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Should I get divorce before I can marry again in the US? I am in the US with F-2 visa. My husband and I are not US citizens or Green Card holders. We are here with F-1 and F-2 visas and our marriage happened in our home country. Now I want to marry with a US citizen. What is the procedure I must do? Is it necessary to go to my home embassy in the US and request a divorce there. Then after it accepted and happened, take this paper to a US court to get permission to marry again? Can we do our divorce in the US without going to our home country embassy and no need to get any paper from them? *** Should I leave the US after getting divorce and apply for a new marriage visa from outside of the US or I can do it inside the US immediately after getting divorce with no need to leave the country? | It is illegal to marry while you are already married This is the crime of bigamy in all 50 states. A marriage ends with the death of one of the couple, a divorce or (in some very limited circumstances) an annulment. The US will recognise any of these wherever they happen so it’s your choice whether you get divorced in your home country or the US. By the way, don’t cause the death of your husband, that’s also illegal. | If the spouse of the US president filed for divorce, would a) the President have any claim of immunity from any litigation that followed (e.g. the division of assets in the matrimonial pot, child custody etc.), The President could claim it, but the President wouldn't win. Notably, a number of state governors and mayors have divorced while in office, and other foreign heads of state have been divorced while in office. For example, a U.K. court recently handled the divorce of a UAE monarch (over his objections to jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds), applying the same common law principles of head of state and sovereign immunities that exist in U.S. law and concluded that it had the authority to move forward with the case. Also, any Presidential divorce would take place in state court, not in federal court. Federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over divorce and custody cases (under the "domestic relations exception" to federal jurisdiction), so the civil action could not be removed to federal court, unlike federal criminal cases involving the official duties of the President and unlike civil cases over which the federal courts have jurisdiction. b) would all the proceedings be fully held in private, This would be in the reasonable discretion of the judge. It would not be a matter of right, but it is quite plausible that a judge might close the proceedings, especially if minor children were involved. c) could the President themselves be compelled to take the stand and Yes. A party to a lawsuit may always be compelled to take the stand, at least if no other person can provide a full substitute for the party's testimony. In ordinary civil lawsuits against the President, a President is usually compelled to testify only if an underling involved in the same matter cannot provide equivalent testimony. In many civil cases naming the President in his official capacity, the President has no personal knowledge of the facts and so can't be compelled to testify. But that would rarely be true in a divorce case, and would never be true in a divorce case where custody was an issue. This said, a state divorce court judge would almost certainly be very deferential to the scheduling concerns of the President for that testimony, and might allow that testimony to be provided remotely via videoconference so as to minimize the interruption this would pose to affairs of state and to address the security concerns of the Secret Service (i.e. the President's official bodyguards). d) what would happen if the President refused to do so? The judge could hold the President in contempt of court, which is punishable by fines and/or incarceration. But a more likely outcome, tailored to minimize interference with government business, is that the Court would sanction a President who defied an order to testify by assuming as a matter of law that any testimony from the President would have been unfavorable to the President and make a conclusive adverse inference on the evidentiary issues about which the President was asked to testify against the President. | There's no hard deadline for you to return to the US. There are some consequences, however, beginning at 180 days, at which point you are to be processed at the border as an "applicant for admission," which will usually have little practical impact on the process. After a year, your green card is no longer valid for admission to the US. This doesn't mean that you lose your LPR status, and the green card remains valid for other purposes. It just means that you should get a returning resident visa (unless you have a re-entry permit, which you would have to have acquired before leaving the US, so I assume you don't have one). There are ways to get into the US without a returning resident visa -- in particular, an airline isn't going to refuse to fly you to the US, because they won't know that you've been away for more than a year. Your LPR status remains until there is a formal finding that you have abandoned your residence in the US. This can be a result of your voluntarily relinquishing it or of an administrative or judicial action. In general, it's probably safe to say, the longer you're away, the more likely the immigration officer is to look into the possibility of abandonment. If you are absent for more than six months, you may also delay your eligibility to naturalize because this absence would disrupt "continuity of residence." A good starting point is the USCIS page International Travel as a Permanent Resident, which has more information about these matters as well as links to more detailed descriptions of some of them. Since this is https://law.stackexchange.com/, I suppose I should add some citations. The 180-day threshold is found in 8 USC 1101(a)(13)(c). The one-year threshold is at 8 CFR 211.1(a)(2). Residence requirements for naturalization are regulated at 8 CFR 316.5. It should be stressed that failing to meet these requirements does not by itself put your LPR status at risk; it only affects your ability to qualify for naturalization. | There are several reasons people wish to get a marriage annulled. I'll try to list them in order of frequency -- though I'm unaware of any statistics that confirm that my ordering is correct. Money. As per Nij's comment, when people are divorced, their property is subdivided 50-50. If one person can get away with an annulment, and keep the property which he earned, then it will be in his interests to do so. Religious reasons. As per SJuan76's comments, several churches, including Catholic, Mormon, and Russian Baptist, do not allow a person to marry if his previous spouse is still alive. An annulment is a way around that. Fraud marriages. This is rare, but under Trump it happens more often then you might think. People (usually women) come to the US illegally, marry someone (generally significantly older), and after the wedding day they are never again seen by their spouse. They use their marriage certificate to ensure permission to stay in the US -- but, they were never interested in marrying that person in the first place. When found, often such people are living with another illegal alien "as a boyfriend", with kids born before the fraud marriage even took place. It is in such cases, that their new spouse often tries to attain an annulment of the marriage -- to make sure that the illegal alien doesn't get rewarded for cheating them. Personal reasons. For some people, having never been married means it's easier to get a spouse who also has never been married -- and being able to check the "Single -- Never married" box on a form is always a plus in such cases. Now, don't ask me why people prefer to marry someone who's never been married, over someone who's been divorced. :) Incest. Under the US law, if you marry someone who's your close relative, then you are guilty of a felony -- even if you didn't know they're your close relative at the time of marriage. However, if you annul the marriage, then you can avoid prosecution. | What could be the consequences of this wedding? They would be married For example, if they break up and end their PACS in France, would they still be officially married in the USA? Yes, and also in France. And if after that they marry other partners, could this be a problem for them when applying for an American visa? Yes, bigamy is illegal in both the USA and France. Does France and the USA exchange information on wedding of foreign citizens on their soil? Don't know, probably not. Could they even end up being officially married in France even without doing any paperwork themselves? Most definitely. France recognises US marriages so they would be married in France (and the U.K., and Australia, and Germany, and ...). This is true even if the French government doesn't know they are married. | We do not have a law requiring you to renounce citizenships that you might hold, like the Nationality Law. I am not sure what you mean saying that renouncement is processed only within the Japanese legal system -- that is how it is everywhere, and there is no international authority or clearing house that handles citizenship renunciations. The effect of renouncing Japanese citizenship would be that you are then no longer a citizen of Japan: I can't find an explicit law prohibiting an exclusively-Japanese citizen from renouncing his citizenship and becoming stateless. A dual citizen would then be exclusively a citizen if "the other country", thus you would become strictly an Iranian citizen. According to the Civil Code of Iran you would be an Iranian citizen under clause 2 of Article 976. Article 977 allows accept a different citizenship but that would not apply if you have an Iranian father (and I guess does not actually get rid of your Iranian citizenship). Article 988 sets conditions for Iranians to abandon their nationality: you must be 25 or older, have renounced all property rights in Iran by transfer to Iranian nationals, have done your military service, and, have approval of the Council of Ministers. So yeah, not possible. Article 14 of the Japanese Nationality Law requires you to "choose either of the nationalities" before reaching 22, and furthermore Choice of Japanese nationality shall be made either by depriving himself or herself of the foreign nationality or by the declaration provided for in the Family Registration Law in which he or she swears that he or she chooses to be a Japanese national and that he or she renounces the foreign nationality (hereinafter referred to as “declaration of choice ”) Article 16 says "A Japanese national who has made the declaration of choice shall endeavour to deprive himself or herself of the foreign nationality". The bold part above seems to resolve that paradox, although that is based on a US-style interpretation of law and working from a translation of the law. That is, the requirement is that you try, not that you succeed (which is impossible in the case of a person with an Iranian father). There would be an effect in the US. If you renounce Japanese citizenship, you're strictly an Iranian national, and that has one consequence. What is not clear is whether the US recognizes, in any way, a renunciation which Iran doesn't recognize. This case features a person with renounced Iranian citizenship (he is also a US citizen), who was approved for a security clearance based in part on his renounciation. This gives some indication that the US does not care that Iran makes renunciation next to impossible. This is of course just for informational purposes and calls for an immigration attorney if it really matters. | One can find contradictory claims out there. Here is an English version of the marriage law. There is a surprising amount of legal rigamarole (in Norway, as well) pertaining to clearing "impediments". Assuming that the parties have done their part, then we move to Chapter 4. Article 16: Marriage may take place before a minister of the church, a representative of a registered religious organization empowered to perform such ceremonies, cf. Article 17, or before a civil official so empowered So turning to Article 17: Religious solemnization of marriage shall be performed by the ministers of the National Church, and priests or other representatives of registered religious organizations in Iceland who have been empowered to perform such ceremonies by the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs and that is now part of the Ministry of the Interior. I can't find any indication that ULC has been approved. There are 49 religions officially listed by Statistics Iceland, including Siðmennt, a secular humanist organization which gained official status on May 3rd, 2013 when the organization was officially registered as a secular life stance organization under a law passed in the Icelandic Parliament on January 30th of that year. A formal ceremony was held by the Interior Minister Ögmundur Jónasson who had strongly supported our cause, to mark this historical event. As a result, Siðmennt gained the same legal and funding status as religious life stance organizations in Iceland. Weddings conducted by Siðmennt celebrants since then are legal and couples no longer have to go to government offices for that purpose. In light of the fact that Siðmennt is officially listed and ULC is not listed, I would conclude that you did not accidentally marry anyone, even if they had dealt with the impediments. | When you get married is possible to have contract renouncing both parties right to a divorce. No. That clause would be redundant, materially indistinguishable from breach of contract, and otherwise unenforceable. It is redundant because the legal definition of Marriage (Black's Law Dictionary) states that it is "A contract, according to the form prescribed by law, by which a man and woman [...] mutually engage with each other to live their whole lives together in the state of union which ought to exist between a husband and a wife". Thus, the perpetuity as expressed in the term whole lives preempts the conceiving of an eventual separation. Insofar as marriage is legally cognizable as a contract (see legal definition), it might specify or imply remedies in the event that one or both spouses decide(s) that substance of marital relationship no longer exists; that is, in the event that a breach of that contract occurs. A court may order to the breaching spouse performance of certain acts (for example, alimony) in accordance to statutory law or common law. However, a prohibition to divorce goes beyond the scope of what is legally permissible. The U.S. Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-618 (1984) helps explaining why a prohibition to divorce would be unenforceable: "In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty." If that is not possible how much can you limit the right to a divorce with a contract or something similar? There is no possible limit or requisite duration of a marriage, as that would inherently infringe a person's fundamental element of personal liberty mentioned in the Roberts case. |
What laws apply to Visa holders in the US? I'm a French citizen currently staying in Los Angeles for studies under an F1 Visa. I was told that in the US, only federal law applies to foreigners which is why despite Pot being legalized in California I was told that I am forbidden from buying/consuming it. So I am wondering, what laws do apply to me? Do I have to comply with State laws? What if State and Federal laws contradict each other? | All laws (federal, state and local) apply to everybody, unless you have diplomatic immunity. That is, unless e.g. the federal government decides as a matter of policy to ignore certain federal laws. California does not have a law generally prohibiting the use of marijuana, though public consumption is illegal, minor consumption is illegal, and possession over 28.5 grams is illegal. So that is one less law to be concerned with violating. The federal law still exists, and has not been repealed for anyone. However, the federal government by policy is not pursuing marijuana cases in legal contexts in those states that have legalized marijuana. The complication for foreign students is that there are also immigration laws whereby you may be deported for a drug offense (that link is full of technical details on immigration and drug laws, worth reading). The immigration laws basically make it easy to penalize a foreigner (for example you might be deemed "inadmissible" so you cannot be re-admitted to the US if you leave; it just depends on what their grounds are for action). For example, "a noncitizen is inadmissible as of the moment that immigration authorities gain substantial and probative 'reason to believe' the noncitizen has ever participated in drug trafficking," which does not mean a conviction. It is reported that in California, DHS officers have treated minor infractions as "convictions," which means to be safe you have to avoid even infractions. It appears (and hire an immigration attorney if you want to test this) that trouble only arises if there is reason to believe you are trafficking, if you are a drug addict or abuser, if you are "convicted" (not necessarily "tried and found guilty," it also includes certain legal maneuverings), or if you admit to drug use (even in the case of home use under doctor's orders, i.e. a California-legal context). This incidentally includes non-use but working for the marijuana industry. It is possible that you could get stopped on the street by a random immigration search, and if you are in possession, then... it is not guaranteed that possession of a small amount of marijuana, when caught by federal authorities, cannot lead to immigration problems. | There are nuisance lawsuits and constructive eviction arguments--you can check with your local attorneys and perhaps tenants' rights organizations for detailed information. Just because marijuana is legal under state law (if certain steps were followed) does not mean that your landlord or another tenant can interfere with your use and enjoyment of your home. Civil consequences--such as a court order to the smoker to stop smoking, money damages, or a partial abatement of your rent until the smoking stops--may be achievable. It is important to follow the rules for your jurisdiction closely when starting a legal action, so you should talk to an expert in your jurisdiction if you want to pursue legal action. But where possible, most people deal with this kind of thing by moving. | Legally, they cannot just nab you. The usual (?) option is that authorities in the US request extradition pursuant to the US-Mexico extradition treaty via the Department of Justice, and if the paperwork is in order, this can result in a Provisional Arrest Warrant (and arrest) in Mexico, which will be carried out by the Mexican federal police. This is true whether or not you go to the US consulate. After a hearing in the Mexican courts you might be extradited (or not, but DoJ presumably doesn't proceed with cases that they will lose). Extradition is not possible for every offense, so you would have to look at the offenses listed in the treaty, and whatever the Arizona warrant is about. You can't be extradited for parking tickets, you can be extradited for murder: whatever it is, it has to be a crime in both places, and has to be subject to a minimum one year imprisonment. Also, if you are a Mexican citizen as well, you cannot be extradited unless the Mexican authorities agree to (whereas there is no choice if you are only a US citizen). An alternative is deportation, which would overcome limitations related to extradition, but it's not clear what the requirements for deportation from Mexico are (typically illegal presence, unclear whether Mexican authorities can or would try an end-run around official extradition procedure). Although consulates enjoy a degree of immunity from local law, a consulate in Mexico is still Mexican territory, subject to Mexican law. If you are in the consulate, Mexican authorities cannot enter without permission to arrest you. They also cannot arrest you without a warrant (see Art. 16 of the Mexican constitution). Consular staff also cannot arrest you (if you are not caught flagrante delicto). Nor are they authorized to execute a US warrant in Mexico (thus they have to go through the process of judicial review to send you back to the US, and why a Mexican warrant is required). See this Q&A, relevant to the status of embassies: what is relevant to us is that both the US and Mexico operate under the rule of law, so the issues surrounding Syrian refugees in the Syrian embassy do not arise here. | Growing marijuana is very often legally classed as "manufacture of a controlled substance." In criminal law, "manufacture" tends to be explicitly defined to include cultivation, but this is in fact a reasonably common use of the term (it doesn't have to mean producing with machinery). And so it's extremely unlikely that anyone will be convinced that you even might have thought the agreement didn't cover growing marijuana. The intent of the parties is fairly clear there. | I do not know the particular legal environment in France, but in general the shop is private property and the owner decides who may enter and who may not. You have no right as such to enter somebody else's property against their will. Doing so would at least be classified as trespassing, possibly more serious considering you mention using force to enter the premise. | The only really authoritative source of answers is a court interpreting the laws on an as applied basis (and there are many U.S. traffic laws, one in every state and sometimes additional local ones, not a single U.S. traffic law). An answer from a government official or police department is not authoritative, although it may be informative of how the official in question would enforce the law. | Yes, and this is very common - Cuba, North Korea and Iran are often excluded. Mind you, this is from a US perspective. The banned country may have other ideas about the legality of the ban under its laws. But if you weren't planning to do business with that country anyway, that's not exactly going to hurt you. | The newly-reinstated presidential proclamation says (Sec 3(b)) says The suspension of entry pursuant to section 2 of this proclamation shall not apply to: (i) any lawful permanent resident of the United States; The State department also lists exceptions to the travel ban on 8 countries, identifying those who "will not be subject to any travel restrictions listed in the Proclamation" d) Any lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States; Requesting / receiving a passport (or renewed passport) from your current country of citizenship does not invalidate your permanent resident status. Additionally, State says No visas will be revoked pursuant to the Proclamation. Individuals subject to the Proclamation who possess a valid visa or valid travel document generally will be permitted to travel to the United States, irrespective of when the visa was issued. If you stay out of the country too long, that could cause a problem. If you plan to stay away more than a year, you have to first apply for a reentry permit. This is the current state of the law, which is subject to change. |
What would happen if undocumented immigrants vote in the United States? Asking this as a factual question. No political agenda intended. In the current US election dispute team Trump have repeatedly made the allegation that there was mass voting by undocumented immigrants. (They use the term "illegals") If that is true at all, would their votes actually be disqualified? Or are they lawfully entitled to vote while they are living in the USA? Just inform me about the law, please. No arguing about whether the law as it stands it is right or wrong, or whether the claim is true or not, or whether it would change the result. | 18 U.S. Code § 611 is the relevant law. (a) It shall be unlawful for any alien to vote in any election held solely or in part for the purpose of electing a candidate for the office of President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, Delegate from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner, unless— (1) the election is held partly for some other purpose; (2) aliens are authorized to vote for such other purpose under a State constitution or statute or a local ordinance; and (3) voting for such other purpose is conducted independently of voting for a candidate for such Federal offices, in such a manner that an alien has the opportunity to vote for such other purpose, but not an opportunity to vote for a candidate for any one or more of such Federal offices. This is not the most straightforward of law on the books. It says "you can't vote unless..." three things. It has to be locally legal to vote for something other than a federal office, the election has to include something other than voting for federal office, and it cannot be possible to vote for a federal office at the same time. Given that, it is impossible for any alien (even documented) to vote for president. Extant alien-voting laws are no higher than municipality, most being in Maryland. Violation of the law is a crime. Because non-citizens are not allowed to vote in state-wide elections, the theory is that they literally cannot vote, so they will not receive a ballot, which comes from the state. Here are the election laws for Maryland. There isn't a provision for "disqualifying" a vote, instead a person is prevented from voting in the first place if they are successfully challenged, because they can't prove who they are or the person they claim to be is not registered to vote (a non-citizen will never be registered with the state to vote, assuming no fraudulent documentation). Takoma Park non-citizen residents can vote in city elections and they register with the local gov't, not the state. | The direct answer is "no" and the indirect answer is "yes", that is, your way of putting the matter diverges significantly from how the Bill of Complain puts the matter. The claim is that the defendant states violated the Electors Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Texas claims that there is an injury in fact, citing various SCOTUS rulings e.g. Wesberry v. Sanders which says that No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined See the argument in the brief for more legal rhetoric. There can be no question that one state can sue another; equally clearly, the plaintiff must show actual harm and not just annoyance. New Jersey v. New York is a case involving a question of equity, not the federal constitution, but there is no legal principle to the effect that one state cannot sue over a constitutional harm rather than an equitable harm. See the brief p. 65 ff. The court does not require that there be exact precedential analogs (otherwise, Roe v. Wade would have turned out differently), what's required is simply that there be reasonable logical steps: SCOTUS gets to decide what is reasonable (or it can decline to decide). | There are two models for citizenship, by location of birth and by the nationality of the parent. The US chiefly follows the first model, which is why only your grandma's father is American, and your grandma is not. By the same logic, you are not. Countries like Spain are far more lenient, and do allow you to request Spanish citizenship if you can show any of your direct ancestors are Spanish. That's possible because each country can make its own laws within reason. The international norm is that everybody should get at least a citizenship at birth; statelessness should not happen. | The last part, about equal suffrage in the Senate, does not expire. The question is whether it can be itself amended out of existence. There has been no test of that possibility. This article argues that this may not be subject to amendment. There is only one way to find out for sure. The idea is that the original intent was that this is supposed to be an absolute clause, but of course that only speaks to original intention (and the original intention is not clear, as the article discusses). | I can't speak for Latvian law, but it's not unusual for someone to be expelled from or denied entry to a political party in the UK for supporting a rival party at the same time. As one example, Alasdair Campbell was expelled from the Labour Party after he admitted voting for a rival party in elections. From that link, Labour Party rules say that someone "who joins and/or supports a political organisation other than an official Labour group or other unit of the Party" will "automatically be ineligible to be or remain a Party member". So it's not about voting, which is secret, but about supporting a rival party. Similarly, at least one member has been expelled from Labour for supporting the Scottish National Party on social media. Such decisions may have an element of the political (using it as a pretext to getting rid of someone you don't like). But there is no suggestion that such an action is illegal, if it is in the party rules. Political parties have a lot of discretion as to who is allowed to be a member, and who they expel. It's not like buying a gym membership where you are entitled to gym services or your money back; legally you sign an agreement to follow the rules when you join, and joining doesn't entitle you to much. | The standard of proof for a criminal conviction is the same. So they would similarly need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the foreign national of a crime. But deportation is not a criminal proceeding, and has a different standard of proof. (In deportation you also don't have criminal defendant rights like right to an attorney if you can't afford one.) I believe the standard is "clear and convincing evidence". | Legally there is no problem. What you say is protected speech under the 1st Amendment as long as it is either true or a matter of opinion. However Ron Beyer's comment is a good one; while legal this sounds very inadvisable. You would be far better off hiring a lawyer. The Mr Dicks of this world make money from the widespread fear of legal action. He will probably fold as soon as he sees a letter from a lawyer threatening a lawsuit. Until then stalling doesn't cost him anything so he will carry on doing it. BTW, don't delay. I don't know about the US, but over here in the UK there are a number of ways that people like Mr Dick can make it hard to collect. Don't give him time to play shell games with his assets. | No - at least not in South Carolina, depending on your intent. SECTION 7-25-200. Unlawful inducement to file for or withdraw from candidacy for election. (A) It is unlawful to offer or accept, or attempt to offer or accept, either directly or indirectly, money, a loan of money, or any other thing of value which includes, but is not limited to, employment or the promise of employment to induce a person to file or withdraw as a candidate for any state or federal elected office. The FEC, apparently does not see this a problem federally. Conduct that Does Not Constitute Federal Election Fraud Various types of conduct that may adversely affect the election of a federal candidate may not constitute a federal election crime, despite what in many instances might be their reprehensible character. For example, a federal election crime does not normally involve irregularities relating to: (1)distributing inaccurate campaign literature, (2) campaigning too close to the polls, (3) engaging in activities to influence an opponent’s withdrawal from an election, |
An erstwhile friend misled me to believe she had committed suicide. Can I take action? A good friend of many years, but with whom I fell out two years ago, meticulously misled me via multiple emails purporting to come from a member of her family, that she had died. Not only died, but committed suicide 2 days after last contacting me by email. I was very distressed, and announced the death not only on Facebook, with a long and compassionate eulogy, including a photo of her and I, but also personally to multiple people that she once knew in our town (she left about 3 years ago). Some of the later mails went on to impart a portion of responsibility to me for the apparent suicide, fictitiously citing her mother and step father. This increased my distress then, and my anger now, further. I consider this kind of hoax to be in more than bad taste, and indeed, punishable, as she has not only humiliated me, and the several people who called me, but because of the public post, made me look socially awkward, stupid. She also put many people through a lot of sadness for the 24 hour duration of her hoax. Has she broken UK law? What recourse do I have to ensure she doesn't do things like this again? She has a history of bad behaviour (though this takes the cake). | Has she broken UK law? You might have only a claim of harassment because of the multiplicity of acts (i.e., emails) with which your former friend made the hoax. Pseudocide or faked death is in and of itself not unlawful, and your description does not reflect that she obtained or sought to obtain something of value. Likewise, your scenario seemingly falls short of a tort of intentional infliction of mental shock. In addition to having to proof severity of distress, it is noteworthy (from an article regarding data privacy) that "compensation awards for emotional distress are typically low value and may not provide sufficient incentive to bring such a claim". Nor is online impersonation of lay people (such as a family member) for purposes of that hoax a crime under UK law. The impersonated member of her family might have a claim of defamation if the wording of the emails injure or tend to injure that relative's reputation. Similarly if the emails contain defamatory falsehoods regarding someone else. However, the fact that you published information [on which you relied] would defeat your claim of defamation as for her hoax making you "look socially awkward, stupid". Since there is no judicial recourse for preventing her from doing this again, your best option is to clarify to your audience that this was all a prank of hers. Besides helping to restore your reputation, your clarification will warn others not to blindly rely on other misrepresentations she might make or has made. | I'll use Wisconsin as a jurisdiction. If you file a false death certificate, that's a felony. But you probably wouldn't go that far. It could be disorderly conduct. In Wisconsin disorderly conduct is described as follows: Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. There's also a statute prohibiting "Disrupting a funeral or memorial service" but it won't apply in this case unless disorderly conduct applies. It would raise the penalty to a class A misdemeanor (or a class I felony if you somehow did it again after being convicted once.) On the civil side, there could be an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, either for the false report of your death, or for a "corpse" suddenly coming to life. This kind of lawsuit requires "extreme and outrageous conduct", but if this isn't, I don't know what would be. | In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe). | This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs. | Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo! | This is interesting because things get extremely different on state and federal levels. Quoting this, Under modern U.S. law, suicide is no longer a crime. Some states, however, classify attempted suicide as a criminal act, but prosecutions are rare, especially when the offender is terminally ill. The "some states" part is much more important than was emphasized there, however. A case that reached the Virginia Supreme Court, Wackwitz v. Roy (referred to in Wikipedia) pivoted about the legality of suicide. From the decision: We are aware of only one legislative enactment that addresses suicide as a crime. Code § 55-4 provides that "[n]o suicide ... shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate." Thus, although the General Assembly has rescinded the punishment for suicide, it has not decriminalized the act. Suicide, therefore, remains a common law crime in Virginia as it does in a number of other common-law states. See, e.g., Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 29 Ala.App. 207, 194 So. 421 (1940); Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422 (1877); State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961); State v. Carney, 69 N.J.L. 478, 55 A. 44 (1903); State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1891), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C.1991). To constitute suicide at common law, however, a person who takes his own life "must be of years of discretion, and in his *865 senses." 5 William Blackstone, Commentaries *189; accord Plunkett v. Supreme Conclave, 105 Va. 643, 646, 55 S.E. 9, 10 (1906) ("`To constitute suicide at common law the person must be of years of discretion and of sound mind.'"). This common law rule comports with a contemporary definition of suicide. Suicide is defined as "the deliberate and intentional destruction of his own life by a person of years of discretion and of sound mind." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2286 (1981). I believe that the "only one legislative enactment" refers merely to Virginia state law, not nation-wide law. Thus, in Virginia, and other states, suicide could be treated as a common-law crime. However, in United States v. Hudson, it was ruled that such common-law convictions are not allowed at the federal level. I'm not always a fan of Google Answers, but the last one here provides a fairly well-documented section on common-law rulings about suicide. Note that in many states, this is not enforced, as common-law rulings are increasingly rare. | Note: this can vary by jurisdiction. Defamation in General Defamation can be libel, which is written, or slander, which is spoken. In order to prove you are the victim of defamation, you must show that the statement that allegedly defamed you was: published false injurious, and unprivileged Published means that some third party (other than you and the individual who allegedly defamed you) saw or heard the statement that allegedly defamed you. This can be achieved through media as varied as a newspaper, a picket sign, or even in conversation. The truth is not subject to suit for defamation. It doesn’t matter how mean something is, if it is true, you can’t sue. Thus, the statement made must have been objectively false (therefore protecting opinions). You must show how your reputation was hurt by the statement. Being ostracized in your community, losing work, being harassed by reporters, are examples of ways to show the statement was injurious to you. Finally, there are certain situations where the importance of free speech is even more important than usual to make a speaker’s statement be considered as “privileged.” For example, it is so important for a witness in a trial to be frank and open in their testimony that it is recognized they should not feel constrained by worrying about whether they will get sued for defamation. Thus, a witness who falsely testified to something in court or a deposition is not subject to defamation suits. Obviously, prosecution for perjury is possible if they testify to something they know is false. The Public Figure You are talking about the Family Guy and other TV shows which make fun of politicians and other well-known people from Kelsey Grammar to Whoopi Goldberg. Because the value we put on the ability to criticize our government and those we elect to it, as well as all publicly influential people in general, the people Family Guy, etc., make fun of, public figures, have a higher bar to reach when it comes to proving defamation. A public figure is someone who has gained prominence in the community as a result of his or her name or exploits, whether willingly or unwillingly. Easy examples of this can include politicians, CEOs, NFL quarterbacks, or movie stars. However, certainly, depending on jurisdiction and context, certainly regional or local level individuals may at times be considered public figures. To prevail in a case alleging defamation, a public figure has to prove the above-mentioned four elements and, additionally, must show that the person who made the statement was acting with “actual malice.” This rule derives from the Supreme Court case New York Times v. Sullivan where SCOTUS described the reasoning as deriving from a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. Thus, a private person claiming defamation has more protection as a victim than a public figure does as a victim. When people put themselves out there for any reason, they are causing themselves to become a matter of public interest and subject to scrutiny. A private person should not have to walk around with the same burden on his mind because he has not likewise put himself out there. That said, the private person may be “pushed” into the public sphere without his consent due to other occurrences that drew the public’s attention to him. The Limited Purpose Public Figure Finally, a person may be a limited purpose public figure where he has purposely and noticeably put himself out there in some public controversy with the purpose of influencing the controversy’s outcome. An example is a church pastor who decries abortion because “he thrust himself to the forefront of a particular controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issue.” Another is a local expert on suicide because that person “distinguished herself in this particular field.” Limited purpose public figures must also show “actual malice” to prevail in a defamation suit. Parody/Satire These forms of communication, despite containing statements that may be intentionally injurious and/or offenses, are protected under the notion of political commentary. Satire and parody are protected, “provided a reasonable reader would not mistake the statements as describing actual facts.” So, someone who is the subject of parody of satire cannot sue “unless the irreverent comments contain a provably false fact.” In addition, they must also prove the “actual malice” element and the four original elements. Various factors go into deciding whether something is parody or satire and it is a reasonableness test where none of those factors are subject to an absolute requirement or subject to a certain level. For context, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of actions reporters can take when publishing parody and satire, noting again that no single item below must be included and the presence of one of them does not provide an absolute defense. Is the content at issue separated or labeled to indicate it is not straight news? Does the irreverent tone exist throughout the piece? Does the publication have a history of producing satire or parody? For example, the difference between The Onion and cnn.com. Are there illogical or over-the-top situations or actions in the piece? Are there fictitious names that are similar to real ones? Such as, “Don Drumpft” and “Plaidimir Vutin” (which I’ve actually seen somewhere once!). If this is based on a specific event, how soon after or long after was the content published? If the event is still in the public memory vs. if it has long been forgotten. Is there a disclaimer indicating it satire or parody? Note that a disclaimer must be reasonably visible and accessible to the average reader. Content seen on shows like the Family Guy are a) usually against public figures and b) usually sufficiently done in a context that conveys the fact that it is satire or parody. Therefore, suits against the show’s creators simply do not (or are very rare and even more rarely successful) do not materialize. | I assume that the loan was legal, in light of rule changes pertaining to non-borrowing spouses. If so, there is really no recourse other than to repay the loan. This article explains the current options / restrictions in an understandable manner, but of course it is too late to do anything about it. If there was actually fraud or coercion in the loan, or if the elder party was mentally incompetent, there might be some legal recourse, but we don't have any evidence of fraud, coercion or incompetence here. |
Can I be sent to collections in this way? I recently had ServPro come and help with some water in my basement. After the job was done, they had charged me waaay more than they should have, so I asked them to fix a few things on the bill. We've been going back and forth for a few months now, and they have agreed to remove several charges from the bill. However, In their most recent email they told me that I have to accept what they're charging me as is, and if I don't, they'll send me to collections, except some of the things they've taken off the bill will be added back on when they send it to collections. My question is: Are they allowed add things back onto my bill that we've already agreed shouldn't have been on the bill, and then send that to collections? I still have other disputes with the bill that I'd like to discuss, but I don't want to get sent to collections just for asking | Yes You asked for work to be done in the expectation you would have to pay for it and they did the work - that’s a legally binding contract. It appears that you did not agree on a price and possibly not on a time for making payment. If that is so, you agreed to pay a reasonable price in a reasonable time. They have issued an invoice stating what and when they believe is reasonable. You dispute parts of that invoice. That’s fine, people are allowed to have disputes. You have paid the undisputed amount I hope? Notwithstanding, your negotiations with the other party can go back and forth and things can be put on and taken off the table. But you don’t have a deal until you have a deal. At any time, either party can walk away and assert their rights. Or make a take it or leave it offer, commonly called playing hardball. Since it is undisputed that you owe them something, they can refer the debt to “collections (be that internal or an external debt collector). You should pay the undisputed amount immediately and you can continue to dispute the remainder. They will make a deal, initiate legal action, or let the matter die. | are they allowed to immediately try to recover the debt or must they go to court first? They can try to recover the debt, either directly or through a debt collection agency. They do not have to go to court first; courts are for the resolution of a dispute and right now there isn't one. If the consumer disputes the debt (which they should do in writing) then the debt is held in abeyance until the dispute is resolved. While in this state debt collection must stop and the debt must be noted as disputed on any credit agency checks. Dispute resolution may be through negotiation, litigation, mediation, arbitration or a statutory mechanism (e.g. involving a government agency or ombudsman if applicable). If the supplier chooses litigation then they must go to the court and summons the consumer; stating the basis of their claim. The consumer is then entitled to mount a defence. | You can sue your cat. The proper question is "Do I have an actionable claim?" Use your state's consumer protection laws: Namely, send certified return receipt letter to the collection company disputing the debt. Then, if the collection company does ANYTHING (calls you, sends a letter) after your proper notice of dispute of the alleged debt, then each act is a violation of consumer laws and will warrant x amount of payment from them: The Fed's FDCA (Fair Debt Collection Act) allows up to $1,000 per violation for acts after receiving your proper notice of dispute to the debt. Any change to your credit status after dispute relating to the disputed debt is actionable under consumer laws. Most states have some remedy tied to collection violation again. The federal statutes' remedies work too. | Is It Too Late To Collect The Bill? Probably not. There is a statute of limitations for collecting unpaid medical bills that varies in length in different jurisdictions, and the age of the bill in the question is approximate, so it is hard to know for sure if this one is too old. The relevant statutes of limitations in most U.S. states would be at least three years and in some it could be as much as ten or twelve years. If I recall correctly, in Canada, the relevant statute of limitations would be determined at the provincial level. Given that this was "a couple of years ago" realistically, it is probably not barred by the statute of limitations yet. Are Interest Charges Allowed. Generally yes. Most jurisdictions allow for pre-judgment interest at a statutory rate from the date due in the absence of a contrary agreement and if the provider's paperwork with you provided for another interest rate, that would apply instead. So charging interest is allowed. The existence of a dispute wouldn't change this result, although it would, of course, mean that if some portion of the bill was disallowed in a later lawsuit that interest would be owed only on the portion that the court found was actually owed. The Provider's Remedies A Lawsuit If these bills are not paid, they can sue. Statute of limitations, or errors in billing, or failure to seek reimbursement from the police as arranged with them, would all be legitimate defenses in lawsuit brought by the provider. Given the modest amount allegedly owed and the existence of defenses, this might not be a very attractive one for the provider to choose to bring suit to collect. Credit Reporting On the other hand, in lieu of suing, the provider could simply report it as a bad debt with a credit reporting agency through their collections company. This would look bad on your credit (for up to seven years in the U.S., although you could insist on filing a rebuttal statement as part of your credit report, I don't know how disputes about credit reporting work in Canada). Paying them would almost admit that there was a late payment for credit reporting purposes, but also might prevent the incident from entering the credit reporting system at all. | Regarding to your instructions concerning the funds in the account, it's hard to prove a negative. As far as I know there is no legislation that requires a credit balance to be retained. However, there may be some regulations or internal policies regarding the closure of home loans, which may preclude closure without some documentation or other process. But just because you can't cite legislation that requires you to do things, doesn't mean it doesn't exist. You don't ask the new bank to support their claims which contradict the old banks, because it works in your favour. With regard to the last instruction regarding your funds, the bank can and will provide you with a list of fees and charges applied to your account - it's called a statement. With regard to your explicit other option - is what the bank's doing essentially theft? - you can call it theft, but it's not. At worst it's conversion, the remedy for which is the recovery of the converted property, or damages equal to the value of the property. If you have attempted to resolve your complaint through the bank's internal dispute resolution processes (usually some kind of complaint process), you can also contact the Financial Services Ombudsman, who may assist with these situations. Finally, as for your further instructions, they are all void and unenforceable. 1. You cannot impose terms on the conduct of another party without their agreement. This is called a counteroffer or variance to their established terms which you will have agreed to at the time that you established the original loan. 3. You can never be compensated just for your time. | It would be up to your HOA agreement. If you signed a contract agreeing to pay for services then yes. If not then no. An HOA agreement is just a contract like any other and you would have to abide by what you agreed to. Also, they may not have an actual contract for you to sign, but by moving to the community you would be agreeing to follow the by laws of the HOA. If you have a disagreement with them that can not be resolved, you can let a judge decide in court, but that could cost more than just getting the service. https://www.wishtv.com/news/local-news/indianapolis-man-battles-homeowners-association-over-solar-panels/ So to sum it up, you can refuse but they have the right to take you to court if they choose. I would assume a judge would rule in your favor since it's an issue of what goes on in your own home, but there is really no way for anyone to say what someone else will do. | When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints. | Nope. Say I sue you successfully, and the court delivers a judgement that awards $1000 in damages. It is not the responsibility of the small claims court to ensure that the judgement is fulfilled. In fact, the debtor (person who lost) can outright refuse to pay the creditor (or the person who won). They are not in violation of any law at this point. However, the creditor can ask the court for options on enforcing their judgement, and these can include, but are not limited to: Garnishing wages Providing a court order Seizure of assets (through court sheriff, don't use this yourself or you end up getting into criminal matters) and others to enforce the judgement. The debtor isn't liable for refusing, unless when they are in violation of a court order. Violating a court order is a criminal matter, and the debtor could possibly be found guilty of contempt of court. Oh, and the case wouldn't move on to a higher court. Cases go to a higher court when an appeal is made, generally when there has been an error in enforcing the law. You also need to be provided leave to make an appeal. |
Can possession of an asset be assumed in US civil court? I'm wondering about what facts can be assumed in a civil court, or in different terms, is civil court more concerned about the exact argument between parties, rather than actual facts? In Bitcoin news, a man named Craig Wright won a civil case allowing him to keep 1.1 million Bitcoin, but must payout $100M for intellectual theft of Bitcoin related software (I'm actually unclear what exactly was stolen/misused, though I'm well-versed about how bitcoin works). Here's the problem: There's no proof Craig Wright owns the Bitcoin in question, and there's quite a few skeptics regarding his claims about it. Further, it would be negligibly easy for Wright to prove it, either publically or privately to the court. However, in this case, both parties agree on the "fact". Is that all that's required for a fact of such gravity? What if he was ordered to give up some of the Bitcoin (not its value, the bitcoin itself), but turned out he's not actually in possession of it? Is it different in criminal court? | If the parties agree the sky is green then that is taken as fact by the court common-law Common law courts are adversarial and exist to resolve the dispute between the parties. That may involve them making a decision on what the facts are on the evidence if those facts are in dispute. If the parties agree on the facts then the court will not enquire into whether those facts are objectively correct. This is so fundamental that virtually the first thing that happens in a case is the parties submit an agreed statement of facts which tells the court “nothing to see here, move along.” | I assume you are talking about this case: FORIS GFS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD vs THEVAMANOGARI MANIVEL. For that amount, most people would be willing to break the law to keep it, and good advice what to do would be “ask a lawyer”. Needs citation. I certainly wouldn't: a) I think taking money that I know doesn't belong to me is wrong, b) even if I didn't believe that, the amount is so large the bank will certainly eventually come after it. The amount is so large I won't credibly be able to claim an innocent mistake. Simply hiding the money won't work, since the bank will be able to demonstrate that the money was deposited in my account, and I did withdraw it. I would be required to make restitution. This is exactly what happened to the defendant in the above case: they split up the money among friends and bought a house. The house is now being sold by the court, with the proceeds used to reimburse the plaintiffs. Would a lawyer be allowed to give me legal advice to help me keeping this money, for example by giving 500,000 each to twenty reliable friends, moving to Panama, or whatever would allow me to keep and spend the money? (Not asking whether two strategies that I came up with in ten seconds would actually work). Especially if it is advice if the form “X is illegal, but you can get away with it”. No. For example, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client & Lawyer states: (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. That's just a suggested ethical standard, but most countries will have something along those lines. Note also that in the US there is also a "Crime-Fraud" exception to attorney-client confidentiality. If a lawyer assists a client in carrying out a criminal or fraudulent scheme then their communications are no longer privileged and can be subpoenaed and introduced as evidence in court. | I understand that by "civil law systems" the OP means to refer to civil (vs criminal) cases, not to the civil law (vs common law) systems. The standard for proof of "guilt" (which is not actually called "guilt") is indeed "much lower" in civil cases, but the reason for that is not that it has to be so, but that the standard of proof in criminal cases has to be much higher. In civil cases none of the parties face criminal conviction. One party will just lose some money or property, will have to perform some work, will lose some opportunities etc. So, initially, both parties play the same game and each of them is in to lose it down to a similar level of peril. What follows is that, at the baseline, neither of the two parties should be in more advantageous position to prove their rightness than the other. In other words, if any of them proves that they are more than 50% likely to be right than the other, they should win. Indeed, why would one party have to prove their rightness beyond reasonable doubt? If it was so, it would mean that the other party would effectively have to prove their rightness to only a small degree, which would be utterly unjust. lot of guarentees like right avainst self incrimination are also not available in civil law systems. what is the reason behind this ? False. If saying something from a witness stand would risk you being prosecuted, you can refuse to say it regardless of whether you are giving evidence in a civil or a criminal case. | This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't | The fact that it is possible to engage in fraud, doesn't mean that it is impossible to prove something. Usually, in a civil action, testimony that a business record says something and that it was not falsified is sufficient to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard (i.e. to establish to the satisfaction of a judge or jury that it is more likely that something is true than it is that it isn't true). It is easy to forge checks too (and hard to prove that a signature is fake), but that doesn't mean that you can't prove payment by check or that negotiable instruments are useless. | Suppose you could. Now the proceeds of the sale belong to the shell company. What good does that do you? If you want to use the money to buy stuff for yourself, the shell company has to pay it back to you as a dividend or salary or something, and that payment will be taxable income to you personally. This might even come out worse for you: if you had held the bitcoins for more than a year, and sold them yourself, you could benefit from the lower long-term capital gains tax rate. But if you collect the funds as salary or dividend, you pay the higher ordinary income tax rate. | The money is forfeited to the state This would normally be the case even if Daniel is acquitted. The proceeds of crime may be seized using forfeiture rules which require Daniel to prove that the suspect money is legitimate. | It first depends on what state you are dealing with. This expression shows up in standard forms in Georgia, where it is not defined. You can read the associated statutes (Georgia Code, Title 53) especially the definitions, and it won't tell you. The probate court rules also don't tell you. So in Georgia, it would be "what a reasonable person would conclude" (good luck there). Searching for legal blogs that might give a hint, this article refers to "Significant assets that are solely titled to the decedent- property, automobiles, boats, homes", which seems obvious – they don't suggest a lower value, because that is not legally determined and they don't want to get in trouble for advising that $1,000 (or $500) is "an insignificant value". The purpose of the form is to put beneficiaries on notice as to what is at stake, and for purposes of that form, it is an estimate, not a binding promise. You have pretty much identified the indeterminacy of the law (in Georgia). |
If a car owner has a monthly credit account with a car workshop, then why wouldn't the garage have a lien on the car? This case matters to my husband and me, because we pay much money yearly to service our cars at auto shops!! 1. We have never heard of "monthly credit account" at vehicle workshops? How does this work? I don't understand footnote 49 quoted below. Why does Wilson's having a monthly credit account prevent the garage from having a lien on Wilson's car? Wilson v Lombank Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 1294. FACTS: Wilson bought a car from a person who turned out to be a rogue, and took it to a garage for repairs. After the repairs were completed, the car was left on the forecourt of the garage, but before Wilson could collect it, the garage permitted Lombank Ltd to remove the car. The car had been stolen and Lombank honestly believed that it owned the car. Subsequently, Lombank discovered that it did not own the car and so it delivered it to the true owner. Wilson sued Lombank for trespass to goods. Trespass to goods requires the claimant to have had possession of the goods and that the defendant interfered with that possession, so the issue was: did Wilson have possession of the car? HELD: When Wilson left the car with the garage, he still retained possession of the car, since the garage was holding it to his order at all times.49 Consequently, Lombank was liable in trespass to Wilson for the full value of the car, together with the cost of the repairs. COMMENT: This case illustrates two important points. First, Wilson was able to protect his right to possession against Lombank, even though there was someone who had a better title to the car than him. This reminds us that property rights are simply relative and a title which is less than absolute is still protected by the law. Second, the law may treat a person as being in possession even where the goods are physically controlled by someone else. In this case, Wilson had what is called ‘constructive possession’, which is discussed later in this chapter. 49 Note that the garage did not have a lien on the car, since Wilson had a monthly credit account with it. Lee Roach, Commercial Law 2019 3e, p 32. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lien A lien is a form of security interest granted over an item of property to secure the payment of a debt or performance of some other obligation. So the garage might have held a lien on Wilson's car as a way to secure a debt that he owed them, such as payment owed for repairs. If so, it would have prevented Wilson from selling the car until the debt was paid. It would also have made it a little less clear who was truly in possession of the car if the garage had a security interest in the car. However, in this particular case, Wilson had a monthly credit account with the garage. I would assume that means he had come to some arrangement with the garage where they would do the work without demanding payment on the spot, and that he would pay what he owed at the end of the month, or something like that; perhaps on terms like net 30 days. They evidently trusted him enough to grant him unsecured credit, instead of demanding a lien on the car as security. So the issue of a lien did not come up in determining possession. This sort of arrangement would have been a lot more common in 1963, before credit cards were common, so I'm not surprised that your garage today doesn't offer it. Nowadays the garage is more likely to demand payment as soon as the work is done, but you can get much the same effect by paying them with a credit card; then you will have about a month before you have to pay your credit card bill (or begin paying interest on it). | In Spain, most traffic offenses are usually considered administrative sanctions and involve just a relatively small fine, and perhaps losing some points in your licence. In those cases, if the driver if the vehicle cannot be established (your example, or a far regular one of a parking violation in which the officer did not see who did park it and will not wait by the side of the parker until the driver appears), the fine just goes to the registered owner. When the fine is reported to the registered owner of the vehicle, he can report who was the actual driver who broke the law at the time of the offense. I do not know what would happen if the person named does not recognize his responsability, but my guess is that the owner has to pay the fine (HINT: do not lend your car to someone who cannot be trusted). If the infraction is so excessive that it becomes a matter of penal law then there must be a trial and then the accused must be established without reasonable doubt, so in that case such a stunt maybe could work. | Yes You have a contract and, while I don't know what it says, its a fair bet that not making payments the contract requires you to make would be a breach of that contract. This would allow the other party to sue you for the unpaid fees as well as interest on them and the consts of collection (collection agency fees, legal fees etc.). In addition they can report you as a defaulter (which you would be) to any and all credit reporting agencies which would wreck your ability to get credit in the future. If the do sue you and succeed (as the probably would) they can seize your assets to sell them to recover their debt - since the time-share appears to have limited value they would probably seize your savings or your car instead. You need to read the contract to find out how you can end it legally. | However, he wants a new security deposit and a month's rent for the time we will use it in March, claiming that the sale process makes us new tenants. What are the legal rights and legal obligations of an estate in a month-to-month rental situation? The estate is just starting the probate process, and I am unclear on whether the landlord is a "traditional" creditor or in a unique situation since the money he is owed for rent continues to accrue after death. The decedent's security deposit, less valid deductions, is property of the estate, so if the landlord takes a second security deposit he is double dipping. Generally speaking, after someone dies, money judgments that have not been reduced to judgment liens, and unsecured debts (i.e. debts not supported by collateral) only have a right to be paid via submission of a claim to the probate estate in the probate process with claims made paid according to a priority schedule set forth in the probate code. But, generally speaking, death does not impair the property rights of third parties, so the fact that a debtor's estate is in probate is usually not a basis upon which a foreclosure or repossession of collateral for a default on a secured debt, or an eviction due to the termination of a lease, may be postponed while the probate case runs its course. Probate does not have the equivalent of the "automatic stay" in bankruptcy that prevents any creditors, secured or unsecured, from engaging in any collection activity against an estate, and probate estates are not allowed to file for bankruptcy either. If you really wanted to play hardball and only needed the apartment for a few days in March, the estate could simply continue to occupy it for that period of time and they pay the landlord the extra month's rent but not the additional security deposit when it was done. The landlord can't begin a foreclosure proceeding until there is a default which can't happen sooner than the last day of February. Even if the landlord is really on his toes, the landlord will be hard pressed to get a notice to vacate served on the estate and then to prepare and serve an eviction lawsuit on the estate and get that case in front of a judge before the estate will be ready to move out anyway. The estate might incur some attorneys' fees in the process if it did that, but the attorneys' fees would be an unsecured claim of the landlord that would have to be collected through the claims process in the probate proceeding which is usually a fairly favorable forum for the estate, instead of the usual court where small landlord-tenant disputes are handled. The probate estate could simply deny his claim for attorneys' fees and then, if the landlord wanted them after making a claim, the landlord would have to bring a lawsuit on fairly tight deadlines in the probate court to have the disallowance of the claim overturned. If you wanted to be even more aggressive, rather than paying the last month's rent, the estate could just holdover into March without paying rent or a new security deposit (vacating before the eviction process can run its course), effectively forcing the landlord to use the security deposit for March rent, and then forcing the landlord to use the probate claims process for both damages to the property claimed and for an attorneys' fees. If the estate is insolvent, or if the claim wasn't filed by the landlord (who may not even know that it is necessary to file a claim in probate) within the short deadline for probate claims arising after death, those expenses just wouldn't get paid at all. | From a legal perspective co-signing a loan isn't the same thing loaning the money to the other co-signer. When you co-sign a loan with someone else both you and the other person are equal parties in the loan, both jointly responsible in fully paying off the principle and interest. If loan is defaulted on, the bank can pursue legal remedies to try to recover its money against either or both of you. If you end up having to pay part or all of the loan, then whether or not you can recover any of that money will depend on whatever agreement you made with the other person. Given that you probably wouldn't a have a signed written agreement with the other signer in case like this, it'll probably come down to whether or not you can prove (on the balance of probabilities) that the other party promised to you to pay off the full amount of the loan. It will help if the loan is specifically tied to a car, a house or other property that the other party benefits from but you don't. Note that you'd have to give serious consideration to whether the other party can actually pay the amount owed. There's no point going to court to obtain an unenforceable judgement. I also should say that from a financial perspective it does make some sense to think of it as if you were loaning out the money yourself. While there's a big and significant difference between the two, in that your bank account isn't affected unless the other person defaults, if they do the result is going to be pretty much the same. Indeed in that case it's not much different than just giving the other person the money. When co-signing a loan you really need to trust that other person. | What you are describing may be the crime of insurance fraud: to avoid that, you would have to admit to the insurance company that you put a "Please steal me" sign in an unlocked car with the keys in the ignition, in a high-crime area. If we remove some of the elements of the scenario and reduce this to "leaving the keys in the ignition", this would probably be be considered contributory negligence, meaning that you failed to act prudently to protect your property. This can reduce the amount that the insurance company has to pay you. At this point, it depends on what state you're in, since sometimes a little bit of negligence (in Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia) means that you may get nothing. However, negligence hinges on an assessment of the actions and intentions of a party, and what you describe isn't "neglect", there is the direct intent that the car be stolen. Insurance policies exclude coverage for intentional loss. So the bottom line would be that the person would be out a car, and could be in prison for fraud if they did not reveal what they actually did. One should assume that the thieves took a lulz video of the sign before they stole the car, and posted it on FaceTube where it entered the viral hall of fame and was used against you in a court of law, so fraud is the worst choice. An alternative if you have a car is to donate it to charity, and take a tax write-off. | The new buyer (ie purchaser) gets the car and title, and the seller (ie debtor) retains the HP debt with the finance company (ie creditor). Under a Hire Purchase/Conditional Sale agreement the finance company generally own the car until the end of the finance agreement. If a person has the vehicle on such a finance agreement then sells it to a private and innocent purchaser the purchaser gets good title to the car. The only recourse the finance company has is against the person who had it on finance or any of the trade buyers/sellers in between. http://www.lawgistics.co.uk/legal-article-business-law/motor-trade-advice/special-rights-to-customers-buying-cars-subject-to-hire-purchase | Let's say one of us borrows the other one's car (with permission) and has an accident. Whose coverage is responsible at that point to satisfy the legally mandated insurance coverage? I assume that's only coverage against damage to others (which should go under liability insurance?) but if I'm wrong please correct me. There are different types of insurance that may be required: liability insurance - pays damage to others (usually including your own passengers) which you are responsible for. This is legally required almost everywhere (both in the USA, where this depends on the state, and elsewhere). Rules vary on the required minimum amount, and the exact coverage (e.g. whether lost wages are covered in case of injury). uninsured motorist coverage - pays damages you or others suffered, which are the responsibility of another driver who is not insured. This is mandatory in some states of the USA. In some other countries, these damages are covered by a public insurance or trust (such as the Verkehrsopferhilfe in Germany). personal injury protection - pays your own medical costs, no matter who is at fault. Required in some states of the USA. Is the lender's insurance supposed to cover it? This depends on the insurance policy, but in almost all cases the policy is for the vehicle (and often has to be, under the laws requiring insurance). So if yes, if you lend your car to someone else, your insurance will cover them. Note, however, that some insurance policies restrict your right to lend your car - read the fine print! There is one situation where your own policy may be relevant: If the damages exceed the limit of the vehicle's insurance policy, your own policy may pay the rest - again, this will depend on the policy. If so, wouldn't this not make sense? Insurance companies look at your driving history (& risk) when they offer you a plan, and if the borrower has a poor history, you've increased the company's risk without their knowledge, right? It would seem to open insurance rates to abuse. Yes, exactly. That is why many (if not most) insurance policies place limits on lending your car. You may only be allowed to lend it to people over 21 years of age, or only to people who you have registered as car users with the insurance company. Is the borrower's insurance supposed to cover it? If so, wouldn't this not make sense? Insurance companies charge you differently based on what and how many vehicles you want covered, so wouldn't borrowing someone's Lamborghini suddenly open your insurance company to a massive risk without their knowledge again? No, the borrower's insurance does not usually apply. Making the borrower's insurance apply would be problematic because the risk is based on the vehicle (type), too. Also, the borrower may not have insurance (e.g. may not own a car). In particular, enforcing the mandatory liability insurance is easier in practice if it is per vehicle, because you can check the insurance at vehicle registration (which practically all countries already require). If the liability insurance were per driver, it would be difficult to prevent a person w/o insurance to borrow a car (as in your example). Finally, sometimes after an accident there is a dispute about who was driving the car (especially with hit-and-run accidents), but there is usually clear evidence (collision damage) what vehicle was involved. If insurance applies to the vehicle, a dispute over who was driving will not interfere with the victim's restitution.Thanks to supercat for pointing this out. |
You are asked to choose between 2 people who will be killed. What happens if you pick someone? Say the following situation occurs: A sadistic murderer kidnaps you and 2 other people. They tell you to pick one of the two other people, and the person you did not pick will be killed. You have 30 seconds, and if you give no answer, both people will be killed. Are you guilty of any crimes if you pick a person? What if you pick no one in the 30 seconds? Does the situation change if after the 30 seconds, all 3 of you will be killed? | Duress is a defense to crimes in most jurisdictions. This circumstance (you have been kidnapped and are falsely imprisoned by a murderer who has indicated a present intent to kill someone) would constitute duress. You would not have criminal liability in those jurisdictions. Some, but fewer jurisdictions than those that recognize a duress defense, also recognize a choice of evils defense. This defense might be applicable in this situation as well. But it could apply in a situation when you were not kidnapped but the bad guy called you and posed this question to you. | It appears you want to go for a defense strategy based on a self-defense argument. This won't work in many jurisdictions, because self-defense usually doesn't apply when you intentionally caused a situation where you knew you would have to harm someone in self-defense. Similar case: Bob regularly mugs old women in the park by threatening them with a gun. Charlie finds out and wants to stop him. But instead of reporting it to the police, he wants to take care of this himself. Charlie get a gun, dresses up as an old woman and waits in the park. When Bob shows up and tries to mug Charlie, Charlie shoots first. Well, anyone else who would have found themselves in a park threatened by Bob with a deadly weapon might have had a self-defense argument. But Charlie knew that by dressing up as an old woman, he would provoke Bob to attempt to mug him. This of course doesn't exonerate Bob. But Charlie actively caused the situation which would give him the opportunity to kill Bob "in self defense". Charlie even made a complex plan to arrange this situation and put serious effort into setting it in motion. It's premeditated murder. Your situation is basically the same. You caused someone to make an attempt at your life, and then killed them to "defend yourself". And you had plenty of other options: There are lots of ways to end your life without requiring the help of a hitman. By getting them involved, you incited them to commit murder (killing someone who wants to die is still murder under most circumstances). By hiring the hitman, you created two possible options: Either you kill the hitman, or the hitman kills you and they would be guilty of murder. Both are the direct consequences of your actions. You could have tried to cancel the hit when you changed your mind (if you tried and failed, that might give you a slightly better legal argument) You could have called the police and ask them for protection. Further, when you hired the hitman you committed a crime: incitement to commit murder. The fact that you were also the victim of that crime doesn't really matter. It also doesn't matter that you wanted to die: Assisted suicide is only permitted in very few jurisdictions, and those only allow it if performed by medical professionals under very narrow circumstances. Those circumstances would certainly not have applied, so the hitman would have been guilty of murder if he had succeeded (he is at least guilty of attempted murder, but you can't put a dead person on trial), so you would too. When you commit a crime and cause someone to die in the process, then that falls under the felony murder rule in many jurisdictions. You will likely be convicted of manslaughter or murder of the hitman, depending on when you decided to kill the hitman before they kill you. When you can convince the court that you did not premeditate to kill the hitman but only panicked in the last minute, and no felony murder rule applies, then you might get away with manslaughter. You might also be found guilty of incitement of attempted murder (your own murder). | It means exactly what it says: one of the parties (call them A) to the case purchased a life insurance policy that would pay £300,000 (presumably to A) if the judge were to die. Why they did this, we can only guess. But if the case was extremely long, there may have been a greater chance that the judge would die before it ended, and this would presumably delay the proceedings even further, causing more trouble and expense to the parties. It may be that A wanted to be protected financially if this happened. Another possibility is that A felt that Scarman was favoring A's side of the case; if Scarman were to die and be replaced by another judge, it might reduce A's chances of winning, and so A wanted insurance against that. | In the US, it depends on the jurisdiction because each state has its own homicide statutes: but, the defining elements don't differ a lot. Drawing on Washington state law, the first question is whether you intended to kill a person (it doesn't have to be a specific person). If you did, you have committed first-degree murder. It is first-degree murder, because it requires a certain amount of advance planning to kill with a drone. It does not matter that the drone houses the gun that killed the person and a program determines when the gun fires (the "it was the drone, not me" defense gets you nowhere: otherwise, you could always claim "It wasn't me, it was my gun / knife / fist".) If instead this is a badly-designed pig-slaughtering drone, then it could be manslaughter in the first degree, if the act was reckless, or manslaughter in the second degree, if the act was with criminal negligence. To determine which it is, you look at the definitions: A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. versus A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. So it would depend on whether you decided that safeguards which would prevent shooting people were too much bother (you know there is a risk and set aside that concern), or it didn't occur to you that a flying gun might hurt a person. | You asked, "could that guy as defendant claim self defense and win?" First let's try to make it clear what is meant by "win". In the Rittenhouse trial, the defendant was charged of the following crimes: First-degree reckless homicide First-degree recklessly endangering safety (x2) First-degree intentional homicide Attempted first-degree intentional homicide Possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18 (dismissed) Failure to comply with an emergency order from state or local government (dismissed) Rather than thinking of the defendant as a "winner", it might be more appropriate to say that he was "acquitted" of these charges. If someone that was involved in the conflict fired first, as you described here: "They encounter each other when each is leaning or reaching or tripping, or whatever it would take for them to unintentionally point their gun at your head. You react and you raise your gun in defense, he spots your move and points his at you. You both fire. You shoot each other and you both are gravely injured. Like, paralyzed", then would they also be acquitted of all of the non-dismissed charges listed above? If everything was as you described ("unintentional", "reactionary", and "in defense"), then likely they would also not be found guilty of those crimes. It's not like they would "win", it's more like they will not be found guilty of committing one of those crimes. The precise outcome will depend on all the facts involved in the case, and the jury's decision based on those facts. So there is no single answer that always applies to every situation, but it sounds like you're wondering about some hypothetical situation that appears to be paradoxical because in this case only one person was charged with crimes: if someone else was the first shooter, the sequence of following events would first of all depend on whether or not they got charged with a crime, and I wouldn't characterize the outcome as a "win" or "lose" but as an "acquittal" or "conviction", and yes it is possible to be acquitted if everything is "accidental" as you described, and presumably not "reckless" (often meaning that a reasonable person in the same situation would have done the same thing). About your more broad question: "Is mutual self defense a thing?" It depends on what crime is being charged against the defendant. In the Rittenhouse case there was only one person that was charged. If you're asking about a hypothetical situation in which two people involved in a 1-on-1 conflict both claim self-defense, I hope I can assume that they were both charged with a crime against which to defend themselves in court in the first place. It is indeed possible for a State to prosecute both parties of a 1-on-1 physical conflict, and for both of them to successfully claim self-defense in order to eventually be both acquitted. It wouldn't be called "mutual self-defense", but each defendant would make their own self-defense case individually. | So, in England and Wales your son assaulted Mario. (From Wikipedia: "Assault is committed if one intentionally or recklessly causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence". I expect Mario expected your son was going to thump him, and that would certainly be unlawful.) You were both trespassers on the property; however it sounds like there was nobody there who could require you to leave, so that probably doesn't matter. Both of these would be true whatever the age of your daughter. Finally, in England and Wales, if you had forced your 16-year old daughter to come with you against her will, you would both have been guilty of kidnapping. (16 is the age at which children become independent in terms of deciding where to go.) She can choose to leave home and live with her boyfriend, and there is nothing you can do to stop her. Edit: The question did not originally mention a jurisdiction. This is an area where the legal situation is likely to be very jurisdiction dependent. | I do not believe this would be a violation of freedom of thought. The person being asked is free to leave, and free not to answer despite the repeated requests for an answer. Extended following and asking might run afoul of stalking/harassment laws, but that's jurisdiction-dependent and probably not a human rights violation. | (Note that some of the below may be UK specific, but the general principle applies in many other jurisdictions) Well the first thing is to stop working from this from the wrong direction: There is no law that makes it legal to assault someone: the law only makes it illegal to assault someone (eg in the UK, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 apply). The law states that it is illegal to assault someone. So let's explore how sport works. In most legal systems, you are able to give consent for certain activities or risks. This is also why certain other activities (for example, things a couple may enjoy in their own home) are not necessarily assault if consented to. Essentially, therefore, your consent gives the person doing the hitting the legal excuse (a little different to a normal excuse for forgetting your homework or being late to work): or a defense that their actions were reasonable. This stops the issue being the law, therefore, and becomes an issue of what does/doesn't constitute an "excuse". It is not therefore a question of "What law allows you to commit a crime during sport?" instead it is really one of "Exactly how much consent can a person give, to allow consent to be used as an excuse, and at what point is that consent no longer an excuse?" For example in R v Brown (UK Case Law) it was established that you cannot give unlimited consent. Similarly in every jurisdiction I'm aware of, that consent is only able to be given within the realms of the rules of the sport. As soon as the rules are broken, a crime may have been committed. I won't go into the details of R v Brown here, as I'm not convinced that it's suitable for SE (although I'm sure you can find it), but to give a more sport-related example, R v Donovan established that No person can license another to commit a crime, if (the jury) were satisfied that the blows struck ... were likely or intended to do bodily harm ... they ought to convict ... only if they were not so satisfied (was it) necessary to consider the further question whether the prosecution had negatived consent. Again, similar case law or exemptions exist in most jurisdictions. Essentially what this establishes is that if the intent is to cause harm, rather than to undertake the sport or activity to which consent has been given, it is still a crime The question after this is then generally one of whether it is in the public interest to prosecute, and often (but not always) the victim's wishes are taken into account. In some cases, the sportsman is prosecuted: for example this British football player who assaulted an opponent. In other cases there is either insufficient evidence, or insufficient interest in the prosecution. In many cases where the rules are broken but no serious harm is done, for example where rules are broken accidentally or in a minor way, the police or prosecution service (or equivalent) may simply regard the matter as sufficiently dealt with. This is the same as with most other cases, where not every instance of assault is necessarily prosecuted: two teenage brothers fighting may not result in a prosecution, or an assault in the street may not carry enough evidence. And to indirectly answer the question - the reason players are often not prosecuted is because "In the public interest" incorporates an element of public opinion. If a certain action has become (or always been seen as) acceptable, it is unlikely to be prosecuted. For example minor fouls in games, or accidental fouls causing injuries. The other primary reason is that the victim chooses not to press charges (although this isn't required, and the police are able to press charges themselves, it is often taken into account) |
Is recording a conversation with school officials on school property without consent legal in Washington State/Bellevue? I have a student-administration meeting (voluntary) with a couple of other students and school administration. This meeting is being held over a walkout held recently within the school, and I would like to record it without the administration's knowledge of the recording being present. Is this legal? I understand that Washington is a two-party consent state, yet I vaguely remember recording laws differentiating on federal property. Is there such an exemption for school property as well? Would recording this meeting without consent be legal? I am in the Bellevue School District, Washington State, United States. | The nature of the meeting matters: I assume this is a private meeting, not a public meeting. Under RCW 9.73.030, you have to announce that the meeting is being recorded (the announcement must itself be recorded), or the recording device must be obvious. There is no exception regarding property status (such as "on school property; in a government-funded facility"). But it also matters if the conversation is "private". See State v. Townsend, 57 P.3d 255, which gives weight to the subjective intent of the parties, thus the primary question would be whether the school official intended the communication to be private. Given strong FERPA privacy protection of personal information about students and in light of the likely nature of the conversation, one might think that the administrator intends the discussion to be private. However, the administrator cannot discuss e.g. disciplinary issues with third parties, so that would not be a valid basis for expecting privacy. You would really need to get a lawyer, discuss the expected subjects with the lawyer, and see if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (even if this is not a public meeting). Your local ACLU chapter might advise you of your rights, though they would probably also advise you to not experiment with breaking the law (I don't see what legitimate purpose would be served by recording in secret). | You acted illegally in assaulting your fellow student. When you are in public, a person can legally take your picture, and you are not allowed to assault a person because you do not like their legal actions. Any degree of force is excessive except in certain responses to illegal fource, and even the threat of force is excessive. You also have no right to demand that a person prove that they didn't take your picture, and certainly no right to enforce that demand with physical violence. | According to this article, the Malmö Administrative District Court found that the intent of the user is immaterial to whether a camera is being used for surveillance, so even if that is not why you are doing this, it counts legally as "surveillance". The law requires a permit from the länsstyrelse (county? government), according to the Kameraövervakningslag (2013:460) (article 8 states the requirement for permit, art. 16 tells you who to apply to). I believe that a tennis court would be considered a "public place", even if privately owned. Art. 17 tells you what goes into an application (there is probably a form), and art. 18 says that the kommun gets to weigh in. Presumably it would be critical to have a consent form signed before any recording happens, and you would include that in the application. | There is no common law offence of electronically recording a private place/activity, but many jurisdictions have legislation that makes it an offence: e.g. Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic), s 7. Whether evidence collected through illegal surveillance is admissible will depend on the legislation in each jurisdiction. For example, in Victoria, such evidence is inadmissible unless the court decides that admitting the evidence is sufficiently desirable: Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 138. This discretion reflects 'the fundamental dilemma... between the public interest in admitting reliable evidence (and thereby convicting the guilty) and the public interest in vindicating individual rights and deterring misconduct and maintaining the legitimacy of the judicial system': Australian Law Reform Commission (2006) 'Uniform Evidence Law', [16.84]. | The issue is not exactly with minors, it is with FERPA and COPPA. This assumes that you have some indication of what students are connected to the web page. If you have students under 13 (surely you do), you need verifiable parental consent. The FTC approves or disapproves particular methods of verification, here is their page on that. One approved and patented method is ChildGuardOnline Technology (it;s a business, not a free service). The other concern is that you have to scrupulously protect "student records". You already know that you can't disseminate "student records" without parental consent, what this adds is possibly new concerns with online security. However, many schools are exempt from the COPPA requirements. Here are some "exceptions" to the rule, and nonprofit organizations are not subject to Section 5 of the FTC Act. | Defendant's girlfriend should produce the copies of the recording to police, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney. Possession of the recording should induce the police and prosecution to at least re-evaluate the charges against Defendant, as Defendant would be able to subpoena the gun's owner to testify about the purchase and then use the recording to impeach him if he then denies owning the gun. It is unclear, though, whether the audio actually has any value because we don't know what charges Defendant is facing. If he's charged with unlawfully owning a gun, the recording would likely be quite helpful; if he's charged with unlawfully transporting a weapon, the recording's value would probably depend on whether the law in question outlaws "knowingly" transporting a weapon or "negligently" transporting a weapon, or transporting a weapon regardless of whether he knew about it. | When the SCO emails instructors on Student's behalf, then instructors will know that something has gone awry, because students normally email their instructors directly. Well, it looks like something has gone awry between the department and the student already, which is why there is now a case which the SCO is dealing with: We have discussed your case with your department. So, apparently, the SCO thinks that the issue between the student and the department is of such magnitude that any further direct interaction between them would only complicate the case. Simply put, you don't go dancing with someone in the evening if in the morning you testified against them on a witness stand. That said, the SCO is just trying to resolve the issue, and is just asking the student not to make it harder for them. This isn't a breach of confidentiality between the department and the student because the department and the SCO are parts of a single entity — the university. For any uni-related issues, confidentiality can only exist between the student and the uni as a whole, not with individual departments. | A teacher could not instruct students in how to build explosives for use in Federal crimes: It shall be unlawful for any person to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction [...] with the intent that the teaching, demonstration, or information be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence (source) This Federal statute creates a law preventing the teaching (in any context, including schools) of bombmaking for the purpose of committing a federal crime. So "bombmaking" is one subject that cannot be taught, although I don't think that there have been any prosecutions of regular K12 teachers under this law. |
In Iowa why is there are harsher punishment for causing serious injury without intent than with intent? In Iowa under §708.2 an assault (which is not distinct from battery in Iowa) with the intent to inflict a serious injury upon another§708.2(1) is an aggravated misdemeanor, which is punishable for up to two years in jail with a fine of $625-6,250§903.1(2). An assault which causes bodily injury or mental illness§708.2(2) is a serious misdemeanor, which is punishable for up to one year jail with a fine of $315-1,875§903.1(1). But if one commits assault without the intent to inflict serious injury, but who causes serious injury§708.2(4) they are guilty of a class "D" felony, which is punishable for up to five years in jail with a fine of $750-7,500§902.9(1)(e). This is in contrast to homicides where less intent generally results in a lesser sentence. For instance murder in the first degree is committed by willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation kills another person§707.2(1)(a) which is a class "A" felony, which is punishable only by a mandatory life sentence, without the possibility of parole or probation§902.1(1). Second degree murder is committed when someone still has malice aforethought, but doesn't meet the requirements of first degree murder. This is a class "B" felony which is punishable with up to 50 years in jail§707.3. Voluntary manslaughter is committed when a person causes the death of another person, under circumstances which would otherwise be murder, if the person causing the death acts solely as the result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a person and there is not an interval between the provocation and the killing in which a person of ordinary reason and temperament would regain control and suppress the impulse to kill§707.4(1). which is a class "C" felony, which is punishable up to 10 years in jail, with a fine of $1,000-$10,000§902.9(1)(d). Involuntary manslaughter which unintentionally causes the death of another person by the commission of a public offense other than a forcible felony or escape§707.5(1)(a). is a class "D" felony, while involuntary manslaughter which unintentionally causes the death of another person by the commission of an act in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury§707.5(1)(b). is an aggravated misdemeanor. So why is it that lacking intent to inflict serious injury, but causing serious injury nonetheless has a harsher punishment than inflicting serious injury with outright intent? | I think you should read this section in conjunction with 708.4: Any person who does an act which is not justified and which is intended to cause serious injury to another commits willful injury, which is punishable as follows: A class “C” felony, if the person causes serious injury to another. A class “D” felony, if the person causes bodily injury to another. So a person who commits an assault with the intent to inflict serious injury, and actually does inflict serious injury, will not get away with a 708.2(1) aggravated misdemeanor. They may instead be convicted under 708.4(1), a class C felony, punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a fine of $1,000-$10,000. This is a more serious crime than the class D felony of 708.2(4) for someone who does not intend to cause a serious injury but does so anyway. As an exercise, you can make yourself a 3x3 grid of all possible combinations of intent and result among "no injury", "bodily injury", "serious injury", and I think you'll find that the severity increases with either worse intent or worse result. | Neither with or without a warrant, if the confession is all there is. For a felony, the question is whether there is probable cause (4th Amendment). This is true whether the police arrest you, or they get a warrant – the difference being that in the latter case the warrant is issued by a guy with much greater knowledge of what constitutes probable cause. The question then would be whether a confession alone constitutes probable cause. There is a venerable rule, the corpus delecti rule (300+ years old) that requires there to be independent evidence of a crime, the point of this rule being to to prevent mentally ill people from being convicted of a crime that never even happened. Under that rule, a confession alone would not be probable cause (but a confession and a bloody glove could be). This article reports that at the federal level and in 10 states, there is a lower bar of mere "corroboration" without the need to argue that there was an actual crime. Exemplifying this relaxing of the traditional rule, in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, the court held that "[a]n accused's extrajudicial admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, made subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions, and corroboration by independent evidence is required". However, "[t]he corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti" and "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth; but those facts plus the other evidence must be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt". In such jurisdictions, courts take a "totality of circumstances" approach focusing on whether the confession is trustworthy. | Self-Defense is an active Defense for Homicide (note, this is the legal term for taking a life. Criminal Homicide and Justified Homicide are two subsets of Homicide and are denoted by illegal actions and legal actions. Homicide as a result of Self-Defense is a Justified Homicide, regardless of the weapon, so long as it was applied with the minimal amount of force required to stop the criminal harm to oneself). Suppose you use a taser and the current causes the attacker to go into cardiac arrest and die. Your intention in using the taser was to stop the criminal from injuring yourself, your property, or another person or their property (defense of others). Even though the Taser is non-leathal, it's more like less lethal. Death by Taser is uncommon, but not impossible or rare. It would be handled as a defensive use of a weapon (same as if the attacker was killed by a gun) and processed as such. Pennsylvania is a Stand Your Ground State, meaning that in a public place, you do not have a duty to flee if your attacker approaches you in a public place, you do not have to prove that you could not flee in order to claim self-defense. However, if you pull a weapon and your attacker decides to flee, you can not give chase and kill him upon capture. You also need to have a reasonable expectation that the attacker is about to use deadly force (this normally means having sight of the weapon or what would reasonably look like a weapon i.e. a realistic toy gun without the orange safety cap would be reasonable). You also cannot claim self-defense if you were engaged in another crime when the attacker approached you (i.e. If you rob the Krusty Krab and the Hash Slinging Slasher approaches you with a knife, sucks to be you cause you don't have a right to be in the Krusty Krab after closing.). | IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed. | It is premature to judge the particular case because the facts are not all available. But we can address the general principles. The Model Penal Code 3.04(2)(a) sets out the general principles clearly. A person has the right to self-defense against unlawful force. But, the use of force is not justifiable to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful. But more specifically under (b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat However, there is a further condition that force is not justifiable if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take Then finally, §3.05 says that this goes for people using force in defense of others. The short version is that the common law right to resist illegal arrest has been supplanted by a statutory requirement to submit to police authority, for example in California and New York. In Ewumi v. Georgia, defendant was illegally arrested and physically defended himself, which resulted in a battery charge and conviction. The battery charge was overturned because the arrest was illegal ab initio. If one resisting an authorized arrest, where an officer's force is likely to result in unjustifiable great bodily harm, the question is whether a reasonable person would find it necessary to resist in self-defense. It is unusual for the courts to find that to be the case. Minnesota law says that reasonable force may be used upon or toward the person of another without the other's consent when the following circumstances exist or the actor reasonably believes them to exist: (1) when used by a public officer or one assisting a public officer under the public officer's direction: (a) in effecting a lawful arrest Other sections say that a person who is not a public officer may use force to effect an arrest, or, "(3) when used by any person in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person". Being arrested by the police is not an offense, and none of the other justifications for use of force apply. | I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario. | If someone attacks your dog, or the dog of a third person, you may use force to defend property rights, see ORS 161.205 and ORS 161.229. This does not apply to a person attacking their own animal. Force may also be used to effect an arrest by a private person (ORS 133.225) – you "may arrest another person for any crime committed in the presence of the private person if the private person has probable cause to believe the arrested person committed the crime". You would need to study up on ORS 167.320. Assuming that the abuse is less than causing death, for first degree animal abuse, it is when one "causes serious physical injury to an animal". The child actually becomes relevant because the misdemeanor becomes a felony when The person knowingly commits the animal abuse in the immediate presence of a minor child. For purposes of this paragraph, a minor child is in the immediate presence of animal abuse if the abuse is seen or directly perceived in any other manner by the minor child. So in fact, no amount of force can legally be used to prevent a person from hitting their dog. Force can be used to arrest a person (which prevents any further beating), if the person causes serious physical injury to the dog. | Criminal cases The answer in the case of criminal charges in the federal system and in the vast majority of U.S. states is that you can almost never recover legal fees you incur defending a criminal action. There is such a thing as a lawsuit for malicious prosecution, and there is such as thing as a lawsuit for a civil rights violation caused by bringing baseless charges, but in both circumstances one must demonstrate that the charges were brought without probable cause. But, in most cases of serious criminal charges like this one, either a grand jury probable cause finding, or a preliminary hearing probable cause finding, both made well prior to a trial, will conclusively preclude a malicious prosecution or civil rights lawsuit. (Also, prosecutors have absolute immunity for their discretionary prosecution decisions, and judges have absolute immunity for their judicial decisions, and you can't sue jurors unless they accepted a bribe or something like that.) But, the standard of proof necessary to establish probable cause is much lower than the standard of proof necessary to convict. A very small minority of states allow for reimbursement of fees upon an acquittal, but even then, it is often necessary to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that you were actually innocent, so a dismissal on procedural grounds or an acquittal at a criminal trial where the prosecution must show beyond a reasonable doubt that you are guilty, is not sufficient to show that it is more likely than not that you are innocent. Likewise, you are not entitled to recovery for indirect financial damages caused by criminal charges. As you correctly imply, this is a very harsh rule that can mean that wrongful criminal charges can ruin you. On the other hand, if you are unable to afford an attorney, and a public defender is appointed for you by the state, you do not have to reimburse the state for the public defender's fees if you prevail and are acquitted. A minority of states, however, require that you reimburse the state for the public defender's fees if you are convicted along with other court costs, fines and restitution awards. For what it is worth, only about 1% of criminal charges brought result in an acquittal at trial. Most cases are resolved through a pre-trial plea bargain, a voluntary dismissal by a prosecutor who acknowledges that there is no case against you prior to trial, or a conviction of at least something at trial. About 10% of cases go to trial and about 10% of cases that go to trial result in an acquittal or hung jury (in very round and approximate numbers that vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and by type of case). Also, probably at least 10% of acquittals are of people who were factually guilty, because juries get it right something on the order of 90% of the time when cases go to trial. But, the vast majority of acquittals result in a vast injustice to the defendant (although not as great as when a judge uses the factual basis of the events from which you have been acquitted to enhance the sentence against you on other charges which is done from time to time in both the federal and state legal systems in a practice that is unfair but not necessarily sufficient to overrule those sentences on appeal). Civil cases The situation in a civil case is different and too broad to answer in one question. There are some civil cases where a prevailing defendant is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs, while there are others where a prevailing defendant is not. The default rule, called the "American Rule" is that a prevailing attorney is not entitled to attorneys' fees and costs of a defense. But, there are myriad exceptions to that rule that vary by type of case, by the particular details of how a case was prosecuted, and by legal jurisdiction within the United States, that are not easily summarized. For example, in Colorado civil cases, some of the more common grounds for an award of attorneys' fees to a defending party are: (a) a two-sided contractual fee shifting term, (b) dismissal of the case before filing an answer for failure to state a claim when tort claims were asserted, (c) a determination that the suit was groundless, frivolous or vexatious, (d) violation of certain rules relating to disclosure of information to the other party, (e) a statutory fee shifting provision in the case of a claim based upon a statutorily created right which is present in some statutes but not others. |
i find a security vulnerabilities but my company dont put time to fix it I work as Developer in a big company, I found security vulnerabilities that let me login to any user accounts in the system. I told my team and my boss for about 9 mounts ago. my project manager and my team leaders don't prioritize the ticket so it gets done by somebody. What can i do? I have signed contract so i cant just go out and tell about it to somebody outside the company. What if i stooped working there right now? can i tell or write about it on my website or blog? Can i do something without getting fired or get in trouble ? | Every software is potentially vulnerable, unless it runs on an air-gapped computer with sealed data ports. How vulnerability fixes are prioritized against other goals is usually a business decision, legitimately made by the management. There are some jurisdictions and issues where the law requires them to act, but again there is usually a judgement call involved. For example, the GDPR talks about due regard to the state of the art. What you describe seems to be a difference in opinion about the importance of the fix. Ask about that at Workplace SE, not here. There are ways for software developers to influence their management, but ultimately the management is responsible for the outcomes and gets to decide. You can inform your superiors, in writing. If you are in a large company, there may be a legal or compliance department. Inform them if you have a reason to distrust your superiors. In most jurisdictions, you cannot simply talk to the press, either now or later. If you believe that your company is acting criminally, talk to a lawyer. | I would recommend talking to an adult person in HR. I'm quite sure they will notice that what your manager wants to do is more than dodgy, and doing something dodgy may be in the interest of your manager, but not in the interest of the company. The best thing is to go to HR, acting as if a mistake has been made, and point out to them what your start date was, and that the new contract has the incorrect starting date, and they need to fix this mistake or you can't sign the contract. If they insist you sign it, then you DON'T sign it. If they say you will be fired if you don't sign it, then you tell them that in that case you would get legal advice. BTW. You definitely don't sign this as it is. PS. This answer was posted on workplace.stackexchange, not law.stackexchange, so please don't complain if there is no legal content. | I am not knowledgeable about UK law, but since almost everywhere in the U.S. employment is at-will by default, in all three scenarios Company B is entitled to terminate the employee very easily. The assumption that the employee was accurately found guilty of harassment elsewhere precludes more interesting analyses where matters such as defamation and public policy are involved. If the contract between the employee and Company B establishes that termination will be for good cause, the employee has only a mild chance of not being terminated for what he did in Company A. However, I say "mild chance" because in most cases Company B can reasonably argue that it seeks to protect its other employees and/or customers from the possibility that the employee's misconduct may occur in the current workplace. A very detailed analysis of the factual circumstances might be required for discerning whether Company B's decision to terminate the employee is merited. Additionally, in cases where The Employee is a publicly visible figure and a figure of authority having a management role there could be a concern that the employee's misconduct elsewhere may harm the image of Company B. | Be careful of the 10% time “perk”. It is not your own time. It is work time where you are self-directed. Any project unrelated to your work should be on your actual own time not dork time that is free of specific assignment. Fortunately the section 39 of the UK patent law is short and relatively straightforward. It is focused on “the course of your usual duties” not on whose time you were on or whose equipment you were using. It belongs to them if - (a) it was made in the course of the normal duties of the employee or in the course of duties falling outside his normal duties, but specifically assigned to him, and the circumstances in either case were such that an invention might reasonably be expected to result from the carrying out of his duties; or (b) the invention was made in the course of the duties of the employee and, at the time of making the invention, because of the nature of his duties and the particular responsibilities arising from the nature of his duties he had a special obligation to further the interests of the employer’s undertaking. Otherwise it’s yours. See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-patent-act-1977/section-39-employees-inventions-right-to-employees-inventions | Read it carefully. "Work additional hours as required by the nature of your work assignments". Does the nature of your work assignments require additional work hours? That's very unlikely. It may be that your boss wants you to do three weeks work in two weeks, but it's not in the nature of your work assignments that they take two weeks. If it's three weeks of work, then it is actually in the nature of your work assignments that it takes three weeks. It may be in the nature of a work assignment that once it is started it must be finished quickly. For example if you are a plumber, it may very well be that once you start a job and unscrew the first screw, that job must be finished. In that case, you can't go home after 8 hours and leave a job unfinished which could be a major problem for your customer. Are you in a similar situation? If your company is too tight to hire enough people to do the job, and deadlines will be missed if people work 40 hours a week, that is not in the nature of your work assignment - it's because your company is too tight to hire enough people. | You need to be very clear with B that you intend to continue to operate A. You need to be clear whether you are to be an actual employee of B, or a hired contractor for B. If an employee, you need to agree with B how much time you can devote to A while employed by B, or to put it another way, how much time (per day, week or whatever) you are expected to devote to B before doing stuff for A. Are there to be restrictions, such as a ban on your doing things for A while at B's worksite? Above all, you need to agree on who owns what rights to both the existing A code, and any new code will be held by you, and what rights will be held by B. All the above should be in a written agreement, and you would be wise to have a lawyer draft or at least review the language. If B will not agree to this, you will have a choice to make: put A on hold while working for B, or not accept B's offer. Do not lie to B about what you are doing with A. Oh, and if you had any sort of non-compete agreement at the job you quit four months ago (let's call them C) be sure that you comply with it, or are prepared to fight it. If there is any question, this is another area where you would do well to consult a lawyer. Many non-compete agreements claim more than local law allows, and are not enforceable. Many others are very much enforceable. It depends on the wording of the agreement, and the provisions of the law where you are located. Also, do not use any confidential data from C without C's written permission. | Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG. | The "Severance Agreement" is a contract between the company and you. It spells out what the company will do and probably what they expect you to do going forward. Simple enough. The statement you referenced merely says that you are not being forced to sign the agreement. That's all. You don't, presumably, have the option of remaining employed at this company but you DO NOT have to sign this agreement. But if you don't, it's likely that any benefits being promised in the agreement will not be delivered to you. So specifically in answer to your questions: It protects them against a claim that they somehow forced you to sign the agreement. Likely anything that the agreement says the company will do such as pay you a certain amount of money and the like. Bottom line is that if you don't like the agreement, don't sign it. If you want the benefits they are promising in the agreement, then sign it and move on. |
Is someone under legal obligation to return a wrongfully issued refund? Suppose someone ordered supplies totaling over $1,000. When he picked up the purchase, he was issued a refund that the order was canceled. He now has all the products he ordered and was not charged. This was not due to him canceling the order; the employee did so wrongfully. Ignoring morals, is there legal obligation for him to attempt to return the refund? Does this fall under unjust enrichment? If so, to what extent must he try? | Ignoring morals, is there legal obligation for him to attempt to return the refund? No, but he must pay for the goods if the supplier asks. Does this fall under unjust enrichment? No. This is simply a contract law issue. The person is contractually obliged to pay for the goods and, in the present circumstances, they haven’t done so. If so, to what extent must he try? He doesn’t have to make an active effort to pay but he can if he likes. However, if and when the vendor realises their mistake and asks for payment, it must be made in a reasonable time. | No. Theft is, in most jurisdiction, an action by which the offender takes another person's property with the intent to permanently deprive them of it. The clerk isn't taking any property from the store, and she doesn't have any intent to deprive the store of anything. She is therefore not guilty of theft. If she were doing this intentionally -- either in league with the customer or even without the customer knowing -- she could likely be held liable for the theft, either on a conspiracy theory or perhaps an innocent-agency theory. The lack of criminal liability of course does not mean that there can be no accountability. The employer is free to terminate the employee, and it will have different options -- depending on jurisdiction -- to recover the value of the uncharged printers, perhaps by docking her paycheck or through a negligence action. | There is no contract Specifically, an agreement to agree is void for uncertainty. If the total cost of shipping was an insignificant fraction of the value of the contract then there might be sufficient certainty - that is, it could be argued that the buyer (or seller) has agreed to pay a reasonable rate for shipping. However, in the context of most items on the site this is unlikely to be the case. As an aside, your use of the term "rescind" is incorrect. Rescission occurs when one party breaches a term of the contract and the other party elects to terminate (and optionally seek damages) in response. The correct term for both parties agreeing to release the other is "termination by agreement". | You have a contract - they have fulfilled their obligation (they paid you), if you do not fulfil their obligation (not to post it online) then you are in breach of the contract. Your obligation continues even if you gift the money back to them. If you breach the contract then they can sue you for the damage that they suffer. Presumably this would be damage to their reputation and for a public figure this could run into millions of dollars. In demanding additional money from them beyond what you are legally entitled to you are, at least, flirting with the crime of extortion/blackmail. This would not be a matter for them to sue you for, it would be a matter for the DA to prosecute if they chose to make a complaint. There doesn't seem to be a defamation issue here because you are not stating anything that isn't true. Now, the extent of the agreement appears to prohibit you posting it on the internet, however, the spirit of the agreement is that you will keep the information secret in all respects - that is likely how a court would look at it. Of course, if someone does steal the information from you then you haven't broken the agreement but you would probably have to prove that it was stolen when they sue you. | Yes, it's illegal new-south-wales s118 of the Crimes Act says: Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. QED | Is it illegal to ask a company for money in exchange for information on a bug in their software/website? That in itself is legal. Indeed, the company would incur unjust enrichment if it coerced you to disclose your discovery for free. Only if you threatened the company to divulge to others your discovery unless the company pays you, it would be illegal and trigger charges such as extortion (likewise, legislations outlaw the unjustified delivery of programs or instructions for hacking a software/network/etc., although this goes beyond your actual question). Can the company take legal action against me? That seems doubtful, futile, and it could backfire (please note I have not done any research on legal precedents about this). Although the terms and conditions of the website or the End User License Agreement (EULA) of software might prohibit you to reverse engineer (RE)/decompile/etc. the application, anti-RE clauses are unenforceable and the remedies therefor are indeterminate because the sole act of conducting reverse engineering does not subject the company (or third parties) to any losses. The company's decision to take legal action for your discovery could backfire from two standpoints. First, it calls attention to the fact that the software at issue is defective and unsafe. And second, the bug is likely to be detected by someone else anyway, thereby potentially compromising customers' systems. | This is not "libel," which is a form of defamation (publishing a false and defamatory statement that injures another). "Bait and switch" is a type of violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Law. That Law makes it illegal for a business to engage in any false or deceptive practices, or to perform any false or deceptive acts, in commerce. Read more about it on the Massachusetts' state government site. If the restaurant's conduct was deceptive and it caused you harm (for instance, you would not have gone into the restaurant and ordered at all if you had known you had to order a drink to get the favorable price on sliders,) there may be a violation. | You didn't consent to being ripped off. You did however fail to grasp the terms under which you were permitted to park on their property, and you failed to pursue an alternative (such as looking for change; using a credit card). It is possible that you should have known that this was a no-change-given machine, since one can often see that there is no mechanism on these machines whereby you can actually get change. However, if you have clear proof that you owed $6 and you paid $10, then 4 of those dollars are properly yours, and there is a reasonable chance that you could prevail in a suit against them. There is even a greater chance that they would refund the difference, just as a sensible business practice. "Exact change" is legal and can even be the law, especially in government-run transportation systems. |
To what legal extent can parents prevent children from masturbating? There was a meme circulating around of an Amazon review of a chastity belt (Be warned, there's a chastity belt in the image). It essentially is a mother describing her absolute joy that her son is no longer "sinning" at night thanks to a chastity belt. Whether this is actually real, morally acceptable, socially acceptable or good parenting is another question. But I'm curious on whether this is legal and if religion is a legal justification of such actions. I feel that if any minor told me that their mother puts a chastity belt on them I'd be morally obligated to call CPS. To what legal extent can parents prevent children from masturbating and are religious reasons legal justifications for such actions? | To what legal extent can parents prevent children from masturbating and are religious reasons legal justifications for such actions? One of the main restrictions on parental authority is a prohibition on engaging in child abuse or neglect. But, in most cases, this either isn't defined at all, or is defined only in the most general terms (in the same way culpability for an accident depends upon "negligence" which is also only vaguely defined). So, somebody would have to decide if that conduct constitutes abuse or neglect of a child (realistically, this fact pattern would involve the issue of abuse, rather than neglect), and while religious reasons can justify some conduct that might otherwise be considered abusive because it caused harm for no justifiable reason, ultimately, the interest of the state in preventing the abuse of children outweighs freedom of religion and could give rise to criminal child abuse charges and/or termination of parental rights. Whether or not a chastity belt would constitute abuse would depend upon the judgment of the relevant CPS official, a prosecuting attorney and a trial judge (possibly subject to appellate judge review), in light of common sense and community standards. There is no hard and fast rule, and the question might be resolved in different ways in different times and in different places. | No It's your device, you can do what you like with it (subject to the law - you can't hit people with it. Unless they want to be hit: whatever turns you on, turns you on). However, if you do operate it outside their instructions then they would not be legally liable if it failed and injured you or someone else or set fire to the cat or whatever. The "prohibition" would limit their legal liability. | This is roughly accurate, but there are nuances. The real US issue with teacher-led prayer is that a teacher's authority can make it effectively coercive, or seem so, even if this is not intended by the teacher. (And in the past it has often been so intended, by teachers and administrators who thought it was good for children to be required to engage in prayer.) There is no ban on a teacher praying privately. Similarly, there is no ban on private prayer by a student. Indeed such a ban (for either teacher or student) might violate the free-exercise clause of the US constitution. Of course a student should not be engaged in prayer when s/he is supposed to be doing classwork, but there are times during the school day available for prayer. However, public, student-led prayer can also be an issue. For example, at some schools it was customary to have such public prayer at the start of football games, or school assemblies. This official designation of a moment or occasion for prayer was challenged as an endorsement of prayer by the school, and as coercive to those who did no want to participate, but might feel strong social pressure to do so. The point is that the school, as an aspect of government, and one where students are required to attend at that, should not make prayer an expected norm, resulting in singling out those who do not conform. But no US law or court decision has ever forbidden private prayer in schools by students, or indeed by teachers. | One relevant US law is Title 18 Chapter 110. Using real children in porn is against the law, as is most anything connected to it (permitting children to do it, distributing, buying...). Under the definitions (18 USC 2256(1)) “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years. The possible hook for cartoons is via the definition of “child pornography” which is any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where— ... (B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. My guess is that hentai doesn't satisfy this definition, since I hear that the characters in a cartoon don't actually look like real people. However: there are also general laws against obscenity in some jurisdictions, and in US v. Whorley, it was held that you can still be convicted of receiving obscene material (Japanese child porn cartoons) – SCOTUS refused to hear an appeal. Most cases that are prosecuted also involve real child porn, or plea bargaining. In light of Whorley, it hasn't been definitively determined that hentai is against the law, but the first step has been taken. | Leonard's law says that the school can restrict speech if it is against the religious tenets of the organization. Now I don't think school uniforms fall are part of the tenets of Catholicism, so why can private schools enforce dress codes? I see there's a misunderstanding of the Leonard's law. But I fault the California legislators (not you) for that confusion, since the statutory language is ambiguous and leads to the reasonable interpretation your inquiry reflects. The statute reads: (c) This section does not apply to a private postsecondary educational institution that is controlled by a religious organization, to the extent that the application of this section would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the organization. It is not that a religious school is allowed to restrict speech if it contravenes the tenets of that religion, but that the statute altogether is inapplicable to religious schools because it is considered an infringement of fundamental liberties to which religious institutions are entitled in the US. The [religious] school would prevail on the basis of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. See Dermody v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 530 S.W.3d 467, 474 (2017): The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine prohibits courts from deciding cases "dependent on the question of doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical law, rule, or custom, or church government[.]". (Please note that I strongly disagree with the application of that doctrine in the Dermody case and I consider it impermissibly outdated for the controversy litigated therein, but that is a separate issue). A religious school could convincingly argue that the judicial review of its uniforms policy infringes matters of ecclesiastical discipline/rule/custom, aspects which ultimately "involve an internal church dispute over religious authority or dogma" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 220 (2005). Infringements of ecclesiastical abstention and akin doctrines would be outweighed only in "compelling" [cases] because "the duty to prosecute persons who commit serious crimes is part and parcel of the government's `paramount responsibility for the general safety and welfare of all its citizens'" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct. at 225 (brackets added in this answer). A free speech controversy such as the school's uniform policy simply does not meet that threshold. | It probably depends on whether the employer is covered by a relevant non-discrimination statute. Most employers in the United States are covered, but some are small enough to be exempt. Federal law exempts employers with under 15 employees and religious organizations. There might also be a relevant state law. It also would depend upon whether the EEOC or a court found that "be blessed" was a compelled religious statement in violation of a worker's beliefs, and whether allowing the worker not to say it would be a "reasonable accommodation." This is a strong case, and I suspect that the worker would win on both counts but it isn't a completely open and shut case. There is arguably a secular meaning to the word "blessed" and a court could conceivably find that there is a legitimate and indispensible business purpose for insisting that every single person in the worker's position need to make this statement, although I doubt that a court would do so. | "As we know non-adults aren't allow to carry weapons" This is not something that we know or an obvious point. It is also not obvious that a knife would qualify as a weapon for these purposes. This would not be true in most jurisdictions in the world. I have no idea what knife control laws look like in China or Taiwan. A reference to why you think that this is the case would be helpful. Even if there are laws banning possession of knives (i.e. carrying knives) when one is in public for use as a weapon, it would be very surprising to me if teens weren't allowed to possess knives in a kitchen, or a work site where a knife was a necessary tool. It would similarly surprise me if a teen working on a knife design in a craftsman's workshop would be illegal. What makes you think that any of these things are illegal in China or Taiwan? This might have been illegal in Japan in the 1600s when metal blades were highly regulated (this is one of the reasons that most Japanese food is served with portions pre-cut to be bite sized), but I very much doubt that teen possession of knives for practical purposes is illegal in any of those places today. There is also, in general, nothing wrong with factories run by adults making knifes from other people's designs. They do that all the time and it wouldn't be illegal to do so just because the designer wasn't allowed to use the product of the factory in public. I would be surprised if a factory even asked how old the designer was, particularly if he was operating through a company formed for him (something an adult might have to do). The harder question would be whether the teen can enter into an enforceable and valid contract with a factory without having the co-signature of a parent or guardian. Many countries don't allow this so that the teen is not exploited into agreeing to a big contract on unfair terms. Also, many countries make a distinction between criminal acts committed by adults and the same acts committed by minors. A teen, particularly a young teen, may be under the relevant law, capable of only engaging in juvenile delinquency, rather than an adult felony. But, again, I don't know how this is handled in Taiwan or China. In general, the legal system in Taiwan strongly resembles that of the legal systems in Continental Europe not long after World War II (i.e. in the 1940s), with its own local developments since then. But, China's legal system is quite unique and is not very similar to the common law legal systems of England and former or current English colonies, or the civil law legal system of Continental Europe (or for that matter, Islamic law). China's legal system is different at the level of very deep concepts of legal process, of what is and isn't law, and of many core legal concepts. It also has piecemeal bits that are imposed by treaty even though they are not organically natural fits with the rest of the Chinese legal system (e.g. its intellectual property laws). | Parents have a legal obligation to care for their minor children: it is illegal to harm a child through action or inaction. State law and associated welfare programs are complex: you can start here. If surgery is medically necessary, her insurance should cover it. If her parent do not have medical insurance, they still have the obligation of care; though various governmental programs may alleviate the problem, such as the state medical assistance program. The parents may therefore be in violation of the law, and anyone may report this to DSHS (specifically through Child Protective Services). This obligation terminates when the child turns 18 (assuming that someone does not petition for adult guardianship). Legislation is not crystal clear as far as what constitutes "injury of a child ...under circumstances which cause harm to the child's health". CPS has no authority to compel parents to pay for a medical treatment, but they can go to the courts on behalf of the child. At that point, it's hard to say what the court would order. For example, if the parents are capable of providing medical insurance and just willfully chose to not cover their child, the court could order them to get insurance. It is virtually guaranteed that the courts would not order the immediate amputation of the child's feet, and there would be no legal basis for ordering the parents to pay for the procedure in a decade, after the child is an adult. However, if you are suggesting that there is an immediate treatment (which the parents have opted to not provide, hence the prospects of later amputation), then it is reasonably likely that the courts would order the parents to provide for the treatment (if it would be possible for them; otherwise, the state may intervene and provide for the treatment). |
How long does provocation remain relevant in physical crimes? In the Rittenhouse case, the prosecution ended up going with "provocation" as being at the core of their argument as to why they believe Rittenhouse "provoked" Rosenbaum into chasing him. My question is, if we assume that Rittenhouse did in fact "provoke" Rosenbaum by pointing his rifle at him, how long after the provocation has ceased, will the initial provoker re-gain his right to self-defence? In the Rittenhouse case, Kyle is seen running away from Rosenbaum, right up until the point where, according to testimony from Richie McGuinness and the FBI footage (I believe), Rosenbaum lunged at Rittenhouse in an attempt to grab his rifle. Does the phenomenon of "reasonableness" come into play here, as in, "What a reasonable person of ordinary prudence and intelligence would do"? EDIT: Due to my lack of knowledge at the time I got one thing wrong. The prosecution didn't claim that Kyle pointed the rifle at Rosenbaum. They stated that he pointed it at Ziminski. This fact adds additional complexity. When should "provocation" be legally used in court? Can a person who wasn't actually provoked chase after a man and beat him? | Short Answer There is a fairly vague one sentence answer to this question, in the general rule case that does not involve an escalation of conflict by the person provoked with a deadly weapon that wasn't part of the original provocation, with little case law interpretation in the applicable Wisconsin statute. This sentence states: The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. Beyond that, in any remotely close case, it is up to the jury to decide what this sentence means. Long Answer The relevant Wisconsin statute states that: Provocation affects the privilege of self-defense as follows: (a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self-defense, but the person is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely to cause death to the person's assailant unless the person reasonably believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm at the hands of his or her assailant. (b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. (c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.48(2). There are two reported appellate case precedents in Wisconsin that have addressed this question and interpreted this statutory provision. One from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals is State v. Cummings, 451 N.W.2d 463 (Wisc. App. 1989). It held that when a prisoner was charged with assault based on his biting officer who was one of several officers restraining him when he became agitated while in hospital for treatment was not entitled to self-defense instruction in prosecution for battery to correctional officer because the prisoner was engaging in unlawful conduct when he refused to obey officer's direct orders and physically resisted officers as they attempted to restrain him, and prisoner's own testimony was that officer's arm was on his throat for only a few seconds, which constituted brief and legitimate response to resistance that prisoner was putting forth. This primarily addresses part (a), however. The other from the Wisconsin Supreme Court is Ruff v. State, 223 N.W.2d 446 (Wisc. 1974) which held that if a person attacked escalated fight beyond that which would be legally justifiable in view of nature of original provocation, aggressor would regain privilege of self-defense, because victim, by resorting to deadly force which was not a justifiable exercise of right of self-defense, would himself become aggressor. Thus, the right to regain right of self-defense was not available to defendant at moment when he pointed gun at intended victim and stated “This is a stickup,” since at that moment, the right of self-defense was limited to the person at whom defendant's gun was pointed, not on side of defendant commencing a stick-up. This primarily addresses part (c), however. There is no binding case law interpreting part (b) in Wisconsin that is squarely on point. Wisconsin's rule on this point codifies the common law rule, so Wisconsin cases prior to the enactment of this statutory rule, and out of state precedents interpreting that common law rule or codifications of it that are very similar to Wisconsin's statutory rule, would probably be considered persuasive by a court seeking to interpret and apply this statutory rule. In the alternative, the judge might simply have a jury instruction that contains the language of part (b) and simply leave the jury to decide what this means based upon its plain language and the facts before them, where the facts of the case present a colorable withdrawal of provocation issue. | There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense. | This is the Texas law pertaining to self defense, which says that "a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force". Relatively little of the law pertains to firearms, and none of it restricts the right to self-defense based on whether you are a resident, or you are using your own firearm vs. a borrowed one. The one provision, subsection (b)(5), that refers to firearms is an exception whereby force is not justified, namely if the actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's differences with the other person while the actor was: (A) carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02; or (B) possessing or transporting a weapon in violation of Section 46.05. (Sect. 46.02 is about conditions unlawful carrying of weapons, which covers such things as under-age carrying of certain knives, or not having control of your weapon, or being a felon in possession, etc. 46.05 is about machine guns, explosives, zip guns etc.) Deadly force is covered by a separate section, 9.32, adding the requirement that the actor "reasonably believe[] the deadly force [to be] immediately necessary". (A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or (B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Note that "deadly force" is defined as "force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury". Sec. 9.33 likewise allows deadly force to be used analogously in defense of a third person, and intreestingly, in 9.34(b), "A person is justified in using both force and deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force or deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an emergency". In addition, deadly force can be justified in defense of property, per sec. 9.41, if you "reasonably believe[] the force [to be] immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property", and you may also use force to recover or re-enter the property (as long as the force is used "immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession", and "the actor reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when he dispossessed the actor; or the other accomplished the dispossession by using force, threat, or fraud against the actor"). Sec. 9.42 then provides the possibility of justified use of deadly force in protection of property, if the force is immediately necessary (A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or (B) to prevent the other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the property; and (3) he reasonably believes that: (A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; or (B) the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The short version is, if deadly force is justified in the particular circumstances, then deadly force with a borrowed weapon is justified. However, there are federal laws regarding non-resident aliens possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(B) says that It shall be unlawful for any person...who, being an alien (A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or (B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)))...to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce Under subsection (y) there are exceptions for licensed hunters, government representatives etc. You can also petition the Attorney General for an exception. The point is that federal law would make possession of a firearm illegal for most visa types: here is the list. | There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle. | Yes, such as this limitation on free speech. Initially, the limitation was "Clear and Present Danger" test (Schenk v. United States, 1919) which held that speech inciting lawless action was not protected speech and thus could be crimilized speech (i.e. Schenk publishing anti-draft fliers during World War I, which advocated draft dodging which at the time was a crime under the Espionage act of 1917). This was later over ruled to the "Bad Tendency" test which allowed for advocacy of criminal actions to be criminilized (Whitney v. United States, 1927. Whitney was accused of helping establish the American Communist Labor Party (ACLP), which held as a party platform the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government in favor of one advocated by the ACLP. This is standard to most Communist Parties at the time around the world. The difference between Schenk and Whitney was that Schenk actively called for a criminal action, where as Schenk was speaking of a future action following other party successes). This was overturned again by Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969) which introduced the "Imminent Lawless Action" test. This explicitly overturned Whitney in addition to other cases not mentioned such as Abrams v. United States (1915), Giltrow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951). It does not overrule Schenk, but it did cast doubt upon the decision made. In the case, KKK leader Brandenburg made a speech advocating for revenge against African Americans and Jews as well as expressing the belief that the United States government actively surpressed White Americans and needed to be opposed. He was charged as advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Imminent Lawless Action added the important componant that the violation must be advocacy of lawless action (revenge against racial minorities) must have a definite future date (like "tonight", "tomorrow", or specific time and date) and a vague future time will not count. And must show intent to break the law (Brandenburg did not specifically intend to break the law... he wanted it changed so it would not be legal before he took action). Additionaly, they found that the mere advocacy of resisting the government did not have any language componant that suggested violent resistance. Brandenburg, as discussed, overturned the reaffirmed B and put Schenk on some shaky ground as parts of Shenk were still relevant (Schenk first introduced that Free Speech was not without restrictions, but some of the case law was not relevent anymore, as Whitney used it as a basis in that decision, as did to a limited extent Dennis, which didn't work well with Whitney for other reasons. It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court does not typically take cases that wholly reaffirm past cases. Typically, their rulings are to clarify situations in a previous case that are not stated by the current extant rulings. For example, if the Supreme Court took a case that called Roe v. Wade into question, the case would more likely test whether Roe allows for a particular practice that isn't all that clear in Roe. It may affirm that Roe is still law, but the new case is not consistent with Roe, which will place a restriction on Roe, but not, figuratively, (pardon the pun) throw the baby out with the bath water. | The case Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 may help to explain this. In a use-of-force case, "courts must identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force, and then judge the claim by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right", therefore "The notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic standard is rejected". Such claims "invok[e] the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right "to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable seizures," and must be judged by reference to the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard". In invoking the notion of "reasonable", the court is referring to the fact that a person chooses an action being in possession of certain knowledge, and using that knowledge plus reasoning, to judge an outcome. So when a suspect appears to be armed, the officer has to decide whether the weapon is real and whether the suspect is likely to use it against the officer. When one conjectures that a lesser degree of force could have been used because it turns out that the suspected weapon was a plastic toy, one is appealing to knowledge not available to the officer at that time. In Graham, the court held that the legal question is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in a particular situation In other words, the judgment is made by reference to the objective facts of the circumstance, and not the subjective emotional state of the officer. As the court put it, "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight". | england-and-wales No. Reconciliation between victim and attacker has no bearing on the guilt of the attacker. It may have a bearing on the decision to prosecute: A victim can be forced to testify, but they may well not make a very convincing witness if they are. Also, in past times (when the police were the prosecutors for most crimes), they often had a "least said, soonest mended" approach to domestic violence. It may also have a bearing on the sentence. Note: England and Wales is a jurisdiction where prosecutions can occur without a complaint (in general). | There are four criteria used today in the United States: The statement was false, but was claimed as true. The statement must have been made to a third, previously uninvolved party. The statement must have been made by the accused party. The statement caused harm. The first (and very important) criterion was discussed in New York Times v. Sullivan, where it was ruled that A State cannot, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, award damages to a public official for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves "actual malice" -- that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. Pp. 265-292. (c) Factual error, content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient to warrant an award of damages for false statements unless "actual malice" -- knowledge that statements are false or in reckless disregard of the truth -- is alleged and proved. Pp. 279-283. Quoting Wikipedia and Justice Black, The Court held that a public official suing for defamation must prove that the statement in question was made with actual malice. In this context, the phrase refers to knowledge or reckless lack of investigation, rather than its ordinary meaning of malicious intent. In his concurring opinion, Justice Black explained that "'[m]alice,' even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove. The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment." New York Times v. Sullivan is regarded as one of the most - of not the most - important defamation cases of the century. It was argued in 1964. If the case you discuss - which I haven't been able to find - occurred after to the ruling, then it could have been dismissed, because A did not intend it as malicious in the sense of defamation (and did not claim it was true), though it was almost certainly meant as an insult. Had this case occurred prior to New York Times v. Sullivan, things might have been different. Non-public officials Things are different for private officials. Those who are not classified as public figures are considered private figures. To support a claim for defamation, in most states a private figure need only show negligence by the publisher, a much lower standard than "actual malice." Some states, however, impose a higher standard on private figures, especially if the statement concerns a matter of public importance. You should review your state's specific law in the State Law: Defamation section of this guide for more information. Note: There are differences between defamation, libel, and slander; a quick overview is given here: "Generally speaking, defamation is the issuance of a false statement about another person, which causes that person to suffer harm. Slander involves the making of defamatory statements by a transitory (non-fixed) representation, usually an oral (spoken) representation. Libel involves the making of defamatory statements in a printed or fixed medium, such as a magazine or newspaper." |
May pre-judgement settlement be considered as compensatory damages for the purposes of punitive damages? Say Alice is harmed by the bad faith conduct of Bob that results a punitive damages’ multiplier in a suit therefor; however, Bob, post-motion and pre-judgment, offers a settlement for all compensatory damages, and Alice accepts it: Is the compensatory settlement amount accounted in calculating the amount of punitive damages if the factfinder imposes such on Bob to pay Alice after the two agree on a settlement for the compensatory, but not the punitive damages causes of actions? A 50-state comparative analysis gets very close to the question, but still it is unclear whether a pre-judgment settlement would be considered actual damages for purposes of punitive damages: "An award of actual damages, either compensatory or nominal, is a prerequisite for an award of punitive damages. If damages are actually suffered, punitive damages may be awarded in appropriate cases, even if the injured party is only awarded nominal damages. Carr v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 199 Cal. Rptr. 835 (Cal. Ct. App.1984). See also Cheung v. Daley, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)." | A true settlement is a full settlement of all outstanding issues in the case, and if accepted, would moot the availability of punitive damages or any other award by the court. | First of all, there is more than one legal sense in which the term a person's "estate" is used. You are using it in the archaic sense of all of the property owned by a living natural person, but this is not a contemporary use of the term. Normally, the term estate is referred to property that belongs to a dead person that is subject to probate, the property that belongs to a trust, or the property that was transferred to a bankruptcy trustee by operation of law upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. None of those modern senses of the word apply to this question. You are just asking about the extent to which a particular kind of debt (criminal restitution) can be collected from the person who owes that debt. Your tag also implies that you are particularly interested in New York law. The probate laws of the State of New York are codified in a portion of its statutes known as the EPTL (Estate, Powers and Trusts law), but as noted above, that is not relevant in this case. The criminal law provisions related to restitution, and the general rules applying to debt collection (spread across several of New York's statutes such as the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), the New York Penal Law, and the Civil Procedure Laws and Rules (CPLR)) are the laws applicable to your subquestions. 1) Mr. X has spent all the money and is broke. He can't possibly pay the $1 million. When he gets out of jail and (presumably) starts working again, how much of his income can he keep, and how is "excess income" assessed toward the $1 million debt? This involves the liability of Mr. X and not "his estate". If he goes bankrupt this debt would not be discharged if the proper procedural steps are taken. In general, restitution judgments can be enforced by the procedures set forth for collection of a civil judgment and also through the terms of any relevant probation or parole conditions (which would typically allow for incarceration for willful failure to comply with the conditions to the extent that Mr. X is able to do so with minimal due process protections). Civil judgments can be enforced through garnishment of amounts owed to you (such as bank account balances and wages) subject to certain exemptions from creditors (only some of which apply to restitution judgments) and through writs of execution against property owned by you (the process is quite different for tangible personal property v. real property). The general rule is that wages are exempt from creditors up to an amount equal to 30 hours times minimum wage or 75% of the total whichever is greater. There is usually no exemption for income as an independent contractor, businessman or for bank accounts (unless fully traceable to certain exempt assets). Certain kinds of property (there is a long list) are exempt from creditors as well (although certain kinds of assets are exempt as against some but not other creditors). 2) Mr. X has a house worth $1 million with a mortgage of $1 million (a civil liability). I have been told that a criminal judgment takes precedence over a civil liability. Is it true, as my friend asserts, that the $1 million crime victims will get their money before the mortgagee after the house is sold? This is also a claim against Mr. X and not his estate. Your friend was incorrect. A mortgage is a property interest that takes priority over an unsecured debt like a restitution judgment even if that debt may have special priorities in some circumstances. (This assumes that the mortgage is recorded before a "judgment lien" is recorded in the real property records of the county where the house is purchased or is recorded contemporaneously with the purchase of the house. If a judgment lien is recorded and then a mortgage is entered into and recorded later, the judgment lien would have priority.) 3) Mr. X has a house worth $2 million with a $1 million mortgage, and $1 million of equity. Is there anything (e.g. taxes) that will stand in the way of the house being sold, $1 million being paid to reimburse the crime victims, and $1 million to the mortgagee? Put another way, what is the order of reimbursment between victim, mortgagee, and other claimants such as taxes? To grossly oversimplify a complicated process with a variety of exceptions: The highest priority would be any outstanding liens for unpaid property taxes, Then sometimes all or part of a homeowner's association lien, then the first mortgage, then any other other liens junior to the mortgage that are not subject to a homestead exemption of CPLR Section 5206, because the homestead exemption was waived or to which it does not apply by law (e.g. mechanic's liens for work done on the property but not paid for and second mortgages), then the homestead exemption amount (paid to Mr. X) which in New York ranges from $75,000 to $150,000 depending upon the county in question which remains exempt for one year if kept segregated or reinvested in a new home (twice as much if the debtor is married), then judgment liens paid in order of recording which were recorded prior to the restitution judgment lien. The property interest in the house associated with judgment liens or other mortgages recorded after the restitution judgment lien foreclosed upon that burden the property (i.e. junior liens) are erased in a foreclosure, subject to a right of redemption set forth in in RPAPL Section 1352: Sec. 1352. JUDGMENT FORECLOSING RIGHT OF REDEMPTION. Where real property has been sold pursuant to a judgment in an action to foreclose a mortgage, and an action is thereafter brought to foreclose or extinguish a right of redemption in such real property, the judgment, instead of directing a sale of the property, shall fix the right of any person having a right of redemption therein or the right to foreclose a subordinate mortgage or other lien and shall provide that a failure to redeem or commence an action for the foreclosure of such mortgage or other lien within such time shall preclude such person having a right of redemption or the holder of such mortgage or other lien from redeeming such property or foreclosing such mortgage or other lien, and thereafter such person having a right of redemption or the holder of such mortgage or other lien shall be excluded from claiming any title or interest in such property and all title or interests of such person having a right of redemption in, or the right to foreclose a subordinate mortgage or other lien against such property shall thereby be extinguished and terminated. The claims would be paid out of the proceeds of a sheriff's sale net of the costs of sale. If there is money left over after all of these claimants are paid, it would go to the property owner, Mr. X. But, in your scenario with a $1 million mortgage and a $1 million restitution lien and a $2 million value, there would be no excess. If a properly bid sale price is not enough to pay the entire restitution judgment, the shortfall called a "deficiency" remains as a "deficiency judgment" that is still owed by Mr. X. Strictly speaking, the higher priority liens don't get paid from the sales proceeds (except the owner's homestead exemption amount), instead the foreclosure sale buyer takes the property subject to those liens and those senior lienholders have a right to foreclosure in turn if they are paid off. Also, procedurally, the value of the property net of higher priority liens and encumbrances is determined by the highest bid made at a sheriff's sale (with the foreclosing debtor allowed to use the amount of the lien as payment), not on the basis of an appraisal or prolonged sale via a realtor. Often there will be no bidder other than the creditor bringing the foreclosure. APPENDIX: Criminal restitution in New York State is primarily governed by N.Y. Penal Law Section 60.27 which reads as follows: Restitution and reparation In addition to any of the dispositions authorized by this article, the court shall consider restitution or reparation to the victim of the crime and may require restitution or reparation as part of the sentence imposed upon a person convicted of an offense, and after providing the district attorney with an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the provisions of this subdivision, require the defendant to make restitution of the fruits of his or her offense or reparation for the actual out-of-pocket loss caused thereby and, in the case of a violation of section 190.78, 190.79, 190.80, 190.82 or 190.83 of this chapter, any costs or losses incurred due to any adverse action taken against the victim. The district attorney shall where appropriate, advise the court at or before the time of sentencing that the victim seeks restitution or reparation, the extent of injury or economic loss or damage of the victim, and the amount of restitution or reparation sought by the victim in accordance with his or her responsibilities under subdivision two of section 390.50 of the criminal procedure law and article twenty-three of the executive law. The court shall hear and consider the information presented by the district attorney in this regard. In that event, or when the victim impact statement reports that the victim seeks restitution or reparation, the court shall require, unless the interests of justice dictate otherwise, in addition to any of the dispositions authorized by this article that the defendant make restitution of the fruits of the offense and reparation for the actual out-of-pocket loss and, in the case of a violation of section 190.78, 190.79, 190.80, 190.82 or 190.83 of this chapter, any costs or losses incurred due to any adverse action, caused thereby to the victim. In the event that restitution or reparation are not ordered, the court shall clearly state its reasons on the record. Adverse action as used in this subdivision shall mean and include actual loss incurred by the victim, including an amount equal to the value of the time reasonably spent by the victim attempting to remediate the harm incurred by the victim from the offense, and the consequential financial losses from such action. Whenever the court requires restitution or reparation to be made, the court must make a finding as to the dollar amount of the fruits of the offense and the actual out-of-pocket loss to the victim caused by the offense. In making this finding, the court must consider any victim impact statement provided to the court. If the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such finding or upon request by the defendant, the court must conduct a hearing upon the issue in accordance with the procedure set forth in section 400.30 of the criminal procedure law. The provisions of sections 420.10, 420.20 and 420.30 of the criminal procedure law shall apply in the collection and remission of restitution and reparation. For purposes of the imposition, determination and collection of restitution or reparation, the following definitions shall apply: (a) the term "offense" shall include the offense for which a defendant was convicted, as well as any other offense that is part of the same criminal transaction or that is contained in any other accusatory instrument disposed of by any plea of guilty by the defendant to an offense. (b) the term "victim" shall include the victim of the offense, the representative of a crime victim as defined in subdivision six of section six hundred twenty-one of the executive law, an individual whose identity was assumed or whose personal identifying information was used in violation of section 190.78, 190.79 or 190.80 of this chapter, or any person who has suffered a financial loss as a direct result of the acts of a defendant in violation of section 190.78, 190.79, 190.80, 190.82 or 190.83 of this chapter, a good samaritan as defined in section six hundred twenty-one of the executive law and the office of victim services or other governmental agency that has received an application for or has provided financial assistance or compensation to the victim. A victim shall also mean any owner or lawful producer of a master recording, or a trade association that represents such owner or lawful producer, that has suffered injury as a result of an offense as defined in article two hundred seventy-five of this chapter. (a) Except upon consent of the defendant or as provided in paragraph (b) of this subdivision, or as a condition of probation or conditional discharge as provided in paragraph (g) of subdivision two of section 65.10 of this chapter, the amount of restitution or reparation required by the court shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars in the case of a conviction for a felony, or ten thousand dollars in the case of a conviction for any offense other than a felony. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subdivision, if an officer of a school district is convicted of violating any section of article one hundred fifty-five of this chapter where the victim of such crime is such officer's school district, the court may require an amount of restitution up to the full amount of the fruits of the offense or reparation up to the full amount of the actual out-of-pocket loss suffered by the victim, provided further that in such case the provisions of paragraph (b) of this subdivision shall not apply. (b) The court in its discretion may impose restitution or reparation in excess of the amounts specified in paragraph (a) of this subdivision, provided however that the amount in excess must be limited to the return of the victim's property, including money, or the equivalent value thereof; and reimbursement for medical expenses actually incurred by the victim prior to sentencing as a result of the offense committed by the defendant. Any payment made as restitution or reparation pursuant to this section shall not limit, preclude or impair any liability for damages in any civil action or proceeding for an amount in excess of such payment. In the event that the court requires restitution or reparation to be made to a person and that person dies prior to the completion of said restitution or reparation, the remaining payments shall be made to the estate of the deceased. The court shall in all cases where restitution or reparation is imposed direct as part of the disposition that the defendant pay a designated surcharge of five percent of the entire amount of a restitution or reparation payment to the official or organization designated pursuant to subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law. The designated surcharge shall not exceed five percent of the amount actually collected. Upon the filing of an affidavit of the official or organization designated pursuant to subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law demonstrating that the actual cost of the collection and administration of restitution or reparation in a particular case exceeds five percent of the entire amount of the payment or the amount actually collected, as the case may be, the court shall direct that the defendant pay an additional surcharge of not more than five percent of the entire amount of a restitution or reparation payment to such official or organization, or the actual cost of collection or administration, whichever is less unless, upon application of the defendant, the court determines that imposition of such additional surcharge would cause undue hardship to the defendant, or any other person who is financially supported by the defendant, or would otherwise not be in the interest of justice. Such additional surcharge, when added to the initial five percent surcharge, shall not exceed ten percent of the amount actually collected. If the offense of which a person is convicted is a class A, class B, class C, or class D felony involving the sale of a controlled substance, as defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter, and no other victim who is a person is seeking restitution in the case, the term "victim" as used in this section, in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall mean any law enforcement agency of the state of New York or of any subdivision thereof which has expended funds in the purchase of any controlled substance from such person or his agent as part of the investigation leading to such conviction. Any restitution which may be required to be made to a law enforcement agency pursuant to this section shall be limited to the amount of funds expended in the actual purchase of such controlled substance by such law enforcement agency, less the amount of any funds which have been or will be recovered from any other source, and shall not include a designated surcharge pursuant to subdivision eight of this section. Any law enforcement agency seeking restitution pursuant to this section shall file with the court and the district attorney an affidavit stating that funds expended in the actual purchase of a controlled substance for which restitution is being sought have not been and will not be recovered from any other source or in any other civil or criminal proceeding. Any law enforcement agency receiving restitution pursuant to this section shall promptly transmit to the commissioner of the division of criminal justice services a report stating the dollar amount of the restitution received. If the offense of which a person is convicted is defined in section 150.10, 150.15 or 150.20 of this chapter, and no other victim who is a person is seeking restitution in the case, the term "victim" as used in this section, in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall mean any municipality or volunteer fire company which has expended funds or will expend funds for the purpose of restoration, rehabilitation or clean-up of the site of the arson. Any restitution which may be required to be made to a municipality or volunteer fire company pursuant to this section shall be limited to the amount of funds reasonably expended or to be expended for the purpose of restoration, rehabilitation or cleanup of the site of the arson, less the amount of any funds which have been or will be recovered from any other source, and shall not include a designated surcharge pursuant to subdivision eight of this section. Any municipality or volunteer fire company seeking restitution pursuant to this section shall file with the court, district attorney and defense counsel an affidavit stating that the funds reasonably expended or to be expended for which restitution is being sought have not been and will not be recovered from any other source or in any other civil or criminal proceeding. For the purposes of this subdivision, "volunteer fire company" means a fire company as defined in paragraph a of subdivision two of section one hundred of the general municipal law. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, when a person is convicted of harming an animal trained to aid a person with a disability in the second degree as defined in section 195.11 of this chapter, or harming an animal trained to aid a person with a disability in the first degree as defined in section 195.12 of this chapter, the court, in addition to any other sentence, shall order the payment of restitution to the person with a disability who was aided by such animal. If the offense of which a person is convicted is defined in section 155.25, 155.30, 155.35, 155.40 or 155.42 of this chapter, and the property taken is timber, the court may upon conviction, in addition to any other sentence, direct the defendant to pay the rightful owner of such timber an amount equal to treble the stumpage value of the timber stolen as defined in section 71-0703 of the environmental conservation law and for any permanent and substantial damage caused to the land or the improvements thereon as a result of such violation. Such reparations shall be of such kind, nature and extent as will reasonably restore the lands affected by the violation to their condition immediately before the violation and may be made by physical restoration of such lands and/or by the assessment of monetary payment to make such restoration. If the offense of which a person is convicted is defined in section 240.50, subdivision one or two of section 240.55, section 240.60, section 240.61, section 240.62 or section 240.63 of this chapter, and no other victim who is a person is seeking restitution in the case, the term "victim" as used in this subdivision, in addition to the ordinary meaning, shall mean any school, municipality, fire district, fire company, fire corporation, ambulance association, ambulance corporation, or other legal or public entity engaged in providing emergency services which has expended funds for the purpose of responding to a false report of an incident or false bomb as defined in section 240.50, subdivision one or two of section 240.55, section 240.60, section 240.61, section 240.62, or section 240.63 of this chapter. Any restitution which may be required to be made to a victim pursuant to this subdivision shall be limited to the amount of funds reasonably expended for the purpose of responding to such false report of incident or false bomb, less the amount of any funds which have been or will be recovered from any other source and shall not include a designated surcharge pursuant to subdivision eight of this section. Any victim seeking restitution pursuant to this subdivision shall file with the court, district attorney and defense counsel an affidavit stating that the funds reasonably expended for which restitution is being sought have not been and will not be recovered from any other source or in any other civil or criminal proceeding, except as provided for by section 3-112 of the general obligations law. Where a transfer of probation has occurred pursuant to section 410.80 of the criminal procedure law and the probationer is subject to a restitution condition, the department of probation in the county in which the order of restitution was imposed shall notify the appropriate district attorney. Upon notification by the department of probation, such district attorney shall file a certified copy of the judgment with the clerk of the county in the receiving jurisdiction for purposes of establishing a first lien and to permit institution of civil proceedings pursuant to the provisions of subdivision six of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law. | The complaint is available online. In fact, it asks for more than 1.6 billion, because it doesn't suggest any amounts for certain categories. The amounts that are specified include things such as the cost of providing security in the wake of death threats they received. Starting on page 136, they ask for General compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial, Damages of not less than $600,000,000 for lost profits, not less than $1,000,000,000 for lost enterprise value, not less than $600,000 for security expenses, and not less than $700,000 for expenses to fight the disinformation campaign waged against them, Punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial, Pre- and post-judgment interest, and Expenses and attorneys' fees. Justification for the amounts in the second item is found in the complaint. | Yes The normal remedy for not receiving a fair trial or due process is the declaration of a mistrial. A mistrial legally never happened so it is up to the prosecution to decide if they want a retrial. Unless the appellant can demonstrate that no reasonable jury would have convicted on the evidence (which seems unlikely verging on impossible), the appeal will not acquit the accused. | I belive you have misread the linked article: "A Narrow Lane: Navigating Claims for Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing"/ It says thst all conrtreacts involve a duty of good faith: It is a settled principle of New York law that “all contracts imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the course of performance.” 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 98 N.Y.2d 144, 153 (2002) (collecting cases). Courts have described this covenant as a duty “encompassing any promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding were included and which are not inconsistent with the contract.” It goes on to say that it is tempting for a plaintiff to include a bad faith claim in any contract dispute: After all, most plaintiffs probably believe that the defendant did not act in good faith and/or that the result was unfair. But it says that courts are reluctant to honor such claims in ordinary contract disputes: ... courts are loath to make rulings that might vary the terms to which the parties agreed. A party’s conduct either breaches the terms of the agreement or it does not; if it does not, that is generally the end of the line for a breach of contract claim. A party seeking to impose an additional duty on the ground that it is “implied” bears a heavy burden. In short, claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing fail far more often than they succeed. This article explores some of the nuances that make such claims particularly thorny. ... “[t]he law encourages ‘efficient breaches’”; that is, breaches committed based on the breaching party’s calculated determination that it “will still profit after compensating the other party for that party’s expectancy interest.” 28A N.Y. Prac. Contract Law § 23.2. Absent a specific provision in the contract that requires good faith, a “bad faith breach” is no different from any other. ... although a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires that the parties have a valid contract ..., such a claim will fail if it is based on the same alleged conduct that forms the basis for a cause of action for breach of the contract’s express terms. See Kim v. Francis, 184 A.D.3d 413, 414 (1st Dept. 2020). So the article explicitly says that a claim for breach of contract does not automatically imply a breach of good faith. To the contrary, something more is required. | Is it worth it to contact a lawyer? No. The amount at issue indicates that the matter would have to be litigated in Small Claims court, where typically parties are not allowed to be represented by a lawyer. Furthermore, litigating in Small Claims court will give you some exposure to judicial proceedings. Being able to advance your legal arguments in court is useful, and this seems to be a great occasion to gain experience of that sort. The rental company's uncooperative behavior is unreasonable and can forfeit its entitlement to at least a sizeable portion of its actual expense. In many jurisdictions, the legislation provides treble damages in claims of fraud. Although claims of fraud and breach of contract oftentimes overlap, your entitlement to treble damages is not something to rule out. At the outset, the company's initial promise to give you the final statement most likely supports a finding of reasonable reliance, one of the prima facie elements of fraud. It is unclear whether the rental company made the aforementioned promise in writing. For evidentiary purposes, make sure that all your subsequent interactions with the rental company are in writing. That will make it harder for the company to disavow its verbal representations. | Yes In general, default judgements can be set aside for good cause. If the defendant can show that they had a legitimate reason for being unable to respond to the cause of action, then the judgement can be set aside and a new hearing scheduled. However, “good cause” encompasses things both unforeseen and unforeseeable and includes having good cause why the court and/or plaintiff/prosecutor could not have been advised of the incapacity before default judgement was entered. In most jurisdictions, they also need to show that they have a prima facie defence such that a different result is possible. The “superior sovereign” is not really germane: good cause can include a sudden illness or injury, police detention (be they superior, inferior, same-level or foreign sovereign), natural disaster etc. | Probably not. This condition is what's known as a penalty clause, which is not universally allowed. This article discusses penalty clauses in EU law. In the English-Belgian variety, the clause is simply not enforceable. In the Dutch-French and German-Swiss models, such a clause might be enforceable, but the judge can adjust disproportionately high amounts – 250 times the normal price strikes me as disproportionately high. It isn't clear what amount the courts would deem to be reasonable and fair: but the infringer would have to request a reduction in the amount. |
What are a business's obligations now that the Biden (OSHA) administration has suspended enforcement of its business vaccination mandate(s)? The Biden administration has suspended enforcement of its vaccination and testing requirements for private businesses after a federal appeals court halted the rules pending review. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, in a statement on its website, said the agency “has suspended activities related to the implementation and enforcement” of the requirements “pending further developments in the litigation.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, considered one of the most conservative in the country, ordered OSHA last week to “take no steps to implement or enforce the Mandate until further court order.” Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt, in an opinion for the three-judge panel, called the Biden policy “fatally flawed” and “staggeringly overbroad,” arguing that it likely exceeds the authority of the federal government and raises “serious constitutional concerns.” Source: https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/18/biden-administration-suspends-enforcement-of-business-vaccine-mandate.html Thousands of private and public companies across the USA have mandated a strict vaccination policy, and threatened employees they will get fired if they will not comply. For example: CNN fired 3 employees for coming to the office unvaccinated. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-58112125 26,000 NYC employees were placed on administrative leave without pay, and potentially will be fired if will not be vaccinated: https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/579257-26k-nyc-workers-remain-unvaccinated-after-friday-deadline The CEO of ChristianaCare in Delaware said the hospital has terminated approximately 150 employees who did not adhere to its vaccination policy. It employs more than 12,000 workers. Northwell, New York's largest health care provider, recently dismissed about 24 unvaccinated employees. Northwell employs 76,000 workers. Novant Health, a hospital system based in North Carolina, has fired more than 175 unvaccinated employees. More than 99 percent of its 35,000 employees have complied with the company's vaccine mandate. Last week, Novant suspended 375 workers, giving them five days to get at least a first shot, which 200 did—suggesting that suspensions can work. https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/coronavirus-firing-unvaccinated-workers.aspx And many more. These business are not covered under the HIPAA umbrella to maintain the medical records of their employees with the HIPAA guidelines. And these businesses have no legal way to verify the vaccination record/proof of their employees. So essentially it is a "trust me" system. I was under the assumption that the businesses were relying on the OSHA vaccination requirements that Biden created. With that requirement being off the table, and potentially being considered as unconstitutional - how will that affect the legal requirement of businesses requiring a vaccination proof? | Not at all. A US business always had the authority to require employees to be vaccinated before entering the workplace, except if a valid state law prohibits this. The EEOC has confirmed that none of the Federal laws which it enforces prevent such a requirement. The proposed mandate under the OSHA Act would merely have required a business subject to the mandate to do what it had the right to do anyway. Even if it is held that the US Federal Government does not have constitutional authority to impose such a mandate, that would not in any way impair any business which chooses to do so from imposing such a requirement on its employees, subject to the requirements under the ADA and the Civil Rights act to offer reasonable accommodations for sincere religious objections, and for disabilities that would interfere with accepting vaccination. Businesses generally are not "covered entities" under HIPPA, and so can ask employees for health information such as a vaccination record, if they choose to. Or they can choose to trust an employee's word on the matter. | In the US, the most wide-spread proscription against a medical treatment (broadly construed) is that only 10 of 50 states allow physician-assisted suicide. In Washington v. Glucksberg (one of the states that subsequently made such suicides legal), SCOTUS affirms that such a law does not violate the Due Process Clause. Given a historical analysis, the court concludes that an "asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause". O'Connor in her concurring opinion further states that "There is no dispute that dying patients in Washington and New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths", but this falls short of a ruling that a person has a protected liberty interest in seeking medical care. Cruzan v. Director affirms that "[a] competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical treatment" (also noting that "informed consent" may derive from common law or specific state constitutions). Reciting prior reasoning on Due Process and medical treatment and referring to Jacobson v. Massachusetts (smallpox case), they note that "the Court balanced an individual's liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine against the State's interest in preventing disease". There seems to be a dearth of cases affirming a protected liberty interest in seeking a particular medical procedure. Were the court to announce a fundamental right to seek some medical treatment, that right could still be subordinated to the states compelling interest in preventing some harm associated with a medical procedure, with legal review being carried out under a strict scrutiny standard. It should be borne in mind that Congress does limit access to drugs and devices, hence there is no constitutionally-protected right to take LSD as a treatment for mental problems. To the extent that a procedure relies on a (not-yet approved) device, that device must be approved by the FDA. | Since this is a board about law, the legal answer is that New Jersey does not regulate vacation pay: In New Jersey, employers are not required to provide employees with vacation benefits, either paid or unpaid. If an employer chooses to provide these benefits, it is only required to comply with its established policy or employment contract. The specific law cited by that web page is this one, which says that "Nothing in this chapter requires an employer to pay an employee for hours the employee is not required to be at his or her place of work because of holidays, vacation, lunch hours, illness and similar reasons." So whether your boss can count weekend days as part of your vacation will depend on your employment contract and the established policies of your employer. Unfortunately, that's not something this forum can provide advice on. | The authority for the ban is laid out here: all that is required is putting the company on the Commerce Department's entity list. More specifically, under 50 USC 1701 there must be an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat If that condition is satisfied (and it has been: we have the emergency), then 50 USC 1702 grants POTUS broad economic powers, including prohibiting transactions in foreign exchange, or any kind of transaction involving any right regarding any property. Under that order, one implementational step for putting a company on the list is an executive review involving the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Trade Representative, the Director of National Intelligence, the Administrator of General Services, the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and, as appropriate, the heads of other executive departments and agencies There must be a determination that the transaction involves information and communications technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary and that the transaction "is a threat". This last requirement is the tallest hurdle that a Twitter-ban would face, namely establishing that Twitter is controlled by a foreign adversary. | A company can mandate getting a flu shot as a condition of employment. The government can do the same (for its employees) – Washington state has done so at least for covid. Some individuals qualify for a disability accommodation, so they would be exceptions (e.g. they could be moved to working away from the public). A sincere religious conviction also gives rise to a religious-accommodation exemption. This guidance addresses the question of what constitutes a sincerely held religious belief. | It's probably not unlawful to ask, but an answer cannot be required immediately. Per the Department of Labor, Susan has 60 days to elect COBRA coverage (the qualifying event here being the termination of Susan's employment): Your plan must give you at least 60 days to choose whether or not to elect COBRA coverage, beginning from the date the election notice is provided or the date you would otherwise lose coverage under your group health plan due to the qualifying event, whichever is later. It would be unlikely for an employer to discourage an employee from electing COBRA coverage due to costs to the employer, as you suggest: Susan is still employed and thus could be treated differently in her last two weeks depending on how she responds because the company is struggling financially and is looking for every opportunity to save money. Susan electing to use COBRA coverage is unlikely to cost the company money, because the employer is permitted to charge her the entire cost of the coverage, plus 2 percent to cover the cost of administering it (additional DoL source). As far as privacy goes, I don't think anything illegal has occurred here. The most prevalent law regarding privacy of health information, HIPAA, generally does not apply to employers. Susan could, of course, request a private discussion, and any response from Emily could not rise to the level of illegal harassment or create a hostile work environment. | "This policy" is referring to the Mozilla Community Participation Guidelines as amended (basically a Terms of Service (TOS) agreement). If so, does it mean adherence to Guidlines is fixed to version current at the moment of commencement of employment? Not really. It means that Mozilla Community Participation Guidelines are primarily guidelines for members of the general public who are not employees, and that different unstated policies delivered to employees are what govern employees instead. There are consequences for Mozilla employees failing to honor the current version of the Mozilla Community Participation Guidelines, but those consequences are set forth in an employment contract with the employees rather than being limited to the consequences and procedures set forth in the Mozilla Community Participation Guidelines for members of the general public who aren't employees. | Some interesting reasoning about standing aside (which antivaxxers etc. will love though, because it stipulates that the FDA refusing to collect all side effects statistics [even starting 16 years later] gives standing to sue on the original approval), the Texas' judge estimation of success on the merits is essentially relying on the finding that "Pregnancy is not an illness" (p. 40) and essentially repeated on p. 44 as "Chemical Abortion Drugs do not provide a Meaningful Therapeutic Benefit", so that in the Judge's estimation drugs for terminating pregnancy can be held to a [much] higher safety standard than the FDA decided by itself. This ultimately phrased as (p. 57): The Court does not second-guess FDA's decision-making lightly. But here, FDA acquiesced on its legitimate safety concerns in violation of its statutory duty based on plainly unsound reasoning and studies that did not support its conclusions. It's followed by another finding that there was likely political interference by the Clinton administration with the FDA's decision. This a rather partial summary since the order involves several FDA decisions, the details of which which I'm glossing over here (like the fact that the decision to not collect all side effects stats for mifepristone is rather more recent, being taken in 2016--but nonetheless the judge found that consequently the original 2000 decision was reopened as well, and can the object of the suit too.) |
Automatically updating a Steam user profile Is it legal to automatically update a user profile on Valve's Steam network? I looked through the subscriber and privacy agreements, but couldn't really find anything precise enough about it (or I missed it, I don't know much of law). So is it possible, for example, to make an app that allows people to, say, automatically update their steam profile's bio every day, featuring a unique daily quote, as long as they give their agreement and login credentials, without them actually pressing the "Save" button or anything ? Or is it possible to automatically send comments to other users' profiles if agreement is given? Or is it possible to automatically upload files to the Steam Workshop ? I'm very new to all of this, thanks for reading me out. | Only if you ask Valve for permission first, and they agree in writing. I'm not a lawyer, but when I was reading through the Subscriber license you linked, this stuck out to me: You are entitled to use the Content and Services for your own personal use, but you are not entitled to: (i) sell, grant a security interest in or transfer reproductions of the Content and Services to other parties in any way, nor to rent, lease or license the Content and Services to others without the prior written consent of Valve, except to the extent expressly permitted elsewhere in this Agreement (including any Subscription Terms or Rules of Use); (ii) host or provide matchmaking services for the Content and Services or emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Valve in any network feature of the Content and Services, through protocol emulation, tunneling, modifying or adding components to the Content and Services, use of a utility program or any other techniques now known or hereafter developed, for any purpose including, but not limited to network play over the Internet, network play utilizing commercial or non-commercial gaming networks or as part of content aggregation networks, websites or services, without the prior written consent of Valve; or (iii) exploit the Content and Services or any of its parts for any commercial purpose, except as expressly permitted elsewhere in this Agreement (including any Subscription Terms or Rules of Use). The part that I've bolded is probably the part that makes this against the Terms of Service, since in order to post these sorts of automated messages to their service, you'd need to use a "utility program" to "emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Valve in any network feature of the Content and Services, through protocol emulation, tunneling, modifying or adding components to the Content and Services". I doubt that Valve would ever agree, since such a program could very easily be used to create spam bots that works bombard users with unsolicited advertisements, but maybe Valve would be willing to cut deals with AAA video game companies to let them deploy tools to automatically manage their store pages. | You can license the use of your IP only for certain uses, for example (most commonly) "non-commercial". The general template of permission is "You have permission to ___ as long as you ___". What the user is permitted to do, in your scheme, is something along the lines of "only distribute the output in this manner", or "not distribute code developed with this tool anywhere else". It's up to you to prove that someone violated that condition, if they did. | Copying is illegal, creating an identical work by coincidence isn't. If it is not a criminal case, then a court decides whether it is more likely that the identical work was created by copying or by coincidence. Creating an identical work through a random process isn't going to happen, claiming this would be an awful defense. On the other hand, it is quite possible that two software developers using very stylized code adhering to struct coding conventions can produce quite large bits of identical code. Your links titled "metadata" and "hash" don't actually link to a description of metadata, or the description of a hash, but to a description of torrent files, which is something totally different. Systematically distributing files whose only purpose is the illegal duplication of copyrighted works should not be done without consulting a lawyer, as has been said on other threads (whether posting links to copyrighted files is legal). The chances that a random process will generate a file identical to an existing copyrighted file of say over 100 bytes are virtually zero. If there is an illegal copy of a copyrighted file, and you claim that you created it through a random process and coincidence, you will lose, and deservedly so. | I know that some of this may be covered by either the Creative Commons license or the OGL it was published under, but it's not clear to me how far those freedoms extend. It was all published as materials under copyright to the original authors, TSR, WotC, &c. and if things had been left like that hszmv's answer would've been completely correct: stay vague and allow users to enter those names and descriptions, talk to WotC's lawyers and sales department about license fees, or just keep it to yourself and your friends. You're right, though: WotC went whole-hog, dumped their partial OGL idea, and relicensed some things as Creative Commons. There are different Creative Commons licenses, though, some restricting commercial use that would still keep your app to yourself and friends without a specific licensing agreement. Go find out exactly what WotC put under CC. If it's only the Player's Handbook, then you can only use names and descriptions that are from the Player's Handbook and you're still facing a cease-&-desist if you start adding in Monster Manual info.If it's everything, it's everything they have but still won't include any older modules that they don't have the right to change the copyright status of. It'll still be under copyright, usually until 70 years after the death of the original creator. For Gary Gygax, that'll be 2078. Expect that length to extend during your lifetime though. US copyright usually extends every time Mickey & friends come close to entering the public domain. [Edit: The comments below suggest it might only have been the Systems Reference Document (I assume for 5e). It's 403 pages of not nothing but it's not much given the universe we're talking about. The spell and monster lists are generic. Bigby is nowhere to be found and the only mention of a beholder is a reminder not to use the name beholder without their written approval.] Go find out exactly which CC WotC used. The article above says "all use" but you need to find out the exact number of the Creative Commons license for each thing you're using and make sure all of your uses fall within its terms. Some are basically free use but still insist you mention the copyright holder prominently or in every use. Go ahead and do that if you have to. [Edit: The comments below say it is probably CC 4.0. The SRD download page says you can use CC 4.0 or their own OGL. In both cases, yes, you must acknowledge WotC by name in a way prominent enough to satisfy the license you choose.] And of course, Don't trust legal advice from internet randos or ChatGPT. If this is a serious thing you're going to be spending a good chunk of your life working on or expect to make significant money from, go talk to an actual lawyer. Bonus points for one specialized in IP with a knowledge of roleplaying and the way it's been (partially) opening up lately.If you start off just by talking to WotC's lawyers, just do that somewhere where you get their explanations and permissions in writing. Then keep that somewhere safe in electronic and hard copy. Then still take that with you when you go talk to your own lawyer. | Anyone can sue anyone for anything- you don't need a law that says "user39137 is allowed to sue Microsoft for restarting his PC". The question is whether you will succeed. You won't, for two reasons. Three if you count the fact that it's trivial to stop updates restarting your PC at inconvenient times. First, you probably agreed to this in the EULA. Updates. The softwareperiodically (sic) checks for system and app updates, and downloads and installs them for you. You may obtain updates only from Microsoft or authorized sources, and Microsoft may need to update your system to provide you with those updates. By accepting this agreement, you agree to receive these types of automatic updates without any additional notice. Windows 10 EULA This likely isn't the only bit where you accept this, but it's the best I could find by skimming with ctrl-f. Obviously if you were to start a lawsuit, you'd want to read the whole thing. Second, to sue someone you need to have suffered damages. "Being annoyed because the computer restarted in the middle of Among Us" isn't really worth anything. | Per the comment, the applicable license term seems to be Licensee agrees to maintain in confidence the source code version of the Licensed Software by using at least the same physical and other security measures as Licensee uses for its own confidential technical information and documentation, but in no case less than reasonable measures. So if your own code is on a physically unconnected thumbprint-secured blah blah blah computer deep in a mountain, with files encrypted, so must theirs be. If yours is stored in "the cloud" with decent password protection, theirs must be as well. This seems to describe your Github use (I don't have any knowledge of the degree of hackability of private Github repositories). The legal judgment as to whether this is "reasonably secure" is based on whether a prudent person would know that it is practical to gain unauthorized access. Protecting a file with the password "password" would probably be found to be unreasonably insecure. | A web site that is serious on protecting some content behind a paywall will put the protected content, or a version of the page with both protected and unprotected content, on separate page or pages, so arranged that a user will not be able to follow the link until that user has signed in and been accepted as an authorized user. A site that merely uses CSS to hide "protected" content is not really protecting it. CSS is designed to be modified by the ultimate user -- that is part of its function. If the site chooses to send you content, you are entitled to read it. Even if some of the content has a CSS tag attached which suppresses or obscures the display of that content, they know perfectly well that any user can supersede this with local CSS, and so I don't see how they have any legal claim, nor any way of knowing if you have accessed the "hidden" content or not. If you attempt to bypass or hack a login screen, that might be circumvention under the US DMCA, or "Unauthorized computer access" under any of several laws. | The agreement linked in the question seems to be or to purport to be, for a non-final, non-production version of the board. I have seen such agreements used, both for hardware and software, used when beta-test versions of products are being distributed to those who agree to do such testing, often in exchange for a reduced price on the final product, or an early look. I have also seen similar language used when an evaluation version of a product is provided free, or at a much reduced price. In such a use, it would be a reasonable contract, it seem to me, and I see no reason why if it were agreed to by both parties in such a situation, it would not be binding. Often such agreements also include a non-disclosure aspect, but this one does not seem to do so. I cannot see how such an agreement could be made applicable automatically, without both parties having chosen to agree to it, and indicated this by signing, clicking, or in some other positive way. I doubt that it could be made automatically applicable, on an "by using this product you agree" basis. I don't know of any physical consumer product, or appliance, sold with such an agreement in ordinary commerce. I am not sure what would happen if a manufacturer wanted to require all purchasers to sign such an agreement. I don't know if it would be binding. I would think that the purchaser's rights under the First Sale doctrice, could be modified by a valid contract agreed to by the purchaser. I do not think that they could simply be revoked by a contract of adhesion, which the purchaser had no choice to decline before making the purchase. As the OP says this was not signed or agreed to in any way, I can't see how it binds the OP. |
What is Stamp Duty Land Tax used to fund? According to the gov.uk website, UK residents need to pay Stamp Duty Land Tax when they buy a property over a certain value. Where does this money go and what is it used to fund? | It goes into the Consolidated Fund and thereafter is used the same way as the rest of the government's money; there's no special destination for this particular set of tax receipts. That was also the case for its predecessor tax, stamp duty (which still exists for some other transactions other than the ones in land covered by SDLT). Without tracing the legislative history too far, the Finance Act 2003 created SDLT as a tax, and provided for it to be collected by HM Revenue & Customs the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 says that HMRC must put all their receipts into the Consolidated Fund, apart from certain exceptions which don't include SDLT As a matter of policy, HM Treasury strongly prefers the "one big pot" system. See the Government manual Managing Public Money, 2021 ed., at 5.6.3: Proposals to create new taxes in order to assign their proceeds to new spending proposals are rarely acceptable. Decisions on tax are for Treasury ministers, who are reluctant to compromise their future fiscal freedom to make decision. The general reason here is that if there is one big pot of money, the government has a freer hand than if there were (say) separate funds that could only be spent on road maintenance, or agricultural subsidies, or whatever. Additionally, within the context of the "Exchequer Pyramid" also explained in that document, the one big pot is used in overnight market operations by the Debt Management Office, and having more money available for that purpose is generally useful. While this particular facet of the system has been in operation only since 1998, the general pattern of having one big pot of money has been policy since at least the early 19th century. When "stamp duty" originated in 1694 (5 Wm & Mary c. 21) it was one of several taxes created at about that time, and intended to fund the Nine Years' War (as we now call it; obviously not a label of the time). Over the next century, it was continued and expanded, since it was found to be convenient to administer, and capable of raising good sums of money. But that time period then brushes into the modernisation of the public finances, including the creation of the Consolidated Fund as mentioned. Rather than taxes being special affairs created for specific spending needs, we had a form of government with more predictable outgoings and an interest in being systematic about the management of the national debt. In the case of SDLT, its creation involved rationalising the aspect of "stamp duty" that was relevant to most people's lives (buying property). One policy aim was that by severing it from the former version of stamp duty, it would become easier to provide different rules for how it could work, specific to the nature of the property market. There is no particular policy need to have it fund any given aspect of public spending, including war with France. These days, war with France would be paid for out of general funds. | Yes, in england-and-wales the Criminal Finances Act 2017 introduced 'Unexplained Wealth Orders', which compel the respondent to provide a statement: (a) setting out the nature and extent of the respondent’s interest in the property in respect of which the order is made, (b) explaining how the respondent obtained the property (including, in particular, how any costs incurred in obtaining it were met), (c) where the property is held by the trustees of a settlement, setting out such details of the settlement as may be specified in the order, and (d) setting out such other information in connection with the property as may be so specified. There a few requirements set out in section 362B, for example, the property must have value of over £50,000; there should be "reasonable grounds" for suspicion that the respondent would have been unable to obtain the property using their lawfully obtained income; the respondent or their connections must have either been involved in serious or organised crime, or be a politically exposed person, and so on. If the respondent refuses to make such a statement, the police may apply for a Civil Recovery Order to confiscate the property, with the property in question "presumed to be recoverable property" (section 362C(2)). Giving false information in such a statement is a criminal offence. | Summary: More information needed, but I have listed out some legal claims available to homeowners when they have similar concerns. There are several issues here which need elaboration before deciding if you can take legal action. The first is: "the destroyed some vegetation on my street." If the by "my street" you mean that the street is part of your property, you may sue the builders for trespass and/or damage to property. If the street isn't your property, but the vegetation is your property, you may sue them for destruction of your property. What you are probably looking for, however, is a prohibitive injunction. This is a court order forcing the builders to avoid doing something, e.g. An order forcing them to avoid using roads adjacent to your property. To obtain such an injunction you will have to prove that what they are doing is violating your rights, is somehow harmful to you or your property, or inevitably will do either of those things. One way to demonstrate this is if you can show that you have a claim under nuisance, or damage to property, or trespass. On the description you have given us, there isn't enough to say your rights are being violated, or that your property has come to harm or will come to harm because of their actions. You should also be aware of claims under nuisance. Nuisance is when someone is doing something that prevents you from "peaceful enjoyment of your land". It appears from your question that the actions of these builders have, in your mind, done this. However there are several aspects that have to be satisfied for this to amount to private nuisance: What the builder are doing must be a "continuing state of affairs." They may have annoyed you by trampling over vegetation, but if this is a "one-off" event, it is unlikely to amount to nuisance. A reasonable person must find the conduct to interfere with the enjoyment of their land. That is to say: it isn't enough that their conduct is making you unable to enjoy your land peacefully, you have to show that any reasonable person in the same situation would find this conduct unacceptable. Finally, the context of your neighbourhood matters: if the behaviour is something expected in a residential area, then it will not amount to a nuisance. For example, heavy drilling in an industrial location will not amount to a nuisance, while the same may do so in a normally quiet neighbourhood. | Until the estate is settled and the interest in the house is definitively resolved, the estate has to pay property taxes. There is no requirement for the house to be insured, unless there is a mortgage and insurance is mandated by the lender. The duties of the personal representative generally include taking reasonable steps to protect the assets of the estate, which would include reasonable insurance coverage -- which the estate would pay for. Necessary maintenance would also be included in the things that are to covered by the estate, for example the cost of repairing a broken water pipe (which can cause serious loss, if not repaired). Freshening up the paint in preparation for selling the house, assuming that the house is to be sold and the assets divided, would also be covered by the estate. Utilities, on the other hand, are not within the realm of things that need to be done to protect the interests of the beneficiaries: that is a benefit to whoever lives there, making it their responsibility. The question is foot-dragging is a separate issue, one that should be resolved with the aid of your lawyer. I do not understand why he would maintain that the estate is responsible for paying the utilities. | If I need to pay property tax on the house, are there any exemptions, based on the fact that I have no income? No. There may be property tax exemptions for other reasons, but there is not a property tax exemption for lack of income. The most common property tax exemptions in New York are listed here. They are: STAR (School Tax Relief) Senior citizens exemption Veterans exemption Exemption for persons with disabilities Exemptions for agricultural properties The stunningly long full list of property tax exemptions can be found here. The long list mostly reflects, however, a variety of property exemptions for non-profits and governmental entities, enacted in a piecemeal fashion. Given that you are relying upon a home search website, rather than official records, I suspect that the gaps are simply due to incomplete data for the website. | Because an owner cannot tell another owner what they can and can't do with their own property The quoted paragraph clearly sets out some of the things the leasehold arrangement allows: "... set out the rights and responsibilities of the residents, such as funding the maintenance of the building and placing restrictions on antisocial behavior." When you own land, you own it; and no one can tell you what you can and can't do with it, not even your co-owners (governments excepted). Want to run chickens? Sure: it's your land. Spinal Tap your stereo to 11 at 2 am? Sure: it's your land. Become a hoarder? Sure, it's your land. When there's a single dwelling on the land, none of that is a problem. When there are multiple dwellings on the land, as in a block of flats (apartments for the Americans among us) then some of these are likely to be problematical. But they aren't problems the law cares about because you all own the property. Different common law jurisdictions have arrived at different solutions to this problem but the UK has particular difficulties because people have been owning land there for a long time. A lot longer than in the USA, Australia or New Zealand. This is quite an elegant solution: all the owners own the land but each of them have a lease over their own flat and that is a contract the law will enforce. | In general, you still need to pay for the drink. If you had purchased the drink (on credit, ie a tab or similar as you appear to have done), and you had offered the vendor CASH, and he had refused, [if you can prove you offered him cash] he would be unable to pursue you for the debt (technically you would still owe it to him, but as he had declined government issued tender the government won't act on his claim, so he has no remedy available to him to extract payment - although he can refuse to serve you in future etc). Paying through a debit card is not the same as paying cash - although the money goes out of your account and into his, its not "legal tender" in the same way cash is. | You can purchase any expensive item for cash, if the seller will accept it. In the US and many other jurisdictions, a seller is not required to accept cash, but many will. In the US and many other jurisdictions banks are required to report large cash deposits to government authorities, to help combat money-laundering, drug-dealing, and tax-evasion. Such a report may trigger an investigation, and during that investigation a person who bought an expensive item for cash may well be asked about the source of the cash. Whether an answer is legally required will depend on the law in the particular place. But even if it is not legally required, refusing to answer such questions may trigger additional investigation. |
No notice Tenant eviction in North Carolina upon forclosure legal? I was rvicted from my home by police due to Landlord's property foreclosure. I was given no notice to move by anyone prior to this nor did any formal or informal eviction take place. The lady in the clerk's office told me that it is perfectly legal for this to happen at the drop of a hat here in Rutherford county North Carolina. She told me that the tenant protection act nor any North Carolina state laws pertain to me because I did not present a copy of my lease to the clerk of court and request a file be created and opened in my name and such life they placed into this file the day that I came here three years ago. The real estate company overseeing for the bank had refused to let me get any of my belongings from this property. I have talked with a very inexperienced attorney at Pisgah legal services who has no time for my questions and tells me she does not know what I should do. I know this cannot be legal. How can they just rip me out of my home after work one day with no notice whatsoever and just throw me on the street and keep everything I own?? Is this how tenants are removed upon foreclosure of a rental property? People have just been driving up and going in and hauling my things away. Thieves. They have removed and take it to the scrap yard two lawn tractors for window air-conditioning units which were room size and two that were large 25,000 and above BTU unit as well as a fully drivable RV that was being restored in numerous other smaller items. I don't know what's going on here or what to do about this the officer was extremely rude and everything I own is on this property as well as everything my son owns our parents ashes are out there. everything. How can this be and how can it be that I'm just supposed to take my one pair of pants and walk away after years of being here? The Real estate representatives knew I was here because they had been here before about a month before because they pulled in my driveway and saw me standing there and backed out quickly and the officer that did this had been here one time before to serve a civil summons on the property owner and I had a conversation with him and let him know she no longer lived here and told him where she lived therefore he knew I lived here too but regardless he told me he had already called animal control to Come assist him getting me off of this property so yes he knew I was leaving there. They all knew we lived leaving there. I cannot afford to retain a private attorney and I need guidance I need help in a bad way and I have become homeless at the drop of a hat for no reason other than the property went back to apparently the bank. I rent month to month and have for a few years now. I have not been told to look for a place to take my mobile home or anything at all by anyone I have my home out there,two cars, and everything I have ever owned is out here and they tell me now that that's just too bad. I am 52 years old in Rivertowne in North Carolina I'm trying to stand up for myself but I have absolutely no idea how. What should I do every official I'll try to talk to here just dismisses me and just tell me that they don't know. | It would appear, from the facts as stated in the question, that the tenant here has been deprived of some of the tenant's legal rights. Tenants have a right to notice, to a hearing, to appeal the result of the herring, and to obtain property after an eviction. The federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (12 U.S.C. § 5201 *et seq.) gives a tenant a right to 90 days notice before any eviction after a foreclosure, even if there is no lease. If the is a lease, protection will in most cases last until the end of the lease. According to the "Landlord/Tenant Issues" page of the NC court system, a lawful eviction in North Carolina requires that a hearing take place in small claims court before a magistrate. The decision in such a hearing can be appealed to a District court. Parties have 10 days to appeal, and the landlord must not try to remove the tenant before the end of those 10 days. If an appeal is filed the tenant may not be evicted until the appeal is heard. According to the court page after eviction: Depending on the value of your belongings left in the home, you have 5 to 7 days after the home is padlocked to arrange with the landlord a time to remove your belongings. Landlords are only required to allow tenants one visit to the home to collect all of the property. If you leave property worth a total of $500 or less in the home, you have 5 days to retrieve it; if it is worth more than $500, you have 7 days. If you have not yet arranged to move your things in this time period, the landlord can dispose of them. The page "Renters and Foreclosure" from the NC Department of Justice (NCDOJ) says: If your lease is entered into before the notice of foreclosure, the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act usually requires the mortgage holder and foreclosure buyer to honor your lease. If you do not have a lease, if your lease allows for the landlord to terminate it at will, or if the foreclosure buyer wants to move into the home, you must be given 90 days’ notice to vacate. These protections do not apply if your landlord is a close relative or if your rent is substantially less than fair market rent. ... If you have questions about your rights as a renter during foreclosure contact us for help or call toll free within North Carolina 1-877-5-NO-SCAM. The Nolo page "Protections for Tenants After a Landlord’s Foreclosure" says: The PTFA (12 U.S.C. § 5201 and following) provides protections to bona fide tenants who have a lease as well as those who don’t, like month-to-month renters. ... Renters who don’t have a lease, such as month-to-month renters, or those with a lease that can be terminated at will, get 90 days’ notice before having to move out of the property. Importantly, the PTFA also provides that if state law gives a more generous amount of time for renters to stay in the home, that longer period applies. Foindlaw's page "Tenant Eviction in Foreclosure: What Are Your Rights?" also mentions PFTA and the 90-day notice to tenants it requires The page "Tenant’s Rights in Foreclosure" from HCP l;aw says: One provision under North Carolina law that can protect a tenant before any sale or foreclosure occurs is to record the written lease in the Register of Deeds office. If that is done, any buyer, including a buyer at foreclosure, takes the property but is bound by the lease, just like the prior landlord was. When the lease is not recorded and when a purchaser obtains the property through a foreclosure sale, and the purchaser is not going to occupy the property as his primary residence, in most cases, the tenant can remain through the length of the remaining lease or one year from the date the purchaser acquired the title, whichever is shorter. The NOLO page "Tenant Defenses to Eviction Notices in North Carolina" indicates several defenses that tenants may have to eviction cases. The Nolo page mentions that: North Carolina law states that it is against public policy to evict a tenant by any means other than court proceedings. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.6.) Any attempt to evict a tenant without a court order constitutes a self-eviction or a “self-help” eviction. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.9(a).) Some common “self-help” methods include turning off utilities, changing the locks, or simply insisting that the tenant leave the premises. (See the Nolo article Illegal Eviction Procedures in North Carolina for more information.) A tenant subjected to “self-help” methods will have a defense to eviction. However, the eviction will only be stayed until the landlord commences a lawful action. The Nolo page advises that: For an overview of landlord-tenant law and eviction rules and procedures, see the Renting and Evictions section of LawHelpNC.org, the Legal Aid of North Carolina (LANC) Landlord-Tenant brochure, and HUD.gov. To read the law itself, see Chapter 42: Landlord and Tenant of the North Carolina General Statutes. The Nolo article has advice on how to find a lawyer and how to get legal aid. The "Guide to the Eviction Process in North Carolina" also mentions that tenants must be served with an eviction notice, at least 7-days notice for a monthly tenant. This page deals primarily with evictions because of non-payment of rent or other fault of the tenet. It also mentions notice for disposing of property saying: landlords must notify [Tenants] of their belongings before disposing of them. If the tenant doesn’t respond, you can dispose of the personal items after the time-frame on the notice expires. (NCGS § 42-25.9) and (NCGS § 42-36.2) NC statutes section 42-25.9 provides that: § 42-25.9. Remedies. (a) If any lessor, landlord, or agent removes or attempts to remove a tenant from a dwelling unit in any manner contrary to this Article, the tenant shall be entitled to recover possession or to terminate his lease and the lessor, landlord or agent shall be liable to the tenant for damages caused by the tenant's removal or attempted removal. Damages in any action brought by a tenant under this Article shall be limited to actual damages as in an action for trespass or conversion and shall not include punitive damages, treble damages or damages for emotional distress. (b) If any lessor, landlord, or agent seizes possession of or interferes with a tenant's access to a tenant's or household member's personal property in any manner not in accordance with G.S. 44A-2(e2), 42-25.9(d), 42-25.9(g), 42-25.9(h), or G.S. 42-36.2 the tenant or household member shall be entitled to recover possession of his personal property or compensation for the value of the personal property, and, in any action brought by a tenant or household member under this Article, the landlord shall be liable to the tenant or household member for actual damages, but not including punitive damages, treble damages or damages for emotional distress. (c) The remedies created by this section are supplementary to all existing common-law and statutory rights and remedies. (d) If any tenant abandons personal property of seven hundred fifty dollar ($750.00) value or less in the demised premises, or fails to remove such property at the time of execution of a writ of possession in an action for summary ejectment, the landlord may, as an alternative to the procedures provided in G.S. 42-25.9(g), 42-25.9(h), or 42-36.2, deliver the property into the custody of a nonprofit organization regularly providing free or at a nominal price clothing and household furnishings to people in need, upon that organization agreeing to identify and separately store the property for 30 days and to release the property to the tenant at no charge within the 30-day period. | If it were me, I would leave. Who wants to rent a room in a home where you are not wanted? However, there should be concessions. I would ask for 1.5 months rent refunded, but would happily settle for one month. I am sure there are many nice rooms, close by, where you are welcomed. Given additional information commented by the OP, the landlord is looking to increase his rents. Evidentially this municipality has strict rent controls. In this case, I would enter negotiations with the landlord. I would offer him a percentage of his anticipated rent increase and probably start at 50%. If the OP has been a good tenant (always paid on time, and low maintenance) the landlord might see this as a bargain. No need to find a new tenant and no need to vet one that might pay poorly. The better the tenant has been, and the more strict the renter protection laws the more appeal this offer will have to the landlord. The benefit for the OP is they don't have to move, or find a new place with its associated costs and inconvenience. If the landlord is just a mindless corporate drone with no decision making power, this will not work. | The community charges $300 annually for access to the community pool, to which I only actually used the first three years living here. It likely does not matter whether you used the pool or not. I was handed a case by a police officer today saying I have exactly 30 days upon receiving the letter to pay dues for the community pool for the past 8 years that I have not used it. I imagine the result of failure to pay the HOA fee is a lien on the property. I don't know whether foreclosure is an option but it might be. The communities HOA has made it incredibly difficult to contact to ask for a copy of the rules and regulations, since their automated phone system demands a pin of some sort to which it swiftly disconnects you if you do not have it. This is not likely to be a valid excuse for not paying the HOA dues. You almost certainly owe them regardless and you probably also owe any late charges or penalties associated with not paying on time. My question is, can they legally force me to pay this fee? Nobody can force you to pay. But if they present their case in court and win, the judge can force you to pay, have your assets seized, garnish your wages, or put you in jail if you refuse. That comes pretty close. Is there another way to obtain a copy of the community rules and regulations? Of course. Send certified letters requesting the CCRs to: The HOA office The government office where the deed is recorded If the CCRs are valid and binding something to that effect will be recorded on the deed. If so, the current valid and binding CCRs may be filed with the government or may only be available from the HOA. I am not a lawyer. If you have $2,400 to pay I suggest you pay it and stay current on all future payments. HOAs that actually notice missing fees are not to be trifled with. If you think they are making your life miserable now, you ain't seen nothing yet. | Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity. | It depends on the jurisdiction (naturally). The answer for Washington is "No, not exactly". RCW 9a.83.030 states that "The attorney general or county prosecuting attorney may file a civil action for the forfeiture of proceeds". The police can seize real property, but must file a lis pendens regarding the property. The bar that has to be cleared for forfeiture is "probable cause". The Institute for Justice has an extensive analysis of civil forfeiture, especially with a state by state summary (they aren't positionally neutral on forfeiture, but they are legally respectable). Then after a inevitable judgment (90 days if the judgment is sooner), the property is transferred. Notice is to be "served within fifteen days after the seizure on the owner of the property seized and the person in charge thereof and any person who has a known right or interest therein, including a community property interest", so they would notify Bob (assuming they know Bob is the real owner). Or, if Bob learns of the seizure that "If a person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession of property within forty-five days of the seizure in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, the person or persons shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to the claim or right". It is possible that Bob's property could be taken (nothing prevents it), especially if Bob's hands are unclean. | Regarding concern one: I don't know much of anything about historical landmarks and how they get exempted from certain laws. However, I can tell you that the law generally prefers safety over preserving historical value. It is highly unlikely that a court would ever consider a plant that has existed for any number of years to be of more value than a pedestrian's or driver's safety, and thus requiring that the hedge be trimmed or removed to allow for that safety would be far more important. As well, your argument that cutting or removing the hedges would decrease the value of the property isn't the strongest argument. Currently, you have hedges that violate a local law. That immediately decreases the value of your property because a part of your property is in violation of ordinances that would have to be corrected in order for the sale of the property to go through, because most homeowners do not want to buy a property with a burden attached to it. Thus, a potential buyer would likely stipulate that the hedges be removed before they consider buying, or they might also stipulate a lower price so they can use the difference between buying and list price to remove the hedges themselves after the sale. Sure, if you only include the part of "this property has beautiful hedges" then the property value goes up, but once you tack on "which are also in violation of law" that value you just gained is immediately negated. Now in your specific case you mentioned that it hangs a foot over an eight-foot wide sidewalk. That is an abnormally wide sidewalk (a standard sidewalk in most places is only around three feet wide, with some extending up to five feet). I've only personally seen eight-foot or more wide sidewalks in very heavily trafficked areas, which from your "small town" description doesn't sound like the case there. You might be able to argue that in your particular case, due to the size of the sidewalk, that the hedges do not actually inhibit the safety of pedestrians and thus the ordinance shouldn't apply, but there's no guarantee that would work (it sounds like the city council already decided that they want it enforced there). However, if it is hanging over into the street in any capacity, you are pretty much out of luck. It's unlikely you would ever get an exception for that kind of violation. Regarding concern two: You're widely conflating "daily" and "excessive" to mean the same thing. Daily fines are not automatically excessive fines, and it is not in any way unconstitutional for a fine to be assessed on a daily basis. The laws you cite about excessive fines refer to the cumulative total of the fine. At a certain point of assessing a fine on a daily basis, the amount reaches a point where it is an excessive amount to pay. In a situation like that, it makes far more sense to stop increasing the fine and instead jail the person as they have shown a clear disregard for the law and a willingness not to comply with the law. Continuing to fine them has proven not to deter them any further from breaking the law, and that a massive fine does not justly punish them for the actions they have taken. A different punishment is warranted. This is the premise of the case you cite in your question. Brunk argued that a cumulative fine of over $100,000 for his violations was quite excessive and appealed on that argument. I don't know what the final outcome of his appeal was, because that particular court did not make a decision (rather they vacated the amount and sent it back to a lower court for reconsideration to determine if that amount was fair). It's entirely possible he still ended up with the same fine in the end. Regarding concern three: There is nothing remotely illegal about this. So long as there is a city ordinance that allows the officer to write such a citation, the officer is perfectly within his authority to write such fine and threaten such fine for noncompliance. A law in its natural form is a threat. The government body that created that law is issuing a threat to all of its citizens that if they do this thing, then this fine or amount of jail time will be applied to them. We just don't think of laws as threats in that regard when we talk about them. An officer reiterating that to you does not constitute anything other than them telling you what the law is and what can happen if you disobey it. Now if the officer threatened something against you that is not mandated by law, that would be a more serious concern that potentially could have some legal consequences for them. But there's no evidence that occurred here. Your situation in general: If you're hoping for some constitutional argument that you can throw in the officer's face to get him to back off, you're not going to find one. Generally that part of the constitution is only reviewed after fines have been handed down. You would first need to be fined and have a judge review the case to determine a total amount of how much you will be fined for all the cumulative violations. At that point if you believe it is excessive and in violation of the constitution, you would challenge the decision in court or appeal the decision if the case has already been closed. But even then, the fine would not be dropped. It would just be reduced to a value that some other judge reviewing the appeal thinks is a fair, non-excessive amount for a fine given the specific details of your case. Your case details do matter. For example, if you just argue with the officer the entire time and do nothing to resolve the problem identified, a judge might consider a much higher value vs if you actively worked to resolve the problem but just weren't capable of doing it fast enough. "Excessive" here is a completely subjective term that is different for every single case. No one can tell you whether something is excessive until the final number has been totaled and given out. Consider the two alternatives I just mentioned above. If both of those cases were in trial at the same time, they would both likely end up with different amounts for fines and, on appeal, one might succeed in convincing a judge that the fine was excessive and one might not. Better options: You could talk to the officer and explain to him that you are not capable of doing the work that quickly without hiring additional help, which you cannot afford. But that may only work once. If the issue arises again in the future (say next year), the officer likely won't be as forgiving since you've been warned about the hedges hanging over the sidewalks and streets before. If anything at all, it will show a court that you attempted to work out an arrangement of some sort to fix the problem, and were trying to cooperate. If it ended up in court for some reason, that interaction would be immensely helpful to you. As well, you'll want to consult an attorney for exact interpretations of the city's ordinances to make sure that this is actually against the law and how the law punishes its violation. Many cities have ordinances forbidding trees and other plants from obstructing sidewalks and roadways for safety concerns, but not all. As well, I've found it is much more common for a city to impose a single fine for a violation like that if the warning is ignored. The city would then send out its own crew to rectify the problem and then charge the resident for labor, materials, and removal costs. However, if the city does not have their own Public Works department, that may not be an option for them. If you do find more specifics about how the law is to be enforced, politely tell the officer that. It won't get you out of trouble, and he may still have the legal authority to fine you in some way according to the actual law, but knowing the exact details of your township may give you more peace of mind in knowing the actual limitations of how much you can be fined. | Your lawyer will advise you whether to worry, but it is not a crime to not pay the rent. The action that the landlord can take is (a) evicting you and (b) suing you for the unpaid rent. Whether a written lease is necessary depends on which province / territory you are in, since that is the level at which landlord-tenant law is determined. As far as I know, no province allows a person to avoid their rent obligation on the grounds that there was no signed lease. It doesn't matter if you have been living elsewhere most of the time or all of the time. | The key here is the provision "through no fault of his own". A landlord who relies on this provision would need to be able to demonstrate what the cause of the delay was, and that s/he had not been reasonably able to avoid it. Nor could a landlord simply fail to take steps to repair the problem, whatever it might be. If the problem will clearly take more than 30 days to fix (Isay the building burned down), the prospective tenant would have the right to cancel the lease at once. True, in such a case the tenant would be put to the trouble and expense of finding another place at short notice, but then the landlord would have lost his income from the property. The provision allocates the losses between the parties in such a case. If the property is not available at the specified time for the lease to start, but could be available a few days later, the quoted provision would not allow the landlord to just ignore the situation and end the lease. The landlord is allowed only a "reasonable time" to fix the problem, and taking significantly longer than is needed would not be "reasonable". |
Double Jeopardy in Texas v. Young? According to this Texas Tribune article, in Texas v. Young, Clinton Young was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. Fifteen years later, a Texas court of appeals has thrown out his conviction and remanded him to a county jail, where he will wait while the state decides whether or not to retry him. My question is how can they retry him? Wouldn't that be violating double jeopardy? | If you are convicted you can be retried (indeed, on appeal, you asked for a retrial). Double jeopardy prevents retrials in cases of acquittals and some mistrials, not convictions. | No, a later trial is not allowed A prosecutor can, and often will charge multiple related crimes, and all will be addressed at the same trial. But once a person has been acquitted on a given set of events, the same jurisdiction cannot re-try the same person on what is often called a lesser included offense. Nor on a greater offense implied by the same events. Not even if additional evidence comes to light. However, if an act (or set of acts) is a crime under both state law and Federal law, for example theft by deception (state crime) and wire fraud (federal crime) one jurisdiction may try the person even after ther has been an acquittal in the other. I think the same rule applies if an act is a crime within the jurisdiction of two different states, that both can trey the accused. In many cases prosecutors will choose not to bring the second trial, but they can if they see fit. | I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at *11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on. | X can be convicted of murder in all jurisdiction in the United States (and probably the other common law jurisdictions). The issue here is two-fold. Contracts that involve illegal actions are not enforceable. In fact, the contract killing example you gave is a classic illegal agreement/contract. See the Wikipedia articles on illegal agreements and contract killings. Most criminal prosecutions involving bodily injury or death proceed regardless of the victim's wishes. This is because the prosecution represents the State's interests and can prosecute a case where the victims want it dismissed. Consider and example where the "battered spouse" doesn't want to testify against his/her abuser. The prosecution can still bring changes where the victim is not cooperative. It just makes proving their case more difficult. Check out this article from the DOJ that discusses how victims do not have a right to veto a plea agreement or other prosecutorial decisions. http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/6439-input-into-plea-agreement One could make an argument that the affirmative defense of consent could apply; however, most states have consent statutes like Colorado's that would not apply to murder. See C.R.S. § 18-1-505(2), which states: When conduct is charged is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that conduct or to the infliction of that injury is a defense only if the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious, or the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport, or the consent establishes a justification under sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-707. This statutes basically says consent doesn't apply where someone received serious bodily injury (murder would meet this standard), unless they are in a lawful athletic sport, such as boxing. | It's impractical to say what the law of Guyana was in 1978, but we can substitute criminal law from 1998 and assume that there would be substantial overlap. Suicide is still a crime, as is murder and while many people committed suicide, many also died at at hands of others. Whether or not Jones committed any murders, he was an access before the fact, and can be treated as a principal (Title 3), and for conspiracy to commit a felony (murder). Under §96, conseling or aiding in suicide is a felony punishable by life imprisonment. The Heaven's Gate suicides took place in California, where suicide is not a crime. However, it is a felony to aid, advise, or encourage another to commit suicide. As a backup, following the model of Michelle Carter's conviction (appeal denied Mass Supreme Court, petition to SCOTUS, cert denied), he might be charged with involuntary manslaughter, although prosecutors would have had to think of that angle (encouraging suicide is not a crime in Massachussetts, thus the need to be creative in prosecution). | Maybe. There are two questions presented. The first is whether someone who is in prison for a felony may be admitted to the practice of law. There is not a categorical prohibition on doing so. Instead, a character and fitness committee in each state to which an applicant seeks admission (even if it is a reciprocal admission) considers an applicant on a case by case basis. Usually, people with a felony conviction that is being served or is recent are not admitted to the practice of law, but it is not a blanket prohibition, so that could happen, although it would be highly unusual. The second question is whether someone admitted to the practice of law in good standing who is incarcerated in prison would be allowed to do so by prison officials. The work the inmates are allowed to do is largely in the discretion of the prison warden at a particular institution. It isn't inconceivable that a prison warden could allow an inmate to do this subject to significant limitations on scope of practice, but again, it would be highly unusual. Some factors that might encourage a prison warden to allow it would be that: (1) the state has to pay another lawyer to represent inmates in some kinds of cases if the fellow inmate does not at greater expense per hour to the state, (2) it might promote rehabilitation and garner good press, and (3) the prison warden might reasonably guess that an inmate represented by a fellow inmate is less likely to prevail on the merits than an inmate represented by another lawyer and might prefer that outcome. The leading treatise on the subject of lawyering by inmates, with and without full or limited admission to the practice of law, is the Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual. | With these facts, assuming Mr Y was charged with involuntary manslaughter (like in MA v. Carter) or aiding a suicide, based solely or almost solely on the messages, under which jurisdiction would he be charged? Applicable Law States have jurisdiction both over crimes that are committed in the state and over crimes that cause harm in a state. The classic law school example is a murder committed by shooting someone with a gun across a state line. Both the state where the gun is fired and the state where the person is shot have jurisdiction over the crime. Jurisdiction generally requires a purposeful act directed at someone or something in the state where the harm is suffered in most cases. But that isn't a hard and fast rule of constitutional law in other contexts, and there are few cases on point. I would consider this to be an open question. Certainly, however, the mere fact that the victim of a crime is transported to another state for medical treatment, where that victim then dies from causes relate to the crime, does not give the state where the death ultimately occurs in the hospital jurisdiction over the offense. Double Jeopardy Indeed, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not prohibit both states from independently convicting and punishing the same defendant for the same crime in this situation under the "dual sovereignty" doctrine. As background, the Colorado Supreme Court decided a dual sovereignty double jeopardy case today. Application To Facts (The application to the facts has been revised upon closer examination of them.) The line about "Ms X, who is, at this point, still in Nevada," is confusing because she was in California before and isn't described as ever being in Nevada. I presume that "still in California" was really meant. Mr. Y could be charged (at least) in Nevada or New Jersey from which the continuing course of communications was sent (undue emphasis on the final communication is probably inappropriate), and Wyoming, to which the bulk of the communications were directed and where the bulk of the harm was suffered. California and Nebraska do not seem to be places to which the communications were really directed or where the greatest harm was suffered. Momentary presence in Nebraska air space is probably insufficient. There are also a set of statutes that specifically address crimes committed during an airplane flight (see also here) that has been discussed in other answers at this website. To the extent that this is treated as a homicide committed while in flight, 49 USC § 46506, might also allow for a federal criminal prosecution. I'm not sure that this is really a crime committed in flight, however, as it involved a course of conduct. A single email or a single moment of death doesn't really capture it. It is more analogous to a poisoning taking place in many doses over a period of time. Is Mr Y's speech in this case protected by the First Amendment? No. First Amendment considerations do apply to crimes involving communications between people that are not false, but if there is sufficient intent to cause suicide or other harm, the First Amendment yields to other considerations. The freedom of speech is not absolute. The exact place that the line is drawn is a matter of ongoing litigation. This specific issue is explored in depth in Clay Calvert, "The First Amendment and Speech Urging Suicide: Lessons from the Case of Michelle Carter and the Need to Expand Brandenburg Application" 94 Tulane Law Review 79 (November 2019). This article is responsive to that case of Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019). The article explains in its introduction that: In February 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Carter' affirmed Michelle Carter's conviction for involuntary manslaughter as a youthful offender based on her urging Conrad Roy to commit suicide.' In doing so, the court rejected Carter's claim that her conviction violated her First Amendment' right of free speech. Specifically, it reasoned that Carter's words with Roy immediately before and while he died were "integral to a course of criminal conduct and thus [did] not raise any constitutional problem." In brief, Massachusetts's high court concluded that Carter's speech caused Roy's death' and that the First Amendment provided her no refuge.' | While the point made by user6726 is not wrong with respect to this particular statute, it doesn't address a more basic point about how the supremacy clause works. Federal criminal laws govern punishments for federal crimes in the federal criminal justice system. Federal prosecutors bringing federal criminal charges against criminal defendants in the federal criminal justice system can and do secure death penalty sentences against criminal defendants in states where there is no state death penalty. One recent case where that happened was the Boston Marathon bombing case where a defendant was sentenced to death in federal court for the crime for violation of a federal criminal statute, despite the fact that Massachusetts has no death penalty of its own. This is not a supremacy clause issue. No state law had to be changed or invalidated because of the existence of the federal law. States law governs how the state criminal justice system works, not the federal criminal justice system. When we say that a state has abolished the death penalty, we mean that it has abolished it in the state criminal justice system. This doesn't absolutely foreclose the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed in that state on federal charges, although it does make it far less likely that the death penalty will be imposed. Partially, this is because "blue collar" crime is handled by the states. Partially, this is because out of comity and a concern that juries in states without a death penalty are less likely to vote for a capital sentence, federal prosecutors are less likely to seek the death penalty in a state without capital punishment than in a state with capital punishment. For example, there are 2,902 people on death row as of 2016, in the U.S. Almost 98% of death penalty convictions that have not yet been carried out were obtained in state courts. Only, 62 involve civilian death penalties imposed in federal courts (mostly in states that have the death penalty) and another 6 involve death penalties imposed in military courts (mostly in states that allow the death penalty or abroad). All of the other cases arose in state courts. |
Do civil courts have the power to force a criminal investigation after it finds evidence of fraud? Say a person sues a fraudster in civil courts. Upon showing evidence of fraud, can the court, through request of the plaintiff, request a criminal investigation on the fraudster? I would presume such criminal investigation when instructed by the courts will be of higher priority to law enforcers. To put into context, I am currently suing a fraudster and would like to know if it is possible to request the courts to instigate a criminal investigation on the fraudster. For a jurisdiction, I am based in Australia (though I am happy to accept answers from any other jurisdictions as well) | No The police and the office of the public prosecutor have discretion in which cases they investigate or prosecute. The court may refer an instance of criminality to them but they are under no obligation to do anything with that referral. | I understand that by "civil law systems" the OP means to refer to civil (vs criminal) cases, not to the civil law (vs common law) systems. The standard for proof of "guilt" (which is not actually called "guilt") is indeed "much lower" in civil cases, but the reason for that is not that it has to be so, but that the standard of proof in criminal cases has to be much higher. In civil cases none of the parties face criminal conviction. One party will just lose some money or property, will have to perform some work, will lose some opportunities etc. So, initially, both parties play the same game and each of them is in to lose it down to a similar level of peril. What follows is that, at the baseline, neither of the two parties should be in more advantageous position to prove their rightness than the other. In other words, if any of them proves that they are more than 50% likely to be right than the other, they should win. Indeed, why would one party have to prove their rightness beyond reasonable doubt? If it was so, it would mean that the other party would effectively have to prove their rightness to only a small degree, which would be utterly unjust. lot of guarentees like right avainst self incrimination are also not available in civil law systems. what is the reason behind this ? False. If saying something from a witness stand would risk you being prosecuted, you can refuse to say it regardless of whether you are giving evidence in a civil or a criminal case. | The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence. | Assume that this happened in a matter that goes to court. In civil court, there is no "innocent until/unless proven guilty". In civil court, the judge hears everyone's story, and decides which story is more likely to be true. So I tell the judge "I sent a letter by registered mail; this is what was in the letter, and the post office reported to me that they delivered the mail, and someone signed for it". And you say "I never received a letter". The judge will believe me and the post office. You say "I received a letter and signed for it, but there was just a birthday card inside". Who does the judge believe? Does he or she believe that you received a letter with the contents I said and you are lying about it, or does she believe that I sent you an unsolicited birthday card by registered mail? Why would I do that? So they believe me. Now if you said "I received a registered letter containing just a birthday court, so I immediately called my secretary and three other people in the office to see this and to verify there was nothing but the birthday card, and here they are as witnesses", then the court might start believing you. | If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically. | Hacking into a computer owned by someone else and accessing the data stored on it without permission is a misdemeanor according to StGB 202a (de|en). But only if it's successful. So a failed attempt isn't a misdemeanor yet. When you notice that someone might have committed a criminal offence (regardless of whether you are a victim or just a witness), then the usual procedure is to report it to the police. If they consider the crime serious enough to investigate, then they will request the identity from the ISP. But the copyright lawsuits which are filed in bulk by law firms working with media companies are not crime reports. They are civil lawsuits. A civil lawsuit is when someone had a tangible damage because of something someone else did, and now they want money in compensation. When there is no damage, then there is nothing to sue for. So when you want a judge to file an injunction to force an ISP to give them the identity of one of their users, then you would first have to explain to them how much financial damage you had because of that person and that this is enough damage to make it worth everyone's time. That might be quite challenging for nothing but a failed SSH login attempt. But it might be possible if a single person made so many login attempts that it incurred you non-negligible bandwidth cost or even caused a denial-of-service. | Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible. | Yes, you can be compelled by the government to reveal information: All it takes is a judge agreeing with a plaintiff or prosecutor that it has some relevance to a complaint over which the court has jurisdiction. If that point arrives and you want to protect that information you only have three choices: Get a legal team good enough to convince the court otherwise. Face the consequences of contempt of court for failing to supply the information requested. Flee to another jurisdiction before #2 happens. |
What is the canonical ruling on why the rulings of a supreme court cannot be appealed? I am essentially asking for a quote that I know exists but cannot remember. A Law Lord from the British House of Lords either made a remark or an actual ruling on the subject of whether a ruling from a final court could be appealed. It was something like "otherwise, nothing would ever be settled and there would be no finality". I'm sure I read it in some kind of "intro to law" book. | One direct statement about this is in White v. Tommey [1853] 10 E.R. 483, in which the House of Lords had to consider whether to allow a rehearing of a case which they had previously decided, on the basis that there had been misrepresentation the first time round which affected their judgement. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Cranworth, said: What ought your Lordships to do in this state of things? It was pressed very strongly on the part of Tommey by his counsel, that your Lordships in truth have no jurisdiction; that after a matter has once been heard and adjudicated upon in this ultimate Court of appeal, there is an end of it, that there must be an end somewhere, and that if it can be said that the trustees can be heard now to come and call in question the decree of 1850, what is to prevent Mr. Tommey coming afterwards, in 1860, and praying your Lordships to reconsider it again, and so toties quoties to the very end of time? In this case, the Lords sent the case back to the Court of Chancery in Ireland, setting aside their earlier orders relating to the appeal. This did not amount to a rehearing of the merits in the House of Lords, but their correction of a mistake in the proceedings and restoring the status quo ante. In an earlier case, Stewart v. Agnew [1823] 1 Shaw 413, another Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon, observed: It is infinitely better that the matter should be here finally decided upon one hearing, even if the decision is wrong, than that there should be a new litigation unknown to our proceedings, as to this matter of rehearing; - nor can any one say where it is to stop. In general, it is to be hoped that the decisions of this House are right; but, whether right or wrong, it has been taken for granted that considerations of infinitely greater moment than the considerations which arise out of the particular mischief in particular cases, have led this House to determine, that where a matter has been heard between parties at the Bar, and the House has given its decision upon the merits discussed by those parties, the House will not rehear the cause. | Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say. | The House of Lords declared themselves able to depart from their own precedents in 1966, stating (emphasis added): Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules. Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this house as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so. In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlement of property, and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law. This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in this House. This applies equally to the Supreme Court, which has replaced the judicial functions of the Lords. The Practice Statement of 1966 itself overturned London Street Tramways v London County Council [1898] AC 375, in which the Lord Chancellor, Lord Halsbury, had said: A decision of this House once given on a point of law is conclusive on this House afterwards. In the modern understanding, it is in the interests of justice for the Supreme Court to always be able to say what the law is, even if that conflicts with the understanding of the past. As it is the final court of appeal, there is no other court which could review or overturn its decisions. Parliament could, and sometimes has, done so, but it is not always easy to express the desired effect in statutory language; and Parliament has many other demands on its time. It was felt that the court itself should be in a position to say that a past judgement was wrongly decided, or should no longer be considered binding for another reason. In the Scottish tradition, this power has long been held to be inherent in that country's highest courts, the Court of Session / High Court of Justiciary. It is allied to the nobile officium, or equitable jurisdiction of those courts to provide a just remedy in the absence of any explicit law. Judicial precedent is not a barrier to justice either. As Lord Kames said (Historical law-tracts, 1758; tract 8), No defect in the constitution of a state deserves greater reproach, than the giving license to wrong without affording redress. Upon this account, it is the province, one should imagine, of the sovereign, and supreme court, to redress wrongs of every kind, where a peculiar remedy is not provided. Those courts have not held themselves to a strict idea of stare decisis with respect to their own decisions, feeling instead that in the interests of justice they should be able to decide what a particular case demands. John Erskine explained (An institute of the law of Scotland, 1773; book 1, title 1, section 47): Decisions therefore though they bind the parties litigating create no obligation on the judges to follow in the same tract if it shall appear to them contrary to law. English courts, at least once in their roughly modern shape following the reforms of the late 19th century, have taken a stricter view of precedent, in the interests of predictability. The reform of 1966 was influenced by differences between English and Scottish practice, and represents something of a course-correction away from the strict position of the prior era. In terms of the present and the past, "precedent" doesn't precisely mean that the past wins out. It would be better to say that a past decision is presumed to be right, up until proved otherwise, or made obsolete by events such as the passage of new statutes. The presumption is binding on lower courts, and merely "very strong" for the highest court. The post-1966 position recognises that it is sometimes appropriate for the Supreme Court itself, seized of a particular case, to point out when a past decision is no longer right. | The direct answer is "no" and the indirect answer is "yes", that is, your way of putting the matter diverges significantly from how the Bill of Complain puts the matter. The claim is that the defendant states violated the Electors Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Texas claims that there is an injury in fact, citing various SCOTUS rulings e.g. Wesberry v. Sanders which says that No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined See the argument in the brief for more legal rhetoric. There can be no question that one state can sue another; equally clearly, the plaintiff must show actual harm and not just annoyance. New Jersey v. New York is a case involving a question of equity, not the federal constitution, but there is no legal principle to the effect that one state cannot sue over a constitutional harm rather than an equitable harm. See the brief p. 65 ff. The court does not require that there be exact precedential analogs (otherwise, Roe v. Wade would have turned out differently), what's required is simply that there be reasonable logical steps: SCOTUS gets to decide what is reasonable (or it can decline to decide). | There is currently no means for the Earl to disclaim his title, if it has been longer than the permitted period since he inherited it. He also could not do so if he was the first holder, since the 1963 Act only applies to inheritance, and he cannot disclaim a life peerage. The reasoning from 1963 is that the Act was made for people who wanted to sit in the House of Commons, but could not do so due to an accident of birth - something they had no say in. For a life peerage, or peerage of the first creation, they should have refused the honour at the time it was offered. The situation is now a bit different thanks to the removal of all but 92 hereditary peers from the House of Lords in 1999, and the resignation provisions in the House of Lords Reform Act 2014. If the Earl were one of the 92, then he could not disclaim the peerage until he resigned, or was disqualified under other provisions of the 2014 Act. On resignation, he would become able to vote in general elections, stand as a candidate, and sit in the Commons if elected. (By the way, Church of England bishops who are members of the Lords can also resign, but do so in a different way.) So any hereditary or life peer who feels that they are disenfranchised by virtue of sitting in the Lords also has the means to leave that chamber. That makes it difficult to make a human rights claim on the basis of Article 3 of the First Protocol. The European Court of Human Rights has upheld other kinds of voting restrictions in parallel circumstances, such as Ahmed and others v United Kingdom [1998]. In that case, several local government officials were barred from certain political activities, including standing for election, and brought a claim against the UK concerning violation of Articles 10 (free expression), 11 (free association) and 3 of Protocol 1 (free elections). The Court found that the restrictions were justified, and in particular that the applicants could avoid them by resigning. An opposite case was X v United Kingdom [1978] in which the applicant claimed a violation of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) because he claimed to have the right to sit in the Lords but his petition to the Queen was denied. The Commission found that participating in the legislature is part of public law as opposed to a "civil right" within the scope of Article 6. Also, granting or withholding an honour has traditionally been held to be immune from judicial review - cited for example in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 - although this conclusion may no longer be completely solid since the well-known 2019 Miller case. That would apply for aspects of a peerage which are purely ceremonial in nature. The Earl might want to argue that his free expression is impaired by having a hereditary title at all. But there is nothing stopping him from calling himself by an ordinary name. British law doesn't require him to be called the Earl in any context, and there are plenty of peers who use their normal names while working at normal jobs. He has a defined place in the order of precedence, but I am not convinced that the situation would arise where he insisted on going to a fancy dinner and had a contretemps with the host over the seating arrangement that amounted to a human rights violation. Equally, he has the right to wear an Earl's coronet at a royal coronation, but our newly republican Earl would probably just not go. In the case of the Earl Marshal - a hereditary office which goes along with being the Duke of Norfolk - there are non-trivial duties involved, and an Earl Marshal might justifiably want to stop doing them. The past procedure has been for the Crown to appoint a Deputy Earl Marshal instead, as was done in 2000 when the Duke at the time was unwell. It would seem that a similar manoeuvre would work for any other hereditary offices that were more than nominal. If the Crown refused to do this, then perhaps a claim could arise under Article 14 (discrimination on the grounds of birth), but it would require a particularly intransigent Crown. Hereditary peers may hold property in a variety of entertaining feudally-derived ways, in addition to more familiar modes. The most relevant scenario to imagine is that our Earl owns Exampleshire Castle in "fee tail", meaning that he can't dispose of it even though it is horribly expensive for him to keep paying for repairs to its leaky roof - it must pass to his eldest son, and so forth. Even if the Earl is able to disclaim his peerage, he may still be on the hook for the property, depending on how everything is structured. However, there are generally legal workarounds these days, beyond the scope of this question, unlike when entails were so important to the plots of historical stories featuring the aristocracy. There is a current campaign by daughters of some peers to change the inheritance laws away from male-preference primogeniture, including on human rights grounds. It remains to be seen how that will work out, but a key difference here is that they are losing out by not being able to inherit, while the Earl is able to divest himself of all the disadvantages of the title, by simply not using it. | Parliament in the UK is sovereign: Parliament [is] the supreme legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any law. Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and no Parliament can pass laws that future Parliaments cannot change. If parliament passed a law saying that it was a crime for "a black American woman sat at the front of the bus" and provided that it repealed all existing laws that would invalidate that law (e.g. the European Charter of Human Rights); then there is no defence to that crime if the prosecution proves the elements beyond reasonable doubt i.e. that you are a) black, b) American, c) a woman and d) sat at the front of the bus. In the UK there is no higher law that can be appealed to like a constitution. Over the years, UK parliaments have passed laws limiting their sovereignty, however, any current or future parliament could (in theory) repeal those limits. Just like the USA could (also in theory) repeal the Bill of Rights amendments to their constitution (or even replace the Constitution as a whole); albeit the process is different and less likely to succeed. The limitations on this are political, not legal. | A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws. | This depends on how far along you're waiting for court rulings to set in, and if you count laws of Congress passed under the 13th amendment's enforcement clause. There were quite a lot of things that got ruled as violations of the 13th and 14th amendments (mostly the 14th), but many were not ruled or legislated that way for decades. Some were even ruled to have an essentially opposite effect of what the current (overturning) precedents do. "Separate but equal" was challenged on 13th amendment grounds, but was upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), and wasn't overturned, on 14th amendment grounds, until 58 years later in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Your particular situation sounds like peonage, which was outlawed by Congress in 1867 via the enforcement clause. This law specifically banned "the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise." However, peonage cases continued to make their way into the courts for more than 40 years thereafter, such as Clyatt v. United States (1905)— which ruled that peonage was involuntary servitude— and Bailey v. Alabama (1911). These cases affirmed that the 13th amendment abolished not just chattel slavery but essentially all forms of involuntary or indentured servitude (except as punishment for a crime). Though exactly what qualifies as "involuntary servitude" is still something courts decide on a case-by-case basis; the draft doesn't, nor does mandatory community service to graduate high school. |
Does GDPR apply if my web app stores personal data on the user's phone only? My web app stores personal data about the user, but on the user's phone only (HTML5 Local Storage). The data is never touched by any server or database. I can't see the data. My server can't see the data. I do not store it anywhere outside of the user's phone. I do not send it anywhere. I do offer to back up the user's personal data, but the data is then encrypted on the user's phone (using client-side JavaScript) before it's being sent to my server, and the encryption-key is stored on the user's phone only (end-to-end encryption). It's therefore impossible for me to decrypt the data since I don't have the encryption-key. Does GDPR apply to me? ADDED INFO: The purpose of storing this data is to help the user keep track of his or her personal diet and other health-related information. This is stored together with the user's first name, to enhance the user experience. I guess this could be considered identifiable information. | Does GDPR apply if my web app stores personal data on the user's phone only? No. If you are not processing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) then the GDPR does not apply to you. This is what a web browser does when it asks to remember your username and password for this web site. You are providing a tool, the user is using that tool to process their own data. I do offer to back up the user's personal data At this point you are processing the users PII, and the GDPR does apply to you. Even though you do not have enough information to identify an individual, as it can be used with other information to identify an individual it is PII. From the ICO: Can we identify an individual indirectly from the information we have (together with other available information)? Even if you may need additional information to be able to identify someone, they may still be identifiable. That additional information may be information you already hold, or it may be information that you need to obtain from another source. When considering whether individuals can be identified, you may have to assess the means that could be used by an interested and sufficiently determined person. | Per GDPR Art 12(5), “any actions taken under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 shall be provided free of charge”. The right to rectification is Art 16 and reads in its entirety: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a supplementary statement. Thus, I think it would be invalid to charge a fee for an address change if that change was made in exercise of your data subject rights. If you didn't invoke this right, it's debatable whether charging a fee would be proper. On the one hand, they can charge whatever service they want (provided that this was part of the contract you entered). On the other hand, they have an obligation to assist you with your exercise of data subject rights. This includes recognising a data subject request even if you didn't explicitly invoke the specific GDPR article. For example, refusing a request for erasure just because you didn't invoke some magic GDPR words would be clearly noncompliant in my opinion. If the company offers multiple customer service options, charging for some of them may be all right. Typically, the lowest-cost solution for a company to deal with GDPR requests is to offer an online self-service option. An email to the data protection officer would typically also be free. Charging for phone support might be fine though. In an insurance context, there could also be a legitimate claim that updating your address is not a mere correction of your personal data, but a modification of the contract (depending on what you're insuring). Another possible counterpoint (which I think is not valid though) would be that the company never stored inaccurate data and therefore doesn't have to satisfy a rectification request. | These are only tangentially related to the GDPR A government entity processing data in accordance with a member state law is ipso facto in compliance with the GDPR. That’s because lawful government data processing is a legitimate reason for processing data under the GDPR. If Germany, for example, passes a law saying German police can record every phone call in Germany, then that would be a lawful basis for processing under the GDPR. There may be constitutional or other legal limitations on such a law but as far as the GDPR is concerned, they’re fine. | Please note that Google Analytics do not anonymize the data you collect on its behalf unless you configure it to do IP-anonymization. If you use Google Analytics and do not use this feature, you need to have a DPA (Data Processing Addendum) in place with Google in order to comply with the GDPR. This is a real hassle, so unless you absolutely need fine-grained demographic data, it is strongly recommended that you use IP-anonymization. According to our data protection supervisory authority, this is sufficient to comply with the GDPR vis-a-vis Google Analytics. Does data that is anonymized need to be collect in the event of a GDPR Subject Access Request? No. But as the controller, you need to make sure that is is anonymized. | Yes, a site may check for a cookie indicating past consent before prompting for consent to read and store cookies When people speak of the "Cookie law" they usually mean the ePrivacy Directive, (ePD) more formally the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58/EC. The full text of the directive is here First of all, being a directive and not a regulation, the ePD is not itself legally binding. Instead it instructs the legislatures of member states to implement it, which they generally have done. So the actual binding law is the law of a particular country, which could vary from the wording of the directive. However, in this case, my understanding is that the implementations do not vary significantly. An updated and revised ePrivacy Regulation (ePR) has been proposed, which would replace the ePD and complement the GDPR. But there has been dispute over the proposed terms of the ePR, and it has not yet been passed. Article 5 section (3) of the ePD reads: Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user. Notice that this covers both writing (storing) and reading (gaining access to) cookies and other information stored on a user's device. Cookies ar one form of such locally stored information (LSI). Note that the GDPR, which replaces Directive 95/46/EC, is used to define "consent" in the ePD. In general, one must have consent to read or store, and consent must be sought only when the user has been given "clear and comprehensive information ... about the purpose" of the stored information. The relevant exception for this question is that information (including cookies) which is "strictly necessary" to provide a service specifically requested by the user. Here the user has requested access to the web site, and may have previously agreed to accept cookies. The site must prompt for consent if the user has not previously consented (and the site will store cookies not strictly needed), and should not if the user has. Therefore, it is strictly necessary to check for and read if present a cookie indicating that such consent has previously been granted. If such a cookie is not found, no consent has been granted. Strictly required LSI should not have a dual purpose where one purpose is not strictly needed. For example, an "I accept cookies" cookie should not also be used for tracking. That should be done (if at all) with a separate cookie, and only after consent is received. Note that there should be an easily found and easily used method or link on the site (preferably on each page of the site) to review the purposes of stored or accessed LSI, and to withdraw previous consent. If consent is withdrawn, the cookie indicating that consent has been granted should be erased, as should any cookies or other LSI not strictly needed to provide the services requested by the user. Keep in mind that the legal distinction is not between cookies that contain "technical" information and those that do not. That is not relevant. Nor is the distinction between cookies that might be used to identify a person and those that do not. The legal distinction is between cookies (or other LSI) that are strictly needed to provide the services requested by the user, and all other LSI. Strictly needed LSI does not require consent, all other LSI does. For example, a random string, used to determine the number of unique visitors, but not linked to any identifying info about the user, does not help to identify an individual user. But it is not strictly needed, so it can only be stored with consent. Data that are associated with an identifiable natural person (human being, not a firm or organization), are governed by the GDPR (where it applies). There must be a lawful basis for processing such data, which includes reading them from LSI, and storing them. Consent is one of the six possible bases for such processing, but consent need not be obtained if another lawful basis applies. When consent is the basis, it must be easily withdrawn by the user. Note that this applies to all data (PI) that is associated with a person, not just data that can readily be used to identify the person (PII). Note that other workflows are also lawful. For one example, if a site is a strictly membership site, it could prompt for a login before reading or storing any LSI, and then read previous preferences stored on the server by that user to determine whether consent for cookies has been granted. Conclusion A cookie indicating that consent to access and store cookies hs previously been given by a particular user can lawfully be read before a user is prompted for consent, under the ePD and its implementing laws. | The GDPR does not prescribe how exactly consent must be managed, as long as consent was obtained in line with the GDPR's principles. Similarly, the EDPB does not provide concrete recommendations in its guidelines on consent, mainly noting that Controllers are free to develop methods to comply with this provision in a way that is fitting in their daily operations. I would not be too concerned with edge cases like failing HTTP requests, at least not any more than for other HTTP endpoints. If the user indicated consent, and you act on that indication of consent in good faith, that's probably fine. However, remember that you must provide a equally easy way for the user to revoke consent later. If the user changes their mind, they can use the mechanism that you offer to inspect their consent status, and revoke it if they want. But again, how to do that is largely up to you. | This issue touches upon two distinct GDPR rights: Art 15 right to access: you have a right to receive a copy of all personal data concerning you that are undergoing processing (including storage). Access may only be denied where this would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” Art 20 right to data portability: if processing is being carried out by automated means, and processing is based on certain legal bases (consent or contract, but not legitimate interest), then you have a right to receive a copy of your personal data in a machine-readable format, for personal data that you have provided to the data controller. Whereas the right to access is fairly straightforward, the right to data portability applies under much more narrow conditions. Basically, it's a right that you can download any data that you've uploaded so that you can move to a different service. Google Takeout is primarily concerned with your right to data portability, and provides your data in a machine-readable format. Any photos that you've uploaded to Google Photos, you'll be able to download. Thus, it could be technically compliant to exclude information that they've inferred about your personal data, such as image-recognition results. Such results would still be personal data under the GDPR definition of the consent, and would be covered by your right to access. Google might argue that you already have access to this data through the web interface. In my opinion the GDPR clearly requires the data controller to provide a “copy”, i.e. the data in some durable form – not merely access through a web interface. Whereas your question is specifically about Google, the same issue applies to other services as well. E.g. Ruben Verborgh has an interesting blog series on trying to get access to all their data from Facebook, though unsuccessful so far. Similar to your scenario, Facebook offers a download for personal data but does not include all personal data in this download. In one of the documents provided by Facebook in the course of the exchange, they note that they allow access to photo tags through the web interface, but do not include this in downloaded data – without providing further justification. | From the GDPR's definitions: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; This blurred image would be "information relating to an identified ... natural person (‘data subject’)." It does not matter whether the person can be identified using the information in question. Therefore, the answer to your question Under GDPR, does blurhash of a profile picture count as personal data is yes. |
Why is trying to get "vaccinated" into a fake arm considered fraud (in Italy)? I'm curious under what legal provisions this bizarre story falls under in Italy. An Italian man is facing charges of fraud after turning up for his Covid-19 vaccine wearing a fake arm. [...] After completing the bureaucratic formalities, including signing a consent form in front of a doctor, the man, aged 50, sat down and lifted up the sleeve of his shirt as he prepared for a health worker to administer the jab. Initially, the health worker did not notice anything odd, as the silicone looked similar to skin. But after taking a closer look and touching the arm, the medic asked the man to take off his shirt. His plan foiled, the man, who has not been named, then tried to persuade the health worker to turn a blind eye. [...] She told La Stampa she could not see the man’s veins: “At first I thought I made a mistake, that it was a patient with an artificial arm.” [...] La Repubblica suggested that the incident might not have been a one-off, citing a recent message on social media that might have been written by the man in Biella. The Twitter post featured a silicone male chest half-body suit, complete with fake arms and neck, that was on sale on Amazon for €488 (£416). Alongside the image was the message: “If I go with this, will they notice? Maybe beneath the silicone I’ll even put on some extra clothes to avoid the needle reaching my real arm.” There is however hardly any detail in that newspaper reporting under what Italian legal provision trying to get "vaxxed" into a fake arm would fall... So why would it be illegal? | Article 640 of the Italian Penal Code under the heading "Crimes against property by fraud" begins (via Google Translate): Anyone who, by artifice or deceit, by misleading someone, procures an unfair profit to himself... And the article (cited by the OP in a comment) says the suspect... ...worked in the health sector and had been suspended from his job because he had refused to be vaccinated against COVID-19. The jab is mandatory for all health workers. So, it seems the allegation is that he intended to "profit" by gaining a COVID-19 vaccine certificate and therefore unjust employment after attempting to use the silicone patch to deceive the health worker. Edit following @jkej's comment observing that the alleged unfair profit was never actually procured. The more likely charge - depending on the actual evidence - would seem to fall under Article 56 which begins under the heading Crime Attempted (again via Google Translate): Whoever carries out suitable acts, directed in an unequivocal way to commit a crime, is liable for an attempted crime, if the action is not carried out or the event does not occur. | We can look at Missouri law as an example. Missouri Statutes §577.029 says A licensed physician, registered nurse, phlebotomist, or trained medical technician, acting at the request and direction of the law enforcement officer under section 577.020, shall, with the consent of the patient or a warrant issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol content of the blood, unless such medical personnel, in his or her good faith medical judgment, believes such procedure would endanger the life or health of the person in custody. Blood may be withdrawn only by such medical personnel, but such restriction shall not apply to the taking of a breath test, a saliva specimen, or a urine specimen. In withdrawing blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol content thereof, only a previously unused and sterile needle and sterile vessel shall be utilized and the withdrawal shall otherwise be in strict accord with accepted medical practices. Upon the request of the person who is tested, full information concerning the test taken at the direction of the law enforcement officer shall be made available to him or her. "Shall" means "must" – if there is a warrant (we assume there is no consent). Then the question is, what happens if the phlebotomist (etc) refuses? First, §577.031 immunizes the medical-person from legal liability when they act in compliance with a request from a LEO (a simple request, not necessarily accompanied by a warrant). §577.033 says that being dead, unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing does not constitute withdrawal of consent (which is implied, by law). No specific penalty is prescribed for refusal to administer a court-ordered blood draw. There is no penalty for complying, there is no prescribed criminal penalty for refusing to comply with a court order (there is the possibility of a finding of contempt of court). Not every state is Missouri: I understand that Utah is different. | Assuming the USA, since that's where they appear to be located. Spreading misinformation is not illegal- it is protected by the first amendment. There are exceptions but I can't see how any would apply here. You haven't mentioned any that you think apply. If some of the videos on the site guaranteed results or made medical claims, maybe that could be considered false advertising. However, I see no evidence of this. Users are advertised that paying for access to a bunch of hocum videos will get them access to a bunch of snake oil and this appears to be the case. | You have not committed a crime or a violation of non-criminal law when you swear something under oath believing in good faith that what you are saying is true, and you are mistaken. The law does not expect omniscience. Also, making a false statement under oath is only sanctionable if you make a false statement of a "material fact." Whether or not you have a Social Security number is not a "material fact" in the context of a passport application where the material facts are that you are the same person as the person described in your birth certificate, that the parents there are to the best of your knowledge your parents, that the birth certificate is authentic, and that you have not renounced U.S. citizenship. The question about a Social Security number is there for administrative convenience, not to make any determination about your right to a passport. You should apply for a Social Security number. If you already have one, your actions consistent with not having one will only corroborate the fact that you were ignorant of that fact when you applied for a passport, and you will have your existing Social Security number provided to you. As a practical matter it is unlikely that you have one. There are no forms that your non-U.S. parents would have to be filled out that would have required one, and you know that you haven't applied for one in the past. Before Social Security numbers of dependents were required on U.S. tax forms, most people didn't get Social Security numbers until they got their first job. | The Fifth Amendment only protects you against being compelled to testify by the government. So unless Wonder Woman is acting on behalf of the government, information obtained through the use of the Golden Lasso is admissible. The question about whether she has been "deputized," is not the right one. Rather, the question is whether she is a "state actor." The answer to such a question is not always clear, as courts may ask a variety of questions to reach it: Is the actor paid by the government? Directed by the government? Assisted by the government? Acting under some power established by law? Also, is it "fair" to attribute that actor's actions to the government? Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 936 (1982). Undoubtedly, there are occasions in Wonder Woman's history where she has worked closely enough with the police that a Golden Lasso confession would be inadmissible. And there are many times where she was working so independently that a Golden Lasso confession would be plainly admissible. I don't remember the exact circumstances of the confessions you're talking about, but if they were from the "small group of reactionary terrorists" I remember from the beginning of the film, I can't think of any basis for excluding their confessions. Wonder Woman came on scene independently, took control and subdued the suspects without any police direction or assistance. Unless the police later asked her to assist with the interrogations, those confessions could not be "fairly attributed" to the government. (All of this is of course ignoring the fact that the crime and confessions occurred outside of the United States and are therefore not covered by the Fifth Amendment.) | It may not be libel, but it may violate other statutes and may support a judgement against the person publishing this information as long as there is an injury-in-fact ("an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"). A recent case, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins 578 U.S. ___ (2016) considered the case where a company created a profile for a person. That profile stated "that he is married, has children, is in his 50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent, and holds a graduate degree". The plaintiff asserted that all of this was incorrect. The plaintiff made a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act because the information was false. However, mere violation of statute is not sufficient to meet the "injury-in-fact" requirement for standing. Congress can't create standing via statute. Injury-in-fact still requires a "concrete" injury. This does not need to be a physical, tangible injury. But, it does need to be concrete. On its own, publication of false information, even when statute prohibits it, does not create standing. There must be an injury-in-fact. | There are some problems with this kind of vandalism, one of them clearly that the internet is international and vandalism can be performed from everywhere on servers everywhere in the world. And so it may be (both technically and legally) difficult to get hold of the vandal. Therefore, most wikis primarily focus on blocking offending accounts or their IPs and hope that this helps at least for a while. Only if it doesn't and the vandalism continues for extended time periods, legal measures are considered. Legally speaking though, vandalism is prohibited by many jurisdictions and of course by the terms of use of the wiki operators. For instance, the Swiss criminal code Art 147 explicitly puts "abusing of data processing equipment" under penalty and hence gives website operators a legal backup for setting up rules for the use of their services. Computer fraud Art. 147 1 Any person who with a view to his own or another's unlawful gain, by the incorrect, incomplete or unauthorised use of data, or in a similar way, influences the electronic or similar processing or transmission of data and as a result causes the transfer of financial assets, thus occasioning loss to another, or immediately thereafter conceals such a transfer shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. 2 If the offender acts for commercial gain, he shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding ten years or to a monetary penalty of not less than 90 daily penalty units. Technically, the law even requires prosecution ex officio, even though without a hint from the operator, the police won't start an investigation. I'm sure the US has a similar law. The problem is, as with all internet crimes, it's practical application, particularly because often website operator and offender are not living in the same country. Edit After reading the exact text again (it was unavailable yesterday) Art 147 is mostly about fraud performed by computers (classical "hacking") but it shouldn't be difficult to argue that fighting and reverting vandalism requires significant (technical and personal) effort and hence the operator looses money. Additionally, there's Art 144bis which matches even better for the scenario here: Damage to data Art. 144bis Any person who without authority alters, deletes or renders unusable data that is stored or transmitted electronically or in some other similar way shall be liable on complaint to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender has caused major damage, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed. The offence is prosecuted ex officio. Any person who manufactures, imports, markets, advertises, offers or otherwise makes accessible programs that he knows or must assume will be used for the purposes described in paragraph 1 above, or provides instructions on the manufacture of such programs shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender acts for commercial gain, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed. | This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas). |
On forums such as Stack Exchange, is it okay to "plagiarize" myself across other forums and vice versa? Sometimes when I've had questions, I've simultaneously asked them on other forums as well. For example, I may ask a question on christianforums.com, copy the same question, and paste it on hermenutics.stackexchange.com to get more perspectives, and vice versa. Also, I may copy an old answer I've given on one of the forums and then used it to answer a similar question from the other. So long as I'm the creator of a question or answer on a forum, am I generally allowed to copy and paste what I've written and use it across forums, or do most sites consider themselves the "owners" of what I post, forbidding me from copying and pasting what I wrote elsewhere? | See https://stackoverflow.com/legal/terms-of-service and https://law.stackexchange.com/help/licensing. As with most social media sites, your contribution of content does not transfer ownership of any copyright in the content; rather, you grant to the platform a non-exclusive license. Because the license is not exclusive, you can grant similar or different licenses to other parties, which generally happens when you post the same content on other sites. (Of course, you can only grant licenses when you own the copyright or have a license that allows you to grant a further license, so posting content created by others can be complicated; this seems to be beyond the scope of the question, though, so I mention it only in passing.) To answer with respect to a specific site, of course, you have to look at the site's terms of service. | Evaluating a potential copyright violation is very fact-intensive, so we don't have enough information to answer the question. Making a copy is generally going to be a copyright violation, but there's still going to be a lot of breathing room under the fair use doctrine. Again, we'd need more details to provide a useful answer, but you may be able to analyze the question yourself using the following information. Analysis of fair-use defenses looks at four questions, and the answers to the questions can tip the scales in favor of or against a finding of fair use: Does your kind of copying affect the market for the original? To what extent can your copy fulfill the demand for the original? What if there were widespread copying of the kind you're considering? The more potential there is for the copies to replace the original, the less likely it is to be fair use. This is the most important factor in the analysis. Why did you make the copy? If you made the copy for purposes of news reporting, criticism, or commentary, it's more likely to be fair use. If you made a copy just so you could watch again later whenever you feel like it, that's may still be fair use, but it is somewhat less likely. If you made a copy so you could sell it for profit, that's almost certainly not fair use. How much did you copy? Did you copy the whole thing, or did you copy only as much as you needed to achieve your purpose under Question 2? If you copy "too much" -- both in the raw amount and as a fraction of the whole work -- it's less likely to be fair use. What did you copy? Such works can be copyrighted but are not part of the Highly creative works, such as poems, music, and movies, are at the "core" of copyright principles. A fair use analysis will be more stringent in these cases than when copying a purely factual work, such as a phone book, biography, or list of statistics. This is the least important factor in the analysis. So take all of those and imagine the answer to each on a spectrum. If you see things generally tipping in the direction of fair use, that's a good indication that you're going to be safe. If you see things tipping in the other direction, you may want to reconsider. Again, these can be notoriously tricky questions. If you're dealing with a real situation, you should consult an attorney to get an answer specific to your situation. | In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost. | I'm not sure this would be a copyright violation. 17 USC 117 says: (a)Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy.—Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner... Due to the shutdown of the license server, it is impossible to use the program without an adaptation. It is therefore an "essential step in the utilization of the computer program", and not infringing, in my opinion. | That would be pretty much a classical case of copyright infringement. Drawing a thing from memory is copying just as much as drawing a thing with the original before you or xeroxing a thing. The degree of match between the original and your copy may vary depending on how good your memory is, but that doesn't matter, because copyright protection is not about "making exact replicas", it is about copying in any form. | They have copyright in their additional text, and possibly in things like their visual design choices (fonts, layout etc). They may also have introduced a few deliberate typos to detect any literal copies from their version (rather as mapmakers add a few imaginary features to their maps). None of this creates any rights to the original text. You are still free to produce your own copies of the original text. Just get it from some other source so you can be sure not to include anything of theirs. | From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end. | The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission. |
Can I be held liable for accidental damage to my company laptop? I have resigned from the company I am an employee at and I am currently serving my notice period. To minimise distractions to other employees, my manager has asked me to work from home for the duration of the notice period. While working at my home desk, I spilled a glass of water and it went over my closed laptop. I did my best to prevent damage (quickly drying the laptop, powering it off, and leaving it to dry for 48hrs). Unfortunately it looks like the laptop is damaged, I imagine beyond economical repair (though I will verify this at the store). I have checked my contract and there is nothing outlining company equipment. Can I be held responsible for this damage? | What happens is the same as if you were an employee in the office, staying with the company for another few years. You are an agent for the company, and everything you do is as if the company was doing it (except for extreme circumstances). A company employee broke your laptop. It's the company's problem. They should have insurance for this kind of thing. And they told you to work from home, so if something happened because you are at home, that's the company's problem as well. It could be different if your company had told their employees not to have any fluids anywhere near their computers, and you had acted against this. Or my company doesn't allow me to take my works computer with me on a holiday; if I did without explicit permission and it got damaged, that would be my problem. | The real question isn't whether there is a law, but whether you want to keep your job. If you want to do something that you believe will affect your company negatively, and you ask whether it's legal or not, the question alone should show you it's a bad idea. And another question is whether you can be sued, and what it will cost you even if you can win a case, and the answers to that are "yes" and "a lot". | You are probably entitled to the $100 (more or less) They breached the contract and you are entitled to damages (what it cost you) for dealing with their breach if they are unable or unwilling to remedy their breach. This would include the reasonable cost of your disposing of the unwanted mattress plus or minus any difference in the price from you sourcing the equivalent mattress elsewhere (subject to any legitimate terms of the contract that allow them to cancel the contract if they can’t supply). Of course, it’s not worth suing over such a trivial amount but this is the sort of thing the consumer protection regulator in your jurisdiction would be interested in. | Statute of limitations is the least of your problems To answer your headline question is 7 years. However, the problem that you have is I hear (and your employer and the court will hear): "I say I suffered this injury at work but I didn't report it, no one saw it happen, I didn't tell anyone at the time and I didn't see a doctor until 'later'." What are you going to say when they ask you for evidence of your claim? | united-states If they have a contract with the employee which specifies that such IP is assigned to the company at creation, such a contract is valid until and unless a court holds that it is void. It might be held void as against public policy,. or as being "unconscionable", but it might well not be so held. An even broader contract, which claimed any and every kind of IP created by an employee, even if crated during off hours and not at the work site nor with company resources is more likely to be held void, but even this is not certain to be held void. In the absence of a contract explicitly assigning such IP to the company, the company might attempt to apply the rule that makes works created by an employee within the scope of employment works-made-for-hire (WFH). This is in 17 USC 101 (the definitions section of the copyright law). This would affect copyrights, but not patents or other IP. There is very little US case law interpreting the "scope of employment". But there seems some reason to believe that work that was not assigned by the employer, not intended to benefit the employer, not used by the employer, not done within usual working hours nor using company resources, and not of the specific type normally assigned to or carried out by the employee, is probably not "within the scope" of the employee's employment. If that is so, the work would not be WFH, and only an explicit written contract, signed by the employee (or the employee's authorized agent) could transfer the copyright. | The employee must, during and after employment, without limitation in time, observe a duty of confidentiality regarding [...] the Company's internal affairs such as business plans, profitability, pricing, employees, methods, processes, routines, code and the like as well as other information that the Company typically wants to keep secret The pure information that the company had at some time a security problem with their product is internal knowledge you only gained through working there. By what is written here, you are indeed prohibited from speaking about it. If it were public knowledge, you could point to a press release and say "I did that, that was me fixing the problem". That would work. Because it doesn't share anything that isn't public anyway. But you cannot share things the company wants to keep secret. Finding out whether that contract is legally enforcable in your country and juristiction is the job of a real lawyer, but just as written, they are right. You signed a contract to not do that, not talk about it an certainly not publish it on the internet. So you should not do that, unless a good lawyer you trust tells you otherwise. That said, "I found a security flaw" is about as impressive as "I found a dollar on the floor". Maybe you can talk about your knowledge to prevent something like it happening. That says nothing about whether or not it happened in your old company, and for me as an employer it is much more valuable to have you on board with structured knowledge you can apply, than with your memories of being lucky once. | The key here is the provision "through no fault of his own". A landlord who relies on this provision would need to be able to demonstrate what the cause of the delay was, and that s/he had not been reasonably able to avoid it. Nor could a landlord simply fail to take steps to repair the problem, whatever it might be. If the problem will clearly take more than 30 days to fix (Isay the building burned down), the prospective tenant would have the right to cancel the lease at once. True, in such a case the tenant would be put to the trouble and expense of finding another place at short notice, but then the landlord would have lost his income from the property. The provision allocates the losses between the parties in such a case. If the property is not available at the specified time for the lease to start, but could be available a few days later, the quoted provision would not allow the landlord to just ignore the situation and end the lease. The landlord is allowed only a "reasonable time" to fix the problem, and taking significantly longer than is needed would not be "reasonable". | The question of whether a person was acting on their own behalf or that of a company would generally be a question of fact, so if such a case came to court it would be for both sides to present evidence and argue for their interpretation of it. In most cases the context makes it clear. You mention having a company email domain and associated email signature; that is certainly good practice and would go a long way towards creating a presumption that you were acting for a company. Also signing yourself with your job title or role (e.g. "Joe Bloggs, Chief Bottlewasher") makes it clear that you are speaking in your role as an employee. The content of the communication also matters; if you use your company email address to order goods from a supplier that the company has used before then the recipient can reasonably assume that you are ordering on behalf of the company and a court is likely to agree. OTOH if you use the company address to send libellous emails then the recipient would have a much higher bar to claim that this was the company view rather than a personal one. |
Is it possible to have more joint tenants in equity than the number of joint tenants in law? Dealing specifically with England and Wales: Is it possible for there to be more joint tenants in equity for a specific property than the number of joint tenants in law? For example, if A, B, C contribute to the purchase of a property, is it possible for only two of these parties to be legal joint tenants, whilst all three parties are beneficial joint tenants? | Yes. It is fairly common for there to be one owner at law, but another person who has a beneficial interest - such as a long-term cohabiting partner. This may arise because the parties set it up that way, or perhaps more often when courts find that there is a "constructive trust" or a "resulting trust". See for example the concurring opinion of Lord Hope of Craighead in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, Parties are, of course, free to enter into whatever bargain they wish and, so long as it is clearly expressed and can be proved, the court will give effect to it. But for the rest the state of the legal title will determine the right starting point. The onus is then on the party who contends that the beneficial interests are divided between them otherwise than as the title shows to demonstrate this on the facts. The resulting court process may find that the beneficial interest exists, or not, and what fraction of the property it represents. It's common to find situations where one party put up most or all of the whole purchase price of a house, which was then registered in both names, and they then disagree about whether it should be split 50-50 or otherwise - that's an example of the beneficial ownership differing in proportion from the (equal) legal ownership. (See Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 at paragraph 51 for an explanation of this particular pattern.) The same sort of case arises when a cohabiting partner does not own the house, but still contributes to the mortgage and other bills - then, depending on the facts at hand, there may be a "constructive trust", and the partner is entitled to a share of the sale price of the house even though they are not its legal owner. A "resulting trust" might arise when someone contributed money for the purchase of the property, even though they didn't end up as a registered owner, but the parties acted in other respects as if they were joint owners. | In the lease agreement we stipulated that rent would be 50% off until the building received full services and then the full rent payment would be due. Ouch. I bet the lease agreement also says something like "no other agreements verbal or otherwise are in effect for this agreement." So what you did was release the landlord from the responsibility to make the building habitable. Pretty sure you will need a lawyer to unwind this. | In most common-law jurisdiction, a purchaser buys a house subject to any existing lease. If that is true in your jurisdiction, the notice to vacate was illegal, and you are entitled to remain until the end of the current lease. The return of the deposit will depend on the condition of the property when you move out, and will be governed by the specific law of your jurisdiction. Residential leases are highly regulated in many places, and the laws vary widely. Often they vary even by individual cities or towns within a country. Without the specific locality in which the hosue is, no specific answer is possible. | Numbering is for the sake of clarity, and is not intrinsically required. If you refer to a section, you need a way to say which section you mean, and a vague description like "up there where I talked about copying" is insufficient. You can refer to a section by a title, if you need to refer to sections within the contract, as long as your titles match what you refer to them as (and you don't have two sections called "Your Rights"). | A lease of land is not the same as a residential lease, the latter being strongly regulated by special laws. So caveat emptor is the default rule for land leases (see this article). You have to look at the laws of your state, but let's take Washington as an example. This is not a residential tenancy which is subject to different laws, it's just leasing land, similar to leasing a chainsaw or a car. Your implied warranty would be that the land is fit for the ordinary purposes for which land is used, and that is all. It might be worth wondering about whether building a cabin on the land changes your property tax liability. | Why use Part 8? Because the Civil Procedure Rules say so. See Practice Direction 56.2(2.1): ...the claimant in a landlord and tenant claim must use the Part 8 procedure as modified by Part 56 and this practice direction. And Rule 56.1(1)(f): (1) In this Section of this Part ‘landlord and tenant claim means a claim under – ... (f) section 214 of the Housing Act 2004. What is its purpose? Shelter's handy guide offers this: The Part 8 procedure is used where a rule or practice direction requires or permits it [see above], or where the claimant seeks the court's decision on a question that is unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact. | First review the existing contract for anything that specifies what happens at the end of the term. I have seen ones that switch to month to month, others automatically extend by a whole year. In the United states the rental law is done at the state level or even more local than that. So I took a look at the UK policies. I focused on England. Guidance How to rent: the checklist for renting in England Updated 24 March 2023 At the end of the fixed period If you want to stay If you want to extend your tenancy after any initial fixed period, there are a number of important issues to consider. Check Shelter’s website for advice. Do you want to sign up to a new fixed term? If not, you will be on a ‘rolling periodic tenancy’. This means you carry on as before but with no fixed term. Your tenancy agreement should say how much notice you must give the landlord if you want to leave the property – one month’s notice is typical. Shelter publishes advice on how you can end your tenancy. I then went to the shelter website How to end a periodic tenancy: How much notice You can give your landlord a legal notice called a 'notice to quit' to end a rolling tenancy. This is a more formal option. Your tenancy will end legally if you follow the rules on how much notice and where to send it. A legal notice must: be in writing give the right amount of notice end on the correct day Here is an example of a notice to quit. A legal notice ends your tenancy and your right to live in your home. Joint tenancies will end for all tenants even if only one of you gives notice. You cannot withdraw a valid notice if you change your mind. Your landlord may agree to let you or other joint tenants stay on after a notice ends. Minimum notice periods You need to give at least: 1 month if your rent is due monthly 4 weeks if your rent is due weekly You can usually give the minimum notice to end your tenancy if your most recent agreement does not mention a longer notice period or if you've never had a written agreement. You may still need to give more than the minimum notice to make sure it ends on the right day. If your agreement says you must give more notice Your agreement might have a 'notice clause'. For example, if it says you have to give 2 months' notice. A notice clause might not apply after your fixed term has ended but sometimes it will. When will the longer notice apply? The longer notice period will only apply if either: you never had a fixed term agreement your agreement says it continues as a contractual periodic tenancy after the fixed term You can ignore a notice clause in your most recent agreement if both: your fixed term has ended your agreement does not say that it continues as a contractual periodic tenancy It looks like the notice period is a month, unless the contract says that the notice period is longer during the periodic tenancy. | Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity. |
Why misleading to describe Bills of Lading as "negotiable"? Why "a little misleadingly"? I do not know what is misleading. Documentary intangibles are things in action where the documents with which they are associated are so identified with the underlying obligation that transfer of the document effects a transfer of the obligation. For example, in what are called ‘documentary sales’ of goods, the sale goods will be in the physical possession of a carrier in transit to the buyer and consequently inaccessible to either the buyer or the seller. Documents called bills of lading are used, which are regarded as documents of title to the goods identified in them, so that typically the seller has an obligation to tender a bill of lading to the buyer rather than the goods, and the buyer must meet his payment obligation by tendering the purchase price against receipt of the documents. Thus, if it is transferable (known a little misleadingly as ‘negotiable’), a bill of lading can be bought and sold as if it were the goods themselves, since title to the document is recognized as title to the goods.8 8 In fact this is only a possessory title, since the bill only embodies a right to possess the goods. Lee Roach, Commercial Law 2019 3 edn, page 23. | Because transferable is not the same as negotiable Most property is transferable. That is the owner of the property can legally transfer ownership to someone else (by contract, deed, or gift). This may require various degrees of formality: transfers of land must be in writing, transfers of motor vehicles usually require a change to a government register, transfers of a can of soft drink require no formality. Bills of landing serve to formalize the ownership of goods in transit and are so ubiquitous that the transfer of one is the transfer of the other. But that doesn’t make them negotiable. For normal goods, a person cannot pass on better title then they themselves possess. So, if I steal something or acquire it by fraud or otherwise dishonesty, I don’t own it. If I sell it to you, you don’t own it either even though you are a possessor in good faith (I, as the thief am a possessor in bad faith). The actual owner can recover the goods from whoever possesses them even if that person legitimately acquired them. Negotiable instruments are a special kind of transferable property where the mere possession of them (in good faith) makes you the owner of them. The most familiar type of negotiable property is cash. If I rob a bank and use that cash to legitimately buy something from you (and you don’t know the cash is stolen) then you own the cash. The original owner can go after me but they can’t come after you. | Declaratory judgments clarifying the meaning of a written instrument such as condominium governing documents are possible, but only when there is a bona fide dispute between parties who have personal economic interests in having the issue resolved. For example, if an owner is seeking reimbursement for expenses incurred from the board, and the board cannot agree regarding what is required of it, the board could bring an action naming the owner as a defendant for a declaratory judgment determining what the governing documents require it to do in that situation. | Short Answer It depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances. But based on your description, this approach is likely problematic and might not withstand judicial scrutiny. Explanation Plaintiffs can attack this behavior as a sham transaction. Court could find this to be a fraudulent conveyance. and provide relief via clawback order. Badges of Fraud include: (Source: Wikipedia) Becoming insolvent because of the transfer; Lack or inadequacy of consideration; Family, or insider relationship among parties; The retention of possession, benefits or use of property in question; The existence of the threat of litigation; The financial situation of the debtor at the time of transfer or after transfer; The existence or a cumulative effect of a series of transactions after the onset of debtor’s financial difficulties; The general chronology of events; The secrecy of the transaction in question; and Deviation from the usual method or course of business. | In the real world, the contract could not be enforced, as being unconscionable. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445. This, from the ruling, seems particularly applicable to TOS conditions: Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices | They have subtle differences. Starting with the Oxford Dictionary definitions (using the one most appropriate for a legal context): clause. 2.a particular and separate article, stipulation, or proviso in a treaty, bill, or contract. A clause is a self-contained concept within the written contract; it may have a number of subclauses. It may reference other clauses but ideally it can be read and acted on on its own. Typical contracts will contain clauses on payment, time, termination, scope etc. It is a feature of the drafting of the contract document. provision 3.a condition or requirement in a legal document: "the first private prosecution under the provisions of the 1989 Water Act" A provision is any condition (q.v.) or stipulation of things to be done or not be done within the contract. A provision may correspond with a clause, may span several clauses or be contained wholly within a subclause. It is a feature of the contract itself: verbal contracts will have provisions but they will not have clauses. condition 3.a state of affairs that must exist or be brought about before something else is possible or permitted: "for a member to borrow money, three conditions have to be met" A condition is a set of circumstances that must arise before another action can occur. There can be a "condition precedent" which means the condition must be satisfied before there is a contract. There can (will) also be conditions within the contract, for example, there will be conditions that must be satisfied before payment is made (like issuing an invoice). Conditions are a creature of the contract not the drafting. term 4.(terms) conditions under which an action may be undertaken or agreement reached; stipulated or agreed requirements: "their solicitors had agreed terms" (I don't like this definition much but it is the best they had.) A term is a provision (q.v.) in the contract for which one of the possible remedies for breach is termination of the contract by the innocent party . A provision where termination is not an available remedy is a warranty. | Caveat Keep in mind that words do not have uniform definitions for all times and places and contexts. Words can have different meanings in particular contexts and can be defined in a contract or statute to have a meaning different from the common meaning. "Person" Usually Includes Entities Of Any Kind This said, usually the term "person" in the law refers to any human being and any trust, estate or entity that is capable of suing and being sued and entering into contracts. An "entity" in this sense would often include partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, non-profit associations (whether or not incorporated), business trusts, joint ventures, local governments, states, the federal government and foreign governments. (I break out trusts and estates separately because there is divided authority in different jurisdictions over whether trusts and estates are entities, or are simply a special hat that the trustee or executor wears that are not entities, which can be relevant in some highly technical situations.) Agency Situations The term "person" is also often used in the sense that it refers to the principal and not the agent, when an agent is taking action on behalf of the principal. Thus, if there is a law that says "a person who enters into a real estate contract must disclose that person's taxpayer identification number", and someone with a power of attorney from you signs a real estate contract on your behalf, the power of attorney agent should disclosure your taxpayer identification number and not theirs. Why Is The Term "Person" Defined So Broadly? One important reason for using the term "person" to apply to entities as well as human beings, is that it allows for statutes and contract terms or case law legal rules to be stated in very general terms without being wordy in a way that accurately reflects how those legal rules or contract terms should apply to entities. For example, a statute using the word "person" might say: A person who is engaged in business in this state must register with the department of business licenses. By using the word "person" in this way, the statute wouldn't have to say instead (probably less accurately and less comprehensibly): Any individual, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, business trust, non-business trust, estate, governmental entity, or other entity, including the principal of any agent acting on behalf of the principal, engaged in business in this state, must register with the department of business licenses. The phrasing without the word "person" would be more likely to create loopholes because some kind of entity is omitted, and would be prone to ambiguity because one would have to decide which words that define the kind of persons and entities that are covered modify which other words in the sentence. Thus, using the word "person" is often makes entities more rather than less accountable to the law, by making legal language more clear and more general (and hence containing fewer loopholes). "Individual" or "Natural Person" Usually the term "individual" or "natural person" would mean a human being, although, of course, there are other senses of the word "individual" such as "an individual Widget" referring to exactly one Widget in particular, as opposed to Widgets in general. Alternative Definitions Of "Person" There are isolated times when the word "person" would not include minors and incapacitated people who are incapable of suing or entering into contracts in their own name due to lack of legal capacity. It isn't uncommon to have a definition of "person" in a statute or contract that omits governmental entities, that omits all kinds of entities, or that omits particular kinds of entities (e.g. foreign entities or corporations). For example, a tax statute might define "person" in a way that includes natural persons and entities, but excludes governments. Some of the definitions of terms like these in the bankruptcy code are particularly non-intuitive. | In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source. | The point of the Bluebook is to give uniform citation rules, so that anyone who reads a citation to a public record like a case, statute or regulation will be able to find it for themselves. It's generally used for brief writing. If you're talking about a private contract between two individuals, nobody is going to be able to look it up, because it's not a public record; there is no "citation" that will magically get them to it. Instead, you would ordinarily attach the contract as an exhibit, then cite it accordingly. On first reference: April 20, 2014 Agreement of Sale ("Sale Agreeent"), attached as Exhibit A. On later reference: Sale Agreement (Exhibit A). Of course, your court's citation rules may vary. If you're looking to cite something for an academic paper rather than a court filing, and you have to use bluebook format rather than a real academic citation format like MLA or Chicago, follow rule 17.1, the general rule for unpublished materials. For these purposes, a contract is no different from a letter or another non-public document. |
Is this true? "Thanks to GDPR laws, EU country A cannot check/investigate a corporate structure of a company incorporated in EU country B" Not sure how to describe it better but I'll try my best. According to someone I talked to this is 100% legal and 100s of people do this. Here's the setup. You are a tax resident in EU country A. This country is normally high tax country but they have a temporary tax regime for foreigners (you) that doesn't tax foreign dividend income. You set up a company in EU country B. Here corporate taxes are super low for less than $1M turn over. If you do work for this company or manage it from country A, that makes this company subject to local high taxes. So you hire two local directors, as contractors, from country B. On the contract signed, they oversee the day to day operations and work for you as advisor since you're the only shareholder. So their existence, the contract and the structure show that the company is managed in country B, run in country B and has economic substance in country B. This way the offshore company isn't taxed in country A. This allows you to get dividends from the company tax free (after paying corporate taxes in country B) to your account in country A. Thanks to GDPR laws, tax office of Country A can't go around checking everything company B workers do in country B. They also cannot put a camera in your bedroom and watch you 24/7 in case you work for the company. They also cannot put a monitoring software on your computer in case you work for the company. There's nothing that stops you from working in tech or have a SaaS business through your company. As long as you have proper invoices. In case country A develops an interest in your business, you show them the corporate structure, contract with directors, invoices and relevant documents you got from the country B tax office. Everything is kosher. Is this actually true? | Is this actually true? Not really although there may be figments of truth woven in. First, the GDPR does not prevent tax authorities from determining layers of corporate ownership or investigating tax fraud. Second, your substantive tax liability depends upon the tax laws of the countries in question. If you owe taxes under a country's tax laws but the country can't find it, that makes you a tax criminal, and doesn't mean you don't owe the tax. Third, the exact rules on what triggers tax liability in mixed country fact patterns are highly technical and not fully uniform. If you actually do business abroad within the meaning of a country's tax laws in a way that is not subject to its taxes, then it is legal. But this scheme probably doesn't meet that standard under most country's tax laws. So you hire two local directors, as contractors, from country B. On the contract signed, they oversee the day to day operations and work for you as advisor since you're the only shareholder. So their existence, the contract and the structure show that the company is managed in country B, run in country B and has economic substance in country B. This way the offshore company isn't taxed in country A. This allows you to get dividends from the company tax free (after paying corporate taxes in country B) to your account in country A. A few thoughts on this specific example. If you truly are nothing but a passive source of funding for a company, then owning shares in this company is no different from owning shares in a public held company (e.g. BMW). The notion that dividends from the company are tax free in county A in that situation is very likely incorrect. Usually, dividends and other intangible income is taxable income in the country where they are received. Most likely, the dividends are income subject to taxation in country A. There is a concept in tax law which U.S. tax lawyers call the "Economic Substance Rule" which is also true, but with different names (most of these countries don't have English language tax terminology anyway) which means that when someone is going through the motions of conducting a transaction in a tax favored form when in substance, something different is really going on, the tax authorities can choose to tax the substance rather than the form of the transaction. So, if the really valuable work is being done by the shareholder without visible compensation, rather than by the local directors and managers, you the shareholder might be taxed on "imputed income" representing the fair market value of the services rendered, or treated as the true manager of the company in country B. Similar issues can arise when valuable intellectual property is transferred to the company without being duly reflected in a fair market value purchase of equity interests, a sale at fair market value, or a licensing agreement for royalty payments. Tax officials aren't limited to looking at paperwork. They can and do interview the human beings involved in interviews that those human beings are legally obligated to attend and cooperate with and to provide truthful information in with legal consequences for lying in those interviews. Even if no official documentation or public statements would tip off tax officials, a significant share of tax evasion cases are driven by whistleblowing by disgruntled former employees, ex-spouses, jilted significant others, mistreated business partners, and revengeful angry children who feel that they have been mistreated by their parents. Nothing in the GDPR prevents whistleblowing to tax authorities. Background In E.U. countries, closely held company ownership must be declared and recorded in a notary public's "public records" or a corporate register (unlike, for example, the United States, where, this information was only contained in the internal records of the company in most cases, although a new law called the Corporate Transparency Act effective January 1, 2022, or later if initial regulations aren't adopted, changes this status quo). E.U. directives expressly requires much more public disclosure by private companies than the U.S. more generally. For example, a recent Dutch overhaul of its rules for disclosing beneficial ownership of companies is a model of contemporary modern European legislation on the subject. This affords access to this information as follows (UBO is the Universal Beneficial Ownership registry and FIO is the Fiscal Intelligence Agency, an anti-money laundering agency): The public can only access the publicly accessible UBO-information with a valid registration and in exchange for a fixed fee. The identity of those persons that access the UBO-register will be registered with the Dutch Chamber of Commerce and UBOs may inquire as to how often their information has been consulted. The Chamber of Commerce may register the Citizen Service Number (Burgerservicenummer) of persons who access the register. The FIU and other competent authorities will, upon request, have access to that information. The FIU and other competent authorities may perform a search in the UBO-register based on the name of an individual, thus listing all connections of that individual, while the public will only be able to search the UBO-register for the UBO(s) of a specific entity (and not for the name of an individual). Even though this limitation to search options was presented as a measure to protect the privacy of UBOs, it is generally expected that commercial platforms that register company information will enable searches based on the name of individuals. The FIU and competent authorities have access to both the publicly and not publicly accessible UBO-information. In the Netherlands, the following institutions are, amongst others, qualified as competent authorities with unlimited access to the UBO-information: the Dutch Central Bank; the Authority for the Financial Markets; the Financial Supervision Office; the Dutch Gaming Authority; the Tax & Customs Authorities; the National Police; the Public Prosecutor’s Office; the Dutch intelligence agencies; and the Tax Intelligence Agency. As this example illustrates, taxing authorities are given express statutory authority to gather information pertinent to tax collection. The Dutch situation, prior to the recent reform, collected essentially similar information, but at a decentralized basis in the offices of the notary handling the incorporation of the entity in question, with similar parties having access to the information. The E.U.'s General Data Protection Regulation generally, affirmatively extends to the provision of a good or service to an E.U. person subject to the regulation, something that would not include tax collection. See Article 3(2). Also, mutual assistance treaty obligations between E.U. countries to share information, which would include many tax treaties between E.U. countries, and criminal investigations (which would include criminal tax fraud cases) are expressly exempted from its scope. | I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy. | The GDPR actually does require you to follow DNT in Article 21: In the context of the use of information society services, and notwithstanding Directive 2002/58/EC, the data subject may exercise his or her right to object by automated means using technical specifications. I think this is quite explicit. | Whether GDPR applies does not depend on the country of residence. Instead, GDPR applies to a non-EU site or service if the data controller offers products or services to people in the EU (see Art 3(2) GDPR). This depends solely on the behaviour and intent of the data controller / the provider of the website – compare also the discussion of the “targeting criterion” in EDPB guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR. While your proposed measures might not be entirely ineffective (in that they document an intent to not serve people in the EU), they are both unnecessarily restrictive and overly lax. For example, they would unnecessarily prevent EU tourists in the US from registering but would nevertheless allow US tourists in the EU. For the targeting criterion, it matters whether the data subject is in the EU at the time of the offer, not at all what their residency is. Even if a person who is currently in the EU registers with your service, that doesn't necessarily mean that you are targeting people in the EU. Instead of implementing signup restrictions, a better strategy might be to clarify in the copy on your website that you are only targeting the domestic US market, not the European market with your services. I have discussed this in more detail in an answer to “How can you block GDPR users from US based sites?” If you have a site where GDPR doesn't apply, and you receive a GDPR data subject request, you shouldn't deny it on the basis that the user must have lied – instead you can deny it on the basis that GDPR just doesn't apply to you. | It depends on the state. In some states the Secretary of State holds the records for business entities and in others, such as Arizona, it's an organization known as the Arizona Corporation Commission. Regardless of the state's organization that keeps the information, one of the pieces of information you will find when you look at a company's records is the "registered agent", "resident agent" or "statutory agent." The agent, whether a person or a representative corporation, must be located within the state where business is conducted. That agent is who or what gets served with papers for a lawsuit. Here's a good explanation at legalzoom. A personal example that may help: I am an owner in a business that does business in Louisiana and Arizona. Our LLC is registered in Louisiana and is registered as a "foreign corporation" in Arizona. However, we are required to have a registered agent in each state. We pay a company to act as our registered agent in each state and the registered agent has a physical address in each state in which we are registered. If someone wants to sue my company then they can look up the name of my company in either state and will find my registered agent along with the registered agent's physical address. Service to the registered agent counts as service to my company. The agent will forward to me any service which is made to them. EDIT: if you don't known the name of the entity, i.e., the name on the door of the business does not represent the name of the company, then you need to find the "doing business as," or DBA record of the company. I don't know what state you're in but all the states in which I've done business maintain a "Doing Business As" system that can be searched. I guess it's possible that you're in a state that doesn't maintain DBA filings or require them. Typically, you can search either way - search by owner or search by the DBA name. Some states, such as Arizona, record DBA names at the county level. I've seen some states allow searching by address also. | First, when using profiling third party services (Analytics is "profiling" as defined by the GDPR), your main concern is not such a trivial thing as cookie compliance, but the security of processing I've analyzed Google's IP anonymization in some detail (as part of the DPIA I do for clients). My conclusion is that for most of the web-sites we manage, Google's IP anonymization is adequate to ensure security of processing as required by the DPIA process. However, on some sites that are likely to visited by users interested in what the GDPR calls "special categories of personal data" (Article 9), we either do not use Google Analytics, or we add additional layers of security in case the USA Government orders Google to disregard the stipulations in the DPA and hand over the data (yes, the US Government can legally do that - read the fine print in the Privacy Shield accord). As for Facebook Analytics, I think you've simply misunderstood their policy. Nowhere in that policy document does Facebook say that they "are not collecting Personal Identifiable Information". AFAIK, they collect tons of it, in all sorts of obnoxious and sneaky ways. What they actually say about PII in the context of Analytics is this: We do not share information that personally identifies you (personally identifiable information is information like name or email address that can by itself be used to contact you or identifies who you are) with advertising, measurement or analytics partners unless you give us permission. Let me remind you that one of their "analytics partners" was Cambridge Analytica, so if this promise not to share is true, it looks like a pretty new policy. OK, moving on to cookie compliance. To you (the controller), both Google and Facebook are processors. Given the history of the NSA and the methods it have used and AFAIK still use to get US-based companies to hand over the personal data about Europeans through orders issued by secret FISA courts, plus the fact that total nutcases currently are in charge in the USA, I am not going to rely on the privacy policy of any US-company for protection of personal data. So if I make use of Google Analytics (and I often do, they provide a great service), I always make sure that my users opt-in on that (hard cookie concent), even I make use of their IP anonymization feature (YMMV). As for Facebook, the fact that they promise not to share PII with third parties is irrelevant because they collect personal data. You will always need consent from your users to hand over their PII to Facebook in the first place. This is not optional. PS: If was a user, that consent would never been granted, no matter how great or valuable your site might be. If you have any sort of relationship with Facebook, I'll give you my personal data when you pry it from my cold, dead hands. | Countries, and supranational governments like the EU, have jurisdiction over companies that do business in their jurisdictions. Oracle is technically not a U.S. corporation; it's a closely related group of California and Delaware corporations. Very few companies incorporate under U.S. federal law (I believe some banking corporations are required to, but don't quote me on that). Almost all companies are incorporated under state law. However, if Oracle does business in Texas, it still has to obey Texas law. And if it does business in the EU, it still has to obey EU law. Some laws make distinctions in some corporate matters between domestic corporations (incorporated under that state's laws) and foreign corporations (incorporated under another state's laws). But if you do business in a state, including an EU member state, you still need to obey that state's general laws, including antitrust law. Short version: if you visit another country, you can't go around shooting people, then say, "your laws don't apply to me, I'm an American." Neither can a company, no matter where it's incorporated. As for stopping the merger...any country where the merging companies do business can stop the merged company from doing business there if the merger violates local law. If this is a major, commercially important region like the EU, then failure to get EU approval will stop the merger. If it's a minor territory, the company will sometimes enter into an agreement to divest itself of local assets or entities. For example, if merging Oracle and Sun would create an antitrust problem in the minicomputer repair market in Laos, the merged entities would sell off either Oracle's or Sun's Laotian minicomputer repair division. | On the first page of https://www.gov.uk/duty-free-goods/overview you find: "You can bring some goods from abroad without having to pay UK tax or ‘duty’ (customs charges), as long as they’re for your own use." And on the next page "... will use them yourself or give them away as a gift". This clearly doesn't cover anything that you bring into the UK to sell it. And a bit further on the site it says "You must tell customs (known as ‘declaring’) on arrival in the UK if you have goods: ... that you plan to sell". Since you are asking here, it is quite obvious that you intend to sell :-) You said "e.g. say this guys comes every month from Russia to France for unrelated business, each time he fills up his luggage with the maximum allowed amount of goods that comply with custom laws". If this guy sells the stuff to you, then the maximum allowed amount of goods to import without paying taxes is zero. Once he is willing to pay taxes, there is no limit. Obviously regularly importing things from Russia or France and selling in the UK at a profit means that he is running a business in the UK, which means he would have to register a business, pay corporation taxes etc. It's all a matter of degree; for small amounts nobody cares (up to some limit you don't need to register a business or pay taxes; I don't know the details). |
For an appellate court, how does 'burden of proof' differ from 'standard of review'? Preface: This book discusses civil trials, and not criminal trials (whose procedure is more complex, per the author). Source: p 86, Thinking Like a Lawyer: An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (2010, 2 ed) by Kenneth J. Vandevelde The burden of proof governs fact-finding at trial. [1.] As discussed in chapter 2, on appeal, the court will not reevaluate the evidence against the burden of proof. [2.] Rather, the court will evaluate the evidence only against the standard of review. For example, in a civil case, the appellate court will examine a jury verdict only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. If so, the court of appeals will affirm the judgment of the trial court, even if the appellate court itself would not have found the burden of proof to have been met. In other words, a factual finding at trial is usually not disturbed on appeal. I do not understand the differences between the bolded terms (in 1 and 2). How and why can the standard of review differ from burden of proof? I know that appellate courts decide questions of law, and not of fact, unless an error of fact is exceptionally clear. (I know that the required gravity (of such errors of fact) is defined with specific Modifiers, but I do not use them because they differ across jurisdictions.) | In any court, there will be situations where a judge has discretion to make some decision. The judge might have to decide "did X meet the burden of proof", and due to the situation two reasonable and competent judges could come to different conclusions. You couldn't blame either for the decision, even though they would make opposite decisions. On the other hand, a judge might make gross mistakes. The judge might decide "X met the burden of proof" when this is clearly a mistake. That's what the appellate court is interested in. An appellate court checks whether the judge made mistakes that a judge shouldn't make. So in this situation, the appellate court doesn't decide whether X met the burden of proof. The appellate judge decides "did the trial judge make a decision that a trial judge shouldn't have made". An appellate judge might think to himself or herself: "well, I would have decided differently, but this trial judge’s decision was one that a reasonable judge could have made", and if that is what he or she thinks, the original decision will stay intact. | The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form. | The case of Sanchez v. Kerry provides evidence as to what standard of proof is required in an analogous case. Petitioner sued the Dept. of State, which makes citizenship determinations (22 CFR 50.2), alleging that he was born in Brownsville TX and submitting a birth certificate in support of the claim. The court found that the Texas certificate was not valid evidence (it was alleged to be filed falsely), and instead a competing Mexican birth certificate was valid. The court concludes as a matter of law that "the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was born in the United States", with citations (Bustamante-Barrera, 447 F.3d 388, 394 (5th Cir. 2006); Reyes v. Neely, 264 F.2d 673, 674-75 (5th Cir. 1959); Tijerina v. Brownell, 141 F. Supp. 266, 270 (S.D. Tex. 1956); Patel v. Rice, 403 F. Supp. 2d 560, 562 (N.D. Tex. 2005). The district court lays out the comparative evidence pretty clearly, so that you can see how the courts would probably rule (the case was upheld on appeal). The decision would be based on a totality of evidence, and one would have to go beyond the one fact that distinguishes this case from others. In Sanchez there was substantial counter-evidence. In the present case, other facts would be relevant, such as whether a birth certificate had been filed in a timely manner in some state, whether there was a competing birth certificate from another country. Testimony from competent witnesses would be germane, and could easily devolve into a series of competing technical claims (do people on a plane really know where they are relative to the ground?). | Basically, the idea of incontrovertable evidence is that the evidence points to one and only one truth, and the fact-finder need not doubt it (metaphysical doubt) unless opposition provides material fact that refutes the claim. That is, the defendant may be innocent until proven guilty, but evidence that shows guilt exists on the defendant's part is not false just because it demonstrates this. Thus, if the person making the claim meets the burden of proof, the person in the defense must refute with new evidence that raises doubt about the new fact. One should not assume it is not factual just because it aids in the claim against a defendant. You cannot doubt the evidence just because you doubt it; there must be a reason. | I assume that you don't mean "standing" in the legal sense (i.e. who has a right to sue over something). The question of whether a building has structural integrity is an evidentiary issue. As a result, any competent evidence may be introduced to convince the finder of fact of the issue, and the finder of fact (in a civil matter) will resolve that issue based upon a preponderance of the evidence. There are lots of ways that it could be proven (or disproven): Some instances of lack of structural integrity would be so obvious that a mere authenticated photograph or video clip offered by a lay person would be sufficient to prove the issue. A recent citation from a city inspector would argue strongly for a problem. A recent issuance of a certificate of occupancy would argue strongly for a lack of a problem. Any contractor with a license adequate to do that work would probably be competent to render an opinion. Sometimes an architect would be competent to testify. A licensed or certified building inspect might be competent to testify. Structural integrity is usually the province of someone trained as a civil engineer with a structural engineering speciality. But often evaluating the condition of the soils would be considered a separate speciality to be evaluated by a soils engineer, often as a consultant whose work is used by the structural engineer to form an overall opinion. Except in the case of a lack of structural integrity that it obvious to a lay person that can be proved with a simple photograph or video clip, or can be established with a citation or a certificate of occupancy, anyone presenting a factual opinion regarding the structural integrity of a building would have to be accepted by a court as an expert witness. A court's acceptance of someone as an expert witness is a process that would typically involve presentation of the qualifications of the expert in terms of education, licensure, experience, and history of publications in the area, as well as some defense of the validity of the discipline in which the expert witness is skilled as having a scientific basis and is relevant to the question at hand in this particular case. In a fully litigated case, these issues are typically resolved in pre-trial motion practice and a pre-trial evidentiary hearing in the case of a dispute over whether the area in which the witness has expertise provides is a valid approach, as discipline, to answer the question in a scientifically reliable way. But this broad based attacks on an entire approach to addressing an issue don't usually come up in the case of the standard building and engineering professions. Also, in a fully litigated case, the parties normally disclose an official report of the expert witnesses offered and make them available to be deposed prior to the trial. This requirement is often dispensed with, however, in litigation over preliminary matters. The issue of what kind of expert testimony is competent to prove a disputed issue of fact is determined on a case by case basis. There is not a body of law that spells out in any real specificity what kind of evidence is or is not competent to prove the issue. The general rules of evidence apply and there might be (but probably isn't) case law under the rules of evidence for expert testimony that is on point to resolve your particular issue. More often, there will be pronouncements in variously kinds of professional licensing statutes regarding what someone with a particular qualification is qualified to do, and those are evaluated with respect to a particular tendered witness in a manner that does not preclude someone else who might also have different qualifications that are also relevant to some aspect of the issue from also testifying to the factual issue presented. Of course, that fact that an expert witness meets the minimum threshold to testify in court under the rules of evidence doesn't end the analysis. An expert witness is introduced in order to persuade the judge that the expert's opinion is correct. And, the more highly credentialed a witness is, the more relevant the credentials the witness holds, and the better the witness is at communicating the basis for the opinion of the witness to the judge or jury, the more likely it is that the finder of fact will give weight to the opinion of the witness and rule consistently with the opinion of the witness. So, on one hand, a contractor or inspector would probably be less credible than a structural engineer working with a soils engineer. On the other hand, someone with great technical expertise who isn't a good communicator, or can't deftly respond to an opposing attorney's cross-examination question without falling into a "trap" laid by that attorney, could still be a poor expert witness. Many technically skilled expert witnesses are more timid than necessary in formally giving opinions in court because they are used to discussing ideas in non-adversarial contexts where pointing out the limitations of your conclusions is welcomed and the colleague experts evaluating your opinion know not to give those limitations undue weight. | While it is true that jury instructions are typically less than optimal, it is ideological hyperbole or cynicism to claim that instructions are purposely confusing. The ultimate source of the confusion is that the legal system has to assume (pretend) that it has clear-cut rules that any reasonable person can easily understand and automatically apply. In order to maintain uniformity of the law, there is an externally-defined instruction that a judge may read (rather than giving his personal spin on what "reasonable doubt" means or what the relationship is between "reasonable doubt" and convicting a defendant). Once the relevant body of government (committee of judges and lawyers) has established the apparently correct formula for expressing the applicable legal concept, they don't mess with it, until SCOTUS overturns decisions enough times based on crappy instructions. Legal professionals are trained to carefully scrutinze language so as to achieve a single interpretation of a given clause (never mind the fact that there turn out to be many such interpretations). Since they can apply these interpretive rules, it is assumed that anyone can apply them. But in fact, we know that people don't just use literal semantic principles to reach conclusions – but the law resist pandering to that imperfection in human behavior. There is a huge literature on problems of jury instructions, some of the better of which relies on psycholinguistic experimentation to establish that a given instruction is confusing or gives the wrong result. See for example Solan's "Refocusing the burden of proof.." (and references therein) that addresses the problem of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which has the unintended consequence of implying that the defense has an obligation to create a doubt (which is not the case, and allows conviction if there is the weakest imaginable evidence which hasn't been refuted). But who gets to decide what the improved instructions should say? The instructions have to correctly state what the law holds (where "the law" means not just statutes, but the trillions of relevant court decisions and applicable regulations). Thus there is massive inertia, and improved jury instructions will not come about quickly. | Typically an Answer would have two parts. The first part presents the Defendant's side of the story raised in the Petition in an effort to assert that the Petition when viewed in light of the actual facts hasn't demonstrated a right to relief. The second part sets forth "affirmative defenses", most of which are procedural in nature. An affirmative defense raises some set of circumstances not discussed in the Petition that make it appropriate to deny relief even when, but for the defense, if everything in the Petition was true, this would suffice to establish grounds for relief. For example, procedural defenses might include: failure to meet a deadline, failure to give notice to the proper persons, failure to pay a filing fee, failure to include required information (such as a case number or a statement of facts or a signature) in the Petition, or lack of standing to file the Petition on behalf of the child because parental rights or legal guardianship are absent or because the person filing the Petition isn't an adult. The notion is that the Reply, in theory, should limit itself to responding to the newly raised procedural defenses stated in the Answer, or to new documents provided with the Answer, instead of trying to argue and resolve every dispute of fact or credibility issues between the Petition's version of the facts and the Answer's version of the facts. When in doubt, talk about it in the Reply. At worst, it is beyond the scope of what should be included in a Reply and can be ignored by the hearing officer as harmless. And, sometimes the hearing officer will decide that they want to know what is said even if it isn't strictly within the proper scope of a Reply. Certainly provide any documents that weren't previously provided that rebut the claims in the Answer. | An appeal may be made by a plaintiff, prosecutor, defendant or other interested party, so the term 'defendant' is not very useful; the party opposed to the Appellant (and served with the appeal) is usually called the Respondent. A contested appeal just means that the Respondent wishes to be represented at the appeal, presumably to fight it; most appeals are contested, but not all. Unlike a first-order case which may go by default, an uncontested appeal will still have to have some sort of a hearing; you are, after all, saying that a court decision should be set aside, and the Respondent's views are not necessarily relevant. It is, though, fair to say that an uncontested appeal will have a greater chance of success. |
Can you break a lease because the landlord refuses to evict another tenant who physically threatens the leaseholder? Suppose a tenant has a neighbor who has taken it upon themselves to verbally threaten and harass said tenant. Due to the inherent risk of engaging with the neighbor, the tenant contacts their landlord to inform them of the situation and request their assistance. The landlord either opts not to assist, or the assistance is ineffectual and the threats escalate to death threats. After a few months of this harassment, which progresses further to property damage, the tenants escalate the issue to the police who eventually arrest the unruly neighbor. Unfortunately, the neighbor cannot be held long-term as said neighbor makes bail. Upon recognizing this, the police advise the tenant that it is likely not safe for the tenants to remain in their home. Due to this escalating threat, the tenant moves into a hotel after advising their landlord of the situation. Said landlord informs them that they are still liable for the rent. Given the costs of the hotel plus rent aren't feasible, can the tenant elect to break their lease, and if so, how would they do so with minimal impact to their credit? | California Civil Code 1946.7(a) says that A tenant may notify the landlord that the tenant intends to terminate the tenancy if the tenant, a household member, or an immediate family member was the victim of an act that constitutes any of the following... (3) Stalking as defined in Section 1708.7 and stalking is "a pattern of conduct the intent of which was to follow, alarm, place under surveillance, or harass the plaintiff", with various other conditions also being applicable. It is not sufficient to just allege such harassment, you must attach documentation in the notice to landlord. This means that you must first serve proper notice to terminate the tenancy – you can't just walk away. There has to be some qualified third-party documentation, such as a written police report. It is not required that the victim actually sue and win a case against an alleged stalker. | Joint tenancy means that you both have equal (full) rights to the entire property, so just as you don't his permission to live there or to invite guests, he doesn't either. Unless they threaten you in some way (and you get a court order barring them from entering), there is no legal means to deprive an owner of their property rights, while they are still an owner. | Under an AST agreement the landlord is not permitted to evict you on a whim - if you refuse to leave, in order to 'take possession' the landlord must persuade a court to give him a court order. http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/applying_for_possession_assured_tenancies In the fixed term the landlord must first serve the tenant a 'section 8 notice' with a 'ground for possession' (there are 20). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/50/schedule/2 http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_assured_tenancies Were you to refuse or fight it a court would determine whether the landlord may take possession on the ground in the section 8 notice. That particular clause you are concerned about is common to the AST agreements I've seen. See for example the government's model agreement: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/695944/Model_Agreement_for_an_Assured_Shorthold_Tenancy_and_Accompanying_Guidance.docx The guidance isn't specific about "illegal, immoral, disorderly or anti-social purposes" but examples elsewhere include prostitution in the property (doing it yourself or allowing it to be done) or it being used to store stolen goods. http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_assured_tenancies/discretionary_grounds_assured_tenancies#7 I'm just curious to know if there are any laws protecting me as a tenant from the landlord abusing that i.e immoral is certainly subjective and realistically he could find anything he doesn't like immoral? It is unrealistic to assume the landlord can take possession based on saying anything he doesn't like is immoral. Do any laws exist to ensure there is a limit on what can be considered reasonable? Statute isn't specific about what's "reasonable". Ultimately what's reasonable is what the court says is reasonable. You can look at case law. http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_assured_tenancies/discretionary_grounds_assured_tenancies#1 If not, am I within my rights to ask the landlord to expand on that clause to ensure there is no doubt between the two parties? You are free to ask the landlord what that clause means and to define it specifically - the landlord is free to do so or walk away from the deal. Consider that landlords tend to want tenants who will pay on time, keep the property clean and warn them about maintenance problems - I doubt the majority have any interest in their tenants' private lives that the landlord comes to know about unless the landlord anticipates an economic impact. | An obvious example would be a contract that gives possession of something to someone else. It's normally legal to use some reasonable amount of force to protect or prevent trespasses against property you own, but if you give possession of that property to someone else you can lose that right. For example, you can use force remove a guest who refuses to leave real property you own, but can't use force to remove a tenant even if they broke the terms of your contract. In most jurisdictions you'd need to get a court order and have the police use force if necessary remove the tenant. | Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol. | Is it worth it to contact a lawyer? No. The amount at issue indicates that the matter would have to be litigated in Small Claims court, where typically parties are not allowed to be represented by a lawyer. Furthermore, litigating in Small Claims court will give you some exposure to judicial proceedings. Being able to advance your legal arguments in court is useful, and this seems to be a great occasion to gain experience of that sort. The rental company's uncooperative behavior is unreasonable and can forfeit its entitlement to at least a sizeable portion of its actual expense. In many jurisdictions, the legislation provides treble damages in claims of fraud. Although claims of fraud and breach of contract oftentimes overlap, your entitlement to treble damages is not something to rule out. At the outset, the company's initial promise to give you the final statement most likely supports a finding of reasonable reliance, one of the prima facie elements of fraud. It is unclear whether the rental company made the aforementioned promise in writing. For evidentiary purposes, make sure that all your subsequent interactions with the rental company are in writing. That will make it harder for the company to disavow its verbal representations. | Owners can't be evicted from their own property. That's one of the fundamental rights of real estate ownership. You may have a contractual basis for a lawsuit that either leads to payment or provides for forfeiture of their share, but that relies on the details of your specific case and will require specific legal advice from your own lawyer. | Yes, they still have to go through the normal eviction process and must still provide the minimum number of days required by their local jurisdiction in order to vacate the property. By moving in and establishing residency, the tenant and landlord form an implied lease - the tenant does not need anything in writing in order to establish their legal rights to tenancy. More information: No written lease--Am I in trouble? |
Is a contract null and void if one party acts outside of the terms? I am based in the United Kingdom. Acting as a business, I have negotiated a contract with a service supplier (waste management). The initial instruction was to have apparatus delivered by the supplier on 1st December and for the contract for payment to start at that point. They delivered the apparatus on 1st November, and also billed me from this point. I raised a dispute with them because of this, and while they did offer to credit my account, I decided that I didn't want to move ahead with the company in light of this, and their customer service. They are insisting that I am now tied into a contract with them, even though this dispute was caused because of their mistake, and the fact they had acted outside of the bounds of the agreement by delivering the apparatus before the agreed upon date. Is the contract null and void due to the counterparty acting outside of the terms? TLDR: A service supplier delivered apparatus and started their service before the agreed upon date. Am I within my rights to back out of the contract based on this? | No Or at least not necessarily. Contract terms are legally one of three types: Conditions, Warranties, or Intermediate. Breach of any term allows the aggrieved party to sue to recover damages - monetary compensation to restore them to the position they would have been in had the breach not occurred. Breach of a condition also (or instead) allows them to terminate a contract. Breach of a warranty does not. Intermediate terms are terms that might be a condition or might be a warranty depending on how egregious the breach was. A contract can explicitly make a term a condition, the historical and still used phrase being that X is “of the essence”. If the contract is not explicit (most aren’t), then that is the concept that the court uses to decide - is the term “of the essence”, that is, absolutely fundamental to the performance of the contract. Similarly a term can be explicitly a warranty, usually by saying party Y “warrants” something. Most incidental or procedural terms are warranties - if breached, they never give rise to a right to terminate. Most terms are intermediate, particularly most terms about time. Normally, intermediate terms are warranties but if a breach is egregious enough, then this can elevate the term to a condition. Payment terms are a classic: if you are a day or a week late in making payment, the other party can’t cancel the contract. If you are a year late, they can. Somewhere in between, your breach changes the term from a warranty to a condition. For your situation, the early delivery is clearly a breach of a warranty, not a condition. If it even is a breach - the contract may say that they are obliged to deliver by 1 December: delivery on 1 November is clearly in compliance with that term. If it is a breach, you do not have the right to terminate the contract and if you tried you would be breaching the contract yourself by repudiation. By the way, repudiating the contract is definitely breaching a condition. A huge number of contract disputes turn on who validly terminated and who repudiated the contract. If it is a breach, you can sue for damages which, since they have not charged you for November, would be what it cost you or what you lost by having their bin on your premises for a month. My guess that this would be in the order of zero. | Adults are bound to contracts with minors The technical term is that a contract with a minor is that it is voidable by the minor unless it is subject to the exemptions - a contract for necessities or a contract of benefit to the minor (e.g. a reasonable mobile phone contract). Until the minor chooses to void it, it is binding on everyone involved. They can do this anytime before they reach majority or within a reasonable time after that providing the contract is not complete. That means, for one and done transactions, the contract cannot effectively be voided because the contract is complete - think of a child buying an ice cream, riding a bus or going to the movies. If it is voided, the minor is obliged to return whatever consideration they received and that is still in their possession. So, for the mobile phone contract, if it included a handset, they must return that providing they still have it. | Can a landlord (UK, English law) make a claim from a potential tenant who wants to back out of signing a Tenancy Agreement? No. Your description reflects that in this particular scenario there is no tenancy contract. The only actual contract relates to the holding deposit, and your description suggests that both parties fully complied with their obligations pursuant to that contract. Accordingly, neither party has a viable claim against the other. Regardless of whether verbal agreements are cognizable under UK tenancy law, the meeting of the minds you portray is that this tenancy ought to be formalized only by signing a contract. That supersedes customer's prior verbal expressions of intent about moving in. The landlord incurred expenses that either were covered by the customer's holding deposit or were unreasonable. An example of the latter is the fees "landlord has paid for the dates on the contract to be changed (repeatedly)", a task that any person can perform with a text editor at a negligible cost. Likewise, "turn[ing] down other potential tenants" is covered by the holding deposit the customer paid. As for taking "a detailed inventory", that is a task the landlord would perform with any potential tenant and which would render the same outcome regardless of who the tenant would be. The holding deposit must be associated to a deadline or holding period. Beyond that deadline, it is up to the landlord to grant customer's requests for postponement. But the landlord is not entitled to compensation for a risk he deliberately took without even requiring a [renewed] holding deposit. what's the situation if the tenant still claims they want to move in, but the landlord wants to withdraw because they no longer trusts the tenant's promises? That depends on the deadline associated to the holding deposit. Once the holding period has elapsed, the landlord is entitled to do with his property whatever he wants. The customer would have a claim only if (1) landlord withdraws prior to the deadline and (2) customer provably intended to move in. | Yes. The formation of a contract requires (among other things) that the parties intend to be legally bound. Their sending the offer from a corporate email address shows this. You replying in the same way shows your intention. Signatures are optional. Consider, verbal contracts are binding; how do you sign those? | Is there any sort of implied expiration date for a contractor's completion for medium size contractor jobs (< $10k)? Absent a provable deadline, the question would be whether the delay is reasonable (or habitual) under the circumstances. The contractor's presumption that he can do whatever he wants regarding unspecified aspects of a contract is inaccurate. Those matters can still be decided on the basis of contract law and/or under principles of equity. See also the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which is frequently cited by U.S. courts, at §235(2) and §243 regarding non-performance of a contract. Will my verbal complete-by date hold up in lieu of any written complete-by date? It depends on each party's credibility. Proving that he essentially ignored your follow-up requests will make it harder for him to credibly refute your assertion about the verbal deadline. In case none of your follow-up efforts (or none of his responses) are in writing or if he denies that you repeatedly called him, you might want to subpoena his phone service provider --if the matter goes to court-- and file as evidence the resulting production of records. | does the individual have a legal case against the company? Unfortunately, no. Some details and terms you use are unclear (e.g., "phantom" equity, "manifest" core technology, and so forth), but your overall description reflects that the individual sabotaged himself by signing a contract that does not mention the promise of equity through which he was persuaded to engage. A written contract usually supersedes any prior agreement --regarding the subject matter of that contract-- between the parties. That superseding effect means that the contract formalizes or overrides, accordingly, said agreements or promises. Since the initial promises of equity are not reflected in the "interim" contract, the investor's subsequent silence upon individual's reproach/reminders is from a legal standpoint irrelevant. At that point only the terms of the contract matter. The individual might consider alleging mistake in the sense of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 151-154 such that would make the contract voidable and perhaps "make room" for other theories of law. However, that seems futile unless the interim contract contains language that (1) provides specific conditions for its expiration, or (2) reflects the company's [mis-]representations that induced the individual to sign it. Neither seems to have occurred in the situation you describe. There is always a possibility that the contract might favor the individual's position and he just has not noticed it. But the only way to ascertain that is by reading the contract itself. | Notwithstanding in this case takes its ordinary meaning - "despite": Despite anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, any provision of this Agreement which provides for me to assign any of my rights to a Work shall not apply to any invention developed on my own time without using equipment, supplies, facilities or trade secrets… Without having the text of the rest of the relevant parts of the contract, my initial interpretation is that the effect of this, is that you would not need to assign your rights to Works produced in your own time without connection to your paid employment. Also, if this was subordinate to the other clauses you mentioned, then it would have little or no effect. Finally, the general legal principle is that works produced in your own time with no connection to your employment (resources, knowledge or otherwise) are not assigned, unless specifically stated. That is, the contract would generally explicitly state that works produced in your own time with no reliance on your employment are assigned to the Employer. However, such a term is almost certainly unreasonable and could be challenged in court if the employer ever attempted to enforce it. | With the additional information in the comment, the approach most likely to give you a good outcome would be to present this as a dispute between the retailler and the manufacturer. Make a note of who said what and when, and try to obtain written confirmation from the retailler. It sounds like the retailler is currently on your side, which makes your position stronger as your legal contract is with them and they will have obligations under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (I'm assuming you bought the item as a private individual and not as a business). Note that you may not have a right to replacement. Consumer protection legislation and warranty terms include several ways the supplier can provide redress (usually repair / refund / replace). Since the preference is replacement, you will not be able to argue an inherent design fault with the product. This may give the manufacturer the opportunity to assert that the retailler, or you, specified an incorrect fitting kit - or that it was incorrectly installed. If the fittings were supplied with the foil, you could argue that it was an issue with these that led to total loss of the rest of the foil. It looks like you currently have grounds to claim this against the retailler. If there's no satisfactory resolution, consulting the Citizens Advice bureau would be a good place to start. |
Is Kyle Rittenhouse "out of the woods" or could he face Federal charges? Kyle Rittenhouse has been found not guilty of Wisconsin state criminal charges. Is there any federal law that he violated? | Double jeopardy does not bar him from facing federal charges, although U.S. Justice Department policy reserves such prosecutions for exceptional cases. Also, it depends to some extent upon whether there is a suitable federal crime that fits the conduct. | It's not an interrogation Nothing makes Mr. Hansen a police investigator. He is a private person talking with another private person. His testimony or the recording of the interview might or might not be admissible in trial, that's for the court to decide. But Miranda warnings are only needed when you are under arrest or when you are in a custodial interrogation. Hansen, agent of the police? There's arguments that Hansen might or might not have acted as an agent of the police, and in one case he was deputized. However, that does not change that for Miranda you need an arrest or custodial interrogation (e.g. where one is not free to leave). As far as I am aware, none of the people interviewed was in such a situation and technically free to go at any time - making Miranda not required. | The President wouldn't be in breach of Insider Trading Laws (Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act) since he has no information resulting from a position of trust within Twitter (or as a trusted provider of services) and no ability to depress their stocks through intentionally fraudulent practices. [O]ne who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information “that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.” The key word here is "insider". The President is not an insider, he's merely the user of a service. He certainly has material information, but not gleaned from a position of confidence or trust. anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed. That being said, it's arguable (and I'm reasonably sure his political opponents would argue it until the cows come home) that his shorting their shares would be a material violation of the STOCK Act, specifically section 6 which requires the President to have disclosed his holdings of shorted stock to the public. It's also pretty arguable that his popularity on Twitter is a direct result of his office as President, and hence making money by publicly and messily leaving their service will result in a breach of accepted ethical standards and potential impeachment even if no specific law has been broken. | The mere presence of a weapon is probably not, on its own, justification to shoot the possessor. Ultimately, the actions will be judged under the totality of the circumstances related to the shooting. I want to be as neutral as possible here in sharing the information that has thus far come to light but nowhere has "the presence of a melee weapon" been used as justification for the police shooting. This shooting may be found, after an investigation, to be unjustified or it may be found to be justified. Here is some of the information available. The report issued by Wisconsin Attorney General Joshua Kaul has additional information: Kenosha Police Department officers were dispatched to a residence in the 2800 block of 40th Street after a female caller reported that her boyfriend was present and was not supposed to be on the premises. Although the statement from the Attorney General doesn't mention a restraining order filed against Mr. Blake, the criminal complaint filed by an Assistant District Attorney on July 7, 2020 seems to indicate that Mr. Blake had waived the necessity of a restraining order and agreed to stay away from the property. An arrest warrant had been issued based on the criminal complaint. Police officers are trained to be extra cautious when approaching individuals subject to felony arrests. The Attorney General stated: During the incident, officers attempted to arrest Jacob S. Blake, age 29. Law enforcement deployed a taser to attempt to stop Mr. Blake, however the taser was not successful in stopping Mr. Blake. Mr. Blake walked around his vehicle, opened the driver’s side door, and leaned forward. There are reported witness statements from Raysean White that the police repeatedly told Mr. Blake to "drop the knife." No witnesses, that we currently know of, have come forward to say if Mr. Blake was holding the knife that was reportedly found on the floorboard. Also from the Attorney General report: During the investigation following the initial incident, Mr. Blake admitted that he had a knife in his possession. DCI agents recovered a knife from the driver’s side floorboard of Mr. Blake’s vehicle. A search of the vehicle located no additional weapons. Under Wisconsin law, it is a felony to resist arrest while armed with a dangerous weapon or threatening to use a dangerous weapon whether or not the arrestee has a dangerous weapon. All of the above information, along with any other information gathered from the investigation being conducted by the Wisconsin Division of Criminal Investigation will be used to determine if the use of deadly force was reasonable. It would be unreasonable to draw a conclusion either way regarding the use of deadly force with the limited information available to us. It is not unusual, though, to see the use of deadly force, or the threatened use of deadly force, when an arrestee physically resists arrest. Your ultimate question as to whether or not seven shots were justified is much more difficult to answer. If we assume that the use of deadly force was justified, a fact currently undetermined, it is much more difficult to say that too many shots were fired. A properly trained police officer will be taught to shoot until the threat justifying the use of force is neutralized. The Attorney General's report states: While holding onto Mr. Blake’s shirt, Officer Rusten Sheskey fired his service weapon 7 times. and further states: No other officer fired their weapon. Kenosha Police Department does not have body cameras, therefore the officers were not wearing body cameras. It is possible that only Officer Sheskey knows if seven shots were justified. It's possible that Officer Sheskey was affected by adrenaline and shot more times than necessary and it's also possible that Officer Sheskey shot until he no longer perceived Mr. Blake to be a threat. It is not possible, today, to answer your question about the reasonableness of seven shots and it's possible that it will never be answerable. | Giving someone drugs without their knowledge or consent, say in food or drink, is a criminal act. At the least it is a form of assault, and possibly a more serious crime could be supported by the facts. Note that people's reactions to drugs vary, and serious harm or even death can result from drugs that do not have serious effects on most people. Very serious criminal charges might then result. The facts should be reported to the police. If this is a case where the people receiving the drugs know about them, and want them, that is a very different matter, although it may still be illegal depending on the nature of the drugs. Note that under US law, an uninvolved witness is not normally required to report a crime, although reporting is strongly encouraged. This rule is different in different countries. That is, in some countries an ordinary citizen may be legally required to report a crime. In at least one state any person is required to report a crime if a victim is in danger of bodily harm (Wisconsin statute 940.34) There may be similar provisions in the laws of other states. People with some sort of duty of care, or who are made "mandated reporters" by statute, such as teachers and health professionals, may be legally required to file reports when they know or have reason to believe that a crime is underway or has taken place. Such statutes vary from state to state, and will be different in non-US countries. | A prosecutor's discretion is almost unassailable. The main reason for this is to prevent prosecutors from having to defend in a legal forum every single decision made. In a civil matter, prosecutors have absolute immunity form being personally sued for their actions (again, to prevent a prosecutor from being sued from every single defendant). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosecutorial_immunity Misconduct by prosecutors may be resolved by reversal or retrials of court proceedings. But this is not something that really has criminal penalties. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosecutorial_misconduct#:~:text=In%20jurisprudence%2C%20prosecutorial%20misconduct%20is,is%20similar%20to%20selective%20prosecution. Occasionally, a prosecutor may be subject to discipline from the state's Bar. This is rare, and is not much of a deterrent. https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/harmful-error/misconduct-and-punishment/ Theoretically, a prosecutor who out and out breaks the law can be prosecuted. Examples seem to be rare, and are more about government malfeasance (expense reports, misuse of government equipment, etc.). Due to the above standards, proving criminal conduct around prosecutorial discretion will be extremely difficult, as will finding a fellow prosecutor willing to even go down that road. It is in no prosecutor's interest to set the precedent of prosecutors being jailed for their behavior. So, why has nothing happened? Because in general, prosecutors can get away with almost anything. And I will add, Because America seems to like it this way. | The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions "based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'", which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute. | This would be a violation of 18 USC 1361, which prohibits destruction of federal property. See also the DoJ legal notes on this crime. The act does have to be willful, so dropping a cup accidentally is not a crime. If for example the act is mustaching Obama's portrait, the damage would probably rise to the quarter-million dollar fine and 10 years in prison level. It would of course be at the discretion of the (new) DoJ whether to press charges. |
Is the new Texas law on social media invalid on first amendment grounds? I have just seen this video on Youtube: "Republican Texas governor Greg Abbott has signed a law that forbids social media companies from banning people from their platforms based on their location and/or their politics. " I presume this is intended to prevent things like Twitter banning Trump from posting. Is this law unconstitutional, on the grounds that it violates freedom of the press? As I understand it, the First Amendment means the government can't tell any publisher what political opinions they must publish, or must not publish. If that is correct, does 'the press' include social media? | most likely The government can't compel people to some sort of speech under the 1st amendment. Forcing a company to host people is compelled speech by the company. It is well established that the government can't compel a newspaper to host its messages as it wants. The key case might be Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 418 US 241 (1974). In this case, it was deemed unconstitutional that a newspaper would need to host speech of a political candidate the newspaper didn't like in the same amount it had used to disparage that candidate. While the Miami Herald brought the newspaper into the line by the action of the newspaper, Wooley v. Maynard 430 U.S. 705 (1977) held that the state could not force any citizen to host its motto. Or for the matter, any message. The State may not constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. Pp. 71717. Forcing a public web page to host advertisement or speech from any government - or under the threat of the government action - is compelled speech and violates the rulings of Miami Herald, Wooley and other cases. However, there is a little light for the government under PruneYard, Turner Broadcasting and Rumsfeld. However, all of them don't cut here: Turner Broadcasting was about a service provider for radio that did not host its own speech. PruneYard is a shopping center that doesn't host its own speech and is only useful in California as there is a California constitution issue. And Rumsfeld dealt with military recruitment, which always is special. A similar Florida law was deemed to be very likely unconstitutional by the (federal) Northern District of Florida (Injunction Text) Addendum A joint lawsuit by NetChoice & CCIA was filed against Texas on 22nd September 2021 (Complaint), asking for a preliminary injunction. NetChoice puts its filings on their website. Further reading: Ken White - Make No Law podcast #11: Deplatformed Ken White - Section 230 Is The Subject of The Most Effective Legal Propaganda I've Ever Seen 01st December 2021 Update Indeed, the relevant parts of HB20 were put out of enforcement via injunction on December 1st, 2021, reasoning that: Social media platforms have a First Amendment right to moderate content disseminated on their platforms. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1932 (2019) (recognizing that “certain private entities[] have rights to exercise editorial control over speech and speakers on their properties or platforms”). Three Supreme Court cases provide guidance. First in Tornillo, the Court struck down a Florida statute that required newspapers to print a candidate’s reply if a 13 newspaper assailed her character or official record, a “right of reply” statute. 418 U.S. at 243. [...] In Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., the Supreme Court held that a private parade association had the right to exclude a gay rights group from having their own float in their planned parade without being compelled by a state statute to do otherwise. 515 U.S. 557, 572– 73 (1995). [...] Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that California could not require a private utility company to include a third party’s newsletters when it sent bills to customers in Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986). HB 20 compels social media platforms to significantly alter and distort their products. Moreover, “the targets of the statutes at issue are the editorial judgments themselves” and the “announced purpose of balancing the discussion—reining in the ideology of the large social-media providers—is precisely the kind of state action held unconstitutional in Tornillo, Hurley, and PG&E.” Id. HB 20 also impermissibly burdens social media platforms’ own speech. Id. at *9 (“[T]he statutes compel the platforms to change their own speech in other respects, including, for example, by dictating how the platforms may arrange speech on their sites.”). For example, if a platform appends its own speech to label a post as misinformation, the platform may be discriminating against that user’s viewpoint by adding its own disclaimer. HB 20 restricts social media platforms’ First Amendment right to engage in expression when they disagree with or object to content. For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the State’ s motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 23), is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, (Dkt. 12), is GRANTED. Until the Court enters judgment in this case, the Texas Attorney General is ENJOINED from enforcing Section 2 and Section 7 of HB 20 against Plaintiffs and their members. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), Plaintiffs are required to post a $1,000.00 bond. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, (Dkt. 43), is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT. | As many parties as have standing. The First Amendment protects the right to petition for redress of grievances, so any limitation on that right would be highly disfavored. When there's a rush of cases like this, though, there are a few option for dealing with them. For instance, a plaintiff may seek class certification, permitting him to stand in for similarly situated parties so they don't need to litigate themselves, or a court may consolidate the cases if they are sufficiently similar. | Your school can compel you to pray, if it is a private school. I assume you are asking about a government school. As a limited public forum, the school can limit content (can forbid discussion of a topic), but cannot limit viewpoint (cannot allow only pro-abortion speech while prohibiting anti-abortion speech). If they allow the Godly pledge, they must allow the Satanic pledge (as well as allowing silence). See Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98. "The power to so restrict speech, however, is not without limits. The restriction must not discriminate against speech based on viewpoint, and must be reasonable in light of the forum's purpose". While it is true that schools are allowed to limit disruptive behavior, declaring "disruption!" does not automatically suspend the First Amendment. A reasonable person would not find find replacing a few word to be a disruption. If you scream "Satan!", that is disruptive, if you just say "Satan" instead of "God", that is not a disruption. | There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order. | You say: the school expects him to create a public Twitter account, with his real information, in order to promote the program & the results of the program. This is a cut-and-dried case of compelled speech. Your son is being required to say certain things in public in order to pass this course. The Supreme Court has decided that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate". This is subject to the legitimate interests of the school, but it is hard to see how compelled speech on Twitter can be defended as a legitimate interest. You also say this is to "promote the program and the results of the program". It sounds like the students are being required to say certain things about the course. If your son were to create the account and then post only material critical of the school, such as complaints about compelled speech, would that result in a passing grade? It sounds like it might be an issue. Compelled speech at school was considered by the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), which is the case about students being required to salute the flag. They found that requiring students to salute the flag was unconstitutional. Public education, according to the Court, should “not strangle the free mind at its source [or] teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” Instead, education should enable students to make informed choices about what to believe. From the judgement itself: the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. That is very much the case here. Your son's refusal to make the required public speech is not causing any difficulty for the school authorities. In conclusion, your son has made a decision not to create a Twitter account under his own name and say certain things within that account. This is entirely his constitutional right. You might consider contacting the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who have a history of engaging in cases like this. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) might also be interested. Edit: Zack Lipton in comments below makes the point that much student work can be considered a kind of compelled speech (e.g. "Write an essay on Hamlet" or "Submit an entry to this poetry competition") and asks how this is different. Its a good question, and I have to say it does suggest that there is a difference of degree rather than kind. However I would argue that posting to an international forum widely used by adults is a different matter to a school assembly, or even a national essay competition. It would also depend a great deal on what has to be posted to get a passing grade. | Such a lawsuit is known as a strategic lawsuit against public participation, or SLAPP. In the United States, several states have enacted laws that penalize those whose file SLAPPs. The provisions of these laws vary from state to state, but they usually allow a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the grounds that their statements were constitutionally protected free speech about a public figure. These laws may allow discovery to be halted until the motion to dismiss is decided; they may also require a plaintiff who files a SLAPP to reimburse the defendant's attorney's fees, possibly also with punitive damages. Some state's laws require the speech to be before a government forum (as opposed to, say, on Twitter), or to be aimed at procuring government action. And several states have no such laws at all. A summary of various US states' anti-SLAPP laws can be found on the website of the Public Participation Project, an organization advocating the establishment of such laws. Note that these motions to dismiss are not always brought by "the little guy" against "the big guy". A notable recent case was Stormy Daniels's libel suit against Donald Trump, which was dismissed earlier this year. Daniels had filed suit against Trump claiming that one of Trump's tweets about her was defamatory. Trump moved to dismiss under Texas's anti-SLAPP law, on the grounds that his tweet was protected political speech about a public figure (namely Daniels); and the judge agreed. | I'm just going to talk about the US. The First Amendment to the US Constitution codifies that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;... What is clearly prohibited by this Amendment would be Congress (or any inferior legislature via the 14th Amendment) restricting the ability of religions which refuse to marry same-sex couples from marrying opposite-sex couples, or in general outlawing any kind of religious law about who a particular church is willing to marry (e.g. only marrying if both parties are of the religion). However, legislatures are generally allowed to influence action via government inducements (I'll just use inducements to describe subsidies, tax breaks, etc). The current precedent for determining whether a particular legislative action violates the Establishment Clause is the "Lemon Test," from Lemon v. Kurtzman, which has the following test: Government action violates the Establishment Clause unless it: Has a significant secular (i.e., non-religious) purpose, Does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and Does not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. On the first point, I think the law fails - inducing religious establishments to perform same-sex marriage does not have a "significant secular purpose" because ultimately the government doesn't care whether or not you have a marriage ceremony, just that you sign a marriage certificate with an appropriate witness, which can be a government official. The law could survive on the second point if it could be shown to have at least the preponderance of being for social good, if it is argued that the law's purpose is to make church marriage ceremonies more accessible for same-sex couples by inducing more churches to perform them, and not to harm churches that don't perform them. However, this would probably be an uphill battle, since the law has the practical effect of promoting some religions' beliefs over others. The law probably fails on the third point as well, going back to the previous point that it effectively results in the government choosing one religious practice to promote over another. However, the Lemon Test often criticized or entirely disregarded by the current Supreme Court, for example in the case American Legion v American Humanist Association (a case decided by the current Supreme Court): This pattern is a testament to the Lemon test's shortcomings. As Establishment Clause cases involving a great array of laws and practices came to the Court, it became more and more apparent that the Lemon test could not resolve them. It could not "explain the Establishment Clause's tolerance, for example, of the prayers that open legislative meetings, . . . certain references to, and invocations of, the Deity in the public words of public officials; the public references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings; or the attention paid to the religious objectives of certain holidays, including Thanksgiving. Even without the Lemon Test, we can look at Walz v. Tax Commission of New York for an idea of when tax breaks for religious establishments is allowed (emphasis mine): The legislative purpose of the property tax exemption is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion... New York, in common with the other States, has determined that certain entities that exist in a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its "moral or mental improvement," should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes. It has not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such;... The State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest. This paragraph seems to provide some argument both ways. First, the bolded section would seem to prohibit using government inducements to promote one religious practice over another, and that the government can only assist religious institutions when the assistance is applied equally. On the other hand, states are allowed to grant tax relief to religious organizations "that foster..."moral or mental improvement,"..." A legislature could argue that the law promotes "moral improvement" by encouraging acceptance of same-sex marriage, rather than a particular religious belief. However, I don't think that such an argument would prevail over the general prohibition on promoting any religious exercise over another. Government assistance for religious organizations is very thinly held to be permissible only when it is equal. In my opinion, the Supreme Court already has to use twisted gymnastics to argue in favor of any government assistance of religious organizations granted because of their religious status, so they are unlikely to allow something this far (especially since it is usually the conservative justices arguing in favor of these policies, and they are less likely to do same-sex marriage any favors). On the other hand, a permissible policy may be to have government grants for any organization that performs same-sex marriage ceremonies, whether or not that organization is religious. Whether or not that is allowed is likely going to depend on what proportion of the receiving organizations are religious in nature, but there may be enough hotels and other non-religious venues that would qualify that such a law might survive. | There is no parallelism between the Texas decision and the proposed lawsuit. In the anti-mifepristone lawsuit, there exists a statute granting the FDA authority to regulate and review new drugs, and a petition procedure whereby citizens can state ground for the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to consider a regulatory action. There is no statutory basis on which a ban of meat-eating could be created by executive action. Congress cannot be sued for not passing a law (failure or refusal of Congress to pass a particular law is not justiciable). If, for example someone were to submit a petition to the FDA urging such a regulation, the petition would have to be denied because the FDA does not have statutory authority to issue such a regulation. As argued here, the anti-mifepristone plaintiffs lack standing in that case, so one can expect that to be a substantial issue in the subsequent appeal. |
How can I add a small claims judgment to someone's credit report? I won a judgement in small claims court against a tenant two years ago. The person has not paid. I'd like to know how to put the judgement on their credit report. | The easiest way would be to hire a collection agency to collect the debt (for a fee of course), because collection agencies routinely include debts that they are collecting in credit reports. Credit reporting agencies differ in what other kinds of debts they will report. Recording a judgment lien in real property records will trigger a credit report entry with some agencies, but not others. Some agencies report all judgments entered in courts, but others don't. You could also contact a credit reporting agency and ask it if it will simply report your judgment without further action if you send them a copy. | If I understand your question correctly, you have some clients who have paid you for services that you have not yet provided and, indeed, they have not yet requested. Is this correct? The accounting term for this is a "prepayment". The correct accounting treatment is to increase an asset account (your bank account) and create a liability account (Prepayments or something similar). You need to talk to your accountant about how to treat these for consumption and income taxes. Legally, these people are now creditors of your business - just like all of your suppliers and employees. There is no legal requirement to escrow or otherwise treat this as trust money. Basically, if your business goes bust they will lose their money. This is something that you should have dealt with in your contract with your customers - if you are running an online business then you should get a lawyer to revise your terms of service to cover things like how they can ask for a refund (and how long you have to get it to them) and how long (or if) they forfeit the funds. As it stands the money effectively becomes yours after whatever time under a statute of limitation applies to transactions of this type and size (under whatever law applies to the contract) since after that time they cannot sue to get it back. | Are you at fault for the fact that Car C read ended you? Close call. A jury could go either way. Can this accident which is now appearing on your insurance be disputed as Car A did not report anything? Essentially I'm just wondering what the odds are that this can removed from Car A's record. I think that it is unlikely that the situation you suggest would happen, even though anything is possible. Usually there needs to be a claim of actual damage for an insurance company to treat it as an accident. The usual rule is "no harm, no foul" (unless someone is cited for a traffic violation). Insurance company accident records are not regulated to the same extent as say, credit reports. You could threaten to sue the company for negligent misrepresentation, or the driver of Car C for defamation, in order to try to get this statement removed, but those would be hard cases to win since you are at least arguably at fault and fault is to some extent a matter of opinion. It would be much easier to win a suit like that if the accident didn't happen at all. Here, it would be undisputed that an accident happened at a particular time and place involving certain cars and drivers, and the dispute is only over who was at fault. | Yes In general, default judgements can be set aside for good cause. If the defendant can show that they had a legitimate reason for being unable to respond to the cause of action, then the judgement can be set aside and a new hearing scheduled. However, “good cause” encompasses things both unforeseen and unforeseeable and includes having good cause why the court and/or plaintiff/prosecutor could not have been advised of the incapacity before default judgement was entered. In most jurisdictions, they also need to show that they have a prima facie defence such that a different result is possible. The “superior sovereign” is not really germane: good cause can include a sudden illness or injury, police detention (be they superior, inferior, same-level or foreign sovereign), natural disaster etc. | I don't have enough to comment but I know where I live it's the landlords responsibility to take care of mold. That being said, if it is mold caused by negligence of the tenant e.g. always leaving the window open in the rain or something, then the landlord can claim compensation. Where I live the landlord keeps some of the damage deposit he must prove to the tenant why he did so within a months time of when he was supposed to return the damage deposit. For example if it cost him $200 to repair damage done by the mold, he must return the rest of the damage deposit and a letter explaining why $200 was kept, and the receipts. Where do you live? The laws really do very greatly from region to region. It has been my observation that it's not that uncommon for landlords to try and sneak something into the lease that isn't really allowed by law. | If you sue a person for a tort X, one of the things you have to prove is that the defendant did do X. A baseless belief that it must have been so-and-so will do you no good. You do not have to have iron-clad evidence of your allegations, for a civil suit, but you have to show with a preponderance of evidence that the claim is true. A combination of "hates me" and "provably did this a number of times in the past" could well suffice. As for damages, it depends on what harm you actually suffered. If you get fired and you show that it was because of a false allegation, you would probably have to take this to the big court, since small claims court handles amounts in the $5,000 range (jurisdiction-specific). | No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement"). | B and C have a contract with A In return for paying 3 months rent, B and C will remove A from the lease. This has all the required elements to be a contract. B and C have fulfilled their obligations and A hasn’t. B & C could sue A for damages. They would need to prove that there was such an agreement and that they agreement was a legally binding contract. Is this agreement written down? Was it witnessed by impartial third parties? What evidence of this agreement do you actually have? If A says they agreed to X, yet B & C say they agreed to Y: what evidence exists to show who is right and who is wrong? Failing to fulfill the obligations of a contract is not fraud. For there to be fraud, B & C would have to prove that A never intended to comply by the terms of the agreement. Given that the terms of the agreement are somewhat ambiguous, this would be very difficult. This seems to be more of a case where [Hanlon's Razor]: "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity." That is, A's actions are more likely to be the result of a misunderstanding (by A, or B & C, or both) than a deliberate plan of deception. The landlord is not involved - they removed A from the lease at the request of A, B & C; they’ve done what they’re required to do. |
In the USA, may parents prevent their children from receiving gifts or acquiring owned property? This a follow-up question to In the USA, do parents have the right to control their children's possessions?, The answer to the other question appears to establish that (in general, or at least in some states or by common law) minor children can legally own property, though interestingly, this may not include money or items the children earn through their own labor or efforts—it is primarily gifts that they can own, and those generally would only be special gifts, not normal household maintenance items given to them such as clothes or shoes. Parents also have some level of control over their children spending their own money (not the topic of discussion here). My question is: given that once minor children receive a special gift it is theirs and the parents cannot take it, can parents legally prevent their minor children from receiving gifts in the first place? Let's say Grandma wants to give $10,000 to Junior. Could the parents say “No, Mom. Either give the money to us and we will administer it, or Junior can’t accept the gift at all.”? This is not taking what Junior owns, it's preventing him from owning it in the first place. If such prevention can be legally done beforehand, then consider further if the gift has already been accomplished. Perhaps Grandma has already placed one hundred crisp 100-dollar bills into Junior's hands (or, say she deposits money into his custodial bank account before the parents learn of it). He runs to Mom and displays the cash/balance slip saying, "look what Grandma gave me!" Has the gift been irrevocably given at that point, or can the parents require it to be returned or set conditions on the gift at that point, given this is happening the moment they learn of the gift and immediately after the giving? If they cannot prevent the ownership against the child's wishes at this point, what if the parents convince the child to give the money back or give the money to them (perhaps operating under a mistaken belief about what is legal, knowingly or unknowingly communicating falsehoods about the situation to their child)? Could the child or the gift-giver later claim that the parents stole the money because the child didn't understand his rights at the time? It seems like if the law considers a child competent to receive and own gifted property, the child is competent to also give away such property, and if a child could legally refuse Grandma's gift in the first place (even if foolishly) then he can also give away Grandma's gift after its receipt (even if foolishly). Focusing more closely on the quoted cases in the original question, one part may be relevant: in HOBLYN vs. JOHNSON, 2002 as recorded at law.justia.co (emphasis mine): "As a general rule any property acquired by the child in any way except by its own labor or services belongs to the child, and not to the parent." [46 C. C. 1314]. . . . It furthermore goes without saying that a parent cannot deprive a child of its property except pursuant to law (31 C. J. 1011), and the fact that in this instance the father had the property in question assessed as his property could not affect the title of the children. In Banks v. Conant, 14 Allen (Mass.) 497, it was said: "In consideration of the duty which the law imposes on a father to furnish adequate support to his child during infancy, the services of the child during that period are due to the father, and, if they are rendered to a third person, the right of the father to recover the value thereof is clear and indisputable. But this is the extent of the father's right. He has no title to the property of the child, nor is the capacity or right of the latter to take property or receive money by grant, gift or otherwise, except as a compensation for services, in any degree qualified or limited during minority. Whatever therefore an infant acquires which does not come to him as a compensation for services rendered, belongs absolutely to him, and his father cannot interpose any claim to it, either as against the child, or as against third persons who claim title or possession from or under the infant." Rephrasing this more directly, "the right of the child to receive property by gift is not limited or qualified in any degree during minority." This would seem to suggest that parents may not interfere with gift giving to their children, however it is not clear. Does "the right to take property or receive money is not limited" assert that children must be allowed to receive any gift at all? Or is this only recognizing that, once given (a process that the parents might legally prevent, but did not), the parents cannot then take the gift after its receipt? Imagine the parents believe all dancing is wrong, and a friend of the child gives him a book on how to breakdance. May the parents legally demand the return of the book to the friend? | Probably A valid gift requires: Intention of donor to give the gift to the donee (donative intent) Delivery of gift to donee. Acceptance of gift by donee. As the legal guardian, parent could refuse acceptance on behalf of the child. Again, in the same capacity, they could limit or restrict use of the gift providing while the child remained a child. | If two parties have a contract, where one party is required to do X in exchange for the other party doing Y, then the terms specified in that contract would determine what happens. You would have to see exactly what it says, especially if the other party has the option to not give you money. A contract might say "A shall at his option give B $5,000 by date X; if A elects not to make payment, notice must be given 60 days before X". Failing to give timely notice is thus breech of contract. However if the clause only says "A shall at his option give B $5,000 by date X", then there is no requirement for advance notice. And this assumes that there is a contract whereby both parties have some obligation to the other. A gift, on the other hand, carries no obligations on the giving party. There may be some social code to the effect that they should have told you by now, but failing to give advance notice is at most rude and certainly not legally actionable. | Two people exchanging goods or services on a commercial basis and then pretending it was two gifts is tax evasion. It's not a gift. It's a commercial sale that you lie about by 'putting' a different 'label' on it. Sometimes two people will give mutual gifts, e.g. if you come to my wedding: I give you dinner, you give me some kitchenware. Yet there's nothing commercial about it. So that's not income for either party. However, if you're talking about two businesses making sales to each other, that is very much income, regardless of what you badge it. | I believe non-probate assets are specific gifts you call out -- in the Will -- that are designated for specific beneficiaries. Little Jimmy gets the old pair of lucky Yankees socks, Little Suzie gets the old, decrepit, half-eaten turkey sandwich that Babe Ruth once took a bite out of, etc. This is incorrect. Every transfer arising from a will is a probate asset, because probate is the formal legal process of determining if there was a will, and if so, which will applies, and then distributing the assets of the person who died in accordance with that will (or with the determination that there was no will). I'm guessing things like: 401ks/Roth IRAs Life Insurance policies Savings accounts Stock market investments Houses, land & real property ...could all be probate assets if one does't specifically gift them to a Beneficiary? A 401k/Roth IRA with a beneficiary designation (other than the owner's estate), a life insurance policy with a beneficiary designation (other than the owner's estate), a savings account or stock account or investment with a joint owner or a pay on death beneficiary (other than the owner's estate), or real property with a transfer on death beneficiary or a joint ownership with right of survivorship is a non-probate asset. Any of those assets if there is no beneficiary designation, if there is no pay on death beneficiary, if there is no joint owner with right of survivorship, if it is not owner through a trust, and if there is a beneficiary designation that names the owner's estate, is a probate asset. The General Rule Anything subject to allocation and distribution in a will, or by intestate succession is a probate asset. Specifically devised property in a will is a probate asset. A non-probate assets is something transferred pursuant to a beneficiary designation, pay on death provision, joint ownership with right of survivorship, tenancy by entireties, or provision in a trust existing prior to the death of the decedent. These assets are not dealt with through the probate court process. However, if a will purports to specifically devise property that has a beneficiary designation or pay on death beneficiary or is owned by a trust or is in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, then the non-probate transfer prevails over the inconsistent language in the will. See also: Examples of Non-Probate Transfers Used in Estate Planning The following are examples of non-probate transfers commonly used in estate planning: Passing property to beneficiaries through a living trust. Leaving funds to a beneficiary named on a pay on death account or transfer on death account. Leaving funds to a beneficiary named on a life insurance policy. Leaving funds to a beneficiary named on an IRA, 401k or other retirement account. See financial planning. Holding title to property as joint tenants or tenancy by the entirety. Leaving motor vehicles to a transfer on death beneficiary. Gifting assets to heirs during your lifetime so the assets do not pass as part of your estate. Executing and recording a transfer on death deed naming a beneficiary to inherit your real estate. (Source) The American Bar Association devotes a full chapter length treatment to discussing the difference. It begins: Upon death, a decedent’s estate includes both probate and nonprobate assets. Probate assets are those that pass to persons identified in a will (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of wills), whereas nonprobate assets pass outside an estate’s administration. Examples of traditional nonprobate assets include qualified and nonqualified retirement plans, individual retirement accounts, and life insurance policies. However, nonprobate assets can also include certain checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit, investments, and even real property, but only if a beneficiary is designated and state law allows for such an asset to pass outside of an estate’s administration. Nonprobate assets are frequently referred to as “will substitutes.” | It depends on the jurisdiction (naturally). The answer for Washington is "No, not exactly". RCW 9a.83.030 states that "The attorney general or county prosecuting attorney may file a civil action for the forfeiture of proceeds". The police can seize real property, but must file a lis pendens regarding the property. The bar that has to be cleared for forfeiture is "probable cause". The Institute for Justice has an extensive analysis of civil forfeiture, especially with a state by state summary (they aren't positionally neutral on forfeiture, but they are legally respectable). Then after a inevitable judgment (90 days if the judgment is sooner), the property is transferred. Notice is to be "served within fifteen days after the seizure on the owner of the property seized and the person in charge thereof and any person who has a known right or interest therein, including a community property interest", so they would notify Bob (assuming they know Bob is the real owner). Or, if Bob learns of the seizure that "If a person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession of property within forty-five days of the seizure in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, the person or persons shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to the claim or right". It is possible that Bob's property could be taken (nothing prevents it), especially if Bob's hands are unclean. | No, the minor cannot be in violation either being on the property of residence or the sidewalk in front of that property. Montgomery County Curfew Law: Section 1-2 (Offenses): (a) A minor commits an offense if he remains in any public place or on the premises of any establishment within the unincorporated areas of the county during curfew hours. Section 1-3 (Defenses): (a) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 1-2 that the minor was: (1) Accompanied by the minor’s parent or guardian; (2) On an errand at the direction of the minor’s parent or guardian, without any detour or stop; (3) In a motor vehicle involved in interstate travel; (4) Engaged in an employment activity, or going to or returning home from an employment >activity, without any detour or stop; (5) Involved in an emergency; (6) On the sidewalk abutting the minor’s residence or abutting the residence of a next-door neighbor if the neighbor did not complain to the police department about the minor’s presence; (7) Attending an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by Montgomery County, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor, or going to or returning home from, without any detour or stop, an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by Montgomery County, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor; (8) Exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution, such >as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the right of assembly; and (9) Married, had been married, or had disabilities of minority removed in accordance with Chapter 31 of the Texas Family Code. (b) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 1-2 (c) that the owner, operator, or employee of an establishment promptly notified the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department, or the appropriate Constable’s office, that a minor was present on the premises of the establishment during curfew hours and refused to leave. Your property is not public, so you cannot be in offense of this ordinance being on your private property. You also cannot be in violation being on your sidewalk (or a neighbors sidewalk if that neighbor has not called police on the offender). | In general As Dale M explained, if you give the money to someone who is not obviously authorized by the business to accept money and sell stuff in exchange, you have not entered into a valid sales contract. That means you are taking things without permission. Therefore the shop could sue you for any damage this causes (maybe you took something the shop did not want to sell, or the person at the information desk was not an employee and ran away with the money). However, whether this constitutes a crime such as theft will depend on jurisdictions. Germany In Germany, for example, it would probably not, because by definition a theft requires "intention to take posession in violation of the law" (StGB §242). You could argue that you did not intend to violate the law, because you paid the required amount, and only gave the money to the wrong person by mistake. Of course, I cannot guarantee that will convince the judge... England and Wales Similarly, the law in England and Wales defines "theft" in section 1 of the Theft Act 1968: A person is guilty of theft, if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; [...] Furthermore, section 2 says: A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— [...] (b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or [...] So, similar to the situation in Germany, you could argue in court that you intended to buy the item legally, and believed that the shop would be okay with that. | Normal ways of owning a house don't allow this In common law jurisdictions (so, be careful if you set this in Louisiana which has mixed civil/common law) the normal ways that residential property is owned would either require the agreement of all parties to sell or one party could sell their share but they could not force the other party to do so. However, there are lots of ways that property can be abnormally owned. First, there is the transitional period where the property is legally owned by the Estate of the deceased for the benefit of the beneficiaries and administered by the executor of the will or the administrator if there is no will. If the house was bequeathed specifically to the beneficiaries then the executor must arrange for the legal transfer. However, if there is no will or the will just bequeaths assets without identifying them then the executor/administrator has discretion on whether to transfer the house or to sell it and distribute the proceeds. If this is shortly after the death and the sister was the administrator, she could decide to sell. The house could be owned by a company. If so, the director(s) would be able to dispose of it. The director(s) are appointed by the shareholders and if the sister had more than 50% of the shares, well. This is not a particularly common way of owning residential property because it has tax disadvantages but it is a common ownership method for industrial or commercial property: many companies own the land where they do business. Perhaps the house is a small part of a large factory complex? The property could be inside a trust with the brother and sister as beneficiaries but the sister as trustee. Trusts can be discretionary (i.e. the trustee decides who gets what) or unit trusts (like having shares in a company - you get it in proportion to your holding). The latter is the way publicly traded property trusts work. While the trustee has to operate in line with the trust deed and for the benefit of all the beneficiaries, the sister may, reasonably or unreasonably, decide that selling the house is in those interests. |
Enforcing the GPL license on software I published a software project under the GNU Affero General Public License version 3.0. I have written the code behind it, hence I am the copyright holder. According to the AGPL license, anyone who redistributes this software or a derivative must distribute it under the GPL as well. Recently, I saw a distribution of a modified version of my software distributed under another license, and also violating other terms of the AGPL v3.0. I have contacted several organisations, such as Free Software Foundation (FSF) gpl-violations.org but I did not receive any response. I do not have adequate (financial) resources (and time) to hire a lawyer just to settle this small issue, especially as this is just a side project of mine. How do I enforce the license of my AGPL software, and take action on the violators of the license(to comply with the AGPL)? There are a lot of information on the Internet on how to use the (A)GPL on your software but very few sources of information on how you can enforce it when someone violates the license. Thank you. | This kind of piracy is unfortunately common. When your copyright has been violated, your available response is to sue the infringer. Yes, this costs money, and yes, many infringers get away with it. In the Free Software/Open Source community, a couple of actors including the FSF, gpl-violations.org/Harald Welte, and the Software Freedom Conservancy have sued GPL infringers. But they can only do that for copyrights that they hold themselves. For example, the FSF holds copyright for the GNU userland, whereas Welte and Conservancy hold copyright for parts of the Linux kernel. They do not hold copyright for your software so they cannot enforce the AGPL license on your behalf. What can be done fairly easily is to file a takedown request with platforms that host the infringing content. Under various safe harbor laws including the US DMCA, a platform is not responsible if they accidentally host infringing content uploaded by users. However, the platform has to take the content down if they're notified that the content is infringing. For example, you could file a DMCA takedown request with GitHub to take down their repository, in case they are using GitHub. The drawback is that a takedown notice can be contested by the alleged infringer, in which case the content is reinstated and you would have to sue. The platform is not allowed to make its own determination about whether you or the infringer is right. | That depends of the combination of licences, up to the point that there may be no solution valid for all of the components and you have to rework your project. The terms from the different licences must be evaluated to see which terms are appliable to the final product. For example, the GPL licence affects all of the source code of your project, and not only to the GPL licenced components1. So, imagine that you get one component under a licence which does not provide the source code (not even to you, even less for distribution) and a GPL licenced component. Incompatibility! Keep in mind also that usually there are several "flavours" and versions of BSD and GPL licences (with some BSD licences being compatible with GPL while others at not), so there is no general rule. That said, BSD licences are usually pretty open, so if you have a mix of (GPL-compatible) BSD licences and GPL licences, you usually can redistribute this with any licence that meets the GPL licence restriction. And, since the GPL forbids adding any additional restriction to GPL licenced code, that is pretty much it. 1That is why GPL is sometimes called a "viral" licence, because it "infects" all the code of your project. | The first thing that people need to do is to quit over thinking it. That being said, I'm going to see if I can tackle your problems one by one, before summarizing and providing my own opinion: Many users don't care if their code is copied. I'm like that. I left a couple comments on Shog9's post that read this: Good point: Licensing does not prevent careless or malicious use. I'm surprised about how many people are thinking that this license will let them steal their code, because it's already happening right now. I don't want to sound pessimistic, but when thousands of people break a license/law/contract, it's a bit of a lost cause. You're not significantly damaged in a direct way, so honestly, let it go. All I want is to make sure that no one can come up to me if something of mine screwed something on there side. Aside from that, I don't care about people who don't attribute me: chances are, they have no moral sanity, and I will appreciate the people who do, and help me out. As it is, I'm 16, I share what I know with a good heart, and in a well-spirited manner, and at the end of the day, knowing that I was able to help someone out makes my day. I don't mind if my code is copied. I know that people will copy my code whether I like it or not, but I also know that there will be people in the world who will say "thanks", and will try to attribute me where possible. I feel good about that. That being said, I don't care. But the person who uses my code does. The license that affects all Stack Exchange posts are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike license, or CC BY-SA. Code contributions don't fit well with this. This excellent post on Open Source explains why it's discouraged for code. What these people want is a code-friendly license, so that they can stay in the clear when it comes to copyright issues. The next thing they want, is for someone to come after them over some licensing issue. You may think that people are good, but you never know the world around you. They can be evil. For other users, they don't mind their code being copied to another post, as long as there is a link to the post and a mention of the original author. Most people post with good intention. There's not that much of an issue from a legal perspective either: The license allows people to copy and paste into answers of their own, and since the license remains the same, there's no issue to get into. The license allows it, and contributors kind of have to acknowledge it. I don't think anyone cares what happens to code that is less than 3-4 lines at least. I can probably agree. Such code probably wouldn't be eligible for copyright anyway, since it's so trivial. Many jurisdictions have a "Threshold of Originality," which means that simple things can't be under copyright. Stack Exchange does not probably want people to own the code they submit. For example, Stack Exchange has (and probably wishes to retain) the right to keep even deleted posts in the visibility of the high rep users (even if the author is against it). Wait what? You may be right that it is in Stack Exchange's interest to host content. After all, they get hits, which helps them as a business. It is illegal for companies to host illegal content. If somebody sees objectionable, copyrighted content hosted on Stack Exchange that they would like removed, then they need to file a DMCA Takedown Request. This is also why moderators, like myself, cannot process legal requests. The reason why Stack Exchange doesn't act themselves, even if they see something that is copyrighted and objectionable, is because it's a form of liability. When YouTube began removing copyrighted content themselves, they received a wave of lawsuits (If you remove some, you need to remove all. Why didn't you remove mine? being the argument). The plaintiff's won those, and when YouTube did nothing, they weren't liable at all. If a user wants to have their content taken down, it's tricky. You need to look at the Terms of Service for Stack Exchange: (quoting Section 3) You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange When Stack Exchanges gets your content, you grant them an irrevocable license to your contribution. This is pretty standard across a lot of sites: it's just a way to secure data and stay in the clear of licensing issues. At the same time, it doesn't seem fair for SE to acquire complete ownership of the content. The user must still have the final say, if the content is to be used for purposes not already agreed upon in the licence. They don't. What users have done is that they have provided a license of their content to Stack Exchange. This is done, again, through their Terms of Service: You grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works and store such Subscriber Content and to allow others to do so in any medium now known or hereinafter developed (“Content License”) in order to provide the Services, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by You. The user grants a license to their content to Stack Exchange, but they do not assign or relinquish copyright. The code still belongs to them. It's important not to conflate the user contribution policy, with copyright assignment. You are still free to add an additional license to your content (known as dual or multi-licensing), and have a copy for your own use. Stack Exchange will always host a copy licensed under the CC BY-SA license. Stack Exchange can expect a high level of decorum and respect for laws from its users. At the same time, it cannot expect redundant attributions anywhere and everywhere, because one of its main aims is to not waste the users' time. Not only Stack Exchange expects it, but many copyright laws in various jurisdictions require it too. There's a concept known in many jurisdictions known as moral rights. These are rights that are irrevocable, whether you like it or not. Generally, these include attributions, disclaimer of liability, and other rights as well. Even if your work is in the public domain, you still retain these moral rights. If memory serves me right, the right to be attributed is revokable under United States copyright law. Therefore, attribution becomes more a courtesy, when the right is revoked. Licenses such as CC BY, and CC BY-SA still require attribution as a part of their licensing terms. What defines attribution is generally up to the person who uses the content. If memory serves right again, one can not demand how to attribute. There should be a clear-cut way to determine what is code and what isn't. The code formatting indicators on SE may not be adequate because some users simply use backticks, or 4-space indented text for other not-so-codey text. Personally, I feel like making the entirety of a post under both the Creative Commons license and whatever proposed code license they use is the best option, and allow people to use moral judgement to determine the most appropriate license. The concern comes about people who lack such judgment. I bet these same people don't follow the existing license anyway - and are a lost cause. We made it through! There will always be debate on the license of choice. Some people want the GPL, a license that's apparently closer to the status quo of Creative Commons license (I disagree that it's a good match), while other's want permissive licenses, such as the MIT or the Apache licenses. I'd prefer the permissive type, since it allows use in closed-source applications, and grant more rights (i.e. less restrictions) to the people that use them. I'm not going to right much because my hands are tired, but I'm sure if you've got more questions about the open source licenses themselves, you can probably ask on Open Source Stack Exchange. | It is unclear whether WINE is infringing copyright or if it can rely on a fair use defense. The CAFC held that: that the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of the API packages are entitled to copyright protection In that light, if WINE had original content in the structure, sequence, and organization of its API, the CAFC would likely also find that it is entitled to copyright protection. However, because this issue is outside the scope of the CAFC's exclusive jurisdiction (this is a copyright issue, not a patent issue), the holdings are not binding in any other circuit. Each circuit is free to review anew the copyrightability of APIs when such a case comes up. My guess is that this is the reason the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal on CAFC's Oracle v. Google opinion. To address your fair use question would be simply speculation, because fair use is always assessed case-by-case, and even in WINE's closest analogy (Oracle v. Google), the CAFC remanded the fair use question back to the trial court, and that question hasn't been decided yet: we remand for further consideration of Google’s fair use defense in light of this decision | A person that fails to comply with a copyright licence does not have a licence to use the copyrighted material. The owner of the copyright can take all the normal actions for copyright violation including seeking an injunction to stop the breach and/or suing for damages. Additionally, if the breach constitutes criminal activity, then the state can enforce those sanctions. However, suing a Chinese company in a Chinese court is generally a hiding to nothing. I won't say the Chinese legal system is biased towards its citizens but I wont say it isn't either. However, a case can be brought in any jurisdiction where the breach occurs (e.g. the USA) and enforcement action can be taken against any assets located in that jurisdiction. | I wrote a letter to the Eclipse Foundation. The consultant pointed me to section 5 in their FAQ. My case falls under the term "linking". He warned that he isn't a lawyer, but offered the following short answer: The Eclipse Foundation does not consider linking with EPL content to be a derivative work and so you are not required to disclose your source code. | While the Commons Clause is not an Open Source license, the BSD license allows you to do this. To be clear, you cannot change the license of other people's code. You can however add your own code and license it under whatever terms you want. The resulting code then consists of your modifications, under whatever license you want parts of the original code, under BSD-3-clause Since you are a license-taker for the BSD-3-clause material, you must still comply with its license such as providing any recipients with the copyright + license notice. When people receive the software with your modifications, they must comply with both your chosen license terms for your modifications, and with the BSD-3-clause license for the other parts. For example, you can use the Commons Clause to prevent certain competing uses of the software as a whole. But since you will presumably provide the source code of the software, other people are free to use the BSD-3-clause code under the terms of that license, ignoring your restrictions. If you provide binaries then the resulting binary would not be covered by the BSD-3-clause license, but you would still have to provide the copyright and license notice for the original code as a kind of attribution. | No. You cannot be held liable for violating the EULA if you have never used the software and are only reporting what people who did use it told you. Of course, people bring groundless lawsuits all the time and you might have to defend such a lawsuit if you are sued. In some places you could be subpoenaed to disclose your sources, and in others, a reporter's privilege would allow you to quash such a subpoena. |
How can UK police fine people when it is not supported by law? United Kindgom During the COVID pandemic, police officers have taken to fining members of the public who break government guidelines (exercising too far away from their houses, exercising more than once a day, etc). It has been reported numerous times (and is clear from reading the text of the law), that none of these behaviours are actually illegal, they are simply government guidelines. How can police officers enforce something that is not stated in law, and, therefore, and these fines lawful? | They can’t But they aren’t This is the law (as amended). Section 9 contains the penalties. In any event the police don’t fine people they issue an infringement notice which is an allegation of an offense - police can issue these even if they reasonably believe they took place - they are entitled to be wrong. The person given the notice can admit the offense by paying the fine or contest the allegation by going to court. | The COVID restrictions are new enough that there are few court decisions on how to interpret them. There are frequent requests for court injunctions seeking temporary relief. Some pass, some are denied. The website might accuse locations listed there of breaking the restrictions. Making such an accusation in public sounds like a very bad idea, especially if there is no solid documentation. But the aggrieved party would be any location falsely listed. The site may or may not be hosted in Germany. If it is not, it becomes a really interesting question which law applies. You might inform the authorities, but beyond that, forget it. | This is controlled by state law (there is also a federal murder statutes but the federal government doesn't dictate defenses for state law). Here is Washington's. RCW 9A.16.020 says when use of force is lawful, and there are different "public officer" vs. "person" related provisions. Generally, public officers may use force (1) Whenever necessarily used by a public officer in the performance of a legal duty, or a person assisting the officer and acting under the officer's direction; but persons (other than those assisting an officer) may only use force (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Additionally, RCW 9A.16.040 is a long section specifically about officers, the most germane parts of which are that use of deadly force is justifiable (a) When a public officer applies deadly force in obedience to the judgment of a competent court; or (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer meeting the good faith standard of this section to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty; or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer meeting the good faith standard of this section or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony; RCW 9A.16.050 has more limited circumstances when homicide is justifiable by others (not in self-defense): (1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished; or (2) In the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony upon the slayer, in his or her presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he or she is In other words, the box for police officers is bigger: they can use deadly force to do their job, your plumber cannot. RCW 9A.16.040 is not a general license to kill: the rest of the section details the conditions under which one can consider such use of force to be lawful. The officer must have "probable cause to believe that the suspect, if not apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or a threat of serious physical harm to others". If that is so, "deadly force may also be used if necessary to prevent escape from the officer". Also, as usual, the fact-finders do not make that judgment post hoc, the officer at the scene does and he "shall not be held criminally liable for using deadly force without malice and with a good faith belief that such act is justifiable pursuant to this section". In enacting this law (in case the courts wondered, years later, the legislature declared The legislature recognizes that RCW 9A.16.040 establishes a dual standard with respect to the use of deadly force by peace officers and private citizens, and further recognizes that private citizens' permissible use of deadly force under the authority of RCW 9.01.200 [since recodified], 9A.16.020, or 9A.16.050 is not restricted and remains broader than the limitations imposed on peace officers There do not appear to be statutory defenses for federal murder statutes, instead this results from common law interpretation, implemented in federal rules of criminal procedure (discussed here w.r.t. defenses) and jury instructions in the various circuits. | No. The Flag Code is not a criminal law, so the government is not permitted to bring criminal prosecution for violating it, and it therefore cannot secure a proper conviction for such a violation. | No For the same reason that requiring a licence to drive might, in some circumstances, result in harm to a person who cannot drive because they don’t have a licence. The city (or any government) has legislative immunity for the laws they put in place even if those laws have negative consequences to some people. All laws have negative consequences to some people, for example, laws against theft are extremely prejudicial to thieves. Similarly, the executive is immune for exercising their discretion in the enforcement of the law. This is the basis of the police not having a general duty to protect. However, police have a specific duty to protect when they have taken an individual into their care and control. | Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings. | The only time cops are violating the law for cowardice is when they fail to intervene in misconduct by another cop, see, e.g., here at page 10 (two police carry out a blatantly unlawful arrest, but there is also liability for the two other junior officers watch and do nothing about their superiors' misconduct), or when an arrested or incarcerated person has been placed in peril by the cop, see, e.g., here (police arrest woman and put her in a squad car on train tracks and fail to try to rescue her when a train is about to and then does smash into the squad car where she is helplessly handcuffed and locked in). This said, cops are routinely disciplined or fired for cowardice as an employment matter (see, e.g., here where a policeman who fails to rush in to stop a school shooting in progress was "suspended in the immediate aftermath of the attack and later resigned" and also here in a similar case). But, they are rarely disciplined or fired for being too aggressive even if it crosses the legal line unless the facts are unequivocally clear. | There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense. |
Can you sue someone for stealing a slice of pizza? Can you sue someone for stealing a slice of pizza? (Origin of question... a simple tease that someone took a little too seriously, and now I'm curious.) | If it’s your pizza, yes The civil equivalent of theft is the tort of conversion, “consisting of "taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession". In England & Wales, it is a tort of strict liability.” | Yes, it's illegal new-south-wales s118 of the Crimes Act says: Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. QED | It isn’t theft Theft requires depriving the legal owner of possession permanently. In concept it’s closer to fraud than theft, however, copyright violation is its own crime - neither theft nor fraud. In casual usage, you can call it theft if you like - or pomegranate, or Howard. Whatever gets your point across. | Hacking into a computer owned by someone else and accessing the data stored on it without permission is a misdemeanor according to StGB 202a (de|en). But only if it's successful. So a failed attempt isn't a misdemeanor yet. When you notice that someone might have committed a criminal offence (regardless of whether you are a victim or just a witness), then the usual procedure is to report it to the police. If they consider the crime serious enough to investigate, then they will request the identity from the ISP. But the copyright lawsuits which are filed in bulk by law firms working with media companies are not crime reports. They are civil lawsuits. A civil lawsuit is when someone had a tangible damage because of something someone else did, and now they want money in compensation. When there is no damage, then there is nothing to sue for. So when you want a judge to file an injunction to force an ISP to give them the identity of one of their users, then you would first have to explain to them how much financial damage you had because of that person and that this is enough damage to make it worth everyone's time. That might be quite challenging for nothing but a failed SSH login attempt. But it might be possible if a single person made so many login attempts that it incurred you non-negligible bandwidth cost or even caused a denial-of-service. | There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake. | You could probably hire a Pennsylvania lawyer to intervene in the case on your behalf and file a motion to seal the evidence in the case, and there is a good chance that it would be granted, and quite possibly, unopposed by the parties. But, the fact that it has already been made available to the public on the Internet could cause the court to deny your request on the grounds that it is futile to do so. | If you are accurately representing the facts, this is a clear case of defamation. Your attorney will point out that you could sue him / them, since he apparently accused you of a crime (the accusation to the police, it's the later public accusation that counts). You can subpoena the video, in connection with a lawsuit. There is no way to force them to turn it over without a court proceeding. | It all depends on whether you knew (or should have known) beforehand that your friend was going to commit a crime. But more importantly, if you think you are likely to be charged with a crime (rightly or wrongly), you really should get legal advice, not opinions from the Internet. |
Is propensity evidence ever allowed as circumstantial evidence? I, being a non-expert in any country's/state's law, was somewhat surprised when it was said that propensity evidence isn't, in Wisconsin, legal evidence; see between 5.57 - 8.15 in this video about the Rittenhouse trial. I thought that propensity evidence could be seen as circumstantial evidence. This is not the case in Wisconsin (at least not usually). So my question is, are there any states/countries you know of where propensity evidence is allowed, whether generally or in exceptional cases? EDIT: The following is in response to @ohwilleke's answer. (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. The item (...) such as proving motive (...) catches my eye. If I understand correctly, the propensity evidence must suggest motive without invoking an argument reliant on character. Let me explain my (mis)understanding with an example: The defendant is on trial for theft. They have a criminal history of theft. The prosecutors say that due to the propensity evidence, the defendant has a thieving character (or more extremely, has kleptomania), and thus, has motives for theft. In the above example, the propensity evidence is inadmissible, because it argues via character, despite ultimately making a claim about motive. An allowed example would then be: The defendant is on trial for the theft of ancient Egyptian relics. The defendant has a criminal history of stealing ancient Egyptian relics. The prosecutors use this propensity evidence to suggest the defendant has a collection of Egyptian relics, and/or a fascination/obsession of/over ancient Egyptian relics. The first suggestion is not a matter of character, but simply a claim about the defendant possessing a collection. The second suggestion is more borderline, as whether one is to view "a fascination/obsession of/over ancient Egyptian relics" as a part of their character, or as merely a non-physical possession/quirk is hard to say for me. So, is my understanding correct? | The short answer is that propensity evidence can only be circumstantial evidence and that it is generally inadmissible. But we should start by clarifying what "circumstantial evidence" means. It is not the opposite of legal evidence, but more like the opposite of direct evidence. Direct evidence is evidence that independently establishes a fact in question, while circumstantial evidence is evidence that gives rise to an inference that a fact in question is true. There is a misconception that circumstantial evidence is somehow inadmissible or inferior to direct evidence, but the truth is that the vast majority of evidence is circumstantial. So if you are on trial for murder, direct evidence would include your confession, an eyewitness account of the murder, and surveillance video of you killing the victim. Circumstantial evidence would include things like the victim's blood on your clothes, a taxi driver's testimony that he dropped you off at the victim's apartment just before the murder happened, or surveillance video of you exiting the cab and entering the apartment. Propensity evidence is evidence that a person is likely to have acted one way in this case because they have acted that same way in the past. It is therefore never going to be direct evidence and always going to be circumstantial evidence, because it never explicitly says "the defendant did it," but rather says "the defendant did it before, so maybe he did it again." The general rule is that propensity evidence is inadmissible. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). It sometimes comes in anyway, though, for various reasons. If a defendant is facing trespass charges, for instance, a prosecutor would want to introduce evidence that the defendant has previously been convicted of trespassing. The defense will object that it's propensity evidence, but the prosecutor will respond that it's admissible if he's using it to establish something other than the likelihood that the defendant did the same thing again. If the prosecutor needs to prove that the defendant knew he was not allowed on the property, the trespass conviction is very strong evidence on that point. Another common exception is in sexual-assault cases, where some jurisdictions allow this type of evidence. Indeed, Wisconsin is among the states that explicitly permit evidence of the defendant's previous convictions for certain sex crimes to demonstrate that he committed a sex crime again in the current case. WI Stat § 904.04(2)(b). Louisiana likewise allows propensity evidence to establish that the defendant has a history of "sexually assaultive behavior" or a "lustful disposition toward children." C.E. 412.2. Likewise, the defendant may be able to introduce evidence that the victim previously consented to sex and is therefore likely to have consented to sex in the current case. C.E. 412. EDIT: To address your examples, then, I would say that that the first would probably not survive a Rule 404(b) objection, and the second one would stand a better chance. On the second one, the defense should argue that the court should allow evidence of the defendant's interest in Egyptology, but not evidence of the convictions, as that would allow the jury to consider his motive without being diverted into propensity territory. The prosecution should probably counter that the defendant's convictions show more than just the existence of a motive, but also the strength of that motive, as well as perhaps that the defendant had the prior knowledge and skill that would be necessary to pull off a museum heist. The judge could go probably rule either way without being reversed. I would clarify one point on how to analyze and characterize this evidence: Rule 404 deals with propensity evidence, i.e., evidence that is meant to demonstrate that a person acted in conformity with his character. Subsection (a) deals with establishing propensity through "character evidence," which is evidence that the defendant's character or character traits are consistent with the conduct in question at trial; while subsection (b) deals with establishing propensity through "other acts" evidence, which is evidence that the defendant previously engaged in conduct that is consistent with the conduct at question of trial. Both types of evidence -- character evidence and other-acts evidence -- are inadmissible to establish propensity, but they may be admissible to establish motive, plan, preparation, etc. So when your defendant's previous convictions are offered to prove motive to expand his Egyptology collection and not to establish propensity, the court could allow them into evidence not because they are admissible propensity evidence, but rather because they are not propensity evidence at all. | My understanding is that defendants in Britain have to prove statements true by the preponderance of evidence, whereas in the U.S. the standard of evidence is "compelling" (a lower standard). This is not the case. Preponderance of the evidence can still be the burden of proof in the United States (in a civil libel case, although it must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal libel case). But, the difference is in what has to be proved. In Britain, it appears to be necessary to show that the statements are true in order to prevail. In the U.S., it is merely necessary to show in a case like this one (because it involves a matter of public concern) that the statements were made with knowledge that they were false, or with reckless disregard to the truth or falsity of the statements made. A factual basis for believing the statements made to be true is a defense if the basis is at all reasonable, and is a complete defense if the factual basis for making the statement is disclosed and that is true or believed to be true by the speaker. It is not necessary for the statements to actually be true under U.S. law in a case such as this one, although actual truth is also a defense, which is not the case in all circumstances in U.K. law, and was not the case under the historical common law. Historically, defamation claims could be brought for statements critical of the monarch, for statements pointing out the natural infirmities of someone for example by mocking a person with low IQ, or for speaking ill of the dead. Furthermore, the U.S. has a variety of doctrines that make it hard to find that a false statement was made in the first place. For example, statements of opinion are not actionable and many of the alleged falsehoods in the McLibel case would be considered to be statements of opinion in U.S. law rather than statements of fact. Similarly, U.S. law does not require that statements be literally true, and instead recognizes that a defendant may have been engaged in using hyperbole, or may have gotten the gist of the accusation right even though strictly speaking the exact statement made is not technically true (e.g. someone might say that a company paid a "penalty" when it actually paid a settlement amount in a lawsuit seeking a penalty or paid an amount representing compensatory damages only rather than a penalty amount). In the same vein, it must be clear from the context of the statement that the person making it intended it to be received as a truthful account and not a mere parody or satire which was intended to be understood as false. For example, I couldn't sue someone who made a knowingly false statement that I assassinated King George V, who died several decades before I was born, or that I was telepathically controlling my uncle because I had a space alien parasite in my spine. Those claims are so absurd that they would be inferred to intended to be fictional on their face. Certain kinds of falsehoods (e.g. lying about one's military record in a a political campaign) are simply not actionable as a matter of law, no matter what, as the harm is not concrete enough. There is not, however, necessarily a defense under U.S. law to defamation liability if the defendant said many things that were true, but something else that would be defamatory in isolation. For example, even if everything else were true, if the defendant had also stated that the CEO of the Plaintiff was convicted of leading a Nazi concentration camp and killed millions of people, which would have been possible given the CEO's age, knowing perfectly well that the person with a similar name to the CEO who did so was someone else who died an untimely death decades ago, that statement might be defamatory and actionable (at least by the CEO personally and probably by the company if it was alleged that he was hired despite the fact that the company was aware of this circumstance). | I am just a foreign patent attorney who is studying common law to pass the California Bar Exam, but I will present my personal view. (I cannot guarantee the validity of my theory) There is an equitable theory called Constructive Trust. If it is established, the victim is entitled to benefit of any increase in value of defendant's (thief) property, meaning in this example victim (plaintiff) can recover $100 million. In order to assert CT, the following must be met: Wrongful appropriation; Here, D stole lottery ticket. Met. D has title; Here, D has title to $100 million. Met. P can trace his property to D's property; P can trace from P's $1 lottery ticket to its possession by D and collection by D of $100 million. Met. Unjust enrichment by D; D was enriched by stealing P's property (the lottery ticket). Met. Thus, it is highly possible that a court will order D to hold the property ($100 million) in constructive trust for P. This means, in plain language, that P will recover $100 million. | There are essentially no such limits on the use of such evidence. The police are free to use evidence from one case in whatever other cases it may be helpful, and criminals have no right to turn over evidence to the police on the condition that it not be used against them. The Exclusionary Rule has no application here, because it only governs evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because the defendant here consented to producing the evidence, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Nor does the Fifth Amendment prohibit the use of this evidence. The right against self-incrimination only applies to compelled self-incrimination; if a defendant wants to voluntarily confess or turn over inculpatory evidence, he is free to do so. | I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking. | They could be prosecuted in any state where there was evidence that part of the crime was committed. Realistically, either State A or State B could prosecute for conspiracy to murder as an additional charge, because the conspiracy clearly spanned more than one state, even if they can't prove where the crime was committed, although physical evidence (e.g. traces of camp sites, footprints, testimony about landmarks, evidence of poop with human DNA from the victim in it), would usually make it possible to show that some part of the crime was committed in the state. There is probably also a federal crime that could be implicated such as "murder involving flight across a state line" (hypothetical, but I'm sure that there is something similar on the books). I'm not going to address the further hypothetical as it is too bizzare and law is ultimately very context specific. Find a more plausible fact pattern, perhaps with a different crime, and ask a separate question if you want to really address the issue. | The Evidence Would be Admissible. Under the so-called "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule the evidence would probably be admitted over Bob's objections in both cases mentioned in the question. Recent US court decisions have limited the exclusionary rule when police officers reasonably but mistakenly believe that a valid warrant exists, and find evidence acting under such an apparent warrant. However, if there is good evidence of intentional falsification by the police, the exception will probably not apply. As to the second case, where Bob is home and protests that an error is being made, police are not required to, and often do not, accept much that suspects or subjects of warrants say in their own defense. If anyone could simply claim there was an error and delay a warrant, perhaps giving time to dispose of evidence, many problems would result. However, the "good faith" exception only applies where the police reasonably and honestly believe that the warrant is valid, or that probable cause exists. If Bob says something such as: This warrant is for 1020 Anne street, where Alice Crook lives. But I live at 1050 Albert street. See the house number is 1050 right here. There must be a mistake. then a reasonable officer would probably double check the warrant, and if the officer unreasonably fails to do so, the search might later be suppressed. But this is going to be a very fact-sensitive inquiry, and none of the cases that I know of on the "good faith exception" rule are exactly on point for this situation. I cannot be sure how a court might rule in such a case. Leon and Evans Cases In United States v. Leon 468 U. S. 897, the US Supreme Court created a "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule. In that case the Court held that when officers make an objectively reasonable, good faith decision to rely on a warrant later held to be invalid, the exclusionary rule does not apply, and evidence found during a search under such a warrant, or in the course of an arrest under such a warren, is admissible. The basic logic is that when the invalid warrant was the result of an honest mistake, suppressing the evidence would have no deterrent effect on future similar mistakes, as no one intended to make them in any case. In Arizona v. Evans 514 U. S. 1 (1995), this rule was extended to officer who rely in good faith on information mistakenly provided by Court employees. The underlying logic is much the same. Herring v. United States In Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) this exception was further extended to officers who acted in good faith on the mistaken information of other officers. Evidence found in a search incident to an arrest, although there was no valid arrest warrant or other probable cause, was not suppressed. In this case a warrant had been issued but later recalled. however this recall was somehow not properly entered into the database of warrants maintained by a sheriff's office. When a nearby jurisdiction called to ask if there was an outstanding warrant on Herring, they were told that there was one. Herring was arrested, and drugs and an unlawful firearm found. Minutes later the officers were told that the arrest warrant was not valid. Herring was convicted based on the evidence from the search, and the US Supreme court upheld the conviction. The court wrote in Herring: When a probable-cause determination was based on reasonable but mistaken assumptions, the person subjected to a search or seizure has not necessarily been the victim of a constitutional violation. The very phrase “probable cause” confirms that the Fourth Amendment does not demand all possible precision. And whether the error can be traced to a mistake by a state actor or some other source may bear on the analysis. For purposes of deciding this case, however, we accept the parties’ assumption that there was a Fourth Amendment violation. The issue is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied. The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 223 (1983). Indeed, exclusion “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse,” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U. S. 586, 591 (2006), and our precedents establish important principles that constrain application of the exclusionary rule. ... the exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it “ ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ... When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted “in objectively reasonable reliance” on the subsequently invalidated search warrant. 468 U. S., at 922 (Leon). We (perhaps confusingly) called this objectively reasonable reliance “good faith.” In a companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984), we held that the exclusionary rule did not apply when a warrant was invalid because a judge forgot to make “clerical corrections” to it. ... in Evans, 514 U. S. 1, we applied this good-faith rule to police who reasonably relied on mistaken information in a court’s database that an arrest warrant was outstanding. We held that a mistake made by a judicial employee could not give rise to exclusion for three reasons: The exclusionary rule was crafted to curb police rather than judicial misconduct; court employees were unlikely to try to subvert the Fourth Amendment; and “most important, there [was] no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in [those] circumstances” would have any significant effect in deterring the errors ... the abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary rule featured intentional conduct that was patently unconstitutional ... ... To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. ... In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978), ... we held that police negligence in obtaining a warrant did not even rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation, let alone meet the more stringent test for triggering the exclusionary rule. ... We do not suggest that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary rule. In this case, however, the conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion. In Leon we held that “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” 468 U. S., at 922. The same is true when evidence is obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently recalled warrant. If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation. See the Wikipedia article on Herring and this Leagal Information Institute article on the case | It is like an affidavit of sort, sworn out without the jurat and not before a notary. The swearing out of a complaint or rebutting evidence in all Federal civil matters (some states allow for the same) must contain an affidavit or an "unsworn declaration" that swears out the facts to be true and accurate, even though not notarized, and is based on fact and not supposition. It is subject to the same penalties of perjury if one lies as if you swear on a bible and testify in court or on a "sworn" affidavit. Affidavits need not be sworn before God, or on a bible. You have a right to just "affirm" that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth....and not "so help me God". Many courts don't use a bible at all anymore. 28 U.S.C. 1746 relates to these "Unsworn Declarations Under Penalty Of Perjury" It is not b/c you don't believe in God that you'd use this...you always have the option of swearing out even a declared affidavit or testifying without swearing on a bible if you're an atheist. They just leave out the "before God" part. Affidavits are the norm, however, in Federal Courts that have an expedited docket this is typically used when it could take a while to get a notary and the evidence is due. (In some states lawyers are automatically notaries but in others they aren't). The ability to swear out a complaint or contest a deposition without having to wait on a notary can be the difference between making your deadline or not. It's commonly used when records custodians are called to certify the authenticity of documents produced pursuant to subpoena or other formal request. Under F.R.Civ.P 56 declarations usually are not within the type of evidentiary categories that can be used at the summary judgment phase. If it's a small misstatement you would probably be faced with a fine. If it's a total lie, outright, you'd be looking at jail time (say a records custodian removed evidence and swore out it was the complete business record in a fraud case). 18 U.S. Code § 1621 discusses perjury generally (in federal actions). |
Who has more power over the Police? RESUME When ranking the "power"(see footnote 1) over a community, the ordinary citizen will have the least power while the local police in the respectful community (street, city etc.) will have more legal power to do certain things (at an extent). Examples could be, breaking into a house (warrant), searching another persons car if there is ground for suspicion, walking with a firearm in public and allowed to use it to disarm a deadly force (generally speaking, for all countries and communities alike) etc. QUESTION: Are there any government forces (see footnote 2) which has more power over the local police? I know some certain countries combined with certain government structure like the Queen of England, has the "supreme power" which makes her (when looking at jurisdiction) "invincible". I also know that some organisations like NATO makes their military have more power than some development countries. I accept answers based globally and also in specific countries and communities, so if I write "FBI, CIA" it is only examples and should NOT be seen as ONLY America. Furthermore, links or statements to the "book of law" for your specific country are also accepted. The question and answers will be used for research purposes on my paper that I am working on. FUNNY DILEMMA During one of my lectures, my Professor ended his lecture with If the Queen of England pointed a gun at the President of America and the President of America pointed a gun at the Queen of England, could you prosecute and/ or charge any of them? This was just a funny thought which I will post here also. footnotes With power is measured how much legal action a body has according to jurisdiktion. With government forces is meant any government, branches - hereby of police, military, special forces, FBI, CIA, positions of authority like President, foreign affairs, Kings, Queens, Princes, Princesses, The Head of State's personal staff (hereby Doctors, bodyguards, nutrients, Chef etc.). | The question that you pose can't be answered in the abstract and the conceptual framework you introduce in the section entitled "Resume" is largely unsound from a legal perspective, even if it may have some political theory usefulness. Indeed, even the framework of "relative power" doesn't really work. The question almost always presents itself in a binary fashion. Either a law enforcement officer has authority to do some particular thing, or the officer doesn't. Frequently, there are multiple law enforcement officers in different agencies who all have the authority to do a particular thing, and whoever gets there first may do so. In U.S. law, law enforcement is highly decentralized. There are hundreds of distinct federal law enforcement agencies, dozens of distinct law enforcement agencies in every single state, and almost every local government (sometimes even school districts, water boards, and park districts) have their own law enforcement agencies. All told, the number of independent law enforcement agencies in the U.S. is in the low tens of thousands. Something on the order of 90%+ of those law enforcement officers report to local governments like cities and counties and have no direct chain of authority that goes up beyond that point. The remainder are split roughly equally between the state level and the federal level, but highly fragmented within each such level between different agencies within each state and with the federal government. The most common kind of law enforcement officer in the federal government is not the stereotypical F.B.I. agent. Instead, it is a federal park ranger. A few small states are more centralized (e.g. Hawaii), but massive decentralization is the norm. The law enforcement officers in every single one of those agencies has a statutorily defined jurisdiction. Rather than being a neat hierarchy in which one law enforcement agent is always superior to another law enforcement agent, one has to analyze the circumstances in light of a particular grant of jurisdiction. There are general trends in how these grants of authority are made, but they are far from uniform. Most grants of authority include both territorial and subject matter elements. State police can typically arrest anyone for a violation of state law within their state, but not for violations of federal law or the laws of another state under circumstances where a citizens arrest is not authorized and where there isn't a warrant outstanding. A state game warden can arrest you for violating hunting laws in his geographic area, but not for violating state tax laws or federal immigration laws. A village constable in a tiny hamlet in rural Tennessee can arrest the chief of police for the Tennessee Valley Authority's law enforcement agency (the TVA is a federally charted independent government agency), for drunk driving in that constable's village. In contrast, an F.B.I. special agent doesn't have the authority to make that arrest, but could arrest either the village constable or the TVA chief of police for taking a bribe contrary to federal anti-corruption laws. There are law enforcement officers who specialize in investigating crimes by other law enforcement officers (often in the same agency). In state and local police agencies these are usually called "internal affairs officers", with a unit in the state police or state bureau of investigation that works closely with a unit of the state attorney general's office having a secondary role in this task. In the federal government, the Inspector General's office in each cabinet department is typically charged with primary responsibility for these kinds of investigations. In the military, improprieties by active duty soldiers in connection with their implementation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice would usually be investigated by the criminal investigation service in each cabinet level department (i.e. the Army, the Navy (including the Marines Corps), and the Air Force) within the Department of Defense. But in neither case is the conceptual issue one of authority. Usually any law enforcement officer in a particular agency has authority to arrest any other law enforcement officer from the same agency (with the possible exception of their direct superiors). It is a question of focus and job responsibilities, not of legal authority. There is a notion of federal supremacy under the U.S. Constitution. In a bald showdown of authority between federal law enforcement officers and state law enforcement officers, say, over who is entitled to custody of a non-law enforcement officer criminal who has been arrested, the federal law enforcement officers will prevail. But, these showdowns are rare, and interagency conflicts within state governments and the federal government respectively, if not reconciled sooner, are more often resolved by a Governor or President, through a chain of management command authority within that governmental entity, than in the courts. Even when there is no one shared chief executive between law enforcement officers, usually these disputes are resolved by negotiation between the chiefs of the respective officers, rather than through legal channels. This is much less true in most countries other than the U.S. Most countries have far fewer independent law enforcement agencies, and have more clear and hierarchical lines of authority between them. This distinction is illustrated by your professor's example: If the Queen of England pointed a gun at the President of America and the President of America pointed a gun at the Queen of England, could you prosecute and/ or charge any of them? In the U.K., nobody has the authority to arrest the Queen, and the authority to arrest the U.S. President would be highly limited by diplomatic treaties relating to the treatment of foreign heads of state. In the U.S., the question is tricker and quite fact specific. The President has immunity for his official acts, but not for his private acts. If this standoff with guns breaks out on the floor of the U.N. in the context of a breakdown of negotiations, the President hasn't committed a U.S. crime. On the other hand, suppose that the President and the Queen have been having a private tryst at a bed and breakfast at our small village hamlet in Tennessee where they have managed to escape their respective security details. (Pardon me for bringing such an icky vision into your head, this is purely for educational purposes and you should censor your own thoughts as you imagine it. I blame the questioner's professor for presenting a scenario that has this possible aspect to it.) The village constable can arrest the President for this crime in violation of Tennessee law (assuming that the President doesn't have legal justification for his acts such as self-defense) since this act was conducted in an unofficial capacity. But he probably can't arrest and charge the Queen under diplomatic treaties that the U.S. has with the U.K. In contrast, a U.S. Secret Service agent would have authority to seize the Queen sufficiently to disarm her and prevent her from being a threat to the President, even if he couldn't charge her with any crime. | Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect. | Can a vigilante perform an arrest? This depends on whether the vigilante has the power to perform a citizen's arrest. The rules depend on the jurisdiction (and vary from state to state in the US), but generally the power to perform a citizen's arrest is quite limited. It may include the power to 'pre-empt' an offence if the would-be offender has attempted to commit the offence. However, often the power is limited to particularly serious offences (eg. felonies). There may also be a requirement that the crime occurred in the citizen's presence, or that the citizen was unable to contact the police instead. Is evidence obtained by a vigilante admissible? In the United States, the constitutional exclusionary rule generally prevents evidence from being admitted if the government obtained it illegally. I answered a general question about the scope of the exclusionary rule here. However, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained illegally by a private individual: Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). In Burdeau, the defendant's papers had been stolen and turned over to the government, which proposed to present them as evidence to a grand jury. The Supreme Court said: In the present case, the record clearly shows that no official of the federal government had anything to do with the wrongful seizure of the petitioner's property ... there was no invasion of the security afforded by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure, as whatever wrong was done was the act of individuals in taking the property of another ... We assume that petitioner has an unquestionable right of redress against those who illegally and wrongfully took his private property under the circumstances herein disclosed, but with such remedies we are not now concerned. However, the exclusionary rule in some states goes beyond the Fourth Amendment. For example, article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that evidence illegally obtained 'by an officer or other person' is inadmissible. This provision was apparently enacted to deter vigilantes: Bubany and Cockerell, 'Excluding Criminal Evidence Texas-Style: Can Private Searches Poison the Fruit?' 12 Texas Tech Law Review 611 (1981), p 625. Can such evidence be admitted even if the vigilante is not present? Assuming that no exclusionary rule applies, evidence obtained by a vigilante can potentially be admitted through the testimony of a police officer or other witness, subject to the rule against hearsay and the question of reliability. The rule against hearsay means that a police officer cannot give evidence that a vigilante told them that the accused was guilty. Evidence of this kind is not admissible because the accused has no opportunity to challenge the reliability of the source of the information in cross-examination. The rule against hearsay does not apply when the probative value of the evidence does not depend on the truth of the absent vigilante's assertion. If the evidence provided by the vigilante is really 'damning' then it might fall into this category. For example, a vigilante might provide the police with a weapon that has the accused and victim's DNA on it, or tell the police that incriminating evidence can be found at a particular location. A police officer can then give evidence that the weapon was tested and found to have matching DNA, or a search warrant was executed and the incriminating evidence was found. There is no admissibility issue here. However, the fact that the police were tipped off by a vigilante who has broken the law and is not present to face court may cause the jury to reject the evidence as unreliable (ie. it could have been planted). | Yes. This is legal, even though it is highly unlikely. There were very few, if any, instances of the federal pardon power being used this way historically, but it could happen, and President Trump, while he was in office, intimated that he might use the pardon power in this fashion. Realistically, it would be easier for the President to prevent someone from being prosecuted in the first place if the crime took place during his term, but he might pardon someone who committed the crime under a previous administration. The fact pattern in the question: “don’t be surprised if I pardon anyone that puts to death repeat heroin and fentanyl dealers dealing in amounts larger than 50 pounds” doesn't sound very morally palatable. But consider a slight variant of it which is much more plausible. Suppose that while running for office a Presidential candidate says: don't be surprised if I pardon someone who was convicted of homicide in a previous administration for killing someone who had been using them as a sex slave in a human trafficking network, or killing someone who was in the process of raping them shortly before their divorce became final but was not allowed to assert a self-defense argument at trial because marital rape was legal at the time. Now arguably that's different, because it doesn't induce someone to commit a future crime. But the President has broad discretion to make policy to de-emphasize certain kinds of criminal prosecutions in any case while in office even without the pardon power, and generally, this is not a basis for having a special prosecutor appointed at the federal level since there is no individualized conflict of interest. Of course, the U.S. President can only pardon someone from a federal crime and can't pardon state crimes or criminal convictions from other countries. So, even if the President pardoned someone of a federal crime in this situation, the state in which the murders took place could prosecute the individual for murder unimpeded (constitutional double jeopardy considerations would also not bar a state prosecution following the federal prosecution). Indeed, the vast majority of murder prosecutions are made under state law, and there are very few murders that take place which are beyond the jurisdiction of any U.S. state and any foreign country, that are in the jurisdiction of the U.S. government and covered by a federal homicide statute, in any year. As noted by @hszmv in a comment to another answer: Federal Murder charges are a thing and can be prosecuted, but are normally reserved for murders that either involve federal government employees (especially if they are murdered because of the duties the performed in the course of their duty or the status as a federal employee) OR murders that occur on Federally Owned Property OR the Murder involved crossing state lines OR is in U.S. Jurisdiction but not in a territory or state jurisdiction (usually applies to some uninhabited territorial islands or U.S./International Waters). Further, a pardon would not prohibit the victim's family for suing the murderer for wrongful death, and indeed, probably wouldn't prohibit them from using the murder conviction that was pardoned to conclusively establish liability in a civil case under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (I haven't researched that highly specific and technical civil procedure issue, however, but even if that wasn't possible, the murder trial transcript would be admissible in the civil case). A civil judgement for wrongful death was famously obtained against O.J. Simpson by the victim's family after O.J. Simpson was acquitted in a criminal murder trial. This tactic would really only be helpful to a prospective defendant with respect to cases where there is not a parallel criminal offense under state law. | In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source. | I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired. | The president alone has power, under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, to grant pardons for federal offenses. Many states have an analogous power for governors, to pardon state offenses. In some states, though (for example Minnesota), there is a board in charge of the process (made up, in Minnesota, of the Governor, Chief Justice and Attorney General). Likewise, in Canada, pardons are granted by a board. Although POTUS has the power, in terms of implementation it is a bit more complicated, since he doesn't sit around wondering "Who should I pardon": he has an Office of the Pardon Attorney who makes recommendations. However, there are other ways to get out of jail (besides doing the time), namely having the conviction overturned, being paroled, and credit for good behavior. Federal parole is no longer an option, but the other avenues are open, at least in principle. | The concept of reasonable suspicion is used throughout the common law world. While the Wikipedia article (at present) focuses on the term as used in the ‘stop and search’ context of Terry v. Ohio, a different line of authority has emerged in the interpretation of police powers (both with and without warrant) in Commonwealth countries. Commonwealth case law One significant authority is Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942, a decision of the Privy Council on appeal from the Federal Court of Malaysia. This case concerned the interpretation of a power of arrest, under the Malaysian Criminal Code, which arose if “reasonable suspicion existed of [the plaintiffs’] having been concerned in an offence …” Lord Devlin, delivering the judgment of the court, said: Suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: “I suspect but I cannot prove.” Suspicion arises at or near the starting-point of an investigation of which the obtaining of prima facie proof is the end. When such proof has been obtained, the police case is complete; it is ready for trial and passes on to its next stage. It is indeed desirable as a general rule that an arrest should not be made until the case is complete. But if arrest before that were forbidden, it could seriously hamper the police. To give power to arrest on reasonable suspicion does not mean that it is always or even ordinarily to be exercised. It means that there is an executive discretion. In the exercise of it many factors have to be considered besides the strength of the case ... There is no serious danger in a large measure of executive discretion in the first instance because in countries where common law principles prevail the discretion is subject indirectly to judicial control. Lord Devlin noted that “the test of reasonable suspicion prescribed by the Code is one that has existed in the common law for many years,” and continued, citing Dumbell v Roberts [1944] 1 All ER 326: The police are not called upon before acting to have anything like a prima facie case for conviction ... Prima facie proof consists of admissible evidence. Suspicion can take into account matters that could not be put in evidence at all. The Privy Council’s judgment was quoted with approval by the High Court of Australia in George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104. Terry v. Ohio Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) involved testing police conduct “by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and deciding whether, if the petitioner’s constitutional right had been violated, the exclusionary rule should prevent the use of evidence obtained in the search. The Supreme Court held: [T]he quite narrow question posed by the facts before us [is] whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest. It is important to remember the constitutional context of Terry v. Ohio. The analysis of a statutory grant of search powers upon reasonable suspicion, particularly in a jurisdiction with no constitutional bill of rights, is a different exercise. It is also significant that one purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to curtail the abuse of the royal writ of assistance, which a customs officer must hold to exercise the power conferred by s 161 of the Customs and Excise Management Act! The Customs and Excise Management Act There is a good chance that a statute of the United Kingdom, conferring police-like powers on a public officer upon reasonable suspicion, would be interpreted in accordance with the long history of the use of that term at common law. The scope of any litigation would probably depend on the procedure that brought the question before the court – for example, judicial review of a warrant, an action to recover goods, or an action for damages. I am not aware of any case law on s 161. Perhaps there are not that many customs officers holding a royal writ of assistance. But any court reviewing the scope of that power would consider the purpose of the legislation, as well as the traditional common law meaning of ‘reasonable suspicion.’ |
Can I modify the YouTube licenses in order to make a YouTube video about SO Content? I would like to create a YouTube video about content from StackOverflow. The licenses of SO do not seem to be compatible with the two licenses offered by YouTube as described in an answer here. The same answer also indicates that it might be possible to modify the licenses offered by YouTube by simply putting the desired license into the description. Am I really allowed to modify the offered licenses by YouTube to my liking? If yes, on what basis? | TL;DR: Technically, the SO and YouTube licenses are (probably) incompatible, so if you want to use copyrightable elements from SO in a YouTube video, you'll have to get permission from the original author. Certainly it never hurts to ask, even if you might not strictly need it. You cannot change the YouTube license… When you upload a video to YouTube, you have to choose between one of (currently) two licensing options: "Standard YouTube Licence" and "Creative Commons – Attribution". Neither of those licenses is exclusive, so you're certainly allowed to also license your video (to YouTube and/or anyone else) under some other terms. (That's what the answer you linked to means by "[stating] a license in your video description".) But even if you do so, your original license grant to YouTube still applies in addition to the other license. You can't just turn around and say that haha, no, you were just kidding, it actually doesn't. (And if you try to do that, and actually get someone at YouTube to notice, their most likely response is to simply take your video down. They're a huge company with millions of uploaded videos — they're not going to care about just one video, or even one channel, at least if it doesn't happen to be one of the handful of their most popular ones.) …and you must license derivative works of Stack Overflow content under CC BY-SA (not CC BY!) According to the Stack Overflow Terms of Service, "subscriber content" on SO (and other Stack Exchange sites, including this one) is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution–ShareAlike license (CC BY-SA, version 2.5, 3.0 or 4.0 depending on when the content was posted). The "human-readable summary" of this license, as shown on the linked page above, says (emphasis mine): You are free to: Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially. Under the following terms: Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. ShareAlike — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your contributions under the same license as the original. No additional restrictions — You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits. Note that this is not the same license as the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 license (CC BY) offered as one of YouTube's licensing options. In particular, the CC BY-SA licenses include the "viral" ShareAlike condition, which requires any derivative works based on the licensed work to also be licensed under the same CC BY-SA license (or one of a handful of designated "compatible licenses"). So if you e.g. make a derivative video based on a CC BY-SA license Stack Overflow post, you must also license your video as CC BY-SA in order to be allowed to distribute it at all. …and you (probably) can't just dual-license your video to YouTube either In principle, there's an option that might be allowed under the terms of CC BY-SA, and would at least seem to follow the spirit of the license: Upload your video to YouTube normally, selecting "Standard YouTube Licence". Also license your video to the public under CC BY-SA 4.0, e.g. by stating so in the video description or in the video itself. The idea is that, by explicitly releasing your derivative video to the general public under CC BY-SA, you've followed the requirements of the ShareAlike clause of the original Stack Overflow content's license (with some possible caveats regarding downloadability — see below). The remaining question, then, is whether you're allowed to also license the video YouTube itself under their standard license. And this, in turn, effectively boils down to the following question: Does the standard YouTube license allow YouTube to do something with your video that CC BY-SA doesn't already allow them to do anyway? If it doesn't, then the YouTube license grant is redundant: you're just telling YouTube "sure, I give you permission to do all these things that you already can do under CC BY-SA." If it does, however, then it's likely that you are not legally allowed to grant YouTube such permission to use your video, since it's (presumably) a derivative work of SO content it's based on, and thus may not be legally distributed without the original copyright holder's permission (which you and YouTube, again presumably, only have in the form of the CC BY-SA license). The tricky part here is finding out exactly what the "standard YouTube license" actually says. As far as I can tell, the actual terms of that license are buried in YouTube's Terms of Service, and basically say the following (plus some other stuff regarding monetization and content deletion that do not seem relevant here; emphasis again mine): Licence to YouTube By providing Content to the Service, you grant to YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, transferable, sublicensable licence to use that Content (including to reproduce, distribute, modify, display and perform it) for the purpose of operating, promoting, and improving the Service. Licence to Other Users You also grant each other user of the Service a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free licence to access your Content through the Service, and to use that Content (including to reproduce, distribute, modify, display, and perform it) only as enabled by a feature of the Service. As far as I can tell (and keeping in mind that I am not a lawyer), the "licence to other users" is innocuous — it's just a subset of the rights already granted by CC BY-SA. (And none of these license grants are exclusive, so they don't prevent you from also granting a more permissive alternative license, such as CC BY-SA.) Most of the "license to YouTube" also looks fine to me, insofar as it basically just allows YouTube to distribute the video on your behalf, which, again, CC By-SA already allows anyway. Mere mechanical modification of the the video for display purposes (such as downscaling it to a lower resolution, adjusting the playback speed, etc.) also does not seem particularly problematic to me, as such mechanical changes are generally not sufficient to create a new copyright, and thus your CC BY-SA license grant should extend to such mechanically modified versions as well. However, there are a couple of terms in the license, which I've highlighted in bold above, that may be read as allowing YouTube to create further derivative works of your video (and thus, potentially, of the SO content it is based on) e.g. for promotional purposes, and to release these derivative works under a license other than CC BY-SA. That would be a violation of the ShareAlike clause, and thus something that you may not give YouTube permission to do on behalf of the original SO content creator. Would YouTube actually do that with your video? Most likely not. Could they? Under that license, yes they could. Also, there's a potential issue with the clause in CC BY-SA 4.0 that says (in section 3(b)(3)): You may not offer or impose any additional or different terms or conditions on, or apply any Effective Technological Measures to, Adapted Material that restrict exercise of the rights granted under the Adapter's License You apply. The problem here is that YouTube does not normally permit downloading videos, and has been known to send DMCA takedown requests against software projects such as youtube-dl that attempt to circumvent this restriction. As such, only distributing your video on YouTube could be interpreted as an attempt to prevent viewers of the video from exercising their right under CC BY-SA to download, redistribute and create derivative works of it. Also, even if you e.g. included an alternative download link in your YouTube video description, that might not be sufficient to make you compliant with CC BY-SA, since you would still have granted YouTube a license to display and redistribute your video as they want, including in contexts that do not include your download link. …but your video might not be a derivative work in the first place However, all is still not lost, and in practice you might well be able to legally create a YouTube video based on a Stack Overflow post anyway. The first, obvious, question is whether your video even counts as a derivative work in the first place. Ideas cannot be copyrighted, and if all you're taking from the SO post is the idea, while not copying any specific phrasing choices or images or code, then your video won't be a derivative work under copyright law, and as such, you won't be bound by the restrictions of the CC BY-SA license. Also, even including e.g. small snippets of code may be permitted without turning your video into a derivative work, if either the pieces are simple and generic enough not to meet the threshold of originality required for copyright protection, or if your use of them in your video is permitted under fair use (US), fair dealing (UK and commonwealth) or similar legal doctrines in your local jurisdiction. In such a case, you're legally allowed to use them in your video without availing yourself of the permissions granted by the CC BY-SA license, and thus also without being bound by the restrictions included in that license. The tricky bit here is that the boundaries of copyrightable originality and fair use are notoriously blurry and vary between jurisdictions, and it's very hard to be sure on which side of them your use falls on without an expensive and uncertain legal process. When in any doubt, I would thus recommend not relying on them too much, at least not if your use is such that you could possibly imagine someone wanting to sue you over it. By the way, one of my own answers on Physics Stack Exchange was actually turned into a YouTube video by the "It's Okay To Be Smart" channel a couple of your ago. What they did was exactly this: while they followed the style and structure of the answer quite closely in many respects, they took care to rephrase everything in their own words and to recreate all the demonstrations and diagrams. Is their video legally a derivative work of my answer? Maybe, marginally — some of their diagrams look very similar to mine, and some of the similarities just might be distinctive and original enough to be copyrightable. But even if I wanted to sue them, this would be a tough argument to make and the outcome would by no means be certain. I do wish they'd at least included my name and a backlink, though. :/ …or the author of the original SO post might have multilicensed it Even if your video is a derivative work of an SO post, you might still be able to use content from the post in it without relying on the CC BY-SA license. In particular, the same content might also be available under another, less restrictive license that you can choose to follow instead. In some cases, the post your quoting might directly include an alternative license notice e.g. as part of a code snippet, making that snippet (or whatever the extra license notice applies to) dual-licensed. The code, images or text that you want to use may have been published elsewhere under a different license by its author. For example, you might find a copy of it on one of the author's GitHub repositories (example), or it might have been reposted on the author's blog. Or, in the case of code, it might actually come from an open source project available under a permissive license (example). (BTW, both of the linked examples above are also examples of code with explicit license notices on SO). In the absence of an explicit link in the post, Google can be your friend here. Just make sure that any versions with a different claimed license really are licensed by the author and not just unauthorized third-party copies. Some Stack Overflow users, such as myself, include a general dual-licensing statement on their user profile. Mine, for example, currently looks like this: Please consider any (original) code I post to Stack Overflow and other Stack Exchange sites to be released under CC-Zero unless stated otherwise. You may do whatever you want with it and don't have to credit me in any way, although of course that would be nice. In addition, to avoid ambiguity regarding the open source status of CC-Zero, you may also use, copy, modify, and/or distribute any original code I have posted on any Stack Exchange sites under the terms of the ISC license or any other OSI approved open source license, unless explicitly stated otherwise. If doing so, please use the copyright statement "Copyright <year of posting> Ilmari Karonen" if no other copyright statement is provided. (Disclaimer: the statement above has been written by me for my own use, and has not been reviewed by a lawyer in any jurisdiction. If you like it, you have my permission to adopt it verbatim or paraphrased for your own use, but I make absolutely no warranties regarding its legal effect or validity.) …or you could just ask for their permission Obviously, this is always an option, assuming that you can contact the author. One simple way to do that is to post a comment on the post you want to reuse, asking for explicit permission to use it in your video and/or for an alternative license with more permissive terms. Of course, it's up to the author whether or not they want to grant such permission. At a minimum, something like the following additional permission should be sufficient (noting, again, that I am not a lawyer and that the text below has not been reviewed by one): In addition to the permissions granted by the CC BY-SA 4.0 license (and incorporating the definitions therein), You may upload Adapted Material based on this Licensed Material to third-party content sharing sites such as YouTube, and in doing so grant such sites an additional separate license to the Adapted Material and any Licensed Material contained therein, as required by their Terms of Service, provided that: You follow the License Conditions of the CC BY-SA 4.0 license (including the requirements to license the Adapted Material under CC BY-SA 4.0 or a BY-SA Compatible License, and to indicate this to recipients in a reasonable manner), and You make a reasonable effort (e.g. by providing an alternative download link, if the content sharing site does not provide one by default) to allow recipients of the Adapted Material to download it in a manner and format that allows them to easily exercise their Licensed Rights to it. or, in non-legalese: Yeah, sure, you can make a YouTube video based on my SO post, as long as you license it under CC By-SA and include a download link in the video description. …and they might not care enough to sue you, anyway All things considered, it's extremely unlikely that anyone would bother to spend the time and money to actually sue you over a video based on a Stack Overflow post. At worst, if they really didn't like what you did, they might decide to send YouTube a takedown request for your video, since that's a relatively simple process. At that point, assuming that YouTube acts on the request and takes your video down, you basically have three options: cut your losses, let the video stay deleted and hopefully be more careful next time, contact the author of the source material and try to come to a mutually acceptable agreement with them (which, of course, you should ideally have done before posting the video), or if you really believe that your use of the SO content was not a copyright violation, you can submit a counter-notice to YouTube (who will forward it to the original claimant, who will then "need to respond with evidence that they’ve taken legal action to keep the content from being restored to YouTube" within 10 days). Of course, ideally you wouldn't ever let things get that far in the first place. And the way to do that is to follow the advice above, and specifically to: not reuse copyrightable content when you can easily avoid it, but instead express your ideas in your own words, and with your own pictures and code; when you do want to reuse content created by someone else, ask their permission if possible; when basing your work on freely licensed content such as SO posts, try to follow the spirit of the license as far as possible, even if you cannot technically follow it to the letter; in any case, always give credit where it's due, both for (potentially copyrightable) content and for (non-copyrightable) ideas and inspiration; and generally try to be nice to people whose knowledge, creativity and hard work you're building on. Of course, following this advice won't prevent someone from suing you for copyright violation (although it might in some cases reduce their chances of prevailing, and/or the damages they can successfully claim if they do). But it makes it less likely that they'll want to. | Let's examine some laws that may apply to your case Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) There are criminal penalties for willful infringement for personal financial gain. If you are only sending it to one family member through a private communication (eg not posting it publicly) and not selling it and one copy of the music video has a retail value of $1,000 or less then there will be no criminal penalties. But you may be liable for civil penalties. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) Courts have ruled that ToS violations do not constitute unauthorized access (or exceeding access) so you aren't in violation of the CFAA Civil Liability By downloading a video off of YouTube you are in violation of their ToS. There isn't enough prior case law for me to tell you the outcome here. You may be committing some sort of civil wrong by the act of downloading. In addition, you are distributing a copyrighted work without permission which would open you to more civil penalties. The real question is how likely is it for this to be enforced? Not likely. | Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence. | It's hard to say, under the Twitter TOS. They do not claim that copyright is transferred to them: "You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. What’s yours is yours — you own your Content (and your photos and videos are part of the Content)". But you do license the content: By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. You agree that this license includes the right for Twitter to provide, promote, and improve the Services and to make Content submitted to or through the Services available to other companies, organizations or individuals for the syndication, broadcast, distribution, promotion or publication of such Content on other media and services, subject to our terms and conditions for such Content use. Such additional uses by Twitter, or other companies, organizations or individuals, may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services. The totality of conditions, including the Twitter Rules, is ever-evolving and not apparently contained in a single link. From what I can tell, there is no condition that prohibits a user from copying tweets into a book. There are numerous statements about "respecting copyright" which refer to taking material that is not licensed to Twitter and redistributing: nothing about redistributing licensed material.A plain reading of the first bold sentence says that you can make your content available to the world, not restricted to "retweeting". | No If YT#1 gets a license from artist A, that permits YT#1 to do whatever copying and reuse is stated in the license. It might be narrow or very broad. Usually such a license will only grant permission to the person who asked. Unless the license also grants permission to YT#2, or to some broader group which includes YT#2, YT#2 cannot claim any rights under such a license. Assuming that the license does not include him or her, YT#2 has the same rights as any member of the public would, but no more. In general, pitch raising a piece of music is a way of creating a derivative work. In the US, under 17 USC 106 one needs permission from the copyright owner to create a derivative work. Otherwise doing so is copyright infringement. The laws of other countries, and the Berne Copyright Convention have similar provisions on this point. Creating a derivative work requires permission in all countries that I know about. "Piggybacking" is not a thing in copyright law. A copyright owner can give permission (usually called a license) to any person or group of persons that the owner pleases. The permission does not extend to anyone else. This is true in all countries. I should be clear that YT#2 needs permission from both YT#1, and from A. The way the question is worded I have been assuming that YT#2 had permission from YT#1, but a comment from grovkin made it clear that I needed to be more explicit about this. It is possible for a license to permit a person to pass on the license to others. For example, all CC licenses and all copyleft and most open source licenses do this, and others could. But the license must explicitly grant such permission. The one way in which a person might create a derivative work without permission and without it being infringement is if an exception to copyright applies. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more detail on fair use. Fair use decisions are made on a case by case basis, and generally depend on the detailed facts of the ase. But based on the limited info in the question, this would not qualify. It seems to use the whole piece of music, which tends to weigh against fair use. The new work does not seem to be transformative, that is, it seems to serve the same general purpose as the original. The new work might harm the economic value of the original, or might if many people did this. The original is creative, not factual. All of those weigh against fair use. Different countries have very different exceptions to copyright, and I do not know all of them. But the use described in the question does not seem to fit any that I know of. In any case, an exception to copyright applies to anyone, and does not depend on another person's license. It is thus never a form of "piggybacking". By the way, the question describes pitch raising ads "illegal". Making an unauthorized derivative work gives the copyright owner grounds to sue. If the owner does sue, and wins, s/he might be awarded money damages, and the court might issue an injunction ordering the infringer not to infringe again. But it would not normally be treated as a crime, and law enforcement would not be involved. In the US, only bulk copyright infringement, carried out as a business, is usually prosecuted (for example a factory churning out unauthorized music CDs). | What would be the legal validity of this behaviour? Your changes to the browser source of the website contract or license of Terms of Service (TOS) - essentially a "click-wrap" license - before agreeing to it means nothing in a legal sense, other than to void the contract. The other party (the website) can't possibly agree to those contract changes without them being submitted as contractual changes and agreeing to them, if they did agree to them. That's basic contract law. That website TOS probably has a clause that says that if you don't agree to the TOS in full, as written, without modifications, you can't use the website. And the TOS may also say that they reserve the right to prevent you from using the site by closing your account or even blocking your access. Your "witness" to the contract changes is meaningless, as your witness is not a party to the contract. And any witness to the fact that you have changed the terms of the TOS before agreeing to it would work against you in a civil proceeding as proof of your attempt at modifying the contract. | Yes, you can. To be precise, I claim that one can take BSD-licensed code and distribute it under the combined terms of both the BSD and the GPL licences. We know that, if I receive someone else's code under a BSD licence, I may redistribute it to you under those same terms. This is common practice, and not (I hope) in any way contentious. We also know that I may not redistribute it to you without the conditions that the BSD licence imposes; that is, I may not place less onerous conditions on you than BSD requires (that is, requiring the inclusion of the original copyright notice, the disclaimer, this list of conditions, and a prohibition on claiming the original author's endorsement on any modified version). So the question becomes whether I can distribute that code whilst adding more onerous terms than the BSD licence itself imposes. It is clear that I can. As the question notes, Microsoft is known to have taken code which it received under a BSD licence and used it in proprietary products. These come with very onerous conditions on the the use, modification, and redistribution of the derived code (usually, they permit one instance of it to be run, and no modifications nor redistributions of any kind). For clarity: if I were to seek from Microsoft permission to modify and/or redistribute the derived code, and they were to grant it, they would not be able to free me from the BSD requirements as they applied to the derived code; I would still need to comply with those. But they are perfectly capable of applying new, onerous requirements of their own. The GPL imposes conditions on redistribution that are more onerous than BSD's, but less onerous than those of most proprietary licences. I am therefore perfectly entitled to receive code under a BSD licence, and - with or without making modifications of my own - redistribute it, adding in the GPL's requirements, if I choose to. If I haven't modified the code, those added requirements are probably pointless; if you don't wish to be bound by them, you will go and get the code from the original author, who presumably will happily distribute it to you under the BSD licence. But if I have modified the code, and you wish to use those modifications, then you will need to abide by the requirements of both the BSD and the GPL licences, since both will apply to this new, combined work (the original code + my changes). | They certainly can make that a license term and revoke the license if you do not comply. However, revoking the license is all they can do to "forbid". Or they could sue you for damages without revoking the license. That said, you are free to consult how to use their software so long as you do not hold a license so that you are not bound by the terms AND you do not break the law e.g. copyright. How to do it is up to you to figure. Maybe you could simply consult users that do have a license — on their premises and devices. |
How much does civilian-jury cases impact legal precedent? Apropos of the Kyle Rittenhouse case: In the Rittenhouse case, one of the arguments made by the prosecution (I don't know if it was a "main" argument as I only watched snippets of the proceedings myself, but it was definitely presented by the prosecution) is that Kyle Rittenhouse lost his right to self-defence, or at least that right was impacted, by the fact that he chose to be in a plainly dangerous area (a riot zone) in a provocative manner (with a firearm). Therefore, he did not deserve the right to defend himself from a situation that "he caused" (according to the prosecution). Hypothetically speaking, let's say the civilian jury (whom, to my knowledge, are not law professionals and don't have knowledge of the law beyond what's instructed to them by the judge) agreed with the prosecution in this instance and convicted Rittenhouse based on this notion. The judge, of course, being a trained professional in the law, even if he disagreed with the conviction, would not be able to (to my knowledge) overturn the jury decision and would have to sentence Rittenhouse as guilty. To what degree could this case, decided by non-legal-professionals, be used as legal precedent in future, similar cases? Could it be used in future cases of life-endangerment (where the defendant believed their life to be in danger), providing the accompanying circumstances (dangerous area + provocative appearance) existed? Could it be used in other cases of attempted capital crime (e.g. where an attempted-rape victim defended themselves and caused grave bodily harm, including death, to the attacker), provided existence of the accompanying circumstances? | A jury verdict does not have any effect as legal precedent. Only appellate court opinions (that are not mere de novo bench trials of a court not of record) have effect as legal precedent outside the dealings of the actual parties to the case in future litigation with each other. Even then, an appellate court ruling is binding precedent only over the courts inferior to the appellate court issuing the opinion. | In the US, a person is generally protected from being tried for the same offense twice, but they are not necessarily absolutely "protected". If a jury convicts a person but the judge enters a directed verdict of not guilty, the prosecution can appeal that action (Wilson v. US, 420 U.S. 332). The reason is that the acquittal could be disposed of on appeal without subjecting the person to a second trial. In contrast, in Fong Foo v. US, 369 U.S. 141 the trial judge ordered the jury to enter a verdict of acquittal. The appeals court rejected the judges basis for ordering an acquittal: but Fong Foo was "protected" because there could not be a second trial (double jeopardy), and it does not follow that the jury would have convicted but for the judge's order. The question reduces to the limited circumstances under which the prosecution can appeal a verdict. For instance, the prosecution can appeal a tre-trial motion to dismiss, and since there was no trial, there is no second jeopardy. Within a single jurisdiction, the only circumstance allowing a second trial involves bribery of a judge (Aleman v. Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F.3d 302), where the basis for allowing a second trial is that defendant was not in jeopardy with the first trial. New evidence does not override a defendant's protection against a second trial, whether it is new DNA evidence or a confession. It does not matter if this evidence arises seconds after the final verdict is entered, or months after. Or even before, but the prosecution was unaware. | Civil litigation involves general causes of action that are available to anyone, including both private parties and the government. Civil courts are designed primarily to provide restitution to the injured party. Criminal courts exist for governments to exercise their police powers: specific, limited authority held only by the government. The principal purposes of criminal law are...well, they're debated, but broadly speaking, it's to punish and/or rehabilitate the criminal and deter future criminals. Because criminal conviction can result in jail time and even the death penalty, there are more stringent procedural protections accorded to criminal defendants than there are to civil defendants. So when the government's goal is to recover damages, it's easier for them to use the less burdensoome civil procedures, just the same as anyone else would. Let me give you an example. Someone steals your identity and runs up $100,000 on your credit card. You call the police, and they find someone they think is the guy. To convict him, the police must convince an entire jury panel that he did it, beyond a reasonable doubt--a high standard. He pleads the fifth, and without his testimony, the police may not succeed. If they do, he will be sent to jail, and he may also be ordered to give part or all of your money back. If the case is weak, however, the police may not want to spend their limited time on it--and that's their call, not yours. (This also applies to government agencies; only law enforcement can bring a criminal case, not any government agency.) However, you can also file a civil lawsuit. In that lawsuit, depending on the jurisdiction, you may only need to convince some of the jury--civil verdicts don't always have to be unanimous. You may even just face a judge, with no jury. And the legal standard is a "preponderance of the evidence," which in layman's terms just means "more likely than not"--a much easier thing to prove. Because the Fifth Amendment doesn't apply to civil litigation, you may even be able to argue before the jury that the defendant's refusal to testify suggests he's guilty. In summary: civil lawsuits use different rules and procedures, which may make it easier to recover money (or get other civil relief, such as an injunction) in cases where that's the goal. These courts are open to anyone, including the government. But if the government wants to use its special police powers to put someone in jail or get other criminal relief, they have to use the stricter criminal rules and procedures. | To provide an initial answer, without getting to the specific of the 51 statutory standards for self-defense in U.S. states and the exact Canadian standard, as applied to your examples, I'll make some general observations: Self-defense is a justification for doing something that would otherwise be illegal (intentionally using force against someone else). Self-defense justifications include a sense of proportionality. It isn't proper to use more force than is reasonably necessary to achieve the defensive objective. There are basically two levels of self-defensive force: Deadly Force and Non-Deadly Force. Preventing some crimes and harms is statutorily justified to do using deadly force (e.g. to prevent a murder). To prevent other crimes and harms statutes only justify the use of non-deadly force (e.g. to prevent shoplifting). The exact list of crimes in each category varies somewhat. Historically, for example, there have been some U.S. states that have authorized the use of deadly force to prevent a rape that does not put the life of the victim at risk, and others that have not authorized the use of deadly force for that purpose (I don't know if that is still the case). Typically, law enforcement officers are also authorized to use deadly force in some circumstances in which a non-deputized civilian could not. As a practical matter, a use of force that causes death is presumptively considered to be deadly force, even if the means used are not inherently deadly in all circumstances. Meanwhile, a use of force involving the use of a "deadly weapon" such as a firearm, is presumptively considered to be deadly force, even if it doesn't actually kill someone. But both of these "presumptions" (and I am using that term loosely in this answer, rather than with its precise legal meaning), can be overcome with relevant evidence. Mildly shoving someone with hemophilia (or tossing a dish full of peanuts in the face of someone with a severe peanut allergy), without knowing that this person suffers from this condition, is not a use of deadly force within the meaning of laws justifying self-defense, even if it actually ends up causing their death. Similarly, proving that you intended to and did, shoot out the tires of someone's car, or shot their foot, instead of shooting to kill, would not always constitute a use of deadly force for purposes of statutes justifying the use of force in self-defense. Getting to the specifics of the question, the majority rule would be that the use of deadly force is justified in most circumstances to prevent a home invasion burglar from harming you or other people in the residence, and to repel the home invasion burglar from the residence, although some jurisdictions would qualify this in one respect or another. The case that the use of deadly force is justified would be stronger if the home invasion burglar was armed than if he was not, and would be stronger if the homeowner was not physically competent enough to be confident of an ability to dispatch the invader in a non-deadly manner. If deadly force was justified in that circumstance, it wouldn't really matter how you killed him, nor would it matter that you intended to kill him to defense your home and the people in your home. If the law only authorized the use of non-deadly force in the circumstances, for example, because the burglar had seized an envelope full of cash and was fleeing the house, so you were really only using force to protect your property, rather than to protect your home or the safety of the people in it, at that point, then the analysis would get tougher. If you intended to kill the fleeing thief in circumstances when only non-deadly force was authorized, the weapon you used wouldn't matter. You intended to use deadly force, the force you used caused the intended death, and you did those things even though the law didn't authorize you to do so in those circumstances. If you didn't intend to kill the fleeing thief in circumstances when only non-deadly force was authorized, but you ended up killing him anyway (so that you didn't have a prohibited intent behind your actions), then the question would be whether your intent and belief that your actions would not kill him was reasonable under the circumstances. If you caused his death with your bare hands, or with a less lethal weapon (in truth, there is no such thing as a non-lethal weapon), your belief that the thief wouldn't die from your use of force would be more likely to be seen as reasonable. If you caused his death with a lethal weapon, your belief that the thief wouldn't die from your use of force would be less likely to be seen as reasonable. If the jury (or a judge in bench trial) didn't believe you were reasonable in your use of force which you didn't intend to be deadly, then the jury (or judge as the case might be) would not allow a self-defense argument to prevent them from convicting you of some kind of homicide crime. So you would probably be convicted of some form of homicide (perhaps heat of passion manslaughter), although you might still not have the requisite intent for first degree murder in circumstances like that (so that your self-defense argument might end up providing you with an incomplete defense). | The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se. | I assume you mean to ask whether the guilt of the victim affects the validity of a crime-of-passion defence. canada In Canada, the only crime-of-passion type defence is provocation, today codified at s. 232 of the Criminal Code. Provocation is only relevant to a count of murder. If the person who committed what would otherwise be murder "did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation," then the conviction is reduced to manslaughter. Current codified defence: victim must have done something that would be an indictable offence punishable by five or more years of imprisonment One of the statutory requirements for a successful provocation defence is that the victim must have conducted themselves in a way that "would constitute an indictable offence under this Act that is punishable by five or more years of imprisonment." This is an objective element of the defence, not dependent on the perception of the accused. One court has found this limitation to the defence to be unconstitutional (R. v Simard, 2019 BCSC 531). However that court would still require that the "conduct of the victim [to be] of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control..." The common law and the previous codified defence also required provocative conduct by the victim Both the common law and the pre-2015 codification of the provcation defence required that the victim's provocative conduct be "of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control" (R. v. Cairney, 2013 SCC 55 at paragraphs 24-35). Burdens for establishing this defence The provocation defence is an "air of reality" defence (R. v. Cinous, 2002 SCC 29, paragraph 57). This means that there is an initial evidential burden on the accused. There must be evidence on the record that, if believed, could lead a reasonable properly instructed jury to acquit (or, in the case of provocation, to convict of manslaughter instead of murder). Once the accused meets this burden, then the defence is properly in play and will be successful unless the Crown disproves any element of the defence beyond a reasonable doubt. | Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification. | Yes, there is a good chance. Ordinarily, the law as written is what is enforced. On occasion, the wording of the law is actually ambiguous, or vague, which means that the jury will need an instruction as to how to interpret the law. In fact, juries are not literally read the statute, they are given a set of decision-making instructions so that they can decide "If we find X, we must acquit; if we find Y we may convict". Your attorney will, if he is diligent, note the problem and strive for an instruction that favors the client. (The prosecution will of course object). Eventually, on appeal, a court will decide what the law "really means", and that decision might be strictly based on the letter of the law, or it might be based on a supposed spirit of the law, i.e. what the legislature "originally intended". That outcome is determined in part by the jurisprudential ideology of the prevailing justices of the appeals court. Usually, letter of the law prevails until a higher court rules that a particular "spirit" is what was originally intended. |
One sided i.e. unilateral termination clause in a contract; Does this render contract void / unenforceable? I am a non-lawyer reading a relatively simple contract draft where everything else seems fine and dandy but the termination clause just says the following: You agree that Company (A) retains the right to terminate this agreement at anytime. Don't such unilateral termination clauses (sans notice) make a contract void and unenforceable? Just curious. It's a low stakes contract (somewhat of a formality) so I don't care much either way, but just wanting to get my legal fundamentals right, now that I have a chance. Edit: (a) Does a clause like this give party A any advantage over the other? As it stands, both parties are allowed to terminate so long as they communicate, right? And without mentioning notice periods or acceptable causes for termination what value does a clause like this add? (b) More generally what is the utility of a termination clause when it does not add details about notice periods, or acceptable causes etc? A simple termination seems a recourse that is implicitly allowed, in any case, right? Whether I put such a termination clause or not? e.g. "Both parties have a right to terminate this agreement at any time" What's the utility of such a clause? Even if I didn't write this explicitly that's what will be the default position? | Unilateral termination clauses are legal and very common They even have a name: termination for convenience. However, a contract is not terminated unless and until it is communicated to the other party. Rights and obligations that have accrued up until termination are enforceable. | This is not a "if you breach the contract we may sue you" clause. This is a clause which says "if we find you trying to breach the contract, we can ask a court to stop you from doing so (even though you may not have actually breached the contract at that point in time)". The provision entitles the aggrieved party to specific relief - in this case, by the way of an injunction. Specific relief means relief of certain determined nature or of a specific kind, rather than a general relief or damages or compensation. Essentially, the clause that provides that if the receiving party of the confidential information threatens to disclose such information, the disclosing party shall be entitled to ask the court to specifically order the receiving party not to disclose the confidential information (as opposed to post-facto asking for damages for the harm caused by reason of such disclosure). In the absence of this provision, a court may rule that the disclosing party has no locus to take pre-emptive legal action, as no damage has been caused yet by the other party. | Clarity is always better than ambiguity in drafting a contract. Conflicts about contracts are always easier to resolve when they are formed then when they are on foot. If you are concerned that the clause can be interpreted in the way you suggest (and it is not a groundless concern) raise it now and have the clause redrafted to remove the ambiguity. | Is this even legal? Yes, it is lawful. The Ontario Tenancy Act does not seem to outlaw that type of clauses. But the clause (or lease) will be binding only if you agree to it. Also note that the clause refers to reasonable costs, which implies that those costs must be for a reasonable cause. In other words, the landlord would be barred from recovery of legal expenses if you persuade the Board that the landlord's complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Notwithstanding that the clause is lawful, I would personally discourage you from agreeing to pay the adversary's attorney fees. Note that the clause may apply in the event that neither party fully prevails, whence it is in your best interest to preclude the risk of having to reimburse the landlord in that scenario. | Assuming there is a contract (and it is not clear that there is), this is a purported liquidated damages clause. Alice is trying to dictate what Bob will owe her if he breaches his promise to not share the file. However, there are limits on what can be stipulated in a liquidated damages clause. Super Save Disposal Inc. v. Blazin Auto Ltd., 2011 BCSC 1784: The enforceability of a liquidated damages provision in an agreement engages two competing objectives: freedom of contract versus the right of the courts to intervene in a given case to relieve against an oppressive or unconscionable result flowing from enforcement of the liquidated damages term. It is well settled that the enforceability of such a term turns on whether it is a genuine pre-estimate of the expected loss that a party will sustain in the event of a breach of contract or a penalty clause so oppressive or unreasonable that equitable intervention is justified to prevent an injustice. Judicial interference with a liquidated damages provision will be justified if enforcement of the term results in payment of a sum which is extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach Oppressive liquidated damages clauses work against a person's freedom to breach and the possibility of efficient breach. Perhaps if the file were a trade secret like the Coke recipe, the $1,000,000 might be a genuine pre-breach estimate, but without much more information about the nature of the file, I predict a court would find the $1,000,000 to be extravagant and unconscionable in comparison to the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach. What follows is less researched. If it is not a contract then I think it is at best a licence, which would make Bob's agreement to pay $1,000,000 a free-standing unenforceable promise. I also agree with Matthew's position on the possibility (and limitations of) a claim in promissory estoppel, especially in jurisdictions following Waltons Stores or similar reasoning. | are contract terms enforceable that say the employee has to pay the employer if they leave without giving notice? Yes, as long as the penalization is not of punitive nature. The doctrine of at-will employment is only the default condition, but a contract may supersede it. As for the extra question, reciprocity of sanctions (as in leaving without notice) is not a requirement for enforceability of a contract. In general, the lack of reciprocity only signals that there is a difference in the parties' bargaining power, but usually that does not affect enforceability. | If two parties have a contract, where one party is required to do X in exchange for the other party doing Y, then the terms specified in that contract would determine what happens. You would have to see exactly what it says, especially if the other party has the option to not give you money. A contract might say "A shall at his option give B $5,000 by date X; if A elects not to make payment, notice must be given 60 days before X". Failing to give timely notice is thus breech of contract. However if the clause only says "A shall at his option give B $5,000 by date X", then there is no requirement for advance notice. And this assumes that there is a contract whereby both parties have some obligation to the other. A gift, on the other hand, carries no obligations on the giving party. There may be some social code to the effect that they should have told you by now, but failing to give advance notice is at most rude and certainly not legally actionable. | Is it even possible for two separate agreements to be made exactly contemporaneously? The issue is not whether two separate agreements on the same matter(s) can be entered at exactly the same time. By contemporaneous agreement, a "Supersedes Previous" clause refers to any agreement which was in force at the time the new one is entered (or just prior to the new one being entered). what happens if other agreements have this clause (that it supersedes all other agreements)? doesn't this result in multiple agreements superseding each other? There is no general answer to that, as it highly depends on a wide range of circumstances. For instance, if two (or more) mutually superseding, contradictory agreements are drafted by the same party, the non-draftsman may invoke the doctrine of contra proferentem to determine which agreement is binding for the controversy at issue. When contra proferentem is inapplicable, ambiguities would be adjudged in a way that is most consistent with the intent of the parties as ascertainable from the rest of terms and conditions. The fact that two parties knowingly and willfully entered contradictory agreements can only complicate the task of identifying the legitimate intent of their contract(s). In a context where the legal relation is so fuzzy, things can backfire when the dispute is adjudged. Thus, it is not in the parties' best interest to deliberately commit to flawed clauses in the first place. |
How can the UK government fine itself? In this news story the UK government has been fined £500,000 but who is doing the fining? Is the government fining itself? | Expanding on @Rick's answer, the UK government does not hold all of its money in an undifferentiated general fund (although much of it is held that way). In non-profits and government, one generally uses "fund accounting", in which particular pots of money can only be used for particular purposes and the government keeps track of how much money is held in each fund. In this case, credit in a fund for cabinet operations would be transferred to a fund for privacy violation fines whose disposition would be set forth either in the Data Protection Act (2018) itself, or in some other piece of legislation (perhaps statutes on court administration) setting forth how funds collected as fines are used. This said, the intuition of the question isn't wrong. When one part of the government fines another part of the government, especially if the fine has the impact of preventing the fined part of the government from carrying on necessary governmental operations, the economic effort of the fine can be swiftly wiped out in the next annual appropriations bill, or in an interim emergency appropriations bill, if necessary. And, if the individual offenders who committed the violations aren't penalized, this may not be a very effective incentive to bring about compliance with the law. Of course, even if the economic incentive that the fine creates to comply is negligible, this doesn't mean that the symbolic and political cost of holding a government agency accountable in the same way that a private firm would be held accountable, that indicates the magnitude of the wrong done, is meaningless for the politicians running that agency. | The facts you describe are very likely an infringing derivative work which would provide a basis for a lawsuit against the person operating the website. But, nothing is certain, and these determinations are highly fact specific. It is highly unlikely that the government would enforce a violation of copyright alleged in these circumstances criminally. | No, a penalty clause is illegal, end of story. A contract could include a "liquidated damages" clause – this is how late fees are legal – that if you breach the contract in a certain way, you will compensate the company for the damage that you have done (bookkeeping, interest on money owed) in a standard and reasonable manner. Incidentally, what you describe is slavery, which is illegal throughout the US. The closest you could get is if the company offers a benefit for staying with the company for some period of time, then the employee might forego that benefit if they don't fulfill that aspect of the contract. | Claiming to be independent is probably not a crime: the family that say they have set up the Principality of Sealand have never been prosecuted (though that may have something to do with the difficulty of arresting them). It does not, however, excuse a British subject from the ordinary duties of paying taxes and the like; anyone in a more accessible (and more clearly British) part of the country would be subject to the normal forms of law enforcement, including imprisonment for contempt of court if they refused to obey court orders. Despite the more eccentric theories of the 'sovereign citizen' movement (who do exist in the UK), the fact that somebody living in Britain is subject to British laws is not open to negotiation. Resisting this law enforcement by force would not be a good idea: as well as the fact that the Government has access to bigger and better armed forces than you do, it would probably render you guilty of treason. The Treason Act 1351 (as amended and translated) makes it illegal to "levy war against our lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere"; the good news is that the death penalty for treason was abolished in 1998 (some time after that for murder). | The government cannot seize property because a person residing at that property has a tax debt: the debtor has to have a legal interest in the property, which you say you don't have. The government can seize property under the practice of civil forfeiture, which is a legal dispute between law enforcement and property – the simplest way to put it is that the property itself has "done wrong" (is involved in illegal activity). That's not what tax debt is. It is possible for the state to seize property in error, so just because the state makes a mistake somehow does not mean that the state cannot file the paperwork and seize the property if the owners ignore the summons. | In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe). | Given that this is a UK based company, the most applicable Act would be the Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971 A person who, not having reasonable cause to believe there is a right to payment, in the course of any trade or business makes a demand for payment, or asserts a present or prospective right to payment, for what he knows are unsolicited goods sent (after the commencement of this Act) to another person with a view to his acquiring them [for the purposes of his trade or business], shall be guilty of an offence and on summary conviction shall be liable to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale. This law specifically refers to [unsolicited] charges for entries in directories. You also mentioned that they're misrepresenting that a company is already a customer and sending out invoices on that basis. That would be a breach of the Fraud Act 2006 A person is in breach of this section if he dishonestly makes a false representation As to their enforceability, that answer is no. If this came before an actual judge, the judge would throw it out in a heartbeat. No agreement was made to provide a service in return for a payment and these companies rely on sending threatening letters via (seeming) third-parties precisely because they wish to avoid that level of scrutiny. | No, it is not illegal in UK to use proxies. No, it is not like the tor concept. No, the ISP does not slow you down (they mostly throttle detectable p2p connections), but if you use public proxies, many of them will be unacceptably slow. Note: for things like facebook, a proxy is utterly useless. You already donated your private data to them, there's nothing to hide. |
When is a web-site owner obligated to report a crime? Suppose someone operates a web-based forum where users can post information for other users to view. While not a mandated reporter as defined by the state the operator lives in, the site users come from different parts of the United States and some from other countries. Would the operator be obligated to report a crime or suspected abuse which is posted by a user to law-enforcement agencies? If so, what criteria should be used to determine which agency or agencies they should report to? | It may depend on what offences are suspected of being committed. One example is: In the united-states under 18 U.S. Code § 2258A an Electronic Service Provider (ESP) is required to report apparent violations of sections: 2251 [Sexual exploitation of children] 2251A [Selling or buying of children] 2252 [material involving the sexual exploitation of minors] 2252A [material constituting or containing child pornography] 2252B [Misleading domain names with intent] 2260 [sexually explicit depictions of a minor etc] The report is made to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) who in turn forward the information to the relevant domestic or foreign law enforcement agency. The ESP is protected from commiting distribution or related offences when making the report by virtue of subsection (g)(4): Permitted disclosure by a provider.— A provider that submits a report under subsection (a)(1) may disclose by mail, electronic transmission, or other reasonable means, information, including visual depictions contained in the report, in a manner consistent with permitted disclosures under paragraphs (3) through (8) of section 2702(b) only to a law enforcement agency described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of paragraph (3), to NCMEC, or as necessary to respond to legal process. | You misunderstand the significance of the phrase "innocent until proven guilty." This is in part because you are not considering the entire phrase. The full phrase is that an accused party is "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This does not mean that the accused is innocent, only that criminal procedure must take as its starting point that the accused did not commit the crime. The major implication of the presumption, and indeed its original purpose, is that it places the burden of proof on the prosecution. This means that if a prosecutor asserts that you stole something, you do not have to prove that you did not. Rather, the prosecutor must prove that you did. The only reason to present evidence of your own is to rebut the prosecutor's evidence. Another practical implication is that a decision to detain someone awaiting a criminal trial may not be based on the assumption that the accused committed the crime. On the other hand, that decision is not based on the assumption that the accused did not commit the crime. There is a presumption of innocence, but no assumption of innocence, and the government is not obliged before the person is convicted to treat the person as if there is no accusation or charge. Wikipedia has a decent discussion. If we modify your question accordingly, it becomes How can two people be presumed innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? Now the answer should be clear. The prosecutor must develop evidence that shows which one of the people has committed the crime. If the prosecutor cannot do that, neither person may be punished. | Police have discretion in the enforcement of the law Which is to say, police get to decide which crimes they make arrests for, which they handle with warnings, which they report and which they ignore. This applies whether they are in uniform, undercover or off-duty. If they abuse this discretion then they are liable to disciplinary action. If they apply it corruptly or otherwise illegally then they are liable to criminal sanction. | Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest. | In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless. | Section 230 (of Title 47) grants immunity from civil liability under certain circumstances, so the website is not liable to the porn-distributor for taking down their images. There are also criminal laws pertaining to child porn, such as 18 USC 2252. It is not a crime to "see" child porn. Instead, the crime is defined with reference to one who knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction... of child porn. Therefore you cannot be prosecuted if you do not know that the image is has the prohibited characteristics (is child porn). See US v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64 for discussion of th scienter requirement. The surrounding circumstances (the report) at most indicate that the moderator has some reason to believe that it is porn, and the immediate deletion of the material supports the conclusion that the moderator's action complies with the law. Paragraph (c) of that law also provides a defense, in case of prosecution: It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating paragraph (4) of subsection (a) that the defendant— (1) possessed less than three matters containing any visual depiction proscribed by that paragraph; and (2) promptly and in good faith, and without retaining or allowing any person, other than a law enforcement agency, to access any visual depiction or copy thereof— (A) took reasonable steps to destroy each such visual depiction; or (B) reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and afforded that agency access to each such visual depiction. | The police only get involved with criminal matters. So when your question assumes police involvement, the logical conclusion is the host parents allegedly committed some crime. If that were the case, let's say the crime were something like child abuse, criminal negligence or abandonment of a minor. Then the prosecutor's office and/or CPS (Child Protective Services) would do an investigation and, if warranted, refer the matter to the jurisdictional prosecuting attorney's office who could file criminal charges and pursue a prosecution. | You are referring to Michigan State Police v. Sitz 496 U.S. 444 (1990). It does not require or suggest a requirement of advance publication of any details regarding the checkpoints. The dissent mentions that "a sobriety checkpoint is usually operated at night at an unannounced location. Surprise is crucial to its method." This point was not countered or even mentioned by the majority. In this case, a state committee had created guidelines setting forth procedures governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity. The mentions this as a background fact, but does not rely on the existence of these guidelines as a requirement for the constitutionality of checkpoint stops. It does contrast checkpoints with "roving patrol stops". Quoting from Martinez-Fuerte 428 U. S. 543 (1976), the majority in Sitz said: "at traffic checkpoints, the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion". There are state guidelines, some states have constitutions prohibiting sobriety checkpoints (lots of case law at the state level regarding this), and some state legislatures have made these illegal. In Sitz, the checkpoints were being operated subject to guidelines developed by the Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee (of the State Department of Police). Federally, the NHTSA has guidelines on visibility and publicity towards the goal of effectiveness. |
What is personal jurisdiction and how can it allow someone to not respect the copyright of another individual? https://web.archive.org/web/20110713050011/http://blog.internetcases.com/2009/01/22/no-personal-jurisdiction-over-australian-defendant-in-flickr-right-of-publicity-case/ The court similarly found that any purported agreement with Wong via the Creative Commons license was not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. The Creative Commons license did not require Virgin to perform any of its obligations in Texas. Instead, the license permitted the photograph to be used anywhere in the world. Furthermore, Chang failed to show that Virgin performed any of its obligations in Texas. It used the photograph solely in Australia, the one place that, according to Virgin’s evidence, it was authorized to sell its products and services. Finally, because Virgin only used the photograph in Australia, the license that permitted its use was centered in Australia, not Texas. What is personal jurisdiction and how can it allow someone to not respect the copyright of another individual? Also, does that mean that Chang can sue Virgin in an Australian court? | A court must have both personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction Personal jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the parties to the case, for example, a New York court does not have personal jurisdiction over a murder committed in California. Subject-matter jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the law, for example, a Small Claims court can only hear cases where the amount in dispute is below the small claims threshold. In the case you cite, the court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction because the alleged tort took place in Australia, not Texas. Or, more precisely, the connections to Texas were too insubstantial to enliven it’s jurisdiction. Importantly, this was not a breach of copyright case. It is undisputed that Virgin had a valid licence (the CC-BY 2.0 that the photographer had granted to Flickr) and complied with it. Chang was pursuing “a number of tort claims including misappropriation of Chang’s right of publicity”, not copyright infringement. Further, unless the photo was a selfie, Chang would not be the copyright owner; copyright in a photograph belongs to the photographer, not the subjects. Chang can sue in any or all of the states or territories in Australia where the ad was broadcast and the relevant court would probably decide that it did have personal jurisdiction. However, the case would fail because breach of the “right of publicity” is not a tort recognised under Australian law. That is, if Virgin had done what they did in Texas it might have been illegal but because they did it in Australia, it wasn’t. | There is ample reason to conclude that "non-commercial" would include a church, as well as advocating a political cause or candidate. The hard part of "personal". In the context of (Canadian) bankruptcy law, it can mean "non-business use"; in the context of "personal use property", it can be "A type of property that an individual does not use for business purposes or hold as an investment. In other words, property that an individual owns for personal enjoyment". US tax law takes "personal purposes" to refer to non-business purposes. But in the context of copyright (especially music downloading / copying), it is taken to refer to the use of or by an individual. Distributing free copies of a protected work does not get legally sanctioned due to the copying being non-commercial. The alternative term "private" is much clearer, in identifying "just you", but is probably avoided in this kind of context so as to avoid the wrong inference that you can only play Pokemon in the privacy of your own home. So the slightly less clear term "personal" is used instead of "private" especially in copyright-related contexts. "Personal" and "private" are not exactly the same, but when it's about use, I don't see any difference, and I think there is no question that use to attract to a church or political candidate is not "private", it is public. Since the license does not define "your own personal purposes" and there is not an existing crystal-clear definition of "personal purposes", the phrase could be given its "ordinary (plain) meaning". Of course, plain meaning has to give way to contractual intent, so we have to figure out what the parties intended. Except, you don't have a contract with Niantic, but still, plain meaning surely has some place in the law of licenses. At this point, in a lawsuit, both sides would hire an expert witness like a linguist or English teacher to make the case that a church or other non-commercial non-private use is / is not included in the meaning of "personal purpose". A silly argument could be made to the effect that if you personally have an interest in doing something then it is a personal purpose (if specifically commercial, it would be precluded by the term "noncommercial"). What makes this silly is that everybody does things for personal purposes (even acting in a way that benefits others, since you do so for the personal reason that you should do so), and thus "personal" would not mean anything. That is, "personal purposes" does not mean "whatever motivation or interest you personally have". You can also gain a certain understanding of what "personal purposes" means by looking at similar licenses. In the context of academic publishing, authors are typically granted license to copy "for personal, professional, or teaching purposes". Professional purposes and teaching purposes are things that the person has an interest in, so by mentioning these things separately, we must conclude that "teaching" is not a "personal purpose". And so: I would conclude that a court could find that using a product to support a political campaign, philosophy, or religion, is a "public" purpose, not a "personal" purpose. At the same time, at least as I understand it, a lure module is a thing that others besides yourself personally can see (I admit, I don't go), which implies that the purpose of the thing is not entirely private. In addition, there is a fair amount of buzz out there about how a lure could be good for business, which is (1) clearly in contradiction of the license terms and (2) clearly a golden opportunity for Niantic, perhaps in a few weeks after everybody gets hooked and then they will offer non-personal licenses. Their license terms also say that you will not "use the Services or Content, or any portion thereof, for any commercial purpose or for the benefit of any third party or in a manner not permitted by these Terms". I would say that that definitively says "No don't do it", and it also means that you can't be nice to a neighbor. So what they literally say and what they really intend are probably completely different things. | You've tagged this as both united-states and european-union, so this answer is about the United States. Before you can "license" someone to do something, you must first have the legal right to prevent them from doing it. Otherwise, your purported "license" is just a worthless piece of paper (technically, you might be able to sell those pieces of paper notwithstanding their lack of validity, so I suppose they wouldn't be completely worthless). If we imagine that the subject of a biography or autobiography wants to control the publication of that biography, there are a number of legal grounds that might be cited, depending on the circumstances: Copyright: The person who actually wrote the biography (who may or may not be the subject!) can prevent others from making copies or derivative works of it, as well as several other rights enumerated in 17 USC 106. Most publication agreements involve signing an exclusive license with the publisher. If the author has not signed such a license, then the biography is not going to be published in the first place. Regardless, copyright only exists once the work is "fixed in a tangible medium" (e.g. saved to a hard drive, written down on a piece of paper, etc.). If it's still "in your head," then you don't own anything. If the subject and author are different people, then the subject does not have any rights here at all; copyright belongs exclusively to the author. Furthermore, copyright only protects the individual work. It does not prevent someone else from writing a different biography from scratch, so long as this second biography is original and does not reuse any content from the first biography. The underlying facts belong to no one. Privacy rights are generally handled as a tort under state law. If the subject is a public figure (i.e. the sort of person who's likely to have a biography written about them) then privacy rights tend to be rather limited. However, they are not nonexistent, and invasion-of-privacy claims are occasionally raised, usually in cases where highly personal, sensitive information is disclosed against the will of the subject. This may also become relevant if the author of the biography obtains information in an illegal fashion such as by hacking or physical trespass. However, in most cases, the content would need to be pretty far beyond the pale before this would have a realistic chance of succeeding. Personality rights are usually considered an extension or variety of privacy rights. In general, they allow the subject to prevent their name from being associated with a commercial endeavor without their permission. However, it is likely that the First Amendment would bar the application of personality rights to a biography, unless the publisher tried to misrepresent a ghostwritten work as an autobiography without the consent of the subject. Libel is a tort under state law. Libel laws in the US are extremely limited, and the subject would need to establish at least all of the following in order to succeed (or else the claim is barred by the First Amendment): The defendant published a statement. A reasonable person would interpret that statement as factual (and not an opinion, puffery, etc.). The statement is materially false (i.e. the "gist or sting" of the statement is false, regardless of whether it is technically 100% accurate). The statement harmed the reputation of the plaintiff. The defendant knew the statement was false, or made no serious effort to verify it ("actual malice"). Not required unless the plaintiff is a public figure, but the subject of a biography probably will be a public figure. There may be additional requirements depending on the state, and the defendant will probably try to file an anti-SLAPP motion if state law allows for it. Of these four rights, copyright is by far the most commonly "licensed," followed by personality rights. Nobody gives out licenses to commit libel or invade their privacy. That leaves us with two ways of licensing your (auto)biography: Actually write it yourself, and sell it to a publishing company. You will give them a copyright license as part of the process (in exchange for royalties and an advance). Convince a publishing company to hire a ghostwriter for you, and then license your likeness to them. The public will be told that you "wrote" the book, and you will promote it in exactly the same way as if you did write it. Neither of these options will prevent someone else from coming along and writing their own biography about you, of course. | Yes, but ... You can bring a suit in an Australian court of competent jurisdiction. You would then need to find and serve the defendant in compliance with both Australian law and the law of the jurisdiction they are in. They can then raise a jurisdictional challenge that the Australian court is not the appropriate forum - they might be right depending on where the substance of the contract happened, whether the contract has a nomination of venue clause and if the contract is subject to an arbitration agreement. If the Australian court decides it does have jurisdiction it would have to decide which law applies - this is likely to be a mix of law because some laws in both jurisdictions are likely not excludable by contract. If you win, you would then have to get the judgement enforced somewhere the defendant has assets. Not paying a judgement is not a crime so the defendant will be of no interest to law enforcement - getting money from them is your problem. tl;dr Cross-national litigation is way more expensive in time and money and way less certain in outcome beyond the inherent uncertainty in any lawsuit. This is not something you can expect to succeed at without lawyers in both countries so you will be spending tens of thousands for an uncertain outcome. If you are chasing millions this may be worth it but if you are - don’t do million dollar deals by email in the future. | In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage. | Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence. | You may want to select a state where you have some sort of presence. According to this article, personal jurisdiction can be waived, but subject matter jurisdiction can not, and "for pragmatic reasons some states deny subject-matter jurisdiction to specific claims, such as those arising in other states". In other words, if nothing about you, the other party, or the case has any relation to the state, the court doesn't necessarily have to listen to the case. And if that happens, the provision about them submitting to the jurisdiction is worthless. Beyond that, are you OK with going to court in the location you select? Do you know whether all your terms and conditions are valid in that location? Do you know whether one place or another has more favorable interpretations of the laws, or more favorable local rules, when it comes to the types of disputes you are likely to have? You probably want a lawyer to help you decide. | All the CC licenses permit anyone to use the licensed content, and to make copies of it for others. Some of them permit using it for commercial purposes, others (the ones including the -NC- clause) do not. Some CC licenses permit creating modified versions of the original work (derivative works), others (the ones including the -ND- clause) do not. I do not know of any standard license which allows users to create and distribute derivative works, but not to distribute the original. The license used by Project Gutenberg permits re-use and re-distribution, but if a fee is charged beyond recouping expenses requires the removal of the PG name and logo. One problem is that if derivative works are allowed, this would include works which are only trivial modifications to the original, which would have the effect of allowing distribution of the original. If the main concern is about commercial sales, possibly a CC-NC-SA license would effectively serve the purpose? That allows redistribution, including of derivative works, but forbids commercial reuse or distribution without separate permission, and requires all redistribution to be under the same license. Otherwise a new license for this situation might have to be created. It is often a good idea to have the assistance of a lawyer with IP expertise in creating a new license, or the wording chosen may have unexpected effects or include unintended contradictions. Or one could simply place a basic copyright notice along with text such as "Modified versions may be created only with permission from the author. Request permission at [email protected]". However, if the work proves popular, there might be a large volume of requests. |
Is it copyright infringement to make a derivative work for personal use in the US? In this comment, user253751 writes: You cannot create derivative works without permission of the copyright holder (even if you create it and keep it to yourself) really? That seems unconstitutional or something (in countries that have that). You should be allowed to do whatever you want with your own stuff in your own home. Is the maker of the comment correct? Or is the quoted answer (by user gnasher729) correct? What is the US law on making derivative works? | The comment is incorrect; creating a derivative work without permission is still disallowed, even for private use. In US copyright law 17USC 106 defines the exclusive rights that the copyright holder has, the right "to do and to authorize". The second of these is: (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; Note that the right is the right to "prepare" a derivative work, not the right to "distribute" or "sell" the work. US copyright law defines a derivative work in 17 USC 101 which reads: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. The laws of other countries are similar to US law on this point. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (3) Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. However, it should be noted that if a person creates a derivative work in private, and never shows it to anyone else, the copyright owner would never learn of it, and so could never sue for infringement. But if it were shown or described to anyone, and the owner did learn, then he owner could in theory sue. Whether the owner would choose to sue over a derivative work never circulated is a different matter. The real effect of this law is that when an infringing derivative work is distributed and the owner wants to sue, the owner need not prove distribution. Proving creation of the derivative work is enough. The quoted comment asks about whether such a rule is "unconstitutional or something" and says that "You should be allowed to do whatever you want with your own stuff in your own home." The US constitution does not grant any such broad right. There are lots of things one might do in own's own home that are illegal: building a bomb for example. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution, sometimes called the Copyright Clause or the IP clause, grants Congress the power: To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. See the LII page "Intellectual Property Clause" and the page Nature and Scope of the Right Secured for Copyright where it is written that: Congress was within its powers in giving to authors the exclusive right to dramatize any of their works. Even as applied to pantomime dramatization by means of silent motion pictures, the act was sustained against the objection that it extended the copyright to ideas rather than to the words in which they were clothed. {Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). For other problems arising because of technological and electronic advancement, see, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).} See also the Wikipedia article "Copyright Clause". | Generally, no, this will not violate copyright. Your end user might violate copyright, but that is their problem not yours. Your program is a tool, just like a word processor is. If I copy a Harry Potter book into a word processor that does not make the word processor maker liable. There is a concept of "contributory infringement", which I think is what you are concerned about. I don't know about Danish law in particular, but most countries would require evidence that you had reasonable knowledge that actual copyright violation was occuring, rather than just being aware that it might happen in theory. This is normally applied to file sharing services who have to have "notice and takedown" measures, file filters and the like. This isn't your concern as you never have any access to the files created by your users. You can also be found liable if you induce anyone to commit copyright violations. Don't draw your customers attention to the custom monster feature as a workaround for those copyrighted monsters, as that could be considered to be inducement. Also don't provide any "wizards" or similar tools which make it noticeably easier to duplicate the custom monsters (e.g. if you notice that the copyrighted custom dragon stats are all on a linear scale with dragon size, don't create a "dragon creation wizard" embodying that fact.) This assumes that your program runs entirely on the end user computer. Its different if you provide any kind of cloud storage for generated characters. | Am I as the user of this site in any way liable if the music turns out to violate copyright? Yes. In a similar way to if I give you “permission” to take my neighbour’s car. Only worse. Because stealing requires intent - you have to mean to do it - while copyright violation is strict liability - if you do it, you’re guilty. If the user that uploaded the item did not have the authority to give the site permission then the site does not have permission and neither do you. If you take reasonable precautions such as performing a reverse image source and verifying that the item appears to be owned by the same person everywhere and, perhaps, reaching out to them then your violation will be an “innocent” infringement which mitigates but does not eliminate damages. The only way to be sure with copyright is to know the provenance of the copyright/licences back to the original creator. | The situation in Texas is unclear. It is worth mentioning Texas as a state where the law may require statutory authorization in order to copyright state documents. Although the statute does not explicitly state such as a requirement, it can be inferred from an attorney general opinion. At a bare minimum, the Department of Health, the State Preservation Board, the Water Development Board, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and county governments all have statutory authority to hold copyrights. In your specific case, there's an additional complication. Something is only a work of the State of Texas if one of the following is true: 1) it was created by a government employee as part of their job duties, or 2) it was a work for hire. It's quite likely that neither of the above is true for a student newspaper, rendering the question of Texas-owned copyrights irrelevant. | Basically, you cannot do it. You are required to include the MIT license in any derivative work. However, that holds only for the parts that you import from this other project. You can identify which parts of the final product are copied from the MIT-licensed program (and indicate "these parts are subject to the following MIT license"), and then you can do whatever you want with the remainder that you wrote. The downside of not licensing your material is that nobody can use it. To use it, people would need permission, which is what a license is. If you don't license it, you don't give permission, so people can't use it. You presumably want to subject your own contribution to different licensing conditions, so then you would state those conditions and clearly indicate what parts of the code you wrote. | Is it ok to copy the game concept and even with mostly similar content like "fighting", "building houses" etc ? Yes, but ... I should also mention that pretty much my whole User Interface is based on the User Interface from "Parallel Kingdoms" Is copyright violation. Ideas are not protected by IP law. The tangible representation of those ideas (art, words, layout, format etc.) is protected. | I believe the author has published it online. I agree. It is posted at his publisher's website. However, I am unsure if I'm allowed to read it. This answer assumes you are in jurisdiction whose copyright laws is based upon the Berne convention (i.e. the civilized world + USA). Assuming it was the author published it online, it is perfectly legal to read it. Technically, the author is performing his work by putting it online, and by reading it, you are just enjoying his performance. Also, if you are in a jurisdiction with an explicit exception from copyright for personal use, or where fair use allows making copies for personal use, it would also be legal to download it, or to print it on paper (but for personal use only). As for downloading and printing for non-personal use - that is not legal in Berne jurisdictions. | It doesn't make a difference if the product is free or commercial use, if it's initiated by a company or an individual. What you are considering would be a "derivative work" and without explicit permission from the copyright holder, it is considered a violation. |
MIT and GPL-3.0 conflicting licence I am creating a project for myself based off of two different GitHub projects. Code from each of the two projects are used in my project, and I am planning on releasing it to the public. The conflict I face is that the two original GitHub projects my project is based off of each have differing licences. One has the MIT licence, and the other has the GPL-3.0 licence. Both of these licences require that any resulting code from those projects are released under the same licence. Therefore, what licence should my new project be released under, or do I have a choice to choose whichever I want? Thanks | You have misunderstood the MIT license. The MIT license requires you to include a copy of "the above copyright notice and this permission notice" in "all copies or substantial portions of the Software." However, this is not the same as requiring you to offer the Software under those terms, and in fact the MIT license explicitly permits you to sublicense the Software under different terms ("including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software"). If you had to offer the Software under the same terms, then the sublicense right would be extinguished, so that cannot be the correct reading of the license. Therefore, you can do exactly what you describe, releasing the software under the GPL. In other words, you have to include the permission notice, but you are expressly permitted to wrap it in terms that state "these permissions don't apply to you, dear end user, but only to people who go and download the original from the upstream source." That's what "sublicense" means. The Free Software Foundation, which publishes the GPL, agrees with this analysis (although they recommend avoiding the phrase "MIT License" because MIT has offered software under other licenses). | The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use. | There isn't a meaningful difference; they just renamed it for version 2.0. Comparing CC-BY-ND-NC 1.0 and CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 side-by-side, one can easily see that their scope is the same--there is some rewording, but that rewording is common to all CC-1.0 vs. CC-2.0 licenses, and not indicative of any change in the fundamental scope or purpose of CC-BY-ND-NC vs. CC-BY-NC-ND. | Yes, you did something wrong; you used both the university's trade mark and copyright without their permission. I don't know the law in India, however, if it is similar to Australia it is unlikely that the police will be interested in doing anything about it. While it is technically a crime, criminal prosecution is usually reserved for egregious breaches on a for profit basis. I suggest you apologise and agree to stop distributing your app. | This can't be right. If I modify open source code as part of the work done, by nature of the open source license that code can not become intellectual property of the client. Certainly it can. That which is "developed or produced" would be the modifications to the pre-existing code, i.e the copyright on the derivative work so created. If the base code was under a share-alike or copy-left license, then the client can only distribute it under the same license (or a compatible one, perhaps). But nothing compels the client to distribute it, and for the client's use, the client owns the copyright, without fear of any future claims by the contractor. If I have my own code/scripts/settings/templates/etc that I use as a contractor, and I modify those in the interest of coding efficiency in the interest of serving the client, it hardly seems correct that these assets become property of the Client. Those are your work, and you can choose whether to sell the copyrights to the client or not. Again, only the work done for that client would be covered under the wording quoted above, unless there is another provision that grants the client a license to use the pre-existing work which you modified for the job, which there probably ought to be. Or I suppose the agreement could assign copyrights in pre-existing work to the client, but that seems an odd choice, and the language in the question would not do that. You and the client could agree on a different provision such as: The contractor grants to the client a fully-paid, non-exclusive permanent license to use all intellectual property developed under this agreement, and any pre-existing works that may be incorporated therein. The contractor warrants that s/he is entitled to grant such license, without infringing on the intellectual property of any other person or entity. That wording would have the contractor retain all copyrights and other IP, but provide a license to the client to use it without further payment or expiration. Many other ways to structure such a provision are possible, dividing the rights up however the contractor and client can agree. The price for the work might vary depending on what rights the client obtains. Both forms, and many others, are perfectly legal, it is just a question of what the contractor chooses to sell, and what th4e client chooses to buy. | united-states The license won't let you sell the .stl file. Probably you have created a derivative work, which means you can't sell it without a copyright license (and the CC-A-NC won't do). If it were licensed under CC-A you could sell it without problems (you'd have to give attribution, of course). You could also sell it under the CC-A-SA, but once you do you have no control over the result -- anyone you sold it to could give it to someone else under the terms of the license. This could work, though, if it were (say) a commission and you only expected to sell one copy. I don't know what the situation would be with the physical objects printed under any of these licenses. | It doesn't work like that! If the code is not properly licensed, you can not acquire a license for it. If you don't have a license, you can not use it. Usage without a license is copyright infringement and not allowed: the copyright is with the author, and only the author may make derivates or copies or allow them to be made by licensing it. You do not gain copyright by fixing a licensing error - in fact, you commit copyright infringement if you do not have a license, and providing wrong copyright management information is illegal under 17 USC 1202 | Since licensing can only be done by the copyright holder, you generally need individual permission from each copyright holder to change the license of their code. (If the project is being re-licensed to the GPL from a compatible license, then no re-licensing from the copyright holder is necessary; however, versions 2 and 3 of the GPL are not compatible with one another.) Ways around this are: Remove or replace all code written by the unreachable contributors. Have contributors assign copyright to a person or legal entity that controls the project, so that there is exactly one copyright holder. (This is a preventive measure. If you have not done this already, it's too late when you cannot track down a contributor.) But if you can't do either of those things, what do you do? Historically, re-licensing of software without explicit approval from all contributors has been done before, under the advice of legal professionals. However, the legal mechanics of it are unclear and have never been tested in court. The two prominent examples appear to be: Mozilla relicensed from the MPL to a triple-licensed MPL/GPL/LGPL scheme The Dolphin emulator relicensed from GPLv2 to GPLv2+. The Dolphin project produced a report about the process, but it lacks any specifics about how the legal mechanics of the switch work. They say (emphasis mine): Out of all [200 contributors], we managed to contact all or take care of the code of all but 10 of those developers. Considering that many of those accounts are now dead and the people seemingly vanished from the Internet, finding the rest is akin to squeezing blood out of a stone. That's when research provided us some much needed relief when it seemed as though relicensing was an impossibility. In 2003, Free Software lawyers consulted for Mozilla's relicensing project and stated that relicensing with the permission of just 95% of contributors was fine, as long as there were no objections in the remaining 5%. [...] [...] Instead of simply asking all of our active developers and relicensing, we made a very strong effort to get a hold of every single developer. Despite this, it simply wasn't feasible to make contact with every single person who worked on Dolphin. [...] We definitely would love to hear support from those that we were unable to contact, and if there are any concerns we will gladly address them in a prompt fashion. That posts links to a post from Ciaran O'Riordan: Someone who works with many lawyers on free software copyright issues later told me that it is not necessary to get permission from 100% of the copyright holders. It would suffice if there was permission from the copyright holders of 95% of the source code and no objections from the holders of the other 5%. This, I’m told, is how Mozilla was able to relicense to the GPL in 2003 despite years of community contributions. There is no information available about why Mozilla's lawyers believed it was acceptable to re-license without each copyright holder's permission. It's also unclear if any factors apply to Mozilla specifically that might apply less strongly to anyone else in a similar situation. In sum, we know only that: You need the permission of every contributing copyright holder to re-license a work Mozilla's lawyers believed (for unspecified reasons) it would be acceptable for Mozilla to make a good-faith effort to contract all contributors and then re-license, even if 5% of the contributors were unreachable (and none of the contributors disapproved). |
Why can the UK's Competition and Markets Authority tell Facebook to sell Giphy? The UK's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) tells Facebook owner to sell GIF library Giphy. But since Facebook (now Meta) is an American company, what authority does the UK have to tell Facebook to sell Giphy? | My understanding is such: It doesn't matter where the company is incorporated (e.g. incorporated in the US = "American company"). It matters where the company does business. Companies must comply with the law in ALL countries that they do business in. Facebook does business in the UK, so they must comply with UK regulations, including those by the CMA, just like any other UK company. So, what can Facebook do? Comply Appeal Ignore and face legal penalties (fines, suspension of ability to do business in the UK, seizure of UK assets, etc.) Stop doing business in the UK (e.g. see Google News leaving Spain over their news aggregation law). | Can't we get a legal action about AdBlocker as web masters? No. I assume that by "web master" you mean a server admin who contracts with entities which are seeking to advertise their goods and services. An advertiser pays the server to transmit (or send(), in terms of a socket API) certain content to whoever submits a GET or POST request ("the client"). The scope of the contract ends there, and the end consumer or client is not a party to that contract. Any point beyond the server admin's routers, it is perfectly lawful for end users to run some program on the client side where the purpose of that program is to (1) parse any packets received in the client socket, (2) filter out some of it, (3) and forward the rest to a browser. Bringing legal action against AdBlocker would be somewhat akin to suing producers of TV remote controls under the allegation that the mute button functionality blocks advertisement content. | By posting an image (or any other content) on an openly accessible page, a person such as Alice is implicitly giving permission to anyone to view or read that content, although not necessarily to make copies of it. A link from a page operated by Bob to such content is not making a copy, nor is it any other form of infringement. However, there are other possible cases. For example, if Alice sells access to her pictures, placing them behind a paywall, so that only those who have paid have a valid ID/PW set to gain access, then if Bob provides a link that bypasses the paywall, that may well be contributory infringement (CI). When Bob builds a business model on encouraging or facilitating infringement, that will be CI. If Alice does not post her pictures, but Charlie gets copies and posts them without permission, a link from Bob's site to Charlie's may be CI, particularly if Bob gets per-click revenue or other benefits for increased traffic. | A document can be distributed under more than one license. Just because it has been made available under a CC license for free, doesn't mean that IEEE can't negotiate a different license with different terms that allow them to sell the content. (This is similar to the way that a software library can be available for free under a license that permits non-commercial use, but also be made available for a fee for commercial use.) If you want to know whether IEEE is legally selling Aaron Swartz's manuscript, you can contact Morgan & Claypool, the publisher that owns the copyright, and ask them whether this use by IEEE has been authorized by them. For the other documents you mention, contact MIT Press. Etc. | Very simply, they aren't selling genuine titles. There are two limited exceptions: Note that there is considerable difference between Scottish and English law in this area. You cannot purchase a genuine British title, with one exception, the feudal title of a Scottish baron; and certainly cannot buy a peerage title. Scottish Feudal Baronies fetch a mighty price; the Barony of MacDonald was up for sale at over £1 million. Richard, 7th Earl of Bradford, at http://www.faketitles.com/ For Scottish feudal baronies, For centuries baronies conferred important commercial benefits and legal privileges, but they are now personal titles with no powers or responsibilities. Holders are able to sell, gift or bequeath them, as ‘incorporeal’ property separate from the ownership of land, and there is a small but active market for them. https://www.lindsays.co.uk/services/for-you-and-your-family/scottish-barony-titles We generally estimate legal fees between £2,000 -£3,000 for the acquisition of a barony and £3,000 -£4,000 for an earldom. The barony itself will cost in the region of £75,000 or more in the case ofalordship, earldomor marquisate. https://www.lindsays.co.uk/assets/downloads/Buying-a-Scottish-Barony-Title.pdf In England, it is possible you can purchase a Lordship of the Manor, which does not give you a title, but enables you to put after your name, Lord of the Manor of Lower Piddling-in-the-Trough or some such place. Richard, 7th Earl of Bradford, at http://www.faketitles.com/ When I acquire a barony title what will my name be? Let us assume that your name is John Smith and that you have acquired the Barony of Strathglen. You can then style yourself John Smith, Baron of Strathglen. But note, neither Baron Strathglen nor Baron Smith of Strathglen because both of these would indicate a peerage title and barony titles are feudal titles. https://baronytitles.com/frequently-asked-questions/ | In theory, what Dale says. However, in practice: Nope, and that's why the trader is in Timbuktu. And I apologize profusely to the Malian people, I have every reason to think it is a fine country in which citizens obey international laws and honor claims, unlike certain other countries. In anglo/Five Eyes nations, Timbuktu tends to simply be used as a metaphor for "a country far, far away and different in its ways than us". If Bob is regularly buying things in the USA or Timbuktu, then either Bob works for Aperture Science and is using portals, or more likely Bob is using mail order. And now, we get to the nut of it. Most mail order sales are done by mail-order sellers who deal in volume. Those people choose their jurisdictions and venues carefully. And they have help. Do European or British consumer rights legislations bind the American/Malian trader to protect Bob, as the GDPR would? No! That's WHY they're in Timbuktu! (or, wherever they actually are; generally behind what I'll call the Red Curtain.) The point of being there is to be untouchable by civil action or government penalty due to that government's non-enrollment in international agreements, and outright obstruction of such actions. Yes, they and their legal team have crunched the question of "what happens when a European or Briton sues us? What happens when an Anglo or EU government tries to action us?" Their companies are structured so they slough those off at minimal real loss. Ever notice how many sellers have a company name that looks like they rolled their face across a keyboard? That's a sockpuppet shell company, and they have thousands of them. If their other layers of defense fail, they simply fold that company and create another. Their government lets them do this, because they chose jurisdictions wisely. A huge fraction of mail order sales are done on this basis, typically through web sites which purport to be "only a marketplace connecting buyers to sellers"... even though some of those marketplaces also provide warehousing and shipping services to the third party ("only a warehouse" and "only a drop-ship firm")... and even though they are known for selling their own products, and use the smallest text on the page to mention that this particular item is from a third party. Not mentioning any names. This type of "be fully complicit in selling junk, while the seller of record hides behind the Red Curtain and uses arrays of shell companies to limit exposure" has become systemized in much of the mail order world. Another scheme I've seen is to trick American consumers into being the seller of record; these people end up "holding the liability bag", and are typically not insured and not collectible in any practical way. Of course you have lovely companies like Eaton, Midnight Solar, Harsco Rail, Roshel, ILSCO, etc. who will meet GDPR simply because it's the right thing to do, even if they don't have feet on the ground inside the EU or UK against which those governments might action. But nobody asks if they're subject to GDPR, do they? | That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D & E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small. | You might follow the Wikipedia links to the full holding. They did recognize that Google caches images, particularly thumbnails of images. Do a Find on "cache". From the 9th Circuit Holding - That local browser caching is fair use is supported by a recent decision holding that Google's own cache constitutes fair use. |
Why can't the current legal system handle liability for harm caused by artificial intelligence? I'm confused about why people claim that current legal system cannot handle any wrongdoings of algorithms that involve artificial intelligence. The claim is that it is impossible to find who is liable for the wrongdoing. This claim seems strange: isn't it obvious that it's the company who developed the algorithm that is liable for any issues that this algorithm caused? Can someone explain where the current legal system/framework/laws break down when it comes to any harm caused by artificial intelligence? | Real-world situations are rarely so clear-cut Let's say, hypothetically, that I'm in the driver's seat of a car. The company told me that the car has "Full Self Driving" capabilities based on some sort of artificial intelligence, though they also said that these capabilities "are intended for use with a fully attentive driver, who has their hands on the wheel and is prepared to take over at any moment." Let's say I was not fully attentive at a moment when the car's AI decides to swerve into oncoming traffic, and I fail to grab the wheel and prevent that. Who's at fault? Is it the car company's fault for a bug that caused that? Is it my fault for failing to be fully attentive? Is it some combination of the two? But wait, it can get more complicated: maybe the car company argues that they couldn't have reasonably anticipated the situation that caused it: maybe the lines were incorrectly drawn on the road, and indicated that the road continued in that direction. Maybe I argue that the car swerved quickly enough that even a fully attentive driver couldn't have recovered. These and more are all facts that need to be sorted out in a trial. There's no way to simply say that "any issues that this algorithm caused" are entirely the company's fault. In other words, this isn't really the legal system "breaking down"—it's working as intended, trying to figure out whose fault an event actually was. The law just isn't very developed yet as to the process a court would follow to assign liability. | What statute is s 11(4) of UCTA 1977 referencing? Any and all current statutes (already in force or that may be enacted in the future but before the event occurs) that bear on the reasonableness of the attempt to limit liability. In theory, this is all current statutes. In practice, the vast majority of statutes will be self-evidently non-applicable. In this example, we are talking about contract law so statutes about crime, defence, fishing, aerospace, farming etc. are clearly not relevant. So, a practitioner needs to know which statutes will bear on contract law, and specifically on limitation of liability, and look at those. No one said studying law was easy. | In common law jurisdictions like the United States, this would probably be controlled under normal tort principles, which would mean that the answer turns on the hacking victim's state of mind. If the victim is unaware of the virus or unaware of the hacker, she probably has no duty to the hacker, and therefore cannot be held liable for any injury he suffers as a result of her failure to address the virus. But if this a case of a victim laying a trap for a potential hacker, then you have a variation on the old "spring gun" cases. The classic example is Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971). In that case, a man owned an house -- abandoned for about a decade -- that kept attracting burglars and vandals, even after he boarded it up and posted "no trespassing signs." So Briney rigged up a shotgun to fire at anyone who entered the bedroom. About a month later, two antique collectors went into the house looking for old bottles and jars. One of them, Katko, opened the door to the bedroom, and the gun basically blew off one of his legs. Although he was convicted of breaking into the house, Katko sued Briney for negligence. The jury awarded Katko $20,000 for medical expenses and the like, as well as $10,000 in punitive damages. Consistent with the approach of most courts, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the verdict: The value of human life and limb, not only to the individual concerned but also to society, so outweighs the interest of a possessor of land in excluding from it those whom he is not willing to admit thereto that a possessor of land has ... no privilege to use force intended or likely to cause death or serious harm against another whom the possessor sees about to enter his premises or meddle with his chattel, unless the intrusion threatens death or serious bodily harm to the occupiers or users of the premises. So I'd argue that a person who leaves a virus lying around his computer, hoping to infect a hacker, is like Briney, intentionally laying a trap to injure someone who he could probably just defend himself against instead, and therefore liable to the hacker for injuries. But I could also argue it the other way: Briney's trap was designed to inflict bodily harm or even death against a person who posed no real threat, given that the property was abandoned, while a computer virus merely disables the hacker's weapon, and is used against someone who is attacking property that has greater value than an abandoned house, given the quantity and often extremely sensitive nature of contents on a personal computer. So the answer, as always, is that it could go either way. | I finally found the actual transcript of the voir dire part of the case mentioned in the question. http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2012090614295190 As can be evidenced from the transcript, the judge has specifically instructed the two jurors working as engineers at the local tech companies that they'd have to "forget" what they know about both the software engineering and the patent law itself, too, starting their work on the whole case with a completely clean sheet, using a very simple criteria for making decisions: One side or the other is going to have the burden of proof on -- one side has the burden of proof on some issues, the other side has the burden of proof on other issues. When you go into the jury room to deliberate after you've tried your hardest to understand the evidence, if they haven't educated you on it or if they haven't persuaded you, the party with the burden of proof loses. It's that simple. You don't have to -- you have to make a good faith effort to understand it, but if the party with the burden of proof has failed to do that, the party with the burden of proof loses. That's the standard. You have to -- you, the jury, decide. Now, what you cannot do is bring to bear something that you've learned in some other case, some other patent case, about how some piece of equipment works or something like that. You can't do that. It has to be based on the record here. Then, after a short break and a consultation with the lawyers, where Oracle seems to have expressed some concern to having the computer experts be on the panel, which subsequently prompted the judge to declare the following to the two potential jurors who worked at Cisco and HP: So this is really going to be directed at both of you, but, you know, you come to the party, so to speak, with some prior training that bears upon the subject matter we're going to be hearing a lot about here. That's okay. That's not disqualifying, but you -- it's okay to use your common sense when you render a verdict, but you cannot add to the record in court something that you know about the way software programming works that the witnesses didn't actually testify to. You see what I'm saying? You've got to decide the record -- the case based on the record made here as opposed to adding into it what else you may have known about the way programming and software works. Since both jurors had so much software and patent experience that they couldn't disregard it easily, they were thus both excused (page 95 of 224). All right. I think it would be too hard for you to sit in this case and sort out what you knew already against what is proven or not proven here, and itwould not be fair to the parties to have that extra burden even though you two actually know something about the subject. It's in a way too bad, but it's for the best. So you two are excused to go back to the jury assembly room. Thank you. The other instructions that the judge gives to the potential jurors is also worth reading (starts on page 36 of 224) The full transcript is at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/OraGoogle-942.pdf. In summary -- jurors are only allowed to talk to one another when the deliberation process starts, and, no, they are not allowed to bring any "baggage" to the case at stake. | A case for negligence or some other tort would likely never reach the stage where we could answer this question, as lawyers are generally immune from suit for their litigation conduct. I don't know of any case with facts likey you've described, but my understanding is that the litigation privilege precludes virtually any tort action based on a lawyer's statements in the course of the proceedings. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, for instance, has specifically acknowledged that claims for defamation, extortion, fraud, perjury, forgery, slander of title, injurious falsehood are unavailable: The policy reasons for the privilege have often been repeated: In fulfilling their obligations to their client[s] and to the court, it is essential that lawyers, subject only to control by the trial court and the bar, should be free to act on their own best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of later having to defend a civil action for defamation for something said or written during the litigation. Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). | The answer to the question "can so-and-so sue me?" is almost always "yes", regardless of context. Such a suit might be baseless, and it might get settled in your favor, but you still have to spend the time and money to defend yourself. This can be disastrous for a start-up that's trying to get off the ground, and it's how patent trolls make their money. (I'm not accusing SnapChat of engaging in such tactics as a rule, of course; I'm just pointing out that the legal system does allow for them.) Whether or not you are likely to be sued is a separate question, and one that can really only be effectively addressed by a trademark attorney with full knowledge of the particularities of your situation. | This is part of an indemnification clause. Basically, the idea is that the service provider guarantees that if your business gets harmed because they let in an intruder, then they will absorb the losses if somebody sues you, as long as they have control of the court case and you cooperate with them in defending the court case. So, for example, imagine you are using a web hosting service. Suppose there is a vulnerability in the hosting service computers, and a hacker is therefore able to break into your web site and steal your customer information. Your customer sues you for allowing their credit card to fall into the hands of a hacker. The web hosting service's insurance will pay the damages if the lawsuit succeeds, as long as you let their lawyers (ie the insurance company's lawyers) run the defense of the lawsuit and you cooperate with them. The reason this language is there is because the "service provider" has an insurer that is guaranteeing them if they get hacked or something, then the insurer will cover any damages. The insurer requires them to make all their clients (like you) sign an indemnification agreement which includes the control clause. | I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly. |
How to prevent non-profit from being taken over? I am a board member of a very small non-profit (we have about 15-20 members). I have heard a real life story about how a non-profit similar to ours was taken over. A few "new members" joined that non-profit, invited a whole bunch of "friends and family members" to join as well, and when elections came those "friends and family" all voted for these "new members", which became new board members and changed the non-profit for worse. It was a purposeful take over. Edit (additional info): These "friends and family" did not exercise their own free will in voting process; they were told by "new members" to vote for them (for the sole purpose of "take over"), which they did because they are "friends and family". How can we prevent a similar scenario happening to us? We were thinking of only allowing people to vote after they were a member for like a year or two, but that could only delay the "take over". Is there a better solution? Update - more details on how we accept members. Currently anyone can join as a member. It's just a matter of "new member" meeting with one of our Board Members (BM), signing a bit of paperwork, signing up for PayPal auto-pay (there is monthly membership fee) and BM giving out an RFID card for access. We are currently working on improving this model to be more safe. If you have ideas on how we can improve this on-boarding model that could help solve the "take over" problem please share your suggestions as well. To answer this question in comments: are there criteria currently we don't have any criteria. However, if there would be criteria they would be something like "don't join our non-profit to steal things or to take over, or stuff like that". So, essentially, the nature of our non-profit is that anybody can join. The problem is filtering out people with bad intentions. | That isn’t a “takeover” Most importantly because not-for-profits do not exist as financial vehicles for their owners, they are a resource of the community for the benefit of their members, both current and future - that’s why they get tax concessions. Further, what you describe isn’t a takeover, it’s the members of an organisation expressing their democratic rights to have the organisation run by the people they choose to run it. The correct response from an ex-board member in this situation is to congratulate the winners, wish them luck, and offer them whatever transitional and ongoing support they can in the best interests of the organisation. A board member has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the organisation irrespective of their personal feelings and desires. You can disagree with the direction a new board is taking an organisation but that’s their call, not yours. Indeed, many not-for profits benefit, some even need, renewal at the board level. A junior sports club needs to be run by the parents of the children playing now, not those who played 30 years ago. What can you do? There are a number of things that can be done, however, given the fiduciary duty the directors owe to the organisation, some of these are … problematic to outright illegal. The list below is arranged from least problematic to least most problematic. Get big. The Red Cross and Amnesty International don’t have to worry about this because they have so many members that a small clique can’t gain control. Restrict membership. The organisation exists for a purpose, it is perfectly legitimate to restrict membership to people who are actively pursuing that purpose. For example, returned services organisations can legitimately restrict voting members to those who served overseas on active duty. Similarly, sporting clubs can legitimately restrict voting membership to those (or the parents of children) who are actively playing or coaching the sport. Stagger board elections. Board members serve for 2 years and only half the board is up for election at each AGM. Local law may prohibit this but it does provide for greater stability generally. Create executive positions that aren’t elected. For example, there can be an executive role for “past-Presidents” or Guardians who are appointed for a long-term, possibly life. Such roles legitimately create corporate memory and incidentally guard against the type of rapid turnover you are worried about. However, depending on local law, this might be illegal. In some jurisdictions, companies can set up poison pills to enhance the rights of existing shareholders over the rights of future shareholders. However, these are not legal in the UK for example and do not apply to the type of organisation you describe which has members rather than shareholders. Even if it is legal, such structures are often not suitable for not-for-profits as they may be ineligible for tax exemption, charitable status or to be tax-deductible gift recipients. Before doing anything, get legal advice. | Companies have a registry of their shareholders. Anyone with at least one share registered in their name is a shareholder of record. However, the vast majority of people who consider themselves "shareholders" aren't actually registered owners of a stock. Instead, almost all public stock in the US is held "in street name." That means that the stock is formally held in the name of a brokerage. What an individual has is "beneficial ownership:" the brokerage passes dividends on to the beneficial owner, will vote how the beneficial owner tells it to vote, and requires agreement from the beneficial owner before it can sell the stock. To make stuff even more complicated, the broker itself generally holds the stock in street name. Almost all public stock in the US is really owned by the Depository Trust Corporation in the name of Cede and Company (a general partnership of a few DTC officers). The reason public stock is mostly held in street name is efficiency. Transferring the legal owner of a piece of stock is a nontrivial process; until recently, it involved physically shipping stock certificates to the new owner. Even now that stock ownership can typically be transferred electronically, it's much easier to tell Cede & Co. "the new beneficial owner is this person." Because beneficial ownership is just a contract, you can skip all the formalities of updating the company's official register of shareholders. | In an extreme hypothetical situation: at a meeting where there is a quorum present, there are 50 members qualified to vote in attendance. An issue comes up for a vote, and 45 people abstain, 3 vote yes, 2 vote no. Would this pass 3 to 2, or is there some overriding part of "majority present and voting" that I am just not understanding? The measure would pass 3-2. The words mean what they say. Quorum requirements prevent the small number of people voting from being unfair. | You can't You are asking the analogue of "What happens when you start a game of chess with the black queen on D1?" and the only correct answer is "That is not a legal starting position, the only position the Black Queen may have at the start of the game is D8. Re-setup the board to how it should be." An AI can't hold property, because it is not a recognized legal entity, and trying to file for a transfer to an illegal recipient is in itself impossible. As such, all your plan fails on step 1 (transfer property to AI) and all other questions are moot - the position required can't come up legally, and attempting to get it done results in the documents that tried to do it being all Void and Null: The person that tried to get rid of the company is the owner. That person is liable for all the tax that needs to be paid. All lawsuits against the corporate or the owner proceed as if nothing had happened. YES, you could be sued for attempted tax evasion, communally called "tax fraud". | The shareholders can change who is the company director, but the company director runs the company (until he or she resigns or is forced to sign by the shareholders). So the company director is who has the say what happens in the company. If the contract is between Fred and John Smith directly, then I would expect John Smith to give the orders and to pay Fred. However, Tom is company director, so he can order Fred to stay off the company premises. He can't order Fred what to do, since there is no contract between Fred and the company, and the company won't pay Fred if it doesn't want to - it's up to John Smith to pay Fred from his own pocket. The whole setup is highly unusual. I would assume that the situation is unsatisfactory for everyone involved, so likely they will agree that the contract between John Smith and Fred is cancelled, that there is a new contract between Small Company Ltd and Fred, and from then on the company director gives the orders. | Why would the method by which you transfer a item that has a copyright impact the copyright? You buy a new book at a new bookstore, a used book at a used bookstore, a used book at a garage sale, someone gives you a book, you find a book on the sidewalk, you steal a book from a store, you buy and download an ebook, you give an ebook to someone on a USB stick, you download an ebook via Bittorrent. The author's copyright - as well as the design copyright, and any book company trademarks - does not change in any of those scenarios. Copyright around most of the world - read Berne Convention (Wikipedia) - says that copyright exists at the moment of creation of a work, i.e. a work that you say is "100% yours". This has nothing to do with the way the work may be transmitted or stolen or downloaded. A work in the public domain can still be copyrighted in terms of cover artwork and design, annotations, etc. Read Welcome to the Public Domain - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center You can say someone "owns" a book in the sense that they might have paid for it or it is personal property and one could justifiably call it theft if someone took it from them, but "owning" the physical or electronic copy in any sense doesn't mean you own the copyright. Read the copyright notice on a book or ebook; you get a license to read it, not ownership of it. Read What's the difference between Copyright and Licensing? - Open Source Stack Exchange. Sure, the TOS of a network can specify the ownership/licensing status of the files shared on such network. They will almost all explicitly say not to upload or share anything that will violate the copyright of that work. The TOS of a network could possibly say that anything that is uploaded is automatically licensed to them. A network could demand the reassignment of copyright upon upload, but that would have to be outlined in the TOS and is not simple. See Copyright Ownership and Transfers FAQs - Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center. | You can do it using a US non-profit, but you need a lawyer We know it can be done in the US using a non-profit because it has been done. For example, the Clay Institute’s Millennium Prize does exactly what you propose: it pays people who solve unsolved math problems. Similarly, the the Everglades Foundation used a prize to get people to come up with new ways to get phosphates out of the water sources. To do what they did, you need to follow their lead, and set up and run a non-profit (aka, 501(c)(3), named after the relevant provision of the tax code). Because non-profits are tax exempt under US tax law, you have to apply to the IRS to become a non-profit. Speaking broadly, the IRS imposes two requirements on non-profits: 1) It must serve a charitable purpose; 2) It must spend a certain percentage of its money every year doing charitable work. To set up a foundation you have to specify the charitable purpose you will serve (“encourage research in mathematics”), and have a plan to do so (“we will award a cash prize to people who solve important unsolved problems”). If the IRS decides your plan is genuine, then they give you a pass on paying taxes. To make sure you are carrying out your charitable plan, the IRS requires you to spend a certain percentage of your money each year on charitable work. (This is called the "distribution requirement.") Meeting the distribution requirement may be a problem, since you may not award prizes every year. You may be able to get a general idea about how the IRS deals with such situations by searching on line. At some point, however, you will probably need to talk to a lawyer with experience setting up non-profits. (FWIW, it looks to me as if the Clay Institute meets its yearly spending requirement by supporting lots of other activities that count towards the spending requirement.) One other problem that it seems you won’t have involves giving prizes directly to individuals. For obvious reasons, the IRS is generally suspicious of prizes given to individuals, so they impose restrictions. For example, for the winner to avoid taxes, the prizes have to be for previous work. Where to go for more information: USA.gov has a nice overview of the application process here. The IRS has several publications and websites that you might find helpful: here, here, here, and here. These cover everything from the general rules to nuts-and-bolts details about which forms to use. You can read more about the IRS treatment of prizes here and here. Depending on how comfortable you are with financial statements, you may learn about how these non-profits work by reading their 990 forms. The Clay Institute's forms are here. | You have several issues. Breach of Contract When you sign up with each of those services you are entering a legally binding contract and must comply with the terms of that contract. For example, this is taken from Facebook's terms: Here are some commitments you make to us relating to registering and maintaining the security of your account: You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission. You will not create more than one personal account. I haven't checked but its a fair bet that the other services have similar terms. Unless you have permission, what you are doing breaches these terms of service. If what you do causes damage to Facebook et al then they can sue you and your employer for damages. Even if it doesn't they can probably bar you from having an account for as long as they like. Improper use of images This is jurisdictional but it is generally required to have the permission of the subject of a photograph where that photograph is used for commercial gain. There are exceptions where the person is not the primary subject (e.g. crowd shots, or images primarily of something else where the person happens to be in the shot) but the type of photos you would use for these services are not going to be exempt. The sanctions for breaching this will be dependent on jurisdiction. Breach of Copyright Somebody owns the copyright in those photographs. If you do not have a licence to use them in the way you propose then you are breaching their copyright. The copyright holder can sue for damages (if any) and any profits you make. Vicarious Liability An employer is strictly liable for the actions of their employees, jointly and severally with the employee. That means a plaintiff can go after either the employer, the employee or both. An employee may have some statutory or contractual indemnity but this is by no means common. |
Is there a term for a legal professional who follows their client in their everyday life just in case legal advise becomes necessary? Is there a term for someone who acts as a "legal bodyguard"? That would be someone who follows someone around to looks after their legal safety like a conventional bodyguard looks after their physical safety? I suspect the people and cases where it would be worth the expense to never be cought without legal counsel would be few and far between, but I suspect they do exist. | There isn't a distinct word for this role in modern English, mostly because there aren't meaningful numbers of persons in this role. For example, in the TV series Succession, there are lawyers who act in such a role (accompanying a leading character on his yacht while on vacation, for example) and those people are simply called lawyers (a term that emphasizes their legal knowledge and expertise) or attorneys (a term that emphasizes their authority to take action on behalf of their clients as agents of their clients in legal matters). The concept also has some similarity to the 17th and early 18th century role of a factor (see definition number 2 at the link) before the legal profession became a regulated one, and the term attorney is an outgrowth of this sort of conception of the role. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1, the template for the ethical rules for lawyers in all U.S. jurisdictions, refers to a lawyer acting in that role as an advisor or counselor. A lawyer acting in such a role in U.S. practice is not limited to providing legal advice and can consider the client's needs more generally. Many organizations (for profit, non-profit, and governmental), however, have a general counsel or corporate counsel or chief legal officer or county attorney or city attorney, who works full time for the organization who is commonly described as in house counsel and serves a similar role for the organization. Sometimes this is a full time position, sometimes, it is a part-time position. Going back even further in history, this also has similarities to a courtier. @NateEldredge's reference to a consigliere in the modern sense of an advisor to an organized crime boss (who might be, but isn't necessarily, a lawyer) also isn't far off and traces back to the more legitimate feudal role of a particular sort of courtier. In modern politics, and less savory "gray area" activities corporate and criminal alike, a person who does something similar to this, who is sometimes, but not always, a lawyer, is sometimes also called a fixer. @grovkin also suggests in a comment, the title of handler which heavily overlaps with the notion of a fixer. In federal and state government, such a person would often be a chief of staff or a member of a President or Governor's "kitchen cabinet", although a personal lawyer in addition to the Attorney General and attorneys in the Office of Legal Counsel who also serve those roles exist formally as well. In the military, sometimes a staff officer fills a role similar to this one, especially if that staff officer is a member of the Judge-Advocate General's (JAG) corps. A couple more points not precisely responsive to the question. First, in some science fiction works, including Kate Elliot's "The Novels of the Jaran", the future equivalent of pretty much this precise role is called a Protocol Officer, effectively envisioning a merger of law, etiquette, and diplomacy in a more civilized world that is not balkanized and instead has only a single universal political system. (See also, e.g., C3PO, a Protocol Droid carrying out a similar role in the Star Wars saga.) I believe that similar roles (with job titles that have only Chinese or Japanese or Korean language terminology) were present in some of the heavily Confucian influenced monarchies of East Asia, in roles perhaps most analogous to military staff officers for feudal aristocrats and high officials. Second, in most civil law countries (in contrast to common law legal system countries), there are lots of people who earn an undergraduate bachelor's level degree in law without seeking to enter a licensed or regulated profession to become a true practicing lawyer in the common law country sense. Instead, these individuals typically seek managerial professional positions in businesses in much the way that a business major with a specialization in marketing or finance or management might. So, unlike, common law countries, in most civil law countries that is a significant population of people with formal legal training who are not lawyers or paralegals in the common law country sense. I honestly have no idea what kind of job titles people on that career track typically hold, or just how they use their legal training in the course of their careers. It might be that someone like this would sometimes take on the role described in the question, but I don't know enough to know if that is really the case. | I haven't reviewed the filings, but I can tell you that it's perfectly routine for lawyers to describe the other side's position as "plainly without merit," with no regard for the actual merits. The lawyer's job is to make his client look good, in court and in public; the existence of this question shows that he's doing a good job at least on the latter half of that equation. But in truth, it's such a generic thing to say that no lawyer who hears it will actually think it means anything. In all likelihood, the filing is like most others, in that it makes a good case on some points and a bad case on others, and the opposing lawyer's job is to argue that all of them are bad. In the rarer case that a filing is actually "plainly without merit," courts can and sometimes do impose penalties under Rule 11, which allows for sanctions against parties and attorneys who make factual assertions that are not supported by reality or arguments that are not supported by the law. | Congratulations, intrepid legal enthusiast or learner! What you'll need A legal dictionary, especially if you're just getting started. If you don't own one, you can try Black's Law Dictionary A little bit of patience and time. Or maybe a lot, depending on the particular case and the particular question you're trying to answer. Maybe a normal dictionary, too. Again, if you don't own one, there's plenty online. Onelook is a dictionary search engine, so it'll search a lot of dictionaries at the same time. Okay, I've got those things, now what? Alright, there's a few things you should know. Firstly, decisions of superior courts are binding only on those inferior courts within the same hierarchy. This means that you can appeal to a higher court so long as it has appellate jurisdiction. Generally, a state (meaning a country) will have a supreme or highest court, with appellate jurisdiction over all other courts - in Australia, this is the High Court of Australia, in the United States, this is the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the United Kingdom, this is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Secondly, decisions of a court are generally binding only on the matter in dispute. For example, if in a case, the matter of whether the police owe a duty of care to citizens in detecting crime, a comment on whether the police had correctly parked their vehicle is not binding - it is called obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta). What we're looking for in a judgement is the ratio decidendi (plural rationes decidendi), which is the reason for the decision. This is what is binding, and would be considered in future decisions. The problem? It's not always easy to tell the ratio from the obiter. Finally, often, the only way to know whether our interpretation of a case is right is to see whether it is applied in a future case, or overruled. Examples, examples! Sure. Let's try something easy to start with. Do product manufacturers owe a duty of care to their customers? Yes. The decision in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 found that product manufacturers - in this case, a ginger beer manufacturer - have a duty of care to ensure their products are safe for use or consumption. Lord Atkin said: The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. Okay, so the answer to this question is yes. How do I verify it? Get the source of the judgement. Without this, you're going to be relying on hearsay. The next best thing is a subsequent judgement that applies the one you're looking for, because if the judgement says what it's supposed to, it'll be mentioned in the subsequent judgement. I've found this one. Decide whether the matter in dispute is actually being decided. In our case, it is. But if I was quoting this from a judgement on whether product manufacturers have an obligation to transfer title for goods supplied on a credit agreement, it wouldn't be binding. Find the quote. If you've been given a quote. Otherwise, grab a cup of tea or coffee and get ready to read. A lot. If you can't find something that says, or means, what it's supposed to, it's probably not accurate. Make sure the judgement hasn't been overruled This is tricky, unless the judgement database you're using has a way of searching it. Most do. In any case, it's much like trying to prove a negative. In fact, it's exactly that. But always check whether the judgement has been overturned on appeal. Make sure the judgement hasn't been obsoleted by statute Again, this is tricky. It's proving a negative, again. And trying to find statute might be an answer for another time. Is that it? Pretty much, I think. These are at least the main points. There's a whole laundry list of things you shouldn't do with judgements, but they're more about reasoning than legal principles. It's a skill you can really only develop by using, and I'm constantly practising myself. Many discussions about cases are precisely about what their effect is. Yes, the decisions and orders are usually pretty clear-cut - for example, the decision is that the manufacturer has a duty of care, and the orders are for damages and costs to be paid. But what it means beyond that can be murky. Luckily for us, judges have become better at writing their judgements so that others can understand. Also, for more important cases, where the entire country, or world, is watching, others will interpret it for you - consider Obergefell v Hodges, for example. Not everyone can be trusted, but everyone, taken together, is a much more trustworthy source than just one person. In the end, there's not a mathematical formula for determining what judgements mean. There's some interpretation involved, some judgement. There's not always going to be one judgement that's enough to prove your matter. I'm struggling to end this post neatly so I'll just finish it with a cliff- | With this in mind, would a non-lawyer practicing law for oneself (acting pro se) be able to have a paralegal prepare legal documents so long as the aforementioned non-lawyer oversees the work and accepts responsibility for it? No. Critically, many things that paralegals (who are not themselves members of a licensed profession) are allowed to do under the supervision of an attorney, are not things that they are permitted to do independently. In the case of the question, the paralegal is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law if doing anything more than taking dictation and formatting documents (case law often refers to merely taking dictation as "acting as a scrivener", which is not the practice of law). Unauthorized practice of law is a question of state law and varies somewhat, but the outcome in this particular fact pattern would be pretty consistent. For example, the Colorado Attorney Supreme Court has an FAQ that states: The Colorado Supreme Court has defined the “practice of law” as “act[ing] in a representative capacity in protecting, enforcing, or defending the legal rights and duties of another and in counseling, advising and assisting [another] in connection with these rights and duties.”1 The Court’s words make clear that providing legal advice to another person constitutes the practice of law, as does the selection and drafting of legal documents for use by another person.2 A nonlawyer’s exercise of legal discretion on behalf of another’s legal interest is prohibited because of potential harm to the public.3 Thus, a non-lawyer generally cannot: Provide legal advice to another person; Select legal documents on behalf of another person; Draft legal documents on behalf of another person; Interpret the law as it may apply to another person’s situation; Represent another person in any legal transaction or matter; Prepare another person’s case for trial. 1 People v. Shell, 148 P.3d 162, 167 (Colo. 2006); Denver Bar Ass'n v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 391 P.2d 467, 471 (Colo. 1964). 2 See C.R.C.P. 202.2(2); See also Shell, 148 P.3d at 167; Denver Bar Ass'n, 391 P.2d at 471 (holding that "there is no wholly satisfactory definition as to what constitutes the practice of law; it is not easy to give an all-inclusive definition....). 3 People v. Adams, 243 P.3d 256, 265 (Colo. 2010) (citing Perkins v. CTX Mortgage Co., 969 P.2d 93, 102 (Wash. 1999)). See also, e.g., Baron v. Karmin Paralegal Services, __ N.J. Super. __ (2019). The Appellate Division in Karmin found that Karmin prepared legal documents for plaintiff, which is clearly the practice of law. Id. at 13–14 (citing Cape May Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Ludlum, 45 N.J. 121, 124 (1965)). | We hire very good paralegals, explain to them what we are trying to achieve, and let them use common sense and the good organizational skills that got them hired to figure it out. (Really, I once had a part-time assistant in my law office who had a full time job doing essentially what you describe over and over again. This is a classic transactional paralegal task.) | Cohen has ethical problems, but this is probably pretty far down the list. If he were lying about the law, though, that could be treated as a violation of Rule 4.1 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct: In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third person. It could also be a violation of Rule 8.4: A lawyer or law firm shall not ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; Although these would be violations of his ethical obligations, they probably do not rise to the level of seriousness that would result in any meaningful punishment. Disbarment would be extremely unlikely, though a censure is conceivable. If someone reported the offense, I would actually expect that the state would decline to investigate at all. Of course, all of this assumes that he was deliberately lying about the state of the law, which I think overestimates his competence. More likely, he's just an idiot and didn't know that he was wrong. Importantly, being wrong about the law isn't unethical; it's a presumption at the foundation of our adversarial justice system. | The relevant law for you is ORC 4705.07. (A) No person who is not licensed to practice law in this state shall do any of the following: (1) Hold that person out in any manner as an attorney at law; (2) Represent that person orally or in writing, directly or indirectly, as being authorized to practice law; (3) Commit any act that is prohibited by the supreme court as being the unauthorized practice of law. (This is a prime example of legal language that cannot be interpreted on the basis of rules of English -- the issue is the meaning of "that person"). This does not prohibit you from giving an opinion as to what the law is, which is a right protected under the First Amendment. You would be in trouble if you said "This is my advice as a lawyer". Section 2 b.t.w. says that only the Supreme Court (of Ohio) can determine if a person has committed an act on their don't-do-it list. Rule 7 pertaining to their procedure is here. Section 2 therein enumerates the relevant categories, which fall under the categories "rendering of legal services for another" and "Holding out to the public or otherwise representing oneself as authorized to practice law in Ohio", which is what the statute says. | In Connecticut, this is covered by the firefighter's rule. Police and fire personnel entering a property as part of their official duties are considered licensees, which limits the duties of the landowner. The rules are as follows: You can't intentionally hurt or lay a trap for the licensee. If you know or should know the licensee is there, you need to exercise due care with them. You don't have to worry about obvious hazards (but keep in mind that it's harder to see stuff at night). If you're doing something dangerous, you need to watch out for them. If you know about a hidden hazard, you must warn them. I'm not sure how in-depth you need to go with the warnings; various things I find suggest the duty to warn might only be there when you know or should know the licensee is present, but signs are a good idea regardless. On the other hand, if you do need to warn them, you might need to mention the specific locations of the pits you actually know about. However, there's no duty at all to proactively look for possible hazards. This rule originated as a rule for professional firefighters responding to a negligently-started fire: the idea is that professional firefighters sign up to do a dangerous job, and letting them sue for hazards inherent in their job (they aren't called without a fire) is a bad idea. Also, since they cannot be denied entry, go in places not open to the public, and can arrive at any hour, needing to keep the property safe for them is an unreasonable burden. Of course, there's an exception if a law is passed to protect their safety, because statutes override common law. The rule has since been extended in some states to police, and to situations besides the very problem they were called for. Other states have abolished it. In any event, this is for civil liability only: this is when cops can sue for injuries caused to them. |
Safety and effectiveness have not been established for _ If an FDA approval says the following for treatment with a medical device, does this mean a doctor absolutely cannot treat a patient (with any of the conditions) with the device? Or does it just mean be cautious? "Safety and effectiveness have not been established for pregnancy and delivery; patients under the age of 18; or for patients with progressive, systemic neurological diseases." | It means what it literally says, that safety and effectiveness have not been established in certain contexts. The rationale behind saying this is §201.57 of 21 CFR 201, a regulation that mandates giving warnings. It is permitted to use a device or prescribe a substance where it is not yet proven that it is effective or safe for that usage, but you must not imply that it is perfectly safe and effective in all contexts. This part of the federal regulations dictates language aimed at particular scientific uncertainties. Insofar as a patient is expected to give informed consent for a treatment, informing the patient that a treatment is to some extent unproven is an essential part of the information that must be given for informed consent. So you can interpret it as a flag to the patient (or the prescribing doctor) that there is greater risk. | There are circumstances in which medical ethics historically authorized treating physicians to defer sharing information with patients or even to mislead them in their best interests medically, although the scope of what is considered ethical in that regard is narrowing. But in the fact pattern described in the quoted material there is no plausible way that this withholding of information could be justified. If it was intentional (or for that matter, even if it was negligent) there could be grounds for tort liability for harm caused as a result (although causation and damages are hard to prove). On the other hand, just because it could give rise to tort liability, doesn't imply that the action is necessarily a crime, at least without some kind of motive other than random spite to intentionally provide a false result. However, it is quite difficult to come up with a believable reason that this would happen to someone at random. If the person taking the test bribed someone to provide a false result, which is plausible, that is one thing, but just doing it randomly really doesn't make any sense. The fact pattern provided sounds like it doesn't include the "full story." Why keep records of the actual test results (or for that matter why do the actual tests at all) if you are merely going to intentionally provide a false negative? | There are, as far as I know, no "FDA-approved" vaccines against covid in the US. The FDA has given Emergency Use Authorization to some vaccines. This does not currently include the Johnson & Johnson vaccine. It is impossible for a person to get the J&J vaccine in the US, because it is not authorized, and J&J does not distribute it. One could imagine an unauthorized foreign vaccine being smuggled into the US, but it would be illegal to distribute it. I assume that you specifically mean, can a person refuse to get a vaccination on the grounds that it only has an emergency authorization and is not actually approved: and can one sue an employer for firing you because you refused to get vaccinated? In general, the employer can fire for anything they want, unless you have an employment contract that limits the grounds for termination. There are discrimination-based grounds that they cannot use, such as race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, age (age 40 or older), or genetic information at the federal level. Mississippi has no specific employment discrimination laws. Other that that, an employer can fire an employee for any reason, or no reason (Mississippi is what's known as an "employment at will" state). There are some state restrictions where it is prohibited for an employer to fire an employee for engaging in a specific required activity such as being called for jury duty or being called to military duty. An employer could not require an employee to break the law, but that is not applicable here. | The "Privacy Rule" (45 CFR Part 160 and Part 164, Subparts A, E) don't forbid this. Sect. 164.502 states the general rule: (a) Standard. A covered entity or business associate may not use or disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by this subpart or by subpart C of part 160 of this subchapter. "Health information" is defnes in part 160 as any information, including genetic information, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that: (1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual. Your picture would not constitute health information (and anyhow, they are allowed to gather health information, just not freely disseminate it – the pictures on the wall were presumably with permission). There is no general law (which would be state law) against taking a person's picture (though commercially exploiting someone's picture would require permission, via the concept of personality rights), and it is directly required in a number of instances (for identification purposes – school ID, driver's license, passport, voting in some states). It is an unusual requirement and since they scanned your driver's license it is especially inexplicable. Assuming that this is just a story they tell all patients because they want before and after pictures (which you would have to consent to, if you didn't already in one of those "sign here" flurries), saying that this is for "security purposes" would be untrue, but I don't think it's actually illegal. Taking but not using a photo would not cause you harm, so if you had let them take the picture, there would not be a basis for suing. If they use it for advertising without permission, that would be a problem. | Providing the antenna was installed in accordance with the law it's hard to see what basis they could either void their lease or seek damages. The antenna poses no risk to health (non-ionising RF radiation is harmless) and you have no rights in any view it may be blocking there is no damage. The only thing that I can see is if there was misrepresentation at the time the lease was formed. That is, the developer knew that there was going to be an antenna and specifically said there wouldn't be. This falls flat if a) they never mentioned antennas or b) the decision to install it was made after the lease was formed. | Yes - patents are not for results but for devices and processes that can achieve the result. An airplane and a helicopter can have similar results; more than one medication helps to reduce blood sugar levels. | There is no parallelism between the Texas decision and the proposed lawsuit. In the anti-mifepristone lawsuit, there exists a statute granting the FDA authority to regulate and review new drugs, and a petition procedure whereby citizens can state ground for the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to consider a regulatory action. There is no statutory basis on which a ban of meat-eating could be created by executive action. Congress cannot be sued for not passing a law (failure or refusal of Congress to pass a particular law is not justiciable). If, for example someone were to submit a petition to the FDA urging such a regulation, the petition would have to be denied because the FDA does not have statutory authority to issue such a regulation. As argued here, the anti-mifepristone plaintiffs lack standing in that case, so one can expect that to be a substantial issue in the subsequent appeal. | There is no prospect for equitable relief in such an outcome. The Texas state government enjoys sovereign immunity, except as specified under the Tort Claims Act. Under that law, immunity is waived only in the case of damage caused by negligence of a state employee, and is limited primarily to vehicle accidents and physical injuries. So the state cannot be sued for passing a law found to be unconstitutional. An individual would not enjoy such immunity, but given the law, there is no identifiable defendant to seek relief from (everybody is a potential defendant). An former abortion provider who now declines to perform an abortion can't be sued, because doctors in general have no obligation to perform particular medical procedures (most doctors in Texas won't perform an abortion, even before SB8), and the course will not render a judgment against a doctor on the grounds that they obeyed an existing law but should have known that it would be found unconstitutional. |
Am I liable for copyright infringements made by a non-affiliated source? Let's say that I find a non-affiliated source that offers some creative work under a copyleft license and I decide to use that work, stating where I found it and under which license. If in the future that 3rd party gets sued for copyright infringement, can I be considered liable? | If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible. | If an infringement suit is filed, the plaintiff(s) would have rights of discovery. They could subpoena the source code in such a case for comparison. They could take the depositions of EvilCorp's developers and ask them about the libraries that they used. There might well be other ways to achieve the same effect. | This is likely to depend on whether Person B is aware of what Person A is doing, regardless of any imputations Person A makes as to the nature of their business. If Person B is aware, or it is found that Person B ought to have been aware, that Person A is doing something illegal, then they may be held contributorily liable for damages suffered. For instance, in (what is still) a landmark case for copyright infringement, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001), Napster was found to be contributorily guilty of copyright infringement. A defense that they attempted is they weren't aware of it - which was thrown out on the basis that they should have, and could have, known that it was happening. I'm not a lawyer, but you'll need to give a lot more information about the situation for liability to be determined. Oh, and also — both of them could be held liable. It's not necessarily a case of one or the other. | The platform will get in trouble for copyright infringement. The disclaimer that you are not liable does not work, legally, since the person suing you hasn't agreed to the TOS on your webpage. You can be sued for "secondary infringement", meaning that not only the uploader but also you the service provider are liable. The solution to this quandry is the "DMCA safe harbor", a set of rules which, if you follow them, you won't be held liable. The specific piece of law is here. The essence of the rules is that you have to have a "designated agent" who receives takedown notices: if a copyright owner finds their stuff on your page, they officially notify you, then you take the material down – expeditiously (no dawdling). You notify the uploader, they either accept the takedown or file a counterclaim, you notify the rights-holder, there's a waiting period, then the rights holder can file a lawsuit, or not. If the rights-holder doesn't file suit, you can put the material back up. You cannot rely solely on the intricate DMCA notice / counter-notice dance, because under para (c)(1)(A)(ii) of §512, you also must not be "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent". | If you do not have permission to make and distribute reproductions of the work, then it is illegal to make and distribute reproductions of the work. US copyright law Indian copyright law | The first thing that people need to do is to quit over thinking it. That being said, I'm going to see if I can tackle your problems one by one, before summarizing and providing my own opinion: Many users don't care if their code is copied. I'm like that. I left a couple comments on Shog9's post that read this: Good point: Licensing does not prevent careless or malicious use. I'm surprised about how many people are thinking that this license will let them steal their code, because it's already happening right now. I don't want to sound pessimistic, but when thousands of people break a license/law/contract, it's a bit of a lost cause. You're not significantly damaged in a direct way, so honestly, let it go. All I want is to make sure that no one can come up to me if something of mine screwed something on there side. Aside from that, I don't care about people who don't attribute me: chances are, they have no moral sanity, and I will appreciate the people who do, and help me out. As it is, I'm 16, I share what I know with a good heart, and in a well-spirited manner, and at the end of the day, knowing that I was able to help someone out makes my day. I don't mind if my code is copied. I know that people will copy my code whether I like it or not, but I also know that there will be people in the world who will say "thanks", and will try to attribute me where possible. I feel good about that. That being said, I don't care. But the person who uses my code does. The license that affects all Stack Exchange posts are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike license, or CC BY-SA. Code contributions don't fit well with this. This excellent post on Open Source explains why it's discouraged for code. What these people want is a code-friendly license, so that they can stay in the clear when it comes to copyright issues. The next thing they want, is for someone to come after them over some licensing issue. You may think that people are good, but you never know the world around you. They can be evil. For other users, they don't mind their code being copied to another post, as long as there is a link to the post and a mention of the original author. Most people post with good intention. There's not that much of an issue from a legal perspective either: The license allows people to copy and paste into answers of their own, and since the license remains the same, there's no issue to get into. The license allows it, and contributors kind of have to acknowledge it. I don't think anyone cares what happens to code that is less than 3-4 lines at least. I can probably agree. Such code probably wouldn't be eligible for copyright anyway, since it's so trivial. Many jurisdictions have a "Threshold of Originality," which means that simple things can't be under copyright. Stack Exchange does not probably want people to own the code they submit. For example, Stack Exchange has (and probably wishes to retain) the right to keep even deleted posts in the visibility of the high rep users (even if the author is against it). Wait what? You may be right that it is in Stack Exchange's interest to host content. After all, they get hits, which helps them as a business. It is illegal for companies to host illegal content. If somebody sees objectionable, copyrighted content hosted on Stack Exchange that they would like removed, then they need to file a DMCA Takedown Request. This is also why moderators, like myself, cannot process legal requests. The reason why Stack Exchange doesn't act themselves, even if they see something that is copyrighted and objectionable, is because it's a form of liability. When YouTube began removing copyrighted content themselves, they received a wave of lawsuits (If you remove some, you need to remove all. Why didn't you remove mine? being the argument). The plaintiff's won those, and when YouTube did nothing, they weren't liable at all. If a user wants to have their content taken down, it's tricky. You need to look at the Terms of Service for Stack Exchange: (quoting Section 3) You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange When Stack Exchanges gets your content, you grant them an irrevocable license to your contribution. This is pretty standard across a lot of sites: it's just a way to secure data and stay in the clear of licensing issues. At the same time, it doesn't seem fair for SE to acquire complete ownership of the content. The user must still have the final say, if the content is to be used for purposes not already agreed upon in the licence. They don't. What users have done is that they have provided a license of their content to Stack Exchange. This is done, again, through their Terms of Service: You grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works and store such Subscriber Content and to allow others to do so in any medium now known or hereinafter developed (“Content License”) in order to provide the Services, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by You. The user grants a license to their content to Stack Exchange, but they do not assign or relinquish copyright. The code still belongs to them. It's important not to conflate the user contribution policy, with copyright assignment. You are still free to add an additional license to your content (known as dual or multi-licensing), and have a copy for your own use. Stack Exchange will always host a copy licensed under the CC BY-SA license. Stack Exchange can expect a high level of decorum and respect for laws from its users. At the same time, it cannot expect redundant attributions anywhere and everywhere, because one of its main aims is to not waste the users' time. Not only Stack Exchange expects it, but many copyright laws in various jurisdictions require it too. There's a concept known in many jurisdictions known as moral rights. These are rights that are irrevocable, whether you like it or not. Generally, these include attributions, disclaimer of liability, and other rights as well. Even if your work is in the public domain, you still retain these moral rights. If memory serves me right, the right to be attributed is revokable under United States copyright law. Therefore, attribution becomes more a courtesy, when the right is revoked. Licenses such as CC BY, and CC BY-SA still require attribution as a part of their licensing terms. What defines attribution is generally up to the person who uses the content. If memory serves right again, one can not demand how to attribute. There should be a clear-cut way to determine what is code and what isn't. The code formatting indicators on SE may not be adequate because some users simply use backticks, or 4-space indented text for other not-so-codey text. Personally, I feel like making the entirety of a post under both the Creative Commons license and whatever proposed code license they use is the best option, and allow people to use moral judgement to determine the most appropriate license. The concern comes about people who lack such judgment. I bet these same people don't follow the existing license anyway - and are a lost cause. We made it through! There will always be debate on the license of choice. Some people want the GPL, a license that's apparently closer to the status quo of Creative Commons license (I disagree that it's a good match), while other's want permissive licenses, such as the MIT or the Apache licenses. I'd prefer the permissive type, since it allows use in closed-source applications, and grant more rights (i.e. less restrictions) to the people that use them. I'm not going to right much because my hands are tired, but I'm sure if you've got more questions about the open source licenses themselves, you can probably ask on Open Source Stack Exchange. | Quoting content may or may not constitute copyright infringement, depending on the various factors that go into the fair use defense. Short quotes which are made for the purpose of discussion, research and commentary and not for copy would be squarely in the domain of "fair use" under US law. That means that the copyright owner would not succeed in suing you for quoting them: under the statutory mechanism for recognizing his right to his intellectual product, there is a limit on how much control he can exert over your behavior (since the two of you have not worked out some kind of agreement -- copyright law creates rights even when there is no contract). As for Facebook, you have a contract with them, embodied in the terms of service. You have been given permission to access material that they host (permission is required, under copyright law), and their permission is conditional. It says "you may access stuff on our platform only as long as you do X": if that includes a clause "don't be nasty", then that limits your right to speak freely and be as nasty as you'd like. If it says "don't quote even a little", that means you cannot quote even a little, even when you would have the statutory right to quote a little (or, to be nasty). Fair use would mean that you can't be sued for copyright infringement of the stuff that you quoted a little of. You can, however, be expelled from Facebook. You probably cannot be sued for "accessing Facebook without permission". There is a federal law against unauthorized access of computer networks, and there was a failed attempt to construe violation of a TOS as "unauthorized access" – it isn't. But accessing Facebook necessarily involves copying (that's how computers work), and there is no "fair use" defense whereby everybody has a fair use right to access Facebook. Theoretically you could be sued for copyright infringement, for accessing Facebook's intellectual property without permission. Also, Facebook can rescind your permission to access their content (see this case), and once you have been banned, it is a crime to further access their network. This assumes that there is no overriding limit on contracts that would nullify a no-quoting condition. There is no such limit on contracts in the US, so such a contract would be enforceable. There is also nothing illegal (unenforceable) about a TOS which prohibits automated methods of access. | The GPL does not explicitly specify a time within which the source code must be provided, which probably means a "reasonable time" is allowed. What is "reasonable" would eventually be evaluated by a court, if the matter ever got that far. But please note that only the copyright holder (or the holder's authorized agent) can sue for infringement. The license does not give other people a right to sue for infringement, and I doubt that any license could grant such a right. One could inform the copyright holder who could sue, but the holder need not sue, and undertaking such a suit would involve expense, time, and effort. Whether the offer to provide the source constitutes a binding agreement is not clear, and may well vary in different jurisdictions. The question does not state any particular jurisdiction. |
Legal requirement to publish land sale prices? Is it a legal requirement in the UK to publish purchase prices for land (not property) or can this be omitted from such a public register on commercially sensitive grounds? | Is it a legal requirement in the UK to publish purchase prices for land... england-and-wales Yes Section 8(2) of the Land Registration Rules 2003 requires.. Where practicable, the registrar must enter in the proprietorship register— (a)on first registration of a registered estate, (b)following completion by registration of a lease which is a registrable disposition, and (c)on a subsequent change of proprietor of a registered estate, the price paid or value declared for the registered estate. And note that: The terms of a confidentiality clause will not override the obligation on the registrar to enter the price paid in the register. Source scotland Yes Rule 5(g) of the Land Registration (Scotland) Rules 2006 requires the Keeper of the Registers of Scotland to record in the "Title Sheet": any consideration stated for the transfer of the interest in land; northern-ireland Yes Rule 41 of the Land Registration Rules (Northern Ireland) 1994 requires that... A transfer of ownership shall be made by a deed in Form 9 [to] 16 ...and all those Forms (found at pages 105 to 115) require details of the consideration made or paid. | Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant). | I know it's not a huge amount of money, but I'm not currently in a position to pay it. Is it still legal to send invoices this long from the past? Yes, it is legal. And the surveyor is still within the statute of limitations to sue you for breach of contract. Beyond the purely legislative aspect, personally I would encourage you to pay the surveyor once you are in a position to do so, even if the statute of limitations had expired. From your description, it seems that the surveyor acted with nobility in that Even though he didn't mention any payment, he sent me the survey. and there is no indication that the survey was faulty. Thus, it would be opportunistic not to honor your part in the contract under pretext of the statute of limitations. Consider this: You would not wish to be deprived of compensation today (or once the debtor becomes able to pay you) simply because years earlier you were too overwhelmed to send an invoice for work you actually performed. | Portable signs are legal and you have to obey then. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/27/section/65 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/482498/2-11.pdf | That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant. | Not under that name In common law countries, like Canada, the concept is known by the delightfully visceral term price gouging or, in emergency circumstances, profiteering. This is not regulated at a Federal level in Canada. A brief overview of provincial level laws can be found here. Typically, they require prices that are not just excessive - they need to be unconscionable which is a very high bar. | user662852 has a good point -- whoever own the property has the right to make the rules. Is the property, land+construction in fact your's or does it belong to the HOA who just grant you access as a lease holder? Different states has different rules, but in my state it is illegal to maroon a property and there must be a access to public streets even when this necessitate passing over somebody else land. However that is irrelevant if the HOA owns the land your house is build on. I think you will have to look at your HOA agreement and see what it says. | Summary: More information needed, but I have listed out some legal claims available to homeowners when they have similar concerns. There are several issues here which need elaboration before deciding if you can take legal action. The first is: "the destroyed some vegetation on my street." If the by "my street" you mean that the street is part of your property, you may sue the builders for trespass and/or damage to property. If the street isn't your property, but the vegetation is your property, you may sue them for destruction of your property. What you are probably looking for, however, is a prohibitive injunction. This is a court order forcing the builders to avoid doing something, e.g. An order forcing them to avoid using roads adjacent to your property. To obtain such an injunction you will have to prove that what they are doing is violating your rights, is somehow harmful to you or your property, or inevitably will do either of those things. One way to demonstrate this is if you can show that you have a claim under nuisance, or damage to property, or trespass. On the description you have given us, there isn't enough to say your rights are being violated, or that your property has come to harm or will come to harm because of their actions. You should also be aware of claims under nuisance. Nuisance is when someone is doing something that prevents you from "peaceful enjoyment of your land". It appears from your question that the actions of these builders have, in your mind, done this. However there are several aspects that have to be satisfied for this to amount to private nuisance: What the builder are doing must be a "continuing state of affairs." They may have annoyed you by trampling over vegetation, but if this is a "one-off" event, it is unlikely to amount to nuisance. A reasonable person must find the conduct to interfere with the enjoyment of their land. That is to say: it isn't enough that their conduct is making you unable to enjoy your land peacefully, you have to show that any reasonable person in the same situation would find this conduct unacceptable. Finally, the context of your neighbourhood matters: if the behaviour is something expected in a residential area, then it will not amount to a nuisance. For example, heavy drilling in an industrial location will not amount to a nuisance, while the same may do so in a normally quiet neighbourhood. |
Is Austria COVID vaccine mandate legal? Austria plans to impose fines for those who refuse to get vaccinated against COVID19: Under the government’s plan, authorities will send out invitations to vaccination appointments to the 2 million people who are not yet fully vaccinated, and after Feb. 1, will begin imposing fines of around $4,000 on those who refuse to attend. In the meantime, when the current lockdown lifts on Dec. 13, restrictions will stay in place for unvaccinated people. https://time.com/6123087/austria-covid-19-vaccine-mandate-protests/ However, at level of the European Union, vaccines are not mandatory and in fact COVID-19 travel certificates must prevent 'discrimination'. Austria has promised the coronavirus vaccination will not be compulsory, despite concern about a rising anti-vaccination movement in the country. In short, if a EU country decides that the vaccine should be mandatory, especially when they promised again and again it would not be compulsory, wouldn't that raise law-related problems? Is it legal? | .. if a EU country decides that the vaccine should be mandatory, especially when they promised again and again it would not be compulsory, wouldn't that raise law-related problems? Is it legal? Yes, it is legal since public health is classified as a shared competence where the European Union does not exercise its own competence and therefore within the competence of a member state to decide. Supporting public health in Europe EU health policy focuses on protecting and improving health, giving equal access to modern and efficient healthcare for all Europeans, and coordinating any serious health threats involving more than one EU country. The European Union coordinated the creation and implementation of the EU Digital COVID Certificate, but it is up to the member states to decide under what conditions (and to whom) a certificate is to be issued and used. (shared competence) Protection of health, due to experiences of the past, is often considered (depending on the jurisdiction) a major task of national governments. During the Black death (where no vaccination was available), many countries took extreme measures to protect their population. Although the concept of isolating people to prevent the spread of disease had already existed, the term quarantine originated during this period. Since the early 19th century (1807 in Bavaria), some countries imposed compulsory vaccinations to eradicaticate smallpox where it was deemed as a danger to the whole population. History has shown, when faced with no other choice, a country will exercise any extreme measure needed for the benefit of their population. Division of competences within the European Union ... The EU has only the competences conferred on it by the Treaties (principle of conferral). Under this principle, the EU may only act within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the EU countries in the Treaties to attain the objectives provided therein. Competences not conferred upon the EU in the Treaties remain with the EU countries. ... Exclusive competences (Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — TFEU) areas in which the EU alone is able to legislate and adopt binding acts. EU countries are able to do so themselves only if empowered by the EU to implement these acts. ... Shared competences (Article 4 of the TFEU): the EU and EU countries are able to legislate and adopt legally binding acts. EU countries exercise their own competence where the EU does not exercise, or has decided not to exercise, its own competence. ... Supporting competences (Article 6 of the TFEU): the EU can only intervene to support, coordinate or complement the action of EU countries. Legally binding EU acts must not require the harmonisation of EU countries’ laws or regulations. ... ... Due to the smaller amount of Exclusive competences in important areas, the European Union is more of a Confederation than a Federation (such as Canada and the United States). Sources: Division of competences within the European Union EU Digital COVID Certificate | European Commission Confederation - Wikipedia Federation - Wikipedia | There are, as far as I know, no "FDA-approved" vaccines against covid in the US. The FDA has given Emergency Use Authorization to some vaccines. This does not currently include the Johnson & Johnson vaccine. It is impossible for a person to get the J&J vaccine in the US, because it is not authorized, and J&J does not distribute it. One could imagine an unauthorized foreign vaccine being smuggled into the US, but it would be illegal to distribute it. I assume that you specifically mean, can a person refuse to get a vaccination on the grounds that it only has an emergency authorization and is not actually approved: and can one sue an employer for firing you because you refused to get vaccinated? In general, the employer can fire for anything they want, unless you have an employment contract that limits the grounds for termination. There are discrimination-based grounds that they cannot use, such as race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, age (age 40 or older), or genetic information at the federal level. Mississippi has no specific employment discrimination laws. Other that that, an employer can fire an employee for any reason, or no reason (Mississippi is what's known as an "employment at will" state). There are some state restrictions where it is prohibited for an employer to fire an employee for engaging in a specific required activity such as being called for jury duty or being called to military duty. An employer could not require an employee to break the law, but that is not applicable here. | The CDC does not authorize shots or vaccine distribution. The FDA authorizes vaccine distribution, or distribution of medicines in general. A medicine is authorized for use in a certain way, which is an "instruction" directed at the medical professional. So-called "off-label" use is discussed by the FDA here. Such use if legal, it simply stretches the limits of what the FDA was allowed to approve (e.g. was found to be safe and effective for X, was not similarly tested for Y). Patients are free to take whatever medicines they want if they can find them, and if they are not on the Controlled Substances list. Hence it's legal to take DMSO, but it's not legal to peddle it as a cancer cure. The prescription regime for covid vaccinations seems to be somewhat relaxed, in that it is likely that many people get a vaccine without a (meaningful) doctor's exam, instead, you show up and get the shot. This is normal with flu shots. The upcoming 3rd shot approval is addressed to doctors, so they can then recommend third shots. | A company can mandate getting a flu shot as a condition of employment. The government can do the same (for its employees) – Washington state has done so at least for covid. Some individuals qualify for a disability accommodation, so they would be exceptions (e.g. they could be moved to working away from the public). A sincere religious conviction also gives rise to a religious-accommodation exemption. This guidance addresses the question of what constitutes a sincerely held religious belief. | In the united-kingdom it is a breach of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules for an athlete to have a "Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers" in their sample. No mention is made, as far as I can see, that the intent to use a placebo as described by the OP would fall foul of these Rules. The only relevant mention of intent seems to be when the substances etc are present: It is each Athlete’s personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters their body. An Athlete is responsible for any Prohibited Substance or any of its Metabolites or Markers found to be present in their Sample. Accordingly, it is not necessary to demonstrate intent, Fault, negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part in order to establish an Article 2.1 Anti-Doping Rule Violation; nor is the Athlete's lack of intent, Fault, negligence or knowledge a valid defence to an assertion that an Article 2.1 Anti-Doping Rule Violation has been committed. | Overview An executive order cannot make new law. However, most executive orders are based on powers granted by law to the President, or to some executive agency or department. Others are based on laws that come under the general power and duty of the President to "take care that the laws are executed" and announce some policy for how laws will be interpreted and enforced. Announced mandates In the case of the mask and vaccine mandates announced but not yet issued by the Biden administration, they apparently claim to exercise powers granted under various laws, particularly the Occupational Health and Safety Act. It is likely that once such regulations are formally issued they will be challenged by those opposed to such mandates. If they are upheld, (or are somehow not challenged and thus assumed to be valid) they will carry the force of the laws under which they are issued, and thus the Supremacy Clause will apply to those laws, and to the orders as ways to enforce those laws. Other Precedents The question says: Currently, the only precedent to enforce fines and vaccine mandates (at a state level) that I am aware of is a 1905 decision by the Supreme Court, Jacobson v. Massachusetts (197 US 11 (1905)), where it allowed Massachusetts to fine an individual for refusing to comply with vaccine mandates set by the state. This is not quite correct. Jacobson is the leading case on this issue, but there have been some others. In Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) the US Supreme Court held that a local ordinance mandating vaccinations for school attendance did not violate federal constitutional rights, citing Jacobson and calling the matter settled law. Note that the ordinance in Zucht applied to both public and private schools without exception. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) the Supreme Court opinion included (at 166) the statement that: Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state, as parens patriae, may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243. The catalogue need not be lengthened. It is sufficient to show what indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare, and that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction. (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted) Prince v. Massachusetts was a child labor case, not a vaccination case, and the above comment was technically obiter dictum (not binding precedent). But because of it Prince has several times been cited in later vaccination cases alongside Jacobson and to show that Jacobson is still good law. Note that Prince, like Jacobson and Zucht, was a case supporting state law against a 14th amendment challenge. Supremacy Clause An Executive Order that is not backed by any valid law would not be the "Supreme law of the land" under the supremacy clause, and might well be simply held invalid for lack of Presidential authority to issue it, depending on the subject of the order. But orders claiming to make law on the President's own authority are quite rare. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the steel seizure case) invalidated such an order. In that case the President not only did not have the backing of a specific law, but failed to follow the procedures set out in a relevant law. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer the concurring opinion by Justice Jackson has proved influential in later cases and in later congressional drafting of laws. The key passage of that opinion starting at 343 U. S. 635 reads: Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government, as an undivided whole, lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables, rather than on abstract theories of law. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. Into which of these classifications does this executive seizure of the steel industry fit? It is eliminated from the first by admission, for it is conceded that no congressional authorization exists for this seizure. That takes away also the support of the many precedents and declarations which were made in relation, and must be confined, to this category. Can it then be defended under flexible tests available to the second category? It seems clearly eliminated from that class, because Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field, but has covered it by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure ... Would a vaccine mandate or mask mandate that goes beyond any law passed by Congress fall into Jackson's "zone of twilight"? In the absence of a court ruling, no one can say. | Section 2 (a) of the order says: The heads of executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall immediately take action, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to require compliance with CDC guidelines with respect to wearing masks, maintaining physical distance, and other public health measures by: on-duty or on-site Federal employees; on-site Federal contractors; and all persons in Federal buildings or on Federal lands. (emphasis added) It would seem that if, in future, the CDC changes its guidelines to indicate that mask wearing is no longer needed (presumably in the wake of a large decline in cases) the order would mean compliance with such revised guidelines, and thus reduced or eliminated mask wearing, when and if that is advised. The order does not contain any dated sunset or reevaluation provision. But the President can at any time revise or rescind this or any other Executive Order. The Twitter comments could be taken as an intention to reevaluate and a hope to be able to remove, the order within 100 days. In any case Twitter comments are not legally binding, nor are press conference statements or other public statements by the President. Evert if the order had contained a fixed sunset date, the President could always issue a new order extending this one at any time. Note also that the order only instructs department heads to "take action, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law." This leaves significant room for judgement as to what is "appropriate." | As no jurisdiction was given, the law in Australia is the Life Insurance Act 1995. Section 228 says; A life company may only avoid a life policy on the ground that the person whose life is insured by the policy committed suicide if the policy expressly excludes liability in case of suicide. This 2011 parliamentary report says: For a death to be classified as a suicide in Australia, it must be: … established by coronial enquiry that the death resulted from a deliberate act of the deceased with the intention of ending his or her own life (intentional self-harm). In practice, life insurance policies have an exclusion period for suicide when the policy is taken out where it is not covered; after that it is. |
Ahmaud Arbery trial - what if they had witnessed him commit a crime? In the Ahmaud Arbery trial, they tried to do a citizens arrest on him when they had no proof he had committed any crime. So, they couldn't claim self defense. This is logical. But what if they had witnessed him commit a crime. The crime could be on a whole spectrum of severity from stealing a pencil to trying to kill someone and everything in between. To me it is logical that if someone was running away with a pencil and you tried to do a citizens arrest and then had to shoot and kill them in self defense, you should probably go to jail. If on the other hand they were trying to kill someone and you tried to do a citizens arrest and ended up having to shoot them, you shouldn't face consequences. But there could be so many things in between that are more grey. How does the legal system deal with this? Does it just say that self defense is justified if you're trying to stop a confirmed crime no matter how small? | Self-defence has nothing to do with whether you are performing an arrest (lawful or otherwise) Self-defence is a plea that you used reasonable force to protect yourself, others and in some jurisdictions, property, from immediate harm. There is, as you say, a “whole spectrum” of both the perception of the threat and the force used that go into determining if the actions of the defendant amounted to self-defence or not. That’s why it’s up to the jury to decide on a case by case basis. A person who has the power of arrest (law enforcement officers and citizens who actually witness a crime) is authorised to use reasonable force to effect that arrest. Of course, effecting an arrest may cause a situation to escalate to the point where self-defence becomes an issue. | Of course The prosecution just needs to prove that the crime happened (or the defendant believed it to have happened) and you helped (in brief, there will be specific elements of the crime that each need to be proved). This would be easier if the primary crime had a convicted perpetrator but it’s not impossible without. Allow me to illustrate with an example. I will set out facts which are somewhat contrived and would not be so clear cut in a real case but for the purposes of the example please take them as undisputed and fully supported by evidence. John and Jill are in a relationship. This relationship is well known to be argumentative with frequent shouting matches and one or the other storming out. This does not amount to domestic violence by either party. John's friend Alan believes (wrongly) that there is domestic violence. During an argument Jill drops dead of a heart attack. John rings Alan distraught and says "I've killed her." Alan assumes (wrongly) that John has murdered Jill. Alan says "i'll take care of it. You go to your dad's". Alan (alone) disposes of the body. John is not guilty of murder (or indeed, anything). Alan is guilty of accessory to murder even though the actual crime never happened. The fact that Alan believed it happened is enough. | I would just like to clarify, in addition to the other answers and what Dale M alluded to, one important detail: Unless you are carrying out the death penalty, no one under any circumstances is allowed to kill anyone else. What you are sometimes authorized to do, is to use deadly force. There is an important distinction between the two. When using deadly force, you are using extreme force to stop someone doing something, which may result in getting that person killed, but killing isn't the point, stopping whatever he is doing is. If instead of a knife you had a gun on the train, you shot the guy in the face, his crime spree came to and end, yet he was still alive but unconscious, and you decided to "finish the job" and shoot him some more, you'd be going to prison. The language is important. Even if in self defense situations, if you say that you were shooting to kill, you're going to be in serious trouble, but if you say you were shooting to stop, you're in the clear. | There are problems with the claims. In summary: someone that in Sweden acts to defend themselves while "in peril" when subjected to — or are in imminent risk of — a criminal attack, will not the convicted, unless the act is "blatantly unjustifiable". Context We have a problem here in Sweden with people being ill-informed about the right to self-defence, and this is compounded by people with opinions spreading myths about it. Often these myths err on the side of claiming you have less rights than you really have. So, two things before we go on... The characters may have been unreliable. Do not ever assume that just because a character says something in a work of fiction, that the character is meant to know what they are talking about. And even if they are meant to know what they are talking about... The author may have been unreliable, and done their homework poorly. Keep this in mind... That said, the right to self-defence is not infinite. The law According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 3, §§ 1-2 and 6... If you intentionally kill someone, you get convicted of "murder" If you intentionally kill someone, but there were mitigating circumstances, you get convicted of "manslaughter" If you act in reckless disregard for the risk your actions are causing, and this leads to the death of someone, you get convicted of "causing the death of another", or what we here can call "reckless killing" And Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 24, § 1 states that an act performed in "peril" shall only lead to a conviction if the act was "blatantly unjustifiable". "Peril" is enumerated to exist in cases of... A commenced or imminent criminal attack on person or property A person has gained or trying to gain unauthorized access to a room, house, yard or ship A person refuses to leave a domicile after being told to If — when caught red-handed — a person uses violence or threats of violence to resist stolen property from being retaken When judging whether an act is "blatantly unjustifiable", the prosecutor must look at... the nature of the attack that caused the peril the significance of that which the attack was aimed at (such as a human life) other significant circumstances That last bit is interesting because it takes human psychology into consideration, and let the defendant's assessment of the peril be the standard by which the act is judged. The claim Let us start with the easy bit first... "if she killed the intruder, under Swedish law, she could very well be charged with manslaughter, and possibly murder if it could be proved that she placed the golf clubs around the house ahead of time." Murder? No. According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk, 1962:700), Chapter 3, §§ 1-2, a person that kills an intruder in their home could at the most be charged with manslaughter, because there are mitigating circumstances, i.e. the person felt threatened and there was a home invasion in progress. In order for this to become murder, she would more or less have to have invited the assailant or in any other way drawn them in with the intent to kill them. Yes, she prepared to defend herself or a potential intrusion, but without knowing for certain that the assailant would come at certain time or at least a certain day, any kind of premeditation towards killing is more or less impossible to prove. With this, murder is off the table. That claim is simply wrong. Whether it is the author or the character that is erring, I cannot say. So, manslaughter then, or the even lesser degree, called "causing the death of another", or reckless killing. Manslaughter would come up of she — when whacking them with the club — did so with the intent of killing them. The operative word here being intent. The prosecutor has to prove that intent. Sure, we can dream up scenarios where this is the case; the classic reason for why people do get convicted even acting in peril is when they keep harming the assailant after the danger has passed. But — again — just preparing for a potential intrusion is not enough to prove that intent. Finally, reckless killing. This is where such cases usually ends up. And — again — this usually happens because the defendant did something when the danger has obviously passed; the criminal attack was no longer imminent but passed. Conclusion Unless the protagonist in question had set up lethal traps; unless they had foreknowledge of an attack; unless they invited the assailant in with the intent to kill them; unless they fend off the attack and gets themselves into a perfectly safe situation and then proceeds to beat the assailant to death; and unless all of this can be proved, then it cannot become murder. Manslaughter or reckless killing, yes, there will be an investigation for that, but from the description of the situation — the protagonist fearing the assailant is dangerous and means them harm — preparing a home defence with strategically placed golf clubs does not in any way preclude the prosecution being dismissed as justifiable self-defence. Only(!) if the home invasion was obviously harmless, and/or the protagonist keeps harming the assailant after the home invasion has been staved off / neutralised, can a conviction for manslaughter or reckless killing become a possibility. Summary Yes, in Sweden a prosecutor will look at the case when you kill someone. But — no — in the situation described, a home invasion by someone perceived as wanting to cause harm, this is very unlikely to become "murder", for lack of premeditation. The remaining possible charges — manslaughter or reckless killing — will only result in a conviction if the situation was obviously and provably harmless in the eyes of the defendant, and they still killed the assailant. | Unless there is enough evidence to convict one or more of the suspects, none will be convicted. In general the argument: We know it must be one of you, but we don't know whch, so we find you all guilty. is not allowed in any non-dictatorial jurisdiction. Just how much evidence is needed for a conviction varies by jurisdiction in theory, and by judge or jury in practice. Also, it would be possible to charge several of the residents with having acted jointly in the crime, but there would still need to be sufficient evidence against each defendant to obtain a conviction. | Once a case has been commenced, you can definitely lose, or you can probably lose. If you decline to proceed, you definitely lose. If you proceed, the jury (or judge as the case might be), might find some witnesses more believable than others and might find that the forensic evidence is not as convincing as it seems. Empirical evidence suggests that criminal trials reach the correct conclusion in about 90% of cases that aren't resolved on an uncontested basis. Generally speaking, the Crown is only going to press a case where the prosecutor subjectively believes that they are correct that the defendant is, at least, guilty of something. So, a Crown prosecutor can also justify "rolling the dice" in a case with a low probability of winning, because at a minimum, a factually guilty defendant (whether it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or not in a particular trial with a particular finder of fact) has to suffer through a trial which is a form of punishment (particularly if the defendant can't secure pre-trial release). Also, while the Crown prosecutor ultimately represents the state and not the victim, the victim of a crime is a quasi-client and sometimes a victim who often has personal knowledge of a defendant's factual guilt, really wants to have their "day in court" and a chance to present their case to the public for all to hear. Law enforcement officers working on the case may want it to go to trial for similar reasons. Strategically, bringing even weak cases to trial also makes a Crown prosecutors threat to go forward with a trial even in a seemingly weak case more credible and that can increase the prosecutor's negotiating power. Also, a trial always reveals information, and sometimes the information revealed in a trial that is lost can provide value in future law enforcement efforts. Finally, prosecutors are humans and people, in general, don't like to admit their own mistakes. So, they may go forward even when their case is weak because they don't want to admit that they were mistaken and would prefer to have somebody else say they were wrong than to admit error. The personality type that doesn't admit mistakes is pretty common in this area. | I'd take the city council's advice and realize that you could be charged with a crime. Their job is to know the local laws and put them into place, as well as know how those laws relate to state law. As for state law, the Revised Statutes of Missouri, RSMo Section 574.115 Making a terrorist threat says: 574.115. Making a terrorist threat, first degree — penalty. — 1. A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree if such person, with the purpose of frightening ten or more people or causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation, knowingly: (1) Communicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (2) Communicates a false report of an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. 2. The offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree is a class D felony. 3. No offense is committed under this section by a person acting in good faith with the purpose to prevent harm. A fake gun turret on a porch in the public view that tracks people who walk by could be interpreted as making a terrorist threat because it (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. And, it's probably safe to assume your turret has the "the purpose of frightening ten or more people." The fact that the gun turret is on private property doesn't mean much; it is in view of the public and your intent is for it to be seen by the public and you want to invoke fear in the public members who walk by. And it's not going to be seen by the council as some sort of security; threats are not security. If you did put up such a turret, and the state didn't take action under 574.115, and there is no local law on the books that applies, the council can easy put one in place at their regular council meeting with a simple motion and vote. Since you already asked the council, they may already be considering such a law. And, depending on the county, the council could invoke a law addressing threats to the public that has more severe penalties that the state law, because Missouri is a home rule (Wikipedia) state. | The laws on this will vary somewhat from state to state in the US. But in general, a person who convinces another to commit a murder might be convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, or accessory to murder. Being an accessory often carries the same penalties as being in principal, and in some jurisdictions there is no legal difference. In addition such a person might be charged with a violation of Federal law, specifically 18 USC 373 - Solicitation to commit a crime of violence. Subsection (a) provides that: (a) Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, solicits, commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such conduct, shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) fined not more than one-half of the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the crime solicited, or both; or if the crime solicited is punishable by life imprisonment or death, shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty years. In US law charges of "incitement" are limited by the "imminent lawless action" test laid down in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) The court opion in that case states: the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. This case held that a person may not be convicted of crime for speech advocating violence unless the advocacy is for immediate, present violence, or at least violence in the very near future, and there there must be significant likelihood of the violence actually occurring. This test has mostly been used in cases of public advocacy of violence to groups or crowds, but nothing prevents it from begin used in cases of one-on-one advocacy. See also the Wikipedia article "Incitement". I have not researched the specific charges in the Manson case. |
Do you have to give attribution if an image falls under Creative Commons? Do you have to give attribution if an image falls under Creative Commons? Let's say you're sharing it on social media and you're not getting money out of it. Is it fair use even if you don't credit the author of the image? It seems crazy to me that you would have to give credits for some image especially if you're just sharing those images for fun. | It seems crazy to me that you would have to give credits for some image especially if you're just sharing those images for fun. It seems crazy to me that anyone would think you can just use someone else's image without giving them credit. I mean, it's not really a good idea to assume that if you see something you want, you can just take it. But anyway, back to the point: in order to share an image on social media, (1) you have to make a copy of it, (2) you have to give ("distribute") that copy to the social media website, and (3) they have to make and distribute copies of it in order for anyone else to see it. In the US or countries with similar copyright laws, the right to make copies of a creative work - like an image - is reserved to the copyright holder, which is often the person or company that created the work in the first place. Same with the right to distribute copies. So based on that part of the law alone, all three steps I mentioned above would be illegal, and if that were all there were to it, it would be flat-out illegal to share images on social media. However, there are two ways to get around this. One is to have the copyright holder give you permission to (1) make copies of the work, (2) distribute those copies, and (3) legally give other people the right to make and distribute copies of their own. The typical way to do this is with a license, such as the Creative Commons licenses. For example, the CC-BY-ND 4.0 license says this: Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to: reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and produce and reproduce, but not Share, Adapted Material. In your case, what that means is that the copyright holder for the image ("Licensor") grants "You", the person who downloaded or otherwise acquired the image, permission to (1) make copies ("reproduce") and (2) distribute copies ("Share") of the image (the "Licensed Material"), as long as you abide by certain conditions ("Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License"). And there's another section that says this: Every recipient of the Licensed Material automatically receives an offer from the Licensor to exercise the Licensed Rights under the terms and conditions of this Public License. which means that the copyright holder ("Licensor") gives anyone who gets a copy of the image (such as the people you share it with) permission to (3) make and distribute copies of their own, as long as they comply with the same conditions. So there you go: as long as you abide by the conditions, and the social media site abides by the conditions, you have permission to do all three things you need to do to share the image on social media. Now, what are those conditions? There are a few of them but this is the main one for what you're asking: If You Share the Licensed Material, You must: retain the following if it is supplied by the Licensor with the Licensed Material: identification of the creator(s) of the Licensed Material and any others designated to receive attribution, in any reasonable manner requested by the Licensor (including by pseudonym if designated); a copyright notice; a notice that refers to this Public License; a notice that refers to the disclaimer of warranties; a URI or hyperlink to the Licensed Material to the extent reasonably practicable; indicate if You modified the Licensed Material and retain an indication of any previous modifications; and indicate the Licensed Material is licensed under this Public License, and include the text of, or the URI or hyperlink to, this Public License. This says that if you share the image, you have to keep the attribution information provided along with the image when you got it. The attribution info might be in the image itself, or it might be part of a web page in which the image is embedded, or something else. Whatever it is, you have to pass it on along with the image in some reasonable way. On social media, that might mean including the attribution info in the same post where you share the image, if it's not already included in the image itself. If you don't, then this part of the license kicks in: However, if You fail to comply with this Public License, then Your rights under this Public License terminate automatically. That means that if you share the image without keeping the attribution information that was there when it was shared with you, then you have lost your right to share the image at all (because, remember, the license was the only thing that allowed you to share the image in the first place; otherwise it would have been illegal to copy or distribute it). So in summary, if an image is under a Creative Commons license, yes you must share the attribution info along with the image. Otherwise it's illegal for you to share the image at all. For completeness, though, I should mention there's another way to get around the sharing of images being illegal. Most countries' copyright laws provide limited exceptions where you can copy and distribute something you otherwise wouldn't be able to in order to enable education, research, journalism, critical analysis, and that sort of thing. In the US, the factors that go into determining whether this exception applies are how you're using the copyrighted work (in your case, the image) - this includes whether you're trying to make money off it the nature of the work, such as how creative it is how much of the work you're using whether and how your use affects the market for the original And although the details vary widely in other countries, many of them also use some of the same or similar criteria. This is one way that the fact that you're not making money from sharing the image could conceivably push it toward being okay, although you don't necessarily get a free pass to share the image just because you're not making money from it. Because the laws vary so much from country to country, and the circumstances vary so much from case to case, it's impossible to say in general whether attribution is really required when you're taking advantage of this exception. Even if it's not mentioned directly in the law, it might be among the relevant pieces of information taken into account by a court in any particular case. However, I have a hard time imagining how including attribution could hurt this kind of case, so my guess would be that even someone who intends to rely on this exception to copyright law is better off keeping attribution information intact. | Attribution is not a legal requirement If company A owns IP (copyright and trademarks in this case), they can licence it to company N on whatever terms are mutually acceptable. They may require company N to attribute their IP or they may not. | All artistic and literary work has copyright at the moment of creation This includes things “built” in Minecraft. However, under the terms of the Minecraft licence you give a wide ranging copyright licence to Mojang: If you make any content available on or through our Game, you agree to give us permission to use, copy, modify, adapt, distribute, and publicly display that content. This permission is irrevocable, and you also agree to let us permit other people to use, copy, modify, adapt, distribute, and publicly display your content. You are not giving up your ownership rights in your content, you are just giving us and other users permission to use it. | You are in breach of Copyright. Plain and simple. Certain websites allow you to use the website content as long as a link is made, but the website must clearly state that. You may also use a tiny portion of the content if it falls under Fair Use, where "Fair Use" does not mean "I want to". The best thing to do is not to do it. You can't copy anybody's work without consent. If you're thinking about Google specifically then they offer multiple APIs so that you can use their content in a wide variety of ways. | It is certainly possible to transfer a copyright or other IP without an explicit charge, indeed it can be a pure gift, and normally would be when it is left by will, as is common enough. From a paid consultant it might be clearer to include a statement that the transfer is part of the consulting assignment, rather than putting a price of zero in a blank. But one could instead convey a permanent non-exclusive license, granting permission to use or modify the work in any way desired, ans saying that this is provided as part of the consulting process. Then there would be no question of what rights the consultant retained, or that the same or a very similar solution could be provided to different clients. Indeed such a license would not be so very different from a CC-BY license, or any of several open source licenses, although I would not use one of those by name. But the legal effect would be much the same, and the wording could be similar. Otherwise there could be a later claim that the right transferred precluded the consultant from using the same solution for other clients. Even if such a claim was not legally sound, and was not upheld, it could be a distraction and costly of time and energy at least. | You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license. | I agree that you have a very strong copyright fair use case. Although the logo is creative and you're using the entire thing, your use is for a nonprofit educational purpose and does not affect the value of the work. The logo is also probably trademarked. But you aren't using the mark in commerce, so I don't think that will be a problem for you. | Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement. |
Can sharing an image on social media without attribution or permission be considered as being fair use? Can sharing an image on social media without attribution or permission be considered as being fair use? For example, let's say you're posting the image of an eagle by someone, but you don't credit him and you don't get permission from him, but you identify what kind of eagle it is. Could this be considered fair use since like an encyclopedia you're effectively teaching what an eagle looks like, and what are the requirements to make that educational claim valid? Does it make a difference if the images are under creative commons? | It Depends If the person reusing the image (lets call that person R for reuser) is not complying with the terms of the Creative commons license, which include a requirement to provide attribution of the source work, then R cannot rely on the license, and the granting of the license ad the presence of a license declaration is legally irrelevant. R must have some other basis to reuse the image. This could be an exception to copyright, such as fair use or fair dealing. Or possibly the image is not protected by copyright, for example because its copyright has expired, or because it is a work of the US Federal Government being used in the US. In the absence of such a basis, R is infringing copyright. In much of the world copyright now lasts for 70 years after the death of the author (or of all co-authors). In some different terms apply, ranging from life+50 to life+100. Sound recordings and photos get shorter terms in some countries. In the US the term is life+70 for recent works, but for work created and published before 1978 more complex rules apply, depending on the date of publication, and whether laws on notice and renewal were complied with. See the well-known chart Copyright Term and the Public Domain for the various cases and when copyright expires in each case. The question asks about fair use. This is a US-specific legal concept. It is designed to be flexible, an is highly fact-dependent. As a result it is rarely possible to say if a use will qualify as a fair use with certainty until a court passes on it. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more on fair use. Not providing attribution is itself often considered to weigh against fair use. The question does not give enough detail to make even a good guess as to whether such a use is likely to be held to be fair use. Identifying the kind of eagle has some educational value, which might favor fair use to some extent, but must be considered in light of the overall purpose of the use, which is not described. There is no indication as to whether the original work is creative or factual, or whether the reuse would be likely to harm the market for the original. Much use of images on social media does not stand up under a fair use analysis. Providing proper attribution might well help any fair use claim. See also Do you have to give attribution if an image falls under Creative Commons? | "Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI. | Per a decision of the US Copyright Office last month, AI generated images are not subject to copyright. That means you can use the generated images for any purpose you want1, but so can anyone else. However, the specific usage of a given image might be protected - so if you put a caption on the image and arrange it in the form of a comic (as the artist in that example did), that specific text and arrangement can be protected, but the underlying image can't be. Laws may differ elsewhere in the world, but that's the current stance in the US. 1 Subject to any appropriate laws, including any copyright laws which the new image itself may violate. Just because the image isn't protected itself doesn't mean that it can't infringe on someone else's copyrights. See the other answer for more details. | What a lovely question! US Copyright law is clear: the author of a creative work owns the copyright unless it is work for hire. In this instance, the photographer is not doing work for hire so they own the copyright. However, the photographer does not own a copy of the photograph – that is owned by the owner of the camera. The photographer cannot demand that they give him a copy but the parties can agree on such a transfer on whatever terms they like. As the owner of a “physical” copy they can do what they like with that copy but they cannot duplicate it except as fair use or as licensed. They could sell the memory card to whomever they like but the new owner couldn’t copy it either so it would seriously limit publication. Similarly they could move the file provided there was only one copy. Arguably, they could make a print of it providing they deleted the electronic version without copyright violation. Which brings us to who owns the copyright now. The camera owner can argue that the photographer has gifted the copyright to them. This is quite a strong argument as the parties' intentions at the time of arranging the taking of the photograph is that the photographer would have no further interest in it – after all he probably doesn’t want to hang a photo of some strangers on his wall. However, in many jurisdictions, including the united-states, copyright transfers must be in writing. As a fallback position the camera owner can argue there is an implicit license given even if copyright was not transferred. The scope of the license then becomes an issue. It is probably indisputable that the license is perpetual and royalty free. What is arguable is if the license allows commercial exploitation or only personal use. This is where the battle lines would be drawn and I don’t know how it would play out. Other jurisdictions are different For example, in Australia, copyright in a photo commissioned “for valuable consideration” for a “private or domestic purpose” vests in the commissioning party, not the photographer; even though this is not work for hire by an employee. For the circumstances you describe, the purpose is “private or domestic” but there is no “valuable consideration” so the photographer owns the copyright in this case. However, if there was an agreement to “pay” the photographer (even one as simple as “I’ll take your family photo if you’ll take mine”) then the person who asked for the photo to be taken owns the copyright. | Reviewing https://stackexchange.com/legal/trademark-guidance shows the following: The logos associated with Stack Exchange Inc. and any Stack Exchange site are a trademark. The purpose of trademark law is to prevent consumers from being misled as to the origin of a product. So if you were making a product, and you used a Stack Exchange name or logo in your product (or in its advertising) in such a way that would mislead someone into thinking that your product was owned by, operated by, endorsed by, or in any way part of Stack Exchange Inc., you would be violating the trademark and this would not be legal. Our logo images and site names are copyrighted. Any content on the Stack Exchange Network not contributed by users is copyrighted. Copyright is different than trademark. Ordinarily you couldn't copy it. But if you were writing a news story or blog post about a Stack Exchange site, reproducing the logo image would almost certainly be considered "fair use" and allowed under trademark law because you were not using it "in trade." So the answer to your question is yes, you would need to seek the permission of the trademark holder. | 17 U.S. Code § 107, which governs fair use in the US, says (emphasis mine): Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Note that commercial/educational use is part of only one factor. Even if that factor is in your favor, it may not be fair use, and even if it isn't in your favor, it might be fair use. Because fair use is determined on a case-by-case basis, we can't really say whether your use is fair use, with or without the donations. That would be the sort of thing you'd ask a lawyer about to get real legal advice on your particular case. | No It says right on the page you linked: These downloads are not public domain, as they are parts of content that has already been licensed and distributed. Although using these downloads may be permissible as long as the project itself falls under the rule of "Fair Use," it is ill-advised to use these downloads for any project intended for profitable gain or commercial advertisement, unless otherwise stated by Kyutwo.com. | This appears to mean that the author, while retaining copyright, is allowing anyone to make copies without asking permission from the author. This would seem to be similar to a CC-BY license, or perhaps more exactly a CC-BY-ND license, as the author has apparently not granted the right to create modified versions or other derivative works. This does not require one who makes such copies to distribute them free of charge, unless there is another provision not mentioned in the question. Amazon, or anyone else, would be free to sell copies at any price they cared to ask. If the author wanted to limit the sales price, that would take another provision, and might not be enforceable. |
What is a reason for not making an initial arrest of a person accused of sexual assault? Recently Tommy Robinson's daughter was allegedly sexually assaulted by a man at a holiday resort somewhere in the United Kingdom. Tommy has claimed that he legally prevented the accused from leaving after confronting the man. He allegedly punched the accused in the face several times. He called the police. Upon arrival, the police interview Tommy's 8 year old daughter who told them what had happened. She stated that the accused "squeezed" her "bum". My question is, what is a valid reason to not arrest the accused? Secondly, what are the minimum requirements for a man to get arrested for sexual assault in the context of this story, i.e where the "crime-scene" is still "fresh" and all parties involved are present? | Police make arrests when they (or a judge) decides to Police have the legal power to make an arrest if: they witness a crime being committed. Indeed, anyone can make an arrest in this circumstance. they have reason to believe that a crime has been committed. they have a warrant from a judge. Some reasons why police can, but choose not to make an arrest are: they don’t believe a crime has taken place. Accusations are easy; convictions are hard. they are exercising the discretion they have under the law to not prosecute a crime where it would not be in the public interest. Factors at play include the seriousness of the crime, the availability and strength of the evidence, the police and court resources available, other matters they have before them etc. they do not have sufficient evidence now but will pursue investigations to get more. Arresting someone starts all sorts of legal clocks ticking and if they can’t bring their case in time the defendant will walk. | There is no requirement to interview the victim and/or the suspect prior to filing charges. Often statements are taken from the parties involved/witnesses by police and presented to the District Attorney's office as evidence. However charges can be filed without either party being interviewed, especially by the DA. This can often be the case in things like domestic violence cases, where the victim refuses to cooperate and the perpetrator refuses to talk ("lawyer up" or invoke 5th amendment rights). Charges can be filed based on circumstantial evidence of the crime (in the example, marks on the fist of the perpetrator and injuries to the victim, along with proximity). The police will try to interview the suspect and/or victim, but usually the prosecutor does not get involved at this point until charges are filed and the defendant has retained a lawyer (or declined one). | “Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all. | In the case you link, this was given as an opening statement by the defense. Opening statements do not contain evidence. The defendant may or may not testify on their own behalf during the trial - this testimony, if given, counts as evidence, even if it is somewhat self-serving. And anything which tends to casts doubt as to the defendant's guilt is evidence that they didn't do it, even if it isn't proof. If there is reasonable doubt, then "he didn't do it" is not illogical. And it would seem unfair to allow the prosecution to say "he did it" but not allow the defense to say "no he didn't". | There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context. | In that case, Cruise-Gulyas was subject to a second stop, and the court found that the second stop was an illegal seizure. There is no qualified immunity since this was an exercise of a clearly established First Amendment right. The authority to seize her ended when the first stop ended. The finger is not a basis for a stop, since it does not violate any law ("This ancient gesture of insult is not the basis for a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or impending criminal activity", Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105. | If the police order you to sit in an interrogation room and you are not permitted to leave, by definition, you have been arrested. Detaining someone against their will for longer than necessary to answer a few questions on the spot (which is a lesser imposition on your freedom called a "Terry stop") is what it means to be arrested. Legally, the police are only allowed to arrest you if they have probable cause to believe that you have committed a crime. I believe that you are confusing arrested (being detained by law enforcement against your will for more than a Terry stop), with being booked, or being charged with a crime. Generally speaking people are arrested first, and then booked next, and then charged with a crime after that, although this isn't always the order in which this happens. In much the same way, if the police observe someone committing a crime, they will first handcuff them which places them under arrest, and then book them sometime not too long later when they arrive at the police station, and then formally charge them sometime after that after a conversation with the prosecuting attorney to see if the prosecuting attorney is willing to pursue the case. Booking generally involves bringing someone to a police station, getting identifying information, taking a mug shot, taking finger prints, and depending upon what the police want to do, searching your person and inventorying your possessions prior to putting you in a jail cell in jail garb. Usually, however, the grand jury or the prosecuting attorney (it varies by jurisdiction) does have subpoena power to compel you to provide information under oath prior to trial as a witness, following the service of a subpoena upon you a reasonable time in advance as set forth in the relevant court rules, unless you invoke your 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination and are not granted immunity from prosecution based upon your testimony in exchange, or you invoke some other legal privilege against having to testify. They can, of course, simply ask you to come to an interrogation room and answer questions, and merely imply that it is mandatory without actually saying that you must and without clarifying the situation. In that case, which is extremely common, their legal right to interrogate you flows from your own consent. If you answer their questions, your answers could provide the police with probable cause to arrest you that they didn't have when they started asking questions. Indeed, often, when police interrogate you before booking you, they are doing so because they need your statements to establish the probable cause needed to legally arrest you. This is why criminal defense attorneys counsel people to immediate ask for a lawyer and refuse to answer any questions other than those needed to establish your identity. You can also ask if you are under arrest and if you are free to leave (which are mutually exclusive). If they say you are not under arrest, you are free to leave, unless you are appearing pursuant to a subpoena. | The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal. |
If I post my own code to Stack Overflow, can I then use that code in a project that uses a license other than CC-BY-SA? Suppose that I have a block of code that represents my own original work (i.e. I am the copyright holder), and that I would like to post this code on Stack Overflow--either to answer someone else's question or to ask a question regarding the code. Let's also suppose that I want to use this code in my own project as well--either one released under a non-copyleft license like the MIT license, or even a closed-source, proprietary program. If I post my code onto Stack Overflow, which uses the CC-BY-SA 4.0 license (a copyleft license), am I then required to release my project under the CC-BY-SA 4.0 license? Or am I free to use the MIT license or any other license of my choosing? | When you license your creative work under one non-exclusive license such as CC-BY-SA, you are in no way prevented from also licensing your works under different non-exclusive licenses such as MIT. The other license doesn't even have to be an open source license – dual-licensing is a common business model. You are the sole copyright holder of the creative work. No one else can use your works. By offering licenses, you are giving permissions to other people. But you still retain all your rights. You are not required to comply with these licenses yourself – you are the licensor, not the licensee. Technically, the licensor of CC-BY-SA 4.0 material does give up some rights. For example, you waive the right to collect royalties when recipients exercise the permissions you gave them through this license (cf section 2.b.3). But that doesn't restrict you outside of that license. | A document can be distributed under more than one license. Just because it has been made available under a CC license for free, doesn't mean that IEEE can't negotiate a different license with different terms that allow them to sell the content. (This is similar to the way that a software library can be available for free under a license that permits non-commercial use, but also be made available for a fee for commercial use.) If you want to know whether IEEE is legally selling Aaron Swartz's manuscript, you can contact Morgan & Claypool, the publisher that owns the copyright, and ask them whether this use by IEEE has been authorized by them. For the other documents you mention, contact MIT Press. Etc. | The basic principle about copyright protection is that the expression of an idea is protected, but the idea itself is not. So wholesale copying without permission is infringing. But the abstract algorithm is not protected by copyright (and let us assume that it also isn't patented). By way of analog, an insertion sort is a pretty easy concept to grasp, and once you understand it, you can re-create it, independent of how the original example (where from you learned about the sort) is expressed. So the question is whether it is necessary for you to copy that code (copyright protects against copying), or can you independently re-express the algorithmic idea (ideas are not protected)? | Broadly speaking, the difference is the "sharealike" clause of CC-BY-SA. Any derivative of a CC-BY-SA work must itself be licensed CC-BY-SA, whereas a derivative of an "MIT with attribution" work can be under any license the author wants. There are a number of other differences in the fine print (eg. CC forbids DRM, where MIT doesn't), but that's the big one. | Stack Exchange have already covered this in a couple of places, from MSE's A site (or scraper) is copying content from Stack Exchange. What should I do?: When should I not report these sites? They follow all the attribution requirements. As mentioned before, there is nothing wrong with copying our content elsewhere on the web, so long as they are following all the attribution requirements given. There is no action we can take against a scraper who follows all the rules. And the old Attribution Required blog post mentions that the actual requirements are: Visually indicate that the content is from Stack Overflow or the Stack Exchange network in some way. It doesn’t have to be obnoxious; a discreet text blurb is fine. Hyperlink directly to the original question on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/questions/12345) Show the author names for every question and answer Hyperlink each author name directly back to their user profile page on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/users/1234567890/username) By “directly”, I mean each hyperlink must point directly to our domain in standard HTML visible even with JavaScript disabled, and not use a tinyurl or any other form of obfuscation or redirection. Furthermore, the links must not be nofollowed | I can see two points you might be confused about in your question. 1. Works can be in the public domain without having a CC license The Wikipedia statement and the government statement are not inconsistent with each other; just because something isn't available under a Creative Commons license doesn't necessarily mean that it is restricted by copyright. In fact, CC licenses are moot for material in the public domain: When a work is in the public domain, it is free for use by anyone for any purpose without restriction under copyright law. Public domain is the purest form of open/free, since no one owns or controls the material in any way. ... Creative Commons licenses do not affect the status of a work that is in the public domain under applicable law, because our licenses only apply to works that are protected by copyright. So if a work is in the public domain, you can use it for whatever purpose you wish (though see below), without restriction or attribution. This is less restrictive than the various Creative Commons licenses, which require various levels of attribution, non-modification, etc. depending on the license chosen by the creator. 2. Trademark protections are separate from copyright protections Your quote from the government website implies that these logos might be trademarked, even if they're not under copyright; this is entirely possible. Roughly speaking, trademark protections keep other people from trading on your good name & reputation; copyright protections keep other people from directly profiting from your creative endeavors. If another party creates a product that uses a trademark in a way that would create confusion among consumers, the trademark holder can sue for that. Depending on how you use the logos, you might run afoul of these protections. See this Q&A for futher details under US law. (Australian law may differ a bit but I would expect that the general principles are the same.) | Section 108(a) is the most useful for an infringer who posts an entire copy of a protected work in public. Subsections(b,c) require that the copy not be made available outside the premises, which precludes internet posting; (d) requires a user request to make a copy; (e) applies only to items that are off the market and transferred to a specific user; (h) allows more copying in the last 20 years of the period when a work is protected (not applicable here). Subsection (a) allows a library or archive to make one copy of a work, as long as there is no commercial advantage to making the copy, the library is relatively public (it might restrict access to bona fide researchers), and a copyright notice is included: this has the fewest restrictions on copying. The internet downloader is not a library or an archive, so the downloader is not granted any permission under 108 to make a copy. Under 108(a) a library can make no more than one copy available, but every uploading or downloading is "making a copy". A library would be contributorily liable for the illegal downloadings of their "customers". It is difficult to know exactly what one can get away with under 17 USC 107 a.k.a. "fair use". I am fairly sure that posting a copy of a contemporary book in the open is not "fair use" even if the intent is to make it possible for dummies to study chemistry: such copying is not at all transformative, totally unlimited, and provides a significant market substitute for the protected work. | Yes you can. What you do is called mere aggregation. Your app and the GPL container run isolated and do not share memory space: they are clearly separate programs vs parts of one program, so your app does not get infected by GPL. |
Are my assumptions about clean-room reverse engineering and copyright of computer programs correct? Recently, the people behind the re3 project (public decompilation of the games GTA III and GTA Vice City) were served a civol lawsuit by Take Two, the owning company of the games. What the group did was run the binaries through decompilers, such as IDA, and making a recreation of equivalent high-level C++ source code. From my underdstanding of law and jurisprudence, this would not breach copyright law. My reasoning is the following: Computer programs are only covered by copyright because their source code is, therefore so is the resulting object code. However, the processes and sequences of operations that make the program do what it does aren't copyrightable (a patent would be better suited for those things). Taking that into account, by decompiling the object code into new, re-arranged source code, the only elements that would remain are the specific sequences and processes that are represented by it. No copyrighted works remain, neither the object code nor the original source code the engineers wrote and later compiled. I have what I believe to be a good analogy to explain it better. Suppose there is a recording (object code/binary) of an orchestral performance (original source code) of a song that is in the public domain (processes/sequences of operations) Wouldn't the decompilation project be the equivalent of me running the recording through a program which would recognize the individual notes and throw together a music sheet? The recording and performance are copyrighted, but the core concept in which they are based on is not (in this case because the song is on the public domain, however keep in mind I only used this to have an example of an "non-copyrighted" thing. processes/sequences of operations can never enjoy copyright protections at all) While of course noting that we cannot predict the future: could this argument hold up? If not, what are its flaws? | I think that both your examples would be considered, if not outright copies, then at the very least derivative works of the originals. Under US law, the copyright holder of a work has the exclusive right to prepare derivative works. So anyone who prepares such a work without the authorization of the copyright holder is infringing their copyright and will be liable for such infringment. The US Copyright Office, in their Circular 14, explicitly includes "a new version of an existing computer program" as an example of a derivative work. That would certainly seem to cover the GTA folks. The concept that derivative works generally include "translations" might capture them, too. Your example of transcribing a musical performance isn't explicitly mentioned, but I think your sheet music would likewise be a derivative work of the performance: it includes all the editorial and arrangement choices made by the orchestra. Of course, both the performance and your transcription are derivative works of the original composition, but since the composition is out of copyright, there's no legal problem with that aspect. | Copyright law treats computer files containing text as "copies" and computer files containing sound as "phonorecords". Indeed it must, otherwise there would be no copyright protection for ebooks and for downloadable music. Thus, I would take 17 U.S. Code §121 to apply. The word "material" in copyright law has been held to include "stored in electronic form on any storage device" so that the key requirement for an initial copyright, that the work be "fixed in a tangible form" or "fixed in any tangible medium of expression" is satisfied by a computer file, see 17 USC 102 17 USC 121 reads: it is not an infringement of copyright for an authorized entity to reproduce or to distribute in the United States copies or phonorecords of a previously published literary work ... if such copies or phonorecords are reproduced or distributed in accessible formats exclusively for use by eligible persons. Note that the page "Copyright and Digital Files" describes computer files recorded in a computer or on disk as "copies" as in deed does 17 USC 117 This establishes that such files are copies, and thus consist of "materiel objects". The official US copyright office page on "Can I Use Someone Else's Work? Can Someone Else Use Mine?" reads: Whether or not a particular work is being made available under the authority of the copyright owner is a question of fact. But since any original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium (including a computer file) is protected by federal copyright law upon creation, in the absence of clear information to the contrary, most works may be assumed to be protected by federal copyright law. (emphasis added) Copyright Office Circular 1: "Copyright Basics" reads: A work is “fixed” when it is captured (either by or under the authority of an author) in a sufficiently permanent medium such that the work can be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a short time. A computer file is petty clearly "sufficiently permanent" for this purpose. Also consider Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc 886 F. 3d 1179 As this web page reports: In a 6-2 decision, the Supreme Court has ruled that Google's use of Oracle's software code in developing the Android operating system constituted a fair use under §107 of the Copyright Act. The use would not have been fair use unless the code was protected by copyright, and the code almost surely existed only in the form of computer files. Thus the US Supreme Court has treated computer files as "materiel objects" for purposes of copyright law. (Note also that the use was declared to be infringement unless fair use applied, which leads even more directly to the same conclusion.) | The audio book would probably be an infringing derivative work because the client could redistribute it once the client received it. It sounds very much like a product that is regularly sold by merchants relying on copyrights. Conceivably, simply reading a book aloud to a client in some sort of streaming context that could't be shared with others or replayed would merely be fair use, much like hiring a baby sitter to read a book aloud to your children would be clearly fair use. If there were an automatic text to sound converter as opposed to an individualized performance, it might not be considered infringing. There are people with programs that do this who haven't been sued, but the boundaries haven't been explored very thoroughly. Honestly, there isn't a lot of guidance in this area from statutory language, and the questions would often not be guided by much case law involving similar facts. Your intuition living in the modern world is probably almost as good as a lawyer's in this situation. | Generally, no, this will not violate copyright. Your end user might violate copyright, but that is their problem not yours. Your program is a tool, just like a word processor is. If I copy a Harry Potter book into a word processor that does not make the word processor maker liable. There is a concept of "contributory infringement", which I think is what you are concerned about. I don't know about Danish law in particular, but most countries would require evidence that you had reasonable knowledge that actual copyright violation was occuring, rather than just being aware that it might happen in theory. This is normally applied to file sharing services who have to have "notice and takedown" measures, file filters and the like. This isn't your concern as you never have any access to the files created by your users. You can also be found liable if you induce anyone to commit copyright violations. Don't draw your customers attention to the custom monster feature as a workaround for those copyrighted monsters, as that could be considered to be inducement. Also don't provide any "wizards" or similar tools which make it noticeably easier to duplicate the custom monsters (e.g. if you notice that the copyrighted custom dragon stats are all on a linear scale with dragon size, don't create a "dragon creation wizard" embodying that fact.) This assumes that your program runs entirely on the end user computer. Its different if you provide any kind of cloud storage for generated characters. | If you do, can you build/run it without being bound by said license? No, you cannot. Because there is no way to "build/run" it without making a copy. You copy the sourcecode, before you can run your compiler. That is the copy you are making, not copying the file that results from this process. A valid question might be, are you bound by the license? Well, that is up for lawyers and a court to decide, but in all countries I know, copyright is automatic for anything worth copying. And the copyright holder can grant licenses to people to allow things. So arguing you are not bound by a specific license would mean you would argue that you are bound by the legal default, which in most countries is "You cannot copy that. At all. Unless you have explicit permission". That argument would sound like "I stole all 10, because the offer of buy-one-get-one-free was not legally binding". Maybe it wasn't. But that doesn't mean you get to do something unrelated illegal instead. Now, there are many exceptions for "personal use". You can sing any song in the shower. I would assume you can compile any program there, too. You just cannot use that program for anything worthwhile, the same way you cannot record your song in the shower and sell it. | No, the musical composition itself (i.e., what you might express tangibly in sheet music) has copyright distinct from the copyright that exists on Led Zepplin's recording of the song. Your new cover will still be a derivative work of the musical composition. When you record a cover of a copyrighted song, you must get permission from the composer (or current copyright holder of the composition). In the United States, however, you can compel the copyright holder to grant you license under 17 USC §115. Under a compulsory license, you pay a fixed fee per copy of the cover that you distribute (currently 9.1 cents), and the copyright holder must allow you to distribute those copies. See the circular Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords from the U.S. Copyright Office. I am not aware of other countries that have a similar compulsory license scheme, so in those jurisdictions, you would need to negotiate a license with the publisher or an intermediary agency they use. However, even if you did get a compulsory license to distribute your cover song, you must get permission to synchronize the song with a video. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers describes the copyright holder's exclusive synchronization right: A synchronization or "synch" right involves the use of a recording of musical work in audio-visual form: for example as part of a motion picture, television program, commercial announcement, music video or other videotape. Often, the music is "synchronized" or recorded in timed relation with the visual images. Since the synchronization right cannot be acquired under a compulsory license, you will need to have the publisher (or whoever the copyright holder is) agree to license the synchronization right to you under whatever terms the two of you can agree upon. | No These are derivative works and making them is copyright breach. Doing this as a hobby or even for the entertainment of friends in private is likely fair use. Distribution or performance in public (monitored or not) is likely not fair use and you would need a licence. Here is a summary of the relevant law in australia. | There are two processes that go on all the time, and are generally considered legal: Encryption algorithms are attacked by cryptographers and weaknesses identified. In most cases this results in a gradual reduction of the work required to break the algorithm by a few orders of magnitude at a time. The history of SHA-1 is a good example of this. People identify security holes in software and follow responsible disclosure rules. This means that they notify the vendor and give them an opportunity to fix the bug before going public. Note that this is merely considered good practice; immediate publication would be legal too. Your scenario sits at the intersection of these two processes: an attack (process 1) which completely destroys the security of many systems (process 2). Responsible disclosure occupies a legal grey area: someone who finds a bug might have had to exploit it to at least some degree to demonstrate it, and there have been cases where vendors have used police or courts to retaliate. However this wouldn't apply to your scenario. In America the First Amendment makes it unconstitutional to use the legal system to stop people saying true things (copyright excepted, and untrue things are often legal too). If your Wunderkind lives in America then a widely published factual description of their solution would therefore be legal. Legal problems only start if they provide the details in secret to people they should reasonably suspect of intending to use them for crime. |
How can I exclude any rights for my own software projects from the contract? I'm about to sign a long terms terms contract for software development and maintenance. This job implies working with several applications and creating new ones. It seems to be difficult to put all of the tasks and assignments I'm going to working on and I totally understand that the company I'm going to work with has to make sure they keep rights for the software I create for them. I personally think it's fair the company is going to own any code and IP rights under their project. On the other hand I'd like to make sure my own projects or any side projects that I may take part in the future do not / will not fall under this agreement. I am talking about any other code that I write in my free time commercial/open source in a non-competing field. So I'd like to include a general sentence to acknowledge that I (or some other project) will still keep any rights for my(their) code while the current project keeps any right for the code (designs, written text) I write specifically for them. What would be a good example of such clause? | You need a lawyer There is no magic phrase to do what you want. The company will care about defending their assets, while you will want to defend yours. Only a lawyer will be able to tailor the condition that makes sense based on what your job's domain covers and your side projects. It is entirely possible that your personal projects conflict with your employer's, and you must then put your personal projects on hold or risk getting sued. e.g.) developing two pieces of software that does the same thing. Your lawyer will be able to advise on how that looks and what to do. No random strangers on the internet can give you accurate advice. | As Greendrake says, you can legally create your "open source" license. There are two problems with this: Since you are not an experienced contract lawyer, there is a significant risk that your license doesn't do what you intend it to do. As a consequence, people who you want to use your software might not do so, because your license prevents it or makes it too risky. Or people may use your software in ways that you didn't want to allow, because the text of your license doesn't prevent it. Your license terms may be incompatible with other open source licenses. For example, I might want to use GPL licensed software A, and your software B with your license in my application. Being careful, I give both licenses to my lawyer, and the lawyer says, "sorry, you cannot possibly follow the terms of both licenses, because GPL and Ky's license require that you do two contradictory things. You can use software A and follow GPL's terms, or you can use software B and follow Ky's license terms, but you can't use both". All in all I would recommend that you use a widely used open source license. | As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum). | If it is open source code, then usually the requirement is that you produce the source code for the software that you release. Exactly for the software that you release. For example if you took open source software X, and added feature Y, and distributed the combined software outside your company, anyone can request the source code for X including Y. Handing them the source code for X only wouldn't meet the open source requirements. Now all this is not illegal, but it means the copyright holder of X could sue you for copyright infringement. They will do that if they have enough reasons to do so. So let's say you are continuously developing your software and occasional hand out your compiled software. Say you built versions 100, 101, 102, 103, 104 of the software, you gave versions 100 and 103 to customers, and anyone asking for the source code is given the source code for the latest, slightly improved version 104. The copyright holder of X might sue you but: 1. They wouldn't know you are doing this. 2. A judge might side with you and decide that newer, improved source code is good enough (I don't know this, but it seems not unreasonable). 3. The copyright holder might decide that they don't want to sue you for this because you are close enough to meeting the requirements. | I'm assuming that you are not seeking to change the license, and so it will remain GPLv3. As long as you've built on the original software, that license still applies. You also need to keep the previous copyright notices, including the names of the original people. Assuming that, everything you're doing is legal, which is what's on topic here. There is some etiquette around forks (which is what you're doing), which would be on topic at the Open Source Stack Exchange. I'm puzzled by your desire to have a different license text. You can't change the license from GPLv3, so that has to stay the same. (If the original has GPLv3 "or, at your option, any later version", you can drop the any other version text if you like.) | Assumptions Let us assume that the code involved was created during the period of employment, was within the scope of that employment, and was validly work-made-for-hire (WFH). In that case, the code copyright is owned by the former employer.dn the person who wrote it has no more rights than a random stranger would. I am also going to assume US law. Ownership of Ideas Who owns the ideas, the knowledge of how these libraries work? No one does. In the absence of a patent, no one ever "owns" an idea. ]17 USC 102(b)](https://copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#102) provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Derivative Works Copyright law does prohibit anyone making a derivative work from a work protected by copyright without the permission of the owner. A derivative work is one "based on" the source work. The classic case is a translation. Exactly when a piece of software is a derivative work of another is fact-dependent. Bu several things are clear. If the source work is trivial and obvious, ther may not be sufficient "originality" for the source work to be protected by copyright at all. If the source work is not protected by a valid copyright, nothing is a derivative work of it. A "hello world" program, for example, is probably not original enough for any copyright. A straight-forward implementation of a basic algorithm like quicksort is probably not original enough, either. If there is only one way, or only a small number of ways, to express the ideas of the source work, the merger doctrine applies. This means that the expression of the work is merged into the idea, leaving the expression unprotected. When the merger doctrine applies, there is, in effect, no copyright. If a work copies ideas from a source, but none of its particular expression of those ideas, the result is not a derivative work, and is not an infringement of copyright. If a work is definitive, but is also a fair use of the source work, it is not an infringement. The usual four-factor fir use analysis must be made to determine this. In particular, if a work is highly transformative, it is likey to be found to be a fair use. Issues from the Question What if the new code (presumably, in the case of something simple) comes out exactly the same (even if I rewrite it without looking)? That Rather suggests that the work was too trivial to be original enough to have copyright protection at all, or else that there are only a few ways to express the idea, and the merger doctrine applies. But if neither o those were true, this might be an infringement. [* To be coninued*] | This answer is limited to United States law. The situation in other countries is definitely different. Under United States law, the owner of a lawfully made copy of a copyrighted work has, as a right of the physical possession of that work, the right to the work's ordinary use. Licenses grant you additional rights such as the right to make derivative works, the right to make copies beyond what's needed for ordinary use, and so on. A pure license doesn't ask for anything in return, it just gives you new rights. Those rights may be conditional, but the conditions are just things you have to do to get new rights. They're not conditions imposed on any existing rights you had. A contract is an agreement between two parties. Both parties must agree to a contract for the contract to be enforceable. Contracts can take away rights you otherwise have. You don't need a license or contract to use a copyrighted work if you lawfully possess a copy of that work. Say you download a copy of a work covered by the GPL. You can refuse to accept the GPL license and you can still use that work. Why? Because no law prohibits you from doing so and there is no civil cause of action for using a lawful copy of a work under US law. But now say you want to give a copy of that work to your friend. This is illegal under US law because 17 USC 106 restrict that right to the copyright holder and there's no applicable exception since that's not part of the ordinary use. For a work covered by the GPL, the license offers to give you that right, a right you wouldn't otherwise have. It imposes conditions on you that are specifically in exchange for the grant of the new right. If you do accept the GPL, it functions as a contract. You got in exchange a right you didn't have before and if you don't comply with the GPL's terms, you don't have the copyright holder's permission to exercise those rights which is required under the law. By contrast, a click-through or EULA takes effect when you agree to it and such agreement is a condition for using the software. That's a pure contract and usually doesn't give you any rights you wouldn't have in the absence of such an agreement other than the use of the software. | Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark. |
Can someone be arrested for not being ‘nice’ to police? We came out of a night club and there was a police car with dogs barking at the back of it. For some reason this fascinated my friend and he stood behind the police car laughing and watching the dogs bark. Few seconds later an officer came through and I believe he thought he is the one who was provoking the dogs, but as far as i remember the dogs had been barking for at least half an hour as we were had been standing outside for a while, because there was already some unrelated incident which is why the cops where there. The police first words were ‘Hey fuck off’. My friend said why u talking to me like that and the policeman got offended and a bit aggressive then all of a sudden he was in handcuffs with at least 10 cops around him. The whole time he wasnt fighting back, just asking what he did wrong. I explained what happened to a few of them and finally they let him go with a move on notice but they also told him he will be appearing in court. Seems weird and an abuse of power to me. Could they win such a case?? | Can someone be arrested for not being ‘nice’ to police? Yes. The arrest may later be declared unlawful, and the cop could later be disciplined by his boss, but if a cop wants to arrest you now for any reason they just can. Seems weird and an abuse of power to me. The available means of dealing with abuse of power have never been in excess. Could they win such a case? Yes. So could your friend. It depends on many many factors. | Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification. | You should file a complaint with the police. If you complain to the police then they might do something. If you don't complain then they certainly won't. Are food trucks licensed? You might try complaining to the license authority. However go to the police first because the licence authority are unlikely to do anything without a police complaint. Even being just another statistic helps increase the pressure for action on the wider issue of racism in society. If all else fails you can just post the incident on YouTube and see what happens. Its an unreliable method of enforcement and can backfire, but it has been known for international embarrassment to kick reluctant authorities into action. | There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf | The non-cougher committed an unjustified assault, and could be arrested or sued for his actions. The actions were clearly not the minimal level of force needed to prevent continued assault or to effect an arrest (the dude who entered and coughed clearly is guilty of assault). This is regardless of covid. Instead, the other guy decided to beat on the first punk. The courts might retaliate against the cougher by fining him or sending him to prison: that is what the law is all about (putting the use of force under the control of laws, not individual emotion). It would be legal to use some degree of force to arrest the guy, and it would be legal to use some degree of force to prevent the guy from continuing with his assault. The puncher was not engaged in self-defense, because there was no credible continuing threat and his response was way over the top. The particular response here, vigilante justice, was disproportionate, and not justified by the circumstances. A police officer might have arrested both of them, had one been present (but police have discretion, so he might have gone with the "you started it" theory). Legally, they were both wrong. | “Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all. | Yes. This is clearly kidnapping. It is probably not a terribly aggravated sub-type of kidnapping, but it is kidnapping nonetheless. It is probably a felony. The fact that the victim does not press charges, or ratifies the conduct after the fact, does not change the fact that a crime was committed. The police decision to arrest the ex-boyfriend was entirely proper. It was not a false arrest. They had probable cause to believe that a crime was committed by the ex-boyfriend, and, in fact, a crime actually was committed by the ex-boyfriend. In the United States, the prosecutor has full authority to prosecute the ex-boyfriend to the full extent of the law for felony kidnapping for his conduct, over the objections of the victim. The decision to prosecute or not is entirely in the discretion of the prosecutor who brings criminal charges on behalf of the state and not the victim. Often the police and prosecutors will honor a victim's wishes, and this appears to be what happened in this case, but they are not required to do so, and could change their minds and bring charges in the future against the ex-boyfriend within the statute of limitations, if they wanted to do so. (This analysis does not apply in countries with Islamic law, but the facts of the question suggest that Islamic law does not apply in this jurisdiction.) | This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best. |
Can a developer use someone else's product name as an Open Source project name? Suppose that an open source developer wants to use the product name ninjago owed by Lego for the name of an Open Source project. Is it allowed to base the project name on Lego brand? Also can the developer create a unique logo for this open source project that will look kind of similar or has some kind of reference to Lego product? Or is even a name protected? | united-states Trademark law varies somewhat from country to country, and the set of protected trademarks varies a lot from one country to another. In this answer I shall consider primarily US law, although I will try to make the answer as wide ranging as I can. What trademark law protects is the identification of a source of goods or services, and the associated reputation an good will. By using a trademark that is identical to or confusingly similar to an exiting mark, one may be relying to some extent on the reputation of the existing brand. Unless done with permission, this is unfair, and is generally not allowed. However, the protection of a trademark is normally limited to a product or service of the same kind as the existing mark. So suppose one firm registered "GreenCall" as the name of a smartphone service. Another firm wanting to use "Greencall" as the name of a wine would probably not be infringing on the first firm's trademark, and could not be successfully sued. (They might well be sued, however, and need to spend significant money defending their mark.) In some countries, only registered trademarks get any protection. In others, such as the US, use of a mark without registration will provide some protection, but not as much as registration does. In the US at least,a well-known or "famous" mark gets addition protection, even outside the category where it has been registered and used. What counts as "famous" is ultimately a decision fo the US Patent and Trademark office (USPTO) to make. A toy line set in a fantasy world would seem like a rather different category than an open-source project, unless the project was a game with similar elements. The farther and more obviously different the project might be from the toy line, the less likely the use of the same name would be to be held a trademark infringement. Since the Lego mark is used not only on toys, but on a successful TV series, a movie, a video game, and a theme park, it might be held to be a "well-known" mark, and be protected even in categories it is not used in. Actually the project being an open-source one would make no significant difference here. Open source project and commercial products follow the same trademark rules. However, even if the category is different enough that the use of the same name is ultimately held not to be trademark infringement, it is not unlikely that the trademark owner would take legal action, and the developer or development group would need to spend money on legal fees at n early stage of the project. It might be wiser to choose a more clearly distinctive name. It might also be wise to consult a lawyer with trademark expertise. As to the logo, if the logo in some way "looks similar" to an existing logo, it might be held to be a derivative work, and thus a copyright infringement. This is a highly fact-dependent judgement call. | Yes, the original designer (or the designer's employer) would have a legal right to the design, insofar as it included protectable design elements. Copyright on the design of "useful" products is limited, and the exact limitations vary from country to country. However, it might be hard for the designer (or the company for which the designer works) to prove that the creation was original, and was not an actual leak. But if the designer or company has retained sufficient evidence to convince a court, then a suit could be successful. Such a possibility makes me doubt that Apple or a similar large company would do that. The risks are too great when a design of their own creation would probably be quite good enough for their purposes. But that is all speculation. | You're not going to find an OSI-approved or FSF-approved license that meets your needs because these licenses comply with the OSI definition or FSF definition of open-source software, and your requirements don't. Looking at your requirements, it looks like you want a license where users can modify the software and use it for private use, but cannot use it for commercial use. I ran a search on TL;DR Legal to see what licenses match. There are some one-off licenses that appear to be written by individuals or groups or written by companies that explicitly call out a particular software package. One appears to be a modification of the Apache License. I wouldn't recommend simply using one of these without not only reading them thoroughly yourself, but also consulting a lawyer - just because they started with a license that is trusted doesn't mean that a change they made didn't cause problems if it were to be challenged. For a project hosted on GitHub, it doesn't need to be open-source. You can upload a project that is all rights reserved, but by using GitHub, you do need to allow others to view and fork your repository. However, I wouldn't expect many outside contributors. Why should I give you my hard work if you're just going to turn around and make money on it? That's essentially free labor. I'm not aware of any listing of vetted licenses that are designed for commercial use of software, like how the OSI and FSF maintain lists of licenses. There is a Binpress license generator, but again, it's not a vetted license. How much stake you put into license generator or some random license you find on the Internet is up to you and the level of risk that you find acceptable. If you want to make money on your open-source software, you may want to rethink your approach. In my experience, I've usually seen dual licensing achieve this. One license is a custom written commercial license while the other is a very strong copyleft license, like GPL or AGPL (depending on how you intend your software to be used), which forces companies to also open-source their software if they use yours. It doesn't explicitly prevent commercial usage, but many companies will either look for an alternative that has a more permissive license or purchase the commercial license to prevent their software from being required to be open-source as well. You may also be interested in questions on Open Source about how to monetize open-source projects. There are options out there - selling support and maintenance or related services or selling additional documentation or examples. Under this model, all of your software is free and open source under any of the well-known open-source software licenses, but you make money supporting users of the software. | I agree that you have a very strong copyright fair use case. Although the logo is creative and you're using the entire thing, your use is for a nonprofit educational purpose and does not affect the value of the work. The logo is also probably trademarked. But you aren't using the mark in commerce, so I don't think that will be a problem for you. | Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement. | If you are utilizing the name of the characters just so users can rate them (by rate - I mean rank, review, critique) you should be fine. Copyrights are subject to "fair use" by the public. For purposes such as review, criticism, and comment - this is generally considered to be fair use. Is the site commercial or for-profit? That could impact the analysis, but only if you are making money flowing from the use of the actual copyrighted material(s), rather than advertising (like Adsense) or something similar (this should not suggest that those type sites cannot violate copyright, but it's part of the analysis). If it is something you are investing money into creating, you may want to get a formal legal opinion. But if the site if for fun, or hobby, you are likely fine if what's described is the only use. http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/copyright-fair-use-and-how-it-works-for-online-images/ This link is to a great, easy to read and understand article on fair use, what it is and what it allows. Keep in mind each case is fact intensive, however, from what you are describing this seems fine. | You will need to obtain permission from the company whose logo you intend to use before using it. Just because you use a product from that company in your devices doesn't necessarily give you permission to use their logo. Many companies have co-marketing plans that you can apply to be a part of but generally you and your product must meet certain requirements in order to be a part of it. | Apparently not The full text of the license is not included on the page you link to, or on any linked page that I checked. But the FAQ says: free educational licenses can be used strictly for non-commercial educational purposes (including academic research). Exactly how this company defines "non-commercial educational purposes" is not stated. If work is done on a student project, and after a non-student license is purchased that project is commercialized, would the license have been violated, and if so, would the company be likely to sue? The fist question cannot be answered without the full text of the license, and the second would require reading the minds of the company officials. But it seems reasonably clear that this is not what the company has in mind. Another user has pointed out a link to the actual license terms which I failed to note. Section 3.1 of the license says, in relevant part: ... JetBrains grants You a non-exclusive and non-transferable right to use each Product covered by the Toolbox Subscription for non-commercial, educational purposes only (including conducting academic research or providing educational services) ... This would seem to confirm what the FAQ quoted above says. It is hard to see how any development intended as an eventual commercial product would be covered under such a license term. It would appear that a regular non-student license would be needed for such use. |
Can the only legal heir refuse to inherit from his/her father in India? If there is exactly one legal heir for a Hindu person's assets and liabilities and that heir does not want to inherit anything (possibly because there is too debt or complexity) is it possible for the heir to completely abandon all rights to the assets and liabilities? What is the manner of doing so? Just keeping quiet? And what happens to the assets and liabilities then assuming no one comes forward to take responsibility? | A person can decline to accept an inheritance under the law of India. The mechanism for doing so depends upon the stage of the probate process at the time and the nature of the property, and often involves a notarized document, or a letter clearly expressing an intent not to inherit. In those cases, the person declining to accept an inheritance (an action sometimes called a "disclaimer" or "renunciation" of an inheritance), and all of that person's descendants, are treated as if they predeceased the decedent from whom the inheritance derives, for purposes of further distribution of the inheritance. | The default choice of law rule is that intestate succession is governed by the law of the place of domicile of the decedent at death (i.e. by the law of the state where someone resides in the U.S. in this case), if there is no will and if no other consideration applies. Incidentally, the citizenship of the decedent is pretty much irrelevant. You don't need to be a a citizen of a place to be domiciled there. Similarly, where you happen to be when you die is also irrelevant to succession although other post-mortem processes like inquests are affected. Real property, however, is generally governed by the laws of intestate succession in the place where it is located. This requires a separate Mexican succession process, which would be called an ancillary probate in U.S. practice, but probably has a different name in Mexico because Mexico has a civil law legal system that follows the Spanish tradition for succession at death rather than the common law procedural process concept of a probate proceeding, and is often handled by a legally trained Mexican notary outside the court system. At the same time, common law legal systems give near absolute discretion to the testator in how they make their bequests subject to minimum immediate family support rules, while civil law legal systems are usually more limiting. Intangible personal property (e.g. a bank account) is usually deemed to be governed by the law of the place of domicile. Whether tangible personal property is governed by the law of the place of domicile, or by the law of the place where it is located at death, isn't an issue that is resolved uniformly in all jurisdictions. It would depend upon how the issue presented itself and in what legal forum it presented itself. Often, the reality that "possession is 9/10th of the law" and that tangible personal property often has little significant economic value, means that these issues are resolved without resort to the courts or formal legal process. (In England, in the early modern era, succession to tangible personal property was vested in the clergy and courts only handled succession to real property and intangible property.) Also, in terms of choice of law, in the U.S., probate is a matter of state law and is subject to a case law exception to federal jurisdiction that prevents it from being litigated in federal courts. Mexico also has a federal system, but I don't know whether Mexico's laws on intestate succession are state laws or federal laws (I believe that it is governed by state law but that there isn't much interstate variation). | Under 28 Pa. Code 1.6, The child of an unmarried woman may be registered with any surname requested by the mother. If no other surname is so requested, the child shall be registered with the mother’s surname Registration is the point at which there is parental discretion. Subsequently, a name change is possible by court order, however as maintained in numerous cases including in re: Niedbala, 36 Pa. D. & C. 3d 397 When the court, however, is confronted with the question of whether to amend or change the surname of a child, lacking sufficient understanding to choose for herself, then the court must not consider protectible parental interests or whether the parents are married, divorced or never married or whether they are male or female, but rather the child's best interests As stated in that ruling, the court will then consider the child's preference; the effect of the change on the preservation and development of the child's relationship with each parent; how long the child has used one vs. the other name. Pennsylvania law on child support is rather long, but there is no provision whereby only a married father or mother can be held liable for support. It is probable that the father was legally established as the biological father, and that would, according to these guys, allow you to have your name put on the birth certificate and perhaps even gain custody. | The most important aspects in India which are governed by specific religious laws are: Marriage Inheritance Marriage It is easier and faster to get married using the religious laws (Hindu Marriage Act or Shariat Act), as compared to the secular marriage law (Special Marriage Act, 1954). That is why many young couples convert to a single religion to get married quickly. Inheritance If one's ancestors identified with a specific religion, and one identifies with another religion, then that could affect one's inheritance. The inheritance of a person, especially a woman, could also be affected by them marrying outside their religion or state. So, if one decides to become the first generation atheist in a family (against the wishes of the family or the larger religious community), their inheritance and their rights (especially if they are engaged in agriculture) could be severely affected. This becomes all the more difficult, if the business of their family is not incorporated as a company under the Companies Act. If you are professional or a first generation business owner, then you shouldn't have legal challenges but primary and secondary social challenges. Primary social challenges could be people not ready to deal with you or engage with you if you declare publicly that you are an atheist. Secondary social challenges, would be to be able to find a lawyer (in your town and whose services are affordable) who can address these challenges. And in case you go to court, the judge may not have a lot of experience or education about how to deal with atheist cases. Also, most lawyers will advise you to identify yourself as a member of a religion to avoid unnecessary legal hassle. | This is going to depend very much on exactly what is in writing. Note that your father could, if he chose, directly leave both the house and the IRA to his partner. If you become the homeowner after your father's death, and the "3-year right to use" and the cost sharing provisions are not in writing, then neither is legally binding. You and the partner may choose to honor your father's wishes, but if he does not put them in the will or another legal document, neither of you is bound. The question says: I cannot evict her if needed, as she is a senior citizen, living in my home, with no lease. I do not know of any jurisdiction in which there is a general ban on evicting a senior citizen in all cases. There will be some restrictions no doubt, but they will depend on the local laws. And of course you may not wish to exercise all the legal rights you may have. You would ultimately, have the right as homeowner to evict the partner. I don't what procedures would need to be followed legally -- that will depend on the specific jurisdiction, which the question does not list. As the homeowner, you would be legally responsible for maintaining and paying taxes and other expenses on the house. The partner would be either your tenant or your guest. Once you have title (and that will take some time after your father's death, in all probability) if the "right to use" was never put in writing, you could ask the partner to sign a lease. The terms could be whatever the two of you choose to agree on. If she becomes a tenant under such a lease, she has both legal rights and legal responsibilities, and each of you has the protection of a clear agreement. You would be wise to consult a lawyer to learn exactly what the local law does and does not permit. Your father might well be wise to put his wishes more clearly in writing while he still can. | is spousal immunity a defense for a forced restraining order by a biological father if he won't even speak to a suitor (i.e. may I take your daughter on a date)? There is no such thing as "spousal immunity". Your post is replete with unclear references, unclear statements, and seemingly unrelated questions. But it is noteworthy that spousal privilege (not "immunity") does not preclude obtaining and enforcing a restraining order. The only relevance of spousal privilege is the evidentiary issue of precluding a spouse's testimony from being obtained and entered as admissible evidence in the court proceedings to which the respondent is a party. In the context of restraining orders, spousal privilege might be available only if the respondent invokes it during the proceedings for civil or criminal contempt that resulted from respondent's violation of the restraining order. If the restraining order is pursuant to, or in the context of, divorce proceedings, spousal privilege is inapplicable. See, for instance, MCL 600.2162(3)(a) and other exceptions listed therein. At least in theory (since courts often do whatever they want), a party's conduct & statements (in or outside of court) regarding his/her spouse may forfeit spousal privilege regardless of whether the respondent or spouse ever spoke to a suitor (whatever that means) at all. | Unfortunately, it looks like the answer is yes. There was a bill passed around 2007 called the "Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007". You should track down official information as I am going by newspaper articles. If an employed, adult child isn't supporting their parents or step-parents, 60 or older, their parents or step-parents can go to a tribunal and ask for an enforcement order. The upper limit was 10000 rupees per month or a possible jail term. The Times of India has an article from December 2019 that the government plans to expand the law to include son- and daughter-in-laws as responsible besides children, step-children, and adoptive children. The new bill also includes grandparents and they do not have to be over 60. The plan is also to remove the 10000 cap. | In the US it's very simple: How does the party that makes the lawsuit get the money in this scenario? They don't. Winning a lawsuit against a person is a legal confirmation that they really do owe you the money. It also gives you the ability to do certain things to try to collect: you could seize their assets or garnish their wages. If they don't have any assets or any income then you are out of luck. You can't take what doesn't exist. As the saying goes, "you can't squeeze blood from a turnip". A bit of legal jargon sometimes used here is to say that such a defendant is judgment proof. Even if you win a lawsuit against them, it won't do you any good, because they just don't have any money. If the person cannot pay it off, does it transfer over to their relatives? No. People are not responsible for the debts of their relatives. |
How are five murder charges used for each defendant in the Arbery case? I saw on the news that all three defendants were found guilty of murder of Ahmaud Arbery. I watched the verdict video and noticed the charges, and became confused when I heard that they each had been charged with 5 counts of murder. Each defendant was charged with one count of malice murder and four counts of felony murder, a total of five murder charges for each defendant. How is that possible? Why and how can they put four felony murder charges on each person when they murdered one man? Is this because of federal law or Georgia state law? | Georgia doesn't have degrees of murder, but instead has malice murder and felony murder. Neither requires prosecutors to prove an intent to kill. The three men demonstrated “malice aforethought” when they jointly and illegally chased Arbery through the streets in pickup trucks and shot him. That's the basis for the malice murder charge. The three men were charged with jointly intentionally committing four felonies each — two counts of aggravated assault and one count each of false imprisonment and criminal attempt to commit false imprisonment. Each of those felonies caused Arbery's death. Thus four felony murder charges each. | No Once a state has accused a person and tried that person for a particular act or set of acts, the state can't later hold a different trial for the same act or acts. That is the Double Jeopardy rule (or the basics of it at least). Some limited exceptions: If a person is convicted and appeals, and the conviction is overturned, the appellate court may order a new trial. *If there is a mistrial, such as a hung jury (jury cannot agree) then there can be a new trial. If an act is both a state and a Federal crime (in the US) then both can have separate trials, and possibly two convictions. If the accused bribes the judge or jury, that trial will not count, and there may be a new trial. If an act is a crime in two different countries, each can have its own trial (but often they don't). If it is later discovered that the accused committed a quite different act than the one s/he was tried for, a new trial for that act may be possible. But otherwise, whether the accused is acquitted or convicted, only one trial for a given alleged crime. The state cannot later change its mind on what to charge the accused with for the act. | Federal crimes and State crimes are different crimes - double jeopardy doesn’t apply, you can be charged with both. Prosecutors have wide discretion on who they charge and who they don’t. If it is demonstrated that a prosecutor has acted corruptly then that case will be referred to a different prosecutor - who has wide discretion etc. | I can at least look at the federal sentencing guidelines. From the description of the offense I'm guessing he's charged under 18 USC §922(g)(3). In the guidelines, this offense would appear to fall under "§2K2.1. Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions Involving Firearms or Ammunition". The notes here say: For purposes of subsections (a)(4)(B) and (a)(6), "prohibited person" means any person described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or § 922(n). I therefore believe he meets the criteria of §2K2.1(a)(6) ("if the defendant was a prohibited person at the time the defendant committed the instant offense"), which would mean the base offense level was 14. Then the big question is whether he falls under §2K2.1(b)(2): If the defendant, other than a defendant subject to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), or (a)(5), possessed all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection, and did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition, decrease the offense level determined above to level 6. I doubt the handgun was for sporting purposes or for collection; it was likely for self-defense. But I also don't think he is accused of unlawfully discharging or using it. I'm not sure exactly how this would be interpreted. If the offense level is 6, a sentence of probation would normally fall within the guidelines. If it was 14 (or even 12 after a possible 2-level decrease for taking responsibility), a sentence of probation would not be within the guidelines. This is, however, a pretrial diversion, not a conviction. I'm not sure how much the ordinary guidelines apply to that, or whether that's normally done for this sort of thing. It's also possible that I'm missing some factor which would change the offense level more. | Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions. | An indictment is issued by a grand jury when they are convinced, on the basis of evidence presented to them by the government, that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime. However, the indictment only has to state the charges, i.e. the grand jury's conclusion; it doesn't have to describe the evidence that led them to this conclusion. In particular, the grand jury can hear the testimony of witnesses under oath, and has subpoena powers to compel testimony. But testimony before a grand jury is sealed and must not be revealed by anyone except the witness themself. A good source for learning more about the grand jury process is the Handbook for Federal Grand Jurors. The authoritative source is the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title III. So, there must have been some evidence that he committed a crime, at least in the grand jury's view. But we, the public, don't get to see it at this time. If the case goes to trial, evidence will be presented publicly at that time, though it won't necessarily be the same evidence that convinced the grand jury to indict. (Note that this answer is about the US federal criminal justice system, since that's what's involved in the Collins case. Some states may have a similar system; others may not.) | You've got four cases there with four different reasons for substantial delays: In the case of the Aurora theater shooting, the shooter pled not guilty by reason of insanity. There's no doubt about who did it, but doubt was raised about the mental status of the shooter. Murder is not a strict liability crime, so the ability of the defendant to form the intent to commit the crime is relevant. In the case of the Charleston church shooting, the defendant was twice evaluated for competence to stand trial. Again, no doubt about who did it, but most if not all jurisdictions require a defendant to be sufficiently sane to participate in their defense. In the case of the Parkland shooting, the initial delay was confusion over who the defense lawyer would be. Florida will only provide a public defender to someone who cannot afford their own defense lawyer, and it took nearly a year to determine that the defendant had inherited enough money to afford a private lawyer. Due to this delay, the trial was initially scheduled for mid-2020, which caused it to be delayed by the COVID-19 outbreak. In the case of the Tree of Life shooting, it appears to be straight-up delaying tactics by the defense. There are a great many motions, appeals of motions, requests for delay, and other things a lawyer can do to slow things down. Since the defendant is currently being held without bail, the prosecution probably isn't strongly motivated to speed things up. | Yes, this is allowed. A famous example was the Rodney King beating, where police officers were acquitted at the state level but convicted federally. US v. Lanza formalized the rule, and it has survived the application of the double jeopardy rule to the states. It's called the separate sovereigns doctrine, and also applies to prosecutions by two states (see Heath v. Alabama) and by an Indian tribe and the feds (see US v. Wheeler). It does not apply between DC and the feds or territories and the feds, because DC and territorial laws are established under the power of the federal government. These prosecutions are uncommon. As far as the feds go, they normally consider a state prosecution to have satisfied the federal interest in the case (win or lose). But prosecution by multiple sovereigns is not barred by the Fifth Amendment. |
Does a software developer have a fiduciary duty to the user? I've recently had to learn about fiduciary duty, and it struck me that this seems to apply to software developers. So my questions are Am I right in thinking that a developer has a fiduciary duty to the user? If so, what does this mean for a lot of software development organisations with business models that depend on software that does not entirely respect the interests of its users. For instance, would the developer of an ad-blocker who takes money from advertisers for allowing their adverts to bypass his block be considered in breach of this duty? The rest of this post will explain my reasoning that this fiduciary relationship exists. Suppose that Alice writes some software and sells it to Bob to use. I happen to live in the UK, but from what I have read the same legal framework exists in many countries. The Wex legal dicationary says: Fiduciary duty is imposed whenever confidence is reposed on one side in a contractual relationship, so as to allow that side to exert influence and dominance over the other. Bob is clearly reposing confidence in Alice here. Alice could have included hidden functionality in the program which would work to Bob's detriment. Bob has no practical way of finding out if Alice has done so. In effect Alice has been given control of a part of Bob's computer. In addition to the physical resources, Alice also has indirect access to information stored on the computer that Bob may wish to keep confidential. Alice has "influence and dominance" over those parts of the computer that her program can access. The Free Dictionary says: Courts have neither defined the particular circumstances of fiduciary relationships nor set any limitations on circumstances from which such an alliance may arise. [...] A fiduciary relationship extends to every possible case in which one side places confidence in the other and such confidence is accepted; this causes dependence by the one individual and influence by the other. I've seen lists of fiduciary relationships, but it is plain that all of these are illustrative rather than complete. It may be that a court has never found that a software developer has a fiduciary duty (Google hasn't turned up any), but there doesn't seem to be an obstacle to such a finding. Looking at the second paragraph, it is clear that Bob has placed confidence in Alice. It is not necessarily clear that Alice has accepted such a relationship with Bob in particular, but it seems to me that By offering her program for sale, Alice has accepted a duty to her customers, and That this duty is a fiduciary one by the nature of the trust placed in her by her customers. When Alice wrote the program she was unaware that Bob in particular was going to run it, so it would not be possible for Alice to know exactly what the interests of Bob are under all circumstances. However she will still have a clear understanding of the general interests of her users as a class, and she has a duty to act in those interests rather than her own. | You could certainly run the argument: it is unlikely to succeed. Fiduciary duties are either specifically legislated (e.g. company directors) or involve a relationship of confidence (the obligation to keep secrets) as well as trust (e.g. lawyer, doctor). Engineers (including software engineers) do not have this and AFAIK a fiduciary duty between an engineer and their client has never been found, even where the work is a one-on-one commission. For example, an engineer designing a bridge has the duties imposed by their contract to their client and a general common law duty e.g. the bridge won't fall down. Where the engineering is for a mass market commercial product finding a fiduciary duty seems a vanishingly small possibility. The relationship lacks the intimacy required to create one. Reliance on a person's expertise is not enough - that's just a normal contractural or common law duty. | It's hard to give a definitive answer, since the specific details matter. You should read this question and answer, What is a derivate work? for more information. If you're really considering investing the time and energy to create such a product, you might consider getting advice from an actual attorney, and not from strangers on the Internet. | The agreement linked in the question seems to be or to purport to be, for a non-final, non-production version of the board. I have seen such agreements used, both for hardware and software, used when beta-test versions of products are being distributed to those who agree to do such testing, often in exchange for a reduced price on the final product, or an early look. I have also seen similar language used when an evaluation version of a product is provided free, or at a much reduced price. In such a use, it would be a reasonable contract, it seem to me, and I see no reason why if it were agreed to by both parties in such a situation, it would not be binding. Often such agreements also include a non-disclosure aspect, but this one does not seem to do so. I cannot see how such an agreement could be made applicable automatically, without both parties having chosen to agree to it, and indicated this by signing, clicking, or in some other positive way. I doubt that it could be made automatically applicable, on an "by using this product you agree" basis. I don't know of any physical consumer product, or appliance, sold with such an agreement in ordinary commerce. I am not sure what would happen if a manufacturer wanted to require all purchasers to sign such an agreement. I don't know if it would be binding. I would think that the purchaser's rights under the First Sale doctrice, could be modified by a valid contract agreed to by the purchaser. I do not think that they could simply be revoked by a contract of adhesion, which the purchaser had no choice to decline before making the purchase. As the OP says this was not signed or agreed to in any way, I can't see how it binds the OP. | The GPL doesn’t require you to distribute the software to anyone. The only requirement to distribute something is that if you do distribute the software to someone as a binary, you must also distribute the source code to them at no additional charge. The focus of the GPL is ensuring freedom for people who have copies of the software, not ensuring that the software is available to the world at large. Because your final deliverable is source code, you’ve already complied with the requirement to distribute source alongside object code. You have to comply with the requirements in section 5: a) The work must carry prominent notices stating that you modified it, and giving a relevant date. b) The work must carry prominent notices stating that it is released under this License and any conditions added under section 7. This requirement modifies the requirement in section 4 to “keep intact all notices”. c) You must license the entire work, as a whole, under this License to anyone who comes into possession of a copy. This License will therefore apply, along with any applicable section 7 additional terms, to the whole of the work, and all its parts, regardless of how they are packaged. This License gives no permission to license the work in any other way, but it does not invalidate such permission if you have separately received it. d) If the work has interactive user interfaces, each must display Appropriate Legal Notices; however, if the Program has interactive interfaces that do not display Appropriate Legal Notices, your work need not make them do so. You have to license the software to the company that hired you under the GPL v3 (since parts of it were licensed to you under GPL v3), so you can’t stop them from distributing it to the world. But nothing requires you to distribute it to the world. | You have several issues. Breach of Contract When you sign up with each of those services you are entering a legally binding contract and must comply with the terms of that contract. For example, this is taken from Facebook's terms: Here are some commitments you make to us relating to registering and maintaining the security of your account: You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission. You will not create more than one personal account. I haven't checked but its a fair bet that the other services have similar terms. Unless you have permission, what you are doing breaches these terms of service. If what you do causes damage to Facebook et al then they can sue you and your employer for damages. Even if it doesn't they can probably bar you from having an account for as long as they like. Improper use of images This is jurisdictional but it is generally required to have the permission of the subject of a photograph where that photograph is used for commercial gain. There are exceptions where the person is not the primary subject (e.g. crowd shots, or images primarily of something else where the person happens to be in the shot) but the type of photos you would use for these services are not going to be exempt. The sanctions for breaching this will be dependent on jurisdiction. Breach of Copyright Somebody owns the copyright in those photographs. If you do not have a licence to use them in the way you propose then you are breaching their copyright. The copyright holder can sue for damages (if any) and any profits you make. Vicarious Liability An employer is strictly liable for the actions of their employees, jointly and severally with the employee. That means a plaintiff can go after either the employer, the employee or both. An employee may have some statutory or contractual indemnity but this is by no means common. | It would depend on how the ownership contract is written. 30% sounds like a minority stake, so I don't know how they could block new investments unless the contract requires a super-majority to approve new rounds of financing. How does the remaining 70% of ownership feel about this? If they are abiding by the terms of the ownership contract I don't see that this is questionable behavior on their part. This is a business relationship. Business partners may come to have different outlooks on the future of the company, and the best way to protect their investment. Consider flipping the viewpoint: "I'm a minority owner in a company I no longer have confidence in. I would like to dissolve the company and sell off the assets to re-coup as much of my original investment as I can. The other owners want to chase this to the bitter end, and do a new round of financing, which will significantly dilute my shares, without (in my opinion) giving the company a real chance of success. What can I do?" When the founder of your friend's company accepted money for shares in the company, they gave up absolute control over the company's direction. Assuming none of the parties are acting in violation of the ownership contract, the most reasonable way to resolve a conflict like this is to buy out the dissenting shareholders. | For cases where this occurred within the United States, with works created on or after January 1, 1978: (the OP has since clarified that their scenario occurred elsewhere) By default, the author (the actual creator) of a work is the owner of the copyright. However, this is not the case if the work is a "work made for hire" for an employer. In that case, the company is considered the author of the work, and owns the copyright. From US Copyright Office Circular 09: If a work is made for hire, an employer is considered the author even if an employee actually created the work. The employer can be a firm, an organization, or an individual. Works are considered to be made for hire in two situations, as described by that circular (emphasis added): a) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment or b) a work specially ordered or commissioned...if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. If no written agreement was signed and no employment relationship existed, then ownership of the copyright to the software would go to the person who wrote it, and they would be able to do anything that a copyright holder could do with a work, including using it however they want or selling it. Do note that this would only apply to software or changes made by the person in this situation. They could not, for example, sell or distribute any other piece of the software written by other people without the copyright holder's permission, even if these pieces are necessary to use the software that this person created. | This could be a problem if the consultancy agreement contains a provision that assigns to the client any copyright in any code created by the consultant. That is why there should be no such provision. In the absence of such a provision, the consultant owns the copyright in the code, so it would be impossible for the consultant to infringe that copyright. Even so, copyright protects a particular expression of an idea, not the idea itself. The idea of an "analyze data" class containing a "read data" function is not itself subject to copyright protection. It could potentially be patentable as a "process," but it would fail to meet the criterion of novelty. It would also fail to meet the criterion of non-obviousness. On the other hand, a software developer cannot (without permission) copy source code that is protected by copyright simply by changing the names. Changing the names would constitute the creation of a derivative work, and the right to create derivative works is also protected by copyright. |
How does Miranda rights work in regards to sign-language? If a person were to be interviewed by police and he responded in sign-language. What he said turn out to be false. In court his lawyer argued what he said could not be used against him because he did not say anything. Miranda right say what you say can be used against you, how does sign-language fit in with that? | You can say things in sign language It wouldn’t be much of a language if you couldn’t. Further, you can say things in writing and with body language like nods and head shakes. The Miranda Waring is to advise you that anything you say can be used against you, even if what you say is non-verbal. | I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely. | If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed. | In case there is no way of knowing, thus no way to sue, would this seem like a loophole that practically abolishes the 4th amendment ? The 4th amendment only means that the officer needs a probable cause/reasonable suspicion to detain you. It absolutely does not mean that he has to tell you what that is. In fact, not telling you what the probable cause is is often a part of the officer's job because, if you are indeed a perpetrator, letting you know what the suspicions are could make you do things that would allow you to escape justice. There is certainly always a way to sue i.e. file a lawsuit, for which you do not need to know what the probable cause was. Instead, you contend that there was not any. And from this point the officer has to tell the court what it was, if any. If he fails to provide one, you win and get redressed for harassment — this is how your 4th amendment rights work. If he does provide a good probable cause, you lose because in this case you either: actually did something suspicious and knew there was a probable cause; OR jumped to the conclusion that the officer harassed you when he was simply doing his job. | The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing | Indirectly, no the wording of the caution is "You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence." It is illegal to question someone if they have asked for legal advice. so if you ask for a solicitor they are not allowed to question you, and you cannot (by definition) fail to answer their questions if they're not allowed to ask them. Reference from https://www.gov.uk/arrested-your-rights/legal-advice-at-the-police-station "Once you’ve asked for legal advice, the police can’t question you until you’ve got it - with some exceptions." | Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh. | An existing law actually prohibits using census data "against" a person, see this recent question. The 5th Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") is not interpreted to imply an absolute privilege to not answer, it means that your answer cannot be used against you in a criminal case. You can be compelled to testify "against yourself" if you are granted immunity from prosecution. |
Can junk mail from the Royal Mail be classed as fly tipping? Despite a no junk mail sign, unsurprisingly I still get it though the door. I decided to take a stand for the fun of it and called Dominoes Pizza head office to complain. I asked them to stop fly tipping inside my home but they said it was nothing to do with them, they paid Royal Mail to do it. This did seem to irritate me so I asked them would it be OK and nothing to do with me if I paid someone to fly tip trash in their restaurants. As expected, they hung up. I then contacted Royal Mail to complian that my local postman was ignoring the no junk mail sign. The person on the line told me that posting junk mail was part of the postmans job and it was OK to ignore the sign. This did not go down well either. I gave them my objections to this and I also asked about how I could get this to stop. I was quite surprised as to how this works. Firstly you are considered automatically opted in unless you opt out. There is no easy way of opting out. You have to download a form from here. Print it out and send it off. The opt out only lasts for 2 years. After that you have to reapply. Anyway my questions are these... How is this even legal? Can I invoice the advertiser or Royal Mail for a disposal fee? Can I get the Royal Mail prosecuted for fly tipping? From a health and safety point of view they are causing a fire risk not to mention damage to the environment. I want it to stop but object to this implied opt in and having to send a form when conveniently for them, it cannot be done online or even over the phone. Rather than be a victim, I wish to profit from this or at the very least annoy them back. I welcome your thoughts. :-) It is not just me, there are millions of UK residents affected. Can it be stopped? Edit: Just to clarify, these are flyers/leaflets. Not unaddressed mail in envelopes. | Junk mail is perfectly legal From Preventing unsolicited mail published by the House of Commons Library: It is not illegal for a company to send unsolicited mail unless the material is obscene or threatening. No legislation exists which can protect a householder from receiving it. If postage has been paid, Royal Mail is legally obliged to deliver all addressed mail, which includes mail that is addressed “to the occupier” as well as mail that is personally addressed. However, there are various options available to an individual who wishes to stop unwanted and unsolicited direct marketing mail. From you description, it appears that Dominos paid for the mail to be delivered “to the occupier” and the Royal Mail has a legal obligation to do so (unless you opt out). | While it is true that cash is legal tender, this can still be overridden by mutual agreement (i.e. in a contract). So the legal tender status only matters if payment methods were not agreed upon before entering into an agreement. In other words: If a restaurant lets you eat without telling you they do not accept cash, they will have to accept cash. However, if they explicitly tell you they only accept card payments, they can insist on this later. This applies in both the United States, in Germany, and in Canada (see e.g. It may be legal tender, but more businesses are snubbing cash). So to address your points: As I understand the legality would work something like this: 1) I accept the the contract where I agree to pay with card in exchange for food Yes - however, in accepting the contract you also accept that the restaurant is "cashless" (assuming the restaurant clearly tells you so, e.g. by putting up a sign or by saying it in person). I attempt to fulfill the contract to the best of my ability, but am prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond my control Yes. Since you attempted to fulfill the contract, you did not commit the crime of theft (which requires intention not to pay). However, you still owe what you promised when entering into the agreement, which is to pay with a card. At this point I owe the restaurant the money, but since the original transaction failed, this is a debt, which I offer to settle with legal tender No. As explained above, if the agreement stipulates a specific payment method, this generally overrides the "legal tender" aspect. In short: You agreed to pay with a card, so you are required to pay with a card. If you cannot pay with a card, you have not fulfilled your part of the agreement. It is is arguable that it is not your fault, but this does not change your obligation. Now you must either negotiate a suitable alternative (cash, cheque, golden watch...), or come back to pay later with a card. Also, the business may be able to charge you additional costs, such as extra accounting work or interest because of your non-standard payment - that would depend on the details. | One path would be to get compliance, by demonstrating that it is legally required. The best evidence that he is legally required to wear a mask is this recent mandate from the Department of Public Health. However, I cannot find a corresponding executive order, which may be in a generic form empowering CDPH to issue orders. Any imposition of penalties for violation must be publicly announced and rest on legislative authority. The mandate is not generally enforced, except in a few cases regarding bars and restaurants. There are various persuasive avenues that you could pursue, such as asking CDPH to come talk to him (unlikely, but you could try), complaining to the property owner, appealing to local social media to apply pressure (possibly putting yourself at legal risk for defamation, if you make a false statement). There are two more involved legal actions to contemplate. One is to terminate the lease and move elsewhere. This would likely result in an action to collect the remainder of the rent, but the strategy would be to argue that the manager has interfered with your private enjoyment of the premise. A second, highly improbable, is to sue the manager and get an enforceable court order requiring him to wear a mask. Courts have a prejudice against ordering people to take actions when other options exist (terminating the lease, monetary compensation). It could be an interesting but expensive test case to see if you could get a judge to order the manager to wear a mask. So yes they are obligated to wear masks, but legal enforcement is going to be difficult at best. | england-and-wales northern-ireland General rule It doesn't make any difference. Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 provides: Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the expression “serve” or the expression “give” or “send” or any other expression is used) then, unless the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. Provided you meet the following elements: Properly addressing Properly pre-paying Properly posting, then you can take advantage of the above deemed delivery rule. It also makes no difference whether or not the recipient "might or might not bother to open" it. What matters is when it was delivered. The rebuttable presumption is that the notice is effective when it would have been "delivered in the ordinary course of post" (e.g. next day for first class, etc.). To rebut that, the burden of proof shifts to the recipient, who must prove (on balance of probabilities in a civil case) that it was delivered late or not at all. In practice that will be extremely difficult in the majority of cases. You might try to make an argument that "letter containing the document" implies an envelope. However, in my view, the ordinary meaning of the word letter means a piece of paper with some written words on it. A letter is still a letter even when it isn't inserted in an envelope. "Contains the document" suggests to me that the document is found within the words written on the piece of paper. Exceptions The phrase "unless the contrary intention appears" means that if a particular Act contains its own rules of service which contradict Section 7, then Section 7 will be overridden. | Very briefly in terms of contract law, by hiring this person to haul away your trash, you're entering into a contract with him/her for the disposal of the trash. The fact that he says he has a legal place to dispose of the trash is part of your contract. That fact - either verbal (or in writing) in that contract - should really absolve you of any responsibility of what happens to the trash. You don't need to actually know all the details of his legal dumping place, but you can hold him/her to the agreement if it happens that they do illegally dispose of the property they have been hired to remove. In reality, this person is advertising this service as a business (on Facebook) and has been operating for some time, so they are probably legally disposing of refuse in a landfill while making some money from whatever might be valuable. The trash hauler probably depends on some of your trash being valuable, in terms of recycling or repairing or selling collectables ("old toys"), and not all of that will be disposed of in a landfill. I suppose it's possible a municipality could accuse you of illegally disposing of the trash if it was somehow tracked back to you, i.e. personally identifiable items or papers in the trash that was found illegally dumped. But you have the contract with the trash hauler to show you acted in good faith. Ask in the Facebook group if indeed this person disposes of trash in a legal manner, or ask others who have hired him/her. Clearly outline your stipulations for legal disposal with them. You can even ask to see their business license from the city/county. | Given a large database of email addresses that you can't prove have given consent to receive email, the only legal thing to do with it, is to (securely) delete it. (I am going to switch your question about a larger company to a bank: in the UK, big pharma is forbidden from advertising to individuals.) In principle the rules are the same for a huge bank and everything down to a self-employed plumber. In practice the plumber will be told "don't do that again" rather than fined. This case was treated under the Data Protection Act, which has a maximum fine of £500,000 – so a big bank would probably have been fined more, but not necessarily much more. Under GDPR, fines are related to turnover, so the fine would be a lot bigger for a large bank. The incident is a year old now. Details here. | I want them to give me the promised price ... You can’t make them do this. A business that has posted an incorrect price is not obliged to sell for that price. See https://law.stackexchange.com/a/4466/344 ... and I want them to stop the Misleading advertising You can’t stop them yourself but you can report them to the relevant authorities. These are the ones you linked to: NSW Fair Trading for state law breach and the ACCC for Commonwealth breaches. Misleading pricing is a breach of both state and Federal law. Can you please give a practical advice? No. If you want legal advice, hire a lawyer. What can I do? Where should I complain? See above. | Neither The contract is completed when each party has totally fulfilled its obligations under the contract. In this case, it is when the purchaser has consumed or otherwise dealt with the banana to their satisfaction. The vendor has ongoing obligations under the contract until this happens. For example, obligations that the banana is of merchantable quality and fit for purpose. If the purchaser peels the banana and discovers that it is "off" or eats the banana and develops food poisoning then the vendor still has obligations and can be sued under the contract. Yes, I realize that no one is going to sue anyone over a rotten banana but let's assume that "banana" is code for 54km of motorway construction and £1 is actually £1 billion. When is the contract formed? This is not a trivial determination and there are literally hundreds of thousands if not millions of lawsuits that have turned on this exact question. Once the contract is formed its binding on both parties; until then, either can walk away (subject to estoppel) The traditional analysis involves offer and acceptance. In your banana scenario, the shop displaying "Banana's: 50p/each" (it's a fruit shop - they always have unnecessary apostrophes) is not an offer - it is an invitation to treat. An offer is made by Ben placing the banana on the counter and proffering the £1, it is accepted by Sam taking the £1. At this point, the sale is binding on both parties. Ben has fulfilled all his obligations under the contract, Sam still has some. In addition to those discussed above, he owes Ben 50p. Strictly speaking, this is not an obligation under the contract but a debt due and payable. Consumer protection law The proceeding is a strict contract law interpretation - many jurisdictions have consumer protection legislation (and food safety laws for bananas) that impose additional protections and may change the contract law position. |
Can an airline forcibly remove a senior citizen who is wearing a soiled adult diaper? I am curious to know if an airline has a legal right to forcibly remove a senior citizen from an airplane if it is discovered that this person is wearing a soiled adult diaper. Say for example that when passengers are boarding an airplane, a person who is sitting next to a senior citizen notices a strong foul odor coming from the senior citizen. This person then walks up the aisle and reports this problem to a flight attendant. Say that the flight attendant then asks the senior citizen if he/she is wearing a soiled adult diaper and senior citizen says yes, so the flight attendant instructs the senior citizen to go to the airplane bathroom to change the adult diaper. Let's say that the senior citizen replies that he/she doesn't have any more adult diapers and then says that it is very important that they take this flight so they are absolutely not going to depart the airplane despite having a soiled adult diaper. At this point, can the flight attendant have the senior citizen forcibly removed from the airplane? As far as I know, an airline would never forcibly remove a mother and her baby from an airplane if her baby had a soiled diaper when they boarded the airplane and the mother did not have any more baby diapers. Yet, I'm not sure what an airline would do, or could do, regarding a senior citizen with a soiled adult diaper. | It depends on what the Contract of Carriage says. Delta Airlines, for US contracts, says under rule 7 that Delta may refuse to transport any passenger, and may remove any passenger from its aircraft at any time, for any of the following reasons:... (E) Passenger’s Conduct or Condition Delta may refuse to transport any passenger, or may remove any passenger from its aircraft, when refusal to transport or removal of the passenger is reasonably necessary in Delta’s sole discretion for the passenger’s comfort or safety, for the comfort or safety of other passengers or Delta employees, or for the prevention of damage to the property of Delta or its passengers or employees and gives as an example When the passenger’s conduct, attire, hygiene or odor creates an unreasonable risk of offense or annoyance to other passengers. So yes. It is unlikely that an airline lacks any such condition, but you would have to look at all of the airlines and all of the countries where airlines operate to be absolutely positive, so I will say that that can refuse to carry the passenger. In your case, the passenger is not a Person with a Disability as defined under 14 CFR 382.5 and 382.31, but you might construct a disability-related scenario that gets a different answer. | Bad people are quite uncommon Most people behave in good faith most of the time - don't tie yourself in knots over the very few people who would be unscrupulous enough to try to do this. Burden of proof The person who makes the allegation has the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities. So the person who claims they didn't receive it has to prove that. If there are two equally credible witnesses, one saying they packed and posted the thing and one saying the thing was not packed then the burden has not been met. If the person who packed it has a photo of it packed and addressed then the other person has definitely not met their burden of proof. Insurance Insure it against loss or damage in transit. Then you can just replace it and claim on your insurance. | E can leave at any time E is not detained and there is no basis to detain her. As a child, that decision can be made by a parent. E can be subpoenaed to testify but she does not have to talk to law enforcement (and would be wise not to). | Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? This is a hard question to answer that doesn't have a neat resolution. Very little pertaining to the authority of a parent over a child is codified in statutory law and there is not a clear cut age at which a child has "freedom of conscience" vis-a-vis a parent. Most of the law related to children concerns allocation of parenting time and parental decision making between divorced, separated or unmarried parents; abuse and neglect; and juvenile delinquency. There is also usually a snippet of criminal law stating that certain kinds of uses of force to discipline children do not constitute crimes. But, part of why it doesn't come up very much is that older children are usually socialized in a manner that causes them to show a certain amount of respect for the wishes of their parents. It also doesn't come up much for children who aren't in their late teens, because the complete economic dependence of children on their parents or guardians gives the parents considerable power of their children that doesn't require the exercise of physical force. Also, it is quite dependent upon how the issue presents itself. No law enforcement agency is going to aid a parent in forcibly dragging a kid to church against their will. But, no social services agency is going to remove a kid from a home because his birthday party will be cancelled if he doesn't go to the church of his parents' choice the Sunday before his birthday. There are also some subtle but important distinctions between states on the issue of emancipation. In Colorado, emancipation is a statement about the empirical reality. If a child is self-supporting and lives apart from parents or guardians then the child is an emancipated minor. It is not a status granted by a court, it is a status acknowledged by courts when evaluating other issues. In California, a child is not emancipated unless a court grants a child that status and a child who is de facto emancipated without the leave of a court is guilty of a "status offense" (the New York State term for someone in this state is PINS for "person in need of supervision"). Basically, if a parent can force a child to go to church by means that don't constitute abuse or neglect and don't exceed the level of force authorize for child discipline in the criminal code, then they can do it, and if they can't manage that, then they can't do it. Many states have a "status offense" that allows government intervention with the cooperation of a parent or guardian in cases where an "uncontrollable" child is defiant and simply will not give any heed to the parent or guardian's instructions. In practice, the older a child is, the less likely someone viewing a parent's conduct forcing a child to do something is to be viewed as acceptable or legally justified. The legal rights of children in a school setting are also age dependent under the case law, although not always in a really well defined way. Controls on student expression that would be uncontroversial for elementary school students may be looked upon by the law with disfavor for high school students and clearly prohibited for adults. Perhaps one useful way to conceptualize it is that trying to make a child attend a particular kind of religious service is not considered an improper purposes for a parent of any minor to utilize the resources available to the parent to do so, but the range of resources available to a parent with regard to an adult child is much narrower. | In Texas, as in most of the US, the law is "Employment at Will". This means that an employer is free to fire people at any time, for any reason, or none, as long as it is not for one of the few reason forbidden by law, such as racial or age discrimination. Hourly employees are entitled to overtime pay in such cases, but "exempt" employees are not. Nor are they entitled to comp-time as a matter of law, that is at the option of the employer. (The question seems to imply that the employee in question was "exempt" but does not actually say so.) The only really effective recourse against that sort of "death march" is to quit and find a better job, or to threaten to do so while they still need you, unless the conditions return to acceptable ones. I have heard of people in such a situation who "get sick" every day at 5:30pm, because local law forbid requiring ill employees to work. But that is pretty much inviting an arduous and possibly expensive administrative and/or legal battle, and will depend on the specifics of the state/local law. In any case, it is too late for the person in question to try that. On the facts as stated, there might be a valid claim of age discrimination. But additional facts would be needed to establish this, and it would be in my view unwise to try it without consulting a good employment lawyer. Such a lawyer could advise exactly what must be proved and how, and what the probable chances of any recovery would be. | Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination. | When a US Senator or Congressperson poses a question to a private company about some behavior or action of the company, does that carry any legal weight? In other words, (a) is the company required to answer? and (b) if the result is "bad" (however that is defined), can the Senator or Congressperson impose any penalty. Is it all just "showboating" on the part of the politician? Individual members of Congress cannot compel a company to testify, although a failure to respond might result in legislation being adopted in a way contrary to the preferences of the person being asked, while a response might influence legislation in a manner that the person being asked likes. Congressional committees have subpoena power which if disregarded may be enforced in federal district courts on pain of the non-responsive person being held in contempt of court, which is essentially equivalent to the power of a court to subpoena someone's testimony. | Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it. |
Can your silence be used against you? Miranda rights say you have the right to remain silent and that anything you say can be used against you. My question is, can the exercise of this right be used against you at a trial? It seems that at the Rittenhouse trial the prosecutor called into question why the accused remained silent. This seemed like a clear violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. | Your silence can be used against you: this is known as an adoptive admission. It is an exception to the hearsay rule, and is based on the premise that if a person hears and understands an accusation against them (even framed very indirectly), and "adopts" the truth of the accusation by directly acting in a certain way or by failing to dispute the accusation, this can be introduced as a form of admitting to the accusation. For instance, B might say to A "I laughed when you shot Smith in the foot" and A might say "That was pretty funny, right", that can be admitted and interpreted as a confession. The same goes for A saying nothing. What's crucial is that the accusation has to be made in the defendant's presence, they must hear and understand it, they must be able to deny the accusation and it would be natural to deny the accusation. There is a relationship between this and the Fifth Amendment, see Salinas v. Texas (and prior law), that "To prevent the privilege against self-incrimination from shielding information not properly within its scope, a witness who “‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’". During a non-custodial interview, defendant was asked asked if his shotgun “would match the shells recovered at the scene of the murder”, and he said nothing (and actually gave non-verbal indicators that the accusation was true). He did not invoke his right to silence, thus the court reasoned that "Because he failed to do so, the prosecution’s use of his noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment". | This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit. | united-states The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant in a criminal case the right to “confront one’s accuser”, and the Supreme Court has taken a notably originalist view of this right, holding that this means face-to-face cross examination under virtually all circumstances. While there are some small exceptions related to minors and to witnesses who became unavoidably absent after giving a sworn statement (none of which could apply to Alice), and while the Supreme Court hasn’t explicitly ruled out cross examination over videoconference, the idea of anonymous testimony in a criminal case is unthinkable. Part of an effective cross examination is arguing why the witness’s testimony might be unreliable, and a defendant who didn’t know whose testimony it was would be hamstrung at that. | Generally speaking, no. Assuming your lie did not cause some "legally cognizable harm" -- as in the case of perjury, defamation, fraud -- it is almost certainly protected by the First Amendment. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). | The Fifth Amendment always protects someone from being forced to testify against themselves if it would implicate them in a crime (see, among others, Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17). Any person can assert the privilege, regardless of their role in the trial, with the possible exception of the plaintiff (who is the one person who wanted to go to court). Like always with the Fifth Amendment, they can answer some questions but not others (but if they do answer a question, they need to fully answer it). In civil cases, the Fifth Amendment itself does not keep the jury from making adverse inferences against whoever invoked the privilege; if you refuse to testify, they can assume that it's because testifying would be extremely damaging in that particular case. However, most states have rules against that, and so invoking the privilege in state courts generally works like it does in a criminal case (where the jury basically ignores that the question was even asked). In federal courts, if a case is being heard under diversity jurisdiction (plaintiff and defendant are from different states but the claim is not a federal claim) the state rule is supposed to apply; if the claim is a federal claim, the federal rule applies and adverse inferences are allowed. While the Fifth Amendment can be invoked by anyone, there may be consequences. In many states (where adverse inference isn't allowed), a witness who will just invoke the Fifth and answer no questions can't be called, because it's a complete waste of time. If the plaintiff invokes the Fifth to not answer key questions, then the court can potentially dismiss the case; they have the right to assert the privilege, but their lawsuit might suffer for it. In federal court, another possibility that's been done several times before is that the civil case is just put on hold until the criminal matter is resolved. Sources: “The Fifth Amendment Can & Will Be Used Against You In a (Federal) Court of Law” Taking the 5th: How to pierce the testimonial shield Plaintiff as Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amendment | In McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, the Supreme Court declared that The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 It can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, [Footnote 10] and it Page 406 U. S. 445 likewise finds that the privilege can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. There may be some confusion over criminal vs. civil cases, so first we should restate the self-incrimination clause: nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself There are many ways that this language can be interpreted, for example it could mean that a person who is a criminal defendant cannot be compelled to testify against themselves in that case; or that the protection applies to a possible, future criminal case against them (when they are the defendant in a criminal trial); or when they are a non-defendant witness in some criminal trial. Instead, the courts interpret the privilege as protection against any being compelled to testify, when that testimony has a tendency to incriminate. The line that exists, w.r.t. civil cases, is that you can be compelled to testify against your civil case interest – you can be compelled to testify that you breached a contract, for example. When testifying in a criminal case, you can be compelled to testify to a breach of contract. It is not about the nature of the case where you are testifying, it is about the nature of the possible case where that testimony could be used against you. | I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking. | There's an interesting philosophical debate you can have. By the plain text of the First Amendment, it protects libel. Aside: Yes, the First Amendment does apply to libel cases. A libel case, like all lawsuits, involves the government's judicial branch using its coercive power to make you pay money as a result of your speech, based on a law requiring you to pay money for certain kinds of speech. Tort law is not optional; a libel case isn't "you promised not to say bad things and then said bad things," it's the government saying "what you did is bad, now pay the person you hurt because of your speech." The idea that "you can say it, you just have to face the consequences" isn't enough and hasn't been for quite a while now. Traditionally, the main point of freedom of speech was that a court couldn't stop you from saying something, but could only seek to punish you after the fact (and for that you get a jury, a public hearing, etc.) But more recently, courts realized that subsequent punishment had similar effects to prior restraint. If you're going to be punished for some kind of speech, you're going to steer clear of saying anything a jury might think is that kind of speech. Libel law is heavily influenced by the First Amendment, and has been for over 40 years. The First Amendment looks like it protects libel, but it also looks like it should protect your right to reprint any book you want. It also looks like it should protect your right to tell someone "go and murder this person." It also looks like it should protect your right to say whatever you want in court, whether or not it's true. It also looks like it should protect your right to falsely shout "fire" in a crowded hall, with the intent to cause a stampede (this isn't just a turn of phrase, there was an actual incident in which 73 people were killed which is believed to have started when someone falsely shouted that there was a fire). It also looks like it should protect your right to post a sign saying "There is a bomb at this elementary school." Yet the Constitution explicitly sanctions copyright, and no one would seriously conclude that Congress may not protect the integrity of the judicial process by punishing perjury. Ordering a hit, making bomb threats, intentionally causing panics -- the fact that speech is a key part of these can't mean that the government isn't allowed to criminalize them. You cannot run a civilized society in which death threats are legal. So, the courts interpret. Language in the Constitution that appears absolute is understood to have implied exceptions. The people writing the document were well aware that perjury was generally a crime. The same Congress that proposed the First Amendment passed a law criminalizing perjury. Sure, you're punishing someone based on their speech, but it's clearly not meant to be protected. You can't run a court system without perjury laws, and its absence from the First Amendment doesn't mean that the First Amendment thereby upended this basic principle. The courts have identified a number of kinds of speech that, by longstanding practice, are not protected. Intellectual property violations are one. Obscenity is another. So are threats. So is "speech integral to criminal conduct" (e.g. "what'll it be, your money or your life?") And so is defamation. The text of the First Amendment may not exclude it, but courts have uniformly held that it's not something the amendment was ever meant to protect. The First Amendment does still pose constraints, which are some of the most defendant-friendly in the world (interestingly enough, US law is descended from English law, and English libel law used to be among the most plaintiff-friendly in the world). It's not libel if it's true. It's not libel if it's an opinion (unless it's a statement of fact dressed up as opinion). It's not libel unless you were at least negligent; if it was about a public figure, you have to have known it was false or seriously doubted its truth. But these restrictions leave a core of speech that is and always has been punishable. |
What is the difference between Common Law and Civil Law in the U.S.? Is there a difference between Common Law and Civil Law in the U.S., and if so, what is it? | Its always the simple questions that have complicated answers. In this case its because both Common Law and Civil Law have several different meanings. Civil Law v Criminal Law In this context, civil law means the ability of people to seek redress for wrongs from other people. These people may be individuals (natural persons) or legal persons (corporations, government etc.). When someone sues someone else they are using civil law. In contrast, criminal law is where a government prosecutes (not sues) a person (again natural or legal) who is alleged to have committed an offence. To illustrate the difference, if a person murders another person the government will use criminal law to prosecute the murder and the family of the victim will use civil law to pursue a wrongful death suit. Common Law v Civil Law In this context, common law and civil law refer to two of the major legal systems in use on Earth: By Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa) - Own work, using World map by Canuckguy and others UNESCO World Heritage map by NNW The data sources are:University of Ottawa: JuriGlobe – World Legal Systems Research Group Wikipedia: List of national legal systems European legal systems map by Ain92 and others (which seems to be based on this map by C.Löser and others) World legal systems map by Robinkissac, CC BY-SA 2.5, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=40154967 Common Law is derived from the law of England and is used in areas colonized by the English - the UK, Canada, the USA, Australia and New Zealand. Civil Law is derived from continental European law and ultimately from Roman law. The primary contrast between the two systems is the role of written decisions and precedent. In common law jurisdictions, nearly every case that presents a bona fide disagreement on the law is resolved in a written opinion. In contrast, civil law decisions typically do not include explanatory opinions. In common law systems, a single decided case is binding law to the same extent as statute or regulation, under the principle of stare decisis. In contrast, in civil law systems, individual decisions have only advisory, not binding effect. In civil law systems, case law only acquires weight when a long series of cases use consistent reasoning, called jurisprudence constante. Civil law lawyers consult case law to obtain their best prediction of how a court will rule, but comparatively, civil law judges are less bound to follow it. For that reason, statutes in civil law systems are more comprehensive, detailed, and continuously updated, covering all matters capable of being brought before a court. The United States and 49 of the states are Common Law jurisdictions, the exception is Louisiana which is a Civil Law jurisdiction (specifically the Napoleonic subset of Civil Law) as, unlike the rest of the country, it was initially a French possession. Common Law v Common Law In addition to the way the term is used above, "common law" can be used within a Common Law jurisdiction to distinguish that part of the law which arises from judicial precedent from that part which arises from legislative statute or administrative regulation. Further, within legal argument, the term may be used to distinguish "common law" (or just "law") from equity. Before 1873, England had two parallel court systems: courts of "law" which could only award money damages and recognized only the legal owner of property, and courts of "equity" (courts of chancery) that could issue injunctive relief (that is, a court order to a party to do something, give something to someone, or stop doing something) and recognized trusts of property. | It depends highly on which jurisdiction you're referring to. This is one of the areas where it varies state to state. "Practicing law" is not generally defined in statute, but the Wikipedia definition defines it as (emphasis mine): giving legal advice to clients, drafting legal documents for clients, and representing clients in legal negotiations and court proceedings such as lawsuits, and is applied to the professional services of a lawyer or attorney at law, barrister, solicitor, or civil law notary. Wikipedia defines Legal advice as the giving of a professional or formal opinion regarding the substance or procedure of the law in relation to a particular factual situation. and displays the following enforcement provision (emphasis mine): Criminal laws and enforcement of "Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL)" statutes is the organized bar's preferred method. Thus, New Jersey has a law which makes it a “disorderly persons offense” to knowingly to engage in the unauthorized practice of law, and a “crime in the fourth degree” to commit UPL if one (a) creates a false impression that one is a lawyer; (b) derives a benefit from UPL, or (c) causes an injury by UPL. See also IANAL, which has some information about usage on the Internet: The case law standard for determining what comments cross the line is generally "the application of law to facts specific to an individual seeking legal advice". | Are there any legal terms which can make it clear that such questions are about the "outside of reach" rather than "outside of claim of reach" situations? Enforceability Laws that claim but cannot reach lack enforceability. Note that enforceability is case-specific and subjective. The US may or may not be able to reach out to those it deems to be criminals on the other side of the world; those may or may not care. | I can't do much better than the opening to Wikipedia's article on this: The contemporary legal systems of the world are generally based on one of four basic systems: civil law, common law, statutory law, religious law or combinations of these. However, the legal system of each country is shaped by its unique history and so incorporates individual variations. I believe that there are about 196 sovereign nations in the world so that gives 196 national systems. Many of these have sub-national jurisdictions (e.g. The USA with 50 states plus military law) so this total is at least several hundred and may run up to 1000. In addition there are systems of supra-national law such as maritime law, war crimes law and supra-national jurisdictions like the EU. So, short answer: lots. The correct terminology for a system of law is a jurisdiction. Note that many activities will be subject to multiple jurisdictions. | State supreme courts are not allowed to defy binding supreme court precedents and are quickly slapped down if they do. But not all U.S. Supreme Court rulings have that character. For example, even if a state has rules of civil procedure which are verbatim identical to the federal rules of civil procedure, it does not have to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of an identical rule. For example, many states have rules of civil procedure 8, 9 and 12 which are verbatim identical to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9 and 12. But, when the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted FRCP 8, 9, and 12 in a new way in cases known as Iqbal and Twombly, not all state courts adopted the new interpretation and this was not a defiance of binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent, because the U.S. Supreme Court's precedents only apply to federal laws and rules. Similarly, many states have state constitutional rights in a bill of rights which are worded with language identical to that of parallel rights under the U.S. Constitution as amended. But, state courts don't always interpret that language in the same way that the U.S. Supreme Court does. If the federal constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court is more protective of a right than the state constitution, then the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation sets a floor of protection (except in the small number of circumstances like the right to a civil jury trial, or the requirement that serious crimes be pre-approved by grand juries, where a federal right is not applicable to state and local governments). But, if the state constitution is interpreted by the State Supreme Court in a manner more protective a right than the U.S. Supreme Court, this is allowed and does not conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of identical language in the United States Constitution. | "Ignorance of the law" refers to a (non)-defense for committing a crime ("I didn't know it was against the law"). In this case, the government hasn't passed a law saying that "the term 'simple majority' shall always be defined as..." – there is no law saying that "simple majority means more than half of the total number of votes". Instead, terms are generally given their "common meaning". A reasonable case can be made that the common meaning of "majority" is "more that any other choice", and one can point to ample evidence showing that, such as this. However, one can also argue that extra weight should be given to to specialized definitions appearing in The Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure or Robert's Rules of Order (or other such document), in support of a competing definition of "simple majority". Both sides will need to provide evidence that supports their interpretation of the phrase, based on external sources (parliamentary handbooks, dictionaries, and so on), as arguments for a particular interpretation of the term. The courts will be most impressed by evidence pertaining to the behavior of the parties, so that if everybody agrees that they understood "simple majority" to be "the choice with the most votes", then that is how the term will be interpreted. | No, Natural law is not a type or subset of Common Law Natural Law is derived from what some person thinks is a logical and obvious rule, or what some person thinks is God's Law. There are many versions and varieties of natural law, and there is no wide agreement on what it does or does not specify. Common law is derived from the judgements of the Royal Courts in England (later Great Britain, still later the UK) roughly during the period 1250-1850. (After that it continued to develop as case law, but major changes were usually statutory, although not always as a comment by Martin Bonner points out.) It started with a rough distillation of then widespread customary law, ultimately traceable to Germanic and Norman traditional law. Supposedly, common law had been in force "since the memory of man runs not to the contrary" and judges did not create it but merely "discovered" it. Common law was then expanded and altered over the centuries by the decisions of judges of the common-law courts in individual cases, primarily the court of the King's Bench, the court of the Exchequer, and the court of Common Pleas. It also included some rules derived from statutes, particularly early ones, such as those of King Henry II. Later statutes could and did alter the rules of common law. Technically such altered rules became "statutory law" not strictly part of the common law, but where they dealt with matters handled by the common-law courts, they were often considered to be part of the common law in an informal sense, as they were laws taught to the lawyers (barristers) who practiced in the common-law courts. Common law was distinguished from several other kinds of law: Local customary law: the law used in local courts, particularly Hundred courts and Shire courts, but also the courts of local lords. This law varied from place to place, and was largely derived from "ancient local custom" supplemented by Royal and noble charters. Church law: the law used in church courts, which had jurisdiction over wills and land owned by the church, laws on Sunday observance and several other things, as well as the discipline of priests and other clerics. Admiralty law the law of ships and seagoing matters. It covered salvage, disposition of captured enemy ships and cargo (prize law), maritime insurance, mutinies and crimes aboard ships, and other nautical matters. In the seventeenth century Lord Justice Coke fought to reduce its jurisdiction in favor of common-law courts. Justice Story, of the US Marshall Court (1800-1835), fought to reverse Coke's changes on this point in US law. Law Merchant: law specifically for cases between merchants. It dealt with specifically commercial issues, and was eventually merged into the common law. Piepowder law: Special law for the dealings of foot peddlers. (The name comes from a Norman French term meaning "dusty feet".) It also was eventually merged into the common law. Prerogative law: law derived from the direct authority of the King, particularly as exercised by the Court of the Star Chamber. It was widely regarded as tyrannical and was largely abolished by the English Civil War and its aftermath. Feudal law: Law dealing with the holding and inheritance of land under feudal tenure (largely knight's service, but other kinds too) and with other aspects of feudal rights, privileges, and obligations. It slowly became largely obsolete as less and less land was so held. Equity: Law developed by the Lords Chancellor of England (later Great Britain), intended to modify injustice worked by inflexible parts of the Common Law, but eventually becoming rather stiff itself. It was merged into the common law at different times in the US and the UK, but generally during the 1800s. The modern remedy of injunction is derived from equity. Statute Law Law directly derived from acts of the legislature -- Acts of Parliament in England/Great Britain/the UK. Civil Law: Law largely in force in Europe, partly derived from Roman law or Roman legal concepts, mixed with various local customary laws, and later much influenced by the Napoleonic Code. Modern EU law is considered a part of Civil Law. Civil law varies between different countries, and is at least as large and complex a subject as common law. It is also a subject I know less about. International Law: Law derived from treaties and other intentional agreements, and the traditional customs of dealing between countries (mostly in Europe). None of the above are "natural law" although in some cases natural law concepts influenced legislators and judges. There is some conceptual similarity between natural law and early common law, in that both looked to a supposedly pre-existing but unwritten law But natural law generally attempted to apply over-arching, top-down logical or theological rules, while common law was built up from low-level, decisions on individual cases, and then derived rules from these individual decisions. A version of natural law concepts, derived from Enlightenment philosophers, particularly Locke, influenced the drafters of the Constitution. (See Gary Wills, Explaining America; See also the Wikipedia article on Natural Law, linked above). But that was quite different in style and content from recent versions of natural law, which are usually aimed at imposing theological rules and abolishing secular rights which would hinder this process. (See How acceptable (mainstream/marginal) is the discussion about replacing the human rights with the natural law and to delete human rights chapters? and the link in the question for examples.) Moreover, different authors who advocate natural law do not agree on what that law is or should be. The above is only a very brief summery. Anyone interested should read more widely. I recommend The Law of the Land: The Evolution of Our Legal System by Charles Rembar (1980) e-book version by Open Road Media. It is a history of law written by a once-prominent practicing US lawyer, intended for those who are neither historians nor lawyers. In my view it is particularly well-written. There are, however, quite a few books available on the history of the common law. | One important formal difference is that self-represented litigants cannot claim the same costs if they prevail in a civil case. Costs are capped at 2/3 of what they would have received, had they been represented. ("Disbursements", such as court fees, are not subject to the same limit.) Moreover, their deemed hourly rate is £19/hr, unless it's possible to demonstrate that they've incurred greater financial loss as a result of doing the work. This is much less than the billed rate for qualified counsel. A less practical privilege is wearing gowns and wigs. Self-represented litigants are not allowed to pretend that they are barristers by donning their finest horsehair, or going on about "my learned friend". Solicitor-advocates are "my friend" but laypeople should not use this language at all. Outside of the courtroom, ordinary people can in principle do their own conveyancing (for example), but there are many practical obstacles. One is being fully exposed to the costs of mistakes. Mortgage lenders will often refuse to let random members of the public take care of the legal intricacies, and some solicitors on the other side will advise their clients not to bother. There are also a few technicalities which are easier for practicing solicitors, such as access to DX (a specialist private postal service) for shuttling reams of paper documents across the country. Case law (Domb v Isoz [1980] 1 All ER 942) lets solicitors effect an exchange of contracts by telephone, but this has not been recognised for other people, who continue to have to do it physically. |
How does context nullify the Rittenhouse self-defense? The Rittenhouse defense has invoked self-defense justification for the shooting deaths of 2 in Kenosha Wisconsin. Given the context of: Protesters: similar to a "place of nuisance" in the sense there is a high probability of violence. Rittenhouse indicating intent to protect property from protests How, if at all, does said context nullify the Rittenhouse self-defense? RyanM has written a good response to a question posing a single issue (suspect's age), whereas my question is more consider with the broader context (suspect's statements, situation, nature of conflict). The narrow question is: Does this latter fact [of being a minor in possession of firearm] make it impossible for him to claim self-defense? This questions serves to cast a "wider-net" to consider the context ('all the facts') to determine the validity of self-defense. | None of this affects a claim of self-defense I've described elsewhere the things that do affect a self-defense claim in Wisconsin. These do not affect it. Protesters I'm not sure what you mean by this: the existence of protesters has nothing to do with a claim of self-defense. The standard for lethal self-defense is much higher than could be satisfied by simply being near an angry crowd. Specific actions of protesters could affect it, but you'd need to detail which actions you're referring to. Rittenhouse indicating intent to protect property from protests This might affect the claim if it were his property (which it was not). Section 939.48(1m)(ar) of Wisconsin law provides for a castle doctrine if, basically, the person has unlawfully broken into or is currently unlawfully breaking into the defendant's home, vehicle, or place of business. Since it was not his property, this defense doesn't apply. | Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest. | Examples Detention: A person suspected of a felony can be detained at gunpoint (and, in many jurisdictions, subject to "citizen's arrest"). A more clear example is when you encounter someone committing a felonious assault. You can brandish your gun and order them to stop. If they do stop, then you cannot shoot them unless there is no alternative to preventing them from inflicting grievous bodily harm on another. Defense: If you reasonably feel that another person poses a real and grievous physical threat, you can brandish a gun in defense. A common example is the slight woman followed into a vacant alley by a large man. She can brandish a gun to keep him at bay, but she cannot shoot him if he is not making explicit threats and (supposing one accepts the "Tueller rule") makes no aggressive motion within 21 feet of the woman. Law One helpful explanation of the distinction, by a MO attorney citing the MO Supreme Court: While deadly force can only be used to meet the threat of deadly force, the threat implied by brandishing is justified by a low level threat. “When a person has reasonable cause to apprehend on the part of another a design to inflict a great personal injury, and there was reasonable cause for him to apprehend immediate danger of such design being accomplished he is justified, and has the right, ‘to avert such apprehended design,’ and in proper circumstances the right of attack may be essential to the right of self-defense.” More detailed analysis can be found of California Penal Code 417 (California's law against "Brandishing," which is similar to brandishing laws in most states): [I]f you were lawfully defending yourself or defending another person, California's self-defense laws will excuse your otherwise criminal act. You lawfully act in self-defense or in defense of others when you reasonably believe that you or another person is about to suffer imminent harm, and you fight back with no more force than is reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. I.e., sometimes it's enough to say, "Stop!" But sometimes it's necessary to present a gun for the bad guy to get the message. Additionally: Simply drawing or exhibiting a weapon isn't enough to justify a conviction for 417 PC. In order for prosecutors to convict you of brandishing a weapon or firearm, you must do so in a rude, angry, or threatening manner. The same law review provides illuminating comparisons with the related offense "Assault with a Deadly Weapon" (ADW — CA 245 PC). | In California (as in all states) there is a justifiable homicide defense which might be used in such a situation. For the force to be justified, you have to reasonably believe you are in danger of being harmed, that you need to use force to avoid the harm, and you may only use the minimum force necessary to eliminate the threat. It then is a matter for the jury to decide whether those principles were followed in your particular instance. The reason why it's hard to predict the outcome is that it depends on a subjective evaluation by the jury, as to whether the shooter had a reasonable fear and whether lesser force was a viable option. The jury's decision is guided by instructions to the jury (#506, #506) which focus on relevant distinctions. The jury will be told that "Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be", and that you have to reasonably believe there is "imminent danger of great bodily injury". My evaluation is that that does not describe the scenario in the question. There is some possibility of future harm... but not imminent harm. People v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470" states that "the rule developed at common law that killing or use of deadly force to prevent a felony was justified only if the offense was a forcible and atrocious crime" and "Examples of forcible and atrocious crimes are murder, mayhem, rape and robbery", and that could support application of a justifiable homicide defense in a bank robbery. But in the present instance, the bank is being robbed and the shooter is a by-stander. Despite all of the bank robberies in California, there is no relevant case from which one could draw an analogy. | Most people would refer to this as "defense of others." In North Carolina, though, the relevant statute, G.S. 14-51.3, formally refers to this as "Use of force in defense of person." The statute allows a defense against criminal and civil liability for non-deadly force used "against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other's imminent use of unlawful force." Note, however, that the statute does not allow you to invoke the defense when the victim "is a law enforcement officer ... was lawfully acting in the performance of his or her official duties and ... identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law." This raises the question of whether the officer in this case was "lawfully acting in the performance of his official duties" when the relative intervened. If he was, the defense would likely be unavailable. | Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification. | The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well. | The General Rule In practice, the only time when self-defense against a police officer is legal is when you do not know and have no reasonable way that you could have known that the person attacking you is a police officer. (And arguably, a police officer acting in an official capacity in furtherance of his or her duties, rather than in a personal capacity as an individual.) For example, if the police do a no knock raid in the dark of night, and don't announce themselves, and you shoot police officers reasonably believing them to be home invasion burglars, you would not have criminal or civil liability for doing so. A similar valid self-defense claim might arise when someone has an objectively reasonable reason to think that someone claiming to be a police officer is really just a criminal impersonating a police officer, even if that belief is, in fact, mistaken. In almost all other circumstances, you need to submit to the officers, and you are pretty much required by law to bear the risk that excessive force by the officer will harm you. If you don't, you will probably be guilty of the crime of resisting arrest and will not be entitled to a self-defense defense. The fact that you are not actually guilty of a crime is irrelevant. This is often the case and police officers are not omniscient. If the officer lacked probable cause for an arrest (which there is often no way that the person being arrested or attacked can know at the time), the remedy is a civil rights suit after the fact, not self-defense. In theory, there might be other isolated circumstances where self-defense against a police officer is legal, but they involve fact patterns so quirky that they would almost never happen in real life, or would almost never be possible to prove in a manner that the courts would believe. Officer Liability For Harming Someone Legitimately Acting In Self Defense Whether the officers had civil liability to you if you were harmed by the officers while exercising your right to self-defense would depend upon their state of mind, even if you were rightfully using self-defense. For example, a U.S. Supreme Court case decided in January of 2017 (White v. Pauly) involved this fact pattern. In White v. Pauly an officer arrived late on the scene and had no reason to believe that the officers who arrived there before him and were being shot at by citizens in a house that they were approaching, lacked probable cause, or had not announced themselves. The court held that as a result, he had no civil liability to a citizen he shot, even if the person who the late arriving officer shot while that citizen was shooting back at the police officers on the scene was actually engaging in good faith self-defense. The citizen's self-defense in the case had a valid defense to criminal or civil liability for firing on the officers, because the citizen shooting back didn't actually know that the people approaching his house were police officers. But, because the late arriving officer reasonably believed under the circumstances that the citizen had no right to engage in self-defense, because he thought that the early arriving officers had probable cause and had announced themselves, the late arriving officer had no civil liability to the citizens he shot. |
Are public/conference speeches copyright protected? Are speeches by personalities like Warren Buffett copyright protected? I am not speaking about interviews to news channels but speeches usually made to the public and investors like those found in https://buffett.cnbc.com/warren-buffett-search-results/?query=Mutual%20funds. Can I use them in my websites without legal issues? | Often, but not always If the speech is "fixed in a tangible medium" it is protected by copyright. That includes a prepared written version, and an audio recording made as the speech is delivered. Note that fixation only counts if it is done "by or under the authority of the author". Someone else recording or writing down the speech does not make it fixed unless the author has directed that this be done, or at least authorized it. However, if the speech is neither written down, nor recorded, nor in any other way "fixed" then it is not protected until it is fixed. Someone who took notes or simply memorized the speech would be free to use it as long as it is not protected. All the above is true in the US, and in all other countries that adhere to the Berne Copyright Convention or the TRIPS Agreement. Almost all countries adhere to one or both of those. In many cases there is an exception to copyright for news reporting, but not always. In the US this is covered under fair use and is subject to the normal four-factor test for fair use. In the UK this is covered by fair dealing. In many countries there is a specific exception for news reporting, but such exceptions generally have limits, and the individual law's terms will matter. US Law on Fixation 17 USC 101 provides that: A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission. | You would be in poorly-tested waters under US law. The invented name "Cthulhu" as appearing in a novel is not protected by copyright. A collection of invented names and other words assembled into a dictionary (e.g. of Klingon) might be found to constitute a copyright-protected creative work. In Paramount Pictures v. Axanar Productions (complaint), plaintiffs partially base their claim on infringement of language; defendants sought to dismiss the suit on various grounds ("questions of law" rather than questions of fact), but the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, defendants settled the case. Constructed languages are highly creative expressive works whose elements are deliberately selected for an artistic purpose, and they are not naturally-occurring facts. The copyright office has no position on copyright protection of a constructed language, and any such position would have to come from so-far non-existent (definitive) case law. The dismissal in Paramount v. Axanar doesn't clearly indicate that a constructed language is protected. The primary legal question would be whether the database that you copy into your system is protected. There is a colorable legal argument that a collection of language-like objects. The statutory language in 17 USC 102 does not specifically preclude protection of a wholely-creative database, and the copyright office does not say whether a conlang can be protected because the courts have not ruled one way or the other. The situation in Feist is very different from the case of a work which invents a language from nothing. | Facts cannot be copyrighted. Such a project does not violate copyright law, and if you're in the United States, it is protected by the First Amendment. | There is no such law; copyright secures exclusive rights for the copyright holder (and related rights sometimes secure certain rights for the author which cannot be sold or given away except through death), but it cannot be used to force them to spend money to distribute it in a form that you can conveniently use. Such a rule would defeat the purpose of copyright law, which is to give the copyright holder control over the use of the work, not take away their ability to do so. You can certainly request that they release the work, and can offer to pay them for doing so. But someone who does not own the copyright or any related rights cannot use copyright law to force the person who does own the copyright to spend their own money to convert a show into a new format. | No. There are certain provisions of section 230 that carve out what liability these companies have for third party (i.e. User) speech on their web pages in 230(e). 230(e)(2) says that nothing in Section 230 may be construed to limit or expand laws reguarding intellectual property. These services are still on the hook if users post trademark or copyright infringing material to the site. Other such matters similarly not permitted include obscenities laws, exploitation of children laws, state laws, communications privacy laws, and sex trafficing laws. As a special note that section 230 was created to allow for emerging internet technologies and buisness to not have to worry about third party speech on their platform from holding them liable as a publisher. Thus, if I was to sue youtube for defamation of character based on a video you uploaded, calling me a Sith Lord, I could not sue Youtube (who has lots of money) but would rather have to sue you (who I presume does not have lots of money... at least not youtube/Google levels of money). Thus youtube cannot be civilily liable. It can still be criminally liable and liable for copyright infringement. | No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though. | Legally there is no problem. What you say is protected speech under the 1st Amendment as long as it is either true or a matter of opinion. However Ron Beyer's comment is a good one; while legal this sounds very inadvisable. You would be far better off hiring a lawyer. The Mr Dicks of this world make money from the widespread fear of legal action. He will probably fold as soon as he sees a letter from a lawyer threatening a lawsuit. Until then stalling doesn't cost him anything so he will carry on doing it. BTW, don't delay. I don't know about the US, but over here in the UK there are a number of ways that people like Mr Dick can make it hard to collect. Don't give him time to play shell games with his assets. | Yes. This is infringement. This infringement might be excused by a "fair use" defense but it probably isn't. At a very small scale tailor to a very specific educational program, for example, for just members of a thirty person English class that they are currently taking, it might qualify as educational fair use. But I get the impression that the contemplated translation project is far more ambitious than that. The underlying content of the events reported in the news are not protected by copyright, but the language used to report those events and any translations of that language, is protected. The only reliable way to solve it is to get permission to do so from the holder of the copyright of the source of the new reports you are translating. |
If a cop is mistaken in his belief that X is true, where X would typically be grounds for reasonable suspicion, does he have reasonable suspicion? If a cop is factually mistaken (but sincerely mistaken, not a liar) in his belief that X is true, and if X would typically constitute grounds for reasonable suspicion (were it to be true, which it isn’t), does the cop have reasonable suspicion? Example: A cop pulls a driver over because he thinks the driver turned right without signaling. The cop smells something strange, conducts a search, finds a crack pipe, and arrests the driver. Dash cam footage from the cop car is later reviewed, and shows that the driver did in fact use his turn signal properly when turning. Did the mistaken cop have a "reasonable suspicion", and thus, grounds for pulling the car over? Is the crack pipe admissible as evidence? A Spicier Example: A cop thinks he hears a woman screaming from inside a house, repeating the phrase, “Help! They’re stabbing me!”. He calls for backup and has the house surrounded. Officers enter the house and find it completely empty, other than a small meth lab in the basement. They find no people in the house, no amplification devices, and absolutely nothing capable of producing the sound of a woman screaming for help. Witnesses who were standing next to the cop are interviewed, and all report that they heard nothing. Digital forensics experts later conclude that the officer’s body cam audio shows no traces of a woman screaming, and that there is no way a normal human ear placed within three feet of the camera would have heard anything other than silence. There are fingerprints all over the equipment in the lab. They belong to the owner of the house. Did the cop - provably mistaken in his sincerely held belief that there was a woman screaming for help - have reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed, and thus, grounds for entering the house, admitting the meth lab into evidence, and arresting the owner? Would the answer be different if the cop’s medical history was deemed admissible, and it turned out that he was a schizophrenic with a history of hearing voices? | A fact cannot by itself constitute reasonable suspicion; the word "reasonable" describes not only the relationship between the fact and the possible existence of a crime, but also the officer's knowledge about the fact. The officer must not only sincerely believe the truth of the facts constituting reasonable suspicion, but must also reasonably believe it. I do not know whether a hallucinatory experience may be found reasonable for this purpose; I suspect that it would be a matter of dispute at trial. The first example is perhaps more straightforward, as there are probably a few possible explanations for the officer's failure to notice the turn signal. Still, are they reasonable? If the officer could not see the turn signals because something blocked the line of sight, it would not be reasonable for the officer to conclude that the driver had failed to use the signal. Rather, the officer has no evidence one way or the other, and absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The question deals in hypotheticals, where we can assume that the officer is sincere. But in a trial, the jury (or judge in a bench trial) cannot do that. They will look at the evidence, including the officer's testimony, and assess the officer's credibility. They will form an opinion about whether the belief was sincere and reasonable before they look at whether the facts, as the officer believed them to be, reasonably indicated that a crime was being committed or was imminent. | The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home. | So my answer depends heavily on a clarification. Are the Police Suspicious or do they have a warrant? This is a big difference in the two behaviors as the former is not a thing, from a strictly legal perspective, and the police should not be harrassing Bob, who doesn't want to talk to them, when they should be making calls to get a warrant (If the police think Bob is being disorderly, they will arrest him and Bob should zip it, get an attorney down to the station, and let the Lawyer yell at the cops... and the judge... and the prosecutor and whoever else... If it's the latter case, they don't need to ask Bob to have Bob come outside... they can kick in the door and arrest Bob or remove him as part of executing the warrant. That's why you have them. In the situation as described, it reads like there was some crime in the area and the police think Bob may have some knowledge about it (he need not have done it, they could be looking for a witness). Bob does not have to say anything to the cops as per his rights against self-incrimination, so Bob tells them he does not wish to speak to them, possibly in an irksome manner and the Police won't take no for an answer. Perhaps they really think Bob might be the criminal... this doesn't necessary mean they have evidence to arrest Bob on. Perhaps Bob was identified by a guy off of security camera footage... maybe it was Bob, or maybe it was Bob's evil twin he never knew about and Bob's been home all night Keeping Up With The Kardassians (anyone knows Bob knows he can't stand going a week without knowing what Kim and Kanye are doing). Either way, it could be enough for a search warrant but just wanting to talk without a warrant, Bob can refuse and they need to respect that. Again, it's probably a bad faith arrest, but the street is not the place to have that fight... save it for the courts. | In the Hicks case, police entered the premise, reasonably, pursuant a bullet having been fired from Hicks' apartment into a person in the apartment below. There were expensive stereo components in plain sight, which raised a reasonable suspicion. But that reasonable suspicion did not justify a further search, which police nevertheless conducted: they turned the stereo to get the serial numbers. Having phoned in the numbers and learning that the items were stolen, they then had probable cause for a seizure. That cause was, however, obtained via an illegal search. Suppose that the serial numbers had been visible from the front: then because they would have been in plain view and since the police were there for a reasonable search related to the shooting, then could have legally seized the stereo, since no additional search was required. There is no distinction between search and seizure w.r.t. 4th Amendment protection ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"). Police could not confiscate the stereo without probable cause, nor could they confiscate cash, or any other thing, again, unless they had probable cause. And they could not search for evidence that would give them probable cause to take stuff. As SCOTUS said, regarding searches versus seizures, We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action, and we see no reason for a distinction in the particular circumstances before us here. | The citation could be written but it should be easy to beat. In the circumstance that you describe the accused could just say the he was not driving his car at the time. If the prosecution is a sham with all your friends saying you all saw this thing, then the defendant can bring all of his friends to say that he was at some other place. The benefit to having a cop on the scene is that the cop will get ID and positive identification. The other thing the cop has is expert judgment. If a cop sees unsafe lane movement and writes a ticket, his testimony in court carries more weight than the "it was not unsafe!" testimony of the accused. Keep in mind, getting all of your witnesses to court on the same day, after continuances and other delays, and getting them all to tell the same story to overcome the presumption of innocence is no small feat. All that to say, it's easier with police as witness. There are two mechanisms which could get you where you want to go. Private prosecution and citizen's arrest. Private prosecutions are a part of history but not strictly unavailable at the state level. You could write up some charging documents to see if you can get your target indicted. Citizen's arrest is interesting because the rules are fairly unclear unless governed by a specific statute. There are two necessary parts of citizens arrest and the first part gets the attention. The first part is the detention (arrest). The crimes for which a citizen can legally detain a suspect are likely defined by state statute. The second part is giving testimony about the witnessed crime. Let's assume that you see a felony happen and watch the perp walk into a gas station bathroom. You are prepared to arrest, do part number one, and then call the cops, to do part number two. But while you wait for the guy to come out of the bathroom a cop walks up. You explain the felony and the cop goes into the bathroom and arrests the guy. It's purely witness testimony that led to the arrest and the indictment (physical evidence - let's say there is none) and even the trial. You successfully get the guy indicted and when you show up to testify you tell the story as you witnessed it. Now the accused gets to take the stand. When he takes the stand he says, "it was the other guy." When asked, "what other guy?" He says, "I was in the bathroom and a guy ran in and went into the stall. Then a cop came in and arrested me." Reasonable doubt right there. How much more if it's a bunch of friends ratting on some lone driver? Police need evidence. Prosecutors need evidence. Judges need evidence. | Police make arrests when they (or a judge) decides to Police have the legal power to make an arrest if: they witness a crime being committed. Indeed, anyone can make an arrest in this circumstance. they have reason to believe that a crime has been committed. they have a warrant from a judge. Some reasons why police can, but choose not to make an arrest are: they don’t believe a crime has taken place. Accusations are easy; convictions are hard. they are exercising the discretion they have under the law to not prosecute a crime where it would not be in the public interest. Factors at play include the seriousness of the crime, the availability and strength of the evidence, the police and court resources available, other matters they have before them etc. they do not have sufficient evidence now but will pursue investigations to get more. Arresting someone starts all sorts of legal clocks ticking and if they can’t bring their case in time the defendant will walk. | In the case you link, this was given as an opening statement by the defense. Opening statements do not contain evidence. The defendant may or may not testify on their own behalf during the trial - this testimony, if given, counts as evidence, even if it is somewhat self-serving. And anything which tends to casts doubt as to the defendant's guilt is evidence that they didn't do it, even if it isn't proof. If there is reasonable doubt, then "he didn't do it" is not illogical. And it would seem unfair to allow the prosecution to say "he did it" but not allow the defense to say "no he didn't". | It's illegal if the intent is to deceive. Under S50(1) of the Police Act 1996: Any person who with intent to deceive impersonates a member of a police force or special constable, or makes any statement or does any act calculated falsely to suggest that he is such a member or constable, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both. Their intent would need to be proven. It will be fact-specific; in some cases far easier to prove than in others. The criminal justice system is overburdened and underfunded so it is no surprise that these trolling videos are given no priority whatsoever. Further complicating the matter is the need to correctly identify the individual to prosecute. Doing so would require a fair amount of police time, time that could perhaps be spent on more urgent priorities given the relative lack of harm these videos are doing compared to more serious crimes. However, in this video (Would You Help a Police Officer Having An Asthma Attack?) an S50(2) offence would seem to have been committed by the actor wearing the police clothing: Any person who, not being a constable, wears any article of police uniform in circumstances where it gives him an appearance so nearly resembling that of a member of a police force as to be calculated to deceive shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. It does appear that both offences are being committed in these various videos, and the only reason people aren't being prosecuted is practical: there are more serious crimes to focus on, and the police would need to identify who exactly committed this crime--given these all happened at least two years ago, it would be challenging to say the least. They also seem to commit the separate crime of wasting police time, for example by approaching cops in the street and falsely confessing to crimes. Under S5(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1967, wasting police time is a criminal offence. Bringing proceedings in court requires the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) since those proceedings could have a chilling effect on the propensity of the public to report genuine matters to the police in the future. It is likely that while "wasteful employment" of police time was caused by these people, so committing the offence, it is likely viewed simply as "part and parcel" of the job and the officer likely didn't spend any time at all investigating the confessions (depending on their nature). Of course, even if the officer did spend time investigating the false confessions, the DPP would need to give their consent so unless the person has a demonstrated history of doing this (that would stand up in court) or the time wasted was of a particularly serious nature (e.g. the man who falsely claimed to be the Yorkshire Ripper), it seems unlikely consent would be granted. |
Algorithm generated fines In the UK, there was recently a case in the press about a driver that was issued a fine for driving in a bus lane. The photograph the Local Authority supplied as "evidence" was of someone wearing an item of clothing with wording that was similar to the number plate of his car. Clearly, this fine was issued by software and no human being was actually involved in the process. Apparently this is acceptable. My question is, this behaviour is so egregious, does the "offender" have the right to completely ignore the fine and all its auto-generated escalation correspondence, until an actual human being finally looks at it, realises the error and quashes the case? If he did ignore it completely, and the first human to see it were a judge, would that judge 1) have sympathy for his situation and reprimand the Local Authority for wasting the court's time, or 2) take a dim view of his lack of action to get the case quashed at an earlier stage? If 2), what if this item of clothing became fashionable and was therefore causing this person to receive hundreds of these fines every week? EDIT: In response to @motosubatsu's answer, in particular my "fashionable item" aspect. I suppose by "fashionable item" I was intending to cover a larger topic which I could summarise like this: Suppose I want to annoy somebody as much as possible, what's to stop me from printing a t-shirt with their actual number plate on it, then walking around past all sorts of cameras, knowing that they will receive multiple fines every day and have no choice but to keep calling and explaining. After all, the council has no duty to make it easy for someone to get through on the phone, so, potentially, I could walk around bus lanes and car parks all day. I could get some friends to do this all over the country in different local authority areas and the victim could - literally - have not enough hours in the day to have to keep fighting false fines. Would they not have some recourse to sue for harassment or "vexatious litigation"? | I assume you're talking about this case: Bus lane camera mistakes woman's sweater for number plate. No he couldn't just ignore it - because that doesn't actually result in it getting put in front of a human (judge or otherwise). Instead the fine would escalate and ultimately be passed to a collections agency. Only challenging the Penalty Charge Notice (as this person did) would get a human involved. As a bonus, if the automated fine happens to come with a S172 notice to identify the driver ignoring that is an offence in of itself (irrespective of the original alleged offence), and in many cases carries a worse penalty (£1000 and 6 points IIRC). what if this item of clothing became fashionable and was therefore causing this person to receive hundreds of these fines every week? While it's unlikely to get to that stage - the item of clothing on its own wouldn't do it, there needed to be a specific partial-obscurement of the garment as well, it's not impossible, after all perhaps it's their favorite sweater, they always carry their bag like that and cut across the bus lane on their way to work etc. In those circumstances there's nothing legally that changes, I'd expect the poor vehicle owner to be on first name terms with the people at the council enforcement call centre in question sooner rather than later. Re edit: Suppose I want to annoy somebody as much as possible, what's to stop me from printing a t-shirt with their actual number plate on it, then walking around past all sorts of cameras, knowing that they will receive multiple fines every day and have no choice but to keep calling and explaining. After all, the council has no duty to make it easy for someone to get through on the phone, so, potentially, I could walk around bus lanes and car parks all day. I could get some friends to do this all over the country in different local authority areas and the victim could - literally - have not enough hours in the day to have to keep fighting false fines. Would they not have some recourse to sue for harassment or "vexatious litigation"? In all honesty I don't know for sure what would happen in this scenario - I can't think of a similar enough case. But I would expect targeting an individual in this manner would qualify as harassment pretty easily and for which there are both criminal and civil actions that can be taken. I suppose hypothetically you could argue that the "number plate shirt" is effectively being used to make false allegations that the car's registered keeper had committed crimes, which opens up avenues to prosecution for Perverting the Course of Justice or wasting police time. But I have no idea how likely that would be to be pursued. | Probably moot considering how much time has passed but here goes. California 22349(a) states that no person may drive upon a highway at speeds of greater than 65 mph. So if you're going to be convicted under 22349(a), it doesn't matter if you're going 80 or 90. The charge is that you were doing greater than 65. The judge found you were going 90. 90 > 65. Conviction secured. The only sticky part is if the judge charged you the extra $150 because he alleges you went 90 instead of 80. You could appeal that, since even the officer argues you went 80, but since the officer testified that his radar clocked you at 90, you'd probably lose, especially since the officer's rationale for writing 80 was, by his testimony, your alleged admission at the scene, and you at the scene would have reason to downplay your speed. TL;DR: Yes, the judge, as the trier of fact, can do that. Something came out during the trial (radar at 90) that contradicted the ticket (80) so the trier of fact (the judge) resolved this by going with the radar. You might have been able to get out of it, if you asked the officer why he didn't write 90 when that's what the radar read. There was a reason the officer didn't trust that radar, and if he articulated it, then the judge would likely have stuck with 80. | Arizona Revised Statute 28-1591 has a specific exemption for service of a parking or standing violation: B. This article does not require that either the initial notification or a subsequent summons and complaint for a parking or standing violation be issued or served as required by this article. This section carves out an exemption for parking infractions in that they don't need to be personally served. If there is no response to the complaint left on the car, the statute further states: If it is necessary to issue a summons and complaint because there is not a satisfactory response to the initial notice of a parking or standing violation, the summons and complaint may be sent by regular mail to the address provided to the department by the individual made responsible for the alleged violation by the applicable statute or ordinance. Service of the summons and complaint is complete on mailing. When service is complete the court of jurisdiction has personal jurisdiction over the defendant and can enter a default judgment. You are correct in the rest of your statement regarding moving violations reported by camera systems - the violator must be personally served. If personal service is not achieved then the complaint is dismissed with no record. This article has a good explanation of the process for service for moving violations. The article references precedence established in Tonner v. Paradise Valley Magistrate's Court. Arizona requires personal service in order to create personal jurisdiction for the court. Alternatively, the defendant can waive the personal service. In Arizona, if one takes an action recorded on a traffic camera that causes a complaint to be issued that person will receive in the mail a form that is a waiver of service. Signing such a form and returning it tells the court that you waive personal service. Refusal to sign and return the form does not remove the requirement the state has of personal service. If the state wishes to pursue the case they will need to provide personal service. If the state does successfully conclude personal service then the defendant will be liable for the initial fine as well as the cost of service. From the article and the case: Without completed service, the court does not obtain jurisdiction. “The incomplete service left the trial court without jurisdiction, i.e., without authority to enter the judgment.” Id., Supplemental Opinion, 187 Ariz. 487, 488, 930 P.2d 1001, 1002. Ignoring a personally served citation, i.e., a ticket, allows the court to enter a default judgement. In the case of a citation that was not personally served and where personal service was not waived means the court never had jurisdiction in order to render a default judgment. There is a time limit within which personal service must be completed for a complaint. I've found sources that claim both 120 days and 180 days from when the court was made aware of the complaint. Some sources also claim that the court must be notified and processes started within 10 days of the date of the infraction. If service is not completed within that time frame then the complaint is dropped and no record is retained. So, yes, parking tickets do not have to be personally served according to statute and, yes, a person in Arizona has to be personally served with a moving violation citation. Failure to achieve proper service results in dismissal of the complaint. | Maybe. In many but not all situations, the police have a certain latitude in how they charge an incident. In many but not all socieities, speeding is seen as less morally repugnant than, say, theft or tax evasion. "Can happen to anyone, oops," the excuse goes. So a credible expression of remorse might cause the police officer to issue a caution or verbal warning instead of a ticket. Unless you are in a place where there is a grossly antagonistic relationship between the police and the citizens, or where the police department relies on fines for funding. | Let me give you a simple, even if rather silly example: You take me to a civil court. You tell the judge "gnasher regularly parks his blue car in front of my home, and the color blue violates my sense of beauty. Judge, make him stop it. " A question of fact would be: Is my car actually blue? Not green, or red? And do I actually park my car in front of your home, and do so regularly? A question of law would be: Am I allowed by law to park my car in front of your home, even when my car has a color that you don't like? If this goes to a civil court, the judge would look at it and probably say: "Even if all the facts that 'Gimme the 401' claimed are true, as a matter of law there would be no case for gnasher to answer, since these actions would be permitted by law". If the judge decided that it is illegal to park cars in offensive colours in front of someone else's home as a matter of law, the court would then have to decide the facts: Whether what you claimed is actually the truth. (And while this example is silly, there have been people claiming that the neighbour's use of WiFi interfered with their health. And by law it is illegal to interfere with someone's health, so the facts would have to be examined). | No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412 | Assume that this happened in a matter that goes to court. In civil court, there is no "innocent until/unless proven guilty". In civil court, the judge hears everyone's story, and decides which story is more likely to be true. So I tell the judge "I sent a letter by registered mail; this is what was in the letter, and the post office reported to me that they delivered the mail, and someone signed for it". And you say "I never received a letter". The judge will believe me and the post office. You say "I received a letter and signed for it, but there was just a birthday card inside". Who does the judge believe? Does he or she believe that you received a letter with the contents I said and you are lying about it, or does she believe that I sent you an unsolicited birthday card by registered mail? Why would I do that? So they believe me. Now if you said "I received a registered letter containing just a birthday court, so I immediately called my secretary and three other people in the office to see this and to verify there was nothing but the birthday card, and here they are as witnesses", then the court might start believing you. | This is likely to be a matter of policy rather than law That is, it’s not likely there is a law prohibiting it but it is highly likely that the person’s training and their employer’s policy on the matter is that they must complete a ticket once they start it. It’s a pretty universal anti-corruption measure - it prevents the situation where they are writing the ticket, the owner appears and offers them half the value of the fine in cash to stop: well, they can’t stop so they can’t be tempted by the bribe. Of course, the bribe can be offered before they start but, when fighting corruption, you minimise the opportunities rather than eliminate them. I know that police and rangers (private people can’t issue tickets) in new-south-wales are so restricted. |
Though CC license couldn't be revoke, could I later decide to change by license from CC BY-SA to CC BY? So though Creative Commons has stated that when things are licensed under their license, it couldn't be revoked, but could I choose to re-license under a less stricter license? Like from CC BY-SA to CC BY (giving up Share-Alike restriction) or like CC BY-NC-SA to either CC BY or CC-BY-SA. As I'm putting down restrictions, is it possible to do such things? | By the terms of the CC license, you cannot "cancel" or "revoke" it. But as the copyright owner, you may separately release under a different license: a less restrictive CC license, or a completely different license such as the GPL or the MIT license. You could even release under a more restrictive CC license, going say from a CC-BY to a CC-BY-ND or a CC-BY-SA. You could remove all mention of the earlier license from any website or app you control. Anyone who had obtained (or later obtains) a copy under the earlier release could use it or give it to others under the terms of that license, but anyone who did not so receive it, but instead gets it from you under the different terms it could only use it under the terms of the later release. By the way, although the CC license describe themselves as irrevocable, there is under US law, a five-year period during which any license grant may be canceled, provided the proper procedures are followed. This is under 17 USC 203, and the period starts 35 years after the license was granted, or 35 years after the work was published. | To answer the question in your title: Yes, software licenses are copyrighted. They are written works that involve (significant, expert) creative effort to create. The best solution would be for Grammarly to hire a lawyer and say "we want a new EULA. We think this one covers a number of points our current one doesn't". Most legal documents will be copyright for the same reason (there may be a few that are so stereotypical that there is essentially no creative effort in putting them together). | If the app (and the service accessed from the app) truly doesn't have any EULA, ToS, or license agreement, to include restrictions on reverse engineering, you can probably create an alternate front end, so long as you aren't using their logos, etc. However, their data may be a different beast, depending on the nature of it. For example, extracting data from Twitter would potentially violate Twitter's license on the original text copyright held by the authors in question. Wikipedia explicitly includes redistribution in their license agreement with authors/content creators. If all you are extracting and storing is the temperature at a particular weather station, you might have less of a concern. Anything beyond merely factual runs the risk of a copyright infringement as you store the data in your own database. | Broadly speaking, the difference is the "sharealike" clause of CC-BY-SA. Any derivative of a CC-BY-SA work must itself be licensed CC-BY-SA, whereas a derivative of an "MIT with attribution" work can be under any license the author wants. There are a number of other differences in the fine print (eg. CC forbids DRM, where MIT doesn't), but that's the big one. | united-states The license won't let you sell the .stl file. Probably you have created a derivative work, which means you can't sell it without a copyright license (and the CC-A-NC won't do). If it were licensed under CC-A you could sell it without problems (you'd have to give attribution, of course). You could also sell it under the CC-A-SA, but once you do you have no control over the result -- anyone you sold it to could give it to someone else under the terms of the license. This could work, though, if it were (say) a commission and you only expected to sell one copy. I don't know what the situation would be with the physical objects printed under any of these licenses. | No you don't. There are two copyright holders regarding the derivative work: yourself, for creating the original. the other artist, for creating the modified version. The other artist has received the right to use your original through the CC-BY license, under the condition that they attribute you appropriately. However, you have not received any rights to the other artist's work. | It would be illegal because only you are allowed to view the comic you purchased. Creating a copy of your comic (e.g photcopying, scanning etc) is not allowed, and showing others a copy of your comic is also not allowed | What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation. |
What are the consequences of lying to US immigration authorities? Application for a US visa now requires information about social media accounts. I know that intentionally omitting this information constitutes misrepresentation, but what are the potential consequences of not disclosing the social media information? Is it just the risk of being denied a visa and deportation? | A sample visa application is provided here. On p. 80, it warns that the submission of an application that contains false or misleading information may result in permanent refusal of a visa or denial of entry, and that all declarations are unsworn declarations made under perjury of penalty, 28 USC 1746 the penalty being specified as a fine and up to 5 years prison in 18 USC 1621. | It really depends on what "services" you are providing, but generally speaking you would be in violation of the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). These regulations are spelled out in 31 CFR §560.205 and 560.420 and apply to US citizens and residents wherever located. Specifically, the action that is prohibited is the "exportation, reexportation, sale or supply of goods, technology, or services to Iran. Here "Services" is broadly construed to mean anything of value even if no money is exchanged, including providing technical assistance to an Iranian national or Iranian institution. See See § 560.204; §560.410. The civil penalty for violation of these sanctions would be $250,000 or an amount "equal to twice the amount that is the basis of the violation". Criminal penalties may include fines up to $1 million and 20 years in prison. Now there are some exempt transactions outlined by § 560.210 (c) which may be applicable here, however it would be up to you to prove that these are "information or informational materials" as defined by § 560.315. For more information, 31 CFR Part 560, Subpart B refers to the prohibited transactions with Iran. Since you are not specifically spelling out what services you intend to provide, it is difficult to say for sure you would be in violation of them. It should be noted though that the US Government uses publicly funded money to run a proxy server through which Iranians can access otherwise blocked websites such as social media in Iran. | united-states A "penalty of perjury" statement includes not just the warning about penalty of perjury, the person signing avows that the statements are true to the best of their knowledge. If you lie on such a statement, and if the "penalty of perjury" statement is legally allowed (typically, mandated), then the person can be prosecuted. However, XYZ cannot arbitrarily inject the risk of perjury, that requires some legal authorization. An example would be if XYZ is employing the person under a Defense Department contract that requires a sworn statement. The federal perjury statute characterises this as being when "a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered". The only effect of notarization is that it decreases the probability that the person could effectively argue "I never even signed this statement, that's a forgery". | Short answer: You find a country who is willing to recognize you as stateless, and issue you travel papers. At that point you can enter the U.S. by applying for a visa. The USA really does not want to create stateless people. They are laboring diplomatically to eradicate statelessness. As such, the State Department will want to see that you are secure in another country's citizenship before they will repudiate your US citizenship. Otherwise, they are very reluctant. The State Department will insist you do the repudiation in a foreign country at a US embassy. If you want to become stateless with your feet in the United States, you'll likely have a legal fight on your hands. Regardless, it will cost you $2300 in filing fees (plus, all your back taxes) :) At that point, you become the problem of the foreign country. You aren't anyone to the USA, and you have to apply for a visa just like anyone else. When a stated person enters the US, immigration's pivotal concern is whether you'll leave the US consistent with the terms of your visa, i.e. return to your country of citizenship. Being stateless increases this risk, and being a USA expat increases that risk further, since you are so familiar and comfortable in the US. If you found yourself in the kind of piccadillo that would qualify a foreigner for refugee or asylum status, the US would consider it just the same as others, since those statuses include right of residency. Some countries manufacture stateless people, e.g. Syria will not grant citizenship to a non-Muslim born there. | This has some basis in law. You need permission from a person to commercially exploit their likeness especially in California, and a waiver is a way of staving off future lawsuit over right of publicity. YT has a privacy policy whereby a person who have been filmed can request removal of the video (see also this, because they don't explain the policy in a single place). Because YT is commercially exploiting people's personalities, this is necessary. | Your question (when read with your follow-up comments) is somewhat complex, so I am going to make a few assumptions and break it down into several sub parts. Assumptions The conviction occurred in a state where the expungement statute allows you to tell employers that you were never arrested and convicted. When you say “public records websites” you’re asking about sites like atlaspublicrecords.com. That atlaspublicrecords.com is a US based company. They don’t list an address and the website used a private registration services, so can’t easily determine that they are US-based. Your questions and follow-up Considerations After I get it expunged, will it be removed from public records websites . . . . No. Websites like atlaspublicrecords.com do not link to actual public records. I searched a couple of common names and feel safe in assuming that it only collects and publishes the information—it does not actually link to court records. Nevertheless, it would not be available from the actual government agencies that keep those records. By getting your records expunged the convictions and arrest would no longer be available as public records that someone could request from the courthouse, police department, or whatever state agency does criminal history in your jurisdiction. do I have to show them proof of the expungement . . . . Yes, if you believe what the website claims. I can’t find a physical address for the website and don’t know if they are real or a scam, so understand that when you give them information about your expungement—or pay their silly fee, they might collect the money and do nothing. My opinion is that the company is shady and seems to operate in a gray area of the law that I will explain below. Options if they don’t remove the post: You could try to sue them for some type of secondary dignitary tort like defamation or false light. But these would have some significant legal hurdles. See G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300 (N.J. 2011), where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that commenting on an expunged criminal records was not defamation or invasion of privacy because it was the truth. You could try to argue that they are a consumer reporting agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). If they're governed by the FCRA, you have some additional legal remedies (like civil penalties/fines) if they don't remove/clarify an expunged record. The Fair Credit Reporting Act applies to credit reporting agencies, like Experian & Equifax but also covers companies that compile and sell information for background checks. This includes criminal records. See the Federal Trade Commission’s Advisory Opinion to LeBlanc (06-09-98). But . . . this website is operating in a gray area that appears to comply with the law. The FCRA only applies to consumer reporting agencies, which are defined as: Any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) Because they’re not charging money or a fee to access the reports and they’re not a nonprofit cooperative, they probably do not meet the definition of a CRA. Bottom-line is that you're best option is to give them the expungement documents once you obtain them. | There is a relevant rule, the "posting rule", according to which an acceptance is effective once posted (this is a quirk of acceptances). This would be as soon after 7 May 2016 as Bobby sent his letter, presumably well before the deadline. So yes, a professional lawyer would be needed. If Bobby is in Australia, it might be more complicated; if Bobby is in Norway, it's simpler because they don't have the posting rule. | What is one supposed to do if they want to take an extended trip somewhere? Or is one basically not allowed to take such trips if they are a US citizen eligible for Jury Duty? In the US you are not required to seek permission to travel, or prove your past whereabouts to the government if you happen to miss some civic duty. They generally call up way more people than they need for this sort of reason. The length of time you are gone or where you choose to travel is irrelevant. In my experience you are given about a month heads up. If you didn't receive the notice until you returned from out of town, and they send a follow up, simply inform them of the fact that you were gone and didn't receive the notice until you returned. Jury duty is an obligation to some extent, but it is also a right and a privilege. It isn't a criminal offence you are liable for if you didn't get the notice. If it were that important to verify your availability ahead of time the notification would be sent registered mail with a signature required. |
Can the President serve as both President and an executive officer? Suppose NIAID director Dr. Anthony Fauci is elected President. If he never officially resigned from his position as a director, and he was never forcibly removed from the same position by the former President or by Congress, could he legally serve as both President and director, and thereby have direct control of the NIAID (as opposed to the bureaucratic nightmares that might otherwise get in his way)? | Under the Hatch Act, Fauci would not be allowed to run for President while employed by the federal government. He would have to resign his post as NIAID director before beginning a campaign. If he did so and were then elected, there's a question of whether he could reappoint himself as NIAID director. In the Office of Special Counsel Hatch Act FAQ there is a question "May I keep my elected position if I become a federal employee after taking office?", saying that an elected official can be appointed to a federal office. It is unclear to me whether he could actually appoint himself. NAIAD Director doesn't appear to be a politically appointed office, so in principle it would probably be the NIH Director making the appointment. Also, if someone else had been appointed in the meantime, there would be a question of whether that person could be fired to make way for Fauci's reappointment. Generally a Civil Service employee can't be fired except for cause, and the firing can't be done by the President directly; this question came up during the Trump administration. The NIH Director or HHS Secretary could fire them, but would still have to show cause, and the sitting NIAID director would have the right to an appeal process. Even if Fauci was able to serve as President and NIAID Director simultaneously, he'd still be subject to the Hatch Act restrictions in the latter role. So while he'd be President, he'd be forbidden to pursue any political activities - which would make the job of President nearly impossible. | Different people have suggested different things as to what constitutes, "the unitary executive theory". The US Supreme Court is not likely to simply adopt such a theory in general terms. It will, instead, rule on a specific case that comes before it, and state the principles behind that ruling. There are a number of Supreme Court rulings saying that a President must abide by laws limiting presidential authority, perhaps the most famous is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) in which the Court rules that the President did not have authority to seize steel mills to put a stop to a labor dispute that was allegedly endangering national security during the Korean War. Congress had passed a law providing a different method of dealing with such situations, and President Truman did not follow the method established by that law. The President has broad power over the operations of executive branch agencies, possibly including the right to order an investigation halted for whatever reasons seem good to the president. If such a case came before the courts and they supported the President, presumably they would hold that the President's actions did not constitute obstruction of justice or any other crime. I find it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule that the President may "act against the rule of law", but they might rule that in particular cases the law implicitly grants the President power to take certain actions that others may not take. | Yes It's legal: but that's more of a bug than a feature. The Constitution says this about the appointment of Supreme Court judges: he [the President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... judges of the Supreme Court, ... In the Federalist Papers: No 76, Hamilton had this to say: But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. The person ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference, though perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his nomination would often be overruled. The Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they might feel to another, to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure themselves, that the person they might wish would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination. They could not even be certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them; and as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected, and might have the appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the chief magistrate, it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal. and in No 78: It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. For I agree, that "there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers." He was wrong about the first but right about the second. Now, this is only the way he saw it and others no doubt had other views but he was focused solely on balancing the powers of the executive and the legislature. There is no consideration of what would happen if, for whatever reason, including partisanship, the executive and the legislature were tightly aligned or hopelessly opposed. Even for the time, this view seems overly idealistic and hopelessly naive. However, these are the same people who thought it would be a good idea for the runner-up in the Presidential race to be the vice-President. Indeed, Hamilton saw and was an integral part of the intense partisanship that arose in the 1790s between the Federalists and the Republicans and the first rejection of a Supreme Court nominee happened during George Washington's Presidency. This analysis shows that the confirmation rate when the White House and Senate are politically aligned is 87.2% but only 47.2% when they are different. That said, most (78%) nominees have been confirmed with the last decade being about average. The US Supreme Court has always been partisan. Indeed, it's only since the Second World War that the idea that it shouldn't be has taken root. In earlier days, the Supreme Court was not populated by jurists - it was the domain of politicians, some of whom moved back and forth between the bench and the Capitol. In Brown v Board of Education 4 of the 9 judges had been Congressmen or Governours and some had never been on the bench of any court before their appointment to SCOTUS. So, yes its totally legal but no, it probably isn't what the founders intended but yes, it has ever been thus. | Yes. US Constitution, at Article two, Section two, provides that the President has the power to nominate the justices and appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate. There is nothing restricting the President from doing this on any particular day from beginning to end of his term, and also no restriction on when the Senate may give their advice and consent. | With regard to subpoenas, the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Trump v. Vance makes it clear that states can issue subpoenas to sitting presidents. (The case in question involved a subpoena to a third party for the president's records, not to the president himself, but the opinion makes it clear that the court would apply the same reasoning in either situation.) The questions of what actions a state may take to enforce such a subpoena if it is not complied with, or of arrest / indictment / trial by a state, have never arisen and thus have not been resolved by courts. | In most places I imagine the issue would go before a probate judge who would attempt to determine the validity of each presented will, and if both were valid, then they would attempt to reconcile the disparities to the best of their ability. Broadly speaking, the process would look like this (I'm using UK law as an example): You die An individual is chosen to handle your affairs (executor or administrator [or possibly both depending on jurisdiction]) They choose a will to go off of (these steps could be reversed if the wills named different administrators, in which case each administrator would file for the grant of representation and consequently involve the probate judge earlier) Someone challenges and suggests using the other will (probably because they feel they're not getting what's theirs) A probate judge is involved The probate judge decides Appeals would be made to Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court That being said, every jurisdiction is different, and this is more of a template answer for English common law (and derivative courts), than an attempt to describe in detail any specific jurisdiction's procedures. | I would say no, it's not the same. There's a reasonable expectation of privacy that you have in an office that isn't present when you're standing on a roadside or in a city park. In Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit said "The filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers performing their responsibilities" was in the spirit of the First Amendment. And this is not limited to police; an arrest "in the course of filming officials in the hallway outside a public meeting of a historic district commission" was found to be a First Amendment violation in Iacobucci v. Boulter (1st Cir. 1999). But a private meeting in an office is not a "public place" as it is meant in Glik (even if the building is owned by the government.) And the Glik decision says "To be sure, the right to film is not without limitations. It may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions." | An executive order is a way of memorializing in writing Presidential authority that is either expressly granted to the President by the constitution or statute, or is left to President by implication either from a lack of guidance or as a result of the structure of the constitution and historical precedent. Congress has wide discretion to legislate in a manner that limits the power to make executive orders and pass regulations, and can mandate that the administration issue regulations in a certain area or refrain from issuing regulations in a certain area where the Executive branch is denied discretion or denied the right to set overarching policies as opposed to deciding things on a case by case basis at a lower level in the bureaucracy. In principle, Congress could so micromanage the executive branch that it would be unconstitutional, but that is basically a hypothetical concept with no meaningfully well defined boundaries. The hard cases involve grants of regulatory authority subject to further approval by a subpart of Congress like a committee, as opposed to a full fledged act of law (something called a "legislative veto") which has dubious constitutional status despite being common. The main "meta-legislation" governing regulations in general in the federal government is the Administrative Procedures Act. Subject to the limitations imposed by Congress, a President can take any approach desired to making and changing regulations, but the APA does impose meaningful limits, in particular, on how and how fast, existing regulations can be changed, which may make it hard to eliminate two regulations for each new one that the administration wants to pass or is mandated by Congress to adopt to implement statutes it has passed. But, because a "regulation" is not a meaningfully defined unit, it is a pretty meaningless edict. You can satisfy it simply by cramming two sections of a bunch of regulations into one, essentially reformatting it for political cosmetics rather than making substantive changes, or by incorporating something else by reference. So, the 2 for 1 EO is basically an aspirational statement of policy and attitude more than it is a meaningful constraint. No one could sue the administration or invalidate a regulation it passed because it didn't comply with this EO. |
Can I refuse to send an email to untrusted domain If I have to discuss financial, legal or medical subjects (or anything requiring privacy, or anything really) via email, can I refuse to do so if I don't trust the domain of the email of the other party? The country is Belgium if that matters. More details about my specific case: my ex-wife and I have seen a notary¹ recently regarding our divorce. We need to come to a financial arrangement, so we have to discuss this via e-mail with the notary in CC. I have a Gmail email account, the notary has a belnot² account and my ex-wife has her employer's email. I trust quite much @gmail.com because, ok, maybe their automatic systems will read my emails to target advertising, but no one malicious could ever specifically open my email about my divorce to... to what? What could anyone from Google do with that? I trust @belnot.be quite much too, just because I've seen so many notaries with such an email account. That may be a bad reason but if so many professionals use this service, and those profesionals deal with sensitive data, I hope it's not too bad privacy-wise. But I don't trust @my-ex-wife-s-company.be. Her new husband work there too, it's a small company (it's not a company but a public administration but it is small and managed without a lot of financial means and not too many rules) and I don't really know who can access the mailboxes of everyone. I'm sure that I would not send emails from my company email for personal information, but can I refuse to send emails to a recipient I don't trust? Thank you. ¹ Not sure about the translation, it is a notaire in French. ² I'm not absolutely sure about who manages this domain (maybe something like the national federation of notaries if such thing exists, or something equivalent), but most notaries in Belgium have a @belnot.be email account. | Communicate how you like You are under no obligation to use any particular method of communication. If you don’t want to use email use the post. Or hand-deliver your messages (probably better to use a courier so it doesn’t look like stalking). Of course, she is free to share anything and everything you send her with anyone she likes. Unlike the lawyer, she owes you no duty of confidentiality. I think you are naive if you don’t think she shows or at least tells her new partner what her ex-partner has sent. | No, there is no general publicly accessible directory of lawsuits against private individuals, even if it concerns yourself. The complaint must identify you as the defendant indicating a ladungsfähige Anschrift, § 253 Ⅱ, Ⅳ, 130 ZPO. Commencing an action requires service of process, § 253 Ⅰ ZPO. I presume you are not a De-Mail user. So you will get a hardcopy. You may not know that, but such mail in Germany is usually sent in yellow envelopes. The mailman will carefully compare the mailbox label and in case of a match record the date and time of successful delivery on the envelope as well as a slip of paper returned to the sender, the court in this case. Now this will obviously fail in your case (unless the landlord maliciously attached a corresponding label to a mailbox). In a civil action the court “pretends” to be dumb regarding facts. The landlord must try to track you down. Evidently he knew your email address, so he had some contact details. If he was evil, the next option would be to ask the court for an öffentliche Zustellung, § 185 ZPO. If the court agreed, this means there will be, for instance, in the city hall a paper on a bulletin board “To the attention of Coala, last known address …: There is mail for you to pick up at my office.” Two weeks later the letter is automatically considered to be delivered.Some cities (example: Cologne, NRW) also publish these documents on the internet, but due to GDPR considerations delete them after a certain period now. If there was a lawsuit, there will have been a default judgment by now, i.e. you will have lost just by being a no‑show. However, you said you have never received the bill. This means the landlord must have produced false evidence, claim to have sent the bill and a subsequent warning notice, but there was none. But this is an entirely different issue. | We cannot dispense personalized legal advice: that is what your attorney is for. However, I agree with your analysis that this is most likely covered by fair use, and indeed it is not obvious that you have taken anything that is protected. There is no creativity behind a number such as entries in the "I did N pushups" column. The arrangement of data into a web page passes the smidgen of creativity test, but "210" is not a creative number. The terms of service of a website cannot negate your right to use the website however you want in a non-infringing way. If your use is "fair use", then they can't tell you that you can't use it. In case it turns out that "fair use" fails, the matter would hinge on what exactly the TOS says. They may have granted you permission to make use of their "information". So there are three positive avenues for you to consider: not protected, fair use, and permitted. A practical difficulty is that a university lawyer is only interested in the interests of the university, and they are as likely to say "don't do that" or "get permission" as they are to say "that is fair use". You can hire a lawyer who is paid to care about your interest, though there is never a guarantee that the lawyer's advice is correct. I think it is likely that the lawyer will tell you to not say anything until legally forced to, given the apparent rebuff of your request for special permission. | Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability. | Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable. | Yes, their waiver has no legal basis and is invalid under the GDPR. They should have hired a better lawyer. GDPR rights cannot be waived (mrllp.com). The last bit should have been: Therefore, in consideration of my participation in any project, I understand that retaining my name and email address, as described above, does not require my consent and that the right of erasure, as spelled out in the GDRP Article 17 (1) b does not apply. The legal basis for our lawful processing of this personal data is Article 6 (1) f ("processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller"). I.e. there is nothing in the GDPR that compels GitLab to erase this information, but their waiver is bogus. Keeping track of individual contributions in a software projects is necessary for a number of reasons, including security (if somebody contributes code that jeopardizes security, you want to audit everything that person has contributed). | The GDPR does indeed require that the password be stored "securely". It does not specify the technology which must be used for that purpose. Hashing the PW is a common method, and should be sufficient if properly implemented (strong hash function, use of salt, etc). But other methods of securing the password might be sufficient. Encrypting the PW rather than hashing it, so that an authorized person could decrypt it temporarily might be OK. Or perhaps a security app can separately retrieve only the specified characters of the PW through some sort of encryption. Or perhaps the ISP is not using proper security. In the case of Knuddles in the linked news story, an actual breach occurred which led to the poor security being reported. You could send a report to the appropriate national Data Protection Authority. | In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source. |
File copyright header after copyright transfer It's a common practice to put a copyright header into each file like Copyright 2020 The Company Ltd. All rights reserved where the year is the year the file got created (and not last updated). How should the copyright header look like if the copyright (of proprietary software) was transferred to another entity? I could think of these examples: Copyright 2015 New Company Ltd. All rights reserved // but New Company did not own it in 2015, it also may have not even existed in 2015. Copyright 2021 New Company Ltd. All rights reserved // but the file was created earlier. Copyright 2021 New Company Ltd. All rights reserved Previously Copyright 2015 The Company Ltd. // something like this? Note that it's copyright on proprietary software, unlike open source the original author does not have rights to the original work after transfer. I could ask a similar question about software copyright in general (i.e. the copyright notice in the distributed binary). | First of all, the notice is legally optional, and so a notice not conforming to any standard does no harm. But if one wishes to conform, under US law,17 USC 401 (b) provides that: (b) Form of Notice.—If a notice appears on the copies, it shall consist of the following three elements: (b) (1) the symbol © (the letter C in a circle), or the word “Copyright”, or the abbreviation “Copr.”; and (b) (2) the year of first publication of the work; in the case of compilations or derivative works incorporating previously published material, the year date of first publication of the compilation or derivative work is sufficient. ...; and (b) (3) the name of the owner of copyright in the work, or an abbreviation by which the name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the owner. Note that it is the name of the owner of the work, not of the author or first owner. It is the year of first publication, not the yer the owner acquired the copyright. So in your example the technically proper notice would be: Copyright 2015 New Company Ltd. I believe this would suffice as a proper notice in any country that complies with the Berne Copyright Convention or the TRIPS agreement (which is the vast majority of all countries in the would). The symbol © can be substituted for the word "copyright" and might be more comfortable internationally. The phrase "All Rights Reserved" was never required under US law, but was once standard, because it was required for full protection under the Buenos Aires Convention. As the Wikipedia article says of this statement: As the Buenos Aires Convention was not modified, the presence of a simple copyright notice was sufficient to ensure mutual recognition of copyright between countries which became parties to the UCC (which only Honduras never did). As of 23 August 2000, all parties to the Buenos Aires Convention are also parties to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which provides for mutual recognition of copyright without any formalities (Art. 5.2 Berne) So "All Rights Reserved" is even less required than the optional copyright notice, although it does serve to remind people that a work is not under an open-source or permissive license. And of course it does no legal harm. But it can safely be omitted, its retention is essentially a matter of habit and tradition, its legal value ceased in 1952 when the UCC effectively superseded the Buenos Aires Convention. The same notice would be suitable for a notice displayed when the program runs, and indeed for any copyright notice on any kind of work (although in some cases the year can be omitted). Effect of Notice in US 17 USC 401 (d) provides that: (d) Evidentiary Weight of Notice.—If a notice of copyright in the form and position specified by this section appears on the published copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had access, then no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages, except as provided in the last sentence of section 504(c)(2). The cited sentence of 504(c)(2) deals with an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library, archive, or public broadcasting entity who reasonably believes that copying fell under fair use. | The software is "work for hire" and the copyright is owned by the client, not you. This is the default rule when copyrightable work is done on this basis in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. To not be "work for hire" you would have had to have a written agreement to the contrary or would have had to written the software before you were engaged by the client and then sold it to the client as an off the shelf finished product. [After further research I have determined that the language above is not accurate.] While you didn't have a written agreement, you did have an agreement reached without committing it to a final written form signed by both parties that is sufficient to cover all of the material terms of the contract and that is a binding and fully performed agreement. UPDATE: The "work for hire" issue is a bit more complex than I initially stated. Here is an American Bar Association summary of the issue in the independent contractor context (there is also a plausible argument that while the parties characterized you as an independent contractor for tax purposes that you were in fact of de facto temporary employee in which case it would automatically be work for hire, but I'll put that issue aside and take it at face value): Under the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.), a work is a “work made for hire” only if: (1) it is prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment; or (2) it is specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor pursuant to a written agreement and the work falls within one of nine statutorily defined categories. . . . For works created by independent contractors, only the following types of works are eligible to be “works made for hire”: a contribution to a “collective work” (a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole); a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work; a translation; a “supplementary work” (a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes); a “compilation” (a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship); an “instructional text” (a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities); a test; answer material for a test; or an atlas. This software is clearly specially ordered or commissioned from an independent contractor. I suspect that if you looked at the course of dealings including the client's specification of what work needed to be done (probably in part by email or in some other written form) that it would meet the requirement of a written agreement even though there wasn't a document called a contract signed by both parties. But, this still begs the question of whether it falls in one of the nine statutory categories. This American Bar Association source says that custom software doesn't qualify. The list above does not include many types of works that businesses frequently hire outside personnel to create, such as websites, logos, advertisements, photography, and custom software. For works that do fall within the defined categories, the business must have a written agreement from the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire for it to qualify as such. Although the agreement and course of dealings between a business and an independent contractor may give rise to an implied license for the business to use the works created by the contractor, it is highly preferable to avoid relying on an implied license. Any business that engages a non-employee to create a work and intends to own the copyright to such work should have a written agreement with the author expressly stating that the work is made for hire (if it falls within one of the eligible categories). If the work is not eligible to be a work made for hire, and for good measure even if it is, the written agreement should include a provision assigning the copyrights to the business. An example of such a provision is: “To the extent that the Work Product is not recognized as a ‘work made for hire’ as a matter of law, the Contractor hereby assigns to the Company any and all copyrights in and to the Work Product.” By including such a copyright assignment clause, a business will be able to obtain the copyrights it expects, even if the work does not qualify as a “work made for hire.” The copyright office's official publication on the subject provides a statutory citation (17 USC 101), and doesn't contradict the ABA presentation, although it is less detailed and specific on the legal issues. This section of the United States Code is a series of definitions. The relevant one states: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work made for hire under paragraph (2), neither the amendment contained in section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, nor the deletion of the words added by that amendment— (A) shall be considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or (B) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or disapproval of, or acquiescence in, any judicial determination, by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph (2) shall be interpreted as if both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, were never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness by the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations. | Is this work for hire? There is an arguable case to be made that you are an employee for copyright law purposes and, if so, the copyright belongs to the company. The closer an employment relationship comes to regular, salaried employment, the more likely it is that a work created within the scope of that employment will be a work made for hire. But because no precise standard exists for determining whether a work is made for hire under part 1 of the definition in section 101 of the copyright law, consultation with a lawyer may be advisable. Second, if you do own the copyright, there is clearly an implied licence with the company to allow them to use it. It is arguable that the licence is exclusive since the software is bespoke and made specifically for the company. Can you sign an agreement now Yes, but … It is clear that the purpose of signing the agreement is to screw the company over (with the compliance of 2 of the directors). That’s a contract entered into in bad faith and possibly for an illegal purpose and would likely be found invalid. You need to understand that the company is a distinct legal entity from its owners and it has its own rights. People make the mistake of thinking the owners are the company: they aren’t. The two rebel founders are on dangerous legal ground. Assuming they are the directors of the company, they have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company. That is, they must put the company’s interests ahead of their own. It is clearly not in the company’s interest to have a rival business start so they cannot plan to do that while they are directors - they need to resign first. You are not so much at risk - as an employee/contractor your duty is to follow the directions of the company (the company - not a faction within the company). However, if you aid the other two in what might be a crime, you could be in trouble. | "Pastiche" is a literary, not a legal term, and as a professional coder, I would not use it to describe code that to some extent imitated other code. The legal question here is: is your code a derivative work of the code it is based on, and if it is, did you have permission to make that work. Copyright, in an Berne Convention country, which includes the EU, does not protect ideas and concepts, it protects expression. It protects the choices of words and symbols, and other forms of expression. If all you did was study example code, presented for educational purposes, and then write code that performs a similar function, using the same general techniques, then I don't think you have infringed copyright. That, after all, is why people post code to Stack Overflow and similar sites, to allow them to learn how to use specific coding techniques, including in commercial projects. I have used techniques posted to SO to do coding as part of my paid job. The usual test for copying under US law is "substantial similarity". This takes into account cases where there is essentially only one way to say or code something. I don't know the exact tests under the various laws of various EU countries, and they will not all be the same. But I suspect that on this point they are, well, substantially similar :). I can't advise on your specific situation. But if it is as described, I don't think you have a problem. | The closest that you can come to an official list is the registry maintained by the US copyright office. That tells you which copyrights have been registered, and does not tell you much about items not on the list. But, if a work is registered (and the copyright has not expired, which you can calculate), you know it is not in the public domain. The question is a bit odd, because I don't see how you could ever need to prove legally that a random work is not in the public domain. Copyright is inherent in the act of creating a work and requires no additional actions, under current law. If you know the date of creation of the work, you can figure out whether the work is old enough that its copyright has expired. If you know that the work is "prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties", you know that it never was protected. These are the main sources of "being in the public domain" under US law, but the law doesn't actually talk about "public domain", it says when things are or are not protected by copyright. A third source for being "in the public domain" is a "public domain" license, there an author says something sounding like "anybody can use this work as they see fit". CC0 is one attempt to emulate the concept of "public domain", by waiving rights and granting permission. Still, the work is protected by copyright if not in one of the two actual public domain categories. Also, under 17 USC 203 such a license can be terminated under certain conditions (during a period between 35 to 40 years after creating the work, approximately). | It depends on where you are For example, in USA copyright exists in a literary or artistic work stored in permanent form like a book, a movie, an audio recording, a building etc. In contrast, in Australia there is no requirement for the work to be stored - that means copyright can exist in a spoken lecture. The owner of the copyright (usually, but not necessarily the creator) has the right to choose if and how their work is copied and if and how any derivative works may be made from it. For your example, the book is an original work in which copyright vests with the author(s), your notes are a derivative work in which copyright vests in you. However, you presumably did not have permission to make your derivative work so that makes it prima facie a copyright infringement. Fortunately, in the USA there exists a Fair Use defence and in Commonwealth countries the slightly less permissive Fair Dealing defence (if you are somewhere else you will need to do your own research). Search this site or read the copyright article on Wikipedia to learn about these defences. Long answer short (too late!), taking notes to aid your own study is almost certainly Fair Use/Dealing. So is sharing it with your friends. Publishing it may or may not be depending on all sorts of factors; for example, if you were to write a study guide for say a Harry Potter book for use by English literature students this is probably OK even if it is a for profit activity, because criticism is Fair Use/Dealing. Citing work is not necessary to comply with copyright law. Failing to cite may be academic misconduct but that is not a legal matter; its a matter for your academic institution. | I don't see how. Remember that a license is a contract where the author gives permission to copy (modify, redistribute, remix, etc) a copyrighted work, provided that the licensee fulfills the stated conditions. If the license is not in effect, then we revert to the default situation under copyright law, which is that the potential licensee has no rights to copy the work. (Not counting particular instances of copying which are permitted under fair use and similar exceptions - I presume that's not what you have in mind, or the whole question is moot.) In this case, the conditions include that the licensee must credit the author under their chosen pseudonym. The licensee can't get out of that obligation simply because they find it distasteful or objectionable for whatever reason. If they don't want to do it, then they should not accept the license in the first place, and so refrain from copying the work. (Of course, if the author is offering the CC license in hopes of encouraging reuse of the work, then this may not be a desirable outcome for the author, so they might want to think twice about their choice of pseudonym.) Even if the author's pseudonym were something that would actually be illegal to quote (say, because it is obscene), I don't think it lets the licensee off the hook. A contract with illegal terms is void, so legally it is as if there is no license at all, and we revert to the default in which there is no right to copy. A question was raised in comments about the word "reasonable". I don't know of case law where this has been tested, so I can only speculate: The context suggests that "reasonable" is intended to refer to the means of attribution (for instance, where the attribution should appear in a piece of source code or documentation), not to the pseudonym. There's a legal principle that the specific governs over the general, and the requirement to credit the author by a particular pseudonym is clearly more specific than the general requirement of "reasonableness". It seems clear that the author, who is the one offering these terms, didn't intend for the general term "reasonable" to render meaningless their request for the use of a specific pseudonym; if they had, why would they have bothered to put it in? On the flip side, there's the principle of contra proferentem, that ambiguities in a contract should be resolved in the favor of the party that didn't draft it - here, the licensee. But it's hard to argue that this is really ambiguous; it seems quite clear what the author wants. Of course, the author can circumvent the whole issue, if they're worried, by licensing the work instead under a modified version of the CC license in which the word "reasonable" is removed. After all, there is nothing particular magical about CC's language: the contract is whatever the author and the licensee agree to, and they're just using the pre-written CC license as a convenience to streamline their negotiations. | Assumptions Let us assume that the code involved was created during the period of employment, was within the scope of that employment, and was validly work-made-for-hire (WFH). In that case, the code copyright is owned by the former employer.dn the person who wrote it has no more rights than a random stranger would. I am also going to assume US law. Ownership of Ideas Who owns the ideas, the knowledge of how these libraries work? No one does. In the absence of a patent, no one ever "owns" an idea. ]17 USC 102(b)](https://copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#102) provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Derivative Works Copyright law does prohibit anyone making a derivative work from a work protected by copyright without the permission of the owner. A derivative work is one "based on" the source work. The classic case is a translation. Exactly when a piece of software is a derivative work of another is fact-dependent. Bu several things are clear. If the source work is trivial and obvious, ther may not be sufficient "originality" for the source work to be protected by copyright at all. If the source work is not protected by a valid copyright, nothing is a derivative work of it. A "hello world" program, for example, is probably not original enough for any copyright. A straight-forward implementation of a basic algorithm like quicksort is probably not original enough, either. If there is only one way, or only a small number of ways, to express the ideas of the source work, the merger doctrine applies. This means that the expression of the work is merged into the idea, leaving the expression unprotected. When the merger doctrine applies, there is, in effect, no copyright. If a work copies ideas from a source, but none of its particular expression of those ideas, the result is not a derivative work, and is not an infringement of copyright. If a work is definitive, but is also a fair use of the source work, it is not an infringement. The usual four-factor fir use analysis must be made to determine this. In particular, if a work is highly transformative, it is likey to be found to be a fair use. Issues from the Question What if the new code (presumably, in the case of something simple) comes out exactly the same (even if I rewrite it without looking)? That Rather suggests that the work was too trivial to be original enough to have copyright protection at all, or else that there are only a few ways to express the idea, and the merger doctrine applies. But if neither o those were true, this might be an infringement. [* To be coninued*] |
If you borrow something but can't contact the owner to return it, does it become yours? Do I become the owner of a device someone lets me borrow if I can't return it? Say someone lets me borrow their iPad since I need an Apple platform for a project. They say I don't need to return it soon since it's an older one they don't really use anymore. Months later, I try contacting the person more than one time on Facebook Messenger, letting them know I'll be at a place to return the device if they want it back, but they ignore the messages by leaving me on read (i.e., they view the messages without replying). In examples such as the above where you borrow a device and contact someone so you can return it, but such attempts are clearly ignored by the owner, are you legally permitted to consider the device yours, now? If not, would you be guilty of larceny if you assumed ownership, or would you only be guilty if the original owner wanted it back, but you refused? | "become yours" - Which court are you in? The court of the schoolyard? If you're in real court, then You would need to sue, to quiet title When a bona-fide dispute as to ownership exists, a case can be brought before a judge to resolve ownership definitively. The axiom of a quiet title action is that you must notify all parties who could possibly have an interest. Really, notification is 7/8 of it, because by the time you arrive at a "quiet title" action, most likely they either lost interest or are gone. And the crux of "Notify" is that your efforts to notify the party are to the standards of the court. You are a hostile party, noting your interests are in conflict with theirs. (we must fairly assume they want their iPad back; you want to take the iPad). Thus, it is obvious you will prefer to fail in your efforts at contact, and you will do a bad job of it, possibly on purpose. Since parties in a lawsuit are responsible to serve all documents on each other, courts have very high standards for that. And these standards are tested and gamed all the time. I even had a clever plaintiff do it to me! (we were expecting both the appeal and the dis-service). The crux of document service is you hire a licensed, third-party independent process server. A process server is naturally good at skip-tracing (think "Dog: the Process Server") and is accustomed to finding people who are actively hiding. (because some people think they can avoid consequences by evading service. That's a loser's game generally.) So, when you show up in court and they aren't there, the judge will ask "did you serve them?" And then you say "yes", name the company, and if needed call the process server to the stand, and the server reads out of their notebook all the things they did to search for the counterparty. | But lately he has had his friend use my PayPal account. Someone will send me money and then I transfer it to where he tells me. To cash app or venmo. That's money laundering. Definitely illegal. He said it's money owed for cellphones. People in jail aren't supposed to have cellphones. You are helping him break the law, which means you are helping him break the law. | The most minimal elements of theft are: An unauthorised taking or use of another's property; and An intent to permanently deprive that person of that property or its use You've authorised the fee as per the terms of service that you agreed to. If you didn't read the terms of service, you are deemed to have read it. As the first element is not satisifed, no, it's not theft. As to what that fee is for, it's not really a question of law, but because they're a business and they are entitled to recover the costs of providing products or services and make a profit when you use their products or services, I fairly confidently would say that they're charging you to recover the costs of providing you their products and services as well as to make a profit from your use of their products and services. But again, not a question of law. | Do fans legally have any ownership rights? Generally, no. It can be done if an agreement of the team is put into place when the team is founded or if the current owner agrees to it (which can then be binding on whomever the team is sold/transferred to). There are some leagues, such as the Bundesliga (Thank you Nij, for the correction; Sports in general are not my thing) where the clubs must be owned by fans, at least 51%. So it can be done, but cannot be forced on an owner against their will, unless such a covenant is agreed to before they take possession of the club. It can be required for a given club to join/participate in a given league. Legally, supporting a club via buying club merch and match tickets give an ownership interest in the items bought, not in the club/team itself. | You own it In general, if you own an object, you can do what you like with it if you otherwise comply with the law. It is possible that a particular object may be protected under heritage or similar law, but if it isn’t, and you comply with environmental and safety law, you grind that thing into dust if you want to. Of course, if it did, you would never be able to delete a voicemail, email, or throw out used notepaper - they’re all copyright. | Assuming that the owner of the hard drive (irrespective of if that owner is a government or private person) is legally entitled to take possession of the hard drive then they can do so subject to the fact that they generally cannot commit a crime to do so (e.g. trespass or damage to property). If the person in possession of the hard drive refuses to hand it over, the owner can seek a court order to seize it - this may allow trespass etc. Any IP on the hard drive that doesn't belong to the owner of the drive is still protected by all relevant IP laws. For example, the owner of the drive cannot copy copyright material without permission unless it is in accordance with fair use/fair dealing rules. | Of course it doesn't work. You haven't discovered an end-around to property ownership I gave someone a car and want it back (they refuse) You no longer own this car. It is now titled in their name. Your interest in the car is now exactly zero whether or not they paid for it. I use a shell company to buy my own debt Okay. This has nothing to do with the car. You're now out of the cash it took you to set up this new entity. How are you doing this? I assume it means paying off your creditors with money you already have. You will also have to come up with some type of bogus documents that explain to the future court why this was even done. If you have the money, why do you have debt? My shell company sues me for conveying the car to conceal it from creditors Um, Ok. Now you're also out filing fees. Let's assume you know how to do this without paying an attorney to do it for you. I settle Makes sense, since you're suing yourself. The shell company now gets a court order to seize the car Seize the car how? This is a stretch. A judgement would be against you for the value of the car. You can't settle a lawsuit using assets you do not own. A court won't order something repossessed because of an unrelated squirrelly lawsuit. An exception would be a bankruptcy court that rules the item was sold or disposed of outside the court's orders. I would expect an astute court to hit you with contempt or sanctions for trying to use it to further your interests with some sort of end-around to property ownership. Expect more fees for this use of the court's time. The shell seizes the car No. Now I have the car back No. | You don't state a jurisdiction, but the following will apply in most common-law jurisdictions. If you entered with permission, picked up the bird and walked out with it without any objections then a charge of theft would not stick; you were simply reclaiming your own property with the permission of the householder. However from your post that doesn't sound likely. If your ex objects to you taking the bird then they can call the police. The police will refuse to get involved in arguments about ownership and will just act to preserve the status quo ante. As long as you haven't broken in or acted deceitfully then you haven't committed a crime, but they are unlikely to let you take the bird as long as the person with possession claims legal title. If you try to "steal it back" then you will be guilty of theft, and possibly burglary, criminal damage and maybe other crimes depending on how you did it. Don't go there. You probably need to file some kind of civil case for the return of your property. Details will depend on the jurisdiction, but if you can get a court order for possession then the police should accept that as evidence that you are acting legally when you turn up to reclaim your property. However (again, depending on jurisdiction) you might need to hire a specialist to do the actual repossession; the laws about gaining entry, searching property etc tend to be complicated and you don't want to get on the wrong side of them. This is all on the assumption that the value of the bird is lower than the likely cost of hiring a lawyer. If this is an expensive bird then you need legal advice. |
Am I still considered to have entered into a contract if I don't receive the other party's acceptance? I sent a purchase order via email to a company to supply and invoice for around £200 worth of equipment on behalf of the organisation I volunteer for. I did not get a response after a few days, so sent a follow up email via a contact form on their website, and posted on their facebook page (also no response). All this time, their phones were not being answered either. After a week and a half, I wrote off the idea and purchased what I wanted from elsewhere. At the beginning of this week I received a notification from a courier that my package was on the way and it was from this company. Tangentially, the package didn't arrive next business day as per the courier's email, so today I phoned to find out why and it hadn't been booked into their warehouse properly. I told them not to bother delivering it and to return to sender. I followed that up with an email to the company explaining that their lack of response led me to assume they weren't going to supply what I asked for and that I couldn't understand why they sent me the equipment before receiving payment, despite us having no prior relationship. They have now replied saying they issued an invoice on the 16th, with 30 days payment terms (the original order was sent on the 11th) and that as I'm now returning the items they expect me to pay their re-stocking fee which amounts to about £50. I have refused on the grounds I've laid out above. My question: their website terms state "When an order is placed online, by telephone, email, post, or in person, the order will be considered as accepted by [company name] when you checkout online and complete payment, or (if not shopping online) when we supply an invoice to you." At what point does is it deemed that they have supplied an invoice? If they sent one and it genuinely disappeared into the ether, have they supplied it in the eyes of the law? I can prove without a shadow of a doubt that I've had no email from their domain into our (Office 365) domain until today, but that doesn't preclude the email disappearing before it got to us. From their perspective they have accepted the terms of my request even if I haven't recieved notification of it. This is on the assumption they genuinley sent an invoice, which even if they didn't they can fudge proof of. I am a domain admin on our O365 and can see the email is not in quarantine or in any way hit our Exchange server. Even if it did, that doesn't excuse their lack of response to my follow-up email or facebook message. | No The contract is created at the moment that an offer was accepted. In normal circumstances: You accepted an offer that they made to the general public by sending a purchase order for specific items at specific prices, or They accepted your offer by communicating their acceptance to you (being advised that the goods have been dispatched counts). However, in this circumstance, the company has been explicit that the contract is only created when either: You checkout and pay, or They “supply an invoice to you.” It appears that neither event happened so there is no contract. Their specific terms have overridden the common law rules on offer and acceptance (as they are allowed to do) and the offer has not been accepted until you receive their invoice. Specifically, it cannot be accepted by performance (dispatching the goods) and the requirement for the invoice to be supplied overrides the postal rule. Note that, in this case, you got lucky. 99 times out of 100 there would have been a valid contract and you would have breached it. In future, cancel orders specifically, don’t make assumptions. | Fax or email At this time in common law, faxes and email are considered to have been accepted when actually communicated to the other party. This means that if I sign a contract and send it to you, I acceptance of the offer is not actually effected until you read it. Post However, the postal acceptance rule can play havoc with this. Under this rule, and specifically for post, as long as there is some indication that we contemplated acceptance by post, my acceptance of the offer is effected the moment I put it in the mailbox, regardless of when or whether it actually reaches you. Your scenario A has signed a contract and faxes it to B B doesn't reply A or B tries to claim that they never agreed to this or signed this B has read the contract and was the offeree If B claims not to have read it, A must prove that they have, or that acceptance was otherwise communicated to them. This is unless the postal acceptance rule applies, in which case it does not matter whether or not it was read. Proving that it was posted is a different matter. B hasn't read the contract or was not the offeree A was the offeree (A sent B a signed contract) In this case, A must prove that they actually communicate a revocation of the offer. If B has not accepted the offer, then A can communicate this in any reasonable way. If B has accepted the offer, then A must prove that the revocation was effected prior to their acceptance. Otherwise, A is bound by the contract. A and B drafted this contract together (offer and acceptance is unclear but there is clearly agreement at some point) In this case, it's a bit murkier but it is likely that A would not be bound by the contract. | The retailer You can try making a subject access request under Articles 15(1) and 15(3) of the UK GDPR. Provide as much information as you can (your name, date of purchase, store you purchased it from, copy of the receipt, etc.) and ask for the serial number. If they still have it, and it is stored in a way which is linked to you in an identifiable way, then they are obliged to provide it without undue delay (and in any event within 30 days). You may want to provide a copy of your passport in the request to pre-empt them coming back with an ID check request under Article 12(6), which then allows them to delay processing the request until you have replied. As stated above, if they no longer have the data or you are not identifiable from the data then they do not have to provide it. If they do have to provide it but refuse then you can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office or ask the County Court for a compliance order under section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The insurer Regulation 3(1) of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 prohibits "unfair commercial practices". Regulation 3(4) provides that a commerical practice is unfair if, inter alia, it is listed in Schedule 1. Paragraph 27 of Schedule 1 contains the following item: Requiring a consumer who wishes to claim on an insurance policy to produce documents which could not reasonably be considered relevant as to whether the claim was valid, or failing systematically to respond to pertinent correspondence, in order to dissuade a consumer from exercising his contractual rights. As you've provided proof that you purchased the item, you can try to argue that having the serial number of the lost item can not "reasonably be considered relevant". Yes, the contract says that you must provide it, but consumer rights legislation overrides contractual provisions. You may also want to consider dealing with the insurer by email/post instead of by phone, (a) to avoid continuing to waste time on hold, and (b) because if they systematically fail to respond then this may also cause them to be in breach of the above provision, (c) to acquire evidence which you can use later. Escalating If you get no results from the insurer, make a formal complaint to them through their complaints process. Under the FCA Handbook rule DISP 1.3.1R, the insurer is required to provide a complaints procedure. Under rule DISP 1.6.2R they are required to provide a final response to a complaint within 8 weeks. If you are not happy with the response, you can escalate the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service which has the power to make financial awards pursuant to section 229 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("FSMA"). Doing so is free of charge and is therefore a good alternative to going to court. The ombudsman can also make awards that are not strictly based on law (i.e. they can go further than the courts can) because of section 228 of FSMA which provides that: "A complaint is to be determined by reference to what is, in the opinion of the ombudsman, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case." You must generally escalate a complaint to the Ombudsman within 6 months of receiving your final response from the insurer (rule DISP 2.8.2R). | If someone sends you something that you did not request, that is "unordered merchandise", and under US law, can be treated like a gift meaning that you do not have to return the goods or pay for it. Under the circumstances that you describe, this is not classic unordered merchandise. The vendor simply has to claim (and prove) that you did order the merchandise, which could be done in small claims court. What is unclear at present how any person could, out of the blue, decide to send you the same thing a week later. Innocent error is one possibility (slip-up by either party or some communication error by Ebay), as is fraudulent skullduggery (credit card fraud). The point is that the vendor would have to prove that you did indeed order the goods, so if they want to avoid paying for shipping (if we are still talking about a non-litigious response), they would need to provide compelling proof that you did indeed order the goods. This almost certainly will involve Ebay's tech staff (who would be in the best position to say where the order actually came from). So, yes, you could be sued in small claims court, and it really depends on how strong their proof is that you ordered the goods. | Is there any sort of implied expiration date for a contractor's completion for medium size contractor jobs (< $10k)? Absent a provable deadline, the question would be whether the delay is reasonable (or habitual) under the circumstances. The contractor's presumption that he can do whatever he wants regarding unspecified aspects of a contract is inaccurate. Those matters can still be decided on the basis of contract law and/or under principles of equity. See also the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which is frequently cited by U.S. courts, at §235(2) and §243 regarding non-performance of a contract. Will my verbal complete-by date hold up in lieu of any written complete-by date? It depends on each party's credibility. Proving that he essentially ignored your follow-up requests will make it harder for him to credibly refute your assertion about the verbal deadline. In case none of your follow-up efforts (or none of his responses) are in writing or if he denies that you repeatedly called him, you might want to subpoena his phone service provider --if the matter goes to court-- and file as evidence the resulting production of records. | The contract remains valid. Most contracts don't need to be written at all. Even if yours did need to be written under the Statute of Frauds or some other law, you're saying that it was made in writing, even though you later tore it up. The fact that the contract is missing or destroyed doesn't change the fact that it exists and obligates the parties; it just makes it harder to prove what it said. | If the stranger was aware of the reward offer at the time of the return you have a legally binding contract - you made an offer to the world, money for return of the phone, and they accepted it by returning it. If they were ignorant of your offer and returned the phone then there is no contract and you do not have to pay: albeit at the cost of being a jerk. Of course, if they obtained your phone unlawfully (e.g. by stealing it) the contract is void. | Neither The contract is completed when each party has totally fulfilled its obligations under the contract. In this case, it is when the purchaser has consumed or otherwise dealt with the banana to their satisfaction. The vendor has ongoing obligations under the contract until this happens. For example, obligations that the banana is of merchantable quality and fit for purpose. If the purchaser peels the banana and discovers that it is "off" or eats the banana and develops food poisoning then the vendor still has obligations and can be sued under the contract. Yes, I realize that no one is going to sue anyone over a rotten banana but let's assume that "banana" is code for 54km of motorway construction and £1 is actually £1 billion. When is the contract formed? This is not a trivial determination and there are literally hundreds of thousands if not millions of lawsuits that have turned on this exact question. Once the contract is formed its binding on both parties; until then, either can walk away (subject to estoppel) The traditional analysis involves offer and acceptance. In your banana scenario, the shop displaying "Banana's: 50p/each" (it's a fruit shop - they always have unnecessary apostrophes) is not an offer - it is an invitation to treat. An offer is made by Ben placing the banana on the counter and proffering the £1, it is accepted by Sam taking the £1. At this point, the sale is binding on both parties. Ben has fulfilled all his obligations under the contract, Sam still has some. In addition to those discussed above, he owes Ben 50p. Strictly speaking, this is not an obligation under the contract but a debt due and payable. Consumer protection law The proceeding is a strict contract law interpretation - many jurisdictions have consumer protection legislation (and food safety laws for bananas) that impose additional protections and may change the contract law position. |
Is it legal in the US to leave a gun in the hands of a minor without oversight? Reading about the detail of the trial of Rittenhouse I wondered how it was possible that a minor was allowed to go around holding a weapon. I searched on the internet and I read some blogs claiming that minors are allowed to hold weapons only in a shooting range or when hunting therefore his presence in that context was illegal, but it was treated as a misdemeanour. First of all I would like to understand whether this is correct. But there is something else, a violation of the law by a minor could be considered a misdemeanour, but what about the adult who gave him the gun? Is there a law that prescribes that whoever gives a weapon to a minor should make sure that the minor remains strictly in the allowed context? Is some kind of oversight mandated? | Aiden4's answer about Winconsin's statute 948.60 is correct, but incomplete and the complete reason is interesting/funny, so I'll expand on it: The statute reads: 948.60 Possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18. (1) In this section, “dangerous weapon" means any firearm, loaded or unloaded; any electric weapon, as defined in s. 941.295 (1c) (a); metallic knuckles or knuckles of any substance which could be put to the same use with the same or similar effect as metallic knuckles; a nunchaku or any similar weapon consisting of 2 sticks of wood, plastic or metal connected at one end by a length of rope, chain, wire or leather; a cestus or similar material weighted with metal or other substance and worn on the hand; a shuriken or any similar pointed star-like object intended to injure a person when thrown; or a manrikigusari or similar length of chain having weighted ends. (2) (a) Any person under 18 years of age who possesses or goes armed with a dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. (b) Except as provided in par. (c), any person who intentionally sells, loans or gives a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age is guilty of a Class I felony. (c) Whoever violates par. (b) is guilty of a Class H felony if the person under 18 years of age under par. (b) discharges the firearm and the discharge causes death to himself, herself or another. (d) A person under 17 years of age who has violated this subsection is subject to the provisions of ch. 938 unless jurisdiction is waived under s. 938.18 or the person is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of criminal jurisdiction under s. 938.183. (3) (a) This section does not apply to a person under 18 years of age who possesses or is armed with a dangerous weapon when the dangerous weapon is being used in target practice under the supervision of an adult or in a course of instruction in the traditional and proper use of the dangerous weapon under the supervision of an adult. This section does not apply to an adult who transfers a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age for use only in target practice under the adult's supervision or in a course of instruction in the traditional and proper use of the dangerous weapon under the adult's supervision. (b) This section does not apply to a person under 18 years of age who is a member of the armed forces or national guard and who possesses or is armed with a dangerous weapon in the line of duty. This section does not apply to an adult who is a member of the armed forces or national guard and who transfers a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age in the line of duty. (c) This section applies only to a person under 18 years of age who possesses or is armed with a rifle or a shotgun if the person is in violation of s. 941.28 or is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593. This section applies only to an adult who transfers a firearm to a person under 18 years of age if the person under 18 years of age is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593 or to an adult who is in violation of s. 941.28. 2 things to note: (1) takes care to include, in the list of dangerous weapons: nunchaku, shuriken and manrikigusari. While the first 2 are more or less familiar to everyone knows anything about Japanese martial arts, the last one had to be looked up by everyone following the case to discover that it's the "secret weapon of the Ninja"(even more than the shuriken). (3.c) says that the whole of this entire section applies[adding the brackets to make following the formal logic easier] only if (the person under 18 is in violation of 941.28[barrel length under 16 inches]) or (is not in compliance with ss. 29.304[Restrictions on hunting and use of firearms by persons under 16 years of age] and 29.593[Requirement for certificate of accomplishment to obtain hunting approval]). In programming terms(for those so inclined), 3.C could be written as: IF ((barrelLengthInches < 16) OR (huntingUnder16Applies AND huntingCertificateApplies)) THEN statute948.60Applies ELSE statute948.60DoesNotApply Since the barrel length is over 16'' and Rittenhouse is over 16 and no hunting permit was required for his activities, the whole section of the law did not apply. Assistant District Attorney James Kraus argued that the exception renders the state’s prohibition on minors possessing dangerous weapons meaningless. In essence, that the legislators drafting that law spent too much time watching cheesy early 90's action movies and thinking of how to save Wisconsinites from the Ninja threat, to draft the law properly, so it should be read according to its intent from the title of the section. However, there is a binding Common Law precedent, dating back from the 16th century called the "Rule of Lenity", also called "Strict Constructionism" in the US, whereby if the legislature screws up, it's the legislature's problem. In the original case, the law in England forbade "felonious stealing of Horses, Geldings or Mares". A thief was caught, but argued that since he only stole one horse and the law specified horses, the law didn't apply to him. He was let off and the law hastily rectified. Pre-revolutionary Common Law precedent is binding in the US and it was re-affirmed multiple times, e.g. United States v. Wiltberger, where a US sailor got off with killing another US sailor in a Chinese estuary, because the law only applied on the "high seas". So, the charge was tossed and the defense didn't press the issue further. However, the really interesting bit is that even though it didn't get to be argued since Rittenhouse was 17, the way the law is actually written, this section only applies if (huntingUnder16Applies AND huntingCertificateApplies). That means that there is literally nothing in Wisconsin barring a 12 year old(under 12 is separately forbidden in the 29.304/huntingUnder16Applies section) from possessing and using an AR-15(or AK-47), as long as the barrel is >16'' and a hunting license isn't required for the activity. I think that the legislature will amend the law with haste, before it can be tested on 12 year olds. P.S. the other guy who gave him the gun will get off with this precedent too, since the statute for his charge is: This section applies only to an adult who transfers a firearm to a person under 18 years of age if the person under 18 years of age is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593 or to an adult who is in violation of s. 941.28. i.e. the same 3 sub-sections as for Rittenhouse. | Generally, it is forbidden on Santa Clara County property. Santa Clara County Ordinances section B19-10 (a): It shall be unlawful for any person to bring onto or possess a Firearm, loaded or unloaded, or Ammunition, or both, on County Property. This subsection shall not apply where the possession of Firearms or Ammunition is prohibited by State law. There is, however, an exception at B19-11 (n) that may be relevant: Subsection B19-10(a) does not apply to the following: [...] (n) A person lawfully possessing an unloaded Firearm or Ammunition, or both, in the locked trunk of, or inside a Locked Container in, a motor vehicle; So the prohibition would not apply if you keep the firearm unloaded and locked in your trunk the entire time you are on county property. It isn't clear whether that is what you had in mind. As for parks specifically, there is B14-31.1 (a): No person shall set, leave or deposit, or have in his or her possession, any weapon, spear, missile, sling shot, trap or hunting device, air or gas weapon, throwing knife or axe, or any other weapon or device capable of injuring or killing any person or animal, damaging any property or natural resource, except in areas established for such use or while in direct transit to or from such areas and available parking. It's not clear to me whether this would prohibit a weapon in the trunk. You'd be well advised to ask the park officials for their interpretation; they might also be able to tell you if there are other relevant regulations. | In the US, the details are determined at the state level. The term "abandonment" is used very broadly, and can include a situation where a parent leaves a child without making contact for a period of time (which may result in termination of parental rights, but not a punishment). "Abandonment" as it applies in Washington state is explained here. There is what is known as a "safe haven" law, which allows a newborn (under 72 hours old) to be transferred (anonymously) to a qualified recipient (health care employee, medic, etc.), and not be liable under the criminal laws. This does not include dumping the infant in the snow. Under RCW 9A.42.020, the parent would be guilty of criminal mistreatment in the first degree if their action "causes great bodily harm to a child or dependent person by withholding any of the basic necessities of life" (note that the law is not specific to children), and this is a class B felony. There are multiple grades of mistreatment, so if the action "creates an imminent and substantial risk of bodily injury" or "causes bodily injury or extreme emotional distress manifested by more than transient physical symptoms", this is 4th degree mistreatment, which is a misdemeanor. There are, in parallel fashion, laws against abandonment of a dependent starting at RCW 9A.42.060, punished as a class B felony down to a gross misdemeanor. The maximum penalty for a class B felony is $20,000 and 10 years in prison, and for a simple misdemeanor it is 90 days and $1,000. In case death results, the discussion could move to the homicide statutes. Homicide by abuse is when, with extreme indifference to human life, the person causes the death of a child or person under sixteen years of age, a developmentally disabled person, or a dependent adult, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of said child, person under sixteen years of age, developmentally disabled person, or dependent person. and this is a class A felony. If a person "recklessly causes the death of another person", this is manslaughter in the first degree (class A felony), but if it is "with criminal negligence", it is manslaughter in the second degree (a class B felony). Manslaughter charges are predicated on there not being an intent to kill. If the intent was to actually kill the child, this would be first degree homicide, where the punishment is life imprisonment. Additionally, first degree homicide can be found if "under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person". State v. Edwards is a relevant case, where a person was charged with both second degree murder and homicide by abuse, and the issue came up that "extreme indifference to human life" is not a self-evident expression. It turns out that case law in Washington interprets this, as applied to first degree murder, as meaning "indifference to human life in general", not "indifference to the life of the specific victim". After a lengthy review of principles of judicial interpretation, the court upheld the trial court's refusal to give the first-degree murder definition of indifference, that is, it is up the the jury to decide what constitutes extreme indifference, for homicides other than 1st degree murder. | The police can arrest and charge anyone if they have a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed so: yes. However, if the question is: can they secure a conviction the answer is a resounding no. North Carolina law has three prohibitions on minors and alcohol: supplying to, possession of and buying. Possession is easily dealt with: the minor never possessed the alcohol. Supplying is also dealt with perfunctorily: the supply went from the restaurant to a person 21 or over. This only leaves buying. Now, buying something requires a contract (or since the object is illegal, what would be a contract but for that). Did the minor have a contract with anyone? That is, were they under an obligation to pay for the alcohol? No. If the pair had skipped out on the bill, the restaurant would pursue the adult for payment because that is who they have a contract with. Any arrangement between the diners as to how they will split the bill is a private, unenforceable arrangement, not a contract. | The legal question is whether you can be convicted of a crime under the laws of some jurisdiction on earth. I'll start by assuming that you are in a jurisdiction where you can legally possess firearms and carry them in public. Since you added "and commits suicide", I assume you're not asking if it is a crime to drop a firearm, the question is just criminal culpability for this consequence. Now we will zoom into the laws of a specific jurisdiction, Washington state. RCW 9A.36.060 says A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he or she knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide. The question then is whether your act "knowingly causes or aids" an attempted suicide. You turn to the jury instructions to see what that means: A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a [fact] [circumstance] [or] [result] when he or she is aware of that [fact] [circumstance] [or] [result]. [It is not necessary that the person know that the [fact] [circumstance] [or] [result] is defined by law as being unlawful or an element of a crime.] If a person has information that would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that a fact exists, the jury is permitted but not required to find that he or she acted with knowledge of that fact. [When acting knowingly [as to a particular fact] is required to establish an element of a crime, the element is also established if a person acts intentionally [as to that fact].] The outcome depends on specific circumstances. For example, "accidentally and unknowingly drop and leave" will not sustain a conviction. "Intentionally drop and leave" could, but you would also have to other information connecting the suicide to the availability of a weapon. If you intentionally drop and leave a firearm at a shooting range, a reasonable person would not think "OMG someone might see this weapon and kill themselves with it! Hahaha!". You can spin a yarn where you know that Smith is suicidal and will kill himself if he has a weapon, so that dropping the gun off constitutes "knowingly aiding". | Children can enter contracts There seems to be this pervading myth that they can’t. This is weird because, if true, it would mean that a child couldn’t buy anything: a chocolate bar, a bus ride, a sandwich, because all sales involve a contract. What is true is that a contract is voidable by a minor. That is, they can walk away from it anytime until they turn 18 and for a reasonable time thereafter. They can’t do that if the contract is for “necessities” (all of the above examples are), if the contract is complete (again, all of the above) or if the contract is clearly for the benefit of the child (e.g. contracts involving the child’s education). Children do not normally need a parent’s permission or approval to enter a contract. So, the contract is binding on Mary and voidable by James. John’s involvement is irrelevant unless he is a party to the contract in some way such as if he is acting as a guarantor. | Are you required to comply with a police officer's order to put your baby down in an uncertain situation and allow yourself to be handcuffed? Of course. If holding a baby could immunize people against arrest, every criminal would have a baby around whenever possible. Similarly, suppose an officer legitimately fears for his or her life or safety, or the lives or safety of others, on the basis of a suspicion that someone carrying a baby is about to produce a weapon and use it against someone. Courts, at least in the US, give wide and explicit deference to police officers in stressful situations like that, and they recognize that even if, in hindsight, it is perfectly clear that there was no danger, the officer must be allowed the leeway to act on his or her suspicions in case they are correct. The officer will of course have some obligations to ensure the welfare of the child after separation from the adult, but the only immediate recourse the adult has is to appeal to the officer directly, or perhaps the officer's supervisor if he or she is available. Any other enforcement of the officer's obligation will have to take place in the courts after the fact. | Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? This is a hard question to answer that doesn't have a neat resolution. Very little pertaining to the authority of a parent over a child is codified in statutory law and there is not a clear cut age at which a child has "freedom of conscience" vis-a-vis a parent. Most of the law related to children concerns allocation of parenting time and parental decision making between divorced, separated or unmarried parents; abuse and neglect; and juvenile delinquency. There is also usually a snippet of criminal law stating that certain kinds of uses of force to discipline children do not constitute crimes. But, part of why it doesn't come up very much is that older children are usually socialized in a manner that causes them to show a certain amount of respect for the wishes of their parents. It also doesn't come up much for children who aren't in their late teens, because the complete economic dependence of children on their parents or guardians gives the parents considerable power of their children that doesn't require the exercise of physical force. Also, it is quite dependent upon how the issue presents itself. No law enforcement agency is going to aid a parent in forcibly dragging a kid to church against their will. But, no social services agency is going to remove a kid from a home because his birthday party will be cancelled if he doesn't go to the church of his parents' choice the Sunday before his birthday. There are also some subtle but important distinctions between states on the issue of emancipation. In Colorado, emancipation is a statement about the empirical reality. If a child is self-supporting and lives apart from parents or guardians then the child is an emancipated minor. It is not a status granted by a court, it is a status acknowledged by courts when evaluating other issues. In California, a child is not emancipated unless a court grants a child that status and a child who is de facto emancipated without the leave of a court is guilty of a "status offense" (the New York State term for someone in this state is PINS for "person in need of supervision"). Basically, if a parent can force a child to go to church by means that don't constitute abuse or neglect and don't exceed the level of force authorize for child discipline in the criminal code, then they can do it, and if they can't manage that, then they can't do it. Many states have a "status offense" that allows government intervention with the cooperation of a parent or guardian in cases where an "uncontrollable" child is defiant and simply will not give any heed to the parent or guardian's instructions. In practice, the older a child is, the less likely someone viewing a parent's conduct forcing a child to do something is to be viewed as acceptable or legally justified. The legal rights of children in a school setting are also age dependent under the case law, although not always in a really well defined way. Controls on student expression that would be uncontroversial for elementary school students may be looked upon by the law with disfavor for high school students and clearly prohibited for adults. Perhaps one useful way to conceptualize it is that trying to make a child attend a particular kind of religious service is not considered an improper purposes for a parent of any minor to utilize the resources available to the parent to do so, but the range of resources available to a parent with regard to an adult child is much narrower. |
What crimes did Rosenbaum commit when he engaged Rittenhouse? The jury has found Kyle Rittenhouse not guilty of murder of Joseph Rosenbaum based on the defense's claim that he acted in self defense. Given the facts outlined by this NPR article, it appears that the strongest evidence for such claim comes from the testimony that Rosenbaum tried to "grab" Rittenhouse's weapon. Had Rosenbaum survived the shooting, would it be possible for him to be criminally charged with violating any laws? If so, which specific Wisconsin statues would he be likely in violation of? | NPR left out things that don't fit their narrative. According to testimony presented during the trial, from both Rittenhouse and Ryan Balch, Rosenbaum had told their group that “If I catch any of you fuckers alone, I’m going to fucking kill you.” Given that Rosenbaum had "spent most of his adult life in prison starting at age 18 for sexual conduct with five preteen boys" (in the NPR article), was straight out of mental hospital and was (from both earlier video and other testimony) acting in a psychotic manner earlier in the evening, including using the N-word at black protesters, while ostensibly protesting racism, the jury believed that he was disturbed enough to have made such a threat. Rittenhouse was running away from an older bigger and stronger man who has made an explicit threat to kill him in that exact scenario (alone), was chasing him in an apparent attempt to make good on his threat, did not stop chasing him even he pointed an AR-15 at him and tried to run away some more and only shot at literally the last second when Rosenbaum had caught up, had his hand on the gun and Rittenhouse could not run away any more. The above is sufficient for self defense, but in terms of specific crimes: making death threats, assault and apparent attempted murder. | Cohen has ethical problems, but this is probably pretty far down the list. If he were lying about the law, though, that could be treated as a violation of Rule 4.1 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct: In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third person. It could also be a violation of Rule 8.4: A lawyer or law firm shall not ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; Although these would be violations of his ethical obligations, they probably do not rise to the level of seriousness that would result in any meaningful punishment. Disbarment would be extremely unlikely, though a censure is conceivable. If someone reported the offense, I would actually expect that the state would decline to investigate at all. Of course, all of this assumes that he was deliberately lying about the state of the law, which I think overestimates his competence. More likely, he's just an idiot and didn't know that he was wrong. Importantly, being wrong about the law isn't unethical; it's a presumption at the foundation of our adversarial justice system. | Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility. | Is it the case that Police in the US are unable to proceed with a charge if a victim declines to "press charges" and if so, how are murder charges or even more pertinently, domestic violence charges, brought to court? First of all, it is prosecutors and not police officers who actually bring criminal charges in the legal systems in the vast majority of U.S. states (although not quite all, minor offenses in Rhode Island, for example, are an exception). Second, a prosecutor does have the right to bring criminal charges even if the victim or someone affiliated with the victim does not "press charges". Indeed, a prosecutor can almost always bring criminal charges over the objections of a victim, although "victim's rights" protections in some U.S. states require a prosecutor to confer with a victim before doing so. This said, law enforcement and a prosecutor cannot prosecute a criminal case if they have no knowledge that a crime was committed, so if no one brings a crime to the attention of authorities it is unlikely to be prosecuted. And, law enforcement and prosecutors will defer to the wishes of a victim that charges not be pressed in the legal system against an offender in many kinds of cases (although that discretion is limited in many states in domestic violence cases by statute). | So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense. | Is it true that a teacher can't engage/attack a shooter from behind during a school shooting that is in progress? No. Any use of force of any kind that only harms or kills the shooter who is actively engaged in a school shooting (and indeed, even if it caused bodily injury that isn't grave or deadly to someone else who is innocent) is always justified. You can't shoot someone who is not an ongoing threat to others if they flee, in order to arrest or punish them (e.g. an unarmed shoplifter), but under the leading constitutional case, Tennessee v. Garner, this limitation doesn't apply to murderers and mass shooters anyway, at least if they continue to pose a future threat. | This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas). | "Double jeopardy" applies to a criminal proceeding, that is one that needs to be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," and involves criminal sanctions such as jail time. Once OJ was acquitted of criminal charges, he couldn't be tried again as a "criminal." The second trial was a civil trial, with a "lesser" standard of proof (preponderance of evidence), and lesser "damages" (money, not jail time). So even though the facts were the same, OJ was accused of violating a different standard, that is a different "law" so to speak. He could be tried for a "tort" just not a crime. Or put another way, "wrongful death" is not the same as murder. The latter requires intent. Wrongful death suggests "tortious" negligence, but not necessarily intent. |
Was the officer assigned to Parkland school legally obligated to intervene? This question is related to Are police legally required to stop a crime they see being committed?, but IMHO there is a twist. Although SCOTUS decided multiple times, as in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales and in Warren v. District of Columbia, that, generally speaking, police officers are not required to protect the citizens, I'm not sure whether that applies to a situation when the officer was specifically assigned to protect that particular school. As we all have heard by now, Deputy Scot Peterson was outside building rather than confronting the shooter. The question is: does accepting the assignment to protect the school legally obligate the officer to interfere? By accepting the specific assignment to protect the school he prevented the school from hiring a guard and therefore his withdrawal of protection put the kids in worse position than they would be w/out him - that would be my reasoning around the above SCOTUS decisions. Is that enough to make him legally obligated to protect the school against the intruder? | To be determined. Warren Decision [t]he duty to provide public services is owed to the public at large, and, absent a special relationship between the police and an individual, no specific legal duty exists [emphasis added] Castle Rock and Warren denied the existence of a legal duty to specific individuals of performance of law enforcement activity given the specific fact pattern in those cases. These rulings have been generalized into what's been called the No Duty to Rescue Doctrine (NDRD). It's possible a future court could uphold those principles and apply the NDRD to the Parkland case. Or not. Depends on the arguments of fact and law made in court to that effect. The primary argument against applying the NDRD might be as you described, i.e., the specific nature of Peterson's duty assignment to Parkland. One interesting angle on this question is if Peterson owed a duty to act, then who rightfully owned the debt of his obligation? One could argue the Sherrif's department that employed Peterson was the sole lawful holder of his duty to perform and not the school or the victims. In short, it's all very complex and the specific facts at play (which are still surfacing) will be determinative as no applicable statutes or case law yet exist that extend beyond the cited references. | The general rule is that using force in self-defense is justified if the person using the force reasonably believes it immediately is necessary to prevent the unlawful use of force against themselves or a third party. Deadly force is not generally justified except in response to a reasonable fear of deadly force, or to prevent certain violent crimes (like rape, kidnapping, robbery, etc.) Force is not justified in retaliation. In some states, if you're not at home (or maybe even then), you also have a duty to retreat before you can use deadly force in self-defense. So, for your specific questions: If they hit you once but aren't continuing to hit you, it's illegal to hit them back. You can only use force to defend yourself, not to get even. If someone gets in your face without touching you, you might be allowed to use force, but it depends on the circumstances. You don't have to wait for someone to hit you, but you can't sucker-punch someone because you want more space in a mosh pit. Your use of force needs to be something you reasonably believe to be necessary to stop/prevent their unlawful use of force. It also needs to be proportional to the force you're defending against; you can meet deadly force with deadly force, but shooting someone to stop them from slapping you is murder. Likewise, no one's going to believe that you really thought you had to beat the crap out of someone in order to stop them from slapping you, or that it's in any way proportionate to what they did. Deadly force is not allowed in defense of a person unless you reasonably think deadly force is needed to prevent the unlawful use of deadly force, or to prevent one of a few crimes being committed against them. Depending on the state, it might be presumptively justified if the person is trying to forcibly break into your occupied house, car, or place of business, but that's state-dependent. | This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs. | This is the Texas law pertaining to self defense, which says that "a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force". Relatively little of the law pertains to firearms, and none of it restricts the right to self-defense based on whether you are a resident, or you are using your own firearm vs. a borrowed one. The one provision, subsection (b)(5), that refers to firearms is an exception whereby force is not justified, namely if the actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's differences with the other person while the actor was: (A) carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02; or (B) possessing or transporting a weapon in violation of Section 46.05. (Sect. 46.02 is about conditions unlawful carrying of weapons, which covers such things as under-age carrying of certain knives, or not having control of your weapon, or being a felon in possession, etc. 46.05 is about machine guns, explosives, zip guns etc.) Deadly force is covered by a separate section, 9.32, adding the requirement that the actor "reasonably believe[] the deadly force [to be] immediately necessary". (A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or (B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Note that "deadly force" is defined as "force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury". Sec. 9.33 likewise allows deadly force to be used analogously in defense of a third person, and intreestingly, in 9.34(b), "A person is justified in using both force and deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force or deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an emergency". In addition, deadly force can be justified in defense of property, per sec. 9.41, if you "reasonably believe[] the force [to be] immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property", and you may also use force to recover or re-enter the property (as long as the force is used "immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession", and "the actor reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when he dispossessed the actor; or the other accomplished the dispossession by using force, threat, or fraud against the actor"). Sec. 9.42 then provides the possibility of justified use of deadly force in protection of property, if the force is immediately necessary (A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or (B) to prevent the other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the property; and (3) he reasonably believes that: (A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; or (B) the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The short version is, if deadly force is justified in the particular circumstances, then deadly force with a borrowed weapon is justified. However, there are federal laws regarding non-resident aliens possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(B) says that It shall be unlawful for any person...who, being an alien (A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or (B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)))...to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce Under subsection (y) there are exceptions for licensed hunters, government representatives etc. You can also petition the Attorney General for an exception. The point is that federal law would make possession of a firearm illegal for most visa types: here is the list. | In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful? | This is controlled by state law (there is also a federal murder statutes but the federal government doesn't dictate defenses for state law). Here is Washington's. RCW 9A.16.020 says when use of force is lawful, and there are different "public officer" vs. "person" related provisions. Generally, public officers may use force (1) Whenever necessarily used by a public officer in the performance of a legal duty, or a person assisting the officer and acting under the officer's direction; but persons (other than those assisting an officer) may only use force (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Additionally, RCW 9A.16.040 is a long section specifically about officers, the most germane parts of which are that use of deadly force is justifiable (a) When a public officer applies deadly force in obedience to the judgment of a competent court; or (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer meeting the good faith standard of this section to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty; or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer meeting the good faith standard of this section or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony; RCW 9A.16.050 has more limited circumstances when homicide is justifiable by others (not in self-defense): (1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished; or (2) In the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony upon the slayer, in his or her presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he or she is In other words, the box for police officers is bigger: they can use deadly force to do their job, your plumber cannot. RCW 9A.16.040 is not a general license to kill: the rest of the section details the conditions under which one can consider such use of force to be lawful. The officer must have "probable cause to believe that the suspect, if not apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or a threat of serious physical harm to others". If that is so, "deadly force may also be used if necessary to prevent escape from the officer". Also, as usual, the fact-finders do not make that judgment post hoc, the officer at the scene does and he "shall not be held criminally liable for using deadly force without malice and with a good faith belief that such act is justifiable pursuant to this section". In enacting this law (in case the courts wondered, years later, the legislature declared The legislature recognizes that RCW 9A.16.040 establishes a dual standard with respect to the use of deadly force by peace officers and private citizens, and further recognizes that private citizens' permissible use of deadly force under the authority of RCW 9.01.200 [since recodified], 9A.16.020, or 9A.16.050 is not restricted and remains broader than the limitations imposed on peace officers There do not appear to be statutory defenses for federal murder statutes, instead this results from common law interpretation, implemented in federal rules of criminal procedure (discussed here w.r.t. defenses) and jury instructions in the various circuits. | So for your first question, yelling "Stop Thief" loudly at the thief is perfectly legal (Like Yelling "Fire" in a crowded theater, it's legal if the theater is infact, on fire... the quote implied that it was a prankster who drew amusement from the reaction of the people who took him seriously). This may alert store employees, who have a specific kind of Citizens Arrest Power known as "Shopkeeper's Privilege" and is a reduced liability compared to Citizens Arrest. This is also pretty basic self defense agains people who are not engaged in any physical action against you but are starting to scare you. Suddenly shouting draws attention to you and discourages them from their behavior "I SAID DON'T TOUCH ME" being suddenly shouted in a Wal Mart is going to get notices from the immediate crowd drawn to you, and by poximate location, the person who is making you uneasy. For your second question, maybe, it depends... since the cop is clearly chasing the guy, you meet the qualification to use non-deadly force in stopping the criminal (i.e. you are witnessing a person committing a crime, in this case, resisting arrest or persuit) and it would certainly be reasonably non-deadly force if you were to trip, grab, or push the fleeing suspect. Citizens Arrest doesn't specify a minimum time to qualify, so if the officer is seconds behind, and you detain the criminal in this action until the gap is closed, it still counts. | In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect. |
Does partiality discredit witnesses? In criminal trials, when a regular (non-expert) witness does not like the defendant (and admits it when asked), does that alone give a valid reason to discredit them to any extent at all? Can the jury be given directions along the lines "this witness does not like the defendant, and that may have been why they testify against him, and hence they may lie"? On the one hand, it makes perfect sense. But on the other, if such witnesses were routinely legally discredited, then no victim's testimony would ever be allowed weight. Where does the balance lie? Are there any rules, principles, tests that are applied to decide whether witnesses disliking defendants are to be believed or not, or to what extent? Related, but not dupe as it is much broader: Witness credibility questions on cross-examination | Only a jury can answer your question, and then on a case-by-case basis. When a witness testifies, the question of whether and to what extent to believe/disbelieve a witness is nearly 100% the decision of the jury (or the judge in a bench trial). In a criminal trial, at least, if a thousand disinterested nuns can take the stand and give identical testimony that Defendant robbed the bank, and Defendant's mother says he was actually with her on a Bahamas cruise at the time of the robbery (nevermind the fact that he was arrested exiting the bank), the jury is 100 percent free to conclude the nuns are lying and the mother is telling the truth. Likewise, if Superman is on trial, the jury would be free to believe or disbelieve whomever they chose if the only evidence they had to rely on was (1) Lex Luthor's testimony that he hates Superman and saw him kill Doctor Light; and (2) Lois Lane's testimony that she loves Superman and saw Lex Luthor do it. The jury's right to weigh credibility is hundreds of years old. The question of how to weigh this evidence -- and the answer, which is that it is essentially left entirely to the jury -- is among the most well-settled principles of common-law evidence. See, e.g., Blackstone, Commentaries, 3:354 (1768) ("All others are competent witnesses; though the jury from other circumstances will judge of their credibility."). Jury instructions therefore routinely advise jurors that they may consider a witness's prejudices for or against the defendant and conclude that his statements are not reliable, whether because he is lying or simply too biased to reliably remember the events in question. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S. Ct. 465, 469 (1984) ("Bias is a term used in the 'common law of evidence' to describe the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness' self-interest."). You can follow the trail of cases supporting this position quite a ways back. I stopped when I reached Honegger v. Wettstein, 94 N.Y. 252 (1883), a case where a manufacturer sued members of a firm that had bought its goods but never paid. At trial, a principal of the firm testified about the invoiced amount to be paid, and because the testimony was uncontradicted, the judge ordered a directed verdict in favor of the buyers. But the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the credibility of a biased witness's testimony must be left to the jury: Although not contradicted, he was an interested party, and had a direct interest in increasing the fund in the hands of the receiver, and in preventing its payment to the plaintiffs. His evidence was given for the purpose of showing the alleged violation of law by the plaintiffs, and in explanation of the three invoices which were made of the goods, of which duplicates were made, and it was a fair question for the jury to say whether he might not have been influenced by the circumstances stated. Ten years later, the Supreme Court addressed your question a bit more directly. In Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301 (1895), a defendant who took the stand was convicted after the trial court told the jury that "Where the witness has a direct personal interest in the result of the suit the temptation is strong to color, pervert, or withhold the facts." But the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that "the court may, and sometimes ought, to remind the jury that interest creates a motive for false testimony." Modern courts permit, but do not require, instructions highlighting a specific witness's bias. These cases of course deal with witnesses who have a bias in favor of a party, but the rule is no different in cases where a witness, as in your question, admits to a bias against a party. In United States v. Coleman, 887 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1989), for instance, a defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit arson. Because the only direct evidence of his agreement to the arson was testimony from a witness "who admitted a bias against defendant," he sought a judgment of acquittal, but the trial court denied his motion and sent the case to a jury. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction, holding that it was up to the jury to decide whether the witness was credible: As defendant points out on appeal, Boscaglia's credibility was very much in issue at trial, but the jury resolved the issue against defendant. The jury's decision on "the credibility of witnesses is not reviewable on appeal." Although such instructions are allowed, this does not mean that a court is always required to give an instruction addressing the credibility of a specific witness. Depending on who the witness is biased for/against, there are likewise cases saying that no instruction was necessarily required, Kovacich v. Spearman, No. 2:13-cv-0985 KJM DAD P, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108233 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015) (denying habeas claim by defendant who unsuccessfully sought jury instructions highlighting the bias of the investigating officer), or that such an instruction is a bad idea but not disallowed, United States v. Jones, 372 F. App'x 343, 345 (3d Cir. 2010) ("While such an instruction that singles out the defendant's interest in the case is not advisable, we find that here it did not constitute reversible error."). I haven't found any saying that such an instruction was a reversible error, though I suspect that there are cases out there in which verdicts were reversed because the judge went overboard in suggesting to a jury how much credibility they should extend an admittedly biased witness. | The terminology used may vary some by jurisdiction, but in many it will be said that Bob provoked the confrontation, or that Bob was the aggressor, or that Bob was engaged in a felony and so cannot claim self-defense. This fact patter is highly unlikely to arise in real lie, because if Bob has even a half-competent lawyer, the issue of self-defense, sure to fail, will not be raised. Doing so only wastes the court's time, and may well make them think worse of Bob, which may cost him. In less open-and-shut cases, the general rule is that one who provokes a confrontation, or who is the aggressor, may not claim self-defense. But the exact rule varies by jurisdiction, and the line will be drawn in different ways in different jurisdictions. In some one who seeks a confrontation may be denied a right of self-defense. | Evidence of pre-trial correspondence can be adduced if it is relevant to a fact in issue, and not excluded by another rule of evidence. Commonly, pre-trial correspondence is not relevant to a fact in issue, because it consists of legal argument and rhetoric. In other words, the letter is a solicitor's inadmissible opinion. And when pre-trial correspondence does set out the facts, it is often in inadmissible hearsay form. Pre-trial correspondence is also likely to attract without prejudice privilege (if sent to the other side in an attempt to negotiate a settlement) or legal professional privilege (if private between a party and their lawyer). For all of these reasons, pre-trial correspondence is not usually considered by a judge or jury at trial. However, in some circumstances pre-trial correspondence is admissible, typically as an admission, prior consistent statement or prior inconsistent statement. Depending on the facts which make the correspondence relevant and admissible, it may also be appropriate to cross-examine the client, a director or other agent of the client who instructed the solicitor, or the solicitor, about it. In some cases, a client may be cross-examined about a prior statement of their solicitor on the basis that the solicitor would not have made the statement without the client's authority, and would have relied on the client's instructions. If the court accepts that a prior inconsistent statement was made with the client's approval, this may damage their credibility. If the client asserts legal professional privilege, or testifies that their lawyer acted without instructions, difficult questions arise. Some of these questions were explored by the High Court of Australia in Hofer v The Queen [2021] HCA 36. Lawyers and judges will try to conduct cases in a way which avoids these procedural challenges, if at all possible. In rare cases, a lawyer may be called to give evidence about whether a previous representation was actually made or authorised. This is, for example, the purpose of having a solicitor or other reputable professional witness formal documents. Barristers should take special care not to place themselves at risk of becoming a witness, but in exceptional cases where the client waives legal professional privilege, they can also be required to give evidence about the client's previous instructions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this comes up more often in criminal law. The decision in Hofer was an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which had received evidence from a barrister about the reasons for making decisions during the appellant's criminal trial. Conversely, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales dismissed an application for leave to cross-examine a solicitor, by applying the rules of evidence concerning prior consistent statements, in Hall v The Queen [2015] EWCA Crim 581. | Falsification of evidence, forgery of documents, destruction of evidence (which is called "spoliation"), giving false testimony under oath or otherwise, and all manner of other similar conduct can make it hard to impose civil liability in the court system (or to prevent its imposition when it isn't called for), and does happen from time to time. Sometimes it is more blatant and verifiable. Other times it involves testimony that you know is clearly false but proving that is difficult or impossible. In my experience, medical malpractice defendants who are medical doctors routinely lie in testimony in ways that are non-verifiable, but very rarely falsify documents or provide false testimony regarding verifiable facts, frequently setting up a credibility fight for a finder of fact (i.e. judge in bench trial or jury in a jury trial). Medical doctors tend to be more honest and use fewer fraudulent litigation tactics than law enforcement officers sued in civil rights actions, but are less honest on average than business managers who are in commercial litigation who aren't in sales, and also less honest on average than professionals in mechanical and engineering fields. Fraudulent litigation conduct tends to be more common when the alleged wrongdoing is emotionally charged and personal. Judges usually take great pains to refrain from calling any witness out for lying, unless there is unequivocal evidence that an intentional lie, rather than a situation where a failure of memory or misperception led to a disputed issue of fact. This kind of conduct almost never gives rise to criminal charges when it does happen in civil litigation. It often leads to sanctions against the litigant who uses this tactic in the context of the court case (often quite draconian ones) and it sometimes leads to ethical complaints against an attorney for someone who does this (or who does this personally) knowing that it is being done in the case, often resulting in a lengthy suspension of a license to practice law or disbarment. The consequences of this kind of conduct can be career ending and economically unsurvivable when a court feels that someone has done so. I've seen awards in excess of $1 billion in lawsuits involving large publicly held companies where this has been documented. Identifying cases where this happens is more art than science, and often involves a healthy amount of good luck. There is no one strategy involved in identifying it, but seeking the same information from multiple sources and finding inconsistent results, noticing subtle irregularities in documents, understanding the context of the situation and what usually happens when people are honest, are among the methods used. It is very difficult to defeat this fraudulent efforts to present false evidence, and even when falsification is discovered it is often discovered at such a late stage that it may be difficult or impossible to remedy the harm done. It is always more expensive to deal with these kinds of tactics, although the magnitude of the extra costs varies wildly. Most of the time, it is never discovered at all unless the stakes in the case are so high that extraordinary efforts to leave no stone unturned are justified economically in the litigation. There are tactics that can be taken to reduce the likelihood of misconduct (like securing access to documentation and taking witness statements as soon as possible and ideally before a records custodian realizes its significance), but none are foolproof. A fairly typical example of this was in a securities fraud case that I once represented plaintiffs in, in which the defendant submitted one set of bank statements in response to discovery requests from us, and the same bank statements obtained by subpoena directly from the bank revealed that the defendant had photoshopped years of bank statements in an effort to deceive the plaintiffs. Generally speaking, the larger the bureaucracies involved in the case, and the more people who were involved in the situation, the harder it is to get away with something along these lines. For example, in a medical malpractice case, an instance of malpractice that happens in the office of a doctor who practices alone with only one staff person who is also her husband, demonstrated by a single in house document is much easier to cover up with fraud than a pattern of conduct in a large health care provider network involving encounters with dozens of professionals at multiple large hospitals generating thousands of pages of documentation, and managed by third-party administrators. Ultimately, there is only so much you can do to hedge against the risk that parties to lawsuits will engage in fraudulent conduct. But, because of the dire consequences that arise when someone is caught red handed doing so, this kind of litigation conduct is very rare. While false or misleading testimony on "squishy" issues of motive or opinion, or on impossible to verify points like recollections of unrecorded conversations, happens in perhaps one in five or so actively litigated cases, outright fraudulent tactics of the kinds discussed in the OP probably happens in significantly less than one case in twenty actively litigated cases, but probably does happen in at least one actually actively litigated case in two hundred cases. In the absence of omniscience, or Wonder Woman's lasso of truth, this is the best that lawyers and the judicial system can do. This kind of conduct is sufficiently rare that it doesn't materially upset the usefulness of the legal system for seeking recourse in civil actions. There are backstops like bankruptcy that exist, in part, in recognition of the fact that courts sometimes reach unjust results. Far more cases are wrongly decided due to attorney or judicial incompetence in cases with a complete absence of fraudulent litigation conduct, or from the misguided whims and misunderstandings of juries in cases with a complete absence of fraudulent litigation misconduct, than are wrongly decided as a result of successful fraudulent litigation misconduct. Also, even when fraudulent tactics are used in litigation and aren't caught, these tactics don't always turn the tide in favor of the party using them in litigation, because the people who use those kinds of tactics often don't have a good understanding of what facts are and are not legally important in their cases. It also isn't uncommon for fraudulent litigation tactics to be used in cases where the person employing them is actually in the right on the merits in the absence of these tactics, even though they are unscrupulous when it comes to their responses to accusations of wrongdoing. So, fraudulent litigation conduct doesn't always do substantive harm in the sense of producing a wrong judicial outcome, even when it is successful. | If the government withholds information that is pertinent to the credibility of a witness is that cause for a mistrial? Only if the error is not harmless under the standard applicable to evaluating harmless error in criminal cases (there is a voluminous case law on that point). Basically, it means that a new trial may be held and a conviction vacated on a charge against a particular defendant if there is a reasonable possibility that the withheld evidence, when considered in light of the total picture of evidence presented at trial, might have changed the outcome on guilt or innocence. Does whether the government knowingly or unknowingly withheld this information influence whether a mistrial will be granted? Not really. Knowledge is imputed. If someone in the prosecution team including the police knows, then it is known to the entire team for Brady purposes. If no one knew that it had the information (e.g. a key exculpatory document in possession of the prosecution was misfiled in one of dozens of bankers boxes of documents that it seized in a search and no one reviewed those particular boxes knowing to look for a document like that one or attuned to its potential significance, since it wasn't supposed to be in the place where it was filed), then it hasn't been withheld in the Brady sense unless someone specifically asked for the information in question with enough specificity that it could have been located if they looked at what they already had. The knowledge that must be disclosed is what the prosecutor's office or the police the prosecutor's office is working with knows. So, if a beat cop hides exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor's office, that is a Brady violation, but if the cops do a sloppy investigation that fails to reveal exculpatory evidence that is out there to be found, it isn't a Brady violation. Likewise, if a cop in another department halfway across the state knows something that impacts the credibility of a witness and the prosecutor is totally unaware of the existence of that information as are all the cops working on the case, then that isn't a Brady violation. What If It Isn't A Brady Violation? Exculpatory evidence discovered after the trial that isn't a Brady violation not to disclose may still be grounds for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence in a motion for post-trial relief. But, the standard to get the court to grant a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence that was not withheld in a Brady violation is much more stringent than the mere harmless error standard. Instead: With a single exception, criminal defendants in the United States seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are required to establish only that the new evidence makes it more likely than not that, in a new trial, they would be acquitted. Ohio requires clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. There's a lot of case law on what constitutes newly discovered evidence which is "new, material evidence that was unavailable at the time of the original trial[.]" If evidence was available, but not used at trial, it can't be presented in a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Often this means that it can't be considered even if the salience of the evidence previously available is only clear later in the light of other evidence that is genuinely newly discovered, or the defense attorney's failure to use that evidence in the first trial was negligent to a level constituting legal malpractice. | The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se. | While @jqning is absolutely correct in stating that truth is always an "absolute defense" to a claim of defamation, keep in mind that truth can be a subjective thing. What is one person's version of the truth, may not be another's, even with regard to the same exact experience. Also, while "statements of opinion are not defamation" is typically regarded as true, it has very broad exceptions and is not something that can be relied on in isolation. Defamation is generally defined as a false, published statement that is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation. An online posting, even on an obscure website, will likely be seen by a few people, thus satisfying the publication requirement. A plaintiff cannot succeed in his or her online defamation claim if the defendant's defamatory statement is true. So, for example, if a customer posts a review of your restaurant on Trip Advisor claiming that there were roaches crawling around, you may sue them for defamation. You would then have to prove that there was no roach infestation, and thus, the defendant's statement was false. However, what if there was only one? What if he has a witness who saw it? His truth may be different from yours, and it is up to the trier of fact to decide. Also, getting sued, whether or not you prevail, is at minimum a pain and can be a very expensive ordeal. Opinions are exempt? OK: Following that line of reasoning, restaurant owner shows he's had monthly inspections and prophylactic measures to ensure against pests and the exterminator testifies. The defendant, fearing he's in trouble now, claims that his assertion of roach infestation was just his opinion based on his experience. Opinions are privileged under the law of defamation, right? Not always! Importantly, an opinion may be viewed, generally, as a statement of fact (employing the "reasonable person" standard) if it is something that is either provable or disprovable. What this means is that if the reasonable person would construe your statement to be factual, and not mere opinion, it will be deemed as such and if untrue then you're liable for defamation. The courts may interpret, "I think that [restaurant] has a roach infestation problem," as a statement of fact. This has occurred in numerous cases where people think they can say what they want as long as they couch it as an opinion, with words like "I think..." or "In my opinion...". But when someone says something that factual in opinion form, that is not protected. So, if Jane says, "In my opinion Joe Schmoe is a pedophile..." without absolute proof that Joe is, in fact, a pedophile, then this is libelous (defamation if published or spoken to another). This is because the statement in and of itself is one of "verifiable fact couched in opinion" and it is so damaging to Joe's reputation that if it's not true it is libel per se (defamatory if published – meaning shared). A statement of verifiable fact is a statement that conveys a provably false factual assertion, such as someone has committed murder or has cheated on his spouse. While the law varies some, and sometimes substantially, from state to state, here are some often used examples arising from California courts. Libelous (when false): Charging someone with being a communist (in 1959) Calling an attorney a "crook" Describing a woman as a call girl Accusing a minister of unethical conduct Accusing a father of violating the confidence of son Not-libelous: Calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar" in chance encounter (because hyperbole in context) Calling a TV show participant a "local loser," "chicken butt" and "big skank" Calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch" Changing product code name from "Carl Sagan" to "Butt Head Astronomer" Since libel is considered in context, do not take these examples to be a hard and fast rule about particular phrases. Generally, the non-libelous examples are hyperbole or opinion, while the libelous statements are stating a defamatory fact. Modified photos that can be shown to scandalize persons or businesses are clearly defamation, and are quite popular on social media. So, for example, if you threw the flyers (I assume you didn't but as an example) all over, and then photographed and published your opinion about the business littering neighborhoods, this would be libelous. The less obvious and absurd the modification, the more likely it is that a court will find it defamatory. So, a picture of a woman with a man's naked torso photoshopped on will not be defamatory, a version photoshopped showing what is to be purported to be her naked body, is. In your case, you face two issues that you should ask yourself: Is your opinion really verifiable (or non-verifiable) facts couched in words that try to make it opinion, or is it truly just your opinion. If fact, is it absolutely true? If the answer is yes, it's fact and yes, it's absolutely true, you're OK. Keep in mind though what I mentioned about truths differing: What if the business didn't know they were put there, or, what if they were placed on cars in a public place and blew in the wind? That could be a problem. While you are most likely fine, you may want to just say, X business's fliers are all over the place, littering the neighborhood and (assuming you called and asked them to pick them up, or wrote them) they refuse to pick up the litter. It sounds like the statements you made are fine, because you don't say that the business littered, or that they put them there; you say they are "plastered" all over, but you don't accuse them openly. That isn't to say it wouldn't be found to suggest fact that they would have to show isn't true (or that they didn't get permission from the property owner). My point is only that, in general, be careful. If he felt that you misrepresented what he did by way of distributing fliers, or if he thought you doctored the photo or set it up, he could sue you if he felt it damaged his business's reputation. | Child Sexual abuse - can you jail person just based on what child said? Under U.S. law, yes. There is no proof whatsoever about this, no facts, or witnesses Testimony of a witness is evidence. There is a witness, the child, and another witness, the psychologist, who heard the child and testified. Those are facts and witnesses. Assuming that an exception to the hearsay rule and confrontation clause can be secured (which it certainly can for purposes of a probable cause determination to make an arrest and sometimes can and sometimes can't for purposes of a conviction), what the child said can be presented through the psychologist, which is admissible evidence. The fact that something was said by a child does not make it not evidence, nor does it make it inadmissible. The rules governing when hearsay is admissible as evidence are arcane at best and very circumstance dependent. A jury can choose to believe that any particular item of evidence is sufficiently credible to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility and weight are for a jury, not for the judge and not for an appellate court. |
California: "For quality assurance, this phone call is being recorded" In California, it is illegal to record phone calls without the consent of all parties involved. However, when you call corporate phone number, you often get a message to the effect of "For quality assurance reasons, this call is being recorded." Isn't this illegal, if you are calling from California? What can be done to prevent the company from recording (other than hanging up - let's assume there's a reason you needed to call them)? | The recording is not illegal because you've been told it would happen, and by not hanging up, you've agreed to have a conversation that can be recorded. This was determined in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. applying the exception of Penal Code 632 that communications are not considered confidential if there is a reasonable expectation that the call will be overheard or recorded - being explicitly told that the call will be recorded makes this true. It would not be illegal for them to only record their own statements during the call, nor for you to record only your statements, either. In particular, the company is allowed to record the part of the call where they make this statement, as they are not recording a conversation, only their own (likely pre-recorded) statement (again?). Indeed, including their statement about the recording in the recording is common practise partly for protection against claims that the other party was not informed of the recording occurring. | As stated in the answer to What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?; if either of the participants is in Australia than unless all parties have given consent then the recording is illegal. Notwithstanding its legality, property in the recording vests in the person who made it. There is no law against him keeping it. There is no law against him publishing it unless the material contained is offensive, hate speech or defamatory (see Customer feedback gathering in Australia). | Do these warnings have any legal force? In the United States, no. They do not have any legal force. Some have tried to argue that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) applies; however, this law only applies to intercepting e-mails—not accidentally sending to the wrong party. There is no legal protection for "reply all" or "accidental send" human errors. If so, what are their consequences? If you're asking why some people put them in there, even if it's not legally enforceable, one reason is lawyers trying to prevent an accidental waiver of attorney-client privilege. Generally, a waiver of the attorney-client privileged must be intentional and knowing. Therefore, some argue that a disclaimer could help one argue that privilege was not waived. Although, I could not find a published case where an e-mail disclaimer actually helped this argument. Additionally, placing the e-mail disclaimer on the bottom of an e-mail (which is customary) is less effective than placing one at the top. As a note, some legal commentators and ethics committee's suggest that lawyers should use encryption "to ensure the confidentiality of such communications remain so when the circumstance calls for it, particularly if the information at issue is highly sensitive and the use of encryption is not onerous." See Legal Productivity's Post that quotes a California Ethics Opinion For more info, read this article here from the American Bar Association's Litigation Section regarding the efficacy of E-mail disclaimers: Do Email Disclaimers Really Work? | california It's legal, because the pentester doesn't have the intent to defraud. California Penal Code Section 470 governs forging documents, signatures, handwriting, etc. All of its provisions making actions illegal begin with "Every person who, with the intent to defraud..." Because the company itself is aware of and has authorized their actions, the pentester isn't attempting to defraud the company whose premises they are attempting to enter. They are providing forged documents to the guard (who isn't aware of the test), but a real attacker doing that would be attempting to defraud the company, not the guard. Of course, as with any otherwise-illegal action taken during a penetration test, this assumes that the agreement with the company granted the pentester permission to take that action (i.e., that it was in scope for the test). | The hypothetical situation would be a material misrepresentation of the facts, as well as a fraudulent misrepresentation - both are grounds for nullifying the contract. Under your hypothetical this is almost certainly material and is certainly a fraudulent misrepresentation. A fraudulent misrepresentation of the facts pertinent to a contract occurs when one party, to a bargain for exchange, misstates a fact and either knows or believes that the fact is not true, or is not sure whether or not his statement is true but claims it to be true nonetheless. If a party to the contract relies on the fraudulent misrepresentation and enters into a contract based on that misrepresentation, the contract is voidable by the innocent party. A material misrepresentation is a misstatement of fact that will induce a reasonable person to enter into a contract. If a misrepresentation is material to the contract, the contract will be voidable by the relying party even if the misrepresentation is not fraudulent. So, in this scenario, the contact would be voidable because there is both a material misrepresentation, as well as a fraudulent one. If the other party suffers a monetary loss because of the deceit, you would almost certainly be held responsible for any damages that may flow from the inducement. | The nature of the meeting matters: I assume this is a private meeting, not a public meeting. Under RCW 9.73.030, you have to announce that the meeting is being recorded (the announcement must itself be recorded), or the recording device must be obvious. There is no exception regarding property status (such as "on school property; in a government-funded facility"). But it also matters if the conversation is "private". See State v. Townsend, 57 P.3d 255, which gives weight to the subjective intent of the parties, thus the primary question would be whether the school official intended the communication to be private. Given strong FERPA privacy protection of personal information about students and in light of the likely nature of the conversation, one might think that the administrator intends the discussion to be private. However, the administrator cannot discuss e.g. disciplinary issues with third parties, so that would not be a valid basis for expecting privacy. You would really need to get a lawyer, discuss the expected subjects with the lawyer, and see if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (even if this is not a public meeting). Your local ACLU chapter might advise you of your rights, though they would probably also advise you to not experiment with breaking the law (I don't see what legitimate purpose would be served by recording in secret). | australia It's dishonest. Dishonesty is not, in general, illegal. Dishonesty is illegal when it is used to obtain someone else's property or financial advantage through fraud. It's also illegal if it's part of a statement made when applying for an authorisation or benefit. It's potentially misleading. Misleading people is not, in general, illegal. Misleading is illegal when it takes place in trade or commerce. It gives you a title you don't hold. Claiming a title you don't hold is not, in general, illegal Claiming a title you don't hold is illegal if it is a protected title under Australian law. For example, there are protected titles under the National Health Practionioners Registration Scheme: "medical practitioner" is a protected title; "doctor" isn't. Further, holding yourself out to be able to practice in certain professions when you are not (e.g. law, engineering in some states etc.) is illegal. Context matters Putting on a white gown, wearing a stethoscope and calling yourself "doctor" when attending a fancy dress party is not illegal. Doing it to angle for a free upgrade on your airline ticket is. | All of these are state laws, so answers will vary. NC defines illegal operation of a mobile handset as use to: (§ 20-137.4A) (1) Manually enter multiple letters or text in the device as a means of communicating with another person; or (2) Read any electronic mail or text message transmitted to the device or stored within the device, provided that this prohibition shall not apply to any name or number stored in the device nor to any caller identification information. So using a voice assistant in NC would not be manually entering text and therefore not criminal. The part of the law applying to motor carriers explicitly exempts voice commands and "hands-free" devices. |
What was the relevance of 'crossing state lines' in the Kyle Rittenhouse case? It seems to be a common talking-point that the now exonerated Kyle Rittenhouse did something wrong by 'crossing state lines' to attend the BLM demonstration in Kenosha that led to the subsequent shootings of three of the protestors. What, if anything, was the relevance of state borders in this case? | The "crossing state lines" narrative originated from the false presumption that Kyle Rittenhouse illegally carried a rifle across state lines from Illinois into Wisconsin. If this had been the case, Rittenhouse could have potentially been charged with a federal crime. In the context of this case, it was never a relevant factor as he was charged by the District Attorney's office and not the Department of Justice. | Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter. | None of this affects a claim of self-defense I've described elsewhere the things that do affect a self-defense claim in Wisconsin. These do not affect it. Protesters I'm not sure what you mean by this: the existence of protesters has nothing to do with a claim of self-defense. The standard for lethal self-defense is much higher than could be satisfied by simply being near an angry crowd. Specific actions of protesters could affect it, but you'd need to detail which actions you're referring to. Rittenhouse indicating intent to protect property from protests This might affect the claim if it were his property (which it was not). Section 939.48(1m)(ar) of Wisconsin law provides for a castle doctrine if, basically, the person has unlawfully broken into or is currently unlawfully breaking into the defendant's home, vehicle, or place of business. Since it was not his property, this defense doesn't apply. | Could DA Bragg have only charged Trump with 34 misdemeanor counts, without elevating the charges to felonies? Yes. if Trump's defense team argues that the law that elevates the misdemeanor charges to felony charges does not apply in this case, because the elevation option does not include federal laws, then since this is a matter of law and not a matter of fact, Judge Mercan (rather than the jury) will decide whether or not to dismiss the felony charges? Yes. Does Judge Mercan have the option of dismissing the felony enhancement but allowing the misdemeanor charges to proceed, or would Mercan have to dismiss all charges against Trump? Judge Mercan could probably choose either option if he found that the original charges were not supported by the law. There is law regarding how this decision is made but I personally don't know that area of law well. One of the reason that I am unfamiliar with it is that it is exceedingly rare for a judge to conclude that the prosecutor's charges are not supported by the law. I would be very surprised if that judge reached that conclusion in this case, in particular, because both federal election law violations and state and federal tax law violations are implicated by the indictment. The DA no doubt legally researched this issue exhaustively before presenting the charges to the grand jury and has made out a prima facie case for a felony under the applicable New York State law. If Trump is brought to trial, then would it be possible for a jury to return a verdict that Trump was guilty of the misdemeanor offenses of falsifying business records but innocent of doing so with an intent to commit another crime? If so, then could Trump still be found guilty of the misdemeanors, or would he be fully acquitted, since the jury ruled that he was not guilty of the exact charges that DA Bragg filed? Whether a jury is presented with a lesser included offense charge at the request of the defense, is partially a matter of the prosecution's election to make that option available or not, and partially a matter of the judge's decision on how to handle it. The body of law involved in how this decision is handled on a case by case basis is quite involved. Most of the case law involves homicide cases, assault cases, and property crime cases where there are charges with are identical except for aggravating factors for the most serious charges. But, lesser charges generally aren't presented if based upon the evidence presented at trial, either the more serious charge is established or no charge is proven. For example, if the defendant presents an alibi defense, and a witness whose credibility is disputed places the defendant at the scene intentionally committing a crime, a lesser included offense charge would not be appropriate. But, if the defendant admits hitting a pedestrian and causing the pedestrian's death, but claims that the pedestrian was at fault in the accident for jay walking, while the prosecution alleges that the pedestrian was intentionally struck as part of a mafia hit, multiple lesser included offenses would probably be charged involving different levels of intent of premeditated intent/aggravated circumstances killing (first degree murder), to a knowing killing (second degree murder), to a reckless killing (manslaughter), to a criminally negligent homicide or vehicular homicide charge. Typically, the decision on this point would not be made until all evidence was received and the judge in a hearing away from the jury but in the presence of the prosecutors and defense counsel crafted jury instructions based upon the evidence presented at trial and the arguments raised by counsel at trial. | One widely-used book on the topic is Brown's Boundary Control and Legal Principles. I have the 4th edition published in 1995, and the relevant chapter is 8, "Locating Easements and Reversions". The law varies from state to state. In New England, it is likely for interstate, US, and state highways, the state will own the roadbed in fee. Smaller roads are likely owned by the adjoining private owners, with the public holding a right-of-way that allows the government to build and maintain a road; the adjoinders are restricted from using the right-of-way in any manner that would interfere with the transportation use. The meaning of "right-of-way line" depends on context, but is likely to be the line between the pubic's right of way and the portion of the adjoining private property that is exclusively under the control of the private property owner. If the public records do not reveal the width of the road, there is likely to be a statute that states a default width of the road. This is discussed, for Vermont, in The History and Law of Vermont Town Roads by Paul Gillies | Aside from the law regarding trespass, ORS 498.120 specifically forbids hunting on another’s cultivated or enclosed land. The land need not be fenced or posted with "No trespassing" signs: For the purpose of subsection (1) of this section, the boundaries of “enclosed” land may be indicated by wire, ditch, hedge, fence, water or by any visible or distinctive lines that indicate a separation from the surrounding or contiguous territory, Apparently hunters have some obligation to be aware of private land boundaries in the areas they hunt. The degree of this responsibility is something that is still regularly disputed in court. In the linked case of State v. Hinton, a hunter was convicted of criminal trespass with a firearm. This was prosecuted as a violation rather than a misdemeanor which reduced the state's burden of proof to a preponderance of the evidence. The hunter moved for a dismissal, claiming that the state hadn't proved that a reasonable person would have known they were on private land: The evidence presented at trial shows that there was nothing about the border between BLM land and the GI Ranch where defendant walked that would cause a reasonable person to believe that permission was required to enter. The landscape was the same. There was no fence. There were no signs posted. The border between the GI Ranch and the BLM [land] was in the middle of thousands of acres of the high desert of central Oregon. The circuit court denied the dismissal, and the hunter appealed. The Oregon State Appeals court affirmed the circuit court's rejection of the dismissal: Specifically, the record provides ample evidence that, using maps, people in this area can determine generally where they are and whether they are on GI Ranch land or BLM land. To be sure, they may not be able to know "the very second" that they cross onto private land. But, viewed in the state's favor, the record establishes that reasonable people can know generally once they have made the crossing. | Yes. This is treated as time served as several media accounts of sentencing hearings in these cases have demonstrated. See, e.g., this account in The Atlantic magazine, and this one in the newspaper USA Today, and this one in the newspaper the Houston Chronicle. I also saw a similar account in the L.A. Times but can't provide a link because my non-subscription access limit has been exceeded. | It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common. |
Is time spent on litigation recoverable as lost wages? Generally, pro se non-attorney litigants cannot recover attorney fees under a statute providing for attorney fees. Can a non-attorney recover for time spent on litigation (time preparing for trial, time in court, etc.) via alternative means (lost wages, consequential damages, etc.)? More generally, can a litigant who has attorney representation recover for time spent on litigation? | england-and-wales Litigants in Person - i.e. litigants not represented by solicitors (= attorneys in US) can recover the cost of their time at a set rate under the Litigants in Person (Costs and Expenses) Act 1975 | In general you can dispute and negotiate any bill from a professional. The stronger your arguments for disputing it, and the more coherent your demands for adjustment, the more successful you will tend to be. This is like any business negotiation. One partner at a very large U.S. law firm once admitted to me that their corporate clients almost always ask for – and receive – billing adjustments. Of course, when push comes to shove, unless you're accusing the lawyer of fraudulent billing, then typically by contract you are liable for the bills. However, non-lawyers often assume that they will lose any dispute with their lawyers because it seems like lawyers have free access to the legal system. The reality is that there is a significant threshold that must be met before a law firm will sue a client for payment. That threshold will depend on the firm's opportunity costs, the costs of litigation, their assessment of reputational risks, how much they expect to actually collect, and sometimes just how ticked off they are. | If you want to take legal action, hire a lawyer. If you want to puff your chest and see if they flinch here is what you do: First let's deal with this arbitration agreement. (There is probably also a jurisdiction agreement in there, ignore that for now.) First you need to find someone to to arbitrate and a place to hold the arbitration. I suggest a babysitter, dog-walker, friend, whatever... just make sure it is a real person. You write them a letter saying that you are exercising the dispute resolution set forth in the terms and that you propose an arbitration by [insert person's name here] to take place at [location] on [date and time]. You are going to mail this to a physical address and should include a sentence asking them to let you know within 30 days if this schedule works for them. Also tell them that you prefer to communicate via email and provide an email address. Mail this letter. Just mail it plain old snail mail. In two weeks write another letter opening with a statement indicating two weeks ago you sent a letter and asked for confirmation of receipt, that you did not get receipt and would they please acknowledge. You have now puffed your chest. Pretty soon 30 days will run and you will go to the courthouse. Hopefully this will have gotten them talking to you and you can get this resolved. What I describe next is an absolute interbreeding and then slaughter of various states' court rules. I hope that more-informed stack participants edit with gusto. If you can't resolve things go to the courthouse and tell the clerk that you want to file a claim in small claims court against [company] for [dollar amount] based on breach of contract. She will give you paperwork to fill out. You will pay her the filing fee. One of the things you will fill out is a complaint, one is a summons. It might be two in one. Here is an random example. It should be a simple form. Keep it all as simple as possible but be sure to describe the facts that support your claim. You might include the fact that they ignored your requests to arbitrate. Take this complaint and summons and serve them on your defendant. To do this you will need to get someone in the company's city to serve it. There are professionals who do this, mail or email them (if possible) the summons and complaint and pay them. They will you with provide proof of service. Now you have moved past chest-puffing and you've thrown a punch. Now you have initiated a law suit. They must file an answer. This means that they must get lawyers involved. You've gotten their attention and it only cost you filing fees. They must now file an answer to your complaint. They will also likely file a motion to dismiss and do one of a few things: 1. complain that you need to arbitrate 2. It will complain that the contract requires legal action in a certain state or county 3. It will complain that regardless of the contract this is the wrong court for any host of reasons 4. they will claim that you haven't stated a valid complaint 5. some other boilerplate stuff. You might have a hearing scheduled to deal with these things, you might deal with them all on a trial date. Now go back to the clerk at the court and ask for a subpoena form. You will have this served on the defendant also - it must name a person. This is a document that requires them to come to court at a time and place. Again, lawyers get involved to quash this. Lawyers = $ so you probably got their attention. Oh yeah, you need to pay a witness fee and travel costs. You can also serve a subpoena duces tecum which requires them to bring documents that you ask for. This needs to be served on the person in change of keeping records. You will probably pay the costs of the documents. The clerk will have forms for you and will describe the process in ambiguous terms while repeating "we cannot give legal advice." You've got your documents, you have a witness coming, you are ready for trial. If you haven't had some sort of hearing already to deal with defendant's motions to get this thing dismissed, you will need to deal with that stuff now. They will claim that arbitration is required. You tell the judge that you invited them to an arbitration that you set up and they refused to come. You show all the paperwork, including your contract with the arbiter. They will argue about jurisdiction, good luck with this one but it's a whole other problem that I can't touch here! If you survive these objections you will tell the story to the judge, you will call the witness and question her, you will present your documents as evidence. In small claims court the judge (or magistrate or referee) might ask the lawyer some questions about facts. Then the judge will bang his gavel and you wait for his decision. If you win come back here and ask how to get your money. | Can my accountant bill me for previous work he agreed to perform for free? No. The difficult part will be for you to prove that he agreed to do the job for free. Hence the importance of having this kind of "gentlemen's" agreements in writing. You have the burden of outweighing --even by means of circumstantial evidence-- the common presumption that professional work is done for compensation, not for free. However, just like it might be hard for you to prove the aforementioned "gentlemen's agreement", it would also be hard for him to prove that you agreed to (or knew, or should have known, you would have to) pay the amount he is billing now. In the event that you are unable to prove he agreed to work for free, you might want to dispute the reasonableness of the amounts he is pursuing so belatedly. It is noteworthy that the work at issue being "really simple" would not be the only factor for assessing how much he may recover. Other factors such as the accountant's qualifications or the market rate for similar services would be weighed in awarding recovery (if any). Can I legally ignore these invoices? It does not make any sense that he sends me invoices for work done 4 years ago. You may ignore the invoices regarding older work, that is, those for which the period of limitations has elapsed. For most cases, section 4 of the Ontario Limitations Act provides a two-year period to bring a claim. Since the accountant himself did the job, and most likely he was --or should have been-- aware of the payments due for his services, he would be unable to prove that his "discovery" of claims (see section 5 of Limitations Act) regarding older tax filings meets the period of limitations. Equivalently, see here the paragraph starting with "For example, if the courts determine that [...]". | Realistically, if your lawsuit is with the person who has been acting as your agent in the United States, small claims court is probably not the right way to go. If you are owed less than $10,000 (possibly including attorney fees), you probably need to hire a lawyer to pursue your case in the non-Small Claims Magistrate Division of the District Court. Lawyers are allowed in this forum, unlike the Small Claims division which is oriented towards pro se parties (i.e. people without lawyers). Small claims can consider only claims up to $4,000 against defendants in the county where the lawsuit is brought, and attorneys are now allowed in small claims court. (Source) Even if you can be in the Small Claims division of Magistrate's Court, the enforcement of a judgment if you win requires technical court documents which are essentially the same as those for collecting a judgment from any other court. Even when Zoom participation is allowed in a court, usually the main trial can't be conducted entirely remotely so someone needs to be in the courtroom representing you for the trial. (The only U.S. state where there is an actual right to participate in a civil court trial remotely is Alaska.) A lawyer will also often be more effective at negotiating a settlement, with or without a mediator, which would avoid the need for a trial at all, and mediations these days since COVID are routinely conducted remotely. Mediation is often required before a case goes to trial. If you are owed more than $10,000, you probably need to hire a lawyer to pursue your case in District Court (outside the Magistrate's Division). (Source) It is also possible in District Court (not the Magistrate's division) in some cases to resolve the case in "motion practice" based upon submitted papers, rather than in a hearing. This is not really a possibility in the Small Claims Court or the Magistrate's Division. Also, to be perfectly honest, the kind of case you describe is probably beyond the capacity of even a college educated person without legal training to do right and not screw up. Handling issues like service of process, the rules of evidence, and the collection of a judgment are all highly technical matters, and there may be legal claims related to possible misappropriation of funds that you might not know how to raise. Depending upon the language of your contract, the other side may even be able to demand a jury trial which is far beyond the capacity of an unrepresented person to manage, even if they are only doing it to force you to hire a lawyer. It could also be necessary to use the "discovery" process or subpoenas to obtain records needed to prove the case. For what it is worth, Idaho lawyers are less expensive than lawyers in much of the U.S., and Idaho is not known for having overcrowded courts the greatly delayed schedules, however. | You can't normally ask the court to "recuse" an attorney, because "recusal" is normally restricted to the judge leaving the case. The more common term is moving to disqualify opposing counsel. | There are two basic problems with your theory: You say: can't one accept a case on contingency and "as time permits," so that in such an event one would simply drop the contingency case (or, if it looked promising, hand it off to some other lawyer in a slump)? No. you can't. If you take a case, then drop it because a more profitable case comes along, you might well be disbarred, not to mention sued by the client you just threw over. You might even spend a night in jail for contempt--in many cases, you are not allowed to simply drop a case without the court's permission. So if you accept a contingency case, you accept it until (1) the case is over, (2) the client fires you, (3) you, the client, and the judge all agree you can quit, or (4) you can convince the judge you should be allowed to quit regardless of the client's wishes. Until then, you are stuck with the time and expense involved with handling the case. "Expense" is the second problem. You seem to be under the impression that once you've paid for the office and the coffee maker, there's no downside in pursuing a contingency case. But filing and pursuing a lawsuit cost money, not just time. Copying and coding documents costs money. Stenographers for depositions cost money. Just filing a lawsuit often costs a few hundred dollars. Hell, in a major lawsuit, you will probably spend a few hundred dollars just on postage. And a lot of commercial litigation now involves expert witnesses, whose fees start at a few hundred dollars an hour. Normally that all gets billed back to the client, but on a contingency case the lawyer often absorbs most or all of it. So from a lawyer's perspective, even if he or she is not working right now, "any positive payout" isn't enough. It has to be enough of a payout, and enough of a chance of winning, that the expected reward is worth paying, potentially, the cost of a trial, and forgoing other work if things get busy again while you're trying to prep your contingency case for trial. The fact is, for a lot of this sort of case--even if it looks "potentially profitable" to a non-lawyer--is going to be less profitable, in the long run, than spending the same amount of time playing golf with people who might actually pay you by the hour to do something. Also, two quick notes: Your suggestion of raising the contingency up to 100%, or close to it, won't help--it's illegal in many jurisdictions, and unethical in all of them. As a side note, even if a lawyer did take one of these cases, it wouldn't do you any good, since lawyers are prohibited in most cases from splitting their fees with non-lawyers. | You will almost certainly be sued For a small amount like this they would use junior lawyers and while the suit may take a while I’d be surprised if a lawyer spent a week all up on such a simple case. Say 40h at $200 = $8,000 which, when they win, you have to pay. Bargain. |
Is Google's Consent Management Platform not GDPR compliant since it does not show a consent form when 'personalised ads' are disabled? This question borders the line between technical and legal but I am posting here because it is not a coding problem in itself. Apologies if this is the wrong forum. I have set up my mobile app to use Google's own Consent Management Platform called User Messaging Platform / UMP (https://developers.google.com/admob/ump/android/quick-start) via Admob to gather consent to show ads. My Admob account is set to show either personalised or non-personalised ads depending on which settings users select in the consent form. The consent form shows up fine so long as users do not have personalisation disabled in their phone settings / Google account and so long as I haven't disabled personalised ads completely from within the Admob / UMP interface. In this case, users who use the form are able to disable whichever aspects of data processing they want and Google Admob automatically disables elements of ad personalisation accordingly, and completely disables all ads if users do not select the required elements in the consent form. However, if a user does have personalised ads disabled on their phone / Google settings or if I have disabled all personalised ads from within the Admob / UMP interface, then the consent form is not able to be displayed to users. In this case, users will simply see non-personalised ads in the app without having been presented with a form beforehand. There is no way at all to present a form to users because the request is always unavailable. It turns out that this is expected behaviour and exactly how the UMP consent form is apparently supposed to function. To demonstrate this, Google displays this message in the Admob interface about their consent platform messages: This is the answer that Google gave directly to this question: If you have disabled personalized ads then there is no need to display the consent form. The forms and all consent are only needed for when you are looking to show personalized ads. So to be compliant with GDPR you just need to have the ability to call the consent and if the person has the phone set to show personalized ads, it will then show them the form. With the steps that you have mentioned, the behavior looks actually to be correct, if you have chosen to not show personalized ads, then there is no need for the forms. This appears to me to be contradictory to the advice that Google themselves display on their site, which states that 'non-personalised' ads still use cookies and therefore require consent to display: https://www.google.com/intl/en_uk/about/company/user-consent-policy-help/ What if I’m a publisher serving only non-personalised ads to EEA and UK users? If you do not serve personalised ads to users that visit your site, and visits to your site do not influence the ads served elsewhere, you are still required to obtain consent for the use of cookies or mobile identifiers, where legally required. Consent for cookies or mobile identifiers is still required because non-personalised ads still use cookies or mobile identifiers to combat fraud and abuse, for frequency capping and for aggregated ad reporting. https://support.google.com/adsense/answer/9007336?hl=en-GB Non-personalised ads (NPA) Although non-personalised ads don’t use cookies or mobile ad identifiers for ad targeting, they do still use cookies or mobile ad identifiers for frequency capping, aggregated ad reporting and to combat fraud and abuse. Therefore, you must obtain consent to use cookies or mobile ad identifiers for those purposes where legally required, per the ePrivacy Directive in certain EEA countries. Therefore, I'm completely confused by this. Is this a case of Google's team not understanding their own legal obligations? Should I be wary about releasing my app using Google's UMP which I have already integrated? Or is there a technical detail that I'm not aware of which makes Google's approach GDPR compliant? For reference, here is Google's AdMob & AdSense program policies Publisher integration with the IAB TCF v2.0: https://support.google.com/admob/answer/9760862?hl=en&ref_topic=9756841 | Obtaining consent for cookies is not required by the GDPR at all. Instead it is covered by the e-privacy directive, which as a directive rather than a regulation, must be implements by specific legislation in each individual country. The exact requirements vary with the law of each country. An e-privacy regulation has been proposed, which would have scope similar to the GDPR, would replace the Directive, and would not require national implementing legislation. However it has not yet been adopted. Proposed versions have significantly different requirements than the current Directive. Nor does the GDPR require consent for advertising that does not involve the processing of personal information, unlike some other privacy laws such as the California CCPA. However, if the Google package sets cookies without consent that are not strictly necessary for operation of the web site, it might well fail compliance with some of those national laws implementing e-privacy. Also, even necessary cookies must be disclosed to the user, as I understand it, possibly only in general terms. Several national Data Protection agencies have said that cookie compliance is not a major priority, at least not until an e-privacy regulation is in place. But that does not mean that lack of compliance is legal. Unfortunately I see no way for a developer using the Google package to correct this issue within the package. One would either have to implement a different solution, or trust that Google will fix this before enforcement becomes a serious issue. However, the app developer could add a separate general cookie consent banner, and turn off all adds if consent is not given, I believe. | Art. 15(4) GDPR says: (4) The right to obtain a copy referred to in paragraph 3 shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. If I was the controller in this situation, and I believed that this would endanger the students that have criticised the professor, I would base my argument for not complying on this. In addition, Art. 85 GDPR requires member states to: [...] reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression and information [...] So you may be able to argue that the students posting messages are engaging in "processing for journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression", depending on the laws of the particular member state. (edit: this could be difficult since you mention it is a private database). The second case seems just like the first in terms of GDPR, but may constitute defamation. Defamation (or libel) laws differ wildly in each country; he Wikipedia article on Defamation explains the situation in each member state in more detail. In the third case: if the professor submits a request based on the rights of a data subject other than himself, they don't need to comply. These requests need to come from the data subjects themselves, not just a random person assuming authority. (although I suppose it's possible for them to give power of attorney to the department head if they wanted to) Personal data and the rights that GDPR provides to data subjects always relate to a natural person, not an institution or a company. | Yes, a site may check for a cookie indicating past consent before prompting for consent to read and store cookies When people speak of the "Cookie law" they usually mean the ePrivacy Directive, (ePD) more formally the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58/EC. The full text of the directive is here First of all, being a directive and not a regulation, the ePD is not itself legally binding. Instead it instructs the legislatures of member states to implement it, which they generally have done. So the actual binding law is the law of a particular country, which could vary from the wording of the directive. However, in this case, my understanding is that the implementations do not vary significantly. An updated and revised ePrivacy Regulation (ePR) has been proposed, which would replace the ePD and complement the GDPR. But there has been dispute over the proposed terms of the ePR, and it has not yet been passed. Article 5 section (3) of the ePD reads: Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user. Notice that this covers both writing (storing) and reading (gaining access to) cookies and other information stored on a user's device. Cookies ar one form of such locally stored information (LSI). Note that the GDPR, which replaces Directive 95/46/EC, is used to define "consent" in the ePD. In general, one must have consent to read or store, and consent must be sought only when the user has been given "clear and comprehensive information ... about the purpose" of the stored information. The relevant exception for this question is that information (including cookies) which is "strictly necessary" to provide a service specifically requested by the user. Here the user has requested access to the web site, and may have previously agreed to accept cookies. The site must prompt for consent if the user has not previously consented (and the site will store cookies not strictly needed), and should not if the user has. Therefore, it is strictly necessary to check for and read if present a cookie indicating that such consent has previously been granted. If such a cookie is not found, no consent has been granted. Strictly required LSI should not have a dual purpose where one purpose is not strictly needed. For example, an "I accept cookies" cookie should not also be used for tracking. That should be done (if at all) with a separate cookie, and only after consent is received. Note that there should be an easily found and easily used method or link on the site (preferably on each page of the site) to review the purposes of stored or accessed LSI, and to withdraw previous consent. If consent is withdrawn, the cookie indicating that consent has been granted should be erased, as should any cookies or other LSI not strictly needed to provide the services requested by the user. Keep in mind that the legal distinction is not between cookies that contain "technical" information and those that do not. That is not relevant. Nor is the distinction between cookies that might be used to identify a person and those that do not. The legal distinction is between cookies (or other LSI) that are strictly needed to provide the services requested by the user, and all other LSI. Strictly needed LSI does not require consent, all other LSI does. For example, a random string, used to determine the number of unique visitors, but not linked to any identifying info about the user, does not help to identify an individual user. But it is not strictly needed, so it can only be stored with consent. Data that are associated with an identifiable natural person (human being, not a firm or organization), are governed by the GDPR (where it applies). There must be a lawful basis for processing such data, which includes reading them from LSI, and storing them. Consent is one of the six possible bases for such processing, but consent need not be obtained if another lawful basis applies. When consent is the basis, it must be easily withdrawn by the user. Note that this applies to all data (PI) that is associated with a person, not just data that can readily be used to identify the person (PII). Note that other workflows are also lawful. For one example, if a site is a strictly membership site, it could prompt for a login before reading or storing any LSI, and then read previous preferences stored on the server by that user to determine whether consent for cookies has been granted. Conclusion A cookie indicating that consent to access and store cookies hs previously been given by a particular user can lawfully be read before a user is prompted for consent, under the ePD and its implementing laws. | IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics. | The basic requirements for the effectiveness of valid legal consent are defined in Article 7 of the GDPR and specified further in Recital 32. There is no form requirement for the consent, so using a button is not a problem. However, I do not think the MailChimp-button you reproduce as an example is good enough. It asks for a blanket consent to stuff that is buried in MailChimp's “Anti-spam Policy & Terms of Use”. But according to the GDPR, what the data subject consent to can’t be buried in the ToU – it must spelled out in clear, plain language. Requests must be granular, asking for separate consent for separate types of processing. “When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them” (Recital 32). Blanket consent, as used by MailChimp, is not allowed. The other clear requirement from the GDPR is that opt-in is mandatory. Pre-ticked and opt-out buttons are explicitly banned: “Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent” (Recital 32). ‘No’ must become your data default, but if the user chooses to opt-in by clicking a button, this is valid consent. The MailChimp-button complies witrh this. The GDPR also requires you to keep a records of the consents given (so make that part of the user profile), and to withdraw consent at any time – so you make make provisions for that as well in your implementation of consent. | Your title is not necessarily consistent with your example. Can a website demand acceptance of non-essential cookies to allow access? As you have found, GDPR prohibits conditioning the provision of service on consent to the processing of personal data. Cookie walls without alternative means of access are generally considered violations of the GDPR. Can a website demand acceptance of non-essential cookies to allow free access? The situation of a "consent or pay" scheme (or "cookie paywalls") is more uncertain and has not been clearly settled at the EU level. There are data protection authorities that do not consider such scheme necessarily a GDPR violation (Austria, France) if a reasonable alternative access, without requiring non-essential cookies, is provided. For what it is worth, the French data protection authority (CNIL) held initially that all cookie walls are illegal, but on appeal from publishers and advertisers, the French supreme administrative court annulled CNIL's initial guidelines for being too absolute. German and Italian authorities are still examining the validity of such scheme. More reading: Consent or Pay: Privacy Considerations with Cookiewall-Paywall Hybrid Solution, https://securiti.ai/blog/cookie-paywall/ Is the use of a cookie wall allowed in European Countries, https://www.iubenda.com/en/help/24487-cookie-walls-gdpr | The material scope of the GDPR (Article 2) is limited to the processing of personal data (including mere storage) by automated means or as part of a filing system. The question of whether your activity falls within this scope hinges on what you actually do with the data once you take possession of it. You have mentioned saving the contact information of people you have met at conferences, which could refer to simply retaining it for later use, or to the technological process of storing data in a computer. The former, if not done in any structured way (a filing system) would not fall within the scope of the GDPR. The latter, even if poorly executed, such as a photo stored on a business smartphone or a text document thrown onto your workstation's desktop, would always fall within scope as computerised data is processed "by automated means". When the contact information you receive identifies a specific person, as distinct from just a corporate switchboard number and company name for example, it is personal data. When you get that personal data from the person it identifies (data subject), and you're otherwise in scope, Article 13 is invoked, requiring you to provide a list of information, "at the time when personal data are obtained", unless "the data subject already has the information." This is known as the right to be informed. The requirements differ when personal data are not obtained directly from the data subject. I would argue it is unreasonable to be expected to provide the information to the data subject over a cup of coffee or in a quick business card exchange, but if you start entering it into a spreadsheet or your CRM, you need to provide the required information, which may be as simple as a follow-up email thanking them for their time and letting them know you'll keep their contact details on file, along with a link to your organisation's privacy policy, assuming it covers this use, or if not, a specific privacy notice. You will of course be required to comply with other requirements such as the principles of data minimisation and identify a lawful basis, maintain adequate security by implementing technical and organisational measures, hold contracts with any third parties who process personal data on your behalf, and have a process for upholding data subject rights and responding to requests to exercise them - among others - but you should already be doing that for your other processing activities unless exempt. Additional information Edits have been made as clarifications and questions were forthcoming. Email marketing You need to consider the applicable country's implementation of Directive 2002/58/EC as amended ("ePrivacy Directive"). For example, in the UK you could send such messages without consent to contacts at incorporated companies or public sector bodies, but would have required consent for sole traders, private individuals, or partners in an unincorporated partnership. In Ireland, you have an exemption to consent for existing customers who were offered the opportunity to opt out when their email address was collected, but must use the email address for marketing within 12 months. Each EU country will have a different implementation of the Directive. In the Netherlands, Article 17 of the Telecommunications Act implements Directive 2003/58/EC and thus provisions for direct marketing by email. Processing by automated means Processing by automated means refers to processing of personal data in electronic, rather than manual form. All electronic processing is within the material scope of the GDPR, while only manual processing that forms or is intended to form part of a filing system is. Recital 15: The protection of natural persons should apply to the processing of personal data by automated means, as well as to manual processing, if the personal data are contained or are intended to be contained in a filing system. Art. 4(2): ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means ICO guidance What is personal data?: The GDPR covers the processing of personal data in two ways: personal data processed wholly or partly by automated means (that is, information in electronic form); and personal data processed in a non-automated manner which forms part of, or is intended to form part of, a ‘filing system’ (that is, manual information in a filing system). | Keeping logs of chats would not necessarily be against the GDPR as you have suggested. For the IRC service provider/operator: these chats/logs would be within scope if EU-based users are involved and this means the data controller/processors would have legal obligations to comply with GDPR. The IRC service provider/operator would be the data controller and would be held ultimately responsible for the data stored/processed through the IRC service, including backups and logs kept etc, and this would mean any sub-processors they select (such as hosting provider) would also have to be GDPR compliant. Due to the nature of IRC chats being entirely public in the same way forum board posts and comments are public, the contract terms between the IRC service provider and the IRC users would need to be very clear that this is the case, and the IRC users would need to give consent for this processing (this is more complicated for children, see Article 8 regarding consent from the holder of parental responsibility). For IRC users (personal use): If you wish to keep the chat records for personal use only (i.e. not in connection with a business or your employment at a business), then an exemption applies: This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; ... (GDPR, Article 2: Material Scope, Paragraph 2(c), p.32) For IRC users (commercial/business use): In this case I don't think you would have any legal basis to store/process these chats/logs if they contain personal data without a legal agreement with the data controller which would require you to put in place the same protections they have to under GDPR but then allow your business to access the data for specific purposes. While the information may be published or considered to be in the 'public domain', for you to take a copy of it without permission and use it for a purpose they haven't consented to would not be allowed under GDPR. Additionally, to go through the process of removing personal data from the chats/logs would in itself be considered 'processing' under GDPR and therefore would be unauthorised without a legal agreement with the data controller. Practically therefore, your best options under this circumstance would be if: The IRC service provider implemented a 'favourites' feature to save within their own system the chat conversations you wish to retain and refer back to in future. Since they hold the data and you already have a user agreement with them there is no further complications (this is probably the best option); The IRC service provider implemented a feature to download an anonymized copy of a chat conversation (not ideal as there are no guaruntees a user will not include personal data in their messages, though the user agreement could state that message content will be considered to exclude personal data, in a similar way to how StackExchange do for this website, see the paragraph titled "Information You Choose to Display Publicly on the Network" on the StackExchange Privacy Policy). Your business considered an alternative communications solution, such as hosting its own real-time chat system or forum boards system, in which case your business would be the data controller, and while subject to GDPR you could then define the purposes for which the data will be used in your own user agreement. |
Are tickets actualy illegitimate Tickets are a de facto road toll and are therefore federally prohibited. Since you can be ticketed just before entering a highway they are a de facto FHWA violation and a taking of property. Also, local governments are violating their own zoning if they toll a road, and the state doesn't even give them the right to zone a toll road. | You're wrong. RCW 46.61.415 empowers local authorities to establish and change speed limits in Washington, and ORC 4511.21 delegates the same power in Ohio. Whether or not a locality has the power to pass such laws depends on the laws of that state. | No. The laws specify what you can and what you cannot do. If the intent of the authority was that you were allowed to drive at 45 mph, you would have a speed limit of 45 mph, not a speed limit of 40 mph. If you go at 41 mph, you are breaking a law and can be punished. That said, law enforcement officers usually have some leeway on how to enforce the law, and they could very well let it pass with just a warning (or even ignore it if they have more pressing issues); the circunstances of it are specific to every situation and officer. The only point that could be made would be if the difference was so small that it could be argued that it can invalidate the evidence on the basis of margin of errors. If the radar catches you driving at 41 mph but the error margin of the radar is 5%, you could argue that you were driving at 39 mph and that the reading is due to the error in the radar1. That would enable you to challenge the evidence (but here the point is not that you are allowed to drive at 41 mph but that there is no proof that you were driving at 41 mph). From what I know, most police forces will be aware of that and avoid issuing fines unless you are well above that margin of error2. 1In fact, in Spain word of the street is that radars are set to account to possible margin of error of the radar, plus possible margin of error of the vehicle speedometer -even if it is the vehicle owner's responsibility to ensure that it works correctly- and some leeway. 2Some people post on the internet the "magic formula" of how many % of speed you can go over the posted speed limit based on those calculations. Of course those magic formulas rely in the radar and the speedometer being 100% accurate and the driver never getting distracted a few seconds and passing it. So, even assuming that those magic formulas are correct, if either the radar or the speedometer are not accurate or the driver gets distracted for a few seconds, you are at risk of getting a ticket. | The problem is that the law enforcement authorities could easily contend that the simple fact of a police car on the road projects the power and authority of law enforcement, and if a car was built and driven by someone who is not an officer, that would constitute impersonation because people would assume only a police officer would be driving a police car. The police could cite the driver for impersonation; the merits of the case could be decided in court, but it's speculation on what conclusion would be made. There's always the fact that Oregon law could be quickly amended to outlaw personal or custom vehicles which simply appear to be law enforcement vehicles, if the legislature saw the need in response to police requests or requests from the public. Current Oregon law can already interpreted to include those who impersonate the police in a vehicle. There are several recent news articles: One from ktvl.com: Anyone caught impersonating an officer is facing a Class C felony charge, with potentially up to three years in prison. And another: Police impersonator pulls over Oregon driver, turns himself in - oregonlive.com: ...turned himself in to police on Friday evening, OSP said in a release. He was cited and released for criminal impersonation of a public servant and disorderly conduct. | I have beaten all but one of my traffic tickets just by going to court. In one case, the judge threw out the charge because he couldn't read the officer's handwriting on the ticket. In another, the officer charged that I was parked in a "no parking" zone on a particular street (at night), but gave a cross street where parking was, in fact, allowed. | Traffic tickets are not equity law. This said, equity has not been done away with. It has merged with law in almost all states, and in some states, equitable defenses are available to legal claims (although in others equitable defenses are only available to equitable claims). | If the judge is kind, yes However, this is at the discretion of the judge. Even if the judge believes every word you say, you still broke the law. The speed limit in Michigan is “a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper” and that is not “greater than that which will permit a stop within the assured, clear distance ahead.” (MCL 257.627(1)). The posted speed limit is an upper bound on what is “careful and prudent”. Given you description of trucks obstructing your view, it’s arguable that the speed you were travelling at was not “careful and prudent”. The speed limit in school zones may be set at “not more than 20 miles per hour less than the speed limit normally posted but shall be not less than 25 miles per hour.” (MCL 257.627a(2)). And the speed limit on a local street in an area zoned for residential use is 25 mph “unless another speed is fixed and posted.” If you were in a residential street, the school zone speed is no different from the normal speed - the lights just serve to warn drivers that children are about. Finally, you are responsible for knowing the law. You are on that road at that time, it’s your duty to know what the posted limit is as well as determining what speed is “careful and prudent”. It doesn’t matter if it’s hard to know, the law presumes you know it. All that said, if you catch the judge in a good mood, they might give you a break. You don’t have a legal right to one so ask, don’t demand. | I do not know whether anyone has ever tried it, but it would not take much for a judge to conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of a speed limit sign is that the speed is to be measured relative to the surface of the road or to any other object that is stationary in that frame of reference. Does there exist provisions in any legal system to fix this legal loophole? Most rules for interpreting legal texts fix "loopholes" of this sort by providing for the consideration only of interpretations that are reasonably likely to have been intended, or that a reasonable person might arrive at. The interpretation that the speed limit could be measured against any frame of reference (or indeed any one other than that of the Earth's surface) is not reasonable. | Yes, that's exactly what it means. Using it to pass means passing on the right at high speed in a narrow lane full of debris, which is crazy. But they're also saying don't use any arbitrary point on the emergency lane as a turnout. A turnout is a designated "wide spot" made to allow a slower vehicle to be polite and exit the roadway for a moment to allow stacked up traffic behind them to pass. If you want to help people pass, watch for reasonable opportunities to do so, and slow down a bit to help them position for the pass. Then once they commit, slow down more to help them get back in. |
When gun used to kill in self defense and the gun is taken as evidence, can you get it back? Scenario: John Doe uses a gun to kill a criminal in self defense. That gun, the one used, is taken as evidence by law enforcement so it can be investigated and/or used trial or for whatever reasons need be. In the aftermath, tensions heighten and the state charges Mr. Doe with murder. John Doe now has to go through a trial. Months later the trial is finally here. Trial starts. Gun is shown in trial. Witnesses testify all truths. Both sides plead their case to the jury. Trial ends with jury acquitting John Doe because they believe from the evidence they were shown that his actions were legally justified. So now at this point.. THE QUESTION: Can John Doe ask to get his gun back now? Or Can the state/or L.E. give John Doe his gun back at this point? If "No." Then why not? | Law Enforcement can return a firearm to its owner so long as the owner is not prohibited from possessing firearms, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). A person can demand the return of property seized as evidence, if both: The property is not needed for evidence in a criminal trial. The property is not "contraband" (meaning illegal for the claimant to possess). If Law Enforcement does not agree to return the property then the owner can petition a Court of jurisdiction for an order that it be returned. | Since we don't have a system of robot justice, it's impossible to say whether a prosecutor would file charges in this bizarre circumstance, since filing charges is discretionary. However, this situation does fit the description of murder. It is intentional, it causes death (maybe, vide infra), it is not legally justified (as self-defense, or as an act legally sanctioned by a state executioner), the victim is a person. It is not sanctioned by any "death with dignity" statute. The one issue that might be effectively argued by the defense assuming the irrefutability of the factual claims of your scenario is that perhaps the relevant crime is assault with a deadly weapon, since it probably could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim died from the shooting, and not from being incinerated by lava. It depends on where the person is shot, and with what. | The General Rule In practice, the only time when self-defense against a police officer is legal is when you do not know and have no reasonable way that you could have known that the person attacking you is a police officer. (And arguably, a police officer acting in an official capacity in furtherance of his or her duties, rather than in a personal capacity as an individual.) For example, if the police do a no knock raid in the dark of night, and don't announce themselves, and you shoot police officers reasonably believing them to be home invasion burglars, you would not have criminal or civil liability for doing so. A similar valid self-defense claim might arise when someone has an objectively reasonable reason to think that someone claiming to be a police officer is really just a criminal impersonating a police officer, even if that belief is, in fact, mistaken. In almost all other circumstances, you need to submit to the officers, and you are pretty much required by law to bear the risk that excessive force by the officer will harm you. If you don't, you will probably be guilty of the crime of resisting arrest and will not be entitled to a self-defense defense. The fact that you are not actually guilty of a crime is irrelevant. This is often the case and police officers are not omniscient. If the officer lacked probable cause for an arrest (which there is often no way that the person being arrested or attacked can know at the time), the remedy is a civil rights suit after the fact, not self-defense. In theory, there might be other isolated circumstances where self-defense against a police officer is legal, but they involve fact patterns so quirky that they would almost never happen in real life, or would almost never be possible to prove in a manner that the courts would believe. Officer Liability For Harming Someone Legitimately Acting In Self Defense Whether the officers had civil liability to you if you were harmed by the officers while exercising your right to self-defense would depend upon their state of mind, even if you were rightfully using self-defense. For example, a U.S. Supreme Court case decided in January of 2017 (White v. Pauly) involved this fact pattern. In White v. Pauly an officer arrived late on the scene and had no reason to believe that the officers who arrived there before him and were being shot at by citizens in a house that they were approaching, lacked probable cause, or had not announced themselves. The court held that as a result, he had no civil liability to a citizen he shot, even if the person who the late arriving officer shot while that citizen was shooting back at the police officers on the scene was actually engaging in good faith self-defense. The citizen's self-defense in the case had a valid defense to criminal or civil liability for firing on the officers, because the citizen shooting back didn't actually know that the people approaching his house were police officers. But, because the late arriving officer reasonably believed under the circumstances that the citizen had no right to engage in self-defense, because he thought that the early arriving officers had probable cause and had announced themselves, the late arriving officer had no civil liability to the citizens he shot. | Charlie may or may not be guilty of murder or of attempted murder. It depends upon his intent and knowledge, which the question doesn't flesh out sufficiently to evaluate. Why did Charlie bodyslam Bob? The reason matters a lot. Did Charlie know that the building was on fire? Was Charlie trying to kill Bob? Was the thing that Bob knocked his head upon an intended result of the bodyslam, or an intervening cause? Did Charlie's initially less culpable act and his knowledge combine to create a duty to rescue and what offense (probably not murder) would it be if a death resulted from a failure to rescue? Alice is likely to be guilty of murder, but on a felony-murder theory, rather than on a transferred intent theory. In most, but not all, states if you are in the process of committing one of an enumerated list of specific felonies that pose a high risk of serious injury or death, such as arson, you are guilty of murder in the event that anyone (even a co-conspirator) dies as a result of your felonious course of conduct, whether or not you intended that a death result. Alice might have been able to purge her felony-murder liability if she had tried to put out the fire and save Bob once she realized that he was in danger, under the exception to felony-murder for renunciation of a course of felonious conduct, but she didn't even try. The doctrine of transferred intent in a murder case usually applies when you intent to kill one person and instead end up killing someone else. But, Alice didn't intend to kill anyway, so this doctrine does not apply. Alice's best defense would be that the death was a result of the attack by Charlie, rather than by the fire, which she would merely have to establish a reasonable doubt regarding. But, ultimately that would be a weak defense for her. | The legal question is whether you can be convicted of a crime under the laws of some jurisdiction on earth. I'll start by assuming that you are in a jurisdiction where you can legally possess firearms and carry them in public. Since you added "and commits suicide", I assume you're not asking if it is a crime to drop a firearm, the question is just criminal culpability for this consequence. Now we will zoom into the laws of a specific jurisdiction, Washington state. RCW 9A.36.060 says A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he or she knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide. The question then is whether your act "knowingly causes or aids" an attempted suicide. You turn to the jury instructions to see what that means: A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a [fact] [circumstance] [or] [result] when he or she is aware of that [fact] [circumstance] [or] [result]. [It is not necessary that the person know that the [fact] [circumstance] [or] [result] is defined by law as being unlawful or an element of a crime.] If a person has information that would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that a fact exists, the jury is permitted but not required to find that he or she acted with knowledge of that fact. [When acting knowingly [as to a particular fact] is required to establish an element of a crime, the element is also established if a person acts intentionally [as to that fact].] The outcome depends on specific circumstances. For example, "accidentally and unknowingly drop and leave" will not sustain a conviction. "Intentionally drop and leave" could, but you would also have to other information connecting the suicide to the availability of a weapon. If you intentionally drop and leave a firearm at a shooting range, a reasonable person would not think "OMG someone might see this weapon and kill themselves with it! Hahaha!". You can spin a yarn where you know that Smith is suicidal and will kill himself if he has a weapon, so that dropping the gun off constitutes "knowingly aiding". | I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking. | The burden for proving claims in civil actions is "preponderance of evidence," i.e., merely that "more than 50% of the evidence favors a conclusion." However, the standard for conviction of any crime is "beyond a reasonable doubt." I.e., if the defense can raise reasonable doubt about one's guilt then the defendant should be acquitted. There is quite a bit of space between the two standards, which is compounded by prosecutorial discretion to even bring criminal charges. | Is this realistic? Yes. The dramatic performance plays out in the same way that it would in the U.S. Court system. The actual killing of the wife would be 'legal', so can he be charged for murder for something that has been done legally, only because they can prove is intent to kill her before that? Especially since he has already been acquitted of that fact. Mostly, this is an issue of causation and not double jeopardy. From a double jeopardy perspective, the crime of murder is not complete until the person dies, and they have not be tried for murder, so this is a different crime that had not occurred until after the attempted murder trial was over. Causation Issues Even if the immediate cause of the wife's death is withdrawal of life support, the shooting could still be a legally sufficient cause of the wife's death. For example, suppose that you shoot someone and the hospital can't give the victim a blood transfusion because the victim has blood type O- (universal donor) which can only receive blood from other people with blood type O-, and the hospital, due to negligence on the part of a hospital administrator, has run out out of type O- blood. The fact that the victim would not have died if the hospital has not negligently failed to have type O- blood on hand does not provide a defense to murder on the part of the person who shot her. While terminating life support is "legal" it also constitutes a non-judicial finding with legal effect on the part of the person authorizing it and the physicians signing off on the decision, the further medical care would have been futile and that the person whose life support was terminated was already dead in key material respects, even though they would not be dead for purposes of a murder charge until life support is terminated. When death is a natural and foreseeable result of action that causes physical harm, the death is caused by the act that causes the physical harm. Something else that causes death would have to be a "superseding cause" and not just an additional cause of death. Thus, the fact that life support was terminated legally does not mean that she cannot be a murder victim. Indeed, many murder victims are people who are on life support for some period of time and then have that life support terminated because it is futile to continue medical care and the person is already "brain dead" or something equivalent to that. Collateral Estoppel Issues Double jeopardy does carry with it a related concept of "collateral estoppel" which provides that facts necessarily decided in one criminal case cannot be decided differently in a subsequent, related criminal case in some circumstances. But, collateral estoppel applies only when the facts in the prior criminal case were necessarily decided on the merits in the prior criminal case. Acquittal of criminal charged does not necessarily include a determination that someone was innocent of the charges. The fact that he was acquitted of attempted murder does not mean that the jury found that he didn't attempt or intend to murder her. In particular, a dismissal of criminal charges as a result of a technicality that excluded evidence related to an element of the crime for which there was an acquittal, is not a determination on the merits that a particular element of a crime was actually absent, so it would not be binding in the subsequent criminal case for murder. An acquittal does not mean that every element of the prior criminal charges was found not to be present. Collateral estoppel arising from the double jeopardy right, in contrast, might be a ground for dismissal of the murder case, if the man's primary (and perhaps only) defense to the attempted murder case had been that he had established the affirmative defense that someone else committed the murder, or that he had an alibi that made it impossible for him to have committed the murder. Then, the jury would have found on the merits that this defense, equally applicable to the murder case, had already been established. |
Authority of opposite decision on international law of other U.S. court of appeals in state court in instant circuit court Say the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit decides that the provision of a self-executing, ratified-by-the-U.S. international treaty which provides for an individual right does not provide such individual right. However, the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit decides (at a later time) that the treaty does indeed provide for an individual right in the U.S.. Is there, preferably a U.S. Supreme Court decision, or any other case law that decided that the newer circuit court decision relating to federal (or more narrowly relating to international law) should enjoy a rebuttable presumption to be correct over the older one or any case that decided that the circuit court with geographic jurisdiction should enjoy such a presumption regardless of its precedence or antecedence? Or else, is there anything similar that at least decided this question for the geographic jurisdiction of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, that is, is there such a precedent that declares it’s own authority in federal (or more narrowly) international law matters over the decisions of the U.S. court of appeals for any other circuit? I understand that such out-of-circuit cases may be cited without a problem, and they will definitely have persuasive authority (unlike, for e.g. generally unpublished decisions), but the question is whether geographic or the temporal instancy in opposing decisions makes one over the other binding authority. | The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 9th Circuit. The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 7th Circuit. These decisions are not binding precedents, even as to federal law, on state courts, or in any other circuits, although they are persuasive authority in all jurisdictions that don't have a contrary binding precedent. When two circuits reach contrary legal conclusions in binding precedents, this is called a circuit split. Sometimes, circuit splits are resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court (a large share of its docket is devoted to such cases). Sometimes Congress wakes up and enacts a law that resolves the dispute if it involves a non-constitutional issue. Sometimes (arguably, most of the time), circuit splits go unresolved for years or even decades, and the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in one part of the United States is different from the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in another part of the United States. In some other circuit where the legal issue that is the subject of the circuit split is question of first impression with no binding case law decided in that circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, the parties will offer up persuasive authority from the 7th and 9th Circuits that have previously issued binding precedents on the issue and will try to argue that the one that favors them is correct, or that there is a third way to consider the issue that also favors them. Indeed, often the U.S. Supreme Court deliberately refrains from resolving circuit splits until a clear majority has emerged favoring one view or the other. Even simply counting how many circuit splits exist is a surprisingly tricky matter. For example, one database estimates that 29%-41% of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in recent years resolved circuit splits (at the same link) but that was realistically an underestimate. the question is whether geographic or the temporal instancy in opposing decisions makes one over the other binding authority. There is not. There is no procedural rule that resolves a circuit split. | Would a district judge within the Seventh Circuit be allowed to consider the full Bowman quote, or is it restricted to the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Bowman quote? "Bowman quote" aside, in case of conflict between SCOTUS and appellate precedents, a district judge ought to follow SCOTUS precedent to the extent that it directly controls the matter at issue. Otherwise, the district judge would propagate the appellate contravention of the principle formulated in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989): If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions. Bowman states that the legislative intent of extra-territorial operativeness is obvious for some types of crimes. In other words, that the legislator does not need to expressly indicate extra-territoriality for certain classes of crimes. Leija-Sanchez 602 F.3d 797 (2010) does not misconstrue Bowman. Instead, it truncated a statement therefrom. A truncated citation does not create precedent. Furthermore, that truncation is inconsequential because "indeed, all of the conduct ascribed to Leija-Sanchez took place here", Leija-Sanchez at 801 (emphasis in original). That defeats defendant's argument regarding extra-territoriality. Even if a party attempted to take advantage of the truncation in Leija-Sanchez, the adversary would defeat that attempt by pointing out the material portion being omitted. | In brief: In common law systems, are there specific laws? Yes. Are they written down? Yes, here are the laws of Australia and New Zealand. Or are there only previous court rulings? No. Elaboration: Broadly (and rather vaguely) speaking there are 3 sources of law in a common law jurisdiction: Statute law which consists of the Acts passed by the legislature Administrative law which consists of the rules and regulations made by the administrative arm of government under the powers granted them by the constitution or delegated by the legislature Case law which consists of the decisions made by the courts; this can be decisions based on Long-standing precedents whose origins are lost in the mists of time Interpretations of statute and administrative law It is important to remember that the courts only get involved to resolve conflicts (civil or criminal) - they do not unilaterally make decisions on the law. Judges (if they are wise) never give opinions on the law - that is the role of solicitors and barristers who are the paid advocates of the parties. The role of a judge is to decide how the law fits the circumstances of the particular case before them. To do this they interpret the statutes, administrative rules and decisions made by other judges on similar cases. The decision of a superior court is binding on a subordinate court, persuasive on an equivalent court or a court in a parallel jurisdiction and subject to review by a superior court. The overwhelming majority of cases do not make new case law - most of the arguments in court are about why (or why not) the established law applies to the current facts; they are not about what the law is. Occasionally a decision will be made that modifies the previous interpretation or even more rarely represents a paradigm shift - those are the cases that matter! | In most US states such rules are set by the state's highest court, often but not always known as the State Supreme Court. The legislature could set such rules, but normally does not. It may authorize the court to do so. Mote that the Oregon rules (on a page easy to reach for the one linked above) say: Proposed changes to the Uniform Trial Court Rules (UTCR) and Supplementary Local Rules (SLR) are reviewed annually by the UTCR Committee. The committee makes recommendations to approve, disapprove or modify these proposals. After considering these recommendations, the Chief Justice or the entire Supreme Court, reaches a final decision on whether to approve or disapprove a proposed change. The Georgia rules state: **Rule 1. PREAMBLE **- Pursuant to the inherent powers of the Court and Article VI, Section IX, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, and in order to provide for the speedy, efficient and inexpensive resolution of disputes and prosecutions, these rules are promulgated. Rule 1.6 The Council of Superior Court Judges shall have a permanent committee to recommend to the Supreme Court such changes and additions to these rules as may from time to time appear necessary or desirable. [Emphasis added] Many other states have somewhat similar procedures. Others including NY and California, set more of the rules by statute. On the Federal level, the various Federal Rules of Procedure (Civil, Criminal, and Supreme Court, perhaps others) are set by the Supreme Court, although they are usually drafted by an ABA committee Court appointed advisory committee and submitted to the Court for approval, I understand. Many (but not all) state rules closely imitate the Federal rules, down to the numbering and wording in many cases. | Websites are not ships that can choose a flag of convenience to govern which country's laws govern them. Generally speaking an analysis of which jurisdiction's law applies (which is strictly speaking a "choice of law" question as much as it is a jurisdiction question) isn't undertaken on a website by website, or business by business basis. Instead, jurisdiction and choice of law are evaluated on a claim by claim basis. The owners of a website may be subject to some claims in India, to some in Bhutan, and to others in the United States, depending upon the claim. Without knowing who is trying to sue for what, you can't know. Generally speaking, a business that operates in multiple jurisdictions, like a website, will be subject to the laws of all of the jurisdictions in which it does business in regard to claims with a connection to those jurisdictions. Of course, as a practical matter, only claims that can be enforced against the owners of the website are relevant, which usually means that only claims brought where the owners reside or own assets are relevant. If the website owners own property or have amounts payable to them in India, there is a very good chance that India can, as a practical matter, assert jurisdiction over them. And, it is likely, as a practical matter, that Saudi Arabia or China would not be able to assert jurisdiction over them in a meaningful way. The fact that businesses can be conducted through legal entities further complicates the analysis. But, at any rate, the place to begin is to realize that the question "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall?" is basically a category error. You need to ask "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall when it is sued or prosecuted for X kind of matter by someone who lives in Y?" So, really, this one question is actually dozens or hundreds of questions that each have to be analyzed individually. | The existence of a law/legal system is the province of sovereign states. We do not have a world government so there is no world legal system. There is such a thing as international law, however, that is based on what the sovereign nations of the world agree is international law (usually in a treaty) and the degree to which they have implemented them in domestic law. For example, the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over US nationals because the United States of America has refused to ratify the treaty that created it. There are also supra-national entities like the EU whose directives are binding on their member states and such states are required, as a condition of their membership, to enforce such directives domestically. A sovereign state's courts will decide when a person and their activities falls within their jurisdiction based on the circumstances of the particular case. For example, an Australian citizen can be prosecuted in Australia for paying a bribe to a foreign official in a foreign country even while working on behalf of a foreign company even if such activity is locally lawful. Why? Because Australia is a sovereign nation and it says it can. Sometimes it is impossible for a person to comply with the laws of multiple nations. For example, if the EU requires that certain data about their citizens is to be made confidential but the laws of the USA require a US corporation to disclose this information then it is impossible to comply with both. A person in such a position must decide which laws they will break. It is partly for that reason that multi-national corporations are usually multiple corporations i.e. they have a different corporate subsidiary in each jurisdiction (tax is another reason). For example, if all EU citizens do business with Google (Europe) then Google (USA) can rightfully claim that it has no data about European citizens to disclose. | No they are not the same statement. Who has jurisdiction? Let's disentangle a few things: A jurisdiction is an entity that has sovereignty to make, interpret and enforce its own laws. Each country in the world is a jurisdiction. Sub-national entities like states, provinces and municipalities may be a jurisdiction depending on the operation of law in the country they are part of. Some supra-national bodies like the EU and the UN are jurisdictions. To some extent, even companies, clubs and similar bodies are jurisdictions to the extent that they can make, interpret and enforce its own rules. A jurisdiction can decide that it has jurisdiction based on a whole raft of matters including: where the event took place where the party(s) are resident where the party(s) are citizens registration of things like planes, trains and automobiles if money passed through their financial system etc. A court or tribunal has jurisdiction if the jurisdiction has jurisdiction and it is the correct body within its jurisdiction to hear a particular matter. Which laws apply? Once a court or tribunal has decided that it does have jurisdiction it then needs to know what law to apply. This may be the law of their jurisdiction or another jurisdiction or both. Example For example, imagine there is a company in New York, USA that sells a product to a consumer in New South Wales, Australia. Further suppose that the contract says it will be governed by the laws of Ontario, Canada (don't ask me why). In the event of dispute, let's say the consumer begins proceedings in the Local Court in New South Wales. The New York company petitions the court to say that the correct forum is the court in Ontario, or New York, or Mexico where the product shipped from but certainly not New South Wales. The court in New South Wales will consider the jurisdictional arguments and decide if it does or does not have jurisdiction. If it decides that it doesn't then the customer would have to bring an action somewhere else (where the process repeats). Worth noting that the New York company would be precluded from arguing in that forum that New South Wales was the right jurisdiction because they can't have their cake ... If it decides that it does have jurisdiction then it would consider what law applies. Its quite probable that they would accept that the contract is governed by Quebec law. However, Australian law, most specifically the Australian Consumer Law would also apply. If there was a claim on a tortuous basis this might be New South Wales or New York law. They would then proceed to decide the case on the applicable law including working out how to reconcile any incompatibilities. | This is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1401 which details who qualifies for "birthright citizenship". Including of course the condition mandated by the 14th ammendment, Congress is otherwise free to bestow such citizenship essentially as it pleases by duly enacted legislation. One of the cases that receives birthright citizenship is a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States. So the presumption for young children found in the US is that they are citizens by birth. The law in particular requires positive proof that the individual in question was definitely not born in the United States. Lacking this, or it failing to be found prior to reaching the age of 21 years, they are citizens. For other cases, this will likely end up falling to the courts, who will decide the matter on the preponderance of the evidence. In this case it becomes the burden of the individual claiming citizenship to establish that they are a citizen*. Birth certificates can be filed after birth, and can be submitted as evidence. The laws controlling the validity of birth certificates is locally determined. If there are other birth certificates from other countries, or conflicting witness testimony, then it will fall to the court to decide which case is more likely based on the evidence available. *More accurately the burden generally falls on the entity making the claim about someone's citizenship (their own or someone else's). In a deportation hearing, for example, it falls to the government to establish the individual is not a US citizen. Deporation only applies to aliens, so the defendant must be established as such. |
Can true statements or statements of opnion be libel or defamation in any country? This is inspired by this thread on Writing.SE. Under US law, a true statement can never be defamatory, and neither can a statement of opinion, as opposed to a factual statement. Are there any countries where a statement proven true can still be valid grounds for a defamation or libel judgement? Are there any countries where a statement of opinion can be valid grounds for a defamation or libel judgement? Are either of these a matter of the common-law system vs the civil-law system? | One example is Sweden. Ebba Busch, the leader of the Christian Democrat party, accepted an order of summary punishment for writing in a Facebook post that the lawyer of her opponent in a real estate dispute has a criminal conviction, which is true. She said, "I admit having committed a crime, that I in my soul and heart consider myself innocent of. [...] But in Sweden, even the truth can be libel." A professor of civil law commented: "I'm a bit worried that there could be a campaign for true statements on social media always to be permitted, it would amount to terrible consequences and a negative development. In Sweden, libel law has been used to counteract spreading of revenge porn and sex videos of young women. Truth is not unimportant, it is taken into account in the libel process. It would be a negative development if it became allowed to spread everything that is true, in that case you'd need a more precise proposal about how you would permit certain actions and not others." | In the United States at least, the answer is clearly "Yes". Absent some restrictive agreement to which the would-be blogger is explicitly a party, a person has a protected right to comment or report on events and publish opinions of them. The question does not mention a location or jurisdiction, and I am not suren what the law on this point might be in non-US jurisdictions. | Sometimes In general, intentionally false speech gets less protection than other speech, and in some cases it is unprotected. The classic example of speech that is unprotected is "Falsely shouting FIRE in a crowded theater". Note that this is both intentionally false and highly likely to be seriously harmful to multiple uninvolved people. On the other hand, the classic case of New York Times vs Sullivan said that, at least when the subjects were public officials (later broadened to public figures) it was not enough to prove simple falsehood in a defamation case, one must prove "actual malice" (an unfortunate term) which in this context means statements that are either knowingly false or are made with reckless disregard for the truth. The court in that case said, in effect, that if a newspaper had to be sure that its every statement could be proved true in every detail, it would be unwilling to vigorously report on matters of significant public concern (this is a paraphrase, I'll add a quote later). Opinions are considered legally not to be either false or true. "President Jone is the worst leader the US has ever had" Is a statement of opinion, and so is not defamation. Moreover, in political contexts, attempts to punish false statements of fact that are not defamatory have been held unconstitutional. One example was the "Stolen Valor" act, which punished falsely claiming to have been awarded a medal by the US armed forces. This was held to be against the First Amendment. In general, regulation of speech (which here includes writing and other forms of communication) must be fairly narrowly drawn and must have good reasons behind them to survive a court challenge. How much so depends on the nature of the law, and particularly whether it is "content-neutral" or not. Details and cites to come when i have a little more time. | does a reference for a candidate employee have liability for what they say about the candidate? To my understanding lying isn't illegal. Lying is unlawful to the extent that the liar's deliberate intent to mislead other(s) causes or is likely to cause unwarranted harm. This is regardless of whether "the person acting as a reference isn't under obligation not to be a reference". Lies can directly harm the candidate and/or the company, and others indirectly. The harm to the candidate is known as, or comes in the form of, defamation. Depending on the jurisdiction, an intent to mislead might not even be a prerrequisite for liability. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 600.2911(7) allows suits for libel or slander if "the defamatory falsehood concerns the private individual and was published negligently" (emphasis added). The liar's intent to mislead and his knowledge of the falsehood of his statements can only worsen the harm inflicted and his liability therefor. Likewise, the liar can be liable to the company for inducing it to hire a candidate the company would not have hired had it known the truth. Liability ensues when the hired candidate makes the company incur losses which would be prevented by relying on a truthful reference. If the reference is truthful, the chances for liability are significantly narrower. These scenarios typically involve matters of privacy or disclosures that are protected/sanctioned by law. | Yes Deciding a case on a basis the parties have not raised is a denial of natural justice (or procedural fairness) and invalid. The reason is very simple, the parties have not had the opportunity to produce evidence or make submissions about C or D that might have changed the judge’s mind about them. Notwithstanding, to successfully appeal, the aggrieved party must show there were arguments that could have been raised which could reasonably have altered the outcome. That said, it’s the judge’s courtroom and they can say “That’s interesting but what about C and D?” and then the parties can make submissions about them. They do have to be circumspect and make sure that they do not become one party’s advocate - one party might be well aware of C and D and don’t want them brought up because they damage their case and they are hoping the other party misses that - and then the bloody judge come charging in with his bloody duty to wider interests of justice. Non-judicial decision makers like arbitrators, adjudicators and other tribunals need to be even more circumspect because they generally don’t have a duty to anyone but the parties. Unlike in civil law systems, the role of the judge is to decide the dispute between the parties as a referee, not to determine some objective”truth” as an investigator. To keep things simple: if the plaintiff contends that the light was red and the defendant contends the light was green then, assuming there is no evidence opening the possibility, it is not open to the judge to find that the light was amber. Similarly, if the parties agree that red means go and green means stop, it is not the judge's role to tell the parties they are wrong (I'm sure questions would be asked but if the parties are adamant ...): since there is no dispute over this issue the judge would be wrong to agitate one. Now, a judge is free to apply the law that was argued as a whole - if arguments centred on Section 14 of the Relevant Act 1875 but Section 15 is applicable and germane the judge is not wrong for applying Section 15. However, they are on shakier ground if the bring in Other Slightly Relevant Act 1956. | Mockery is allowed; hate speech isn’t While freedom of speech is guaranteed under French law it does have limits. Since 2004, these limits have applied to gender and sexuality. Mockery is contemptuous or insulting speech; hate speech or vilification incites hatred, serious contempt or ridicule. The boundary between them must be established on a case-by-case basis including both content and context (“I’m going to get you” can be a serious threat but it can also be what a father says to his child when chasing them in the park) but in France, as in other liberal democracies, the benefit of the doubt goes to speech being considered lawful. | Meta Considerations I'm not aware of any such cases and I don't think that there are any, because if there was, the case would have generated more publicity around a "glamorous" issue in the law. Despite the fact that constitutional law makes it much easier to bring defamation cases when one is a private individual suing a non-media defendant in a matter of private concern, any search of the case law reveals that the defamation cases that actually get brought are those against media defendants and those involving matters of public concern. Private individuals rarely suffer enough harm to make it economical to bring a defamation suit, and people whose lives are not a matter of public concern rarely have deep pockets to hire attorneys to bring defamation lawsuits. Only Nominal Damages And No Attorneys' Fees Could Be Recovered First of all, even in a negligence per se case, where an award of nominal damages (i.e. $1 and court costs excluding attorneys' fees) is allowed as matter of law to the prevailing party, I don't think that an award of more than nominal damages would be upheld in the face of affirmative evidence that there was no actual harm to the reputation of the person defamed as a result of the publication of the defamatory statement. In defamation per se cases, nominal damages are awarded when "there is no proof that serious harm has resulted from the defendant's attack upon the plaintiff's character and reputation" or "when they are the only damages claimed, and the action is brought for the purpose of vindicating the plaintiff's character by a verdict of a jury that establishes the falsity of the defamatory matter." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 620 cmt. a (1977). This would apply in a case of complete disbelief. Since the American rule applies to attorneys' fees in defamation cases, this would make every such suit an economic loser – which doesn't mean that someone might not act in an economically irrational way to defend their honor or something like that. Suing Increases The Harm Rather Than Mitigating It The publicity of a public trial undermines that approach in the kind of case in the hypothetical as well. Absent a lawsuit, there are one or two people who don't even believe it who heard the defamatory statement. But, if you bring a lawsuit, given the likelihood that the media will cover such a case, millions of people will hear the defamatory statement and they may very well believe those statements because they don't know any better. Even if you are ultimately vindicated at the conclusion of a trial, many people will have heard the defamatory statements after the suit is filed, but will never find out that you were vindicated many months later following a trial. Massively spreading defamatory statements about yourself that nobody would otherwise have heard about is just stupid as a matter of litigation tactics. The Presumption Of Harm To Reputation May Be Rebuttable Secondly, it isn't obvious to me that the presumption of harm to reputation in a negligence per se case is a conclusive presumption as opposed to a rebuttable presumption. For example, one can generally argue in a defamation case that someone's reputation before the defamatory statement was made is so irretrievably bad in the area related to the defamatory statement that it is impossible to damage someone's reputation any further, and so far as I know, that argument is not prohibited in negligence per se cases. For example, an intentionally false defamatory statement (which he can prove is false with an iron clad alibi and which the maker of the statement admits was made up at trial) that Ted Bundy once punched a prostitute in the nose giving her a black eye at the Moonbeam Bar at a particular date in the midst of Ted Bundy's serial killing spree, while constituting negligence per se might not state a claim for relief given that Ted Bundy's reputation for not being a violent criminal is already hopelessly tarnished by his multiple murder convictions for similar conduct. Milkovic Can Be Evaluated In Context Third, I am inclined to think that Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1, one of the holdings is that "statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected," together with cases such as the New York Times case reflect an evolving understanding in the law (quite distinct from the British concept of defamation which has a bit of an "if you don't have something nice to say don't say anything at all" to it), that defamation is simply a special kind of fraud claim in U.S. law, and that the tort of defamation is only constitutional in the United States because it is a form of fraud claim. If defamation is and must be merely a special kind of fraud, then the reliance element of a fraud claim is probably constitutionally required in a case where the existence or absence of reliance can be discerned as a matter of fact, without resorting to generalities as the court in Milkovich had to since the statement was published to a large number of people. It would not be unreasonable (and arguably constitutionally mandatory) to read a gloss on the "statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected" standard of Milkovich, to include an implied "by the people to whom the statement was published" clause, which would have one meaning when a large number of people in the general public heard it, and another in a context when only one or two people actually heard the statement, or when it was only heard by a group of people who would interpret it differently than the general public would. And, if so, that would be a complete defense and would not just reduce the claim to one limited to nominal damages. This is not a great stretch. For example, in California the words of an alleged libel must be considered "according to the sense and meaning under all the circumstances attending the publication which such language may fairly be presumed to have conveyed to those to whom it was published." Macleod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal.2d 536, 546-547; Selleck v. Globe International, Inc., 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 1132. Libel Per Se No Longer Exists For Media Defendants Absent Actual Malice At one point it looked like the case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 481 U.S. 323, 349-350 (1974) might constitutionally eliminate libel per se, but this was premature. Gertz does not apply in cases involving matters of private concern to private individuals where the defendants are not media defendants. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (where a defendant's speech concerned a private individual and a matter of private concern, states could allow plaintiffs to recover presumed and punitive damages even absent a showing of actual malice). But, Dun & Bradstreet didn't address the question of whether the presumption of damages in a libel per se case was a conclusive presumption or a rebuttable one, because if it is a rebuttable presumption, then it could be overcome in the hypothetical of the question. And, it also doesn't address the question of whether the Milkovich analysis in a libel per se case must be context specific. In a case involving a media defendant and a private individual plaintiff the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 481 U.S. 323, 349-350 (1974) that: States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Additionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion, rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact. More to the point, the States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury. We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We need not define "actual injury," as trial courts have wide experience in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort actions. Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury. We also find no justification for allowing awards of punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held liable under state-defined standards of liability for defamation. In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused. And they remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions. They are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence. In short, the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury. See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459 (1976). In the cases where it applies, Gertz requires proof of actual damages and bars the award of punitive damages, as a First Amendment requirement, and since actual damages are entirely absent in the case of the defendants in the question's hypothetical, if Gertz applied to them, they would not prevail. Now, Gertz in 1974 when it was decided, had limitations – it involved media defendants for whom actual malice could not be shown, but it did eliminate the public figure/public concern requirement. But, it isn't obvious to me that the Gertz limitations have not been expanded since then. Libel per se no longer exists in cases governed by Gertz (i.e. media defendants for whom there is no showing of actual malice). From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So.2d 52 (Fla. App. 1981). Texas has expanded Gertz somewhat and held that even in cases where it does not apply, actual proof of actual damages is required to recover exemplary damages, even in libel per se cases where damages are presumed. Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. 1984). | In general, knowingly making a false statement as part of a commercial or financial transaction, or as part of a contract, with the intention that the other party will rely on that statement and be harmed by this is likely to be fraud. However, there are some limitations. For the lie to be common-law fraud: The other party must in fact rely on the false statement. The other party must suffer harm as a result of relying on the false statement. The reliance must be reasonable. If a seller advertises having new 1957 model cars in 2020, a court might well find that this was so improbable that no reasonable person would have relied on hte statement, and that therefore it is not fraud. Whether the reliance is reasonable depends on the overall facts of the case, and the details might affect what is considered reasonable. In some jurisdictions such a false statement might be actionable false advertising even if it is not fraud. If the US mails are used as part of a fraud or attempted fraud 18 U.S. Code § 1341 applies. This law applies whether any actual harm occured or not, adn whether the victim relied on the false statement or not. It is commonly known as "mail fraud". 18 U.S. Code CHAPTER 47 is a US Federal law that prohibits a variety of false statements and false documents. Section 1001 of this chapter prohibits false statements and documents "in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States" but I am not clear if this would apply in the case described in the question. Other sections of chapter 47 deal mostly with false statements made to the US Government, or to obtain money or benefits from the government, Or in connection with various particular regulated activities, and do not seem to apply to the case in the question. According to the Justia article on Fraud: Federal fraud statutes, along with most state laws, require proof of a “scheme or artifice” to defraud. The statutes do not provide an explicit definition of these terms, but courts have developed definitions through precedent. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Carpenter v. United States that the terms apply to any plan intended to deprive another of property, regardless of whether it would cause immediate financial harm. However, I think that a scheme such as the one described in the question would be more likely to be prosecuted by a US State than by the US Federal government. Either the state where the maker of the false statements was at the time of the statements, or the state where the victim was present could prosecute. |
Is mutual self defense a thing? Given very similar facts to the Rittenhouse case, but where the other guy shoots first, could that guy as a defendant claim self defense and win? Imagine two sides in a conflict which hasn’t resulted in much gunfire or death, in which a guy on each side carries a gun for protection. They encounter each other when each is leaning or reaching or tripping, or whatever it would take for them to unintentionally point their gun at your head. One of them reacts and raises their gun in defense, and the other one spots their move and points their gun at them. They both fire. They shoot each other and both are gravely injured (in fact, paralyzed). It seems like both guys claim and win on self defense in the USA. But if guns were illegal at that event, does then the violation of that open up the possibility of a different standard, or compounding crimes, which would find a conviction? EDIT: edited to change the question because in my first hypothetical, both people died. | You asked, "could that guy as defendant claim self defense and win?" First let's try to make it clear what is meant by "win". In the Rittenhouse trial, the defendant was charged of the following crimes: First-degree reckless homicide First-degree recklessly endangering safety (x2) First-degree intentional homicide Attempted first-degree intentional homicide Possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18 (dismissed) Failure to comply with an emergency order from state or local government (dismissed) Rather than thinking of the defendant as a "winner", it might be more appropriate to say that he was "acquitted" of these charges. If someone that was involved in the conflict fired first, as you described here: "They encounter each other when each is leaning or reaching or tripping, or whatever it would take for them to unintentionally point their gun at your head. You react and you raise your gun in defense, he spots your move and points his at you. You both fire. You shoot each other and you both are gravely injured. Like, paralyzed", then would they also be acquitted of all of the non-dismissed charges listed above? If everything was as you described ("unintentional", "reactionary", and "in defense"), then likely they would also not be found guilty of those crimes. It's not like they would "win", it's more like they will not be found guilty of committing one of those crimes. The precise outcome will depend on all the facts involved in the case, and the jury's decision based on those facts. So there is no single answer that always applies to every situation, but it sounds like you're wondering about some hypothetical situation that appears to be paradoxical because in this case only one person was charged with crimes: if someone else was the first shooter, the sequence of following events would first of all depend on whether or not they got charged with a crime, and I wouldn't characterize the outcome as a "win" or "lose" but as an "acquittal" or "conviction", and yes it is possible to be acquitted if everything is "accidental" as you described, and presumably not "reckless" (often meaning that a reasonable person in the same situation would have done the same thing). About your more broad question: "Is mutual self defense a thing?" It depends on what crime is being charged against the defendant. In the Rittenhouse case there was only one person that was charged. If you're asking about a hypothetical situation in which two people involved in a 1-on-1 conflict both claim self-defense, I hope I can assume that they were both charged with a crime against which to defend themselves in court in the first place. It is indeed possible for a State to prosecute both parties of a 1-on-1 physical conflict, and for both of them to successfully claim self-defense in order to eventually be both acquitted. It wouldn't be called "mutual self-defense", but each defendant would make their own self-defense case individually. | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. | It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial. | Under U.S. law, double jeopardy prevents you from being charged with the same charge twice, and also from being charged with any offense which is a lesser included offense of the charged offense, or a charge so substantially similar that for constitutional purposes it amounts to the same crime. Basically, the test is whether a prior acquittal would be inconsistent with a new criminal charge. For example, even though there is an additional element of the crime of murdering a postal officer to the crime of murdering someone on federal property, double jeopardy would probably bar a retrial of a murder on federal property case simply because the victim happened to be a postal worker and that element wasn't charged in the original indictment. This is because the acquittal of the first murder charge would almost always imply a jury determination that a murder didn't take place which would be inconsistent with a murder of a postal worker charge. On the other hand, a trial on a murder charge would probably not bar, for example, a trial on a burglary charge (which at common law involved trespassing with an intent to commit a crime), even if the burglary charge arose from the same conduct. This is because an acquittal on a murder charge isn't necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a trespass, or with the intent to commit some crime other than the murder for which the defendant was acquitted. But the exact way that the line gets draw is tricky and while what I have described is a good general summary of the cases interpreting the double jeopardy clause, it isn't a perfect one. This issue has been litigated many, many tines over the years, so there are a lot of cases that are squarely on point addressing specific fact patterns in precedents that are binding case law that are not always a perfect fit to the general principles. In these circumstances, the binding case law is going to control, at least until a court with appellate authority over the court whose case established the precedent in question decided to overrule a prior precedent from the lower court, or in the case of U.S. Supreme Court precedents, until the U.S. Supreme Court revisits one of its own prior precedents as wrong decided or wrongly interpreted, which happens now and then, although it is a rare event. | A problem with the question is that it uses the loaded term "victim". If you change the question to "Are there actions that you can perform involving another person, which are crimes even if the other person consents to participating in the action", then there are very many. Selling alcohol to a minor; selling heroin to anyone; selling sex in most US jurisdictions; selling firearms to a convicted felon. Also, for a physician to assist a person in suicide, in most states. Formerly in the US, various forms of sexual intercourse were acts that consent did not make legal. Whether or not the person is a "victim" in these cases is open to debate. In the case of physician-assisted suicide in Washington, the doctor is allowed to prescribe (oral) drugs that the person ingests: only a doctor is permitted to do this, both under the DWD Act and as a consequence that only a doctor can prescribe the drugs. There seems to be a belief that it is a crime to assist a person in committing suicide, which is probably correct if the assistance is shooting the person in the head, or in general directly causing the death (thus, "I give you permission to shoot me in the head" doesn't cut it). But from what I can tell, it is not generally against the law in Washington to help a person who commits suicide (e.g. supplying the means of self-dispatching). In some countries, suicide and helping with suicide is illegal, e.g. in Kenya Penal Code 225 says Any person who (a) procures another to kill himself; or (b) counsels another to kill himself and thereby induces him to do so; or (c) aids another in killing himself, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for life. No exception is created if the person consents to being aided to kill himself. | You may legally ask someone to shoot you, or do all sorts of other things to you. There are no laws against asking or various kinds of speech: laws restrict the doing. If you ask a person to shoot you and they do it, that person will probably be arrested for assault (or murder, depending on how it works out) – shooting a person is assault. A possible defense against an assault charge is consent, but that defense isn't freely available whenever a person says "I give my consent for you to assault me". You cannot consent to foreseeable serious bodily injury (more accurately, the law does not recognize such consent as valid consent). You can agree to be struck (in a boxing match) because such force is not serious bodily harm; and if unforeseeably serious bodily harm results, the consent defense is available. But if you ask a person to shoot you in the liver, they will be prosecuted for assault, because the resulting serious bodily harm is foreseeable. | Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo! | The laws on this will vary somewhat from state to state in the US. But in general, a person who convinces another to commit a murder might be convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, or accessory to murder. Being an accessory often carries the same penalties as being in principal, and in some jurisdictions there is no legal difference. In addition such a person might be charged with a violation of Federal law, specifically 18 USC 373 - Solicitation to commit a crime of violence. Subsection (a) provides that: (a) Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, solicits, commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such conduct, shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) fined not more than one-half of the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the crime solicited, or both; or if the crime solicited is punishable by life imprisonment or death, shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty years. In US law charges of "incitement" are limited by the "imminent lawless action" test laid down in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) The court opion in that case states: the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. This case held that a person may not be convicted of crime for speech advocating violence unless the advocacy is for immediate, present violence, or at least violence in the very near future, and there there must be significant likelihood of the violence actually occurring. This test has mostly been used in cases of public advocacy of violence to groups or crowds, but nothing prevents it from begin used in cases of one-on-one advocacy. See also the Wikipedia article "Incitement". I have not researched the specific charges in the Manson case. |
Can you be guaranteed a free lawyer to manage a trust fund dispute? I believe there is a trust in my name which I should have access to, but the trustee won’t transfer me the money. I’d like a lawyer to help me understand my rights better, but I called my free local legal counselling and they said they don’t do trust funds. It seems ironic that I can’t afford the lawyer that could make the case for me to get my money. Is there any law guaranteeing me my right to dispute the management of my trust in a court of law? How can I get the legal expertise I may need, in order possibly to exercise my right? | united-states You may be confusing the right to an attorney if you cannot afford one that is applicable only in CRIMINAL cases, not civil cases like you are discussing. You may be able to get an attorney to take your case on a contingency basis but there are two things to keep in mind: The attorney has to have some expectation that the case is winnable. The amount to be recovered must be worth the risk of taking on this case. In other words, for the attorney it's more of a business question that a legal one. Many attorneys will give you a free 30 minute, more or less, consultation. Perhaps you might give that a try. | Attorneys are universally required to tell the truth at all times and generally, they do. They are not allowed to lie on behalf of their clients or themselves. This doesn't mean that someone else's attorney necessarily has your best interests at heart. And, attorneys can, for example, fail to mention options that exist, but might not be the best for the attorney's client. Also, if an attorney's client lies to him or her about the facts, the attorney could conceivably say something inaccurate while believing it to be true. In the kind of meeting you are describing, however, most likely, the attorneys are simply going to explain your parents' estate plan, over which you have no control or say in any case, and there is no reason for suspicion or paranoia. | Suing them and winning may not be that difficult, and you can generally sue a business even if it ceases to operate as a going concern. Collecting the judgment you win, however, is likely to be very difficult. Still if you are going to sue, the sooner the better, because outside of bankruptcy, the general rule is that the person who is first in time to actually seize the available assets of a company with more debts than assets is first in right to those assets. Also a squeaky wheel is often the one that gets the grease. "Shaming" companies on social media often works for going concerns, but is rarely effective when a company is actually going out of business soon. There are special remedies available against recipients of improperly diverted funds when funds are deliberately sucked out of the organization without receiving anything in exchange for its money (this is called a "fraudulent transfer"), but those cases are expensive to bring and hard to prove. Often in the case of a legitimately failing business, operating losses and not improper diversion of funds from the company, is the reason that it doesn't have enough money to pay all of its debts in full, so this remedy is not available. Winning a lawsuit simply gives you a piece of paper stating that the defendant owes you money which you can then use to seize money and property from the defendant and/or people who owe the defendant money, if you can find either of those things. But, you can't get blood out of a turnip, and the alternative formal collection mechanism (forcing an involuntary bankruptcy) requires the coordination of multiple significant creditors and may not provide much better results if the company has genuinely run out of money, although unpaid wages are often entitled to priority in bankruptcy up to a certain dollar amount which is a preference that is not generally available outside of bankruptcy court. There are sometimes laws that can be invoked to hold people affiliated with the management of a defunct business personally responsible for unpaid wages (sometimes the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and sometimes state wage claim acts). And, very rarely in egregious cases that affect lots of people where there was an intent to stiff you before you finished earning new wages at the company, a local or state prosecutor will prosecute a company or its officers for "wage theft". Finally, "freelancers" often have far fewer rights in efforts to collect wages than true employees, so a mere independent contractor is in a weaker position and should consider that fact when deciding whether or not to settle. Bottom line: consider seriously accepting a settlement because the cost of collection and the unavailability of assets to collect from once it goes out of business may make a bird in the hand worth more than two in the bush. | If what you show is correct and above-board then you are being sued in superior court. However it sounds unlikely that the plaintiff could have served you with notice of such a lawsuit without you realizing it, so if I were you I would first call the court to see if they do in fact have a case with the docket number listed. Then ask: When and who served the original notice in the case (because if you really didn't get it then whoever said you did majorly screwed up and is probably in trouble) Who the plaintiff's counsel is If the letter was from a real lawyer on the California Bar, and that case really is open in the superior court with you as a defendant, then you really are being sued, and you should either get a lawyer or negotiate a settlement, because if you don't answer and defend then you're just going to have more judgments against you. If any of the above does not check out then whoever sent that letter is in big trouble if you report it to the DA, postal inspector, and (if they are a real lawyer) the Bar. | There are two basic problems with your theory: You say: can't one accept a case on contingency and "as time permits," so that in such an event one would simply drop the contingency case (or, if it looked promising, hand it off to some other lawyer in a slump)? No. you can't. If you take a case, then drop it because a more profitable case comes along, you might well be disbarred, not to mention sued by the client you just threw over. You might even spend a night in jail for contempt--in many cases, you are not allowed to simply drop a case without the court's permission. So if you accept a contingency case, you accept it until (1) the case is over, (2) the client fires you, (3) you, the client, and the judge all agree you can quit, or (4) you can convince the judge you should be allowed to quit regardless of the client's wishes. Until then, you are stuck with the time and expense involved with handling the case. "Expense" is the second problem. You seem to be under the impression that once you've paid for the office and the coffee maker, there's no downside in pursuing a contingency case. But filing and pursuing a lawsuit cost money, not just time. Copying and coding documents costs money. Stenographers for depositions cost money. Just filing a lawsuit often costs a few hundred dollars. Hell, in a major lawsuit, you will probably spend a few hundred dollars just on postage. And a lot of commercial litigation now involves expert witnesses, whose fees start at a few hundred dollars an hour. Normally that all gets billed back to the client, but on a contingency case the lawyer often absorbs most or all of it. So from a lawyer's perspective, even if he or she is not working right now, "any positive payout" isn't enough. It has to be enough of a payout, and enough of a chance of winning, that the expected reward is worth paying, potentially, the cost of a trial, and forgoing other work if things get busy again while you're trying to prep your contingency case for trial. The fact is, for a lot of this sort of case--even if it looks "potentially profitable" to a non-lawyer--is going to be less profitable, in the long run, than spending the same amount of time playing golf with people who might actually pay you by the hour to do something. Also, two quick notes: Your suggestion of raising the contingency up to 100%, or close to it, won't help--it's illegal in many jurisdictions, and unethical in all of them. As a side note, even if a lawyer did take one of these cases, it wouldn't do you any good, since lawyers are prohibited in most cases from splitting their fees with non-lawyers. | You can hire someone to locate the defendant with the information that you have, or you can apply to a court for permission to serve them with process via "substituted service" because their physical address can't be determined. But, in general, better business practice is to not enter into contracts with people with whom you have more than a name that might be false, and an email address, unless you have some means of non-judicial enforcement of your agreement (like the practical ability to shut down access to an internet subscription). If you don't even know if someone's name is real and have done nothing to confirm that then you also have no assurances that they have any assets from which you could collect if you won a breach of contract lawsuit. If you deal with large numbers of people in low value contracts, it may be worth treating the fact that some contracts are effectively unenforceable as a cost of doing business. But, if a contract is important, it was foolish from a business perspective to rely on a contract on that basis alone, even if it is legal to do so. | Barristers are advocates, and their other roles fall out of that core role. I think of it this way: your solicitor takes care of your legal risk; your barrister is the 'big gun' you bring in for specific important legal advice and to represent you in person. I'll give you my experience from the perspective of working in a large government agency. For us, 'barrister' often equates to 'Queen's Counsel' (now called 'Senior Counsel'), which is a particularly senior barrister. I am also speaking from Australia. We have the same split profession as the UK, but there are probably differences. You generally don't stop using a solicitor and start using a barrister. Rather, you have a solicitor the whole way through and then you engage a barrister through your solicitor. You can engage a barrister directly, e.g. if you have in-house counsel, but it is not common to do so. Even if you have in-house counsel, you will usually engage more specialised external solicitors to handle litigation. The barrister's role is generally to (1) provide advice on specific issues (after the solicitors have sifted the evidence and provided a brief to the barrister) including advising on your prospects in particular litigation and (2) represent you in court i.e. write submissions and speak to the court. It is not uncommon to have a barristers represent you in proceedings other than a trial (if you have the financial resources to afford a barrister). For example, a barrister may represent you in mediation or may accompany you to an examination by some regulatory authority. (Furthermore, a regulatory authority may even hire a barrister to question you, since barristers are often good at that based on their in-court role; or you and the party you are having a dispute with might appoint a barrister as the arbitrator or mediator.) You may have a barrister you prefer to use; more likely, however, your solicitor would know barristers and would recommend an appropriate one. Barristers are specialised so you would use a different barrister for a tax dispute, contractual dispute, employee dispute, etc. An organisation large enough to sustain constant legal disputes would have a number of barristers that it would go to as and when they were needed, on the basis of their particular skills and availability. There is no such thing as a firm of barristers. Each barrister is independent. A barrister's office will be in 'chambers', which is an organisation that leases office space and hires clerks to manage member barristers' business. But the barristers in a chambers are not in business together as members of a firm of solicitors are. Barristers are proud of their independence, and they all want to be appointed as judges so they have to appear impartial. To further illustrate how you might use a barrister: sometimes you get legal advice from a barrister and you cannot read the advice. You can see the words but it's gibberish. Your solicitor will interpret it for you. | Yes that seems to be the case. The section after the one you quoted, 551:11 Share of Unnamed Child says: If the property not devised nor bequeathed shall be insufficient to satisfy the just share of such child, after allowing advancements received by him, the same shall be made up in just proportion from the property devised or bequeathed to others. The page "Can I Disinherit My Child?" from a law firm blog, says: New Hampshire has a strong policy of protecting “pretermitted heirs,” which are heirs that were not mentioned in a Will. N.H. R.S.A 551:10 states that [e]very child born after the decease of the testator, and every child or issue of a child of the deceased not named or referred to in his will, and who is not a devisee or legatee, shall be entitled to the same portion of the estate, real and personal, as he would be if the deceased were intestate. Simply put, you do not name or refer to your child in the Will, then he can claim an inheritance as if you died without a Will. Historically and currently, the rationale is that if you did not mention him anywhere in your Will, you most likely forgot about him, because it is human nature to forget things. However that same blog page also says: There are various ways to disinherit a child. The most often used method is to specifically name or refer to the child, or a class, such as “my children” or “my son, Alex, and his issue,” that you intend to disinherit, and you must then state that you intend to disinherit that child. Another way to disinherit a child is to state that you give that particular child one (1) dollar, or a small sum of money. So it would seem that if one chose to include language such as: I leave to any other children I might have, and to their issue, if any, the sum of $10, jointly. then such possible surprises are covered. This would be after mentioning specifically any children one wanted to leave larger amounts to. |
Is a lawyer allowed to point an unloaded gun at the jury, if it's just for a demonstration? I understand that sometimes arms have factual bearing on cases and have to be entered into evidence but how anyone managed to point a gun at a jury and not get rugby tackled by a bailiff is beyond me. Pointing a gun is in essence threatening someone to me. Should pointing a gun at a jury not be considered intimidation and hence then also be a chargeable offence? It is just incredible to me that such an act was allowed to happen I'm also wondering what sort of effect this kind of stunt can have with your standing with the Bar. If this sort of thing can have a lawyer lose his license? | I think you're referring to this image: This is the prosecutor pointing the AR-15 at the jury. Evidence, including guns, is allowed in the courtroom, but the prosecutor was widely criticized for his dramatic antics: pointing it directly at the jury, with his finger on the trigger (the rifle should have been checked for being empty, but not having your finger on the trigger unless you intend to shoot, no matter what, is elementary gun safety). | There is no such law mandating this layout, nor is there any law permitting the defendant to demand a change to it. The arrangement seems most likely to have been driven by security concerns when courts began removing "the dock" and letting the defendant past the bar to sit with his attorneys. One court has also concluded that it was meant to assist the government "because it bears the burden of proof." It's of course impossible to prove a negative like this, but I'll note that Kenneth Lay's attorneys raised the issue in the Enron case, and they were unable to cite a single case saying that the defendant has the option to sit closer to the jury. If they couldn't find it, it probably doesn't exist. Meanwhile, the government was able to find several cases saying that the defendant does not have the right to demand a change, though it did not have any cases saying that the layout is mandatory. Instead, it described itself as "traditionally" having a right to the table. In that case, the judge ended up splitting the baby. Saying that there was "no law" to inform his decision, he sat the government next to the jury during its case, and it sat the defense next to the jury during its case. That was quite a bit more generous than the Seventh Circuit, which has rejected the jury-proximity argument as frivolous. So there are some cases addressing the issue, but I don't know of any case where a court has actually looked at the issue and given any real consideration to the due-process implications of the substantial empirical evidence suggesting that the party closest to the jury enjoys an advantage. | In Spain, most traffic offenses are usually considered administrative sanctions and involve just a relatively small fine, and perhaps losing some points in your licence. In those cases, if the driver if the vehicle cannot be established (your example, or a far regular one of a parking violation in which the officer did not see who did park it and will not wait by the side of the parker until the driver appears), the fine just goes to the registered owner. When the fine is reported to the registered owner of the vehicle, he can report who was the actual driver who broke the law at the time of the offense. I do not know what would happen if the person named does not recognize his responsability, but my guess is that the owner has to pay the fine (HINT: do not lend your car to someone who cannot be trusted). If the infraction is so excessive that it becomes a matter of penal law then there must be a trial and then the accused must be established without reasonable doubt, so in that case such a stunt maybe could work. | I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario. | Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification. | The citation could be written but it should be easy to beat. In the circumstance that you describe the accused could just say the he was not driving his car at the time. If the prosecution is a sham with all your friends saying you all saw this thing, then the defendant can bring all of his friends to say that he was at some other place. The benefit to having a cop on the scene is that the cop will get ID and positive identification. The other thing the cop has is expert judgment. If a cop sees unsafe lane movement and writes a ticket, his testimony in court carries more weight than the "it was not unsafe!" testimony of the accused. Keep in mind, getting all of your witnesses to court on the same day, after continuances and other delays, and getting them all to tell the same story to overcome the presumption of innocence is no small feat. All that to say, it's easier with police as witness. There are two mechanisms which could get you where you want to go. Private prosecution and citizen's arrest. Private prosecutions are a part of history but not strictly unavailable at the state level. You could write up some charging documents to see if you can get your target indicted. Citizen's arrest is interesting because the rules are fairly unclear unless governed by a specific statute. There are two necessary parts of citizens arrest and the first part gets the attention. The first part is the detention (arrest). The crimes for which a citizen can legally detain a suspect are likely defined by state statute. The second part is giving testimony about the witnessed crime. Let's assume that you see a felony happen and watch the perp walk into a gas station bathroom. You are prepared to arrest, do part number one, and then call the cops, to do part number two. But while you wait for the guy to come out of the bathroom a cop walks up. You explain the felony and the cop goes into the bathroom and arrests the guy. It's purely witness testimony that led to the arrest and the indictment (physical evidence - let's say there is none) and even the trial. You successfully get the guy indicted and when you show up to testify you tell the story as you witnessed it. Now the accused gets to take the stand. When he takes the stand he says, "it was the other guy." When asked, "what other guy?" He says, "I was in the bathroom and a guy ran in and went into the stall. Then a cop came in and arrested me." Reasonable doubt right there. How much more if it's a bunch of friends ratting on some lone driver? Police need evidence. Prosecutors need evidence. Judges need evidence. | There is no answer to the question, as presented. The criminal law differs in various respects in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland: one cannot speak of 'UK law', because criminal procedure is really very different in the three separate jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the rules of criminal procedure are what govern the issue raised in the question, rather than the substantive laws relating to the various charges which might be brought; and while the substantive laws in England and Scotland are often fairly similar, the procedures are usually very dissimilar. In a trial at the Old Bailey, in London, a Jury has no role in the criminal procedure: once empanelled it performs its usual function of deciding the facts of the case, based upon the evidence presented, but it has no role in determining what charges are preferred against the accused (this is decided by a different court at a much earlier procedural stage), and the jury has no power to alter the charges on the indictment. Only the prosecution can decide what charges are made against an accused person. And if an amendment to the indictment is thought to be appropriate, only the prosecuting barrister can make such a change. If the case has come-on for trial, the permission of the Judge must usually be obtained to any alteration in the charges. The Judge might object to an attempt to add a charge carrying a more severe penalty at a late stage in the proceedings (as the case may of course have already taken many months to reach the Old Bailey). He will often be more accommodating to an application to reduce the charges, to a lesser offence, particularly if accompanied by an undertaking not to proceed on a more serious charge - e.g. due to a lack of evidence supporting it. Where several charges are brought in the alternative, then the jury has a function, since it can then convict of a lesser charge if the evidence on a more serious one does not satisfy it. But it cannot ask for the charges to be altered: the jury represents the layman, and jurymen are inevitably not legally qualified (at one time, being legally qualified was an automatic disqualification from serving on a jury). So the jury is assumed to be incapable of understanding the fine distinctions between different offences, and has no role whatsoever in deciding which offences shall be included on the indictment. Even the Barrister representing the accused has no role in determining which charges his client will face: that is purely a function of the Crown Prosecutor's office, and once the trial has come-on at the Bailey only the prosecuting Barrister and the Judge truly have a role in making any necessary amendments. The function of defending Counsel is to strike a plea-bargain, if he can, and where the opportunity arises: which is to say, if he can persuade his client to plead guilty to a minor charge (whether or not on the indictment), and can also persuade the prosecutor not to proceed on the more serious charge(s) on the indictment. A Judge will not usually object to a legally-represented defendant applying, by consent (i.e. through the prosecutor), to amend the indictment in order to enter a plea of guilty. He might refuse, if the accused has no legal representation, but not otherwise. The short answer, therefore, is that in England and Wales a defendant cannot be convicted on a charge that is not listed on the indictment, but a jury can convict of any charge on the indictment if the judge asks the jury to retire and consider a verdict - but the case may not get so far as that, if a plea-bargain is struck. There are rare occasions where a judge might withdraw a charge, if he desires, by directing the jury to acquit on that particular charge, but this only occurs if he considers that any conviction on that charge would be positively unsafe in all the circumstances of the case. | If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear. |
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