street?), mode of speech, what they actually said, and so on. If Article 10 were reached, then the court would examine whether the Czech law and its application were compatible with the caveat in all respects. A custodial sentence of three years might well be found to be excessive, as that is a significant interference with someone's freedom compared to (say) a fine. For example, in Cumpănă and Mazăre v Romania [2004], no. 33348/96, the Grand Chamber held (para 115): Although sentencing is in principle a matter for the national courts, the Court considers that the imposition of a prison sentence for a press offence will be compatible with journalists' freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention only in exceptional circumstances, notably where other fundamental rights have been seriously impaired, as, for example, in the case of hate speech or incitement to violence. Another important safeguard in Article 10 is the requirement that restriction must be "prescribed by law", which entails that a law must be "formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate their conduct; they must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail" (Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano v Italy [2012], no. 38433/09). It might be argued that the law prohibiting approval of a "committed criminal offence" is not clearly applicable to actions in the international sphere where there has not been a criminal conviction. In the same way, restrictions might be justified on the grounds of preventing disorder, or not: it would depend on whether there really is a public order danger. In Vajnai v Hungary [2008], no. 33629/06, wearing a prohibited Communist symbol (a red star) was held not to trigger "actual or even remote danger of disorder". Restrictions have been upheld for actions during protests where there was such a danger. Similar observations apply to the other potential grounds, such as national security or protecting the rights of others. In summary, application of the Czech law could be found incompatible with the Convention rights, depending on the circumstances. The law is not incompatible on its face but it's the situation in a specific case which matters. | There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence. | It depends on the nature of the documents. This law specifies that it is illegal to disclose or publish etc. classified information concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government and there are 4 such subcategories. Violation results in imprisonment up to 10 years. This is an ordinary prohibition. Government employees may also be given access to classified information whose disclosure is not criminal in the general case, but would be illegal for the government employee to disclose owing to his position, under this law. | It is reported that this is the result of new legal reasoning in German law. In the cases of Demjanjuk in 2011 and 2015 it was found that being a camp guard is enough to be found guilty of accessory to murder, even without specific evidence of a crime. In a more recent trial (Rehbogen) the prosecution used the same reasoning to charge and try a concentration camp guard. | Germany would not extradite to Saudi Arabia. India and Kuwait might, because they and a few other countries have extradition treaties with KSA. To put this squarely in the realm of illegal (it's not clear that accidentally encountering Shiite material online is a crime in KSA), assume that the person deliberately watched porn then fled to India. Generally speaking, this is a severe enough offense to allow extradition under the India-KSA treaty. However, India gets to review the request for exceptions. Under article 3, the central question is whether this is a political crime. There are enumerated acts that are not deemed to be political. Watching porn is not a listed exception. Accordingly, India could determine that this is a political crime, and refuse to extradite. If the crime is advocating atheism, however, then under Article 3 (1)(j), this is presumably not an excludable offense, because atheism is officially terrorism in KSA per Royal Decree 44 (I can't find an official copy). On the third hand, India may still reserve the right to apply their definition of terrorism. Even if there were an extradition treaty between Germany and KSA, German law Act on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters of 23 December 1982 §3(1) would currently preclude extradition because Extradition shall not be granted unless the offence is an unlawful act under German law or unless mutatis mutandis the offence would also constitute an offence under German law. There might be acts that are offenses in both countries, but not e.g. "watching porn" or "advocating atheism". The boundaries of blasphemy under German law are not clear to me. Section 166 of the Strafgesetzbuch imposes a maximum of 3 years in prison for blasphemy, so it could be an extraditable offense. Sect. 6 of the "Cooperation" law also sets forth exclusions for reasons of political and religious persecution. Also, KSA would have to assure Germany that the death penalty would not be imposed. | Almost every European nation has a "hate speech" law that makes the use of offensive bigoted words of phrases illegal. The U.S. does not have any such laws, and the First Amendment makes such laws unconstitutional. The closest the U.S. can get are laws criminalizing "Hate Crimes" which are ordinary crimes which were motivated in part or in whole by the victim's actual or perceived protected class status. Other specific examples as mentioned in comments, are that Germany has strict laws about advocacy of Nazi ideology. This is completely legal in the United States. Nazi ideology is not popular in the U.S. by any means, but it's allowed to be advocated for because of the strong Freedom of Speech Laws in the United States. In other regards, while U.S. Law is fairly similar to U.K. Law (you have to get into weeds about the differences), it is way more difficult to sue for defamation in U.S. than in the U.K. For starters, the U.S. has the "Public Person" rule which requires that any defamation about a person who is largely known to the public (politicians and celebrities largely) must prove Actual Malice Or Reckless Disregard for the Truth (I.E. You didn't even do the basic research into the statement) in order to prove defamation. But there's also the matter of the burden of proof. In the U.K. the speaker of the alleged defamation must prove in court that the statement was not defamatory. In the U.S., all legal challenges to are "protected speech" until proven otherwise in a court of law. This means that even with the "Public Person" rule set aside, the statement's original speaker need not prove that their speech is truthful, and the burden's on the accuser of defamation to prove it. Edit: Additional Info based on comments, but "Protected Speech" is a legal term used in the U.S. that defines speech that is protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States as opposed to commercial speech, which is speech used to make advertise or to further commerce and is restricted, and unprotected speech, which is speech that can land one in trouble. While the list of types of speech is long, every form of speech restriction is very very narrowly tailored. "Hate Speech", which would be the utterance of words or phrases that can be offensive to people of a protected class (a characteristic that is beyond the individuals control). "Hate Crimes" are not necessarily spoken during the commission of the crime, but rather can be charged in addition to the crime. Suppose a serial killer was killing people of a certain race, this is not enough for police to go on because most serial killers target victims that meet a physical description (same skin color, same hair color, same gender). Once the killer is captured, police search his apartment and find a manifesto where the killer admits that he is selecting his target because he believes people of this protected class are subhuman and thus his superior nature gives him the right to kill them, this would show that the killings were motivated out of hatred, and thus qualify as a hate crime. The way he phrases this may be purely academic and use in offensive language OR it could be laden with all manner of crass slurs. It doesn't matter... what he said is protected speech but what he did is... well... to quote Guardians of the Galaxy... is "murder... on of the worst crimes of all. So also illegal." Hate crimes criminalize crimes that are motivated by hatred... they do not criminalize speech that is hateful. | A person isn't required to state their evidence that the claim is true when they make the claim, and as a public figure, a defamation suit filed by Trump would be judged under the stronger "actual malice" claim, meaning that the statement was made with knowledge that the claim is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false. You would have to look at the specific statement. It is generally not defamatory to hurl insults like "rapist!", "pedophile!", "criminal!" etc. against a public figure especially a political figure, since such word don't generally amount to an actual accusation of wrong-doing. On the other hand, a detailed but false claim purporting to relate factual events could cross the threshold. Hyperbole is not actionable. | would this be illegal in the U.S.A.? This would almost certainly fail under the US Constitutions 8th Amendment as being a "cruel and unusual punishment": Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted While the inmate has been sentenced to execution, they are still afforded a lot of protection and are entitled to a stay of execution at any point (which is why there is typically an open telephone line to the state governor etc right up to the point at which the execution starts). Being deliberately put in harms way to catch a killer just because they have been sentenced to execution would be both a cruel and an unusual punishment. |
How do you write a contract that anyone can sue on? Privity is a key principle in contract law. Those who are parties to the contract can sue on it. Those who aren't, cannot. Even in contracts where a huge number of people can sue, it's usually because each of that huge number of people is a party to the contract. (For example, ten million people download some open source software, where each individually is a party to an offer and implied acceptance of licensing terms). But what if I wanted to specifically write a contract in which the essence was that anyone could sue to enforce it, not just the parties? What is the magic phrasing, or legal mechanism, to do so? Examples: I want to enter a contract with B, where (as a contractor) I give copyright of software I write for B's business to B, and as part of consideration, B agrees to make it publicly available for free download under an appropriate open source license, within at most 3 years. I want anyone in the world to be able to sue to enforce that, so that it doesn't matter if I've died, or my executors and heirs aren't bothered or lack funds. I want to sell a business, but being ethical, the future owner must agree that spare parts for my product will be maintained available up to 10 years after product discontinuation. Again, as above, I want to be sure that even if I die and my successors in title don't care, any third party can sue to enforce or for damages, if they breach and past model spares aren't maintained. I can imagine that it's possible to set up a trust or prepay/pre instruct a law firm so that things can be done under my authority even so. Or that I could build a mechanism into my will, or a living will, in some way, if the concern is death or incapacity. The problems with these approaches are that, nobody else can enforce those if my representatives can't/won't, and nobody else can claim a right to be involved in the legal decision how my representatives conduct a case (if they do), what they agree to, or how they enforce it. So I'm looking for solutions that directly within the contract wording itself, extend the ability to sue the contracting party for breach, to anyone in the world in some class (or indeed any person in the world if that's the class), even if they weren't a party to the contract and even if they have never themselves explicitly entered a legal relationship with the contracting party. | what if I wanted to specifically write a contract in which the essence was that anyone could sue to enforce it,not just the parties? Intended beneficiaries have standing to sue for a breach of contract that infringes the rights to which the contract entitles them. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §302 et seq. Both of the scenarios you outline convey the existence of intended beneficiaries. Accordingly, the contract only needs to be reasonably clear as to who the intended beneficiaries are. The intended beneficiaries can be identified in terms of persons/entities, classes thereof, or they might be implied from the nature and scope of the contract. By contrast, some jurisdictions are explicit in that incidental beneficiaries lack standing to sue. Two examples are Myers v. Richland County, 429 F.3d 740, 749 (2005) and Boston Executive Helicopters .LLC v. Maguire, 196 F.Supp.3d 134, 142 (2016). See also Hoy v. Incorporated Village of Bayville, 765 F.Supp.2d 158, 173 (2011) ("An intention to assume an obligation of indefinite extension to every member of the public is seen to be the more improbable when we recall the crushing burden that the obligation would impose", citations omitted). | The liability shield is the big one, and it can't be achieved with a contract. Just because the contract says you're not liable, that doesn't make it true. If I sign a contract with my friend that says "Nate Eldredge is hereby the King of France", that won't make me the king, nor will it force anyone except maybe my friend to acknowledge me as the king. By its nature, a contract can only bind the parties to the contract, and has no effect on the rights of anyone else. Suppose, then, that Alice and Bob agree to start a pizza delivery business, using a contract like you suggest. Their delivery car crashes, injuring Carol, a bystander, who incurs medical bills that exceed the assets of the business. Carol decides to sue Alice and Bob personally. Sure, Alice and Bob have a contract, and maybe it prevents them from suing each other, but it certainly doesn't prevent Carol from suing them; Carol never signed it. So Carol can still go after Alice and Bob's personal assets. Thus contract law cannot give them a liability shield. However, the government can, since it makes the laws about who can sue whom under what circumstances. And it has made laws saying that Alice and Bob can be protected from such suits, but only if they form a company according to the process that the law sets forth. So that's what they have to do. | There is no such law; copyright secures exclusive rights for the copyright holder (and related rights sometimes secure certain rights for the author which cannot be sold or given away except through death), but it cannot be used to force them to spend money to distribute it in a form that you can conveniently use. Such a rule would defeat the purpose of copyright law, which is to give the copyright holder control over the use of the work, not take away their ability to do so. You can certainly request that they release the work, and can offer to pay them for doing so. But someone who does not own the copyright or any related rights cannot use copyright law to force the person who does own the copyright to spend their own money to convert a show into a new format. | A plaintiff chooses where to sue, provided that the chosen court has jurisdiction. The laws of the court's jurisdiction will generally apply, although in some cases it will also look at the laws of another relvant jurisdiction. Therefore, the laws of the developer's location, the hosting location, or of any user's location might apply. Often a user agreement of a license will specify that disputes are to be determined under the laws of a particular jurisdiction. Such agreements are often given effect, but some courts disregard them in some circumstances. Crafting an agreement to limit exposure to other laws as much as possible is the kind of thing for which good legal advice is generally needed. | what responsibilities/liabilities does/will his company have given that it's in possession of my property? None. There is no contract (implicit or otherwise) between the owner and you. The owner receives no consideration from you in exchange for storing your goods, and an essential element of contracts is an exchange of considerations. Thus, he has no obligation to continue storing your goods. Another essential element in contract law is that the agreement --meaning the conditions thereof-- be entered knowingly and willfully. Since the time of making the arrangement and up to now, you were reasonably unaware of the likelihood of an obligation to pay the owner. This preempts the owner's right to start billing you. If anything, you would need to prove special circumstances to avail yourself of a viable claim of promissory estoppel. See Havens v. C & D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158, 171-172 (1994): To obtain recovery in promissory estoppel, plaintiff must establish (1) [a] promise which (2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause the promisee to change his position and (3) which does cause the promisee to change his position (4) justifiably relying upon the promise, in such a manner that (5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. However, the viability and duration of any relief pursuant to promissory estoppel seems very unlikely in the situation you describe. The hardship you are undergoing --and which prompted you to store your goods there-- is unfortunate. But generally speaking, a third party (such as the owner) who is unrelated to the causation or prolongation of that hardship cannot be lawfully forced to aid you for free. | Your GPL example detracts from the question: see this recent answer. Setting aside GPL-specific conditions, the legal underpinning of software licensing is copyright law, whereby copying source code or an executable is only allowed with the permission of the copyright holder. There are two partial exceptions: "fair use" (generally not relevant to software), and a specific statutory permission to copy software in particular ways (making a backup, plus the act of executing software which requires copying from disk to memory). The latter permission only applies if you have legally acquired a copy of the software. Which explains why nobody sells copies of software, they sell a license to use software (a subtle, legalistic distinction, which is essential to modern software qua business). The terms of the license say what you may and may not do: if you violate the terms, you do not have permission to copy the software, and are liable for copyright infringement. One limit on the terms is that they cannot take away a right that you already have by copyright law (e.g. "fair use" cannot be negated by a license term). Another limit is that the terms have to be consistent with contract law, hence the license cannot include a human centipede obligation – or, "all your stuff belong to us". When a contract is ambiguous, the ambiguity is construed against the writer, and that is also so with software licenses. Also like the situation with contracts, the terms have to be legal, that is, cannot deny some right or requirement encoded in law. There is a legal requirement that disclaimers have to be "prominent", and that holds of license terms. As for "tricking" a person, that's not supposed to happen, with a proper license. If you put stuff out there and say nothing, nobody has been given permission to copy the item. You can make it available to a specific named person, but that is limited to one person, thus a license includes language allowing anyone to copy, but also requiring that the license be retained with any subsequent copies. Hence B copies from A, and sees the license; B may share with C (assuming a decent license) but must include that or substantially equivalent license; and so on. A problem arises if B redistributes without original license, substituting a bogus license. When C copies, that copying is not done with the permission (implied or express) of A, and C could be open to legal consequences. B is also clearly open to consequences, since re-distribution with the self-perpetuating license is a violation of the terms of A's condition grant of permission. Ignorance of the true ownership of copyright is no excuse, and there is no general innocent-infringement exception to copyright law in the US. However, the part of copyright law that talks about remedies for infringement, 17 USC 504(b)(2) lessens the burden on the innocent infringer: In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. Still, not zero. I don't see how adding some NOPs would make it impossible to prove that you have a copy of someone else's IP. Perhaps it's not a trivial, but still quite possible. | The question reads: I see an NDA as a pseudo-public document, something you need to read in detail before you acknowledge and opt-in to limit rights (discussion of topic/tech). Unfortunately for this view, the law normally sees an NDA as a private contract, except when it is alleged that it violates public policy. If an NDA explicitly or implicitly includes itself in the list of things not to be disclosed, then posting it would be a violation of the contract. In such a case the party posting the agreement would be subject to whatever consequence the agreement specifies for violation, unless that person had a valid defense. The operator of a web site where the document might be posted would not normally ne a party to the agreement, and so would not be liable for hosting it, unless some other limitation applies, beyond the NDA itself. An NDA can indeed be a significant limitation on the signer's freedom to discuss certain topics, and a person would be wise to consider it in detail, and perhaps consult a lawyer, before signing one. But that does not mean that the person should post or distribute it publicly, nor that the person is automatically entitled to consult NDAs that others have signed. There are sufficient sample NDA forms available that a person can compare an offered NDA with other possibilities, and get an idea if an offered NDA goes beyond the usual terms. | No Contracts are not bound by due process. Due process is a rule of how a lawsuit has to be handled, not how a contract is to be handled. All the Due Process clauses in the US constitution simply don't apply. The only things that apply are the contract language, and the underlying/overwriting laws. If your contract stipulates that it is terminated by winning a coin flip against the other party, that's fine. If it stipulates, that you have to find 15 people supporting you in terminating the contract, that's fine. If it states that the other party can terminate for any and all reasons, including no reason, that's what the contract says, and fine. The contract would have to establish that you actually have a process, and how it is handled. My hypothesis is that these common practices combined with the plain language of the TOS of these social media platforms that grant complete autonomous impunity to the platform[...] This part is correct. They have the complete impunity because of how the contract is written. However, that does not make the contract illusory: you can decide not to agree to it and not go to the place, so it is mutual acceptance. Both sides are bound to perform something until the contract is terminated. An illusory contract would be that Alice gets 2000 USD for nothing (only one side performs). But both sides perform. The contract is to follow the TOS in exchange for site access. Both sides offer something: access in exchange for adherence to rules. The claim of non-mutuality is frivolous: If you claim "I don't agree to the TOS and contract", you can't at the same time get the benefits of the contract either: you signed the contract to follow the TOS in exchange to access the site, and if you don't want to follow the TOS, you have to terminate the contract and can't access the site. You can't eat your cake and have it too. Also, there is a severability clause, which is valid: even if a clause would be illegal, it would be replaced by the closest legal clause, overwritten by the legal minimum, or removed, whichever is the least impact. The rest of the TOS is untouched and fully valid. Your conclusion is wrong and meritless. |
What is the advantage to serving your sentence in a federal penitentiary vs a state penitentiary in the Ahmaud Arbery hate crime trial? In the hate crime trial for the murderers of Ahmaud Arbery, the plea deal was rejected because Arbery's family didn't want the defendants to serve time in a federal facility. This NBC article states But Arbery's family balked at the deals, particularly an agreement allowing the men to serve their hate crime sentences first in a federal penitentiary. Why would a federal penitentiary be preferable to a state penitentiary? They were recently convicted on federal hate crime charges, which means they will still have a federal sentence to serve if my understanding is correct. How is the outcome of a conviction different than a plea deal? What is the advantage of serving a sentence in a federal prison? Are the advantages really so great the family would reject a 30-year plea bargain and admission of guilt for it? | What is the advantage of serving a sentence in a federal prison? Are the advantages really so great the family would reject a 30-year plea bargain and admission of guilt for it? Conditions in federal prisons are, on average, much better than in state prisons. This is mostly due to the mix of fellow prisoners. State prisons are mostly filled with "blue collar" criminals convicted of serious violent crimes and more serious property crimes like burglary. As a result, the risk of suffering from violent attacks from fellow prisoners is high. The conditions in Georgia prisons, in particular, tend to be worse than "best practices" for state prison administration would strive to establish. Federal prisons have a large proportion of white collar criminals, non-violent drug offenders, older felons serving time for possession of firearms who are not as violent as they used to be as younger men, and immigration offenders. The most serious offenders, moreover, are often segregated in maximum security prisons where middle aged first time offenders are unlikely to serve their sentences. Federal prisoners are mostly much better behaved in prison than state prisoners. | Overcharging does confer an advantage on the prosecution, specifically, it enhances the prosecutor's position in plea bargaining, allowing the prosecutor to "compromise" while still getting the actual conviction sought. There is also a more tangible issue. If a prosecutor brings a charge that carries the death penalty as a potential sentence, the jury that will be selected in the case is "death qualified". This means that people who are morally opposed to the death penalty are excluded from serving as jurors in the case. But since people opposed to the death penalty are also more likely to acquit a criminal defendant than someone not opposed to the death penalty, a death qualified jury is more likely to convict on each and every one of the charges before it, even if everyone on the jury promptly agrees in deliberations that the prosecutor has not established the death penalty carrying charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, bringing a weak death penalty charge both enhances the odds that there will be a conviction of something at trial, and enhances the plea bargaining position of the prosecutor both due to that greater change of prevailing on the merits at trial, and because the "worst case scenario" still drives the plea bargaining process to a significant extent. Furthermore, jury trials are inherently uncertain ordeals. My working estimate that I share with my clients is that even if the law and the facts seem to perfectly favor one outcome or another, that there is at least a 10% chance that the jury will get the wrong result. And with an additional charge carries the death penalty, or a long term in prison, as a possible sentence, a 10% risk of that happening is enough to strongly encourage a criminal defendant to plea guilty in a case where the defendant might otherwise "roll the dice" at trial if the more serious charge wasn't on the table. There is also a more subtle issue, which isn't precisely "overcharging" but is related. At trial, the prosecution is only allowed to introduce evidence which is "relevant" to the charges presented to a jury. So, for example, suppose that the primary charge at a trial is aggravated assault. In a pure aggravated assault case, the prosecution would probably not be allowed to introduce the fact that the defendant was suspected of being a drug dealer or participant in organized crime. But if a charge of drug dealing the minimum quantity of a drug for a charge of that type that was found in the vicinity of the defendant were brought, even if showing the defendant actually owned those drugs is difficult or impossible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, the drug dealing charge would open up the ability of the prosecution to present all sorts of evidence showing that the defendant was affiliated with a drug dealing cartel. And while this evidence wouldn't be legally relevant to the more serious aggravated assault charge brought, this character attack and legally irrelevant context might sway the jury. Also, even if the jury would have convicted anyway, the presence of additional relevant issues in the case would make it easier for the prosecution to prevail on appeal in the face of a defense argument that the judge improperly allowed the jury to consider irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. As something of an aside, fighting alleged overcharging by the prosecution is one of the core responsibilities of a criminal defense attorney. It is quite rare that someone going to trial on criminal charges is not guilty of some crime (and when this is the case, the criminal defense attorneys' job is the hardest). But it is far more common for there to be a case where a criminal defendant is undeniably guilty of some crime (e.g. larceny), but where some other more serious charge (e.g. robbery or burglary) is marginal at best. Making sure that a criminal defendant is only punished for the crimes that he or she clearly did commit, and not for more serious overcharged crimes, is frequently a major issue for a criminal defense attorney defending someone who is clearly guilty of some crime. | Chapter 26 section 7 of the Swedish Penal Code points to a possible consequence of prison escape: If the sentenced person seriously violates the conditions for the serving of the sentence in a prison, the date for conditional release may be postponed. Such a postponement may amount to at most fifteen days on each occasion of use. Aiding an escape is a specifically-identified crime, but apparently the act of escaping is not, though is would have a negative consequence (we would say that such a treatment is an "infraction", not a separate crime). This article in fn. 7 indicates that it is not a crime in Germany, and The Interwebs tells me the same thing. Mexican law explicitly declares that there is no penalty for prison escape (Article 154, with translation from here) To the prisoner that to escape (from prison) will not be given any penalty, except when it’s in complicity with one or more other prisoners and they perform violence on other people, in which case the penalty is six months to three years in prison. It is a specific crime in the US (governed by individual jurisdictions). The state of Washington in RCW 9A.76.110 makes general prison escape a class B felony. Adjacent provisions increase the severity of the crime if the person is a sexually violent predator (9A.76.115), reduces the crime if it is escape from detention (not pursuant to a conviction), and further reduces the crime if it is just escape from custody (e.g. escapes from the drunk tank). | The decision will be made by whichever country arrests him first (although a minority of countries allow for the trial of people who break their criminal laws in absentia). Needless to say, if nobody manages to arrest him ever, he will not face any criminal consequences except the issuance of an arrest warrant possibly accompanied by a pre-existing conviction in absentia if arrested in countries that allow for such a proceeding. Normally, in these circumstances, either country would have jurisdiction under its own laws to prosecute and punish the criminal, and many extradition treaties would not require the extradition of someone who committed a crime punished domestically in the state in whose custody the criminal is as part of the same course of events. Many countries will not extradite someone if they could face the death penalty in the receiving country. But, sometimes law enforcement in a country with a less serious penalty will intentionally defer to law enforcement in a country with a more serious penalty that is simultaneously trying to arrest him. Ordinarily, law enforcement is not authorized to use deadly force to arrest someone who is simultaneously being arrested by law enforcement from another country against either the arrestee or the law enforcement from the other country. Indeed, using deadly force against another country's law enforcement officers who are carrying out a lawful arrest in their own country would ordinarily be considered an act of war. U.S. double jeopardy provisions of the constitution do not prohibit a second prosecution of an offender in these circumstances because of a first prosecution by another sovereign, but many prosecutors in many countries would decline to prosecute someone a second time for the offense that they have already been convicted of in exercise of their discretion, and many judges would consider time served in another country for the same offense as a factor in setting their own sentence. | I am not a lawyer and I have never even been to the UK. You will not go to prison if your neighbor's dog attacks you and it dies as a result of you defending yourself. You might go to prison and/or owe the owner damages if: You are somewhere you do not technically have a right to be. It can be shown you could have retreated from harm but chose instead to stand your ground. The force you used was deemed excessive - it showed intent to harm the dog more than necessary to protect yourself You contributed to the confrontation in a way that a reasonable person would think might cause trouble You might be able to protect yourself from problems by: taking pictures or videos of the dog behaving badly or aggressively note dates and times when you observe the dog behaving badly or aggressively formally contact the dog's owner with your concerns and/or evidence in which you assert your rights to access the areas you walk through and your right to defend yourself in the event that you are attacked by the dog if possible, change your route or schedule to avoid the problem entirely Good luck | This document answers the question for Vermont. The question "which prison" is not particularly relevant, what matter is "what policies are followed". The DOC defines a reasonably rich set of distinctions, inmates are given a gender preference form at intake, and they do not treat inmates solely on the basis of their identity. There is segregation housing, and an inmate may be assigned to such housing if the facts warrant – and not solely because of their professed or perceived identify. | She does not assume a power to pardon for state crimes. The main impediment is the practical one, since a vague order regarding victimless crimes may not be enforceable. POTUS has historically granted general amnesties, such as Lincoln's Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction which did not specify particular laws that were violated or individuals who violated the laws. Some degree of resistance to such an order (by prison officials and the judiciary) is to be expected, to the extent that the scope of an amnesty is ambiguous. The Lincoln proclamation is clear enough in its scope (it was triggered by taking an oath of allegiance and the persons to whom this remedy was not available are clearly-enough described). There are on the order of 70,000 federal criminal convictions with sentencing every year, so probably over a million cases would be subject to review. She would need to sharpen the criteria, presumably by enumerating the applicable statutes. This may include or exclude convictions for perjury or lying to a federal officer. In an individual case, it could be argued that in this case, lying did not violate the rights of another person, but in that case it did – case by case review could be required. Violation of 18 USC 228 (Failure to pay legal child support obligations) might be considered to have a victim, or not, so just saying "non-violent victimless crimes" leaves open the question whether interstate refusal to pay child support is in the pardoned set. Targeted amnesties such as violation of the Controlled Substances Act could be specific enough that they could be enforced. | tl;dr The community service is unlikely to be valid consideration. Background While the father seemingly intends to induce performance via the offer, as in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 81, judge-ordered community service is an exception. In particular, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 73 says performing a preexisting legal duty does not constitute consideration. For example, in McDevitt v. Stokes, 192 S.W. 681 (Ky. 1917), a breeder who had promised a horse jockey money if he won a race was allowed to renege on the promise because the jockey already had a professional duty to try to win. Likewise, if you promise the police a reward if they bring the person who burgled your house to justice, they already have a preexisting duty to bring the criminal to justice. There's a small window here to argue the opposite if the dad was trying to induce something above and beyond what the judge ordered. united-states |
What happens if someone provides evidence in court without the knowledge of the judge? It is my understanding that the judge must accept (almost?) all evidence admitted into court. So, this leaves me with three questions: What happens if an official shows evidence that the judge hadn't agreed to feature in the trial? What happens if a private citizen does the above? What happens if the evidence happens to be inadmissible? This question was inspired by a question I raised in a comment to this question's answer. A user said it would be a good stand-alone question. | united-states I am answering this in the case of a criminal jury trial (given the context of the previous question). It is my understanding that the judge must accept (almost?) all evidence admitted into court. So, this leaves me with three questions: What happens if an official shows evidence that the judge hadn't agreed to feature in the trial? . . . What happens if the evidence happens to be inadmissible? A trial in a criminal case takes place in a courtroom at a predetermined date and time, with the prosecutor physically sitting at one table in front of a judge and the defendant and the defendant's lawyer physically sitting at another table in front of the judge, and a jury physically sitting in a seating area to the side of the judge, and a witness (usually) physically sitting in a chair on the other side of the judge (in rare circumstances, for minor witnesses, testimony is provided by telephone with the phone put on speaker in the courtroom for all to hear), and a court reporter or tape recorder keeping track of what happens verbatim. In a trial, essentially all evidence comes in through witnesses sitting on a special the chair in front of the judge designated for witnesses (called the witness stand) at the request of either the prosecuting attorney, or the defense attorney. This is the only way the evidence is introduced (other than by stipulations of both side's lawyers). Prosecutors and defense attorneys don't testify or provide evidence themselves. The judge is usually not told what evidence will be offered at trial in advance, although sometimes a pre-trial hearing is held to consider a particularly important piece of evidence's admissibility prior to trial, in a hearing on what is called a "motion in limine" or a "motion to suppress". If that happens, the judge's decision made in advance will be honored by the judge when anyone tries to introduce the evidence at trial. But those are the exception and not the rule. Usually, any witnesses can be asked any questions at trial and the judge does not consider the admissibility of the answer to the question until it is asked and objected to by the other side's lawyer at trial. A defendant can choose to be, but is not required to be, a witness in his or her own case. In a trial, when it is their turn, the prosecution and defense, respectively, ask witnesses to sit at the witness stand one by one and ask them questions, which the witness answers under oath, absent an evidence objection from the other side's attorney. While a witness is on the stand, exhibits such as documents or physical objects can also be introduced into evidence in connection with the authenticating testimony of the witness (except in cases where both sides stipulate to the admission of the documents or other non-testimonial evidence). As the lawyers try to introduce evidence by asking a question to a witness on the stand, or by asking the judge for permission to introduce non-testimonial evidence, the other side's attorney can say, "I object". If that happens, the witness on the stand is not allowed to answer the question and the non-testimonial evidence (e.g. documents, or a knife allegedly used in a crime) is not made available to the jury until the judge rules on whether it is admissible or not in accordance with the rules of evidence. Usually, the judge rules on the evidence objection immediately in the moment, although in rare cases, the judge will let the jury have a break for a few minutes while hearing arguments from the lawyers for both sides on about the relevant evidence rules and/or researching the legal issue, before ruling on the evidence issue. Once the judge rules on the evidence issue, the trial continues immediately. If the judge "sustains" the objection to the evidence, then the question doesn't get asked and/or the jury doesn't get to see the non-testimonial evidence. The lawyer whose question or offer to introduce evidence was successfully objected to moves on to their next question (if any) for the witness instead. If the judge "overrules" the objection to the evidence, then the witness answer the question and/or the jury gets to see the non-testimonial evidence which is "received" into evidence by the judge. This process continues continuously, for as many business days as it takes, until all witness testimony and all non-testimonial evidence has been presented to the court and both sides have told the court that they have presented all of their evidence. Then each side makes closing arguments to the jury, the judge reads the jury instructions of law on how to resolve the case, and the jury is sent to closed room to discuss the case and decide whether to say "guilty" or "not guilty" with respect to each charge brought by the prosecution in the trial. This decision is called a "verdict" and when the jury has made up its mind on all charges present to it, the jury lets the judge know that it has made up its mind, and the judge calls everyone back to the courtroom, and the jury tells the judge what they decided in open court. If the verdict is "not guilty" on all criminal charges in the case, then the case is over, with no post-trial motions and no appeals. If the verdict is "guilty" the defendant is convicted, subject to post-trial motions to declare a mistrial and appeals by the convicted defendant. If the convicted defendant appeals the case, and the judge abused his discretion in overruling an objection to the evidence that is made by the lawyer for the defendant (or the defendant personally if the defendant is not represented by a lawyer), because no reasonable judge could have found that the evidence was admissible under the circumstances, then the appellate court rules that the judge has made an "error". The appellate court will not find that the judge's ruling is an "error" if the judge made the correct decision for the wrong reason. If it is reasonably possible that "error" possibly in combination with other errors made by the trial court judge could have caused a convicted criminal defendant to have been acquitted by the jury if the errors weren't made by the judge, then the defendant gets a new trial. The new trial usually before the same judge with a new jury. But the new trial is before a different judge and a new jury if the judge is no longer a judge on the court for any reason, or if the judge has been so defiant of the appellate court (typically ignoring its instructions in a retrial after a first appeal) that the appellate court decides it must remove the judge from the case. A criminal defendant is only acquitted by an appellate court if the appellate court finds that it would be impossible under any circumstances for the defendant to be convicted in a new trial, possibly with different evidence presented by the prosecution. What happens if a private citizen does the above? This doesn't make sense. Private citizens don't rule on the admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial, and can't introduce evidence in a criminal trial except at the request of a prosecuting attorney or defendant's attorney by being called as a witness and asking the questions that the lawyers (and sometimes the judge as well) asks the witness. Witnesses are not allowed to volunteer testimony or provide documents to a jury unless asked to do so by a lawyer in the case. What happens if someone provides evidence in court without the knowledge of the judge? As the process described above should make clear, this is basically impossible absent some extremely irregular event on the same level of irregularity as someone bribing a jury or threatening a jury with harm if he votes the wrong way. | What factors might a court consider in these circumstances? Is it true that anyone can just walk up and file a document in any case, with no requirement to identify themselves? If nobody admits to filing a document, it is likely that the court would grant a motion to strike the document and disregard it (revising a past ruling if the issue was raised within the six months allowed for reconsidering rulings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) or the state equivalent). A court document must, on its face, indicate a filing person and be signed to be accepted by the clerk of the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or the state equivalent. But, if the document appears on its face to be legitimate, the person filing it will not generally be required to prove their identity. This happens even less often now than it used to (in the past, fake filings were often made by members of "sovereign citizens" movements to harass governmental officials), because in both the state courts were I practice and in federal court, documents must usually be filed with the court by lawyers via e-filing using a password protected e-filing account. Usually, only parties without lawyers and out of state lawyers who are still in the process of setting up their e-filing account file court documents in person. When documents are filed in person, they are also often delivered via courier rather than by the person who actually signed the documents. And, as a matter of practical reality, third-parties almost never file fake documents in court (in part, because there is usually someone present who is in a position to call attention to the fraud to the court). Still, this can happen, although it is very rare. I've only seen a situation like this come up once in twenty years of practice. (My account below oversimplifies some of the technical details of what happened to get to the gist of the points relevant to this question.) In that case, a lawyer was representing an ex-husband in a post-decree alimony modification case that had been appealed filed a bill of costs that she sought to recover on behalf of her client for the appeal, but she filed it in the wrong court (she filed it in the appellate court where she had represented her client, rather than, as required, in the trial court where another attorney had represented the ex-husband). When an order awarding him costs was not entered by any court, the ex-husband filed an (untimely) bill of costs in the trial court under his appellate lawyer's name using the appellate filing as a model, without her consent, by forging her name on the document. The lawyer didn't discover this (because she was retained only in the appeal and had never entered an appearance in the trial court and thus didn't have access to the trial court file, and because the court doesn't automatically send you a copy of your own filings) until I responded on behalf of the ex-wife to the forged bill of costs alleging that it was untimely which I served a copy of upon the ex-husband's lawyer as required by the rules. At that point, the ex-husband's lawyer immediately called me and the court to explain that she did not file this document and that it was forged (otherwise should could have been sanctioned for knowingly filing the bill of costs knowing that it was out of time and was frivolous at that point and could have been deemed to be responsible for further trial court proceedings of the ex-husband in the case, like keeping him appraised of deadlines, court rulings and filings by other lawyers in the case, since it appeared that she'd participated in the trial court case). Ultimately, the court declined to award the costs because they were filed in an untimely manner and because they were not really filed by the lawyer as claimed. So, the the court disregarded the bill of costs and denied this relief to the ex-husband. (If I was the judge, I would have hauled the ex-husband into court and held him in contempt of court sua sponte, but in this very busy court where hearings in divorcees are often scheduled two or more years out from the scheduling date, the judge didn't have the time to devote to issues like that.) | Here is an excellent (and extensive) explanation of jurisprudence regarding the "good faith exception" to the admissibility of evidence found due to an error. In short: Yes, the contraband found in Unit B would be evidence admissible in court. (Of course, evidence found in Unit B would only support charges against whomever had a nexus to that property. If the owner of Unit C had no access to Unit B, then evidence in Unit B would not per se implicate him in a crime.) Law enforcement will not return seized property if it believes the property is "contraband." As an example, in Pennsylvania a person can petition a court for return of property seized by law enforcement: Rule 588 requires the petitioner to establish entitlement to lawful possession of the property, but the motion will be rejected if the State successfully argues that the property is contraband, or "derivative contraband" (which has been defined in case law to mean there is "a specific nexus between the property and criminal activity"). | National security letters can compel the production of some kinds of (non-"content") user data, and (according to Wikipedia) typically contain a nondisclosure requirement forbidding the recipient of the letter from disclosing it. I assume that a witness has received and complied with a national security letter, and a non-government party wants to ask the witness questions which outside the courtroom, the witness would be forbidden to answer by the national security letter. The witness, or the government if represented in the lawsuit in question, may object to the questions. The purpose which justifies the secrecy requirements of a national security letter is also likely to justify the exercise of state secrets privilege. If the judge thinks a statute might otherwise be violated, they might intervene in the absence of any objection, or consider alternative remedies like an in camera hearing. If the court does not intervene to prevent the evidence being given, and the witness is charged with breaching the secrecy law, this would raise complex questions about the interpretation of the law imposing criminal penalties. The common law doctrine of absolute privilege for witnesses giving evidence in judicial proceedings applies in the United States, and could be raised in defence to any criminal charges. | It is true that judges in the US have absolute immunity from any lawsuit for damages arising from their performance of judicial functions. This applies even if those actions were corrupt, malicious, or illegal. The only exceptions to a judge's immunity to a lawsuit is if the conduct alleged was not a judicial action, or if the judge was acting in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See, among others, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9. However, the term "lawsuit" doesn't refer to criminal charges. Footnote 1 of Mireles specifically says criminal liability isn't blocked by judicial immunity. While a judge can't be sued for damages for rigging a trial, the judge can be prosecuted for doing that. | In the US, they would not be automatically prosecuted. The prosecutor would have to find out about the testimony, decide to prosecute, and go through all the normal processes they otherwise would, but they have an additional piece of evidence. Per the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution, a witness cannot be forced to answer a question that would incriminate them. If the question was objected to on this ground and the objection overruled, the witness' answer would not be admissible against that witness at trial, and the prosecutor would have to prove the case using other evidence. | You appear to be conflating two different legal concepts: evidence and proof. evidence something that furnishes proof: testimony; specifically: something legally submitted to a tribunal to ascertain the truth of a matter proof the cogency of evidence that compels acceptance by the mind of a truth or a fact So evidence is presented to a tribunal who will then decide if that evidence meets the required burden of proof. In a civil matter the burden of proof is met on the preponderance of evidence (in a criminal matter the burden is beyond reasonable doubt) and the onus of proof rests with the person making the allegation. Preponderance is based on the more convincing evidence and its probable truth or accuracy, and not on the amount of evidence. Thus, one clearly knowledgeable witness may provide a preponderance of evidence over a dozen witnesses with hazy testimony, or a signed agreement with definite terms may outweigh opinions or speculation about what the parties intended. Certified mail is evidence (very strong evidence) that something was mailed and delivered. It is, as you rightly point out not evidence of what it contained. So let's follow through with your IRS hypothetical: No Certified Mail The IRS alledges that you did not file your tax return - they have the burden of proof. As evidence, they put forward an affidavit that no return was filed. You put forward an affidavit that you did file a return. The judge considers the evidence and (probably) gives more veracity to the IRS's affidavit than yours - the IRS have met their burden of proof. Certified Mail 1 The IRS alledges that you did not file your tax return - they have the burden of proof. As evidence, they put forward an affidavit that no return was filed. You put forward an affidavit that you did file a return and the proof of delivery from the USPS. The judge considers the evidence and (probably) considers that the IRS has recieved something from you: if it wasn't a tax return then they were in a position to give evidence as to what it was, and they didn't - given that it is the IRS that is obliged to prove that what they receieved wasn't a tax return, the IRS have not met their burden of proof. Certified Mail 2 The IRS alledges that you did not file your tax return - they have the burden of proof. As evidence, they put forward an affidavit that no return was filed but they did recieve an envelope stuffed with newspaper clippings and here they are. You put forward an affidavit that you did file a return and the proof of delivery from the USPS and you have no idea how they changed from a tax return to newspaper clippings in transit. The judge considers the evidence and (probably) gives more veracity to the IRS's affidavit than yours - the IRS have met their burden of proof. | To what standard does the evidence need to be convincing so that the judge is satisfied that a jury could “reasonably convict” the defendant? The High Court expanded on the answer to this question in Mitchell, the decision you cited, at [32]: [In R v Kim [2010] NZCA 106] the Court of Appeal discussed the meaning of “insufficient to justify a trial” in the context of sufficiency of evidence: It is for the jury to determine whether the evidence is, or is not, sufficient to establish guilt. It is not for the Judge to predict what the jury will find. The test is whether the evidence, if accepted by the jury, is sufficient in law to prove the essential elements of the charge to the required standard. If so, the Judge should leave the case to the jury and not withdraw it on evidentiary grounds. Can circumstantial/cumulative evidence be sufficient? In 2015, Dr Chris Gallavin, Dean of Law at Canterbury University, wrote: Circumstantial evidence is the bedrock of inferential reasoning. As advocates, we are well aware that a case is not “weak” by virtue of it being based upon circumstantial evidence alone (a common misconception). Circumstantial evidence will often form the base of a strong case, again, in both the criminal and civil jurisdiction alike. Does this evidence meet the standard asked about above? Unfortunately this question is not allowed, because the rules state: Please don't ask questions seeking legal advice on a specific matter. These are off-topic for Law Stack Exchange. While users generally contribute answers in good faith, the answers are not legal advice, and contributors here are not your lawyer. The test of “insufficient to justify a trial” is somewhat Delphic because it calls for an evaluative judgment. That judgment can only be formed by a court with relevant jurisdiction. |
How to lend money to a friend in Germany with the possibility to enforce return if he doesn't pay back? I hope the title itself is clear. I want to lend money to a friend, are there any legal ways that I can make some sort of a 'contract' for the return? What is the most practical way? | Choice of jurisdiction: You’re pretty much free to choose your jurisdiction. You don’t have to contract under German law. The German state will intervene though if you’re doing criminal stuff. Legally, the best is of course to draft a written agreement. You’re completely free in the terms (unless it becomes immoral, § 138 BGB), but a loan, § 488 BGB (Darlehensvertrag), with a 0% interest rate (if it’s meant as a short-term aid) is standard. The next level is to collateralize your loan, specifically with a pledge, §§ 1204 ff. BGB, i. e. your friend gives you a valuable item which you may (and actually have to) sell for profit if he doesn’t return the loan. However, unlike contract law, in property law you are not completely free regarding the terms (numerus clausus of property law, Typenzwang des Sachenrechts). Here it becomes too difficult though for the layman, so I wouldn’t recommend that unless you know what you’re doing. Ultimately, I/we think it’s nice of you to consider helping out your friend, but as Nike Dattani already portrayed it can get really nasty if you intend to legally enforce such matters. Trish mentioned the saying: Friendship ends where business begins. I, too, suggest to refer your friend to a pawnshop, research (third-party) microloan opportunities, and help him without directly giving him cash, dine together and offer company (i. e. address the psychological dimension financial troubles entail). PS: § 9 SGB Ⅰ: Germany is (to some degree) a welfare state. Maybe your friend is eligible for some kind of assistance. However, and probably typical of Germany, if you want to get money, you have to fill in forms. | Terms in a contract that are not legal or not enforcable are quite capable of causing you trouble and costing you time or money, most likely a generous amount of both. Your friend shouldn't care one bit about whether these terms would be legal and/or enforcable. If he doesn't like them, then he MUST NOT accept the changed contract. Not if these terms are illegal and unenforceable and of course even less if they are legal and enforceable. I would write back "I believe that the suggested change in terms is illegal and would be unenforceable. I also believe that the change is deeply unfair towards me and creates a considerable legal risk that I am not willing to accept under any circumstances. I therefore strongly reject your suggested change. " | According to the United States Treasury Department: Money laundering is the process of making illegally-gained proceeds (i.e. "dirty money") appear legal (i.e. "clean"). Typically, it involves three steps: placement, layering and integration. First, the illegitimate funds are furtively introduced into the legitimate financial system. Then, the money is moved around to create confusion, sometimes by wiring or transferring through numerous accounts. Finally, it is integrated into the financial system through additional transactions until the "dirty money" appears "clean." I have no idea if the $10m are proceeds of crime so we apply the duck test - "If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck and swims like a duck; its probably a duck" A person has gifted another person $10m - there is nothing illegal about giving someone a gift, however, this is a pretty substantial gift. I am calling it a gift because there is no enforceable contract that requires repayment. There is an expectation that the receiver will invest this money for a period of time, hey, if I had $10m I'd probably invest it too. And then return it to the giver; with or without the earnings (you do not say). Again there is nothing wrong with reciprocating a gift; reciprocity is a cornerstone of most societies, however, this is a pretty detailed understanding of what reciprocity means. Quack, quack, quack - its money laundering. Many jurisdictions in the world have "unexplained wealth" laws which basically require a person to explain their unexplained wealth or have it confiscated. If it isn't money laundering it is certainly at risk of this. | On the first page of https://www.gov.uk/duty-free-goods/overview you find: "You can bring some goods from abroad without having to pay UK tax or ‘duty’ (customs charges), as long as they’re for your own use." And on the next page "... will use them yourself or give them away as a gift". This clearly doesn't cover anything that you bring into the UK to sell it. And a bit further on the site it says "You must tell customs (known as ‘declaring’) on arrival in the UK if you have goods: ... that you plan to sell". Since you are asking here, it is quite obvious that you intend to sell :-) You said "e.g. say this guys comes every month from Russia to France for unrelated business, each time he fills up his luggage with the maximum allowed amount of goods that comply with custom laws". If this guy sells the stuff to you, then the maximum allowed amount of goods to import without paying taxes is zero. Once he is willing to pay taxes, there is no limit. Obviously regularly importing things from Russia or France and selling in the UK at a profit means that he is running a business in the UK, which means he would have to register a business, pay corporation taxes etc. It's all a matter of degree; for small amounts nobody cares (up to some limit you don't need to register a business or pay taxes; I don't know the details). | It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages. | In Austria they have a law about "Kreditschädigung" (website from the Austrian government, "credit damage") translated by Google as: Because of credit damage, a person is liable to prosecution if he or she asserts incorrect facts and thereby harms or endangers the credit, the acquisition or professional advancement of another person. A prison sentence of up to six months or a fine of up to 360 daily rates is provided for the offense of credit damage. If you setup a webpage which lists things which might harm somebody's business, you have to proof that every single claim you make is correct (not just your individual experience). So if you have solid proof for each of your claims of your Q&A, you might win a probable law suite. The way you wrote it, it might be difficult to proof because it seems to be your personal experience. See also here for details. (in German). | If you paid by a credit card, the proper procedure is to simply do a chargeback. If the hotel doesn't back down, then the credit card network will hold arbitration. I wouldn't expect them to win, since they don't have anything but their word for it. The hotel does have the option of suing you, but it's unlikely that they will do so for £200, and again they don't have much of a case. Their third option is to just report it to credit reporting agencies as a unpaid debt. For this, there's not much you can do other than have the fact that you dispute it included in your file. Theoretically, you could sue them for defamation, but that would be impractical. | My story: UK passport holder, resident in Switzerland, driving from Houston to San Antonio and stopped doing 105mph in a 60mph section of highway. I was given the citation and instructions, etc., but told the officer I was leaving in 2 days and may not be able to tend to it in time. On my return to Switzerland, I called the court and asked how I could pay. I was told I could get a money order from the post office, to which I replied, "Really, the Swiss Post office will issue U.S. money orders?" After a further 15 minutes of conversation about how I was willing but unable to pay, the officer said, "Well, I guess that we ain't commin' to Switzerland to get you so just ignore it!" I asked if I could have that in writing and he asked me to write to the court and explain my situation. 3 weeks later and I received a reply saying all was forgiven and I should have no problem re-entering the U.S. or the State of Texas. So my advice would be to call them, and act willing to pay. Things may have changed and you may be able to pay with a credit card, but if you act willing and they are unable to accept your payment, then as long as you have a paper trail, you should be fine. I have entered the U.S. dozens of times since and have even sponsored visas for others. |
Does alternate spelling provide sufficient differentiation to avoid trademark infringement? In Australia, one infringes on another's trademark if: The sign1 is substantially identical or deceptively similar or: The goods or services are closely related or in the same description or: The trade mark is “well known” Question Would a company be infringing on another's trademark if it had the same business name but for one character? Assumptions Please assume: the companies have completely different logos the companies both sell assorted general-purpose products (like in a department store) the difference in names is from either the omission, addition, or replacement of one character the names are phonetically identical, despite the different spelling 1 I think 'Sign' means 'logo'. | I think you will find that "sign" here means "mark" and includes a word, a phrase, or a logo, or a combination of any of these. Indeed section 6 of the act defines this: "sign" includes the following or any combination of the following, namely, any letter, word, name, signature, numeral, device, brand, heading, label, ticket, aspect of packaging, shape, colour, sound or scent. The main test is whether the two marks are "confusingly similar" or whether prospective customers are likely to be confused into thinking that one seller is actually the other, or into attributing to one the goodwill or reputation of the other. (This standard is much the same under US law or the laws of a good many other countries.) This is a very fact-intensive determination, and is to some extent a judgement call. But a difference in one letter only, with little or no difference in sound, might well be sufficiently similar to cause confusion. Note that section 10 of the law defines this: For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion, and thus this might well be a case of infringement. Note that for infringement to be found, in addition to the marks being "deceptively similar", the goods or services must also be similar or in the same category, (or goods "closely related" to protected services or vice versa) unless the mark being infringed on is "well known". | It's best to use formal names in legal documents. For example, Ringo Starr's musical compositions are credited to Richard Starkey. If you have a business that wishes to do business under a name other than its legal name, you can investigate d/b/a ("doing business as") designation. For the purpose of a single contract or other document, you can usually include language that designates a name for the business such as "this agreement is between Full Name Incorporation, Inc, hereinafter known as Trademark®, and...." You shouldn't do any of this in real life, however, without first discussing it with your lawyer. If you believe that there is business value in calling your company "Foo" when its actual name is "Bar Corp," then surely that value warrants some expense to find a lawyer who will defend the validity of the company's contracts in court, should that become necessary. | Anyone seriously planning on doing this or anything like it would be well advised to consult a good trademark lawyer with the specifics. Specifics will matter in such a case. That said: Under US trademark law, the key question is whether a reasonable person would be confused into assuming that there is some connection, and that the new firm could be relied on based on the reputation of the old one. if so, this is a trademark infringement unless permission is obtained from the trademark holder (not likely to be granted). Since "orbitz" is a coined term its protection is stronger, there is no natural object or concept this can refer to. "AppleMoving" is less likely to be confused with "Apple Computers" because apples are real things and need not refer to computers. The likelihood of confusion depends on the specific facts of an individual case. Note also that trademark protection is a matter of private civil lawsuits. If orbitz didn't choose to sue for whatever reason, nothing would have stopped OrbitzMoving. | Under United States law: Using a trademark solely to refer to files compatible with a trademarked program would be allowed under the doctrine of nominative fair use. The Ninth Circuit sets out the three-part test for nominative fair use in New Kids on the Block v. New America Pub, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992): "[T]he product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark" "[O]nly so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service" "[T]he user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder." Simply referring to the name of a trademarked program to describe its file format (and not doing so in a way that suggests "sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder," such as slapping a "Certified Adobe Photoshop Compatible" sticker on the box or something like that) would meet these requirements. The International Trademark Association elaborates a bit on the doctrine and gives some examples here. | Yes, they can be. In the example given in the question, there is an additional factor which is that the possibly-infringing company is in a different line of business, which means that it might be possible to use the exact same name without infringing trademark. For example, there are Dove soap and Dove chocolate. (This possibility is probably more remote with a distinctive, novel name such as YouTube.) Trademark protection is supposed to prevent others from confusing consumers. For example, if the graphic design or other branding of the hypothetical youtub were sufficiently similar to that of YouTube that consumers might actually think that YouTube had branched out into the plumbing fixtures industry, then a court would likely find trademark infringement. (Such elements are often protected trademarks in their own right, of course, independent of the world mark; for example, UPS has trademarked "the color brown" in connection with package delivery services.) If a company started using the youtub brand to host and serve digitized video recordings, a finding of infringement is more likely still, even in the absence of other similarities. This would be especially true if it appeared that the name had been chosen explicitly to draw customers from the YouTube site, and that would probably be fairly easy to demonstrate in court. | Yes, the SFC doesn't allow the usage of the term "git" for third-party products unless they have their permisison. From the Git Trademark Policy, 2.3 Prohibited usages of the Marks: In addition, you may not use any of the Marks as a syllable in a new word or as part of a portmanteau (e.g., "Gitalicious", "Gitpedia") used as a mark for a third-party product or service without Conservancy's written permission. For the avoidance of doubt, this provision applies even to third-party marks that use the Marks as a syllable or as part of a portmanteau to refer to a product or service's use of Git code. | As usual with trademarks, the key question is "will reasonable people be confused about the source or affiliations of the product or service". Trademarks are, as you already know, limited to a particular industry or area of business, in general. Displaying user videos is not exactly the same thing as a particular popular song, but they just might be close enough for some consumer confusion tom occur. Whether reasonable people are in fact confused into thinking that the app is in some way sponsored by the makers of the song is a question of fact. A trademark suit would probably need to present some sort of evidence that confusion had occurred or was likely. It also may make a difference whether "Tik Tok" has been registered as a trademark. In the US, registration gets greater protection than mere use. (In some countries there is no protection without registration.) It is also possible that the app has already licensed the rights to the term from the trademark owner for the song. This would avoid a potential suit. It is also worth noting that the term "Tik Tok" is not original with the song. It dates back, in that spelling, to at least the "Oz" books by L. Frank Baum and others Tik-Tok of Oz dates from 1914, and the character of the Tik-Tok from the book Ozma of Oz (1907). Terms that are not original coinages are less strongly protected in trademark law, and the app could claim to be alluding to the Oz character, not the more recent song. A comment by ub3rst4r says that: the term "Tik Tok" is registered as a trademark in the USA by "Bytedance Ltd" (which is the company that operates the app). If that is correct, the US Patent and Trademark office (PTO) came to at least a preliminary conclusion that this trademark did not infringe anyone else's trademark. That doesn't meant that an infringement suit is doomed, but it would make any such suit harder and less likely. It seems that, as described in this news story a company selling watchs under the name "Tic Tok" was sent a cease and desist letter on behalf of the singer Kesha Sebert. The firm responded by filing a suit for a declaratory judgement. The case is Wimo Labs LLC v. Kesha Sebert, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, No. 1:11-cv-02978. However, google does not show any resolution of this case, one way or the other. This was brought to my attention in a comment by StephanS. As this docket record shows, the case was dismissed by agreement without prejudice, apparently after a settlement (as stated in the comment by user muru). Thus there was no ruling on the merits of the case. | united-states If the computer is in fact a HAL-9001 (no doubt running the Clarke-68 OS) then the reseller can so describe it without trademark infringement. This is a case of nominative use, where the trademark is used as the name of the thing, to describe and/or refer to it. In addition, under US law, an attempt to prohibit the reseller from using that term would run into first amendment issues, and would be subject to strict scrutiny. If the term were used in such a way as to disparage the brand, there could possibly be an action for tarnishment of the trademark. but such actions are now limited in the US on first amendment grounds, following the case of Matal v. Tam. See What is trademark tarnishment or dilution under US law? for more details. |
Can a couple be charged for spending $120,000 deposited to their bank account in error? A couple is being charged for spending $120,000 which was deposited to their account in error (also see this PennLive article) This is in Pennsylvania, USA. The facts are presented as follows: One day, couple wakes up to $120,000 extra dollars due to teller error. The money was intended for a business. They are aware that this must be an error but spend the money anyway. The bank wants the money back. The couple quits talking to the bank. The couple is charged with theft and receiving stolen property. I am very confused how they can be charged with either of these things. In the case of theft, I think it is fairly plain the couple did nothing to receive the money. No act on their part caused the money to enter their account. I think most reasonable people would agree that at that point, they "have" the money, and what they do with it after that is irrelevant to whether it was stolen. If this is not the case, and the act of spending the money is the theft, then it implies that any money in anyone's account is not theirs, which I seriously doubt a jury would agree with. With regards to receiving stolen property, there are two options. My claim above is true, and the couple did not steal the money. If the property then is "stolen," the uncomfortable implication is that the bank stole the money. (Teller Error, I don't think, counts as theft). My claim above is untrue, in which case, it's hard to argue they received it at all, since they are the thieves (the reception becomes trivial). It seems to me that the prosecution is doomed if the couple decides to go to trial. What's going to give the prosecution a chance to succeed? If they are doomed, why bother filing the charges at all? Note: I am aware of statues in the case of mail where receiving mail which is not yours and failing to make a reasonable attempt to return it is theft. I am unaware of any similar banking statues. EDIT: The couple did something wrong. I am not disputing that. I simply don't see how either choice in charge by the prosecution results in a conviction. | Broadly speaking, theft offences in common law jurisdictions are defined as the dishonest appropriation of property that belongs to another with intent to deprive the rightful owner of it, without proper authority (e.g. permission or legal right to do that). Appropriation means the assumption of the rights of ownership of the property, i.e. behaving as if you were now its owner, not simply or solely the taking of the property. Possible defences include absence of intent to deprive the rightful owner of the property and intent to search for the rightful owner of the property and return it to them. You say: The facts are presented as follows: One day, couple wakes up to $120,000 extra dollars due to teller error. The money was intended for a business. They are aware that this must be an error but spend the money anyway. The bank wants the money back. The couple quits talking to the bank. The couple is charged with theft and receiving stolen property. I don't know about the charge of receiving stolen property (unless that relates to how they transferred or spent the money) but on the facts presented it's certainly prima facie theft. Reportedly, by their own admissions they found money in their account that wasn't theirs, they knew it wasn't theirs and they spent it. | Presumably, they at least took a report which could make it possible to file an insurance claim for the stolen phone. But, a good faith belief of law enforcement that is unable to figure out who committed the crime with the resources available to them is a legitimate reason not to investigate and prosecute a crime, even in countries with legal systems based upon the German one where prosecutors have an enforceable legal obligation to prosecute criminal offenses known to them. A prosecutor can't bring a case unless he knows who did it. And, the police may be wise not to try to investigate a crime that previous experience has proven to them is a dead end most of the time for a crime of modest economic value. Most cases of simple larceny are never solved. And, institutionally, the police have to balance the cost of investigating the crime against the seriousness of the crime. Murders and kidnappings are almost always going to take priority for police resources over stolen phones, particularly if investigating the phone theft may require international cooperation that makes the investigation more costly. A key point is that the mere fact that a phone is pawned doesn't mean that the person pawning it is necessarily committing a crime, so even if you find out where the phone is in some pawn shop (possibly in Albania or Turkey, by now), that doesn't mean that the job is over. That person could have bought it innocently and at fair market value from a flea market, from someone who could have gotten it from someone who received it innocently as a gift, from a friend of a criminal fence, who may have bought it not innocently from a true thief. In fact, because criminals respond to incentives like anyone else, it is far more likely that the phone was swiftly "laundered" along the lines I suggest in this example, than it is that it is still in the possession of someone close to the thief. But, only the fence and the thief would have criminal liability. It is a lot harder to solve the crime of a stolen cell phone than you would think, and the agency may simply not be able to justify the resources it would take to investigate that case properly to a situation where someone had a phone stole that was worth maybe 400 Euros in used condition. The more you can do to solve the crime, the more likely it is that they will find that it is worth further investigating until a thief can be identified and apprehended. For example, the company with the network that serves the phone might be willing to cooperate with its owner. Also, the more that you can do to show that this case might crack an entire ring of people involved in a black market in stolen cell phones might make it more attractive to law enforcement. | You didn't post the details of what exactly is involved with a "vampire initiation fee": is this simply the purchase of an physical object? Or the purchase of a service, such as the placing of a spell or the providing of the service of alleged protection from vampires? Or is this some form of a real "Advance-fee scam" where money and banking credentials or personal information is involved? (See link below). But in the big picture, one person's scam is another person's persuasive business sales pitch for an unusual item or service. Simply being able to pay for such an item or service doesn't make the sale - or the contract to sell it - illegal everywhere. It may be the case that selling an "vampire initiation fee" does not happen to be illegal in Nigeria. Illegal in the US, possibly yes. illegal there? Maybe not. Contract laws differ; in the US, contracting for something that is illegal voids the contract. In Nigeria, maybe not. Though the "vampire initiation fee" doesn't sound to me like a classic Advance-fee scam (Wikipedia), Google search on 419 scams and the results will tell you that it will be nearly impossible to get a prosecutor in that country to deal with anything like that, even if it is a real scam that promises lots of money for an upfront fee. Prosecutors have much better things to do. And you might have to go to Nigeria to make your case; see other answers that more fully outline the laws and legal aspects. Good luck. And it's better to spend your money on some garlic and a mirror. 7/03/18 Update re: the email transcript linked in question That's not a scam; the person is simply trying to sell you on the initiation fee. There is no crime. There is no promise of more money for a small fee (and bank credentials or personal information) like a typical 419 advance fee scam. You're not producing useful evidence for a prosecutor by engaging in the email and mostly agreeing to pay him. It's not illegal for you to send money by Western Union for the vampire fee. Even if you did send money, you're not being defrauded because you already know the vampire initiation is fake, and as a result you couldn't logically prove to a prosecutor or court that you were scammed. He's not guilty of fraud as no money has changed hands for a (fraudulent) service. Emailing with him might make you feel good by wasting his time, but that's all. | It has been investigated, it simply has not been prosecuted. The investigation started when someone reported suspicious activity in Hastert's accounts. The investigation proceeded from a belief that he was being blackmailed. After listening to a wire of a conversation between Hastert and the alleged blackmailer, the officers investigating decided it was not a simple case of him being blackmailed--they or the prosecutors' office used their discretion to go after Hastert for illegally structuring his payments to avoid anti-money-laundering reporting laws, and to my knowledge have not yet pursued any blackmail charge. Police and Prosecutors have very wide discretion regarding what charges they bring. In addition, it is very common to have a civil lawsuit brought that implicates criminal laws, but not have the criminal violations be charged. For example, if you steal a purse you go to jail, but if you steal a building you are rarely charged with a criminal offense. It is rarely to a civil litigant's advantage to bring up criminal matters and there are ethical rules limiting the interaction between the two. | My recollection is there's a big difference between money and property. I found a 1929 law journal article that supports my recollection. The owner of stolen property is entitled to have it returned. If the person who obtained it from the thief didn't know it was stolen, the person didn't commit a crime, but must give up the property and is not entitled to any compensation (unless the person can get compensation from the thief). A person who innocently receives money is the holder in due course, and gets to keep it. The victim's only recourse is to get compensation from the thief. | There is no significance to using the words "I" or "we", nor does it matter that you didn't sign the surrender paper (after al, you did not have possession of the vehicle and it is not yours to surrender). You will have gotten a notice, at the beginning of this process (when the loan was taken out) that provides information like this, in particular The creditor can collect this debt from you without first trying to collect from the borrower. The creditor can use the same collection methods against you that can be used against the borrower, including suing you or garnishing your wages. If this debt is ever in default, that fact may become a part of your credit record. When you are a loan co-signer, that means the creditor can go after you and you alone to get the money. Since it seems the creditors are pursuing you both, that beats the alternative that you have to sue her to get anything. Since there is no question that money is owed, the point of the trial is to decide who pays it: it will be one or both of you, and it won't be that the bank has to take a loss. Your attorney's job is to argue that it should not be you (her attorney's job is to argue that it should be you). Your concern should be that it's too difficult to get the money from her, and easy to get the money from you, which is why you need to hire a good attorney. | "Fraud" is a broad term. In the first 9 months of Fiscal Year 2015, the US Government prosecuted 5173 white collar crimes, according to Syracuse University's Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. This includes mail fraud, bank fraud, conspiracy to defraud the US, identity theft, health care fraud, wire fraud, and others (listed in the link). Federal prosecutors have a large amount of discretion in when to bring charges. See The Department of Justice Policy on Charging and Sentencing and Title 9 of US Attorney's Manual, Section 27 (Principles of Federal Prosecution). These are not laws, but internal department guidance to prosecutors that outline the factors they should consider when making charging decisions. There is quite a lot of detail in these guidelines, but at the highest level, they are summed up by this paragraph from the Attorney General's memo: Accordingly, decisions regarding charging, plea agreements, and advocacy at sentencing must be made on the merits of each case, taking into account an individualized assessment of the defendant's conduct and criminal history and the circumstances relating to commission of the offense (including the impact of the crime on victims), the needs of the communities we serve, and federal resources and priorities. The US Attorney's Manual gives very specific guidance regarding the prosecution of various forms of fraud. For example, Title 9, Section 43 covers mail and wire fraud. Here is an excerpt: Prosecutions of fraud ordinarily should not be undertaken if the scheme employed consists of some isolated transactions between individuals, involving minor loss to the victims, in which case the parties should be left to settle their differences by civil or criminal litigation in the state courts. | Yes, it's illegal new-south-wales s118 of the Crimes Act says: Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. QED |
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